

**EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSTITUENCY BURSARY COMMITTEES
IN PROMOTING ACCESS AND RETENTION IN SECONDARY
EDUCATION: A CASE OF NAIROBI AND MACHAKOS COUNTIES**

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to all my teachers from pre-school to university for their selfless guidance

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB	- Asian Development Bank
BOG	- Board of Governors
CBC	- Constituency Bursary Committees
CBO	- Community Based Organization
CDC	- Constituency Development Committee
CDF	- Constituency Development Fund
DC	- District Commissioner
DEB	- District Education Board
DEO	- District Education Officer
FPE	- Free Primary Education
GER	- Gross Enrolment Rate
GNP	- Gross National Product
GOK	- Government of Kenya
IIEP	- International Institute of Educational Planning
KNUT	- Kenya National Union of Teachers
LATF	- Local Authority Transfer Fund
MoE	- Ministry of Education
MP	- Member of Parliament
NGO	- Non Governmental Organization
PBA	- Programme Based Approach
PRSP	- Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

PTA	- Parents-Teachers Association
SMB	- School Management Board
TSC	- Teachers Service Commission
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	- United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization
USA	- United States of America

ABSTRACT

The Kenyan government transferred the management of the secondary education bursary fund from Head teachers and School's Boards of Governors to the newly created Constituency Bursary Committees (CBCs) in the 2003/2004 financial year in line with its policy of decentralization. It is a tenet of decentralization that it leads to enhanced efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, accountability and local participation in service delivery. However, some educational stakeholders have criticized the new system of disbursing bursaries as inefficient and ineffective and have numerously called on the government to re-examine it. It is against this background that this study was conceived and executed with a view to: capturing the perceptions of stakeholders with regard to the new secondary education bursary disbursement procedure, determining the effectiveness and equitability of the CBCs in bursary disbursement, and mapping the challenges facing the CBCs. This study adopted an exploratory approach using a descriptive survey design. The study locations were Nairobi County and Machakos County. The target population included members of the CBC, Secondary schools Head teachers, BoG chairpersons, PTA chair persons, elected Councillors, Parents, Students, Religious leaders, KNUT officials and DEOs. Data was collected through questionnaires and interview schedules. The study established that the CBCs were rated lowly by the stakeholders. In a five point likert scale (1 low, 5 high), the CBCs scooped very low scores on a number of key variables namely: efficiency (2.48), transparency (2.36), accountability (2.34), representation of local community (2.40), competence (2.19), and fairness (2.50). The study established that the majority of the stakeholders, especially Parents, BoG members, PTA members, Head teachers and KNUT Officials, would prefer that the Secondary Education Bursary Scheme be managed at the school level. The study further established that the decentralized bursary scheme was inefficient with regard to timeliness in making bursary awards for it took more than two months for 50% of the applicants to get their bursary. It also emerged that the bursary had a limited reach as only 21.9% of the applicants in the 13 constituencies received bursaries over a three year period. Indeed, some constituencies had a reach averaging around 10% over the three year period meaning many of the applicants were unsuccessful. According to the head teachers, some 4302 very needy students were locked out of the bursary and some 65 students dropped out of school due to lack of school fees. The study also tested some five hypotheses using ANOVA and established that the bursary was equitable with regard to gender(p-value 0.474), type of school attended(p-value 0.068), type of family set up(p-value 0.000), family income(p-value 0.000), and region of residence-urban or rural(p-value 0.013). The CBCs faced a number of challenges e.g., political interference by MPs, limited funds against a high number of bursary applicants, delayed release of funds by the MoE, and lack of capacity. In order to improve the effectiveness of the CBCs, the recommends that: MPs should cease being the patrons of the CBCs so as to curb their influence, government should increase bursary allocation in order to benefit more students, government should stick to a schedule for releasing the bursary as this would enable CBCs to plan, and that teachers should be more involved in the screening bursary applicants at school level.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.12 Background to the Study

Since time immemorial, humankind has always placed a high premium on education due to its positive impact on both the individual as well as the society. However, it was not until the early 1960s that education came to be formally recognized as one of the key ingredients to economic growth as well as the overall development process. This followed pioneering studies which confirmed that education was the key catalyst in the growth of the economy of USA (Schultz, 1961; Denison, 1962). Since then, education has come to be regarded as an investment rather than as consumption in that it equips people with skills which enhance their productivity (Rogers & Ruchlin, 1971). The skills acquired from education makes one a 'human capital' which plays a vital role in manipulating the traditional factors of production so as to yield positive results in the production of goods and services (Blaug 1976, Psacharopolous & Woodhall, 1985). Studies have shown that investment in education yields both private (accruing to the individual) and social (accruing to the society) returns (Psacharopolous, 1980; Psacharopolous & Woodhall, 1985).

Investment in education is usually a joint undertaking between the state and the individuals in many countries. Governments invest in the education of their citizens due to the social benefits (externalities) accruing from education as well

as to mitigate market imperfections, which would lock the poor out of the education system (Johns, *et al*, 1983; Psacharopolous & Woodhall, 1985; World Bank, 1995). In Kenya, the government is involved in the provision of education from the basic to higher levels.

The Kenyan government, however, has been unable to shoulder the total burden of financing education due to constraints in public finance. Between 1980 and 2002, the Kenyan economy performed below its potential and it was characterized by low economic and employment growth as well as a decline in productivity (GoK, 2003a). Consequently, in a bid to supplement public educational finance, the cost-sharing policy in education was officially sanctioned through Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1988 on Education and Manpower Training for the Next Decade and Beyond (GoK, 1988). Under the cost-sharing policy, the government's role in education was reduced to the provision of teachers and administrative staff while parents and beneficiaries of education were supposed to cater for other recurrent and capital expenditure by paying fees. It should be noted, though, that even before cost sharing in education was officially sanctioned in Kenya in 1988, parents used to make direct financial contributions to the cost of their children's education.

One major draw back of the cost-sharing policy in education is that those who cannot afford to pay the various user charges are locked out of school. This has had grave implications with regard to access to education considering that 56

percent of Kenyans were living below the poverty line by 2003 (GoK, 2003a). Kenya's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which has the twin objectives of economic growth and poverty reduction, identifies lack of access to basic social services, particularly education and health, as major hindrances to poverty reduction (GoK, 2001). Owing to the critical role played by education in an individual's upward mobility, Kenya's PRSP states that the government places high priority in the medium and long term in ensuring affordable and equitable access to education. At the primary school level, the Kenya government re-introduced the Free Primary Education (FPE) programme in 2003 (GoK & UNESCO, 2004). This move saw the pupil population of public primary schools in the country shoot from 5.9 to 7.5 million in 2003, an indication that school fees had locked many potential pupils out of school.

The secondary school sub-sector in Kenya consists of about 4,000 public and 500 private secondary schools with a total student population of about 850,000 (GoK, 2005b; 2005b). Unfortunately, cost-sharing has seriously impacted on enrolment in the secondary school sub-sector in Kenya. For example, in 2007, about 60,000 students who had been admitted to public secondary schools failed to report because their parents and guardians could not afford the fees, according to the then director of higher education at the Ministry of Education, Mr. Siele (Daily Nation, 28th June 2007). Statistics show that, between 1990 and 2000, transition rate from primary to secondary remained low with a peak of only 46 percent (GoK, 2001). According to the Education Sector Strategic Plan, 2003-2007,

secondary school enrolment rate declined from 29.4 percent in 1990 to 22.2 percent in 2002 while completion rates stood at 79 percent (GoK, 2003c). As a result, based on 1999 census data, about 2.8 million boys and girls aged between 14 and 17 years who should have been in secondary schools were not enrolled by 2003 (GoK, 2005a). This poor enrolment was mainly attributed to the growing household poverty and the high cost of schooling at this level. In its Education Sector Strategic Plan, 2003-2007, the Kenyan government had set the objective of raising the GER for secondary schools from 22.2 percent to 45 percent by 2007 (GoK, 2003b). Similarly, the transition rate from primary to secondary was to be enhanced from 47 percent to 70 percent over the plan period. The transition rate is improving as it stood at 57 percent in 2005 and 59.3 percent in 2007 (MOE, 2007).

As a result of the above enumerated challenges facing secondary education, the Kenyan government has over the years instituted a number of measures aimed at promoting access and retention. One such measure was the issuance of the fees guidelines for public secondary schools which put a ceiling on the school fees that could be charged by the different categories of schools. According to these guidelines, National Secondary Schools were expected to be the most expensive charging students Kenya shillings 28,900 per year. They were followed by Provincial Secondary Boarding schools whose ceiling was set at Kenya shillings 22,900 while District Secondary Day schools were to charge a maximum of Kenya shillings 10,500. These guidelines were meant to check against school

administrations' charging unreasonably high fees. However, the above fees guidelines were flouted in many schools over the years and some National Schools charged students as much as Kenya shillings 50,000 per year, which was almost double the amount recommended by the government. Many schools managed to evade the fees guidelines by introducing new vote heads like 'motivation fees' for teachers and 'PTA fees' for running PTA activities without the blessings of the Ministry of Education as head teachers repeatedly argued that the government set fees guidelines were unrealistic and insufficient for the smooth running of schools. The chairman of the Kenya Secondary School Heads Association observed, during the secondary schools head teachers' annual conference held in Nairobi in June 2007, that head teachers flouted the Ministry of Education fees guidelines as they were neither consulted nor their input sought during their formulation (Daily Nation 28th June 2007:4). In an attempt to reach a mutually agreeable secondary school fees guidelines, the government invited the teachers to participate in the drawing of revised fees guidelines during the head teachers' annual conference in June 2007. However, it is worth noting that even if schools were to adhere to the 2002 government issued fees guidelines, the amounts were still high for most parents bearing in mind that about 56 percent of the Kenyan population was living below the poverty line in 2003. Consequently, the Kenyan government launched another initiative to boost enrolment in secondary education. Indeed, at the beginning of the 2008 academic year, it committed itself to offer Free Day Secondary Education (GoK, 2008). Towards

this end, the government would pay Kenya shillings 10,265 for every public secondary school student implying that those students in day secondary schools would learn for free. However, students in boarding secondary schools would be required to pay fees amounting to Kshs. 18,627 for boarding expenses. The government issued a Circular in 2008 which adjusted the minimum bursary allocation per student from Kenya shillings 5,000 to Kenya shillings 8,000 and which also barred day scholars from receiving the bursary (GoK, 2008). The move to offer Free Day Secondary education was also in line with the School Fee Abolition Initiative (SFAI) that was launched by the United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank in 2005 as an instrument to ensure that existing Education for All (EFA) commitments were met (World Bank, 2009).

The provision of a government funded bursary scheme for poor students is also another measure that has been taken to enhance the participation of students from poor socio-economic backgrounds in secondary education (GoK, 2005a; 2005b). The secondary education bursary scheme was introduced in the 1993/1994 financial year as a safety-net to cushion the poor and vulnerable groups against the adverse effects of cost-sharing in education. When it started, the government allocated Kenya shillings 25 millions per year up to the 1999/2000 financial year. Thereafter, it is note worthy that the amount of money allocated to the bursary kitty has grown exponentially as shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Government's Bursary Allocation from 2000/2001 to 2011/2012

Financial Year	Amount Allocated (Kshs.)
2000/2001	536,000,000
2001/2002	536,000,000
2002/2003	548,000,000
2003/2004	770,000,000
2004/2005	770,000,000
2005/2006	800,000,000
2006/2007	800,000,000
2007/2008	600,000,000
2008/2009	500,000,000
2009/2010	500,000,000
2010/2011	500,000,000
2011/2012	940,000,000

Source: MoE, Nairobi

Table 1.1 clearly shows that the amount of money allocated to secondary education bursary scheme jumped from Kenya shillings 25 millions in 1999/2000 financial year to Kenya shillings 536 millions in 2000/2001 financial year. In the 2011/2012 financial year, the government bursary allocation stands at Kenya shillings 940 millions, representing a growth of 3,760 percent in eleven years, a clear reflection of the government's commitment to helping the needy to access secondary education.

From its inception up to 2003, the secondary education bursary was disbursed directly to all public secondary schools in the country taking into consideration the school population. Head teachers and the Boards of Governors were charged with the task of identifying the needy students and allocating them the bursary. This, however, changed from 2003/2004 financial year when the management of the bursary funds was transferred from the schools to the newly created entity known as the Constituency Bursary Committee (CBC) in line with the government's policy on decentralization and empowerment of communities as enunciated in various policy documents (GoK, 2003d; GoK, 2005a; GoK, 2005c). There were also concerns that the school authorities were not the best placed to identify needy students. Concerns had also been raised about lack of transparency and accountability at the school level with regard to administration of the bursary (Njeru & Orodho, 2003).

Under the new system, the amount of money allocated to each constituency is based on: the number of students from the constituency enrolled in secondary schools in Kenya, the national secondary school enrolment, the district poverty index and the national poverty index (GoK, 2005c). The formula used to allocate the bursary is thus:

$$\text{Constituency Bursary Poverty Index} = \text{Amount Allocated} \times \frac{\text{Constituency Enrolment}}{\text{National Enrolment}} \times \frac{\text{District Poverty Index}}{\text{National Poverty Index}}$$

The District Education Officers are given the mandate of constituting the Constituency Bursary Committee (CBC) with the advice of the District Education Board. The CBC, which has a maximum of 16 members, is composed as follows: Area Member of Parliament (Patron), Area Education Officer (Secretary), three representatives of religious organizations, two chairpersons of PTAs of two secondary schools, one chairperson of Board of Governors, one councillor, one District Officer, one representative of an Education based NGO or CBO, one local KNUT representative and three co-opted members to include two head teachers, one of whom must be from a girls secondary school.

The CBC is charged with the following responsibilities:

- I. Issue and receive bursary application forms
- II. Vet and consider bursary applications using the established criteria
- III. Verify and ensure that all bursary cheques are dispatched to the schools
- IV. Prepare and submit reports on the constituency Bursary Scheme to the permanent Secretary, MOE.

In Kenya, various policy documents express the desire to decentralize a number of educational functions but most of them fall short on specifying the details (GoK, 2001; GoK, 2003b; GoK, 2005a; GoK, 2005b). The move to decentralize some aspects of public service is geared towards increasing efficiency as well as increasing transparency and accountability. The *Education Sector Strategic Plan*,

2003-2007 states that the government envisages a broad based participation in the provision of education services with stakeholders taking responsibility for planning and implementation (GoK, 2003b). The same document further states that, following decentralization, local level structures at the district and institutional level will be vested with authority for decision making and expenditure of funds. These views are reiterated in *Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2005 on A Policy Framework for Education Training and Research* (GoK, 2005a).

The transfer of the management of the secondary education bursary from the schools to the Constituency Bursary Committee seems not to have been well received by a number of educational stakeholders. The Kenya Secondary School Head teacher's Association is one of the key stakeholders on record that was quite critical of the new bursary disbursing mechanism through the Constituency Bursary Committee (Daily Nation, 30th June 2007). The Daily Nation, in an editorial, also called for a review of the bursary disbursing mechanism through the Constituency Bursary Committees arguing that the new method was not only time wasting for students but was also being abused by Members of Parliament to reward their supporters (Editorial, Daily Nation, 27th January 2007). The sentiments raised in the Daily Nation editorial regarding the Constituency Bursary Committees had also been articulated earlier by Njue and Onyango (2004) as well as Mwangi (2006).

1.13 Statement of the problem

The government transferred the management of the secondary education bursary fund from schools to newly created entities called the Constituency Bursary Committees in the 2003/2004 financial year. The government states that this was in line with its broad desire to decentralize the provision of some services in all public sectors, including education. It is a tenet of decentralization that it leads to enhanced efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, accountability and local participation in service delivery.

This policy move, however, seems not to have been fully embraced by all educational stakeholders. Indeed, some of them and notably the secondary schools head teachers have criticized the move to disburse the bursary through the Constituency Bursary Committee and have numerously called on the government to re-consider it. Other Kenyans had also raised their reservations about the new bursary disbursement mechanism through the media. It is as a result of this criticism levelled against the new bursary disbursement mechanism that this study was conceived with a view to assessing the effectiveness of the Constituency Bursary Committees in disbursing the bursary.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The major purposes of this study were to explore stakeholders' perceptions on the decentralization of the management of the secondary education bursary programme to the Constituency Bursary Committee, assess the programme's

effectiveness as well as its equitability, and to identify the challenges limiting the programmes' success. This was done with a view to improving the running of the decentralized secondary school education bursary programme so as to make it more effective and acceptable to the stakeholders.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- I. Analyze and compare the perceptions of different stakeholders on the transfer of the management of the secondary education bursary scheme from schools to the Constituency Bursary Committees.
- II. Assess the effectiveness of the CBC in reaching the income poor and vulnerable students with bursary.
- III. Determine the equitability of bursary disbursement by the Constituency Bursary Committees.
- IV. Identify the challenges faced by the Constituency Bursary Committees while discharging their mandate.
- V. Propose policy recommendations on how to tackle the bottlenecks facing the Constituency Bursary Committees.

1.5 Research Questions

The following research questions were formulated from the above objectives:

- I. What is the perception of the stakeholders on various aspects of Constituency Bursary Committees, namely efficiency, transparency, accountability and local community representation in the CBC?
- II. How efficient are the Constituency Bursary Committees in disbursing funds to needy students?

- III. How effective are the Constituency Bursary Committees in reaching the income poor and vulnerable groups of students and enhancing their retention and participation?
- IV. How equitable are the Constituency Bursary Committees in disbursing bursary to different categories of students?
- V. What challenges are faced by the Constituency Bursary Committees while discharging their mandate?

1.5.1 Research Hypotheses

To further interrogate the equitability of the bursary scheme as managed by the Constituency Bursary Committees, the following hypotheses were formulated and tested.

- I. There is no significant difference in the mean of bursary award success rate of students based on their gender.
- II. There is no significant relationship between students' bursary award success rate and type of family set up.
- III. There is no significant relationship between students' bursary award success rate and family income.
- IV. There is no significant difference in the mean of bursary award success rate of students based on the type of school attended.
- V. There is no significant relationship between students' bursary award success rate and their region of residence

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study comes at a time when the country has just embraced a new constitutional dispensation with a heavy dose of devolution. The new constitution devolves power from the central government to 47 counties. This is in response to

the expressed desire by Kenyans to take more charge of their affairs at the local/grassroots level. Thus, the findings of this study will be instrumental in helping the government and other stakeholders make improvements in the management of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme. The findings will also be useful to the central government and the regional governments at the county level who will be directly involved in the devolution of power. The central government will be ceding power while the county governments will be assuming more power and responsibilities. The study gives good insights into the challenges that characterize the decentralization process and which the two levels of government should strive to avoid.

This study also comes at a time when there is renewed interest in secondary education in the country especially due to pressure occasioned by the successful take-off of FPE. Already, the government has introduced Free Day Secondary Education whereby it is meeting the substantial part of the direct cost of a Secondary School student to the tune of Kenya shillings 10,265 per annum. However, students in boarding secondary schools still have to pay up to Kenya shillings 18,627 per year for boarding expenses thus justifying the continuation of the secondary school bursary scheme. Thus, an improvement in the management of the secondary education bursary fund would complement the government's efforts to enhance access and retention to secondary education.

1.7 Limitations of the study

The study covered both Nairobi and Machakos counties. Nairobi and Machakos had 8 and 6 constituencies respectively. The study collected data from members of the Constituency Bursary Committees, ward representatives, church leaders and school level stakeholders amongst others. The following were some of the major limitations of the study:

- (i) There is scant literature on educational decentralization in Kenya. Thus, most of the cited literature was from other countries which had longer experiences in educational decentralization.
- (ii) A number of the Constituency Bursary Committees and schools did not have complete records of bursary allocations and bursary recipients for the three years under study. This constrained the study as the researcher was unable to get complete data for some years.

1.7.1 Delimitations of the Study

It would have been ideal for this study to cover the whole country. However, due to financial and logistical constraints, the study was limited to constituencies in Nairobi and Machakos counties.

1.8 Assumptions of the Study

The basic assumptions of this study were:

- (i) That CBCs were in place in all the constituencies and that there would be cooperation from members of the CBC and other stakeholders.
- (ii) All the stakeholders were interested in improving the management of the secondary education bursary scheme.

1.9 Theoretical framework

This study was guided by the Centre-Periphery theory (Galtung 1964) and decentralization theory (Rondinelli, 1983; Fiske, 1996; Falleti, 2004). The Centre-Periphery theory postulates that groups or even societies occupying more central positions in the society are usually more informed, more opinionated, more influential and have greater access to power and control mechanisms. The groups at the centre are the ones which trigger social discourse where they play the role of the ‘senders’ rather than the ‘receivers’ in the communication process. Social values (whether originating from the centre or the periphery) only attain relevance when they are embraced and eventually adopted by the groups in the social centre which later transmit the new values to the rest of the society permeating to the social periphery. The main argument of this theory is that the periphery plays a negligible role, if any, in the designing of policies as it is assumed to be a passive consumer of what has been promulgated at the centre. For many years, major educational decisions in Kenya have been made by policy makers and bureaucrats at the centre without involving the consumers of education at the lower levels.

The theory of decentralization, on the other hand, marks a paradigm shift in the relationship between the centre and the periphery as the latter assumes new roles and powers that were erstwhile the preserve of the centre (Rondineli, 1983; Fiske, 1996; McGinn & Welsh 1999; Falleti, 2004). Thus, decentralization alters the political status quo by transferring authority from one level of government and one set of actors to others. In a decentralized set up, lower government or non-government units are given the power to plan and implement activities in their areas of jurisdiction. According to Wolman (1990) the modern case for decentralized government is supported by two arguments: Efficiency Values and Governance Values. Efficiency Values comprise the public choice justification for decentralization, where efficiency is understood as the maximization of social welfare. Allocative efficiency and social welfare are thus likely to be maximized under highly decentralized political structures. Decentralization increases efficiency in determining service provision. In a decentralized, participatory system, citizens can influence decisions about service provision through mechanisms which enable them to indicate the type, level, quality and mix of services they desire. Thus, decentralization facilitates the tailoring of solutions for local problems to local conditions thereby avoiding misallocation of resources.

Governance values, on the other hand, include: (i) responsiveness and accountability, (ii) diversity, and (iii) political participation. Decentralization, by placing government closer to the people, fosters greater responsiveness of policy-

makers to the will of the citizenry and, it is argued, results in a closer congruence between public preferences and public policy. This is not only because decision-makers in decentralized units are likely to be more knowledgeable about and attuned to the needs of their area than are centralized national-government decision-makers, but also because decentralization permits these decision-makers to be held directly accountable to the local citizenry through local elections. Decentralization also facilitates a better division of labour in the management of public affairs. The creation of strong local governments with the capacity to effectively manage local affairs allows the central government to concentrate on higher level functions.

Thus, the transfer of the management of the secondary education bursary scheme from head teachers to the Constituency Bursary Committee by the Kenyan government should be viewed as a form of decentralization aimed at enhancing efficiency and governance values as postulated above. In a decentralized system, roles are shared between the centre (central government/ministry headquarters) and the periphery (local government/non government units) as captured in the following conceptual framework.

1.10 Conceptual framework

Figure 1.1: Model on Decentralization of Secondary Education Bursary Scheme




Figure 1.1 captures the different but complementary roles of the centre and the periphery in a decentralized set up. The centre usually takes the responsibility of designing broad strategic plans, providing financial support, giving advice and Monitoring & Evaluation. In this regard, the centre has provided the secondary education bursary fund, established the Constituency Bursary Committee and issued the bursary awarding criteria. These constitute some of the independent variables. The periphery, on its part, is expected to engage in participatory planning, resource mobilization, resource allocation and Monitoring & Evaluation at the local level. The expected outcomes of this complementary relationship between the centre and the periphery in a decentralized environment, and which also represent the dependent variables, are efficient and effective service delivery, responsiveness and accountability as well as equity in resource allocation. As shown in Figure 1.1, the Constituency Bursary Committee is the decentralized local unit whose mandate is to screen bursary applicants as well as award bursaries to the deserving cases following the laid down procedure. In this regard, the CBC is assumed to have better knowledge of the bursary applicants than would central government officials. Consequently, it is expected that the CBC would do a thorough job of vetting the applicants thus ensuring that only the deserving cases are awarded bursaries. The outcome would be improved access and retention to secondary education by the poor.

1.11 Operational definition of terms

Boarding Secondary School: A school where students are given boarding and accommodation services

Bursary: Direct financial assistance given to needy students to enable them pay fees charged by schools

Centralization: Concentration of government powers and functions at the central/national level of government

Centre: Central/higher levels of government

Constituency: An electoral area which is represented in parliament, the national legislative body.

Councillor: A democratically elected representative of the people who represents a civic ward at the local government level

Day secondary School: A school where students attend lessons during the day and go back to their homes in the evening

Decentralization: Dispersal of government powers and functions from higher/central levels of government to lower/local levels of government.

Effectiveness: Ability of the bursary scheme to reach the intended beneficiaries

- Efficiency:** Extent to which the bursary scheme enhances the participation of the income poor and vulnerable students in education by decreasing their drop-out rates and increasing their survival rates.
- Human capital:** Human skills acquired through education and that have value in the labour market.
- Lottery method:** A form of simple random sampling which entails the creation of a sampling frame which includes names of the sample units in alphabetical order and numbered accordingly. The names are substituted by numbered discs so that each disc corresponds to a name in the sampling frame. The discs are then placed in an urn and mixed well and drawn one at a time. The number of the disc is registered and the corresponding name in the sampling frame is ascertained and picked as a respondent.
- Member of Parliament:** A democratically elected representative of the people who represents a given constituency in parliament
- Needy student:** A student in need of financial assistance to meet the private cost of education.

Perceptions:	Stakeholders' understanding of and opinion on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme.
Periphery:	Local/lower levels of government
Poor and vulnerable student:	A student who comes from a disadvantaged socio- economic environment and who requires financial, moral and social support to get access and be retained in school.
Private returns:	Returns/ benefits accruing to an individual from investing in education
Rural:	The countryside which is characterised by low infrastructural development and low GDP
Social returns:	Returns/ benefits accruing to the society from investing in education
Stakeholders:	Various groups in society with vested interest in education, e.g. parents, students, teachers, BoG chairpersons, PTA chairpersons, Education Officers, Members of Parliament, Councillors, Religious leaders etc.
Urban:	Town which is characterised by high infrastructural development and a high GDP

Vouchers: Coupons with a monetary value issued to students by a government or any other funding body and which are surrendered to an educational institution upon enrolment. The educational institution in turn redeems the money from the issuing authority.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction:

The purpose of this study was to capture the perceptions of stakeholders towards the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme as well as assess its efficiency and effectiveness. Consequently, literature was reviewed touching on the following areas:

- I. Education and Development
- II. Financing of Education: Trends in educational finance; rationale for public financing of education; challenge of equity in public educational finance
- III. Student bursary/loans schemes
- IV. Decentralization: Why decentralize; forms of decentralization; challenges of decentralization

2.2 Education and development

Education plays a major role in the overall development process of any country. Since the 1960s, scholars have made efforts to measure the actual contribution of education to development. The pioneering study in this area was by Schultz (1961), whose findings showed that between 1920 and 1957 the income of the USA increased at a vastly higher rate than could be explained by combining the amount of land, hours worked, and the physical reproducible capital used to produce this income. Other economists had been unable to explain this difference which they referred to as the 'residual factor' and which they attributed to

‘resource productivity’. Schultz begged to differ and postulated that the difference could be explained by the increase in skills and knowledge of the workers. Henceforth, a new term ‘human capital’, which captured these skills and knowledge possessed by the workers, was born. Schultz findings were further reinforced by Denison (1962) whose studies also showed that the increase in U.S.A’s national product between 1929 and 1958 could be attributed to the increase in the education of the workers.

Since then, many other scholars have written extensively on the positive contribution of education not only to economic growth but to the overall development process (Becker 1964, Blaug 1976, Psacharopolous & Woodhall, 1985). Studies carried out in 37 countries to establish the relationship between education and productivity showed that farm productivity increased on average by 7.4 percent as a result of a farmer completing four additional years of elementary education rather than one (Jamison, Lockheed and Lau, 1982). Other studies have been carried out to find out the rate of return to investment in education. In developing countries, investment in higher education yielded higher returns than investment in physical capital at 14.9 percent and 12.8 percent respectively (Psacharopolous, 1980). Education, therefore, came to be viewed as an investment rather than as consumption (Rogers and Ruchlin, 1971).

When analyzing the benefits accruing from investment in education, scholars concur on the fact that apart from increases in productivity, education also has

spill-over benefits (externalities) which benefit the society at large (Johns, *et al*, 1983). In this regard, education helps in population control, improved health, increased social consciousness and intergenerational transfers.

2.3 Secondary School Sub-sector and Development

The secondary education sector has been neglected for many years in many developing countries by both governments and international funding bodies (Lewin and Caillods, 2001; World Bank, 2005). Lewin and Caillods (2001) observe that low and negative rates of economic growth as well as high costs have squeezed the public resources available for financing expanded secondary schooling. They further observe that secondary education has not benefited from external assistance, which seems to have favoured basic (primary) education. Consequently, they warn that unless appropriate strategies to protect current levels of secondary school participation in countries with the lowest GER are put into place, secondary education enrolment rates and quality will decline from already inadequate levels.

Secondary education is important in that it provides the link between primary education and tertiary education. While arguing for support for the secondary school sub-sector, scholars have pointed out that effective secondary schooling offers access to abstract reasoning and the kind of flexible skills associated with growth-orientated production and new jobs in manufacturing and the service sector which have an increasing information processing and knowledge content

(Lewin, 2006; Lewin and Caillods, 2001). When these skills are undersupplied, development is constrained. This view is also shared by the World Bank (2002) which notes that good quality secondary education is now considered a prerequisite both for successful integration of young people into modern economy and for the ability of countries to benefit from the ICT and knowledge revolution and to compete effectively in the new globalized knowledge based economy. The importance of secondary education is further reiterated by the World Bank (2005: xii) which observes that:

Secondary education is the highway between primary schooling, tertiary education, and the labour market. Its ability to connect the different destinations and to take young people where they want to go in life is crucial. Secondary education can act as a bottleneck, constricting the expansion of educational attainment and opportunity—or it can open up pathways for students' advancement.

Indeed, there is evidence that investment in secondary education has played a key role in the rapid growth of the East-Asian countries from the 1970s. One such study reveals that Japan's growth after 1960 was especially influenced by the early achievement of high enrolment rates at secondary school level (World Bank, 1993). On the part of Korea, its economic growth from 1960 was accompanied by heavy investment in post-primary schooling, which contributed to the development of a more educated workforce and easily adaptable workforce (World Bank, 1998). The World Bank (1998) further observed that countries that have higher levels of participation in technical and scientific education have higher levels of growth. The foundations for technical and scientific education are

laid in secondary schools. A study by the Asian Development Bank on economic growth and transformation in Asia indicated that whilst secondary school investment was associated with higher economic growth rates in Asia between 1970 and 1990, the same was not true for primary education (ADB, 1997). Another study by Lewin (1999) using longitudinal data on enrolment growth in Asia suggested that secondary schooling is what differentiates the faster and slower growing Asian countries. Secondary education is also given emphasis in European countries. Indeed, the largest share of public education funding (between 40 and 60 percent) in European Union countries is allocated to secondary education (Briseid and Caillods, 2004).

2.4 Rationale for public financing of Education

From the foregoing, it is clear that education is considered as both a private and social investment due to the benefits that accrue to both the individual and the society. On the one hand, the high private rates of return to educational investments at all levels justify large investments by individuals and their families through immediate or deferred cost sharing. On the other hand, however, there is a strong case for government (Public) funding of education due to its immense social benefits such as enhanced income distribution, controlled population growth, improved health, high social consciousness, intergenerational transfers etc (Johns, Morphet, & Alexander, 1983; Psacharopolous & Woodhall, 1985). If financing education were left entirely to the individual there would be

underinvestment from the social point of view. Due to inherent capital market imperfections, the poor would be disadvantaged as they would not be able to access credit to finance their education from existing financial institutions (World Bank, 1995). Thus, governments, in their endeavour to address the above concerns, are obliged to invest in the education of their citizens.

2.4.1 Trends in public educational finance

Following the emergence of the human capital theory in the early 1960s, education has come to be viewed as an investment which benefits both the individual and the society. Consequently, this has led to heavy public expenditure in the sector. Psacharopolous & Woodhall (1985) note that during the 1960s and 1970s, most of the expansion of education was financed by increased public expenditure on education which rose in relation to national income and public expenditure as a whole. Indeed, the proportion of GNP devoted to education in developing countries rose on the average from 2.3 percent in 1960 to 4.5 percent in 1984 while the proportion of the national government budget rose from 11.7 percent in 1960 to 16.1 percent in 1984.

Other scholars have described the period from the 1960s to 1975 as the 'happy period' for educational finance (Orivel, 1992). This is because the strong economic growth in many countries and favourable international trade led to a healthy expansion of government income which resulted to education receiving a sizeable piece of the national cake. However, the honeymoon enjoyed by

education with regard to public finance could not last for ever. By mid 1970 the convergence of a number of factors led to the decline of public expenditure available to education. One of the major factors was the 'oil shock' which led to sharp increases in the price of oil in the international market thereby destabilizing the economies of many countries. The other major factor was the emergence of other competitors for public resources namely the other sectors like agriculture, health and infrastructure (Jallade, 1973; Chinapah, 1992).

Consequently, from the 1980s many developing countries have been facing constraints with regard to public funding for education. UNESCO notes that in 2009, the world witnessed the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression with far reaching consequences for education financing in the poorest countries (UNESCO, 2010). The economic slow down is jeopardizing public spending plans in education and UNESCO points out that in sub-Saharan Africa, the resources available to education could fall by US\$4.6 billion a year in 2009 and 2010. Over the years, two strategies which have been employed in response to inadequacy of public funds for education are: reducing the unit cost of education by enhancing efficiency and; diversifying sources of educational finance (World Bank, 1980; 1995, Psacharopolous & Woodhall, 1985). Cost-sharing in education is one cost recovery measures that was adopted by most governments in an attempt to diversify sources of educational finance. In Kenya, for instance, the government entrenched the cost-sharing policy in education through Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1988 on Education and Manpower Training for

the Next Decade and Beyond (GoK, 1988). However, one major drawback of cost-sharing in education is that there are high chances of the poor being locked out thus making access to education inequitable. To mitigate this, many governments have set up students' bursary and loan schemes. In Kenya, the government has established the secondary education bursary scheme and a students' loan scheme for university students.

2.5 Strategies of student financing

Since the 1980s many governments, especially in developing countries, have been unable to shoulder the total burden of financing education (World Bank, 1980; Psacharopolous & Woodhall, 1985). Consequently, cost-sharing in the financing of education especially at the post-primary level has become the norm rather than the exception. Though this helps to ease pressure on the government budget, its major draw-back is that it increases the private cost of education. Poor families have difficulty meeting the direct and indirect costs of their children's education. Therefore, an increase in the private cost of education leads to a reduction in the demand of education by the poor (World Bank, 1995). Studies in Latin America and East Asia show lack of private resources as the major obstacle to access and completion of secondary education (Gropello, 2006).

In order to cushion the poor from the adverse effects of cost-sharing which reduce their demand for education, governments have devised various 'demand-side financing mechanisms' like scholarships/bursaries, loans and vouchers to assist poor families invest in education (Psacharopolous & Woodhall, 1985; World

Bank, 1995; Patrinos & Ariasingam, 1997; Ziderman 2003; Mohadep, 2006). This helps ensure equity of access and participation of the poor in education.

2.5.1 Demand-side financing mechanisms

The idea behind ‘demand-side financing mechanisms’ is to give public funds directly to individuals or institutions on the basis of expressed demand, i.e. money follows students (Patrinos & Ariasingam, 1997). Demand-side financing mechanisms take the form of scholarships/bursaries, loans and vouchers. These financing mechanisms help to meet the direct and sometimes indirect costs of education of a student partially or in full depending on the level of need and also the nature of the financing programme.

Scholarships/bursaries: They have been in existence in many countries for a long time. They normally entail cash payments mainly from public coffers going directly to educational institutions or any authorized body to cater for specific educational needs of students, e.g. meeting tuition cost. The beneficiaries of scholarships/bursaries are not expected to repay the monies spent on them.

Loans: When the cost of education is quite high, as is the case with higher education, many governments have come to the realization that it is more tenable to give loans to students rather than scholarships/bursaries. There has also been policy moves in many countries to make beneficiaries of higher education meet a bigger part of the cost following findings that higher education has got higher private returns than social returns (Woodhall, 1983, 1990; Psacharopolous, 1993).

Consequently, this has led to the emergence of government funded students' loans schemes in many countries which advance students money which enable them to meet the cost of their education. These students are obliged to repay the money when they complete their studies and join the labour market. In Kenya, the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) is charged with the task of loaning money to higher education students.

Vouchers: They are advanced as the ultimate instrument of 'demand-side financing mechanism'. Simply defined, a voucher is a coupon of a given monetary value that is given to students or their parents which entitles them to education (Patrinos & Ariasingam, 1997). A distinguishing feature of vouchers is that instead of determining which schools to subsidize and focusing on the "supply side", the government transfers this power to parents and students by allowing them to choose among schools (Kinga, Rawlingsa, Gutierrezb, Pardob & Torresb, 1997). The voucher, once issued to an individual, can be redeemed by enrolling at an institution of choice, thus fostering the free-market system in the delivery of educational services. The idea of educational vouchers can be traced back to Friedman (1955, 1962), an economist, who argued that vouchers would give parents the power to choose the school where they would educate their children. Giving parents the power of choice would not only curtail the monopoly of the public education but it would also foster competition among educational institutions leading to increased service delivery.

Bursaries/scholarships and loans can be issued in the form of vouchers thus enhancing students' choice. Though the voucher system has not yet been tried in Kenya, it has been embraced in other countries like Colombia, Sweden, Chile, and some states in the USA (The Economist, 2007). Vouchers can be used to achieve two objectives: enhancing the quality of education and increasing educational opportunities. Quality is enhanced when schools become competitive in order to net vouchers from students as has been witnessed in some states in the USA. On the other hand, in countries where the demand for schooling may exceed the public sector's capacity to build and manage schools, vouchers which are redeemable in private schools represent a relatively inexpensive and rapid way to expand school places. This spurs private investment in the provision of school places thus relieving the government off the burden of supplying education. This has been witnessed in Colombia where the government Voucher system called PACES initiated in 1991 led to the creation of 125,000 school places in the private sector by 1997(Kinga, Rawlingsa, Gutierrezb, Pardob, & Torresb, 1997; Bettinger, 2005). In Sweden, educational reforms in 1992 allowed students to carry state funding in the form of vouchers to private schools. This led to a massive expansion of the private school sector which saw its share of the total Swedish student population rise from 1 percent to 10 percent (The Economist, 3rd May 2007).

The major challenge with government's education subsidies meant for the poor, however, is that of ensuring that they do finally get to the intended beneficiaries.

This depends to a great extent on whether the method of funds disbursement is Rule-based or discretionary. A study on school funding carried out in Zambia established that Rule-based grants tended to reach every school while less than 20 percent of all discretionary funds eventually reached schools (Das, 2004). This suggests that fiscal targets, while important, may not have the desired impacts unless careful consideration is given to the patterns of disbursement. Therefore, it is important to note that equitable distribution of educational expenditure requires careful implementation on the ground. For subsidies to reach their intended recipients, the results suggest that clearly defined rule-based allocations are more likely to be successful.

2.5.2 Challenges faced by student financing schemes

Many governments have initiated bursary/loan schemes so as to enhance enrolment and participation of the poor in education. The success of a student financing scheme in enhancing access and participation of the poor in education is judged on three issues as summarised in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Three Issues used to Judge the Success of a Student**Financing Scheme**

Issue	Pertinent questions
Reach	i) Does the scheme indeed reach the target group? ii) Which groups are not reached? iii) Are some ineligible students in receipt of bursaries/loans?
Efficacy	i) Do the funds lead to a continuation of study, thus preventing drop-out, for the recipients? ii) What would happen in the absence of a bursary/loan?
Equity	i) Are bursary/loan recipients treated equitably? ii) Do all potential recipients have equal chances of receiving a bursary/loan?

Source: Ziderman, 2003:

While dealing with the above three issues of reach, efficacy and equity, it is vital to take note of the important distinction between targeting and screening with regard to student bursary/loan schemes (Ziderman, 2004). A bursary/loan scheme that is based on screening (rather than real targeting) focuses on the vetting of applications for their eligibility for inclusion, in terms of the defined entry criteria. It is less concerned with the actual composition of those accepted for a bursary/loan (and whether they constitute the group most in need of a bursary/loan), and with the self-excluded but eligible individuals who do not

apply. It is essentially passive in approach, emphasizing legal entitlement rather than attempting to satisfy a need. In contrast, a well targeted scheme actively focuses on those most in need; it aims at reaching out to a target population defined in terms of those most deserving of help, including such less readily reached populations as student dropouts in need and the rural poor.

Domelen(2007) notes that in assessing relative targeting performance in pro-poor programmes, the simplest measures focus on leakage and under-coverage rates. Leakage rates are defined as the fraction of total program resources which go to the non-poor while undercoverage rates refer to the fraction of the poor who do not benefit from the program. According to Domelen, undercoverage, or *Type I errors*, occur when the poor are excluded from a programme benefits. In the case of a bursary scheme, this would be represented by the number of poor students who miss out on the bursary. On the other hand, leakages, or *Type II errors*, occur when the non-poor benefit. This is basically an indicator of the level of efficiency and can occur due to a variety of reasons, including lack of information on who is poor, inability to exclude individual households from benefiting, as well as political economy issues including inability of program managers to resist pressures. In the case of a bursary scheme, this would be indicated by the number of economically well-up students who have benefited from the bursary.

In addressing the three issues of reach, efficacy and equity of student finance support schemes, several challenges are encountered. In many countries, the first

challenge that has to be tackled is that of defining eligibility (Ziderman, 2003; 2004). A bursary/loan scheme targeted on needy students must define the eligibility criteria for receiving a bursary/loan. Most student bursary/loans schemes aimed at the poor do so in terms of a maximal family income ceiling. When family income is used as the major yardstick for determining a student's eligibility, the central policy question is: What level of family income should constitute the eligibility ceiling? If this ceiling is set too high, with a consequent enlargement in the number of eligible students, there is a danger that the less disadvantaged amongst eligible students, may be those who receive bursaries/loans rather than those most in need. This is likely to arise in those schemes where the number of eligible, and potential, borrowers greatly exceeds the supply of available bursary/loan slots. Thus many schemes define the eligibility ceiling in terms of the official poverty line, to ensure that only those most in need are eligible to take up bursaries/loans.

Ziderman's (2004) study established that in China and Philippines, eligibility of students was pegged on the official poverty line. However, for some countries like Korea and Thailand the designated eligibility ceiling is an income level above the official poverty line. For example, in Thailand the income ceiling defining eligibility is three times above the official poverty line for a family with three children. Such a policy gives eligibility to many students who are not drawn from the ranks of the very poor.

Another eligibility problem is checking the veracity of the information on family income that is provided by bursary/loan applicants. This is a central problem in places where an effective system of income taxation is lacking, or where the rural and informal sectors are relatively large. Different schemes in the Five Asian case studies employed alternative methods to check the validity of declared family income. In some cases, the educational institution certifies that the declared income is correct, on the basis of institutional familiarity with the socio-economic background of the applicant; more usually, a civil servant provides certification. In Thailand the village head may provide this certification; however, if the loyalty of the village head is stronger towards the student and his family than to the loans scheme, this certification may constitute little more than a rubber stamp.

More generally, the use of family income as the sole criterion for eligibility, whether or not set at the official poverty level, is itself questionable. The family income measure fails to take into account a number of factors such as the number of children or elderly in the family, the number of other students in the family, whether the head of household is female and the amount of private property owned. When foolproof mechanisms for vetting eligibility are lacking, there is the danger of the funds going to undeserving students. For example, in Indonesia, lack of precise targeting of scholarships under the Scholarships and Grants Programme led to about 18 percent of the scholarships going to relatively wealthy students (Baines, 2005).

On the issue of efficacy, there is need to seriously consider the amount of money to be allocated to the individual applicant. Commenting on the student loans schemes in Mauritius, Mohadep (2006) observes that the loan should be sufficiently large to meet the needs of the students at whom the scheme is directed. He further observes that the implication of a small loan size is that higher education remains beyond the means of the very poor, thus largely defeating the very purpose of the scheme.

Regarding the issue of equity, it is important to give serious focus to horizontal equity (Ziderman, 2003; 2004). To start with, there is need to distinguish between inequality and equity. Inequalities in the system of bursary/loan distribution are not only expected but are justified as students have differing needs. For example, some institutions and courses pursued are more expensive than others. However, inequities arise when bursary/loan recipients of the same economic status and level of need receive bursaries/loans of differing sizes. Principles of horizontal equity would require that regardless of province of residence or educational institution, students of similar socio-economic background should have equal opportunities for receiving a bursary/loan.

Another obstacle to the efficiency of student financing schemes is cumbersome administrative procedures. In a study on loans schemes in the republic of Korea, students and staff viewed the administrative procedures as too complicated and inefficient (Kim & Lee, 2003).

In Kenya the government has been funding the Secondary Education Bursary programme. A study by Njeru & Orodho (2003) established that this bursary scheme was handicapped by a number of factors, the key being: inadequate guidelines with regard to the amounts to be allocated per student, poor criteria for selection of the genuinely needy, inadequate awareness creation about the scheme's existence and operations, limited funds hence limited coverage, delays in funds disbursement, poor coordination and lack of monitoring by the Ministry of Education at the school level and at higher levels. As a result, the bursary scheme was characterized by lack of transparency and accountability, nepotism amongst other aspects of mismanagement. Njeru and Orodho noted that a critical issue that required urgent redress was the awarding of the bursary to less deserving and sometimes completely undeserving but well connected applicants at the expense of the poor and vulnerable groups. It should be noted that since then, the management of the Secondary Education Bursary scheme in Kenya has been shifted from head teachers (schools) to the Constituency Bursary Committee.

2.6 Concept of Decentralization

There seems to be no major contention among scholars about the meaning of decentralization. Rondinelli (1981; 1983) defines decentralization as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and resource-raising and allocation from the central government to (a) field units of central government ministries or

agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels of government; (c) semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or (e) NGOs.

Bray (1984) defines decentralization as the process in which subordinate levels of a hierarchy are authorized by a higher body to take decisions about the use of the organizations resources. On his part, Fiske (1996) states that decentralization is the process of reassigning responsibility and corresponding decision-making authority for specific functions from higher to lower levels of government and organizational units.

Falleti (2004), who views decentralization as a process, describes it as a set of policy reforms aimed at transferring responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of government. Falleti's view differs slightly from Rondinelli's in his assertion that decentralization is a set of state reforms and as such, it does not include transfers of authority to non-state actors (as in the case of privatization reforms).

Finally, UNESCO (2005) posits that decentralization is the transfer, in varying degrees, of decision-making powers from central government to intermediate authorities, local authorities, and educational institutions. UNESCO further observes that the significance of the transfer varies, ranging from simple administrative decentralization (deconcentration) to a transfer of regulatory and financial powers of greater scope, to the regional and/or local level.

An analysis of all the above definitions reveals a common thread that runs through them: that decentralization entails the transfer of power and functions from a higher level of government to a lower government or non-government level. When applied to education, it would mean that the central ministry of education cedes some powers and functions to lower government level, teachers, parents and other stakeholders at the district, constituency and school levels. In Kenya, for instance, there have been efforts towards decentralization in education in spite of lack of a supportive legal framework. For example, since 2001, recruitment of teachers for public schools has been decentralized to the districts and school levels for primary schools and secondary schools respectively (TSC, 2002). Under the decentralized system, primary school teachers are recruited at the district level by the District Education Board while secondary school teachers are recruited at the institutional level by the Board of Governors. Previously, teachers were recruited centrally by the Teachers Service Commission at its headquarters in Nairobi and then posted to various schools countrywide. Similarly, in 2003, the administration of the secondary education bursary was transferred from teachers (who are agents of the central government) to the Constituency Bursary Committees which are supposed to have local representation (GoK, 2003d).

2.6.1 Types of decentralization

There are three broad types of decentralization:

- I. Political (democratic) decentralization;
- II. Administrative (bureaucratic) decentralization, and;
- III. Economic (fiscal) decentralization (Wolman, 1990; Falleti, 2004).

However, there is no clear distinction between the first two. According to Falleti (2004), administrative decentralization comprises the set of policies that transfer the administration and delivery of social services such as education, health, social welfare, or housing to sub-national governments. If revenues are transferred from the centre to meet the costs of the administration and delivery of social services, administrative decentralization is funded (and coincides with fiscal decentralization). If sub-national governments bear the costs of the administration and delivery of transferred services with their own pre-existing revenues, administrative decentralization is not funded.

Political decentralization is the set of constitutional amendments and electoral reforms designed to open new—or activate existing but dormant or ineffective—spaces for the representation of sub-national polities. When applied to education, political decentralization involves assigning power to make educational decisions to citizens or their representatives at lower levels of government (Fiske, 1996). This involves shifting authority to include people outside the system.

Fiscal decentralization refers to the set of policies designed to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments. Fiscal decentralization policies can assume different institutional forms. An increase of transfers from the

central government, the creation of new sub national taxes, and the delegation of tax authority that was previously national are all examples of fiscal decentralization. In Kenya, the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) which was established in 2003 is an example of fiscal decentralization (GOK, 2003e). Under the CDF Act, 2.5 percent of ordinary government revenue is set aside and divided among all the constituencies in the country. The central government is not involved in the utilization of these funds at the constituency level, a task which is left to the Constituency Development Committee (CDC) which is steered by the local Member of Parliament. Another example of fiscal decentralization in Kenya is the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) through which the central government transfers 5 percent of the income tax revenues to 175 Local Authorities (GoK, 2002).

In education, the area of educational finance may be the most decentralized area of decision making authority as many countries have sought to mobilize local funds for schools (Gropello, 2006). Gropello further notes that declines in subsidies from central government and emerging fiscal gaps have forced communities and schools to seek supplementary funding, for example through raising user charges, community contributions and income generating activities. Since the 1990s, reforms towards self-managing schools have led to a high degree of decentralization of school finances in a number of countries such as the United Kingdom (specifically England, Wales & Scotland), New Zealand, the Netherlands and in parts of Australia, Sweden and certain schools in USA

(Levacic & Downes, 2004). These self-managing schools have the freedom to use resources allocated to them in the way they judge most appropriate in their context for the particular pupils enrolled at the school. In Kenya, the management of the Secondary Education Bursary programme was transferred from teachers (who are seen as agents of central government) to the Constituency Bursary Committees (which have local representation) in 2003.

The application of any of the three types of decentralization falls into three major forms depending on the kind of power that is decentralized (Rondinelli, 1983; Fiske, 1996; McGinn & Welsh 1999). They are: Deconcentration, delegation, and devolution.

Deconcentration: It is described as the weakest form of decentralization since it entails only the shifting of management responsibilities from the centre to regional or branch offices while the real decision making (power) is retained at the centre (Fiske, 1996). According to McGinn and Welsh (1999) deconcentration spreads central authority without transferring it to other bodies. It shifts authority for the implementation of rules, but not making them. Thus, deconcentration goes against the guiding spirit of decentralization which is to strengthen and give authority to local structures to carry out operations and make policies.

Onyango & Otieno (2006) argue that the various experiences with decentralization in education in Kenya boil down to deconcentration. For example, at the regional level, there is the District Education Board (DEB) which

is charged with the task of coordinating educational activities in a given district. However, the DEBs lack executive authority and their role is only to implement what has been designed and decided at the ministry headquarters. The composition of the DEBs also ensures that power remains in the center. The DEBs are chaired by the District Commissioner (DC) who is a presidential appointee and answerable to the office of the president. On the other hand, the secretary to the DEB is the District Education Officer (DEO) who is also a central government official. Thus, the local community does not have any position of influence in the DEB. These scholars posit that for decentralization in education in Kenya to make sense, the DEBs should not be chaired by the DC who represents central authority. They should rather be chaired by elected representatives like mayors and heads of county councils who are directly answerable to the local people. At the institutional level, the situation is not different. Though schools have School Management Committees (SMCs) (Primary), Boards of Governors (BOGs) (Secondary) and Parents' Teachers' Associations (PTA) (Secondary) which are supposed to play a crucial role in the management of education at the school level, they do not have sufficient decision making powers over crucial inputs, for example the curriculum, school leaving examinations, budgetary planning etc.. Furthermore, the composition of the SMCs, BOGs and PTAs is in many cases wanting as many of the members lack the necessary technical capacity to interpret educational issues and make useful

contributions. This usually results to a situation where they just rubberstamp the head teacher's decisions.

Delegation: It refers to the transfer of policy responsibility and authority to local governments or semi-autonomous agencies who are not controlled by the central government but remain accountable to it. The main difference with deconcentration is that the central government must exercise its control through the contractual relation that enforces accountability on the part of sub-national units. The authority is delegated on the understanding that it can be withdrawn (Fiske, 1996; Work, 2002).

Devolution: It is considered as the most far reaching form of decentralization in that the transfer of authority is permanent and cannot be revoked at the whim of central officials. While deconcentration and delegation can be carried out as a matter of government policy without extensive outside consultation, true devolution of power on the other hand requires widespread support from the various affected stakeholders. In a devolved system, the local units of government are autonomous and independent and their legal status separate from central government. The central authorities exercise only indirect control and monitoring of the local units but may set up machinery to regulate and evaluate local policies (UNESCO, 2005).

However, though decentralization takes different types and forms as already discussed, it can only work in an environment which is conducive. UNDP (2003:137) points out that decentralization tends to be successful when the central government is stable, solvent and committed to transferring both responsibilities and resources, when local authorities are able to assume these responsibilities and when there is effective participation by poor people and by a well-organized civil society.

2.6.2 Benefits of decentralization

A number of reasons are advanced in favour of decentralization. However, according to Wolman (1990) the modern case for decentralized government is supported by two arguments: Efficiency Values and Governance Values. Efficiency Values comprise the public choice justification for decentralization, where efficiency is understood as the maximization of social welfare. Allocative efficiency and social welfare are thus likely to be maximized under highly decentralized political structures. Decentralization increases efficiency in determining service provision. In a decentralized, participatory system, citizens can influence decisions about service provision through mechanisms which enable them to indicate the type, level, quality and mix of services they desire, and the cost they are willing to pay for such services. Thus, decentralization facilitates the tailoring of solutions for local problems to local conditions thereby avoiding misallocation of resources.

Governance values, on the other hand, as postulated by Wolman (1990) include: (i) responsiveness and accountability, (ii) diversity, and (iii) political participation. The first values, responsiveness and accountability, are easily the most important of these and comprise the political parallel to the argument about efficiency. Decentralization, by placing government closer to the people, fosters greater responsiveness of policy-makers to the will of the citizenry and, it is argued, results in a closer congruence between public preferences and public policy. This is not only because decision-makers in decentralized units are likely to be more knowledgeable about and attuned to the needs of their area than are centralized national-government decision-makers, but also because decentralization permits these decision-makers to be held directly accountable to the local citizenry through local elections. Decentralization also facilitates a better division of labour in the management of public affairs. The creation of strong local governments with the capacity to effectively manage local affairs allows the central government to concentrate on higher level functions.

Diversity in public policy is another argument in favour of decentralization. Diversity is valued because it offers citizens a greater choice in public services on top of promoting experimentation and innovation in public policy. Decentralization will, thus, result in a variety of policy approaches at the local level, some of which will be more successful than others. Once given policies have been shown to work, they can be taken up by other decentralized units as well as central government.

Decentralization, manifested in a participatory style of local governance, fosters greater social cohesion and stability, and encourages reconciliation between local interest groups and a convergence around common interests.

2.6.3 Decentralization in Education

Educational decentralization in most developing countries is interpreted in three complementary ways: asking elected local authorities to take charge of education in their area, strengthening the role of regional and district education offices and increasing school autonomy in resource management (UNESCO Newsletter, 2004). Candy and Anton(2010) point out that the reasons behind the present trend towards decentralization in education are to be found less in purely educational or pedagogical arguments than in the wider political, social and economic environment.

Psacharopolous (1995) notes that in the development of human capital, there is need to redefine the role of the government. He advises that it would be good for the government to decentralize and increase participation in the education sector which plays a key role in the development of human capital. He warns that excessive centralization of agencies of government not only overloads their staff but also channels investments into programs that do not meet the needs of the ultimate beneficiaries well. Thus, to increase programme effectiveness, it may be necessary to decentralize control over some or all aspects of the intervention,

whether the control moves down within the ministry or is transferred to local government, community groups or NGOs.

While identifying decentralization and Programme Based Approaches (PBA) as the two most salient features of modern educational planning, UNESCO (2005b) further notes that decentralization aims at increasing responsibilities for efficient resource management and education quality improvements at levels below the central level. Consequently, as part of the decentralization process, the functions and tasks at the central level, i.e. of the Ministry of Education, increasingly focus on sector-wide policy making and implementation monitoring. At the same time, the Ministry is relieved of tasks related to the day-to-day functioning of educational institutions. Central level management will increasingly focus on responsibilities such as:

- ❑ Formulation of education development and reform strategies and national education plans;
- ❑ Monitoring of implementation of national education policies, plans and targets;
- ❑ Ensuring the quality education (including curriculum development, teacher training, student and teacher performance);
- ❑ Advising provinces/districts on result management of education, and on cost-effective utilization of resources.

The above roles of the central government in a decentralized setting as outlined by UNESCO are supported by other scholars. Bista & Carney (2004) as well as

Gropello (2006) observe that under decentralization, the central authority needs to redefine its role and to reform its structures and processes so that it can fulfil evolving core functions. A common misconception is that decentralization relieves the central government of its educational responsibilities. However, this is not so. Indeed, decentralization enhances the role of the central government in sector wide planning, monitoring and evaluation. This view is supported by findings of studies on educational decentralization conducted in West Africa and Asia. Grauwe (In UNESCO, 2004:3) states that one of the lessons learnt from these studies is that:

Decentralization does not imply that the State abandons its role, but rather that it takes on a different role. Where its supervision and support is weak and where its absence is not neutralized by strong local accountability, the inefficiency and mismanagement that characterized central management is more than likely to be repeated, if not multiplied at lower levels.

Caution is also necessary in educational decentralization and it should not be seen as a panacea to all educational problems since it also generates its own problems.

Hernes (In UNESCO 2004:2) while supporting decentralization also cautions that:

... the question is not: Should we decentralize? It is rather: What should be decentralized and to whom, when, how, with what means, and with what checks and balances?

While answering the above questions, Hernes observes that:

- What can be decentralized ranges from raising funds to determining curriculum, from the hiring of teachers to the building of schools;

- ❑ Who can be delegated authority ranges from parents to mayors, teachers and inspectors;
- ❑ When can address not only the development stages of a system but also financial constraints on the state;
- ❑ By what means varies from authority over budgets, timetables, working hours, or hiring practices;
- ❑ What check and balances pertains to the system of accountability, so that those with delegated authority do not go astray, and are supported when needed.

Hernes opines that there is no one answer to any of these questions – and the combinations of solutions are indeed manifold.

2.6.4 Challenges of educational decentralization

In spite of the perceived benefits of decentralization and its widespread acceptance, the implementation process is not always smooth sailing and a number of challenges have been documented. Politics is the first major challenge that faces decentralization. Fiske (1996) argues that educational decentralization is a highly political process as it involves substantial shifts - or at least perception of shifts - in power. Political leaders and policy makers, ministry employees, teachers, teachers unions, parents, local communities and students are all stakeholders with an interest in education and each of them would do anything within their powers to protect their turf. Decentralization alters the political status quo by transferring authority from one level of government and one set of actors

to others. However, all stakeholders tend to loath giving up power that they have exercised to a new set of actors. Thus, when a tug-of-war erupts between the various stakeholders, chances of the whole decentralization process aborting are high.

Fiske (1996) gives the example of Colombia whose decentralization efforts in basic education had two objectives: 'Municipalize' basic education and increase autonomy to local schools. The first objective was to be realized by transferring financial resources to municipalities and departments while the second objective was to be attained by giving schools responsibility for managing personnel, designing aspects of curriculum and controlling aspects of finance. Though both objectives failed, of interest here is the second one of increasing autonomy to local schools which was shot down by the national teachers' union which felt threatened by the idea of schools hiring and managing their own teachers. The union saw this as an agenda meant to fragment the teaching force thereby rendering the union irrelevant. In Kenya, it is worth noting that teachers are some of the loudest critics of the new method of disbursing secondary education bursaries through the Constituency Bursary Committee (Daily Nation 30th June 2007). It should be remembered that before 2003, teachers were in charge of the disbursement of the bursary funds as the government would send the funds directly to the schools. So far, the review of literature has not established any documented study on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme in Kenya. This is a gap in literature that this study seeks to fill, by amongst others,

attempting to establish whether the teachers' criticism of the new method of disbursement is genuine or driven by malice.

Transparency in the local management of resources is also a big challenge to decentralization and paramount to its success (Candy and Anton, 2010; Grauwe, 2004). Levacic & Downes, (2004) also point out that transparency of educational finance, which is crucial to identifying and preventing corruption is difficult to achieve. One way of enhancing transparency is by ensuring that rules and regulations are known to all. It is also important to make financial information accessible to the public. However, as the study by Levacic & Downes (2004) established, managers of self managing schools acknowledged that they found it difficult to tackle the technical complexity of financial information as well as present it in such a way as to enable the public to understand it.

Lack of effective Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms at the lower decentralized units is another obstacle to successful decentralization. This was evident from research on educational decentralization in West Africa where the poor monitoring on the part of local education offices was attributed to the inadequacy of the financial, material and human resources (Lugaz, 2004).

Lack of local capacity could also be a constraint to successful decentralization. McGinn and Welsh (1999) point out that for any reform, including decentralization, to be successful those involved in the reform must be capable of carrying it out. Levacic & Downes, (2004) in their study on self-managing

schools established that though members of school councils or boards were expected to understand issues pertaining to their schools' finance, only a few appeared to do so. In such a situation, there is a danger of the school council/board failing to offer checks and balances to what the head teachers do with school finances. In Kenya, the Education Act places the management of public secondary schools in the hands of the Board of Governors. However, studies on secondary school management in Kenya have revealed that lack of capacity of the members of these boards in understanding educational issues has impacted negatively on their performance (Osure, 1996; GoK, 2001). Similarly, another study on fiscal decentralization in Kenya also identifies lack of capacity as a major constraint to the ability of Local Authorities to absorb funds transferred to them from the central government (Oyugi, 2005). Mapesa & Kibua, (2006) also identify lack of technical capacity as a major constraint to the success of the decentralized Constituency Development Fund in Kenya. With regard to the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme, there is no study which has been undertaken to establish the capacity of the members of the CBC to discharge their duties effectively. This study therefore seeks to fill that gap.

2.6.5 Steps to successful decentralization

Fiske (1996) urges for consensus building in order to achieve success in decentralization. This consensus should be broad based and should involve the

various actors as well as the various interest groups which would be affected by the change. Fiske outlines the following eight consensus building steps.

- I. Identify stakeholders and their interests;
- II. Build legitimate interest into the model;
- III. Organize public discussions
- IV. Clarify the purpose of decentralization;
- V. Analyze the obstacles to decentralization;
- VI. Respect the role of various actors;
- VII. Provide adequate training;
- VIII. Develop a monitoring system

The above eight consensus steps as proposed by Fiske point to the fact that decentralization should be all inclusive for it to be successful. This view is also shared by UNESCO (2005a) which states that decentralization of education sector management requires that central authorities (the Ministry of Education, etc.) and lower government (provincial) education authorities apply a common approach to education planning and implementation monitoring. Such common approaches should include the planning concept, planning methodology and tools, planning terminology, resource allocation criteria, monitoring criteria and monitoring mechanisms. These views on making educational decentralization successful also

received support from country reports & ensuing debates in an International Seminar on Decentralization Policies and Strategies in Education, organized by UNESCO in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 2003 (UNESCO, 2005b). Amongst others, the most common features of the country reports & ensuing debates on educational decentralization observed that:

- I. The decentralization process calls for consensus building among all the stakeholders in civil society. Decentralization should accordingly always be supported by the dissemination of information, consultation and explanatory action among the population. It is also important to maintain commitments to the process of direct participatory management and the development of a critical citizenry. In this sense, decentralization policies should be tools of social participation which foster individual development and the development of society rather than the exclusive claims and interests of the market model.
- II. Decentralization policies also require national capacity building. Decision makers at all levels should be trained for their new roles, functions and responsibilities. Decentralization should therefore include strategies directed towards intensive, continuing training, including financial training, for all managers, in particular school principals, in accordance with a collective management philosophy.
- III. Decentralization may make for an increased number of imprecise operations and bad practices at local level. The implementation of good

monitoring structures and procedures and increased responsibility may reduce these effects. Decentralization practices should give rise to behaviour marked by greater transparency and more ethical conduct.

- IV. Decentralization should not begin without there being good planning and preparation in advance: legislative framework, new and clear distribution of roles and responsibilities, balance between centralized and decentralized functions (decentralization usually leads to an increase in the central function of supervision and to greater responsibilities at school level), and the allocation of additional financial resources to set the process in motion.

This study also sought to establish whether the government observed the above consensus building steps as proposed by Fiske (1996) as well as UNESCO (2005b) before shifting the management of the secondary education bursary programme from teachers to the constituency bursary committee.

2.7 Summary

The literature review has touched on a number of themes, the key ones being: the role of education in the development process, the importance of secondary education, the rationale for public financing of education, and decentralization efforts in education. The review has addressed the view of education as an investment with benefits accruing to both the society and the individual as

espoused in the theory of human capital. As elucidated in the review, governments invest in the education of their citizens due to the social benefits derived from education as well as the need to address capital market imperfections which would lock the poor out of the education system if it were left purely to market forces of demand and supply. Thus, the review has shown that many governments are involved not only in the supply of education but also in stimulating the demand for education. The latter is achieved through 'demand-side financing mechanisms' like scholarships/bursaries, loans and vouchers. Whereas some countries have embraced the voucher system to finance education especially of the poor, the concept is yet to be adopted in Kenya which runs a bursary and a loan scheme for secondary and university students respectively.

The review of literature has established that the bug of decentralization has caught up with the education sector in both the developed and the developing countries. During the review, it has emerged that decentralization is propelled by the belief that people at the periphery or lower levels of governance should be empowered to take charge of their affairs by having an input in both the decision making and implementation processes on issues touching on their local environment. In Kenya, the government has initiated decentralization measures in different facets of public affairs. One example which has been cited is the Local Authority Transfer Fund which is a form of fiscal decentralization. The other example is the Constituency Development Fund which is also another form of fiscal decentralization. In the education sector, the government has also come up

with some policy decisions leaning towards decentralization in spite of the lack of an overall educational decentralization policy. The transferring of the management of the secondary education bursary fund to the Constituency Bursary Committee is a case in point. Whereas studies have been carried out to map the challenges and impact of the Local Authority Transfer Fund (Oyugi, 2005) as well as the Constituency Development Fund (Mapesa & Kibua, 2006) none has been undertaken on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme. As captured earlier, the move to transfer the management of the secondary education bursary fund from teachers to the CBC as from 2003 ignited a hot debate among the various educational stakeholders as to who was best placed to manage the fund. Thus, this is a potential gap in literature that this study sought to fill.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter gives a detailed outline of how the study was executed. The research design that was used is stated as well as the location of the study, the study population and sample, research instruments, data collection procedure and data analysis techniques.

3.2 Research Design

The study adopted an exploratory approach using a descriptive survey design. Kerlinger (2002:406) observes that exploratory studies ‘seeks what is’ rather than ‘predicts relationships’ to be found and serves the purpose of discovering significant variables in the field situation as well as discovering the relations among variables. Wiersma (1985) also points out that the survey design allows researchers to determine the status quo, as well as gather facts rather than manipulate variables. This design was, therefore, appropriate for this study since the researcher was interested in establishing the facts as they were with regard to the management of the secondary education bursary by the CBC. Kerlinger (2002) further adds that survey research focuses on people, their beliefs, opinions, attitudes, motivations and behaviour. This study sought to, amongst others, explore the perceptions of different stakeholders with regard to the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme under the Constituency Bursary Committee.

Another positive thing about the survey design is that it enables the researcher to not only secure evidence concerning an existing situation or current condition but also identify standards or norms with which to compare present conditions in order to plan the next step (Good, 1992). Thus, the survey design was instrumental in helping the researcher arrive at the facts as they were with regard to the perceptions of the stakeholders towards CBCs, the efficiency and effectiveness of the bursary allocation and disbursement process as well as the challenges facing the secondary education bursary scheme. This assisted the researcher in making plausible recommendations.

3.3 Location of the Study

The study locations were Nairobi and Machakos counties of Kenya. The study focused on secondary schools and Constituency Bursary Committees in the two regions. In 2008, Nairobi County had 8 constituencies while Machakos County had six. One constituency in Nairobi province was used for piloting. These two regions were chosen so as to capture the rural-urban divide. Machakos district represented the rural setting while Nairobi province represented the urban setting.

3.4 Target Population

Nairobi County, which was divided into three administrative districts in 2008, had 8 constituencies, 55 Wards and 53 public secondary schools. Therefore, the target population from Nairobi County was as follows: 128 CBC members (each CBC is composed of 16 members), 55 elected councillors, 3 DEOs, 3 KNUT Executive

Secretaries, 53 head teachers, 53 BoG chairpersons, 53 PTA chairpersons, 24,963 students and about 10,000 parents.

On the other hand, Machakos County which was divided into 4 administrative districts in 2008 had 6 constituencies, 64 Wards and 151 Public secondary schools. The target population from Machakos County was, therefore, comprised of: 96 members of CBCs, 64 councillors, 4 DEOs, 4 KNUT Executive Secretaries, 151 head teachers, 151 BoG chairpersons, 151 PTA chairpersons, 39,732 students and about 20,000 parents.

Thus, the total target population for the two regions comprised of: 224 CBC members, 119 councillors, 7 DEOs, 7 KNUT Executive Secretaries, 204 head teachers, 204 BoG chairpersons, 204 PTA chairpersons, 64,695 students and about 30,000 parents.

3.5 Sampling Techniques & Sample size

As a result of the heterogeneous nature of the population, the study employed both simple and stratified random sampling techniques to draw the sample. Simple random sampling helps avoid bias in that it gives all units of the target population an equal chance of being selected (Sarantakos, 1993; Kerlinger 2002). Furthermore, stratified random sampling helps ensure that the different sub-groups are represented in the sample (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). Sampling for the different categories of respondents was done as follows:

- I. CBC Members:** A sample size of 30 percent of the members of the CBCs was drawn. This sample size was above the minimum acceptable sample size of 20 percent for a small population (Gay, 1992). Since each constituency had 16 members of the CBC, a sample size of 30 percent yielded 4.8 members which was rounded up to 5. The lottery method, which is a form of simple random sampling, was used to draw the sample for each constituency. This entailed creating a sampling frame based on the names of the CBC members. This method captured five respondents per constituency and it was employed in all the 13 constituencies thus producing a total CBC sample size of 65.
- II. Councillors:** A sample size of 30 percent of the elected councillors was drawn. For Nairobi, 30 percent of the 55 elected councillors translated to 16.5 councillors which was rounded up to 17. For Machakos County, 30 percent of the 64 elected councillors gave 19.2 councillors which was rounded up to 20. Thus, a total of 37 councillors participated in the study. The lottery method was similarly used to draw the sample for each region.
- III. Head teacher, BoG chairpersons & PTA chairpersons:** For head teachers, BoG chairpersons, PTA chairpersons and students, the schools formed the basis of determining sample size. A sample size of 30 percent of the schools in each of the two regions was used. As a result of the schools' diversity, stratification was used along the following lines: Boys' Secondary Schools, Girl's Secondary Schools and Mixed Secondary Schools. The lottery method

was also used to draw the sample for each category of schools. Nairobi County had 19 boys' secondary schools, 19 girls' secondary schools and 14 mixed secondary schools. A sample size of 30 percent for each of these categories produced 6 boys' secondary schools, 6 girls' secondary schools and 4 mixed secondary schools giving a total of 16 secondary schools.

On the other hand, Machakos County had 9 boys' secondary schools, 20 girls' secondary schools and 122 mixed secondary schools. A sample size of 30 percent for each of these school categories produced 3 boys' secondary schools, 6 girls' secondary schools and 37 mixed secondary schools giving a total of 46 secondary schools. Thus, the two regions produced a total school sample size of 62. This gave a corresponding number of head teachers, BoG chairpersons and PTA chairpersons.

IV. Students and Parents: The two regions had a total student population of 64,695 students in public secondary schools (24,963 from Nairobi and 39,732 from Machakos). According to the table for determining sample size for large populations by Krejcie & Morgan (1970), the corresponding sample size for that population should be 382. Since a total of 62 schools participated in the study, this translated to 6.1 students per school which was rounded up to seven. Thus, the total students' sample for the study was 434. In single sex schools, the student sample was stratified based on year of study while in mixed sex schools, stratification was based on both gender and year of study.

Form one produced one student while forms two, three and four produced two students each.

Deducing from the student's population, the population of parents could range between 25,000 and 30,000. According to the table for determining sample size, such a population befits a sample size of 380 (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970). Since 62 schools participated in the study, each school produced 6.1 parents to participate in the study. This number, however, was rounded up to 7, giving a total parents' sample size of 434. Simple random sampling was used to select one form 1 parents, two form 2 parents, two form 3 parents and two form 4 parents per school.

- V. DEOs, KNUT Executive Secretaries & Religious Leaders:** Purposive sampling was used to select 3 DEOs, 3 KNUT Executive Secretaries and 5 religious leaders from the two regions. Sarantakos (1993) observes that purposive sampling enables researchers to purposely choose subjects who in their opinion are thought to be relevant to the research topic. Two DEOs were chosen from Machakos County while one DEO was chosen from Nairobi County. The DEOs play a key role as they are the link between the Ministry of Education and the CBC. Similarly, Two KNUT Executive Secretaries were chosen, one from Nairobi and the other one from Machakos. The KNUT Executive Secretaries gave the position of the teachers' union. On the other hand, the researcher purposively picked the official in charge of the education

docket from each of the following religious bodies which sponsor schools in the two regions: Catholic Church, African Inland Church (AIC), African Brotherhood Church (ABC), Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK) and Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims. This yielded six religious leaders. The total sample size that was used in the study is as given in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Sample Size

Category	Population	Sample size	%
CBC Members	224	65	31
Head teachers	204	62	30
BoG Chairpersons	204	62	30
PTA Chairpersons	204	62	30
Councillors	119	37	31
Students	64,695	434	0.8
Parents	30,000	434	1.4
Religious Leaders	20	6	30
DEOs	7	3	43
KNUT Executive Secretaries	7	3	43
Total	95,681	1,173	1.2

3.6 Research Instruments

The researcher used seven questionnaires and three interview schedules to collect data. The questionnaires used in the study were:

- i. CBC members' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This instrument was divided into two sections. Section A sought background information of CBC members specifically on their academic and professional backgrounds. Section B, which employed both closed and open ended questions, sought pertinent information on: perceptions on the composition of the CBC, management of the CBC, efficiency of the CBC, technical capacity of CBC members and challenges facing CBC.

- ii. Head teachers' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This instrument was divided into two sections. Section A sought background information about the type of school and student population. Section B, which employed both closed and open ended questions, sought pertinent information on: number of students who had benefited from the bursary, number of students who were needy but who had not benefited from the bursary and perceptions on transparency and efficiency of the CBC.

- iii. BoG chairperson's questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This instrument was divided into two sections. Section A sought background information about the type of school and the number of years the respondent had served the school. Section B, which employed both closed and open ended questions sought information on: efficiency of the CBC, perceptions on competency of CBC members, perceptions on transparency of the CBC and level of representation in the CBC.

- iv. PTA chairpersons' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This instrument was divided into two sections. Section A sought background information about the number of parents represented as well as the number of years served. Section B, which employed both closed and open ended questions, sought information on the efficiency of the CBC and perceptions on transparency of CBC.

- v. Parents' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This instrument was divided into two sections. Section A sought background information on size of family, number of children in school as well as the annual family income. Section B, which employed both closed and open ended questions, sought information on the efficiency of the CBC as well as the transparency and fairness of the bursary allocation process.

- vi. Students' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This instrument was divided into two sections. Section A sought background information about the type of school attended, gender, and Class level. Section B, which employed both closed and open ended questions, sought information on: sources of information about bursary, efficiency of the bursary allocation process and effectiveness of the bursary in enhancing retention.

- vii. Elected Councillors' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This instrument was divided into two sections. Section A sought background information while section B sought to capture the perceptions of the respondent on the adequacy of representation of local stakeholders in the CBC, the competency of CBC and the fairness of the CBC in allocating bursaries.

On the other hand, the following interview schedules were also used to collect data:

- i. District Education officers' interview schedule on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This interview schedule sought information on the composition of CBC, representativeness of the CBC, management of the CBC, accountability and transparency of the CBC, technical capacity of CBC and the established Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms.

- ii. KNUT Executive Secretaries' interview schedule on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This interview schedule sought to capture the perceptions of the respondents on the CBC with regard to its composition, management, competency and efficiency.

- iii. Religious Leaders' interview schedule on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme:

This interview schedule sought to capture the perceptions of the respondents on the CBC with regard to its composition, management, competency and efficiency.

Nachmias & Nachmias (1996) aver that interviews have the following advantages: flexibility in the questioning process, control of interview situation, high response rate and fuller information. Thus, the interviews enabled the researcher to probe deeper so as to capture the opinions of these groups about the various aspects of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme.

3.7 Validity

Gay (1992) defines validity as the degree to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure. The content validity of the research instruments was arrived at through expert judgement. Experts help determine content validity by defining in precise terms the domain of the specific content that the test is assumed to represent and then determine how well that content universe is sampled by the test items (Gall et al, 1996). In this regard, the researcher consulted academic members in the field of educational research, educational finance and educational

management for validation of the instruments. The consensus was that the research instruments were appropriately designed as to enable the researcher capture data relevant to the study objectives.

3.8 Reliability

Gay (1992) defines reliability as the degree to which a test consistently measures whatever it is designed to measure and further observes that it can be expressed as a coefficient. The reliability of the instruments was tested after the pilot stage. Piloting of the instruments was done in both Nairobi County and Machakos County with a view to helping the researcher to identify misunderstandings, ambiguities and useless or inadequate items (Wiersma, 1985). Piloting of the CBC members questionnaires was done in Langata Constituency in Nairobi. A total of ten members of the CBC were used. Ten councillors (five from each region) were used to pre-test the Elected Councillors' Questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme. Also, 10 schools (Five from each region) were randomly selected so as to produce respondents for pre-testing the following instruments: Head teachers' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme; BoG chairpersons' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme; PTA chairpersons' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme; Students' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme and Parents' questionnaire on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme. Five students and five parents from each school were used for pre-testing the

instruments. The researcher used the test-retest method to determine the reliability of the instruments. Consequently, questionnaires were administered to the same group of study participants at two different times, after a span of two weeks. The open ended questions were scored by giving a mark for a relevant response and a zero for a blank or an irrelevant response. The researcher then computed the correlation between the two sets of scores using the Pearson Product-Moment correlation Coefficient (Pearson r) formula as given below:

$$r = \frac{n(\sum xy) - (\sum x)(\sum y)}{\sqrt{[n(\sum x^2) - (\sum x)^2][n(\sum y^2) - (\sum y)^2]}}$$

The reliability coefficients that were obtained from the different sets of questionnaires that were piloted are as follows: CBC members' questionnaires (0.79), Councillors' questionnaires (0.73), Headteachers' questionnaires (0.76), BoG chairpersons' questionnaires (0.81), PTA chairpersons' questionnaires (0.78), Students' questionnaires (0.74), Parents' questionnaires (0.71). Consequently, the reliability of the instruments was accepted since they all attained a reliability coefficient above 0.70 which is considered a reasonable minimum in education (Slavin, 1984).

3.9 Data Collection Techniques

The researcher started by applying for a research permit from the MOE. Once granted, the data collection exercise followed the stages outlined below:

I- Recruitment and training of research assistants: In the month of May 2008, two research assistants were recruited and taken through two days of training and briefing to acquaint themselves with the study and the research instruments.

II – Administration of questionnaires: The data collection exercise using questionnaires kicked off in the month of June 2008 and continued up to the end of August 2008. The exercise started in Machakos County before winding up in Nairobi County. The researcher and the assistants administered the questionnaires to the different categories of study participants. This entailed going to the study participants and sensitizing them on the study and their expected role. Once mutual agreement was realized, the questionnaires were left with the study participants to be picked after a period of one week. However, some study participants, especially councillors were keen on filling in the questionnaire on the spot. The first person to be brought on board and sensitised about the study was the head teacher. Once common ground was reached, the Head teachers' questionnaire was administered. This opened the way for the administration of questionnaires to the other study participants in the school set-up, namely, the BOG chairpersons, PTA chairpersons, and the students. The study participants were given one week to respond to the items in the questionnaires after which the researcher and the assistants picked them. Questionnaires for parents were delivered to them by their children during the half term break while others were administered to the parents by the researcher in schools during parents' visiting

days. Once the parents had filled in the questionnaires at home, they gave them back to their children who in turn brought them back to school from where they were picked by the researcher. Those parents who were not conversant with the English language were assisted to fill the questionnaires by their children.

III – Interviews: These were conducted by the researcher and the exercise kicked off in the month of September 2008 stretching up to the 2nd week of November 2008. The researcher booked interview dates with the respective study participants. The interviews were conducted at the study participants work stations. In Machakos, the first to be interviewed was the District Education Officer, followed by the KNUT Executive Secretaries and finally the Religious leaders. Interviews in Nairobi followed the same order. The researcher followed the interview guide for each category of study participants. The researcher recorded in writing all the responses.

IV – Assembling of research instruments and debriefing of research assistants: This was the final phase in the data collection exercise and took place in the 1st week of December 2008. All the duly completed research instruments and other relevant field notes were collected and the research assistants debriefed. Though the study had targeted 1,173 respondents (Table 3.1), it only managed to get 1,115 responses which represent an overall response rate of 95 percent as shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Study Participants' Response Rate

Category	Sample size	Respondents	%
CBC Members	65	62	95
Head teachers	62	62	100
BoG Chairpersons	62	62	100
PTA Chairpersons	62	62	100
Councillors	37	32	86
Students	434	427	98
Parents	434	398	91
Religious Leaders	6	5	83
DEOs	3	3	100
KNUT Executive Secretaries	3	2	66
Total	1,173	1115	95

3.10 Method of Data Analysis

After the data collection exercise, all the research instruments were assembled for cleaning, editing and coding of data. Data cleaning helps in catching and correcting errors and inconsistent codes (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). The researcher employed the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer programme for analysis of quantitative data. Quantitative data were analyzed using various statistics such as means, standard deviations, percentages,

frequencies and ANOVA. These statistics were useful in the analysis of both independent and dependent variables. The statistics were also be used in analysis of relations as well as differences among variables. On the other hand, qualitative data was analysed thematically using a log frame. This, according to Mugenda & Mugenda (1999) entails creating a factual code which serves the purpose of identifying a fact, a feeling or an attitude from the text. This in turn assisted the researcher to closely evaluate the usefulness of the information in answering research questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

The findings of the study are presented in this chapter. The findings are discussed hinged on the purposes of the study, which as stated in section 1.3 (pg 10) were to explore stakeholders' perceptions on the decentralization of the secondary education bursary programme, assess the effectiveness and equitability of the decentralized bursary programme and to identify the challenges hindering the success of the programme with a view to making policy recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness of the bursary programme.


This chapter addresses four of the five objectives drawn from the broad purposes of the study while the fifth objective on policy recommendations is addressed in the chapter that follows. The objectives addressed here are to: (i) Analyze and compare the perceptions of different stakeholders on the transfer of the management of the secondary education bursary scheme from schools to the Constituency Bursary Committees, (ii) Assess the effectiveness of the CBC in reaching the income poor and vulnerable students with bursary, (iii) Determine the equitability of bursary disbursement by the Constituency Bursary Committees, and (iv) Identify the challenges faced by the Constituency Bursary Committees while discharging their mandate.

This study generated both quantitative and qualitative data. The data was obtained through the use of questionnaires and interview schedules. There were a total of

seven sets of questionnaires for different categories of respondents namely CBC members (N=62), Head teachers (N=62), BoG Chairpersons (N=62), PTA Chairpersons (N=62), Councillors (N=32) Parents (N=398) and Students (N=427). There were three Interview Schedules for different categories of respondents, namely District Education Officers (N=3), KNUT Executive Secretaries (N=2) and Religious leaders (N=5). Once all the data was collected, it was cleaned and then analysed. The quantitative data from the questionnaires was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer programme. The qualitative data from the interview schedules was analysed thematically using a log frame.

4.2 Type of school and students' background characteristics

The study grouped the schools into three categories, namely; Mixed Secondary Schools, Girls' Secondary Schools and Boys' Secondary Schools. Out of the 422 students who participated in the study, 218(51.1%) were in Mixed Secondary Schools, 108(25.3%) were in Girls' Secondary Schools while 101(23.6%) were in Boys' Secondary Schools as shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Type of school of study participants

The study also sought to establish the distribution of students by gender and age. Of the 427 students who participated in the study, 221(51.8%) were males while 206(48.2%) were females. Table 4.1 gives the distribution of students by gender and age.

Table 4.1: Distribution of Students by Gender and Age

Students' Age group		Gender of students		
		Male	Female	Total
Below 15 years	Count	5	6	11
	% of Total	1.2%	1.4%	2.6%
15-18 years	Count	175	189	364
	% of Total	41.5%	44.8%	86.3%
Above 18 years	Count	40	7	47
	% of Total	9.5%	1.7%	11.1%
Total	Count	220	202	422
	% of Total	52.1%	47.9%	100.0%

Table 4.1 shows that of the 422 students who responded to both items, 364(86.3 %) of them were in the age bracket of 15-18 years. The number of male students in this age bracket was 175(41.5%) while that of the females was 189(44.8%). Only 11(2.6%) students were below 15 years while 47(11.1%) students were above 18 years old. It is worthy noting that more males than females were aged over 18 years at 40(9.5%) and 7(1.7%) respectively. This could imply that retention of older female students in schools is lower as compared to that of male students.

The study also sought to establish distribution of students by age and form. The results are as shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Distribution of students by Age and Form

Class Level		Students' Age group			Total
		Below 15 years	15-18 years	Above 18 years	
Form 1	Count	11	19	0	30
	% of Total	2.6%	4.5%	.0%	7.1%
Form 2	Count	0	119	2	121
	% of Total	.0%	28.3%	.5%	28.8%
Form 3	Count	0	139	14	153
	% of Total	.0%	33.0%	3.3%	36.3%
Form 4	Count	0	86	31	117
	% of Total	.0%	20.4%	7.4%	27.8%
	Count	11	363	47	421
Total	% of Total	2.6%	86.2%	11.2%	100.0%

Table 4.2 indicates that 363(86.2%) students were aged between 15 and 18 years while 47(11.2%) of them were over 18 years of age. For those students aged between 15 and 18 years, 86(20.4%) were in Form four, 139(33%) in form three, 119(28.3%) were in form two while 19(4.5%) were in form one. All the 11(2.6%) students aged below 15 years were in form one.

It was also important for the study to establish the family set up of the students since it has a great implication on their level of need. Figure 4.2 captures the students' family set up.

Figure 4.2: Students' family set up




Figure 4.2 shows that 254(59.5%) of the students who participated in the study stayed with both parents. On the other hand, 96(22.5%) of them stayed with their mothers only while 28(6.6%) stayed with their fathers only. The study also revealed that 49(11.5%) of the students were orphans.

The study also sought to establish the sources of family income. This is captured in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Source of family income

Source of Family Income	Count	Percent
Father's Employment	123	30.5
Mother's Employment	63	15.6
Family Business	48	11.9
Farming	110	27.4
Father's & Mother's Employment	29	7.2
Business & Farming	20	5.0
Father's Employment & Farming	1	0.2
Mother's Employment & Farming	8	2.0
Mother's Employment & Family Business	1	0.2
Total	403	100.0

From Table 4.3, it is apparent that most families depended on fathers' employment as the main source of income as reported by 123(30.5%) of the 403 students who responded to this item. Other sources of family income as given by the students were: farming 110(27.4%), mother's employment 63(15.6%) and family business 48(11.9%). On the other hand 29(7.2%) students had both parents employed. The source of family income has a significant relationship with who pays school fees for students as captured in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Major source of school fees for students

Payer of Fees	Count	Percent
Father	189	44.8
Mother	87	20.7
Brother/Sister	36	8.5
Bursaries	55	13.0
Sponsors	38	9.0
Bursaries & Others	9	2.1
Father & Mother	8	1.9
Total	422	100.0

Fathers were the major payers of school fees as given by 189(44.8%) of the 422 students who responded to the item. Mothers came second as given by 87(20.7%) students. Bursaries were identified as a source of fees by 55(13%) students. Sponsors paid fees for 38(9%) of the respondents while 36(8.5%) of them had their fees paid by brothers/sisters.

It was also important to establish the educational load of families in terms of children enrolled in educational institutions. In this regard, 372(87.5%) students had other siblings enrolled in educational institutions. The distribution of siblings in educational institutions cut across all education levels as shown in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: Number of other siblings in school

Number of enrolled Siblings	Level of Sibling Enrolment					
	Primary School		Secondary School		Post-Secondary Institutions	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
1	102	33.8	114	44.5	113	68.9
2	119	39.4	110	43.0	38	23.2
3	45	14.9	27	10.5	9	5.5
4	29	9.6	5	2.0	2	1.2
5	5	1.7	-	-	2	1.2
6	1	0.3	-	-	-	-
7	1	0.3	-	-	-	-

Out of those students who said that they had other siblings in school, majority of them had one or two siblings in schools. Indeed, 102(33.8%) and 119(39.4%) of them had one and two sibling respectively in primary schools while 114(44.5%) and 110(43%) had one and two siblings respectively in secondary schools. On the other hand, 113(68.9%) and 38(23.2%) of the students had one and two siblings respectively in Post secondary institutions. These responses from students tally closely to those of parents on family size and the number of children enrolled in educational institutions as captured in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.


Figure 4.3: Family size as given by parents

Figure 4.3 shows that most of the parents had big families. In fact, 102(25.9%) of the parents had more than six children, 89(22.6%) had five children, 95(24.1%) had four children, and 66(16.8%) had three children. Supporting a big family calls for substantial financial and material resources. Figure 4.4 shows the school level of children as given by parents.


Figure 4.4: Education level of children

Figure 4.4 shows that 128(23.6%) of parents had children enrolled in primary schools, 404(74.5%) had children enrolled in Secondary schools while 10(1.9%) had children enrolled in Post-secondary institutions. These findings are important as they are a pointer to the financial load that families have to carry in providing education to their children. In this connection it was important to establish the type of occupation as well as the monthly and annual income of parents. Parents responded on their type of occupation as captured in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Parents' Occupation




Figure 4.5 shows that the majority of the parents were self-employed as given by 214(53.8%) of them. On the other hand, 148(37.2%) of the parents were in formal employment while 36(9%) of them were unemployed. The study also sought to make a comparison between the type of occupation and level of income as captured in Table 4.6:

Table 4.6: Comparison of Type of Occupation and Income

Statistics	Occupation					
	Employed		Self Employed		Unemployed	
	Monthly Income	Annual Income	Monthly Income	Annual Income	Monthly Income	Annual Income
Mean	13469.50	157846.53	5291.24	54402.93	2109.09	25309.09
Std. Deviation	17298.74	213662.29	9733.83	73574.94	1889.68	22676.22
Minimum	500.00	6000.00	400.00	4800.00	500.00	6000.00
Maximum	150000.00	1800000.00	100000.00	1200000.00	7000.00	84000.00
Range	149500.00	1794000.00	99600.00	1195200.00	6500.00	78000.00
Skewness	4.57	4.34	6.89	4.52	1.93	1.93
Variance	299246369.68	45651575081.94	94747352.20	5413272413.47	3570909.09	514210909.09
Median	9750.00	78000.00	3000.00	36000.00	1500.00	18000.00

Table 4.6 shows that the level of income differed significantly from one occupation category to another. Those who were formally employed recorded the highest monthly mean income at Kenya shillings 13,469(annually Kenya shillings 157,846). They were followed by those who were in self employment with a mean monthly income of Kenya shillings 5,291(annually Kenya shillings 54,402). Those who were in the category of un-employed had the least mean monthly income of Kenya shillings 1,889(annually Kenya shillings 22,676). Thus, the mean monthly income for the three categories of parents was Kenya shillings 6,956. However, there were wide disparities in incomes especially for those who were employed and those in self employment. For the employed, the range of the

monthly income was Kenya shillings 149,500 as the lowest paid parent recorded a monthly salary of Kenya shillings 500 while the highest paid recorded Kenya shillings 150,000. Similarly, the lowest monthly income for those parents in self employment was Kenya shillings 400 while the highest was Kenya shillings 100,000 giving a range of Kenya shillings 99,600. Considering the earlier observation that 214(53.8%) of the parents were self-employed, then one can state that the majority of the parents had a mean monthly income of Kenya shillings 5,291. Having looked at the level of income of the parents, it was also necessary to capture the fees charged by the secondary schools. The study established that the mean annual fees charged was Kenya shillings 21,870 though there was wide disparity among schools with the range varying from a minimum of Kenya shillings 5,000 to a maximum of Kenya shillings 44,000. Having observed earlier that the mean monthly income for parents was Kenya shillings 6,956 and that a majority of the parents had other children across all the three levels of education, i.e. primary, secondary and post-secondary, then one can conclude that at Kenya shillings 21,870, the mean annual fees charged by secondary schools, posed a big financial challenge to most parents.

4.3 Perceptions of stakeholders on various aspects of the Constituency Bursary Committee

One of the objectives of the study was to analyze and compare the perceptions of major stakeholders with regard to the transfer of the management of the secondary

education bursary scheme from schools to the Constituency Bursary Committees. From the literature review, we saw that decentralization entails transferring of power and functions from a higher level of government to a lower government or non-government level (Fiske, 1996; Falleti, 2004). Thus, the transfer of the management of the secondary school bursary from teachers (who are agents of the central government) to the Constituency Bursary Committees (which are supposed to have local level representation) is one form of decentralization. It is argued that decentralization fosters social participation, efficiency, accountability, transparency and fairness.

Studies have shown that consensus building is vital for the success of decentralization (Fiske 1996, UNESCO 2005b). Fiske outlines eight consensus building steps which entails: identifying stakeholders and their interests, building legitimate interest into the model, organizing public discussions, clarifying the purpose of decentralization, analyzing the obstacles to decentralization, respecting the role of various actors, providing adequate training and developing a monitoring system. While advocating for consensus building among all stakeholders, UNESCO also notes that decentralization should be supported by dissemination of information, consultation and explanatory action among the population and that the policy should be viewed as a tool of social participation. It is with regard to these views that this study gave emphasis on capturing the views of the key stakeholders on the decentralization of the secondary education bursary scheme.

As pointed out in the background to the study, prior to 2003, the Secondary Education Bursary Scheme used to be managed at the school level as each institution would receive its allocation of funds directly from the MoE. This, however, changed in 2003 with the creation of the CBC and the transfer of the bursary funds from the schools to the CBC. This study sought to establish, amongst others, whether consultation with key stakeholders, which is key to arriving at a consensus, was done. Statistics from the study suggest that very little consultation was done as shown in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6: Whether stakeholders were consulted before transfer of bursary fund management




Figure 4.6 shows that 54(90%), 57(93.4%), and 56(94.9%) of the Head teachers, PTA chairpersons and BoG chairpersons respectively were not consulted before the policy change was effected. These three groups represent major constituencies of stakeholders and it would have been imperative to seek and possibly accommodate their views. The PTA, for instance, represents parents who are key stakeholders in the education process. Studies on decentralization show that consultation is important before and during implementation as it helps build consensus among the stakeholders (Fiske 1996, UNESCO 2005b). Thus, it appears the MoE did not engage the stakeholders before shifting the management of the secondary education bursary from the schools to the CBC. As already noted, decentralization is supposed to act as a tool of social participation. However, when the stakeholders' views are ignored, then their support for the system cannot be guaranteed as it robs them the privilege of owning the process.

As noted in the review of literature, the modern case of decentralized government is anchored on two arguments: Efficiency values and governance values (Wolman 1990). Decentralization is supposed to increase efficiency in determining service provision. With regard to governance, decentralization is expected to foster: (i) responsiveness and accountability, (ii) diversity, and (iii) political participation. From these two arguments, which lay the foundation for decentralization, the study sought to capture the perceptions of stakeholders on a number of aspects of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme. These are: efficiency of CBC in processing applications & awarding bursaries, transparency of CBC,

accountability of CBC to local community, representation of local community in CBC, competence of CBC in identifying needy students and fairness of CBC in bursary allocation. Respondents rated each of these items on a five-point likert scale with 1 and 5 standing for very weak and very strong respectively. Responses from CBC members, who are interested parties, were analyzed separately from those of the other categories of respondents. The results for stakeholders who were none CBC members are given in Table 4.7 while those for CBC members are given in Table 4.8.

Table 4.7: Comparison of stakeholders' ratings of on various CBC variables

Mean							
Regions	Stakeholders	Efficiency of CBC in Processing Applications and Awarding Bursaries	Transparency of CBC While Discharging Responsibilities	Accountability of CBC to Local Community/ Stakeholders	Representation of Local/ Stakeholders in CBC	Competence of CBC in Identifying Needy Students	Fairness of CBC in Bursary Allocation
Rural	Headteachers	2.27	2.00	2.16	2.52	1.93	2.16
	Councillors	2.81	2.75	2.81	2.37	2.38	2.81
	Parents	2.23	2.20	2.23	2.50	2.32	2.21
	P.T.A Chairperson	2.39	2.34	2.14	2.41	1.93	2.57
	B.O.G Chairperson	2.35	2.26	2.07	2.16	1.95	2.51
	Total	2.41	2.31	2.28	2.39	2.10	2.45
Urban	Headteachers	2.31	2.06	2.38	2.75	2.06	2.31
	Councillors	3.13	2.81	2.75	2.06	2.69	2.87
	Parents	2.48	2.31	2.65	2.72	2.62	2.44
	P.T.A Chairperson	2.65	2.53	2.35	2.39	1.94	2.71
	B.O.G Chairperson	2.47	2.65	2.24	2.29	2.35	2.76
	Total	2.60	2.47	2.47	2.44	2.33	2.62
Total	Headteachers	2.28	2.02	2.21	2.58	1.97	2.20
	Councillors	2.97	2.78	2.78	2.22	2.53	2.84
	Parents	2.32	2.24	2.38	2.58	2.43	2.29
	P.T.A Chairperson	2.46	2.39	2.20	2.40	1.94	2.61
	B.O.G Chairperson	2.38	2.37	2.12	2.20	2.07	2.58
	Total	2.48	2.36	2.34	2.40	2.19	2.50

Table 4.8: CBC Members ratings of various CBC variables

Mean						
Stakeholders	Competence of CBC in Identifying Needy Students	Transparency of CBC While Discharging Responsibilities	Efficiency of CBC in Processing Applications and Awarding Bursaries	Accountability of CBC to Local Community/ Stakeholders	Fairness of CBC in Bursary Allocation	Representation of Local Community/ Stakeholders in CBC
C.B.C	3.58	3.84	3.79	3.50	3.98	3.21

From Table 4.7, it is clear that the rating of the CBC by the majority of the stakeholders from the two regions (urban and rural) on most of the variables was low. Educational stakeholders from both rural and urban constituencies, represented by Machakos district and Nairobi province respectively, gave the CBC low ratings on the various variables. To start with, stakeholders' rating of the CBC on its efficiency in processing applications and awarding bursaries was low at an average of 2.48. As noted in a later section, 75(50%) of the successful bursary applicants had to wait for more than two months before receiving a bursary, a factor which could have contributed highly to the low rating on efficiency of the CBC. On the other hand, the CBC members rated themselves highly with regard to efficiency at an average of 3.79 as indicated in Table 4.8.

Stakeholders' rating of the CBC on transparency was also low at an average of 2.36. This means that the CBC failed the transparency test in the eyes of most stakeholders. This is contrary to what is expected of decentralization. As noted in the literature review, one of the tenet of decentralization is increased transparency (Wolman, 1990). However, with regard to the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme, there has been no increase in transparency according to the stakeholders. Like with efficiency, CBC members rated themselves highly on transparency at an average of 3.84.

Similarly, stakeholders' rating of CBC on accountability to the local community was also low at an average of 2.34. Thus, though the MoE may have envisaged a

more accountable bursary disbursement system via decentralization, the stakeholders were unsatisfied with CBC's level of accountability to the local community. The CBC members rated themselves highly on accountability at 3.50.

On the issue of the representation of local community in the CBC, the ratings were also low at an average of 2.40. Decentralization, as noted in the literature review, is supposed to enhance social participation through increased local representation (Wolman, 1990; Fiske, 1996; Falleti, 2004; UNESCO, 2005). However, with regard to the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme, the local community still felt locked out of the process. Again, the CBC members gave a high rating of the representation of the local community at an average of 3.21.

The stakeholders were of the view that the CBC lacked adequate competence to identify needy students, giving an average rating of 2.19. The reason advanced to explain this low rating of the competence of the CBC to identify needy students was that unlike teachers who have a personal knowledge of the students, CBC does not know the students and only relies on the information given in the bursary application form. This means that a majority of the stakeholders felt that the CBC lacked adequate competence to identify needy students. This, however, contrasted the view of the CBC members who gave themselves a high rating at an average of 3.58.

On fairness of CBC in bursary allocation, the stakeholder's ratings were also low at an average of 2.50. Thus, a majority of the stakeholders were of the view that the CBC was not fair with regard to bursary allocations and many alluded to fears that the bursary allocation process under the CBC is driven by the political interest of the MP, who is the patron and thus losing on fairness. However, the CBC members rated themselves highly on fairness at 3.98.

Thus, the views of other stakeholders on various variables of the CBC differed sharply with those of the CBC members as seen in the above analysis. This can be understood in the light of the fact that CBC members, as interested parties, would tend to give themselves a favourable judgement while the other category of stakeholders would be quite critical in their judgement.

It was also important for the study to establish the perceived level of influence of the MP on the Constituency Bursary Committee by the various stakeholders. The results are as given in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9: Stakeholders view of the level of influence of the MP on the CBC

Stakeholders	Influence of local MP in CBC decision making
C.B.C	4.19
Head teachers	3.85
Councillors	4.19
Parents	3.20
PTA Chairperson	4.03
BOG Chairperson	4.12
Total	3.93

It is clear that all the stakeholders concurred that the level of influence of the MP on the CBC was quite strong at an average of 3.93 in a 5 point likert scale. It is noteworthy that CBC members rated the MP's influence as very strong at 4.19. This is important since it is the shoe wearer who knows where it pinches. Thus, since they are the ones who are directly involved in transacting CBC business, then their rating of the influence of the MPs should be taken seriously as it implies that the decisions they make are not independent.

Having sought the perceptions of various stakeholders on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme, the study also deemed it necessary to capture their preference on where they would like its management to be based. Their views are as captured in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10: Stakeholders' preference of bursary management

Stakeholder	Preferred level of Management		
	Constituency	School	Ward
Parents	17%	73%	10%
CBC	70%	22%	8%
PTA	12%	87%	0%
BoG	8%	92%	0%
H/T	5%	95%	0%
Councillors	12.5%	20%	67.5%
KNUT Officer	0%	100%	0%
DEO	66.6%	0%	33.3%
Religious Leaders	33.3%	66.6%	0%

From Table 4.10, it is evident that a majority of the stakeholders would prefer that the secondary education bursary scheme be managed at the school level. This applies to parents, BoG members, PTA members, head teachers and KNUT Officials. On the other hand, there are those who would prefer the status quo to remain, i.e. the bursary to continue being managed by the CBC. In this category

were the CBC members and the DEOs. However, there were some stakeholders with an entirely new proposal that the bursary fund be decentralized further to the ward level. This view enjoyed wide support from councillors(67.5%), who are the ward's political representatives. This view also got support from other stakeholders, namely parents(10%), CBC members(8%), and DEOs(33.3%).

4.4 Effectiveness of the Constituency Bursary Committee

Having established the perceptions of stakeholders on various aspects of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme, the second major objective of the study was to assess the effectiveness of the Constituency Bursary Committee in reaching the income poor students as well as enhancing their school survival rates. To achieve this, the study focused on the actual running of CBC affairs with a view to making an independent judgement. As pointed out earlier in the literature review, one of the two main arguments advanced in favour of modern decentralization of government services is based on efficiency values (Wolman, 1990). Decentralization, it is argued, increases efficiency as well as effectiveness in service delivery. Decentralization makes decision making participatory thus empowering the citizens to influence decisions about service provision on the type, level, quality and mix of services that they desire. It was, therefore, imperative to establish whether the decentralization of the secondary education bursary scheme had led to increased efficiency and effectiveness in enhancing access and participation of students from poor socio-economic backgrounds.

From a non-technical perspective, time is one of the simplest yardsticks for assessing the efficiency of most undertakings. An efficient operation is usually adjudged as that one which takes the least time to execute successfully. The study, therefore, sought to establish how long it took students to secure a bursary after submitting an application. Responses from students are presented in Figure 4.7 below.

Figure 4.7: Students' responses on duration taken between Application and Award of Bursary




Figure 4.7 shows that 30(19.9%) of the successful applicants took just two weeks to secure a bursary. On the other hand, 46(30.5%) of the successful applicants took one month, another 45(29.8%) two months, and finally, 30(19.9%) took four months and above. Thus, 76(50.4%) of the successful applicants got their bursary within one month while it took more than two months for the other 75(49.7%) successful applicants to get theirs. When ones takes into consideration that the

school calendar is divided into three terms of three months each, then one can argue that the bursary allocation process was not efficient in terms of timeliness. For the 75(49.7%) of the successful applicants who had to wait for two months or more before receiving a bursary, it meant suffering from financial stress for more than 2/3 of a school term. During this waiting period, the students could have lost learning hours if the school management decided to lock them out until their school fees were paid. Thus, the bursary was not efficient in enhancing students' participation. In the same connection, the study sought to know from the parents how long it took before getting feedback on their children's bursary application from the CBC. Their responses are captured in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11: Parents' response on duration taken to get feedback from the CBC

Duration Taken	Frequency	Percent
One-two Months	24	8.7
Three-four Months	45	16.4
Five-six Months	31	11.3
Seven Months –One year	15	5.5
No feedback at all	160	58.2
Total	275	100.0

Table 4.11 shows that out of the 275 parents whose children had applied for bursaries, only 24(8.7%) of them got feedback on their children's bursary

application within one to two months. Another 45(16.4%) parents reported that it took three to four months to get feedback while it took 31(11.3%) of them five to six months. However, the most perplexing thing was that 160(58.2%) parents never got any feedback at all on their children's bursary application from the CBC. This lack of feedback from the CBC left many parents in the dark and it could have contributed to their low rating on the efficiency and accountability of the CBC. Indeed, as captured in section 4.3 above, the perceptions of stakeholders on the aspect of efficiency is quite low at an average of 2.48 in a likert scale of 5. An analysis of the efficiency scores by category of stakeholders show that 90(25.7%) and 104(29.7%) of the parents scored efficiency as low and very low respectively giving a combined low rating of 194(55.4%). Similarly, 30(49.2%) and 6(9.8%) of PTA members scored efficiency as low and very low respectively giving a combined low rating of 36(59%). The same applies to BOG members as 30(50%) and 6(10%) of them scored efficiency as low and very low respectively giving a combined low rating of 36(60%). For the Head teachers, 21(34.4%) and 14(23%) of them scored efficiency as low and very low respectively giving a combined low rating of 35(57.4%). It is only the CBC members who rated themselves highly with regard to efficiency with 27(43.5%) and 11(17.7%) of them scoring high and very high ratings respectively giving a combined high rating of 38(61.2%). Furthermore, a situation where 160(58.2%) of the parents do not get any feedback regarding their children's bursary application is bound to

lower the transparency and accountability ratings of the CBC in the eyes of the stakeholders as captured in an earlier section.

In assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme, the study was guided by Ziderman (2003) who posits that the success of a student financing scheme in enhancing access and participation of the poor in education is judged on three issues: *reach*, *efficacy* and *equity*. Regarding reach, the questions asked are: *does the scheme reach the target group? Which groups are not reached? Are some ineligible students in receipt of bursaries/loans?* On efficacy, the guiding questions are: *do the funds lead to a continuation of study, thus preventing drop-out for the recipient? What would happen in the absence of a bursary/loan?* Finally, on equity the questions asked are: *Are bursary/loan recipients treated equitably? Do all potential recipients have equal chances of receiving a bursary/loan?* Thus, in assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme, this study has made an attempt to address the questions of reach, efficacy and equity.

For a bursary scheme to reach its intended beneficiaries, accurate information is vital. Getting access to information regarding the bursary is essential if applicants are to submit their requests in time and in the prescribed format. The study, thus, sought to establish the source of information about the bursary for both students and parents. For students, their sources of information are given in Figure 4.8.


Figure 4.8: Students' Sources of Bursary information

Figure 4.8 shows that teachers still play a key role in disseminating information about the bursary to students. In fact, 159(58.7%) of the 271 students who responded to this item got the information about the bursary from teachers, 81(29.9%) from parents/guardians while only 21(10.3%) of them benefited from sensitization campaigns by the CBC. A similar scenario also applies to the parents. Indeed, 121(58.5%) of the 207 parents who responded to the item got information about the bursary from teachers, 46(22.2%) from councillors, and 19(9.2%) from public barazas. Thus, it is evident that teachers still play a crucial

role of informing both students and parents about the bursary. On the other hand, the CBC does not seem to be doing quite well in sensitizing their clients about the availability of the bursary.

Once students and parents have received information about the availability of the bursary, the next important thing would be to apply. The study, therefore, sought to establish the bursary application rates from both students and parents. The study established that 281(66.7%) of the students did apply for a bursary from the CBC. This figure closely tallies with the responses of the parents as 242(62.9%) of them said that their children had applied for bursaries in the last three years. Many of the students had applied for the bursary on more than one occasion as captured in Table 4.12.

Table 4.12: Number of times students applied for a bursary

Number of Times	Frequency	Percent
1	56	19.6
2	69	24.2
3	71	24.9
4	29	10.2
5	18	6.3
6	14	4.9
7	4	1.4
8	4	1.4
10	1	.4
More than 10 Times	19	6.7
Total	285	100

Table 4.12 shows that the rate of bursary application was high. Whereas 56(19.6%) of the students had applied for the bursary once, 69(24.2%) and 71(24.9%) of them had done so two and three times respectively. Another 19(6.7%) students indicated that they had submitted bursary applications for more than 10 times. However, applying for a bursary was one thing while being successful was another thing. The study, therefore, sought to establish from the students how many times their applications were successful. The results are as presented in Table 4.13.

Table 4.13: Rate of success of bursary application

Number of Times	Frequency	Percent
0	54	28.4
1	81	42.6
2	30	15.8
3	16	8.4
4	4	2.1
5	2	1.1
6	1	0.5
9	2	1.1
Total	190	100

Table 4.13 shows that 54(28.4%) of the applicants had never succeeded in getting a bursary. On the other hand, 81(42.6%), 30(15.8%) and 16(8.4%) of the applicants were successful once, twice and thrice respectively. For parents, only 102(35.9%) said that bursary applications for their children were successful. The responses from students and parents on the success rate of the bursary applicants were corroborated by results on number of bursary applicants and recipients from 13 CBCs as captured in Table 4.14.

**Table 4.14: Number of bursary applicants & recipients per constituency,
2005-2007**

Constituency	2005			2006			2007		
	Applicants	Recipients	%	Applicants	Recipients	%	Applicants	Recipients	%
Masinga	770	260	33.7	760	252	33.2	780	250	32.1
Yatta	6932	835	12	3476	715	20.6	3925	486	12.4
Mwala	-	-	-	-	-	-	830	380	45.8
Kathiani	-	-	-	-	-	-	540	338	62.6
Kangundo	-	-	-	4085	985	24.1	825	471	57.1
Machakos	1517	480	31.6	1520	520	34.2	1540	540	35.1
Kamukunji	1625	168	10.3	812	305	37.6	537	401	74.7
Dagoretti	4451	425	9.5	4368	493	11.3	4498	527	11.7
Kasarani	3186	1096	34.4	1829	729	39.9	1019	909	89.2
Embakasi	6752	1305	19.3	6085	1185	19.5	6315	1074	17
Westlands	1203	455	37.8	841	363	43.2	610	345	56.6
Starehe	4150	469	11.3	3885	558	14.4	4435	582	13.1
Makadara	3215	1056	32.8	4364	1205	27.6	4521	845	18.7
Total	33801	6549	19.4	32025	7310	22.8	30375	7148	23.5

Table 4.14 shows that on average 6549(19.4%), 7310(22.8%) and 7148(23.8%) of the 33801, 32025, and 30375 applicants for 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively received bursaries from the 13 CBCs. This means that the bursary reached only 21007(21.9%) of the 96201 applicants in all the 13 constituencies over the three years period. However, the picture is grimmer when one considers individual constituencies. For instance, in Starehe Constituency, the reach of the bursary was such that only 469(11.3%), 558(14.4%) and 582(13%) of the 4150, 3885 and 4435 applicants for 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively succeeded in getting a bursary. A similar scenario was captured in Dagoretti Constituency where only 425(9.5%), 493(11.3%) and 527(11.7%) of the 4451, 4368 and 4498 bursary applicants for 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively were successful. Thus, if one makes the assumption that all those students who apply for bursaries are needy, then the reach of the bursary is quite dismal as only 21007(21.9%) of the 96201 applicants were successful in the 13 Constituencies over the three year period.

It was important to establish from the head teachers whether some of those students who did not receive bursaries were quite needy. In response, 53(97%) of the head teachers noted that there were some very needy students who did not receive bursaries. Indeed, a total of 4,302 students whom the head teachers considered to be quite needy did not receive a bursary from the CBC. If the head teachers' assessment was fair then, the decentralized bursary scheme suffered from undercoverage, or *Type I errors*, which occur when the poor are excluded from a programme's benefits (Domelen, 2007).

Another critical question with regard to the reach of bursary schemes, according to Ziderman, is whether some ineligible students are in receipt of the bursary. Thus, the question to be posed here is: of the 21007(21.9%) of the 96201 applicants who succeeded in getting bursaries in the 13 constituencies over the three years, how many were fully eligible? As pointed out in the literature review, many student finance schemes in many countries are faced with the challenge of defining eligibility (Ziderman 2003; 2004). Some countries define eligibility based on maximal family income ceiling while others peg it on the official poverty line. The study established that the CBCs are guided by the MoE's Bursary Allocation Guidelines which outlines the eligibility criteria for receiving a bursary. It was important to establish the sufficiency of the MoE's eligibility guidelines. When asked whether the MoE Bursary Allocation Guidelines offered sufficient guidance in assessing the level of need of applicants, 34(55.7%) of the CBC members responded that they were insufficient while 27(44.3%) said they were. Thus, one can conclude that the majority of the CBC members who felt that the guidelines were insufficient could not vouch that only the eligible students benefited from the bursary. Another major concern was the over reliance of the CBCs on the information given in the Bursary Application Form in making judgement on the level of need of the applicant. Indeed, 57(91.9%) of the CBC members pointed out that they relied solely on the bursary application forms to garner information about applicants and only 5(8.1%) said that they conducted home visits. Thus, unlike head teachers who have the benefit of close interaction with the students through which they can glean some critical

information about their social-economic backgrounds, the CBC's overdependence on the information filled in the form by the applicants limits its capability of ensuring that only the most deserving cases received the bursary. Most of the CBC members acknowledged that applicants gave false information in the application forms. This was corroborated by students as 99(25.1%) of them stated that applicants gave in-accurate information. Students advanced two major reasons for giving inaccurate information. One was that in-accurate information was given so as to increase the chances of being awarded a bursary. This is quite understandable in a situation where the funds are scarce and can only cater for 21.9% of the applicants as stated earlier. The second reason was interesting as it indicated that some students give in-accurate information so as not to be seen as poor. This means that this category of students would paint a rosy picture of their socio-economic background which automatically locked them out of the bursary. This could be understood from a psychological perspective when one takes into consideration the age bracket of a majority of the students (Tables 4.1 & 4.2) which puts them in the adolescence stage. At this stage of life, peer pressure is usually quite strong and some students would rather miss the bursary than reveal their true socio-economic status. For this category of students, the bursary application was made to oblige the parents. The CBC members acknowledged the limitation occasioned by sole reliance on bursary application forms and 53(89.8%) of them supported the idea of making home visits to corroborate the information given. However, this is easier said than done as the feasibility of such


an undertaking is quite remote when one factors in the big number of bursary applications received by each respective CBC as captured earlier in Table 4.14.

In this connection, the study sought to capture the views of stakeholders on whether the bursaries were allocated to the most deserving. In response, 219(57.4%) of the students were of the view that those who received the bursary merited. On the other hand, 170(43.6%) of the students, which is too big to be ignored, felt that those who got the bursary were not the most deserving. This latter view compares favourably with that of head teachers as 28(46%) of them noted that there were some undeserving students who were awarded bursaries. In deed, a total of 306 students were awarded bursaries but did not deserve them according to the head teachers. Again, if this assessment by the head teachers was fair, then the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme experienced leakages, or *Type II errors*, which occur when the non-poor benefit (Domelen, 2007). However, in spite of the strong feelings that the bursary benefited undeserving cases as expressed by students and head teachers, the number of such cases (306) was not very big as it was only 1.4 % of the 21,007 successful bursary applicants. This could mean two things: one that most of those who actually applied for and received bursaries were quite needy, and, two, the perception that bursaries went to undeserving cases was quite strong even when no strong evidence existed to support the view.

This study also sought to assess the efficacy of the decentralized bursary scheme. Ziderman(2003) observes that the major questions with regard to efficacy of a bursary scheme are:

- i. Do the funds lead to a continuation of study, thus preventing drop-out for the recipients?
- ii. What would happen in the absence of a bursary?

These questions, as raised by Ziderman(2003), assisted this study in addressing the issue of the effectiveness of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme in enhancing retention and participation of the poor and vulnerable students in secondary schools. In essence, the bottom line is: Was the bursary received by a needy student sufficient to keep him/her in school? To answer this question, the study sought to establish the amount of bursary received by students. The results are as captured in Figure 4.9.

Figure 4.9: Histogram of Bursary Allocations

The statistics in the histogram indicate that the mean bursary allocation was Kenya Shillings 7604.5 and the standard deviation was 6728.7 for a total of 132 students who responded that they received bursary. The distribution is skewed towards the left with a majority of students having reported that they had received a bursary of Kenya Shillings 10,000 and below. As noted elsewhere, on average, most secondary schools charged fees to the tune of Kenya Shillings 21,870 per year. Thus, this bursary allocation would at most cover only one third of the total school fees required of a student. In fact, only 12(9.4%) of the successful students indicated that the bursary allocated catered for their total school fees. For the 120(90.6%) of the students whose total school fees were not catered for by the bursary, it was important to establish whether they were able to clear the

remaining balances in their school fees. It emerged that 32(26.7%) of those students who got partial bursaries were able to clear their school fees balance while 88(73.3%) of them were unable to. For those students who got partial bursaries and were unable to clear the school fees balance, 69(78.4%) of them indicated that they were eventually sent home by the school administration while 19(21.6%) were allowed to stay in school following an agreement between the parent/guardian and the school administration. In effect, this means that the effectiveness of the bursary in enhancing retention and participation of needy students in schools is quite limited. This point is further buttressed by responses from parents and head teachers as 174(78.4%) of the parents noted that the amount of bursary received by their children did not have a major impact on their school fees balance and, therefore, did not rescue them from being sent home by the school administration. This view that the bursary allocated was inadequate in meeting the students' financial needs was vindicated by 58(93.5%) of the head teachers. The study sought to establish from the head teachers the percentage of needy students' school fees that were catered for by the bursary and the results are as indicated in Figure 4.10.

Figure 4.10: Head teachers' responses on proportion of needy students' school fees that was catered for by the bursary




Figure 4.10 shows that for 38(66.7%) of the head teachers, the bursary allocated only catered for 10% of a needy student's school fees while 11(19.3%) of them stated that the bursary catered for 20% of a needy student's school fees. Thus, it would suffice to say that for the majority of the students the amount of bursary received catered for less than 20% of their school fees needs. This inadequate bursary had an impact on the academic life of needy students. According to 48(80%) of the 60 head teachers who responded to the question, one major impact was loss of academic hours when students were sent home for fees. Students dropping out of school for good was the second major impact as given by 12(20%) of the head teachers. Indeed, 65 students were reported to have dropped out of school by the head teachers due to lack of school fees. These findings point out to the fact that the bursary lacks efficacy for, as noted earlier in the literature

review (Mohadep, 2006), a bursary allocation should be sufficiently large to meet the needs of the students at whom the bursary scheme is directed. In fact, as captured in the background to the study, one of the major criticisms of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme is anchored on its ineffectiveness. Concerns have been raised about the role of the area Member of Parliament as the patron of the Constituency Bursary Committee with critics pointing out that, as a politician, the MP would seek to buy political mileage by influencing the Constituency Bursary Committee to award the bursary to as many applicants as possible (Daily Nation, 27th Jan. 2007). Though this would appease the MP's political constituency, the bursary loses on efficacy as the amounts allocated to the many recipients are too small and cannot lead to their sustenance in school. The findings of this study vindicate this view as held by the stakeholders.

4.5 Equitability of bursary award by the Constituency Bursary Committee

It was also important to establish the effectiveness of the decentralized bursary scheme with regard to equity. As pointed out earlier in the literature review (Zideman, 2003;2004), principles of horizontal equity would require that students of similar socio-economic backgrounds should have equal opportunities of receiving a bursary. In this study, the issue of equity of the bursary scheme was addressed with regard to gender, family set-up, type of school, level of family income and region of residence (i.e. rural versus urban). To elucidate on equity of

the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme, the following five hypotheses were tested.

- I. There is no significant difference in the mean of bursary award success rate of students based on their gender.
- II. There is no significant relationship between students' bursary award success rate and type of family set up.
- III. There is no significant relationship between students' bursary award success rate and family income.
- IV. There is no significant difference in the mean of bursary award success rate of students based on the type of school attended.
- V. There is no significant relationship between students' bursary award success rate and their region of residence.

The first test of equity of bursary award focused on gender. To assist in the analysis, Hypothesis I which states that, "there is no significant difference in the mean of bursary award success rate of students based on their gender" was tested using ANOVA as indicated in Table 4.15.

Table 4.15: ANOVA on success rate of bursary award by gender

Dependent Variable* Independent Variable	Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	Sig.
Number of times Bursary application was successful* Gender of student	Between Groups	.973	1	.973	.474
	Within Groups	355.390	188	1.890	
	Total	356.363	189		

The ANOVA on success rate of bursary award by gender indicate that the p-value (0.474) was greater than the level of significance (0.005) and hence we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This means that there is no statistical basis for saying

that male and female students had different success rates for the bursary award. Thus, we can conclude that there was gender equity in the award of the bursary.

The second test of equity of the bursary award focused on family set up. To assist in this analysis, Hypothesis II which states that, “there is no significant relationship between students’ bursary award success rate and type of family set up’ was tested using ANOVA as given in Table 4.16.

Table 4.16: ANOVA on family set-up and student bursary application success rate

Dependent Variable* Independent Variable	Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	Sig.
Number of times Bursary application was successful* Family Set Up	Between Groups	35.698	3	11.899	.000
	Within Groups	320.666	186	1.724	
	Total	356.363	189		

Table 4.16 shows that the p-value (0.000) was less than the level of significance (0.005) and therefore we reject the null hypothesis. This means that the family set up and the student’s success rate of a receiving bursary were related events. We find that students with two parents did not have an equal opportunity of being successful in their bursary application as their counterparts who had one parent or who were orphans.

The third test of equity focused on family income. To assist in the analysis, Hypothesis III which states that, “there is no significant relationship between

students' bursary award success rate and family income" was tested using ANOVA as indicated in Table 4.17.

Table 4.17: ANOVA on level of family income and student's bursary award success rate

Dependent Variable* Independent Variable	Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	Sig.
Number of times Bursary application was successful* Annual Family Income	Between Groups	103.173	27	3.821	.000
	Within Groups	112.520	83	1.356	
	Total	215.694	110		

Since the p-value (.000 ANOVA) is less than the level of significance (0.005) we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between bursary award success rate for the students and family income. Thus, students whose family income was low had a higher bursary success rate than those with a high family income.

The fourth test of equity of bursary award focused on school type. Again, to assist in the analysis, Hypothesis IV which states that, "there is no significant difference in the mean of bursary award success rate of students based on the type of school attended" was tested using ANOVA as shown in Table 4.18.

Table 4.18: ANOVA on bursary award success rate by school type

Dependent Variable* Independent Variable	Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	Sig.
Number of times Bursary application was successful* Type of School	Between Groups	10.133	2	5.056	.068
	Within Groups	346.250	187	1.852	
	Total	356.363	189		

Similarly, since the P-value (0.068 ANOVA) is greater than the level of significance (0.005) we fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the type of school attended by a student did not influence the bursary award success rate. Therefore, students from all types of schools stood an equal chance of receiving a bursary.

The fifth test of equity of bursary award focused on the students' region of residence. Again, to assist in the analysis, Hypothesis V which states that, "there is no significant relationship between students' bursary award success rate and their region of residence" was tested using ANOVA as shown in Table 4.19.

Table 4.19: ANOVA on bursary award success rate by region

Dependent Variable* Independent Variable	Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	Sig.
Number of times Bursary application was successful* Region of residence	Between Groups	11.435	1	11.435	.013
	Within Groups	344.928	188	1.835	
	Total	356.363	189		

Since the p-value (0.013) is greater than the level of significance (0.005) we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This means that there is no significant statistical basis to conclude that bursary award success rate varied by regions (urban & rural). Thus, students in rural constituencies stood the same chance of getting a bursary as those ones in urban constituencies.

4.7 Challenges facing the Constituency Bursary Committees

Another major objective of the study was to establish the challenges facing the CBCs and possibly hindering their effectiveness. Towards achieving this end, the study sought the views of the CBC members as well as other stakeholders. Some of the major challenges faced by the CBCs while carrying out their mandate are as outlined below.

I. Inadequate time to transact bursary business

Unavailability of adequate time to transact CBC business was one of the challenges cited by CBC members. This can be understood in the light of the fact that CBC members are not full time workers of the CBC but they are drawn from their respective occupations as indicated in Figure 4.11.


Figure 4.11: Professional Background of CBC members

Figure 4.11 shows that teachers constituted the majority of CBC members. Indeed, of the 62 CBC members who participated in the study, 28(45.2%) were teachers while 26(41.9%) were businesspersons. The diversity of the composition of CBC members made it tricky to arrive at a mutually agreeable time to transact CBC business. Bearing in mind that most of the CBC members were fully engaged elsewhere, getting a full house to transact CBC business was thus a challenge due to different time schedules. Furthermore, the thousands of bursary applications received by the respective CBCs would require full day working sessions spanning almost two weeks if each case were to be given fair assessment time. However, it would be difficult for the CBC members to be absent from their normal duty stations for that long.

II. Delay in release of funds by MoE

Delay in release of bursary funds by the MoE was cited as a major challenge. Bursary funds are expected to be released at the commencement of the school term so that the disbursement can be done early enough so as not to interfere with the students' learning. However, due to fiscal constraints, the government has numerously delayed in releasing the bursary funds on time. Respondents observed that delays of up to two months had been experienced which made the work of the CBC quite difficult bearing in mind that a school term spans only three months. As noted earlier, a majority of the stakeholders viewed the CBCs as inefficient in the sense that the duration taken to award bursaries was quite long. This perception could have been triggered by the failure of the MoE to release bursary funds on time but the blame ended at the doorstep of the CBC.

III. Lack of adequate skills by CBC members

The literature review identified lack of local capacity as one of the constraints to successful decentralization (McGinn and Welsh 1999, Levacic & Downes 2004, Oyugi 2005). This happens when tasks are decentralized to people with no prior experience or skills to undertake the new responsibility. In this study, many members of the CBC lamented that they were given a job but were not equipped with the requisite skills to enable them accomplish the task with ease. In fact, 54(87.1%) of the CBC members pointed out that they were not given any induction while 62 (100%) of the CBC members who participated in the study supported induction. Bearing in mind that quite a good percentage of the CBC members are not teachers, one can argue that they lack close personal interaction

with students making it difficult for them to identify and assess the needy cases. It is imperative, therefore, for the MoE to organize some training package for newly recruited CBC members at the district level.

IV. Insufficient bursary allocation guidelines

The CBC is led by the MoE bursary allocation guidelines in the execution of its mandate. It is these guidelines that specify the eligibility criteria and the CBCs are expected to follow them to the letter. However, 34(55.7%) of the CBC members felt that the guidelines were insufficient in enabling them do a good job. Thus, since the CBC members were supposed to stick to the MOE guidelines which were judged as insufficient by the majority, then it means that it was difficult to fairly assess the eligibility of the recipients and some undeserving cases could have been awarded the bursary and vice versa.

V. Big number of applicants against limited bursary fund

The challenge of a very high number of bursary applicants against limited funds was recorded in all the 13 CBCs. Most of the CBCs received thousands of applications. For example in 2005, the CBC in Yatta received 6932 applications while 6752 applications were received in Embakasi. In 2007, 4498 applications were received in Dagoretti while 6315 were received in Embakasi. These high numbers of applicants are a real challenge to the CBCs especially bearing in mind that the committee is composed of about 15 individuals, who again as noted above face time constraints due to their other occupational commitments. It should be appreciated that it is a herculean task for 15 persons to sort and vet more than

6,000 applications. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the money received for disbursement cannot adequately cater for even 20% of the applicants thus making the vetting process a real headache for the CBC members.

VI. False information by applicants and lack of supporting documents

The CBC members pointed out that many applicants gave false information exaggerating their level of need in an attempt to secure a bursary. This ranged from inflated school fees balances to fake socio-economic profiles. One DEO, who is a member of the CBC, stated that they had come across cases of applicants submitting fake death certificates in an attempt to prove that they were orphans with a view to increasing their chances of winning a bursary. This challenge as given by the CBC members was also corroborated by students as 99(25.1%) of them stated that applicants gave false information. Giving of false information by applicants posed a real challenge bearing in mind that they were not known personally to the members of the CBC so as to authenticate the information provided. As noted earlier, the CBCs do not make home visits to corroborate some of the information given in the bursary application form thus making it quite difficult to verify the true status of the applicants. Many applicants also failed to attach the necessary supporting documents when submitting their applications.

VII. Lack of support from head teachers

CBCs also suffer from lack of full support from head teachers. As observed by one DEO, who is also a CBC member, the transfer of the management of the

bursary funds from the schools to the CBC did not go down well with the head teachers. Consequently, many are not bothered to vet the students' bursary application forms at the school level to authenticate the information given before appending their signature and the school seal. This antagonism between the head teachers and the CBC is expected as was illustrated in the literature review on decentralization. Fiske (1996) noted that politics is the first major challenge that faces decentralization. This is due to the fact that decentralization alters the political status quo by transferring authority from one level of government and one set of actors to others and it is human nature for people to loathe giving up power they exercised to a new set of actors.

VIII Inadequate money for office operations

The study established that the MoE releases the bursary funds to the CBCs in three tranches per annum. According to the MoE guidelines, the CBCs are allowed to use only Kenya shillings 25,000 per tranche for administrative purposes, i.e., purchase of stationary and office management. Most CBC members opined that this amount was too small for the above purposes. Though the MoE would like the bulk of the bursary money to go to needy students, starving the CBC of management funds also has its implications, some of which are detrimental to its effectiveness. Most CBCs acknowledged that they lacked money for stationary and basic office management. This not only had an impact on the efficiency of operations but also on the perceptions of the stakeholders on CBC. Without stationary, basic management functions like communication, filing

and record keeping are impaired which has an impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the CBC. As noted earlier, 160(58.2%) of the parents reported that they never got any feedback from the CBC on their children's bursary application which does not do any good to their perception of CBC on aspects like sensitivity, transparency and accountability. As noted earlier, most CBCs do not hold sensitization campaigns as well as public barazas through which they could engage the public and the study actually did establish that teachers are still the major purveyors of information about the bursary. During an interview, one DEO observed that if the CBCs are to sensitize and engage the public so as to boost their transparency and accountability ratings, they would require some good budget which is currently not catered for by the MoE guidelines.

IX. Lack of sitting allowances for CBC members

The MoE revised bursary allocation guidelines (Ref. No. G9/1/VIII/101) state categorically that no money should be spent on sitting allowances. This means that the CBC members were expected to be philanthropic in giving their services. Indeed, CBC members were not only expected to work for free but also supplement the bursary scheme by using their own financial resources to attend the CBC meetings. This can be quite discouraging as one CBC member noted:

Every term we receive thousands of bursary applications. It takes not less than 15 days to vet all of them and allocate the bursary. It is unfair for the MoE to fail to appreciate the services that we give and the accompanying subsistence costs.

From a management perspective, workers require incentives so as to increase their motivation and the CBC members are not an exception. Furthermore, apart from the issue of de-motivating CBC members, lack of allowances for CBC members had other grave implications. As one DEO who is also a member of the CBC intimated during an interview, there were times meetings failed to take place due to lack of transport allowances for the members. During such times, the DEO noted that:

the CBC is usually forced to appeal to the area MP, who is the patron, for financial assistance to facilitate travel and subsistence for the members.

Though it is good for the local MP to come to the rescue of the CBC so as to enable it transact its business, this action also has a number of drawbacks, as discussed below.

X. Political influence of Member of Parliament

Members of Parliament occupy a vantage position in the CBCs as the patrons. As seen earlier in section 4.3, all the stakeholders were agreed that MPs have a very strong influence on the CBCs. Their clout is further strengthened when they are requested to bankroll CBC meetings (see section viii above) as he who pays the piper calls the tune. Consequently, the MPs often use their clout as a leverage to influence the decisions of the CBC members in bursary allocation. Thus, there is a strong feeling amongst the stakeholders that the CBC is beholden to the MP and it is not surprising that many stakeholders hold the view that CBC members are

cronies of the MP. Indeed, the strong influence of the MP is seen right from the composition of the CBC. Though the MoE guidelines state that the CBC members are supposed to be appointed by the DEO, who is the secretary to the committee, in consultation with the DEB, this is observed more in breach than in practice. In an interview, one DEO noted that:

Constituting the CBC is usually challenging due to a conflict between the sitting MP and the District Education Office. While the DEO prefers people who are well versed in educational issues, MPs are keen to bring on board their political supporters which makes decision making very difficult. Since the MPs, as patrons, are very powerful, the DEO is forced to acquiesce.

One might wonder why the DEOs have to pander to the whims of the MPs but as captured in an interview with one religious leader, '*administrators fear politicians*'. In the pecking order, an MP is much higher than a DEO who is only a middle-level management civil servant. Indeed one DEO confirmed this during an interview when he observed that:

An MP is very powerful. If he decides that a given DEO should be transferred from the area, the officer's fate is sealed.

Thus, many a DEO would endeavour not to rub an MP the wrong way. In fact, all the stakeholders rated the influence of the MP on the CBC as very strong at 4.19 in a scale of 5 as seen earlier in Section 4.3. Indeed, it is quite telling that the CBC members themselves cited political influence as one of the major challenges that they face as captured in Figure 4.12.

Figure 4.12: CBC members' responses on Influence of local MP in Decision making




Figure 4.12 show that 37(59.7%) and 8(12.9%) of CBC members rated the influence of the MP in decision making as very strong and strong respectively giving a combined strong rating of 45(72.6%). For instance, in two constituencies in Nairobi, the MPs had assumed the role of appointing the CBC members and the DEO had been shunted aside. The researcher probed the reasons why these MPs had taken full charge of the CBC. In one of the two constituencies, the argument advanced was that the MP, as the people's representative, was better placed to serve them than the DEO, a government officer. In the other constituency, the reason given was that the MP had initiated a Constituency Bursary Fund way before 2003 when the government introduced the CBC, and since the MP's bursary fund was time tested, there was no need to establish a parallel structure. As noted during an interview with one KNUT Executive Secretary, the quest by

the MPs to control the CBCs was also seen through the reconstitution of the CBCs after a general election as was the case in 2008. The country held a general election in December 2007 and a new crop of MPs was elected into office. These new MPs had to assert their authority in the CBCs and one sure way of realizing that was to disband the old CBCs and constitute new ones preferably composed of individuals they were comfortable with. As politicians, MPs are afraid of working with CBC members who had previously worked with the former MPs, who are their political rivals. One Education Officer in Machakos district pointed out that in 2008, a certain constituency in the area almost returned the bursary money to the MoE at the close of the financial year as the new MP had refused to work with the old CBC. It took a lot of persuasion to elicit the support of the MP who obliged in the last minute on condition that a new CBC would be put in place before the next bursary disbursement.

XI. Nepotism, tribalism and special interest of some members

Nepotism and tribalism were pointed out as challenges facing the CBCs in the discharge of their duties. For Machakos region whose majority of the population is from a homogeneous ethnic group, nepotism and special interest of some CBC members were the prevalent challenges in bursary allocation. On the other hand, in Nairobi which has a heterogeneous ethnic population, tribalism was also identified as a challenge in addition to nepotism and special interests of CBC members.

XII. Pressure on CBC members from families and community

CBC members also pointed out that they were constantly under a lot of pressure from both families and communities. The common expectation seemed to be that a member of the CBC should use his/her position to advance the case of all the needy children from his/her family and immediate community. CBC members noted that being human these high expectations put them under a lot of pressure as they were split between assisting a family/community member and remaining loyal to their call of duty.

4.7 Stakeholders' suggestions on how to improve the decentralized secondary education bursary fund

The study sought views of the stakeholders on how to improve various aspects of the decentralized secondary education bursary fund. With regard to the composition of the CBC, majority of the stakeholders suggested that school representatives, educationists and religious leaders should be included. Notable here was that very few stakeholders supported the inclusion of political leaders in the CBC.

On the appointment of the CBC members, majority of the respondents were of the view that it should be done by the local community and educationists. As noted earlier, though decentralization is supposed to foster local representation, a majority of the stakeholders were of the view that the local community was not adequately represented in the CBC.

To ensure the capacity and competence of the CBC, the suggestions given by a majority of the respondents were that those appointed needed to be well educated and they should also be given some training. Respondents also emphasized that CBC members should be people of high integrity.

On improving the accountability of the CBC committee, a majority of the respondents noted that the CBC should inform the public on the amount of bursary received and disbursed. As noted earlier, lack of communication from the CBC left a majority of the stakeholders, and especially the parents, in the dark and most received information on the bursary from other parties like teachers and local administrators. Other suggestions which had some considerable backing were zero tolerance to corruption, awarding bursary on merit and engaging of independent auditors.

On improving the transparency of the CBC, the suggestion with the strongest backing was that the public should be constantly informed on all the activities of the CBC. It was also suggested that the CBC should conduct its business openly and even invite observers.

On improving the efficiency of the CBC, the suggestion with the strongest backing was that the CBC should be prompt in processing applications and awarding bursaries. Other useful suggestions were that the government should release the bursary funds in time while CBC should commence working on the applications as they await the money from the government.

Other notable suggestions were that the government should increase the bursary allocation, improve service delivery, ensure equitable distribution of bursary, insulate bursary management from politicians and practice Zero tolerance to corruption.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

The purposes of this study, as stated in sections 1.3 (pg 10) and 4.1 (pg 70) were to explore stakeholders' perceptions on the decentralization of the secondary education bursary programme, assess the effectiveness and equitability of the decentralized bursary programme, and to identify the challenges hindering the success of the programme. The four broad purposes gave rise to the following objectives which guided the study: (i) Analyze and compare the perceptions of different stakeholders on the transfer of the management of the secondary education bursary scheme from schools to the Constituency Bursary Committees; (ii) Assess the effectiveness of the CBC in reaching the income poor and vulnerable students with bursary; (iii) Determine the equitability of bursary disbursement by the Constituency Bursary Committees, and; (v) Identify the challenges faced by the Constituency Bursary Committees while discharging their mandate.

To achieve these objectives, data was collected from 1,113 respondents through the use of questionnaires and interview schedules. The data was analyzed using several statistical procedures in order to adequately give answers to the research questions as well as assist in the testing of the hypotheses. This chapter, therefore, attempts to give a conclusion of the findings as discussed in Chapter four as well as address the fifth objective of the study, i.e. give policy recommendations.

5.2 Conclusions

5.2.1 Stakeholders' perceptions on the decentralized secondary education bursary fund

One of the objectives of the study was to capture the perceptions of stakeholders on a number of variables/aspects of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme. These were: competence of CBC in identifying needy students, efficiency of CBC in processing applications & awarding bursaries, transparency of CBC, accountability of CBC to local community, fairness of CBC in bursary allocation and representation of local community in CBC.

Using a 5 point likert scale, the study revealed that the rating of the CBC by the majority of the stakeholders on most of the variables was low. The rating on the efficiency of the CBC in processing applications and awarding bursaries was low at an average of 2.48. Similarly, stakeholders' rating of the CBC on transparency was also low at an average of 2.36. The same case applied to stakeholders' rating of CBC on accountability to the local community which recorded an average of 2.34. On the issue of the representation of local community the ratings were also low at an average of 2.40. Likewise, the competence of CBC in identifying needy students received low rating at an average of 2.19. On fairness of CBC in bursary allocation, the stakeholder's ratings were also low at an average of 2.50. However, all stakeholders, the CBC members included, were agreed that MPs had a very strong influence on the CBC with an average of 3.93.

5.2.2 Effectiveness of the CBC

The second major objective of the study was to assess the effectiveness of the Constituency Bursary Committees in reaching the income poor students as well as enhancing their survival rates. As noted in the literature review, decentralization is supposed to increase efficiency as well as effectiveness in service delivery. The study sought to establish whether the decentralization of the management of the secondary education bursary scheme to the CBC had led to increased efficiency and effectiveness in enhancing access and participation of students from poor socio-economic backgrounds.

With regard to efficiency, the time taken to receive a bursary was one of the parameters that was analysed and the study concluded that the Constituency Bursary Committees were inefficient. The findings revealed that only 30(19.9%) of the successful students got their bursary within two weeks after submitting applications. On the other hand, 75(49.7%) of the successful students had to wait for more than two months before receiving their bursary. Considering that a school term is only three months, the bursary system was therefore not very efficient in enhancing students' participation in school and saving them inconveniences like being sent home.

The study also assessed the effectiveness of the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme with regard to the questions of reach, efficacy and equity. Regarding reach, the guiding questions are: *does the scheme reach the target group? Which groups are not reached? Are some ineligible students in receipt of*

bursaries/loans? A critical determinant of the reach of the bursary is information dissemination. The key issue here was whether information about the availability of the bursary was appropriately disseminated so as to reach the potential applicants and their guardians. The study revealed that teachers still played a key role in disseminating information about the bursary. A majority of the students and parents indicated that they received information about the bursary from teachers. The CBC did not have an effective communication strategy to inform students and parents on the bursary. Indeed, 160(58.2%) of the parents indicated that they did not receive any feedback from the CBC with regard to their children's bursary application.

The reach of the bursary was quite limited. Data from the CBCs revealed that the reach of the bursary in all the constituencies for the three years averaged only 21.9% of the bursary applicants. Thus, if one makes the assumption that all those students who had applied for bursaries were needy, then, it is in order to conclude that the reach of the bursary was limited as only 21.9% of the applicants were successful over the three year period. This implies that there could be very many needy students who were locked out of the bursary. Indeed, some 4,302 students whom the head teachers considered to be quite needy did not receive a bursary from the CBCs.

The study also did establish that some ineligible students did receive bursaries. According to the head teachers, a total of 306 students were awarded bursaries though they did not deserve them. This could to a great extent be attributed to

weaknesses in the vetting process employed for applicants. While conceding that they were bound by the MoE Bursary Allocation Guidelines, 34(55.7%) of the CBC members felt that those guidelines were insufficient in guiding them make sound bursary allocation judgement. This was compounded by applicants who gave false information in the application forms and the fact that CBC members were not in a position to make home visits to authenticate the validity of the information given.

On efficacy of a bursary scheme, the guiding questions are: (i) do the funds lead to a continuation of study, thus preventing drop-out for the recipient? (ii) what would happen in the absence of a bursary/loan? The study, thus, sought to find out whether the bursary received by a needy student was sufficient to keep him/her in school. The study revealed that the mean bursary allocation was Kenya Shillings 7604.5, whereas, on average, most secondary schools charged fees to the tune of Kenya Shillings 21,870 per year. Thus, this bursary allocation would at most cover only one third of the total school fees requirements of a student. The inadequate bursary had two major impacts on the students as given by the head teachers. One was loss of academic hours when students were sent home for fees and the second one was dropping out of school all together. In fact, 65 students were reported to have dropped out of school by the head teachers due to lack of school fees. These findings lead to the conclusion that the bursary lacks efficacy for, as noted earlier in the literature review, a bursary allocation should be sufficiently large to meet the needs of the students at whom the bursary scheme is directed.

Equitability of the bursary disbursement

The study also sought to establish the effectiveness of the decentralized bursary scheme with regard to equity. In this study, the issue of equity of the bursary scheme was addressed with regard to gender, family set-up, type of school, level of family income and region of residence (i.e. rural versus urban). A hypothesis was tested for each of these independent variables.

With regard to gender equity, the study established that both male and female students applied for the bursary equally. The hypothesis testing revealed that there was gender equity in the bursary award success rates. Thus, the study concluded that male and female students had an equal chance of receiving a bursary from the CBCs.

The second test of equity of the bursary focused on family set up. The study established that family set up did influence student's bursary award success rates. Therefore, family set up and the student's success rate of a receiving bursary were related events. Students who were orphans or had one parent stood a higher chance of securing a bursary than their counterparts who had both parents.

The third test of equity focused on family income. The hypothesis testing established that the bursary award success rate depended on family income. This finding was a plus for the CBCs since the bursary is meant for students from poor social-economic backgrounds.

The fourth test of equity of bursary award focused on school type. The study established that the type of school attended by a student did not influence the

bursary award success rate. Therefore, students from all types of schools stood an equal chance of receiving a bursary which was another plus for the CBCs.

The fifth test of equity of the bursary award focused on the students' region of residence (urban & rural). Hypothesis testing established that needy students from both rural and urban constituencies had an equal chance of receiving a bursary.

5.2.4 Challenges facing the CBC

The study established that CBCs faced a number of challenges which impacted on their efficiency and effectiveness. Lack of adequate time to transact CBC business was one of the challenges faced by members. This was due to the fact that the CBC members were fully engaged in their respective occupations.

The high number of bursary applicants against limited funds was another major challenge. Most of the CBCs received thousands of bursary applications which posed a real challenge to the CBCs especially bearing in mind that the money received was not only inadequate but also that the committees were composed of only about 15 individuals, and who also faced time constraints due to their other occupational commitments.

Another related challenge that was identified was lack of capacity by most of the CBC members. As was noted in the literature review, lack of local capacity is usually a major constraint to successful decentralization and usually arises when tasks are decentralized to people with no prior experience or skills to undertake

the new. In this study, many members of the CBC who were not teachers by profession pointed out that they lacked the relevant skills required for the job at hand. The study established that 54(87.1%) of the CBC members were not given any induction. This problem of lack of capacity was further compounded by the insufficiency of the MoE bursary allocation guidelines as indicated by 34(55.7%) of the CBC members.

Another challenge faced by the CBC was that many applicants gave false information which exaggerated their level of need while others failed to attach relevant supporting documents. The study established that this ranged from inflated school fees balances to fake socio-economic profiles. False information by applicants posed a real challenge to the CBC due to the fact that the applicants were not known personally to the members of the CBC so as to authenticate the information provided and neither did the CBCs make home visits to corroborate some of the information given in the bursary application forms. Thus, false information by applicants further compounded the challenges cited earlier of lack of capacity and inadequate MoE bursary allocation guidelines.

Delay in release of bursary funds by the MoE was also cited as a major challenge. Though bursary funds are expected to be released at the commencement of the school term so that the disbursement can be done early enough so as not to interfere with the students' learning, this was usually never the case. In fact, delays of funds for even up to two months were recorded which made the work

of the CBC quite difficult bearing in mind that a school term spans for only three months. These delays on the part of the government may have greatly contributed to the stakeholders' perception that the CBCs were inefficient.

Inadequate money for stationary and office management was another challenge that CBCs faced. The MoE releases the bursary funds to the CBCs in three tranches per annum and only Kenya Shillings 25,000 per tranche is allocated for administrative purposes, i.e., purchase of stationary and office management. Most CBC members noted that this amount was too small for the above purposes. Lack of adequate money for stationary and office management meant that basic management functions like communication, filing and record keeping were impaired which impacted negatively not only on the efficiency and effectiveness of the CBC but also on the perceptions of the stakeholders. As noted in Chapter four, 160(58.2%) of the 275 parents whose children had applied for bursaries reported that they never got any feedback from the CBC on their children's bursary application. It is also worth noting that most CBCs did not hold any sensitization campaigns as well as public barazas through which they could have engaged the public. This did not augur well for the CBCs when it came to their transparency and accountability ratings by stakeholders.

Lack of sitting allowances was another challenge faced by CBC members. The MoE revised bursary allocation guidelines (Ref. No. G9/1/VIII/101) rules out giving of sitting allowances to CBC members. Thus, CBC members were not only

expected to work for free but also supplement the bursary scheme by using their own financial resources to attend the CBC meetings. This situation was demotivating to the CBC members and it also posed further problems when some members failed to attend meetings due to lack of money for transport. Another grave consequence of lack of sitting allowances was that it opened the door to political patronage for as pointed out by one DEO, when in dire straits CBCs were usually forced to request the area MP for a financial bail out to facilitate travel and subsistence of members.

Political influence of members of parliament was another major challenge facing all the CBCs. Though members of parliament occupy a vantage position in the CBCs as the patrons, their clout is further strengthened when they are requested to bankroll CBC meetings as pointed out earlier. As the adage goes, 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'. Indeed, all the stakeholders were agreed that MPs had a very strong grip on the CBCs and members of the CBC cited political influence as one of the biggest challenges that they faced. It goes without saying that the MP, as a politician, has a political constituency to appease and would therefore not hesitate to use his position to influence the decisions of the CBC members in bursary allocation. For instance, some CBC members pointed out that the MPs forced them to only consider cases of those students registered in schools within the constituency which was not only against the MoE regulations but also discriminatory to bright students admitted in provincial and national schools which might not be located in the constituency. One principal of a National

School in Nairobi observed that after form one intakes, he had been forced to go on 'rescue missions' after some students from some regions failed to report. He established that a number of such students who are from poor socio-economic backgrounds had been forced to join local day schools so as to qualify for the bursary. However, according to the head teacher, the sad thing was that the underlying motive which was not to support local schools but to thwart future political competition by crippling further academic achievement of the brightest children from the community.

Nepotism, tribalism and special interest of some CBC members also emerged as challenges facing the CBCs. Nepotism was cited in Machakos region which has a large homogeneous ethnic population while tribalism was cited in Nairobi which has a heterogeneous ethnic population. Pressure from families and community was also cited as a challenge facing CBC members. The families and community expected CBC members to use their positions to ensure their applicants got positive consideration. Thus, the CBC members constantly faced a loyalty test between their job and their families/community.

5.3 Recommendations

This section addresses the fifth objective of the study by giving some recommendations which could be considered by the policy makers in an attempt to tackle some of the bottlenecks facing the Constituency Bursary Committees. Some of the key recommendations are:

5.3.1 Reduce the influence of Members of Parliament on the CBC

One thing that all the stakeholders were agreed on was that there was a lot of political influence in the CBC from the area MP who doubled up as the patron. The study established that MPs not only influenced who would be appointed to the CBC but also who would receive bursaries. The common fear of the stakeholders was that as politicians, the MPs would hijack the CBC to further their personal political objectives. Therefore, in order to win the trust of the stakeholders in the CBC, MPs should be made to relinquish their positions as patrons of the CBCs. This would help erase the perception of the stakeholders that the CBC is just another piece of ammunition in the MP's political armoury. Therefore, this study recommends that the patron should be a non-political, distinguished member of the community with a high degree of integrity.

5.3.2 Timely release of bursary funds by the MoE

The CBCs received low ratings on efficiency from stakeholders as some applicants had to wait for more than two months before receiving a bursary. As pointed out earlier, the CBCs in most of the cases were mere scapegoats as the main culprit was the MoE which delayed the disbursement of funds to the respective CBCs. Thus, the government should ensure that it plays its role effectively and release the bursary funds to the CBCs in time preferably before the commencement of the school term. The government should set specific dates for releasing the bursary funds to the CBCs.

5.3.3 Timely processing of bursary applications

To utilize time efficiently, CBCs could also be advised to start receiving and processing bursary applications way before receiving the bursary money from the MoE. As seen earlier, many CBCs receive thousands of bursary applications which require adequate time to screen. Thus, the efficiency of the CBCs would improve a great deal if the screening of the applicants and categorization according to the level of need could start way before the bursary funds are received from the ministry. If that were to be done, the rest of the work would be easy once the funds are received and very little time would be wasted. Thus, CBCs could develop a timeline divorced from receipt of funds from the MoE which would guide the bursary applicants on when to submit their applications.

5.3.4 Increase bursary allocation

The study revealed that the reach of the bursary was quite limited as only about 21.9% of the applicants were successful. Furthermore, the study also showed that the bursary lacked efficacy as only 9 % of the successful bursary applicants got a full bursary. The rest of the students who got partial bursaries had to contend with losing academic hours as they were sent home for fees. All the CBC members were agreed that the allocation received from the government was inadequate due to the high levels of need. The government, therefore, should source for more funds so as to increase the bursary allocations to the constituencies so as to not only reach more applicants but also ensure that the amount received can sustain one in school.

5.3.5 Improving the MoE bursary allocation guidelines

As noted earlier, the majority of the CBC members stated that the bursary allocation guidelines issued by the MoE were insufficient in helping them make a sound assessment of the bursary applicants. It would be imperative, therefore, for the MoE to liaise with the CBC members and revise the bursary allocation guidelines. This would ensure that the resultant instrument would enjoy high levels of confidence from the CBC members and would go a great deal in improving the effectiveness of the bursary allocation process.

5.3.6 Capacity building of CBC members

The MoE should, as a matter of urgency, mount training programmes for CBC members so as to enhance their capacity. The training should cover areas such as: Needs assessment, Ethics and Integrity, Transparency and Accountability, Community mobilization etc. This training could be carried out by bodies such as the Kenya Education Staff Institute (KESI), the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) and the universities.

5.3.7 Decentralization of CBC further to Location/ward Level

The study recommends that the government should explore the possibility of decentralizing the bursary further to the location/ward level and making the entire process participatory. Each location/ward would constitute a committee which would receive and process bursary applications from the area. This would be like killing two birds with one stone. On the one hand, the number of applicants would be significantly reduced making it manageable, while on the other, chances are

high that some background information about the applicants/or their families would be known. The committee members at this level would be representing the various sub-locations and would have knowledge of the applicants. Thus, this would enhance the efficiency of the process as well as the effectiveness. One constituency in Nairobi had followed this route and the constituency bursary office was just the convergence point as applications for and award of bursary was done at the ward level.

5.3.8 Involvement of teachers in screening of bursary applicants

A majority of the stakeholders showed more confidence in teachers managing the bursary than with the CBC. The main argument was that unlike CBC members who only get to know the applicants indirectly through the bursary application forms, teachers have got a personal knowledge of the students which enables them to judge who is needy to a high degree of accuracy. This study, therefore, recommends that the pre-selection of bursary applicants be done at the school level. This would entail teachers and head teachers receiving the bursary applications from the students and assessing the cases which most merit. Thereafter, each school would submit the names and forms of the most deserving cases to the CBC which would scrutinize them further before deciding on which ones to benefit.

5.3.9 Increase office management funds for CBC

This study recommends that the MoE revise the allocation for office management upwards from Kenya shillings 25,000 to at least Kenya shillings 75,000 per

tranche. This would enable the CBC undertake basic management functions like communication, filing and record keeping as well as reach out to the stakeholders through various channels like public notices, radio advertisements, public barazas etc.

5.3.10 Payment of honoraria to CBC members

This study recommends that the MoE sets aside some adequate amount of money per bursary allocation tranche for CBC members' honoraria. This would serve two purposes: One, it would increase the efficiency of the CBC since the morale of the members would be high and none of them would fail to attend meetings due to lack of bus fare. Two, it would hedge-off the CBC members from political patronage of the MPs who are usually requested to finance CBC sessions.

5.3.11 Incorporation of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in CBC management

The study recommends that CBCs should move with the times and fully embrace ICT in management of their affairs. With proper use of ICT, CBCs can make good data-bases for students within their jurisdiction which would be helpful in profiling students and tracking their bursary award success (or failure) rates as well as avoiding double allocations.

Proper use of ICT would also enable the CBCs engage the public meaningfully and at minimal cost. One of the biggest weaknesses identified by parents was lack of feed back from CBCs on the fate of their children's bursary application. A few of the parents whose children's applications were successful got to know it via the

schools but the majority of the parents were left in perpetual darkness. Since it is not financially feasible to post letters to all the parents of the applicants, each CBC should develop a website where all the necessary information would be uploaded making it possible for members of the public to access the information from wherever they are.

5.4 Suggestions for further research

This study recommends further research in the following areas:

5.4.1 Constituency Development Fund bursary and Constituency Bursary Committee bursary

In the course of the study, it emerged that many stakeholders do not know the difference between the CDF bursary which is given from the Constituency Development Funds kitty and the MoE bursary which is disbursed through the Constituency Bursary Committee. This study recommends that a study be done on the two parallel bursary funds so as to identify their common ground with a view to merging them. This would not only lead to better service delivery but it would also ensure efficient and effective utilization of human and financial resources.

5.4.2 MoE bursary allocation guidelines and bursary application form

This study recommends further research aimed at capturing the specific deficiencies of the bursary allocation guidelines as well as the bursary application form. This would help refine them further so as to make them more effective in assessing needy students.

5.4.3 Decentralization of bursary management to ward/location level

This study recommends further research to not only explore the viability of decentralizing the management of the bursary further to the ward/location level but also to solicit views of stakeholders on how best it can be done.

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Appendix 1:**Letter of Introduction to CBC members, DEOs, Head teachers, BoG and PTA chairpersons, KNUT Executive Secretaries, Councillors, Religious Leaders, Parents and Students**

Department of Educational
Management, Policy &
Curriculum Studies, Kenyatta
University,

P.O. Box 43844,

Nairobi 00100

Date:.....

Dear Respondent,

I am a Kenyatta University doctorate student in the above named department. My research project for my dissertation is focusing on the decentralized secondary education bursary fund. I am seeking to identify, amongst others, the perceptions of the different educational stakeholders towards the Constituency Bursary Committee as well as assess its efficiency and effectiveness in disbursing bursaries to needy students. Such a study is important in that the findings can be used to make positive improvements to the bursary allocation process.

You have been identified as one of the educational stakeholders both in your community and in the country at large. Therefore, you are kindly requested to go through the following questionnaire and provide answers to the questions to the best of your knowledge. You are assured that the information given will be treated with utmost confidence and will be used for research purposes only. You are not required to write your name on the questionnaire.

Thank for your cooperation.

Yours faithfully,

Mukirae Njihia

Appendix 2

**CBC Members' Questionnaire on the Decentralized Secondary Education
Bursary Scheme**

Instructions: Kindly respond to this questionnaire by ticking (√) the preferred answer where there is a provision for choices or by filling the blank spaces

Section A: Background Information

1. Name of Constituency:

2. What is your Academic background?

Secondary /High School Graduate Diploma Holder Degree
Holder

3. What is your professional background?

Teacher Lawyer Doctor Accountant Business

Any other (please specify).....

4. How long have you worked in your given profession?

1-5 years 6-10 years 10- 15 Years 5 Years & above

Section B: Pertinent Information

5. How long have you served in the CBC?

1 year 2 years 3 Years 4 Years & above

6. Were you consulted before your appointment to the CBC?

Yes No

7. Were you given some induction training upon being appointed to the CBC?

Yes No

8. If Yes to question 7 above, was the training adequate?

Yes No

9. If No to question 8, do you think such training is necessary?

Yes No

10. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the time at your disposal to transact business for the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very adequate, 4-Adequate, 3-fair, 2-In-adequate, 1-very In-adequate)

	5	4	3	2	1
Time available to transact CBC business					

11. Do you find the Ministry of Education bursary allocation guidelines sufficient in the discharge of your duties?

Yes No

12. If NO to question 11 above, give suggestions on how to improve these guidelines.

a)

b)

13. How much money has your Constituency Bursary Committee received from the Ministry of Education in the last 3 years?

Year	Amount (Kshs)
2006	
2007	
2008	

14. How many bursary applications did you receive in the last three financial years?

Year	Number of Applicants
2006	
2007	
2008	

15. How many students were awarded bursaries in the last three financial years?

Year	Number of Recipients	Amount Awarded (Kshs)
2006		
2007		
2008		

16. Does your committee make home visits to corroborate information given by applicants?

Yes No

17. If No to question 16 above, do you think such visits are necessary?

Yes No

18. Do you encounter any challenges when discharging your duties in the Constituency Bursary Committee?

Yes No

19. If Yes to question 18 above, please list the four most pressing challenges in order of importance.

- i.
.....
- ii.
.....
- iii.
.....
- iv.
.....

20. Suggest remedies to each of the challenges identified in 16 above.

- i.
.....
- ii.
.....

iii.

iv.

21. In your view, is the composition of the Constituency Bursary Committee representative of people at the grassroots?

Yes No

22. If No to question 21 above, is there a need to empower various educational stakeholders to select Constituency Bursary Committee members?

Yes No

23. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the competence of the Constituency Bursary Committee in identifying needy students. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Competence of CBC in identifying needy students					

24. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee while discharging its duties. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Transparency of CBC while discharging responsibility					

25. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee in processing applications and awarding bursaries. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Efficiency of CBC in processing applications and awarding bursaries					

26. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee to local stakeholders/community. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Accountability of CBC to local community/stakeholders					

27. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the fairness of the Constituency Bursary Committee in bursary allocation. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Fairness of CBC in bursary allocation					

28. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the representation of local community/stakeholders in the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Representation of local community/stakeholders in CBC					

29. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the influence of the local Member of Parliament in decision making regarding bursary allocation by the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very Strong, 4-Strong, 3-fair, 2-Weak, 1-very Weak)

	5	4	3	2	1
Influence of local Member of Parliament in decision making					

30. Given a choice, would you prefer the management of the bursary scheme to go back to the schools or to remain under CBCs? (Please tick appropriately)

- Bursary management should revert to schools
- Bursary management should remain under CBC

31. What reasons justify your view in question 30 above?

a).....

 b).....

32. Make suggestions on what should be done to improve the secondary education bursary scheme in view of:

- a) Composition of the Constituency Bursary Committee (i.e. who should be included)

- b) Appointment procedure of Constituency Bursary Committee members (i.e. who should appoint)

.....
.....

Capacity/Competence of Constituency Bursary Committee members

.....
.....

d) Transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee

.....
.....

e) Accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee.

.....
.....

f) Efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee.

.....

g) Any other

.....
.....
.....

THANK YOU

Appendix 3

**Head teachers' Questionnaire on the Decentralized Secondary Education
Bursary Scheme**

Instructions: Kindly respond to this questionnaire by ticking (√) the preferred answer where there is a provision for choices or by filling the blank spaces

Section A: Background Information

1. Name of School:

2. School Category:

Boys Secondary School

Girls Secondary School

Mixed Secondary School

3. School Student's Population:

4. Name of constituency:.....

5. Name of district:.....

Section B: Pertinent Information

6. In your view, how many students in your school can be described as needy and in need of a bursary?

7. How many students from your school have received bursaries from the Constituency Bursary Committee in the last four years?

2004:

2005:

2006:

2007:

8. Is the bursary allocated to individual students adequate so as to keep them from being sent home for fees?

Yes No

9. If No to question 8 above, are there any students who have been forced to drop out of school due to an in-adequate bursary allocation?

Yes No

10. If YES to 9 above, how many students have been unable to continue with their studies?

.....

11. On average, what percentage of a needy student's school fees was catered for by the bursary?

10 % 20% 30% 40 % 50%
60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

12. Are there students who did not receive bursary but in your view are quite needy?

Yes No

13. If Yes to question 12 above, how many were they?

14. Are there students who received bursary but in your view did not deserve it?

Yes No

15. If Yes to question 14 above, how many were they?

16. Has the new procedure of disbursing bursaries through the Constituency Bursary Committees interfered with the smooth running of the school's academic programme?

Yes

No

17. If Yes to question 16 above, illustrate the kind of interference.

a)

.....

b)

.....

c)

.....

d)

.....

18. Were you consulted before the policy decision was made to transfer the management of the bursary scheme from schools to the Constituency Bursary Committees?

Yes

No

19. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the competence of the Constituency Bursary Committee in identifying needy students. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Competence of CBC in identifying needy students					

20. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee while discharging its duties. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Transparency of CBC while discharging responsibility					

21. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee in processing applications and awarding bursaries. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Efficiency of CBC in processing applications and awarding bursaries					

22. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee to local stakeholders/community. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Accountability of CBC to local community/stakeholders					

23. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the fairness of the Constituency Bursary Committee in bursary allocation. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Fairness of CBC in bursary allocation					

24. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the representation of local community/stakeholders in the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Representation of local community/stakeholders in CBC					

25. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the influence of the local Member of Parliament in decision making regarding bursary allocation by the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very Strong, 4-Strong, 3-fair, 2-Weak, 1-very Weak)

	5	4	3	2	1
Influence of local Member of Parliament in decision making					

26. Given a choice, would you prefer the management of the bursary scheme to go back to the schools or to remain under CBCs?

Bursary management should revert to schools

Bursary management should remain under CBC

27. Make suggestions on what should be done to improve the secondary education bursary scheme in view of:

- c) Composition of the Constituency Bursary Committee (i.e. who should be included)

.....
.....

- d) Appointment procedure of Constituency Bursary Committee members
(i.e. who should appoint)

.....
.....

- e) Capacity/Competence of Constituency Bursary Committee members

.....
.....

- h) Transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee

.....
.....

- i) Accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee.

.....
.....

- j) Efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee.

.....
.....

- k) Any other

.....
.....

THANK YOU

Appendix 4

**PTA Chair-persons' Questionnaire on the Decentralized Secondary
Education Bursary Scheme**

Instructions: Kindly respond to this questionnaire by ticking (✓) the preferred answer where there is a provision for choices or by filling the blank spaces

Section A: Background Information

1. Name of school:
2. Name of Constituency:.....
3. Name of District:.....
4. How many parents do you represent?
5. How long have you served as a PTA chairperson?.....

Section B: Pertinent Information

6. Were you consulted before the management of secondary education bursary fund was transferred from schools to the Constituency Bursary Committees?

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Yes	No

7. In your view, are local educational stakeholders adequately represented in the Constituency Bursary Committees?

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Yes	No

8. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the competence of the Constituency Bursary Committee in identifying needy students. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Competence of CBC in identifying needy students					

9. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee while discharging its duties. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Transparency of CBC while discharging responsibility					

10. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee in processing applications and awarding bursaries. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Efficiency of CBC in processing applications and awarding bursaries					

11. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee to local stakeholders/community. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Accountability of CBC to local community/stakeholders					

12. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the fairness of the Constituency Bursary Committee in bursary allocation. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Fairness of CBC in bursary allocation					

13. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the representation of local community/stakeholders in the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Representation of local community/stakeholders in CBC					

14. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the influence of the local Member of Parliament in decision making regarding bursary allocation by the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very Strong, 4-Strong, 3-fair, 2-Weak, 1-very Weak)

	5	4	3	2	1
Influence of local Member of Parliament in decision making					

15. Given a choice, would you prefer the management of the bursary scheme to go back to the schools or to remain under CBCs?

Bursary management should revert to schools

Bursary management should remain under CBC

16. What reasons justify your view in question 15 above?

- a).....
- b)
- c).....

17. Make suggestions on what should be done to improve the secondary education bursary scheme in view of:

- a) Composition of the Constituency Bursary Committee (i.e. who should be included)
.....
.....
- b) Appointment procedure of Constituency Bursary Committee members (i.e. who should appoint)
.....
.....
- c) Capacity/Competence of Constituency Bursary Committee members
.....
.....
- l) Transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee
.....
.....
- m) Accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee.
.....
.....
- n) Efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee.
.....
Any other
.....
.....

THANK YOU

Appendix 4**BOG Chair-person's Questionnaire on the Decentralized Secondary Education Bursary Scheme**

Instructions: Kindly respond to this questionnaire by ticking (✓) the preferred answer where there is a provision for choices or by filling the blank spaces

Section A: Background Information

1. **Name of School:**
2. **Name of Constituency:**
3. **Name of District:**
4. **School Category :**

Boys Secondary School

Girls Secondary School

Mixed Secondary School

5. For how long have you served as a BOG chairperson of this school?.....

Section B: Pertinent Information

6. Were you consulted before the policy decision was made to transfer the management of the secondary education bursary scheme from schools to the CBCs?

Yes

No

7. Has the new procedure of disbursing bursaries through the CBCs interfered with the smooth running of the school's academic programme?

Yes

No

8. If Yes to question 7 above, indicate the kind of interference.

i.....

ii.....

iii.....

iv.....

9. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the competence of the Constituency Bursary Committee in identifying needy students. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Competence of CBC in identifying needy students					

10. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee while discharging its duties. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Transparency of CBC while discharging responsibility					

11. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee in processing applications and awarding bursaries. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Efficiency of CBC in processing applications and awarding bursaries					

12. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee to local stakeholders/community. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Accountability of CBC to local community/stakeholders					

13. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the fairness of the Constituency Bursary Committee in bursary allocation. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Fairness of CBC in bursary allocation					

14. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the representation of local community/stakeholders in the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Representation of local community/stakeholders in CBC					

15. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the influence of the local Member of Parliament in decision making regarding bursary allocation by the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very Strong, 4-Strong, 3-fair, 2-Weak, 1-very Weak)

	5	4	3	2	1
Influence of local Member of Parliament in decision making					

16. Given a choice, would you prefer the management of the bursary scheme to go back to the schools or to remain under CBCs?

- Bursary management should revert to schools
- Bursary management should remain under CBC

17. What reasons justify your view in question 16 above?

- a).....
- b)

18. Make suggestions on what could be done to improve the secondary education bursary scheme in view of:

d) Composition of the Constituency Bursary Committee (i.e. who should be included)

.....

.....

e) Appointment procedure of Constituency Bursary Committee members (i.e. who should appoint)

.....

.....

f) Capacity/Competence of Constituency Bursary Committee members

.....
.....

o) Transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee

.....
.....

p) Accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee

.....
.....

q) Efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee

.....
.....

r) Any other (please specify)

.....
.....

THANK YOU

Appendix 5

Parents' Questionnaire on the Decentralized Secondary Education Bursary Scheme

Instructions: Kindly respond to all items in this questionnaire by ticking (√) the preferred answer where there is a provision for choices or by filling the blank spaces

Section A: Background Information

1. Name of your Constituency:
2. Name of your district:.....
3. School(s) attended by your child/children:
 - a).....
 - b).....
4. Class level of your child/children:
5. Occupation:
6. Annual Income:
7. Size of family:

One child	<input type="checkbox"/>
Two Children	<input type="checkbox"/>
Three Children	<input type="checkbox"/>
Four Children	<input type="checkbox"/>
Five Children	<input type="checkbox"/>
Six & above	<input type="checkbox"/>

8. How many of your children are in:
- a) Primary Schools:
 - b) Secondary Schools:
 - c) Post secondary institutions:

Section B: Pertinent Information

9. Did you ever apply for a bursary for your children in secondary schools in the last three academic years?

Yes No

10. If yes to question 9 above, how did you get the information about the bursary?

.....

.....

.....

11. Was your application for a bursary for your child successful?

Yes No

12. If YES to question 11 above, how much money was allocated?

Year	Amount (Kshs)
2005	
2006	
2007	

13. What were the total fees charged by the school? Kshs.....

14. Did the bursary allocated enable your child to continue schooling without being sent home?

Yes No

15. After application, how long did it take to get feedback from the CBC?

One –Two months

Three –Four Months

Fiver-Six months

Seven Months –One Year

No feedback at all

16. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the competence of the Constituency Bursary Committee in identifying needy students. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Competence of CBC in identifying needy students					

17. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee while discharging its duties. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Transparency of CBC while discharging responsibility					

18. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee in processing applications and awarding bursaries. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Efficiency of CBC in processing applications and awarding bursaries					

19. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee to local stakeholders/community. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Accountability of CBC to local community/stakeholders					

20. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the fairness of the Constituency Bursary Committee in bursary allocation. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Fairness of CBC in bursary allocation					

21. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the representation of local community/stakeholders in the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Representation of local community/stakeholders in CBC					

22. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the influence of the local Member of Parliament in decision making regarding bursary allocation by the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very Strong, 4-Strong, 3-fair, 2-Weak, 1-very Weak)

	5	4	3	2	1
Influence of local Member of Parliament in decision making					

23. Given a choice, would you prefer the management of the bursary scheme to go back to the schools or to remain under CBCs?

Bursary management should revert to schools

Bursary management should remain under CBC

24. What reasons justify your view in question 23 above?

a).....

b)

c)

25. Make suggestions on what could be done to improve the secondary education bursary scheme in view of:

a) Composition of the Constituency Bursary Committee (i.e. who should be included)

.....

Appointment procedure of Constituency Bursary Committee members (i.e. who should appoint)

.....

Capacity/Competence of Constituency Bursary Committee members

.....
.....

s) Transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee

.....
.....

t) Accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee.

.....
.....

u) Efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee.

.....
.....

v) Any other

.....
.....
.....

THANK YOU

Appendix 7**Students' Questionnaire on the Decentralized Secondary Education Bursary Scheme**

Instructions: Kindly respond to all items in this questionnaire by ticking (√) the preferred answer where there is a provision for choices or by filling the blank spaces

Section A: Background Information

1. Name of your school:

2. Name of Constituency:

3. Name of District:

4. Type of school

Boys Secondary school

Girls Secondary School

Mixed Secondary school

5. Please, indicate your sex: Male Female

6. Please indicate your age : years

7. Please, indicate your class: Form 1 Form 2 Form 3

Form 4

13. If Yes to 12 above, indicate the number of siblings in:

Primary schools:

Secondary schools:

Post secondary learning institutions:

14. Have you ever been sent home due to lack of school fees?

Yes

No

15. If yes to 14 above, how many times were you sent home in the last one year?.....

16. Have you ever applied for a bursary from your constituency's bursary fund?

Yes

No

17. If you have never applied for a bursary, what are the reasons?

a).....

b).....

If you have applied for a bursary in the past, how did you learn about the scheme?

Informed by my teachers

Informed by my parent/guardian

Sensitization campaign by the Constituency bursary committee

18. How many times have you applied for a bursary?.....

19. How many times have your applications been successful?.....

20. If your application(s) for a bursary was successful, what amount(s) were you allocated? Kenya shillings.....

21. After submitting your application how long did it take before the award was given?

2 weeks 1 Month 2 Months 3 Months
4 Months and above

22. Did the amount allocated cater for your total fees?

Yes No

23. If No to 23 above, were you able to clear the balance?

Yes No

24. If No to 24 above, what happened?

Sent home Parent cleared the balance

25. If your application was unsuccessful, were you given a chance to lodge an appeal?

Yes No

26. In your view, do you think those students who receive the bursary are the most deserving?

Yes

No

27. Do students give accurate information about their financial status when applying for a bursary?

Yes

No

28. If No to 28 above, why do students give inaccurate information?

a).....

b).....

THANK YOU

**Councillors' Questionnaire on the Decentralized Secondary Education
Bursary Scheme**

Instructions: Kindly respond to all items in this questionnaire by ticking (√) the preferred answer where there is a provision for choices or by filling the blank spaces

Section A: Background Information

1. **Name of Ward:**
2. **Name of Constituency:**.....
3. **Name of District:**.....
4. For how long have you served as a councillor?.....

Section B: Pertinent Information

5. Are you a member of the Constituency Bursary Committee?

Yes No

6. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the competence of the Constituency Bursary Committee in identifying and vetting needy students. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Competence of CBC in identifying and vetting needy students					

7. By using a tick (√) please indicate your rating of the transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee while discharging its duties. Give your

response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Transparency of CBC while discharging responsibility					

8. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee in processing applications and awarding bursaries. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Efficiency of CBC in processing applications and awarding bursaries					

9. What are your views about the composition (i.e., members who are included) of the Constituency Bursary Committee?

- a)
- b)
- c)

By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee to local stakeholders/community. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Accountability of CBC to local community/stakeholders					

10. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the fairness of the Constituency Bursary Committee in bursary allocation. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very high, 4-high, 3-fair, 2-low, 1-very low)

	5	4	3	2	1
Fairness of CBC in bursary allocation					

11. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the representation of local community/stakeholders in the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very good, 4-good, 3-fair, 2-poor, 1-very poor)

	5	4	3	2	1
Representation of local community/stakeholders in CBC					

12. By using a tick (✓) please indicate your rating of the influence of the local Member of Parliament in decision making regarding bursary allocation by the Constituency Bursary Committee. Give your response on a five point scale (5-very Strong, 4-Strong, 3-fair, 2-Weak, 1-very Weak)

	5	4	3	2	1
Influence of local Member of Parliament in decision making					

13. Do applicants from all wards stand an equal chance of being awarded a bursary by the CBC?

Yes

No

14. If No to 14 above, what are the reasons behind the inequality?
a).....
b).....
15. What in your view are the major limitations facing the CBC?
a).....
b).....
16. Make suggestions on what should be done to improve the secondary education bursary scheme in view of:

Composition of the Constituency Bursary Committee (i.e. who should be included)

.....
Appointment procedure of Constituency Bursary Committee members (i.e. who should appoint)

.....
Capacity/Competence of Constituency Bursary Committee members

.....
Transparency of the Constituency Bursary Committee

.....
Accountability of the Constituency Bursary Committee.

.....
Efficiency of the Constituency Bursary Committee.

.....
Any other

.....

THANK YOU

Appendix 9**District Education Officers Interview Schedule on the Decentralized Secondary Education Bursary Scheme**

1. Name of district:
2. Constituencies under your jurisdiction:
3. Do all the constituencies have their CBC in place?
4. What challenges have you faced while constituting the CBCs?
5. What is your view about the appointment and the composition of CBC members?
6. How do the CBC members answer to the local educational stakeholders for the decisions they make?
7. Are members of the CBC given any training to enable them discharge their duties effectively?
8. If No to question 8 above, is there need for such training?
9. Please comment on the ability and competence of the CBC to conduct its business with respect to availability of the members and technical skills.
10. What Monitoring & Evaluation mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that the CBC sticks to their mandate?
11. Does the MOE head office receive regular updates on what is happening at the constituency level?

12. Members of Parliament have been accused of influencing the bursary allocation process so as to gain political mileage. What is their exact role and how strong is their influence?

13. Given a choice, would you prefer the management of the bursary scheme to go back to the schools or to remain under CBCs?

THANK YOU

Appendix 10**Religious Leaders' Interview Schedule on the Decentralized Secondary Education Bursary Scheme**

1. Name of Religious organization:
2. How many secondary schools are under your sponsorship in the district?.....
3. How many students is your organization sponsoring?.....
4. Are you a member of the CBC?.....
5. What are your views about the composition of the CBC?
6. Do you think the CBC is doing a fair job in allocating bursaries?
7. What are the views of your faithful towards the CBC?
8. Do applicants from all denominations stand an equal chance of being awarded a bursary by the CBC? If No, what are the reasons behind the inequality?
9. What in your view are the major limitations facing the CBC?
10. What can be done to improve the secondary education bursary scheme?

THANK YOU

Appendix 11**KNUT Executive Secretary interview schedule on the decentralized secondary education bursary scheme**

1. Name of district:
2. How many teachers do you represent:
3. Are you a member of the CBC?
4. To what extent does the CBC adequately serve the interests of local education stakeholders?
5. Comment on the appointment and composition of CBC members.
6. Comment on the competence of the CBC to steer the bursary allocation process.
7. What is the position of your office on the management of the secondary education bursary funds?
8. How fair is the bursary allocation process under the CBC?
9. What are the views of your the teachers you represent about CBC?
10. What are the challenges hindering the success of the CBC?
11. Suggest some solutions to the challenges you have identified above.
12. Given a choice, would you prefer the management of the bursary scheme to go back to the schools or to remain under CBCs?

THANK YOU