

Inter-Ethnic Conflicts In Turbo Sub-County, Uasin Gishu County, Kenya (1895-2010).

Were Emmanuel Mbogo

C50/Ce/26485/2014

A Thesis Submitted To The School Of Law, Arts And Social Sciences In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For The Award Of The Degree Of Master Of Arts (History) Of Kenyatta University.

September, 2024.

DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Signature..... Date.....

Were Emmanuel Mbogo

Department of History, Archaeology and Political Studies.

SUPERVISORS

We confirm that the work reported in this thesis was carried out by the student under our supervision.

Signature..... Date.....

Dr. Peter Wafula

Department of History, Archaeology and Political Studies

Kenya University.

Signature..... Date.....

Dr. Edwin Gimode

Department of History, Archaeology and Political Studies

Kenya University.

DEDICATION

Dedicated to my father Efumbi Were and my mother Aloysia Muthoni for their constant care, love plus devotion to my education and upbringing.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I greatly appreciate the help and understanding accorded to me by many people in the course of this study. I am heartily thankful to my supervisors Dr. Peter Wafula and Dr. Edwin Gimode. I am thankful to Dr. Peter Wafula whose encouragement has been instrumental in shaping my academic path. Special thanks goes to Dr. Edwin Gimode whose unwavering support and mentorship from the beginning has been crucial to my work. I am also thankful to Dr. Pius Kakai for his inspiration to strive to excellence. I am equally thankful to the staff of the Post Modern Library of Kenyatta University, Kenya National Library Eldoret and the search room staff of the Kenya National Archives who were very helpful in enabling me retrieve many useful sources. Certainly those who ensured that I went to school my father Efumbi Were and my mother Aloysia Muthoni deserve my gratitude. Similarly deserving my appreciation is my son Efumbi Were (junior) for according me humble time during the research, my field assistants Josiah Cheruiyot and Steven Wambu and all the informants who generously volunteered vital data during field research. I am also indebted to Annrose for her good work in typing my hand written drafts and editing this work. To all the above and many others not mentioned, thank you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	ii
DEDICATION.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS.....	x
GLOSSARY.....	xi
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.....	xii
ABSTRACT.....	xiv
CHAPTER ONE	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Background of the Study.....	1
1.3 Statement of the Problem	6
1.4 Specific Objectives of the Study	7
1.5 Research Questions	8
1.6 Research Assumptions	8
1.7 Justification and Significance of the Study	9
1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study	10
1.9. Review of Related Literature	10
1.9.1 History of Multi-Ethnic Settlement	10
1.9.2 Politicization of Ethnicity	12
1.9.3 Heightened Inter-Ethnic Conflicts and Intervention Measures in Combating the Conflicts.....	14
1.10 Theoretical Framework	17
1.11 Conceptual Framework	18
1.12 Research Methodology.....	19

1.12.1. Introduction.....	19
1.12.2 Research Design	19
1.12.3 Research Area.....	20
1.12.4 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure	21
1.12.5 Research Instruments and Data Collection Procedures	22
1.12.6 Data Analysis and Presentation.	24
1.12.7 Ethical Considerations	25
CHAPTER TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MULTI-ETHNIC COMMUNITY IN TURBO SUB-COUNTY (1895-1962).	26
2.1 Introduction.	26
2.2 The Pre-Colonial Inhabitants of Uasin Gishu Plateau.	26
2.3 Establishment of Colonialism in Uasin Gishu	29
2.4 Labour Contracts and its Role in the Formation of a Multi-Ethnic Community in the Uasin Gishu (1906-1936).	32
2.5 The Squatter Stock Problem and its Effect on Formation of a Multi-Ethnic Community 1937-1944.	40
2.6 Decolonization and its Effects in the Formation of a Multi-Ethnic Community 1945-1963.....	43
2.7. Conclusion.....	53
CHAPTER THREE.: POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN TURBO SUB- COUNTY (1963-1990).	55
3.1 Introduction.	55
3.2 The Genesis of Ethnic Politics in Kenya: Locating the Nexus	55
3.3. Politicization of Ethnicity under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978).	58
3.4. Politicization of Ethnicity under Daniel Moi (1978-1992).	65
3.5. Conclusion.....	70

CHAPTER FOUR: HEIGHTENED INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND MITIGATING MEASURES IN TURBO SUB-COUNTY (1991-2010).	72
4.1. Introduction.	72
4.2. The 1991/1992 and 1997/98 Inter-Ethnic Conflicts.	72
4.3. The Kibaki Era: The 2007/08 Post Election Violence and the New Constitution.	80
4.4. Strategies and Challenges in Mitigating of Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Turbo sub- County, 1991-2010.	92
4.5. Conclusion.	103
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.	105
5.1 Introduction.	105
5.2 Summary of the Main Findings.	105
5.3 Conclusion of the Study.	108
5.4 Recommendations.	110
5.5 Suggestions for Further Research.	110
REFERENCES.	111
PRIMARY SOURCES.	111
Archival Sources.	113
SECONDARY SOURCES.	116
Manuscript.	116
Books.	116
Theses.	124
Articles in Journals.	124
Seminar Papers.	127
Newspapers.	127
Electronic Sources.	129

APPENDICES

Appendix A1: Consent Form	130
Appendix A2: A Sample Questionnaire/Interview Schedule.....	132
Appendix A3 : Focused Group Discussion Guide for Elders, Women and Religious Leaders.....	134
Appendix A4: NACOSTI.....	135

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Relationship between Independent, Dependent and Intervening Variables.	19
Figure 1.2: Map of Turbo Sub County, Uasin Gishu County	21

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

- Ethnic group** Population whose members identify themselves with each other on the basis of common heritage and predecessors, common culture, behavioral patterns, religion or language. In Turbo sub-county the ethnic groups include the Luo, Agikuyu, Abaluhya, Abagusii, Kalenjin and other groups.
- Ethnocentrism** The inherent superiority belief of one's own ethnic group.
- Inter-ethnic relations**-Ethnic cohesion, tensions, mistrust, hatred and conflicts some of which were violent.
- Inter-ethnic conflicts** Episodes of steady violent confrontation in which diverse ethnic groups turn against each other in Turbo sub-county.
- Peace** A state of friendliness within a society in which there is absence of violence.
- Peace building** The process of implementing violence prevention measures to create and maintain a peaceful environment and prevent outbreak of tensions leading to conflicts.
- Politicized ethnicity** The elite manipulation of ethnic identities for personal political interests.

GLOSSARY

Ahoi:	-	Agikuyu traditional land tenants.
Boma:	-	Colonial area of one's jurisdiction
Bororiet	-	Nandi territorial, military and political unit
Githaka	-	Agikuyu traditional landlord
Kaburu	-	Afrikaner farmers
Kaptich	-	Nandi cattle grazing ground
Kokwet	-	Nandi group of homesteads
Madoadoa	-	“Spots”, used to refer to ethnic groups considered outsiders in Turbo Sub-county.
Majimbo	-	Ethnic regions, singular, jimbo
Murenik	-	Nandi warriors

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AP	-	Administration Police
CIPEV	-	Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence
COVID 19	-	Corona Virus 2019
DAO	-	District Agriculture Officer
DC	-	District Commissioner
DO	-	District Officer
DP	-	Demoratic Party
FGD	-	Focused Group Discussion
FORD-A	-	Forum for Restoration of Democracy – Asili
FORD-K	-	Forum for Restoration of Democracy-Kenya
GEMA	-	Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association
GoK	-	Government of Kenya
HRW	-	Human Rights Watch
ICG	-	International Crisis Group
KADU	-	Kenya African Democratic Union
KAMATUSA-		Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu
KANU	-	Kenya African National Union
KHRC	-	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KNA	-	Kenya National Archives
KNBS	-	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KNCHR	-	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
LDP	-	Liberal Democratic Party
MoU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	-	Member of Parliament

NAK	-	National Alliance of Kenya
NARC	-	National Rainbow Coalition
NACOSTI	-	National Commission For Science Technology and Innovation
NCCK	-	National Council of Churches in Kenya
NDP	-	National Development Party
NG-CDF	-	National Government Constituency Development Fund
NGO(s)	-	Non Governmental Organization(s)
ODM	-	Orange Democratic Movement
OI	-	Oral Interview
PC	-	Provincial Commissioner
PEV	-	Post-Election Violence
PNU	-	Party of National Unity
RVP	-	Rift Valley Province
SDP	-	Social Democratic Party
TJRC	-	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
UG	-	Uasin Gishu
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
YK92	-	Youth for KANU 92

ABSTRACT

Kenya is a multi-ethnic society whose people have overtime co-existed, traded and intermarried. These cordial inter-ethnic relations have resulted in the country's social development, economic growth as well as political stability. However, efforts to promote perpetual peaceful co-existence remains a mirage despite decades of restructuring. This is partly because of the failure by the political elite to de-ethnicize politics, a development that is frequently connected with intermittent conflicts experienced in various parts of the country. Such conflicts have threatened the very bases of social order and cohesion, caused hatred, death, destruction of property and collapse of thriving economy. Against this bedrock, and guided by Dahrendorf's Conflict theory, this study investigated Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Turbo sub-county, Uasin Gishu County Kenya between 1895 to 2010. It explored the localized processes of identity production and negotiation in the area. The following objectives guided the study; tracing the evolution of the multi-ethnic community in the study area, analyzing the nexus between politicized ethnicity and inter-ethnic conflicts and examining the heightened inter-ethnic conflicts and intervention measures to mitigate the conflicts in Turbo Sub-county. The study targeted a population of people who had knowledge of the history and surrounding terrain plus those conversant with early inter-ethnic contacts and conflicts in the study area. In its methodology purposive and snowballing sampling method were employed and the data collected and analyzed qualitatively. Primary data was gathered by conducting questionnaires, interviews and by examining government official reports and archival documents whereas secondary data was sourced from theses, books, articles in newspapers and journals from libraries. The study's findings indicate that the demands of the colonial economy resulted in the formation of a multi-ethnic community in Turbo area. The settled people had a peaceful and harmonious co-existence as they mutually engaged in economic and social activities. However, since politics in the country falls short of the best practices and ideals of a democratic political system, politicization of ethnicity through balkanization of the residents into rigid ethnic enclaves and poor governance through resource mal-distribution heightens perceptions of exclusion which consequently provokes conflicts. These conflicts have amplified ethnic differences making citizens to consciously identify more with their ethnic groups than being Kenyan citizens. Even though various stakeholders such as the religious community and non-governmental organizations have taken measures to mitigate such conflicts, the approach has not been integrated. The study faults government efforts for its top down approach to peace building and recommends bottom up approaches including resourcing the institution of elderhood and granting it authority to manage conflicts. The recommendations are aimed to inform the policy makers and other stakeholders on how to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts and thus promote peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction.

This chapter introduces the study by first providing the background on inter-ethnic relations all over the world, Africa, East Africa and Kenya. This is then followed by the statement of the problem, the study objectives, research questions, research premises, justification and significance of the study, scope and limitations of the study, literature review, theoretical framework and research methodology.

1.2 Background of the Study

The word ethnic is a derivative of the Greek word *ethnos* which meant pagan (Eriksen, 1993:5) from which come “ethnicity” and “ethnic”. Over the centuries there have been varied definitions of the term ethnicity. Ethnicity as described by some connotes purely biological instincts for survival (Van den Berghe, 1981). To some it is emotion-based attachment to a group (Horowitz, 1985). Majority describe ethnicity more from the social perspective where every individual has a choice to make (Barth, 1969). Fishman (1977:6) explains ethnicity as an aspect of how the individual identifies his or herself as well as how others from outside the ethnic group view the ones inside. Ethnicity is beyond the physical boundaries and it entails the aspect of how others recognize the in-groups (Ibid: 26). Fishman reinforced the view that if ethnicity needs increased consciousness then there is need for opposition in the boundaries for ethnicity to be understood.

Conflicts are regarded ethnic when they involve organized political movements, civil wars, mass unrest and separatist action with disparate lines existing along ethnic motives

(Stavenhagen, 1991). Ethnic conflict is a global phenomenon witnessed by all including most civilized democracies (Christie, 1998). According to Cartel et al. (2009), many countries including Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and Kashmir have experienced protracted ethnic violence. Other examples include the Kurdish struggle for sovereignty in Iraq, Turkey and Iran, guerilla wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador and insurrection in Chechnya (De Waal, 1996).

Ethnic conflicts as manifested are deep rooted in majority of the communities and what we can observe are its effects which include conflicts between states, conflicts within a state, conflict between different ethnic groups among others. Many scholars connect conflicts to ethnicity, especially the elite in a group who spearhead ethnic conflicts for their personal gains such as power. Socio-economic and political competition are key factors known to fuel these conflicts. In addition, politicized ethnicity has been apparent in various ways such as through ethnic militaries where the political elite form armies constituting of co-ethnics then use them to exacerbate conflicts.

The ethnic battles of smaller communities for political freedom and autonomy from socio-economic exploitation by bigger communities saw the disintegration of former Soviet Union in the 1990s, when ethnic nations split from Soviet Union. This trend was repeated in the rest of Eastern Europe (Goodhand, 2003). Banac (1992) argues that by 1991 when communism fell in Eastern Europe and the victory of the opposition in the 1990 elections in Croatia, Slovenia Mercedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslav and Serbia people's army became more and more isolated and determined to reject further confederation. When Croatia and Slovenia declared independence in June 1991, war broke out prompting an obituary for Yugoslavia in the Serbian Cultural Weekly. This

analysis indicates that ethnic tensions and conflicts do not just happen but develop slowly over time.

In Eastern Chiapas in Mexico politicization of ethnicity became prevalent after diverse groups of various ethnic identities settled in central highland in the 1970s. Those groups included colonists from Northern and Central Mexico plus other Indian immigrants. In 1980s the immigrants together with other settlers formed unions as option to the peasant organizations of the Mexico Institutional Party (PRI), the then incumbent party, because of alienation of the national government. Later, the peasant organization identified themselves with the opposition political parties a move that instigated government repression. Consequently, this resulted to conflicts including the 1994 Zapatista insurrection where other marginalized groups and the poor farmers rebelled against the government (Collier, 1994).

According to Kakai (1997) inter-ethnic interactions that date from pre-colonial days, some of which are depicted by peaceful co-existence, tensions, suspicions and even conflicts continue to pass over to the current generations, are products of historical forces of colonialism and neocolonialism. In Africa, the Rwanda genocide is an example of how ethnic wars can threaten human lives and coexistence in society. The ethnic conflict in Rwanda was perpetuated by the Hutus and Tutsi. Howard and Astri (1999), trace the divide between the two communities to the Belgian colonizers who introduced separate identification (ID) cards for them. At independence most power and land were in the hands of the Tutsi while the Hutu were regarded as forced labourers called the 'akasi'. The two ethnic identities thus came to hate each other over time through systematized inequality and a struggle for power. Prior to the 1994 genocide ethnic polarization

between the two was deepened as accusations were made against the Tutsi of having connections with Rwandan Patriotic Front rebels and consequently jailed. The situation was taken advantage of by the local elite who incited the youth provoking intermittent conflicts that eventually resulted into genocide.

In Sudan, civil war erupted just after independence in 1956 as the traditionalist southerners and majority black Christians resisted discriminative policies from the Arab north who practiced Islam. Consequently, the military broke into two groups, representing the south and the north. After South Sudan's independence in 2011 the military factions re-emerged one identifying with the Dinka and the other the Nuer, a development that thrust civil war into the country (Kristen 2016). In the 1990s economic decline in Sierra Leone and Liberia coupled with politicization of ethnicity led to appearance of ethnic militias which developed ethnic propaganda and revolutionary ideas which were used to accelerate criminal activities and subsequent conflicts (Allen 1991).

Nigeria's ethnic conflicts from 1914 to 1993 is traced by Suberu (1993). He indicates that the need to bring together the Christian Igbo, Muslim Hausa-Fulani, the religiously bi-communal Yoruba and the minority ethnic groups into one single country initiated diverse ethnic tensions, suspicions and conflicts. He posits that the minority groups felt that the larger Nigerian communities neglected them. He argues that after independence, the ensuing ethnic imbalance in Nigeria contributed to the collapse of the first Republic and the imposition of military rule in 1960 and the Biafra War of 1967-1970. The bottom line is that conflicts have resulted to a crisis in governance and state power in many nations across the globe.

Kenya is not immune to ethnic conflicts. Bruce (1998), argues that ethnic conflicts in the country became a major problem with the emergence of multi-party politics in 1991. These are as a result of ethnic inclinations and affiliations, inequitable sharing of resources, political elections among other factors. According to Kakai (2000) the Sabaoth and Bukusu ethnic conflict linked to cattle and land was heightened from 1970s. In Migori and Gucha areas, ethnic-rooted conflicts have arisen involving the Abagusii and Luo.

McCabe (2004) notes that the Turkana and Pokot conflict is among the oldest conflicts in Northern Kenya arising out of border disputes as well as scarcity and competition over water and pasture. New waves of conflict intensified in 1995 when Turkana attempted to occupy part of Pokot but were defeated. Since then, the conflict increasingly turned openly into a boundary dispute that, in early 2012, it involved large-scale displacements and mutual killings on an almost daily basis (Andae & Bii, 2012). Tana River county in the coastal area experienced a reoccurrence of inter-group conflict that climaxed in 2012/2013 between the Orma who are mainly pastoralists and the Pokomo who are predominantly farmers, leading to displacement and death (Shaiye 2013). Similarly; Kalenjin and Agikuyu land ownership conflict erupted in 1992 with Molo being the focal point of the clashes (Akiwumi, 1999).

Turbo sub-county, the focus of the study is a multi-ethnic area with the Kalenjin being the older inhabitants. Land acquisition by other communities in the area was through land buying companies such as Kiambaa Farmers Company Limited, Uasin Gishu Company Limited and Mweyenderi Company Limited (Khamisi, 2018). The new immigrants included the Luo, Abagusii, Abaluhya and Agikuyu. These communities amicably took

part in their economic activities, sent their children to the same schools, traded peacefully and even inter-married. However, intermittent inter-ethnic conflicts have been witnessed in the area with their frequency and scope increasing from 1992 due to heightened ethno-politics during the general elections. Arson, rape, murder, theft of livestock and farm produce has been some of the effects. The conflicts are a matter of great interest to the diverse communities in the study area, the non-state and state actors alike since they have been harmful to national tranquility, public peace and the rule of law which are key pillars to social and economic development.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Ethnic conflicts are a global phenomenon that go deep in the past of human history. These conflicts have been based on cultural identity differences which are then repackaged and politicized to make ethnicity negative. When this happens, communities become vulnerable to manipulation by elite politicians in pursuit of political and economic control. In most cases, ethnic conflicts have taken the shape of “in-group verses out-group”, or majority verses minority ethnic group, or the indigenous verses immigrant dichotomy. The end game is essentially to control resources, politics or economy. At the dawn of independence in Africa the end of colonial power quickly created a lacuna in political power structure, igniting struggle for control of these resources at the national level. Classical examples include the Hutu-Tutsi historical conflict, the ethnic based Angolan conflict in the 1970s and 1980s and the Shona-Ndebele conflicts in Zimbabwe among others.

At a more local level, ethnic conflicts have centered on shared boundaries or actual “foreign” settled communities within territories of the indigenes. The outcome has in

most cases been boiling animosity and desire for control of resources which many times flare up into violence. This study is based in Turbo Sub-County of Uasin Gishu County in the North Rift of Kenya, which is home to many ethnic groups that have stayed together since the dawn of colonial rule and beyond. It seeks to examine the fundamental issues that led to the formation of this peaceful mosaic group during the colonial rule, and the change in attitude and subsequent developments among the groups towards one another in the period after independence. The study seeks to explain why the groups cooperated the way they did and why they differed to the point of violent conflict whenever misunderstandings have arisen. It further attempts to evaluate mitigating efforts towards resolving conflicts, and the successes or otherwise of these efforts. The study period is between 1895 to 2010.

1.4 Specific Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study were as follows;

1. To discuss the evolution of the multi-ethnic community in Turbo sub-county between 1895 and 1962.
2. To demonstrate the politicization of ethnicity and the rise of inter-ethnic tensions in Turbo sub-county between 1963 and 1990.
3. To examine the heightened inter-ethnic conflicts and the mitigating factors that were brought to bear on these conflicts in Turbo Sub-county of Uasin Gishu County between 1991 and 2010.

1.5 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions;

1. Which issues influenced the in-migration and settlement of the different ethnic groups, leading to a fairly harmonious multi-ethnic community in Turbo sub-county between 1895 and 1962?
2. How did politicized ethnicity lead to inter-ethnic tensions in Turbo sub-county between 1963 and 1990?
3. How successful were the mitigating interventions in the heightened inter-ethnic conflicts in Turbo sub-county between 1991 and 2010?

1.6 Research Assumptions

The study was based on the following assumptions;

1. The demands for labor of the colonial economy as well as the need for new land led to a gradual settlement and formation of the diverse ethnic communities in Turbo Sub-county between 1895 and 1962.
2. The politicization of ethnicity especially in reference to the presidency in Kenya led to ethnic tensions among the resident communities in Turbo sub-county between 1963 and 1990.
3. Interventions by different stakeholders have only partially been successful in addressing the heightened inter-ethnic conflicts in Turbo Sub-county between 1991 and 2010.

1.7 Justification and Significance of the Study

The study focuses on Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Turbo Sub-county of Uasin Gishu County, Kenya between 1895 and 2010. Turbo Sub-county is known for its intermittent incidences of inter-ethnic conflict as witnessed in 1992/93, 1997/98 and 2007/08. The conflicts have occurred mainly during electoral campaigns when ethnic animosity is ignited among the resident communities by the political elite. The area comprises diverse ethnic groups which make it possible to acquire insights on inter-ethnic relations in the area. Inter-ethnic conflicts have resulted in innumerable negative effects in all aspects of human existence and development. This study therefore contributes to existing data on ethno-politics, inter-ethnic relations and the nature of politicization of ethnicity in Africa by analyzing the nexus between the two variables. It examines the grass root ethnicity mix up with national political incitement. The findings from this study, it is hoped, will contribute to formulation of new policy and interventions to improve national unity and integration in Kenya.

1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study focuses on Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Turbo Sub-county of Uasin Gishu County, Kenya between 1895 and 2010. Turbo Sub County comprises a multi-ethnic community and its boundaries provided a focal point of analyzing Inter-ethnic Conflicts. The year 1895 was important to the study because it was the year colonial rule was introduced in Kenya (Ochieng, 1981:19). On the other hand, the worst ethnic atrocities in Kenya were characterized in 2008 (Waki, 2010). By limiting the study to 2010, the study was able to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the peace building strategies by various agencies in the study area especially after 2007/08 PEV. During this period, many aspects of inter-ethnic relations could be identified and analyzed conveniently. Using Dahrendorf's conflict theory, the study restricted itself to assessing the history of inter-ethnic contact in the study area, politicization of ethnicity that led to conflicts in the 1992, 1997 and 2007 electioneering period and interventions measures to mitigate those conflicts with a view to resolving inter-ethnic conflicts.

1.9. Review of Related Literature

Varied literature has paid attention on issues of inter-ethnic relations globally. The present literature review focus on the history of inter-ethnic contact, politicization of ethnicity that leads to conflicts and interventions measures to mitigate such conflicts with a view to resolving inter-ethnic conflicts in world's various parts, including Africa, East Africa, Kenya and Turbo Sub-county of Uasin Gishu County.

1.9.1 History of Multi-Ethnic Settlement

Groen (1974) provides information about the establishment of Afrikanerdom in colonial Kenya. He explains the inhabitation of the land on the Uasin Gishu plateau by Afrikaners

who began developing it economically. Settlers got workers from all other ethnicities and this explains how non-Kalenjin communities found themselves in the study area in their pursuit of labor.

Kanogo's (1987) work explore how Agikuyu became a bigger source of labor in plantation in Rift Valley. This work is relevant to this study as it helped in tracing the settlement of the Agikuyu in Turbo sub-county.

Sorrenson, (1968) describes how the colonial government encouraged European immigrants to take up lands aiming at promoting white settlements. Besides encouraging land grabbing, the government also formulated suitable legislation methods to control settlement. Eventually, African reserves were formed after the settlement of the white settlers in the "white Highlands". This discussion, on African land alienation for the European settlers highlights a clear picture that is important in understanding the formation of a multi-ethnic residence in the study area.

Clayton and Savage (1974) gives a detailed description of the evolution of all aspects of labor in Kenya. They trace 'traditional' forms of labor in pre-colonial time, including slave and communal labor to agricultural squatter, and casual labor. Their analysis of labor system was instrumental in the study in its attempt to locate the formation of the multi-ethnic community in the study area.

Leys (1975) reveals how the Europeans gained monopoly over high potential land in the white highlands facilitating access to profitable crops and markets. Africans remained constrained in their original residence without provision of techniques, capital, services or crops to cultivate and produce for the market. As a result, Leys argues that it led to

underdevelopment of Africans leading to their migration to Europeans farms in search of labor. Insights from this work was helpful in exploring how different ethnic groups were affected and their eventual settlement in Turbo sub-county.

1.9.2 Politicization of Ethnicity

Rohwerder (2015) postulates that the reasons for the different conflicts are widely related to the country's deep and persistent fault lines in relation to socio-economic marginalization and manipulation of identities by the elite for political mobilization. The many, overlapping conflicts meaningfully shape the nature of conflict and vulnerability of civilians to violence and need clear responses. This work was helpful in the analysis of political manipulation in the study area.

In African communities' ethnicity is highly reinforced. However, majority of the groups exhibit hostility to out-group (Kimenyi,1997:27). Ethnic groups root for in-group association only in order to retain their identity (Ibid:30). Kimenyi's work was important to this study when examining the issue of politicization of ethnicity and the role played by ordinary people in ethnic conflict in the study area.

According to Olayode (2016:244) "ethnicity does not *per se* explain conflict". It is rather the behavior of the political elite to negatively take advantage of different ethnic identities to cause division and to initiate conflicts for their own benefits. Therefore, ethnicity is seen as among the means and a key tool for accomplishing the objectives of a selected group at the expense of others, steering build-up of conflict. This work is key in explaining how ethnicity was typically not the causative factor of inter-ethnic conflicts in Turbo sub county but a lever, politicians use to attract their adherents in pursuit of power.

Weber (1998:22-23) identifies the cause of conflict as political exclusion of other ethnic groups. The leading ethnic group exploits other groups which try to change the leadership. Ethnicity thus becomes a key weapon in politics. Weber notices that the subordinate group get less resources and are seen as the weaklings. In such a case the subordinate group will aggregate and form a resistance against the dominant group. This work is relevant to the study as it indicates a clear picture which has been common in Turbo sub-county where a few communities have suffered exclusion and political deprivation, a development that has aggravated politics of ethnicity in the area.

Wamwere (2008) explains ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Kenya. He points out that leaders propagate ethnic hatred and illustrates how the country has adopted ethnicity as a way of governance. Majority of political coalitions are formed based on ethnic leaders and this according to him is the highway to genocide. The disadvantaged group ultimately form resistance against the government and thus fuel ethnic conflict in the country. Wamwere's work is useful in illustrating how ethnicity has affected relations among the diverse ethnic groups in Turbo sub-county and the subsequent conflicts among them.

Elaborating the functions of the elite in ethnic conflicts, Adedeji (1999) points out that the elite can ignite ethnic conflict that will affect the entire community. This happens since the elite sell their ambitions as if they are the ambitions of an ethnic group they belong to. Since the ethnic group's dreams is attached to the elite leader, his or her hostile struggle becomes the struggle of the entire group. Adedeji also highlights the aspect of ethnic stereotype where individuals identify themselves as in-groups and others outsiders, this has been used to eliminate some individuals from an area. The narrative of insider

and outsider has led to expulsion of immigrants and thus the work is used to interrogate inter-ethnic conflicts in Turbo sub county.

There are myriad effects associated with ethnic conflicts (Shah 2009). Conflict disrupts the harmony in the society. Citizens are either affected directly or indirectly but the effects are felt by all. In most instances, victims of inter-ethnic conflicts are left without homes, impoverished, traumatized, injured or even dead (Waki 2010, Akiwumi 1999, Kiliku 1992). These works on effects of inter-ethnic conflicts is used in the study in understanding how the resident communities in the study area were affected by the conflicts especially after the 2007/08 PEV.

1.9.3 Heightened Inter-Ethnic Conflicts and Intervention Measures in Combating the Conflicts

African inter-ethnic conflicts are not as a consequence of the fact that the national boundaries and continent are brackets enclosing multi-ethnic groups but are issues of ethnic grudges (Mc Onyango,1995:1). He posits that there are various political and socio-economic grudges between or within the numerous ethnic groups in African states. His work is insightful in exploring the heightened inter-ethnic conflicts in the study area.

Bruce (1998) postulates that the demarcation of ethnic differences takes on political importance and legitimizes claims to rights and resources thereby giving ethnic groups meaning and organized channels for following ethnic interests. Ethnic identities in this context can be manipulated and invested in political competition. The study relied on this work in examining how ethnic animosity propelled the Kalenjin who termed the study area as their 'own' to fight for political survival through ethnically motivated violence.

Various scholars like Mazrui (1969) and Lederach (1997) have suggested solutions to inter-ethnic conflicts. Effective peace building is not only done from top; looking at the cause and addressing from there is very important (Lederach,1997). This work is useful in the quest of investigating the inter-ethnic conflicts in Turbo sub-county.

Mazrui (1969) points out that previous conflicts plays a major role in future conflict resolutions. The experience gained during a conflict is vital in identifying areas of common interest and this helps in solving any real or potential conflicts. The effects of conflict can prevent future emergence of similar conflicts when communities identify that they depend on one another. Identifying a shared ideology will be essential in conflict resolution when previously hostile communities fight for a common goal, they will put aside their differences and work on the common goal. This observation by Mazrui helps the researcher in depicting the peaceful coexistence among the multi-ethnic communities in Turbo sub-county especially after the intermittent PEV.

Managing ethnic conflicts in a region requires the indigenous methods of conflict resolution. Using traditional African methods of conflict resolution to solve African ethnic conflicts will yield better results than using western methods (Luling,2002:71-85). Disregarding the pre-colonial method of conflict resolution in Africa is so evident (Ihonvbere,1994:53). Historically in Africa there were successful ethnic conflict management processes, communities lived together even with the ethnic differences. There is need to look into the informal ways of conflict resolution. It should include use of local efforts and systems. Community leaders were the main custodians of conflict resolution; they were involved in bringing communities together. There is need to study and find out why in Turbo Sub-county the traditional methods did not bear fruits.

Aseka (1994:6-12) explains the need to come up with ethnic values that cover many ethnic groups. When communities share common values they will work towards harmonious society. His work agrees with Manundu's (1994:10) who argues that each member of different communities should develop common interests with other members from different ethnic groups and thus ensure inter-dependence which will create cohesion. Once members of the society develop interdependence and cohesion the shift of power will not threaten the losing ethnic group. Aseka's and Manundu's works are relevant to the study as they shade light on ways of ethnic conflict resolution in Turbo sub county.

Soja (1968:11) argues that populations from a given ethnic group develop some sense of bond that will ensure cooperation and unity to fight external threats. However, this does not prevent internal conflict but it creates cohesion internally for fighting common enemy. This study is important in its attempt to finding ways to solve conflicts in the study area.

Observation from reviewed works is that the key theories identified and examined above are mostly compatible with each other and are valuable in explaining inter-ethnic relations. As such, this study drew upon and inter-weaved these theories in the analysis of Inter-ethnic Conflicts in the study area. However, these theories were limited by their helicopter perspective of not looking at how far ethnicity reflect interaction between stakeholders and locals. This study thus sought to address this gap as it interrogated inter-ethnic relations in Turbo Sub-county, Uasin Gishu County using the conflict theoretical framework.

1.10 Theoretical Framework

Conflicts are a universal phenomena and every society at one point or another experiences disputes be they internal or external (Abraham, 1982:125). Different opinions help a society to identify problems and thus find ways to solve them at early stages before they escalate into conflict. As such various theoretical frameworks have been used to explain conflict in society. One of them is the conflict theory. This theory was developed in the early 3rd century by neo-Christian philosophers (ibid:105). Writers that later contributed to conflict theory include Heraclitus, Polybius, Ibn Khaldun, Niccolo Machiaveli, Thomas Hobbes, Jean Bodin and Gaetano Mosca among others. Their work went a long way in laying the background for this particular study.

Galtung (1996) takes a broad view of conflict encompassing not just direct violence but also cultural and structural violence. He heavily focuses on structural factors as economic disparities and power imbalances. While these are important, they may not fully capture the complex dynamics of inter-ethnic relations. He further portrays conflicts as enduring and unchanging unless structural conditions are altered. In reality, inter-ethnic relations can evolve overtime through reconciliation, dialogue and shifts in societal norms. His theoretical strand has been criticized for lacking robust empirical validation and also oversimplifying complex conflicts and failing to capture nuanced interactions and interdependence between ethnic groups. Whereas Galtung's framework emerges in the study, it is not enough and thus Dahrendorf's aspect bolsters it.

Dahrendorf (Abraham, 1992, 125) builds on Karl Marx ideas of social conflict and class struggle but introduces a more dynamic perspective. He views conflict as normal and inevitable part of social life. In inter-ethnic relations, he argues that conflicts arise from

competition for resources and the desire of ethnic groups to assert their identity and interests. This is true for the study area where struggles over political influence and economic opportunities in different period within the timeframe of the study resulted into conflicts.


Dahrendorf recognizes that conflicts arise and change as power relations shift and further argues that conflicts may arise from deep seated inequalities and injustices that persist overtime. Such grievances can stem from political exclusion, social discrimination or economic disparities. Historical grievances often results from ones ‘group domination over another leading to resentment and resistance from the oppressed group. In the study area the Kalenjin felt that their exclusion from government in different electioneering period coupled by historical grievances especially “loss” of land to other ethnic group justified their violence against them.

1.11 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework graphically represents the independent and dependent variables and how they are related. In this study, the independent variables were the political factors while the dependent variable was the inter-ethnic relations in Turbo sub-county.

Figure 1.1 presents the study’s conceptual framework.

Figure 1.1: Relationship between Independent, Dependent and Intervening Variables.



Source: The Researcher 2022.

1.12 Research Methodology

1.12.1. Introduction.

This section presents the methods adopted during the actual data collection, analysis and presentation. It also includes the instruments employed, the sampling techniques and their justifications, the size of the sample as well as the challenges experienced in data collection.

1.12.2 Research Design

The study employed qualitative and historical research design. A qualitative approach is advantageous because it is appropriate for discovering new insights and generating broad

explanations of a research problem. (Babbie, 2014). On the other hand, the historical design was vital in chronologising of events.

1.12.3 Research Area

Turbo sub-county of Uasin Gishu county is located in the North Rift of Kenya. It neighbors Soy sub-county to the North, Kakamega county to the North West and Nandi county to the South West. It has a population of approximately 210,409 confined in an area of 322.7 square kilometers (NG-CDF). The most represented ethnic groups are the Kalenjin, Abaluhya, Agikuyu, Luo and Abagusii (KNBS, 2019). The sub-county is made up of six wards namely, Ngenyilel, Huruma, Tapsagoi, Kamagut, Kiplombe and Kapsaos. The area has a cool and temperate climate with rainfall of between 624.9 mm to 1,560.4mm. The area's economy is agricultural based whereby large scale agriculture is practiced mostly by the Kalenjin who engage majorly in maize, wheat and dairy farming (DAO, 1996). Figure1.2 shows the map of the study area.

Figure 1.2 Map of Turbo Sub County, Uasin Gishu County



Source: Survey Kenya 2022.

1.12.4 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

The study was conducted on residents of Huruma, Kapsaos, Tapsagoi, Kamagut, Kiplombe and Ngenyilel wards. These sites were purposively chosen because they showed variation and diversity both in ethnic composition and in violence dynamics. The sampling targeted particularly the elderly people, historians and other community members thought to have sound knowledge of the history and surrounding terrain plus those conversant with early inter-ethnic contacts and inter-conflicts in the mentioned wards. The key informants included seven people, four who provided knowledge on colonial period where as the other three gave accounts of recent history. Among the respondents included some colonial employees who worked in the tribunal courts, farm foremen, teachers and tribal police. Others were adored custodians of local traditions and

histories. These potential participants were identified, based on their age, ethnic representation, willingness to participate and their knowledge on inter-ethnic conflicts in Turbo sub-county. A total of three FGD discussions were then held with each comprising a minimum of five informants. The first FGD consisted of six elders who handled matters on evolution of multi-ethnic community in the study area, the second of five religious leaders and which deliberated on politicization of ethnicity whereas the third comprised seven women who examined the heightened inter-ethnic conflicts and mitigating measures of the conflicts. The FGDs limited the amount of time as it generally produced detailed qualitative information from many participants who were in one place. The groups were reached through the help of village elders and the chiefs. Having identified a sample size of fifty participants, snowballing sampling method was then used to pick them to participate in the study. Moreover, the researcher, working together with two trained Research Assistants Josiah Cheruiyot and Steven Wambu identified key informants through purposive sampling. Purposive and snowball techniques of sampling were chosen since the population targeted was large and dispersed in a wide area. The reliability and validity of the study was ensured by pilot-testing the instruments in the neighbouring Kipkenyo ward, Kapseret sub-county of Uasin Gishu county.

1.12.5 Research Instruments and Data Collection Procedures

Sources of data included primary and secondary. Primary data included data from oral interviews, questionnaires, documents from the Kenya National Archives (KNA) such as colonial records, reports and letters that were relevant to the study. Secondary data was acquired from published books and theses, newspapers, government documents, unpublished conference papers, peer reviewed journals, NGO reports and electronic

sources. The study used the following instruments. Questionnaires (see appendix A2) for provincial administration and NGO staff, Focused Group Discussion guide (FGD) (see appendix A3) for women, religious and community elders and an interview schedule (see appendix A2) for local community leaders. The FGDs were used to facilitate comparison and obtain multiple perspective on the research problem. This further facilitated probing of research questions for clarity.

The informants were asked open ended questions in the interview schedule. This helped the researcher in probing and recording relevant data that would have been difficult to come by if close-ended questions were utilized. Interviews were narrative in style and were conducted with purposively selected informants on the basis of their knowledge of and involvement in the issues in question. The interview method was unique in that it involved direct verbal interaction between individuals. Burgress (1984) recommends the technique as it encourages discussion and debate about topics thus facilitating sharing of ideas and learning what is important to respondents. During the interviews, the respondents were asked to feel free to give as much information. The researcher explained the steps and let the respondents get to know the tools that were used.

Responses from the interview were recorded in form of note taking before summarizing and interpreting. A tape-recorder was also used to record some interviews. The auto-reverse tape recorder was used to avoid turning off the tape in the discussion process. Recording ensured collection of raw data without biasness from the researcher. It also offers a chance to re-examine the data in future. Moreover, it makes the interview go faster with no interruptions.

The researcher was personally present in all sites at the time of conducting the interviews. The research assistants were involved in audio recording of FGDs and also facilitated translation of vernacular to English and vice versa. Afterwards, the information acquired from oral interviews was assessed and verified with other data for validity, accuracy, and reliability.

Initially it was difficult to access certain county and national government officials and elder men especially from the Kalenjin. The researcher therefore relied on personal recommendations made by individuals who knew them personally. This was especially so because of the sensitive nature of the subject under investigation and the need for participants to have confidence in the researcher.

1.12.6 Data Analysis and Presentation.

Data analysis was guided by Bryman's (2012) interactive model that include data reduction, data display and drawing and verifying conclusions. Data was analyzed through a narrative synthesis approach that outdraws data from sources, looks for patterns and creates relevant themes in line with the objectives of the study, respective historical timeframe and theoretical framework. The data was first edited to identify and eliminate errors made by the researcher and field assistants especially during the interview. Data was then sorted and placed into folders arranged according to the six wards then saved in flashes and put in safe custody.

The logical historical method was used to analyze and present data. This is a unique method that describes the historical events chronologically and logically (Onimode, 1985:38). Interpretation was made after the past events and developments were subjected

to a critical process of investigation. Data was arranged and presented in a thesis solely by the researcher. Entirely, the data was edited and analyzed within the conflict theoretical framework.

1.12.7 Ethical Considerations

A research permit from the National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) (see appendix A4) was sought before the study commenced. The ethical clearance was sought from Kenyatta University Ethics Review Committee. Acceptable etiquette was observed by the researcher during interaction with all the research informants and the aim of the study was clarified to them. Privacy of the information given by the respondents and confidentiality information given by the informants was ensured. Their names were omitted in representation and any piece of identifiable information avoided. All the respondents were made aware of their right to withdraw from participation at any given time did some form of discomfort emerge as observed in consent form (see appendix A1). Moreover, all COVID-19 precautions were strictly observed during the study. All in all, the researcher sought to maintain objectivity during the research. The next chapter discusses the evolution of multi-ethnic community in the study area.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MULTI-ETHNIC COMMUNITY IN TURBO SUB-COUNTY (1895-1962).

2.1 Introduction.

This chapter illustrates how the multi-ethnic community in Turbo Sub-county was formed and briefly analyses the evolution of these relations within the above time frame using Dahrendorf's conflict theory.

2.2 The Pre-Colonial Inhabitants of Uasin Gishu Plateau.

The belt of land running South-west of Mt. Elgon into the Rift Valley is what is known as the Uasin Gishu plateau (Ehret, 1971). Knowledge of the indigenous inhabitants of Uasin Gishu is very scanty (Darel, not dated manuscript, Ehret,1971:173). According to Ochieng (1975:21) this is because Rift Valley (the plateau included) is an outcome of lengthy historical process which involved socio-cultural, economic and political development and inter-mixture of the diverse populations settled in this part of Kenya. From extant tradition and literature, the earliest inhabitants of Rift Valley were the Khoisan (ibid:21). The next known people after them and the southern Cushites were the "early" southern Nilotic people who later differentiated themselves into the Dorobo, Kalenjin, Ateker, Dadog and possibly Sirikwa people (ibid:25).

Thus varied historical accounts indicate that Uasin Gishu plateau was occupied by different ethnic groups. In the early period of the present millennium, Ehret (1971) contends that the ancestors of the Kalenjin were living somewhere in Uasin Gishu. The Keiyo and Marakwet are said to have occupied the eastern rim of the plateau before 1890

(Kanogo, 1987:11). The Nandi seem to come into being in the early 17th century along the southern Nandi escarpment. They gradually expanded northward by absorbing people of various other Kalenjin groups into their community and settled from sometime in the 18th century on into the 19th century in Uasin Gishu (Ehret,1968:173) much possibly from around Mt Elgon (Were,1987:48,Were,1968:190).

Traditional evidence suggests that the Bagishu who are closely related to the Bukusu of Bungoma occupied the Uasin Gishu plateau before they were driven out to the east of Mt Elgon by the Maasai, Nandi and perhaps the Abyssinians between A.D.1517 and 1652(Were,1968:188, Were 1987:53). Oral traditions also point Sengwer (Sengeli) in Uasin Gishu plateau as the origin of the ancestors of the present Abatachoni (Ehret, 1971:68).

The Maasai and Nandi mythical tales indicate that the Turbo-Kipkaren area in the Uasin Gishu plateau was occupied by pastoralists, the Sirikwa, referred both ethnic groups as ‘the people who were here before us’ (KNA, DC/UG/2/1,1961). This corroborates Darel’s work that stone kraals called *mokwen* were excavated in the area.

From linguistic, historical, oral and archaeological evidence, the Sirikwa, as a people, are thought to have possibly been the ancestors of the present day Kalenjin people of the highlands west of Kenya's Rift Valley (Sutton,1987). Between AD 1600 and 1800 the Sirikwa seem to have established close contacts with the majority of the eastward and southward expanding Kalenjin families who were migrating or sojourning in Sumo and Wareng (or Uasin Gishu plateau) (Ochieng 1975,74). The Sirikwa were ousted by the Uasin Gishu Maasai, also referred to as *kibwobek* (Matson,1972) towards the middle of

the 18th century who took over large area of the land for grazing their cattle(ibid). During the last thirty years of the 19th c the Nandi became most powerful people in western Kenya. The Nandi occupation of a fresh territory happened on the basis of a unit known as a '*bororiet*', which is political union based on territorial and military functions. The '*kokwotinwek*'- formed the basic military group based on homesteads. The inhabitation occurred either forming new political unit or migration of a section of the original unit (Matson,1972:25-26).

The rise of the Nandi as a military power was largely due to the decline of the Maasai power (Were,1987:48) caused by civil wars that began about 1813 and also being weakened by natural factors such as locust invasion, pleuropneumonia among their cattle, and small pox (ibid:65- 66). The *kibwobek*, the Maasai in Uasin Gishu, were eventually exiled by the Nandi, after a major battle at Kipkarren-the Nandi name for "the place of the spears" (Darel,1, not dated manuscript). After removal of Maasai from Uasin Gishu and Siwa, the Nandi accessed the entire grazing region of Uasin Gishu plateau (Oboler,1985:19, Matson,1972, FGD1,2022).

Wolf (1977;16) suggests that social relations occur in four dimensions, which may be; (a) relations through kinship and marital ties, (b) people coming together to preserve shared interest and keep peace, (c) business partners including trading labor for food, and (d) relations formed as people worship and celebrate rituals together. As the dimensions indicate, even though the territorial movement by the aforementioned ethnic groups was not always calm, the inter-ethnic relations between and among them were not defined by confrontation. In areas where actual differences existed, the communities had established laws on how to co-exist with their neighbors. Also due to lack of physical boundaries

there existed long and complicated process of interactions characterized by cooperation through trade and intermarriages. As confirmed by Matson (1972:34), they also did barter trade with other Kalenjin kinsmen, the Dorobo people, and neighboring ethnic groups largely at their territorial borders during periods of severe famine.

2.3 Establishment of Colonialism in Uasin Gishu

Uasin Gishu plateau provided pasture fields for Nandi until they were displaced by the colonial government and made the European White highlands leading to colonial settlement. In the period between 1894 and 1902 Uasin Gishu was formerly part of Uganda up to Naivasha. The region was ruled by the British with their offices in Kampala until April, 1902 (Were, 1967:167) which was later transferred to current Kenya.

From 1890s the Europeans travelled through Rift Valley, identified arable land and reported back to British colony. Such examples include Joseph Thomson who on his way to Lake Victoria passed Uasin Gishu in 1883 (Thomson, 1968:274) whereas Ewart Grogan explored Mau escarpment forest in 1904 and identified the profitability of developing Uasin Gishu plateau (Anderson, 2002:235).

By 1904, many white settlers streamed to Kenya and Uasin Gishu plateau was their hot spot. Initially, the plateau was designated by Lord Charmberlain for Jewish settlers but it received resistance from other white settlers especially the British settlers (Trzebinski 1985:62). The Jewish settlement in the area, therefore, did not materialize (Kareithi, Standard, 2011).

The Nandi gathered against the invasion of the colonial government into their land, causing the government to punish them by mounting disciplinary action against

them with the reason being that they had caused insecurity in the European settlement of the Uasin Gishu. The British organized a series of military expeditions against them between 1895-1905 in what they referred to as one of the “recalcitrant tribes” in Kenya (Ochieng’, 1986:88). In 1905, the trouble with Nandi caused closure of the plateau to more prospective settlers’. The final expedition in October the same year led to the Nandi defeat, thus permitting the introduction of colonial rule in the area. This was after colonel Richard Meinertzhagen murdered the then Nandi *orkoiyot* (a foreseer) Koitalel Arap Samoei (Ochieng, 1981:19, Anderson 1986). The Nandi leaders dispirited by Samoei’s death, then met Hayes-Sadler, the new commissioner and they accepted the terms of peace. The Nandi who lived in the plateau were then moved to the Nandi reserve in which their movement was strictly controlled (KNA, DC/NDI/5/2, 1944, Huntingford 1950,108–118, Matson1993, Nandi District Quarterly Report, June 1905).

The ‘Boers’ moved in from South Africa after the Nandi were defeated (East African Standard, 11 July 1908). The region’s land that was fertile attracted settlers who established large farms, converting the former Nandi pasture grounds into crop-rearing fields. In 1903, a European, W.F. Van Breda from South Africa, became the first person to apply for land in Uasin Gishu on his and his two brothers’ behalf (KNA, DC/UG/2/1,1961).

In 1906, a South African J.A.J. Van Reinsburg did land inspection and was favorably impressed by the plateau. On his return to South Africa, he organized a ‘Reinsburg trek’ (ibid). In 1907 and 1908 there was a rise in the number of settlers from South Africa. These settlers were wealthy leaders and hence came in with more livestock to graze (KNA,Political Record File,1927-30,UG/2). By 1910 visibility of colonial white

settlement in the area was evident. Uasin Gishu plateau was perfect destination for Afrikaners for its weather and fertility favoring wheat farming in addition to proximity to adequate supply of labor from the Nandi and neighboring Abaluhya squatters (Youe,1988:397).

The north of the Uasin Gishu plateau where Van Rensberg's Afrikaners had occupied in 1908 (Trzebinski, 1985:134-136) witnessed the first expansion of European settlement through the 1913 land eviction. The land started being auctioned for leasing on May 24,1913, in Nairobi by English speaking whites. This disadvantaged Afrikaners who managed to only lease one out of eight farms in Uasin Gishu. As a result, "their inability to monopolize the acquisition of very recently opened lands on the Uasin Gishu prevented the Afrikaners from forming a geographically distinct Afrikaner community in the Protectorate"(Groen,1968:93-94).

Other settlers in the area included Derek Haggie who owned Kakeptui Stud farm near Turbo and Arthur Cecil Hoey who owned Kapsirowa Sageru farm (Elspeth and Arnold,1980) that stretched all the way to present day Moi's bridge in Soy area. Other settlers also included Swintone-Home whose land stretched up to Soy area, Charles Bell, Abraham Joubert (Elspeth and Arnold, 1980), L.A. Johnston, North, Snyman, B.C. Barrow, and L.G. Cooper (East Africa Protectorate Economic Commission Evidence 1917:2-3). The British settlers expected a better outcome from their farming. However, they had no prior experience in farming. Equally, the Boers were not conversant with planting season in the region, arriving on the area from Transvaal in 1908. This prompted failure in their maize plantation hence were forced to source their food from the locals (Roets, Undated interview transcript, KNA, 920 Bow, pp. 2-3). H.C. Kirk, one of the

early arrivals with farming experience also did not utilize his land fully only putting twenty acres of his land under cultivation out of a total of two thousand acres (Report of the Native Labour Commission, 1913, 192-193). Over time more land was put into use in farming and thus making Uasin Gishu the hot spot in farm productivity.

Rules governing land ownership restricted locals to reserves while the bigger productive land were given to white settlers. The introduction of 'native reserves' formed the base of ethnically defined administrative units. Creation of reserves had political motive. According to Munene (1992:4) it was to keep various African societies apart to prevent them from coming together to resist against a "common enemy". As a consequence, the separation of different ethnic groups created the basis for ethnic consciousness that facilitated ethnicization of the Kenyan society as will be examined in the next chapter.

2.4 Labour Contracts and its Role in the Formation of a Multi-Ethnic Community in the Uasin Gishu (1906-1936).

The development of an agricultural economy in the alienated Uasin Gishu area depended on the availability of regular and adequate supply of labor. African labor had become unavailable thus forcing colonialist to apply different laws to counter this (Van Zwanenberg, 1972:32). This included establishment of reserves, introduction of taxes, the *kipande* identity system, forced labour and squatting.

Natives being isolated to reserves, became the main source of labor for the settlements. These reserves were overcrowded and unproductive. As they did not have enough land in reserves they were forced to move to settlements in search of employment (Leo, 1975:42)

Besides squatting other types of labor namely *Kaffir* farming and migrant labour had emerged during colonialism in Kenya. *Kaffir* derives its name from South Africa (Kanogo 1987,15). In this arrangement, the poor settlers who were not able to cultivate their farms due to funds shortage would permit Africans to do so and use them for grazing in exchange for a rent that was paid in kind like stock, milk, crops, manure or in cash (Van Zwanenberg,1975:257). *Kaffir* farming was however condemned by colonial administrators who saw it as risk of losing the settlement to Africans if they get rights to own the land (KNA/PC/NZA 3/49/1, 1925). Additionally, it would be difficult to control laborers working under *Kaffir* system for they were guarded by the master and servant ordinance of 1906(Kanogo,1987:17).

As early as 1904, squatting replaced *Kaffir* as European farmers encouraged African families to move and settle in their farms with an aim of obtaining what was thought to be cheap labour (KNA, C0/533/54914). Unlike the *Kaffir* system, squatter labour system required Africans to pay for leasing land by working in white settlements. In order to look after their cattle and cultivated lands the Africans had to move to the European farms to live there (Ochieng and Maxon,1992:177). Extra laws required Africans to pay hut tax and other levies as well, in British currency, in order to continue living and tilling the land (TJRC, 2013:186). This caused poverty to Africans, leaving them with no other choice than accepting the wage-labouring (Bret,1973:186) which also acted as a stimulus for migratory labour. Majority of Africans were being overburdened by taxes as well as providing for their families. More men moved from their reserve settlement to the white settler farms in search of wages.

Of these methods of labour acquisition, squatting was the most preferred by the white settlers (Kanogo,1987:14) and thus used by Uasin Gishu settler farmers or '*kaburu*' as referred to as by the squatters (Murei, O.I,2022). The squatter system highly facilitated the migration of various ethnic groups into the study area. The Nandi squatters' history in the area dates as back as 1912 when settlers requested the Nandi chiefs for labour (KNA, DC/NDI/3/2,1912). By 1919, the squatter families kept growing in numbers (KNA, Nandi Annual Report 1919-1920). In 1920s cereal production boomed and this prompted need for more labor and thus more Nandi squatters moved to white settlements together with their families and livestock (KNA/DC/NDI/5/3). The age set "*nyongi*" who were warriors then, were encouraged to move to white settlements by the Uasin Gishu Farmers Association, through Mr Cecil A.Hoey (KNA, DC/UG/1/2). The process was nicknamed by the Nandi as "*keteben bulu*" from the blue ink used in making labour treaties signed using a thumb print. This large number of Nandi settling in white man land did not seem to threaten the land ownership of the white man. Thus the 1918 Resident Native Labourers Ordinance which fixed and defined squatters' relations with White settlers did not affect the Nandi squatters in Uasin Gishu compared to Central Kenya (Youe, 1988:400).

The Nandi who were pastoral, struck a deal with the settler farmers to contract as squatters in Uasin Gishu provided they carried along their cattle (KNA, Nandi District Annual Report, 1921). With the agreement, large numbers of Nandi people signed the contract and started using the land. This was influenced by confiscation of their livestock and control by the white man following the 1906 pacification campaign (Youe,1988:399) but the incentive was chiefly to evade colonial control over cattle raiding and collective

punishment for taxation and stock theft (Ellis,1976:574). Besides, their stock had overcrowded the reserve.

The Nandi entertained squatting in order to access grazing field in the highlands just like the warriors did after defeat of Maasai. Furthermore, squatting ensured *kamanagan*, the lending of livestock to friends, continued (Youe,1988:401). Loaning cattle ensured the caretaker enjoyed the produce like milk but the ownership of the cattle remained with the lender. This tradition not only strengthened family ties but also provided insurance in case theft and disease broke out.

Nandi squatters' migration to settled areas were further encouraged by settlers since the warriors would hunt lions which fed their livestock. In return the Nandi warriors "*murenik*" discovered good grazing fields in the settlement. The men spread the word about good grazing field and thus prompted a larger population moving to white settlement (O.I, 27, Kapsaos, 2022). The influx of more people provided the increasing need for labor in exchange of grazing fields.

With 1914 outbreak of World War I there was need for manual laborers to transport fighting materials to battlefield. "Carrier corps" was created to assist soldiers move materials in the fighting grounds. The officials had to rely on the PCs, DOs and chiefs to recruit (Savage,1962:315). Due to dangers of war many people started avoiding moving to military work and sought farm work instead (ibid:324).

In 1918 farms started experiencing shortage of labor despite presence of squatters. After switching from mixed farming to large scale cultivation the need for more labor increased against reducing labor supply after 1918(Groen,1974:153). The settlements in the area

was affected by the post-World War One as the British Colonial Government opened the soldier settlement plan. The ex-World War 1 European soldiers were rewarded with land in the area (KNA, PC /RVP 2/2/1). This meant Africans had to lose more land to the Europeans, in turn resulting to a rise in economic pressure in the reserves, forcing Africans from different parts of the country to migrate to the highlands in search of employment. Consequently, more Nandi settlers moved to white farms in search of employment.

In 1920s other ethnic group including the GEMA communities, Kipsigis, Abaluhya and Abagusii started streaming in to Uasin Gishu forming a multi ethnic labor force. The booming cereal production which had prompted increase need for labor facilitated this movement (Youe,1988:400). Though most ethnic groups were victims of land alienation and thus used to seek labour, the colonial authorities resorted to recruitment from Western, Central and Nyanza resulting to the Abaluhya, Agikuyu, Abagusii and Luo moving into the region and settling as squatters (Kahl, 1998).

The Marakwet and Keiyo who as earlier indicated had also occupied the Uasin Gishu plateau in pre-colonial period resorted to squatter labour in the district by the mid-1920s after losing 328 square miles of land to E.S. Grogan in 1922 (Van Zwanenberg, 1975:257). Overstocking became a major problem, due to the small grazing areas left for them. During dry months their treasured animals became vulnerable leaving them no choice than signing on as resident labourers on European farms.

The Kipsigis were also victims of losing 130,000 acres of the Sotik land and salt licks to European farmers. As pastoralists they were hard hit and thus were forced to resort to

squatterdom in search for new grazing grounds in the European farms (Korir,1976). The Pokot, Turkana and Cherangany joined the labor force though they were the minority since their motivation was to get wages and pay taxes (KNA, PC/RVP 2/3/1,1928-1946). The neighboring Cherangani Wandorobo were mostly enlisted to the farms during maize harvesting (Elspeth and Arnold,1980).

Abaluhya squatters also settled in Uasin Gishu farms. Some two Bukusu respondents from Leseru, Kamagut ward stated that they went to the district after they were recruited by private employers' agents. In recruitment, one respondent explained that a European settler sent one of his adult Kavirondo employees to recruit them. “The adult agent was given both money for transport and presents for both chiefs and our parents who would then allow us to accompany him” (O.I, 46, Kamagut, 2022).

Some European farmers viewed the chiefs as a means of recruiting labour and went to the extent of bribing them and Headmen to force their people to work for wages (Clayton & Savage,1963:78). The bribes were presented as rewards and were popularly known as *bakshishi*. Many chiefs were eager to receive it and therefore, they ruthlessly misused their power to force people to work for wages (ibid). For example, the colonial chief of the Bukusu,Murunga M’Mukaria, oftenly drafted men for farm work in Uasin Gishu district (Native Labour Commission Report p. 149). A Agikuyu respondent also stated;

“My father used to tell us that being landless he chose to come all the way from Kiambu so as to escape oppression from the brutal chiefs (O.I, 15, Kapsaos, 2022).”

This statement is corroborated by Kanogo (1987:13) who stated that apart from the settlers need for labor in the study area the Agikuyu had exhausted space in their rural reserves and they were landless. They also desired to evade service in the military with the carrier corps and further run away from tyrannical rule of the chiefs and their agents. Accordingly, central Kenya residents were driven out by harsh administration to move to Rift Valley (Stitcher,1982:34).

Indeed, most Agikuyu respondents pointed out that they came from Kiambu and Limuru area. One key elderly woman stated this;

“My ancestors lost very fertile land between Chania and Kariminu rivers to one Bob Harries who practiced large scale farming (O.I, 12, Huruma, 2022)”.

Another informant narrated as follows:

“I was born in Limuru, my parents did not have land and therefore, we migrated here. They used to work for a kaburu called Snyman (O.I, 37, Huruma, 2022).”

The above oral evidence concurs with written sources (KNA/PC/CP/9/8/15) and Kanogo, 1987:11). The Agikuyu had restricted access to land by *githaka*, their traditional landlords. The *ahoi*, the tenants, thus became first among the Agikuyu to sell their labour to the Europeans (O.I, 37, Huruma, 2022). By 1937, there were many ethnic groups from faraway reserves such as the Agikuyu and Luo who were majorly wage laborers (KNA/PC/RVP 2/3/1, 47) in Turbo sub county.

In these labor areas the African population had a chance to know one another and learn from each other but again calculated efforts were made by the colonialists to ensure that inter-ethnic contacts were minimized and their antagonism induced and kept alive. From 1919, the state sought to ensure that Africans remained tribalized by requiring them to carry an identification card, (*Kipande*) every time when they were not in reserves (Frost, 1997:56). The card contained not only a person's fingerprint but also his 'native reserve' particulars thus it reinforced ethnic differences and consciousness.

Nevertheless, the newly created multi-ethnic community comprising of the Abaluhya, Kalenjin, Agikuyu, Abagusii, Luo, Akamba and other ethnic groups in the area peacefully interacted and worked together in ox-ploughing, burning of maize stalks, clearing, planting and weeding among other tasks (O.I, 27, Kapsaos, 2022). Besides keeping cattle, they were involved in crop farming as well which they could exchange among themselves through barter trade thus promoting peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence (O.I, 43, Kapsaos, 2022). Areas where butcheries and poshomills existed also brought people from different ethnic groups together. For instance, Maili Nne estate in Kapsaos ward in the west of Eldoret town was previously called Cheptek. This was after Kiptek (the owner), meaning "unifier" put up a club which united people as they drank local beer known as "*busaa*" (O.I, 8, Kapsaos, 2022). Laws aimed at attracting workers from other ethnicities created ethnic conflict in the region (Kanogo 1987:29). As will be shown, this ethnic substrate to administration established the roots for future exclusionary ideologies around territories. Such ideologies came to warrant local nationalism and arguments for ethnic pureness within the colonially ascertained administrative boundaries.

2.5 The Squatter Stock Problem and its Effect on Formation of a Multi-Ethnic Community 1937-1944.

Many Nandi squatters became very wealthy and by 1931, they had plenty of cattle, goats and sheep on farms (Huntingford,1950:73). Unlike many other squatters throughout European farms in Kenya, the Nandi people agreed to become squatters majorly due to the presence of good pastures for their cattle than the wages. As a result, the Nandi squatters relied more on their cattle and were satisfied with little wage offered by the *kaburus*.

From 1930s people with their livestock moved to Uasin Gishu in large number despite white settlers using large piece of land for growing cereals. Increase in cereal production made economic sense to settlers (Oboler,1985:167). Cereal prices hiked during depression season but dropped afterwards hence settlers switched back to livestock (KNA, PC/RVP/6A/25/3,1934). The livestock increased tremendously and thus there was first real crackdown to control this explosion (Youe,1988:402). With the working together of farmers' associations in the district such as Soy Farmers Association, Turbo-Kipkarren farmers Association, Soy-Hoey's Bridge Farmers Association, Uasin Gishu Farmers Association and the District Council, interventions to lower the number of squatters were being taken. The settlers opposed the squatter stock in their farms as a measure to stop spread of diseases and pest control in their exotic livestock (Groen,1974:213).

Consequently, Nandi squatters who had large stock expressed their discontent by looking for alternative land elsewhere. Nandi reserve was already crowded and therefore they migrated to surrounding areas (East Africa Royal Commision,1953,165). Moving out of

African squatters was so massive that it created a big shortage in labor in the region (KNA/PC/RV/2/8/10). It prompted changes in laws to allow squatters keep their stock to discourage migration. Squatter stock had grown above 100,000 in 1938 for instance and majority being of Agikuyu and Nandi (KNA/PC/RVP 2/8/13). In mid 1940s the squatter stock arrangement was again destabilized because the settler farmers needed more land for farming. This was because World War two had come to an end and Europe had adjusted most of its agricultural land to cash crop production. In addition, the Kalenjin were expanding in population even as their livestock grew in numbers. They thus demanded more land for grazing (O.I, 8, Kapsaos, 2022).

In April 1944, at the request of Nandi squatters, their representatives held a meeting at Eldoret (the district headquarters) with the District Commissioner, Mr. K.G. Lindsay, (KNA/ PC/RVP2/8/19) to complain of being oppressed to reduce the stock. The squatters in the area did not yield to change the regulations thus again leading to another migration out of the region. More people left their lands and moved to reserve together with their livestock (O.I, 27, Kapsaos, 2022). However, due to overcrowding in Nandi reserve others moved completely out of the region to Pokot and Uganda (KNA/DC/KAPT/1/1/94). Their move of settling among their neighbors such as North Kavirondo or Abaluhya – speaking Bantu showed the togetherness Africans had before the white man came in. The Africans who could not move out of Uasin Gishu had to comply to the regulations of white settlers. Most of the remaining population were natives who had nowhere to go. By 1946, Uasin Gishu District Council structured laws to eliminate keeping of livestock by squatters. One of the reasons for eliminating livestock was to avoid giving the Africans right to own land where they were grazing (KNA, PC/RVP 2/3/1p.3).

In the 1940s, most of the white mixed farms in Uasin Gishu District were 2,000 acres, of which about half would be devoted to wheat and maize and half to grazing (Klopp,2002: 277). Subsequent exit of many Nandi squatters thus created a need for many wage labourers. To replace those who had departed, labor was drawn from other Native Reserves, notably, from the Luo, Teso, Agikuyu, Akamba, and Abaluhya native reserves (Kanogo,1987:14). Besides altering the demographic make-up of the Turbo area, the policies also brought changes to the politics of land ownership and political representation of the residents of such locations in post-independence.

The settlers argued that the Agikuyu particularly were agrarian, sedentary, hardworking and familiar to plant cultivation, unlike the “lazy” pastoralist Nandi” (Klopp,2001:63). This stereotyping created inter-ethnic tensions which developed into animosity between the two communities in the area in the decades after independence.

In 1939, when central Kenya residents were displaced, they moved to Rift Valley in search of a place to settle (Roberts,2009:10) joining others who were working in the region. By 1940 there were reports of the Sabaot, Babukusu and Tachoni ‘running’ to Uasin Gishu to escape harsh chiefs in Bukusuland. Recruitment to military was done harshly by chiefs (Wekesa 2000,194). This forced some Sabaot to work for wages in the established white settler farms in Uasin Gishu so as to escape conscription.

From mid 1940s due to landlessness the movement of squatters to the white settler farms from the reserves created need for more land. Most farms employed mechanization which reduced need for manual labor (Klopp,2001:60). Since the native could not claim back their lands they started resenting non ethnic groups and thus created conflicts.

2.6 Decolonization and its Effects in the Formation of a Multi-Ethnic Community 1945-1963.

The period 1945-1963 saw an increase of African opposition to colonial policy in Kenya. This was because the colonialists had deprived African society and destroyed their pre-colonial organization, breeding with it inter-ethnic tensions, suspicions and conflicts (Kakai,2000:124). The policy of implementing the removal of squatter stock prolonged throughout the 1940s. In 1949 the squatters in Uasin Gishu formed a new body called “The Nandi, Elgeyo and Kipsigis Union” whose main interest was destocking of the squatters’ stock with the effects felt by these ethnic groups (KNA, DC/VG/1/2).

The late 1940s witnessed an increase in individual land tenure in most African communities in the colony, especially the Agikuyu (Sorrenson, 1970). The colonial rule introduced new terms of land ownership which contradicted African values deeply rooted land ownership that had existed for centuries (Kakai ,2000;101). Since the Nandi were herders they were against the new land ownership of title deeds. The Agikuyu on the other hand were somehow okay with this type of land ownership (O.I, 27, Kapsaos, 2022). By altering the structure of land ownership, new motives for personal and group choices and behavior were formed (Andreassen,2003:119). In 1949 Jomo Kenyatta stated that Uasin Gishu belonged to the Nandi and they would reposses the land (KNA, Lab 5/35). These coupled together with other factors as will be illustrated later accelerated inter-ethnic tension and conflict.

By 1950s the Agikuyu population in the Turbo area had grown tremendously and this greatly upset the indigenous Kalenjin who viewed them as strangers and intruders (O.I, 15,Kahoya, 2022). By this time ethnic consciousness had gathered momentum and the

defense of interests based on ethnicity, primarily land, preoccupied the African mind(ibid). As ethnic groups, they laid claims to various parts of the European areas. The annual colonial write-up (Annual Report, 1957, Internal Tribal Affairs) reported:

“In common with other Kalenjin people, however, there is everywhere else, dislike of the Agikuyu settlement being established in what is regarded as their district’s sphere of influence in Uasin Gishu”.

Though Agikuyu influx into the area was halted temporally after a decree from the then Uasin Gishu DC, P.H Brown his successor R.S Symes-Thompson revoked it stating that the Agikuyu were key to the settler’s agricultural success.

By 1952, many non-Kalenjin groups had established themselves as a cohesive, identifiable group in Uasin Gishu (FGD 1, 2022, O.1, 8, Kapsaos, 2022). For the Agikuyu, their enormous insecurity forced them to go urban areas to do businesses (Marris and Somerset,1971:70-71). Today the Agikuyu businesses can be found in most urban and peri-urban centres within Turbo sub-county. In addition to being more economically well off, the Agikuyu political consciousness was higher than the pastoral people. So, wherever they settled, they aroused the suspicion of the resident “tribes” (Annual Report, 1957, Internal Tribal Affairs). The Kalenjin in Turbo sub-county feared being dominated by the non-indigenous ethnic groups and thus asserted their claim to their ethnic areas. As we shall see later, inter-ethnic conflicts were mainly confined to these areas. It is no wonder therefore that the Kalenjin have hitherto been increasingly antagonistic towards these ethnic groups in the study area.

As earlier stated, the white man rules led to many people having no land and hence creation of classism, the squatters, landless and the landlords(Maxon,1990:32) eventually culminating in the Mau-Mau uprising in the early 1950's (Kanogo 1987, Klopp,2001:68). The Mau Mau fighters were viewed as Agikuyu chauvinists who wanted to drive the white protector of small Kenya ethnic groups out in order to take over land themselves (Wamwere,2008:133). Unfortunately, this fallacy is still on even today.

Later, a department of information was created in Rift Valley Province at Nakuru (Kipkorir, not dated). This department's role was to prepare and broadcast news for the Kalenjin with the main message being discouragement against associating with the Agikuyu. The Nandi then developed an attitude against the Agikuyu and became anti-Mau Mau owing to disputes concerning harming of their livestock. This then became the excuse for harassing Agikuyu squatters. The Nandi community began breaking into their farms and huts to steal their produce (O.I, 12, Huruma, 2022).

With the movement spreading to the British settlement, the white settlers urged the colonial authority to put in rules to cap this spread. At the same time, farmers in Uasin Gishu district asked the government to remove Mau Mau associated settlers from the region. As a protective measure, the white farmers started removing laborers from central Kenya from their workforce (Clayton, A. and Savage, 1974:348-349). Consequently, there was a large departure of Agikuyu labourers from the District (KNA, DC/UG/1/2) to central Kenya.

In 1954 with the introduction of the Swynnerton Plan, Native Africans were given small pieces of land to till (Swynnerton, 1954). This implied that rich Africans would have the

capability of acquiring more land at the expense of poor farmers who only had capability to acquire less thereby creating two classes of the landed and the landless (Leys,1975:52). Those with land were among established farmers who were experienced in farming and had already established their wealth while the losers were the landless, majority of them Mau Mau fighters who returned from hiding(Klopp,2001:73).The Mau Mau returnees found the land taken and chiefs still ruling (O.I,12,Huruma,2022). A large number moved to urban areas while others waited to be given back their land after independence (FGD 1,2022). Land ownership created classism and the British associated themselves with the rich who owned the land. The wealthy Agikuyu thus acquired land in the study area not as squatters anymore but as landowners. “This is how my family found their place here” (O.I, 12, Huruma, 2022).

While the Swynnerton plan gave land ownership to Africans, it only benefited those who were already rich and destroyed ethnic cohesion as it allowed other ethnic communities to acquire land belonging to the natives (Anderson 2005). Owning a land became personal responsibility rather than a community responsibility hence people got scattered in search of where to settle (O.I, 27, Kapsaos, 2022). Previously, the land for grazing was community owned and it belonged to the native ethnic group. In contrast, land privatization among them in the reserve, led Nandi squatters in the study area to become landless. As a result, the plan limited the accessibility to the Nandi reserve since the land previously owned as an ethnic property had become an individual property. This plan motivated various ethnic groups to compete for land in the ‘white Highlands’ as they also began nursing the notion of excluding other groups from settlement areas that they

influenced. Moreover, these groups started safeguarding their future by blocking other groups from intrusion to what they laid claim (Jones,1965:186).

By mid-1954 the Uasin Gishu District Council was still determined to eliminate Nandi excess squatter stock in the area. Aware of this, most Nandi squatters moved out of the farms with their cattle in fear of losing them. They took most of the stock to areas which were forested within the district where they could not be reached easily by council officials (FGD 1,2022). The action by the Uasin Gishu District Council officials also happened at the same time when the Agikuyu squatter families were returning from Kiambu to the Uasin Gishu district in large numbers. These squatters were the people who had been ousted from the district in 1953 during the State of Emergency period due to association with Mau Mau activities. With the Agikuyu coming back, the Nandi saw their return as a way of reducing their cattle stock. This cattle scenario was viewed as a way of attacking the Nandi in order to replace them with Agikuyu (FGD 1,2022, O.I,27,Kapsaos,2022). This thus soared inter-ethnic relations between the Nandi and the Agikuyu.

As (O.I, 8, Kapsaos, 2022) stated “whether promoting negative ethnicity was a deliberate British maneuver to ‘divide and rule’ as the African leaders charged, it was the same leaders who exploited this to their fullest advantage. In 1960 the Kalenjin formed the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA) to protect their land from non-natives when the British leave the area. In May the same year KPA showed interest in keeping the Turbo area for only Natives. The Nandi claimed that the Turbo area was theirs before the white man came and even had a plan to particularly push the Agikuyu squatters back into Central

Kenya (O.I,12,Huruma,2022).Her statement were corroborated by the August 1961 East African Standard report which stated that;

People from Central Province “were being intimidated and told not to enter into settlement schemes (in the Rift),” but the chairman of the Settlement Board said that “desire for land would overcome intimidation,” and the minister for agriculture said that “the schemes would go on” (KNA, East African Standard (Aug. 9, 1961), KNA, PC/NZA/4/14/9).

From this, the ethnic conflict in Uasin Gishu can be traced to colonial period. Though the Kalenjin association was banned, the lack of a unified unity to deal with the whites is one of the major failures to forge out a ground basis for national unity.

At the point when Kenya got independence the settlers sold the land they owned to Africans either to individuals or a group. Since the land was sold at market price only the wealthy could afford to buy the land. This led to further displacement of natives who had no money to acquire land from colonial government. The poor locals got displaced while the rich from other ethnic communities could buy land in Turbo area (O.I, 43, Kapsaos, 2022).Moreover, Jomo Kenyatta had insisted on land buying through his statement “Tafta shamba. Hakuna cha bure”, translated as “Buy land. Nothing is for free”.

However, purchasing land through schemes were not transparent and hence a selected group could get the fertile land (TJRC, 2013:213–216, Leo,1978:622). The elite Agikuyu men were employed as clerks and surveyors, providing them much leverage in the programme (Report on the Commission of Inquiry into Land Law System, p.102). Most respondents corroborated these reports. One respondent stated that having the control of key government offices and banks advantaged the Agikuyu elite in the market and in competition for land acquisition (O.I,29,Kamagut,2022).There was a generally held

perception of many people that the Agikuyu held the majority of senior civil service jobs because of their relatively higher education levels availed by their close proximity to colonial and missionary activities, hence highly favored in getting land (O.I,16,Kiplombe,2022).Some Agikuyu respondents stated that they settled in the Turbo area from Nyeri and its environment but others left and went to Gitwamba and Munyaka in TransNzoia to join their kin there who had bought large pieces of land.

A major grievance from the Kalenjin thus was that the Agikuyu became a primary beneficiary of President Jomo Kenyatta's patronage, even in areas outside of their "native" region of Central Kenya. Nevertheless, this land-buying produced a multi-ethnic community in Turbo sub-county which included Abaluhya, Aembu, Akamba, Luo, Abagusii, Agikuyu as well as Kalenjin sub-groups (O.I,15,Kahoya, 2022,Boone,2014). Most buyers included African colonial employees who served in the tribal police, tribunal courts, farm foremen, former headmen in European farms as well as municipal council workers who served in Eldoret and those who had been cattle auctioneers and who had access to cash (FGD1, 2022, O.I, 27, Kapsaos, 2022, O.I, 8, Kapsaos, 2022).The elders, chiefs, and the educated, used wages acquired from formal employment to easily purchase land.

These communities lived together peacefully for many years. However, the schemes have been a source of ongoing ethnic tensions especially between the non-Kalenjin and Kalenjin. The latter felt that their ancestral land was improperly deprived. As the fertile land in the region has tended to shrink, ethnic sensitivities have been developed, motivated by politicization as will be examined in the next chapter.

Most respondents stated that they bought land in the area. One stated;

“Here (Kapsaos) one acre was 100 shillings. It was extremely difficult to find such cash then. Besides, money was less important because of barter trade. I had to sell milk, some of the cows I acquired through dowry and get into my savings to buy” (O.I, 8, Kapsaos, 2022).

Another informant also stated;

“I came here in 1967 when I was just done with my primary studies. My father was working here (Cheplasia, Tapsagoi ward). So, when I arrived he informed me that people were registering to get land. I got registered with the little money I had and that is how I bought this land” (O.I, 5, Tapsagoi, 2022).

Similarly (O.I,22,Kiplombe,2022) stated that he used to transport maize and potatoes across East Africa as a driver, saved some amount and borrowed 40,000 from Land bank which he used to buy his first land at Kiplombe.

Elders in FGD (1,2022) cited Paul Boit a former politician and farmer as having convinced many Africans to sell their cattle and buy land. He himself in July 1961 purchased a 620-acre farm in Kapkong, Tapsagoi ward, where he farmed maize and cattle. His action motivated most Kalenjin to follow suit. At first the Kalenjin saw no need of buying these lands when other communities were buying because from the onset they believed the land belonged to them and banked on the hope that the settlers would leave the land for them for free (O.I, 12, Huruma, 2022). With time, however, some Uasin Gishu Nandi squatters approached their leaders seeking assistance with purchasing land from their former employers in the European farms (O.I, 6, Kapsaos, 2022). Unfortunately, by this time, most squatters had been reduced to bankruptcy, following

orders from District Council to reduce their large herds to only few herds of cattle from whose sale they could not earn much to buy land. Consequently, most of these Nandi squatter families had no choice than remain in forested areas. However, as earlier mentioned, others joined co-operative societies or limited companies with hopes to acquire land. The companies and societies would purchase land in the district then later subdivide it and share out among the members according to each one's contribution (K.NA, DC/KBT/1/8/39).

Most respondents stated that the land they own currently was acquired by buying shares from companies that bought land from settlers. Most of these companies in early 1960s were ethnic- based hence the land was acquired by the same ethnic group (O.I, 37, Huruma, 2022, Gitau, 1996:152). Among the Bantu owners Agikuyu were the majority (Akiwumi, 1999) since the first President Jomo Kenyatta was a Agikuyu and kind of gave them a blank-cheque. Such companies included the Mwenderi Land-Buying Company (MLC) and the Uasin Gishu Land-Buying Company. Members of these companies were previous workers of the settlers whereas some were new members from outside Turbo area. To buy shares and possibly own land depended on social network and ability to pay the price (Gitau 1996). The town council housing was becoming limited and majority of farm workers were now jobless. Few of the laid off workers were absorbed by Indian businesses in Eldoret town locally known as "*kaburiek*".

Once one bought land, one would inform his/her capable kinsmen to also come and have a share (O.I, 18, Kapsaos, 2022). As such, majority of respondents noted that initially there was a clear consciousness of ethnic affiliations amongst residents of some wards

such as Huruma which was and has remained highly inhabited by the Agikuyu while Kapsaos highly by the Kalenjin.

However, towards the late 1960s the scenario gradually changed. As indicated by most respondents some of the shareholders sold their shares in some farms to other people from other ethnic groups and thus promoted inter-ethnic integration in the area (FGD 1,2022,FGD3,2022). The companies made it possible for the settlement of hundreds of thousands of Agikuyu, Abaluhya, Luo, Abagusii, Kalenjin and other ethnic groups throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

Consequently, as will be examined in the next chapter the resettlement of these groups generated objections, ethnic antagonism and animosity from the Kalenjin in the study area who regarded Turbo sub-county as part of their “Kalenjin sphere of influence”. It is however unfortunate that to-date such antagonism has not been addressed by successive regimes. Despite this, the multi –ethnic community of the Agikuyu, Abaluhya, Luo, Abagusii, Kalenjin and other ethnic groups in the area had a peaceful and harmonious co-existence as they mutually engaged in economic and social activities. People interacted freely and the close link between them resulted in several cases of inter-marriages. It was because of this existing harmonious relationship that majority of the informants said that the inter-ethnic conflicts of the 1990s and of 2007/08 came without any warning and were a surprise and a shock to them.

2.7. Conclusion.

This chapter has examined the background of the formation of the multi-ethnic community in Turbo sub-county. It traces the indigenous inhabitants of the area as being the Kalenjin, Maasai and some Abaluhya sub-groups. It then explores how colonialism led to displacement of these African communities pushing them to the reserves. With entrenchment of colonialism the Europeans came up with legislations in order to form enough labour supply for themselves as they developed an agricultural economy in the area. This included the squatter system which guaranteed supply of cheap labour to the European farmers. The Nandi in the area, lacking farming experience plus their exodus from the area due to their stock control paved way for the moving in of other ethnic groups in the area so as to overcome the labor shortage. Thousands of Abagusii, Agikuyu, Abaluhya, and Luo squatters from the neighboring areas (former Nyanza, Central and Western Provinces) were brought into the area as laborers in the early 1900s. Furthermore, African situation was worsened by the Europeans imposition of taxes on them. So in order to pay their taxes, Africans from different parts of the country had no option other than to seek employment on these farms. This employment attracted diverse ethnic groups which remained in the area. Land alienation plus the rising discontent with the colonial rule of the British, led to the emergence of a nationalist movement for independence. By 1961, the British colonial government was forced to compromise. The introduction of a new policy in the 'White Highlands' then permitted Africans to purchase land and farm there. Accordingly, many people from different ethnic groups took advantage of the opportunity and purchased land. These farms have been the epicenter of ethnic violence as will be examined in the chapters to come.

Whereas Dahrendorf did not specifically develop a theory on colonialism and inter-ethnic relations, his broader theoretical framework was applied to analyze how colonial power dynamics interfered with and shaped inter-ethnic relations. The next chapter explains politicization of ethnicity.

CHAPTER THREE.

POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN TURBO SUB-COUNTY (1963-1990).

3.1 Introduction.

This chapter examines the nexus between ethnicity and politics in the study area, between 1963 and 1990. It illustrates how politicized ethnicity played part in creation of the perception of exclusion and how the interlinkages between the two impacted on inter-ethnic relations among the Luo, Agikuyu, Kalenjin, Abaluhya, Abagusii and other resident communities in Turbo sub-county within the above time-frame. Moreover, the incitement from political leaders to community members and the understandings of ethnicity, territory, and politics from a top-down approach in study area is explored. Dahrendorf's theoretical strand provided insights into how power differentials in the above timeframe contributed to the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in the study area.

3.2 The Genesis of Ethnic Politics in Kenya: Locating the Nexus

Politicized ethnicity can be understood as the manipulation of ethnicity for the interest of political elite. Mozaffar (2007) defines it as a strategic method used by political leaders to advance their political goals and gain popularity on the basis of ethnic lines. It involves activating of ethnic identities with an aim of gathering political popularity in the struggle for power and resources.

The study agrees with many scholars that ethnicity is not a colonial invention but a part of human nature in society. It infers that the British only enhanced ethnocentric attitudes among ethnic groups but was not the source of ethnicity. In pre-colonial Kenya, people from different ethnic groups lived harmoniously interacting with each other through

barter trade, warfare and intermarriages. During this period, these groups never conflicted on basis of ethnic lines (Berman, 1998: 310). Besides, ethnic identities were flexible and were never used for political interests like today.

Upon colonization, the British aroused ethnic consciousness and solidarity among ethnic groups in Kenya through the “divide and rule policy”. Many respondents stated that negative ethnicity in the country was fueled by the establishment of marked boundaries at local and national level. The creation of administrative units demarcated along ethnic lines affected cohesion among ethnic groups and has had long term implications insofar as the sources of politicization of ethnicity are concerned (Asingo,2008:295). The conflicts were further enhanced by the “divide and rule” policy that brought the idea that specific geographical areas in the country were owned by specific ethnic groups. For instance, the Kalenjin had large numbers in Rift Valley while the Abaluhya populated the Western part, and Agikuyu formed the majority ethnic group in Central Kenya, as the Mijikenda populated the Coast. With the inhabitation of ethnic groups in particular geographical areas, people developed the perception that governing an administrative territory is same as ruling an ethnic group.

In the push for independence the Mau Mau fighters burned British farms, killed their livestock, police stations and homes perceived to be loyal to the colonial government (O.I, 27, Kapsaos, 2022). In response, the colonial state employed authoritarian force to suppress them. Kenyans inherited this culture of using violence to get what they want from the government while the government in turn nurtured and perpetuated the use of forceful means to maintain law and order in the country.

Furthermore, most FGD participants in the study noted that despite both Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi calling out people to drop ethnic identities after independence, they warmly embraced what Bayart (1993) calls ‘patriotism of the stomach’, whereby one is only concerned about his or her interest and those of own ethnic group. They exploited ethnicity to garner and maintain power. Since then, ethnicity was used as a tool to facilitate achievement of personal interests. Unfortunately, the issue of leaders favoring their ethnic groups is still happening to date and causing ethnic animosity (O.I, 23, Kapsaos, 2022).

Furthermore, the inheritance of a greatly centralized administration system from the British colonial government fueled contemporary ethnicity further. As a result, the administration of provinces was based on ethnic identities (Kanyinga, 2000). African headmen and chiefs were also employed to govern sub-divisions and villages on its behalf. The nature of this relationship served as the foundation of today’s ethnic-based politics. As a way of maintaining loyalty from their collaborators, the British administrators further resorted to gifting chiefs and headmen with goodies making them among the wealthiest Africans. From this, Africans perceived that the state had the capability to distribute benefits of modern development. Significantly, the belief engraved the notion that authoritative offices were the shortest route of accessing state resources (Berman, 1998:318). As a consequence, the perception has succeeded in building a culture of politicizing ethnicity for self-interest in Turbo sub-county.

In late 1960s, after the Nandi declaration where the Nandi objected to settlement of non-KAMATUSA in Turbo sub-county, Daniel Moi a Kalenjin was appointed as vice president and was relied upon to neutralize the groups’ call by convincing them that they

are represented in the government (O.I, 39, Ngenyilel, 2022). Majority respondents equally noted that this trend continues today where president's in different regimes have continued to ignore the issue of inter-ethnic conflicts and tried to masquerade it by appointing a member of revolutionary ethnic group so as to silence the ethnic group (FGD 2;2022, O.I,18,Kapsaos,2022).

The politicization of ethnicity is thus regarded as among the key challenges contributing to the failure of Kenyan politics for the longest time. As a result, it has made people develop hatred and suspicion against others as well as contributed to lack of trust in other ethnic communities making promotion of peace and cohesion difficult. Sadly, in Turbo sub-county, ethnicity has been used to guide both the political processes and the socio-economic activities. By so doing, residents are made to view ethnicity as of significant relevance informing aspects of their personal and collective choices such as of political leaders, place of residence, investment, and in higher extent influencing social interactions such as marriage and friendships (O.I,3,Kamagut,2022).

3.3. Politicization of Ethnicity under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978).

The politicization of ethnicity in Turbo sub-county, especially in reference to the presidency, has led to bitter and fierce conflicts in the area. Mutua (2017:15) argues that the presidency has been perceived the main symbol of ethnic virility. Through the presidency, he argues, the ethnic elite and their *hoi polloi* use the opportunity to loot state resources for their benefit. He further states that instead of working towards uplifting the country's economy, leaders of Kenya's ethnic groups focus more attention on the contest for grabbing state resources. Mutua's argument is applicable in the study area's context when examining Kenyatta's reign.

Prior to Kenya's independence, as it was clear that the exit of the British was unavoidable, cracks began to emerge among the political elite. The Rift Valley leaders and their allies in Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) advocated for majimboism (a form of decentralization) in a bid to control the allocation of resources, especially land, within their own communities. As the third independence Conference advanced, the persistent KADU dissatisfaction and hostility concerns instigated an alarm of the inter-ethnic conflicts in the country. The reports of the police indicated; 'KADU leaders in the Rift Valley were planning to expel all Agikuyu and Luo from the region' (Maxon,2011:232).Fortunately, the plans of ethnic violence did not succeed. However, with concerns about the Conference's results, the KADU parliamentary group, threatened the creation of the Kenya Republic.

In 1963 Independence election was won by KANU's Jomo Kenyatta who undid the majimbo (federal) elements of the constitution, subsumed Moi's KADU into KANU and made Kenya a one-party state. The period between 1964 and 1968 were the calm years as the inter-ethnic conflict took a break after dissolution of KADU and particularly after Moi became the Vice President (O.I, 35, Kamagut, 2022). However, some Luo respondents alluded that the ideological differences between Oginga Odinga and Kenyatta on the distribution of resources and over the exit of Oginga from KANU to form Kenya People's Union (KPU) in 1966 heightened mistrust and animosities between the Luo and the Agikuyu. A Luo respondent (O.I, 19, Huruma, 2022) underscoring the impact of perception in Kenya's politics stated; "We (Luo) suffered marginalization when our king, Jaramogi called out on Kenyatta's biasness towards his co-ethnics. The Agikuyu are thus not to be trusted."

Another Luo, (O.I, 4, Tapsagoi, 2022) justifying the mistrust between them and Agikuyu stated;

“Between July 1967 and June 1968 there was a debate regarding deliberate constitution changes to frustrate Tom Mboya the then secretary general of KANU from taking over should President Kenyatta die in office.”

In effect, these sentiments elucidate that both Oginga and Mboya were victims of politics of ethnicity that aimed to exclude the Luo from ascending to the presidency. To the masses, however, a fall out among the political elite is transferred to the entire ethnic group at the grassroots level. The reverse could be said that the Kalenjin and Agikuyu relations were strengthened when Kenyatta appointed Moi Vice-President in 1967, following the resignation of Joseph Murumbi. Indeed, most elderly FGD participants in the study agreed that many intermarriages between the two ethnic groups were witnessed in the same year. It is unsurprising therefore that ethnic identification and consciousness is very ripe in Kenya and pervades everyday life to the extent that both local and national events are interpreted in ethnic terms. Such tendency plays a role in building, strengthening or testing ethnicity.

Kanyinga (2001:354-5) argues that ethnicities took political formation with each ethnic group forming a political group. The political class mobilized the masses to support their political affiliation hence the bigger ethnic group took the bigger cake while small ethnic groups became marginalized.

The study agrees with KNCHR (2015:9) claims that “politicization of ethnicity is the most powerful single determinant in the domain of governance in the country”. This claim bears a lot of substance since the perception formed by such politicization is that

the one who becomes the president automatically benefits his/her co-ethnics (O.I, 42, Kapsaos, 2022). As such the political class were respected and trusted by their ethnic groups and they became the masterpiece for their communities.

The justification behind such ethnicized political attachment is intimately connected to the expectation of benefit, social pressure, socialization as well as what Kanyinga et al (2010) have called an ‘esteem’ good for the ethnic group. As a Agikuyu respondent (O.I, 14, Kiplombe, 2022) stated; “When my co-ethnic became the president. I told people ‘We’re in power’. It is just pride”. This ‘feel good’ factor in Kenya unifies ethnic groups against others and changes elections into an instrument of enhancing the groups esteem rather than an instrument for consolidating democracy.

From Jomo Kenyatta’s early reign, the only thing guiding Kenyan politics was ethnicity. To get and maintain power, the political class had to mobilize ethnic groups in their favor. Getting the power lead to empowerment economically for the leaders. Kenyatta had Agikuyu group “Kiambu Mafia” which made him look like a local leader rather than a national leader. These subgroups in government alienated other small ethnics from the national cake as well as non-conforming Agikuyu (Ochieng,1995).

It was largely stated by many respondents that seating presidents made sure that their co-ethnics took most of the positions in ministries, security forces, parastatals, and every other government office positions. Besides, they also ensured that their areas or areas where their co-ethnics lived were advantaged in development projects like infrastructure, electricity and hospitals (FGD 2;2022, FGD 3;2022). Over time, these practices resulted in deep inequalities which in turn supported the importance of basing politics around ethnicity.

This was true for Jomo Kenyatta who was now the expert in policies of dividing and ruling as copied from the colonialists. He made sure the loyalists were heavily compensated and hence created a “kikuyunisation” in the government (Murunga, 2004). However, not all Agikuyu sections advantaged from such arrangements. Kiambu, his home district, always received more notice than the other districts in Central Province. The Agikuyu dominance evoked displeasure amongst elite from other ethnic groups who felt excluded a development that planted seeds of negative ethnicity.

Without the protection of federalism, the communities within Turbo area could not gain control over land allocation in their area. Instead, Daniel Moi as vice president allied himself with Kenyatta and facilitated the sale of European farms to those who could afford it, especially to Kenyatta’s Agikuyu. As the various resident communities settled down in to their different socio-economic activities in the area, it befitted an examination of how that engagement drove the inhabitants' sense of attachment to their land. This was relevant since such attachment ultimately determined how the people related amongst themselves and their neighbors. Numerous scholars have explained how regions are perceived to be of a certain ethnic groups and thus every immigrant was not allowed to practice their freedom of choice. Individuals moving into a region were expected to follow the larger groups’ decision or else termed as betrayers. This study goes hand in hand with this view and in particular Jenkins (2012:10). Immigrants were only accepted if they prescribe to the political views of the natives and their eviction was inevitable if they went against that. The territorial politics led to manipulation and therefore avails a powerful framework through which to comprehend inter-ethnic relations in Turbo sub county.

The association between ethnicity and territory is rooted in colonialism. As suggested in the previous chapter, the settlement patterns in the study area and defined administration as well as laws to govern reserves before settlers left created ethnic territory, (Lynch, 2011:17) until today these territories are still described by the ethnic group.

Most respondents observed that due to such ethnic consciousness, the Kalenjin in Turbo sub-county perceived themselves as the ‘owners’ of the area and thus apart from controlling it politically, they believe that they were the ones to gain from the resources connected with it. Thus during periods of political transition the guests ethnic groups were expected to go along with their political wishes (O.I,15,Kahoya,2022).When it was perceived that the Abaluhya, Abagusii, Luo, Agikuyu, Akamba and other non-Kalenjin in the area were trying to appropriate and use these resources and control the area, resentments became explosive.

This powerful attachment of the Kalenjin to the study area as their ancestral homeland made it easier for the emergence of a native-immigrant dichotomy and eventual politicization of ethnicity. Most Kalenjin respondents demonized the non-Kalenjin as settlers who had ‘stolen land’ that rightfully belonged to them. As an elderly man stated;

“This is our homeland. It was first snatched by the colonial state after the death of Orkoiyot, Koitalel Arap Samoei and later sold to the Agikuyu and other ethnic groups by Mzee Kenyatta (O.I, 27, Kapsaos, 2022).

The sentiment was echoed by another Kalenjin, (O.I, 6, Kapsaos, 2022) who stated that;

“Our fore-parents lived here way back in the 1920s and were afterwards turned into laborers’ by the colonialists on their own farms. This area is thus ours and anybody else residing here is because of our hospitality”.

Some Kalenjin respondents considered any other ethnic group a foreigner, even those who did not migrate in to the region of Turbo sub-county. A clear difference was created between the Kalenjin, the Abagusii, Luo, Agikuyu, Abaluhya and any other non-Kalenjin group in the area. Other ethnic groups born in the sub-county considered the area as their home, having spent their whole life there. As such, the association between the Kalenjin and the other ethnic groups was that of suspicion, mistrust and uncertainty that often bursted into overt inter-ethnic conflict especially at the instigation of local politicians.

Politicization of ethnic territory was amplified in 1969 after what became known as the "Nandi Declaration" according to which every non-Nandi was considered short term settler as per the Nandi. In the Nandi hills meeting, they agreed that the land agreement previously signed would not be recognized and any other ethnic group was to forsake its alternative allegiance or be forced out of the region (KNA, KA/11/9,27 July,1969). This, was however, faulted and more non-Kalenjin land buyers continued moving into Turbo sub-county (O.I, 8, Kapsaos, 2022).

As previously noted from the 1960 the Kalenjin leaders had mobilized their co-ethnics to say no to land resettlement after they were disallowed to purchase back the land. In the 1970s on seeing that they were losing their land they resorted to resentment against the government. They formed land buying companies in attempt to get back their land which was now being occupied by Agikuyu and other ethnic groups. At this point the Agikuyu were occupying senior positions in the ministry of land and settlement.

As Oyugi (2000:7) pointed out this event deepened ethnic animosity and the eruption of inter-ethnic conflicts as will be examined indicate that matters raised in the Nandi declaration never died. Such events need to be understood in order to get the bigger

picture of inter-ethnic conflicts in the study area. Majority of settlement schemes by the year 1975 were in the Rift Valley or in the border. Allocation of land were being done by the central government before the function being transferred to the provincial administration. Transfer of the land allocation function created the ethnic mixing (International Crisis Group, 2008). The former Central Province administrators became the major policy makers by the time of Jomo Kenyatta death in 1978. The imperial presidency's uncontrolled powers had already laid the foundations for inter-ethnic conflicts (Nasong'o and Murunga, 2007).

3.4. Politicization of Ethnicity under Daniel Moi (1978-1992).

Daniel Moi, in 1978 took over as Kenya's second president. He faced little struggle for power in KANU, although the 'Kiambu Mafia' offered some friction as they pushed for constitutional reforms to prevent his ascendance to power (Ochieng, 1995: 83-109). Once in office he replaced the movement by 'Kabarnet Syndicate' (Ajulu, 1995: 6). These regional groups had a mandate of controlling the decision making and hence had political powers (Cooper, 2002: 172). Moreover, Moi followed the ethnic path by ensuring the pro-Agikuyu ethnic alliance, GEMA, which dominated political activities back in Kenyatta's era was done away with and systematically replaced it by forming the KAMATUSA alliance. During his era the Kalenjin intruded the government and more political positions taken up by them. This further enhanced politicization of ethnic groups.

In 1980, Moi banned the vibrant ethnic welfare organizations which included GEMA, the Luo Union (East Africa), New Akamba Union (NAU), Abaluhya Association, Kalenjin Association and the Miji-Kenda Association which he considered as fostering ethnicity (Widner, 1994: 58). This was despite the fact that he emphasized on ethnicity and

exploited it to gain powers to rule. In his usual tours to ‘meet the people’ Moi used the slogan, *siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya* (bad politics, bad life) (Nasong’o and Murunga, 2007). The interpretation was that opportunities favored the friendly communities while the hostile ones were disadvantaged. For instance, ‘friendly areas’ benefited by getting more districts and constituencies. As such, development in Luo and Agikuyu land were withheld by president Moi since both had opposed him ever since he got to power (Wamwere, 2008:214).

Under cover of the economic decline, Moi gradually shifted agricultural support from the export cash crops of coffee and tea grown by Agikuyu small holders, to grains, grown by his Rift Valley Kalenjin and western Kenya allies (Wrong 2009). He further undermined the tea industries which were largely controlled by the Agikuyu (O.I, 31, Kapsaos, 2022). Similar efforts were made to advance Kalenjin interests in government and the parastatal sectors (Throup, 1987). Power shift, from Kenyatta’s Agikuyu to Moi’s Kalenjin, was designed to redistribute the “fruits of independence” seen to have been monopolized by the Agikuyu (O.I, 35, Kamagut, 2022).

With this development, other communities, especially the Agikuyu developed envy and hatred coupled with a lot of antipathy and criticism against the Kalenjin. The fanned suspicion between the contending communities characterizes relations between the Kalenjin and Agikuyu upto the grassroots level of the study area. The perceived ethnic based exclusion favoring the Kalenjin deepened politicization of ethnicity in Turbo area and could perhaps be the reason behind intermittent conflicts in the 1990s.

Majority of non-Agikuyu and Kalenjin respondents in the FGDs expressed their perceptions that the Agikuyu and Kalenjin were advantaged in all spheres since they had

produced presidents. As such, the two ethnic groups were presented to have a better chance than others. The informants pointed state appointments to senior posts and appropriation of huge tracts of land that was acquired using tax payers' money as the fore-deal that accrued to the favored ethnic group. According to (O.I, 19, Huruma, 2022) during Moi's reign, the Kalenjin had numerous jobs, big lands and more opportunities.

In underscoring infrastructural favoritism FGD (2,2022) noted that in 1978, the Department of Physical Planning selected a number of centers including Ngenyelil and Tapsagoi, today's wards, within Turbo sub county to have basic social and physical infrastructure. These developments attracted diverse ethnic settlements in the area and thus harmonious co-existence. The pipeline from Mombasa through Nairobi to Eldoret was also mentioned as an example of a deliberate biased development enjoyed by president Moi's co-ethnics.

However, few respondents were not in agreement with the notion that some ethnic groups were marginalized by some regimes. In contrast, they argued that marginalization developed from the engraved belief that Kenyans can only benefit when they had a member of their community ascending to presidency. The refusal to accept that there were many Agikuyu and Kalenjin alike who lived in abject poverty was extreme.

Other ethnic groups had been antagonized and adjudged nationally as well as locally. As such, accession of national leadership was decided by co-ethnics. The presidential elections implied that the losing leader including his/her ethnic group lost in the government developments until a friendlier regime got a chance (O.I, 18, Kapsaos, 2022). Such belief was rooted in ethnic politicization and was much of a bottom-up narration as was of top-down. Consequently, to compete for presidency one was to defend the

interests of his/her co-ethnics before earning their support. Hence, there was inclination on the part of many politicians to do anything, including encouraging their co-ethnics to vote as a block, engaging in hate speech, propaganda and violence to retain or obtain political power. In return, this led to a climate of fear, anxiety, suspicion and animosity among the resident communities mostly utilized by political actors to stir inter-ethnic conflict.

Yet, as much as those who assumed presidency used ethnicity to appeal to their ethnic groups once in power, nothing or very little went back to the ethnic group (Kivuva,2012). Kivuva's study emphasizes the fact that the common man rarely benefited even after having a president of their 'own'. Many respondents were in agreement as pointed out by one who said;

“The ‘eating’, is only done by that community’s elite. For example, Daniel Moi was in power for more than twenty years yet his people (Tugen) in Baringo county are still under abject poverty” (O.I,35,Kamagut,2022).

Another respondent concurred by stating that;

“When your tribe is at the top it does not mean you eat and live rent free. Nothing really changes. It’s just like having an English name. It does not mean you are a British citizen” (O.I, 40, Kiplombe, 2022).

Most respondents acknowledged that after the political season was over the political class disappeared until next election. This was well put by (O.I,10,Ngnyilel,2022);

“I used to religiously work with these politicians. However, I stopped after I realized that they are wolves amongst us. You cannot access them after campaigns. They care less once in office”.

In addition, many informants observed that most leaders used their positions to illegally get wealth and upon being called to account, used ethnicity to defend their wrong doing terming their punishment as a target to the community when the group had zero benefit to the crime (FGD2;2022, FGD3; 2022).

Moreover, narratives of ethnic favoritism were influenced by the identity of councilors, chiefs and local MPs which created a spatial aspect to the perception of ethnic unfairness. For instance, many non-Kalenjin residents of Huruma and Kapsaos wards explained that the MP and area chief mostly assisted the Kalenjin at the detriment of others in matters such as bursaries, investments and loans. As an Abaluhya respondent from Kapsaos ward stated, “It’s a waste of time to seek assistance at the chief’s camp if you are not one them (Kalenjin)” (O.I, 44, Kapsaos, 2022). Unequal or perception of unequal distribution of resources operated in the arena of local politics in Turbo sub-county, showing how significant ethnic identification processes were in everyday life.

Most elders in the FGD2; 2022 noted that from the mid-1980s onward, Moi’s KANU government forged a united ethno-political constituency from the KAMATUSA group. Much ethnic association and loyalties in politics had emerged since the Little General Elections of 1966 when Oginga’s KPU served as the opposition party and thus certain districts and provinces were declared either KANU or opposition zones (FGD 2;2022). The entire Turbo sub county was labeled a KANU zone (O.I, 15, Kahoya, 2022, O.I, 18, Kapsaos, 2022). The Kalenjin had been full adherents of KANU and thus the various ethnic groups in that area were expected to toe the line and support KANU failure of which could result in conflict as will be illustrated in the next chapter.

In line with the theoretical underpinnings of the study, the above examination clearly underscores that unlike in western societies where there is contestation for resources creating a line between the poor and rich, the class is relegated in Kenya whereby ethnicity drives the competition for political power subsequently influencing the social economic class. This has not only soured inter-ethnic relations but has resulted to inter-ethnic conflicts.

3.5. Conclusion

Through a consideration into the country's history, the chapter affirms that ethnicity has been a pertinent force for mobilization by the political elite and access to the state and power. Right from Kenya's independence, both President Kenyatta and Moi skillfully manipulated ethnicity for their political and economic ends. The ethnic politicized ideas of previous 'persecution' in the space of politics, and of former marginalization in resource allocation under the two former presidents, heightened mistrust, hatred and suspicion among resident communities in the study area leading to the 1992 PEV as will be examined. The findings were inconsistent with the theoretic underpinning of the study which posits that inter-conflicts broke out when politicians through ethnic mobilization elevated consciousness among their co-ethnics. There seemed to be 'cosmetic' peaceful co-existence between the Kalenjin and non-Kalenjin in Turbo sub-county and especially between the Agikuyu and Kalenjin. This is because of the perception that the Agikuyu were unreasonably favored in land allocation outside former Central province, and that they appropriated resources that 'belonged' to the Kalenjin as the 'original' owners of the area. The predominance of ethnic consciousness in the study area thus created a favorable environment for the manipulation of ethnicity by political elite and local actors a

development that led to ethnocentrism. The next chapter analyzes the heightened inter-ethnic conflicts and the interventions put in place by different stakeholders to mitigate the conflicts.

CHAPTER 4

HEIGHTENED INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND MITIGATING MEASURES IN TURBO SUB-COUNTY (1991-2010).

4.1. Introduction.

Guided by Dahrendof's conflict theory, this chapter explores the transition from the banal ethnicity which characterizes the study area and Kenya at large to the widespread bloodshed of violence in the above period. It further examines measures that have been taken to mitigate the consequences of these conflicts.

4.2. The 1991/1992 and 1997/98 Inter-Ethnic Conflicts.

Turbo sub-county had witnessed relative peace throughout the 1980s despite the 1982 failed military coup. However, from 1990 when the Agikuyu and most of the other Bantu ethnic groups associated with politics of opposition, the ugly concept of inter-ethnic conflict was born. The quest for pluralism and the repealing of section 2(A) of the constitution to permit pluralism in 1991 divided the study area along ethnic lines and political loyalties. Section 2A of the Kenya constitution which was in force from 1982-1991 stated that Kenya was a *dejure* (bylaw) one party state with KANU as the only legal political party therefore prohibiting the existence of any other party in the country during that period.

The 1990s was marked by activities of political power seekers exploiting their ethnic backgrounds to their own political advantage. The political elite, largely from the Abaluhya, Luo and GEMA communities, mounted opposition to Moi's rule. However,

Moi's authoritarianism was opposed for varied reasons. Most FGD participants stated that the Abaluhya and sections of the Luo felt excluded under Moi, in a similar way they had been under Kenyatta, whereas the Agikuyu were driven by nostalgia for the privileges they had under Kenyatta (FGD2;2022, FGD3;2022). A respondent, (O.I,40,Kiplombe,2022) noted that this period saw an apparent Luo-Agikuyu unity in opposition against Moi's reign, though it lasted for a short time since FORD divided into two with FORD-Kenya being under Oginga Odinga (Luo) and FORD Asili under Kenneth Matiba (Agikuyu). Oginga was the anticipated compromise candidate in getting Moi out of power but ethnicity and Agikuyu-Luo rivalry frustrated efforts of a possible unity. The Kalenjin who claimed the study area as their "home" felt threatened by the enthusiasm with which these ethnic groups welcomed pluralism. They saw it as a direct affront to "their" president, Daniel Moi (O.I,26,Kiplombe, 2022).In addition, the 'zoning off' of Turbo area as a KANU zone shifted the political contest to an ethnic outlook, with Moi's co-ethnics equating political opposition to animosity to the then largely Kalenjin-led government.

In the 1980s the KANU youth wingers popularly referred to as YK'92 (youth for KANU) had been established ostensibly to popularize the ruling party (Africa Watch,1991,14). However, in the 1990s they turned into feared group targeting anti-establishment in all manner of intimidation and molestation. President Moi and his co-ethnics, the Kalenjin, depicted the calls for political pluralism as an anti-Kalenjin movement. As such, the ethnicization of politics and promotion of ethnic violence by the local politicians took shape and the notion that every group had a homeland and the right to eject the non-Kalenjin gained ground.

The local politicians then, such as William Ruto the then secretary of the KANU youth wing, William Saina and Jackson Kibor were cited by respondents to be on the forefront intimidating the multi-party advocates and demanding that non-indigenous people leave politics to local communities (FGD 2 and 3;2022, O.I,16,Kiplombe,2022).Similarly, Farouk Kibet alias Kipkazi was cited by respondents as being on the forefront engaging KANU youth wingmen and advancing the agenda of the then president Moi led party.

During the campaigns, those who advocated for majimboism frequently called for the expulsion of all other ethnic groups from land occupied initially by the Kalenjin and other pastoral ethnic groups before colonialism (Weekly Review June, 29 1993). Of all Kalenjin leaders Hon. Nicholas Biwott a cabinet minister, at a rally held on September 21, 1991, in Kapkatet (Kericho District, Rift Valley Province), came out very strongly in defense of the Kalenjin interests. Implying that the Agikuyu had endangered their interest, a charged Biwott stated that his co-ethnics were there to stay even after president Moi's rule expires (Weekly Review October 7, 1994). He further cautioned that FORD members would be "crushed" and that KANU youth wingers would be ready to fight to the last person to protect Moi's reign (Africa Watch,1991,14).

The local politicians in the study area played upon the immigrant narrative and pervasive fears of immigrant domination using the 'Majimbo' debate. To many respondents, the debate had been understood as the establishment of mutually exclusive ethnically defined regionalism in Kenya. The three MPs of Eldoret North, Eldoret East, and Eldoret South constituencies which made up the Uasin Gishu district then were anti-multipartyism. The rallies otherwise called "majimbo rallies" were preceded by a statement by Dr. J.K Misoi then MP for Eldoret south at a press conference in Eldoret, declaring that he had

drafted a “majimbo” constitution which would be tabled before the house if advocates of multipatism continued their crusade(Kiliku,1998). The Turbo area, then Eldoret North constituency, MP Reuben Chesire, a majimbo proponent, was one the local political leaders, who was said to have intimidated the non-Kalenjin with violence and eviction if they did not support KANU, the party led by president Moi, a Kalenjin (FGD 2;2022, Kiliku,1992). Chesire together with Ezekiel Barngetuny a KANU apologist and businessman and Nicholas Biwott were further cited to paying the Kalenjin warriors to carry out attacks on non-Kalenjin (Kiliku,1992:75).

Further calls were made at the meeting for the Kalenjin to be prepared to safeguard the government and to arm themselves with arrows and bows to destroy any multiparty proponent they could see(ibid,9). Most FGD respondents believed that such calls contributed to ethnic antagonism. Consequently, intermittent Kalenjin attacks against non-Kalenjin who were ‘not in the government’ took place, aiming at intimidating, displacing and otherwise preventing opposition supporters from voting ‘the consciousness of ethnic territoriality’ the KANU way (O.I, 23, Kapsaos, 2022).

Moreover, all local government officials, including the local chiefs, being direct appointees of the President’s Office had to toe the line of defending establishment of multipartyism. As such, they had a role in calling for eviction of non-Kalenjin in the area(ibid). An elder in FGD (1,2022) stated that a week prior to the violence, the then Uasin Gishu DC, Paul Lagat had supposedly said at a public meeting that "in Jomo Kenyatta’s days, if a Luhya had mentioned something against the Agikuyu he would be killed, so now why should Agikuyu say things against the Kalenjin"

(O.I,16,Kiplombe,2022).This implied that the government officials obeyed orders from “above” accordingly.

The Agikuyu, Abaluhya, Luo, Akamba and other non-Kalenjin who had found permanent residence in the study area were implicitly referred to as *madoadoa* (unwanted groups) who needed to be driven away because they were perceived to be supporters of multi-partyism or its sympathizers (O.I,15,Kahoya,2022). To date, these notions have made the Kalenjin in Turbo sub-county to perceive the Abaluhya, Abagusii, Luo, Agikuyu and other non-Kalenjin presence on what they consider to be their ancestral lands as detrimental, unjust and illegitimate. Given the enormous influence the politicians commanded among their electorate, the ethnic question resulted to a political polarization on the basis of ethnicity, from which Kenya, three decades on, is yet to recover.

Majority of respondents noted that in particular, anti-Agikuyu sentiment was high throughout 1991 and 1992. This not only provided strong grounds which Kalenjin KANU politicians would use to assemble adherents, but was also produced and reproduced by local level actors in day to day interactions. Local Kalenjin politicians in Turbo sub-county were cited as spreading the notion that the Agikuyu would seek revenge against the Kalenjin if they came to power. The leaders urged the Kalenjin to defend their ethnic homeland, reclaim land that was rightfully theirs, and evict the Agikuyu out of the area (O.I, 37, Huruma, 2022). Many Agikuyu narrated their ordeal. According to (O.I, 15, Kahoya, 2022);

“I am a Agikuyu and was told that if I salute with two fingers (the way the supporters of the opposition party FORD ASILI were doing), they would be cut off. Then the clashes started. The Kalenjin who were supporting

KANU burnt my house. My more than twenty years' sweat was brought to ashes”.

Such actions clearly illustrated a direct appeal to the sense of ethnic territoriality. Moreover, the businesses of opposition supporters were not only shunned by the Kalenjin but their premises were attacked. One respondent recalled that

“A friend of mine lost his business just because of being vocal in his support of FORD Asili, one of the new opposition parties at the time. One day as the campaigns were underway some local youths attacked his shop and burnt it to the ground (O.I, 3, Kamagut, 2022).

The political atmosphere ethnicized spaces within Turbo sub-county. People supporting the opposition faced intimidation and stigma from the Kalenjin (O.I, 50, Kamagut, 2022). In the end, KANU ‘won’ those elections against a background of gerrymandering, use of the provincial administration and state resources in the campaign, open bribery and financing defections from the opposition. KANU’s Reuben Chesire beat Jason Ambe of FORD Asili and David Omodo of FORD Kenya who came second and third, respectively to retain the areas’ Mp seat (O.I,37,Huruma, 2022). Both foreign and domestic observers reported serious electoral irregularities in the study area, and evidence from defeated candidates and party agents alleged direct rigging of the parliamentary vote in favor of KANU (Troup and Hornsby, 1998:588).

Many respondents indicated that whereas such socio-spatial dynamics frequently silenced their expression of political support, they still voted according to their conscience, but because of fearing retaliation concealed their support of the opposition. Most FGDs respondents stated that a long-term effect of the 1992 violence was the exit of many victims of the violence from the study area. Some non-Kalenjin were cited to have

swapped land with individuals who were willing to take their plot in exchange for land elsewhere in another county. In some areas, local Kalenjin authorities explicitly commanded clash victims to exchange their land with Kalenjin from outside the study area. In Tapsagoi ward, for example, a local Kalenjin chief threatened renewed violence unless the non-Kalenjin, who had fled their land after attacks, exchanged it with his co-ethnics, in disregard of the Land Control Board rules (BBC,1993:17). Furthermore, many non-Kalenjin respondents reported being approached by groups of people seeking to purchase their land with offers way below the market value. Some of them who tried to go back to their land after being evicted by the Kalenjin warriors in December 1992 found their rebuilt houses destroyed while others found the doors removed or fences taken down (FGD 2 and 3,2022). These actions really sored inter-ethnic relations in the area.

Despite the top-down ethnic politicization of the territory, the study also established that there exists a clear boundary consciousness among the dwellers of some areas within Turbo sub-county, and the people were keenly informed of which neighborhood belonged to which ethnic group. The intra-borders were subjectively and inter-subjectively constructed by local residents. For example, according to (O.I, 37, Huruma, 2022) “river Sosiani constituted the boundary that separates the Kalenjin ‘hillside’ and the Agikuyu ward of Huruma.”

It is thus clear that the perception of ethnic others as ‘immigrants’ is a means through which ethnic boundaries were repeatedly reproduced and stabilized in present time. The study further noted that such consciousness influenced the ethnic residential segregation as co-ethnics resided together. The insistence and circulation of such tendencies at the

grassroots level thus facilitated the fruitful adoption of negative ethnic rhetoric from above.

In the 1997 general elections the noteworthy presidential candidates in the opposition were Mwai Kibaki of Democratic Party(DP),Raila Odinga of the National Development Party(NDP),Charity Ngilu of Social Democratic Party(SDP) and Kijana Wamalwa of Forum for Restoration and Democracy Kenya(FORD Kenya). As in the previous cases, ethnic mobilization emerged as a central feature of the elections. KANU remained predominantly a Kalenjin party, NDP was Luo, DP was Agikuyu, SDP was Akamba and Ford Kenya Abaluhya.

The campaigns, once more, took an ethno-political angle where political power was viewed as critical in dealing with “ethnic opponents”. This was especially the case with the presidential election, where the Kalenjin were ready to do anything within their powers to ensure that Moi remained Kenya’s president for the fourth term. Hence the election was against a backdrop of numerous strategies that hindered fair and free elections. Amongst them, was biased voter registration which deliberately omitted voters in the opposition and an Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) that was equally not partial. Many Agikuyu respondents from Huruma ward indicated that in the polling stations most of them could not vote since their names were not on the register, even though they had been given voter registration cards that were viable by the electoral commission. The ECK was bending to KANU-state manipulation to ensure a KANU victory. This was because of the perception that the Agikuyu and other non-Kalenjin groups residing in the sub-county would vote in Kibaki and make Moi lose the election (O, I, 37, Huruma, 2022).

The advocates of war in KANU once more safeguarded by the ruling party provoked violence against the opposition supporters during and post the elections. Some pro-Moi MPs frightened DP supporters with retaliation after Kibaki announced his dismissal of the election results at a KANU rally in Narok. Simon Kiptum Arap Choge, a Minister in the Office of the President, warned that there would be bloodshed country-wide if Kibaki's petition threatened Moi's government, yet the police took no action for incitement to violence (Amnesty International, 10 June 1998).

Indeed, from FGDs response, Mwai Kibaki's declaration to present a petition challenging president Moi's victory and the Electoral Commission for alleged discrepancies in the 1997 electoral process in court, ignited reactions from Kalenjin leaders, triggering more ethnic based conflicts. According to most respondents, people interpreted the contest between Kibaki and Moi as a competition between the Kalenjin and Agikuyu. The notion was further supported by statistics showing KANU's unpopularity in the Central Province of the country where Kibaki's DP had an easy triumph in securing parliamentary seats (FGD 2, 2022, FGD 3, 2022). One respondent recalled that this really made the Kalenjin bitter and they resorted to attacking the Agikuyu in some parts of Turbo Sub-county. At the constituency level, William Ruto defeated the incumbent, Reuben Chesire, who was the Uasin Gishu KANU branch chairman as well as Moi's preferred candidate. Encouraged by KANU ruling party politicians, the Kalenjin demanded expulsion of "settlers" out of "their" territory (O.I, 33, Ngenyilel, 2022).

4.3.The Kibaki Era: The 2007/08 Post Election Violence and the New Constitution.

The period 1999 to 2002 was reported by most respondents as having experienced relative calm in the study area. Moi was doing his last constitutional term which limited

him to serving a maximum of two five-year terms a departure from the former constitution which had permitted for indefinite presidential re-election. On 14th October 2002, Uhuru Kenyatta, a Agikuyu, was backed as KANU's presidential candidate to take over from Daniel Moi. This observation is important in explaining the absence of inter-ethnic conflicts in Turbo sub-county in the 2002 election. Past conflicts had taken place when a Kalenjin candidate and a Agikuyu candidate competed in the election, both at the national and local levels. This time around, the Kalenjin had no candidate of their own and thus supported Moi's preferred successor, Uhuru Kenyatta.

Indeed, senior Kalenjin politicians then such as William Ruto who had retained his Eldoret North parliamentary seat and then MP of Tinderet constituency Henry Kosgei campaigned for Uhuru Kenyatta. In particular, Ruto is reported to have said that in the event of President Moi's retirement, an agreement with the Agikuyu would safeguard them (Kalenjin) post 2002 if Uhuru Kenyatta was to be victorious (Branch, 2011: 247).

The presidential race was between two Agikuyu, Uhuru and Mwai Kibaki thus giving an edge to party politics over ethnic one. The opposition parties united behind Kibaki by forming the National Rainbow Coalition(NARC) which united most ethnic groups, other than the Kalenjin who remained loyal to KANU. After winning, the Kibaki regime, however, failed to inspire the resolve to pursue peace in Kenya. The breakdown of the coalition in 2003 over an alleged failure to honour a pre-election pact, a supposed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) as stated by the coalition leaders, Raila Odinga of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kibaki of the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK), led to renewed political hatred in the quest for constitutional changes in Kenya (Ajulu, 2008:49). The violation of the MoU was once again reinterpreted as 'yet another

illustration' of the selfish and arrogant nature of the Agikuyu. As a pastor (O.I,41,Tapsagoi,2022) stated; "The disregard of the MoU by Kibaki and to name Raila Odinga as Prime Minister was viewed as a betrayal of the Luo by the Agikuyu".

As earlier indicated ideological and personal differences between individual political elite, as well as specific policies and actions taken by a party, are frequently perceived as proof that the whole ethnic group is being targeted. As such, majority respondents described the continued tense relations between Raila and Kibaki within a narrative of a continuous Agikuyu-Luo dislike which had prolonged since independence, and an ever-present resolution on the part of the Agikuyu to obstruct the Luo ascendancy to political power in the country. Moreover, many respondents directly linked the differences between Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga in the start of 1960s with those of Kibaki and Raila. According to (O, I, 40, Kiplombe, 2022) in the same way Kenyatta expelled the Luo out of government in the period after independence, so too did Kibaki. Such statements soured inter-ethnic ethnic relations in the study area, but with a new twist. The main players were not the Kalenjin, but the Agikuyu verses the Luo, whose grievances were interestingly supported by the other ethnic groups.

In 2005 there was polarized campaigns for the 'No' and 'Yes', Orange and Banana Referendum on the proposed constitution as the political elite mobilized along ethnic lines (Kenya Times 17th November 2005,3). The NARC government under Kibaki supported the draft by Amos Wako, the then attorney general, while Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) brought together antagonists in NARC coalition for its rejection. In the end, the Kibaki government (Banana team) was defeated (Nasong'o and Murunga, 2007). The Agikuyu prolonged loyalty to Kibaki in the referendum emphasised their

detachment from other ethnic groups in the country. As a Agikuyu respondent (O,I, 37,Huruma,2022) narrated:

“Although Uhuru Kenyatta,a Agikuyu was opposing the referendum on the Orange side,most of my co-ethnics defended one of us by voting banana almost to the last person. The result isolated us from other Kenyans. The campaign was simply between the Agikuyu and the Kenyans. That distrust was unstoppable up to the general election of 2007. Other ethnic groups viewed the Agikuyu as self-centered, always wanting to remain in power by all means”.

The study established that the Kalenjin were also bitter with Kibaki’s administration from the onset. A Kalenjin respondent in the FGD suggested that the manner in which Moi was treated at the ceremony of handing over power to Kibaki in 2002 was interpreted as a great insult and lack of respect to the Kalenjin by the Agikuyu:

“After Nyayo (Moi) was ‘thrown out’, he was disrespected, mud was thrown at him yet he was elderly. When the masses chanted ‘yote yawezekana bila Moi’ (everything is possible without Moi) it was not only demeaning but humiliating to us (Kalenjin) (O, I, 6, Kapsaos, 2022).

By the end of 2005, Kibaki’s NARC record in terms of national unity was dismal. Like Kenyatta and Moi governments, Kibaki’s regime affirmed that county’s political elite is largely self-centered and ethnic in orientation, with no vision for Kenya. Many respondents felt that Kibaki filled many key appointive positions with fellow Agikuyu co-ethnics, thus following in the footsteps of his forerunners. Consequently, this created bitterness and hostility among other ethnic groups who felt excluded. This was especially among the Kalenjin who had ‘enjoyed” 24-year of state control by Moi. A Kalenjin respondent (O,I,27,Kapsaos, 2022) stated:

“I remember Kibaki sacked our (Kalenjin) high profile members, such as Sally Kosgey who was the chief of the civil service, Zakayo Cheruiyot, the former internal security permanent secretary, as well as the Kalenjin heads of the GSU and CID.”

FGD (1,2022) cited Farouk Kibet alias Kipkazi as one of the local politician who were on the forefront complaining about NARC’s government persecution of the Kalenjin. He was reported to have led a demonstration against Kibaki’s move to have Moi record a statement with the police on allegations of corruption. He was quoted as saying;

“We want Moi to be accorded respect the way he did to Kenyatta’s family on assuming power in 1978”.

The reshuffling of the military and locking out of Kalenjin youth from recruitment in key areas of government was seen as further entrenchment of Agikuyu hegemony at the expense of the Kalenjin (O,I,6,Kapsaos,2022). Indeed, Mwai Kibaki reflected a resurgence of Agikuyu domination (Murungi, 2012;28). Thus, by the time of the 2007 electoral cycle, a powerful discourse of Agikuyu selfishness and reluctance to support other ethnic groups was prevalent. This predisposed the other ethnic groups to be in opposition to Kibaki’s candidacy.

In the 2007, ethnic arithmetic by the political elite remained the most realistic means of winning the elections. In the election, Party of National Unity (PNU) under Kibaki was largely dominated by GEMA while Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) by the Kalenjin, Luo and other ethnic groups mostly from western regions. For once in the country’s history the perceived political enemies the Luo and the Kalenjin became ‘friends’ after a common political coalition. The Luo-Agikuyu animosity was however confirmed after Uhuru Kenyatta’s KANU party moved out of the ODM alliance in July

2007 and went back to Kibaki's PNU umbrella. One Luo youth explained: We were told by the elders,

“As you recall in 2002 we supported the Agikuyu. Our time is now, so they are supposed to assist us, but as you can see, Uhuru has returned home to them. They are bad people and are not with us anymore” (O, I, 40, Kiplombe, 2022).

During the electoral campaigns, the Majimbo debate, described newly as *Ugatuzi* (the devolution of resources and power to the regions) was resurrected as ODM, taking advantage of many peoples' strong wish for constitutional changes, gave a promise of a federal system of government when elected. Whilst ODM did not openly advocate for the expelling of 'foreigners' from their primary areas of residence, there was an intentional vagueness as to what the term meant (Anderson, 2010: 50). This led to deliberate negative interpretation at the local level. Essentially, according to the Kalenjin, in the event that ODM got to power it would reverse the economic and political control of the Rift Valley region by the settler communities, particularly the Agikuyu incase it won the election. This perception made ODM very popular at the local level.

Furthermore, the Kalenjin, 'understood it as ethnic groups, but in particular the Agikuyu, going back to their ancestral areas' (O.I, 15, Kahoya, 2022). A significant number of respondents reported that in one specific campaign speech William Ruto is said to have stated that, following the election, all the Agikuyu would be returned to Othaya, the home area of Kibaki, in one pick-up truck. These claims were corroborated by proof given to the Waki commission (the CIPEV), and clearly illustrates incitements of high levels by the elite. The ambiguity connected to majimboism fanned narratives of “ethnic belonging” to and territorial ownership, contributing to its interpretation in terms of

promoting ethnic ownership. This deliberate elite ambiguity plus the subsequent interpretation at the grassroots level sheds light upon ways the top-down mobilisation interacts with bottom-up discourses and comprehension of society and politics.

Furthermore, during the campaigns, inflammatory statements, hate speech and direct encouragement to violence ‘was spoken of in all circles’ (O.I, 15, Kahoya, 2022). Particularly, there was incitement to use violence to oppose the election outcome. For instance, the Human Rights Watch (2008:4) reported that;

“Around Eldoret local ODM mobilizers and other prominent individuals called meetings during the election campaign to encourage violence in the event of a Kibaki victory’ stating that the reaction to a rigged election ‘should be ‘war’ against local Agikuyu residents”.

Such narratives were taken up by many ordinary people and local elite who produced and reproduced them with more open sinister and frightening overtones in their everyday conversations and interactions.

Consequently, the politicization of ethnicity resulted to Post Election Violence because of the built-up of differences along ethnicity with the main cause being an allegation of election rigging by the Electoral Commission of Kenya to favor PNU and its candidate, President Mwai Kibaki (O.I, 7, Ngenyilel, 2022). Few minutes after the announcement of Kibaki’s victory, ODM’s Raila Odinga dismissed the results and refused to acknowledge Kibaki. Consequently, they called their followers out to object against what they termed rigging of the election by Kibaki and PNU (Daily Nation, January 15th 2008:46). According to many Kalenjin respondents, the rigging had robbed William Ruto the then Eldoret North constituency MP and a member of the Pentagon, ODM’s governing body

(who in the view of many Kalenjin was both a communal and a national leader) and his party leader and presidential candidate Raila Odinga of ODM what seemed as a direct victory. The PNU adherents, real and imagined, got targeted for reprisals as some were forcefully ejected from their homes, raped, their property looted and others killed.

Like in the 1990s, anti-Agikuyu sentiment was similarly high at the time and provided the flame which ODM politicians could use in mobilising supporters. Indeed, a number of respondents were clear that violence against the Agikuyu identified as loyal PNU supporters, was particularly intense. Many respondents stated that initially, the acts of violence targeted Agikuyu groups who publicly celebrated the announcement. As a resident of Maili nne estate of Kapsaos ward recalled:

“I saw some two Agikuyu men celebrating the victory of ‘their’ president, while we were still puzzled. Out of nowhere, stones were thrown at them (O, I, 25, Kapsaos, 2022)”.

Another Agikuyu youth who resided in Baringo estate, Kapsaos ward recalled that his village was attacked by Kalenjin warriors on the day of the announcement. He stated;

“The locals here used to direct them to non-Kalenjin residents and perceived PNU supporters. They were informing them “this place belongs to so and so, here is a Agikuyu, there is a Agikuyu” (O.I, 30, Kapsaos, 2022).

Majority Agikuyu respondents of Huruma ward recalled that they saw smoke emanating from the ‘interior’ rural Kalenjin areas when the violence broke out and that their co-ethnics were escaping these estates as their homes were torched by attackers. Shortly after this, massive attacks were hurled upon their own estate. Most Agikuyu respondents blamed William Ruto, for the attacks because of his strong anti-Agikuyu rhetoric before

the election (O.I, 48, Tapsagoi, 2022, HRW, 2008). Some Agikuyu ran public transport, some were farmers while others had established retail and wholesale trade businesses. The attacks on them were thus based on the perceptions of being economically well off ‘since they were enjoying favors from Kibaki’s government.

Even though a lot of the violence just after the proclamation of presidential results was primarily a spontaneous reaction to the ‘stolen’ elections, most respondents stated that the velocity, nature and coordination of some of the attack must have been planned in advance. Most respondents from Huruma ward narrated how many Kalenjin youths got ferried to the area in lorries and surrounded the area from all sides, pointing out an organized and systematic attack on a predetermined target. As (O,I,36,Huruma,2022) narrated:

“While at Nyathiru, (at the edge of Huruma estate),Huruma ward, our defending area, we saw about six lorries from the hills and from those we caught they confessed to having been brought from Turbo town to reinforce the Nandi warriors. All that must have been planned.”

Some respondents alleged that the planning and coordinating of attacks against the perceived enemies, especially the Agikuyu, Abagusii and Akamba were done at William Ruto’s Sugo home through a group called ‘Network’ under Ruto’s leadership. The ICC prosecution however acknowledged that there was a ‘lack of direct evidence’ regarding such claims(ICC,2011:14).

Reprisals attacks were also made against the Kalenjin warriors. Agikuyu youths formed so-called ‘self-defense forces’ against perceived ODM supporters, predominantly from the Kalenjin and Luo (O, I, 37, Huruma, 2022).The Standard (9 February 2008) reported

an incident whereby over thirty youths who were involved in a ‘revenge mission’ in Huruma ward were arrested by GSU officers.

Many respondents reported that in the first days of January 2008 many houses were selectively set ablaze by Kalenjin youth armed with arrows and bows in Roadblock trading center, Baringo estate and Kapkoros area in Kapsaos ward. Many victims within those areas, mostly women and children sought refuge at Kapsaos secondary school. Sporadic violence against the Agikuyu and perceived PNU supporters at various roadblocks was also cited by a number of respondents. As (O.I,25,Kapsaos,2022) recalled, he lost his Agikuyu friend in early January 2008 at a roadblock at Duka Moja shopping centre,Kapsaos ward, by Kalenjin youth and indicated that this happened because of his ethnicity.

According to many leaders from the Kalenjin community from the study area the coordination of violence was openly spearheaded by well-known people such as Jackson Kibor, a Kalenjin ODM civic leader. Kibor openly encouraged the killing of the Agikuyu people by the Kalenjin in a BBC interview in which he said:

“...We will not sit down and see one ethnic group lead Kenya. This is a war; we will start a war. One ethnic group cannot lead the other forty-one ethnic groups” (Transcript from BBC World Service ‘Assignment’, January 31, 2008).

He was later arrested in February 2008, charged with incitement, but later set free on bond (Daily Nation, February 29, 2008).

Other individuals numerously cited as perpetrators by respondents included Isaac Maiyo,who was William Ruto’s parliamentary candidate campaign manager and Ruto’s aide Farouk Kibet who was shortly arrested and released after he led demonstrations and

stormed the Eldoret police station over the election fiasco. As previously stated, although eminent local leaders openly engaged in coordinating and provoking violence, they were never held accountable in any way. Sadly, this is even after the names of perpetrators under investigation and those mentioned frequently were enclosed in numerous reports of Non-Governmental Organizations like the Human Rights Watch, Kenya Human Rights Commission and two Government Inquiries – “the Akiwumi Commission Report” and the “Kiliku Parliamentary Committee Report”. For example, in the Akiwumi report that investigated the 1992 and 1997 ‘ethnic clashes’ Jackson Kibor a one-time KANU chairman for Uasin Gishu was among the persons listed and his investigation recommended by the Inquiry.

The PEV came to an end on 28 February 2008 following an agreement under mediation by the principal negotiator Kofi Annan and the mediation team of Eminent African Persons between the PNU and the ODM leaders to share power. Nevertheless, in 2009 it was reported that ethnic tensions “were still festering” (CISNET Kenya CX219401). The PEV revealed the deep-rooted inter-ethnic suspicion and hatred among Turbo sub county residents and Kenyans at large. Although there was calm in the area during the research field study, coexistence of the Luo, Abaluhya, Abagusii, Agikuyu, Kalenjin and other ethnic groups in the area was still characterized by suspicion and mistrust. The 2007/08 PEV occasioned social, economic, political and even psychological disruptions. According to official sources, 205 people died in the PEV in the Uasin Gishu district alone(CIPEV,2008). On the social front, the ordeal caused mistrust across ethnic groups, hence affecting social capital among communities. Ethnic mistrust heightened because

neighbors who had lived peacefully turned against each other in spite of the fact that they had co-existed peacefully for a long time.

On the positive note however, the PEV “empowered” the multi-ethnic community of the study area to reflect on their collective situation in relation to the state and other members of the society. They could ignore ethnicity in favor of creating a united front against an exploitative state and politicians that take advantage of their situation.

The Kibaki-Raila accord led to the creation of number of commissions and other institutional reforms, including constitutional and electoral. One of the key commissions that the National Dialogue created was the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), also known as the Waki Commission, named after its chair, Kenyan Justice Philip Waki. The Waki Report is an invaluable account of the violent acts that took place across Kenya in the two months that followed the December 2007 elections. Constitutional reform had been high on the public agenda for at least two decades. The August 2010 promulgation of a new constitution, after majority of Kenyans expressed their support in a referendum, is arguably the most important concrete achievement of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation process. The Constitution has made various strides to find solution for disharmony. This includes the move towards equality, inclusivity, disallowing of the creation of political parties that are ethnic based and the creation of national values in promotion of a national identity. The new constitution thus has the potential to do away with cosmetic peace and cement a spirit of nationhood. However, the longer term effect of the new constitution will depend heavily on the government’s respect for the rule of law and constitutionalism, which is consequently subject to its political will.

4.4. Strategies and Challenges in Mitigating of Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Turbo sub-County,1991-2010.

The study established that the elder-hood institution was potent in Turbo sub-county and was highly regarded in the management of the 1992/93 violence. Discussions from FGDs revealed that every ethnic group in the study area contributed to a council of elders which was called Divisional Peace committee (DPC) chosen by the communities based on their character and dedication to works of peace (FGD 2 and 3,2022). The study gathered that at times, the provincial administration in Turbo sub-county, following a presidential directive, arranged meetings between the elders of the affected ethnic groups in trying to achieve peace and reconciliation. As such, there were joint peace meetings held by the GEMA and KAMATUSA elders (FGD 1, 2022, FGD3, 2022). Such meetings usually had 'reconciliation' of the inter-ethnic conflict victims as the basic agenda. The elders always agreed to enhance peace, good neighborliness and promised to motivate the growth of civility in political conversation (O.I, 43, Kapsaos, 2022). However, most respondents viewed such talks as a 'marriage of convenience' between the GEMA and KAMATUSA patriots who had selfish interests and who mostly failed to agree on relevant issues under deliberation, especially those related to the victims of displacement.

Moreover, some respondents noted that as much as the elders were seen as dependable and well informed in community matters they were the very people who initiated war, blessed and motivated the youth to attack. In their discourses, they expressed profound feelings of communal belonging and responsibility. At the time of the violence the Kalenjin was said "to be together as one to go against the *bunyot*(enemy). As one Kalenjin youth stated;

“In our culture, a war cannot just be started without it being organized by the old men, who have to give their blessings” (O.I, 11, Kapsaos, 2022).

This sentiment was however vehemently denied by all the community elders FGD participants. Nevertheless, the study inferred that they indeed incited their youth and even organized them to attack their neighbors, but were determined to keep the information secret in order to avoid any legal reprisals.

Findings from the FGDs further indicated that the elders had sometimes been hijacked and bribed by the former KANU regime and made KANU wingers, at which point they became corrupt and unfair in their arbitration of cases (FGD 2, 2022, FGD3, 2022). At that time, they really did not command the confidence of residents they were speaking and acting for (O.I,16,Kiplombe, 2022).Despite its weaknesses, the institution of elderhood remained salient and favored in the management of ethnic conflicts as evidenced by the study’s findings.

A large number of respondents noted that the most common approach behind the reduction of inter-ethnic conflicts during the 1991/92 violence cycle in the study area was empowerment from the NGOs and humanitarian assistance. Most cited was the UNDP which was commended for its involvement in a number of interventions that supported national integration and cohesion in Turbo sub-county. These included resettlement of IDPs, conflict-resolution fora and collaboration with religious actors to establish existing relationships of trust with communities (FGD 2, 2022, FGD 3, 2022). However, efforts by UNDP did not receive massive support from the KANU government led by president Moi. Coupled by international and local criticism for its lack of indifference, it pulled out and the program ceased to function in 1995 (Klopp, 2006:67-69).

The majority of respondents further stated that many NGOs existed in the urban centers and not in the rural setting. Their outreach to poor rural areas was not perceived to have been particularly effective. The study thus argues for the need to address this shortcoming and properly coordinate local linkages and government programs in addressing inter-ethnic conflicts.

Accounts of war, government propaganda and other forms of mediation tend to cast women as inert naive victims and men as peace builders (Odongo, 2004). However, this is not truly the case, as women played significant roles as advocates of peace and as relief aid-workers in the 1997/98 inter-ethnic conflicts. Majority of respondents observed that women used traditional peace making methods to advocate for peace.

The study established that cursing was a strong tool Kalenjin women used to prevent their sons from participating in war. A son was not supposed to join the warriors in war while under the mother's curse. One had to make the warriors understand that he was cursed by his mother and therefore could not go. A key respondent in Kapsaos noted that she threatened to curse her three sons during the 1997/98 inter-ethnic clashes in the event they went to war to kill, displace and bring robbed property to her home. Consequently, her sons never joined the warriors (O.I, 43, Kapsaos, 2022).

Through the assistance of Catholic Peace and Justice Commission and Eldoret Rural Women Peace Link (RWPL), sporting activities were introduced by women as way of nurturing friendly relations among the youth from various ethnic groups (Ngyemura 2010, 75). After such games, seminars were held to debate and analyze conflict situation and assign the youths duties (FGD 3, 2022). The Rural Women Peace Link was created as part of NCCCK of Kenya project in 1992 with the objective of providing a forum for

women participation in peace building in different ethnic groups affected by the clashes. Women in the study area were part of the project as they engaged in integration of the warring ethnic groups, especially the Kalenjin and Agikuyu through traditional peace building mechanism and exchange programs. They conducted rural peace exchange programs and solidarity visits where they donated food to the victims and encouraged parents to discourage their children from being misused by the politicians for their selfish interests (FGD 3, 2022). This was confirmed by a respondent who stated that; “We challenged parents not to allow their children to be used by politicians only to be dumped after hurting others” (O.I, 45, Kamagut, 2022). Women also encouraged what a respondent (O.I, 49, Kamagut, 2022) called “cross-pollination”. This was a call to intermarriages among the multi-ethnic community in Turbo sub-county aimed at exchanging inter-ethnic cultural practices that eventually resulted in relative peace in the area.

However, lack of funds and cultural beliefs were cited by some respondents as impeding women participation in peace building process. As (O.I,49,Kamagut, 2022) further stated;

“Men were suspicious as they thought we were trying to compete with them by performing a task which to them is solely within their sphere”.

The women were thus unwilling to participate in peace building activities for fear of divorce for violating the cultural stereotype of women as uncritical advocates for peace. The study underscores the need to demystify women as passive participants in peace efforts and instead avail them platforms to be of assistance.

The study findings further established that the politicians had double standards in conflict and peace building. Even though most of them were the masterminds of the violence they

were the same quoted to have occasionally visited areas affected by clashes, appealed for calm and made new promises but which brought no subsequent positive change (FGD3, 2022). FGDs participants also reported that the same politicians were chief guests at funds drive that helped many PEV victims settle down peacefully (FGD 2, 2022, FGD3, 2022). The politicians occasionally gave philanthropic aid to impoverished IDPs and other vulnerable groups in the study area. However, as noted by a respondent, those responsible with allocation of such provisions frequently used the politicians' names to steal the same with impunity (O.I, 40, Kiplombe, 2022).

Most respondents stated that during and after inter-ethnic conflicts in Turbo Sub County the religious community, Islamic and Christianity alike played an important role in conflict resolution and transformation especially in regards to reconciliation, faith-based trauma and psychological and pastoral counseling, availing food, clothing and in petitioning other stakeholders to assist the victims. The religious community is perceived as free of ethnic tags and thus safe sanctuaries to receive numerous victims during attacks (O.I, 2, Kapsaos, 2022, FGD 2, 2022).

However, the FGDs noted that in 1992 general elections, ethnicity shaped the political leanings of most churches. Most of the respondents further noted that many theists 'preached water and took wine' during the ethnic violence. That most were hypocrites and did not practice what they preached. They failed to rise above ethnic conglomerations and some were even mentioned as violence inciters. For instance, the Africa Inland Church (AIC), which has a significant Kalenjin following was said to have supported President Moi, a Kalenjin. A columnist corroborated the claims by observing that,

“The complete antithesis of the likes of Kuria, Okullu, and Nzeki are the AIC’s Bishop Ezekiel Birech (a Kalenjin]) and the Rev. Jones Kaleli (a Kamba), as is evident from the sermons they deliver at the televised religious services attended by President Moi on Sundays” (The Weekly Review, 7,1992).

Similarly, the informants noted that in dealing with the clashes the AIC and the Gospel Churches in the area were more passive compared to the Church Province of Kenya (CPK) Diocese of Eldoret and the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret which were seriously involved. The FGDs further revealed that for the Catholic church, Bishop Cornelius Korir of the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret then condemned ethnic-based violence in Turbo sub-county and the Rift Valley province at large (FGD 2 and 3,2022, The Weekly Review, 16,1992).

The FGDs further noted that churches were not active in critiquing the state as the NCCK did. The respondents revealed that the NCCK also helped the victims of the 1992/93 ethnic strife (FGD 2 and 3,2022). It sponsored IDP camps in Eldoret and Turbo towns (The Weekly Review, 5,1998).

On 24th August 1996, the NCCK organized a two day workshop in Eldoret Sirikwa hotel whereby the political elite in KANU and opposition in attendance promised to "encourage the growth of civility in political dialogue and emphasized those aspects of speech and conduct that raised tensions and reduced mutual respect among Kenyans (Daily Nation 25th August, 1996:1-2).The Sirikwa accord partly encouraged peace in the country (NCCK,Aug.31,1995).As much as the religious community were regarded helpful, like in the previous conflicts most respondents noted that there also existed variations with regard to how some churches responded to the 2007/08 PEV. The

Catholic church was mostly cited as actively involved than the other 'Faith mission and gospel churches (FGD 3, 2022).

A respondent (O.I, 38, Tapsagoi, 2022) gave an account of how she survived;

“I was six months pregnant with my second born when violence erupted. There were no means of transport to get to town(Eldoret) where I could shelter with my sister. I had to walk to St Jude, Catholic church (in Huruma ward) where I heard it accommodated victims. I was well received and catered for because of the state I was in”.

The Catholic Church's effort were also echoed by (O.I, 24, Huruma, 2022) who stated that

“If St Jude's doors were shut I could have lost my wife and children. That's where I hurriedly left them as I went back to join my village mates in retaliatory attacks against the Kalenjin warriors”.

Through FGDs the study also established that St Jude Catholic Church in Huruma ward also embraced Amani Mashinani (Peace at Grassroots) approach to management of ethnic conflict in the study area. The approach was started by the late Bishop Cornelius Korir of the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret aimed at bringing peace among warring ethnic groups in the North Rift region (O.I, 13, Huruma, 2022). Most participants stated that Agikuyu and Kalenjin elders from Huruma ward and Kahoya in Kapsaos ward could meet at the same church to discuss how best to restore peace (FGD2, 2022, FGD3, 2022).

However, during the 2007/08 PEV, some Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) and the clergy, orchestrated ethnic hatred by furthering and defending the biased political positions of the ethnic communities in defiance of their professed religious ideals (CIPEV,2008:217). The Church's clear ethnic split and lack of voice disappointed

Kenyans. Frequent columns in the newsletters during the time clearly illustrated the disappointment. Editorials appeared with headlines such as “When the shepherds led their flock astray” (Daily Nation,15,Feb,2008). Respondents gave specific cases of some clergy members who leaned towards PNU or ODM side depending on their ethnicity. Those kind of leaders did not have the moral standing to call for peace because of their political parties’ involvement in the conflicts (FGD 2, 2022, FGD 3, 2022). One respondent recalled that he visited three churches in Tapsagoi ward during the clashes and was dismayed by the church leaders’ involvement in political campaigns as most of them openly supported ODM (O.I, 50, Kamagut, 2022). The church leaders’ active participation in politics thus frustrated the peace-building efforts in the study area. Consequently, their peace building endeavor got viewed as political functions rather than genuine advocacy for peace.

A pastor of AIC church, Kapkong, Tapsagoi ward (O.I, 41.Tapsagoi, 2022) noted that peace-building activities in Turbo sub-county would be fruitful with the readiness of all parties to take part in mediation, reconciliation and various mutual discussions. He cited unwillingness by the political elite to participate in the peacebuilding in the study area. Most respondents also observed that in numerous occasions, the government got lately involved or particularly when the interests of the political elite were threatened by the prolonged conflict (FGD2, 2022). They study calls for the need of the religious community to overcome ‘political capture’ remain impartial and act as an arbiter in conflict/potential conflict situations.

Sensational reporting by the media, was cited by most FGD informants as an exacerbating factor in the conflict that occurs in Turbo sub-county. They pointed out the

exaggerated reporting of conflict occurrences in the area, and biased reporting by the media, both local, national and international that depicts the area as a hearth of eternal violence and death. The respondents argued that such provocative coverage motivates ethnic warriors to advance their violent activities further since they deem it as recognition of their prowess on the battleground. They further mentioned the social media as yet another platform that excites conflict through the sharing of violence-arousing photos and messages.

During the 2007/08 PEV the television and radio stations were cited as being very helpful in informing the people what was happening in the country. KBC television was numerously mentioned to have highlighted the plight of IDPs (O.I,20,Kapsaos, 2022, FGD2, 2022).

However, as much as the media was considered vital they were equally blamed for fostering divisions. Majority of the respondents noted that some of the FM vernacular stations created a climate of hate and negative ethnicity during the 2007/08 PEV. According to IREC (2008:100) Inooro FM played Agikuyu dialect songs that imaged Raila Odinga as a murderer and even characterized the Luo as lazy hooligans who did not pay rent. Kameme and Coro FM radio stations broadcasting in Agikuyu dialect were also cited as having had programs that encouraged ethnic divisions. Furthermore, Kass FM, broadcasting in Kalenjin language, also aired materials of xenophobic nature against the Agikuyu. In addition, it aired phrases such as '*madoadoa*' meaning foreigners or spots in the Rift valley region, Turbo sub county included (FGD 2, 2022, FGD3, 2022). These claims were corroborated by CIPEV (2008). Joshua Sang of KASS FM was numerously mentioned by many interviewees as having called on the youth to come out to the road,

saying “vita imetokea (the war has begun)” and asking them what they were doing at home (O.I,11,Kapsaos, 2022). The study argues that the media should be instrumental in providing trustworthy and transparent journalism that is free from political and commercial influence and further correct undesirable misconceptions and misrepresentations.

From FGDs (2and 3,2022) the study further established that the fact that both the police and the defense forces were perceived historically to have been enlisted along ethnicity to safeguard the particular government of the day increased the probability of their breaking down along ethnic lines in a crisis and being either unable or reluctant to maintain law and order impartially. For example, there were claims of ethnic divisions during the 2007/08 PEV amongst the police where they took sides depending on the ethnicity of perpetrators and victims (Waki,2010). Some people who were under attack were sarcastically told by police officers to head to Othaya, the home constituency of President Kibaki, to get refuge there(ibid). These actions were corroborated by a Kalenjin youth who stated,

“The area around Nyathiru motel, Huruma ward, acted as a buffer zone. The police fired at us while there. It must have been Agikuyu police because it’s obvious they knew we were Kalenjin (O.I, 25, Kapsaos, 2022).

Due to the divisions at some point some senior Criminal Investigations Department (CID) officers were send from Nairobi to take statements from those who were displaced and investigate the organization of PEV by Kalenjin leaders (HRW Jan 2008). Such partiality by the police officers should be highly condemned as they are part of key players in mitigating conflicts.

Most respondents also stated that, at times, the police did not utilize the full range of “crowd control tools” such as teargas, batons and rubber bullets prior to firing live ammunition and that in numerous occurrences also did not issue clear warning to the protestors and the masses before shooting with live ammunition. One youth, (O.I, 32, Kapsaos, 2022) who was a victim of a stray bullet had this to say;

“The police shot randomly at unarmed people and those passing by that were neither engaging in demonstration nor any violence. That’s how I got shot. I was lucky it was more of a scratch”.

Such statements were confirmed by numerous hospital records which attested to bullet injuries going through the backs of bodies as captured in CIPEV, 2008 report. Such actions by the police make Kenyans decrease their faith in their service to act in a professional, neutral and timely manner. In addition, such reality only motivates vigilantes to take the law into their own hands.

Despite the findings, majority of the informants agreed that the security forces were very helpful during inter-conflicts in the area. Majority highlighted the 2007/08PEV where they moved the victims out of unfriendly rural areas when they received intelligence of Kalenjin warriors plans to attack. In collaboration with the DC’s office they helped victims by taking them to IDP camps initially established at the ASK Showground in Eldoret town (FGD 3, 2022, O.I, 29, Kamagut, 2022, CIPEV 2008:54).

However, as stated by a number of respondents the security officers’ efforts were not very effective. The absence of joint efforts by the government agencies to arrest and charge the alleged inciters and funders of violence in the study area, particularly the 2007/8 PEV, brought about a huge challenge to peace building (FGD 2, 2022, O.I, 47,

Kiplombe, 2022). Many respondents narrated how some perpetrators were arrested only for them to re-appear without being subjected to trial. Such actions not only made the public lose confidence in security organs but also encouraged impunity. The study advocates for a complete overhaul of police basic principles that apply in the policing of demonstrations. They need to balance the need to maintain order against the rights of citizens.

4.5. Conclusion.

The chapter explored how with the resumption of competitive politics in the early 1990s, the political elite have used diversity in multi-ethnicity to balkanize the study area and plunge it into violence in the 1992/1997 and 2007 electioneering periods. This emphasizes the main thrust of the theoretical basis of the study which illustrates that the elite ethnic mobilization for power frequently culminates into conflicts. Ethnic based political patronage and mobilization created the ‘outsiders’ versus ‘indigenous’ narratives whereby the Kalenjin in the sub-county have perceived everybody else "an outsider" and themselves the "indigenous". The failure by the Agikuyu, Luo, Abagusii, Abaluhya and other communities in the area to back President Daniel Moi in the 1992 general elections was understood by the Kalenjin as an ‘insult of generosity’ of the ‘host’ Kalenjin and contributed to retaliation against the “outsiders”. They were assumed to having sympathized with the rising opposition parties since opposition bigwigs came from their ethnic groups. Once elections were over, some returned to their homes, businesses and farms only to be forcefully ejected again in the 1997 elections in very comparable circumstances. Similarly, in 2007/08, attacks were made on the settler communities deemed as non-indigenous and their property destroyed or looted. The ODM campaign

ideology of Majimbo provided the so called indigenes of the study area a good ideological armory against the non-Kalenjin. Sadly, as revealed by the FGDs, the assailants in those conflicts went scot-free and acts of impunity continued to permeate in the area. Such impunity cascaded right down to the village level, whereby criminals were set free from the custody of the police by the political elite who sought popularity and re-election. The chapter observed that not much has changed since the 1990s and asserts that the political elite play an important role in arousing violent conflict using inflammatory statements and influencing ethnic animosities while chasing their selfish political interests.

Finally, the chapter examined various intervention measures employed in trying to stem ethnic clashes from recurring in the study area. Although it has not analyzed all the reforms undertaken in the study area, the cases examined demonstrate that a lot needs to be done. Moreover, some of the challenges that have sabotaged the efforts to inclusivity has been outlined by the chapter and subsequent proposals on ways to overcome them made. The next and last chapter is the summary of main findings, conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for further study.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

5.1 Introduction.

The study analyzed Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Turbo sub-county in the period 1895-2010. The dynamics of inter-ethnic relations was tied to the theoretical framework of conflict theory which was also linked to the research's objectives. The final chapter, therefore, summarizes the main findings, derived conclusions, and highlighted areas in which further study is recommended.

5.2 Summary of the Main Findings

Chapter two addressed the first objective of the study, namely, to discuss the evolution of the multi-ethnic community in Turbo sub-county between 1895-1962. The research findings revealed that Turbo area is a multi-ethnic community that emerged during the colonial period. The demands of the colonial economy as well as the need for new land plus the pressure from reserves and employment necessitated mobility of African ethnic groups which in turn resulted to the settlement and formation of the multi-ethnic residence in the study area. Further findings reveal that there were no serious ethnic animosity during the colonial period and no conflicts were witnessed during the same period.

The third chapter explored issues derived from the second objective, that is, how politicized ethnicity led to inter-ethnic tensions between 1963-1990. The research findings revealed that Kenya became independent yet independence overshadowed ethnic polarization given the conflict about constitution where KADU advocated for

Majimboism and KANU central government. Moreover, the Kalenjin wanted protection of land they deemed theirs after the exodus of the whites. Jomo Kenyatta as president encouraged immigration of non-Kalenjin into Turbo area making the Kalenjin unhappy. The animosity between ethnic groups in the study area was a product of politicization of ethnicity through personalization of power especially in relation to the presidential office and perceptions of historical marginalization and the balkanization of the residents into rigid ethnic enclaves. The politicization of ethnicity by the Kalenjin elite intensified when Daniel Moi became president as they saw the non-Kalenjin as threats. The findings also revealed that local and national events are interpreted in ethnic terms. The study argues that there is an amplified perceived benefits right from the grassroots level that come along with political power as well as the misconception that the ascendance of an ethnic kingpin to being the president is equivalent to the ascendance of one's entire ethnic group to such a position. This has made ethnicity to become an essential site of identification and conflict. Through such ethnic identification the competition for control in the state and distribution of resources happens. The ethnic conflicts are therefore targeted at destroying any ethnic group that is deemed to obstruct the path to achieving this goal. This, therefore explains the intense political and artificial ethnic rivalry and tension mostly witnessed in different electioneering years.

Chapter four addressed the study's third objective which sought to examine the heightened inter-ethnic conflicts of 1992/93, 1997 and 2007/8 and analyze the intervention measures adopted by various stakeholders to mitigate these conflicts in the study area between 1991-2010. The study revealed that the ethnic tension of the 1990s erupted into conflicts during electioneering period in 1992, 1997 and 2007. These

conflicts took the form of indigenous verses immigrants and further took the form of intimidation, eviction, looting and burning of houses especially of the non-Kalenjin. The immediate causes are political rather than ethnic. Moreover, the misconception of majimboism both at the top leadership and at the grassroots level provokes conflicts. Much of the fighting is attributed to the Kalenjin provocation. The non-Kalenjin are targeted because the Kalenjin view the area as their own and thus want to have political and economic hegemony. Consequently, the relations between the Kalenjin and the other communities is that of suspicion. Particularly, there is perceived tension between the Agikuyu and the Kalenjin who feel that they were shortchanged during Kenyatta's government whereas other communities are blamed for being Agikuyu sympathizers. The study reveals that impunity is too serious that it cascades right down to the village level, where assailants of the conflicts are set free from police custody by politicians.

The study also revealed that numerous attempts by the government and other stakeholders to slay the dragon of ethnicity in Turbo sub-county have only been partially successful. Most of the responses were found to be reactive only for a short period instead of the prospected proactive long term. Moreover, the study found out that a lack of meaningful engagement of youths curtailed the success of efforts put in place to promote peace at the household level. The study thus advocates for youth inclusion in peace building processes in agreement with the UN Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security 2010 which highlighted stories of successful peer peace-building initiatives in Rwanda through Rwanda Youth Forum and Congo through Congo Youth Peace and Justice. Through the groups, peers made remarkable contributions to promoting peace and security (www.un.youthenvoy.2010).

Furthermore, the study also identified faults in the government's top down approach to peace building. It appropriates peace building as a practice of everyday life and argues for a bottom-up approach and integration of traditional and modern conflicts management strategies in order to do away with cosmetic peace in the study area given that most inter-ethnic conflicts are based on historical facts that are resurrected in the modern times.

5.3 Conclusion of the Study.

The study investigated Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Turbo sub-county between 1895-2010. Study findings reveal that the demands by the British colonial economy led to a formation of a harmonious multi-ethnic community in the study area. Land alienation by the Europeans and labor provisions by Africans to them were key contributors to the settlement. However, critical hindrances in the area prevent advancement of social cohesion. As the analysis reveals, politicization of ethnicity especially during electioneering period has resulted to inter-ethnic clashes.

On the basis of the findings, the researcher established that identity on the basis of ethnic background has prominently been used as a major foundation for political mobilization and as a means of acquiring power and control of the state. Ethnicization of the territory in the area has also been expressed by the Kalenjin in form of advocacy for majimbo federalism and claims of autochthony. Divisive political narratives have thus soured inter-ethnic relations in Turbo sub-county.

On the other hand, study findings reveal that efforts to mitigate conflicts based on ethnic differences since 1991 have been inadequate. Firstly, the Kenyan government, especially in the 1990s only did the bare minimum in resolving the conflicts. Moreover, reports show that the government itself took part in triggering some of the conflicts. In addition,

the study highlighted various gaps limiting successful conflict resolution. Among these include; inadequate attention to the grievances raised by the conflicting ethnic groups, and the failure to hold perpetrators accountable to their actions. As a result, there is establishment and prevalence of an impunitive culture. Furthermore, there lacks collaboration among relevant stakeholders meant to facilitate peaceful co-existence.

Overall, the study utilized the conflict theory in the interpretation of its data. The study has endeavored to answer the question as to how ethnicity has been politicized and exploited by the political elites for their self-serving interests as well as how it has impacted negatively on inter-ethnic relations in Turbo sub-county. The study advances the argument that truly, Kenya's problem is not the ethnic affiliation *per se*, but the linking of ethnicity with political power. The study maintains that the suspicions, mistrust and hatred we have against each other by virtue of our differences real or perceived are largely baseless and unjustified. At its core, we are all ethnic beings, but ethnicity is not meant to disintegrate us but integrate us by complementing each other.

In agreement with Dahrendorf's theoretical strand, the study concludes that the society cannot achieve ultimate peace. This however should not deter citizens from striving inch by inch in big and small ways towards peaceful co-existence. The study further urges Kenyans to emancipate themselves from the fanatic mental slavery of being manipulated and used as puppets by the narrow minded politicians who thrive on negative ethnicity, intimidation, incitement and political conmanship. A thorough cleaned-up Kenya is needed urgently where leadership is acquired and retained through integrity, progressive ideological clarity and commitment to the public good.

5.4 Recommendations.

In the light of the above findings the study recommends the following in order to enhance cordial inter-ethnic relations in the study area and the country at large; -

To overcome ‘political capture’ by the religious community the study advocates for re-registration and strict regulation of religious community so as to hold it accountable to the citizens.

The study also recommends that the elderhood institution be resourced and be granted the particular authority to manage ethnic conflicts everywhere in Kenya so that peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence is achieved.

Finally, to deal with historical or perceived historical injustices and mend inter-ethnic distrust and suspicion the study calls for establishment of a well-structured and people-centred Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) free from politicization to contribute to permanent justice, reconciliation and conflict resolution in the country.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Research.

There is need to carry out a detailed study on how the social media as the new battlefield of inter-ethnic hatred can be tamed to avoid its future eruption to violent physical conflict.

REFERENCES.

PRIMARY SOURCES.

Oral Informants

Name	Age	Location	Date of interview
Oral Information 01	60	Huruma	12/2/2022
Oral Information 02	53	Kapsaos	30/1/2022
Oral Information 03	61	Kamagut	20/3/2022
Oral Information 04	47	Tapsagoi	17/3/2022
Oral Information 05	61	Tapsagoi	17/3/2022
Oral Information 06	81	Kapsaos	16/1/2022
Oral Information 07	60	Ngenyilel	22/3/2022
Oral Information 08	77	Kapsaos	19/2/2022
Oral Information 09	68	Tapsagoi	12/2/2022
Oral Information 10	68	Ngenyilel	12/2/2022
Oral Information 11	26	Kapsaos	30/3/2022
Oral Information 12	86	Huruma	8/1/2022
Oral Information 13	49	Huruma	30/1/2022
Oral Information 14	34	Kiplombe	23/3/2022
Oral Information 15	79	Kahoya	3/1/2022
Oral Information 16	83	Kiplombe	16/1/2022
Oral Information 17	47	Kiplombe	23/3/2022
Oral Information 18	53	Kapsaos	20/2/2022
Oral Information 19	82	Huruma	16/1/2022

Oral Information 20	71	Kapsaos	12/2/2022
Oral Information 21	42	Tapsagoi	17/3/2022
Oral Information 22	63	Kiplombe	16/1/2022
Oral Information 23	65	Kapsaos	16/1/2022
Oral Information 24	39	Huruma	25/3/2022
Oral Information 25	30	Kapsaos	29/3/2022
Oral Information 26	51	Kiplombe	23/3/2022
Oral Information 27	93	Kapsaos	8/1/2022
Oral Information 28	80	Kamagut	19/2/2022
Oral Information 29	57	Kamagut	21/3/2022
Oral Information 30	29	Kapsaos	21/3/2022
Oral Information 31	65	Kapsaos	12/2/2022
Oral Information 32	32	Kapsaos	25/3/2022
Oral Information 33	57	Ngenyilel	22/3/2022
Oral Information 34	70	Kiplombe	12/2/2022
Oral Information 35	77	Kamagut	16/1/2022
Oral Information 36	33	Huruma	27/3/2022
Oral Information 37	77	Huruma	6/2/2022
Oral Information 38	49	Tapsagoi	24/3/2022
Oral Information 39	62	Ngenyilel	19/3/2022
Oral Information 40	29	Kiplombe	23/3/2022
Oral Information 41	51	Tapsagoi	30/1/2022
Oral Information 42	43	Kapsaos	30/1/2022

Oral Information 43	68	Kapsaos	13/2/2022
Oral Information 44	56	Kapsaos	21/3/2022
Oral Information 45	36	Kamagut	29/3/2022
Oral Information 46	71	Kamagut	23/2/2022
Oral Information 47	34	Kiplombe	26/3/2022
Oral Information 48	28	Tapsagoi	24/3/2022
Oral Information 49	67	Kamagut	12/2/2022
Oral Information 50	44	Kamagut	20/3/2022

Archival Sources.

KNA /DC/UG/2/1 Uasin Gishu District Political Record File, 1909-1933.

KNA/ DC/UG/1/2 Uasin Gishu District Annual Report 1953.

KNA/PC /RVP 2/2/1 Uasin Gishu District Annual Reports 1913-1914.

K.NA/ DC/KBT/1/8/39, Kikuyu Land Application. 1962.

KNA/DC/NDI/5/3, Notes on Resident Labour Problems.

KNA/DC/KAPT/1/1/94, Interpenetration and Infiltration in Native Land Units.

KNA/DC/NDI/3/2, Nandi Political Record Book: Return of squatter stock from Uasin
Gishu 1912.

KNA/DC/NDI/5/2.Return of Nandi Squatters.

KNA/DC/NDI/5/2 - The Resident Labour problem October 1944.

KNA/ DC/NDI/5/2 - Sale of Resident Labourers cattle.

KNA/ C0533/549/4, Colony and Protectorate: A discussion of the problem of the squatter.

KNA/ PC/NZA/4/14/9)-Settlement Schemes: Land Development and Settlement Board Papers, 1962.

KNA/PC/RV/2/8//10, UasinGishu Annual Report, 1936.

KNA/PC/RVP 2/8/13, UasinGishu District Annual Report, 1938.

KNA /PC/RVP2/8/19 - UasinGishu District Annual Report 1944.

KNA/PC/CP/9/8/15: Central Province Annual Report 1930.

KNA/ PC/RVP 2/3/1 Annual Report, 1942 p. 3.

KNA/PC/RVP 2/3/1 Annual Report, 1946, p.3.

KNA/PC/RVP 6A/25/3, Rules Approved by the District Council, UasinGishu, 1934.

KNA/PC/RVP 6A/25/3, A note on the squatter problem by V.M. Fisher, Principal Inspector of Labour, 1932.

KNA/ Lab 5/35 - Resident labour problem. From labour officer Eldoret to Hon. Labour Commissioner Nairobi 25th Feb, 1949.

KNA/ DC/VG/1/2 – Uasin Gishu District Annual Report 1949.

KNA/UG/2 Political Record File, 1927-30: European Settlement.

KNA /Roets, Stoffel Undated interview transcript, 920 Bow, pp. 2-3.

KNA/Annual Report, 1957, Internal Tribal Affairs.

KNA/Nandi District Annual Report, 1921.

Government official reports and other reports.

Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: East Africa Protectorate Economic Commission Evidence, 1917, p. 2-3.

Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: East Africa Royal Commission, 1953,165.

Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: Report of the Native Labour Commission,1913, 192-193.

DAO.(1996). UasinGishu District Annual Report. Eldoret, Kenya: District Agricultural Office.

Government of Kenya. (2013). The Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission(TJRC). Volume II B Kenya: Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission.

Government of Kenya. (1992). Report of the Parliamentary Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and other Parts of Kenya. The Kiliku Report. Nairobi: Government Printer.

Government of Kenya. (2002). Report on the Commission of Inquiry into Land Law System. Nairobi: Government Printer.

Government of Kenya. (2010). Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence(CIPEV). The Waki Commission. Nairobi: Government Printer.

Government of Kenya. (1999). Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya. Akiwumi Report. Nairobi: Government Printer.

Human Rights Watch. (2008). "Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance." 20, 1(A). New York and Washington.

International Crisis Group. (2008) 'Kenya in Crisis.' Crisis Group Africa Report No. 137.

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2019). Population census, Kenya Literature Bureau Nairobi. Government Press.

Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights (2015): Public inquiry in the Baringo and the North Rift of Kenya. Literature Review.

National Council of Churches Kenya: Clashes Update Issue No.43, Aug. 31, 1995

Republic of Kenya.(1980).Eldoret Physical Development Plan, 1980 - 1985. Ministry of Lands and Settlement. Nairobi (Unpublished Report).

Swynnerton, R.J.M. (1954). A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, Nairobi: Government Printer.

SECONDARY SOURCES.

Manuscript.

Darel, G.(Not dated). The Social Study of Uasin Gishu District. Kenyatta University Post-Modern Library.

Books.

Abraham, M. (1982). *Modern Sociological Theory*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Adedeji, A. (Ed). (1999). *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*. London: Zed Books.

- Ajulu, R. (1995). *The Transition to Multi-partyism in Kenya: The December 1992 Presidential, Parliamentary and Municipal Elections*. Leeds: Centre for Democratisation Studies, Leeds University.
- Anderson, D. (2002). *Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, Kenya 1890—1963*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Anderson, D.(2010). ‘Majimboism: The troubled history of an idea’, in Daniel Branch, Nic Cheeseman, and Leigh Gardner (eds.), *Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya since 1950*, Lit Verlag, Berlin, pp. 23-52.
- Andreassen, B. (2003). *Ethnicity, Rationality and Uncertainty. Reconstructing Political Orders in Multi-ethnic Polities: The Case of Kenya*. Oslo: Department of Political Science.
- Asingo, P. (2008). “Privatization of Water Services in Kenyan Local Authorities: Governance and Policy Issues”. In Mwabu, G & Thomas, K.(Eds.), *Decentralization and Devolution in Kenya: New Approaches*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press.
- Babbie, E. (2014). *The Basics of Social Research*. Wadsworth Centage Learning: Canada.
- Banac, I. (1992). Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia". in *American Historical Review* (New York).
- Barth, F. (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Bayart, J, (1993). *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London: Longman.

- Boone, C. (2014). *Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brett, E.A. (1973). *Colonialism and underdevelopment in East Africa: The politics of economic change 1919-1939*. London: Heinemann.
- Bruce, B. (1998). *Ethnicity, Patronage and The African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism*.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*. 4th.ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carter J, Irani G, & Volkan V. (2009). "Ethno political Conflict in Perspective," in Carter J, Irani G, & Volkan V. (eds.). *Regional and Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives from the Front Lines*. New Jersey: Pearson.
- Christie, K. (1998). "Introduction: The problem with ethnicity and tribal politics." in Christie, K. (ed.), *Ethnic conflict, tribal politics: A global perspective*. London: Curzon Press. Great Britain.
- Clayton A. & Savage D.C. (1974). *Government and Labour in Kenya 1895-1963*, Francass, London.
- Cooper, F. (2002). *Africa Since 1940*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Ehret, C. (1971). *Southern Nilotic History*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Ehret, C. (1968). "Cushites, and the Highland and Plain Nilotes," in B.A. Ogot and J.A. Kieran (eds.) *ZAMANI: A Survey of East African History*. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.

- Elsbeth H. & Arnold C. (1980). *Pioneers Scrapbook: Reminiscences of Kenya 1890 to 1968*. Evans Brothers Limited, London.
- Eriksen, T. (1993). *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Fishman, J.A. (1977). "Languages and Ethnicity" in ed. Giles, H. *Language Ethnicity and integration Relations*. London: Academic Press Inc.
- Frost, R., (1997). *Race Against Time*. London: Rax Collings Ltd.
- Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilisation*. Oaks, California: Sage publications.
- Gitau, S. (2001). "Land-Buying Companies for Urban Housing in Eldoret, Kenya", in Arne et al (eds). *Associational Life In African Cities: Popular Responses to the Urban Crisis*. Sweden: Nordiski Afrika institutent.
- Howard, A & Astri, S. (1999). *The Path of Genocide. Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflicts*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Huntingford, G. (1950). *Nandi Work and Culture*. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office for the Colonial Office.
- Ihonvbere, O. J. (2002). "The State and Ethnicity in Africa," in Udogu, E. (Ed.), *The Issue of Political Ethnicity in Africa*. England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- Kanogo, T. (1987). *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905-63*. Heinemann Kenya Ltd.

- Khamisi, J. (2018). *Kenya: Looters and Grabbers. 54 years of corruption and plunder by the Elite 1963-2017*. USA: Texas, Jodey Book Publishers.
- Kimenyi, M. S. (1997). *Ethnic Diversity, Liberty and the State*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Kivuva, J. (2012). The Political Dynamics of Regional Disparities and Marginalization in Kenya, in F.E. Stiftung, *Regional Disparities and Marginalization in Kenya*. Nairobi Elite Pre Press Limited.
- Lederach, P. (1997). *Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Leo, C. (1975). *Land and Class in Kenya: The Political Economy of World Poverty*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- Leys, C. (1975). *Under-development in Kenya: The Political Economy of Colonialism*. London: Heinemann.
- Lynch, G. (2011). *I Say to You: Ethnic politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McCabe, T. (2004). *Cattle Bring Us to Our Enemies: Turkana ecology, politics, and raiding in a disequilibrium system*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Mamdani, M. (1996). *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of Late Colonialism*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
- Marris, P & Somerst A. (1971). *African Businessmen*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House: Nairobi.

- Matson, A. T. (1972). *Nandi Resistance to British Rule 1890-1906*. Nairobi: EAPH.
- Matson, A. T. (1993). *Nandi Resistance to British Rule*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge. African Studies Centre
- Maxon, R. M. (1990). *An Economic History of Kenya*. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd.
- Maxon, R. M. (2011). *Kenya's Independence Constitution: Constitution-Making and End of Empire*. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press: Plymouth.
- Mazrui, A. (1969). *Violence and Thought*. London: Longman.
- Nasong'o, S.W. & Murunga, G.P. Ed. (2007). *Kenya: The struggle for Democracy*. London: Zed Books Ltd.
- Oboler, R. (1985). *Women, Power and Economic Change: The Nandi of Kenya*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Ochieng' W. R. (1975). *An Outline History of the Rift Valley of Kenya Upto AD 1900*. Nairobi: Kenya East Africa Literature Bureau.
- Ochieng', W & Maxon, R. (1992). *An Economic History of Kenya*. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.
- Ochieng', W. (1995). "Structural and Political Changes" in B.A Ogot & Ochieng(eds). *Decolonization in Independence in Kenya, 1940-1993*. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.
- Odongo, G. (2004). *Role of Women in Peace-building in Kenya. Focusing on 1992 Rift Valley Land clashes*.

- Onimode, B. (1985). *An Introduction to Marxist Political Economy*. London: Zed Books Limited.
- Rohwerder, B. (2015). *Conflict analysis of Kenya*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Soja, E. M. (1968). *The Geography of Modernization in Kenya*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Sorrenson, M. (1968). *The origin of European settlement in Kenya*. Nairobi: Oxford University Press.
- Stavenhagen, R. (1996). *Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State*. London: Macmillan Press Limited.
- Stitcher, S. (1982). *Migrant Labour in Kenya, Capitalism and the African Response, 1895 - 1975*. Longmans, London.
- Sutton, J. E. G. (1986). "The Kalenjin: country and people". In B.A. Ogot (ed) *Kenya Before 1900*. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.
- Sutton, J. G. (1968). "The Settlement of East Africa" in B.A. Ogot & J. A. Kieran (eds.) *ZAMANI: A Survey of East African History*. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.
- Thomson, J. (1968). *Through Maasai Land*. 3rd. ed. London: Frank Cass and Co.
- Throup, D. (1987). Construction and Deconstruction of the Kenyatta State, in Michael Sachtzberg (ed). *The Political Economy of Kenya*. 57-73. New York: Preager.

- Throup, D & C Hornsby. (1998). *Multiparty Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Trzebinski, (1985). *The Kenya Pioneers*. London: Heinemann.
- Van den Berghe, P. (1981). *The Ethnic Phenomenon*. New York: Elsevier Press.
- Van Zwanenberg, R. (1972). *The Agricultural History of Kenya*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
- Van Zwanenberg, R. (1975). *Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 1919-1939*. Nairobi: EALB.
- Wamwere, K. (2008). *Towards genocide in Kenya: The curse of negative ethnicity*. Nairobi: Mvule Africa Publishers.
- Were, G. (1967). *Western Kenya Historical Texts: Abaluyia, Teso, and Elgon Kalenjin*. Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau.
- Were, G. (1968). "The Western Bantu Peoples from A.D.1300 TO 1800" in B. A. Ogot & J. A. Kieran (eds.) *ZAMANI: A Survey of East African History*. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.
- Were, G. S. & Wilson, D.A. (1968). *East Africa Through A Thousand Years. A History of The Years AD 1000 to the Present Day*. Nairobi: Evans Brother.
- Widner, J. (1994). 'Political Reforms in Anglophone and Francophone African Countries'. In J Widner (ed). *Economic Change and Political Liberalism in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Wolf J. (1977). *Differentiation and Integration in Western Kenya*. The Hague: Morton and Co. Bv.

Wrong, M. (2009). *It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle Blower*. New York: Harper Collins.

Theses.

Groen, G. (1974). *Afrikaners in Kenya 1903-1969*. PhD Dissertation, Michigan state University.

Kakai, P. (2000). *History of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Bungoma, Mt. Elgon and Trans-Nzoia Districts 1875-1997*. PhD Thesis, Nairobi: Kenyatta University.

Korir, K. (1976). *The Tea Plantation Economy in Kericho District and related Phenomena to Circa*. A B.A. Dissertation, Department of History, University of Nairobi.

Shaiye, A. M. (2013). *Factors influencing conflict between communities: The case study of Orma and Pokomo communities in the Tana Delta of Tana River County, Kenya*. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

Wekesa, P. (2000). *Politics and Nationalism in Colonial Kenya: The Case of Babukusu of Bungoma District C.1894-1963*. M.A. Thesis, Nairobi: Kenyatta University.

Articles in Journals.

Allen, C. (1991). *Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa*. *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.26, No 81, Violence and Conflict Resolution in Africa pp 367-384.

"*Kenya Cleansed*," BBC Focus on Africa, Vol. 4, No. 3, July-September 1993, p. 17-18).

- Berman, B. (1998). 'Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The politics of uncivil nationalism'. *African Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 388, (pp. 305-341).
- Colier, G. A. (1994). The New Politics of Exclusion: *Antecedents to The Rebellion in Mexico*, Vol.19, No.1, pp 1-17.
- De Waal A. (1996). Contemporary Warfare in Africa: Changing context, changing strategies *IDS Bulletin* 27 (3) 8-17.
- Goodhand, J. (2003). Enduring disorder and persistent poverty: A review of the linkages between ward and chronic poverty. *World Development*, 31(3): 629 – 646.
- Gurr, R. (1994). "Peoples against States: Ethno political Conflict and the Changing World System" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol 38, Issue 3, 347-377.
- Ihonvbere, J. (1994). "Beyond Warlords and Clans: The African Crisis and the Somali Situation", in *International Third World Studies Journal and Review*, Vol. 6
- Jenkins, S. (2012). 'Ethnicity, Violence and the Immigrant-Guest Metaphor in Kenya', *African Affairs* (445):576-596.
- Klopp, J. (2001). Ethnic land clashes and winning elections: The case of Kenya's electoral despotism. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 35, no. 3: 473-517.
- Klopp, J. (2002). Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya. *African Studies*, 61 (2):269-294.
- Kristen, A. (2016). The Ethnic Army and the State. Explaining Coup Traps and the difficulties of Democratization in Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.60, No.4 pp 587-616.

- Munene, G. M. (1992). "Historical Perspective on Ethnic Relations in Kenya" In Wajibu, *A journal of Social and Religious Concern*, VOL.7 N0.3, P 4.
- Mworia, L. & Ndiku, J. (2012). Inter-ethnic conflict in Kenya: a case of Tharaka-Tigania conflict, causes, effects and intervention Strategies, *Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development*, Vol. 2(7) pp. 162-170.
- Newsbury, C. (2005). African Studies Association: *Suffering and Survival in Central Africa*, Vol.48,No.3 pp 121-132.
- Olayode, K. (2016). Beyond Intractability: Ethnic Identity and Political Conflicts in Africa. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 6(6), pp. 242-248.
- Savage, D & Munro, F. (1962). "Carrier Corps Recruitment in the British East Africa Protectorate." *The Journal African History*, Vol 7, No. 2, 1962, p. 315-324.
- Suberu, R.T. (1993). "The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria" in *Journal of Democracy* (Washington: John Hopkins University Press).
- Weber, L. (1998). A Conceptual Framework for understanding Race, Class, Gender and Sexuality, *Psychology of Women*, Vol 22, pp 22-23.
- Youe, P. C. (1998). "Settler Capital and the Assault on the Squatter Peasantry in the Kenya's Uasin Gishu District, 1942-1963", *Journal of African Affairs*, Volume 87, No.348, (pp.393-418). Oxford University Press.

Seminar Papers.

Aseka, E. (1994). 'Implications of Democracy in A Multi-Ethnic Society', (Paper presented at a Conference in a Nairobi Hotel).

Kakai, P.W. (1997). "The Northern Luyia Anti-Colonial Resistance: The Lumboka-Chetambe War." (Drafted paper).

Kipkorir, B.E. (1970/71). "The Kalenjin Phenomenon and Misri Legends", Seminar Paper No. XII, Department of History, University of Nairobi.

McOnyango, O. (1995). "The Jews, The Gentiles and The Grudge". UNESCO seminar paper, 28 - 31, May.

Manundu, M. (1994). 'Resource Ownership and use in Multi-Ethnic Society: The Case of Kenya'. (Presented at a Conference in a Nairobi Hotel).

Mozaffar (2007). The politicization of ethnic cleavages: Theoretical lessons with empirical data from Africa. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2007 workshop on —politicizing socio-cultural structures: Elite and mass perspectives on cleavages, Helsinki, Finland, 7-13 May.

Newspapers.

Daily Nation, 25th August, 1996: 1-2

Daily Nation "When the Shepherds led the Flocks Away", 15th February 2008.

Daily Nation: Andae, G., and Bii, B. (2012, January 9). Three herders killed in revenge mission.

B. Namunane and K. Ongosia. 'Annan Arrives today for mediation," Daily Nation. January 15 2008. p. 46.

East African Standard, 11 July 1908.

Times Team, 'Vote Banana. Civil Servants ordered', Kenya Times 17 November 2005, p. 3.

Nation team, "*Kibor released on 200,000Sh bond.*," Daily Nation, February 29, 2008.

KNA, East African Standard (August, 9, 1961).

Kareithi,A.(2011,18th September).*How Kenya Almost became the promised land for Jews.*

Murungi, K. (2012, 28th October). *The claims of betrayal that killed coalition.* Sunday Daily Nation, p. 28.

Mutua, M. (2017, May 21). *Dear Akamba, Kenya's destiny is in your hands, don't break it.* The Standard,p,15.

Standard "*33 arrested in Eldoret revenge mission*", The Saturday Standard, 9 February 2008, p. 4

Weekly review, "Honest Broker"7,19th June 1992.

Weekly Review "Oh, Not Again!"5,30th January 1998.

Weekly Review "Fresh Outbreak of Violence",16,17th April 1992.

Weekly Review June, 29, 1993.

Weekly Review October 7, 1994:4. Divide and Rule: State -sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya

Electronic Sources.

International Criminal Court, (ICC), 2011, 'In the case of the prosecutor v. William

Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua arap Sang: Document

Containing the Charges', Available at

<http://www.creatakenya.org/uploads/Ocampo-DCC-RutoKosgey-Sang.pdf>

[Accessed 7 July 2022].

Pascale Harter, "Assignment," BBC World Service, January 31, 2008.

Shah, A. (2009). Conflicts in Africa, Introduction, content available at

<http://www.globalissues.org/article/84/conflicts-in-africa-introduction>, accessed

on 10th Jan, 2022.

UN, Youth Peace and Security Envoy, 2010.www.un.youthenvoy.org.

APPENDICES

Appendix A1: Consent Form Informed Consent.

My name is Emmanuel Mbogo Were a Master of Arts student at Kenyatta University. I am conducting a study titled Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Turbo Sub-county, Uasin Gishu County 1895-2010. The information will be used to gather information on inter-ethnic conflict that would consequently help the two levels of government, religious groups, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders to formulate and implement policies that will enhance peaceful coexistence not only in Turbo Sub County but the country as a whole.

Procedures to be followed

Participation in this study requires that I obtain information through a questionnaire, focused group discussion (FGD) and interview guide.

Voluntarism

You have the right to refuse to take part in this study since it is voluntarily. You are free to ask questions related to the study at any time and may also refuse to respond to any questions. You are also free to end an interview at any time. You may also stop being in the study at any time without any implication. The study poses no risks to the participants.

Confidentiality

The information you give will be confidential and privacy will be safeguarded. The collection of data and presentation of results will not display your names or any other characteristic that would make them identifiable.

Contact Information

If you have any questions about the study kindly contact the researcher Were Mbogo

Participant's statement

In order to show that you have fully understood the nature of this study and that you willingly agree to participate in it, kindly sign in the space provided below.

Signature

Date

Investigators statement

I, the undersigned, have explained to the volunteer in a language s/he understands the procedure to be followed in the study and the risks and benefits involved.

Name of interviewer

Signature

Date

Appendix A2: A Sample Questionnaire/Interview Schedule

This study investigates Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Turbo sub-county. You are hereby requested to take part in the study by providing answers to the questions below. The provided information will only be used for research purpose and will be held with extreme confidentiality. Kindly give honest answers. Please answer all questions.

Do I have your consent? []

A. Background information

Name-

Sex-

Age -

Resident ward-

Duration of residence-

Date-

B. Information on formation of Multi-Ethnic community

1. Kindly, give a brief history of your ethnic community in terms of their settlement in Turbo sub-county.
2. Did you settle in this area as an individual, family, clan or as an entire ethnic group?
3. Which other ethnic groups live here? Have they lived here for a long time and how have they interacted? Explain.

C. Politicized ethnicity and conflict

4. In your view what is politicization of ethnicity and where did it originate from?
5. Please explain how politicization of ethnicity could have contributed to worsening of inter-ethnic relations in Turbo sub-county.
6. (a). As a member of an ethnic group in Kenya, do you believe the office of the president is important to your community? Yes or No?
 - b. If No, why?
 - c. If Yes, what do you stand to gain when a member from your community becomes the president?

7. There seems to be interplay between ethnic conflicts and politics. What role has politics played on ethnic conflicts in this area since independence?

D. Heightened inter-ethnic conflicts and intervention measures

8. Did inter-ethnic conflicts in 1992/93, 1997/98 and 2007/08 affect you individually? If yes, how?

9. What peace building initiatives were made by the state and non-state actors in the periods mentioned above to promote cordial inter-ethnic relations in Turbo Sub County? Assess their efforts: - were they successful?

10. What do you think are your roles and responsibilities in preventing violence and promoting inter-ethnic cohesion?

11. What suggestions do you propose to enhance a perpetual cordial inter-ethnic relations in Turbo Sub County?

Thank you for participating.

End.

Appendix A3 : Focused Group Discussion Guide for Elders, Women and Religious Leaders.

1. Comment on how the different ethnic groups came to live together in this area?
2. Discuss how the ethnic groups have been relating with each other?
3. In case of change in the interethnic relations, what has been the nature and causes of such changes?
4. What is your understanding of politicization of ethnicity and how has it interfered with inter-ethnic cohesion in this area?
5. Is there any way you or your co-ethnics benefit when your own becomes the president?
6. There have been inter-ethnic conflicts in Turbo Sub County in the period 1992/93, 1997/98 and 2007/08. Did you experience them and what have been their causes? Explain.
7. Who are the main actors of the inter-ethnic conflicts in the sub county and why?
8. What role do you play during inter-ethnic conflicts in your capacity?
9. (a) Have there been any attempts to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts in this area in the past? Yes or no?
(b) If “Yes” in (a) above, what were the attempts made?
(c) Why do you think the inter- conflicts still erupts even after attempts to resolve them?
10. Briefly discuss the effects of inter-ethnic conflicts in this region.
10. What do you think should be done by the following to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts once and for all? Explain.
 - i) Community leaders-
 - ii) Religious organizations-
 - iii) Local administrators-
 - iv) Arms of government-
 - vi) Politicians-
 - vi) Women-
 - vii) Youth-
 - Other group(s) specify-

Thank you for participating.

End.

Appendix A4: NACOSTI

