The scientific status of natural selection as an explanation of evolution

Abstract

This work is aimed at showing that although natural selection does not satisfy the strict criteria for scientific explanation according to the so-called covering law theory, it meets some broader criteria for scientific explanation latent in the history of the actual practice of both natural and social sciences explicitly propounded in the methodological pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce. To the extent that it meets such criteria, I argue that to the same extent, natural selection is a scientific theory. Scientific inquiry was carried on long before logical positivism was born. While we acknowledge positive contribution to the economy and logical rigour on the part of the covering-law model, the functional comprehensiveness of scientific inquiry latent (even if not explicitly stated) in Peircean pragmatism cannot be over-looked.

The study explores the requirements o the covering-law theory which demands that, for any theory to quality as scientific, it must invoke a general law in addition to its premises being known to be true. These two requirements natural selection fails to meet. Consequently, it fails to qualify as scientific according to this criterion.

The covering-law theory presupposes the correspondence theory of truth. this theory does not either methodologically or epistemologically reflect the history of the actual practice of science which is exemplified in methodology, natural selection is scientific. The necessary conditions stipulated by the covering-law theory are, in consequence, merely contributory and not sufficient for scientific explanation. Scientific progress is accumulative. Therefore, I recommend that, first, one needs to re-examine one's ontological presuppositions before one rejects alternative approaches to scientific inquiry. Secondly, organic Darwinism whose inferences are illegitimately drawn from organic Darwinism leading to untenable conclusions and satisfying no plausible criterion of scientific explanations.

Scientific progress is accumulative. Therefore, I recommend that, first, one needs to re-examine one's ontological presuppositions before one rejects alternative approaches to scientific inquiry. Secondly, organic evolution Darwinism should not be confused with social Darwinism whose inferences are illegitimately drawn from organic Darwinism leading to untenable conclusions and satisfying no plausible criterion of scientific explanations.