

**COLLECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND
STABILIZATION OF THE EASTERN AFRICA
SUBREGION, 1990-2018**

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DECLARATION

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This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in any other University.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to all the gallant men and women I met during my tour of duty and to the esteemed leadership of the Kenya Defence Forces for offering me an invaluable opportunity to exploit my potential in pursuit of peace and security.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACCORD	African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AIMS	Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APF	Africa Peace Fund
APSA	Africa Peace and Security Architecture
AQ	Al Qaeda
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Maghreb Union
AS	Al Shaabab
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF	Africa Standby Force
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AU	African Union
AUC	Africa Union Commission
BINUB	UN Integrated Office in Burundi
BP	British Petroleum
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAR	Central Africa Republic
CBRN	Cyber and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERUs	Conflict Early Warning and Response Units
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CGPCS	Contact Group against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

CISSA	Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa
CNDD	Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie
COMESA	Common Market for East and Southern Africa
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
CPU	Child Protection Unit
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSIs	Collective Security Institutions
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CSSOs	Civil Service Support Offices
CTS	Critical Terrorism Studies
CTSAMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRMTAC	Disaster Risk Management Technical Advisory Committee
EAC CCS	East African Community Climate Change Strategy
EAC	East African Community
EACCCP	East Africa Community Climate Change Policy
EACM	East Africa Community Common Market
EAC-CCMP	East African Community Climate Change Master Plan
EACWARN	East Africa Community Conflict Warning System
EALA	East Africa Legislative Assembly
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EAPCCO	Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
EASBRIG	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
EASBRICOM	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism
EASF	East African Standby Force

EASFCOM	Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EMBs	Electoral Management Bodies
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EVP	Electoral Violence Protection
EWARN	Early Warning Network
EWS	Early Warning System
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FOC	Full Operational Capability
FOE	Friends of EASF
FPTP	First Past the Post
FSI	Fragile States Index
GCCA+	Global Climate Alliance Plus Program
GCTF	Global Counter Terrorism Forum
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HANDS	Humanitarian Action and Natural Disaster Support
HAP	Humanitarian Action Policy
HARDPD	Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division
HIPPO	High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

HoA	Horn of Africa
ICEPCVE	IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICPAC	IGAD Climate Prediction & Applications Centre
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Force in Somalia
IGOs	Intergovernmental Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IOs	International Organizations
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre
IPU	Inter Parliamentary Union
IRCCS	IGAD Regional Climate Change Strategy
IS	Islamic State
ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Program
KHRC	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KII	Key Informant Interviews
KRDC	Kenya Rapid Deployment Capability
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LoN	League of Nations

LVBC	Lake Victoria Basin Commission
LVMP	Lake Victoria Management Programme
MAPROBU	African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi
MERCOSUR	Mercado Comun Del Sur (The Common Market of the South)
MLG	Multi-Level Governance
MINUSMA	United Nations Multi-Dimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilization Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSU	Mediation Support Unit
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centres
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NSA	Non-State Actors
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLS	Ordinary Least Square
OSBP	One-Stop-Border-Post
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAP	Political Affairs Programme
PAPS	Political Affairs, Peace and Security
PCCs	Police Contributing Countries
PCRDR	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PF	Peace Fund
PMSCs	Private Military Security Companies
PoW	Panel of the Wise

PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
R - ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCCS	Regional Climate Change Strategy
RDC	Regional Deployment Capability
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RECSA	Regional Centre for Small Arms
REM	Random Effect Model
RJMEC	Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
RMs	Regional Mechanisms
ROEs	Rules of Engagement
RPAs	Regional Parliaments
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRF	EU Rapid Reaction Force
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SALWs	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SICB	Security Institutions Capacity Building
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SNA	Somali National Army
SNNPR	Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples Religion
SPLA	Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government

TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
UNTEAT	United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
VNSAs	Violent Non-State Actors
WB	World Bank
WIOR	Western Indian Ocean Region
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Collective Security: strategies, measures, plans and programmes made by a regional organization to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts or threats to peace and security within a specific region and member states.

Collective Security Institutions: organizations formed by member states for the maintenance of peace and security in a specific geographic entity to address security threats through strategic measures such as conflict prevention, management and resolution and long-term peace building.

Conflict management: efforts made by states and non-state actors towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones, of ongoing conflicts. More often conflicts are reduced, de-escalated, or contained through a reorientation of the issue or reconstitution of the divisions among conflicting parties.

Conflict prevention: mechanisms put in place in anticipation of conflict in order to address grievances that curtail relapse of conflict and perhaps resolve the conflict or prevent any escalations.

Conflict resolution: a variety of approaches aimed at resolving conflicts through the constructive solving of problems distinct from the management or transformation of conflict. Conflict resolution is multifaceted in that it refers to a process, an everyday engagement for people or members of a community.

Force generation: the mobilization of resources for a peace keeping operation including equipment and personnel.

Force multipliers and enablers: are those components that offer a combat unit a higher probability of success during an operation or a mission

Full operational capability: the ultimate state of preparedness of a force characterized by a well aligned system of resources and technologies that the user can deploy with effectiveness and efficiency.

National security: from the neorealism lens, it refers to the protection of territory and core values from foreign threats; it means a state of containment of perceived threats to the nation-state through legislative, institutional, policy and strategic interventions.

New world order: any new event in history that is evidenced by a dramatic change in world politics and that leads to a new ideological notion of globalized approach in the area of peace and security where collective efforts are deemed necessary in identifying, understanding and settling or resolving global challenges that are beyond the capacity of individual nation states.

Peace building: a corpus of policies, strategies, measures, plans and programs, and associated efforts to restore stability and the effectiveness of social, political, and economic institutions and structures in conflict affected areas. Peace

building generally aims to promote the conditions for a more just society through institutionalization of justice and freedom.

Peace enforcement: operations undertaken to end military or violent exchanges or acts of aggression, with or without the consent of one or more parties to the conflict, to create a permanent and viable environment and guarantee for such conditions.

Peacekeeping: maintenance of public security, civil services, and cease-fire agreements in war and conflict zones by UN or regional military, police, and civilian forces with the consent of the nation-state on whose territory these forces are deployed.

Regional security mechanism: a framework for pursuance of collective security interests by a group of states that are mutually interdependent.

Regional security: the maintenance of collective states security in a specific geographic entity through strategic measures such as conflict prevention, management and resolution and long-term peace building.

Stabilization: integrated multidimensional approaches; from security intervention, development initiatives and diplomatic actions; to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peacefully manage conflicts and prevent a resurgence of violence with the long-term objective of achieving sustainable peace and security, and to mitigate threats to the international community.

Subregion: refers to Eastern Africa which is composed of 14 countries as defined by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) *vide* Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

ABSTRACT

Despite the existence of Collective Security Institutions (CSIs), the Eastern Africa subregion still experiences resurgent and protracted conflicts and hosts over 4.6 million refugees and 6 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Between 2013-2020, over 28,000 fatalities were recorded in South Sudan and Somalia while in the last decade, terror attacks accounted for over 5,000 deaths in the subregion. The objectives of the study were to: establish contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion; analyze the extent to which Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East Africa Community (EAC) and Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) have managed the contemporary security threats; examine the extent of contribution of IGAD, EAC and EASF to conflict resolution in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi and assess the structural and institutional challenges facing the CSIs in pursuit of conflict resolution. The study was guided by Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism and Constructivism theories. A mixed methods research approach incorporating cross sectional survey and phenomenological research designs was adopted. The target population included 638 CSIs staff: IGAD (230), EAC (190), EASF (218) and 210 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) dealing with peace and conflict. The study sample size comprised 226 staff from the three CSIs, 21 CSO representatives and 138 beneficiaries. Proportionate stratified random sampling procedure was used to identify the sample of strategic, operational and tactical level staff of the CSIs while cluster and purposive sampling techniques were used to obtain CSOs representatives and beneficiaries. Questionnaires, interview schedules and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) guides were used to collect data from the CSIs' respondents, CSOs interviewees and FGD participants respectively. Content validity procedures were used to ensure instruments' validity while reliability was tested using Split-Half technique and Cronbach Alpha coefficient. Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics aided by SPSS (version 23) while thematic and content analysis were used for the qualitative data set. The study established that a myriad of contemporary security threats among them terrorism, electoral-induced violence, proliferation of SALWs, cybercrime and resource-based conflicts continue to evolve and lead to violent conflicts in the subregion. The three CSIs performed satisfactorily in conflict early warning, early response and capacity building elements of Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR). Moderate performance was reported in peace keeping and mediation while poor performance was reported in humanitarian intervention. The CSIs performed poorly in post conflict peace building owing to being under-resourced, existence of weak legal frameworks and impediments attributed to sovereignty concerns. Comparatively, IGAD CPMR rating was higher followed by EASF and EAC with IGAD outperforming the rest in conflict early warning (95%), early response (88%), mediation (72%), peace keeping (86%) and peace enforcement (68%). Under-investment in conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building greatly undermined CSIs' response to sub-regional conflicts. Structural and institutional challenges such as overlapping mandates, over reliance on donor funding and lack of political commitment to agreed treaties and protocols exist. The study recommends that sub-regional states designate IGAD as the CSI with the overall mandate for peace and security while EAC focuses on regional economic and political integration with EASF being primarily a military-heavy institution providing the security intervention dimension.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter provides the context of the research thesis and covers background information about Collective Security Institutions (CSIs) and stabilization of the Eastern Africa subregion. It highlights the problem statement, research objectives, research questions, justification, significance and scope of the study. It also presents assumptions as well as limitations and delimitations of the research.

This study looked at three CSIs: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East Africa Community (EAC) and Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), which are security entities comprising several member states within the Eastern Africa subregion and whose mandate entails pursuit of peace and security in their respective Areas of Responsibility (AORs). The CSIs are therefore analyzed as individual security arrangements.

1.1 Background to the Study

Threats to peace and security in the world and Africa remain a major source of concern despite the myriad of initiatives employed by global and sub-regional organizations to stem the tide. Though many studies have been carried out to identify the source, nature and dynamics of the threats, sustainable solutions still appear elusive. Considering the significance of peace and security to the well-being of mankind, the quest for effective global peace and security mechanisms is a worthwhile investment for scholars, policy makers and practitioners.

The search for sustainable peace and security across time and space has over the centuries been a preoccupation of leaders and scholars. The League of Nations (LoN) and the United Nations (UN) were founded on the ashes of the First and the Second World War respectively; where millions of lives were lost and properties destroyed. This means CSIs were recognized as one way of preventing or managing wars within and among states.

While the Cold War period (1945-1989) was characterized by rat race ideological and military competition of the superpowers of the day - the Soviet Union and the United States (US)- the post- Cold War era ushered in more intrastate conflicts in Africa, Central and Latin America, Asia and Europe (Graham, 2017). From 1990 to date, a period of multilateralism among powers has emerged, with a retreating US, a rising China and a military strong re-emerging Russia and other multiplicity of powers asserting themselves in the global scene such as the European Union (EU), India and Brazil (Barry and George, 2014). Neorealism associates multilateralism with anarchy in interstate relations and a higher likelihood of interstate conflicts (Graham, 2017). These conflicts remain the most conspicuous source of instability in the developing world, where Africa is.

Stabilization has not been defined by the UN, though a number of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandates provide for it (Gilder, 2021). UN stabilization missions are generally set to displace and deter armed groups and undertake peace building activities to entrench state authority and create state legitimacy. These actions, as Gilder (2021) avers, are intended to extend state authority, through robust use of force by UN troops and civilian-led peace building activities.

As a way of addressing intra and inter-state conflicts, the UN deployed the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) as the first peacekeeping force in Palestine and since then, use of deterrent forces as a buffer between belligerent forces became the mode of peacekeeping. This approach was limited in bringing sustainable peace among parties in conflict. With the global power political shifts at the end of the Cold War (1989 onwards), the earlier system was replaced by multi-dimensional peacekeeping. This has become the standard model of peacekeeping where the UN and other partners seek to enhance governance and security sector reforms to create a conducive environment for sustainable peace building. Stabilization, according to Karlsrud (2019), came to represent the military or peacekeeping element in the comprehensive UN peace support operations model.

As intra-state conflicts increased, the Western powers calling the shots at the UN were reluctant to fully commit to expensive multidimensional missions. They sought to limit UN peacekeeping to stabilization - that is bringing about ceasefire, supporting governance and creating a suitable environment for humanitarian agencies and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to support long term peacebuilding (Andersen, 2018). This approach is well demonstrated in the UN Stabilization Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). However, the approach faces multiple challenges related to ineffective responses to the needs of communities, failure to protect civilians and contain organized armed groups in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and terrorist groups in Mali. Informed by these trends, stabilization in this study is thus used as a comprehensive concept to include conflict prevention, management, resolution and post conflict peacebuilding.

Conceptualizing peace as freedom from fear and want, the UN as the custodian of global peace and security set the standards and trends for other regional organizations. It has continued to lead in the frontiers of peacekeeping and peacebuilding through its various specialized organs. The practice of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) was more pronounced after the Second World War, when the UN was formed. The establishment of the UN was to prevent mankind from falling into the future scourge of war which had twice devastated previous generations. In 1992, the UN redefined parameters of peacekeeping to include post conflict stabilization and reconstruction (UN, 1992). This change was brought about by the realization that countries relapsed into conflict as soon as the UN exited or completed its mandate in the conflicted areas. The need for creating a conducive environment for sustainable peace through democratic governance and respect for human rights in countries emerging from conflict was identified as an insurance against relapse to conflict. More importantly to this study was the recognition of CSIs as the panacea to the previous fragmented, rambling and individual state efforts that often collapsed in their pursuit for peace.

CSIs, also referred to as Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) in this study, are security institutions put in place to prevent and manage conflicts across the world. These include the North America Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which brings together United States of America (USA), Canada and Europe in security cooperation (Graham, 2017).

The establishment of OSCE in 1975 was said to be the first case of regional security partnership in international politics. This cooperation had been informed by the experiences of the First and Second World War in Europe. The need for such continental security cooperation became more important during the Cold War and during the Trans-Atlantic Alliance (TAA), occasioning formation of other CSIs such as NATO, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), EU Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) (Attina, 2020). Other CSIs include the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) (The Common Market of the South) in South America, Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) (Amer, 2011). For these organizations, initial agreements formed the legal basis for cooperation, such as the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the 1994 Chairman's statement of the first ASEAN Regional Conference. These organizations have evolved in response to the political, security, historical, socio-cultural and economic context of their regions.

CSIs such as the EU, NATO, Warsaw Pact, the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) (Soviet Union) and ASEAN among others were formed to advance collective security and development in their regions (Amer, 2011). Security challenges were identified and acknowledged and institutions/mechanisms to operationalize the agreements established to solidify security cooperation (Brookings, 2015). This comparative analysis provides lessons for the relatively nascent Eastern Africa CSIs which portray historical, legal, policy and institutional development. Such a different context offers insights into how the strategic environment and instruments interact to impact on CSIs' performance in CPMR and stabilization. This assisted the researcher in investigating all the relevant aspects of Eastern Africa subregion CSIs.

In Africa, intrastates conflicts increased after the Cold War (Kaplan, 1994). This period was characterized by an increased wave of democratization and the negative effects of economic stagnation owing to the burden of the 1980s international debts (Porto and Engel, 2013). Moreover, the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda genocide and the civil war in Liberia awoke Africa to the need for customizing solutions to Africa's problems based on the present assessment of the needs of Africa itself. This, therefore, led to reconfiguration of the mandates of regional CSIs to embrace a peace and security dimension. The establishment of CSIs was therefore the culmination of previous efforts by states to systematize and create institutionalized mechanisms for managing conflicts (Ottoh, 2017). Consequently, it became imperative for various regional organizations to add peace and security competencies to their mandates. The African Union (AU) and its RECs aim to create stable states and secured communities (Besada, 2016). This shift called for new laws, institutions, policies, strategies and plans. This study explored the implication of this development to CPMR and stabilization of the Eastern Africa subregion.

The reconfiguration of mandates of regional organizations to embrace peace and security resonates with provisions of the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 which seeks to refocus and reposition the continent as a key player, in among other fields, continental and regional integration, democratic governance and peace and security (AU, 2019). The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are closely linked to Africa' Union's Agenda 2063, which charts a strategic vision for a prosperous and peaceful Africa. Specifically, SDG Goal 16 seeks to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; on one hand and the AU strategy of 'Silencing the Guns' by 2020, on the other. The interdependence

between sustainable development and CPMR is more conspicuous in the African context (AU, 2014). The AU Agenda 2063 goals 13, 14 and 15 seek to promote stability through functional instruments of peace and security which are guided by the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (AU, 2019). This is in line with Goal 16 of the SDGs which advocates for peaceful inclusive societies built on effective and strong justice systems (UN, 2018).

Under the APSA framework, the AU is poised to place Africa towards the road of secured communities, accelerate political and economic integration, promote peace and security, good governance and protection of human rights (Victor *et al.*, 2018). Despite the contributions of the UN and OAU/AU, violent conflicts have continued to claim human lives, rendering many children destitute and sending millions out of their homelands as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees. The APSA offers renewed determination in commitment to regional security despite significant challenges. Peacebuilding and peacekeeping infrastructure continue to evolve through the strategic Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). Consequently, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have made fairly successful interventions when their respective regions faced conflicts (Byiers and Desmidt, 2016).

ECOWAS was formed in 1975 by 15 member states and just like the East African Community (EAC), it was more focused on economic integration and development. However as intra-state conflicts increased with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the organization added peace and security agenda within its focus. This was demonstrated

by adoption of the Non-Aggression Protocol of 1978 and peaceful settlement of disputes in which ECOWAS recognized the need for peaceful co-existence among states if economic development was to be realized. In 1981, ECOWAS put in place a Protocol Relating to the Mutual Assistance on Defence in case of aggression from outside the region or an internal conflict in one -member country supported by outside parties (GoN, 1991). A Peacekeeping Protocol was also established in 1999 thus providing a more comprehensive CPMR framework for the subregion.

According to AU (2020), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1992 as a successor to the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The transformation of SADCC into SADC redefined the basis of cooperation among member states, from a loose association into a legally binding arrangement. This formalized the intention to spearhead economic integration of the Southern Africa region and promote peace and security among other objectives as stipulated under article 5 of the Treaty establishing SADC. ECOWAS and SADC seem to be the most advanced CSIs in military capacity and record of peace enforcement in Africa as exemplified by their performance. For instance, ECOWAS sent peace enforcement contingents in Liberia and Sierra Leone, while SADC has intervened in DRC and in Lesotho.

The Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS) was formed in 1983 by the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States. It has the primary objective of promoting member states' economic and social development, improving people's living conditions and maintaining peace, security and stability. ECCAS has played a major role in assisting the Central Africa Republic (CAR) to defeat organized armed groups and build capacity in the country's security sector. This

has been approached through multiple strategies such as peace talks, mediation and peacekeeping (AU, 2020). Given the fragility of states in Central Africa and the proliferation of organized armed groups, the ECCAS has faced multiple challenges in conflict resolution and managing conflicts in the region.

The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was established under the Marrakech Treaty of 1989 with the primary purpose of strengthening ties between the five member states (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), promoting prosperity, defending national rights and adopting common policies to promote free movement of people, services, goods and capital within the region (AU, 2020). Both ECCAS and AMU face similar challenges to the CSIs in Eastern Africa such as complex security threats and low institutional capacity. The analysis of various RECs /RMs under the APSA provided a basis for the present study in gauging performance of CSIs in Eastern Africa.

The CSIs in the Eastern Africa subregion have had to deal with interstate and intrastate conflicts, terrorism, foreign interventions, piracy and electoral violence that have put a strain on the development of strong regional peace and security mechanisms (Kahombo, 2018). There have also been security challenges brought about by spread of small arms, influx of refugees, drought and environmental degradation as well as humanitarian crises. These challenges transcend state borders thus calling for a regional approach (Soest and De Juan, 2018). The magnitude of these threats, against an already fragile conflict system, points to the lack of or inadequate capacity and capabilities of CSIs in mitigating and addressing security challenges.

The early 1990s witnessed the collapse of Somalia after the exit of Siad Barre and the ensuing destructive civil war. Early efforts by the UN and USA to mitigate the conflict were unsuccessful due to the intransigence of warlords. In 2006, when Ethiopia

intervened, the conflict assumed a religious dimension and the *Al Shabaab* terror group emerged as a critical obstacle to stability in Somalia (Hassan, 2018). The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) entered the scene in 2007 and has since made considerable efforts to pacify rebels though with mixed results. Through the technical assistance of the UN and other development partners, Somalia has gradually improved the capacity of its federal government (Safia, 2018). However, elections have been delayed creating uncertainty in the political system (ICG, 2021). These challenges transcend state borders and hence require a regional approach. In response, therefore, the Eastern Africa subregion has witnessed successful peacemaking efforts at various levels through IGAD and EAC (Peace and Security Report, 2019). According to Arthur (2017), the peace and security mechanism which is premised on APSA, is built on the foundations of two RECs (IGAD and EAC) and the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), which Jacobsen and Johannes (2012) refer to as a RM.

In the Eastern Africa context, IGAD and EAC began as regional integration bodies but the demand for peace and security saw them redesign their mandates to incorporate peace and security. This was as a result of a rise in insecurity (Tadese, 2019). IGAD (comprising seven member states viz Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda) is the successor to Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) founded in 1996 with a focus on mitigating drought and desertification. The IGAD peace and security mandate is drawn from Article 18 (A) of the Agreement Establishing IGAD which outlines essential collective conflict resolution measures and mechanisms of cooperation that member states should undertake to eliminate threats to regional cooperation and to preserve peace, security and stability in the subregion. All IGAD interventions seek to achieve peace, security and prosperity in line with the Africa Union Commission (AUC) strategy (AU, 2017).

IGAD's pursuit of its peace and security objectives through collective action has an implication on the Authority's relations with other stakeholders, especially the AU and other security actors that have similar security mandates in the subregion.

The EAC, a sub-regional intergovernmental organization with seven partner states (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda) and which is guided by its 2000 Treaty traces its origin to the former EAC which operated between 1967-1977. However, the major global events of the 1990s such as the economic crises and the resultant globalization effects influenced the revitalization of the current EAC in 1999, with a mandate to widen and deepen cooperation among partner states in political, economic and social spheres (AU, 2020).

The EAC mandate in peace and security which is enshrined in Article 124 of the 1999 EAC Treaty underscores the centrality of peace and security through preventing, managing and resolving conflicts as a means to attaining peace and security. This is founded on the principle of enhancement and strengthening of endeavours to promote peace, security and stability within and among EAC member states (EAC Treaty, 1999). Despite the expanded EAC mandate that incorporates peace and security, the Eastern Africa subregion remains unstable thus motivating the conduct of the present study.

The formation of EASF was informed by the need for a sub-regional force to serve as Eastern Africa's standby component for the Africa Standby Force (ASF) as provided for by the APSA. The RM comprises ten active member states (Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) and has a mandate for timely response to maintenance of peace, security and stability in the Eastern Africa region through conflict prevention, management and resolution (EASF Agreement, 2014). The CSI was established in 2004 originally as the Eastern Africa

Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and as a RM under the ASF within the APSA structure (EASF, 2020). Initially, IGAD was temporarily charged with the responsibility of establishing and coordinating operationalization of EASBRIG under the auspices of the AU (Bayeh, 2015). However, the membership of EASBRIG spread beyond the IGAD region and extended to the Indian Ocean islands of Seychelles and Comoros including Rwanda and Burundi who are not members of IGAD. Consequently, the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) was established in 2007 and took over coordination of EASBRIG from IGAD (Robinson, 2014). In 2010, EASBRICOM was renamed Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM) and EASBRIG changed to East African Standby Force (EASF), to reflect the multidimensional nature of contemporary structures bringing together military, police and civilian components (EASF, 2020).

As a regional peace and security mechanism for peace support operations in Eastern Africa, the EASF is mandated to carry out preventive diplomacy through rapid deployment of forces under six deployment scenarios and in conformity with Articles 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act (2002). In addition, as provided for by the protocol establishing the AU PSC and the Agreement establishing the EASF, the EASF as part of the ASF is to perform actions related to peacebuilding including disarmament, demobilization and provision of humanitarian assistance (EASF Agreement, 2014). Thus, as a regional force, the EASF is expected to augment efforts of other agencies such as the UN and other international organizations, with the aim of becoming an active player within the APSA framework and thereby contributing to regional integration as well as sub-regional and continental peace (Gardner and El Bushra, 2016).

The CSIs' framework in Eastern Africa reflects the diverse norms, cultural, structural and institutional characteristics. To mitigate security threats and conflicts, the CSIs have embraced a myriad of strategies and approaches, among them being CPMR which has metamorphosed to include the current concept of peace building (Tadesse, 2019). This offers a wider conceptual lens for the researcher to employ in evaluating the performance of CSIs. In spite of these mechanisms, empirical evidence indicates that the region still faces a myriad of security threats (Byiers and Desmidt, 2016). A critical analysis of the CSIs with a view to determining the extent to which the institutions managed contemporary security threats and mitigated conflicts in the subregion forms the basis of this study.

In pursuit of regional stability, member states of the respective CSIs under study have made financial commitments to fund peace and security activities. For instance, besides member states' commitment to the AU Peace Fund as per provisions of Article 21 of the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the annual peace and security implementation budget for IGAD stood at 0.01% of the total member states' annual GDP (IGAD Regional Strategy Implementation Plan 2016-2020; Trading Economic, 2020). In reference to the EAC, each Partner State makes an annual assessed contribution of USD 8 million to the CSI. This amounts to approximately 0.02% of the total member states' annual GDP (Trading Economic, 2020). With regard to the EASF, member states' commitment through assessed contributions from 2019 to 2021 averaged 0.02% of the member states' overall annual GDP (EASF Members States Assessed Contributions for 2019-2021; Trading Economic, 2020).

Arising from this scenario, though IGAD, EAC and EASF have mandates that seek to stabilize Eastern Africa and that respective member states have committed to achievement of peace and security objectives through ratification of treaties and financial contributions to CSI kitties. The subregion still faces several security and conflict challenges foregrounded by persistent, endemic and sporadic as well as morphed conflicts and insecurities. Building on these observations, the study comprehensively examined contributions of these institutions in CPMR and their achievements and constraints towards achieving their security mandates. The performance of CSIs is better understood through structural and institutional factors and Africa's geo-strategic position in global politics.

This background information has demonstrated the existence of CSIs that have over time been created, reconfigured and/or deepened their peace and security functions with a view of addressing/mitigating contemporary, existing and evolving security threats. Sub-regionally, despite the expansion of security mandates of IGAD and EAC, and the creation of a new RM (EASF) under the APSA framework, member states continue to experience violent conflicts that threaten regional stability. It is against this backdrop that this study analyzed effectiveness of collective security institutions on conflict resolution in the context of the Eastern Africa subregion.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Eastern Africa subregion continues to be one of the most unstable parts of the world ridden with resurgent and protracted conflicts and a host of security threats. Although IGAD, EAC and EASF have been established with peace and security mandates and are buoyed by member states' commitment to conflict resolution, the subregion remains highly volatile and is host to more than 4.6 million refugees and 6 million IDPs

(UNHCR, 2020). Thus, despite the investment by regional states demonstrated by the contribution of approximately 0.042 % of their overall GDP to CSIs kitties and extant treaties for peace mechanisms in the region, violent conflicts are evident in the subregion occasioning a series of fatalities. For instance, South Sudan registered a total of 26,856 deaths between 2013 and 2020. In Somalia, between 2018 and 2020, inter-clan rivalry and *Al Shabaab* revenge killings alone accounted for 1,154 fatalities (Moyer and Schunemann, 2020). Moreover, between 2004-2014, the subregion experienced over 5,000 fatalities from frequent terror attacks (Somalia 2996, Kenya 816, Ethiopia 213, South Sudan 681, Uganda 468, Tanzania 12 and Djibouti 5) (Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (2016).

In addition, most countries in the subregion not only rank high in the states' fragility index but also very low in the UNDP global human development index (UNDP, 2020). With frequent insecurity and conflicts, the subregion may continue experiencing human security and huge development challenges. Ultimately, this may momentarily compromise achievement of the aspirations of SDGs and the AU Agenda 2063.

Though CSIs have been hailed as the panacea for peace in conflicted contexts, anecdotal evidence points to incoherence among the Eastern Africa sub-regional CSIs in addressing conflict and security concerns. There appears to be low capacity for state and inter-state resilience in CPMR. At the same time, deficits exist in the subregion's potency characterized by poor environment for achievement of development goals, low level of human rights protection and inadequate capacity to prevent, manage and resolve intra and inter-state conflicts. This has created a region of high levels of disintegration, low mutual trust and collaboration among states. Past studies have focused on individual CSIs, their operations and contributions in specific countries (see

Oluoch, 2015: Hassan, 2017: Mshomba, 2017: Woldearegay et al., 2019 and Nyombe, 2019). However, there remains a dearth of knowledge on the CSIs collective performance in the subregion with respect to their initiatives, approaches, coordination and synergy. Therefore, this study sought to unravel the dynamics affecting the Eastern Africa CSIs in their mandates of achieving regional peace and security.

1.3 General Objective

The general objective of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of regional collective security institutions (IGAD, EAC and EASF) in conflict resolution.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- i. Establish contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion.
- ii. Analyze the extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF have managed contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion.
- iii. Examine the extent of contribution of IGAD, EAC and EASF to conflict resolution in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi.
- iv. Assess structural and institutional challenges facing IGAD, EAC and EASF in pursuit of conflict resolution in the subregion.

1.5 Research Questions

The following questions guided this study:

- i. What are the contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion?

- ii. How has IGAD, EAC and EASF managed contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion?
- iii. To what extent has IGAD, EAC and EASF contributed to conflict resolution in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi?
- iv. In what ways are structural and institutional challenges affecting IGAD, EAC and EASF in pursuit of conflict resolution?

1.6 Assumptions of the Study

- i. IGAD, EAC and EASF as collective security mechanisms implement strategies, policies, plans and programmes to address contemporary security threats and challenges in the Eastern Africa subregion.
- ii. IGAD, EAC and EASF have capacity to address conflict resolution in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi.

1.7 Justification and Significance of the Study

In a subregion that is highly conflicted like Eastern Africa, effective management of contemporary security threats is a prerequisite for social, political and economic development. IGAD, EAC and EASF were formed with a view to effectively manage security threats and reduce related conflicts both in the short and long term in order to contribute to sustainable development (Khayre, 2016). However, statistics indicate that more than 60% of the highly violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa took place in the Eastern Africa subregion. Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi all featured as countries with high intensity violent conflicts, with Burundi registering a sharp increase in violence in 2015 (Heidelberg Conflict Barometer (HCB) (2015).

In addition, most countries in the subregion not only rank high in states' fragility index but also very low in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) global Human Development Index (Fund for Peace, 2020). Specifically, Kenya is ranked 143, Uganda 159, Rwanda 160, Tanzania 163, Ethiopia 173, Burundi 185 and South Sudan 185 while data for Somalia was not available in the human development index (UNDP, 2020). This poor performance is associated with slow economic growth and development partly caused by sporadic and ongoing conflicts (Mkwanzani, 2018).

The ability of African RECs in effectively preventing, managing and resolving conflicts has been a long-drawn debate (Mgaya, 1986; RECSA, 2015). To date their effectiveness even after the establishment of the APSA remains obscure. Given the political capital invested in the APSA, academic and security practitioners' commitment to realize an effective conflict resolution mechanism in the continent, this research work is an addition to studies that seek to place the subregion on a sound footing in the search for durable and effective CPMR mechanisms as conflicts continue to take a high toll on human lives and property in Eastern Africa.

This study selected the most vulnerable countries based on the Fragile States Index (FSI) of 2020 (The Fund for Peace, 2020) where Burundi was ranked number 12, South Sudan 3rd and Somalia 2nd after Yemen, as the most fragile country in the world. These countries have had a history of prolonged violent conflicts. Somalia has been in conflict since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in the 90s and international interventions had not been fruitful until IGAD spearheaded the Somali peace process in the year 2002. The same situation unfolds for South Sudan which slid into anarchy in the year 2013 and Burundi which has had a prolonged history of violent conflicts; with the latest being related to the contested 2015 electoral process and the attempted coup.

In addition, the years preceding 2018 define a period when piracy and terrorism peaked in Kenya with a series of terror attacks that go back to the 2013 Westgate Mall shooting, the 2014 Mpeketoni attacks, the 2014 Mandera bus attack and 2015 Garissa University attack among others. An increase in terror attacks in the subregion elicited a number of concerns on the role of regional collective mechanisms in managing contemporary security threats. An examination of the trajectory of contemporary security threats and the ability of CSIs in conflict resolution in the Eastern Africa subregion was critical.

The study's significance is entrenched in its proposition for a coherent framework for enhancing collective security in a subregion that continues to grapple with a multiplicity of security challenges including ethnic and clan-based conflicts, environmental degradation and climate change, terrorism and border disputes. This study may have value for academic researchers, policy makers and peace and security practitioners with interests in regional security, CPMR and peacebuilding owing to the issues analyzed. The study has explored application of theories to practical conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It has shed more light on how the APSA framework and RECs/RMs are relating amidst geo-strategic transformations to determine the course of CPMR.

The study may also benefit the private sector whose members seek to understand stability conditions of states in order to make informed investment decisions. Ordinary citizens and business communities may also find use for the findings as they seek to understand the value of collective security and regional cooperation for their security, tourism and cross-border trade. The diplomatic community, the UN, humanitarian organizations, local and international NGOs may also gain insights on the status of CSIs since they work together in conflict situations.

Other CSIs in Africa and the rest of the world, researchers, peace and security students and practitioners need to know and learn from the current dynamics of regional threats and conflict prevention, management and resolution practices and the performance of CSIs. Findings of this study will contribute to a better understanding of regional performance in conflict resolution particularly in Eastern Africa and local theorization perspectives in security and peace building. Unveiling the performance of IGAD, EAC and EASF in Somalia, Burundi and South Sudan can inform the global efforts of managing conflicts in fragile states, more so given challenges encountered in past attempts. This may be beneficial specifically to peace and security experts and policy makers in crafting strategies for CPMR in fragile states not only in Eastern Africa but the world over.

1.8 Scope of the Study

1.8.1 Thematic Scope

The study focused on analysis of contemporary security threats and the regional conflict resolution frameworks in place, as could be discerned through operations and performance of IGAD, EAC and EASF. It focused on the collective security aspects of RECs/ RMs in terms of implementation of activities and plans, policies, strategies, legal framework, coordination and harmonization.

1.8.2 Geographic Scope

The study covered Eastern Africa which was contextualized to comprise the Horn of Africa (HoA) and parts of the Great Lakes region. The region covers member states of IGAD, EAC and EASF. The specific contribution of CSIs in the fragile states of Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi was also analyzed further grounding their performance in situations of protracted and ongoing conflicts.

1.8.3 Time Frame and its Significance

The period 1990-2018 covers the post-Cold War period that was characterized by an unstable international world order. During this period, most countries in Africa and the Eastern part of Europe became victims of the Cold War ideological divide. Countries within this constellation internally crumbled and redefined their national identity and territory (Barry and Ole Waever, 2003). The period under study witnessed the birth of new nations such as South Sudan and Eritrea, state failure in Somalia, fall of dictatorial regimes supported by global powers in former Zaire and Ethiopia and violent conflicts and genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia (Graham, 2017). With the retreat of global powers explained earlier, regional CSIs were jolted by the seismic changes to redefine their role.

1.9 Limitations and Delimitations

The wide geographical spread of the research area and the varying ages of the three CSIs limited the study from carrying out a full comparative analysis of the performance of the institutions. This was compounded by the disparity in peace and security engagements in the subregion considering the three CSIs operated in different contexts.

The researcher faced the challenge of sensitivity of information regarding security and this prevented some respondents from openly sharing details about events and happenings especially those related to terrorism, radicalization, weak governance and marginalization. In addition, some respondents were hesitant to discuss matters related to ethnic and clan-based conflicts and cattle rustling for fear of being reprimanded by fellow community members despite having reassured respondents that participation in the research would not occasion them any harm.

The study delimited itself to 1990 to 2018 as the period under review despite acknowledging the diverse periods in which CSIs were formed and changed overtime. This period was considered appropriate due to significant global and sub-regional peace and security shifts that affected CSIs. In addition, the three theoretical lenses employed were necessary to cover the aspects of CSIs under study. However, these theories were developed in regions with different security terrains. The theories were tested and refined in different studies and regions. All aspects of these developments and trends might not have been captured in the study and this may have curtailed optimal intellectual illumination of the dynamics determining effectiveness of CSIs. To mitigate this, the researcher corroborated different sources of data with a critical eye in the analyses.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of related empirical studies and the theoretical framework on which the study was based. The review is done thematically, geographically and chronologically based on the following key areas: security threats, CSIs and management of security threats, CSIs and conflict resolution mechanisms and challenges facing CSIs in conflict resolution.

2.1 Empirical Review

Empirical review covers previous studies on contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion, IGAD, EAC and EASF management of contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion, contribution of IGAD, EAC and EASF to conflict resolution in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi and structural and institutional challenges facing IGAD, EAC and EASF in pursuit of conflict resolution.

2.1.1 Contemporary Security Threats in the Eastern Africa Subregion

After the Cold War, states were faced by other concerns beyond military threats. There has been a diversity of perceived security threats with a transnational nature, greater role of non-state organized armed groups, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and ineffectiveness of traditional conflict management approaches (Nasu, 2018; Jordan, 2017). The domain of security threats has expanded to include cyber space and maritime zones such as sea beds. Dimensions of security have broadened to include human security: economic security, food security, energy and resource security,

pandemics, bio-security, bio-safety and environmental security (Nasu, 2018; Jordan, 2017). All these areas have varied threats and require different strategies of management.

Advancement in science, technological change and innovation are some of the greatest contributors to present day security threats (Rolenc, 2020). Today, there are various forms of security threats including but not limited to terrorism, cyber-crimes, electoral-induced violence and youth bulge among others. Violent extremism and abundance of natural resources are among the front-line causes of security threats not only in the Eastern Africa subregion, but also across the continents (Collier, 2015). Security cooperation in the subregion with regard to investment in capabilities for addressing immediate and gradual security vulnerabilities related to violent extremism and natural resources will be of utmost importance.

Marmeï and White (2017) conducted a study on challenges and threats to US security. The study employed cross sectional survey research design. Study findings revealed that the main threats to US security included revisionist powers, rogue states, Jihadist terrorist organizations, international criminal organizations and cyber hackers. Digital connectivity adds threats on the individual, organizational, government and military levels, which may presuppose that, in the event of conflict, essential and military infrastructure as well as government institutions could be under attack. While the study by Marmeï and White examined challenges and security threats in the US context, the present study analyzed contemporary security threats in the context of the Eastern Africa subregion and the extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF have addressed them utilizing the qualitative and quantitative research approaches.

Chandel *et al.*, (2018) conducted a study on the growth of enterprise cloud and the security implications it had on China. The study aimed at establishing enterprise cloud growth and security challenges in China's perspective and employed content analysis research design. From the findings, it was established that the major threats affecting China's security included Maoist extremism, cybercrime and small arms proliferation. Other threats were China's South East Asia political and economic threats, emanating from internal instabilities and insurgencies, as well as the long and bloody sidetrack of the Indo-China conflict. The present study analyzed contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion and the element of their management by regional security mechanisms. In addition, the study by Chandel *et al.*, (2018) employed content analysis research design, which is mainly a qualitative research approach. The present study adopted a mixed approach, with both qualitative and quantitative paradigms. Use of both paradigms was intended to enrich the current study owing to the aspect of complementarity and triangulation. Further the earlier study uses China as the case study while the current study is based on the contemporary security threats in the context of the Eastern Africa subregion and the extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF have addressed them. A multi-level analysis of security is critical given the effects of globalization. Thus, insights obtained from threat analysis in China provided a basis for the analysis of the nature and dynamics of security in Eastern Africa subregion, the geographical, historical and cultural differences notwithstanding.

In Africa's context, the issue of security threats and challenges is not new. In Nigeria for example, Achumba *et al.*, (2013) examined insecurity in Nigeria and its implications for business investment, operations and sustainable development. From the findings, it emerged that insecurity in Nigeria was enormous and complex and therefore recommended the need to nurture a safe environment favourable for effective business

activities and a sustainable development process. The study further recommended combating perpetrators of insecurity and removing sources of security breaches in order to ensure a safe environment. Whereas, the study by Achumba *et al.*, (2013) was carried out in the context of security threats in business enterprises in Nigeria, the current study analyzed contemporary security threats and how collective security institutions manage the threats and contribute to conflict resolution and stability in the Eastern Africa subregion. A broader analysis and conceptualization of security beyond the neorealist perspective is timely in the present-day international relations. In this context, an examination of the approaches that states and international institutions have employed in addressing contemporary security threats whose referent objects include non-state and sub state actors is important.

Security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion continue to pose a major challenge. Grip (2017) observes that while there is limited arms production in Africa, the Eastern Africa subregion is threatened by the proliferation of small and light arms. Ndawana *et al.*, (2018) in their study contend that proliferation of small arms taints the good image of Tanzania as a peaceful and stable nation and may pose a serious national security threat. This security concern extends throughout the subregion and therefore regional stability may hinge on how well this threat is addressed. In Ndawana *et al.*, (2018), observations were based on a secondary review of proliferation of small arms in Tanzania. However, the current study empirically analyzed collective security institutions' management of contemporary security threats and conflicts in the Eastern Africa subregion, going beyond the single challenge of illegal arms to other security drivers.

The Eastern Africa subregion is prone to radicalization, which poses a major security threat. More often than not, there is an interplay of several factors that can lead to radicalization and acts of terrorism (Osman, 2016). Kyule (2018) conducted a study that analyzed the counter-terrorism strategies used in Kenya. The study sought to establish the effectiveness of counter-terrorism mechanisms and sampled five hundred and forty respondents from different government and non-government institutions specialized in terrorism. From the analysis, the study found out that there were inadequate counter-terrorism policies to effectively mitigate against the threat of terror in Kenya. The current study analyzed contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion, with a view to determining their prevalence. It further examined strategies put in place by IGAD, EAC and EASF in managing the threats.

On their part, Owain & Maslin (2018) examined the relative contribution of economic, political and environmental factors on past conflicts and the displacement of people in East Africa. The study used optimized regression modeling. A new composite conflict database for tracking important occurrences of political violence was compared to meteorological, economic and political indicators. Findings revealed that climate change had little or no role in the causes of violence and resettlement in East Africa over the last 50 years. Furthermore, the study argued that during the post-colonial transformation, high rising population, low or falling economic development and political instability were the most important restraints. However, the study used the optimization regression model which is based on political examination rather than assessing the climatic conditions that lead to the displacement of people hence leading to high crime rates. The current study employed a mixed research approach and sought to analyze how contemporary security threats and conflicts were being managed by CSIs with a peace and security mandate.

Nzau & Guyo (2018) examined the Challenge of Securing Kenya: Past Experience, Present Challenges and Future Prospects. They argued that without comparing the current situation to previous experiences, the dynamic character of insecurity and mitigation solutions cannot be fully appreciated. The study opined that the best way ahead for Kenya was to approach security via a holistically sound institutional perspective guided by the constitution's limitations and the precepts of international law. While the study by Nzau & Guyo (2018) assessed security challenges affecting Kenya and mitigation measures implemented from independence to 2018, the present study examined prevalence of contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion and management measures against these security threats by collective security institutions (IGAD, EAC and EASF) from 1990-2018. Nzau & Guyo's (2018) study, on the other hand, is primarily based on secondary data and employs only qualitative data analysis. Furthermore, the study utilized Kenya as a case study differing from the current study which also focused on Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi.

2.1.2 Collective Security and Management of Security Threats

In a study, Lundgren (2016) observed that the expectation that International Organizations (IOs) can play a role in the resolution of violent conflicts has seen institutional growth in the post-Second World War period with both new and old IOs expanding their mandates and existing instruments of conflict management to gradually include mediation support units, early warning systems and standby military forces.

Using a longitudinal research design to generate cross-temporal data on the growth of these conflict resolution institutions, Lundgren (2016) obtained empirical data on the institutional design of 21 conflict management institutions with yearly observations

during the 1945-2010 period, and centered around three instruments/tools of conflict management: mediation, economic sanctions and peacekeeping. The current study employed cross-sectional and phenomenological research designs in analyzing three CSIs in the Eastern Africa region and their role in regional stabilization in the post-cold war era defined from 1990-2018. While the study by Lundgren was focused on the management of inter and intrastate military disputes, this study went beyond the analysis of conflict management and military approaches to dispute resolution by scrutinizing the broad spectrum of the CPMR tools of the CSIs. The present study also considered the realities of the modern-day dynamic security environment and conflict theatres characterized by a relapse of conflicts.

The Pan Africanism movement of the 1960s marked the genesis of the idea of collective security (Ottoh, 2017). However, the dynamics prevailing at the time prevented many African states from embracing this new Pan African vision. The newly independent states lacked adequate capacity and were still under influence of former colonial powers. In a bid to retain their newly earned sovereignty, these states opted for nationalism and remained neutral (Besada, 2016). This position restricted the OAU's influence, as respect for sovereignty became synonymous with non-involvement in the internal affairs of fellow states (Porto and Engel, 2016). As a result, the OAU failed to build structures to grant it financial muscle to engage in collective security. However, the post-Cold War environment was marred by increased civil wars in Africa, prompting the OAU to establish a CPMR mechanism in 1993 (Jordan, 2017). In spite of this noble idea, Williams (2014) posits that the achievement of collective security in Africa was still untenable because of misconceptions of what contributes to respect for sovereignty. Consequently, Ndubuisi (2016) asserts that the OAU deferred the

establishment of an infrastructure that could anchor the achievement of collective security.

Owing to the dynamics revolving around the 1990s which weaned off African states of colonial patronage, African regimes became exposed to internal challenges and this led to a surge in civil wars and demands for democratic leadership. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) further dented African states' strength by introducing Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and this according to Williams (2016) lifted the lid of economic support for African states. Consequently, African states were jerked to the realization that there was need to seek internal solutions to security challenges. Attendant to this was a redefinition of sovereignty so that states could not simply be left to act at their will for fear of being accused of interference (Porto and Engel, 2016). This marked the origin of the AU spirit of finding endogenous remedies to security challenges and this also informed the push by the UN to have Africa play a more proactive role in regional peace and security.

The convergence of these dynamics severely weakened many African states. These security conditions catalyzed intense debates on the need for endogenous solutions to questions of peace and security in Africa. The OAU's principle of non-intervention was no longer defensible. AU could no longer interpret sovereignty solely as a right to non-interference when states had clearly failed in their primary responsibility to protect citizens. Hence, the need for 'African solutions to African problems' became imperative. Subsequently, OAU guiding principle changed from 'non-intervention' to 'non-indifference' (Porto & Engel, 2016). During this period, the UN was pushing Africa to take a more robust and complementary role on regional peace and security (UN, 1992). While it is a global responsibility for all peace and security actors to

maintain international peace and security, employment of sub-regional mechanisms which better understand security threats in their conflict systems may allow exploitation of effective mitigation strategies. This approach may also improve sustainability and ownership of peace and security processes.

The organizational transformation of OAU to AU had two major outcomes. Firstly, it led to the establishment of APSA under AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC), which comprised of various peace and security mechanisms notably the Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, Peace Fund, and Africa Standby Force (Porto and Engel, 2016, Basada, 2016). Operating on the principle of subsidiarity, these mechanisms, especially Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS) and ASF are functionally linked to sub-regional collective security institutions including the EAC, EASF and IGAD. Secondly, through the AU's Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), the continental organization re-conceptualized security from the then predominant state-centric meaning to include both state and human security (Articles 6-10, CADSP, 2004). CADSP adopted a more realistic view of Africa's peace and security condition, particularly the preponderance of domestic security threats (Tolera, 2012).

A review of AU shows that while observing the sovereignty of independent states, the Union has adopted the non-indifference and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principles. This has catalyzed robust development and institutionalization of APSA, founded on a progressive conceptualization of peace and security and the redefinition of sovereignty as both a right and a responsibility. Moreover, the evolution has infused AU with a doctrinal and legal mandate to intervene in response to threats to peace and (human) security. Significantly, the transformation of AU has anchored its collective

security agenda on sub-regional organizations. In purview of this, the current study aimed to unravel how effectively CSIs have responded to these threats and the factors inhibiting their related mandates.

Kahombo (2018) reviewed the work of the AU PSC with respect to Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The study sought to find out whether the establishment of the PSC in 2002 had led to a rise or a decline of collective security in Africa. The study employed both quantitative and qualitative techniques and demonstrated that in terms of legal and institutional robustness, the PSC had raised effectiveness of collective security compared with its predecessor, the OAU. However, it faced a number of challenges in regional implementation. There was lack of sufficient operational autonomy from member states and international partners, such as the UN. Therefore, the PSC's contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa was still limited. The continent's security threats have not abated since 2002 but rather wars, political crises and the expansion of terrorism reign supreme in many countries. The author notes that operationalization of the ASF could improve performance of PSC. The implementation of the 2016 decision on alternative sources of financing AU's institutions and activities could also be a game changer.

Although the study by Kahombo (2018) does not focus on RECs, it has a bearing on the collective security theme of the current study. The author notes that collaboration with the UN and the EU in PSOs such as AMISOM and that the AU is yet to acquire autonomy in funding them. The author, however, does not place his study on a theoretical foundation to examine power dynamics that call the shots in international relations which is a gap that the current study sought to fill.

The PSC is gradually developing models for effective security coordination and collaboration with RECs and other international actors. The capability of the PSC has a bearing on the performance of RECs in maintenance of peace and security. It is expected that as APSA becomes fully operational, relations between PSC and RECs will further streamline effective conflict prevention and management in Eastern Africa. However, the study by Kahambo (2018) is general and does not focus on specific RECs to demonstrate relations with PSC. The present study elaborates the larger peace and security framework upon which effective collective security in Eastern Africa is anchored.

The AU and CSIs have adopted a reformist approach to make them effective in the management of Africa's security challenges. That is why the OAU transformed to AU in 2002 to make it effective in continental issues. The AU adopted the Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy to enhance linkages with development policies in promoting effective co-ordination of post-conflict activities. It has also designed a Humanitarian Action Policy (HAP) to complement the work of the Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division (HARDPD) under the Political Affairs Department. The PCRD policy, in the words of Boateng (2019), is meant to promote seamless coordination of interventions in post conflict situations in order to achieve state rejuvenation. RECs have also embraced the new dimension of peace and security in the context of upholding sovereignty, making the AU and ECOWAS undergo a structural transformation of their peace and security approaches.

By transforming their traditional methods of security in response to conflict and post-conflict crises, RECs have adapted to the evolving peace and security conceptualization and practice. Boateng (2019) notes that the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the

Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security extends earlier protocols by sanctioning intervention in internal conflicts of states, which can trigger humanitarian disasters, or threaten regional peace and security. In this regard, the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) can authorize interventions including deployment of military and political missions, give and review mandates and terms of reference and inform the AU and UN of such decisions.

2.1.3 Collective Security Institutions and Conflict Resolution

The protracted conflicts in Somalia and South Sudan, among others, have had adverse effects on the security and stability of the countries. Such insecurity has bred economic devastation, abject poverty, rampant unemployment and violence (Ndubuisi, 2018). Ethnic, racial and religious groups have been excluded from local communities and nations, thus legitimizing individual persecution, ethnic violence, civil war and genocide. There has been forcible displacement of target groups which have consequently lost their social networks and government protection, forcing them to become internally displaced or refugees (Habu and Ufumie, 2018). Conflict resolution mechanisms aimed at addressing both physical and social needs of displaced persons in protracted conflicts would help stem related conflict vulnerabilities and instability in the subregion.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), initially established as a defensive military alliance during the Cold War, transformed in the post-Cold War period to reflect the new security era in Europe by not only ensuring defence of the member states, but also contributing to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the European region (Karsten, 2017). Just like NATO, both IGAD and EAC, initially established for environmental and economic security of the subregion respectively,

have had to redefine their mandates to address the current security challenges. This study closely examined their redefined mandates relative to the achievement of stability in the Eastern Africa subregion.

Ndubuisi (2018) examines how the AU and RECs work together in conflict resolution with a specific reference to IGAD - led peace process in South Sudan. The research is based on review of primary literature and interviews. He posits that clarifying and improving AU/RECs relations in maintenance of peace and security will enhance effectiveness and efficiency in deployment of resources. According to PSC Protocol, Article, 16, the AU has primary responsibility in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. However, since RECs were created before the APSA, they often assume primary responsibility of security in their regions. RECs in the Eastern Africa subregion led peace processes in South Sudan and Burundi. On the perennial question of lack of funds, the author notes that the proposal to levy 0.2% of national imports will improve AU's financial capability and reduce over reliance on external funding. Ndubuisi (2018) recommends that to ensure collective continental response to security threats, there is need to strengthen AU's role to set the norms and provide oversight to RECs. AU should also improve its capacity to take over peace initiatives when RECs are unwilling or unable to address security threats. The last suggestion has already been implemented in the AU assumption of the IGAD initiative for peacekeeping in Somalia, IGASOM. The AMISOM established in 2007 demonstrated effective cooperation between AU and IGAD initiatives. The study provides a good snapshot of AU conflict management activities though limited by focus on a single case study.

Adetula *et al.*, (2016) observe that lessons learned from peacekeeping and mediation efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early years of the ECOMOG contributed to

the consolidation of mechanisms for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in West Africa. In their comparative analysis of ECOWAS and IGAD, the authors aver that ECOWAS and IGAD peace building profile has varying levels of success and failure. They also conclude that current peace building initiatives by ECOWAS and IGAD have emphasized a military approach over soft approaches to peace building. Such an observation does not appear justified by historical records. Both ECOWAS and IGAD have had a record of more mediation than military offensive interventions. IGAD did not succeed in establishing peacekeeping force in Somalia. Though AMISOM is mostly composed of IGAD Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), it is not an IGAD mission. The most remarkable force intervention mission is ECOMOG in Liberia for ECOWAS and that would not warrant concluding that there has been more force preference. The authors also maintain that involvement of member states of ECOWAS and IGAD in peace building interventions has been a high cost and risk for national economies and regional economic integration programmes.

On the contrary, the current study argues that given the enormous cost of conflicts in the subregion, resources spent in conflict prevention and peacebuilding are a more cost-effective way of resource utilization. Peacebuilding also creates close working relations, camaraderie and joint problem-solving experiences that become assets for long term peaceful interstate relations.

Adetula *et al.*, (2016) also correctly note that research and documentation of experiences of African RECs in peacebuilding has not received adequate attention, thereby hindering opportunities for lessons learned for future planning, policy formulation and implementation. Though the authors have done a commendable structural peacebuilding comparison, they have not employed a systematic way of

comparative analysis such as comparing mandates, geostrategic threats and challenges, historical experiences, funding, governance, capacity and resource autonomy and dependence. They have also not expounded on the role of the geo-strategic environment in informing evolution of RECs strategies and plans.

Countries in the Eastern Africa subregion have assumed a more central role in the management of peace and security. This has led to the creation of a close linkage between APSA and IGAD, EAC and EASF. Habu and Ufuemie (2018) posit that due to the transboundary nature of contemporary security threats, Eastern Africa states have come to appreciate the importance of a regional stance in mitigating security threats because their spillover effects are detrimental. Mwagiru (2011) argues that even in undertaking these interventions, states are cautious of their state centric interests and respect for sovereignty.

IGAD whose member states include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda has a robust peace and security experience in the Eastern Africa subregion. The organization was founded as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Nyombe (2019) observes that the CSI amended its constitutive treaty in the year 1996 and included peace and security as part of its agenda; a rallying call to member states to cooperate for regional stability. Arising from this, IGAD established its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and as Demeke and Gebru (2014) argue, the CSI is involved in a range of activities aimed at addressing terrorism and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). The IGAD CEWARN is linked to member states' Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) and has a Mediation Support Unit (MSU) which has had a mark in Somalia and Sudan (Besada, 2016). Furthermore, IGAD is

instrumental in promoting good governance and capacity building in Somalia (Byiers, 2017). The current study assessed how resource limitations have hindered the CSI's effective conflict resolution efforts.

A study by Ali (2017) evaluating peace making processes in the Somalia conflict using the case of IGAD, analyzed the impact of IGAD peacebuilding initiatives and recommended ways of enhancing sustainable long-term peace in Somalia. The study assumed that IGAD did not enhance peace and stability in Somalia hence Somalia's instability remains a regional and international threat. This necessitated the need for new approaches towards peacebuilding in Somalia. Data was collected through interviews and questionnaires for the diplomats and officials of IGAD and through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with Somali analysts and community elders. Secondary data was acquired from published and unpublished literature. The outcomes indicate that IGAD's contribution to peace making is hindered by rivalry among member states, lack of adequate resources, member states national interests and a weak secretariat. However, the study based its research only on Somalia. The current study focuses on three CSIs and their conflict resolution mechanisms in South Sudan, Somali and Burundi.

IGAD's efforts in addressing the longstanding security problem in Somalia are yet to assure stability in the Horn of Africa and the larger Eastern African conflict system owing to a number of challenges. Constant review of its CPMR strategy in view of the changing dynamics is critical in ensuring build-up of efforts towards attaining sustainable peace and security in Somalia and in the subregion.

Nyombe (2019) carried out a study on African Sub-Regional Organizations in Conflict Resolution and examined the contribution of IGAD in South Sudan conflict resolution

from 2013-2018. The study used a qualitative research approach and a case study design. Data was collected from secondary sources and was analyzed qualitatively. The study's main recommendation was that inclusivity, particularly of civil society and other political stakeholders, must be strengthened and that advocacy on peace and peacebuilding initiatives among the people of South Sudan be increased. However, while Nyombe (2019) examined IGAD's conflict resolution only in South Sudan, the current study analyzed IGAD, EAC and EASF and their conflict resolution initiatives in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi, thus covering a wider geographical scope.

A study by Bond & Mkutu (2018) indicates that in an effort to seek internal solutions from an African perspective, CSIs have established relevant infrastructure including early warning to enable them remain afloat in the conflict theatre. Indeed, the IGAD CEWARN remains one of the most critical systems of conflict anticipation in the subregion. Despite this initiative, empirical evidence indicates that the Eastern Africa subregion still experiences conflicts for instance in South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi. In view of this, the current study analyzed the contributions of CSIs in conflict prevention, management and post conflict peace building in South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi. While Bond and Mkutu (2018) examined the contribution of IGAD in regional peace, the current study went further to analyze the contribution of IGAD, EAC and EASF to regional stabilization in the Eastern Africa subregion with respect to conflict prevention, management and post conflict peace building and reconstruction.

According to Mathieson (2016), the EAC whose membership includes Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania has a vision for the establishment of a political federation way beyond the current achievement of a Customs Union. Mshomba (2017) contends that the EAC has a protocol for the creation of a monetary union and prides

in having a legislative assembly and a Court of Justice. It is worth noting that the EAC has been more of a REC aimed at establishing deeper integration and good neighbourliness among partner states. In light of this, the REC has developed the EAC Protocol on Cooperation in Defence (2012) and the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security (2013). However, Bayeh (2015) asserts that only Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have signed the defence pact.

Considering the analysis of IGAD and EAC, it emerges that there is a close relationship between security and economic development. Alive to this reality, organizations have had to transform their mandates to accommodate the new concept. NATO which was a Cold War alliance had to redefine itself in the post-Cold War by participating in the promotion of security among its members and in the European region (Karsten, 2017). It is the same redefinition that IGAD and EAC underwent in pursuit of peace and security in Eastern Africa subregion.

To have a ready component that could be rapidly deployed for PSOs in the Eastern Africa subregion, and in line with the APSA, the EASF was established. The RM is a standby entity which the AU can deploy to mitigate situations that threaten peace and security including genocide and war crimes (AU Constitutive Charter, 2002). According to Apuuli (2016), the EASF deploys under the auspices of the AU PSC (under whose command it directly falls).

Desmidt and Hauck (2017) highlight the six scenarios under which the EASF could deploy either within the UN setting or as an independent force in peace support missions (peace keeping, observer, humanitarian). EASF is envisioned to deploy within 14 days upon being cleared by the AU PSC in grave conflict situations that require AU intervention. However, the ability of the CSI to live to this concept in a multi-

dimensional fluid security such as the one in the Eastern Africa subregion is in doubt. From the aforementioned, it is evident that IGAD, EAC and EASF operate within the same geographical region and are guided by similar mandates. The IGAD Treaty, the EAC Treaty and the EASF Agreement stipulate the central role CSIs play in pursuing peace and security initiatives in the Eastern Africa subregion. In light of this, an assessment of the resource factor and how these can be pooled for the sake of regional stability had a bearing to this present study.

Oluoch (2015) examined the role of EASF in peace stabilization in Kenya using a descriptive survey design and purposive sampling technique. The study revealed that although the EASF is mandated with the task of conflict intervention through preventive diplomacy and PSOs, there still exist violent conflicts and durable peace has become elusive in the Eastern Africa subregion. Although the study by Oluoch (2015) examined challenges hindering the EASF from successfully executing intervention missions in the Great Lakes region, it did not bring out the contributions in terms of peace initiatives. The current study therefore not only addressed EASF's contribution to regional stabilization but went further to analyze the elements of conflict prevention, management and post conflict peace building and reconstruction strategies in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi.

Based on their legal frameworks, the three collective security institutions have clearly been assigned similar peace and security mandates and draw membership from the same geographical area. From the organizations' foundational documents (EAC Treaty, IGAD Protocol and EASF Agreement), it can be noted that partners play a key role in provision of human and financial resources for the implementation of various peace, development and stability initiatives in the subregion. An in-depth analysis of the

resources contributed by member states and other partners for the implementation of peace and security initiatives in the subregion through the existing CSIs, and how such resources can be better harnessed to effectively bring about regional stability was a subject of interest for this study.

2.1.4 Challenges facing CSIs in Conflict Resolution

Nyombe (2019) opines that various factors hinder Eastern Africa CSIs from effectively pursuing peace and security. To bring this to perspective, it is critical to examine the situation in other regions and contextualize it within the Eastern Africa subregion.

The establishment of robust CSIs has been challenged by disputes between states in Africa. The UN (2015) observes that the UN may be handicapped in intervening in such conflicts considering that it operates within the confines of peacekeeping operations where availability of troops is dependent on member states' good will. NATO, operating in an environment with complex security threats, intervened in pursuit of regional security in the trans -Atlantic region by addressing concerns related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and terror related sabotage. Kartsen (2017) adds that in 1999, NATO was successful in mounting a humanitarian response in Kosovo to mitigate crimes committed by Yugoslavian troops.

In Asia, the security theatre has also undergone reconfiguration though sovereignty has remained a hindrance to effective involvement of regional bodies to security matters. Amer (2011) observes that such drawbacks have led to inaction even in dire situations of war crimes.

In Africa, developing effective regional security institutions has been challenging owing to inter-state disputes between members of the AU/RECs. UN does not seem

capable of providing real answers to all problems of the contemporary international environment, more so the complex security problems in Eastern Africa that are tied to domestic dynamics (UN, 2015). Furthermore, UN actions in favour of peace are conducted primarily within the framework of peacekeeping operations, which depend on member states to provide troops. In the Eastern Africa subregion, neither IGAD nor EAC has the capacity to deploy while EASF PSOs would depend on the good will of member states to provide troops or staff.

Theoretically, under APSA, deployment of regional standby forces should be done in a region or a state where crimes against humanity have occurred. The practical implementation of the non-interference principle by AU, particularly in response to the protection of vulnerable civilians in situations of conflict has been an issue of concern. AU was non-responsive to the plight of the civilian population under crimes perpetrated by Janjaweed militia in Darfur in the Sudan. Amvane (2015) asserts that the AU did not leverage on the provisions of Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act to address human rights abuses and violations in Libya and Burundi due to sovereignty concerns. The deployment of a regional force by the AU PSC has remained elusive because of vestiges of sovereignty and non-intervention norms. This remains a gap that the current study aimed to examine.

Rwengabo (2016) analyzed how institutional design affects APSA's implementation in Eastern Africa. In reviewing RECs, the study employed three pillars: decision making rules, level of binding of security commitments and implementation mechanisms. The study derived that states' overlapping memberships in both RECs and Regional Brigades breeds decision-making overlaps and conflicting obligations thus limiting intra- REC coordination and commitment. Overlapping membership can also bring

implementation challenges and hence the future of APSA lies in tailoring Regional Brigades along RECs and enhancing RECs' politico-security cooperation. Rwengabo (2016) findings reinforce thematic concerns of the present study though the study only focused on how institutional design challenges affected APSA implementation by RECS in Eastern Africa. The present study analyzed structural and institutional challenges of IGAD, EAC and EASF and their influence on the effectiveness of the CSI's management of contemporary security threats and conflict resolution mechanisms in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi.

Okon (2020) assessed the power indices in ECOWAS and SADC in order to account for the CSIs timely response to security threats and conflicts in the Western African and Southern African subregions. The study employed case study research design and was based on the Power Theory. The study argues that power vested in a state is key to the configuration and survival of regional security arrangements especially within an enmity-amity security complex and that state power determines the emergence of a lead or pivotal state or a hegemon to spearhead pursuit of peace and security within a subregion. This explains the central role of Nigeria and South Africa in the formation of ECOWAS Standby Force and SADC Standby Force in West and Southern Africa respectively. The same dynamics came into play when Brazil took a lead role in establishment of Union of South America Nations (UNSUR). The US led in mobilizing a security intervention in the Balkan conflict by lobbying support from other NATO members. The study concludes that indices of power that related to Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC include a natural strategic geographical location especially one aligned to a long seaport, endowment with natural resources, huge industrial capacity, military capability and a large young and vibrant population amongst others.

While Okon (2020) analyzed the interplay of power within the context of ECOWAS and SADC from a Power Theory approach, the current study examined contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion and the extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF had contributed to conflict resolution to South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi from a multi theoretical dimension (neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism). In terms of methodology, Okon (2020) study was majorly a qualitative research based on case study design while the current study adopted a mixed approach which entailed use of cross sectional and phenomenological research designs.

According to Habu and Ufumie (2018), RECs in East and Southern Africa (EAC, IGAD and SADC) rely on the support of external donors for policy and programme implementation. This situation undermines the AU spirit of 'African solutions to African problems', and challenges the sovereignty, territoriality and legitimacy of countries in these RECs. The study concluded that RECs across Africa have provided no enabling statutes of operation for the Regional Parliaments (RPAs) to contribute to issues of regional security cooperation, peacebuilding and development. Thus, SADC Parliamentary Forum (PF), the IGAD - Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the East Africa Legislative Assembly (EALA), are largely outside the security governance umbrella in the region. Therefore, their contributions to regional good governance and political stability in their respective regions in particular and on the African continent in general are rather insignificant.

Habu and Ufumie (2018) observed that RECs must accommodate political inclusion, good governance and job creation especially for the young, notably in IGAD and SADC. The study identified the external factors hindering effectiveness of RECs as; longstanding political instability, armed rebellions, lack of political determination,

overlapping membership, similarity of import-export goods and the absence of uniformity among member states in undertaking responsibilities. Arising from this empirical review, the present study took cognizance of the outlined factors and analyzed the extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF have addressed contemporary security threats and the contribution of the CSIs to CPMR with a view to achieving regional stabilization.

A study conducted by Bereketeab (2019) on the role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in peace building in the Horn region, using both quantitative and qualitative approaches, revealed mixed challenges. The study indicated that although significant milestones had been achieved, IGAD was plagued by a myriad of challenges such as dependence on external funding, a lack of capacity and the member states' narrow national interests. The study put forward that the problems stemming from IGAD were related to its heavy dependence on external aid, and that Ethiopia's domination had rendered the organization very weak in its peacebuilding efforts in the region compared to other African regional economic communities. However, the study did not cover the scope of conflict resolution and contemporary security threats as it only identified its detrimental consequences. These are areas which this study tried to take a deep dive into while understanding and providing for possible ways to resolve the existing institutional and structural challenges.

Woldearegay & Mamo (2019) looked into how IGAD could overcome its challenges. The study which was qualitative and gathered both primary and secondary data, established that Multi-Level Governance (MLG) was a viable model to make IGAD successful in attaining economic integration. The model proffers that if IGAD decentralized power, achieved effective participation, designed specific objectives and

established a standing technical committee; then the organization would be better placed to realize effective integration in the region. The authors also established that the organization had a poor governance structure, poor leadership and a weak secretariat. While Woldearegay *et al.*, (2019) provided a partial view of challenges that IGAD faced, the current study elaborated the challenges beyond the governance factor.

Hassan (2017) conducted a study to determine the effectiveness of IGAD in promoting regional diplomacy with a case study of the Somalia peace process. The study looked at the organization's failure and achievements in the quest. The study used both quantitative and qualitative approaches in its methodology, providing good feedback of the works carried out in the region. The study by Hassan gives a base for concurrent studies such as this one. With the aim of expanding on the already present knowledge on IGAD structural and institutional challenges, the current study expounded on this subject as it focused on the works in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi as well as other regional bodies such as EAC and EASF. The current study sought to provide further insights on the causes of the failures of these regional organizations by looking at their institutional and the structural challenges.

In the words of Jacobsen and Johannes (2012), there is need for Eastern Africa sub-regional CSIs to build capacity for intervention in peace and security. An area of concern would be the operability of IGAD, EAC and EASF in view of their REC/RM status and past experience. There is need for a review of existing structures in order to address budgetary limitations facing these institutions. In the face of various security challenges, the prohibitive budgetary requirements and the continued inadequacy of these institutions to assure security to the population, there is an urgent need for

evidenced-based policy review that will help strengthen the capabilities of IGAD, EAC and EASF through a rigorous analysis.

In view of this, an in-depth analysis of how these institutions delivered their mandates, over the period under study and their past performance compared to the contemporary security challenges, could help predict their future orientations. In addition, analyses based on primary data from practitioners and scholars within the subregion was useful in understanding the nuances and inflections in the stabilization mechanisms employed by the CSIs.

2.2 Conclusion

This section has surveyed literature dealing with CSIs in Eastern, Southern and West Africa including some parts of Asia. The purpose was to derive knowledge and experiences of previous studies in order to identify gaps that were to be filled by the current study. Most of the literature identifies similar threats to peace and security in Eastern Africa.

Similar challenges facing RECs/RMs have also been identified. A number of studies have also cited the limitations of APSA roll out within RECs regions. However, this has been discussed as a challenge set out to be overcome as APSA institutions take shape and relations with RECs are streamlined. Much of the literature offers specific lenses on issues covered by the current study. Some reviews offered interesting comparative regional performance by RECs such as ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and ASEAN. The current study benefited from this wide perspective enabling the author to identify gaps in the major thematic areas of the study.

The current study specifically focused on the Eastern African subregion to avoid comparing RECs that do not share the same geo-political scene and thematic space. This offered an opportunity to make comparisons, identify strengths and weaknesses and gauge performance of individual RECs/RMs. The study also covered a specific time period: the post- Cold War era, defined by similar global political dynamics. By utilizing both field-based empirical data and secondary literature, the study also acquired enhanced validity and reliability.

2.3 Theoretical Review

The role of CSIs in pursuit of peace and security is a discourse that invites wide theoretical interpretation (Bayeh, 2014). This is attributed to the divergence of views by scholars regarding the role of international organizations/regional security arrangements in promoting regional peace, security and stability in view of state interests. This study was guided by the core arguments of three post-modern theories of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism which are discussed as complementary views providing a broad-based anchor for the study.

2.3.1 Neorealism Theory in International Relations

Neorealism is a theory that explains the behavior of states in international relations and politics. It is a school of thought that is traced from Waltz (1990), Mearshemer (1995). (Bell, 2016; Rossi & Sleat, 2014).

According to Waltz (1990), neorealism is a state centric theory of international relations where the state is seen as the most important actor in international relations and the only referent object of security. In addition, the greatest currency of neorealism is power and self-interests. Significantly, this theory primarily focuses on powerful states at the

expense of other states, arguing that they are the most consequential actors in international politics (Mearsheimer, 2003).

Neorealists separate the internal factors of the international political system from the external focusing only on how exogenous threats shape state behavior and with no consideration of the effects of internal/ domestic dynamics to state security (Waltz, 1996). Thus, neorealism does not adequately address the domestic complex insecurities in the Eastern Africa subregion where different groups can securitize multiple subjects or objects. The theory downplays the centrality of the normative aspect of state preferences encompassing the role of ideas and values within the peace and security paradigm. It is worth noting that states in the Eastern Africa subregion relate within parameters of rivalry and suspicion and this translates to individual states making independent considerations of the degree of urgency of mitigating security threats from a collective dimension.

Neorealists focus on structure of the system (which is anarchical), analyzing the variations, how they affect the interacting units and the outcomes they produce (Waltz, 1990). Since the system is anarchical, neorealists contend that for survival within the international system, states are compelled to pursue their own security and take adequate measures to achieve it (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). Because of inability to predict the behavior of other states in the international system and the inherent suspicion and rivalry among states seeking individual interests, states are bound to pursue self-help measures to protect their interests and this may lead to security dilemmas (Booth, 2007). However, the achievement of state security is more determined by state power rather than by ideology (Baylis, 2011).

Neorealists are pessimistic about the possibility of international cooperation as they believe that states highly care for their relative position (Ayittey, 2002). Mearsheimer (1995) argues that the logic of anarchy obstructs international cooperation owing to consideration of relative gains and pursuit of self-calculated interests.

Driven by the paramount feature of survival in the anarchical international system, neorealists are sensitive to any erosion of relative capabilities as these factors are the basis for security and independence (Grieco, 1988). State actors are therefore cautious about the gains of others whenever cooperating.

According to neorealists, international institutions are thus products of nation states, created to achieve states' national interests and that the states would only join those institutions that best serve their interests (Randall and Priess, 1997). Perhaps this explains why Tanzania preferred to join the SADC standby force as opposed to EASF. Moreover, institutions often reflect distribution of power in the world and have little influence on state behavior and therefore may not ascertain peace and security in the post-Cold War period (Mearsheimer, 1995).

The study used core arguments of neorealism to analyze the role of self-calculated interests and systemic dynamics in influencing the agenda pursued by CSIs in the Eastern Africa subregion and the implications of security interests by respective member states in the context of convergence or divergence (Mearsheimer, 2003). In addition, the arguments by neorealism are useful in explaining why states cannot rely entirely on regional collective entities for their security. However, neorealists did not address the question of security dilemmas caused by states' self-help behavior, a permanent feature of a system of states (Folker, 2015).

2.3.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism Theory in International Relations

The proponents of the Neoliberal Institutionalism theory include Keohane and Nye (1977) and Axelrod (1984). This school of thought shares some assumptions with neorealism (states are the main actors in international relations; the international system is anarchic; given the anarchic state, states pursue self-calculated interests) but draws different conclusions from neorealists. The neoliberal institutionalism theory argues that despite anarchy, international cooperation between states is possible and feasible since latent tensions and competition are subdued (Jarvis, 1999). Accordingly, international institutions are important in facilitating cooperation among states and overcoming security challenges (Folker, 2015).

The theory of neoliberal institutionalism places a lot of faith on the need for states to come together and cooperate because such affords them a platform for maximum benefits in view of deeper coordination and cooperation (Neumann and Weaver, 1997). Consequently, state cooperation yields a win-win situation for parties because through security institutions, governments may share adequate information and jointly promote principles and norms that advance multilateral strategies. Neoliberal institutionalists however agree that even during cooperation between and among states, there will always be tensions brought about by rivalry (Lucey and Arewa, 2016).

Neoliberal institutionalism celebrates mutual interdependence (especially economic and environmental) as a key factor in shaping world politics thus emphasizing the benefits of states' cooperation in the international system (Keohane and Nye, 2001). Axelrod (1984) adds that the interdependence situation in the long-run makes international actors adapt a tit-for-tat strategy which leads to cooperation. Highlighting the importance of international institutions in solving many of the problems that states

face especially at the regional level, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2008) posit that states cede some sovereignty to sub-regional institutions and allow them to provide for cooperative problem resolution rather than having power-based competition. Guided by the neoliberal institutional theory, the present study analyzed how regional collective institutions have changed in relation to the changes in the security environment in Eastern Africa.

Keohane (1995) argues that institutions are created by states because of some anticipated effect that they will have on the behaviour of states through shared norms and processes. He explains that since institutions are created in response to state interests, the institutions are likely to change according to underlying human conditions and actions.

Neoliberal institutionalism analyzes international relations past the post-Cold War balance of power logic. According to Milner (2007) although states are important actors in world politics, neoliberal institutionalists admit that other important actors exist in world politics, for instance non-state actors like international institutions, NGOs and private sector actors. In addition, Milner (2007) recognizes other forms of power besides military forces and threats thus emphasizing the need to move beyond self-help approaches and subordinate the military element in regional security.

By applying the tenets of neoliberal institutionalism, the researcher focused on the importance of delineating anarchy as a hindrance and unpacked it from a dimension of it as a contributor to cooperation within the regional security environment. At the same time, the neoliberal institutional mind enabled the researcher obtain an appreciation of CSIs collective action in view of the various constraints faced (Bell, 2016).

2.3.3 Constructivism Theory in International Relations

Constructivism theory is said to have been introduced by Onuf who discoursed that ‘people and societies construct or constitute each other’ (Onuf, 1989 as quoted in Pellonen, 2017). The theory holds that fundamental structures of international politics are characterized by social relations rather than material. These structures shape actors ‘interests, identity and behavior.’ The theory holds that structures in international relations are constructed by both knowledge and material factors. Therefore, the dynamics of prior and changing epistemic and normative paradigm of interpretation of the material is key in shaping institutions and social relations (Wendt, 2010).

Constructivism is part of critical theory in the gamut of international relations theory, though it has its unique characteristics. It studies the sources and the content of state interests and preferences, which are postulated, and it emphasizes the ideational and social side of international politics, which is ignored by the mainstream theories (Pellonen, 2017).

According to Wendt (2010), constructivism does not place emphasis on the place of security dilemmas and the aspects of state centricism but rather upholds the structures built on ideas that influence state behavior. Unlike neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism which seek to explain security concerns and threats, constructivism aims to understand them. It answers the how and why questions which assist in dissecting the nature of the threat, the object of security and the possibilities of transforming or transcending the security dilemma (Pellonen, 2017).

Constructivism informs CSIs’ choices in the subregion through understanding of the conflict context including security threats which are shared by member states. Since most policy makers are not academicians, they rarely acknowledge the theoretical

paradigm that informs their decision making but constructivism can be discerned in the preference for gradual changes in collective security governance and priorities. The case of Somalia and South Sudan can illustrate such approaches where the different contexts do not offer transferable practitioners' templates. CSIs actions are informed by gradual understanding of opposing parties, the power dynamics, values, norms and alternatives for disputes resolution and peacebuilding.

The tenets of Constructivism theory were useful in this study because they enabled the researcher embrace an in-depth critique of the norms and value system of the respective Eastern Africa subregion CSIs. Through these, the dynamics of de-securitization were analyzed and the interplay of anarchy in state relations and how it affects collective security dissected.

From the preceding discussion, it emerges that each of the theories is limited in comprehensively explaining the security dynamics in the Eastern Africa subregion and the extent to which CSIs can be robust players in influencing collective behavior. In this regard, the study adopted a three-pronged theoretical approach to enhance complementarity.

2.4 Conceptual Framework

Drawing from the theoretical framework, the conceptual framework presents an interplay of factors demonstrating the nexus between CSIs and stabilization and the strategies CSIs should use to manage contemporary security threats and conflicts in their respective regions. The framework highlights the relations between the indicators of independent and dependent variables as shown in Figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework on CSIs and Conflict Resolution

Figure 2.1 indicates that the effectiveness of CSIs to resolve conflicts is determined by implementation of effective strategies and policies. In addition, adequate CPMR mechanisms, structural and institutional strategies are key for any CSI to achieve effective conflict resolution leading to peacebuilding and ultimately regional stabilization.

The indicators of the independent variables act together in mutually reinforcing ways to contribute to effective CPMR and peacebuilding which leads to regional stabilization. In relation to CPMR constructs, which are identified as the dependent variable in Figure 2.2, this study analyzed the strategies adopted by the CSIs in CPMR.

Extraneous variables in this study refer to exogenous factors such as disasters and pandemics that affect the dependent variable while outside the framework of independent variables. During economic depression and pandemics such as COVID 19, many development partners cut down their aid in order to meet domestic economic demands. Locust swarms in the HoA have made CSIs such as IGAD and member states to divert resources from other sectors to respond to the emergency.

The geo-strategic significance of the Gulf of Aden and coastal Somalia in terms of trade and security has seen competition for safe lanes of communication among Asian powers. China's establishment of a military base in Djibouti is also viewed with suspicion. The fear of the so-called Dragon influence in Africa is deemed as detrimental to Western ideological values of democracy, rule of law and transparency. This has prompted Western countries to have more interests in security and development in the region thereby offering more training opportunities for the security sector and increased joint operations. These geopolitical dynamics and alignment mean that CSIs are vulnerable to manipulation of their agendas by foreign powers who fund their

programmes. This is more pronounced in the subregion given the level of financial dependency discussed in this study. The major institutional variables that inform conflict resolution efforts of the IGAD, EAC and EASF are; inadequate capacity, funding, bureaucracy and staffing. In addition, adequate CPMR mechanisms, structural and institutional strategies are key for any CSI to achieve effective conflict resolution that would lead to regional stabilization.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter outlines the research methodology that was adopted in this study. The chapter is presented in the following sequence: research design, area of study, target population, sampling procedures, sample size, data collection tools, validity and reliability of research instruments, data collection procedures, methods of data analysis and ethical considerations.

3.1 Research Design

The study adopted a mixed research approach, a methodology of research dealing with integration of quantitative and qualitative data within a single study. This approach enabled the study to use cross-sectional survey and phenomenological research designs which facilitate collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data simultaneously. Cross-sectional surveys are studies taken to examine prevalence of cases in a population at a given period of time. These studies involve drawing a sample from a population of interest and making use of standardized questions where reliability of items is determined and results/findings can be generalized (Kothari and Garg (2019).

By use of a cross-sectional design, the researcher was able to describe the characteristics of a large population while at the same time allowing for use of questionnaires. This would make the results of analysis of multiple variables significant. In this study, cross sectional design was used to collect data from a huge target population where a representative sample size was drawn from the CSIs (IGAD, EAC and EASF) and CSOs' representatives and beneficiaries. Further the design

allowed use of questionnaires whose results were quantifiable and permitted generalizations of findings.

The study also adopted phenomenological research design which always poses an expectation that a specific phenomenon will be explained from the perspective of the actors in a situation. The design focuses on participants' perception and experience of the events/situation; motivations and views which the researcher would otherwise not have discerned and thus tries to bring out participants' experiences (Creswell, 2017).

Data was collected by seeking experiences of respondents/participants from IGAD, EAC and EASF who had first-hand experience of security threats and conflicts in South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi. The researcher also targeted CSOs representatives and beneficiaries who had witnessed and/or had been victims of conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi. By use of phenomenological design, the researcher obtained perceptions and experiences of individual respondents.

3.2 Area of Study

The study was carried out in the highly conflicted Eastern Africa subregion; where 60% of the violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa took place. Moreover, according to HCB (2015), South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi are the most vulnerable countries and have had a history of prolonged conflicts that reflect emerging and mutating patterns. In analyzing contemporary security threats, the study covered countries which are member states of IGAD, EAC and EASF. With regard to CPMR, the study analyzed conflict resolution efforts of the CSIs in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi; countries which have endured protracted conflicts during the period attended to by the study. The countries covered are indicated on the map in Figure 3.1.



Figure 3.1: Map showing study area

Source: Adapted from the Conflict Monitor 2018.

3.3 Target Population

The study targeted selected staff of the 3 CSIs (IGAD, EAC and EASF) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) representatives from the countries under study. Regarding CSIs, the study targeted a total of 638 members: IGAD (230) EAC (190) and EASF (218). The researcher focused on individuals who make policy at strategic level and planners and implementation entities at operational and tactical levels in IGAD, EAC and EASF. This enabled the researcher assess the respondents’ views and experiences on the role of the CSIs in addressing conflicts. Specifically, the study targeted staff at three levels: strategic level (ambassadors, directors, ministers), operational level (heads of departments in respective CSIs) and tactical level as captured in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Target Population of CSIs

Target population of CSIs (IGAD, EAC and EASF)				
CSIs	Strategic Level	Operational Level	Tactical Level	Total
IGAD	40	60	130	230
EAC	30	40	120	190
EASF	25	50	143	218
Total	95	150	393	638

Source: IGAD Regional Strategy Implementation Plan 2016-2020, EAC Development Strategy 2016-2020 and EASF Strategic Plan 2015-2020.

As shown in Table 3.1, there were 95 respondents at the strategic level: IGAD (40), EAC (30) and EASF (25). Respondents at operational level numbered 150: IGAD (60), EAC (40) and EASF (50) while those at tactical level totaled 393: IGAD (130), EAC (120) and EASF (143).

To obtain in-depth information regarding the effectiveness of CSIs in conflict resolution in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi, the study targeted representatives of CSOs: International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), National Non-Governmental Organizations (NNGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) with experience in peace and security matters in various administrative units of the respective countries. Somalia is divided into 13 provinces; South Sudan has 13 states (10 states and 3 administrative units) while Burundi has 18 provinces. It is from these administrative units that the researcher targeted representatives and beneficiaries of CSOs, which deal with peace and security in the respective countries. Out of the 585 CSOs, the researcher targeted 210 which deal with peace and security in the three countries under study. This is illustrated in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Target Population of CSOs representatives

Country	States and Provinces	INGOs/NNGOs	INGOs/NNGOs (Peace and Security)
Somalia	13	70	40
South Sudan	13	263	90
Burundi	18	252	80
Total	44	585	210

Source: Somalia NGO Consortium (2015); NGO explorer (2020); South Sudan NGO forum (2019) and Burundi.

3.4 Determination of Sample Size

Given the heterogeneous nature of the target population of this study, the researcher adopted various techniques in determining sample size of CSIs, CSOs representatives and CSOs beneficiaries.

3.4.1 Sample Size of CSIs

To arrive at a sample of the staff from the CSIs (IGAD, EAC and EASF) (N=638) sample size determination formula by Kredcjie and Morgan (1970) was used.

$$n = \frac{X^2 * N * P (1-P)}{d^2 (N-1) + X^2 * P (1-P)}$$

Where: n= the required sample size.

X^2 = the table value of Chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired confidence level (3.841).

N = the population size (638)

P = the population proportion (assumed to be 0.35 since this would provide reasonable sample size).

d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (0.05).

Thus, the target population applicable in the formula included 638 staff of IGAD, EAC and EASF.

$$n = \frac{3.841 * 638 * 0.35(1 - 0.35)}{0.05^2(638 - 1) + 3.841 * 0.35(1 - 0.35)} = \frac{557.501945}{1.5925 + 0.8738275}$$

$$n = 557.501945 / 2.4663275$$

$$n = 226.045$$

Out of 638 target population of the CSIs (IGAD, EAC and EASF), the study picked 226 as the representative sample size.

3.4.2 Sample Size of CSOs Representatives

The sample size of CSOs was determined based on the theory of Gay and Diehl (1992) which states that generally the number acceptable for a study is a function of the type of research being conducted. For descriptive research, at least 10% of the population is deemed representative. To arrive at sample size of CSOs, the researcher picked 10% of CSOs representatives from South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi.

3.4.3 Sample Size of CSO Beneficiaries

To arrive at sample size of CSOs' beneficiaries, the study applied a formula by Godden (2004) which is used for infinite population. When a researcher suspects that the target population could be at least 50,000 people, Godden (2004) theory becomes appropriate. Since the beneficiaries of CSOs is approximated to be more than 50,000 people in the three countries, the researcher applied the formula by Godden (2004) in the study:

$$n = \frac{Z^2 \times P(1-P)}{M^2}$$

Where:

SS= Sample Size for infinite population (more than 50,000)

Z = Z value (e.g., 1.96 for 95% confidence level)

P = population proportion (expressed as decimal) (assumed to be 0.1 (10%) since this would provide an acceptable sample size).

M = Margin of Error at 5% (0.05)

$$\begin{aligned}
n &= \frac{Z^2 \times P(1-P)}{M^2} \\
&= \frac{1.96^2 \times 0.1(1-0.1)}{(0.05)^2} \\
&= \frac{3.8416 \times (0.1(0.9))}{0.0025} \\
&= \frac{0.345744}{0.0025} \\
&= 138.2976
\end{aligned}$$

3.5 Description of Sampling Procedures

The study employed probability and non-probability sampling procedures to sample the following groups/categories of respondents: CSIs staff, CSOs representatives and beneficiaries. Probability sampling procedure included stratified, simple random and cluster whereas for non-probability, the researcher employed purposive sampling technique. According to Orodho *et al.*, (2016), stratified random sampling technique helps a researcher achieve the desired representation of various subgroups in the population particularly where the population embraces a number of distinct categories of different sizes. Subjects are then selected in such a way that existing subgroups in the population are fairly but randomly represented within the sample.

The feasibility of using cluster sampling is defined by the selection of groups of individuals from a defined population (Gray, 2007). The cluster sampling procedure enabled the researcher select CSOs representatives and CSOs beneficiaries from the states under study. To obtain adequate qualitative data, the study applied purposive

sampling procedure. Purposive sampling involves deliberate effort based on personal judgment in order to obtain representative data and allows the researcher to use sources who are authoritative custodians of the information in the inquiry. Cases of subjects are therefore purposively selected because they are informative and possess the required characteristics (Mugenda, 2008). Use of purposive sampling procedure enabled the researcher to select respondents that had the required information on the phenomenon being investigated. The researcher also purposively sampled representatives of CSOs (INGOs, NNGOs and CBOs) that deal with peace and security issues in the respective countries. This sampling technique was also applied in obtaining views of CSOs beneficiaries who could have observed, experienced, witnessed, or were victims of conflicts in South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi.

3.5.1 Sampling of CSIs Staff

Stratified random sampling procedure was used to arrive at the sample of strategic, operational and tactical levels respondents of IGAD, EAC and EASF. According to Mugenda (2008), stratified simple random sampling helps the researcher achieve the desired representation of various sub-groups in the population. Where the population embraces a number of distinct categories of different sizes, the frame can be organized by these categories into separate strata. Subjects are then selected in such a way that existing sub-groups in the population are fairly but randomly represented within the sample. The technique also ensures that sub groups that constitute the majority in the population are represented proportionately.

The organizations were first put into different strata (strategic, operational and tactical levels) and then simple random sampling technique was applied to arrive at

proportionate sample of members of staff from the respective institutions as indicated in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Sample of CSIs

CSIs	Strategic level		Operational		Tactical level		Total
	N	(n)	N	(n)	N	(n)	
IGAD	40	14	60	17	130	39	70
EAC	30	12	40	14	120	37	63
EASF	25	15	50	27	143	51	93
Total	95	41	150	58	393	127	226

Source: Field Data (2020).

3.5.2 Sampling of CSOs Representatives

To obtain a representative sample size of CSOs representatives, the researcher used cluster and purposive sampling techniques to identify CSOs which deal with peace and security from the administrative units of South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi.

The sample of CSOs representatives was based on the number of clusters per each administrative unit (states and provinces) in the respective countries. Somalia is divided into 13 provinces; South Sudan has 13 states and Burundi 18 provinces. In Somalia out of 13 provinces, 5 provinces were selected while 10 states from 13 states of South Sudan and 6 provinces from 18 provinces of Burundi were included in the sample.

From each state and province, purposive sampling procedure was used to select CSOs whose main programs/activities deal with peace and security. A total of 21 CSOs from Somalia (4), South Sudan (9) and Burundi (8) formed the sample. Table 3.4 shows a summary of sample of administrative units and CSOs representatives from the three countries.

Table 3.4: Sample size of CSOs Representatives

Country	States and Provinces (N)	Sample size (n)	CSOs (INGOs/NNGOs) (Peace and Security) (N)	Sample Size (n)
Somalia	13	5	40	4
South Sudan	13	10	90	9
Burundi	18	6	80	8
Total	44	21	210	21

Source: Somalia NGO consortium (2015); NGO explorer (2020); South Sudan NGO Forum (2019).

3.5.3 Sampling of CSOs Beneficiaries

To obtain views of beneficiaries of the sampled CSOs who could have observed, witnessed, or were victims of conflicts in South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi, cluster and purposive sampling procedures were used to arrive at the sample of such beneficiaries.

The researcher sampled a total of 21 CSOs dealing with peace and security in the three countries. From the 21 CSOs (South Sudan (4), Somalia (9) and Burundi (8), the researcher then picked 138 beneficiaries and divided them into 17 groups consisting of 8 members each. From the 17 groups: Somalia (4), South Sudan (8) and Burundi (5), the researcher used FGDs to obtain in-depth information from the informants. Table 3.5 gives a summary of CSOs' beneficiaries.

Table 3.5: Sample Size of CSOs Beneficiaries

Country	Number of CSOs (n)	Number of FGDs (each with 8 people) (n)	Total number of beneficiaries (n)
Somalia	5	4	32
South Sudan	10	8	65
Burundi	6	5	41
Total	21	17	138

Source: Field Data (2020).

3.6 Data Collection Instruments

The instruments used for data collection in this study included questionnaires, interviews schedules and Focus Group Discussion Guides.

3.6.1 Questionnaires

Creswel (2013) advises that questionnaires are used in cases where the subject of study is wide and are applicable in analyzing issues such as ideas, experiences, motives and perceptions which cannot be obtained through direct observations. Thus, in this study, questionnaires were preferred because they reach a large population within a short time, are self-administered and generate quantitative data. According to Orodho *et al.*, (2016), questionnaires enable cost-effective administration to large samples who are in diverse geographical locations and are primarily closed, tending to limit the extent to which adequate qualitative data can be generated. In the context of this study, therefore, open-ended and closed questionnaires were used to get respondents' views and facts to enhance objectivity. The researcher majorly used self-administered questionnaires that were either dropped and picked or sent online.

In this study, questionnaires were structured in line with the objectives of study and were used to obtain quantitative data from the operational and tactical staff respondents from IGAD, EAC and EASF. Some of the closed ended questions were based on a

Likert scale whose items were grouped according to the following scale: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Undecided (UD), Disagree (D) and Strongly Disagree (SD). The scale helped the researcher to find out the extent of agreement of the respondents on various issues pertaining to the research objectives.

3.6.2 Interview Schedules

The study also used interviews to obtain qualitative data from the key interviewees. According to Mugenda (2008), interviews are preferred because they provide in-depth information and give room for probing an aspect that questionnaires may not adequately capture. Use of interviews was meant to complement questionnaires given that interview schedules are open ended and provide room for obtaining in depth data from interviewees.

In this study, the researcher used semi-structured interviews. These consisted of an interview guide with a number of already prepared questions. These interviews enabled the researcher to spontaneously probe on certain ideas with a view of gathering in depth information from the strategic staff of the CSIs and from representatives of selected CSOs in the three countries.

The researcher conducted face to face interviews which allowed probing, clarification of issues and understanding of non-verbal cues of the interviewees. The researcher obtained informed consent from the interviewees and with the help of research assistants, took field notes on the proceedings.

3.6.3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

The researcher used Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) to obtain views and experiences of beneficiaries of CSOs who had witnessed, or were victims of conflicts in Somalia,

South Sudan and Burundi. FGDs provide an avenue for detailed and elaborate discussions which are carefully planned and designed to obtain information on participants' beliefs and perceptions on a defined area of interest (Kothari and Garg 2019). This view is also supported by Orodho *et al.*, (2016), who argues that FGD is a special type of group interviews in terms of purpose, size, procedures and that the optimal size of group would consist of 6-8 participants. Small groups are adequate to generate qualitative data to be able to retrieve and retain required and reliable information that would answer research objectives.

FGDs helped the researcher in soliciting in-depth information from CSO beneficiaries on the effectiveness of CSIs in management of security threats and conflict resolution in the Eastern Africa subregion and in their respective countries of habitation. The researcher used FGD guides to collect in-depth data from CSOs beneficiaries who are direct consumers of the sub-regional peace and security.

The total number of those selected to participate in the FGDs were 138 (n=138). The researcher grouped FGD participants as follows: Somalia (4 groups), South Sudan (8 groups) and Burundi (5 groups) with each group composed of 8 members respectively. A group consisting of 8 individuals was considered adequate for effective communication and decision making.

Prior to conducting FGDs, the researcher sought consent of the participants and highlighted the ground rules guiding FGDs such as non-interference during discussions and allowing one participant to participate at a time. In some special circumstances, the interviewer allowed some participants to explain issues in the local language with the help of a translator. During discussions, the researcher paid attention to non-verbal cues

of the FGD participants. A summary of target population and sample size is shown in Table 3.6

Table 3.6: Summary of Target Population and Sample Size

Respondents	Population (N)	Sample (n)	Tool used
CSIs (IGAD, EAC, EASF)			
Strategic Level Staff	95	41	Interview Schedule
Operational Level Staff	150	58	Questionnaire
Tactical Level Staff	393	127	Questionnaire
Total	638	226	
CSOs Representatives			
INGOs, NNGOs, and CBOs	210	21	Interview Schedule
CSOs Beneficiaries	Infinite	138	FGD Guide
		[17 FGD groups each consisting of 8 members)	
Total	-	385	

The total number of respondents/ interviewees/ informants who participated in the study included 226 staff of CSIs (IGAD, EAC and EASF), 21 CSOs representatives and 138 beneficiaries of CSO services. In total, there were 385 respondents who formed the sample size of this study.

3.7 Validity and Reliability

To ensure that the instruments were valid, content validity procedure was used. After construction of the questionnaires, the instruments were given to two experts in peace and security to assess the extent to which the tools were related to thematic areas of the research. Each of the experts worked independently and provided feedback to the researcher. Based on the experts' observations and input, the tools were modified.

The Split-Half method was used to assess reliability of the questionnaires. This technique involved splitting the questions in the research instruments into halves. Each half was administered and scored independently. The association between the two scores was then determined. This method was used because it is time saving and requires only one testing. Reliability coefficient was calculated using Cronbach's alpha method with the help of a Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 23). Reliability coefficient of 0.77 was obtained for IGAD's questionnaires, 0.85 for EAC questionnaires and 0.80 for EASF questionnaires. Thus, the obtained values fell within the accepted levels of 0.6 to 0.7 and hence the instruments were considered to be reliable (George & Mallery, 2003). A summary of reliability output is shown in Appendix J.

Once the reliability and validity of the tools was established, the researcher then proceeded to conduct a pilot study to assess the efficacy of the research instruments and the proposed design. The research tools were piloted using 10% of the AU staff in the department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) at the AU headquarters who were not part of the final study sample. After collection of the pilot data, a scrutiny of the responses was undertaken coupled with descriptive analysis. The instruments were then refined to address the observed gaps and improve clarity and reliability of the data collection tools.

3.8 Data Collection Procedures

Upon obtaining authorization to collect data from Kenyatta University Graduate School, the researcher obtained a research permit from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) (Appendix K). Prior to actual data collection, the researcher ensured the relevant institutions, departments and agencies

were given formal notifications which notifications highlighted the key targeted personnel and relevant offices in view of the study.

To facilitate the process of data collection, the researcher recruited and trained a team of six (6) research assistants. The researcher considered individuals with experience in data collection, background in social sciences, appropriate gender, religion and level of education. In addition, the research assistants were individuals familiar with the target population and their culture. They were trained on interviewing techniques, FGD rules and regulations, ethical considerations, techniques of posing questions, how to capture key points during interview sessions and how to safeguard data. During actual data collection, particularly interviews, informed consent of participants was sought to ensure that ethical issues were adhered to.

3.9 Methods of Data Analysis

To adequately analyze quantitative and qualitative data, the researcher adopted quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze quantitative data whereas qualitative data were analyzed based on thematic and content analysis procedures. Thematic analysis is a method used in identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The researcher applied this technique in developing a coding template, identifying initial themes, classifying, comparing and summarizing the coded data into a specific number of themes and finally reporting thematically in the research report.

Quantitative data obtained from questionnaires were coded and analyzed using descriptive statistics aided by a statistical application (SPSS version 23). Descriptive statistics such as averages, frequencies and percentages were used to summarize the findings. Where applicable, comparisons were undertaken using cross-tabulation and

testing of association was determined by Chi square (χ^2) outputs. For presentation of quantitative findings, the researcher used tables and bar graphs. On the other hand, qualitative data obtained through interview schedules and FGD guides was analyzed using thematic and content analysis method and presented thematically and by use of sub categories based on the research objectives. The qualitative data was integrated within the framework of quantitative data using triangulation to provide complementary function and build the flesh of the analysis.

3.10 Ethical Considerations

To promote integrity in research, the study observed ethical and legal research requirements. These included the principles of informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity, developing trust with the participants, right of participants to withdraw from the study and the element of conflict of interest.

To ensure that the principle of voluntary participation (informed consent) was adhered to, the research participants were informed of the purpose of the study and thus given the option of voluntary participation. In regard to the principle of confidentiality and anonymity, the researcher ensured that instruments did not contain names of respondents and even during reporting, the identities of respondents were concealed. During data collection, the researcher developed trust with the participants, promoted the integrity of research and guarded against misconduct and impropriety. To uphold the principle of conflict of interest in research, the researcher treated the participants professionally to avoid personal biases and unethical inclinations during the study.

3.11 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the research techniques employed in this study. These include the research designs, target population, sample size determination techniques, sample size and sampling procedures. The instruments for data collection, procedures for determining validity and reliability of instruments, data collection procedures, methods of data analysis and ethical procedures were also discussed. The next chapter shows how the methodology outlined in this chapter informed the presentation, analysis, interpretation and discussion of research findings.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction

In establishing regional economic communities, the African people, as expressed in the African Union Constitutive Act, sought to establish institutions built on the ideals of African unity and anchored on the values of respect, tolerance and solidarity that are shared in Africa (AU, 2017). Leaders of African unity initiatives realized that the practical element of ensuring security of the African people would only be achieved through collective inter-state cooperation and collaboration. Despite having established collective security mechanisms in the Eastern Africa sub-region, these mechanisms do not respond adequately to current security threats (AU, 2017). In view of this, the study sought to evaluate the effectiveness of collective security institutions (IGAD, EAC and EASF) in conflict resolution in Eastern Africa subregion.

This chapter presents findings from analysis of data obtained from IGAD, EAC and EASF in terms of the extent to which the three CSIs have achieved their peace and security mandates and is organized as follows and in sequence of the objectives of the study: 1) - to establish contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion. 2) -to analyze the extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF have managed contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion. 3)- to examine the extent of contribution of IGAD, EAC and EASF to conflict resolution in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi. 4) - to assess structural and institutional challenges facing IGAD, EAC and EASF in pursuit of conflict resolution.

The chapter begins with a review of the response rate. This is followed by presentation of findings, analysis and discussion of the four study objectives.

4.1 Response Rate

A total of 185 questionnaires were issued to respondents from the CSIs. Out of 185 questionnaires, 140 were filled and returned, representing a response rate of 76.72 %. According to Kothari and Garg (2019), a response rate that is above 70% is a good indicator of research outreach and improves reliability. As for CSIs interviews, 41 were targeted out of which 35 were conducted: 13 in IGAD, 10 in EAC and 12 in EASF. In addition, 21 CSOs representatives (Somalia 4, South Sudan 9 and Burundi 8) were interviewed and 17 FGDs, each consisting 8 CSO beneficiaries were conducted. Table 4.1 shows the questionnaire response rates.

Table 4.1: Questionnaire Response Rate

Respondents	Sample Size	Return	Return Percentage
IGAD			
Operational Level	17	14	82.35
Tactical	39	34	87.18
EAC			
Operational Level	14	11	78.57
Tactical	37	25	67.56
EASF			
Operational Level	27	20	74.07
Tactical	51	36	70.59
Total	185	140	76.72 %

Source: Field Data (2020).

Going by the standard leadership pyramid, from a total of 35 interviewees and 140 respondents that filled questionnaires from the CSIs, respondents at the strategic level were fewer at 20% of the total respondents as compared to those at the operational and tactical levels (22.3% and 57.7% respectively). The numbers were higher at the middle or operational level while the majority were at the tactical level where most hands-on staff were found. This means that the response pattern echoes the normal personnel deployment pattern in most organizations.

4.2 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Respondents were drawn from IGAD, EAC and EASF. EASF had the majority of the total respondents at 40% followed by IGAD at 34.29% and EAC at 25.71%.

The study analyzed demographic characteristics of respondents in terms of sex, age and work experience. These variables were deemed necessary to give a reflection of how workers understood the various organizations they worked in.

Table 4.2: Demographic Characteristics by Organization

Variable	IGAD f (%)	EAC f (%)	EASF f (%)
Sex			
Male	30(62.5)	28(77.8)	37(66.1)
Female	17(35.4)	8(22.2)	18(32.1)
Total	47(97.9)	36(100)	55(98.2)
Age			
<30 years	7(14.9)	6(16.7)	6(10.7)
30-40 years	9(19.1)	9(25.0)	11(19.6)
41-50 years	29(61.7)	19(52.8)	35(62.5.6)
>50 years	2(4.3)	2(5.6)	3(5.4)
Total	47 (97.9)	36(100)	55(98.2)
Work experience			
1-5 years	22(45.8)	14(38.9)	24(42.9)
6-10 years	9(18.8)	10(27.8)	12(21.4)
>10 years	10(20.8)	4(11.1)	12(21.4)
Total	41(85.4)	28(77.8)	48(85.7)

Source: Field Data (2020).

As shown in Table 4.2, a majority (62.5%) of IGAD respondents were male while the remaining (35.4%) were female. In terms of age, the study established that slightly more than half (60.4%) of IGAD respondents were between 41 and 50 years. Only 4.2% respondents were above 50 years of age. In reference to work experience, 73.7% had more than 6 years.

As for EAC, a majority (77.8%) of the respondents were male while 22.2% were female. The study further established that 52.8% of EAC respondents were between 41

to 50 years of age. Only 5.6% of respondents were above 50 years of age. Regarding work experience, 38.9% of respondents had work experience of 6 years and above. As for the EASF, 67.3% of the respondents were male while 32.7% were female. A total of 19.6% and 62.5% of respondents at EASF were aged between 30 and 40 years of age and between 41 and 50 years respectively while 42.9% of EASF respondents had work experience of 1 to 5 years.

These statistics indicate the general pattern of gender disparity in employment and leadership positions in government and regional institutions (which ranges from 20% to 30%) across Africa (International IDEA, *et al* 2019). The UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) and the AU related policies such as the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004) and the AU Gender Policy emphasize the importance of equal and full involvement of women in the maintenance of peace and security and urge an increase in the representation and participation of women at all decision-making levels in global, regional, sub- regional and national peace and security processes. In view of this, it is evident that IGAD, EAC and EAC are still short of meeting aspirations of these gender policies.

The research targeted people with expertise knowledge and experience in peace and security and therefore majority of respondents were bound to be middle-aged and well experienced. These cohorts were expected to provide reliable assessment of the organizations they worked for and the security environment in the Eastern Africa subregion.

4.3 Contemporary Security Threats in the Eastern Africa Subregion

Eastern Africa, like other regional blocks of the African continent, has its own history of security threats that are both continuous and dynamic. Some may be classified as unique and complex while others may be common and diverse. In view of this, Objective one of the study sought to establish contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion. Respondents were asked to identify the security threats, rate them in order of prevalence, state their nature and explain their effect to peace and security. The method enhanced ranking of the threats from the most prevalent to the least across the IGAD, EAC and EASF AORs. Terrorism, electoral induced violence and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) emerged as the three most prevalent security threats whereas Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), cybercrime and refugee crisis were the three least prevalent across the CSIs. Cattle rustling, transnational and organized crime and cybercrime were unique to EAC region as indicated in Appendix E. In order to capture the respondents' views on the prevalence of security threats per institution, the researcher used a bar graph to highlight the concentration of the threats within each CSI. This is indicated in Figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1: Respondents' ratings of Contemporary Security Threats
Source: Field Data (2020).

As shown in Figure 4.1, respondents identified 15 contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion. These were terrorism, electoral-induced violence, proliferation of SALWs, conflicts over shared natural resources, territorial and border conflicts, youth unemployment, environmental degradation and climate change, ethnic and clan-based violence, cattle rustling, TOC, cybercrime, food insecurity, piracy, maritime disputes and refugee crises.

Respondents rated terrorism (89.2%), electoral-induced violence (84.3%), proliferation of SALWs (73.6%), conflicts over shared natural resources (56.5%), territorial and border conflicts (52.2%), youth unemployment (43.6%), environmental degradation and climate change (40.0%) and ethnic and clan-based violence (38.9%) as the most prevalent of the security threats within IGAD, EAC and EASF AORs. Whereas cattle rustling, TOC and cybercrime related security threats were rated as more prevalent to the EAC (55.6%), food insecurity (22.4%), piracy (22.0%), maritime disputes (20.9%)

and the presence and movement of refugees (6.9%) were identified as security threats but at lower ratings (below 30%) than the others, across the three CSIs.

The contemporary security threats identified by respondents from the CSIs under study were in tandem with the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED, 2020) which revealed the presence of about 21,600 incidents of armed conflict in Africa in 2019 and other contemporary security challenges such as human trafficking, cybercrimes, drugs and illicit proliferation and trafficking of SALWs, money laundering and environmental degradation. According to the report, these incidents and threats were exacerbated by the increasing underlying threats related to climate change, revealing some interplay of factors generating insecurity in the region. Additionally, the study observes that threats under focus were those affecting the sub-region most of which were transnational. Thus, local threats that were specific to one country were weighed against those affecting the subregion of study. This may explain why some local security threats perceived as more frequent in specific countries within the subregion, for instance banditry and ethnic violence in Kenya, did not rank as high as expected. Furthermore, the mandates of CSIs are aligned to those threats that pose the greatest danger, are multi-dimensional and have long-lasting and spiraling impacts for the peace and security of the subregion.

Due to the fragile nature of states in the subregion, these threats build on current sources of instability such as poorly performing economies, high population growth rate, high poverty rate, vagaries of the weather and over reliance on rain fed agriculture. States coming out of protracted conflicts, for instance South Sudan and Somalia, have no capacity to govern all their areas hence such spots become breeding grounds for organized armed groups and terrorist organizations. These structural vulnerability

conditions make security threats more potent. In order to determine if the ranking of security threats varied significantly by source of respondents, the cross-tabulation technique was applied to compare identified threats by institution (i.e., EAC, EASF and IGAD). By cross-tabulating, the researcher identified patterns of concentration of threats per respective CSIs' Areas of Responsibility (AORs) but the Chi square result ($\chi^2 = 4.086$, $P = 0.253$) indicated no significant association between CSI and ranking of the threats (see Appendix E).

Further analysis was carried out on the security threats that respondents deemed most severe across the AORs of the CSIs. The selected threats were therefore analyzed and investigated in detail in order to provide in-depth insights that would be valuable to the target beneficiaries. The specific threats majorly examined were: terrorism, electoral-induced violence, proliferation of SALWs, conflicts over shared natural resources (resource-based conflicts), territorial and border conflicts, environmental degradation and climate change and ethnic and clan-based violence.

Considering the import and transnational nature of terrorism, the study sought to underscore the perception of respondents on terrorism as a security threat in the subregion. From the findings presented in Figure 4.1, it is evident that an average of 89.2% of the CSIs' respondents identified terrorism as the leading contemporary security threat in the subregion. Interviewees at strategic level from IGAD, EAC and EASF concurred with this finding and observed that member states from the three CSIs experienced regular attacks by *Al Shabaab* terrorists. The interviewees attributed the regular attacks to negative religious and political ideology as well as economic factors. Explaining the religious dimension behind the attacks by AS, an interviewee at IGAD strategic level reported:

...the Al-Shabaab which evolved from the Islamic Courts Union is driven by deep Islamic Jihad movement ideas and has been seeking to establish a region fully governed under Islamic sharia in Somalia and expand it to the rest of the Horn of Africa. Any involvement in Somalia by non-Muslim parties is therefore considered unwelcome and ought to be resisted ... (IGAD strategic level interviewee 06, 2020).

From a historical perspective, the Somalia conflict has taken different dimensions since emergence of clan-based warlords after the disintegration of the Somali security sector in 1991. Islamic based armed fighters emerged after 2006 with the invasion of Ethiopia that was seen as a front for the West /Christian liberal imperialism. The precursor of *Al Shabaab*, of Islamic Courts Union (ICU), legitimized this ideological shift. As a youth wing of ICU, *Al Shabaab* came to assume a life of its own after a number of ICU leaders were assassinated and others co-opted into the government and the liberal world order.

From these views, it is clear that fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic religion has been used to perpetuate some political ideology/agenda and that intervention in Somalia is considered to be foreign and a threat to Islamic traditions. This implies that any successful counter terrorism interventions by the CSIs ought to be integrated with value-based approaches and involvement of local population to propagate anti-terrorism ideals.

Respondents at EASF operational level, while giving their views on the high rating of terrorism in the subregion, also attributed economic factors and politics to terrorism. They linked terrorism to the high level of unemployment in the subregion which made it easy for youth to be lured and recruited into the *Al Shabaab* as a means of earning a living. From the respondents, it further emerged that *Al Shabaab* use terror activities as a means of generating income through illegal activities such as extortion, manifest in illegal taxes and demands for ransom. These sentiments are in agreement with (Kyule,

2018) who avers that poverty and unemployment acted as push factors to make the youth vulnerable to *Al Shabaab* and Al Qaeda recruitment in the subregion. Gobena (2020) also indicates that *Al Shabaab*'s trafficking of charcoal to the Persian Gulf countries and sugar to Kenya constitute the group's main source of finance for its terror activities in the HoA.

CSO interviewees linked the high ratings of terrorism in the subregion to political reasons. They explained that the *Al Shabaab* portrays the current Somali government as incapable of bringing effective local governance in fighting corruption and perceived injustices and grievances such as inequitable distribution of public resources hence the terror group projects itself as the alternative model of governance. In such a scenario, the interviewees argued that inability to address grievances and equity in resource distribution may threaten the legitimacy and survival of a government and its people.

Through FGDs, the study established that the *Al Shabaab* viewed any involvement of external actors in Somalia as interference by crusaders of Western ideologies. Citing examples, FGD participants stated that the *Al Shabaab* continuously attacked AMISOM troops along the main supply routes in Somalia and northern Kenya largely by use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as a retaliation to the perceived occupation of Somalia by foreigners. A CSO informant in an FGD conducted in Somalia observed the following:

...*Al Shaabab* considers international organizations as sympathizers of the current transitional federal government. The terror group also brands AMISOM as an occupational force that has invaded Somalia and they carry out attacks to revenge against some Eastern Africa states for their presence in Somalia as well as against the Somalis who are perceived to support the external actors. This explains the frequent attacks in Kenya... (CSO informant 03, Somalia, 2020).

From the views of respondents, it is evident that terrorism is multi-faceted and has economic, political and religious dimensions where one variable can trigger the manifestation of others. External factors also have influence on this transnational threat which invites regional and global attention. The various terror attacks in the Eastern Africa subregion have economic, political and religious perspectives, drawing the concern of the CSIs. The drivers of terrorism/violent extremism are also diverse and complex. Charismatic preachers, teachers and mobilizers have used powerful strategic communications, compelling messages and promises of material and financial benefits or perceived social status as pull factors that get people to join radical groups. But extremists exploit widespread grievances linked to structural factors such as underdevelopment, poverty, lack of access to education, unemployment, corruption, real or perceived social exclusion, ethnic, national and religious discrimination to radicalize and recruit to violence (IGAD, 2016). This means that counter-terrorism strategies must have effective communication plans using modern social media technologies while governments and development partners address long-term development and peacebuilding in the long run.

From the study findings, the nature of terrorism facing the subregion can be well understood from global ideological shifts and competition. From the 1998 twin bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania to the September 11, 2001 attack in the US, the threat came to assume resistance to Western democratic, religious and capitalist ideological paradigm by Islamic fundamentalist groups. This was perceived as a threat to Islamic religious traditions on the role of the state. However, these views were not shared by majority of Muslims (Amal, 2018).

Due to the strategic value of the Middle East and North African oil resources, Western influence on the leaders and governance in such states became a source of tension from Islamic fundamentalists. These global schisms have had ramifications in Eastern Africa especially in majority Muslim Somalia state and its neighbouring states. This pattern and dynamic is reflected in Mali and northern Nigeria in West Africa (Ackah, 2016). To understand deeper dynamics of security threats in the subregion, one must take cognisance of fundamental global power balances and shifts. This is indicated by the globalization of terrorism with emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as discussed earlier and counter global war on terrorism led by the liberal west. This study was premised on neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism theories which capture the above scenario.

Terrorism derails the work of CSIs by undermining peace and security which is the core business of collective security. The initial entry of Ethiopia into Somalia before AMISOM to defeat the ICU diverted attention and interests of member states. To counter the Ethiopia intervention, Eritrea allegedly began supporting groups opposed to Ethiopia and this caused rifts within IGAD leading to the exit of Eritrea.

In addition, terrorism makes CSIs to divert attention and resources from other equally vital areas such as stabilization of Somalia and South Sudan. Development partners' resources are also directed towards terrorism, rather than for example strengthening local early warning systems. Terrorism that was directed at AMISOM member states such as Kenya and Uganda was meant to undermine regional initiatives for stabilization of Somalia. Therefore, although CSIs' infrastructure has not been attacked or directly targeted, their performance is significantly undermined as this study indicated.

The study further sought to establish the effect of terrorism to peace and security in the Eastern Africa subregion. Interviewees at IGAD strategic level observed that terrorism cripples key economic sectors such as tourism, manufacturing and transport thereby negatively impacting on the social and economic development of a country. In addition, the interviewees reported that loss of life, injuries and displacement related to terrorism have an immediate economic impact because governments may be compelled to divert development expenditure to recurrent expenditure to cater for humanitarian assistance. Regarding the political effect of terrorism, interviewees at the EASF strategic level highlighted that in a bid to address terrorism, governments may come up with anti-terror laws and security policies that may be considered by some sections of the population as irrational and repressive and this could invite protests or political upheavals.

Interviewees at the EAC strategic level further observed that terrorism had a psychosocial dimension because it breeds fear and intolerance among communities. They argued that terrorists targeted key installations for maximum effect thus causing death, destruction of property and infrastructure and massive spread of fear which in the Kenya case had fomented discontent and mistrust and brought about ethnic phobia among communities that had previously co-existed.

While citing examples from Kenya and Uganda, interviewees at the EASF strategic level expounded on the fatalities caused by terrorism in the Eastern Africa subregion.

An interviewee at EASF strategic level explained:

... the 1998 bombing of the US embassy killed 200 people, the 2002 Kikambala attack caused 15 deaths, the 2010 Kampala attack on soccer fans led to the death of 79 people, the 2013 Westgate Mall attack killed 67 people, the 2015 Garissa University terrorist attack caused the deaths of over 140 students while the 2019

Dusit D2 Hotel attack in Kenya had over 20 people killed... (EASF strategic level interviewee, 12, 2020).

The chronology of terror attacks indicates shifting focus and trends of terrorism targets in the subregion. The American Embassy attacks, which were owned up by Al Qaeda, were within the global ideological rifts between the US and the Islamic fundamentalist groups. The attacks that followed were more of *Al Shabaab's* war in Somalia and countries with troops in AMISOM. They aimed at soft populated targets with high media effect. Subsequently the strategy changed to focus on the AMISOM troops inside Somalia. This demonstrates *Al Shabaab's* agility, strategic calculations, responsiveness to changing political environment and their internal change of leadership. This further explains why AMISOM contingents quickly learnt the futility of conventional warfare in Somalia and adapted to asymmetrical warfare. This study captured these conflict dynamics in order to clarify the nature of the threats and illuminate the envisaged strategic responses.

Voicing their views on the effect of terrorism, majority of respondents at the EAC operational level argued that terrorism affects the ease of doing business. Giving an example, they highlighted that in Kenya the tourism industry had been affected to a greater extent by low investor confidence as a result of travel advisories and requirement for armed escorts for tourists to access some parts of the country. CSO interviewees also reported that terrorism and uncontrolled religious extremism in the subregion and beyond are potential security challenges with a ripple effect on the tourism sector, trade and development and may lead to an arms race in the region as each country tries to address the challenge.

Supporting these observations, interviewees at the EAC strategic level explained that foregone foreign revenue due to reduction in number of tourists affected the tourism sector which was one of the leading foreign exchange earners.

An interviewee at EAC strategic level asserted the following:

...terror attacks in Kenya by the Al Shabaab have made the tourism sector lose a lot of revenue because attacks that target foreigners and Western interests have made foreign states issue warnings to their citizens not to travel to affected countries. Terror attacks inculcate fear, subsequent insecurity and resultant negative economic impacts on growth sectors like tourism and aviation which are security intensive and account for a substantial proportion of regional external earnings... (EAC strategic level interviewee, 05, 2020).

From the views of respondents, it emerges that terrorism has serious effects on the social and economic development of the Eastern Africa subregion. The threat has affected human capital formation, the key sectors of the economy and this could lead to a decline in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Terrorism also affects the psychosocial well-being of individuals and this is manifested in fear and anxiety.

Economic security is important in maintaining the stability of any subregion as proffered by neoliberal institutionalism. Awake to the realities caused by terrorism in the subregion, for instance fear in the international system, CSIs have provided a platform for cooperation on issues of terrorism owing to the shared impacts of the threat on the economy and development of the subregion. Besides, the resultant fear associated with this threat has caused member states to pursue unilateral actions to protect their perceived national interests thereby bypassing collective norms and approaches. These self-help measures may further jeopardize regional security. This explains the utility limits of CSIs and the primacy of interests of sovereign states in international relations as proffered by neorealism. The ensuing tension of state and

CSIs' security response strategies is thus well illuminated by the theories employed in the study. This is not a unique situation to Eastern Africa but it has been seen in ECOWAS, during the Nigerian-led ECOMOG, EU with the UK Brexit and US unilateralism in global international affairs despite the presence of NATO.

Findings of the present study on the effect of terrorism to social and economic development of the subregion are in consonance with the African Development Bank Report (2019) which posits that as a result of recurrent terror attacks, the performance of economies of Eastern Africa states had been affected in general with reduced economic growth recorded between 2015 and 2019. This is supported by the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report (2020) which ranked Rwanda at position 38, Kenya 56, Uganda 116, Tanzania 141, Burundi 166, South Sudan 185 and Somalia position 190 implying that greater instability occasioned by threats such as terrorism had negatively impacted on the business environment of the affected states. Brodeur (2017) further avers that terrorism leads to a rise in the cost of doing business as a result of higher wages and more expenditure on increased airport security. This resonates with the findings of the present study that expenditure on armed escorts for tourists raises the cost of doing business and hence leads to poor economic performance in the tourism sector in Kenya.

Highlighting the negative effect of terrorism on performance of businesses, Tauringana *et al.*, (2020) also observed that terrorism incidents occasion a major decline in tourism and create an unfavourable environment for business performance. In the Eastern Africa subregion, IGAD, EAC and EASF have attempted to address the problem using different approaches including creation of institutions and programmes for Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (PCVE). However, beyond these material

structures, implementation of such programmes will depend on ideas, interpretation and shared norms among member states.

African countries are trying to eliminate such extremist groups and fight this terrorist ideology. CSIs have put efforts to address terrorism at the intellectual, economic, security and social levels as well. Indeed, AU Agenda 2063 tried to pay due attention to youth in particular, seeking to empower and integrate them into African societies. The Agenda was set to eliminate all manifestations of marginalization suffered by some groups within these societies (UN, 2016).

From a neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist perspective, it may be argued that though these common security threats to the respective subregions have been identified and a common approach proffered in domestication of agreed norms and responses regarding issues such as youth unemployment, good governance and terrorism, there are a number of factors that still hinder effectiveness of CSIs in addressing security threats among them member states differing perception.

Empirical data indicated that electoral- induced violence was rated as the second most prevalent security threat in the Eastern Africa region by an average of 84.3% of the total respondents across the three CSIs (IGAD, 87.5%; EAC, 77.8% and EASF, 87.5%). In support of this high rating, interviewees at EAC strategic level attributed electoral-induced violence to weak governance, which is characterized by elements of corruption and institutional failure in service delivery with far-reaching impacts on the economic and social well-being of citizens in the affected states.

This view was also supported by respondents at EAC operational level who argued that diminished public faith in governance structures undermined the rule of law as well as the legitimacy and constitutional foundations of a state with the attendant effects being,

among others, mass action by civilians and increased crime rate. These have the potential to morph into violent conflict. Further, an interviewee at the EAC strategic level explained:

...weak governance has proved to be a source of insecurity in the region. Lack of respect for democratic norms has made some sections of the society feel frustrated and seek leadership through violence, insurrection and irredentism. In addition, the justice system in the subregion has been weakened by corruption, impunity and lack of accountability making people prefer alternative pathways to justice some of which may promote insecurity... (EAC strategic level interviewee 01, 2020).

All countries in Eastern Africa have suffered from democratic deficits with Kenya's 2007/8 post-election violence a litmus test to its democratic credentials. Tanzania experiences limited media and multiparty freedoms where leaders and journalists are detained for political reasons. Uganda has limited tolerance towards opposition politics while Burundi promotes a nascent ethnic minority and majority fair representation and a tradition of organized armed political parties. Rwanda with its denial of separate existence of ethnic Hutu majority disguises her political subjugation in favour of blind ethnic lens which attempts to emasculate this age-old political tension.

From the foregoing, the study deduced that political systems where formal governance and democratic institutions are obscured by informal relationships based on the exchange of resources and political loyalty may instigate electoral tensions as political constituents support their preferred candidates. The motivation, in this case, is the flow of patronage goods or the fight for political space in view of perceived/real feelings of marginalization.

CSIs such as IGAD and EAC have come up with institutions for good governance. However, implementation of the agreed norms, rules and values at member state level

remains a challenge implicating the limited role of CSIs in influencing the behaviour or actions of member states. This resonates with the neorealists' pessimism of states cooperation in international relations given their self-calculated interests. However, as proffered by constructivism, with continuous actions and interactions, social relations among member states may gradually lead to change in behaviour as a critical mass of member states adopt and internalize good governance norms.

Interviewees at IGAD strategic level further illustrated that electoral-induced violence was as a result of weak electoral institutions which in essence could not guarantee credible electoral processes. Giving reference to South Sudan, an interviewee explained:

...IGAD member states have witnessed highly contested elections and related violence because of perceived manipulation of elections by the ruling class. This has often created a feeling of segregation and marginalization of the leaders in the opposition. A case in point is the South Sudan crisis which has witnessed clashes between supporters of President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar... (IGAD strategic level interviewee, 12, 2020).

The pace of democratic consolidation in the subregion also differs across IGAD, EAC and EASF member states. The challenge of establishing the ballot as the determinant of governance in countries that emerged from civil wars and where rebel leaders metamorphosed into elected leaders, remains significant. In countries such as South Sudan where political hegemony has not been clearly defined among coalition leaders, the system often experiences turbulence as parties jostle for power in a bid to establish a specific paradigm that defines balance of power among contesting constituencies.

On further probing regarding the prevalence of electoral-induced violence, CSO interviewees observed that this threat was attributed to the fight for democratic space

between the ruling regime (considered authoritarian and backed by the state forces) and the opposition leaders who are considered by a section of the populace as crusaders of transparency and accountability in the public sector. This difference in perception by various political constituents has been a recipe for electoral-induced violence, *coup d'états* and the resulting disregard for the rule of law.

One CSO interviewee stated:

...political elections in the region are highly charged and could cause divisions in countries if not managed and accepted by the parties. This is made worse by the common African traditional practice where too much authority is vested on individuals and not institutions. Contested elections can lead to violence and hence insecurity for the citizens like it happened in Kenya during post-election violence in the year 2007 and Comoros which has had over twenty-two coup d'états ... (CSO interviewee 09, 2020).

Electoral management bodies do not enjoy independence even in Kenya where democracy has improved overtime. Sometimes parliaments do not legislate for an enabling environment for electoral conduct. In Tanzania, opposition parties do not operate freely and freedom of the press is curtailed. In Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda elections are marred by harassment of opposition leaders and political intolerance. South Sudan and Somalia are faced by even more challenges to conduct credible free and fair elections, with opposition parties still bearing arms. These national failures make the region vulnerable to political violence as has been witnessed even in the ongoing Ethiopian conflict.

Giving their contribution on the prevalence of electoral-induced violence in the subregion, respondents at operational level from EASF observed that failure to uphold constitutional obligations by governments as relates to the conduct of credible electoral processes often leads to impunity, human rights abuse, corruption and perceptions of

marginalization further propagating inter-communal violence along ethnic lines. The respondents further argued that income inequality attributed to skewed distribution of state resources, increase in poverty and youth unemployment were additional drivers to electoral-induced violence in the subregion. These macroeconomic variables lead to disenfranchisement. Agreeing with the aforementioned, CSO informants in an FGD explained that when such structural gaps are not adequately addressed, physical violence was likely to occur with the electoral process being a trigger.

Between 1990 and 2015, about 60% of elections in Africa experienced some form of electoral violence (Buchard, 2016 as quoted in Ojoka & Ocholb, 2017). Electoral violence is revealed in many ways, for instance, intimidation of candidates and voters, physical harassment, assault on journalists, imprisonment and assassinations, confrontations with security forces and attacks on local party headquarters (Ojoka & Acholb, 2017).

There are a number of strategic and incidental factors identified by scholars as contributors to electoral violence: weak institutions which are highly dependent on individual leaders rather than set rules and regulations, norms and virtues (Klaus, 2015). This malady affects political parties as well as the Elections Management Bodies (EMBs), the judiciary and the security sector. Patrimonialism and corruption coupled with ethnic solidarity creates exclusion for some groups. These groups become frustrated and depending on the magnitude of disaffection may resort to violence as witnessed in Kenya and rebellion in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia (Laakso, 2019). In our analysis, we argue that the role of leadership in electoral malpractices resonates with postulates of constructivism which hold that politics is not

only shaped by material structures such as CSIs but by ideas, beliefs and actions especially of leaders who as agents shape the material structures.

Elections being a competitive process, further exacerbated by the First Past the Post (FPTP) or ‘winner-take-all’ electoral systems prevalent in Africa, is a potential cause of violence. Young people are often recruited as foot soldiers, owing to their relentless energy, vast skills and knowledge (Ojoka & Acholb, 2017). The advent of social media platforms intensified electoral participation as citizens - mostly in urban and peri-urban centres, resort to *Twitter* and *Facebook* to campaign for and against their political candidates. These platforms often become a medium of incitement to violence in contested electoral processes (Ojoka & Acholb, 2017). The implication is that poor management of elections is one indicator of democratic deficit and vulnerability to conflict. This does not provide a conducive environment for CSIs to conduct CPMR and peacebuilding in stabilization of fragile states and the subregion.

Through FGD informants in Burundi, the study further revealed that criminal violence perpetuated by Non-State Actors (NSAs) such as politicians and criminal gangs in pursuit of private motives contributed to electoral-induced violence. Illustrating this, the informants reported that criminal actors may rely on protection of certain politicians in exchange for intimidation of their opponents during elections. Citing some of the criminal activities perpetuated by state and NSAs, the FDG participants identified barring candidates from campaigning or voting, violence against political party agents or specific party followers or even attacks on media and advocacy groups championing democratic principles. One CSO informant explained:

...there are many players that contribute to or perpetuate electoral chaos and conflicts experienced in many of the affected countries. Usually, politicians from both opposing divides may fund youths or use their power in the case of the ruling regime to cause chaos. This chaos may be election related, but also it could be as a result of a desire to achieve hidden agendas by politicians and criminal gangs... (CSO informant 03, Burundi, 2020).

Most countries facing electoral violence have organized armed groups linked to political parties or politicians and their ethnic constituencies. It is only in Tanzania where this phenomenon has not assumed significance. Emergence of such groups can be associated with perceptions of electoral process illegitimacy. It can also be a response from marginalized groups who feel that an electoral process, even when its free and fair, does not deliver electoral justice. From these sentiments, it can be deduced that mitigation of electoral related conflicts, just like many other cross cutting security threats, calls for an analysis of the multiple actors involved as well as their interests. This observation contends with neoliberal institutionalism that recognizes the role of NSAs in international relations as well as constructivism that takes cognisance of the place of agency of individuals for instance politicians on the material structures. These individuals continually shape social structures such as electoral processes.

Contributing on the effects of electoral-induced violence, CSO interviewees identified notable effects of electoral-related violence such as voter apathy, loss of faith in electoral institutions and processes, displacement and loss of lives and livelihoods. Probed to explain the effects of electoral- induced violence on ethnic relations, interviewees at IGAD strategic level argued that electoral violence is related to ethnic and clan-based violence because politicians usually coalesce around their ethnic groups and could fund militia to mete violence against an opposing ethnic group. The result could be deep seated hate and prejudice that lasts beyond elections. At a simple trigger,

violence could easily erupt with each ethnic group citing historical injustices. This finding on the link between electoral- induced violence and ethnic tensions is in concurrence with Birch *et al.*, (2020) who posit that continuous tensions between ethnic groups over elections may have long-lasting effects on inter-communal relations and the potential for renewed violence outside the electoral arena.

From the analysis of findings, it can be inferred that mobilization of groups using ethnic identities against others and in pursuit of values/ goods such as electoral power has been a key phenomenon in the context of Eastern Africa subregion CSIs. Based on the constructivism paradigm, besides the prevalence of electoral related conflicts, Eastern Africa CSIs have adopted common norms and values on good governance to address this threat.

To illustrate the effects of electoral-induced violence on consolidation of democratic principles, CSO interviewees reported that a history of subversion of the sovereign will of the people through electoral malpractices leads to voter apathy. They asserted that voter apathy is manifested through depressed voter turnout adding that disenfranchised voters may also be unwilling to support government policies thus leading to diminished legitimacy of a government. In support, tactical level respondents at EASF added that the effect of this apathy may be carried over to generations thus building stereotypes that could affect the building of firm democratic structures.

Findings of the present study on voter apathy as a resultant effect of electoral violence are in resonance with those by Birnir & Ghodes and Condra *et al.*, (2018) who aver that, victims of electoral violence may feel not convinced to take part in elections and may have a low legitimacy rating for a regime that got into power through a flawed electoral process. Present study findings comport with those of Klaus *et al.*, (2015) and

Laakso (2019) who stated that electoral violence had security implications such as collapse of public order, the flow of refugees and IDPs and the militarization of the state and society in the affected states which also clearly demonstrates the role of both state and non-state actors in perpetuating this threat to security.

From the foregoing, state legitimacy has been a source of social and national disintegration and political instability as has been manifested recently in Burundi, South Sudan, Sudan and the current Tigray civil war in Ethiopia that has even attracted participation of Eritrea forces. The resulting social effects such as IDP/refugee flows and external interventions contribute to the low fragility state index rating that a number of countries in the subregion portray (FFP, 2021).

The CSIs in the subregion have been confronted with incidences of electoral-induced violence (Daxecker *et al.*, 2019). Findings of this study are also in agreement with arguments by Harish & Toha (2019) who contend that electoral violence as a threat to security often involves coercive acts against humans, property and infrastructure. In addition, electoral violence involves multilayered and diverse motivation and various actors Soederberg (2018) and Agbiboa (2018). For instance, other forms of organized violence related with private motives usually spurred /shaped electoral violence as expounded by Barnes (2017) and Trejo & Ley (2018). Thus, from a constructivist dimension, a broadened analysis that takes into account the role of culture and identity in defining the interests of various actors who shape national and sub-regional security policies and transnational securities would be appropriate. This is a feature of countries that have not developed civic nationhood. This implies that state institutions are not perceived to provide individual rights of citizenship therefore groups resort to their

ethnic or clan identity to pursue their perceived rights. Some countries have introduced proportional representation in their constitutions in order to safeguard group rights.

From the views of respondents, the researcher deduced that electoral- induced violence could be a trigger to conflicts or resumption of conflicts in otherwise relatively stable countries. It also emerged that electoral- induced violence may contribute to the weakening of electoral ties between politicians and voters and this may ultimately compromise achievement of consolidation of democracy. From the foregoing, it could be further deduced that electoral-related violence in the Eastern Africa subregion is largely a manifestation of governance challenges where governments perhaps fail to mediate between the needs of different sections of the populace. This is more prominent in countries emerging from conflicts such as South Sudan and Somalia. More stable countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania were also not immune to challenges of honouring voices of the people for instance by conducting free and fair elections. Generally, thus, management of electoral-induced violence largely calls for political strategies that embrace strong institutions that are all inclusive and well-coordinated taking into account the unique historical, socio-cultural and economic dynamics of each country in the three CSIs.

Electoral violence in member states affects performance of CSIs in several ways. There is also the lack of consensus within CSIs' high political organs that provide overall leadership. For example, currently, it is hard to achieve common military and political goals towards stabilization of Somalia and South Sudan, when Ethiopia is undergoing a civil war. There is also lethargy and division among global powers on the best way forward for financial, military and political assistance of the HoA when some countries

are perceived to be going against the grain of sub-regional and international peace and security conventions.

This situation also makes the work of CSIs difficult when foreign powers decide to be impartial in the conflict. As this study demonstrates, global peace and security in the current American and Trans-Atlantic hegemony, is pegged on liberal democratic peace paradigm. The assumption is that countries and regions that uphold democratic ideals and practices live in peace internally and co-exist peacefully with their neighbours. Although domestically instigated, the international ramifications of electoral violence cannot be ignored. The neorealism theory which only appreciates exogeneous factors is thus limited in analyzing the CSIs' capacities /capabilities in mitigating this threat to security. However, the efforts of CSIs with regard to capacity building of institutions and in regard to good governance projects the shared norms /ideology of member state leaders as they embrace conventionally proffered democratic principles. This is in line with the provisions of neoliberalism and constructivism.

The sub- regional security threats examined also take place in an atmosphere where there are perceptions of China rising to overtake NATO economically, militarily and politically in the not-too-distant future. Modern China having emerged from socialism does not embrace democratic ideals of the Western model. In alliance with Russia, it promotes a state-based command economy with freedom of entrepreneurship. China does not measure its relations with developing countries based on human rights or democratic values and practices. In recent years, China has emerged as a leading financier of development in the developing countries. The West has interpreted this as an affront on its power projections. Many African countries have found the China governance and development model attractive, where there are no strings attached and

the colonial paternalistic master - supervision approach is relegated to the archives. These globally competing governance paradigms have an effect on the CSIs' CPMR and stabilization initiatives.

Within the subregion, Djibouti hosts NATO members and China's military bases. Though such neorealism manoeuvres are nominally meant to assure safe international maritime trade along the Indian Ocean, the bases are also strategic assets that can readily be used to pursue external national interests. This may have ramifications on performance of CSIs, where they are relegated to observers as it happened with the African Union during the NATO's 2011 invasion of Libya to 'stabilize' the country.

As neorealism theory maintains, epochs of monumental global power shift have major impacts on international peace and security. Both the first and the second World Wars were meant, at least from the perspective of the victorious alliance, to stem a rising German under a dictator, from destabilizing power balance in Europe, then maintained through a multi-polar alliance of European powers. The end of the Cold War from 1989 ushered in a period of instability within the former Soviet Union's satellite Republics. Yugoslavia broke into several countries as the Balkans exploded into wars based on declared ethnic based states. In Africa, a wave of pluralist liberal democratic states was ushered, where there were internal regime changes, some peaceful and others catastrophic as the early 1990s political pogroms in Burundi and the Rwanda genocide of 1994. CSIs are subject to these forces and this calls for strategic security analysis and planning to enable IGAD, EAC and EASF to determine the best course of action, to limit their vulnerability and to enhance their performance.

In response to the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) as a cause of instability in the subregion, 73.6% of respondents (IGAD, 64.6%, EAC, 72.2% and

EASF, 83.9%) rated SALWs as the third most prevalent threat. While explaining the high rating, interviewees at IGAD strategic level explained that this threat was fuelled by the active presence of arms traffickers, local militia, perceived socio-economic and political marginalization of some communities; especially the pastoral /nomadic communities within the subregion. In support of the aforementioned view, interviewees at EASF strategic level argued that proliferation of SALWs was a direct consequence of resource competition and the presence of ungoverned spaces in the national peripheral regions. Interviewees at EAC strategic level further observed that in such circumstances, local militias acquired SALWs for criminal activities while pastoralists obtained them for protection (of their livestock).

At the EAC strategic level, an interviewee observed:

...cases of small arms and light weapons proliferation have been common in arid and semi-arid areas due to competition or protection of the scarce natural resources on which the inhabitant communities depend for their livelihoods. This situation is made dire by the fact that these areas are very far from the presence of the national government and thus probably have little preserve of state machinery... (EAC strategic level interviewee 01, 2020).

Due to the nature of colonial governance system inherited by independent states, development was concentrated in high potential areas such as metropolitan areas, near railway lines, schools, hospitals, good roads, where cash crops such as coffee, tea, cocoa or minerals were located. This made some peripheral areas with no significant resources feel marginalized. Lack of government facilities also meant low security and administrative establishment. These outlier regions in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria have been a source of complex insecurities that have been exacerbated by climate change with the downwards spread of the Sahara Desert. Devolution, affirmative action, governance and federalism are some of policy

options that have been put in place. However, challenges of CPMR and peacebuilding abound.

Giving their views on the threat, CSO interviewees from Somalia attributed proliferation of SALWs to external actors with vested interests within the subregion and the element of border porosity. They reported that easy access to arms and capacity to sustain conflict by Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) such as warlords, mercenaries, terrorists and pirates influences the accumulation of illicit SALWs. Adding their voice, CSO informants during FGDs in Somalia cited the collapse of the Siad Barre regime which led to the rise of warlords and thus the proliferation of arms and an upsurge in terror activities in the subregion. In support of the influence of external actors, FGD informants in South Sudan attributed SALWs to proxy wars by some countries alleged to destabilize neighbouring states in the subregion by funding and providing arms to local militias. The informants further linked proliferation of SALWs to the presence of foreign Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs) and military bases in view of the trans-border nature of their operations and the porous regional borders. From these findings, the significant contribution of both state, NSAs and VNSAs in the proliferation of SALWs and related insecurity in the subregion can be used to inform the integrated and multi-pronged approach that CSIs in the subregion undertake to mitigate the threat.

Interviewees from IGAD, EAC and EASF strategic level also recognized the challenge of achieving regional stability in a subregion characterized by porous borders and high influx of SALWs. This observation affirms findings by Galadima and Ogonnaya (2018) who argued that the East and Southern African subregions are challenged by border porosity, terrorist insurgencies and the proliferation of SALWs.

A report by Small Arms Survey and AU attribute proliferation of SALWs to both local pull factors as well as push factors from private unaccountable international arms dealers (SAS, 2019). Regarding border porosity, CSO interviewees reported that Eastern Africa's borders are expansive, porous and have largely unmanned crossing points, aspects that favour the transfer of illicit SALWs into the hands of pastoralists and this heightens banditry and cattle rustling in the subregion. According to these interviewees, possession and exchange of SALWs among these unlicensed holders was a trigger to the general insecurity since SALWs were also likely to be hired to criminals in urban areas. Such threats pose challenges to CSIs, thereby hindering their CPMR and peacebuilding programmes effectiveness.

During FGDs in South Sudan, majority of the informants linked the proliferation of SALWs to corruption amongst immigration officials at border points and inadequate modern technology factors that favoured trafficking of SALWs in the subregion. This was summarized by a CSO informant who explained:

...arms used in previous civil wars in Uganda, South Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia found their way into border pastoralist communities. These weapons later facilitated traditional practices of livestock raiding thereby turning the traditional practice of cattle rustling into lethal warfare. Furthermore, as pastoral communities became saturated with arms, they became suppliers of arms to non-pastoral areas and urban centres. Inadequate policing makes it easy for these arms to circulate without being detected. Consequently, armed criminality in urban, rural and border areas is on the increase. As such, it results into a source of insecurity as it is used as a key driver of conflicts over resources and cattle raids... (CSO informant 06, South Sudan, 2020).

Based on the views of respondents, it is evident that the proliferation of SALWs in the Eastern Africa subregion is still an issue of concern. The threat is attributed to presence of arms traffickers, militia and ungoverned spaces in the region. In addition, the high prevalence of the threat is worsened by resource competition, influence of external

actors and border porosity. It also emerged that the nature of SALWs has morphed over the years due to dynamics such as commercial and political interests, cattle rustling and terrorism.

Using the lens of complex conflict view point, proliferation of SALWs may be an indicator of weak governance in the far-flung parts of the state, feelings of marginalization among communities living far away from public services, feelings of insecurity and an instrument of pursuing power and resources from other communities or the state through violence. Unstable countries with porous borders provide a conducive environment for procurement, sale and transfer of such weapons.

Findings of the current study are in tandem with views articulated by Sami (2018) who opined that among factors that fuel possession of small arms are inter-communal conflicts, border disputes, cattle rustling and poaching, the rise of organized crimes, terrorist activities and drug and human trafficking. In a departure from Sami (2018) on factors fuelling SALWs, the current study went ahead and determined that the proliferation of SALWs is influenced by presence of arms traffickers, militia and ungoverned spaces in the region, resource competition, influence of external actors and border porosity. This study also established that commercial and political interests and cattle rustling had been the key triggers behind the morphing of the threat of SALWs.

This study argues that the interdependence of member states in addressing the transboundary threat and the interrelated causative factors requires effective institutional coordination mechanisms that embrace input and concerns from various actors or stakeholders. This justifies the need for explicit mandates of CSIs regarding mitigation of such threats and echoes provisions of the neoliberal institutionalism tenet that places emphasis on cooperation and coordination in pursuit of regional security.

Findings of the study on the influence of external actors in the proliferation of SALWs in the subregion are in consonance with Adeniyi (2017) who avers that the threat of SALWs in Africa revolves around NSAs including militias, warlords and extremist groups with hidden motives who fuel conflict by supplying arms and that the proliferation of SALWs has been a trigger of conflict in Somalia. Adeniyi (2017) posits that the flow of illicit SALWs especially among VNSAs significantly undermines public security and social cohesion thus compromising the stability of the Eastern Africa subregion.

This argument is supported by RECSA (2015) which reported that the threat of SALWs has been prevalent at borderlines and in pastoral communities such as the Karamoja cluster which encompasses north-western Kenya, south western parts of South Sudan and the border regions of the Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples Religion (SNNPR) of Ethiopia. The same dynamics prevail in the Somali cluster region that brings together the borderlines of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. The *Al Shaabab* factor further militarizes this phenomenon, enjoining it to the global religious based ideological conflicts. Findings regarding changing nature and nexus between proliferation of SALWs and other threats are in tandem with a study by Mkutu (2019) who opines that the demand for small arms in Kenya is for instance related to pastoralist conflicts over water and pastures. Citing the case of Somalia, Mkutu (2019) notes that the threat of proliferation of SALWs is rife especially in Somalia where *Al Shabaab* run gun-running activities along the Kenya- Somalia border. This clearly shows the fusion between SALWs and terrorism.

Proliferation of SALWs undermines CSIs performance in CPMR, peacebuilding and stabilization. IGAD has invested a lot of time and effort in strengthening cross border

security arrangements and inter-communal peacebuilding. This was mostly implemented along the Karamoja Cluster (border regions of Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya) and Somali Cluster (border region of Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia). At times the region appeared to have reached a turning point of durable peace especially on the Ugandan side where disarmament was made a permanent feature.

Despite concerted efforts by UN agencies, CSOs and local community peacebuilding networks, SALWs often render this remarkable contribution *a fait accompli*. Instability among states in the region and poor enforcement of rules and regulations, heighten the threat. This situation applies to the EASF domain but it is relatively less significant in EAC member countries such as Tanzania and Uganda, where arid and semi-arid lands form a small part of their territories. From this discussion, one of the key factors connected to this threat revolves around scarcity/ pursuit of resources. Constructivism which edifies ideation structures over material structures is thus limited in explaining this feature. However, borrowing from the same theoretical perspective, the identity of key actors in conflicts over shared resources and their interests has been explored by CSIs such as IGAD which has brought together pastoral communities in the subregion to effectively mitigate the threat. This interaction by actors and their shared norms may change behaviour that would bring about relative stability in the Eastern Africa subregion.

Concerning conflicts over shared natural resources, 56.5% of respondents, IGAD (58.3%), EASF (50%) and EAC (61.1%), rated it as the fourth most prevalent contemporary security threat in the Eastern Africa subregion. When probed to provide further insights, interviewees at EAC strategic level acknowledged that these types of conflicts were more pronounced at border points where ownership of natural resources

assumed a transnational nature. Such conflicts were therefore related to competition over exploitation of potential or discovered natural resources. The interviewees further illustrated that resource-based conflicts had been witnessed in member states of the three CSIs. These include the Abyei conflict between Sudan and South Sudan; the Migingo dispute between Kenya and Uganda; the Ilemi Triangle dispute between Kenya and South Sudan; the Kenya-Somalia maritime row; and the tension among the Nile Basin riparian states such as Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over the exploitation of the Nile waters. Concurring with this assertion, an interviewee at IGAD strategic level explained:

...the Great Lakes Region is affected by the fight for exploitation of natural resources. The conflicts in Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan are mainly fuelled by the desire to control and exploit natural resources. Internal and external actors fund armed groups to cause insecurity and instability in order to exploit resources through unaccounted channels. The riparian states that share the Nile especially Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan have had standoffs regarding the exploitation of Nile waters. Kenya and Uganda have contested over Migingo due to exploitation of fish in the island. Equally, scarcity of water has been a major cause of conflict. In North Eastern part of Uganda and North Eastern parts of Kenya, scarcity of water and pastures for animals has led to ethnic clashes between pastoral communities... (IGAD strategic level interviewee 01, 2020).

In most cases intra-state resource conflicts among pastoral and agro-pastoralist groups are focused on less strategic resources such as water and pasture. Where groups contest national resource distribution, conflicts assume a political dimension, they become more widespread and can threaten state stability. IGAD and EAC have addressed such conflicts with mixed results in South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi.

While contributing on the issue of conflicts over shared natural resources, respondents at EASF operational level highlighted that the threat commonly arises due to inadequate implementation of policy frameworks on the best methods of sharing natural resources

among different communities. CSOs interviewees in South Sudan explained that sharing and exploitation of natural resources was a source of conflict at intrastate level within the subregion. These conflicts took an ethnic dimension and were fuelled by both internal and external actors.

A CSO interviewee explained as follows:

...in South Sudan, the rivalries between Dinka and Nuer revolve around traditional socio-economic issues. The communities fought over access to water and pasture and engaged in cattle rustling. During the secession war, the Sudan Government armed the Nuer to fight against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement which was predominantly Dinka... (CSO interviewee 04, 2020).

This finding is a pointer that access to resources is a significant marker of communal power. Given scarcity of non-strategic resources in the country, inter communal competition leads to conflict. This situation is exacerbated by over reliance on such resources due to lack of alternative means of livelihoods occasioned by the underdevelopment of the national economy.

Through FGDs with CSOs beneficiaries in Somalia, the study established that high poverty levels and perceptions of relative deprivation, especially among pastoral groups, were active drivers of conflicts over shared natural resources. The FGD informants further explained that most Eastern Africa states operate on a single digit GDP (that is below 10%) and the majority of households rely on exploitation of natural resources (land, water, forests) to earn a living. Any threat to the primary source of livelihoods may therefore trigger conflict through mobilization around issues of social exclusion.

The above scenario captures the multifaceted nature of conflicts over shared natural resources and contends with the views of other respondents who indicated that sharing

of natural resources usually had social, political and economic dimensions manifested through ethnicity and clannism, income inequality and achievement of various political objectives. In addition, it is evident from the findings that inadequate policies and implementation strategies on the best methods of sharing natural resources among communities could also be a driver of conflict.

Findings of the present study are in consonance with a study by Aidoo (2017) who argued that fragile states with weak institutions are extremely vulnerable to resource scarcity and are more likely to experience multiple violations of their human rights among their citizenry. In relation to resources, conflicts also manifest in states where there are inadequate policies and structures for effective management of shared natural resources. Kimenyi and Lewis (2016) note the positive impact of the recently discovered oil and natural gas resources on the economies of East Africa countries but also point out that if not well managed, the exploitation of these resources may be a source of competitive conflicts, ultimately undermining the desired development in the subregion. Present study findings support earlier findings of a study by Kweyu *et al.*, (2020) which established that natural resources are a major source of conflict and their uncontrolled use can lead to deforestation and degradation thereby further transforming conflicts.

Based on these findings, it can therefore be deduced that strategic resources may cause conflicts both in scarcity and abundance. Although there are no significant violent conflicts over strategic resources in the subregion, such conflicts may not be ruled out in future if mitigating factors are not taken into consideration. The presence of oil wells along the border of South Sudan and Sudan has been a source of conflict between the two countries and between communities inside both countries. The scarcity of water

and pasture among pastoral communities has often been a source of conflict with the potential of transiting to violent conflicts when combined with other state fragility factors. This, therefore, implies that conflict analysis in the subregion and the subsequent choice of CPMR mechanisms need to take into account the applicable (shared) natural resources.

Cross-border natural resources conflicts mostly affect IGAD and to a lesser extent EAC and EASF. Since IGAD has a higher profile in management of ecosystem-based conflicts, this threat has more bearing on its ability for CPMR and stabilization of the subregion. Most IGAD members share the Nile Basin, where there has been disputes pitting Ethiopia against Egypt and Sudan. This scenario also applies to the Kenya/Somalia maritime dispute based on prospects of abundant strategic seabed resources. Where member states engage in conflict over transboundary resources, the collective good will of IGAD is lost. Resort to legal processes to address transboundary resource disputes creates losers and winners, thereby undermining the value of regional and CSIs, as avenues of mediation and cooperation in member states collective disputes resolution. In such situations, it becomes difficult to arrive at consensus in collective decision making. Political commitment to advance mediation is often lost, where one or more parties are reluctant to engage such as the case of Ethiopia in relation to the dispute over use of Nile waters in the ongoing filling of the Grand Renaissance Dam.

With reference to territorial and border conflicts, 52.2% of respondents, IGAD (64.6%), EASF (64.3%) and EAC (27.8%) indicated that it was the fifth most prevalent security threat in Eastern African subregion. Majority of interviewees at IGAD strategic level noted that territorial and border conflicts were recurring issues that affected the consolidation of peace and security initiatives in the subregion. Furthermore, the

interviewees observed that there were unresolved boundary issues among member states of the CSIs. This was attributed to factors such as political sensitivity, the AU principle on respect of borders existing on achievement of independence and the relative insignificance of border/ territorial conflicts in comparison to the mutual benefits of good neighbourliness. Examples of these conflicts in the subregion, as cited by respondents from the three CSIs include: the Kenya-South Sudan silent dispute over the Ilemi Triangle, Kenya-Somalia maritime boundary conflict in the Indian Ocean and the Kenya-Uganda dispute over Migingo Island in Lake Victoria.

Interviewees at the IGAD strategic level argued that border disputes in the Eastern Africa subregion were related to inherited colonial boundaries and legacies that did not factor in the ethnic configurations of communities. An interviewee at the IGAD strategic level captured it thus:

... Eastern Africa state boundaries inherited from the colonialists at independence are what we call Government boundaries. These are border points viewed as rigid geographical demarcations where the border is more of an enclosure for a state as opposed to being a bridge to other countries. Divide and rule by colonial powers meant that even after independence, states continue to view their neighbours suspiciously... (IGAD strategic level interviewee, 03, 2020).

This view was further corroborated through an explanation by an interviewee at EAC strategic level who asserted:

...border disputes in the Eastern Africa subregion emanated from unmarked demarcation of colonial boundaries. For instance, Kenya and Somalia have a dispute over their maritime boundary in the Indian Ocean which is a colonial border that has never been reviewed. Both countries lay claim to the area because it supposedly has large oil and gas deposits. A larger surface area translates to more resources. This dispute over maritime territory creates interstate tension... (EAC strategic level interviewee 02, 2020).

The effect of colonialism on interstate boundary conflicts/disputes and on the general peace and security environment in Africa was discussed by Okoi (2016) who observed that colonialism and boundary conflicts had greatly affected the peaceful status among most states. Such tensions have greatly influenced contemporary strategies put across to safeguard regional security.

Interviewees from trio institutions under study also recognized the challenge of achieving regional stability in a subregion characterized by porous borders and high influx of SALWs. This observation affirms findings by Galadima and Ogbonnaya (2018) who argued that the East and Southern Africa regions were challenged by border porosity, terrorist insurgencies and the proliferation of SALWs. The findings justify the neorealist argument which has relegated to the back burner, the role of regional institutions in facilitating state cooperation especially on matters that have high sovereignty cost and in which states seek zero sum gains.

Interviewees at IGAD, EAC and EASF strategic level recognized external actors' involvement in maritime disputes in Africa. The inadequacy of the sub-regional state capacity in the mining sector makes states vulnerable to manipulation and extortion by international mining companies who for instance caused and enhanced inter/ intrastate tensions by exaggerating the potential high stakes involved in the anticipated explorations.

This was summed up by an interviewee at IGAD strategic level who asserted:

... most African countries lack strong remote sensing capability to establish and map location and quantity of underground natural resources at their disposal. International mining companies with such capabilities take advantage of countries with weak technological and negotiating capacities. An example is the Kenya-Somalia maritime boundary dispute where different international mining companies have separately approached both countries for access to exploration blocks. The mining companies and sometimes their host countries often divulge

information on the possible quantity and value of the reserves. This raises emotional attachment and political value of the resource hence escalating the maritime dispute between the conflicting states... (IGAD strategic level interviewee 09, 2020).

A dispute between Kenya and Somalia over maritime territory in the Indian Ocean resulted to major Western countries lining up on either side, depending on which of the two African nations best served their oil interests. Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been on a steep decline since early 2019, when Kenya accused Somalia of putting Kenya's blocks up for auction during the February Somalia Oil and Gas Conference in London. Beneath the surface are positions and interests being pushed by players far afield including the US, UK, France, Italy, and Norway (Maluki, 2019).

The UK has shown support for Somalia and has moved to consolidate its economic interests in the region through Somalia. British Petroleum (BP) had oil exploration concessions in Somalia from the 1980s until 1991. Norway was one of the main bidders at the Somalia Oil and Gas conference in London. This could be covertly associated to the fact that Somalia's Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre was a Norwegian citizen, and that Kenya expelled Norwegian oil giant Statoil. The US is siding with Kenya because the country strategic resources policy makes Africa a strategic source of its oil, to reduce dependence on the troubled Middle East region. American companies stand to benefit from the oil and gas exploration if the disputed territory is found to be within Kenya's maritime zone. France is on Kenya's side given that Total Oil was contracted by Kenya in the disputed maritime zone (Maluki, 2019). These findings are in agreement with Obi (2012) who observed that these highlighted strategies by foreign (mining) firms were deliberately employed to have undue advantage in exploitation of African resources.

Although international political and economic shifts driving the current external security dynamics in the Eastern Africa subregion are a major opportunity in terms of investments, infrastructure and global market interconnectivity, simultaneous engagement with diverse foreign actors, for instance in the maritime dimension, constitutes an additional challenge for the subregion. The interdependence created, especially in the HoA as a result of lacking significant maritime policing and naval capacities and expertise, has seen member states become part of the wider international actors' proxy wars and competition. This replica of the Cold War environment risks further fragmenting the subregion and escalating conflicts.

Besides, much of these foreign actors' engagement is managed through bilateral engagements and outside the purview of the CSIs thus a possible absence of a unified regional position by member states in terms of maritime issues. This approach raises the prospect of new alliances with foreign actors thus creating a possibility of undermining the APSA framework in the subregion (Waal, 2019). Thus, despite patronizing in the CSIs, states in the Eastern Africa subregion largely engage with other actors in the international system on a unilateral basis and in pursuit of national interests, bringing to fore the limitation of institutions in facilitating state cooperation in international relations. In view of these inevitable global dynamics, CSIs require a strategic re-think in their CPMR approaches.

Climate change is recognized by the Oxford Research Group as one of the four most important underlying drivers of insecurities in Africa. In addition, half of the African countries classified with higher relative drought vulnerability-Somalia, Mali, Ethiopia, Niger, Burundi and Chad - are from the Eastern Africa subregion (Naumann *et al.*, 2014). Environmental degradation and climate change was rated a prevalent security

threat by 47.9%, 50% and 22.2% of IGAD, EASF and EAC respondents respectively. This accounted for an average rating of 40.0% across the three CSIs.

Interviewees at the IGAD strategic level explained that climate change was a direct consequence of global warming and had been manifest in rising temperatures, unprecedented heavy rainfall, frequent and prolonged droughts and general irregular weather patterns. The interviewees gave several examples of national and sub-regional level manifestations of environmental degradation and climate change which included the Mau Forest conflict, flooding in the EAC and IGAD region, desertification in the HoA, chronic food and water shortage and the 2020 locust invasion in the Eastern Africa subregion.

Respondents at IGAD tactical level argued that these highlights on the effect of climate change beyond the national confines is a manifestation that climate change and related environmental effects is a profound challenge to the global human social, political, and economic systems. In view of the related severe risks and uncertainties, coupled with several non-environmental layers, of concern would be the possible mismatch between human and institutional capacities to respond appropriately and the scale, scope and immediacy of the required collective action to address this systemic and complex problem. Both states and CSIs are captured in the global climate change prevention and mitigation framework of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Interviewees at the EAC strategic level argued that the subregion had lately been experiencing unpredictable weather patterns and extreme weather conditions with lived and expected devastating impacts on the lives and livelihoods of citizens. Citing the impact of this threat to sub-regional security, a tactical level respondent at EAC intimated

that floods had gravely affected member states in the three CSIs with massive internal displacement of populations as had often been witnessed in Somalia's Juba and Shabelle river valleys and in Uganda in the year 2020. A similar pattern was observed in Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan (UNHCR, 2020). This was explained by an interviewee at EAC strategic level who argued:

... in the years 2018 and 2019, floods in Somalia displaced 281,000 and 416,000 people respectively. In October 2020, floods displaced close to 800,000 people across South Sudan. This had devastating effects on populations whose livelihoods depend on agriculture and led to a rise in water borne diseases... (EAC strategic level interviewee 04, 2020).

The long running instability in Somalia has had effects also on the national capability to perform as expected in the UNFCCC. The war had not only led to depletion of forests through charcoal burning in the riverine regions of Shebelle and Juba but also created inter-ethnic conflict on land and resources in that region.

Explaining the effect of climate change, respondents at EASF operational level reported that environmental degradation and climate related human displacement and the drop in overall agricultural production had strained resources and impacted on food security in the subregion. These findings are in consonance with World Meteorological Organization (2019) which reports that climate change contributes to food insecurity, population displacement and stress on water resources in the Eastern Africa subregion. Floods and invasion of desert locusts lead to drought and compromise human security especially in view of the COVID-19 pandemic.

CSO interviewees argued that deteriorating environmental conditions had exerted increasing pressure on populations, especially peasants and nomads, therefore resulting in land and water-based communal conflicts. They cited the example of

environmental conflicts between nomads and agro-pastoralist groups, particularly during drought and famine periods. In the views of FGD informants, the Eastern Africa subregion still faces the challenges of global warming. Since majority of the population in the subregion comprises peasants who rely on water and pasture for economic survival, according to the informants, the consequences of drought and food shortage lead to competition over scarce natural resources and this results to conflicts. Additionally, in a bid to earn a living, peasants and nomads may encroach into government forest reserves resulting into conflict between the government and the population. This is manifest in mass evictions and forceful displacement of populations.

Findings of the current study are in tandem with those of Onguny (2019) who concluded that environmental concerns are a leading explanation for conflicts over land in Kenya. Increased competition for water and food due to uncertain climatic conditions form the basis upon which environmental explanations of land conflicts are grounded. In Tana River County, the mobile livelihoods of the Orma pastoralists clash with the livelihood practices of agro-pastoralist Pokomo groups particularly during dry spell.

Based on the study findings, it can be argued that with increasing populations and scarcity of environmental resources, climate change has become the main factor in the rise in pastoral conflicts. Warmer seasons will heighten key climate-related social- ecological risks occasioned by drought and subsequent resource degradation meaning CSIs may have to realign themselves to new conflict challenges. For instance, IGAD, originally founded to mitigate climate-related vulnerabilities in the Horn of Africa has since established the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC) based in Kenya to assist member states collect real time information on early warning of climate

change, impact on food security and cross border conflict.

Climate change today poses a threat not only to the Eastern Africa subregion but also to international peace and security (Mark, 2020). This is due to the magnitude of the harm done to the ecosystem, which has multiple effects on life, livelihoods and shelter. Floods, droughts, famine, storms and cyclones such as the one recorded in Mozambique recently are poised to increase. The impact of climate change is poised to be more severe in developing countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), such as Mauritius, Seychelles and the Comoros (all members of IGAD and EASF). This is due to rise in sea levels caused by global warming. It is a challenge that threatens to derail most of CSIs CPMR efforts to stem the tide of climate change induced inter-communal conflict as well as ensuring livelihoods and food security. Considering that CSIs may lack adequate human capital or technical and financial resources to overcome such level of threats. They will be overwhelmed and this could lead to a roll- back of achievements hence failure to deliver on their mandates. Without combined global and regional cooperation against the threat, most countries of the subregion will be more vulnerable to instability.

Ethnic and clan-based violence was also identified as a prevalent security threat in the Eastern Africa subregion by over half of respondents at EASF (57.1%), by IGAD (37.5%) and EAC (22.2%). According to interviewees at IGAD strategic level, ethnicity and clannism per se are not threats but become drivers to insecurity when communities fight over shared natural resources or political supremacy. This view was supported by respondents at IGAD operational level who explained that negative ethnicity contributed to insecurity on a political angle and was usually at its peak during electioneering periods when ethnic animosities and tensions were fanned by politicians competing for political power and authority along ethnic groups. Exemplifying, the

respondents cited the inter-ethnic tensions witnessed in Kenya (2007/2008), Rwanda (1994 genocide) and South Sudan (2013 Dinka-Nuer clashes) as ethnic and clan fights for political power.

Besides fighting for political control, respondents at EASF tactical level observed that ethnic and clan-based conflicts were witnessed when communities fought over shared natural resources especially along border points. These conflicts, according to majority of interviewees at IGAD strategic level, had been witnessed in Kenya's northern frontier among the Ogaden, Degodia, Marehan, Ajuran and Garre Somali clans fighting over water and pastures and between the Sabaot and Soy clans in Mount Elgon over land.

The study, through interviewees at EAC strategic level, revealed that when communities coalesce around ethnic and clan lines, marginalization of smaller communities took place and this would fuel dissent and irredentism. The interviewees asserted that the large ethnic communities strived to form government either through impunity or the popular vote and influenced state policies leading to social, political and economic marginalization of smaller ethnic groups. This built resentment and disillusionment which may lead to a revolution against the ruling government.

An interviewee at the EAC strategic level while expounding on marginalization captured it as follows:

...marginalization leads to balkanization as seen in the Oromia region of Ethiopia. In Kenya, there is a wide gap between communities living in arid regions and those living in arable regions. Usually, the marginalized communities turn against the ruling regime. They acquire weapons and form clan militia for provision of security and resort to traditional dispute resolution mechanism. For example, in Somalia, the Siad Barre regime propagated clannism until other clans rebelled leading to the collapse of the State of Somalia. Clans came together and formed defence clan militia and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and that is why clannism remains a challenge in

restoring Somalia statehood. In Kenya, the conflicts between the Pokot and Turkana revolve around marginalization... (EAC strategic level interviewee 05, 2020).

This finding suggests that in many African countries, a higher proportion of national resources were concentrated in state capitals and other urban areas. Development also followed the natural resources extraction routes established during the colonial era. This led to politics of the center and periphery where the periphery received meagre resources from the state where political power was concentrated. This feature informed clamour for decentralization and devolution to stem the tide of conflicts caused by perceptions of inequality and lack of political and economic inclusion.

From CSOs' interviewees in South Sudan, it emerged that negative ethnicity manifested in fighting for political supremacy and sharing of natural resources influenced the civil war in South Sudan. The rivalry between the two dominant ethnic groups - the Dinka and Nuer- played out in post independent 2015 South Sudan whereby the Dinka dominated the government. A CSO interviewee stated:

...after the independence of South Sudan, the Dinkas perceived the Nuer as not having fought for independence and could possibly stage a coup with support from Sudan. This resulted into the 2013 dismissal of the vice president who was a Nuer leading to a break out of a civil war. The minority tribes in South Sudan, do not attract attention of the Dinka and Nuer rival clans, hence they are completely marginalized in all forms of resource sharing... (CSO interviewee, 02, 2020).

The connotation from this sentiment is that every country emerging from colonial or internal domination in Eastern Africa had to establish an ideological paradigm that defines intergroup power relations. The armed struggle for liberation often triumphs over other factors in determining governance legitimacy. This can be seen in the

dominance of the former the National Resistance Movement (NRM) rebels in Uganda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda, Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) in Burundi and the now ousted Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) regime in Ethiopia.

The study findings resonate with those of Afriyie *et al.*, (2020) who observe that ethnicity remains a catalyst for the current conflict in South Sudan where the Nuer and Dinka tribes are deeply incited along ethnic identity. This is supported by Cheeseman (2015) who posits that the fight for political power in South Sudan revolves around regrouping of communities within their ethnic cocoons in order to advance their cause.

It is evident from the findings that ethnic tensions are multidimensional because the threat is instigated by politics and competition over resources. Despite concerted efforts by the UN, AU and the establishment of regional security mechanisms through interventions like peacekeeping and diplomatic missions, the scenarios in the countries mentioned clearly show that ethnic tensions are a recurring phenomenon. Identity per se does not cause conflict but it is a powerful instrument for political and resource mobilization. Identity becomes more potent among pastoralist communities whose nature of livelihoods requires community management of resources. Therefore, national governments and CSIs should embrace communal structures of CPMR and peacebuilding rather than insist on Western models based on individual responsibility and culpability when dealing with inter-communal conflicts and crimes.

The findings of this study are in tandem with those of a similar study by Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) (2018) which revealed that politics and competition for shared natural resources are significant triggers of inter-communal conflicts. Kulang and Ogbonna (2018) also contend that minority groups exclusion may make them feel

marginalized in a country whose election system does not give incentives to communal proportional representation.

Traditionally, neorealism has marginalized the use of power and violence within states, for instance, in the case of ethnic violence, yet the attendant challenges affect the capacities of nation states and the sub-regional CSIs. The neorealists' conceptualization of the security dilemma provides some insight on how ethnic group conflicts/ violence are perpetuated through mutual distrust and insecurity, and the resulting self- help measures by ethnic groups as they pursue power and material interests in an environment of zero-sum gains. The application of this paradigm at the unit (intrastate) level analysis - with the assumption that opposing ethnic groups are the only actors in such conflicts- may, however, be unsatisfactory in explaining why such violence/ conflicts are initiated and also limiting in the various actors involved. Besides, application of this paradigm also marginalizes cooperation facilitated by CSIs such as EAC yet the institutions have been active in resolving ethnic conflict related factors such as cattle rustling. Therefore, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism theories offer more tenable explanations for this scenario.

From Figure 4.1, it was noted that cattle rustling, TOC and cybercrime were contemporary security threats unique to the EAC whereas food insecurity, piracy, maritime disputes and refugees received a lower prevalence rating than the others across the three CSIs.

Cattle rustling received an above average rating from EAC (55.6%) and below average ratings from IGAD (14.6%) and EASF (25.0%) of respondents. In the views of interviewees at EAC strategic level, cattle rustling is both a cultural and resource-based enterprise but often takes a political angle, constitutes a serious security problem by

virtue of the economic and social costs entailed and has continued to morph and modernize with acquisition of sophisticated weaponry. The interviewees further noted that the groupings involved in cattle rustling openly challenged state authority and regional security because the threat assumed a cross border element. An interviewee at the EAC strategic level explained the following:

... cattle rustling has over the years morphed into a commercial venture where sophisticated weapons are used in executing raids. The practice is aided by the proliferation of small arms thus causing deaths among rural communities and security forces. Traditionally, small scale theft was a cultural way of balancing community wealth and power but crime and capitalism have commercialized cattle rustling... (EAC strategic level interviewee, 10, 2020).

The same view regarding the morphing nature of cattle rustling was supported by CSO interviewees. One of them observed the following:

...traditionally, in the subregion, cattle rustling was a kind of cultural sport controlled by the elders. The weapons involved were rungus (knobkerrie), pangas (machetes), bows and arrows and not the AK47 we are seeing today. Elders were consulted on what was not to be done and it was wrong to attack women and children. Cattle raids aimed at increasing herd sizes after a calamity of cattle diseases and famines. Today, cattle rustling is a business and is performed using guns... (CSO interviewee 04, 2020).

The sentiments echo the mutation in both form and intent where the dynamic evolution of the conflict environment and accessibility to modern weapons has had a significant impact on socio-cultural structures that defined cultural values and intergenerational relations. Armed youth acquire power through arms and livestock that changes their relations with elders thereby breaking the social bonds that formed the glue of communal cohesion and stability. This factor has contributed to increased social vulnerability to conflicts.

From the findings, it emerged that the morphing of cattle rustling is evidenced in the type of weapons used and the target of the violence considering that today, there is gross violation of rights of the vulnerable in society which was prohibited by traditional community leaders. This assertion concurs with Kimani and Masiga (2020) who argue that the practice of cattle rustling has morphed over the years from what was once a cultural practice to a criminal activity, attributing this to easy accessibility of SALWs and the breakdown of traditional leadership and control systems.

Explaining the actors involved in cattle rustling, interviewees at IGAD strategic level observed that the threat was perpetuated by warlords who control armed private armies to execute cattle raids. Further, interviewees at EASF strategic level opined that youth were culpable to recruitment into related cattle raiding militia groups owing to unemployment. This view supports earlier assertions by ICPALD (2019) that motives for livestock rustling in Kenya's ASALs were among others, unemployment and poverty among the youth.

Based on the study findings, it can therefore be inferred that there is a relationship between climate change effects on livelihoods, proliferation of SALWs, cattle rustling and community insecurity. Cattle rustling which is most prevalent among pastoralist communities in the EAC region was a security problem owing to its changing nature associated with global factors. The threat has a cross border element fuelled by improved technology and weaponry and has negative effects on the internal state authority of member countries and on regional security.

Cattle rustling has significantly reduced over the years owing to adoption of alternative means of livelihoods such as farming and trade in Turkana and West Pokot counties in Kenya. Urbanization has also created new forms of livelihoods, lifestyles and economic

and social upward mobility opportunities for young people. As more young people go to school, recruitment of warriors has also reduced. However, cattle rustling is occasionally adapted as a strategy for instigating political violence where cattle raiding drives communities away from their residential areas thereby disenfranchising communities during electoral period. The phenomenon is also used as a way of acquiring or reclaiming land where there are disputes or politicized land tenure systems (Burchard, 2015).

Findings of this study echo arguments put forward by Gumba *et al.*, (2019) who reiterate that cattle rustling is synonymous with livestock theft and has become a widespread lethal practice in the East Africa and Horn of Africa regions. Communities involved in the practice include the Maasai, Samburu, Turkana, Borana, Orma, Karamajong, Dodoth, Teso, Pokot, Jie, Kipsigis, Nandi, Somali, Ankole and Tutsi among others. Gumba *et al.*, (2019) add that contemporary cattle rustling is now being practised for commercial reasons and through networks that cut across communal and international borders, rendering the practice a transnational criminal act. From these findings, it may be deduced that although cattle rustling has taken on new forms and is perpetuated by new actors such as VNSAs, the threat still thrives in its traditional set ups (in pastoral areas, ASALs and border points) where state authority is limited and feelings of marginalization contributed to thriving of the threat and other criminal activities. Thus, besides the urgent short-term national security measures on criminality, soft approaches with a deeper and wider analysis of the threat at the local, national and regional level need to be undertaken, taking into account the traditional and modern-day realities, and with targeted interventions especially in the traditional regions that the threat has been observed. Such an approach will enable both state and NSAs locally and sub-regionally (CSIs) to come up with effective intervention

strategies for long term solutions on cattle rustling and related insecurities in the subregion.

In addition to cattle rustling, Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) was identified as a resource driven economic security threat unique to the EAC region by half of the respondents (50.0%). The threat was however not conspicuous in the IGAD and EASF regions as indicated by 6.3% of IGAD and 14.3% of EASF respondents. Interviewees at the EAC strategic level explained that the steady rise in TOC over the last 20 years was attributed to weak governance systems and corruption. The interviewees further observed that TOC is fuelled by international criminal organized groups who undermine state authority through open operations and thrives when law enforcement agencies fail to enforce provisions of the law. They argued that activities involved in TOC undermine the capacity of the state to provide services, promote criminal means of survival and further compromise the health of the people through counterfeit and unhealthy illicit imports.

Giving their views, CSO interviewees also highlighted that TOC undermines the authority of the state to provide justice and the rule of law thus creating room for criminal groups to take over provision of government services and this has far reaching implications on maintenance of law and order, peace, security and stability. On the part of respondents at EAC operational level, TOC is manifested in transnational crimes like smuggling of persons, trafficking of narcotics, illegal arms trade and livestock theft; activities which threaten political stability of a state and negatively affect regional relations between Eastern Africa governments.

Findings of this study are corroborated by Global Initiative (2018) which asserts that organized crime and terrorism in East Africa and the Horn both take place in the

shadows. Al-Shabaab, for example, accesses funds through hidden criminal activities such as money laundering and illegal financial transactions, as well as through overt illicit trade in sugar and charcoal.

A total of 50% of EAC respondents identified cybercrime as a contemporary security threat. Through interviews at EAC strategic level, it emerged that cybercrime has been expanding over the last ten years due to increased internet penetration, adoption of e-government, mobile money transfer and e-banking. This was attributed to prospects of systems being hacked into and used for fraud, identity theft, radicalization, pornography, incitement and misinformation. Respondents at EAC operational level further indicated that cybercrime is a growing phenomenon whose aim is to defraud financial institutions for monetary gain and private sector for property intellectual rights. It can also be used for blackmail or electoral malpractice like rigging.

Findings of this study are in agreement with Kshetri (2019) who established that increasing cyber-attacks in the African continent can be attributed to vulnerable systems and poor cyber security practices. Cyber security is considered to be out of reach because its importance has not yet been sufficiently appreciated or acknowledged in the continent.

Piracy along the Eastern Africa coastline was identified as a resource - driven security threat dating back to the start of the Somali civil war. While giving views, interviewees at the EAC strategic level observed that piracy was mainly attributed to criminal gangs operating from Somalia who attacked ships traversing the East Africa shores, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea for ransom.

An interviewee at EAC strategic level opined that:

...piracy along the East Africa sea line dates back to the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in Somalia. The Somali Navy was disbanded and international fishing vessels began illegal fishing in Somali territorial waters. In response, Somali fishermen formed armed gangs to protect the dwindling fish stocks. Gradually, these fishermen began holding vessels and a lucrative trade started out of it leading to pirates capturing big vessels for ransom... (EAC strategic level interviewee 07, 2020).

Piracy indicates conflict dynamics in the country where tactics change as socio-economic and political factors evolve. While it was viewed by the international community as a disruption of sea transport lanes, in the country it was a patriotic act of defending national resources. This illustrates the glaring dichotomy between parties in conflict, thereby calling for more comprehensive analysis of conflict.

From the study, it emerged that piracy affects the social and economic development of a region. This was supported by CSOs' interviewees who explained that piracy attacks along key trade routes cause anxiety and this affects regional economic stability. This is manifest through losses accruing from reduced tourism as well as reduced investor confidence and increased prices of industrial and household items being shipped.

Interviewees at IGAD strategic level observed that piracy facilitates other maritime security threats, including terrorism, weapons and narcotics trafficking, illegal fishing and dumping and human smuggling operations. Collectively, these activities threaten peace and security of the Eastern Africa subregion. Moreover, piracy threatens the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance to the HoA, much of which arrive by sea. Findings of the present study are in agreement with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) report that the regional coastal States' economy has been severely hit by the outbreak of piracy and that in 2011, Kenya incurred a loss of between \$129 and \$795 million in the tourism sector as a result of Somali piracy (IMO, 2011).

Closely related to territorial border conflicts is the issue of maritime disputes. According to interviewees at IGAD strategic level, maritime disputes were a regional security concern attributed to failure to delimit and demarcate boundaries; a cross cutting problem in Africa. To the interviewees, once there was a perceived presence or discovery of natural resources in a border region, neighbouring countries could each lay claim to a common border point as each state scrambled to exploit the resources. Exemplifying using the Kenya and Somalia maritime row, the interviewees argued that before the perceived discovery of minerals at the disputed maritime boundary, the two states peacefully coexisted along the Indian Ocean maritime boundary.

Elaborating, an interviewee at IGAD strategic level observed:

... the current Kenya Somalia maritime row started in 2014. Through various legal instruments issued in 1979, 1989 and 2005, Kenya established its maritime boundary in its Exclusive Economic Zone, of which Somalia did not initially dispute. In 2009, Kenya negotiated and concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with Somalia on their common maritime border. However, upon the discovery of massive amounts of hydrocarbon deposits and oil potential in the maritime region, Somalia rejected the bilateral negotiations and the Memorandum. In August 2014, Somalia filed a case at International Court of Justice, rejecting Kenya's maritime boundary... (IGAD strategic level interviewee 03, 2020).

Explaining failure by Kenya and Somalia to delimit and demarcate their maritime boundary, respondents at EASF operational level argued that most Eastern African countries had for years not realized the strategic importance of maritime resources and as a result, states had built capacity in conflict resolution only for land-based conflicts. This was further supported by respondents and interviewees at EAC strategic level who noted that the Kenya - Somalia maritime dispute was an awakening call for the need to invest in maritime security by Eastern Africa governments.

An interviewee at EAC strategic level explained:

...by themselves, coastal borders are strategic maritime assets and discovery of assets in these regions is a recipe for conflict. Eastern Africa states have not demarcated and delimited their maritime borders. States have also ignored the maritime component of conflict thereby rendering regional CSIs unable to effectively adjudicate in the Kenya- Somalia maritime dispute... (EAC strategic level interviewee, 02, 2020).

From the views of respondents, it may be deduced that Eastern Africa regional mechanisms for maritime boundary dispute settlement are weak. This could be attributed to the CSIs' lack of institutional, technical, technological and financial capacities; a situation that may have prompted Somalia to seek help from the ICJ. In this context, the maritime domain is the realm of the future for human and national securities. There is increasing human settlement along coastal areas and more food production hinging on marine life. The security theatre is also shifting to the seas due to increase in piracy, terrorism, organized crime, human and drugs trafficking and smuggling. Maritime disputes may hinder exploitation of strategic resources such as oil and gas; cause open conflict and limit joint economic exploitation of mineral rich border zones while hindering regional integration (Walker, 2015). Maritime disputes in Africa could hinder achievement of AU'S 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) and AU Agenda 2063. They should be subjected to bilateral, regional, continental and international adjudication if need be (Walker, 2015).

The refugee menace was identified as a contemporary security threat in the Eastern Africa subregion. Through interviewees at IGAD strategic level, the study established that the refugee crisis was a security threat in the subregion with several Eastern Africa countries such as Burundi, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda experiencing it. Showing the correlation between refugees and insecurity, the interviewees explained

that the process of regaining lost livelihoods for refugees could result in competition over scarce natural resources and could ignite further conflict thus continuing the cyclic nature of conflict.

This was further highlighted by CSOs interviewees who argued that the influx of refugees from conflicts within or in neighboring countries impacted development for both host nations and refugees and consumed a substantial amount of energy for the law enforcement agents in handling refugee affairs. In the views of interviewees at EAC strategic level, refugee camps were possible grounds for planning and executing recruitment into terror groups and could also exacerbate other security challenges such as proliferation of small arms, drug trafficking and environmental degradation. Findings of this study support those of Kaburu (2018) who contends that Somali refugees living in the Daadab refugee camp played a role in environmental degradation and that refugees in this camp have also been associated with planning and execution of terrorist attacks in Kenya.

This section has identified security threats which are emergent as interacting in different dynamics and often feed on structural causes of conflict. They may accelerate conflict as secondary factors or triggers. The identified contemporary security threats in Eastern Africa subregion were variably prevalent at both inter-state and intrastate level. While threats related to situations that undermined state sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states were common at the interstate level, threats related to terrorism, poor management of electoral processes, absence of the rule of law and ethnic intolerance were more common at the intrastate level.

The level of state fragility could determine the coping ability or resilience. Over time countries with higher levels of fragility such as Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi have

borne higher impacts of the threats (Fund for Peace, 2020). It is evident that the contemporary security threats discussed in this study have directly or indirectly led to violent conflicts affecting populations and the stability of the subregion in various degrees. The section has also highlighted how these threats affect the performance of CSIs in CPMR and stabilization.

Given the complex nature of these conflicts and the interdependence of countries in the subregion, CSIs under the APSA have endeavoured to collaborate in addressing these contemporary security threats. The next section addresses itself to objective two of this study which focusses on analysis of the extent to which the CSIs have managed to grapple with contemporary security threats in the subregion.

4.4 Management of Contemporary Security Threats in the Eastern Africa Subregion by IGAD, EAC and EASF

Management of security threats in any region is key to attainment of peace and socio-economic stability. This may be achieved through proper implementation of agreed /stipulated policies. There have been attempts to address these threats ranging from formulation of policies to formation of regional mechanisms. In spite of these mechanisms, empirical evidence points to a situation where the subregion still faces a myriad of security threats. Objective two of the study therefore sought to analyze the extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF have managed the identified security threats and/or drivers of conflict as a prerequisite to achieving stability in the region. Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF have addressed the contemporary security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion. The analysis is done by comparing the three CSIs and a measure of success by each as reported by respondents. Their views are shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF have addressed Contemporary Security Threats in the Eastern Africa Subregion

Threat	IGAD			EAC			EASF		
	Above Av (%)	Av (%)	Below Av (%)	Above Av (%)	Av (%)	Below Av (%)	Above Av (%)	Av (%)	Below Av (%)
Terrorism	40.4	59.5		27.8	61.1	11.1	13.7	45.1	41.2
Electoral-induced violence	35.7	38.1	26.2	8.3	83.3	8.3	41.7	22.9	35.5
Proliferation of SALWs	9.1	50.0	40.9	46.2	38.5	15.4	19.4	38.9	41.7
Conflicts over shared natural resources	-	52.0	48.0		9.1	90.9	-	39.3	60.7
Territorial and border conflicts	12.9	41.9	45.2		50.0	50.0	8.8	64.7	17.6
Environmental degradation	20.0	68.0	12		80.0	20.0	11.5	19.2	69.2
Ethnic and clan-based violence	47.4	52.6	-		40.0	60.0	21.7	43.5	21.7

Source: Field Data (2020).

Owing to the significance of the contemporary security threats, the three CSIs had undertaken measures to address the threats in varying degrees and approaches. Regarding the management of terrorism in the subregion, majority of respondents in the three CSIs (IGAD 59.5%; EAC 61.1% and EASF 45.1%) rated the performance of the three institutions as average. Another 40.4% of IGAD, 27.8 % of EAC and 13.7% of EASF respondents reported that the three CSIs had posted an above average performance.

The AU established the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in 2004. The AU PSC was granted authority to coordinate CT/CVE activities. The convention defined areas of partnership among the states, outlined legal structures on extra-territorial investigations and extraditions, avenues for common legal assistance and instituted state prerogative over terrorist acts.

As per the treaties and agreements of the trio CSIs, they were not designed as intelligence gathering, policing or military institutions. As such they do not engage in direct combat, tracking or arresting of suspected terrorists. In most cases, they engage with terrorism at the policy and strategy making level. They also coordinate AU and UN initiatives in Preventing/Counter Violence Extremism (P/CVE). When the US Global War on Terrorism strategy (GWOT) implemented after September 11, 2001 failed, the global community changed tactics from hard power to use of soft power to metaphorically speaking, drain the swamps. The shift involved less use of force, armaments and infringement on human rights. It revolved around convincing the recruits or potential recruits about the folly of violence.

This meant engaging with the youth and communities that were recruitment havens for terrorists. The strategy involved finding alternative livelihoods, working with local CSOS, private sector, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of returnees and de-radicalization. Local CSOs and private sector cultivated trust among the youth and returnees, thereby convincing some recruits to lay down arms. The CSOs also became entry points for International Organizations and NGOs such as International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNDP and USAID to provide the necessary resources for rehabilitation in East Africa.

IGAD Counter Violence Extremism Strategy was drafted in 2016 and sought to define and operationalize the concept of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). According to the strategy, violent extremism means an ideology that rejects the principles and values that underpin a peaceful orderly and non-violent society and instead espouses violence, terror and coercion as a pathway to change and to realizing specific beliefs and vision of society. On the other hand, preventing and countering violent extremism is primarily

a strategy that highlights non-coercive approaches designed to address the drivers or root causes of extremism in order to neutralize the efforts by extremists to radicalize and recruit followers to violence (IGAD, 2016). Under this framework, IGAD established the Center of Excellence on Countering Violent extremism to provide guidance and coordination to ensure the effectiveness of the activities and programmes proposed by the strategy. The strategy also entailed building regional capacity; research and analysis; empowering local communities, addressing the political, legal, social and economic push factors; and promoting P/CVE diplomacy to underpin broad-based partnerships (IGAD, 2016). The implication is that existing structures (CSIs and states) established to curb violent extremism/ terrorism need to take into account the import of agencies/actors, their identity and associated interests towards devising sustainable measures in addressing the threat. However, beyond integration of various stakeholders' ideas and interests including the civil society, policy/ strategy implementation at member states level is embraced depending on the implication of the policy on national security as states assess their relative gains / interests.

Alongside IGAD CVE strategy, the center has improved coordination of member states counter terrorism activities especially at border points. Most member states have established National Counter Terrorism Centers (NCTC) and drafted Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) strategies. These specialized agencies manned by professional staff from the civil society, police and the military staff provide a hub for harmonized local, national and sub-regional CVE strategies, plans and programmes. Considering the active role of *Al Shabaab* and other extremist groups in Somalia and neighbouring states and the relatively short implementation span of the strategy, it is difficult to gauge the success, efficacy and its impact on the spread and potency of terrorism/violent extremism.

Concerning management of electoral-induced violence, nearly half of respondents from both IGAD (35.7%) and EASF (41.7%) considered these CSIs to have had an above average performance. On the other hand, 83.3% of respondents from EAC considered the CSI to have posted an average performance. A below average performance for IGAD, EAC and EASF in addressing this threat was reported by 26.2%, 8.3% and 35.5% of respondents from the three CSIs respectively.

Electoral violence is perceived as a threat to democracy in developing countries. Therefore, Electoral Violence Prevention (EVP) strategies are employed in reforming electoral institutions so as to enable them to maintain the peace during the electoral period. Both capacity building and attitude transforming strategies have been used by the UN and other development partners' electoral assistance programmes (Sarah and Muchlinski, 2018).

A total of 40.9% of respondents from IGAD reported that the CSI had performed below average in the management of proliferation of SALWs while 50% considered it to have had an average performance. In the views of respondents, the notable marginal performance by the CSI was generally attributable to the absence of an appropriate institutional framework to address this threat and lack of collaborative approaches in addressing DDR initiatives in the IGAD region.

A number of recommendations on management of SALWs were made in Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which came into force in 2014, but majority of countries in the subregion have not yet ratified the treaty. RECSA is the subregion's organization charged with SALWs' management under the Nairobi Protocol of 2000 (RECSA, 2015). A lot of progress has been made in electronic arms marking and tracking but

due to insecurity in poorly ungoverned spaces, demand for illicit arms remains high. RECSA coordinates its activities with IGAD, EAC and member states.

Regarding management of proliferation of SALWs by EAC, the CSI was reported to have performed well as represented by an above average and average rating from 46.2% and 38.5% of EAC respondents respectively. According to respondents, EAC commitment in implementing the Nairobi Protocol on SALWs and the CSI's various multi stakeholder collaborative initiatives in this regard had greatly improved sub-regional and cross regional cooperation in addressing proliferation of SALWs. A total of 15.4% of EAC respondents, however, rated EAC's performance as below average attributing this to weak border controls and corruption. In overall though, EAC was the best performing CSI in the management of this threat. EASF registered fairly good performance in managing SALWs as reported by 19.4% and 38.5% of respondents for an above average and average rating which was attributable to capacity building programmes under the EASF maritime cell. In view of the relatively high threat perception on proliferation of SALWs by the three CSIs, notable measures have been undertaken by all CSIs. However, ineffective collaborative approaches that undermine collective action by various stakeholders were singled out by both IGAD and EASF respondents as an impediment to effective management of this trans-boundary threat. This contradicts the very essence of institutions as platforms for cooperation by member states and regulators of state behaviour/interests as posited by neoliberalism. Neorealists' pessimism on regional security cooperation by states is thus reflected.

Concerning conflicts over shared natural resources, despite a significant threat perception by all CSIs as indicated in Figure 4.2, there was an overall dismal performance. This was indicated by a below average performance rating for IGAD,

EAC and EASF by 48.0%, 90.9% and 32.1% of the respective institutional respondents. The presence of environmental and natural resource related strategies and institutions at IGAD and EAC notwithstanding, the general poor performance across all CSIs is attributed to lack of comprehensive legal frameworks, lack of or inadequate common and inclusive frameworks, resource challenges and sovereignty issues.

The performance of all CSIs in managing environmental degradation and climate change was generally good as indicated by the following respondent ratings: 20% and 68.0% of respondents reported an above average and average performance respectively for IGAD; 80% of EAC respondents rated the CSI as an average performer in this regard while 50% of indicated that the CSI performed marginally.

4.4.1 IGAD Initiatives in Managing Contemporary Security Threats

In terms of management of security threats, IGAD registered above average and average ratings in terrorism (40.4%, 59.5%), electoral induced violence (35.7%, 38.1%), environmental degradation and climate change (20.0%, 68.0%) and ethnic and clan-based violence (47.4%, 52.6%).

According to interviewees at the strategic level, IGAD's relatively good efforts in management of terrorism was attributed to the CSI putting in place appropriate strategies for creating awareness on counter terrorism and radicalization to prevent recruitment into extremist groups. The interviewees observed that IGAD had over time developed adequate measures to effectively combat terrorism in the subregion. These included enhancing internal coordination of a regionalized counter terrorism strategy, addressing marginalization and having enhanced communication and visibility towards peace, security and regional integration in the subregion.

Majority of respondents at operational level argued that the CSI enhanced capacity building through partnership with regional and international bodies in fighting terrorism and violent extremism in the HoA. IGAD also collaborated with CSOs and the religious community to enhance interstate cooperation in the fight against terrorism and radicalization. The same view was supported by CSO interviewees who elaborated that the IGAD counter-terrorism pillar works towards building national and regional capacity for the Horn of Africa in the fight against terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism in partnership with regional and international bodies. One of the CSO interviewees highlighted:

... in 2018, IGAD created a centre of excellence for countering violent extremism. This Centre has provided a platform for various stakeholders including the religious community to create counter radicalization strategies including robust communication mechanisms to counter radicalization and violent extremism in the IGAD member states. So far, there is also an IGAD regional counter-terrorism strategy and an accompanying action plan which stipulates areas of cooperation by various stakeholders for example as it relates to legal assistance and extradition... (CSO interviewee, 01, 2020).

These mechanisms have been explained earlier and they demonstrate that IGAD has a strong capacity for adaptation of global and continental strategies against terrorism. They demonstrate flexibility in conceptualization, strategies, benchmarking, implementation, reflections and learning. This quality makes IGAD more responsive to such threats, therefore assisting the region in promoting CPMR and peacebuilding.

Similarly, CSO informants observed that the IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) launched in 2006 to coordinate counter terrorism measures within individual IGAD member states was bearing fruit. Through ICPAT, there has been formal regional engagement in legislating anti-terrorism laws. The informants

further noted that ICPAT had enhanced intelligence sharing as well as boosted border controls in the IGAD region. ICPAT later transformed into the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) in 2009, upon realization of the transnational nature of terrorism. ISSP addresses terrorism, TOC, maritime security and Security Institutions Capacity Building (SICB).

Findings of the study are in conformity with those of Sheriff *et al.*, (2015) who assert that the IGAD capacity building program against terrorism has been operational since 2006, focusing on building national capacities to enhance a regional approach on terrorism. The capacity building program has supported IGAD member states in formulation of legislation on terrorism as well as enhancing training to upscale judicial capacities. Some of the legislation that has been regionally reviewed as a collective approach to addressing terrorism includes laws on money laundering and intelligence sharing.

GCTF (2019) report also posits that one of the major initiatives launched by IGAD in the fight against terrorism in the Eastern Africa subregion was the IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) which has conducted trainings to equip youth, women, civil society and faith-based organizations with skills to fight extremist ideologies. In addition, ICEPCVE has published a manual to assist in field research on extremism besides establishing the IGAD Cross-Border Peace Initiative to Prevent Violent Extremism and Conflict in the HoA to prevent violent extremism which promotes terrorism and conflict in border areas especially between Ethiopia and Kenya.

Despite the above IGAD initiatives in addressing terrorism, 59.5% of respondents still rated IGAD's performance as average. CSO interviewees observed that most of

IGAD's strategies for counter terrorism had not been fully implemented due to financial challenges. Lack of adequate, reliable and efficiently disbursed funds hinder implementation of CPMR projects thereby rendering stabilization of the host states ineffective. In the final analysis, we observe that lack of cooperation between member states, as envisaged in constructivism, impedes against realization of stability in the subregion. Thus, the constructivist edification of ideation structures over material ones in shaping state behaviour may not suffice in explaining this reality.

Upon further inquiry, respondents at the IGAD operational level argued that the impact of IGAD's counter-terrorism strategy had not been significant due to unstructured and slow engagement with other stakeholders. Giving an example of AMISOM, the interviewees highlighted that the IGAD counter-terrorism centre and the AU had been slow in engaging and coordinating counter messaging strategies at the grassroots level. This was supported by a section of CSO interviewees who explained that the implementation of AU and IGAD strategies was pegged on the cooperation of member states and that lack of broad consultation with stakeholders in strategy formulation and implementation had hindered the effectiveness of interventions. These findings are in agreement with a study by Galadimma and Ogbonnaya (2018) which also revealed that while the adoption of joint conventions on extradition had made it easier to transfer terror suspects across the IGAD region, the practical application of these provisions is yet to be tested.

Demeke and Gebru (2014) also contend that use of hard power in the fight against terrorism leads to lack of coordination between the CSI and the local communities and this compromises the achievement of anti-terror initiatives. They further posit that the IGAD anti-terrorism initiatives are entirely donor funded because the CSI faces

financial handicaps.

Kwabena (2019), while examining ECOWAS, offers a more in-depth and radical approach to analyzing and managing terrorism. Using Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) theory, he provides a skeptical attitude towards the dominant understanding of terrorism discourse. The study recommended a redefinition of terrorism in West Africa based on CTS conceptualization and the sub-region's unique structural, social and historical circumstances, and that strategy formulation and implementation should significantly involve all the three key levels - the ECOWAS Community level, national level and local community level. According to Kwabena (2019), the conceptualization of the identity of the terrorist in West Africa as illegitimate non-state actors, is derived from the broader global discourse and has created a situation where measurement of the success of counter-terrorism operations depends on the number of terrorists destroyed. However, as found in this study, this creates a cycle of killings where extrajudicial killings by state actors rather than reducing terrorism incidents, motivate potential members to join terrorist groups. The interpretation of terrorists as irrational religious extremists is also wrong and has resulted in the adoption of counter-terrorism policies that are over reliant on military force to destroy suspected terrorists and this calls for a soft power approach.

CTS definition of terrorism expands terrorism actors to cover jihadist militants and any other actors who adopt similar nature of violence for strategic reasons. The definition also acknowledges the rationality of the actors and the possibility of abandoning terrorism, for other means. Kwabena (2019) maintains that viewing terrorism as a social construct also provides hope for states in West Africa as the same society can reconstruct the definition and features of terrorist acts to aid building better

counter-terrorism strategies and peaceful societies. This profound structural evaluation of counter terrorism strategies provides an expanded framework for analysis of the Eastern African case and the role of the CSIs, which has been considered in this study as the P/CVE paradigm indicates.

As earlier discussed under objective one, electoral-induced violence continues to threaten the peace and security of the subregion. In this regard, the study sought to find out respondents' views on how the CSIs had addressed the threat. Slightly above a third (35.7 %) and 38.1 % of IGAD's respondents rated IGAD's performance as above average and average respectively. This was supported by interviewees at strategic level who explained that IGAD had advocated for fair democratic practices through the established office of the special envoy to South Sudan and Somalia and sends election observers during elections. Respondents at the operational level further explained that IGAD had established a mediation support division and put in place strategies to promote the role of women in peace making and peace building. These initiatives had strengthened contemporary state building, governance and security structures in respective member states. In addition, the IGAD Secretariat supports political processes that enhance reconciliation through mediation and promoting fair electoral practices in the subregion.

Findings of the study are in tandem with a study by Sheriff *et al.*, (2015) whose findings established that IGAD-convened CSO forums aim at roping in NGOs to enhance good governance in the region. In addressing electoral matters, IGAD has trained and established a pool of election observers in the region and deployed an observer mission to the Sudan during the 2011 referendum in South Sudan. It has also brought together

women parliamentarians in the region with a view of promoting women's role in peacemaking and peace building efforts in the subregion.

In spite of IGAD's positive efforts in promoting fair democratic processes, 26.2% of respondents rated IGAD's performance in management of electoral-induced violence as below average. Further analysis revealed limitations in IGAD mandate to compel member states to uphold good electoral and governance practices. Respondents at the operational level observed that IGAD may not conclusively deal with poor governance issues because states hide under the veil of sovereignty. Further, they argued that in spite of sending election observers, the efficacy of such election observer teams remained in doubt considering that election observers were limited in terms of the extent to which they could monitor elections. Additionally, CSO interviewees noted that IGAD lacked capacity to compel member states to observe electoral codes of conduct. These findings are in conformity with the neorealism theory which contends that states, even though operating within a collective security entity, would be unwilling to have sovereign issues meddled with by external forces including institutions to which they are subscribed.

Current study findings on the limited extent to which IGAD could interfere with election matters of a state are in comport with findings by Aggad (2017) who posits that while IGAD established the Political Affairs Programme (PAP) in 2008 to focus on democracy, governance and elections as a basis for effective regional integration, PAP remains inactive due to staffing constraints as well as limitations in the IGAD mandate regarding the how the CSI could influence governance and election affairs of states most of whom place individual sovereign interests above regional collective ones. Aggad (2017) notes that IGAD member states consider elections as a sovereign and

politically sensitive governance issue of domestic concern and hence this limits IGAD's ability to manage electoral related affairs of member states. Aggad (2017) concludes that even though IGAD carries out election observation activities in the region, these activities are by default rather than design, and are as a response to requests by individual member states as opposed to being initiatives driven by the CSI as part of its mandate. Study findings on the effectiveness of election observer duties also confirm a study by Lucey and Mesfin (2016) who contend that the independence of election observers deployed by IGAD in several countries could not be confirmed.

In terms of managing environmental degradation and climate change, majority of respondents (68.0%) rated IGAD's performance as average. Interviewees at IGAD operational level argued that IGAD's Disaster Risk Management Technical Advisory Committee (DRM TAC) works closely with the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) in providing policy advice and support to member states on disaster and climate risk management.

An interview at IGAD strategic level asserted:

... IGAD has a robust climate early warning system called IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre. The IGAD Disaster Risk Management Technical Advisory Committee and representatives of the national meteorological and hydro meteorological services of the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre have together launched a project titled Building Resilience to Disasters through Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation that handles disaster risk management issues in the region... (IGAD strategic level interviewee 07, 2020).

The above facility points to a high level of disaster response and mitigation preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030), provides a global framework for enhanced capacity for global preparedness. IGAD is well poised to harness regional and global resources to enhance its capacity.

Moreover, interviewees at strategic level stated that IGAD had a Regional Climate Change Strategy (RCCS) drafted and validated in 2016 which carried out capacity building by addressing climate change challenges and strengthening early warning systems. During FGDs, informants explained that in spite of IGAD's efforts to address environmental degradation and climate change, the CSI had not had direct interventions at the community level through technological interfaces which would help to effectively address environmental issues. In addition, respondents at operational level proffered that although ICPAC produced quarterly climate forecasts, it had limited capacity for integrating and improving country-level monitoring systems and producing longer-term climate projections. This implied that regional climatic early warnings had been produced on an ad hoc basis and have had limited impact.

A section of CSOs interviewees also highlighted that ICPAC lacked effective institutional processes for managing and disseminating climate information and early warnings. As a result, vulnerable communities and especially pastoralists in the IGAD region were inadequately equipped to react to and adapt to the impacts of climate change.

IGAD registered below average ratings in the management of proliferation of SALWs (40.9%), resource-based conflicts (48.0%), territorial border conflicts (45.2%) and youth unemployment (65.0%). Respondents at the operational level argued that IGAD's dismal performance in management of SALWs was attributed to lack of an appropriate institutional infrastructure. This view was supported by CSO interviewees who explained that the CSI has not pursued collaborative approaches involving CSOs, partnerships with donors and the international civil society in DDR initiatives. Building on identity of other stakeholders and their interests may lead to a convergence of ideas

and shared norms which may shape social relations and bring about effective strategies in addressing proliferation of SALWs in the subregion.

In relation to conflicts over shared natural resources, the study established through interviews at strategic level that IGAD's initiatives aimed at addressing the conflicts had not been effective due to failure to address water inequalities especially in relation to exploitation of the Nile waters. The interviewees considered the dearth of water management frameworks as a glaring omission given that IGAD was originally created to address drought and desertification. This view was supported by CSOs informants during FGDs who highlighted that the IGAD region still experienced conflicts over use of the Nile waters despite the existence of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) that was tasked with the responsibility of promoting harmonious and collective utilization of the shared water resource.

Respondents at operational level observed that IGAD also lacked adequate policies on water harvesting and conservation especially for communities in arid and semi-arid regions, most of whom engaged in conflict over water and pastures for livestock. In the views of CSO informants, despite IGAD having the Environment and Natural Resources Strategy, the CSI lacked a comprehensive legal framework on the management of shared natural resources.

These findings comport with those of Nanni (2016) who observes that despite the IGAD region having a number of trans-boundary aquifers, except for the Nile Basin, few agreements concern trans-boundary water resources and that the few that are there are outdated having been drafted during the colonial period. Nanni (2016) also adds that despite the endorsement of an IGAD regional water policy, its implementation has been hampered by lack of funding and institutional capacities at member states level; the

latter having been related to draft IGAD regional water resource protocol that is still being negotiated by member states.

The change and reinforcement of new/ relevant frameworks largely relies on the ideas and beliefs held by the leadership of member states thus the position of member states in international relations and their interests together with those of the international community will be important towards adopting policies for improving security in the subregion. However, the subregion being a melting pot of several cultures and different ideologies is faced with the challenge of coming up with common norms, a feature compounded by the interests and ideologies of external actors.

4.4.2 EAC Initiatives in Managing Contemporary Security Threats

The EAC registered relatively good performance in management of the following threats: terrorism (27.8% above average) and (61.1% average), electoral- induced violence (83.3% average), proliferation of SALWs (46.2% above average and 38.5% average), environmental degradation and climate change (80% average) and youth unemployment (50.0% average). Further, the study established through interviewees at strategic level that in relation to the management of terrorism in the subregion, EAC initiated various strategies and mechanisms. These include creation of laws and policies that have enhanced detection of terrorists' cross-border movement and information sharing among member countries. Respondents at operational level observed that the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security had improved cooperation of military, police and other security sector agencies. The creation of the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) had enhanced capacity building in anti-terrorism training and worked closely with the INTERPOL to address the threat of terrorism and SALWs.

These findings resonate with those of Cline (2016) who notes that in addressing terrorism, the EAC launched the Protocol on Peace and Security which seeks to improve coordination and information sharing. However, the protocol falls short of the specifics of actual intelligence sharing. Cline (2016) adds that there exists a regional framework for intelligence sharing under the auspices of the EAPCCO comprising Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Comoros, Seychelles, Rwanda, South Sudan, DRC Congo and Burundi.

In spite of the relatively good initiatives in management of terrorism, during FGDs, some informants argued that EAC counter terror strategies faced several challenges. These included the varied definition of terrorism adopted by partner states and the political nature of terrorism which makes it difficult for the EAC to adopt a coordinated collective response to terrorism. CSO interviewees further observed that the CSI had not developed an EAC counter-terrorism centre although a regional strategy on counter terrorism had been put in place since the year 2014. This explains why there was lack of impetus to push for a regional resolution of conflict and threats of this nature. In the views of majority of interviewees at strategic level, EAC counter terror initiatives were compromised by lack of human and material resources and modern equipment necessary for the implementation of mechanisms for fighting cybercrime. In addition, management of counter terrorism was affected by lack of independence of security organs, poor border security controls and insufficient budgetary allocation for counter terror initiatives.

From the findings of the study, it may be argued that although EAC had put in place measures to address terrorism, lack of established border security command and modern equipment for surveillance of the region's porous borders remains a drawback.

Additionally, corruption at the entry and exit points and insufficient budgetary allocations compromise the fight against terrorism. In such circumstances, the EAC may not effectively be able to address challenges posed by the threat of terrorism. It also emerged from the study that security organs in the Eastern Africa subregion were subject to executive political authority of their respective governments. This created a sense of mistrust, suspicion and lack of political commitment in implementation of counter terrorism policies.

Findings of the current study on border porosity and inadequate security mechanisms at EAC border points as barriers to effective management of terrorism resonate with a study by Omenma and Onyango (2020) which observes that the EAC region has a vast sparsely populated border whose points are not adequately manned. There are lapses in border security because of inadequate biographic and biometric screening equipment at border points. Present study findings on EAC reliance on donor funding for implementation of anti-terrorism initiatives are in agreement with a study by Lisakafu (2018) who argues that western powers especially the USA, UK and Denmark have delivered huge amounts of money as security aid to EAC partner states. Without this donor funding, counter terrorism initiatives in the EAC would be impossible.

Lisakafu (2018) adds that as a result of the desire to fulfil the demands of donors, EAC partner states are unwilling to pursue sub-regional counter terror security policies collective security policies against terrorism but would rather align counter terrorism initiatives with some economic benefit accruing from donor funds. The study cites the adoption of the One-Stop-Border-Post (OSBP) policy along the international land borderlines of EAC partner states attributed to the economic benefits envisioned from the US\$97.3 million for the project by the EU. This is further supported by ICG (2017)

which reported that EAC adopted the OSBP policy to obtain donor funding in spite of the shortcomings of the policy in terms of quality of equipment and reliability in optic fibre connectivity.

In response to management of electoral-induced violence, majority of respondents (83.3%) indicated that the EAC had an average performance in dealing with this threat. Interviewees at EAC strategic level observed that the EAC had put in place programs on good governance, democracy and electoral processes which promoted democratic management of elections in the region, including monitoring pre and post-election activities among partner states. Moreover, the interviewees observed that the EAC had established the forum of heads of national electoral commissions to guide on standards and principles aimed at enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of electoral processes.

Respondents at operational level highlighted that the EAC has put in place programs on good governance, democracy and electoral processes which have facilitated EAC interventions in electoral-induced violence in the Eastern Africa subregion. The respondents further explained that the EAC had made efforts regarding management of elections for instance by deploying electoral observer missions with the overall objective of monitoring pre-election activities, the situation during actual elections and assessing the outcome of elections. On their part, CSOs interviewees reported that EAC elections observer missions had been deployed in Kenya and Rwanda in 2017, to act as a tool for enhancing good democratic practices. These efforts were observed to yield positive results in most cases.

A CSO interviewee also highlighted that the EAC had in the past deployed eminent persons to mediate on electoral-related conflicts in the region. Explaining the involvement of the EAC in mediating electoral conflicts, the interviewee asserted:

...before the Burundi elections, the EAC sent a team of eminent persons in 2014 to mediate with different stakeholders concerning the contentious electoral process. From the consultations, it was clear that Burundi was teetering on the brink of armed conflict. When conflict broke out in 2015, the EAC sent a mediation team comprising President Museveni of Uganda and the late President Mkapa of Tanzania as lead negotiators in the Burundi peace process. The EAC mediation team for Burundi was able to garner support from both the UN and AU. In the Kenyan case of 2007 to 2008, the EAC intervened by sending President Museveni and Mkapa at different times to try to unlock the post-election stalemate... (CSO interviewee 04, 2020).

In line with APSA framework, the Panel of the Wise mechanism was set up as a model of mediation in Africa; a model that resonates to African cultural traditions where elder statesmen enjoy respect and legitimacy. In this line of thought there is also application of the AU subsidiarity principle, where regional leaders are called upon to mediate and in case of failure leaders from SADC, ECOWAS or AU are invited. Such actions promote local peacemaking structures and practices, thereby boosting the role of CSIs.

Informants during an FGD observed that despite EAC's successes in addressing electoral-induced violence, effective management of the threat was compromised by slow implementation of the CSI's protocol on good governance, democracy and electoral processes, lack of resources that hinders meaningful EAC mediation efforts and lack of access to justice for the majority of the population in the EAC subregion.

The present study findings confirm arguments by Khadiagala (2016) who observes that even though the EAC has a draft protocol on good governance, the provisions of the document have not been adopted for implementation by member states. This is because partner states consider provisions of the protocol as pointing an accusing finger at governance gaps or challenges prevailing in some of the member states. Khadiagala (2016) adds that even if the CSI wanted to implement the protocol, this would not be tenable considering the EAC was weak in terms of technical and funding capacity.

Respondents at operational level who rated the performance of EAC in managing electoral violence as below average argued that although partner states had a protocol on good governance and a program on democracy and electoral processes, there has been slow progress in its implementation. This could be attributed to lack of follow up mechanisms to monitor implementation of reports by EAC electoral observer missions due to internal politics. In addition, the respondents noted that each EAC partner state pursues individual policies in the interpretation and adaptation of the concept of democracy and this undermines collective governance frameworks. However, the CPMR application models in each country according to constructivism theory, may be quite different and that the peace building model applied in each case could take a different shape based on the national context.

CSOs interviewees argued that in the EAC region, there was selective application of the rule of law, compromised judicial systems, constitutionalism deficit and poor access to justice for the majority of the population. They further reiterated that even though the EAC had intervened in mediating peace in Burundi, the CSI could not mediate independently without the assistance of the ICGLR, UN, AU and international partners due to lack of resources and the complex nature of Eastern Africa subregion conflicts.

The current study findings resonate with those of Khadiagala (2018) observations that the EAC has made efforts to address electoral processes in the subregion. The EAC forum of heads of national electoral commissions has established common standards and principles that aim at determining the legitimacy and credibility of electoral processes. Indeed, in the Burundi 2015 conflict, both the unilateral approaches by EAC and the AU and lack of a common position by member states of the AU regarding intervention in Burundi (because of varying interpretations of the relevant legal

instruments) led to a delay in addressing the violent conflict situation that affected the Burundian population. However, just like in the ECOWAS management of the Gambia 2016 post-election impasse, and the Kenya 2018 post-election conflict, a political settlement was only possible when the EAC led International Facilitation Team, comprising of EAC, IGAD, AU and the UN came into force (Odigie, 2017). Neoliberalism institutionalism and constructivism theories are manifested in terms of the local CPMR and the use of different international institutions as platforms for mediation among competing local political formations.

Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) as critical institutions in the electoral processes need multi-pronged strategies to involve youth in political and electoral processes. This can be through embracing advances in technology, being transparent and accountable, promoting dialogue and negotiation (Sarah & Muchlinski, 2018). The role of CSIs is to promote relevant policies and strategies to enable members to share democratic principles and ideals as durable guarantors of sustainable peace. In view of the unique historical evolution of each state, there are no replicable frameworks for prevention of electoral violence. However, there are fundamental ideals such as legitimacy of the process through transparency and accountability, participation of all interest groups and societal perceptions of fair and free electoral processes. In line with neoliberal institutionalism theory, the CSIs can only encourage member states to implement global and regional standards of electoral management as one of CPMR strategies. They cannot micromanage electoral processes due to limits of sovereignty. At best they have provided election observers who enjoy limited leeway.

Nearly a half of respondents (46.2%) considered the CSI's performance in addressing proliferation of SALWs as above average. Interviewees at strategic level argued that

this could be attributed to EAC's commitment to the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol and the UN Program of Action on SALWs which has substantially increased regional and cross regional cooperation in managing the threat. While giving their views, respondents at operational level explained that the EAC had put in place measures that had led to improved governance of state-owned arms and the seizure and destruction of illicit arms. Further, majority of the CSO beneficiaries highlighted that the CSI cooperates with the Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA), the military and police to mark and register weapons within the partner countries.

A CSO informant in one FGD stated:

...through these measures, licensing procedures for civilian firearms had been reviewed while physical stockpile, security and management measures had improved. EAC partner states ratified the Nairobi Protocol which made seizure and destruction of small arms efficient. This has assisted in limiting access to small arms by organized criminal groups... (CSO informant 03, Burundi, 2020).

In 2004, Partner states across EAC and the Horn of Africa put in place the Nairobi Protocol to establish the RECSA whose mandate is to coordinate and regulate all SALW interventions in the subregion. Therefore, all the states and relevant actors were obliged to build the necessary institutions, put in place the relevant legislation, and initiate cross-border cooperation and coordination to finding a lasting solution to the human security question. This entailed galvanizing harmonized approaches that can enable law enforcement agencies across all EAC borders to identify the criminal networks that are involved in the illicit flow of SALW and dismantle them effectively. About 15.4% of the respondents who rated the performance of EAC in managing proliferation of SALWs as below average argued that despite putting in place relatively good initiatives, effective control of cross border trafficking of SALWs is hampered by weak border control mechanisms and corruption.

As for management of environmental degradation and climate change, the EAC registered an average performance (80%) and below average performance (20%). While expressing views on the average ratings, interviewees at strategic level explained that EAC had launched a climate change program to run from 2019-2023 as part of the intra Global Climate Alliance Plus Program (GCCA+) to support climate change adaptation and mitigation actions in the subregion. The interviewees reported that the CSI had put in place policies and strategies aimed at domesticating member states internal policies and institutions for climate change and disaster risk management. These views were supported by respondents at operational level and CSO informants who illustrated that EAC had initiated the Lake Victoria Management Programme (LVMP) which were meant to help reduce pollution and conflict over fish exploitation.

A CSO informant during an FGD elaborated:

...in 2019, EAC began to implement a program on strengthening and harmonizing of regional knowledge base, legal, policy and institutional structures for effective management of trans-boundary natural resources and ecosystems. Under this project, EAC will implement activities to reduce wildlife poaching and trafficking. According to the EAC Report 2019, EAC was set to review the 2006 Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources Management, the EAC Trans boundary Resources Management Bill, 2012 and support ratification of the EAC Forests Management and Protection Bill, 2015... (CSO informant 01, Burundi ,2020).

In addition, CSO interviewees observed that the EAC had put in place policies and strategies for climate change and disaster risk reduction which had been adopted by member states. Evidently, Uganda and Kenya have domesticated internal policies and institutions for climate change and disaster risk management.

Although the EAC has made efforts to address environmental degradation and climate change, during FGDs, a section of informants observed that the CSI's mitigation efforts have been hindered by failure to fully implement programs that promote sustainable

use of natural resources. The informants attributed ineffective implementation of the programs to resource constraints and lack of political commitment by respective EAC governments.

In support of this, a CSO informant illustrated that:

... EAC governments have not fully implemented environmental conservation policies because of patronage. For example, polluting industries may threaten with job cuts when forced to adhere to environmental regulations like changing to cleaner production methods. Governments may fear that if polluting industries are forced to adopt cleaner production costs, they may pull out of the respective host states occasioning job losses... (CSO informant, 04, Somalia, 2020).

FGD informants further reported that even though EAC had drafted numerous policies on mitigating climate change, these had remained ideal blueprints that had not been implemented for lack of funds and political commitment by respective member states. Citing examples, they reported that the CSI had duplicated policies all dealing with matters to do with climate change across a wide time margin yet there was no evidence to show successful achievement of any policy goals. This finding confirms arguments by Radeny *et al.*, (2020) who posit that the EAC has numerous policy guides: East African Community Climate Change Policy (EAC-CCP, 2011), East African Community Climate Change Master Plan (EAC-CCMP, 2011–2031) and the East Africa Climate Change Strategy (EAC-CCS, 2015–16). All these aimed at achieving implementation of regional collective measures to address climate change in East Africa while cognizant of the relationship between climate change and food insecurity. However, the policies had not been implemented for lack of funds.

As compared to other security threats, it emerged that EAC registered below average ratings on the management of resource-based conflicts (90.9%). This was evident

especially when an overwhelming majority (90.9%) of EAC respondents indicated that the CSI had performed below average in addressing the threat. Interviewees at strategic level attributed the EAC's dismal performance to unsuccessful strategies in putting in place poverty reduction and eradication mechanisms. They highlighted that despite EAC working with member states to craft and implement mechanisms to reduce or eradicate poverty, resource constraints had rendered these efforts futile. Consequently, these poverty reduction strategies were not meaningfully appreciated at the grassroots level as they had not translated into tangible results. In addition, respondents at the operational level pointed out that with the exception of Lake Victoria programs, EAC lacked a common framework for the management of trans-boundary resources and common shared natural resources and that the absence of such framework meant that natural resources continue to ignite conflict, tensions and rivalries especially at border points and among communities with diverse ethnic configurations.

Conversely, CSOs interviewees observed that the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) under the EAC promotes integrated water resource management though it is a long-term resource-based conflict prevention strategy that if successfully implemented, may make a significant difference in management of conflicts over shared natural resources in the subregion. Despite EAC's challenges in managing conflicts over shared natural resources, 0.9% of respondents gave the CSI an average rating in the management of this threat. During FGDs, a section of informants argued that EAC has been actively involved in addressing any tensions regarding exploitation of the Lake Victoria. They explained that the CSI has also successfully forged a sense of unity in challenging Sudanese and Egyptian monopoly over the Nile waters despite divergent views on utilization of the Nile waters between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia especially over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

It emerged from interviewees at the strategic level that the EAC had developed policies that had significantly mitigated conflicts over shared natural resources in the subregion. This finding comports with a study by Ombara *et al.*, (2020) which highlighted that the EAC developed policies and legislation to support sustainable use of cross border natural resources especially forests, land water resources, wildlife and mountainous environments. Ombara *et al.*, (2020) assert that the EAC had developed the Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources Management to address amicable exploitation of trans-boundary resources. This is consonance with the EAC, (2016) which seeks to marshal parent states' commitment to domesticate policies for sustainable use of cross-border natural shared resources.

Management of territorial border conflicts elicited mixed reactions from EAC respondents. A total of 50% of respondents rated the performance of the CSI as below average whereas another 50% gave the CSI a below average rating. While supporting the CSI average ratings in addressing territorial and border disputes, interviewees at strategic level argued that EAC had made efforts by initiating diplomatic talks to mediate over the Misingo Island dispute between Kenya and Uganda. Though the issue has not been exhaustively solved, the EAC's intervention helped de-escalate tensions between the two states.

Regarding the below average ratings, respondents at operational level explained that EAC has not enacted initiatives to manage territorial and border conflict and disputes. They elaborated that the CSI was yet to conclude a framework for mutual legal assistance to enhance capacity in line with exchange of commodity, evidence and suspects in the region. While giving their opinion on this issue, CSO informants also argued that the EAC does not have a conflict resolution mechanism for member states'

border disputes and that lack of political commitment has hindered conclusive demarcation and delimitation of inter-state borders.

4.4.3 EASF Initiatives in Managing Contemporary Security Threats

This section presents quantitative and qualitative views of respondents on the extent to which the EASF has addressed various security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion. From the quantitative and qualitative analysis, the study established that EASF has performed relatively well in the management of terrorism (13.7% above average, 45.1% average), electoral induced violence (41.7% above average, 22.9% average), proliferation of SALWs (19.4% above average, 38.9% average).

Regarding management of terrorism, interviewees at strategic level attributed the above average and average ratings to EASF's initiatives in counter terrorism and capacity building programs. They explained that through partnership with regional bodies and local/regional CSOs, EASF conducts periodical training for regional forces and sensitization of the population against dangers of terrorism. Respondents at operational level also highlighted that EASF had supported AU and AMISOM in the fight against *Al Shabaab* by virtue of majority of AMISOM troops having benefited from EASF training on counter-violent extremism. In addition, the respondents at tactical level noted that the CSI supports AU and AMISOM in building capacity by conducting awareness campaigns and training on counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism. This contribution was expected to build capacity of key technical personnel who can pass on the knowledge and skills to the lower cadre.

Despite the EASF initiatives for capacity building and awareness campaigns on counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism, slightly above a third (41.2%) of the respondents indicated that the CSI has not adequately managed terrorism. Respondents

at tactical level blamed this on suspicion, mistrust and rivalry among member states which undermine effective implementation of joint counter terror programs in the subregion. This view was supported by interviewees at strategic level who observed that EASF has not developed a concise policy on how to integrate counter-terrorism measures into its current mandate. They further explained that the changing nature of conflicts, the use of hard power to counter terror activities by the respective governments of member states and lack of support by civil society and the general civilian populace were the major hindrance to EASF's counter-terrorism efforts in the subregion.

While voicing their concerns on the issue, majority of CSOs' interviewees argued that regional governments have not collaborated well with the international community in intelligence sharing within and among member states in the fight against terrorism. The use of force by Eastern Africa governments when addressing terrorism was identified as a drawback to any EASF anti-terrorism campaigns.

A CSO interviewee explained the following:

...Eastern Africa governments use coercive tactics in the name of counter terrorism. These tactics often do not respect the rule of law and therefore governments lose out on civil society and general civilian support. Additionally, law enforcement officials lack awareness on alternative legal tools thus over reliance on hard power manifest in the use of military and extrajudicial killings of suspected terrorists... (CSO interviewee 07, 2020).

The above voice is indicative of a concern that was more prominent before the global rethink of anti-terrorism strategies. Though there have been several cases in Kenya, Uganda and to a lesser extent Rwanda and Tanzania where local human rights organizations have expressed dissatisfaction with disappearance of terror suspects after being apprehended by police, development of anti-terrorism management regimes took different forms across East Africa.

These sentiments were also echoed by FGD informants who illustrated that even though EASF has conducted awareness campaigns and trainings on terrorism and counter-terrorism in the subregion, the CSI still lacks a strong autonomous mechanism backed by all member states to adequately address terrorism. Besides, some informants argued that EASF is yet to address the marginalization of religious groups especially among Muslim populations in Christian dominated countries in the subregion and that regional governments have not collaborated well with the international community in intelligence sharing and collective training aimed at fighting terrorism within and among member states. A section of FGDs informants were of the view that lack of modern technology in fighting terror by EASF is a handicap to counter-terrorism measures in the region. Application of neorealism and neoliberalism institutionalism perspectives in the study indicate that member states took time to switch from the American led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) hard power-based paradigm to institutional-based norms on human rights and conflict sensitive P/CVE model. It may be important for CSIs to acquire modern technology to enhance counter terror efforts in the subregion.

Military intervention in countering terrorism faces challenges and hostilities that compromise its objectivity. This may call for a paradigm shift where a generic counter terrorism model, for instance, one blending military intervention and mediation is used. Such mediation initiatives seeking to achieve political solutions through an inclusive and open process that ropes in women and youth and tackling the driving factors of terrorism and violent extremism including marginalization. In view of this, the significance of violent extremism especially in the Eastern Africa subregion has resulted into a re-look at Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) to embrace strategies that appreciate perception of the threat locally, nationally and

regionally so that the multilateral concerns can be aligned with the available resources. Decentralization of P/CVE strategies for instance in Kenya through county P/CVE mechanisms opens a window for a variety of stakeholders, including the civil society, with anticipated inclusive and improved P/CVE initiatives, a limitation of technical capacities in local communities notwithstanding.

In management of electoral- induced violence, almost a half of the respondents (41.7%) rated EASF's performance as above average. Interviewees at strategic level while explaining the CSI's above average ratings indicated that the EASF conducts security assessment surveys on elections and deploys election observer missions in the subregion. In addition, EASF has made public pronouncements on happenings in different elections among member states. Citing examples, respondents at operational level explained that EASF successfully deployed an assessment team and elections observer mission during elections in Comoros (March 2019), Seychelles (October 2020) and Uganda (January 2021). The study established that the CSI also carries out capacity building by providing training on election monitoring and management in the subregion.

However, slightly above a third of the respondents (35.5%) noted that the CSI had not done a lot in managing electoral- induced violence. This is unsurprising given that the CSI was established as a regional mechanism to provide rapid deployment capability and peace enforcement and therefore has little engagement in matters of good governance due to mandate limitations. CSO interviewees also highlighted that effective intervention in electoral-induced violence matters was hindered by sovereignty issues citing insignificant support and cooperation accorded to EASF election observer teams by some member states. While referring to elections in Burundi

in 2015, a section of FGD informants explained that an EASF observer team was rejected by the Government of Burundi citing sovereignty concerns. This was further highlighted by a CSO informant who explained:

...EASF was unable to effectively respond to electoral-induced violence due to the caveat of national interests and non-interference in matters of states. The EASF has not put in place effective policies to enhance governance and respect to the rule of law. The mandate of the EASF was to maintain peace, security and harmony among member states. It was the concern of member states to sustain democracy in their domestic jurisdiction. However, EASF has not secured political commitment from member states in regard to providing independent oversight of elections and referendum processes... (FDG informant, Burundi,01, 2020).

Election management is not a core business of EASF. However, in PSO missions where military, police and civilians are called upon to provide security services, EASF would be expected to offer capacity building in terms of the role of peacekeepers in elections management and cooperation between uniformed personnel and civilians. This is a crucial function offered by UN missions such as MONUSCO and UNMISS, though with limited success.

Based on these findings, it may be inferred that effective management of electoral processes by the CSI is largely a function of how grounded the CSI's mandates are within the institutions' normative and legal instruments and collaboration of various stakeholders with respect to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage.

In addressing proliferation of SALWs, respondents noted that EASF had a relatively good performance (19.4% above average, 38.9% average). Respondents at operational level attributed the above average and average ratings to strategies that EASF had put in place to manage the threat such as establishing an EASF maritime section that conducts domain awareness training on SALWs and human trafficking. The maritime

cell had a platform in place to monitor the Indian Ocean region to provide accurate data on proliferation of SALWs. CSO respondents also observed that the EASF had established an Early Warning Network (EWARN) which was also instrumental in gathering information on transnational crimes (including trafficking in small arms) across the subregion.

On the contrary, about 41.7% of EASF respondents gave the CSI a below average rating in management of proliferation of SALWs. In the views of interviewees at strategic level, effective management of SALWs is inhibited by lack of effective collaboration among regional and sub-regional actors with intimate understanding of the local context. This compromises coordination of collective EASF action aimed at preventing cross-border exchange of arms.

In relation to management of territorial and border conflicts, 64.7% of the respondents rated EASF's performance as average. Respondents at operational level explained that the CSI made efforts by conducting frequent consultative security meetings at border points to devise methods of coexistence in the Eastern African subregion. Further, the CSI participates in AU meetings on border issues with the goal to develop a policy document on approaches the EASF could adopt in addressing border disputes.

Despite the EASF's initiatives in managing proliferation of SALWs, about 25% of CSOs interviewees had a contrary opinion and argued that the CSI had not operationalized the EASF Panel of Elders which could enable involvement in Track 1.5 diplomacy and Track 2 diplomacy. Further, both forms of diplomacy would help in resolving the intricate and transnational threat of SALWs by exploring both official and non-official channels of problem solving and build relationships with various stakeholders.

The regional security mechanism registered dismal performance in management of environmental degradation rated at 69.2% (below average) and conflicts over shared natural resources rated 60.7% (below average). According to a majority (69.2%) of EASF respondents, the regional mechanism failed to implement the African Union Policy Guideline on the role of African Standby Force in Humanitarian Action and Natural Disaster Support (HANDS) policy resulting in the EASF's inability to achieve environmental conservation objectives. On their part, CSO interviewees observed that EASF has not integrated the HANDS scenario to the AU's seven scenarios which are necessary ingredients in addressing the gaps in EASF mandate. In the views of 28.6% of EASF respondents, the dismal performance in management of conflicts over shared natural resources was largely attributed to limitations in the EASF mandate.

Finally, it was important for the study to compare the three CSIs' performance across the region's areas of jurisdiction and across the various indicators of security threats. To generate a rating for their overall performance, the study computed a final score by aggregating the scores accorded to the CSI in each country of intervention using the average and above average scores for each element as shown in table 4.4. This allowed the generation of a final percentage score indicating the strength of each CSI and combined strength across the security threats as shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Ratings of CSIs Performance in Management of security threats in the region

	IGAD	EAC	EASF	Average score (%)
Terrorism	100	88.9	58.8	82.5
Electoral-induced violence	73.8	91.6	64.6	76.6
Proliferation of SALWs	59.1	84.7	58.3	67.3
Conflicts over shared natural resources	52	9.1	39.3	33.4
Territorial and border conflicts	12.9	50	73.5	45.4
Environmental degradation	88	80	30.7	66.2
Ethnic and clan-based violence	100	40	65.2	68.4

Source: Field Data (2020).

Evidently, according to the ratings by respondents, IGAD performed quite well regionally in managing terrorism, ethnic and clan-based violence, environmental degradation and electoral-induced violence as indicated by at least over 70% of respondents. EAC scored well in handling electoral induced violence, terrorism, controlling of SALWs and environmental degradation as observed by at least 80% of study respondents. For EASF, good performance was noted in management of territorial and border conflicts by 73% of respondents as shown in Table 4.4.

Conversely, a paltry 12% of respondents believed that IGAD performed well in management of territorial and border conflicts. This is consistent to EAC's case where ratings for average and above average performance came from only 9% of respondents on the same security threat and handling of ethnic and border conflicts. Lastly, EASF performed dismally in handling environmental degradation and conflicts over shared natural resources as only 30% and 39% of respondents scored it at average and above average on the two factors respectively. Overall, average ratings show that the evaluation of the three CSIs combined reflect high performance in management of

terrorism, electoral-induced violence and ethnic/clan-based violence as scored by 82%, 76% and 68% respectively. Conversely, dismal performance is noted in resolving conflict over shared natural resources and territorial border conflicts where only 33% and 45% scored the CSIs as doing well.

From the findings in this objective, it emerged that the three CSIs have shown commitment at managing the security threats and at varying degrees and levels. This is manifested by the various levels of institutional development and mandates. Despite these efforts, the CSIs face financial handicaps and failure to implement policies especially those that hinge on sovereignty. This explains why the three CSIs had a dismal performance in management of shared natural resources and territorial and border conflicts.

Aspiration 4 of the AU Agenda 2063 anticipated that by 2020 there would be adequate mechanisms to achieve peaceful settlement for disputes in Africa. Therefore, Africa, through Agenda 2063, would be able to inculcate a culture of respect for human rights, democracy, gender and ethnic equality. Peace and security will be attained through prevention of armed conflicts, terrorism, and extremism in addition to the violence based upon gender, drugs, human trafficking, organized crimes, arms trade and piracy (AU, 2015a). The study has demonstrated that the subregion still faces a lot of threats and therefore has developed strategies for managing contemporary security threats. Under these circumstances, achieving the aspirations of AU Agenda 2063 remains a challenge.

4.5 Contribution of IGAD, EAC and EASF to Conflict Resolution in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi

Objective three of the study sought to examine the extent of contribution of IGAD, EAC and EASF to conflict resolution in select countries of Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi in the subregion. This section examines the plans and programmes that have been put in place by IGAD, EAC and EASF to conflict resolution to address the security threats discussed earlier. The section is organized as follows: contribution of IGAD to conflict resolution in Somalia and South Sudan, contribution of EAC to conflict resolution in South Sudan and Burundi and contribution of EASF to conflict resolution in Burundi and Somalia.

Over the years, IGAD, EAC and EASF have developed and employed systematic CPMR strategies to execute their peace and security mandates in order to stabilize the subregion. Conflict resolution was conceptualized in terms of conflict prevention, conflict management and post conflict peace building. Conflict prevention and management entails early warning, early response, mediation, peace keeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention. The post conflict peace building pillar has five elements: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), capacity building, Security Sector Reforms (SSR), electoral reforms and judicial reforms.

4.5.1 Contribution of IGAD to Conflict Resolution in Somalia

The study sought to establish the contribution of IGAD to conflict resolution in Somalia. In this regard, respondents were asked to give their views concerning the contribution of IGAD to conflict prevention, conflict management and post conflict peace building. Ratings on IGAD's contribution to conflict resolution in Somalia are presented in Figure 4.2.




Figure 4.2: Ratings on IGAD’s contribution to conflict resolution in Somalia

Source: Field Data (2020).

As indicated in Figure 4.2, IGAD registered good performance in conflict prevention pillar in the Somalia conflict with notable efforts in conflict early warning, at 62.6% and 29.2% respondents who gave an above average and average rating respectively. IGAD’s initiatives in early response were relatively good as reported by 27.1% and 64.6% of respondents for an above average and average performance, respectively. The CSI also performed relatively well in mediation as indicated by 50% and 31.3% of respondents who rated it as above average and average respectively.

Regarding IGAD conflict management initiatives in Somalia, majority of respondents reported an average (53.3%) and below average (42.2%) performance for IGAD’s humanitarian intervention initiatives. Respondents also reported that IGAD performed relatively well in management of conflicts in Somalia: peacekeeping (33.3%; 57.8%);

peace enforcement (13.3%; 62.2%). In overall, less than a third of respondents reported that IGAD had performed dismally in each of the conflict prevention and management initiatives in Somalia.

Under IGAD's peace building initiatives in Somalia, majority of respondents reported a dismal performance. A total of 40 % and 35%, of respondents indicated an average performance for DDR and SSR respectively. However, 42.2% of the respondents argued that the CSI had dismal performance in DDR due to mandate limitations. For electoral reforms and judicial reforms, majority of respondents 56.3% and 68.9% rated the performance as below average. From the statistics, out of the five elements in the peacebuilding pillar, IGAD had only performed well in the capacity building pillar as demonstrated by 37.5% and 43.8% respondent ratings for above average and average performance respectively.

Owing to frequent terrorist attacks and insecurity in many parts of South-Central Somalia, it has been difficult for CSIs to engage with the populace through the government and CSOs to provide training in SSR, DDR and provision of humanitarian assistance. This makes the work of IGAD not to be felt on the ground in the country thereby limiting its CPMR and stabilization impact in the most deserving parts of the country. However, the UN has also been contributing to SSR and DDR in Somalia mostly in liaison with AMISOM.

Conflict Prevention and Management

Over time, some conflicts have defied the traditional Peace Support Operations (PSOs) approach, where deployed forces used minimal force for self-defence and sought consent from the host country. Today, PSO missions are deployed in Mali, Somalia, Eastern DRC and CAR, where there is no peace to keep. In such situations, often

operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, forces have increasingly been compelled to use force beyond the provisions of Chapter VI. Under this scenario, this study analysed conflict prevention, which includes conflict early warning, early response and mediation aspects. In reference to conflict management by IGAD, the study analysed three components namely contribution to peace keeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention.

As shown in Figure 4.4, a total of 62.6% of respondents indicated that IGAD had performed above average in providing early warning in Somalia whereas 29.2% rated it as average while 8.3% were of the contrary opinion that the performance was below average.

In explaining early warning, interviewees at strategic level observed that IGAD had an established conflict early warning mechanism which provides linkages among the Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) in seven of its member states: Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. Interviews with key informants revealed that IGAD's Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was instrumental in providing early warning indicators in the various phases of conflict in Somalia. This view was also supported by respondents at operational level who reported that the arrangement enhanced active and continuous information sharing between the Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS), CEWERUs and the IGAD CEWARN. On the same note, CSOs interviewees observed that IGAD ensured that all member states were part of the early warning protocol established in 2002 and this enhanced harmonization and implementation of related policies and decisions at the national CEWS.

However, a section of FGD informants argued that the IGAD early warning system was not fully up to the task of responding to security threats because the CSI had not reoriented its policies to make its institutions work together. Other CSO informants argued that IGAD lacked proper documentation and tracking of conflict indicators because of weak linkages between community, national and regional systems. Some CSO interviewees also observed that most conflict indicators used rarely focused on states or interstate security and stability but rather on inter communal conflicts due to conflict sensitivity and sovereignty concerns among member states.

Regarding early response to conflict, respondents rated IGAD's performance as follows: 64.6% (average), 27.1% (above average) and 8.3% (below average). Respondents at the CSI's operational level attributed the above average and average ratings to IGAD having a functional conflict early warning and response mechanism and an established mediation support division. The respondents further explained that IGAD had strengths in quick convening power through which the Secretariat was able to expediently mobilize member states to meet and react to the Somalia conflict. Similarly, interviewees at strategic level opined that IGAD had engaged in early response in Somalia through diplomatic interventions (facilitated by the special envoy to Somalia) which led to attempted deployment of an IGAD force; IGAD Mission in Somalia (IGASOM).

On the other hand, CSOs informants expressed contrary views regarding early response to conflict. They observed that IGAD lacked capacity to provide adequate preventive military deployment and that the IGAD Charter had neither been reviewed nor its policies aligned with emerging conflict dynamics and security threats on the ground.

Findings of the present study on shortcomings of IGAD CEWARN and CEWERUS are in agreement with Maru and El Fassi (2015) who note that IGAD portrays disparity and lack of institutionalization of some of its key departments especially the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP) and the CEWARN thus undermining the essence of having a robust early warning mechanism aimed at promoting peace in the subregion. Maru and El Fassi (2015) argue that there is lack of clear consultation between CEWS and CEWARN on matters related to respective country desk offices in IGAD member states. These views were also supported by Kaburu (2018) who observed that CEWARN is perceived as one of the most elaborate institution established by IGAD, but points out that member states' historical relations characterized by suspicion and rivalry affected the identification and sharing of crucial security information through their respective CEWERUS, thereby impeding effective response situations in the subregion.

In terms of the extent to which IGAD had contributed to peace keeping, majority of respondents (57.8%) rated IGAD's contribution as average. Only 8.9% of respondents rated IGAD below average in peacekeeping. Concerning IGADs' peace keeping initiatives, interviewees at strategic level argued that IGAD made significant attempts to stabilize Somalia. They further explained that in January 2005, IGAD attempted to deploy IGASOM which had been authorized by the AU as a political mission was viewed as a predecessor to AMISOM. To further show IGAD's peace keeping commitment in Somalia, respondents at operational level observed that IGAD attempted to deploy a Ugandan contingent alongside IGASOM before AMISOM took over even though the mission failed partly due to lack of resources.

Among the CSOs who were interviewed, there were those who stated that IGAD's performance in peace keeping was below average. They argued that failure of IGASOM to deploy in Somalia was attributed to IGAD's funding challenge and difficulty in mobilizing troops from member states within a short notice to operate as a single entity. On further probing, the interviewees also explained that lack of political commitment from IGAD member states was a source of the institution's failure to sustain IGASOM even if it were deployed. During an FGD, a section of CSO informants further explained that IGASOM's non-viability was due to lack of proper training for mission components (military contingents, police and civilians) and lack of consent from warring parties in Somalia for IGASOM deployment.

Regarding peace enforcement, a majority (62.2%) of respondents rated IGAD's contribution as average. About 20.0% rated IGAD's contribution to peace enforcement as below average. From respondents at tactical level, it emerged that IGAD contributes to peace keeping and peace enforcement through member states' participation in UN sanctioned missions as articulated in UNSC Chapter 6 and 7 regulations (UN Charter). For instance, Kenya has contributed troops to South Sudan and Somalia under UNMISS and AMISOM respectively. Despite IGAD's contribution to peace enforcement, some CSOs respondents observed that IGAD lacked a peace enforcement force to deploy because the CSI faces logistical incapacity, lacks funds and has failed to implement humanitarian intervention blueprints.

The above findings are in agreement with Fahle (2015) who noted that IGASOM never deployed because IGAD member states could not agree on its composition and that the CSI lacked the required technical capacity and material resources. On the same note, De Coning *et al.*, (2015) observed that even though IGASOM served as a precursor to

AMISOM, the mission did not receive the backing of the ICU and TFG who were opposed to any foreign intervention in Somalia particularly, from neighbouring states. The same views were supported by Farole (2018) who points out that IGAD member states in collaboration with international actors worked towards stabilizing and restoring security in Somalia by combatting *Al Shabaab*. In addition, Asgedom, (2019) highlighted that the proposed IGAD force was not operationalized because of IGAD and member states limitations in mobilizing the necessary human, financial and logistical resources. Agreeing with these findings, Williams & Hashi (2016) added that lack of political buy in by key stakeholders locally and externally, and the lack of a legal basis for such a mission in IGAD's founding documents, all rendered the intended deployment impossible.

In the study analysis, it emerged that it is the ideology of choice to pursue national interests as neorealists would argue. However, where neorealism proved unproductive with regard to reliance on national forces to address regional security threats as was the case of Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006 and Kenya's 2011 military interventions in Somalia, member states opt for resolution of conflicts through CSIs. For instance, when IGAD member states faced diplomatic hurdles, financial and resources overstretch, they retreated to institutions such as AU- AMISOM for cooperation, coordination of effort and reduced financial and legitimacy transaction cost as provided by neoliberal institutionalism.

African CSIs, as this study demonstrates, do not have adequate capacity in terms of the technical aspect, equipment and funds. This makes their impact on CPMR and stabilization low and it also limits their agenda setting ability due to over reliance on external development partners. Even AMISOM relies on external funding which comes

with conditions and mandate limitations that may not be in the best interest of the subregion. This is a recurrent problem extending to the umbrella continental body. Therefore, stabilization of the subregion still remains a mirage.

Post Conflict Peace Building

Violent conflict may cause destruction of infrastructure and damage to systems critical to the functionality of a state. Any state coming out of violent conflict may therefore require the efforts of CSIs and other stakeholders to restore systems thus the rationale for post conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. The study analysed five components under post conflict peace building, namely DDR, capacity building, SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms. As shown in Figure 4.4, nearly half (43.8%) of respondents rated IGAD's contribution to capacity building as average. Slightly above a third (37.5%) of respondents indicated that IGAD's contribution to capacity building was above average. Only 14.6% of respondents rated IGAD's contribution as below average. These findings are backed by those emanating from interviewees at strategic level who argued that IGAD's contribution to capacity building was above average since the institution had conducted relevant training for security agencies in Somalia.

The interviewees further reported that IGAD had (in collaboration with the UN, AMISOM and the EU) provided training on governance, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law. Respondents at operational level also agreed that capacity building trainings were geared towards professionalizing the Somali forces. The respondents observed that IGAD had initiated projects geared towards capacity building in Somalia, for instance, setting up of IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC) that specialized in research and early warning on climate change related activities. This

centre provides scientific and reliable information that IGAD member states can act on to mitigate climate change related conflicts and disasters.

While giving their views on IGAD's capacity building initiatives in Somalia, CSO interviewees highlighted that IGAD had initiated livestock projects and a vocational training centre in Somalia and Somaliland. In addition, IGAD had built capacity in counter terrorism by establishing the Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism to coordinate best practices among member countries. In relation to this, a CSO interviewee observed that:

... the IGAD Somalia Facilitation Office working with and cognizance of the prioritized needs of the Federal Government of Somalia and of the IGAD Peace and Security Division Strategy, has spearheaded and facilitated implementation of a number of activities that have contributed to the relative political and security stability in Somalia. For example, capacity building experience sharing on Federalism was done in Somalia. The IGAD Security Sector Programme has enhanced institutional capacity of Somalia's security sectors to effectively address the challenges related to transnational security threats such as terrorism and maritime security threats... (CSO interviewee 04, 2020).

The above-mentioned capacity building programmes included training of security sector personnel, benchmarking with other well-functioning external institutions, reforms in terms of security strategy, revitalizing the relatively new institutions such as Somali National Army (SNA) and police and intelligence services. These activities were undertaken in collaboration with other partners such as AU and UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS).

Despite IGAD's contribution to capacity building, during an FGD, a section of informants argued that the institution had not done much. They observed that IGAD lacked an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism to determine whether

capacity building initiatives established had achieved the anticipated impact in peacebuilding.

These findings are in conformity with those of Brüntrup (2021) who reported that with regard to the implementation of the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) to achieve drought and disaster resilient communities, ecosystems and institutions; other than sector level and development partner coordination, there was lack of progress in Somalia in implementing all areas of action in the IDDRSI strategy such as setting up national coordination structures which for instance inform aligning humanitarian responses and development interventions. This reflects a lack of capacity and technical support in this regard, for Somalia.

Regarding judicial reforms, a vast majority of respondents (68.9%) rated IGAD's contribution to judicial reforms as below average while 13.3% of respondents rated performance as average. Through respondents at operational level, the study revealed that IGAD worked with relevant actors to initiate electoral reforms in Somalia with the hope that this would culminate in a one-man-one-vote scenario in 2021. However, this was not actualized. The main reason why it was not actualized was articulated during interview with interviewees at IGAD strategic level. One of them observed:

...elections and democratization are sensitive internal affairs of member states who may not easily welcome outsiders' interventions... (IGAD strategic level respondent 09, 2020). Somalia has its own traditional clan-based system of Electoral College. Democracy in the long run must take cognisance of the local cultures, structures and tradition. There may be a contradiction between Western interpretation of democracy and local cultural practices. This means that IGAD push for democratic elections should be built on these structures in order to gain acceptance and sustainability... (IGAD strategic level interviewee, 12, 2020).

SSR has been adapted as an established model of turning rag tag armies, rogue police, weak correctional services and judiciary into professional services that can enhance protection of civilians and access to justice including protecting civilians against human rights violations and abuse. As shown in Figure 4.4, a total of 35.6% of respondents rated IGAD's contribution to security sector reforms as below average. Another 35.6% indicated that IGAD's contribution was average. Only 15.6% rated IGAD's contribution as above average. An interviewee at strategic level explained the following regarding IGAD's below average performance in SSR:

... meaningful SSR activities in Somalia as facilitated by IGAD are yet to be achieved, its implementation however has faced various challenges such as resistance and lack of buy in by the leaders, retrogression, corruption, poor strategies of implementation and inadequate financial and human resources... (IGAD strategic level respondent 11, 2020).

From this assertion, the implication is that there are several processes of SSR in Somalia, with UN led reforms on one side, other developed countries, AMISOM and IGAD among other actors. The local actors appear to respond more to SSR backed by financial incentives. Therefore, IGAD's SSR lacking such financial muscle renders it a weak partner in such endeavours.

In the views of CSO interviewees, despite IGAD's overall dismal performance in SSR, in 2016, IGAD office in Somalia facilitated establishment of a Regional Security Cooperation Framework for the different regions in Somalia such as Dhobley and Puntland that further enhanced the integration of the respective regional security elements into SNA.

From the findings of this section, it is evident that IGAD registered fairly good performance in aspects of conflict prevention and management through conflict early

warning, early response and peace keeping ratings. However, apart from capacity building and DDR, IGAD fared poorly in post-conflict peacebuilding.

IGAD has demonstrated various conflict prevention, management and peacebuilding efforts /initiatives in a bid to resolve conflict in Somalia. Commendable efforts have been made under conflict prevention and management pillar, and more specifically the early warning initiatives. Similar efforts have also been demonstrated in the capacity building initiatives. In overall, IGAD's peace building initiatives, notably in DDR, judicial, electoral and security sector reforms were reported to be below par.

Poor performance in CPMR and peacebuilding translates to near inability in stabilization in the subregion. However, in some cases as alluded to earlier, other partners working in Somalia with more capacity fill the void unmet by IGAD. The current federal government and the prevailing security environment is a product of the long term IGAD mediation efforts and capacity building for CPMR. AMISOM that bears its origin from IGAD continues to support the government's efforts in stabilizing Somalia. In view of the volatility and fragility of the Horn of Africa region, the CSI will continue to determine the peacebuilding trajectory in Somalia. It is more important to focus on developing better interventions within the limited resources available and concentrating on developing more endogenous frameworks that integrate local knowledge and broad-based national dialogue before state building reforms are implemented.

4.5.2 Contribution of IGAD to Conflict Resolution in South Sudan

This section presents analysis of contribution of IGAD to Conflict Prevention, Management and Post Conflict Peace Building in South Sudan. Figure 4.3 shows respondents' ratings of contribution of IGAD to these attributes in South Sudan.




Figure 4.3: Ratings on IGAD’s contribution to conflict resolution in South Sudan
Source: Field Data (2020).

Conflict prevention and management was above average in Conflict Early Warning (CEW) (91.7%) and peacekeeping (56.3%) pillars. The CSI also performed quite well in mediation (52.2% above average) and in peace enforcement (62.2% average). The CSI’s performance in the humanitarian pillar was, however, rated by an overwhelming majority (84.4%) as below average.

Under the peace building initiatives, an overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that apart from the capacity building pillar, IGAD initiatives in DDR, SSR, electoral and judicial reforms were way below average. This was represented by a below average rating by 51.1%, 60.0%, 50.2% and 60.4% of respondents for the respective pillars. About 29.2% and 31.3% were of the view that the CSI had mandate limitations in regard to electoral reforms and judicial reforms respectively. IGAD’s

performance in capacity building was quite good as indicated by 39.6% (above average) and 33.3% (average) of respondents.

Conflict Prevention and Management

As shown in Figure 4.3, a vast majority (91.7%) of respondents indicated that IGAD had performed above average in providing early warning in relation to South Sudan conflict. Only 8.3% of respondents rated IGAD's contribution to early warning as average. According to respondents at strategic level, IGAD had a well-established and operational CEWARN which was instrumental in providing early warning indicators in the various phases of conflict in South Sudan. This view was also supported by respondents at operational level who reported that IGAD's EWS were functional and provided conflict indicators.

Figure 4.3 indicates that nearly half (47.9%) of respondents reported that IGAD had performed above average in terms of contribution to early response to conflict. Slightly over a third (37.5%) observed that IGAD had averagely contributed to early response to conflict while 14.6% noted that the institution had contributed below average. In support of the above average ratings, strategic level interviewees reported that immediately after the outbreak of the 2013 South Sudan violent conflict, immediate and intensive diplomatic initiatives by the IGAD and the international community on President Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar demonstrated IGAD's resolve to ensure an immediate end to open hostilities and to find a political settlement. A CSO interviewee added that just after the conflict erupted, the UNSC authorized deployment of more peacekeepers in South Sudan.

CSOs informants observed that IGAD's Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (RJMEC) regularly monitored the South Sudan conflict and this enabled

quick regional and international response without which the conflict would continue unabated. The informants further reiterated that RJMEC provided early warning alerts of conflict trends through provision of statistics on war casualties, injuries and displacements. This information provided reliable evidence for IGAD partners to devise strategies to assist peace building in efforts in South Sudan.

Interviewees at the strategic level also acknowledged that IGAD played a crucial role in early response by collaborating with other stakeholders to establish a monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure compliance by signatories to the August 2015 IGAD mediated Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), with the aim of preventing a relapse to violent conflict. The interviewees added that IGAD spearheaded the establishment of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) in 2015 and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) to monitor the implementation of the agreements. Respondents at operational level reported that in order to pressurize armed factions to unite and build peace in South Sudan, IGAD often invited countries and organizations from outside the Eastern Africa subregion to influence progress of the peace process.

The study findings are in consonance with Mulugeta & Ahadu (2019) who established that following the 15 December 2013 South Sudan civil war, IGAD through its quick convening power ensured timely and quick diplomatic intervention initiated talks between the warring parties by sending IGAD Council of Ministers envoy, IGAD chairperson and IGAD rapporteur to Juba, and later convened an emergency summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on December 27, 2013 which recommended the appointment of three IGAD special envoys to steer the mediation process. Vertin (2018) also observed that the quick, collective and sustained preventive

diplomacy by IGAD and partners had within two weeks of the conflict forced Government and the opposition teams to go to the negotiating table.

Knoll and Tadesse (2018) also observed that the IGAD early warning analysts' report enabled the IGAD mediators to pick up on early signs and have information on the location of any violations and the parties responsible, thereby supporting IGAD's mechanisms for monitoring and for implementation of the peace agreements. These views were also supported by Bergmann & Müller (2019) who observed that parties to the South Sudan conflict consented to IGAD's mediation role and signed agreements mostly when there was substantive external diplomatic pressure as demonstrated on one hand, by the failure of the IGAD-led Ceasefire Agreement (also known as the *Cessation of Hostilities Agreement*) in 2014 and on the other hand, by the signing of the ARCSS by the conflicting parties only after diplomatic pressure by the 2015 reconfigured IGAD-Plus mediation process.

Bergmann & Muller (2019) and Vertin (2018) also reported that IGAD-led mediation process ensured the establishment of the JMEC and later in 2018, the Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) as a tool for monitoring and verifying the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed by various parties to the South Sudan conflict in 2018.

As for peace keeping, slightly above half of respondents (56.3%) opined that IGAD's contribution was above average. Nearly a third (25.0%) indicated that IGAD's contribution to peace keeping was average. The remaining 14.6% rated the contribution as below average. Interviewees at the strategic level explained that the CSI had contributed to peace keeping in South Sudan through its member states who had

contributed troops in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and in various phases of conflicts in South Sudan. However, the study revealed through respondents at operational level that IGAD lacked capacity to deploy independent peace keeping missions citing the CSI's failure to mobilize enough financial and human resources. This could explain the below average rating by 14.6% of respondents.

In relation to mediation efforts in South Sudan, 52.2% of respondents indicated that IGAD made an average contribution. This view was supported by respondents at strategic level who explained that IGAD initiated consultation and mediation efforts at the local and national levels, leading to the signing of a peace accord that saw cessation of hostilities.

Giving examples, an interviewee at IGAD strategic level respondent reported:

...through mediation efforts, IGAD collaborated in crafting a monitoring and verification mechanism in 2014 to monitor combatants' compliance to a truce. This led to the signing of a peace treaty in 2015 followed by a 2018 Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements and Verification Mechanism... (IGAD strategic level respondent 10, 2020).

The study found out that The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, had been a crucial tool of raising awareness about progress and challenges of implementation of the revitalized agreement. The Government of National Unity was established as provided for in the agreement. There was relative peace among the armed political parties, though full stabilization of the country was yet to be achieved.

Supporting IGAD's role in mediation, CSOs respondents explained that IGAD had a well-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU) which had collaborated with the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) to consistently offer capacity building training to the South Sudan Mediation Committee. They further

cited the IGAD's Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (RJMEC) which had been an effective instrument of ensuring proper and timely implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

While IGAD is credited with having mediated a cessation of hostilities agreement in South Sudan, FGD respondents observed that the ceasefire agreement was based on potential threats of sanctions and embargos hence making the mediation process lack local ownership by the warring parties. This partly explained the recurrent violations of the ceasefire agreement in South Sudan. A section of FGD respondents also highlighted lack of proper planning in the mediation strategy noting that the process failed to garner consensus on ceasefire before engaging political factions. This was supported by a CSO respondent who illustrated as follows:

...IGAD's mediation strategy began by seeking political negotiations before ensuring that all belligerents agreed to a ceasefire. They should have ensured that there is ceasefire before the political agreement so that parties do not resort to use of the military to bargain for political power. IGAD's mediation process in South Sudan has failed because according to belligerents, it looks like it is being forced on them by foreign actors and not an IGAD driven process... (CSO respondent 20, 2020).

Operations of CSIs are done in a global power-driven international political set up. The US and European countries often push the parties in conflict from behind the scenes through threats of sanctions and withdrawal of foreign aid as a bargaining tool to push the warring parties to reach an agreement. Though these tactics often work, where IGAD's soft power is inadequate, they are detested by the leaders for being paternalistic hence the implication is that coercion works against mediation.

Despite mediating the South Sudan conflict, the study established, through respondents at operational level, that the CSI could not effectively achieve peace because the R-JMEC formed to enforce ceasefire was under-resourced and hence unable to fully achieve its mandate. They also attributed this to IGAD's lack of political commitment to sanction belligerents who violated R-ARCSS.

It is evident from the study findings that IGAD mediation in the South Sudan conflict faced local ownership and planning challenges. Mediation strategies were geared towards obtaining political solutions as opposed to addressing the key causes and drivers of conflicts. In addition, the reorganization of the mediation team to IGAD Plus was considered by the warring parties as unwelcome foreign intervention and this compromised local trust in the peace process. These findings are in synchrony with Benny (2017) who argued that the greatest setback in the South Sudan peace process was the perceived external interest by parties to the conflict and hence the peace process was considered more of a foreign intervention. This made IGAD to be viewed as a non-neutral arbitrator and therefore winning the hearts of negotiators was not easy. On the same note, Bereketeab (2017) observed that the IGAD South Sudan mediation process was hampered by advancement of mediators' national interests of respective member states as opposed to regional interests. This was further illustrated by Kassaija (2015) who argued that dominance of national interests and continued dependence on external actors shape IGAD states as an alliance of allies and non-allies protecting and advancing the geo-strategic interests of external regional and global powers.

Whereas Bereketeab (2017) argued that the major setback to IGAD's mediation process in the South Sudan conflict was advancement of mediators' national interests of respective member states, our own analysis reveals that the significant hindrance to the

mediation process was IGAD's poor strategies which prioritized political solutions at the expense of the locals' interests. Additionally, IGAD could not effectively carry out mediation due to lack of resources and political commitment.

Findings of the present study are in consonance with Adetula *et al.*, (2016) who observed that peacebuilding initiatives in the Eastern Africa subregion may not be successful and sustainable if IGAD remains unable to source funding for its peace building interventions. Adetula *et al.*, (2016) note that due to non-commitment of IGAD member states to peace initiatives, the CSI is susceptible to manipulation by external forces thus lacking autonomy to carry out its mandate. It may therefore be inferred that IGAD is still far from achieving autonomy in regard to providing effective and efficient mediation in conflicts. Drawing from the above findings, it emerged that IGAD's mediation had been hampered by lack of coherence in strategy among member states and reliance on heads of states to drive the process. The South Sudan peace process provides elements of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Neorealism is manifested by looking at the parties given legitimacy at the peace table due to political and military powers that they wield. Neoliberal institutionalism is at play in the parties' engagement in negotiation and commitment to international partners' supported agreement based on institutional norms.

The ruling SPLM/A and the opposition SPLM/SPLA-IO in-fights, brought wanton destruction of lives and livelihoods, destroyed national economy and injured the country's diplomatic standing in the region and the world at large. The parties agreed to the resumption of mediation under the umbrella of IGAD. As this research has demonstrated, this course produced positive outcomes whereby the parties committed

themselves to the ARCISS cord and subsequently to R-ARCISS whose implementation is currently being monitored by RJMEC.

Regarding humanitarian intervention, an overwhelming majority (84.4%) of respondents rated IGAD's contribution as below average. Another 6.7% of respondents indicated that the institution's contribution was average. While explaining the below average ratings, respondents at operational level reported that IGAD had not built capacity in humanitarian relief services given that the international community had been more forthcoming in that aspect. Interviewees at strategic level also highlighted that IGAD representatives and CSOs like Christian -based international humanitarian relief organizations faced political resistance working in areas majorly occupied by Muslims in South Sudan. In relation to average ratings, CSOs' interviewees argued that while observing the principle of specialization and comparative advantage, IGAD sought to play a facilitative role to enable international humanitarian organizations deliver the much-needed services to South Sudan and shield herself from the politics of international aid.

From the above findings it is evident that IGAD did not conduct humanitarian activities in relation to the population affected by the 2013 South Sudan conflict, owing to a lack of capacity in this area. This is despite the existence of the African Union Humanitarian Policy Framework (2015) which recognizes the importance of a strategic coherence and coordination with RECs and regional mechanisms as lead institutions in managing humanitarian activities / complex humanitarian emergencies in conflict situations at the sub-regional level. Other actors in the conflict theatre such as the UNMISS and CSOs however provided for these services towards collective peace and security efforts in South Sudan.

In South Sudan, the neoliberal institutionalism values are applied in the context of military power structures and balance among ethnic based armed political parties. This is infused by regionalism in terms of ethnic groups' alliances, settlement and dispersal. Alongside that pattern is control of strategic resources and facilities such as oil and gas infrastructure. Therefore, CPMR in that country takes its own shape, form and identity, achieved through construction of power alignment, sharing and agreement among major political parties. While observance of shared norms as demonstrated through peace agreement is an integral part of the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm, the behavior of armed parties to the conflict demonstrate neorealism power calculations, where every party wants to gain the most at the expense of the others in the battlefield and on the negotiation table.

Post Conflict Peace Building

As in other organizations, effective performance of CSIs is determined by availability of funds, human resource and equipment among other aspects. Most, if not all CSIs, in the subregion are dependent on donor funds. Such funds have been found to be irregular, poorly disbursed and often tied with strings to achieve donor interests. Therefore, capacity of CSIs is relatively weak especially where member countries do not provide their assessed contributions at all, wholly or in good time.

Statistics in Figure 4.3 indicate that IGAD performed below average in post conflict peace building and reconstruction in South Sudan. Apart from capacity building, IGAD performed below average in SSR according to 60.0% of respondents and in electoral reforms (50.0%) and judicial reforms (60.7%). Regarding IGAD's role in DDR, majority (51.1%) of respondents rated IGAD's contribution as below average. Another 17.8% of respondents rated IGAD's contribution as average and 15.6% as above

average. However, a total of 29.2% and 31.3% of the respondents argued that the CSI had mandate limitations in regard to electoral reforms and judicial reforms respectively. The study established through CSOs interviewees that IGAD provided advisory information on DDR but continuous relapse to conflict compromised any DDR objectives due to the CSI's lack of capacity and funds.

In relation to capacity building, slightly above a third (33.3%) of respondents rated IGAD's contribution as average and 39.6% rated the CSI performance as above average. Results of IGAD's contribution to capacity building showed mixed reaction among respondents. Interviewees at strategic level reported that IGAD had made notable efforts in capacity building by collaborating with the EU and UN to offer training to security agencies in South Sudan. The training was aimed at professionalizing the SPLM and inculcate respect for the rule of law and human rights. Thus, the below average rating could be attributed to what one of the IGAD strategic level respondents reported:

... the institution drafted a policy document on the professionalization of South Sudan security agencies in view of their multi agency role in post conflict peace building but the policy was never implemented due to lack of funds. Despite conducting capacity building initiatives, IGAD was not able to meet its targets due to lack of funds... (IGAD strategic level respondent, 08, 2020).

As this study has demonstrated, IGAD's power stems from the good will bestowed upon it by member states. It does not have the power of 'deep pockets', a reflection of the developing status of the member states. As alluded to in the Somalia case, this creates an opportunity for development partners to leverage their powers on the stabilization agenda of the CSI. This also indicates aspects of the neorealism theoretical perspective where despite the altruistic motive of development partners at face value,

their funding choices are determined by their real and perceived enlightened best interests.

Findings of the present study confirm arguments by Lucey and Mesfin (2016) who posit that IGAD contributed to post conflict peace building by carrying out SSR/DDR training in South Sudan. The CSI partnered with the AU and UN in crafting a DDR strategy aimed at empowering the South Sudan National DDR Commission. IGAD also set up the Civilian Capacities Initiative which involved Civil Service Support Officers (CSSOs) from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda seconded to South Sudan on a bilateral basis. This collaboration was aimed at enhancing capacity for South Sudanese civil servants.

The present study highlighted funding challenges as a major hindrance to the implementation of post conflict peace building mechanisms. This is in consonance with Lucey and Mesfin (2016) who observe that IGAD has offices in South Sudan and Somalia that focus on post conflict peace building related issues including security sector reform programmes. Unfortunately, the Post Conflict Reconstruction Development (PCRD) programme has not yet been implemented mainly due to lack of resources.

From the above findings, it is established that lack of funds emerged as a recurrent factor cited in non-performance of peacekeeping and peace building initiatives among African RECs. While the APSA framework provided for an Africa Peace Fund to bridge the funding gap and reduce over reliance on donor funds, AU member states have continued to renege on their duty to pay assessed contributions. For instance, according to AU (2017), in 2016 donors contributed 60% of the AU \$417 million budget; 97% of AU programmes were supported by donors; by December 2016 only

25 of the 54 member countries had fully paid their dues for that financial year. This view was also supported by the Kagame Report of 2017, which highlighted the need for Africa RECS/CSIs to be financially independent so that Africa and the AU can set its agenda and regain its dignity.

Since IGAD is a REC within the APSA framework, and following the subsidiarity principle, IGAD is expected to adapt the AU financial management and independence plan in order to raise its capacity to build peace in the subregion in line with regional priorities and needs. It was observed that reliance on development partners' support even on critical security matters could have ramifications on Africa's security agenda setting and priorities which is reason why the Kagame Report sought to take back decision making power to the AU (AU, 2017).

The prevailing South Sudan government of national unity is a product of the long term IGAD mediation efforts and capacity building. Considering state fragility and militarized politics in South Sudan, IGAD has made commendable efforts to convince the ruling elites and the armed opposition to remain committed to the R-ARCISS. The CSI enjoys significant credibility among member states in the region; where some member states express disdain for foreign interference. Therefore, the CSI remains the organ of choice for sustainable CPMR and peacebuilding in the Eastern Africa region.

4.5.3 Contribution of EAC to Conflict Resolution in South Sudan

The study sought to assess the extent of contribution of the EAC to conflict resolution in South Sudan. Respondents were asked to give their views on contribution of EAC in conflict prevention, management and post conflict peace building. Quantitative findings covering the ratings of EAC on conflict early warning and early response to conflict mediation, peace keeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian intervention,

DDR, capacity building, SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms are summarised in Figure 4.4.




Figure 4.4: Ratings on EAC’s contribution to conflict resolution in South Sudan
Source: Field Data (2020).

With regard to EAC conflict resolution mechanisms in the South Sudan conflict, the CSI performed below average in the following respective areas: early warning (66.7%), early response (82.4%), mediation (70.6%), peacekeeping (44.4%) and peace enforcement (58.8%). However, majority of the respondents argued that mandate limitations hindered the CSI from achieving CPMR initiatives in the following pillars: humanitarian intervention (58.8%), DDR (61.1%), capacity building (50.0%), SSR (66.7%), electoral reforms (66.5%) and judicial reforms (88.9%). EAC performance in conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding was thus below average, in overall.

Conflict Prevention and Management

In reference to early warning, majority (66.7%) of respondents rated EAC's contribution as below average while 27.8% of them rated the institution's performance as average. Only 5.6% rated the institution's contribution as above average.

Explaining reasons for the below average rating, key informants at operational level argued that despite EAC establishing the East Africa Community Early Warning Mechanism (EACWARN), the early warning mechanism had not been operationalized. They attributed this to inadequate human resource capacity and poor strategies for coordination and collaboration with relevant stakeholders such as the UN, CSOs and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) - a body mandated to work as an early warning entity for the AU.

These sentiments were also supported by one of the interviewees at EAC strategic level who remarked:

...EACWARN is virtually not operational; reports are read and just put under the carpet. The mechanism lacks early warning centres for each of the member states. EACWARN is not institutionalized and lacks the latitude to investigate conflicts and disputes. There is a shortage of professional conflict analysts in the EACWARN situation room. Whereas a properly constituted situation room should at least have six analysts, one per partner state, EACWARN has only two staff for the situation room... (EAC strategic level interviewee 10, 2020).

The situation room, as mentioned is core, this being the place where data gathered from different monitors is stored, collated and analysed. It is a crucial unit in early warning and response system since data has to be processed and interpreted correctly to be actionable or usable for responding organizations. Inadequate personnel, therefore, means that the unit cannot perform its role properly, thereby jeopardizing the early warning and response system and the intended beneficiaries.

Regarding early response to conflict, 82.4% of respondents indicated that EAC's contribution to early response was below average; 17.6% rated the institution's contribution as average. In reference to dismal contribution of EAC in early response, interviewees at strategic level explained that given the historical evolution of EAC as an economic integration mechanism, peace and security had not been top priority agenda for the institution even though it had established a division for peace and security focusing on early warning. The interviewees noted that EAC had not fully developed its early warning capacity to a level where it could be used as an effective tool to mitigate conflicts.

This view was supported by a CSO interviewee who reported the following:

...there are cases where warning of conflict was provided but the EAC did not respond appropriately. For example, the American Bar Association (ABA) warned about massive human rights abuse in South Sudan in 2014 but no action was taken. Similarly, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) had warned about the possibility of electoral violence in Kenya in 2007 but no action was taken by the Eastern Africa subregion CSIs including the EAC... (CSO interviewee 01, 2020).

In terms of peacekeeping, slightly below half (44.4%) of respondents indicated that EAC's contribution to peacekeeping was below average while a third (33.3%) rated EAC's contribution as average. Another 16.7% of the respondents were of the opinion that the CSI's peacekeeping efforts were affected by mandate limitations. It emerged from probing that the CSI's below average ratings in peace keeping was as a result of lack of explicit mandate on how the CSI could intervene in regional conflict. As observed by interviewees at strategic level, it was evident that there had never been a concrete EAC led peace-keeping mission in South Sudan. Even though EAC member states participate in UN/AU sanctioned missions, peacekeeping had not produced the

desired peace and stability in South Sudan. As for peace enforcement, a majority (58.8%) of respondents indicated that EAC performed below average while 23.5% observed that the CSI does not have a peace enforcement mandate but can only intervene through its states acting as TCCs in UN/AU missions. Respondents at the operational level also reported that mandate limitations hamper EAC efforts in peace enforcement.

Concerning mediation in South Sudan, the study established that EAC performed below average as reported by 70.6% of the respondents. Interviewees at strategic level attributed this to lack of inclusivity in the mediation process. An interviewee at EAC strategic level explained:

...the mediation process and peace building mechanism were usually done at high political level and was often detached from local institutions. Given South Sudan's protracted and violent conflict, such a high-level peace mechanism was neither accessible to the majority of local population nor did it echo the voice of its people... (EAC strategic level interviewee 06, 2020).

East African political culture built over time has conventionally granted IGAD frontline position in South Sudan and Somalia peace making. EAC enjoys goodwill in undertaking mediation in core member states such as Kenya during the 2007/8 post-election violence, the crisis in Burundi prior and after the 2000 Arusha agreement and Rwanda up to the Arusha agreement of early 1990s. This is the same spirit that informed former Tanzanian's president Julius Nyerere's intervention in Uganda in the late 1970s. This specialization and harnessing of comparative advantage among CSIs based on historical experience is valuable social and political capital necessary for future CPMR and stabilization challenges in the subregion.

In terms of conflict prevention and management, it was clear from the study findings that EAC registered below average rating in all the key aspects. This was attributed to challenges in operationalization of the EACWARN, the historical evolution of EAC as an economic integration mechanism, lack of a clear peace keeping and enforcement mandate, low levels of inclusivity in mediation forums and funding challenges.

Findings of the present study are in agreement with OSAA Report (2018) which notes that effective EAC mediation in the South Sudan conflict was hampered by failure to operationalize the EAC Mediation Support Unit and that the existing mediation framework for the EAC is challenged by human resource and funding issues. Low operational capacity of CSIs means inability to implement CPMR programmes and therefore limited impact on the long-term goal of stabilization of the target state.

Post Conflict Peace Building

The study analyzed the following components under post conflict peacebuilding: DDR, capacity building, SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms. A half (50.0%) of respondents indicated that EAC's dismal contribution to capacity building was as a result of mandate limitations while 22.2% indicated that the institution's contribution was below average and 16.7% of respondents gave the CSI a below average and average rating respectively. Respondents at operational level noted that the institution had no capacity to support effective institutional building due to financial and human resource challenges since EAC lacked experts to conduct relevant training. These sentiments were supported by interviewees at strategic level who highlighted that the CSI's kitty could not support scheduled EAC training activities. Probed to explain the cause of funding constraints, the interviewees stated that majority of EAC partner states were not prompt in honouring their financial obligations and therefore the institution had to

rely on donor funding which came with stringent conditions. This non-payment was also attributed to lack of political commitment where leaders do not put much political weight behind EAC programs.

A majority of respondents (61.1%) indicated that EAC's contribution to DDR was below average due to lack of clear mandate. An additional 16.7% noted that the institution's contribution was average. In relation to the below average rating, respondents at the strategic level explained that the South Sudan DDR program was not properly planned because it did not incorporate the objective of reducing illegal arms since Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and militia retained control of arms thereby making the DDR program untenable.

Giving their views on this issue, CSO interviewees reported that the DDR program was implemented after a long lapse of time meaning the target group of ex combatants had indeed self-mobilized. They also cited lack of common agreement among warring factions regarding the essence of DDR initiatives as well as lack of funds on the part of the EAC to fund meaningful DDR programs. Another obstacle to the successful implementation of post-independence DDR in South Sudan as per CSOs informants was the lack of common agreement among armed factions in the South Sudanese government. The informants further observed that after South Sudan's independence, there was little support to the DDR process even from the government forces themselves because the SPLA viewed DDR as a way of government attracting donor funding and right sizing the army.

According to interviewees at EAC, provision of an effective DDR program would have to involve proper compensation and livelihood support to former freedom fighters. On

the contrary, lack of funds for compensation on the part of the EAC meant that war veterans who had suffered disabilities could not be honourably discharged.

Explaining the funding problem, a CSO interviewee reported the following:

...lack of funds was a major hindrance to successful implementation of DDR in South Sudan and this compelled the EAC to seek donor assistance from the UNDP, UNMISS and international development partners. However, donor funds were not adequate to address the demands of DDR programs... (CSO interviewee 09, 2020).

Over reliance of partners on development partners funding was established in the study as a major obstacle to post conflict peacebuilding and recovery. Given the high level of need in South Sudan amidst the unsettled political settlement and recurrent conflict, low capacity building had significant effects on stabilization of countries emerging from conflicts.

As was the case in conflict prevention and management, EAC contribution to post conflict peacebuilding was below average in all other aspects namely capacity building, DDR, SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms. Based on study findings, it emerged that the EAC could not implement an effective DDR program for South Sudan. This could be attributed to lack of political support from the government and inadequate buy-in from all stakeholders. Funding constraints remain a conspicuous challenge in the success of sub-regional CSI programs and this compromises the achievement of stabilization. This may be a pointer that Eastern Africa CSIs ought to embrace the concept of post conflict peace building and reconstruction, not just as protection from physical harm but building of confidence and faith in the full spectrum of institutions of the rule of law.

From the study findings, it can be inferred that EAC provided an ideal vehicle for good neighbourliness among member countries. Promotion of political and economic cooperation is expected to lay a conducive environment for conflict resolution. In the spirit of the defunct OAU non-interference in domestic political affairs and given diverse conflict historical experience among member countries, the behaviour and attitude of EAC towards intervention in member countries internal conflicts was expected. This position is however changing in line with AU shifts in conflict resolution perspective notably the non-indifference principle.

4.5.4 Contribution of EAC to Conflict Resolution in Burundi

The study further sought to establish the contribution of EAC to Conflict Resolution in Burundi. Respondents were therefore asked to give their views on contribution of EAC in conflict prevention, management and post conflict peace building and reconstruction. Quantitative findings are summarised in Figure 4.5.




Figure 4.5: Ratings on EAC's contribution to conflict resolution in Burundi
Source: Field Data (2020).

Concerning the EAC conflict prevention, management and post conflict peace building initiatives in the Burundi 2015 conflict, respondents indicated that the CSI had an above average performance in conflict early warning (58.8%) pillar and mediation (47.1%). However, majority of respondents indicated that mandate limitations affected the CSI performance in the following pillars: peacekeeping (70.6%), peace enforcement (64.7%), DDR (64.7%), SSR (66.7%) electoral reforms (50.0%) and judicial reforms (69.2%).

Conflict Prevention and Management

In this section, the study examined six components related to contribution of EAC to conflict prevention and management in Burundi, which are early warning, early response, mediation, peace keeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention. Majority (58.8%) of respondents indicated that EAC's contribution to early warning was above average while 23.6% of respondents rated the institution's contribution as average and 17.6% below average.

From interviewees at strategic level, it emerged that EAC early warning mechanism (EACWARN) was instrumental in providing warning on impending conflict in Burundi in 2015. The mechanism shared information on conflict indicators in advance for subsequent action by the EAC. While providing examples, the interviewees observed that prior to conflict breaking out, EACWARN clearly provided early warning indicators that predicted the occurrence of conflict in Burundi.

EAC contribution to early response received a mixed rating from respondents. Majority (58.8%) of respondents observed that EAC's contribution to early response to conflict was below average and slightly over a third (35.3%) rated the CSI's contribution as above average. CSO interviewees pointed out that the CSI had not put in place strategies

to enhance coordination and collaboration with relevant stakeholders including the UN, CSOs and the committee of intelligence and security services of Africa. This state of affairs was manifested during the 2015 Burundi conflict where, in spite of receiving conflict warning indicators, EAC response was slow.

In the views of interviewees at strategic level, the slow response could also be attributed to lack of consensus among EAC member states who were not united in making decisions about intervening in Burundi's internal affairs. Citing examples, CSO informants reported that information about impending violence in Burundi was provided but except for the team of Eminent Persons sent to calm the situation; there was no meaningful action by EAC. They further observed that some member states such as Rwanda and Uganda were not in good relations with Burundi and therefore joint intervention in the Burundi conflict was compromised.

The early response element even in IGAD and EASF is often low and this can be attributed to a number of factors; lack of political commitment due to sensitivity of foreign interventions, lack of financial and technical resources, poor political violence risk reduction knowledge, culture and skills, lack of standing response preparedness framework and plans, poor communication and coordination among actors.

Regarding the functionality of the EACWARN, findings of the present study confirm those of Knoll & Tadesse (2018) who proffered that based on a functional early warning system, information about the impending Burundi crisis was detected and that consequently, an EAC -COMESA Panel of Eminent Persons was sent to Burundi as a preventive pre-election observer mission. The panel engaged various stakeholders and came up with some recommendations to be addressed with a view of avoiding overt violence. Confirming the functionality of the EACWARN, findings of the Institute of

Security Studies (2016) indicate that based on information on the impending conflict, the EAC leadership in 2015 made a diplomatic statement on the need to ensure stability of Burundi through respect of the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement.

Concerning mediation, interviewees at strategic level noted that the EAC made efforts in mediating the Burundi conflict. This involved initiation of the Arusha talks through the UN and AU endorsement under the Eminent Persons framework. The interviewees added that as a result of the Arusha Peace Agreement, the Eminent Persons framework produced a fact-finding mission report which led to creation of the peace accord in Burundi. This was meant to foster local ownership of mediation processes by spreading knowledge and skills in conflict management.

According to CSO informants in Burundi, the IGAD-led mediation was not impactful in the short term because open violence continued in the country despite the appointment of an EAC mediator and facilitator to engage the conflicting parties. A CSO informant asserted as follows:

...the EAC mediation failed to bring out a quick settlement between the opposing parties. Mass displacement of populations both inside and outside of the country and open violence continued as usual even with the appointment of President Museveni and Benjamin Mkapa to investigate the problem in Burundi... (CSO informant, Burundi 03, 2020).

Given regional complex conflict in the Great Lakes Region and the political sensitivity of cross border ethnic identities, it is difficult for regional leaders to marshal effective mediations. In various occasions Uganda under the leadership of Museveni is perceived as closer to the Tutsi of Burundi by the Hutu majority. Tanzania since the leadership of Julius Nyerere is perceived as being more responsive to the Hutu hitherto marginalization by the minority Tutsi then in power in Burundi. Tanzania was also the major host of refugees from Burundi while the Tutsi found safe haven in Uganda.

Findings of this study on the presence of an established EAC mediation process in Burundi agree with the work of Apuuli (2019) who explained that the recognition of the EAC mediation process as the primary mechanism in resolving the Burundi conflict by the AU PSC and Assembly of Heads of State was one of the reasons why a peacekeeping force could not be sanctioned for deployment in Burundi.

Regarding the viability of the EAC mediation process in Burundi, findings of this study confirmed a report by IPSS (2017) which observed that the mediation efforts of the EAC in Burundi were of low quality and were unsuccessful in de-escalating violence and in bringing about consensus among the conflict parties. Elowson & Lins de Albuquerque (2016) also questioned the effectiveness of the maiden EAC mediation process in the subregion explaining that divisions among EAC member states affected collective decision- making and determination of courses of action in the mediation process.

Findings of this study on the effectiveness of the EAC led mediation also confirm those of Wilén (2016) which proffered that the success of the EAC mediation efforts was cast into doubt because of the credibility of the appointed mediator, President Museveni, who was facing contestation regarding presidential term limits and whose commitment and concentration in the process was doubted owing to a presidential election that was almost taking place in Uganda.

Humanitarian intervention has remained a core pillar of comprehensive peace and security stabilization in conflict affected countries. This involves distribution of relief aid such as food, medicine, water, household items and building materials. Humanitarian organizations and staff require protection by peacekeepers in certain situations. It has been established that often in protracted conflicts more people die from

hunger and disease more than those killed in fighting (UNOCHA, 2019). Women, children and people with disabilities are even more vulnerable and may face hurdles in reaching humanitarian relief.

In relation to peacekeeping and peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention, majority of respondents (70.6%), (64.7%) and (58.8%) respectively attributed EAC's dismal contribution in these pillars to mandate limitations. The same observations were made by CSI and CSO interviewees who cited lack of clear mandate in peace keeping, enforcement and humanitarian intervention. This explains why the CSI has not done much in the core aspects of conflict management in Burundi.

Based on the findings of the study, it may be observed that at the regional level, EAC attempted mediation, negotiation and intervention in Burundi by holding talks in Arusha in December 2017 with a view to reaching an agreement to end the Burundian crisis. However, the present study established that the highly fractured mediation process did not achieve tangible results. Considering the history of Burundi where ethnic based militarized conflicts dominated since independence, the CPMR context from a constructivist theoretical perspective took a different dimension. EAC was the leading CSI in mediation for peace in the country due to its socio-economic and political proximity and understanding of the Burundian conflict context and dynamics. This culminated into the Arusha Peace Agreement and subsequent mediation in 2017. Today the former rebels under political party umbrella are in power while the then ruling party is in the opposition. The neoliberal institutionalist paradigm was manifested by the efforts of the UN, development partners and regional CSIs to support durable peace and effective democratic governance in the country.

Post Conflict Peace Building

The study analysed the following components under post conflict peace building in Burundi: DDR, capacity building, SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms. However, majority of respondents indicated that mandate limitations affected the CSI performance in the following pillars: DDR (64.7%), SSR (66.7%) electoral reforms (50.0%) and judicial reforms (69.2%).

Respondents at tactical level attributed the below average performance to lack of funds and limitations in human resource capacity. Citing an example, they explained that even though EAC facilitated the setting up of a DDR camp at Muyange in Burundi, the CSI lacked funds to sustain the intervention and faced shortage of professionals to implement the DDR program. Concerning capacity building, majority of respondents (50.0%) observed that EAC's contribution was below average and 12.5 % rated that the institution's contribution as average. EAC's below average contribution was attributed to the institution's lack of funds. According to respondents at operational level, EAC had no capacity to support effective capacity/institutional building unless with assistance of international organizations such as UNDP, World Bank, WHO and INGOs.

Regarding SSR, electoral and judicial reforms, the study found out that the EAC's contribution was below average in three components. Interviewees at strategic level observed that Burundi, just like any other relatively stable state, might have perceived internal security sector management and electoral and judicial reforms as national rather than regional issues. They observed that states consider their security, electoral and judicial sectors as central to their sovereignty and therefore would consider any attempts to reform sectors as politically non-permissible.

From the above findings, it can be argued that the EAC only employed the conflict prevention instruments of early warning, early response (through preventive diplomacy using the Panel of Eminent persons) and a mediation process that ended up in stalemate. This failure was attributed to unacceptability of the mediator/facilitator, resource challenges and regional interests. The CSI generally did not use a variety of instruments in the conflict management and peacebuilding pillar to resolve the conflict, thus the general poor performance. This finding comports with the APSA Impact Studies (2017) which reported that the Community's and other stakeholders' activities were not only inconsistent but largely insufficient for the magnitude of the conflict that was being addressed and that the logistical and financial challenges may have contributed to the stalled EAC - led mediation process.

However, considering that the Burundi conflict was the first conflict resolution process in which the EAC played the lead role, it may be argued that the CSI did not have prior experience in resolving conflicts of this magnitude. With this knowledge and based on the principle of comparative advantage as proffered by APSA, the CSI worked with other extra regional actors such as COMESA, the AU and UN to prevent further violence. This was achieved by conducting joint fact-finding missions in Burundi releasing diplomatic statements, establishing an EAC led-mediation process and deployment of the AU Human rights observers and military experts. The AU and the UN also supported EAC by maintaining Burundi on their political agenda, until recently when the country was declared to have obtained relative stability, as evidenced by the 2020 December elections, deemed peaceful by the UN and AU.

Borrowing from other successful conflict resolution processes in the region such as the 2000 Arusha Agreement and examining the pitfalls of the EAC- led 2015 Burundi

conflict process, it is evident that for any successful conflict resolution, apart from having sound and implementable CPMR policies; at minimum, the EAC will need to mobilize robust sub-regional political support and commitment, and appreciate collective and decisive actions by all both regional and extra regional stakeholders based on the principle of complementarity.

The CSI has made significant contribution to state stabilization in Burundi since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2000. The efforts of former President Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela built trust among warring parties in the country to participate in regional CPMR. Though the Community did not make military intervention in the country during the 2015 disturbances, it has maintained presence in various CPMR and peacebuilding initiatives. The CSI thus remains the most appropriate CPMR leader for future state stabilization in the country due to context similarities and accumulated goodwill among some member states.

4.5.5 Contribution of EASF to Conflict Resolution in Somalia

Conflict in Somalia has manifested in different ways and a number of efforts/strategies have been formulated to rebuild the war-torn country. Despite these initiatives, stability has not been achieved. In this regard, the study sought to establish the contribution of EASF to Conflict Resolution in Somalia. Findings on contribution of EASF to conflict resolution in Somalia are summarized in Figure 4.6.




Figure 4.6: Contribution of EASF to conflict resolution in Somalia

Source: Field Data (2020).

From Figure 4.6, it is evident that EASF recorded relatively good performance in conflict resolution in Somalia in almost all elements in the conflict prevention and management pillars as per the following ratings: conflict early warning (62.3% above average), early response (45.3% above average, 32.1% average), peacekeeping (30.2% above average and 37.7% average), peace enforcement (50% average) and capacity building (45.3% above average and 30.2% average). However, 49.1%, 41.5%, 56.0% and 78.0% of the respondents argued that CSI performed below average in humanitarian intervention, SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms respectively due to lack of clear mandate.

Conflict Prevention and Management

A total of 62.3% of respondents stated that EASF's contribution to early warning was above average while 37.7 % indicated that the institution's contribution was average. Interviewees at strategic level attributed the positive contribution of EASF to the CSIs established a situation room that is connected to the continental early warning system at the AU and was able to provide conflict early warning indicators on the Somalia conflict.

Explaining the above average and average rating in peace keeping, interviewees at strategic level argued that though EASF had not independently deployed its peacekeeping force in Somalia, the institution had indirectly participated in peacekeeping by virtue of having its member states (Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Djibouti) in AMISOM. The same view was shared by respondents at operational level who further acknowledged that the EASF had contributed to peacekeeping efforts in Somalia through deployment of 14 EASF military observers to Somalia in 2014. However, while EASF made efforts in peace keeping, a section of FGD informants argued that the institution did not contribute much to peacekeeping due to inadequate funding and human resource capacity.

The study established that the EASF's contribution to peace enforcement rated at 50% as average and 22% of respondents as below average. Respondents at operational level attributed the average ratings in peace enforcement to the involvement of member states of EASF in peace support operations in Somalia. It was also established through CSOs interviewees that independently, EASF could not deploy a peace enforcement mission because of competing interests, suspicion and political differences among member states. In relation to humanitarian intervention, 49.1% of respondents observed that the

CSI dismal contribution in this pillar was occasioned by lack of clear mandate. Respondents at tactical level, while giving their views on the dismal performance of EASF in humanitarian intervention, also explained that the CSI had not developed a HANDS policy which was very vital in effective management of humanitarian. This view was also supported by interviewees at strategic level who attributed the CSI's failure in mounting robust humanitarian operations to the institution's lack of practical experience. On their part, CSO's informants explained that EASF did not deploy troops in Somalia owing to financial challenges and sovereignty issues.

As a top-heavy military establishment, EASF has a higher technical preparedness capacity than other CSIs. Peacekeeping preparedness exercises such as Amani series to improve Regional Deployment Capability (RDC) and interoperability was a high-level professional accomplishment. This EASF mechanism also created a valuable opportunity for regional peacekeeping leaders to build a culture of consultation necessary for joint operations and mutual cooperation.

Post Conflict Peace Building

The study analysed five components under post conflict peace building, namely DDR, capacity building, SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms. In the views of interviewees at strategic level, the CSI's above average ratings in capacity building could be attributed to the various trainings the institution had conducted which were aimed at equipping its personnel with DDR skills and training of uniformed and non-uniformed personnel on security issues. Capacity building in DDR and the security sector enhanced EASF efforts in carrying out scanty DDR programs in Somalia as reported by 45.3% who rated EASF's contribution as above average. Citing examples of capacity building initiatives, CSOs informants observed that the EASF had run post

conflict development courses focusing on institutional capacity improvement for Somalia citizens. This view was supported by a CSO informant who elaborated as follows:

...EASF conducted predeployment training of AMISOM contingents which is a key capacity building initiative for troops prior to engaging in AMISOM duties. In 2011, the EASF sent 13 uniformed personnel to support capacity building in AMISOM. In addition, EASF carried out mentoring courses for Somalia police, military and civil components at the CSI headquarters... (CSO informant, Somalia 05, 2020).

Conversely, some FGD participants elaborated that despite EASF enhancing capacities of personnel with DDR skills, they could not conduct meaningful DDR in Somalia due to lack of political consensus and sovereignty issues. However, the EASF carried out a number of Training Needs Assessment (TNA) on Sexual and Gender Based Violence, SSR and DDR through regional centre of excellence in PSO training. As a result of the TNA a number of training programs for police, military and civilians were conducted from 2013.

The EASF had also performed below average in electoral reforms in spite of participation in various electoral-related activities in Somalia. Giving examples, respondents at operational level indicated that the EASF EWARN had been analysing the electoral process in Somalia and providing training on electoral management and monitoring. The respondents further explained that participation in electoral processes was evident in 2018 and 2019 when the EASF sent out a monitoring team to oversee a referendum and national elections respectively in Somalia.

Justice dispensation and access to justice are critical indicators of good governance and a factor influencing achievement of sustainable peace. Judicial reforms involve legal and policy reforms, independence and accountability of the judiciary, its capacity and

professionalism. Often countries emerging from conflict have weak judicial systems. The UN in collaboration with AU and development partners has made efforts to raise capacity of the judicial sector with mixed results in the region. In this regard, interviewees at strategic level revealed that EASF's performance in judicial reforms was below average because the CSI lacked the expertise and funding to initiate and implement reforms.

CSOs interviewees observed that the regional mechanism lacked staff with the requisite skills and training to carry out judicial reforms which was considered a technical field. They added that EASF lacked the financial ability to implement judicial reforms because member states had not promptly honoured subscriptions to the EASF fund. These findings are in tandem with a study by Desmidt & Hauck (2017) which also concluded that EASF focuses more on the military and police aspects of its mandate at the expense of governance and civilian participation in conflict resolution.

The evolution of traditional peacekeeping into multi-dimensional Peace Support Operations (PSO), ushered by report of the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, *'An Agenda for Peace,'* in 1992, also marked recognition of the critical role of civilians in PSO. This was first put into action in the Cambodian UN Peacekeeping mission of 1992/3. With the entry of civilians in PSOs, human rights was elevated as a core principle alongside protection of civilians. Civilians perform roles such as voter education, providing humanitarian assistance, strengthening local institutions and human rights promotion as prerequisites for durable peace (Otto, 2019).

Though research studies have not proved wholesome improvement of human rights with the entry of civilians, in some cases the civilian components contribute to long-term improvement in human rights practices such as peace mission of Cambodia, in

others they score poorly such as peacekeeping mission in Ivory Coast, (Otto, 2019). Civilians perform roles such as promotion of human rights, rule of law, civil society, local governance and election support, or conflict management. They get more contact with civilians in host countries and thereby get an opportunity to improve mission relation with civilians. Civilians engage in negotiations and confidence building practices among government and opposition parties, this interaction provides an opportunity to influence the parties to value human rights and democracy. Civilian personnel are also involved in capacity-building activities to strengthen control and accountability of military and police forces, which in turn contributes to decreasing opportunistic violence. Since reforming and institutionalization of values takes time, in the long run human rights performances are likely to change (Otoo, 2019).

However, the participation and increase in the number of civilians in peace missions is hampered by a number of factors such as recruitment, whereby civilians must acquire specialized training in key aspects of peacekeeping beyond their professional qualifications and experience. Other institutional bottlenecks cited are limited opportunities to participate in field missions sometimes due to insecurity and civilian vulnerability, resistance by the uniformed personnel, among other factors. Therefore, increased participation of civilians in EASF operations will be beneficial to the overall mission by improving protection of civilians and raised performance of CPMR and stabilization of the host country.

On SSR, 37.7% of respondents stated that EASF had performed below average while 41.5% attributed the dismal performance to mandate limitations, lack of funds and sovereignty issues. Through CSOs interviewees, it emerged that the EASF had carried out mentoring courses for Somalia police, military and civil components at the CSI

headquarters. However, the EASF had never carried out SSR in Somalia as an independent venture because of funding challenges. In addition, a section of CSOs informants observed that meaningful SSR programs in Somalia were hampered by competing interests among EASF member states.

Professional police, military, correctional services and judiciary are key institutions for durable peace and security. SSR aims to align these institutions with democratic ideals, human rights and good governance. Failure by EASF to play a role in this sector means reduced capacity for security sector which jeopardizes long term stabilization.

4.5.6 Contribution of the EASF to Conflict Resolution in Burundi

The study sought to establish the contribution of EASF to conflict resolution in Burundi and quantitative findings are indicated in Figure 4.7.




Figure 4.7: Ratings on the EASF's contribution to conflict resolution in Burundi
Source: Field Data (2020).

Figure 4.7 reveals that EASF conflict prevention initiatives in Burundi were reported to be quite good. A total of 52.1% (above average) and 35.4% (average) of respondents indicated that the CSI performed well in conflict early warning. The same performance was indicated for the early response pillar by 23.0% (above average) and 29.2% (average) of respondents. The CSI's performance in conflict management was below average as indicated by the following respondent ratings in these component pillars: peacekeeping (31.3%), peace enforcement (37.5%) and humanitarian intervention (35.4%).

With regard to post-conflict peace building in Burundi, the CSI only performed well in capacity building pillar as reported by 50.0% and 33.3% of respondents, for an above average and average rating respectively. Respondents rated the EASF performance as below average in DDR (47.9%), SSR (45.8%), electoral reforms (81.3%) and judicial reforms (87.5%) and this was mainly attributed to mandate limitations.

Conflict Prevention and Management

From the findings, 52.1% of respondents considered EASF's performance in providing early warning to conflict in Burundi as above average while another 35.4% gave an average rating. The above average and average performance was attributed to the presence of an early warning system that provided indicators of conflict. Through respondents at operational level, the study revealed that the EASF early warning system (EWARN) conducted targeted conflict analysis and assessment of the Burundi conflict and fact-finding missions provided continuous updates on the unfolding dynamics in the various phases of this conflict.

In spite of having an early warning system that provided conflict indicators, interviewees at strategic level revealed that the EASF performed below average in

terms of early response in Burundi as a result of failure to implement findings and recommendations of the EASF EWARN. On probing, CSOs interviewees attributed the failure to bureaucracy and political interests. Citing an example of divergent political interests, a CSO interviewee reported:

.... there was lack of consensus on the part of EASF member states on whether to act on early warning reports because EASF states had vested interests. For instance, Uganda and Rwanda would have readily agreed to implementation of the reports while Tanzania, a close ally to Burundi, would not have concurred... (CSO interviewee 01, 2020).

There are political interests and dynamics necessary for consideration in peacekeeping. The historical and political history of relations among countries, experience in democracy or dictatorship, militarized and ethnicized politics. All these factors affect collective decision making. Given the tragic historical conflicts pitting the Tutsi minority against the Hutu majority, a demographic condition prevalent in both Rwanda and Burundi; relationship between the countries where the opposing identity groups are in power, is a conflict generating factor that needs to be taken into account in SRCSIs collective decision making.

Regarding mediation efforts in Burundi, respondents indicated that the EASF contribution was below average. Interviewees at strategic level explained that the regional mechanism attained Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2014 and approved a policy document establishing the Panel of the Wise (PoW) thus making the CSI a viable regional peace and conflict resolution platform in the context of APSA. However, the interviewees observed that conflicting national interests and political considerations hinder a common approach to peace building through the regional mechanism.

Study findings revealed that the EASF contribution to peace keeping and peace enforcement in Burundi was below average (31.3.4%) and (22.9%) respectively. Respondents at operational level attributed this to lack of funding. They highlighted that while the RM may have the capacity to deploy peacekeepers for a short period of time before expeditionary forces deploy, funding remained a challenge. Respondents at EASF tactical level also observed that EASF had no capacity in terms of troops and equipment to deploy a peace enforcement force because troops and equipment are simply a pledge by member states and funding and vested interests may hinder deployment of such a force. In support of this, interviewees at strategic level explained that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorized deployment of the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), in which EASF was supposed to take a leading role. However, the institution could not deploy MAPROBU largely because of institutional challenges. CSOs interviewees explained that failure to deploy MAPROBU may be attributed to lack of political commitment from the Burundi government and lack of funds to deploy and sustain troops on the ground. They further argued that the standby force pledged capability matrix that exists at the EASF had never been tested in actual deployment in a PSO.

In reference to the RM's contribution to humanitarian intervention, 35.4% of respondents considered performance as below average. Interviewees at strategic level acknowledged that EASF was a viable multidimensional force on paper but not on the ground because its ability to respond and cooperate with intra agency teams on humanitarian intervention had never been tested. This view was further illustrated by one interviewee who reported that:

... the inability of EASF to respond to Burundi's conflict was due lack of funds and inadequate political commitment at the time of the Burundi conflict and EASF had never gathered any experience in humanitarian intervention... (EASF strategic level interviewee 13, 2020).

The lack of consensus amongst EASF member states on the decision to deploy MAPROBU presented a pessimistic view amongst states to address security concerns through a regional approach and this conforms to the neorealism theory which guided this study.

Post Conflict Peace Building

The study established that apart from obtaining above average ratings (50.0%) in capacity building, the institution recorded dismal performance in the following aspects of post conflict peace building: SSR (45.8%), electoral reforms (81.3%) and judicial reforms (87.5%). The respondents linked the below par contribution by CSI to mandate limitations. In terms of capacity building, interviewees at strategic level argued that the CSI carried out capacity building training in Comoros, Seychelles, Rwanda and Burundi.

While giving their views on these aspects, respondents at tactical level argued that SSR and judicial reforms were not achieved because the EASF mandate does not include these aspects. Respondents at operational level also opined that the RM has not taken on board the whole spectrum of peace building. These findings are in tandem with those of Desmidt & Hauck (2017) who revealed that there has not been an agreement among member states to provide EASF with a strong peace building management mandate. This position, however, provides political insulation for the organization through non-interference in member states governance issues.

Based on the findings of the study, it may therefore be inferred that while IGAD, EAC and EASF have made efforts to manage security threats in the subregion, clearly a number of factors have hindered the effective implementation of policies. These range from mandate limitations to funding and lack of political commitment, among other factors which are further discussed in the next chapter. It is worth noting that conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi are associated with a number of structural vulnerabilities from weak state structures and governance, environmental degradation, low social cohesion and susceptibility to terrorism (Soest & De Juan, 2018). The trend of security threats in the Eastern Africa subregion is defined by recurrence of previous conflicts such as in South Sudan, Ethiopia, Burundi and Somalia rather than occurrence of new types of conflict (Soest & De Juan, 2018). This may mean that the underlying causes of previous conflicts were not addressed.

It is also emergent that responses to conflicts in the subregion have been hampered by under-investment by the member states in conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building. There has also been an over reliance on hard power/military solutions at the expense of broad economic and political approaches to address the structural causes of socio-economic and political grievances (Soest, & De Juan, 2018). The current Ethiopia civil war is an indicator of this trend, quite common in countries with militarized and ethnicized political background. A more comprehensive peace building approach where regional strategies complement national efforts would go a long way to prevent relapse of conflicts.

EASF has acquired a PSO capacity building niche in regional peacebuilding. Based on its mandate and focus, it has trained military, police and civilians in various PSO aspects in Somalia and South Sudan. Through regional PSO centers of excellence, it

has carried out Training Needs Assessment in order to tailor its courses to specific needs of each country.

Though EASF has not made any peacekeeping intervention in the Eastern Africa subregion, it has created a vital forum for the regional security sector to familiarize, share ideas and develop civil, military coordination for effective peacekeeping operations. EASF being largely a military led organization, its development, capability and impact in the region is dependent on regional political cooperation and leadership.

It is also important to analyze how these three institutions compare in CPMR, which now the study turns to.

4.6 Comparison of CSIs Performance in CPMR in South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi

This section provides a comparison of performance of CSIs in various pillars of CPMR (Conflict prevention, management and post conflict peace building). The responses on CPMR pillars are summarized in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.

Table 4.5: Summary of CSIs Conflict Prevention Mechanisms Performance

		Conflict Prevention					
		Conflict Early Warning			Conflict Early Response		
CSI	Country	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Above Average	Average	Below Average
IGAD	Somalia	✓(62.6%)				✓(64.6%)	
	South Sudan	✓91.7%			✓(47.9%)		
EAC	South Sudan			✓(66.7%)			✓(82.4%)
	Burundi	✓(58.8%)					✓(58.8%)
EASF	Burundi	✓ (52.1%)					✓(47.9%)
	Somalia	✓(62.3%)			✓(45.3%)		

Source: Field Data (2020).

From the findings indicated in Table 4.5, it can be observed that all CSIs performed relatively well in conflict early warning with IGAD performing very well in the Somalia (62.6%) and South Sudan (91.7%) conflicts. On the other hand, EASF made notable

efforts in providing information about the Burundi and Somalia conflicts. This is indicated by above average ratings in conflict early warning (52.1%) in Burundi and (62.3%) of respondents in Somalia. Slightly above half (58.8%) of respondents observed that EAC fared relatively well in providing conflict early warning in Burundi whereas 66.7% of respondent indicated that the CSI had a below average ratings in early warning in South Sudan.

As regards conflict early response, there was a general marginal performance across board. IGAD's early response in the South Sudan and Somalia was above average (47.9%) and average (64.6%) of respondents respectively. EAC, however, registered dismal performance in conflict early response in South Sudan (82.4% below average) and Somalia (58.8% below average). EASF had above average ratings (45.3%) in early response in Somalia and below average ratings (47.9%) in Burundi.

IGAD performed better than the other CSIs in conflict prevention and this was explained by the well-established and functional CEWARN and other institutions such as the IGAD Mediation Support Unit. IGAD's CPMR initiatives in the South Sudan conflict were reported to have been demonstrated by the presence of a CEWARN that provides conflict indicators alongside those provided by the IGAD-led Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. The CSIs conflict response capability was reported to have culminated to processes such as the signing of a peace treaty among the parties to the South Sudan conflict in 2015 and is enhanced by an established mediation support institution. However, studies on EWER in Africa observe weaknesses in early response due to poor coordination between warning and response institutions and systems, a factor prevalent even in disaster risk reduction mechanisms

(Mutu *et.al.*, 2019). Ineffective response means poor mitigation against impact of conflict and security threats.

IGAD has demonstrated various conflict prevention and management effort/initiatives in a bid to resolve conflict in South Sudan and Somalia. Significant efforts have been made under conflict prevention and management pillar, and more specifically the early warning initiatives. IGAD has an established and functional conflict early warning and response mechanism with regional response units at member states level. The CSI has also carried out diplomatic interventions under the established CPMR institutions. Although the CSI has not deployed an IGAD mandated force, prior attempts in this regard were made, later informing the deployment of the current African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The dismal performance by EAC in conflict early response in South Sudan and Somalia were attributed to lack of adequate strategies to enhance and collaborate with other stakeholders in matters early response to conflicts.

Regarding conflict management, EASF and EAC generally performed dismally in the respective conflict scenarios. However, IGAD registered above average ratings in peace keeping in South Sudan (52.6%) and an average rating in Somalia (61.1%). These are summarized in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Summary of CSIs Conflict Management Mechanisms Performance

		Conflict Management								
		Peace Keeping			Peace Enforcement			Humanitarian Intervention		
CSI	Country	Above Average	Average	Below Av.	Above Av.	Av	Below Av.	Above A	Av	Below Av
IGAD	Somalia		✓(57.8%)			✓		✓		
	South Sudan	✓(56.3%)				✓				✓
EAC	South Sudan			✓44.4%			✓			✓
	Burundi			✓70.6%			✓			✓
EASF	Burundi			✓31.3%			✓			✓
	Somalia		✓ 30.2%			✓				✓

Source: Field Data (2020).

It is evident that IGAD performed relatively well in peace keeping and peace enforcement compared to other CSIs. As observed by over 50% of respondents there was notable dismal performance in the humanitarian intervention pillar across the three CSIs. This is despite the existence of the African Union Humanitarian Policy Framework (2015) and the AU Guideline on the Role of the African Standby Force (ASF) in HANDS which recognize the importance of a strategic coherence and coordination with RECs/ regional mechanisms as lead institutions in managing humanitarian activities/ and complex humanitarian emergencies at the sub-regional level. The dismal performance in humanitarian intervention were due to lack of experience in monitoring humanitarian operation, financial challenges and sovereignty issues which hampered CSIs efforts in this CPMR pillar. For EASF, the below average performance was also attributed to lack of a policy that is in line with the AU HANDS policy.

Though EASF may not be suited to handle humanitarian relief, the CSI however has a comparative advantage in coordinating safe transport and distribution of the aid during crisis. As a regional organization it can rise above local competing political interests. This is an area that the CSI could build capacity in terms of training, enhancing civil military relations, liaison with host government and political parties or other armed

actors. Manoeuvring in situations where humanitarian relief can be used as a weapon of war requires specialized skills, art of negotiation and good will.

Early response is also vulnerable to political commitment among member states. There are cases where government of South Sudan did not respond after warning or actually prevented humanitarian agencies from assisting populations in areas perceived as opposition zones (Stoddard, et.al, 2016). The same case applies in *Al Shabaab* controlled areas in Somalia where some international humanitarian agencies were denied access to deserving populations (Stoddard, *et.al.*, 2016).

In the post-conflict peace building pillar, apart from average performance in capacity building by IGAD (43.8%) in Somalia and (33.3%) in South Sudan, there was an overall below average performance by all CSI in the other pillars (DDR, SSR, electoral and judicial reforms) as indicated by over 65% of respondents for IGAD, over 66.0% for EAC and over 70% for EASF. The respondents attributed the dismal performance to mandate limitations.

Table 4.7: Summary of CSIs Post Conflict Peace Building Mechanisms

		Post-Conflict Peacebuilding														
		DDR			Capacity Building			SSR			Electoral Reforms			Judicial Reforms		
CSI	Country	Above Av.	Av	Below Av.	Above Av.	Av	Below Av.	Above Av.	Av	Below Av.	Above Av.	Av	Below Av.	Above Av.	Av	Below Av.
IGAD	Somalia			✓		✓				✓			✓			✓
	South Sudan			✓		✓				✓			✓			✓
EAC	South Sudan			✓			✓			✓			✓			✓
	Burundi			✓			✓			✓			✓			✓
EASF	Burundi			✓	✓					✓			✓			✓
	Somalia			✓	✓					✓			✓			✓

Source: Field Data (2020).

All the CSIs had a below average performance in DDR, SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms pillars with the main challenge across board being limited funds, political sensitivities and mandate limitations. Notable efforts in the capacity building

pillar were made by the EASF in Burundi and Somalia, and by IGAD in Somalia and Sudan, demonstrated by trainings facilitated by the two institutions as already discussed.

However, IGAD's peace building initiatives, notably in DDR, judicial, electoral and security sector reforms were reported to be below par in both countries: below average (over 60%) in Somalia and over (over 55%) in South Sudan. This was largely attributed to internal political sensitivities; poor multi stakeholder engagement and poor implementation strategies, and inadequate inclusivity in programmes especially at the grass root level. Other challenges that have confronted the CSI in its CPMR efforts include poor institutional coordination internally; limited resources and member state national security sensitivities, which limit post conflict peace building activities.

IGAD also collaborated with partners to build capacity of the local civilian and security agents, facilitated minimal DDR activities. IGAD's poor performance especially in the post-conflict peace building pillars in Sudan was extensively explained by the lack of/ inadequate resource especially the financial resource. Other factors that limited effective IGAD peace building activities in South Sudan were poor strategies that favoured short term political settlements as opposed to adequately inclusive and locally owned ones which address the root causes of conflict; members states' own national interests and lack of a coherent strategy appreciated by all member states.

Long term peace building efforts require local ownership and buy-in from local partners for sustainability. This is often lacking in fragile states such as Somalia and South Sudan where stabilization measures are given more priority (Adetula, Bereketeab & Olugbemi, 2016). IGAD can only build on what the local partners are willing to accept and support (Adetula, *et al.*, 2016).

EAC CPMR efforts are still not well anchored as demonstrated by an overall below average performance in the South Sudan conflict and in the Burundi 2015 political crisis. Respondents attributed this to lack of a clear mandate and strategy on CPMR issues such as peace keeping and peace enforcement. This in effect affected coordination and collaboration of effort in this regard. The EAC draft policy / peace and security protocol proffered the settlement of disputes. Despite the EAC having initiated activities in the conflict early warning and DDR in Burundi, meaningful actions and sustainability of established programmes was hampered by a lack of consensus by member states in a region where peace and security matters are defined by individual national state interests and by patterns of amity and enmity among members states. The resource challenge in terms of finance and technical personnel affected the implementation and sustainability of programs as well as meaningful institutional development and capacity building.

DDR as a specialized field in SSR is yet to be accorded due attention and recognition in CSIs. Though development partners such as UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) and UNDP in South South Sudan have assisted in DDR in terms of strategy, local integration, financing, training and skills development and psychosocial support; CSIs are yet to develop comprehensive DDR implementation regime in the subregion (Bereketeab, 2019; Colombo, *et al.*, 2019). This does not augur well for disarmament of war veterans, integration of combatants and children associated with armed conflicts. Without effective DDR, relapse of conflict remains a threat and sustainable peace building a pipe dream. EASF also had a relatively good response in conflict early warning (above average 53.3%, average 34.0%) in both countries. The CSI also had remarkable attempts in peacekeeping and enforcement initiatives. Humanitarian intervention is still a challenge to the CSI like in the case of IGAD and EAC.

In relation to post conflict peace building activities, the CSI performed relatively well in DDR and capacity building initiatives despite registering dismal performance in other aspects (SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms). EASF general poor performance in the post-conflict peace building pillar in Burundi conflict as indicated by majority of respondents (80%) and (over 60%) in Somalia (SSR, electoral and judicial reforms) was attributed to lack of HANDS policy, lack of political commitment, financial and conflicting national and political interests.

Although relatively young in comparison to IGAD and EAC, EASF has left footprints in resolution of conflict in Somali conflict through conflict prevention, management, and post-conflict peace building initiatives. This, according to respondents, was manifested by the presence of an established EASF early warning system linked to the continental AU early warning system. The CSI has deployed military observers in Somalia and has presence in AMISOM through member states' forces. The CSI has also conducted capacity building programs for the Somalia nationals in areas such as electoral management and monitoring. EASF CPMR efforts in Somalia have been hampered by resource challenges, institutional factors and reverence to sovereignty issues. Though heavily challenged, the CSIs have managed to hold the subregion together irrespective of state fragility.

As noted in Chapter 1, CPMR has a short-term life span while peacebuilding is long term and continuous. CPMR is implemented by CSIs, national security sector, CSOs/NGOs and other government agencies. Peacebuilding is implemented by CSIs, CSOs, International NGOs/government agencies/UN, among others. The security sector provides crises response and stabilization while other agencies work on long term structural measures that address root causes of conflict (Bereketeab, 2019). This

division of labour is critical in working beyond fire-fighting or crisis stage to engagement in post conflict stabilization. Beyond silencing the guns, communities require support to meet their broad and varied human security needs.

EASF performed well in DDR due to its focus on capacity building for PSO in the subregion. EASF has built a comprehensive roster of PSO experts who can train for advanced courses in various aspects of PSO. EASF also has a close working relation with centers of excellence in PSO in Kenya, Rwanda and Ethiopia. The organization usually organizes PSO causes to build capacity of military, police and civilians in PSO (Desmidt and Hauck, 2017). This has enabled TCCs to have a large pool of well-trained peacekeepers who are often called upon to serve in various countries such as Somalia and South Sudan. The Amani Exercises that are carried regularly to assess troop preparedness and operability have also enhanced regional preparedness to handle crises situations.

Finally, to allow a comparison of performance rating in the various aspects of CPMR, across the region's areas of mandate, further analysis was conducted to compute a final score by aggregating the scores accorded to the CSI in each country of intervention using the average and above average scores for each element as shown in table 4.8. This allowed the generation of a final percentage rating score indicating the strength of each CSI and combined strength across the CPMR domains.

Table 4.8: Rating of Performance of the CSIs in the Region across Indicators

Indicator	IGAD %	EAC %	EASF %	Average score %
Conflict early warning	95.9	57.85	93.75	83
Early response	88.55	29.4	64.8	61
Mediation Efforts	72.2	41.2	46.05	53
Peace keeping	86.2	31.2	53.75	57
Peace enforcement	68.85	14.75	46.7	43
Humanitarian intervention	30	5.9	24.4	20
DDR	41.15	17.15	36.2	32
Capacity building	77.1	23.3	79.4	60
SSR	38.95	2.8	19.8	21
Electoral reforms	28.1	2.8	24.25	18
Judicial reforms	10.8	0	6	6

Source: Field Data (2020).

From the table, at least 95% of all respondents believed that IGAD had performed at average and above average level in conflict early warning in the sub-region compared to about 57% in the case of EAC and 93% in the case of EASF. IGAD also topped the evaluation of performance by respondents in the case of early response (according to 88%), mediation efforts (72%), peace keeping (86%), peace enforcement (68%) DDR (41%), security sector reforms (38%) and electoral reforms (28%). EAC did not outperform the rest on any single indicator while EASF performed comparatively better only in the case of capacity building as indicated by 79% of respondents. Overall, IGAD performance on CPMR is rated highly followed by EASF and then EAC. The CSIs were rated to have performed well in conflict early warning area (average rating by 83%), early response (61%) and capacity building (60%). Conversely, the three CSIs performed dismally in the elements of judicial reforms, electoral reforms, humanitarian interventions and security sector reforms all of which were scored average and above

average by less than 25% of the respondents as shown in the average score. These findings are further illustrated in Figure 4.8.




Figure 4.8: Respondents Ratings of CSIs' Performance
Source: Field Data (2020).

Although IGAD has been the most active and experienced CSI in the subregion as demonstrated by its long engagement in Somalia and South Sudan peace processes, these two states continue to have longstanding and fragile peace. This implies that IGAD mediation efforts are yet to yield the ultimate desired outcome. Generally, all the CSIs performed poorly in the post conflict peace building pillar and this was attributed to limited resource capacities, weak legal frameworks and sovereignty issues yet most of the identified threats which are mostly structural can thrive in societies with poor or no institutions. Post conflict peace building is a key pillar for maintaining and sustaining peace in post conflict societies. The study has clearly shown that the three CSIs have challenges in implementation of this pillar. And this could explain why peace remains elusive in both South Sudan and Somalia. The next section is therefore an

analysis of the challenges that IGAD, EAC and EASF may have faced in the process of implementing various CPMR mechanism in the subregion.

CSIs comparative advantage in specific areas reflects their mandate and historical development. The desired outcome is not necessarily equal performance across all the sectors examined but to enhance mutual complementarity in performance and the services delivered to enhance overall peace and security indices in the subregion.

Whereas threats to peace and security are influenced by local dynamics, most of them transform to become transnational. These transnational threats demand that states work together collaboratively within well-structured institutions that allow for common approaches to responding to instabilities caused by the threats. Moreover, effective delivery of peace and security mandates by the three CSI's is inhibited by lack of comprehensive adaptive structural and institutional frameworks in support of multidimensionality and the rapid transformation of threats in the region.

In conclusion, the CSIs under study have put in place CPMR initiatives to address contemporary security threats and any conflicts that may have arisen thereof. AU Agenda raised the slogan: 'by 2020 all guns will be silenced'; referring to the vision that Africa aims to set foundations of lasting peace among its peoples and states. This should be done through mechanisms of peaceful settlement of conflicts and spreading a culture of peace and benevolence among children and youth (AU, 2015b). Though most of the Agenda 2063 goals and aspirations have not been achieved, there is a significant momentum among CSIs to reach the goals by 2063.

4.7 Challenges facing IGAD, EAC and EASF in Conflict Resolution in Eastern Africa

The previous section was an examination of the extent of contribution of IGAD, EAC and EASF to conflict resolution activities in the Eastern Africa subregion. It was established that the CSIs have initiated conflict resolution activities aimed at promoting regional peace and security albeit with challenges.

Objective four of the study sought to assess challenges facing IGAD, EAC and EASF in conflict resolution with a view to achieving regional stabilization in Eastern Africa. Respondents were asked to identify challenges that they considered affected the ability of the three Eastern Africa CSIs' realization of conflict resolution objectives and the extent to which each challenge affected each of the CSI in pursuit of regional peace and stability. They listed the following in order of importance as: political commitment, finance handicaps, lack of regional hegemony, resource constraints, inadequate policies, legal landscape and cumbersome bureaucracy.

In line with neoliberal institutionalism theory, the success of a CSI in achieving regional peace and security could be determined by several factors. These challenges can be divided into two: structural (challenges that inform the geo-strategic, political, economic and socio-cultural environment) and institutional factors (those associated with the functional capability of the organization which may be determined by resources, decision making and legal protocols among others). This section therefore presents findings, analysis and discussion of the challenges and assesses their combined impact on the effectiveness of the respective CSIs throughout the CPMR spectrum.

4.7.1 Structural Challenges

4.7.1.1 Overlapping Mandates

One of the core challenges cited by respondents that could hamper the achievement of regional peace and security by the three CSIs is overlapping mandates. After ranking, respondents were asked to state the extent to which they considered overlapping mandates as affecting the achievement of regional stabilization. Table 4.9 summarizes respondents' views.

Table 4.9: Overlapping mandates

Institution	SA		A		U		D		SD	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
IGAD	14	45.2	12	38.7	3	9.7	1	3.2	1	3.2
EAC	10	34.5	12	41.4	1	3.5	3	10.3	3	10.3
EASF	29	42.6	30	44.1	5	7.4	3	4.4	1	1.5

Source: Field Data (2020).

As shown in Table 4.9, a majority of IGAD respondents (83.9%) reported that overlapping mandates were a challenge to IGAD's ability to stabilize the Eastern Africa subregion; this was affirmed by 75.9% and 86.7% of EAC and EASF respondents respectively.

Through CSO interviewees, the study established that the three CSIs were involved in a range of similar sectoral activities pointing that IGAD and EAC engage in agriculture, health, environment, economic cooperation, peace and security while the EASF was involved in peace and security initiatives.

Asked to explain the effect of overlapping mandates, interviewees at IGAD strategic level observed that overlap of mandates translated into states being members in numerous CSIs and this may affect the degree of member commitment to CSI objectives.

An interviewee at IGAD strategic level asserted the following:

...IGAD has lost its focus when it comes to peace and security partly because there exist several collective security institutions carrying out similar activities within the same region. This matter should be addressed by the AU so that collective security institutions put together resources and develop clear strategies that are likely to have positive outcomes rather than engaging in duplicated roles in a number of regional arrangements... (IGAD strategic level interviewee 05, 2020).

At the EAC, interviewees revealed that overlapping mandates caused unhealthy competition amongst states and this hampers achievement of peace and security. On their part, respondents at operational level observed that overlapping mandates by EAC partner states being into numerous regional security arrangements translated to adversarial competition, multiple financial responsibilities and this leads to lack of commitment to the organization's goals. This was also explained by interviewees at the strategic level with one stating:

...mandates of the collective security institutions in the Eastern Africa subregion overlap as a result of multi-memberships in several arrangements. This burdens the member states because it brings in multiple financial responsibilities, wasting of efforts and resources. Members may struggle to catch up with different strategies, decisions, procedures and schedules some of which could be in conflict and contradict each other bringing in adversarial competition amongst CSI member states and this in turn affects the efficiency of regional sub-organizations... (EAC strategic level interviewee 07, 2020).

Overlapping mandate was also evident at the EASF with interviewees at strategic level and CSO interviewees observing that it made member states lose commitment and focus towards the various mandates that different regional security arrangements seek to achieve.

Respondents' views on overlapping mandates were corroborated through document analysis to show multiple membership as shown in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10: IGAD, EAC and EASF member states multiple membership

STATE	EAC	IGAD	EASF
Kenya	√	√	√
Uganda	√	√	√
Tanzania	√	-	-
Rwanda	√	-	√
Burundi	√	-	√
South Sudan	√	√	-
Somalia	-	√	√
Ethiopia	-	√	√
Comoros	-	-	√
Seychelles	-	-	√
Sudan	-	√	√
Djibouti	-	√	√

Source: IGAD, EAC and EASF Strategic Plans, 2015-2020

Table 4.10 shows that majority of member states of the three CSIs are members in at least two other regional arrangements. Elucidating on the effects of overlapping mandates, interviewees at IGAD strategic level reported that multiple membership meant that states can have divided loyalties that may compromise commitment to mandates of some CSIs at the expense of others. Consequently, being in several CSIs leads to financial over stretch implying that member states may not be prompt in paying annual contributions. The same views were shared by CSOs interviewees who opined that duplicity of membership leads to divided loyalties implying that Eastern Africa regional security arrangements cannot work in unison towards a common peace and security agenda. A CSO interviewee captured this thus:

...the problem of states in the subregion being members in many regional security arrangements is a factor in the poor payment record of contributions to the kitties of the organizations. Besides, it compromises on level of commitment to the objectives of a collective security entity thereby reducing state loyalty, creating conflict of interests and this is a barrier to achievement of regional peace and stability... (CSO interviewee 05, 2020).

Content analysis further indicated that duplication of roles is manifest in CSIs' engagement in similar sectoral activities. Health, Education, Peace and Security,

Tourism, Agriculture and Infrastructure are among the several overlaps of activities that IGAD and EAC engage in. This is shown in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11: Thematic representation of IGAD pillars and programmes

Thematic Representation of IGAD Pillars and Programmes in the Implementation Plan, 2016-2020

Pillar 1: Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment

Pillar 2: Economic Cooperation and Integration and Social Development

Programmes: Agriculture/Livestock and Food Security, Natural Resources Management, Environment Protection, Climate Variability and Change and Disaster Risk Management, Applied Research and CSO Support.

Programmes: Trade, Investment, Industry and Tourism Development Program Area, Infrastructure Development, Health and Social Development to include Health, Migration, Education, Youth Affairs and Sports).

Pillar 3: Peace and Security

Programmes: Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR), Transnational Security Threats, Governance, Democracy and Rule of Law and Human Rights

Pillar 4: Corporate Development Services

Programmes: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building, Research, Science and Technology.

Source: IGAD Regional Strategy Volume 2 Implementation Plan 2016-2020

Regarding the EAC, document analysis revealed that there are 18 sectors within the EAC Framework. These are Agriculture and Food Security, Culture and Sports, Customs, Education, Science and Technology, Energy, Environment and Natural Resources, Financial, Gender, Community Development and Civil Society, Health, Immigration and Labour, Infrastructure, International Relations, Investment Promotion and Private Sector Development, Legal and Judicial Affairs, Peace and Security, Resource Mobilization, Tourism and Wildlife Management and Trade.

Majority of interviewees at strategic level in the 3 studied CSIs were in agreement that duplication of roles drains the budgets of the CSIs and leads to reduced commitment and loyalty to respective regional security arrangements. Additionally, member states have to multitask with several objectives and this overstretches the mandates of IGAD, EAC and EASF.

However, on further content analysis, overlapping mandates and membership may not always be a negative factor. Tanzania was a founding member of the SADC and EAC. While SADC was more focused on liberating the remaining southern African states under colonialism such as Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia and Apartheid era South Africa; EAC was more focused on economic integration. Tanzania's experience in SADC was vital to the development of the peace and security strategy of EAC. Similar effects were bound to occur with Kenya and Uganda's experience in peace and security management through IGAD.

The findings of this study are in agreement with a study conducted by Rwengabo (2016) which observed that interlocking arrangements hinder the IGAD, EAC and EASF from attaining their regional stabilization mandates. The study also indicated that overlapping mandates caused by duplicity of membership into various CSIs and bureaucratic decision-making processes hinder the effective implementation of APSA. This in turn makes IGAD, EAC and EASF challenged to achieve regional peace and stability in the subregion.

Findings of the study show that overlapping mandates contribute to negative duplication of efforts and if there are no structures of integration or harmonization, it may lead to under-utilization of scarce resources. This is in consonance with Byiers (2016) who states that IGAD has been hindered from achieving its peace and security

mandate because it has numerous specialized institutions with 15 different offices spread across member states and this poses challenges in integration of functions. Sometimes these specialized institutions seek donor aid independently, a factor that may compromise unity of purpose and voice in seeking for a common approach for IGAD agenda.

Regarding IGAD's engagement with the civil society findings of the study point to a situation where the IGAD-NGO/CSOs initiative does not function effectively in promoting the IGAD agenda for peace. Interviewees at the strategic level cited the overlap of missions that several CSOs may seek to achieve. Ultimately, the IGAD-NGO/CSO forum achieves little beyond organizing workshops (Byiers, 2016).

Thus, Eastern Africa CSIs operate within a region with multiple regional organizations, overlapping memberships and commitments resulting to conflict of interests and this could expose them to unhealthy competition in conflict management. Consequently, IGAD, EAC and EASF may never properly function in the context of African Standby Force in an environment of several regional organizations and member countries present pursuing similar interests.

4.7.1.2 Political Commitment

The researcher went on to further ground how achievement of regional peace and stability by IGAD, EAC and EASF in the Eastern Africa subregion faced the challenge of lack of political commitment from member states of the respective CSIs. Table 4.12 shows responses gathered.

Table 4.12: Respondents views regarding political commitment

Institution	SA		A		UD		D		SD	
	f	%	f	%	F	%	f	%	f	%
IGAD	15	48.4	10	32.3	1	3.2	4	12.9	1	3.2
EAC	11	37.9	12	41.4	1	3.5	3	10.3	2	6.9
EASF	15	22.1	20	29.4	12	17.6	14	20.6	7	10.3

Source: Field Data (2020).

From Table 4.12, a total of 80.7 % (IGAD), 79.3 % (EAC) and 51.5 % (EASF) of respondents agreed that political commitment is a key challenge affecting the ability of the CSIs in their pursuit of regional stabilization in the subregion.

The study established that policies which member states commit to uphold within a CSI may only be realized if political leaders have the commitment. Interviewees at IGAD strategic level asserted that CSIs represented states led by politicians and whose state interests may supersede collective interests of a region meaning a CSI could only ratify what the political leadership approved of.

A strategic level interviewee at IGAD stated the following:

...heads of states are politicians and therefore the political dimension permeates into every strategic move an IGAD member state makes. Policies may be there but then there is no substantive political commitment by individual states to have the policies work... (IGAD strategic level interviewee 01, 2020).

In addition, interviewees at the CSOs reported that owing to the lack of autonomy and independence, civil servants seconded to serve in various capacities in IGAD affirm their loyalty to their mother countries and not exactly to the CSI agenda. Exemplifying, they identified lack of political commitment in the South Sudan peace process where despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement overseen by IGAD, rebels and government leaders continue to dishonor the de-escalating measures with their

respective political leaders unwilling to take charge to stop violations.

Corroborating these assertions, CSO informants during an FGD in South Sudan observed that respective IGAD member states lack political obligation and show unwillingness to give executive independence and autonomy to the IGAD secretariat to run and administer the institution. They added that the IGAD Executive Secretary is a political appointment and observed that decision-making power remains in the hands of national leaders through the Assembly leaving the Secretariat to play a downgraded role of working within the commands given by member states.

In support of this finding, a CSO informant explained:

...even though the Secretariat ought to independently administer the regional body, the IGAD Secretariat has no capacity to implement decisions but relies on direction provided by the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. In such circumstances, political interference from respective states may not be ruled out and as a result, the role of the Secretariat is so downgraded that it at times does not even attend meetings of the council of ministers... (CSO informant 04, South Sudan, 2021).

Sentiments on lack of political commitment by partner states were shared by interviewees at the EAC strategic level who reiterated that the security sector is politically sensitive and the nerve centre of national sovereignty. For this reason, partner states may be politically non-committal to pursue collective peace and security policies that appear to go against their interests and will often invoke sovereignty to guard against collective regional interventions. Citing an example, the interviewees indicated that the 2015 Burundi crisis was a result of failure by the political class to commit to the full adherence and implementation of the Arusha Accord.

In support of these views, respondents at the EAC operational level asserted that occasional conflict of interests between what partner states considered as national as

opposed to regional security interests could occur and hence compromising on political commitment. Giving examples, the respondents noted that Tanzania is often allied to Burundi regarding some regional political issues while Kenya portrays an image of a neutral actor amongst all member states and this played out in the 2015 Burundi crisis. This was further highlighted by interviewees at EAC strategic level with one of them observing:

... on 30th May 2015, attorney generals from EAC members submitted a legal note to the EAC head of States noting that it was unconstitutional and in violation of the Arusha Accord for President Nkurunziza to seek for a third term. However, a former Tanzanian President prevailed on his fellow EAC members by asking them to drop the issue, arguing that the issue was domestic, and should be dealt and determined by Burundians... (EAC strategic level interviewee 07, 2020).

From the views of respondents, it can be deduced that unity in leadership/ decision making at the leadership levels of CSIs is pertinent in building, strengthening and sustaining CSIs and their role in peace and stability of the subregion.

Acknowledging that political commitment was a key determinant to achievement of regional security, CSO informants during an FGD in Burundi highlighted that the EAC had mechanisms for preventive diplomacy but these policies may not be fully implemented due to existing political differences of opinion between member states. They observed that political dispositions could make some EAC member states become allied to each other or put them in separate positions.

In regard to the EASF, through interviewees, the study established that lack of political commitment was an impediment to the achievement of the CSI's regional stabilization mandate. Interviewees at EASF strategic level indicated that political interests pose a great challenge to the implementation of EASF policies because states want to preserve their perceived national interests regardless of whatever deployment tasks may lie

ahead. They observed that heads of states are politicians whose decisions are subject to acceptance or rejection by their citizens who form the electorate and that more often than not, member states would want to get into memoranda or decisions that are backed by their voters, the citizens.

Respondents at the EASF tactical level reported that there have been cases where EASF decisions (including decisions on troop deployment and contribution to the EASF kitty) have failed to be implemented due to lack of political support from member states. Majority of these respondents opined that due to lack of political commitment, there is suspicion and rivalry amongst EASF member states and this means member states formulate policies in line with their national security objectives as opposed to objectives of the CSI. This limits promotion of peace and security in the Eastern Africa subregion.

From the findings, it can be deduced that lack of political commitment hinders efficient decision making for responding during crisis. This hinders the CSIs from implementing the CPMR and peacebuilding agenda thereby hindering stabilization.

Study findings are in consonance with those of Nantulya (2016) who asserts that lack of strategic political harmony among EAC members meant the CSI failed to provide a roadmap to return to constitutional order in Burundi. Members were divided and there was lack of dialogue with states boycotting emergency summits on Burundi. This was a show of lack of political commitment as opined by Elowson and Albuquerque (2017). This view is also supported by Apuuli (2017) who established that the issue of protecting perceived national interests of every member state also influences the strategies which should contribute to peace and stability in the region. IGAD, EAC and EASF member states make political considerations before acceding to any regional security arrangements and this hurts regional stabilization.

It is emergent that study findings resonate with provisions of neorealism theory which argues that since states naturally seek to protect their interests, states within a region are always in a state of competition and will, therefore, view one another suspiciously. Neorealists consider a state safer away from a regional co-operation agreement even if that agreement has positive benefits, because collective interstate agreements may constrain pursuit of state interests. Even if integration would mean more economic power, neorealists cannot sacrifice state independence and national interests for economic gain. This may partially explain why Tanzania might have opted for membership in SADC as opposed to IGAD.

Findings of the study are in agreement with those of Soderbaum (2016) who argues that among the reasons why regional collaboration may fail is lack of political commitment of African governments. This study established that states may find individual peace and security more a priority as opposed to pushing regional agenda. Gebru (2016) concurs with this noting that sovereignty is highly prized and states tend to guard it at all costs. This is further complemented by Costantinos (2019) who avers that African governments are usually possessive of their sovereignty and would not want to surrender or delegate security matters to regional arrangements where security assumes an interstate approach. From the foregoing, the theory of neorealism can be said to be at play and impinges against collective security. Striking a balance therefore remains a challenge.

Based on the above findings, the researcher inferred that the IGAD Secretariat operates within bounds declared by IGAD member states because of lack of political commitment amongst political leaders who according to Healy (2016) want to use the organization as a vanguard to endorse their agenda. From the views of respondents, the

study established that lack of political commitment among member states affected IGAD, EAC and EASF in achievement of regional stability in the Eastern Africa subregion. A regional mechanism comprising states with strong political interests in ensuring that it achieves its mandate easily obtains political commitment in the implementation of peace initiatives.

On the contrary, where governments undermine and bypass regional security organizations, then such regional instruments do not succeed. Differences in political perceptions and affiliations affect formulation and implementation of sound strategies and policies necessary for peace and security in the region. From the foregoing, the researcher observed that IGAD, EAC and EASF cannot be proactive and independent in pursuit of regional peace and security without considerations of political interests by respective states. From the analysis of the findings, it appears that membership into regional security arrangements brings in some limitations to political regimes that may not vouch for implementation of some peace policies for fear of compromising their political interests.

4.7.1.3 Financial Resources

Evidence from the global arena shows that financial stability is a prerequisite for the success of any CSI. In view of this, the researcher sought the views of interviewees on the CSIs financial abilities and the extent to which financial issues could influence their efforts towards management of security threats and implementation of peace initiatives in the Eastern Africa subregion. Respondents identified finance as a challenge to the three institutions under study and observed that financial status; availability, reliability and disbursement, influence the implementation of their programmes and operations. Regarding financial status, the study sought to establish the extent to which it could

affect the operations of IGAD based on several financial parameters. Table 4.13 shows distribution of responses.

Table 4.13: Respondents views regarding IGAD’s financial status

Statement	SA		A		UD		D		SD	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Financial challenges hinder IGAD’s capacity to handle large and complex operations in the Eastern Africa subregion	17	54.8	10	32.3	-	-	4	12.9	-	-
IGAD funding from donors is insufficient	9	29	12	38.7	2	6.5	7	22.6	1	3.2
Member states have failed to effectively fund IGAD’s operation budget	11	35.5	15	48.4	4	12.9	1	3.2	-	-
IGAD is mainly dependent on donors for funding	12	38.7	9	29	3	9.7	7	22.6	-	-

Source: Field Data (2020).

As shown in Table 4.13, majority of respondents (87.1 %) were of the opinion that financial challenges hinder IGAD from handling complex security operations. In fact, 83.9 % of respondents stated that IGAD has a huge deficit in its operational budget. Additionally, 67.7% of respondents concurred that not only did IGAD over rely on donor funding which has strings attached and is also insufficient. A further 78.6 % of respondents were of the opinion that low level of economic development amongst IGAD member states is a contributor to lack of financial stability.

Further, through interviews, the study established that IGAD runs a number of programs grouped into various pillars and that the CSI has to solicit for donor funding to bridge the fund deficit, which in itself poses challenges.

An interviewee at IGAD strategic level asserted:

...we carry out several programs and I can tell you that, though insufficient, 70 % of the funds are obtained from donors. Member states' annual contributions are inconsistent. Out of 8 member states, 3 do not consistently contribute, that is Somalia, Eritrea and South Sudan. This now explains why 90% of IGAD's programs are supported by donors. However, donors provide funds based on their interests. This affects the sustainability of the peace and security mandate of IGAD... (IGAD strategic level interviewee 008, 2020).

Considering the significant role that financial stability plays in achievement of sectoral activities, interviewees at strategic level explained that inadequate funding at IGAD has hampered implementation of several programs.

To showcase the number of programs the CSI is engaged in relation to adequacy of funding, the researcher carried out document analysis and the findings showing sectoral programs against available funds and funds to be mobilized are in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14: IGAD's estimated expenditure in US dollars: 2016-2020

Overall Goal							
	Programme Area	Programmes	Projects	Available	To be mobilized	Total	Percent available
Pillar 1	5	16	55	27,361,644	128,648,409	156,010,053	18%
Pillar 2	3	14	53	9,412,500	87,019,000	96,431,500	10%
Pillar 3	3	6	21	40,000,000	68,804,000	108,804,000	37%
Pillar 4	2	5	23	38,983,000	1,700,000	40,683,000	96%
Total	13	41	152	115,757,144	286,171,409	401,928,553	29%

Source: IGAD Regional Strategy Volume 2, Implementation Plan 2016 – 2020

Key: Pillar 1: Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment; Pillar 2: Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development; Pillar 3: Peace and Security and Humanitarian Affairs; Pillar 4: Corporate Development Services

As shown in Table 4.14, IGAD's available funds for Pillar 3 for the period 2016 - 2020 stood at USD 40 million. This accounted for only 37% of IGAD's peace and security

budget (USD 108 million) translating to a deficit of about USD 69 million. This explains IGAD’s dismal performance in implementation of peace initiatives particularly the aspect of post conflict peace building in South Sudan and Somalia as already noted in objective three of this study. In addition, Table 4.12 indicates that IGAD has only 10% of the required budget for pillar 2 IGAD economic cooperation and social development activities and programmes. With a 90% budget deficit, IGAD’s efforts in implementing social and economic peace initiatives are highly compromised.

To illustrate on the effect of insufficient funding on IGAD’s peace and security mandate, CSOs interviewees noted that inadequate funding for IGAD had affected IGAD’s collaborative works with CSOs in promoting the regional peace agenda under the IGAD-NGO/CSO forum. The interviewees indicated that the forum had thus largely remained docile, citing IGAD’s reliance on donor funds with little or no alternative sources of funding to execute their duties.

Responses regarding EAC’s financial status

To ascertain the financial soundness of EAC, the researcher sought the views of participants based on financial parameters indicated in Table 4.15.

Table 4.15: Respondents views regarding EAC’s financial status

Statement	SA		A		UD		D		SD	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Financial challenges hinder EACs capacity to handle large and complex operations in the Eastern Africa subregion	13	44.8	12	41.4	2	6.9	2	6.9	-	-
EAC funding from donors is insufficient	12	41.4	11	37.9	4	13.8	2	6.9	-	-
Member states have failed to effectively fund EAC’s operation budget	9	31	9	31	7	24.1	3	10.4	1	3.5
EAC funding is mainly dependent on donor states and governments	10	34.5	12	41.4	5	17.2	2	6.9	-	-

Source: Field Data (2020).

Table 4.15 shows that 86.2 % of respondents considered financial handicaps as a challenge to the EAC; 79.3% of respondents concurred that donor funding was not sufficient for the EAC budget while 75.9% of respondents agreed that the EAC largely depends on donors to fund CSI activities.

The study, through interviewees at strategic level, established that the financial situation of the EAC was unstable because partner states had not been remitting assessed contributions in time and that the Council of Ministers had not invoked legal provisions to push defaulters to pay.

An interviewee at EAC strategic level indicated as follows:

...the EAC is under financial crisis and the East African Civil Society Organizations Forum through EALA in October 2019 filed a petition recommending the Council of Ministers to consider invoking Article 143 or 146 to impose sanctions against partner states that default on payments because it is tantamount to display of non-commitment to the integration process. EALA also wants the Alternative Financing Mechanism which could include an import levy finalized and effected ... (EAC strategic level interviewee 05, 2020).

Commitment of member countries to fund EAC programmes just like in AU before the Kagame reforms has been an impediment to self-reliance and effective management of peace and security in the region.

From these findings, the study affirmed that the EAC kitty was unable to independently fund regional peace and security activities without donor support. Considering that donor funds are insufficient, it is plausible to conclude that when member states default on paying their annual contributions, the EAC budget is unsustainable and hence the CSI cannot implement all its scheduled programmes rendering it a fiasco to those dependent on it for the stabilization of the region.

Responses regarding EASF's financial status

To analyze the EASF's financial ability, respondents were asked for their views on the financial status of the EASF in relation to implementation of its programs based on financial parameters as indicated in Table 4.16.

Table 4.16: Respondents views regarding EASF's financial status

Statement	SA		A		UD		D		SD	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	F	%
Inadequate finance is a barrier to achieving EASF objectives	27	39.7	16	23.5	7	10.3	15	22.1	3	4.4
EASF funding from donors is insufficient	18	26.5	30	44.1	12	17.7	6	8.8	2	2.9
Financial contributions of member states towards EASF activities depend on threat perception and interests of individual nations	31	45.6	29	42.6	4	5.9	3	4.4	1	1.5
Funding for EASF is mainly dependent on donors	21	30.9	29	42.6	12	17.7	6	8.8	-	-

Source: Field Data (2020).

From Table 4.16, the study established that 63.2% of respondents agreed that inadequate funding is a barrier to the achievement of EASF peace and security objectives. A total of 88.2% of respondents viewed EASF member states as unwilling to contribute financially especially when state interests are at stake. A total of 73.5% of respondents concurred that EASF funding is mainly from donors while 70.6% indicated that the same funding was insufficient. In addition, 86.4% of the respondents were of the opinion that low economic development among member states of EASF hinders the achievement of peace and security in the Eastern Africa subregion.

Through interviews, the study established that the EASF (just like IGAD and EAC) faces financial challenges that may hinder its success in pursuit of regional peace and security. EASF strategic level respondents attributed these financial challenges to failure by EASF partner states to honour their financial obligations to the CSI thereby

making the force seek donor support to implement its regional peace and security initiatives. In addition, EASF operational level respondents acknowledged that while majority of EASF member states owed assessed contributions in arrears, the CSI lacked modalities of forcing member states to honour payments and that donor funds were unsustainable because donors gave EASF funds based on their assessment of what they considered a threat.

To corroborate these findings, the researcher conducted document analysis and examined EASF member states' contribution gaps for the financial year 2019/2020 as well as the EASF Budget Summary for the year 2020. Table 4.17 shows a summary of EASF financial status.

Table 4.17: Summary of EASF Financial Status for FY 2019/2020

EASF Financial Status						
Member States	New Ratio	Arrears as at Dec 2018	Arrears Prior to Cessation	2019 Assessed Contributions	Remittance	Expected Contributions In 2019
	%	USD	USD	USD	USD	USD
Burundi	4.62	472,187.29		207,389.89	522,089.88	157,487.30
Comoros	3.07	257,518.64		137,811.03		395,329.67
Djibouti	4.62	387,561.19		207,389.89	193,744.39	401,206.69
Ethiopia	18.00	45.00		808,012.55	808,012.55	45.00
Kenya	19.00	25.06		852,902.14	-	852,927.20
Rwanda	9.29	74.62		417,024.25	-	417,098.87
Seychelles	4.12	-		184,945.09	184,945.09	-
Somalia	4.00	623,643.69		179,558.34	-	803,202.03
Sudan	19.00	296,630.03	2,958,062.90	852,902.14	245,710.03	903,822.14
Uganda	14.29	25.39		641,472.18	641,377.57	120.00
TOTAL	100	4,995,773.81	2,958,062.90	4,489,407.50	2,595,879.51	3,931,238.90

Source: EASF Financial Report, 2019/2020

The EASF financial status shows that various member states do not promptly pay annual contributions. As shown in Table 4.17, in 2018, EASF member states had arrears to the tune of nearly USD 5 million. In 2019, EASF member states were projected to remit USD 3.9 million yet they remitted USD 2.5 million only. This left a budget deficit of USD 1.4 million. This shows a huge gap in terms of EASF member states' contributions. This financial gap has a bearing on EASF's budget and programmed activities and security initiatives.

The EASF Budget for the year 2020 was also examined. Table 4.18 shows the EASF budget summary for the year 2020.

Table 4.18: EASF Budget Summary 2020

Source of funding	Amount USD	Percentage
Member States	497,000.00	15.88
Peace Fund	200,000.00	6.39
APSA IV	1,081,000.00	34.55
Friends of EASF (FOE)	1,350,500.00	43.17
Totals	3,128,500.00	

Source: EASF Financial Report, 2019/2020

As shown in Table 4.18, out of the total EASF budget of USD 3,128,500.00, member states contributed only USD 497,000.00. This translated to 15.88% contribution raising the question of commitment by member states to the EASF peace and security agenda. Such a paltry contribution by member states also translates to seeking external funds from donors thus implying that EASF member states do not own the peace and security initiatives they work towards because they are donor driven. Findings of the study revealed that donor support through the Friends of EASF (FOE) consists of almost half of the EASF budget implying that agenda setting has significantly shifted from member states to donors. Other factors such as perceived benefits may also be playing a role. An interviewee at EASF strategic level observed:

...there are many other factors that could be attributed to delayed member states contributions. Some countries may perceive that in spite of spending money contributing to the EASF kitty, the CSI has not done much to achieve peace and stability in the region or that their funding contribution is not matched by their representation in the country staff employed in EASF. Occasionally there could also be feelings that despite some member states' lower contributions; they are favoured or unequally advantaged in staff employment and appointment to leadership positions in the institution. This is more likely to be seen among states that are major contributors to the fund... (EASF strategic level interviewee 06, 2020).

As a result of financial challenges, arising from secondary data, EASF's implementation of scheduled activities is affected as shown in Table 4.19.

Table 4.19: EASF structured activities

	Activities Done	Activities on course	Activities Postponed	Activities not done	TOTAL
Pillar 1	02	-	-	04	06
Pillar 2	31	02	02	04	39
Pillar 3	10	-	-	-	10
Pillar 4	-	-	01	01	02
Total	43 (75.4%)	02 (3.51%)	03 (5.2%)	09 (15.7%)	57

Source: EASF Strategic Plan 2015 – 2020

Key:

Pillar 1: Political, Diplomatic and Advocacy Affairs.

Pillar 2: Maintenance of a Fully Operational Standby Force and Operational Capability.

Pillar 3: Institutional Capacity and Sustainability.

Pillar 4: Regional Cooperation and Partnerships.

As indicated in Table 4.19, only 75.4% of the EASF planned activities were implemented. Those that were postponed comprised 5.2% while projects not undertaken at all totaled 15.7%. The study established that this could be attributed to lack of funds.

From the analysis above, the study established that IGAD, EAC and EASF are hindered from achieving their regional stabilization mandates due to shortage of funds. The kitties of the three CSIs are in arrears. For instance, IGAD's disposable income was only 29% out of the estimated total budget for the period 2016-2020. Furthermore, as at December 2018, EASF member states had arrears to the tune of nearly USD 5 million. The EASF budget summary for the year 2020 revealed that out of budgetary estimates of USD3.13 million, member states contributions only accounted for USD 497, 000. This was approximately 15.88 % of the total budget.

Clearly, this situation has implications on the future and sustainability of CSIs' programmes in the Eastern Africa subregion. The study findings showed that the

fundamental issue is about ownership and economic dependency of member states on donor funding. For instance, if member states' assessed contributions cannot fund even half of their annual budgets, ownership of institutional agenda gets compromised. Findings of the present study in regard to financial challenges are in tandem with Badmus (2015) who argues that African regional security organizations are institutionalizing the peace and security arrangements in line with their mandates but have to rely on international partners for funding. This dependency on funding from donors by RMs/ RECs compromises ownership of peace and security initiatives. Donors may at times even dictate on the implementation approaches and priorities to be taken by CSIs / RMs in handling peace and security matters. There is need for IGAD, EAC and EASF to seek funds mobilization mechanisms that could see them able to independently finance their peace and security projects. In the words of Arthur, (2017), CSIs could come up with methods of raising funds in order to avoid over dependence on donor support.

Best practices in ECOWAS indicate that the CSI has established a Community Levy. Through this levy, ECOWAS has been able to fund up to 85% of its operational budget. In fact, Arthur, (2017) portrays ECOWAS as ahead of the AU in terms of generating resources from member states for its programmes. On its part, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has embraced best practices for financial mobilization. The alliance operates on the principle of common funding where all 30 members contribute according to an agreed cost-sharing formula, based on Gross National Income (GNI). This represents a small percentage of each member state's Defence budget. Additionally, NATO operates on what is called the 2% defence investment guideline.

In 2006, NATO defence ministers agreed to commit a minimum of two per cent of their member states Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to spending on defence. This guideline principally serves as an indicator of a country's political will to contribute to NATO's common defence efforts. This could be adopted by IGAD, EAC and EASF to boost the CSIs financial power and gather sufficient political commitment.

Interviewees from IGAD, EAC and EASF observed that financial challenges facing CSIs were mainly due to overreliance on donor funding. This donor funding is insufficient and when member states default on payment of annual contributions, estimated CSI budgets cannot be sustained. Donors give funds based on assessment of their interests. These findings are in agreement with a similar study by Porto and Engel (2016) which found that institutions with no sound financial structures were unable to engage in significant security undertakings. In the same breadth, Ligami (2015) points at EASF member states as being generally poor and therefore inevitably reliant on funds from donors. Kaburu (2018) further contends that in spite of making a mark in the Somalia peace process through an institutional approach, IGAD could not, for instance, marshal resources to deploy IGASOM. This was brought out in Objective Three of the study.

From the analysis of the findings, it is evident that IGAD, EAC and EASF are far from being financially independent. The institutions' programs cannot be effectively locally financed and thus the over-reliance on donor funds. Findings of this study echo provisions of the social constructivism theory that a security structure operates both on material and social components. Funding is a material component and hence without financial autonomy, IGAD, EAC and EASF may not achieve their peace and security mandates. This finding is in concurrence with Maru and El Fassi (2015) who contend

that the IGAD-NGO/CSOs forum, a key component in implantation of the peace and security mandate, was non-operational for lack of funding.

It is debatable whether non-payment of membership dues is attributed to low economic development status or lack of appreciation of the work done by EASF or other CSIs. There could also be expectations that development partners will chip in. Findings of the study are in agreement with arguments by Soderbaum (2016) who posits that unrealistic expectations by African governments on donor funding are among the reasons why regional collaboration may fail. The same situation afflicts the AU and efforts have been made to introduce new tax levies and tough sanctions for members who delay settling their bills in order to act as deterrence (AU, 2017). Perhaps Eastern Africa subregion CSIs could borrow a leaf.

Based on the study findings, it may be concluded that adequate funding has been identified as a primary goal of the APSA structure to ensure that member states can own operations of regional CSIs. Reliance on external funding means that the agenda and priorities of CSIs are controlled by foreign parties and this position militates against the AU objective of offering African solutions to African problems. Development partners have no intention of assisting IGAD financially on a permanent basis (Tadesse, 2019) and EASF's high level dependency on donor funds curtails African ownership of peace and security activities and plans. Eventually, some activities seem to be more donor-driven than based on the wishes and priorities of EASF (Fleming, 2017). The experience of African TCCs in AMISOM in accessing UN and European Union (EU) funds, often tied with political interests and where the TCCs have little say on the UNSC authorized mandate; should convince African countries to bear the cost of funding CSIs and also control their agenda and programmed priorities.

4.7.1.4 Human Resources and Equipment

The study sought to establish respondents' concurrence to the view that human resource and equipment challenges affected the ability of IGAD, EAC and EASF in achievement of their stabilization mandate. Responses are shown in Table 4.20.

Table 4.20: Respondents views regarding under resourcing

Institution	Yes	No
IGAD	76%	24%
EAC	72%	28%
EASF	81%	19%

Source: Field Data (2020).

From Table 4.20, findings show that respondents from the three CSIs (IGAD 76%, EAC 72% and EASF (81%) cite human resources and equipment as a factor affecting achievement of peace and security in the subregion. On average, therefore, over 76.3% of respondents expressed consensus that the CSIs face under resourcing challenges.

In relation to IGAD, the study established through interviewees that IGAD faced human resource constraints manifested in poor staffing. Interviewees at the strategic level observed that staffing was one of the reasons the IGAD CEWARN was not achieving its objective. They had a shortage of field monitors and even those who were there were inadequately remunerated and this hampered quality data collection and monitoring the work of CEWERUs.

Acknowledging the staffing problem at IGAD, CSO interviewees highlighted that there was a high number of unfilled posts and this had affected the efficacy and success of the organization as a whole. Citing examples, they observed that there were 14 posts in the organizational structure of IGAD secretariat that had fallen vacant since the year

2009 owing to transfers and retirement and because of budget limitations, the CSI could not fill them up leaving the secretariat to operate at 50 percent of its human resource capacity.

Interviewees at strategic level observed that IGAD's peace and security department is understaffed and yet the roles designed under this sector require a large human labor to be able to effectively achieve its objective. They added that the IGAD human resource department has not automated core functions leaving maintenance of project information, payment processing and leave management remain manual. The interviewees added that due to reliance on donor funds for staff hiring, IGAD largely remains guided by donors regarding recruitment and human resource matters.

An IGAD strategic level interviewee captured it thus:

...staff seconded to IGAD are first citizens of their respective countries and secondly IGAD staff and therefore their allegiance is first to their mother country then second to IGAD. In addition, states that pay their assessed contributions promptly especially Ethiopia and Kenya have a bigger say on who takes what appointment. The states have a bigger leverage and bargaining around staffing matters. Additionally, staff key functions of IGAD are donor funded meaning the CSI has no exclusive independent say on human resource matters... (IGAD strategic level interviewee 02, 2020).

Turning to the EAC, the study established that the CSI faces human resource challenges that could affect its implementation of the peace and security agenda. Interviewees at strategic level indicated that even though the CSI had knowledgeable and experienced consultants to plan and implement its peace and security strategy, there was a staff shortage for staff needed by the secretariat, specialized institutions, other organs and partner states in order to implement Development Strategies. Explaining the cause of this, CSO interviewees argued that the EAC had well developed recruitment policies but there was no appropriate human resource planning to match the size and skill-sets of

the workforce to correspond with the emerging demand occasioned by advancing technology and EAC expansion.

In relation to human resource and equipment factors at the EASF, interviewees at strategic level observed that the EASF may be unable to effectively deal with conflicts in the Eastern Africa subregion because the force has weak logistical capacity. Further probing revealed that the force lacked modern and sufficient artillery assets, helicopters, and air defense and communication capabilities to deploy during emergency security threats in the region. Citing an example, operational level respondents highlighted the kidnapping of an AMIS peace team in Darfur in 2008 where the EASF did not have the air defence system to support the kidnapped team adding that the EASF and its member states has very limited airlift capability and thus would have to rely on external assistance for deployment and sustainment of the forces. Giving their views, CSO interviewees added that despite having declared achievement of full operational capability in 2015, pledged capability for military equipment and troops could not count for practically deployable resources readily available on the ground and this insufficient logistical capacity makes EASF to remain donor dependent.

Regarding the manner in which key appointments at the EASF rotate, CSO informants observed that the Secretariat's leadership specifically rotates on an alphabetical rotation system following the first letter of the member state. However, the informants noted that some EASF member states seconded staff without prerequisite skills for implementing the EASF Secretariat peace and security agenda.

From these findings, it may be inferred that achievement of peace and security by IGAD, EAC and EASF in the subregion remains challenged by resource factors. These findings resonate with findings by Kassaija (2015) who notes that the IGAD secretariat

is understaffed and that several professional posts have not been filled over the years due to lack of financial resources and this hinders implementation of the IPSS. Findings of the study also concur with the NEPAD (2015) whose report cites shortage of specialized skills in key departments of the EAC and the need therefore to turn around the human resource and capacity building mechanisms of the EAC in line with the demands of its peace and security mandate.

Study findings concur with Robinson (2014) who notes that the EASF lacks sufficient logistics and competence to support troops in peace support operations. According to Bayeh (2014), under scenario six which calls for intervention, the EASF ought to deploy within 14 days and self-sustain for 90 days before the AU or the UN takes over the mission. However, the EASF may be unable to meet this for lack of resources to staff a brigade and a well-established logistics base (Kassaija, 2019).

Lack of adequate regional financing of CSIs is a recurrent problem well observed by the Kagame report (AU, 2017). This setback militates against independent agenda setting on crucial security matters such as hiring of critical human resource. It renders CSIs vulnerable to foreign manipulation based on funding priorities and disbursement. Lack of a reliable funding stream also hinders implementation of programmes according to set priorities and needs thereby hindering success of CPMR activities. This goes against effectiveness of long-term stabilization of the target states.

4.7.1.5 Regional Hegemony

The study sought views of respondents on influence of hegemonic issues on IGAD, EAC and EASF peace and security initiatives. Table 4.21 shows distribution of responses on the extent of influence of regional hegemonic issues on the CSIs.

Table 4.21: Respondents views regarding regional hegemonic issues in the Eastern Africa subregion

Institution	SA		A		UD		D		SD	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
IGAD	9	29	12	38.7	3	9.7	5	16.1	2	6.5
EAC	12	41.4	9	31	1	3.5	4	13.8	3	10.3
EASF	23	33.8	22	32.4	12	17.6	11	16.2	-	-

Source: Field Data (2020).

Table 4.21 shows that 67.7% (IGAD), 72.4% (EAC) and 66.2% (EASF) of respondents consider the Eastern Africa subregion as challenged by hegemonic issues and this affects the CSIs in their achievement of stabilization.

The study, through interviewees, established that the HoA did not have a leading power that could drive IGAD peace and security policies single handedly like South Africa (SADC) and Nigeria (ECOWAS). Asked to explain how a hegemonic state would benefit IGAD, interviewees at the strategic level opined that such a state would have power to influence institutions and authorize interventions that favour peace using both soft and hard power. Citing an example, they indicated that a hegemonic state would find it advantageous to promote its national interests through influencing IGAD politically and militarily and thereby promoting accountability for peace and security activities.

Acknowledging that the Eastern Africa subregion lacks a visibly distinct lead state capable by virtue of its superior size and strength to play the unchallenged role of a hegemon, respondents at the IGAD tactical level were of the opinion that Ethiopia silently portrays its pivotal influence on conflict prevention. They cited examples of pivotal status when Ethiopia deployed its peacekeepers to Abyei in the Sudan- South Sudan border region in the year 2011. Ethiopia hosted mediation talks for the South

Sudanese civil war in the year 2015 and has continually engaged in military action against the *Al Shaabab* in Somalia at times even deploying unilaterally without express authority from the AU.

In support of these views, CSO informants at an FGD in South Sudan observed that Ethiopia hosts majority of the security related specialized institutions of IGAD. Citing examples, they indicated that Addis Ababa hosts five of these institutions - the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP), the IGAD Somalia Peace and Reconciliation Facilitation Office, the Office of the IGAD Special Envoys for South Sudan and a Technical Support Unit. This therefore elevates Ethiopia's pivotal state status.

Interviewees at the EAC cited lack of a hegemonic state as a factor that has affected the CSI from effectively achieving its peace and security mandate. Majority of interviewees at the strategic level argued that no EAC partner state had the ability to economically, militarily or diplomatically garner full support of all other member states in pursuit of a common peace agenda. Giving an example of the Burundi crisis, one strategic level interviewee at the EAC observed:

...during the 2015 Burundi crisis, none of the EAC partner states was able to assert herself in negotiating an acceptable political settlement to the crisis. When negotiations for peace in Burundi began under the EAC auspices, partner states entered into silent alliances based on interests with Burundi and Tanzania on one hand while Uganda and Rwanda were on the other with Kenya remaining neutral... (EAC strategic level interviewee, 01, 2020).

This demonstrates the complex states relations in the Great Lakes Region as earlier alluded to. This political schism has had a huge impact on peace and conflict in the region. Sometimes alliances spread in other African counties such as DRC, Angola and South Africa as witnessed in previous regional conflicts.

In relation to the EASF, the study through interviews revealed that the lack of a lead state that could take an unchallenged position to push the EASF agenda was cited as a drawback to the EASF ability to stabilize the subregion. Interviewees at the strategic level asserted that Ethiopia and Kenya were possible candidates for pivotal states by virtue of exhibiting factors related to strong military and economic power and diplomatic clout that has accorded the states some regional respect. However, the two states are faced by intra state challenges with Ethiopia having to contend with the expansionist threat of Somalia and sour relations with Eritrea while Kenya engaged in anti-terror campaigns as well as the current maritime dispute with Somalia. Interviewees at the strategic level therefore argued that such distractions may not allow the states to leverage on opportunities to marshal other EASF member states to a common peace and security front. In addition, CSO interviewees highlighted that EASF member states are engaged in silent supremacy wars, rivalry and suspicion which undermine undermines institutional build up and prompt decisions during conflicts.

From the above findings, it could therefore be inferred that no single IGAD, EAC or EASF member state has come out to take up political and military accountability for peace and security in the Eastern Africa subregion and hence the absence of a regional hegemon affects prompt decision-making required whenever conflict arises.

These study findings are in consonance with a study by Adetula *et al.*, (2016) who note that suspicion and rivalry within IGAD compromises achievement of IGAD's peace and security mandate while Ethiopia is seen as dominating the CSI. For instance, there was the 2006 intervention by Ethiopia in Somalia to annihilate the ICU, a move that was unilateral yet it was backed by IGAD. This was a non- authorized military intervention and Ethiopia justified its legitimacy on the grounds of its right to individual

and collective self- defence against a terrorist threat and as a reply to an invitation from a legitimate government Somalia took the invasion negatively and in response to IGAD's support for Ethiopian intervention, Eritrea suspended its membership in April 2007.

Findings are also in comport with Adetula *et al.*, (2016) who argue that the war against terrorism in the subregion had a negative effect to IGAD member state relations. Depending on their allies, IGAD member states identified differently. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda formed a grouping considered friendly to Western partners engaged in Global War on Terror (GWOT). Ethiopia and Eritrea were involved in a diplomatic spat that culminated in Eritrea suffering UN sanctions with South Sudan and Ethiopia involved in a diplomatic tiff over allegations of rebel support. The chairmanship position held by Ethiopia for relatively long was also a cause of state tensions (Byiers, 2015).

The dominant posture assumed by Ethiopia in terms of being home to numerous institutions is also noted by El-Fassi and Maru (2015) who write that Ethiopia hosts the AU Headquarters for the Peace and Security Committee and has chaired IGAD since 2008, it has been elected three times as member of the PSC and has influence on the AU organs and representative of AU Member States in Addis Ababa. In addition, Ethiopia hosts a number of IGAD offices and specialized institutions and thus apparently seems better suited to push the IGAD regional mandate.

Findings of this study are in agreement with arguments by Bayeh (2015) who identifies lack of a regional hegemon, overlapping membership into other RECs and lack of funding as factors affecting the EASF in pursuit of regional peace. Study findings are in consonance with those of Thobejane and Yitay (2018) and Kimokoti (2018) who

contend that Kenya and Ethiopia stand out as pivotal states to push the regional stabilization agenda but engagement with internal issues including terrorism and border disputes deter their assertiveness. From this we infer that no single Eastern Africa CSI is hegemonic enough, stable and willing to take up political and military accountability for peace and security in the Eastern Africa subregion.

Due to competing ambitions for hegemony between states in the region, there is no principal organization for security cooperation (Elowson and de Albuquerque, 2016). Due to its socialist background, Ethiopia has not developed a leading economic model commensurate with its population and geographic size. As a country that has also gone through internal civil wars and external war with Somalia and Eritrea, it does not provide a good role model in maintaining peace and security. In terms of soft power, the country's democratic and human rights deficit spoils its regional leadership credentials.

The supremacy battle for regional leadership has pitted Kenya against Ethiopia by virtue of their pivotal states character, economic and military capabilities. However, none of these two countries had demonstrated actual capacity for burden-carrying within the EASF; majorly because both countries suffer from internal challenges of under development and societal inequalities, that does not afford them leadership role of burden carrying on behalf of the other member states (Hassan, 2015).

According to De Coning *et al.*, (2016), the Lead Nation Model for stabilization initiatives is one where a lead nation serves as the framework country for the operation. The lead nation provides strategic lift, the mission support requirements and finances of the operation, either on the basis of a voluntary contribution, or on a cost-sharing, common cost or reimbursable basis, depending on the specific nature of the

arrangements entered into between the lead nation and the mandating organization. This model was used when ECOWAS deployed in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and early 2000 when Nigeria served as the lead nation. The Lead Nation Model was also used by the AU in the case of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) between 2003 and 2004, when South Africa played the role of a lead nation, providing the framework which enabled Ethiopian and Mozambique to deploy to the operation. Eastern Africa CSIs could also adopt this model in future peace processes (AU, 2017).

This manifestation of lack of a hegemon is supported by neorealism theory which argues that any regional integration mechanism is likely to invite the need for a lead state. However, a lead state may by design or by mere chance take the position of regional leader to exploit others. Meanwhile, smaller states within the regional mechanism end up “band wagoning” after the powerhouse. Consequently, to maintain peace, states are usually not willing to stand out as hegemons for fear of compromising the overall integration initiative.

In line with neorealism theory, states are willing to commit their resources for power projection when they perceive their interests will be met. Hegemons can have stabilizing or destabilizing effects as witnessed in the political clash between China and the US in South China Sea. The US has remained a stabilizing power in the Western Hemisphere for close to two centuries since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 (under President James Monroe, the US declared its hegemony over the region), due to its strong economic, military and diplomatic power.

4.7.2 Institutional Factors

4.7.2.1 Policies

The researcher sought to establish the existence of efficient and effective policies that IGAD, EAC and EASF could implement to address peace and security challenges in the Eastern Africa subregion and thereby achieve stabilization. Table 4.22 tabulates responses regarding this.

Table 4.22: Respondents views regarding existence of effective and efficient policies

Institution	Yes	No
IGAD	33.3%	66.7%
EAC	4.5%	95.5%
EASF	19.4%	80.6%

Source: Field Data (2020).

From Table 4.22, it was noted that 66.7 % of respondents were of the opinion that IGAD lacks effective and efficient policies to mitigate against regional insecurity. These sentiments were shared by 95.5% and 80.6% of EAC and EASF respondents respectively.

Through interviews, it was established that IGAD aims at managing conflict as opposed to putting in place robust long-term conflict preventive strategies policy. They argued that even the conflict management initiatives that the CSI seeks to adopt remain unimplemented and this renders them ineffective and inefficient. Majority of interviewees at the IGAD strategic level were of the view that even if the CSI came up with the conflict preventive policies, implementing them within an environment of scarce resources and a militarized security in the subregion may be challenging.

In relation to the EAC, study findings revealed that the CSI lacks strong policies that

govern intervention in the event of conflict. Respondents at the EAC operational level affirmed that on paper, the EAC has an early warning system, defence cooperation and preventive diplomacy but in practice these systems are weak and not operational. Citing examples, respondents at the operational level acknowledged that if, for instance the EWS warns of conflict in a certain region, the EAC does not have a statute that compels the particular affected state to respond to the conflict and this makes the policy redundant.

In regard to the EASF, interviewees at strategic level argued that the CSI did not have a clear policy on intervention to conflict and that decisions to resolve conflicts were more political as opposed to being institutional policy concerns.

From responses in Table 4.20, and those obtained from interview transcriptions, the study found out that IGAD, EAC and EASF had a challenge in terms of implementation of policy due to resource constraints. Furthermore, CSO interviewees indicated that most of the existing CPMR policies on paper are about management of conflicts as opposed to prevention. Effectiveness of robust and proactive CPMR and peacebuilding mechanism is subject to the capacity of CSIs, which the study has established is low. For sustainability of stabilization efforts in the subregion, CSIs need to build durable capacity in the identified areas.

Comprehensive Defence and Security Policy

Another institutional concern for the researcher was in regard to effectiveness of a comprehensive defence and security policy for IGAD, EAC and EASF. The researcher sought to solicit information from key informants on the availability of defence and security policy that would provide strategic direction for conflict prevention in each of the three CSIs. Table 4.23 demonstrates responses gathered in respect of this sub theme.

Table 4.23: Respondents views on soundness of defence and security policy

Institution	SA		A		UD		D		SD	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
IGAD	2	6.5	4	12.9	3	9.7	13	41.9	9	29
EAC	2	6.9	2	6.9	2	6.9	5	17.2	18	62.1
EASF	11	16.2	13	19.1	2	2.9	12	17.7	30	44.1

Source: Field Data (2020).

From Table 4.23, a total of 69.7 % of respondents (IGAD), 83.4 % (EAC) and 61.7 % (EASF) stated that the respective CSIs did not have a sound defence policy for intervention in regional conflict. Through interviews, it was also established that the defence and security policies in existence were not comprehensive.

The study, through interviews at strategic level, established that at IGAD, there is a defence policy making mechanism but the policy is more managerial than preventive. They indicated that the lack of a Common Peace and Security Policy in the subregion had triggered IGAD states to be more proactive in responding to perceived common threats as opposed to relying on a common sub-regional approach. Citing examples, interviewees at strategic level highlighted the heavy military presence of Uganda, Burundi and Kenya in AMISOM and the frequent independent incursions of Ethiopia into Somalia as illustrating how Eastern Africa subregion states are cooperating as a security block in a bid to achieve regional stability. The interviewees further observed that due to lack of a comprehensive defence policy, IGAD is often caught up by conflict rather than implementing conflict prevention strategies.

In regard to the EAC, respondents at the operational level reported that while partner states lacked a comprehensive defence policy for the achievement of regional peace and stability, the EAC as per provisions of Article 125 of the EAC Treaty had in 2015 ratified an EAC Protocol on Defence and Security to provide for close cooperation in

defence related issues. However, a Mutual Defence Pact was yet to be ratified by partner states and hence this prevents the EAC from robustly championing a regional peace agenda.

In addition, interviewees at the EAC strategic level observed that even though the EAC had draft policies on illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, refugees and maritime security, full implementation of these protocols faced perennial challenges of resource scarcity. Giving examples, they observed that implementation of the defence policy on counter-terrorism was affected by inadequate strategies to collect intelligence and convict terrorists in an accountable judicial system and this compromised the regional war against terror. As a result, findings from the study established that the CSI had not operationalized the EAC Peace and Security Protocol.

Elucidating challenges related to the implementation of a mutual defence pact, an interviewee at the EAC strategic level had this to say:

...institutionally, the EAC has different member states with different structures of addressing peace and security. Basically, therefore, the EAC is a correlation entity whose implementation of policies is by individual partnership. Implementing a comprehensive defence policy for the EAC could be impeded by the fact that each EAC member state has its own unique security history... (EAC strategic level interviewee 04, 2020).

The above sentiments capture challenges but this should not obscure the efforts being undertaken to implement the agreements. The EAC countries have a Mutual Defence Protocol and Mutual Peace and Security Protocol, where a number of consultations have been done bringing together relevant agencies in the military, police and judiciary. Efforts are certainly in progress to implement the said agreements. A number of EAC military exercises have been undertaken to improve mutual operability.

Commenting on EAC defence policy, CSO interviewees acknowledged that the EAC is currently crafting a Draft Protocol on Peace and Security informed by emerging security threats especially cyber-crime, human trafficking, terrorism and piracy. However, the interviewees indicated that while a common defence pact was good for the subregion, it may not be completely welcome by EAC partner states because such a protocol involved ceding of critical sovereignty powers to a regional security entity which would have to be viewed as superior in matters security.

In regard to the EASF, the study established through interviewees that the CSI has a defence policy that has not been comprehensively implemented. Interviewees at strategic level attributed failure to implement the policy to differences in member states' military doctrines which would hinder inter-operability and reluctance by member states to delegate their sovereign security interests to a supra national organization.

This was summarized by an interviewee at the EASF strategic level in the following statement:

...there exists a defence policy but implementing it is a challenge because different EASF member states have varied military doctrines and command structures. States will thus align their support to tasks that favour their doctrine. States are sovereign and so they formulate defence policies in line with their security objectives. Therefore, implementing a comprehensive defence approach to security amongst the EASF member states is a big challenge... (EASF strategic level interviewee 08, 2020).

Despite the highlighted political and ideological challenges and the differing levels of national capacity, militaries in the subregion have jointly undertaken scheduled activities such as the March 2022 Mashariki Salaam Command Post Exercise, sports, military students' exchange programmes and cross border disaster responses. These

activities form part of the resilience and focus that is required by member states in advancing the common defence policy.

The study findings are in concurrence with a study by Miranyi (2018) who points out that in order to gain from integration and create synergy; a number of structures in the EASF have to be harmonized, several policies must be agreed upon and implemented jointly in order to create synergy and enhance CSI effectiveness. For a defence policy to be effective and efficient, it should be geared more towards prevention rather than erratic response to conflict.

From the study findings, it may therefore be argued that IGAD, EAC and EASF member states have security policies. However, the existing security policies on contemporary security threats like terrorism, cybercrime, small arms proliferation and maritime security have not been effectively implemented. This is attributed to resource constraints and differences in military doctrine and command structures.

AU Agenda stressed on the importance of maintaining security through addressing causes of conflicts and wars. This entails adhering to values of coexistence and fraternity, elevating moral and human values and preventing all forms of organized crime of drugs and human trafficking and arms trade in a bid to guarantee peace and to protect welfare of their citizens through a mutual defence, security and foreign policy (UNSC, 2016).

Long-term strategic planning based on regional collective treaties, strategies and policies is a hallmark of effective CPMR. Lack of such operational framework limits the flexibility of the CSIs' secretariats in decision making. All these factors have negative implication on the effectiveness of stabilization initiatives.

4.7.2.2 Cumbersome Bureaucratic Factors

Another thematic concern for the study was to examine the framework for decision making in the structure of the CSIs. The study sought to establish whether cumbersome bureaucracy in IGAD, EAC and EASF challenged the achievement of regional stabilization mandates. The table 4.24 shows responses obtained.

Table 4.24: Respondents views regarding cumbersome bureaucratic structures

Institution	SA		A		UD		D		SD	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
IGAD	7	22.6	17	54.8	2	6.5	4	12.9	1	3.2
EAC	7	24.1	15	51.7	4	13.8	2	6.9	1	3.5
EASF	13	19.1	31	45.6	-	-	23	33.8	1	1.5

Source: Field Data (2020).

From Table 4.24, about three quarters of IGAD (77.4%) and EAC (75.8%) respondents and 64.7% of EASF respondents reported that the bureaucratic structure and organization of the CSIs affects effective decision-making. The researcher therefore sought to establish how bureaucracy was a determinant to effectiveness in implementation of the CSIs peace and security mandates.

Through interviewees at the strategic level, the study established that the IGAD decision - making process is long and involving because decisions pass through many stages before being approved leading to delay of resolutions. Probed for reasons, the interviewees highlighted that IGAD had numerous specialized institutions predominantly located in two key IGAD member states: Ethiopia and Kenya. They acknowledged that bureaucracy in IGAD was manifest in the organizational structure which had a high number of organizations and offices which worked in complementarity. Giving examples, the interviewees highlighted that within the spectrum of the IGAD Peace and Security architecture, there were four main units each with a series of responsibilities to coordinate.

On their part, CSO interviewees in Somalia observed that decision - making processes at the IGAD Secretariat were weak and subject to political manipulation by ministers and heads of states of respective member states who are out to guard their sovereign interests. The interviewees added that the situation was made worse considering that the Secretariat comprises civil servants seconded by their mother countries to IGAD and whose loyalty to their mother countries cannot be over emphasized.

In regard to the EAC, the study revealed that bureaucracy was an impediment to the achievement of regional peace and security. Through interviewees at strategic level, the study established that decision making in the EAC was by consensus and getting total buy- in on peace and security matters from partner states (states who have diverse interests and rivalries and operating in an environment of overlapping mandates and competing state interests) was a challenge. Highlighting the disadvantages of the consensus rule, respondents at EAC tactical level argued that a disenfranchised member state may misuse the consensus rule and deliberately create a quorum hitch during deliberations on crucial matters (more so those issues states deemed unfavourable to their interests) and thereby derail or undermine the CSI's peace and security agenda.

Interviews at strategic level on EASF established that poor decision-making practices were a factor to the slow implementation of the peace and security agenda of the CSI. Majority of strategic level interviewees attributed this to the long chain of command and cumbersome procedure that resolutions had to pass through before being finalized occasioning delay in implementation owing to the distant location of the EASF PLANHELM and the Logistics Base and Brigade Headquarters. Bureaucracy would in this case lead to logistical and communication constraints especially for an organization like EASF which faces resource constraints. Probed for a possible solution to this

location constraint, some interviewees opined that perhaps the PLANHELM should have been co-located with the brigade headquarters and staffed on a permanent basis for ease of command, control and communications.

Regarding effective deployment of troops, strategic level interviewees further highlighted that the EASF operates on a pledged capability matrix of troops and equipment and states may fail to uphold the pledge in time during deployment in a PSO owing to red tape and state interests.

An interviewee at EASF strategic level put it as follows:

...the organizational structure of the EASF is poor and is characterized by red tape. It becomes difficult at times to make decisions with the planning element of EASF in Kenya and the brigade headquarters in Ethiopia. As a result of the long chain of coordination needed to link these two distant organs, effective decision making and implementation of peace and security agenda is hindered. Also, by the time a state contributes troops for an EASF mission, the decision must pass through a long chain which at times is influenced by political interests and sovereignty matters thus delaying deployment... (EASF strategic level interviewee 05, 2020).

From the above findings, the researcher may therefore infer that IGAD, EAC and EASF face decision making challenges that may jeopardize achievement of the regional peace and security mandates. This is because the consensus rule on matters peace and security may be unachievable in situations where member states coalesce around interests. In this case, Eastern Africa subregion does not seem ready for a supranational security entity that can intervene in state security matters irrespective of sovereignty and competing interests.

The study findings resonate with those of Verhoeven (2015) who argues that perhaps out of supremacy battles, Kenya and Ethiopia succeeded in lobbying for the establishment of the EASF organs in their respective countries to the detriment of

effective decision making for the organization. The findings of the study further confirm Byiers (2016) who argues that IGAD Peace and Security institutional setup illustrates the wide scope of organizations and numerous offices which are physically spread out over the region and this poses a challenge for effective coordination of the CSI's peace and security activities thus undermining achievement of regional peace and security. Maru and El Fassi (2015) also corroborate the findings of the present study when they argue that the IGAD secretariat operates in a framework which does not allow it autonomy to make decisions but instead Secretariat decisions are vetted by and judged against political interests of member states and not according to provisions of the IGAD mandate. To confirm this political interference in decision making and the downgraded role of the Secretariat in decision making, Verhoeven (2015) observes that in terms of peace and security, the role of the IGAD Secretariat is so downgraded that there are times the Secretariat did not attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers.

Administrative bottlenecks have a negative effect on performance of CSIs. Day to day operations of the secretariats are dependent on efficient decision making which can be hindered by bureaucratic red tape. Certainly, this setback has an effect on performance of CPMR and stabilization initiatives through hindering robust decision making and implementation of the set agenda.

4.7.2.3 Inadequacy of the Legal Framework

The study also sought to find out the existence and effectiveness of a legal framework that governed management of regional peace and security by IGAD, EAC and EASF. Table 4.25 shows responses obtained in regard to existence of such framework.

Table 4.25: Respondents views regarding existence of a legal framework

	SA		A		UD		D		SD	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
IGAD	12	38.7	14	45.2	4	12.9	-	-	1	3.2
EAC	7	24.1	17	58.6	3	10.3	1	3.5	1	3.5
EASF	19	27.9	25	36.7	4	5.9	18	26.5	2	2.9

Source: Field Data (2020).

From Table 4.25 the study noted that 86.9% (IGAD), 86.4% (EAC) and 64 % (EASF) of respondents observed that there existed a legal framework to support the respective CSIs in their endeavour to achieve peace and security in the East African subregion. However, through key informant interviews, it was established that the existing legal framework was ineffective.

Interviewees at IGAD strategic level observed that the legal framework in place did not have a strong legal basis to commit member states to the IGAD mandate. Citing examples, they acknowledged that when member states failed to honour payments to the IGAD kitty; there was no legal provision to make them pay up. The interviewees further reported that IGAD lacked an effective legal framework guiding the CSI chairmanship and even convening of Summits. Respondents at the IGAD operational level acknowledged that there were times ordinary summits are skipped for years leaving one state to assume chairmanship for long. Providing an example, they cited that Ethiopia once chaired both the Heads of State and Council of Ministers making Eritrea deem this as Ethiopian dominance over the CSI.

Regarding legal framework, CSOs interviewees argued that lack of effective legal guidelines in matters related to staff appointments compromises professionalism. This was explained by a CSO interviewee as follows:

...the CSI lacks an explicit legal framework that could be used to inform the appointment of individuals to head the various IGAD divisions. This makes heads of divisions within the Secretariat become political appointees. Different nationalities hold various offices as a subtle way of ensuring that member states own IGAD and its processes. However, there is no legal backing to the appointments and there are no clear terms of reference for these portfolios... (CSO interviewee 07, 2020).

In most cases CSIs have agreements and policies of rotational leadership and member states secondment in key sectors. It is in the lower cadres where the Secretariat might have a leeway to recruit based on qualification rather than citizenship to a specific country.

In relation to the EAC, the study through interviews established that the EAC lacked a binding legal document which may be used as a reference to ensure that member states abide by the Community's agreements. Interviewees at the strategic level indicated that the EAC Protocol on peace and Security established in 2013 was a legal instrument that embraced security from a non-traditionalist dimension but the protocol's effectiveness cannot be assessed because its framework is yet to be institutionalized and its ratification by the member states is low. They attributed this to sovereignty issues, lack of political commitment from partner states and resource constraints. An interviewee at EAC strategic level explained:

...member states have not fully ratified the EAC protocol on peace and security. This is because states may be politically uncomfortable to cede their sovereignty and individual security interests to a joint collective security arrangement. Although the EAC protocol is a good framework, the EAC lacks sufficient financial resources, adequate public participation and enough consensuses from member states for its ratification and hence the failure to operationalize the protocol ... (EAC strategic level interviewee, 01, 2020)

It was established through interviews that the EASF currently operates on a policy framework of the year 2004 and the MOU establishing EASBRIG signed in the year 2005. Interviewees at the EASF strategic level observed that these two documents have

a low legal threshold and make no legal declarations or provisions for modalities of ensuring that states pay annual contributions or contribute troops for deployment. These important commitments are largely left to depend on the political goodwill of member states.

It is evident from the analysis that the CSIs lack robust legal basis which can be used to compel member states to commit themselves to regional stabilization initiatives. Equally, there is no strong legal provision that can be invoked by IGAD, EAC and EASF to deploy forces or intervene in conflict without the consent of the host nation. Qualitative findings from the study showed that the present IGAD, EAC and EASF legal framework is not robust enough to commit member states to organizational goals including honouring of annual contributions, sharing of trans-boundary resources and measures to combat proliferation of SALWs, human trafficking and terrorism.

Findings of the study echo Byiers (2016) who avers that the lack of a robust legal basis for staff appointments is also manifest in the office of the IGAD Executive Secretary which is a political appointment. Even though the IGAD Assembly should be chaired on rotational basis, the CSI has no legal framework to compel states to hold ordinary summits in which the Chairmanship changes. Sudan supported the long duration of chairmanship arguing that Ethiopia was a neutral arbiter in the Sudan-South Sudan dispute. This political disagreement might have contributed to Eritrea's suspension of membership from the CSI in 2007.

Noting that CSIs in the subregion have not implemented tangible strategies to mitigate conflicts, Byiers (2016) observes that although frameworks for regional cooperation are in place, regional integration and conflict prevention has been poor. For instance, in IGAD, there are no effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to review

measures put in place and progress made by member states in preventing conflicts. The situation that holds is that a CSI is expected to build capacity for conflict prevention for member states (Tadesse, 2019). Further, Kidane (2018) argues that ensuring fairness and putting in place working legal frameworks will be pivotal in ensuring successes of RECS.

Findings of the study are in agreement with Manyolo (2017) who considers the East African Protocol on Peace and Security as an appreciation by subregion states that the scope of security expands beyond state to non-state actors and encompasses emerging global security challenges including terrorism, cattle rustling, cyber-crime, money laundering and refugee crisis. Manyolo (2017) acknowledges that the protocol lacked the necessary buy - in from politicians and the public (especially marginalized communities) and the necessary institutional framework for its implementation. The study adds that had Article 8 of the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security been fully functional, then the EAC would have been robust in stabilizing Burundi and South Sudan through a peace support mission (EAC Secretariat, 2013).

It is evident from the analysis that study findings conform to the neorealists school of thought who insist that matters relating to national security are the sole mandate of a sovereign state and therefore states would be unwilling to subject their security to an external functional entity should undertake the task. Study findings are in consonance with Byiers (2016) who observes that operating on two documents: the Policy Framework of the year 2004 and an MOU of the year 2005 makes the legal framework of EASF low and weak. Lack of a binding legal document leaves the EASF member countries with a low commitment to back the organization and subject to political interference by respective heads of states. Citing examples, Kasaija (2014) observes the

absence of a binding legal document makes EASF member states have low commitment to support the organization and member states may fail to meet their financial and troop/equipment pledges. For lack of a strong legal basis, honouring of pledged capability to the EASF becomes a political decision of member states contributing troops based on threat perception.

In addition, Robinson (2014) concurs that there is still no binding legal arrangement between Members States for force deployment Members States renew their MOUs on pledged forces annually. This is echoed by Elowson and Lins de Albuquerque (2017) who contend that one of the obstacles to the effective EASF's intervention in Burundi conflict was the weak legal framework asserting that the EASF policy framework had been structured on a non-binding MoU and thus, had less legal basis to compel members to contribute to EASF, or to enforce peace and security.

In comparison, to garner commitment to organizational goals by member states, Arthur (2017) mentions that ECOWAS has created a legal framework that commits respective member states' governments to abide by ECOWAS mechanisms aimed at fighting trans-boundary security threats including human trafficking. Additionally, ECOWAS has a functional partnership with civil society groups in order to cascade ECOWAS objectives to the grassroots. This has made ECOWAS successful in implementing its peace and security mandate. Eastern Africa subregion CSIs could borrow a leaf from this to improve on their peace and security programs.

The study has demonstrated that neorealism theory informs specific aspects of the functions of CSIs through determining member states behavior in decision making. Consideration of national interests was demonstrated during commitment to provide troops for peacekeeping, contributing membership dues, providing troops and

equipment, engaging in diplomacy and mediation, making timely decisions and showing commitment in CSIs agenda,

However, where neorealism proved unproductive such as reliance on national forces to address regional security threats, such as the case of Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006 and Kenya's incursion into Somalia in 2011, neoliberal institutionalism took precedence. After member states facing diplomatic hurdles, financial and resources overstretch they retreated to collective security mechanism in AMISOM. The same case was observed in South Sudan where the ruling SPLM/A and the opposition SPLM/SPLA-IO in-fights, brought wanton destruction of lives and livelihoods, destroyed national economy and injured the country's diplomatic standing in the region and the world at large. The parties agreed to the resumption of mediation under the umbrella of IGAD. As this research has indicated, this course produced positive outcomes where the parties committed themselves to implementation of current agreement.

In view of the reliance of CSIs on foreign funding, they are susceptible to foreign neoliberal institutionalist ideas and values which often make up the donor pre-conditions for funding. Such conditions are promotion of democracy, human rights and gender considerations among others. CSIs also receive technical support and expertise in their programming to integrate such values in donor supported projects. Therefore, neoliberal institutionalism is the most influential theoretical paradigm in the UN and AU (Karlsrud, 2017).

During mediation for South Sudan and Somalia, there were numerous experts from development partners to provide behind the scene technical support. Due to the diplomatic support that accompanies neoliberal institutionalism theory in the form of

globalization, its values are often accepted with limited critical evaluation. From the global war against terrorism to P/CVE and control of the proliferation of small arms; IGAD, EAC and EASF are strong partners within bilateral and multilateral development partners' frameworks.

Neoliberal institutionalism theory, however, is a general explanatory theory and it is rarely applied uniformly across different socio-economic and cultural contexts. Therefore, in the context of this study, constructivism theory was applied to explain the 'local turn', or context in the subregion. Constructivism theory is employed in understanding the unique security and CPMR context in the subregion. The CPMR application model in South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi are quite different. The peace building model applied in each case takes a different shape. The local clan structures in Somalia which operate like an indigenous parliament, takes center stage in major decision making rather than universal suffrage in legislative representation. In South Sudan, the neoliberal institutionalism values are applied in the context of military power structures and balance among ethnic based armed political parties. This is infused by regionalism in terms of ethnic groups' alliances, settlement and dispersal within the devolved units of the country. Alongside that pattern is control of strategic oil facilities such as oil and gas mainly in the Blue Nile and Upper Nile states. Therefore, CPMR in that country assumes a distinct dimension.

Considering the history of Burundi with ethnicized and militarized politics, the CPMR context took a different dimension. EAC was the leading CSI in mediation for peace in the country with support from the UN, development partners and regional CSIs. It emerged from the study that the work of the CSIs in achieving their peace and security mandates was hampered by financial instability and dependence on donor funds. This

may comprise ownership of the CSIs peace and security programmes as well as their effectiveness. Weak political commitment, perpetuated by ambivalent legal frameworks largely affected the performance of the CSIs in the conflict management and post conflict peacebuilding pillars in the conflict theatres. Yet, these two pillars require the financial muscle and political support of key actors in any conflict area.

4.8 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to analyse contemporary security threats, assess the extent to which IGAD, EAC and EASF have managed them. The chapter also intended to examine the contribution of CSIs in conflict resolution and assess structural and institutional challenges facing the CSIs in achieving their peace and security mandates. From the findings, it is evident that there is a myriad of security threats which have diverse drivers and affect the peace and stability of the subregion. Terrorism, struggle for political power related to electoral processes and social exclusion based on ethnicity/ religion constitute potential drivers of conflict in the subregion. It emerged from the findings that the three CSIs have shown commitment at managing the security threats at varying degrees and levels. This is manifested by the various levels of institutional development and mandates. Despite these efforts, the CSIs face financial handicaps and failure to implement policies especially those touching on sovereignty. This explains the dismal performance in management of shared natural resources and territorial and border conflicts.

Although IGAD has been the most active and experienced CSI in the subregion as demonstrated by its long engagement in Somalia and South Sudan peace processes, these two states continue to have longstanding and fragile peace. This implies that IGAD mediation efforts are yet to yield the ultimate desired outcome. Generally, all the

CSIs performed poorly in the post conflict peace building pillar and this was attributed to limited resource capacities, weak legal frameworks and sovereignty issues yet most of the identified threats which are mostly structural can thrive in societies with poor or no institutions. Post conflict peace building is a key pillar for maintaining and sustaining peace in post conflict societies. The study has clearly shown that the three CSIs have challenges in implementation of this pillar, and this could explain why South Sudan and Somalia have experienced relapse to conflict.

It emerged from the study that the work of the CSIs in achieving their peace and security mandates was hampered by financial instability and heavy dependence on donor funds. This may compromise ownership of the CSIs peace and security programmes as well as their effectiveness. Weak political commitment, perpetuated by ambivalent legal frameworks largely affected the performance of the CSIs in the conflict management and post conflict peacebuilding pillars in the conflict theatres. Yet, these two pillars require the financial muscle and political support of key actors in any conflict area.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a concise summary of the findings and highlights the salient features under the four objectives. The summary, conclusions and recommendations are based on the thematic discussion of results as per the objectives of the study.

5.1 Summary

5.1.1 Contemporary Security Threats in the Eastern Africa Subregion

The Eastern Africa subregion continues to face a multiplicity of security threats which hugely impact the region's development. These threats, as this research has established, range from terrorism, climate induced threats and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, to emerging cyber related threats.

An overwhelming majority of respondents (above 89.2%) identified terrorism as the leading contemporary security threat and was deemed as extensively impacting since it creates uncertainty and affects the ease of doing business in the subregion. Electoral-induced violence received a high prevalence rating of over 84.3% by respondents across the three studied institutions. The threat was attributed to weak electoral institutions and the fight for democratic space usually between the opposition and the ruling class. Proliferation of SALWs received an over 73.6% prevalence rating. The threat emanated from perceived socio-economic and political marginalization and was fuelled by the active presence of arms traffickers and local militia in the subregion.

It emerged from the study that territorial and border conflicts are closely linked to colonial legacies. Border insecurity has implications for influx of SALWs and poses a big challenge for IGAD, EAC and EASF.

Findings of the study revealed that conflicts over shared natural resources take social, political and economic dimensions, where the social aspect is manifested through ethnicity and clannism and the economic aspect is indicated by income inequality. The prevalence of this threat was attributed to inadequate implementation of policy frameworks on the best methods of sharing natural resources and influence of internal and external actors with vested interests as relates to exploitation of these resources.

The study findings reflect various manifestations of effects of environmental degradation and climate change affecting agricultural production and food security leading to massive displacement which may lead to conflict. In addition, deteriorating environmental conditions have resulted in land and water-based communal conflicts.

Ethnic and clan-based violence was attributed to real/imagined perceptions of marginalization and balkanization along ethnic groups, especially during allocation of political and economic resources and this leads to resentment and possible escalation of tensions into violent conflicts as is the case in Somalia and South Sudan.

The study established that cattle rustling is more prevalent in the EAC region and has morphed owing to its transnational nature and improved technology/weaponry. TOC, weak governance systems and corruption provide opportunities for the threat to thrive. The threat is connected to possible financial facilitation of terror activities and proliferation of SALWs.

It emerged that cybercrime was also more pronounced in the EAC region and is fueled by increased internet usage in e-government, e-banking and mobile money transfer. This threat was attributed to growing number of international criminal networks which take advantage of inadequate security practices and hack electronic systems associated with money transfers.

5.1.2 Management of Contemporary Security Threats in the Eastern Africa Subregion by IGAD, EAC and EASF

The study established that the three CSIs had undertaken measures to address the identified security threats in varying degrees and approaches. Over 50% of IGAD respondents observed that the CSI performed relatively well in management of terrorism, electoral induced violence, environmental degradation and climate change and ethnic and clan-based violence. This was explained by the presence of IGAD's established institutions, which include a counter-terrorism/counter-radicalization strategy in the Horn of Africa, an active mediation support unit and advocacy strategies for fair democratic practices. In addition, IGAD has Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, IGAD Disaster Risk Management Technical Advisory Committee (DRM TAC), IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) and IGAD Regional Climate Change Strategy (IRCCS). The last three institutions carry out capacity building to strengthen the IGAD early warning system. However, financial constraints and inadequate inclusivity in the CSI's counter-terrorism initiatives curtail the full implementation of counter terrorism efforts while sovereignty issues and limited capacities deter the CSI from compelling member states to uphold good electoral and governance practices.

From the study findings, it emerged that IGAD registered dismal performance in the management of proliferation of SALWs, resource-based conflicts and territorial and

border conflicts. The dismal performance in managing proliferation of SALWs was attributed to lack of an appropriate institutional infrastructure to tackle the threat and paucity of efforts in pursuing collaborative approaches in DDR initiatives. IGAD lacks adequate policies on water harvesting and conservation especially for pastoral communities in arid and semi-arid regions, most of whom engage in conflict over water and pastures. Even though IGAD has the Environment and Natural Resources Strategy, the CSI lacks a comprehensive legal framework on the management of shared natural resources.

Majority (over 65% of respondents) indicated that EAC registered relatively good performance in the management of terrorism, electoral-induced violence, proliferation of SALWs and environmental degradation. The EAC has created laws and policies that have enhanced detection of terrorists' cross-border movement and information sharing among member states. The Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) has enhanced capacity building in anti-terrorism training and works closely with the INTERPOL to address the threat of terrorism and SALWs. EAC had put in place programs on good governance and democracy to promote management of democratic and credible electoral processes in the subregion. However, inadequate human and material resources, lack of independence of security organs and poor border security controls have curtailed the CSI's efforts in managing these threats.

The EAC had dismal performance in management of resource-based conflicts, territorial and border conflicts and ethnic and clan-based conflicts. The CSI lacks a common framework for the management of trans-boundary and shared natural resources. Resource constraints hinder implementation of meaningful poverty reduction/eradication programmes at the grass root levels. In relation to territorial

border conflicts, EAC does not have a conflict resolution mechanism for member states' border disputes. In addition, conclusive demarcation and delimitation of inter-state borders has not been attained owing to lack of political commitment.

Findings of the study revealed that EASF performed relatively well in the management of terrorism, electoral induced violence, proliferation of SALWs, territorial and border conflicts and ethnic and clan-based conflicts. As regards terrorism, the CSI conducted periodical training for regional forces and carried out sensitization of the population against dangers of terrorism. EASF collaborated with other stakeholders in capacity building activities. However, suspicion, mistrust and rivalry among member states have undermined effective implementation of joint counter- terrorism programs. EASF had conducted security assessment surveys on elections, deployed election observer missions in the subregion and carried out capacity building on election monitoring and management. In addition, the EASF maritime cell had contributed towards capacity building to fight proliferation of SALW. Regarding territorial border conflicts, the CSI has conducted frequent consultative security meetings at border points.

However, lack of effective collaboration among key stakeholders, sovereignty issues and failure to operationalize the EASF Panel of Elders have hindered effective management of these threats. The EASF registered dismal performance in management of environmental degradation and climate related conflicts and conflicts over shared natural resources. This emanated from failure to implement environmental degradation protocols.

In summary, the three CSIs managed the following threats relatively well: terrorism, electoral- induced violence and proliferation of SALWs. Conversely, the CSIs poorly managed conflicts over shared natural resources and territorial as well as border

conflicts. Matters of sovereignty *vis a vis* the CSIs' mandates, the high levels of mistrust among member states and financial handicaps limit IGAD, EAC and EASF in coming up with a common security strategy and legally binding frameworks on management of contemporary security threats.

5.1.3 Contribution of CSIs to Conflict Resolution in Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi

It emerged from the study that IGAD, EAC and EASF performed differently in various pillars of CPMR (Conflict prevention, management and post conflict peace building). All CSIs performed relatively well in conflict early warning with IGAD's performance rated very well in handling Somalia (62.6%) and South Sudan (91.7%) conflicts. EASF made notable efforts in providing information about the Burundi and in Somalia conflicts. This was justified by the presence of a CEWARN situation room connected to the continental early warning system at the AU. In addition, the EASF provided early warnings in both the Somali and Burundi conflicts.

Majority of respondents (over 58.8%) of respondents observed that EAC fared relatively well in providing conflict early warning in Burundi and Somalia but performed dismally in early warning in South Sudan. This was because the EACWARN had not been operationalized due to inadequate resource capacity and poor strategies for collaboration with relevant stakeholders.

IGAD's good performance in early warning was attributed to the CSI's strengths in quick convening power through which the Secretariat is able to expediently mobilize member states to meet and react to conflicts. In addition, the IGAD's Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (RJMEC) regularly monitored the South

Sudan conflict and the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement by parties to the conflict, thus facilitating quick responses.

As regards conflict early response, there was a general marginal performance across board. Over 64.6% of respondents indicated that IGAD's early response in South Sudan and Somalia was average. EAC, however, registered dismal performance in conflict early response in South Sudan and Somalia as observed by over 58.8% of respondents. This was attributed to the CSI's poorly developed early warning capacity. EASF also registered average ratings in early response in Somalia and Burundi.

EASF performance in the conflict prevention and management pillar in Burundi and Somalia was generally dismal largely due to CSIs mandate limitations. Regarding conflict management, the CSI registered an overall below average performance mostly explained by mandate limitation, even though the main focus of the CSI is rapid deployment as per the Africa Standby Force guideline and the requirement to carry out humanitarian activities in conflict theatres as per the African Union Guideline on the Role of the ASF in Humanitarian Action and Natural Disaster Support (HANDS). The CSI however registered an average performance in conflict management in Somalia, explained by EASF deployment of military observers in Somalia and the participation of EASF member states' troops in AMISOM and UNMISS.

It is evident that IGAD performed relatively well in peace keeping and peace enforcement compared to other CSIs. However, there was notable dismal performance in the humanitarian intervention pillar across the three CSIs. This was attributed to lack of experience in monitoring humanitarian operations, financial challenges and sovereignty issues which hampered CSIs efforts in this CPMR pillar. For EASF, the below average performance was also attributed to lack of a policy framework that is in

line with the AU HANDS policy. IGAD performed better than the other CSIs in conflict prevention and this was explained by the well-established and functional IGAD CEWARN and the IGAD Mediation Support Unit.

In the post-conflict peace building pillar, apart from average performance in capacity building by IGAD (43.8%) in Somalia and (33.3%) in South Sudan, there was an overall below average performance by all CSIs in the other pillars (DDR, SSR, electoral and judicial reforms) as indicated by over 65% of respondents for IGAD, over 66.0% for EAC and over 70% for EASF. All the CSIs scored a below average performance in DDR, SSR, electoral reforms and judicial reforms pillars with the main challenge across board being limited funds, political sensitivities and mandate limitations. Notable efforts in the capacity building pillar were made by the EASF in Burundi and Somalia, and by IGAD in Somalia and Sudan as explained by trainings facilitated by the two institutions.

EASF general poor performance in the post-conflict peace building pillar in Burundi as indicated by majority of respondents (80%) and (over 60%) in Somalia (SSR, electoral and judicial reforms) was attributed to lack of HANDS policy, lack of political commitment, financial constraints and conflicting national and political interests.

In overall, however, IGAD's peace building initiatives, notably in DDR, judicial, electoral and security sector reforms were reported to be below par in both countries, and this was largely attributed to internal political sensitivities; poor multi stakeholder engagement, poor implementation strategies and inadequate inclusivity in programmes especially at the grass root level. Other challenges that have confronted the CSIs in CPMR efforts include poor institutional coordination; limited resources and member state national security sensitivities which limit post conflict peace building activities.

The EAC CPMR efforts are still not well anchored as demonstrated by an overall below average performance in the South Sudan conflict and in the Burundi 2015 political crisis. This is attributed to lack of a clear mandate and strategy on peace keeping and peace enforcement.

The below average performance for the EAC in conflict prevention, management and in post-conflict peace building was related to weak or lack of appropriate CPMR strategies, frameworks and mandates, lack of experience in conflict resolution, subregional political sensitivities and resource challenges. In addition, most EAC CPMR institutions were still in the nascent stage.

IGAD, EAC and EASF attempted to resolve conflicts in their respective areas of responsibility with varying levels of success. This could be related to the various levels of development of the CSI in terms of the CPMR activities and the level of threat perception in different conflict theatres, by member states. This hinges on the respective levels of development of CPMR initiatives and degree of threat perception by member states.

5.1.4 Structural and Institutional Challenges Facing CSIs in Conflict Resolution

The major structural and institutional challenges to IGAD, EAC and EASF conflict resolution efforts were overlapping mandates, inadequate political commitment, lack of regional hegemony, resource limitations, inadequate policy and legal frameworks and cumbersome bureaucracy.

Overlap in mandates occurred both in thematic and geographic domains impacting the CSIs in terms of competition over scarce resources and financial over stretch while duplicity of membership in multiple CSIs led to divided loyalties. Despite collaborative frameworks, implementation of conflict resolution strategies was hindered by inadequate member state political commitment, failure by partner states to (timely) honour remittances and lack of legal enforcement mechanisms on remittances compound the financial handicaps the CSIs face leading to over reliance on donor funds.

The Eastern Africa subregion does not have a de-facto lead nation to provide some unity of direction in implementation of policy actions and this hindered effective and efficient realization of stabilization mandates of the studied CSIs. Poor staffing, weak logistical capacity and lack of a comprehensive common peace and security policy in the subregion compromised efforts to mitigate against regional insecurity.

The pattern and trajectory of the CPMR and peace building paradigms of the three CSIs bear different elements of neorealism in terms of power distribution and control, neoliberal institutionalism in terms of institutional structures of governance and CPMR and constructivism in terms of the local or indigenous mediation pattern and power dynamics among competing political formations.

5.2 Conclusions

This study explored the performance and contribution of CSIs in mitigating security and conflict threats in the Eastern Africa subregion. From the elaborate analysis and evaluation, the study concludes that security threats in Eastern Africa are inextricably tied to state fragility both as a cause and outcome, as exemplified by the current situation in Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Ethiopia. Indeed, close to 50% of the countries in the subregion under study are at various levels of fragility. This fragility is linked to the rise of violent extremism and the attendant high levels of terrorism. State fragility further compounds the proliferation of SALWs which correlates to other criminalities including cattle rustling, ethnic/clan-based violence and resource-based conflicts; thus, heightening sub-regional instability. Consequently, the subregion cannot realize its full potential. This has implications for CSIs and stakeholders in the Eastern Africa subregion and may call for a multi-pronged mechanism that recognizes the interconnectivity of states and the security threats confronting them. This is a pointer that stabilization efforts ought to take cognizance of the range of available interventions in domains of security, development and diplomacy; all synchronized to deliver legitimate authorities in the fragile countries, creating conditions for a stable subregion.

From the study, evaluation of the management of contemporary security threats in Eastern Africa by IGAD, EAC and EASF reveals mixed outcomes. Individually or collectively, the subregion's CSIs record moderate positive impact in responding to threats of violent extremism as is the case of Somalia. However, the successes are undermined by an incoherent approach by the three CSIs marked by structural disconnect in managing contemporary security threats. A case in point is the ongoing

operation in Somalia where Ethiopia, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda have been engaged in counter-terrorism operations but are working under the AU and not as members of a regional CSI, as happens in West (ECOWAS) and Southern Africa (SADC). This incoherence has contributed to lack of a common framework for management of contemporary security threats in Eastern Africa.

Further, this study established that the duplicity of capabilities within IGAD, EAC and EASF does not necessarily provide advantage to the management of security threats. This is firstly attributed to lack of common frameworks for coordination, communication, cooperation and collaboration amongst critical pillars like conflict early warning. Secondly, there is no overarching mechanism established to oversight the performance of the three CSIs which undermines accountability.

It was evident from the study that each of the CSIs exhibited strengths and weaknesses in conflict resolution efforts. For instance, IGAD's efforts in conflict early warning in Somalia and South Sudan were rated higher than those of the other two CSIs which is indicative of a comparative advantage in having an established CEWARN. In spite of having the ability to mobilize member states faster, IGAD's conflict response through security interventions was ineffective and IGASOM is a case in point. However, IGAD's diplomatic approaches have been effective, while its development initiatives have been minimal.

The EAC's contribution to regional stability through diplomatic measures has resulted in mixed outcomes while its security and development interventions emerge as minimal. The EASF on its part has a weak structural and institutional construct which inhibits its freedom of action. This institutional challenge has been illustrated by its lack

of a political structure that would help generate the much needed political will to commit resources including peacekeepers to undertake the conflict resolution mandate.

On the overall, based on comparative analysis of the three CSIs, it is emergent that IGAD's performance in conflict prevention, management and resolution has ranked it high ahead of the pack. However, IGAD's potential in achieving regional stabilization remains largely unexploited due to mandate duplication and lacking structural coordination. It further emerged from the study that in implementing their respective mandates of stabilizing the Eastern Africa subregion, IGAD, EAC and EASF encounter complex regional dynamics ranging from high levels of fragility, wavering member state commitment to effects of climate change and influence of external actors which demand responsive institutions both at the national and multilateral levels.

These findings are buttressed by the study's theoretical foundation that rests on post-modern paradigms offering a critical lens through which the performance of the three CSIS has been analysed. From a constructivist perspective, the study has highlighted inter-state cooperation to achieve common security goals and interests, despite challenges of states' pursuit of power and maximizing their individual interests. The neoliberal approach has aided to underpin the commitment of the CSIs in the subregion's collective security amidst varied socio-economic, political and legal framework challenges.

The neorealist approach enabled the study to bring to the fore the limitations of CSIs in collective security where national interests override sub regional security cooperation goals. Thus, the three theories collectively offer snippets of insight in the understanding of regional security phenomenon in a wider and profound perspective.

Application of multiple theories in a specific study may be limited in exhaustively testing the reliability of each theory in explaining behavior of specific variables under study. However, the study has to a large extent demonstrated their explanatory significance to the findings and conclusions.

To keep pace with a rapidly transforming security environment, the study underscores that the stabilization of Eastern Africa demands CSI structures and institutional frameworks that have diplomatic, security and developmental constructs to holistically respond to the mutating threats and to provide diplomatic and developmental interventions that deliver legitimate authorities and assure sustainable peace and security. Additionally, improving CSIs' performance will be contingent upon regional states committing to providing commensurate resources, both human and financial, to strengthen the institutional frameworks of the CSIs. Evidence from other regions has shown that though CSIs encounter the reality of varied endowment of member states in terms of human and resource gaps, a more capable state within the CSI steps up to provide leadership and readiness to shoulder a heavier burden than the other member states. The examples of NATO, ECOWAS and SADC in providing leadership in their respective CSIs during severe crisis is well documented.

5.3 Recommendations

In a region where close to 50% of the countries rank high on the fragility index heavily impacting negatively on development, there is an urgent need for a structured institutional CSI framework that encompasses multidimensional approaches of diplomacy, security and development to effectively manage security threats and conflicts. The study thus makes the following recommendations towards the realization of a formidable, coherent and common approach to resolving security threats and achieving a pacified subregion.

First, there is need for a unified approach that focuses on peace and security designating one of the CSIs to lead in its delivery. Since IGAD performed comparatively well in both dimensions, the study proposes re-designation of IGAD as the lead CSI to prevaricate the notion of ‘silo’ operation and concentrate resources in one entity while fine tuning mandate and approach. This will not only optimize resources but also increase impact on the ground. In line with this, the study recommends that sub-regional states designate EAC to the regional economic integration function which has emerged as its area of strength. Eventually, EASF may remain primarily a military-heavy institution to provide the security intervention when required due to its status as a regional mechanism as opposed to the other two CSIs.

Secondly, the study recommends that IGAD’s structures be comprehensively re-evaluated to align with current and emerging threats to peace and security including Cyber and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats as well as climate change implications.

Thirdly, in line with the need for a regional hegemony, the study recommends that Kenya adopts a more assertive foreign policy approach; influenced towards strengthening a structured IGAD to respond more effectively to current and emerging regional threats to peace and security predicated on strong institutionalization, resourcing and leadership. Leadership in particular is a key determinant of successful CSIs and the Eastern Africa subregion needs a lead nation to galvanize states in times of crisis. Kenya’s pivotal and geostrategic location puts her in pole position to step in as a lead nation.

Lastly, this study adopted the terminology of stabilization which has been commonly used by the UN in most of the peace enforcement missions in Africa including those in

Mali, CAR, and DRC among others. However, it is apparent from the study that stabilization has not been defined in the UN doctrine. Consequently, the study recommends that stabilization as used and defined in this study be adopted as the standard definition due to its broad and profound coverage.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Research

A study could be conducted on the role of a reconfigured IGAD in responding to maritime threats arising from increasing competition for commercial ports and military bases in the Eastern Africa subregion.

A comparative study on IGAD and ECOWAS, for example, could unearth contextual and institutional factors that determine effectiveness and efficiency of CSIs' performance.

Climate change and its impact on regional and global stability continues to be an enduring discourse. However, CSIs' role in the management of this existential threat requires in-depth study in view of the linkages between conflicts and environmental degradation.

Further, research can also focus on the host state's socio-cultural, economic and political contexts and how they affect performance of CSIs.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Questionnaires for the CSIs (IGAD, EAC and EASF)

Dear Respondent,

I am PhD student at Kenyatta University undertaking a study on Collective Security Institutions (CSIs) and stabilization of the Eastern Africa sub region. Please proceed to complete this questionnaire after reading and consenting. The exercise should take about 20 to 30 minutes.

Purpose of the Study

To evaluate the effectiveness of Collective Security Institutions (CSIs), specifically IGAD, EAC and EASF in pursuit of regional stabilization in the Eastern Africa sub region. Information generated will be used to advise the CSIs.

Benefits

Participating in this study does not have direct benefits. However, your responses will ultimately inform on the CSIs performance in contributing to regional stability in the Eastern Africa sub region.

Risks and Confidentiality


There is minimal risk in participating in this study. We assure you that information provided will be kept confidential and no identifiers will link specific responses to you as an individual. A specific code will be used to enter and analyze data and information collected will be well stored.

Voluntary Participation

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may opt not to answer any question. There is no payment for participation in this study.

Robert Kiboth

Name of researcher



Signature of researcher

16th JUNE 2020

Date

Section A: Background Information

1. Gender

a) Male []

b) Female []

2. Age bracket

a) Below 30 yrs	[]	c) 41-50 years	[]
b) 31-40 years	[]	d) 51 years and above	[]

3. Education Level

a) University	[]	c) Secondary	[]
b) College	[]	d) Primary	[]

4. Specialization (specify) _____

5. Designation _____

6. Institution _____ Department

7. Work experience in IGAD/EAC/EASF

a) 1 year and below	[]	c) 6-10 years	[]
b) 2-5 years	[]	d) 11 years and above	[]

Section B: Contemporary Security Threats – IGAD/EAC/EASF

1. a. List the security threats that affect the Eastern Africa sub region. *(Please list your responses in order from the most to the least-occurring)*

Threat number

one.....

(i) What is the nature of the threat?

Social () Political () Cultural () Resource-driven/economic ()

(ii) Please give reason(s) for your answer in (i) above

.....

(iii) For how many years has the threat been looming?

.....

(iv) Mention the leading actors and their roles in fueling the threat

Actor:	Role
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(v) Mention the leading community actors and their roles in mitigating the threat

Actor:	Role
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(vi) What is the effect of the threat to peace and stability? Significant []
 Insignificant []

(vii) Please give reason(s) for your response in (vi) above

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Threat number

two.....

(i) What is the nature of the threat?

Social () Political () Cultural () Resource-driven/economic ()

(ii) Please give reason(s) for your answer in (i) above

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.....

(iii) For how many years has the threat been looming?

.....

(iv) Mention the leading actors and their roles in fueling the threat

Actor:	Role
•	
•	
•	

(v) Mention the leading community actors and their roles in mitigating the threat

Actor:	Role
•	
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(vi) What is the effect of the threat to peace and stability? Significant []
Insignificant []

(vii) Please give reason(s) for your response in (vi) above

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Threat number

three.....

(i) What is the nature of the threat?

Social () Political () Cultural () Resource-driven/economic ()

(ii) Please give reason(s) for your answer in (i) above

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(iii) For how many years has the threat been looming?

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(iv) Mention the leading actors and their roles in fueling the threat

Actor:	Role
•	
•	
•	

(v) Mention the leading community actors and their roles in mitigating the threat

Actor:	Role
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(vi) What is the effect of the threat to peace and stability? Significant []

Insignificant []

(vii) Please give reason(s) for your response in (vi) above

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Threat number

four.....

(i) What is the nature of the threat?

Social () Political () Cultural () Resource-driven/economic ()

(ii) Please give reason(s) for your answer in (i) above

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(iii) For how many years has the threat been looming?

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(iv) Mention the leading actors and their roles in fueling the threat

Actor:	Role
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(v) Mention the leading community actors and their roles in mitigating the threat

Actor:	Role
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(vi) What is the effect of the threat to peace and stability? Significant []
Insignificant []

(vii) Please give reason(s) for your response in (vi) above

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Threat number five.....

(i) What is the nature of the threat?

Social () Political () Cultural () Resource-driven/economic ()

(ii) Please give reason(s) for your answer in (i) above

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(iii) For how many years has the threat been looming?

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(iv) Mention the leading actors and their roles in fueling the threat

Actor:	Role
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(v) Mention the leading community actors and their roles in mitigating the threat

Actor:	Role
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•	

(vi) What is the effect of the threat to peace and stability? Significant []
 Insignificant []

(vii) Please give reason(s) for your response in (vi) above

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Threat number six.....

(i) What is the nature of the threat?

Social () Political () Cultural () Resource-driven/economic ()

(ii) Please give reason(s) for your answer in (i) above

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(iii) For how many years has the threat been looming?

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(iv) Mention the leading actors and their roles in fueling the threat

Actor:	Role
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(v) Mention the leading community actors and their roles in mitigating the threat

Actor:	Role
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(vi) What is the effect of the threat to peace and stability? Significant []

Insignificant []

(vii) Please give reason(s) for your response in (vi) above

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Threat number

seven.....

(i) What is the nature of the threat?

Social () Political () Cultural () Resource-driven/economic ()

(ii) Please give reason(s) for your answer in (i) above

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(iii) For how many years has the threat been looming?

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(iv) Mention the leading actors and their roles in fueling the threat

Actor:	Role
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(v) Mention the leading community actors and their roles in mitigating the threat

Actor:	Role
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•	

(vi) What is the effect of the threat to peace and stability? Significant []

Insignificant []

(vii) Please give reason(s) for your response in (vi) above

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Threat number

eight.....

(i) What is the nature of the threat?

Social () Political () Cultural () Resource-driven/economic ()

(ii) Please give reason(s) for your answer in (i) above

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(iii) For how many years has the threat been looming?

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(iv) Mention the leading actors and their roles in fueling the threat

Actor:	Role
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•	

(v) Mention the leading community actors and their roles in mitigating the threat

Actor:	Role
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•	

(vi) What is the effect of the threat to peace and stability? Significant []

Insignificant []

(vii) Please give reason(s) for your response in (vi) above

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Section C: Management of contemporary security threats

2. (b) This question examines the extent to which IGAD/EAC/EASF have addressed the prevalent security threats in the Eastern Africa sub region as identified in Question 1 (a). Below is a table that contains six columns. Please list the prevalent security concerns you identified. Secondly, proceed to rate (by ticking) the degree to which IGAD/EAC/EASF have addressed the security threat on a scale ranging from Excellent to Above Average, Average, Below Average and Poor. Thirdly, in the spaces below, please give an explanation as to why you have rated the response to the security concern as such. Lastly, what recommendations you would give to better IGAD/EAC/EASF's actions to the security concerns going forward.

Prevalent security concern	IGAD/EAC/EASF reactions to addressing the threat				
	Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Poor
1.					
Please give reasons for your response above:					

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Recommendations for improved reaction by **IGAD/EAC/EASF**

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	IGAD/EAC/EASF reactions to addressing the threat				
Prevalent security concern	Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Poor
2.					

Please give reasons for your response above:

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Recommendations for improved reaction by **IGAD/EAC/EASF**

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	IGAD/EAC/EASF reactions to addressing the threat				
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Prevalent security concern	Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Poor
6.					

Please give reasons for your response above:

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Recommendations for improved reaction by **IGAD/EAC/EASF**

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IGAD/EAC/EASF reactions to addressing the threat

Prevalent security concern	Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Poor
7.					

Please give reasons for your response above:

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Recommendations for improved reaction by **IGAD/EAC/EASF**

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IGAD/EAC/EASF reactions to addressing the threat

Prevalent security concern	Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Poor
8.					

Please give reasons for your response above:

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Recommendations for improved reaction by **IGAD/EAC/EASF**

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Section D: Contribution of IGAD/EAC/EASF to conflict resolution in Eastern Africa

3. Contribution of IGAD/EASF in conflict resolution – The Somalia Peace Process

The Eastern Africa sub region has faced a myriad of conflicts. One of IGAD/EASF’s objectives is to enhance peace and security. How do you rate the level of performance of IGAD/EASF in the following priority programs in resolving the Somalia conflict?

		Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Conflict prevention						
a	Conflict Early warning					
Please give reasons for your response above						
b.	Early response to conflict					
Please give reasons for your response above						

c.	Mediation efforts					
	(i) Local level					
Please give reasons for your response in (ii) above						
	(ii) National level					
Please give reasons for your response above						
	(iii) Regional level					
Please give reasons for your response in (ii) above						
2.	Conflict management					
a.	Peace Keeping					
Please give reasons for your response above						
b.	Peace Enforcement					
Please give reasons for your response in (a) above						

c	Humanitarian Intervention					
Please give reasons for your response above						
3. Post conflict peace building/reconstruction						
a.	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)					
Please give reasons for your response above						
b.	Capacity Building/Institutional Building					
Please give reasons for your response above						
c.	Security Sector Reforms (SSR)					
Please give reasons for your response above						

d.	Electoral Reforms					
Please give reasons for your response above						
e.	Judicial Reforms					
Please give reasons for your response above						

4. Contribution of EAC/ EASF to conflict resolution – The Burundi conflict

The Eastern Africa sub region has faced a myriad of conflicts. One of EAC/EASF's objectives is to enhance peace and security. How do you rate the level of performance of EAC/EASF in the following priority programs in resolving the Burundi conflict?

		Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Poor
1.Conflict Prevention						
a	Conflict Early warning					
Please give reasons for your response above						
b.	Early response to Conflict					
Please give reasons for your response above						

c.	Mediation Efforts					
	(i) Local level					
Please give reasons for your response above						
	(ii) National level					
Please give reasons for your response above						
	(iii) Regional level					
Please give reasons for your response above						
2.	Conflict management					
a.	Peace Keeping					
Please give reasons for your response above						
b.	Peace Enforcement					
Please give reasons for your response above						

c	Humanitarian Intervention					
Please give reasons for your response above						
3. Post - conflict peacebuilding/reconstruction						
a	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)					
Please give reasons for your response above						
b.	Capacity Building/Institutional Building					
Please give reasons for your response above						
c.	Security Sector Reforms (SSR)					
Please give reasons for your response above						
d.	Electoral Reforms					

Please give reasons for your response above					
e.	Judicial Reforms				
Please give reasons for your response above					

5. Contribution of IGAD/EAC to conflict resolution – The South Sudan peace process

The Eastern Africa sub region has faced a myriad of conflicts. One of IGAD/EAC’s objectives is to enhance peace and security. How do you rate the level of performance of IGAD/EAC in the following priority programs in resolving the South Sudan conflict?

		Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Conflict prevention						
a.	Conflict Early warning					
Please give reasons for your response above						
b.	Early response to conflict					
Please give reasons for your response above						
c.	Mediation efforts					

	(i) Local level					
Please give reasons for your response above						
	(ii) National level					
Please give reasons for your response above						
	(iii) Regional level					
Please give reasons for your response above						
2.	Conflict management					
a.	Peace Keeping					
Please give reasons for your response above						
b.	Peace Enforcement					
Please give reasons for your response above						

c	Humanitarian Intervention					
Please give reasons for your response above						
<p>3. Post conflict peace building/reconstruction</p>						
a	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)					
Please give reasons for your response above						
b.	Capacity Building/Institutional Building					
Please give reasons for your response above						
c.	Security Sector Reforms (SSR)					
Please give reasons for your response above						

d.	Electoral Reforms					
Please give reasons for your response above						
e.	Judicial Reforms					
Please give reasons for your response above						

Section E: Challenges facing IGAD/ EAC/EASF in pursuit of conflict resolution in the Eastern Africa sub region.

6. List the challenges that IGAD/EAC/EASF face in pursuit of conflict resolution initiatives in the Eastern Africa sub region.

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.
- f.
- g.

7. Briefly explain how each of the identified factors limits the effectiveness and efficiency of IGAD/EAC/ EASF in pursuit of conflict resolution in the Eastern Africa sub region.

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8. Explain how IGAD/EAC /EASF can address each of the identified challenge(s) in 2 above.

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9. Structural factors affecting IGAD/EAC/ EASF in pursuit of conflict resolution in the Eastern Africa sub region

Indicate using a check mark (✓) whether you strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements regarding the extent to which these factors relate to conflict resolution in Eastern Africa.

(Key: SA: Strongly Agree; A: Agree; UD: Undecided; D: Disagree, SD Strongly Disagree)

Serial No	Factors	SA	A	UD	D	SD
a.	Duplicated membership by IGAD/EAC/EASF member states into other regional communities affects their conflict resolution efforts					
b.	Overlapping mandates lead to duplication of roles and this hinders effective conflict resolution.					
c.	There is lack of adequate political commitment by IGAD/EAC/EASF member states for conflict					

	resolution efforts in the East African region					
d.	IGAD/EAC/EASF faces financial handicaps.					
e.	IGAD/EAC/EASF's regional conflict resolution efforts are hindered by absence of a regional hegemony					
f.	Human resource limitations affect IGAD/EAC/ EASF's conflict resolution initiatives in the Eastern Africa sub region.					
g.	Regional collective security institutions in Eastern Africa have not been able to develop a sound strategic approach to regional stabilization to raise own funds or attract more funding.					
h.	Commitment and contributions of member states towards the activities of the IGAD/EAC/EASF depend on the threat perception of the situation and interests of individual nations					
i.	Sovereignty issues by individual member states of IGAD/EAC/EASF affect the achievement of common conflict resolution initiatives					
m.	IGAD/EAC/EASF is limited in terms of staff and modern equipment and this hinders effective achievement of conflict resolution initiatives					
n.	Wrangling, suspicion, rivalry and inter- state tensions among member states compromises the effectiveness of IGAD/EAC/EASF in achieving regional stability in the Eastern Africa sub region					

o.	States view collective security as a secondary concern as opposed to individual state security which is deemed more important					
p.	Financial funding of security institutions in East Africa is mainly dependent on donor states					
q.	IGAD/EAC/EASF has a weak Secretariat due to political manipulation and poor recruitment policies					

10. Institutional factors affecting IGAD/EAC/EASF in pursuit of conflict resolution

Indicate using a check mark (✓) whether you agree, strongly agree, undecided, disagree or strongly disagree with various institutional factors regarding IGAD in its mandate of regional stabilization.

(Key: SA: Strongly Agree; A: Agree; UD: Undecided; D: Disagree, SD Strongly Disagree)

NO.	Factors	SA	A	UD	D	SD
a.	Ambiguous treaties and protocols have hindered achievement of the IGAD/EAC/EASF mandate					
b.	There is lack of a clear legal framework to guide the pursuit of regional conflict resolution by IGAD/EAC /EASF					
c.	The bureaucratic structure and organization of IGAD/ EAC/EASF bars it from effective decision making					
d.	IGAD/EAC/EASF lacks a comprehensive defence policy on peace and security to mitigate regional insecurity					
e.	Absence of strong legal framework is a key barrier to achieving IGAD/EAC/EASF objectives.					
f.	Lack of effective border management frameworks in the subregion leads to border porosity and affects conflict resolution efforts					

Appendix B: Interview Schedule for CSIs (IGAD, EAC, EASF)

1.
 - a. What are the major contemporary security challenges facing the Eastern Africa sub region?
 - b. To what extent has IGAD, EAC, EASF addressed the contemporary security challenges in the Eastern African Sub region? (Interventions that IGAD, EAC, EASF has put in place to handle the identified contemporary security threats)
2. What are the major triggers of security threats/conflicts in the Eastern Africa sub region and how has IGAD, EAC, EASF addressed them to bring peace and stability?
3. Explain the extent of success and failure of IGAD, EAC, and EASF's interventions in the following conflicts in the Eastern Africa sub region:
 - a. South Sudan peace process.
 - b. Somalia
 - c. Burundi
4. What are indicators of full operational capability and how does the presence or lack of it affect the EASF in pursuit of its peace and stabilization mandate in the Eastern Africa sub region?
5.
 - a. Briefly highlight the institutional and structural challenges IGAD, EAC and EASF face in pursuit of peace and stability mandate in Eastern Africa sub region (The CSIs' mandates, policies, legal framework, decision making processes)
 - b. How can the institutional and structural challenges be remedied?
6. What are the barriers that have hindered IGAD, EAC, EASF from fully achieving their peace and security mandate?
7. Borrowing from best practices in ECOWAS, SADC and NATO, highlight what different mechanisms would be put in place if IGAD, EAC, EASF were to be effective and efficient in pursuit of regional peace and stability in the Eastern Africa sub region.
8. How can IGAD, EAC, EASF extricate themselves from donor dependency?
9. In what ways does external influence from other interested states affect the success or failure of IGAD, EAC and EASF?


Appendix C: Interview Schedule for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) – IGAD (Somalia and South Sudan), EAC (South Sudan and Burundi) and EASF (Somalia and Burundi)

I am PhD student at Kenyatta University undertaking a study on Collective Security Institutions (CSIs) and stabilization of the Eastern Africa sub region. The CSIs under study are Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East Africa Community (EAC) and Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and the states under focus are Eastern Africa states, specifically South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi. I am glad that you have been selected to take part in a voluntary interview which will take about one hour. Your responses will be used for research purposes only and your identity kept confidential and anonymous. You are kindly requested to participate in this interview.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Robert Kariuki Kibochi,

Kenyatta University.

Date 16th June, 2020
Signature..... 

1. a. What are the contemporary security threats that affect this state/province/country/region?
 - b. Explain the various measures put in place by IGAD/EAC/EASF to manage the identified contemporary security threats.
 - c. In your view, were the measures effective? If yes / no, give reasons.
2. a. What interventions / measures has IGAD/EAC/EASF put in place to address the conflict in this state/province/country/ region in terms of:
 - i. Conflict prevention and management (early warning, early response, mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention).
 - ii. Post conflict peace building (DDR, SSR, judicial reforms, electoral reforms).
- b. Were the interventions successful or not successful? Give reasons.
3. What are the structural and institutional factors that affect IGAD/EAC/EASF CPMR initiatives in addressing the conflict in this state/ province/country/ region? (probes: funding, mandates, legal issues, human resources etc)


Appendix D: Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Interview Guide for CSIs in South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi

I am PhD student at Kenyatta University undertaking a study on Collective Security Institutions (CSIs) and stabilization of the Eastern Africa sub region. The CSIs under study are Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East Africa Community (EAC) and Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and the states under focus are Eastern Africa states, specifically South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi. I am glad that you have been selected to take part in a voluntary Focus Group Discussion (FGD) which will take about one and a half hours. Your responses will be used for research purposes only and your identity kept confidential and anonymous. You are kindly requested to participate in this interview.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Robert Kariuki Kibochi,

Kenyatta University.

Date 16th June, 2020
Signature..... 

Date and Time	
Venue	
Name of Interviewer	

Part I: Demographic information of participants

S/NO	Name	Age	Gender	Marital status	Education level	Occupation
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						

PART II: CSIs and conflict resolution in the Eastern Africa subregion

1. What are the security threats that affect this region and who in the community is most affected by the threat (s)?
2. Who are the main actors involved in fueling the security threats in this area? (Probes: why, how, what is the contention about?)
3. What mechanisms have been put in place by IGAD/EAC/EASF to manage the identified security threats? (Probes: effectiveness, sustainability, appropriateness, implementation, impact.... of initiatives, protocols, interventions etc).
4. a. What interventions / measures has IGAD/EAC/EASF put in place to address the conflict in this state/ province/ region in terms of:
 - i. Conflict prevention and management (early warning, early response, mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention).
 - ii. Post conflict peace building (DDR, SSR, judicial reforms, electoral reforms).
- b. Were the interventions successful or not successful? (Probe: positive effect or not, why, give reasons)
5. Why do you think the initiatives by IGAD/EAC/EASF in 4 above were effective / ineffective in addressing the conflict in this state/province/region?
6. What are the factors that have affected IGAD/EAC/EASF initiatives in addressing the conflict in this state? (probes: structural and institutional).
7. What measures do you think IGAD/EAC/EASF should put in place to adequately address the conflict?
8. What can other stakeholders do to enhance IGAD/EAC/EASF initiatives in addressing conflict in this state/province/region?
9. Overall, how would you gauge IGAD/EAC/EASF efforts in managing the South Sudan/Somalia/ Burundi conflict?

Appendix E: Cross Tabulation Output -Threats' Identification by CSIs

Threat	Institution		Total	
	EAC	EASF	IGAD	
Terrorism	34 (27.4%)	48 (38.7%)	42 (33.9%)	124
Pandemics	20 (68.9%)	9 (31.0%)	0 (0.0%)	29
Electoral- induced violence	28 (23.5%)	49 (41.2%)	42 (35.3%)	119
Youth bulge and unemployment	8 (12.3%)	34 (52.3%)	23 (35.4%)	65
Proliferation of small arms and light weapons	26 (25.0%)	47 (45.2%)	31 (29.8%)	104
Territorial and border conflicts	10 (12.9%)	36 (46.8%)	31 (40.3%)	77
Ethnic and clan- based conflicts	8 (13.8%)	32 (55.2%)	18 (31.0%)	58
Piracy	4 (12.1%)	18 (54.6%)	11 (33.3%)	33
Maritime disputes	2 (6.3%)	18 (56.2%)	12 (37.5%)	32
Food insecurity	6 (18.8%)	12 (37.5%)	14 (43.8%)	32
Environmental degradation and climate change	12 (19.1%)	28 (44.4%)	23 (36.5%)	63
Transnational organized crime	18 (62.1%)	8 (27.6%)	3 (10.3%)	29
Resource-based conflicts	22 (28.2%)	28 (35.9%)	28 (35.9%)	78
Cybercrime	18 (72.0%)	3 (12.0%)	4 (16.0%)	25
Cattle rustling	20 (48.8%)	14 (34.2%)	7 (17.1%)	41
Refugees crisis	2 (20.0%)	5 (50.0%)	3 (30.0%)	10

$\chi^2 = 4.086, P= 0.253$

Appendix F: Thematic representation of IGAD pillars and programmes

Thematic Representation of IGAD Pillars and Programmes in the Implementation Plan, 2016-2020

Pillar 1: Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment

Programmes: Agriculture/Livestock and Food Security, Natural Resources Management, Environment Protection, Climate Variability and Change and Disaster Risk Management, Applied Research and CSO Support.

Pillar 2: Economic Cooperation and Integration and Social Development

Programmes: Trade, Investment, Industry and Tourism Development Program Area, Infrastructure Development, Health and Social Development to include Health, Migration, Education, Youth Affairs and Sports).

Pillar 3: Peace and Security

Programmes: Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR), Transnational Security Threats, Governance, Democracy and Rule of Law and Human Rights

Pillar 4: Corporate Development Services

Programmes: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building, Research, Science and Technology.

Source: IGAD Regional Strategy Volume 2 Implementation Plan 2016-2020

Appendix G: IGAD's Estimated Expenditure in US dollars: 2016-2020

Overall Goal							
	Programme Area	Programmes	Projects	Available	To be mobilized	Total	Percent available
Pillar 1	5	16	55	27,361,644	128,648,409	156,010,053	18%
Pillar 2	3	14	53	9,412,500	87,019,000	96,431,500	10%
Pillar 3	3	6	21	40,000,000	68,804,000	108,804,000	37%
Pillar 4	2	5	23	38,983,000	1,700,000	40,683,000	96%
Total	13	41	152	115,757,144	286,171,409	401,928,553	29%

Source: IGAD Regional Strategy Volume 2, Implementation Plan 2016 – 2020.

Appendix H: Summary of EASF Financial Status for FY 2019/2020

EASF Financial Status						
Member States	New Ratio	Arrears as at Dec 2018	Arrears Prior to Cessation	2019 Assessed Contributions	Remittance	Expected Contributions In 2019
	%	USD	USD	USD	USD	USD
Burundi	4.62	472,187.29		207,389.89	522,089.88	157,487.30
Comoros	3.07	257,518.64		137,811.03		395,329.67
Djibouti	4.62	387,561.19		207,389.89	193,744.39	401,206.69
Ethiopia	18.00	45.00		808,012.55	808,012.55	45.00
Kenya	19.00	25.06		852,902.14	-	852,927.20
Rwanda	9.29	74.62		417,024.25	-	417,098.87
Seychelles	4.12	-		184,945.09	184,945.09	-
Somalia	4.00	623,643.69		179,558.34	-	803,202.03
Sudan	19.00	296,630.03	2,958,062.90	852,902.14	245,710.03	903,822.14
Uganda	14.29	25.39		641,472.18	641,377.57	120.00
TOTAL	100	4,995,773.81	2,958,062.90	4,489,407.50	2,595,879.51	3,931,238.90

Source: EASF Financial Report, 2019/2020.

Appendix I: EASF Budget Summary 2020

Source of funding	Amount USD	Percentage
Member States	497,000.00	15.88
Peace Fund	200,000.00	6.39
APSA IV	1,081,000.00	34.55
Friends of EASF (FOE)	1,350,500.00	43.17
Totals	3,128,500.00	

Source: EASF Financial Report, 2019/2020.

Appendix J: Reliability Coefficient Output for Questionnaires

IGAD

Reliability statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.774	.844	27

Respondent (15 -23)

EAC

Reliability statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.850	.855	39

Respondent (11 -20)






EASF

Reliability statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.800	.623	44

Respondent (11 -20)

Appendix K : Research Authorization Permit

 REPUBLIC OF KENYA	 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
Ref No: 208037	Date of Issue: 14/August/2019
RESEARCH LICENSE	
	
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