

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF AKRASIA IN
KENYA'S EDUCATIONAL POLICY.

BY

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A

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
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CERTIFICATE

This thesis is my original work
and has not been presented for
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PREFACE

As a teacher in secondary school I found that students rarely behaved as required. Even after the teacher endeavours to teach to the best of his/her ability, the students sometimes do not do what is expected of them. When given some homework, they come back to class without having completed their homework. Sometimes they do not even attempt the homework. They do not also feel contrition for their inconsistent behaviour.

Students were found not eager to come to school early enough. They were sluggish in responding to bells even when going for lunch or supper. Yet, we expect them to respond quickly to the bells when it means lunch or supper. This is even when we know that they are slow to respond to class bells. This is because of the belief that at least if they do not value class work they may make for it by eating. However, it seemed not to be the case. They were slow in their response to all bells. These were not the only inconsistencies in the behaviour of the students. Our endeavour to give students an

education which we think is for their good, seems not to be appreciated by students. Yet, we assume that they know the utilitarian value of education. This itself is a challenge to any teacher who goes to teach with high hopes of getting good results in all his/her teaching endeavours. Utility itself as an end of education seems to be inadequate a motivation for the desired behaviours in students.

Any teacher counts himself a failure if his/her pupils pretend that they have got the knowledge of the subject of study but when evaluated they fail. The teacher usually feels exasperated to the point of walking out from the teaching profession. Many Maths teachers for example, almost give up their endeavour to demystify Mathematics - a subject which is not liked by students because they feel it is an abstract subject and hard. Bertrand Russell in his A Free Man's Worship and Other Essays (1976) says that many students never enter beyond the corridors of Mathematics temples. The reasons of which needs to be articulated.

Nobody will doubt that when a problem presents itself, then the best thing is to try to find a possible solution to the problem. Thus, the seemingly awkward behaviour of the students needs an answer. For example, what was missing that they behaved the way they did? This is itself a difficult question. Many people, no doubt, especially in the teaching profession face the same problem. An inconsistent behaviour of the students.

This thesis is therefore, important in trying to find the answer to the sometimes faltering human behaviour. At one time a person acts diligently. At other times he acts in such a way that defeats any reason. Such behaviour motivated this study. We therefore make a contribution to the clarity of what happens when a person acts as expected and at other times he acts differently. Why is man both theoretical and practical but not practical enough as he is expected to be? This question finds an answer in this thesis.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents,
Mr. Isaac Njoroge and Mrs. Emily Njeri
who believed that education was the
ladder to success and therefore
endeavoured to educate me through
thick and thin so that, I may live
a better life.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost I wish to thank my two supervisors, Dr. H. Olela and Mr. J.N. Mburu whose skilled midwifery, incisive criticism, and patient encouragement were a constant source of inspiration. The supervisors have eruditely allowed me to write a thesis of my own when they could, obviously, have not only written their own far better works on my topic, but also could have written my version for me to its infinite amelioration. I have greatly valued their tolerance and their encouragement.

I am also indebted to Professor D.N. Sifuna, the Chairman of the Educational Foundations Department for facilitating my registration in the department and for supporting my decision to study philosophy. Thanks are also due to Professor R.J. Njoroge who at the time of my course work was a busy man as the Dean of Faculty of Education, but yet found time to introduce me to the study of being as being. My gratitude is also due to Dr. S.N. Bogonko who kindly gave me a recommendation to forward to my sponsors. As the Chairman of the Post-graduate Studies Committee in the Department

of Educational Foundations he also found time to keep track of my progress in the thesis.

To Drs. G.A. Bennaars, P.K. Wainaina (presently Chairman, Educational Foundations Department - Moi University) and M. Waiyaki, I express my thanks for shaping my philosophical and research rigour. Mr. S.K. Rutto also gave me much needed encouragement especially when I informed him of my intention to study philosophy. Mention must also be made of other academic staff and supporting staff of the Department of Educational Foundations for the good social climate they provided.

I must also register my appreciation to Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) who were my sponsors. If it were not for their philanthropic gesture, this work would have been impossible. To them, I say keep up the good work.

Thanks also goes to members of my family who gave me moral support. Mention must be made especially of Mr. M.D. Gatiba my elder brother who endeavoured to put sense into me about the value of hard work since I was a primary school student. He never tired, for in the course of

working on this thesis he kept on reminding me that hope and determination are two things that must be there in any human endeavour. In a class by itself is the debt I owe my wife, Lilian Wanjiku whose constant encouragement and interest raised me from a near abyss of total despair and gave me motivation to continue with the thesis to its optimal conclusion. My two children, Douglas Njoroge and Caroline Njeri missed a total fatherly attention which was their due. To them, I say life is not smooth running and many obstacles have to be overcome before the actualization of any endeavour.

- Finally, I wish to thank Ms. Margaret Wambui for typing the thesis in a good manner which many have come to take for granted. To her, I say keep up the good work.

A NOTE ON FOOTNOTING

Where works by Plato and Aristotle have been cited, it is the paragraph numbers that are used and not the page numbers of the respective works.

A NOTE ON NAMES OF PEOPLE

The names: Kamau, Onyango, Mrs. Achieng, Mr. Achieng, Mungai, Maina and Njoki are used only for illustration.

ABSTRACT

In Chapter one, a general framework of the thesis is given. This includes the statement of the problem, a theoretical framework where assumptions to be studied are stated, the purpose and significance of the study, the methodology to be used and a brief organization of the study.

In Chapter two, I present the Competitivist understanding of akrasia. This understanding in following the advice of Hegel is taken as the thesis. The Competitivists understand akrasia as basically knowledge. This is reflected in their delineation of man as always in conflict. The conflict usually results from the opposition of the inclinations or appetites and emotions to the rule of reason which should always lead man to rational and good actions. This conflict is permeated to the behaviour of man. What he judges, the knowledge he has, the decisions he makes, he eventually does not act on them. All that he has as a good for himself remains theoretical. It remains intellectual. Man is thus theoretical. It is from this that akrasia for the Competitivists

is taken to mean knowledge or intellect.

Four illustrative philosophers of this understanding of akrasia are considered: Plato, gives the conflict between reason, appetites and emotions which are the three principles in the soul of man. Aristotle gives two levels of knowledge from which a man may be said to have knowledge and yet act against such knowledge. He shows that a person may not act as per the knowledge that he has because of the opposition to reason by the appetites. Immanuel Kant gives the opposition between duty and the inclinations. Man has no goodwill and thus does not act from the call of duty. This is because of the inclinations which are hindrances to his endeavours. Finally, John Wilson gives the components of a morally educated man, a man who should always act in a morally praiseworthy way. However, people are usually not known to be the ideal morally educated man as given. They usually do not act as they should. This is because of counter-attractive desires which avert the good decisions to act morally.

In Chapter three, I present the Precisionist understanding of akrasia. Since their position is in opposition to that of the Competitivists, then their understanding still in following the advice of Hegel is taken as the antithesis. The Precisionists understand akrasia as action. This is reflected in their delineation of man as always action oriented. Man loves to do good for himself and his society. He shuns what is detrimental to his welfare and that of his fellows. He feels pain when he sees others suffering. Thus, he averts their pain by the sympathy he gives them and the pity that he shows. Man, therefore acts on knowledge, judgements, decisions and more so on principles and norms as enacted for him by his society. He is therefore, all action. Thus, from this delineation, Precisionists are interpreted to understand akrasia as action.

Four illustrative philosophers of this understanding of akrasia are considered: Socrates, argues that no man with knowledge will act as against knowledge. Thus, no man will willingly engage in evil. Essentially, man will act in conformity with what he knows is for the good

of himself. This is because man loves what is good and therefore pleasant and hates evil which is painful. F.H. Bradley says that, man strives after self-realization. Self-realization is acting in a way that promotes the good of oneself and the society. In the society, one finds what is beneficial to him. Man is felt to act in such a way that he does not alienate himself from his station and his duties. He strives after good actions for his is the only way that he realizes the self. J.J. Rousseau argues that, man is naturally good. It is therefore not in human nature to do that which is evil. He acts in ways that are in consonance with his nature. While he loves himself, he also feels pity for others and therefore liaises with them to avert evil in the world. Finally, R.M. Hare argues that moral language is prescriptive and thus action guiding. This means that no man can sincerely assent to a principle or a command and not act on it. The judgement and principles that are therefore enacted for man by his society is always for his own good, then it means that, man always acts in conformity with what is for his own good. Man means action.

In Chapter four, the most significant chapter, I give a synthesis of the two understandings of akrasia as delineated in chapter two and three. Still in the Hegelian attitude, we have in labelling the philosophers as Competitivists and Precisionists shown that, they understand akrasia on the polarities. For this, their understanding of akrasia was referred to, as the thesis and the antithesis. Hegel had found out that, the truth of a proposition can be found out only by a synthesis of the thesis and the antithesis. A thesis is a proposition which one starts with. However, this proves to be inadequate an argument. The thesis therefore generates its opposite which is the antithesis. This also proves inadequate. These opposites are taken up into a synthesis. The synthesis preserves what is rational in them but cancels what is irrational. By following this advice of Hegel, we have found the truth or the proper understanding of akrasia to be 'the will'. The will is the rational criteria that avoids the conflict of the two understandings of akrasia as given by the Competitivists and the Precisionists.

In Chapter five which makes the educational component of this thesis, I examine the significance of the will (as the proper definition of akrasia) in Kenya's educational policy. An analysis of the educational policy is first given through documentary study of Ominde, Gachathi and Mackay Education Reports. It is found out that while the policy acknowledges the role that the will plays in human endeavours, it understands the will as action and not as both knowledge and action. The educational policy is thus weak since it emphasizes only practice and thus ignores theory which is also important. The policy is therefore found to be based on an incomplete and improper philosophical foundation. To inbuild what is lacking in the policy, it is recommended that theory and practice should be the essence of education.

In Chapter six which is the concluding chapter, the salient findings of the thesis are given. More so, recommendations on how to ingrain the will as both knowledge and action in our education, especially in the curriculum, educational planning, educational administration, teaching methods, discipline and in our teaching of virtue through character education are given.

CHAPTER ONE

1.00: INTRODUCTION

1.10: Prologue

The edifice of a good character, it is important to note, is the translation into action of whatever moral decision that one makes. Though it may sound trite to observe that decision making is one of the most recurrent human activities, decisions lay the foundation for whatever action is taken. It is characteristic of human beings to hold beliefs about how they ought to live; what they should do and should not do, what kind of people they ought or ought not to be¹. But what strikes a person as paradoxical is the infirmity or the fallibility of human judgement. People do not seem to be capable of highly consistent judgement though they hold certain principles as good directors of their behaviours.

¹P.H. Hirst, Moral Education in a Secular Society.
(London: University of London Press Ltd.,
1974), p. 9.

What does it mean to have an awareness and then consequently this awareness reduces to nullity in terms of application?. This non-translation of awareness into action is what is referred to as an infirmity of human character. Man is capable of doing wrong even when he has the ability to do right. This weakness is usually referred to in Greek as the akrasia. This classical term is translated as incontinence or weakness of the will. The term akrasia is derived from the Aristotelian distinction between the akrates, the morally weak man, and the enkrates, the man who is capable of resisting temptation². Akrasia is thus taken to denote a lack of, or deficiency in, a certain kind of kratos, for example, strength or power. The power in question is the ability to control oneself. This has traditionally been conceived as the power to act as one judges or to resist the temptation to act otherwise. One can however speak of the power to believe as one judges best.

Akrasia is exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or 'actional' sphere. But, the most challenging case is where the akratic agent performs

²A. Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy. (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1979), P. 4.

an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgement of what is the best thing to do. An incontinent action manifests the agent's weakness of will. Weakness of will is having too little of the propensity which consists of sticking to tasks; that is, in not being deterred or diverted³. While the will is a disposition to act in a certain way⁴, weakness of the will can be said to be a dissolution of the disposition to act in a certain way. Further, weakness of the will can be viewed as the dissolution of the person's will into nullity. This is prompted by the fact that even after an awareness of what is right through the power of the will, the person goes ahead to do what is contrary to the held principles.

The abilities to live up to the desired principles are mostly noticeable by their absence. This is so especially in day to day decision making. We do not live up to what we hold to be good. To know what is best is necessary but not sufficient. This is because ideas in themselves are not enough. To know the good is not the same as doing the good.

³G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963), P. 71.

⁴R.J. Njoroge, "The Volitional Element in Character Training", A Staff Seminar Paper at Kenyatta University College, April, 1982.

Ovid and St. Paul have emphasized this fact⁵.

St. Paul was actually not speaking for himself when he said in his letter to the Romans.

"I don't do the good I want
to do. Instead I do the evil
I do not want to do".⁶

We appear unable to live up to our principles. What is said by St. Paul is a common thing. Observations of and conversations with our friends in their good moments reveal that we are in the same predicament. Normally, a friend will tell you that 'I should have opted for this course of action, but it is unfortunate that I didn't'. This shows that man shows contrition and remorse for doing what was not his better judgement.

It is clear that it is within the ability of the agent to do the chosen act but the agent does not do it. Indeed, this is an inconsistency that disorients people's endeavour to translate judgements into action. However, it is important to note that judgements in decisive cases present themselves where

⁵R.W. Livingstone, The Rainbowbridge and other Essays in Education. (London: Paulmull Press, 1959), P. 172.

⁶St. Paul, "Letter to the Romans" in Good News Bible: Todays English Version. (New York: United Bible Societies, 1966), Chap. 7, v. 19. 1966, Chap. 7, v.

alternatives exist. Man thus lives in conflict. This is so, whenever he has to make decisions. Indeed, the history of man is the history of his triumphs and his failures. This does not depend only on his cognitive achievements but also on the choices that he makes. Any choice carries with it an effect. The choice brings about an inherent reward or a punishment according to whether the effect is good or bad⁷. In view of this, it can be observed that in the choices that man makes resides the foundation of the good and the bad that man has to come to terms with as he goes around in his everyday work.

1.20: Statement of the Problem

If asked what is the essence of education today, anyone judging by informed public opinion would say that it is self-employment especially in the informal sector. This would ultimately lead to strength, industry and development of our Nation. All these however, would be very important issues and rightfully they are of great concern. But, there is a problem though never highlighted, which is

⁷S. Arieti, The Will to be Human. (New York: Quadrangle Books Inc., 1972), P. 32.

expressed under the cover of other issues. It is generally consented to, though I maintain that it is not put openly that, the strength, the industry and the civilization of a Nation depend on the individual human character. Yet, despite its transcendent importance it is never given its due weight. The question is, how does it happen?

It is subsumed in the Socratic view of man in our Kenyan educational policy, that man will translate into action whatever he judges to be right. Man is viewed in this policy as action-oriented. In this view, the consequent remedy for all our troubles lies in education. That, when a person is equipped with all the necessary skills that he is capable of acquiring, then there is no doubt that he will create good neighbourly relationships and consequently fulfil his duties responsibly. This way he will build the Nation that is desired⁸. As a matter of lip-service, it is believed that knowledge so gained will be translated into action. It is sad to state that, this may not happen and in certain cases does not.

⁸Government of Kenya, Social Education and Ethics Syllabus. (Nairobi: Kenya Institute of Education, 1985), P. 1.

It is my contention that such a view as above emphasizes man as action-oriented. This view overlooks the fact that man may not translate knowledge (so given) into action. This means that knowledge is not automatically actualized once an education has been given. There seems to be a misunderstanding of akrasia and its role in human nature. It would be important to ask ourselves what contributed to the failure of great civilizations such as the Egyptian and the Graeco-Roman. Nations have been observed to falter in their development. Definitely, it is not lack of science, technology, but it is due to defects of human character. It would be hypocritical to talk about growth of Nations, actualization of inherent potentialities in a Nation's people unless we are prepared to face the basic facts upon which the growth of a Nation would depend. Perhaps, it would be plausible to say that the growth of a Nation should begin with acknowledgement of man's inability to actualize perfection.

Our acknowledgement of the importance of basic skills and the inculcation of new attitudes towards manual labour as important for self-sustainment and consequent result enhancing economic growth perhaps should be interpreted to mean that, there should be a new focus on character. This would have a foundation

on the clarity of what akrasia is all about. Having been clear on what akrasia means, our educational policy will be based on firm philosophical theory. For, example, not just viewing man as action-oriented. Man can also fail to actualize what he knows. As much as action is very important, man should have the will to know how to act as well as the will to act. As much as we would like people to act, there seems to lack the emphasis on the will to know how to act. What is emphasized is the will to act. Such an emphasis ignores this important fact (the will to know how to act) as a determinant of what actions a man will engage in.

One way of looking at things as they are today is to say that people seem not to live up to their personal and national standards. In Kenya, we live in an era of great fear and anxiety. For the majority, the fear and anxiety is that personal standards, individual treatment of others and other intercommunal relationships are degenerating at such a rate, that they leave people wondering what really has gone wrong. It is not thus uncommon to hear the old praising the past traditional era when man knew how to behave, and knew how to treat others well.

I would however point out that there is more to it than people knowing how to behave and knowing how to treat others well. What is expected of people is to behave properly and acknowledge others in the community. It means developing the will to know what to do and the will to do those things that the society values. It can be summed up as, to live up to the expectations of the society in general. Unfortunately we find that this does not always obtain.

Sometimes we say that a person knew or had knowledge yet he never actualized this knowledge. What lacks in such an assumption is an awareness of the relationship between knowledge and action. With true understanding of a situation, this knowledge should facilitate some movement towards actualization of such knowledge into action. Thus, true knowledge should in essence not be separated from action. Whereas we may say that a person had knowledge and never acted, it then shows a kind of deficiency in the kind of knowledge such a person had. This happens when in our education we emphasize action. We do not realize that knowledge and action must form a whole.

In essence they should form the will. Our education lacks this. It emphasizes action in most cases without proper understanding of what the action entails. Therefore, by observing how people behave we may conclude that there lacks the knowledge of how to

behave, more so, the will to know what to do is not developed. If it were there, then the people would actualize such knowledge.

On the inconsistency between knowledge and action, philosophers have different views. In other words, they give different versions of what akrasia entails. Socrates would argue that 'to know the good is to do the good'⁹. R.M. Hare on his part says, that we cannot sincerely assent to a command addressed to ourselves, and at the same time not perform it¹⁰. John Wilson however, says that it is both logically and empirically possible for a person to make a sincere and genuine decision and not carry it out even though he could do so¹¹. The best way out of this conflict in understanding the nature of akrasia is a clarification. This will be the problem of this thesis.

⁹Plato, Protagoras. Trans. by W.K.C. Guthrie (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1956), 358 B-D.

¹⁰R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), P. 20.

¹¹J. Wilson, The Assessment of Morality, (Windsor: NFER Publishing Co. Ltd., 1973), P. 63.

1.30: Theoretical Framework

The contention of this thesis is that the 'gappiness', to borrow the words of Neil Cooper¹², between judgement and action is a normal human feature. In the light of this, the thesis will examine the premises that: Akrasia is an inescapable feature of man's struggle as pertains to his moral life.

For anyone who has the opportunity to persevere and observe human behaviour, it becomes clear that, people often act contrary to what they assert as right or wrong for themselves. It is intriguing to imagine why one does what is contrary to what he predicates to be good for himself. Man is tempted to depart from his moral principles. Making a moral choice and the one that tallies with what is a good option is part of what makes a human being realize his potentialities. The potentiality, for example, that he can stick to decisions without deviations. But how often does this happen? The probable conditions which may make a man discount the very principles that guide his actions could be:

¹²N. Cooper, "Oughts and Wants", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Suppl. Vol. XLII, 1968, Pp. 143-154.

First, a man who usually does not stick to his original decision as concerns cases where he needs to make decisions is not authentic. By being not authentic I mean that he lacks a quality of sticking to what he judges to be good. An authentic person lacks the seriousness that would make him realize his potentialities. The authentic man heeds the voice of his conscience. The non-authentic does not heed the voice of his conscience. Such a man after doing what is contrary to his principles says to himself:

'Yes, if I were asked to do that again, I would act differently'. He is again asked and the same thing happens; and again he acts just as he did previously - to his great astonishment¹³.

Such is the person who lacks authenticity. Sartre says that authenticity has to be earned by an individual. In his words:

I shall be my own authenticity only if, under the influence of conscience, I launch out towards death, with resolution and decisions, as towards my own particular possibility¹⁴.

¹³A. Schopenhauer, Perergera and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays. Trans. by E.F.J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 232.

¹⁴J.P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness. (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1958), p. 246.

The non-authentic rarely have a self-belief in what they could do. They do not believe themselves. They do not stick to decisions because of self-doubt. They do not stick to judgements. This is because they do not persevere even in the light of difficulties .

Second, the man who discounts his principles lacks attention. He is easily distracted by other things. He lacks a concentration of the task of hand. If he is easily distracted then he lacks self-control. William James noted a relationship between attention and self-control. He thus contended that the attentional processes are the mainstay of self-control. He asserts:

Attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies. The essential achievement of will ... is to attend to a difficult object ...¹⁵ .

Those who are inattentive distract their will from proper judgement and consequent commitment to action. That is, from engaging in the action that is consonant with the judgement.

¹⁵W. James, The Principles of Psychology. R.M. Hutchins (ed.) (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), P. 814.

Third, man though conceived of as rational is sometimes in the face of difficulties to opt for the easy course of action. If he finds that the principle that he has enacted for himself is a difficult one to live up to, he is bound to choose the easier course of action. He opts to choose the easier course of action even with its inherent evil rather than the hard course of action though perhaps with greater good.

Fourth, the functionality of alternatives presenting themselves to the agent could also be a factor contributing to the discounting of principles. If, for example, the agent's principle is 'I will never steal' and in the course of duty money comes to his possession by virtue of his employment or duty, he may start thinking in terms of what the money could do for him. How the money could be used to achieve what he has desired in this world. The more he becomes convinced that he could become better than he is at present in terms of status, the more he may deviate from his principle. He eventually may choose to steal the money with the consequential effects that stealing the money entails. In such a case, the agent chooses the evil instead of the good.

The above delineates to some extent the nature of man. That, while at times he overcomes the temptation or resists successively, at other times he finds himself succumbing slowly¹⁶. In the post-action we feel remorseful for our wrong actions, yet we in another situation continue to do the same thing that we abhor. The translation into action of our judgements therefore remains at the theoretical level. In essence, our knowledge is never translated into action.

The second premise that will be examined is that: Akrasia has a role to play in the problems that consistently haunt the educational enterprise. The aim of education is to transform people into better individuals. John Ruskin observes that, education does not mean teaching people to know what they do not know, rather it means teaching people to behave as they do not behave¹⁷. In this, it is aimed that the education will change the way people think and act. This is done with the assumption that people will appreciate the multifarious reasons

¹⁶N. Cooper, op. cit.

¹⁷The contentions are cited in R.W. Livingstone, op. cit., P. 151, from John Ruskin.

advanced in the course of the education enterprise. It is hoped that good reasons will obtain as the supreme influence of men's beliefs and behaviour. Albeit this good intention of education, it is unfortunate that education deals with behaviour in an indirect way. Educators are left in a dilemma of unsureness that the learner's reasons will transcend the theoretical sphere and desired good reasons will be translated into action or practice.

William Kay observes that it is not enough to know the good. One must be committed to it. That is:

... for education for any kind to be more than a system of instruction, one must make a total response with the whole personality. It must entail comprehension and commitment. If either is omitted, the process becomes an enervated caricature¹⁸.

In other words, our education must give the understanding which should motivate the learners to act. When an education just emphasizes behaviour that is observable without caring so much for the comprehension that the learners have as

¹⁸W. Kay, Moral Education. (London: George Allen an Unwin Ltd., 1975), P. 137.

pertains to the behaviour that they ought to display, such education defeats its purpose. Such an education essentially reduces itself to what Kay would hate to see. This is unfortunately what happens in our education. Due to non-comprehension by the students of what they ought to do, they thus show total lack of commitment in many areas. While in any political system, one of the desired goals is the good of the children in their future life, children seem to rarely engage whole heartedly into their education with any anticipation of a future in their minds. To make the children put theory into practice is the problem that make educators and parents live in constant anxiety. The problem of the educator is two fold: To encourage learners to act presently in accordance with good reasons and in the future in accordance with good reasons that he is learning now¹⁹.

¹⁹R. Straughan, I ought to but (Oxford: The NFER - Nelson Publishing Co. Ltd., 1982), P. 156.

1.40: Purpose and Significance of the Study

It is my contention that there is a conflicting philosophical dualism in the understanding of akrasia. The dualism is between philosophers whom I have decided to call the Competitivists and the Precisionists. These two positions will however be clarified later. The Competitivists define and explain akrasia in terms of the individual person. The Greeks²⁰ explain akrasia as the conflict between reason, appetites and emotions as three principles in the Soul of Man. For any harmony, reason should control the appetites and the emotions. When however, it is overcome by the appetites, then the judgements that a person makes are never actualized. Man is presented as a person who is always in conflict within himself. There is competition in him. Whichever of the three elements in his Soul wins, the subsequent action will tell. Whereas reason should be the driving force behind an individual's action, this does not always obtain. Man falters in the judgements that he makes. This is in this case explained and defined in terms of competition.

²⁰For example, Plato expresses this view in the Republic. His understanding is examined in my chapter two under the competitive perspective.

The Precisionists however explain and define akrasia in terms of conformity. Human beings always comply with whatever judgements that they make. Essentially, a person in a society will follow the norms and other dictates of the society. One feels the obligation to always act in such a way as not to antagonize others. In other words, no one will, for example, assent to a principle and not act on such principle. Hume asserts:

We are always included, from our natural philanthropy, to give preference to the happiness of society and consequently to virtue above its opposite²¹.

We essentially prefer to do what is for the good of the society and consequently for ourselves and not what is detrimental to the society. The good for self as a member of society and the desire to uplift the society's harmonious existence becomes the motivating factor behind men's actions. Human beings are pictured as lovers of virtue. They follow principles that are enacted or which they enact for themselves. Man is action-oriented. His judgements, knowledge must end up translated

²¹D. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (Eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), P. 227.

into action.

There is therefore, a conflict of what akrasia is, as per the Competitivists and the Precisionists. Anyone following such views as expressed would ultimately ask where the truth lies. It is at this juncture that this study comes in. There is a need for truth in what akrasia means. The study is thus aimed at the clarity of akrasia in the light of these two positions. Once the conflict between the positions is removed I as a philosopher of education, would be able to see the application of akrasia in Kenya's educational policy. Left as it is without clarity, akrasia may signal some failure in any educational endeavour. This is so, especially if educational policies are based on either of the conflicting positions. We may set up an educational policy with the assumption that reason will always obtain or will drive the individual towards that which is desired. It may not happen. On the other hand, we may set up an educational policy with the idea that man is action oriented. That is, there is total conformity in terms of action of whatever we give in education. Such assumptions need a thorough understanding. The assumptions may be based on a wrong or no theory. Assumptions are for example made

in our educational policy. The 8-4-4 Report says, in part, that it is the:

Duty of education is to help young people acquire ... sense of nationhood by promoting positive attitudes of mutual respect which will enable them to live in harmony and to make a positive contribution to society²².

This is an assumption that falls in the Precisionist understanding of akrasia. This is because it assumes that once students are given academic education, they will have gained attitudes that will make them live in harmony. In other words, the education is translated into action. Such an assumption seems not to acknowledge the possible non-translation of the education into action.

Philosophers of education are helpful in the clarity of such assumptions as have been made above. Louis Arnaud Reid puts this succinctly:

One of the most important things which philosophy of education has to do is to dig up and bring out into the light for critical examination

²²Kenya Educational Supplement, Mwalimu, Vol. 2, No. 6-7, Jan/Feb., 1985. P. 9.

the assumptions (some of which are concealed or at least taken for granted) which are made about education²³.

We would be doing our job as philosophers of education, if we were to clarify akrasia and then look at its place in our educational policy. Without clarity of akrasia, the researcher holds that any effort towards realization of what is thought desirable for the subjects of any Nation is bound to fail. As philosophers of education, we must take cognizance of the akrasia and consider what we can offer in an endeavour to clarify it within the education enterprise.

Though the problem of akrasia troubled the Greeks since the times of Socrates and Aristotle and a lot has been done in an attempt to come to terms with it, it is the researcher's contention that, akrasia and its place in education has not been looked into. Understanding the nuance of akrasia will also add to the researcher's philosophical *insight* and clarity of this phenomenon.

²³L.A. Reid, Philosophy and Education: An Introduction. (London: Heinmann Educational Books Ltd., 1962), P. 18.

1.50: Methodology

In the appraisal of akrasia, I will adopt an integrated approach which combines the contemporary methods of the philosophy of education, namely, critical and implicaitons approaches. However, the study will be basically located within the analytic approach.

Analytic approach is primarily concerned with logical analysis of language and concept. Philosophers seek to analyze concepts, statements and languages used in different contents. This aids in clarification and justification of meanings²⁴. Basically, the role of anlaysis is therapeutic. It clears the mind by revelation of the sources of conceptual perplexity²⁵. Of necessity, ambiguities and confusions are removed.

²⁴R.J. Njoroge and G.A. Bennaars, Philosophy and Education in Africa. (Nairobi: Transafrika Press, 1986), P. 25.

²⁵G. Kneller, Introduction to Philosophy of Education (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1964) P. 99.

Analysis in this study will lead to a proper definition of akrasia. This aims at making akrasia well understood. The nature of our analysis will be the seeking of criterias or the elements that constitute akrasia.

1.60: Organization of the Study

In my endeavour to come to terms with akrasia, the analysis is examined under the following outlines.

Chapter two looks at akrasia in the light of the Competitivists. Their understanding of akrasia therefore falls under what I call the Competitive perspective. The competitive nature of man is emphasized in the understanding of akrasia by philosophers in this perspective. In this perspective, four philosophers are considered. They are, Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, and John Wilson. The attention to these philosophers is not directed upon the great influence of this or that philosopher. This attention is upon an examination of the arguments which they adduce in support of their understanding or ideas which are interpreted to mean that such philosophers fall in

the competitive perspective. Thus, each of the philosophers has certain contributions to make towards the understanding of akrasia.

In chapter three, akrasia is examined in the light of the definitions put forward by the Precisionists. Their understanding of akrasia therefore falls under what I call the Precisionist perspective. The conformist nature of man is emphasized in the understanding of akrasia by philosophers in this perspective. In this perspective, actions by people are such that they are usually consonant with the judgements that they make. In this perspective, four philosophers are considered. They are, Socrates, F.H. Bradley, J.J. Rousseau and R.M. Hare. We here look at the arguments they adduce in support of their definitions of akrasia which are interpreted to mean that such philosophers fall in the Precisionist perspective. Each of the philosophers makes a contribution towards the understanding of akrasia.

Having been clear on what akrasia means to the Competitivists and the Precisionists, chapter four makes a synthesis of these conflicting understandings of akrasia. In this chapter, we endeavour to bridge the conflict. Hegel had found

out that, the truth can be found out only by a synthesis of thesis and the antithesis. A thesis is a proposition that one starts with. However, this proves to be inadequate an argument. The thesis therefore generates its opposite which is the antithesis. This also proves inadequate. These opposites are taken up into a synthesis. The synthesis preserves what is rational in them but cancels what is non-rational. By borrowing this Hegelian method, then we try to find the truth about akrasia.

Like in a dialogue where one person will ordinarily start with certain opinions or presuppositions and another person may offer counterbalancing points of view concerning the same topic of discussion or dialogue, so are the different understandings of akrasia viewed. An agreement however, must finally be reached on certain points which leads to a new formulation or a compromising statement that both persons agrees upon. The Competitivist's understanding of akrasia is taken as the thesis. The Precisionist's understanding is taken as the antithesis. Chapter four is their synthesis. The will is given as the new definition of akrasia.

In Chapter five, the significance of this new definition of akrasia or the will in Kenya's educational policy is looked into. Recommendations for action are thereafter given. The conclusion of the thesis is found in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER TWO

2.00: THE COMPETITIVE PERSPECTIVE

As highlighted in Chapter One, philosophers have different and varied understandings of akrasia. They thus differ in the degree of emphasis they place upon the possible conflict between the judgement that a person makes and subsequent action. In this chapter, we will concern ourselves with akrasia as understood by the Competitivists. As according to Hegel's dialectic which is adopted by this thesis, the Competitivist's understanding of akrasia is taken as the thesis. The thesis is only one part of the triad which consists of the thesis, the antithesis and the synthesis.

I will now look at who the Competitivist philosophers are and what the Competitive perspective is all about. We start by looking at the verb compete. Compete derives from the Latin word competere which means to seek a common thing or in the intransitive context-to coincide. When we say that Kamau and Onyango are competing

in a race, we mean that they aim at the same end. In other words, they are contesting to determine the winner. Winning is the desired end with its accompanying benefits. When people compete, the result depends on one's skill, knowledge or strength. In a race, the combination of skill, energy and strength contributes to how fast a person is. All in all, to contest or to compete means that there is a desired end which motivates such a contest. Usually the end is winning.

The adjective 'Competitive' from which derives what we have called Competitivists connotes the idea of equality. By saying that A and B are equal, we may mean that A and B are the same in size, amount, number, degree or value. However, in the context that we have analyzed the word compete, then equality, may be said to mean that in a Competition - or in the instance of contest at which skill, strength or knowledge is tested, the contenders or contestants have the same chance of winning. No-one is advantaged or disadvantaged over another in the competition set up. The advantage or dis-advantage is within the competitor not from without. When we talk of a competitive race for example, we mean that the contestants have equal opportunity of

wining the race. Winning the race will however depend on one's ability. This is the skill one has for running and the strength that one has for endurance in a competitive situation. Whoever wins, will have displayed the ability to emerge the winner in a difficult situation.

Competitivists are therefore those philosophers who understand akrasia in terms of contest or competition. This contest occurs in a person. Man is potrayed as a being who has appetites, emotions and reasons which are elements that contest for supremacy. This contest determines the outcomes of our judgements, decisions and actions. Reason is supposed to influence our actions. If it realizes over the appetites and the emotions, then this culminates in rational actions. However, if the appetites and the emotions overcomes reason, then we act as against our judgements, knowledge and decisions. While reason is concerned about the good of the person, the appetites are not. Due to these different aims of reason and the appetites, there is a conflict. Each of these elements desires to emerge the winner and its end realized.

The result of the contest manifests itself when a person makes acts on a judgement.

If reason is behind such judgements, a person will

act in such a way that the resultant action is consonant with the judgement. If the appetites are behind such judgements, that is, they have overcome reason, then a person acts contrary to the judgements and knowledge. The conflict between the appetites, reason and the emotions is elucidated by Plato in the Republic where he calls them three principles in a man's soul. Kant in his General Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals emphasizes the contest between the inclinations and duty. Due to this constant contest in man, it means that there exists a gap between what a man knows and the subsequent action that he manifests. This gap is manifested in many instances by behaviour that is portrayed by persons. Such a gap is a normal thing for the human beings. This view is expressed by Neil Cooper who gives the thesis of the Competitivists in these words:

Between principles and practices; Ideal and fulfilment, there will in any normal morality be a gap- this gappiness is an essential feature of the moral life and is made in the tension which may exist prior to action, between principle and desire ... It is the necessary feature of any rational morality that it should leave room for moral weakness¹.

¹The contentions are quoted in Roger Straughan, "From Moral Judgement to Moral Action" in Morality in the Making. H.W. Haste (ed.) (Chicester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1983), P. 129.

The above quotation shows that according to the Competitivists a normal human being should leave room for inconsistencies between knowledge, judgement and action. Man is not ideal. He does not always do what he judges as good. This is however due to the influences of the appetites and the emotions which counteract the endeavour of reason to emerge the winner in their contest. In the delineation of the contest in man, man is portrayed as an area of conflict. He is a battleground.

So, the competitive perspective is the view of man's actions as always a manifestation of the outcome of a conflict or contest within himself. The competitive perspective consists of various interpretations. However, as we have just shown, the central characteristic of this perspective is that an agent is understood as always in conflict. There is always a gap between his judgements, knowledge and his actions. He is normally in conflict with moral requirements. Man thus means non-translation of what is good into action. He is theoretical in many instances. That is, what he knows or judges usually remains at the intellectual level. It is not practised. In other words, the

Competitivists emphasize judgement or knowledge as they remain in theory. This is because for man, what he does at times is not consonant with what he knows or judges to be good. But, he does that which cannot be praised, since it is not the result of the original good judgement but the result of a judgement due to appetites and emotions. It does not result from reason. Virtue is thus a highly theoretical inclination of the human being. The Competitivist thesis will be much clearer when we look at the understanding of akrasia in the context given by the following illustrative philosophers. Namely, Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant and John Wilson.

2.10: Plato: Reason, Appetite and Emotion as
Conflicting Principles in the Soul

The three principles as are found in the Soul rests on Plato's contrast of the world of Forms with the world of perceivable things. According to Plato, it is the Soul and not the body which attains the knowledge of Forms and

which is the concern of ethics². Plato is one of the main sources of the dualist conception of man. According to this conception, the Soul is a non-material entity. It can exist apart from the body and is indestructible. People who possess wisdom, courage and say temperance are considered to be dominantly spiritual. The Soul controls their emotions and general behaviour. Those who are dominantly controlled by the passions of the body lack the above virtues as possessed by the spiritual. The Soul plays a significant role in determining man's actions.

The doctrine of the three principles in the Soul is found in Plato's Republic³. In the division the Soul into three, Plato wanted to show how the soul contributes to every kind of action that a man performs. In the division he compares it with the division as found in the state. Man is affected in the same manner like the State. The three

²L. Stevenson, Seven Theories of Human Nature. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 26.

³Plato, The Republic. Trans. by B. Jowett (New York: Random House, (Undated)). The division of the Soul is mostly found in Chapter Four.

principles manifest three kinds of desires⁴ as they correspond to the three principles in a state. First, there is the appetitive principle. It is entirely good independent, non-rational, uninfluenced by beliefs about goods. Second, there is the emotional principle. It is partly good dependent and influenced by beliefs about some kinds of goods. Third, there is the rational principle which is entirely good dependent. It is rational and is influenced by beliefs about the overall good of the person.

These principles are not distinguished by explicit description but by examples of desires belonging to the respective principles in the Soul. Plato tries to answer the question about the commission of actions-whether they emanate from the principles in the Soul or the whole Soul. This, he finds to be a difficult question. However, he finds a way out the difficulty by offering examples to show the respective principles in the Soul.

⁴I. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), P. 192.

The principle of non-contradiction of two things is used by Plato. A given thing A cannot stand to a second thing B in both of two opposite relationships at the same time⁵. If the Soul is conceptualized as a unitary, the existence of conflicts offends against this principle of contradiction. There would eventually lack a source of conflicts. This paradox is resolved by Plato when he lays down a conflict in which the appetite is opposed by something else which proceeds from reasoning but which is to an extent independent of reasoning. This conflict is manifested in a case where a man is thirsty but unwilling to drink. Perhaps a man with diabetes, for example, whose diet allows him no alcohol may be thirsty and wants to drink alcohol. He may however be restrained from drinking by the knowledge that drinking alcohol would be detrimental to his health. Since the same thing cannot act or be acted on in opposite ways at the same time in relation to the same object⁶, it then follows that there are two

⁵I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrine.
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), P.96.

⁶Plato, Op. Cit., 436.

principles. These are the rational principle with which a man reasons and the appetitive principle with which he loves, hungers, thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire⁷. The rational principle advises man. From this principle we derive reasons for our actions. Reason is the power to understand and form opinions about a situation. Reason as is found in the rational principle urges a man to do what is for his good. It influences his doing of what is right, what is practicable or what from common sense is a sensible thing to be done by a man. However, it does not compel man to refrain from certain actions that he might engage in. The rational principle is essentially responsible for our prudent acts. It reasons about the good of the whole person. It reasons about the good of the body, the Soul and its principles. The appetitive principle on the other hand proceeds from passion and the diseases. The appetites encompass physical desire especially for food, the strong longing for sex, drink etc. Thus, by the appetitive principle we are able to gratify our organic desires. It is responsible for our biological drives for food, sex, drink and others. The appetitive principle

⁷Ibid., 439.

is not concerned about the good of the person. It is after gratification of the organic desires and does not care about how such gratification is met. The means to gratification could be detrimental to the person but that is not the concern of the appetitive principle. We thus find in the Soul, a prudential master and an organic master. This leads Plato to the conclusion that the two makes two principles existing in the Soul.

Plato next shows a conflict in which all or part of resistance to the appetites is mounted not because of the care for the overall good of a person. The resistance is mounted by an emotional attitude such as aversion for corpse-gazing. If one gives in to the primitive urges for example, to gaze at a corpse, the emotional attitudes turns into anger. This is because a person is then relegating himself to what is not his true nature. Leontius⁸, the Son of Aglaion makes this clear. His anger at his desire for corpse-gazing is not just an appetitive aversion. He thinks his desire is bad. He thus condemns himself for it. By such

⁸Ibid., 439-440.

condemnation of himself, he shows a principle by which we act so as to uphold our own self-dignity.

The emotional principle cares for our good.

It is therefore not to be confused with the appetitive principle. This care for some good of man means that the emotional principle has to side with the rational principle. It offends our

self-dignity when we do that which reason tells us not to. Our anger is aroused when we or others suffer what reason conveys to us as injustice.

Though there is this natural affiliation between the emotional and the rational principle, the two should not be inadvertently identified. Sometimes conflict does arise between these two principles. The

rational principle has to sometimes discipline and restrain the passions or emotions which are strong feelings of love, hate, joy, fear or grief.

Depending on what kind the emotions are then reason must step in. For example, one may hate somebody by sight not because such a person has had any contact with you. The rational principle may intervene to tell you that you consider such a person as any other human being. You should change your attitude and be yourself. Consider him as you consider any other person. Do-not dehumanize others by hate. In hate, you attach certain factors

which may not be justified. In such a case, when the rational principle intervenes there may occur a conflict with the emotional principle. Thus, according to Plato, it is plausible to deduce that the rational, appetitive and emotional principles form three distinct entities. Since they aspire for different goods they thus pull in three distinct directions⁹.

Reason, emotions and the appetites assert themselves in every human being. The division of the Soul into these principles which oppose each other particularizes the kinds of a person one becomes. This is dependent on which principle is dominant in a man. The ideal for man is harmonious arrangement between the three principles. This is possible only when the appetites and the emotions follow the rule of reason. Although ideas such as these are desirable, most individual persons rarely manifest the harmony.

The conflict of the three principles gives Plato's understanding of akrasia. In the division of the Soul into three principles and the consequent

⁹Ibid., 441.

conflict, Plato offers an explanation to the gap between judgements, knowledge and consequent action. The principles so to speak, are entreated to analyze the process of decision as a result of agreement or disagreement between the desires in man. They also explain the different kinds of decisions that man may come up with. This points to the prevailing causative dominance of one desire over another. Akrasia results because of the conflicts in the principles as are found in the Soul. Akrasia means moral struggle in a human person when he has to act. When reason overcomes the other two principles, then a person acts on his judgements. If appetites overcome reason, then one acts incontinently. One shows an inconsistency in his judgements and subsequent action. This is because while one may judge a situation properly, the appetites which are never interested in a man's good may thwart the endeavour to realize such judgement. Akrasia results because the rational principle has a difficult job in trying to control appetites and the emotions which normally overcome it. This explains the sometimes unpredictable human behaviour. We engage in evils though reason tries to show the detrimental dimensions of the actions that the appetites drives us to engage in.

From the conflict, we deduce that moral goodness consists in the supremacy of reason over the other principles. A good man is the man whose appetites and the emotions are indulged only in so far as reason decides that their indulgence is in his best interests. From this, Plato emerges as a rationalist. It is reason that should be the cause of our actions. This does not however obtain. Although one may interpret the emphasis of reason over the appetites to mean that if the appetites were not there, then we would not have problems in human behaviour, this would be unfair to Plato. This is because he acknowledges the role that the appetites play. They are concerned with our organic needs. However, it is their over indulgence that is not for the good of the human person. As far as they act according to reason they are important and have a role to play in praise worthy actions.

2.20: Aristotle: The Two Levels of Knowledge
as a Basis of Akrasia

People always seek knowledge to do what is good for themselves, but it is surprising that men fail to do what they know is right. The inconsistency between knowledge and action according

to Aristotle sounded a normal human affair.

For this reason, he thought that it was ridiculous for Socrates to repudiate the fact that incontinence or akrasia is a normal feature for human beings.

The Socratic thesis is that: 'It is inconceivable that anyone should act contrary to his knowledge of what is best for himself'. In other words, non-one would willingly do what is bad for himself.

Aristotle's understanding of akrasia can be understood in the light of his criticism of this Socratic thesis. Aristotle says that such thesis contradicts everyday experience. In his own words:

"This view contradicts the observed facts and we must enquire about what happens to such a man"¹⁰.

The man that Aristotle talks about is that one who with knowledge does that action which is contrary to such knowledge. Rather than contradict what facts show, Aristotle postulated his own understanding of akrasia which is opposed to the Socratic thesis. Akrasia is discussed at length

¹⁰Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by W.D. Ross (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), 1145b25-30.

in chapter seven of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The chapter pays special attention to the question of whether akratic or incontinent people act knowingly or not. However, to be able to answer this question one must know who the incontinent man is. Aristotle makes a distinction between the incontinent and the wicked man. This distinction gives clarity to what Aristotle means when he talks of the incontinent man. The incontinent man is:

Like a city which passes all the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them ... but the wicked man is like a city that uses it's laws, but has wicked laws to use¹¹.

The incontinent man enacts principles that are good. He assents to follow them but fails to follow them when time comes. Both the incontinent and the wicked man does what is bad. However, the wicked man rationalizes his actions while the incontinent man does not¹². The incontinent man does know what he ought to do. He is not ignorant

¹¹Ibid., 1152 a 20-25.

¹²Ibid., 1152 a 1-10.

of the principles that he enacts for himself. He unlike the wicked man, knows what is to his advantage. He knows the general principles that states this¹³. For example, the incontinent man would be taken to know that courage and temperance are good. However, on those cases when he ought to do that which is courageous or temperate he eventually fails.

The actions of the wicked emanate from his choice. But, the incontinent man acts not by choice but acts contrary to his choice and judgement. Normally the incontinent has the intention to do that action which is good. However, due to choice of pleasant and harmful things he fails to act on the good judgements or principles that he had enacted for himself. This is common to many people. The incontinent men are at variance with themselves. They usually have appetites for some things and rational desires for others¹⁴.

¹³R.D. Milo, Aristotle on Practical Knowledge and Weakness of Will. (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1966), p. 68.

¹⁴Ibid., 1166 b 5-10.

The incontinent man possesses a rational principle which is supposed to influence his choice of things that are for his own good. However, the appetites oppose this rational principle. The incontinent consequently performs that action which is contrary to the desires of the rational principle. Aristotle says that in the incontinent man there is found:

"... another element naturally opposed to the rational principle which fights against and resists that principle"¹⁵.

Like Plato, Aristotle explains incontinence as resultant partly to the conflict between the principles in the Soul. When the appetitive principle overcomes the rational principle, the incontinent man loses the capability to do that action which is consonant with his enacted principles. The incontinent man usually regrets his actions. He is therefore curable of his weakness but the wicked man is incurable. There is no cure for that person who does not regret his errors. The incontinent man knows that what he does is bad. He is therefore

¹⁵Ibid., 1102b 10-15.

conscious unlike the wicked man who is unconscious of his wickedness¹⁶.

Having distinguished the wicked from the incontinent man, Aristotle's conception of akrasia is clear. However, to know how knowledge is a basis of akrasia we have to understand what Aristotle means by knowledge, and how a man can have knowledge and act against it. An incontinent man is a person who has knowledge yet he acts against such knowledge. He has knowledge because he is not oblivious of the general principles that he has enacted for himself. Knowledge is awareness of what one is required to do. Aristotle distinguishes between two senses that a person may be said to know something.

There are two senses of the word 'know'. One may have knowledge without using it; or one may have knowledge and use it¹⁷. There is nothing strange in saying that the incontinent man has knowledge in the former sense. However, saying that what he is doing is knowledge at work is absurd. The point Aristotle wishes to make is that if a man knew in the sense of actually

¹⁶Ibid., 1150b 35.

¹⁷Ibid., 1146b 30.

exercising his knowledge then this would be a strange thing to say. However, it would not be strange if the man who only knew in the sense of having knowledge were to act against such knowledge.

In the distinction between the two senses of 'know' the difference between potentiality and actuality is postulated. Potentiality is a foundation to those states and forms that can be achieved or realized. The potentiality is realized only if effort is forthcoming. Actuality is the realization of a potentiality. It is the realization of the desired states and forms. It is a reality of a capacity inherent in a given thing. For example, making of a mathematician of a student.

The knowledge that an incontinent man has is like that of a man who is asleep or drunk¹⁸. In other words, this is a case of a man who has knowledge in one sense. He has acquired the potentiality that comes with the possession of such knowledge. In this case, Aristotle compares such knowledge to the case of an indisposed man. Such a man cannot act at that particular time for he is temporarily incapacitated or rendered impotent.

¹⁸Ibid., 1151a 10-15.

However, the main reason why a person may fail to act in a way consonant with the knowledge that he has lies in the non-translation of Universals or general principles to particulars. Universals are always contrasted with the particulars but the contrast is not always the same. Aristotle has in mind a distinction within the class of universals or types. A Universal is a general type while the particular is a specific type¹⁹. In other places however, the contrast is between types and individuals. Particulars are individuals while Universals are types²⁰. The particulars being the concern of knowledge can thus be understood in the two senses of knowledge as distinguished earlier. Knowledge of the particulars can be understood as knowledge of the specific type of actions that are appropriate to specific situations. It may also be understood as knowledge of individual acts and circumstances. Knowledge of the Universals encompass generalities. Universal means belonging to, done by all or affecting all. That is, without exception. Universal is thus to be understood in the context of the all. Where principles are

¹⁹Ibid., 1107a 28-29.

²⁰Aristotle, Metaphysics. Trans. by W.D. Ross (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), 981a 5-25.

principles are enacted as guide for human action, then Universal may be understood as the entirety of what is bound by an enacted principle. Each and every person must observe the principle. There is no exception to the principle.

The Universals may thus be understood as general principles which guide action. The Particulars may on the other hand be understood as those specific facts befitting a situation. The Universals and the particulars also give the two levels of knowledge. The practically wise man is that man who has knowledge both of the general and the particular facts. If one's knowledge is to be practical, one must translate the knowledge of general principles to particular actions.

The two levels allows the non-translation of knowledge into action by agents. A person may act against his professed principles. This may result from his failure to see the action at hand as falling under the said principles. It is not therefore absurd to say that a person can act against his knowledge. In the words of Aristotle, a person fails to act since there is:

Nothing to prevent a man
having both premisses
(universal and particular)
and acting against his
knowledge, provided that he
is using only the universal
premiss and not the particular
for it is the particular acts
that have to be done²¹.
Words in brackets mine.

The inconsistency between knowledge and
action is a failure to proceed from the Universal
or general principles to the Particular. Aristotle
demonstrates this by use of a practical syllogism.
In the De Anima, Aristotle gives the form which
all 'practical syllogisms' must have. They must
have two kinds of premises. The two represents
the two levels of knowledge. Aristotle says:

The one premiss or judgement
is Universal and the other
deals with the particular
(the first tells us that
such and such a kind of man
should do such and such kind
of act, and the second that
this is an act of the kind
meant, and I a person of
the type intended)²².

²¹Op. Cit., 1146b 35-1147a 10.

²²Aristotle, De Anima. Trans. by J.A. Smith
(Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952),
434a 15-20.

The Universal premiss is a judgement of value or an imperative. For example, all citrus fruits are nutritious or an imperative, all citrus fruits ought to be eaten. The conclusion following from the combination of such a universal premiss with a minor, for example, this is a citrus fruit, is not merely a statement. It is an action: the subject eats the fruit. In his De Motu Animalium, Aristotle tells us that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action²³. Whereas this is plausible an argument, the conclusion is not an action in the context that we know. It is a belief. In itself it does not tell a person to eat the fruit, for example. A person may thus never stand accused of a refusal to act. The conclusion as made by Aristotle is plausible as we can draw a similar conclusion from a theoretical syllogism. However, what is clear is that Aristotle seems to have equated a belief with action. This had resulted in some confusion. One may have a belief and not act on the belief. This seems to be a weakness of the practical syllogism. However, if the conclusion

²³Aristotle, De Motu Animalium. Trans by A.S.L. Farquhason (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), 701a 10-20.

is understood as a belief and then qualified, as the basic determinant of actions which may obtain or fail, then the practical syllogism is absolved of the weakness.

Aristotle has offered an example of a practical syllogism²⁴ from which it can be shown how a person may know and yet act against such knowledge.

A person may actually know the universal premiss, for example, 'Dry food is good for every man'.

One may actually know the minor premiss which makes the personal application, 'I am a man' and perhaps a further minor premiss such as 'such and such food is dry' but one does not actually know that 'this food is of that kind'. Lack of this particular (this food) makes it possible for a person to act incontinently. Of the particulars of the practical syllogism, Aristotle says that either a person has the knowledge in potentiality or doesn't have. In other words, the incontinent may have the knowledge at both levels, the general and the particular and not use it.

²⁴ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Op. Cit., 1147a 1-5.

The non-actualization of the knowledge of the particular is sometimes due to the account of desires which counteract the process to action. Due to these desires a moral contest is set. Aristotle says:

Even when the mind does command and thought bids us pursue or avoid something, sometimes no movement is produced; we act in accordance with desire²⁵.

Since action must result due to the translation of the general knowledge into the particular, a contest then occurs between the desires and the rational principles calling for a particular action. It is plausible on the account of this to go further on Aristotle's thesis and say that a man may not act even when he has both levels of knowledge. The general and the particular. Aristotle has held and shown that the incontinent usually fails to act at the particular level. But, we have also seen that the result of a practical syllogism may be a belief and this is on a theoretical level not actional level. Such a belief is a particular conclusion. This means that

²⁵ Aristotle, De Anima. Op. Cit., 433a 1.

a man has knowledge of the Universals as well as of the Particulars. Thus, one may not act not due to lack of knowledge but due to other influences like desires as Aristotle has shown above. Indeed, the incontinent is a man with knowledge. He is a person like any other person who is practically wise. In the words of Aristotle:

Everything of which we say
that it can do something,
is alike capable of
contraries. E.g. that
of which we say that it
can be well is the same
as that which can be ill²⁶.

In other words, a person who at times follows his judgement or knowledge and translates such judgements and knowledge into action, is the same person who fails to act in a such a way at other times. He can act in a contradictory way even when he has knowledge at both levels, general and particular due to the influence of desires. Or, he may genuinely fail to realize or know the significance of a particular situation. In this case, he has failed at the second level of

²⁶ Aristotle, Metaphysics., Op. Cit., 1051a 5.

knowledge. This is because, normally, a person is aware of the general principles.

While Aristotle acknowledges the fact that akrasia is a normal human feature, he understands it as the non-translation of the knowledge that we have into action. He explains this inconsistency by giving two levels of knowledge. There is potential and actual knowledge. In line with this, he distinguishes between universal and particular knowledge. This, he further elucidates by use of practical syllogism. From this, he has shown that the incontinent man fails to act because of failing to know that a particular situation calls for such and such action. He also assents though by implication that one can have both the general and the particular knowledge and not act because of counter-attractive desires. These desires overcome our reasons. Man therefore, has the potency for doing that action which is good and that which is bad.

2.30: Kant: The Inclinations and Acting for the Sake of Duty

When principles are enacted in most situations, they are essentially external elements to an agent of morality. These external elements arouse in the agent the need to act as duty requires of him. However, man has internal elements which sometimes act in opposition to the given principles. Kant stresses the contest between duty and the internal elements. These internal elements he calls inclinations. Inclinations are desires that bend the reasoning of an agent to act as against the call of duty. Duty is itself what one as an agent of morality in a society is obliged to by morality. Duty is a moral obligation that one must fulfil if one is to be said to have acted as the edicts of morality demand.

The concept of the good will which Kant think is important for our actions helps in understanding the relationship between duty and the inclinations. In his Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant dramatically observes that:

Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it which can be called good without qualification except a good will²⁷.

The concept of unqualified good could be understood as follows: External possessions such as money and power can be misused. A good will cannot be bad or evil in any circumstances. It is a good without qualification. Kant refers to a will which is intrinsically good in itself and not merely in relation to something else. Circumcision for the Kikuyus is good. It is however good not in itself but in relation to the respect effect that it is designed to bring about. Circumcision is in this case a good with qualification. A will according to Kant cannot be said to be good in itself just because it causes for example, good actions.

A will which acts for the sake of duty is a good will. Will is understood as practical reason. This means the use of mental powers in

²⁷I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. by T.K. Abbott (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), p. 256.

the attempt to do that which is a sensible thing or conduct. The concept of duty or obligation involves certain subjective restrictions and hindrances²⁸. The concept of duty involves at least the concept of the possibility of self conquest. This means the will must overcome some obstacles. A good will is not necessarily that which acts for the sake of duty. A completely good and perfect will would never act for the sake of duty. This is because, in every duty there are bound to be inclinations to be overcome.

A 'holy will' manifests itself in good actions without any recourse to a contest with inclinations. Thus, it would never act from a concept of duty. This is however possible for the infinite creatures like God. For the finite creatures like man, 'subjective limitations' do occur. Man's will is not wholly good. It is susceptible to sensuous desires or inclinations which are hindrances to the good will present in him. Thus, for the human person, a good will is that which acts for the sake of duty albeit the inclinations which influence man to act against such duty.

²⁸Ibid., p. 257.

Duty is the designation of any action to which any person is bound by an obligation. Duty therefore becomes the subject matter of all obligation²⁹. For example, when one is reminded, 'Do not forget your duty to your Parents', the person is being reminded that he has an obligation to provide for them in terms of clothing, food and other necessities. Obligation means what one ought to do. Obligation is the necessity of action when viewed in relation to an imperative of reason³⁰. In other words, acting for the sake of duty can be conceptualized as the necessity of acting from respect for the law³¹. Law is an imperative of reason and thus obligating. By law, Kant means law as such. To act for the sake of duty is to act out of reverence for the law as such. The form or characteristic of law as such is universality. A universality does not admit of exceptions. Like physical laws of nature which man and other beings follow unconsciously

²⁹I. Kant, General Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. by W. Hastie (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), p. 391.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹I. Kant, Op. Cit., p. 259.

and necessarily, moral law is also universal. However, only man is capable of acting in accordance with the idea of the law. The moral worth of an action lies in the respect for the law. The moral worth does not lie in the effects whether actual or intended. The worth derives from the maxim of an agent. The maxim must be that of abiding and obeying out of respect for the law. Laws arise from the will of an agent viewed generally as practical reason due to its obligating nature.

A maxim is usually a subjective principle of volition³². It is a principle on which a moral agent would act as a matter of fact. It is a major influence or factor in his decisions for particular actions. Such maxims may accord or may not accord with the objective principles. Objective principles are those principles which all men would act on if they were purely rational moral agents. However, such principles can also serve as subjective practical principles. This is only possible when reason has full control over the inclinations. An example of objective principle is practical law or moral law.

³²Ibid.

There appears to be an inconsistency in Kant's formulation. If a maxim can be out of accord with the moral law, how can it confer moral worth on the actions prompted by it? The inconsistency is met by the distinction between material maxims or empirical maxims and a priori or formal maxims. Material maxims are compatible with desired personal ends. Formal maxims do not. Thus, formal maxims confer moral worth to actions. That is, they do not fall prey to sensuous desires or the inclinations. They are maxims of obeying the universal law as such. Formal maxims presents themselves to us as commands or imperatives. Kant conceptualizes an imperative as distinct from a command. In his words:

The conception of an objective principle in so far as it is obligatory for a will is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative³³.

Imperatives essentially express the relation between the objective laws of volition and subjective imperfection of the will of a rational being. A good example of an imperfect will is

³³Ibid., p. 265.

the human will. Imperatives are characterised by the use of an ought. They indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will. However, the subjective constitution of an imperative is not necessarily determined by an obligation³⁴. In saying that the objective principle is obligatory, this does not necessarily mean that the will cannot help obeying the Law. This means that the desires or inclinations are diametrically opposite claims to those of reason. Indeed, the inclinations are undesirable for pure practical reason³⁵. Inclinations pervert the human will because it is prevented from following the rule of reason. What results from this, is that, the law for the moral agent assumes an external force. This force pressurizes the will to conform with the principles as enacted. In this sense, the law is said to be obligatory for the will. However, the will is not necessarily determined by the law.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵The contentions are quoted from Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. by L.M. Hinman in his essay "On the purity of our Moral motives: A critique of Kant's account of the emotions and acting for the sake of duty" in The Monist. Vol. 66, April, 1983, pp. 251-267.

Practical moral law is strictly universal, universality being as it were, its form³⁶. Hence, all concrete principles of conduct must partake in this universality if they are to qualify to be called moral. Kant says that an agent should be 'able to will'³⁷ that a maxim of his action be a universal law. Kant however, does not qualify the notion of willing or being 'able to will'. One interpretation that can be advanced is that an agent may not succeed in overcoming the contest of his reason with his inclinations. This means a failure in application of the practical principle. Another interpretation can be that, in the case of inclinations submitting to reason, then an agent is able to act on the practical principle. Copleston³⁸ argues that what one is inclined to understand Kant as referring to, is the absence or presence of logical contradiction when one tries to universalize one's maxim.

³⁶F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy. Vol. 6, Part II. (New York: Image Books, 1964), p.117.

³⁷I. Kant, Op. Cit., p. 270.

³⁸F. Copleston, Op. Cit.

In the formulation and translation of a certain principle (which must be a universal law) into action, there is usually a conflict. Kant says that:

We infact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the contrary, we will that the opposite should remain a universal law, only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favour or (just for this time only) in favour of our inclination³⁹.

Human beings usually acknowledge objective principles but ultimately do not act for the sake of duty. This results from the antagonism of inclinations to the dictates of reason. To come out of this situation reason has to extend its reigns on the inclinations. This is if man has to feel settled on the principles. Kant observes that:

Unless reason takes the reins (sic) of government into its own hands, the feelings and inclinations play the master over the man⁴⁰.

³⁹I. Kant, Op. Cit.

⁴⁰I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics. Trans. by T.K. Abbott (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), p. 378.

Man cannot achieve complete virtue even with its maxims due to inclinations which defeat the endeavour for virtue. Kant continues to say that:

The impulses of nature ... contain hindrances to the fulfilment of duty in the mind of man, and resisting forces some of them powerful⁴¹

Inclinations are powerful and sometimes overcome reason. Inclinations are vices, the brood of unlawful dispositions and the monsters⁴² that man has to combat. When man overcomes these monsters by reason, he achieves virtue. This signifies a good will. Virtue is the moral strength of a man's will in his obedience to duty⁴³. Non-performance of duty results from weakness of will. The practical principle of reason remains at the empirical level. It does not reach the subjective level. Moral behaviour may thus be said to take a two-stage status. Failure can occur at the intellectual level. That is,

⁴¹Ibid., p. 367.

⁴²Ibid., p. 377.

⁴³Ibid., p. 367.

principles are grasped or acknowledged in general terms. However, the effort to act on the principles becomes null and void. The agent consequently acts contrary to the objective principles. He acts on those principles which benefit his inclinations and not his reason and as required by duty.

From the above, we can say that Kant understands akrasia in the context of the opposition of the inclinations to duty. Such duty is however based on practical reason. These inclinations normally oppose the rule of reason. This is the reason why human beings do not act from a sense of duty. If inclinations were not there, then we would act for the sake of duty. However, the presence of inclinations means that we do not have a good will. Akrasia is thus a normal thing. Man is always in conflict with himself as concerns what to do.

2.40: John Wilson: The Moral Components and
Being Morally Educated

The moral components are given by Wilson in his analysis of a morally educated person. Wilson emphasizes reason though not with exclusion of emotions and imagination⁴⁴. The combination of reason, the emotions and imagination bring about a reasonably well integrated person⁴⁵. Therefore, the affective is as important as the cognitive aspect in the determination of man's actions. Thus, in any endeavour to teach morality, the development of moral skills must form an apex. Formulation of principles is however not enough. One also needs the ability to live up to such principles⁴⁶.

The anomaly that occurs between the formulation of principles and their translation into actions made Wilson offer a sort of

⁴⁴J. Wilson, et al. Introduction to Moral Education (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 179.

⁴⁵J. Wilson, The Assessment of Morality. (Windsor: NFER, Publishing Co. Ltd., 1973), p. 64.

⁴⁶I. Mills, "Moral Decision Making, Religious Reinforcement and Some Educational Implications" in Journal of Moral Education. Vol. 6, No. 3, 1977, pp. 162-169.

"a phenomenological description"⁴⁷ or a breakdown of moral components.

There are six major components for the morally educated person⁴⁸. First is PHIL. PHIL is the attitude and degree to which a person acknowledges others as his equals. That is, another's feelings and interests are accepted as of equal validity to one's own. Second is EMP. EMP refers to the awareness or insight into the feelings of oneself (AUTEMP) and of others (ALLEMP). Third is GIG. GIG refers to knowledge that is necessary for making rational judgements especially the awareness and appraisal of the consequences that may result from an action. Fourth is DIK. DIK is the assemblage of values which an individual affirms and consequently undertakes to follow. It is the rational formulation of EMP and GIG on the basis of PHIL, into a set of rules or moral principles to which the individual commits himself. Fifth is the PHRON. PHRON is the assemblage of values relating to

⁴⁷J.Wilson, et al. Op. Cit., p. 192.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 219.

oneself. Finally, there is KRAT which is the ability to put moral principles into action or practice, for example, translation of DIK or PHRON principles into action. When one talks of KRAT one is concerned about the person who genuinely decides on a principle whether moral or prudential, but who in some sense is compelled to act otherwise.

According to Wilson the 'Components' are to be:

Understood in the sense of logical components, one might say a set of attributes of the morally educated person. They are not psychological components of specific psychological skills or abilities⁴⁹.

The components are therefore attributes that a morally educated person is supposed to exhibit when performing his actions. A person who is deficient in one of the components is bound to mis-translate his judgements. He therefore performs an action incompatible with his judgements.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 219.

A morally educated person is that person who has concern (PHIL), awareness (EMP), and relevant factual knowledge (GIG). He brings these to bear on an actual situation. That is, he makes a serious and responsible decision to act. He also has the motivation to translate his decision into action⁵⁰. From this, we can conclude that morality takes a two-stage meaning. An agent must consider other peoples interests as he makes decisions that affect himself. Wilson's 'morally educated person' can be said to be an ideal (utopian). He is a person who if he were to exist would be superbly good. He does not engage himself in evil. This ideal person is a standard by which we can measure our strengths and weakness in bringing own decisions to bear.

The component analysis gives a two-tier view of what it takes to perform an action. There is the primary component tier which consists of PHIL, EMP, GIG, DIK and PHRON. The secondary component tier consists of KRAT. The primary tier

⁵⁰J. Wilson, Practical Methods of Moral Education.
(London: Heinemann Educational Books,
1972), p. 28.

refers to what one has as knowledge. It is the understanding of what it means to be in a society. One needs others. The secondary tier means translation of this knowledge into action when situations demand. It is however, unfortunate that people do not translate their knowledge into action. They thus are not the ideal morally educated persons. Wilson puts it succinctly:

There are no doubt some people who ... act on impulse, drift, get carried away by the people they are with or by their own feelings, ... they do not plan, form policies, think about the future, consider the effects of what they might do, or face the possibility of alternative actions ⁵¹.

This manifests the fact that we are not as good as we ought to be⁵². The morally educated person still remains utopian. The human person normally fails even to act on what he has judged. Indeed it is:

⁵¹Ibid., p. 34.

⁵²Ibid., p. 23.

Both logically and empirically possible for S to make a sincere and genuine decision and not to carry it out even though he could do so ⁵³.

So, Wilson understands akrasia in the light of an ideal that is desirable and what is normally manifested by human behaviour. Akrasia to Wilson is therefore a normal human feature. It results from the non-translation of judgements, decisions and knowledge into practice. This has a foundation in the weakness of man who is usually affected by impulses. It can be summed up as a weakness in the will of man, since it cannot be justifiably said that man lacks knowledge in totality. He has it, yet he acts against such knowledge. The incontinent is a person who has reasons and ability, but other facts or he himself decides not to translate his judgements into action.

2.50: Synopsis of the Chapter

The chapter has looked at the various understanding and explanations of akrasia as given by philosophers who are illustrative of the

⁵³J. Wilson, The Assessment of Morality.
Op. Cit., p. 63.

Competitive perspective. Competition between what is desirable for praiseworthy actions as directed by reason occurs because of the appetites. Ensuing conflict between reason and the appetites or desire prevents the translation of human judgements, knowledge and decisions into action. Appetites make a man do that which is contrary to his and his society's principles. In essence, what is known to be good is never actualized.

Plato on his part emphasizes the contest between reason, the emotions and the appetites. The appetites which forms the largest part of the Soul usually defeat the endeavour of reason to make our judgements, decisions and knowledge actualized. Normally, what we know as worthy remains at the intellectual or theoretical level. What is actualized is what is not for the good or welfare of the person.

Aristotle gives two levels of knowledge which explains why it is plausible to say that one can have knowledge and yet act against such knowledge. There is the general principle level and the particular situation level. Aristotle shows this by use of a practical syllogism.

While one may know what is required of him at the general principle level he may not translate such knowledge to be consonant with a particular situation. Reason is usually overcome by the appetites. Thus, one acts in an inconsistent way.

Immanuel Kant emphasizes the contest between duty and the inclinations. The inclinations makes it impossible for human beings to act from a call of duty. They do not therefore have a good will. A good will acts for the sake of duty. This is however, impossible for the human beings because of the inclinations. They are such that they make the translation of what is obligatory as demanded by practical reason difficult. Essentially, knowledge of what is required of us is in most cases never translated into action. It remains at the theoretical level. What is acted on is for the benefit of the inclinations.

John Wilson on his part contrasts what is ideal by the analysis of the components that make a morally educated person with what is normally manifested by human behaviour. Feelings and sometimes the decisions of persons makes it impossible for them to be the morally educated

persons that they ought to be. People engage in actions that are irrational. That is, the knowledge which is consonant with a person's reasons is not actualized. What is the best thing to do is thus not practised. Thus, as in the cases postulated by the other philosophers above, knowledge remains intellectual.

What these understandings of akrasia shows is that, for the Competitivists, man normally knows what he is supposed to do. He however acts as against such knowledge. The proper knowledge-knowledge as befitting a certain situation remains intellectual or theoretical. Appetites or inclinations thwart the endeavour of reason which should rule a man. It should be behind our actions. This delineation shows that, Competitivists are rationalists. While reason is important for action, it normally does not fulfil this duty. It is overcome by non-rational influences. This transforms man into a being which is always in conflict. Man is not action. He is all knowledge, yet he does not transform this knowledge into action.

We may at this point say that Competitivists understand akrasia as knowledge. However, it is knowledge that is intellectual and not practical. Man is therefore theoretical. He rarely acts on what he knows or judges.

In chapter three, akrasia as understood by the Precisionists is given. Their understanding is treated as the antithesis.

CHAPTER THREE

3.00: THE PRECISIONIST PERSPECTIVE

In chapter two we considered the Competitivist understanding of akrasia as the thesis. The treatment in this chapter is the Precisionist understanding which in line with Hegel's method of dialectic is treated as the antithesis.

It is important to first understand what the Precisionist perspective is all about and who the precisionist philosophers are. We may start by first looking at the adjective 'precise'. The word precise puts forward the notion of definiteness or accuracy or exactness. In the context of the problem under study, this definiteness or accurateness is in the actions, decisions and judgements that a person may make. Thus, to say that a person is precise is to say that he is exact. In other words, his manner of behaviour is correct. It manifests itself very clearly in consonance with his actions as they relate with the judgements that he makes prior to the action. His actions are free from error of judgement.

The noun 'precision' from which derives what we have called the Precisionists connotes the idea of a quality. It connotes a disposition of always coming out clearly in the performance of actions. These actions are in accordance *with* principles, facts as they are. Precisionists are therefore, those philosophers who understand akrasia to mean that man does not act against the judgements that he makes. This is reflected by the agent's actions. Man is disposed towards that which is good. He is all action. He acts on what he knows. The exactness in his actions suggests conflictless action. For example, if Kamau says he will never drink beer anymore, this is shown by action. He will not drink beer come what may. Even if put in front of him there is nothing that will sway him to deviate from his principle. This means that for the Precisionists, there is always a smooth translation of judgements, principles, knowledge and decisions into action. Akrasia to the Precisionists means action.

So, the precisionist perspective is the view of man's actions as not conflicting with his judgements, knowledge, principles and decisions. It means acting on knowledge such that the action

so resultant conforms with the knowledge. The actions are praiseworthy. Man's actions are such that he acts on edicts as given by his society. The Precisionist perspective consists of various interpretations. However, as we have just shown, the central characteristic of this perspective is the claim that the agent always acts in conformity with moral requirements. Thus, it is a normal human feature for an agent to act in accordance with what is agreed to as good. Human behaviour does not therefore admit of any inconsistencies, as between knowledge and action.

To the Precisionists, man is disposed to follow the norms of his society. These norms are for his harmonious existence. The agent is not likely to go against such norms. Hume puts it very clearly when he asserts:

It appears that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and order in society does always, by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engage us on the side of the social virtues ... these principles of humanity and sympathy ... have so

powerful an influence
as may enable them to
excite the strongest
censure and applause¹.

According to Hume, people prefer virtue as against vice. The principles enacted for them are strong enough to show the benefit of virtue as against vice. What society desires manifests itself in the actions of an agent. Hume emphasizes 'Sympathy' as a principle of communication of feelings that an agent may have for another. The principle inclines the agent towards what is good for self and his society. Sympathy is therefore, the capacity for sharing the feelings of others and tenderness when need arises.

F.H. Bradley² feels that the greatest desire in an agent is self-realization. An individual realizes what is for his own good. His station in a community dictates the duties that promote the society's good. Man realizes himself not in engaging in that which is evil but in that which is good.

¹D. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals.
L.A. Selby Bigge and PH.Nidditch (Eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 231.

²F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

Socrates who started the debate on akrasia argues that it is inconceivable for anyone with knowledge to act against such knowledge. His view is given weight by R.M. Hare³ who argues that a person cannot sincerely assent to a command addressed to himself and at the same time not act on it.

Rousseau on his part argues that it is built into human nature the love to do that which is good. In essence, he argues that there can be no original perversity in human nature. According to him, everything is good as it comes from the hands of God. All the views as given facilitates the observation that, it is foreign to human nature to engage in evil. The desire for virtue is therefore a highly practical inclination of the human being. These various positions on akrasia will become clearer when we consider the philosophers in detail. The above, namely, Socrates, F.H. Bradley, J.H. Rousseau and R.M. Hare, are taken as illustrative of the Precisionist perspective.

³R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).

3.10: Socrates: Action as Always a Consequence
of Knowledge

The understanding of akrasia as mainly action is explicitly given in Plato's dialogue, Protagoras. It will be noted that in the Competitive perspective we considered akrasia as understood by Plato. We consequently interpreted his understanding of akrasia as mainly the contest and strife between reason, the emotions and the appetites. The contest meant that, judgements, knowledge and decisions are never translated into desired actions. What is known usually remains at the theoretical level. It is never practised. However, the understanding of akrasia being considered now is taken to be Socratic in persuasion. The understanding of akrasia by Socrates is popularly referred to as the Socratic Paradox⁴. The reason why it is taken to be Socrates' definition though the Protagoras was written by Plato is due to the researcher's conviction that the Plato of the Republic is very different from the Plato who had earlier written the Protagoras. In the Protagoras, Socrates accepts that knowledge

⁴M. Ringbom, "Socrates' Ethical Paradox and akrasia" in Ajatus 37: Yearbook of the Philosophical Society of Finland. pp. 67-78.

is a sufficient condition for virtue; he in essence rejects the gap between judgement and action. He consequently emphasizes action as always resultant whenever a person has some knowledge. In the Republic, Plato talks of a conflict in the human person. This conflict results from the opposition between the three principles in the Soul. The opposition means non-actualization of knowledge or judgements that we make. Hence, knowledge is insufficient for virtue. To show the polarities of these two positions on akrasia, Plato was considered to be a Competitivist. Socrates on the other hand is considered to be a Precisionist. This is facilitated by his thesis that no-one willingly does evil. Socratic position as it appears in the Protagoras is thus an argument in antithesis as is the encompassing Precisionist Perspective.

Socratic paradox is the contention that no-one acts against what one considers the best thing to do. The paradox arises from the common view that people sometimes seem to act against their own judgements and knowledge. They falter on their acknowledged obligations.

The Protagoras is a Sophist dialogue between Protagoras and Socrates. On the matter of akrasia, Socrates first elucidates what the common view is. He says:

Most men ... maintain that there are many who recognize the best but are unwilling to act on it. It may be open to them, but they do otherwise. Whenever I ask what can be the reason for this, they answer that those who act in this way are overcome by pleasure or pain⁵.

To be overcome by pleasure corresponds to what happens when one desires organic or biological satisfaction. They are usually pleasant. However, one may be aware of their detrimental consequential effects but chooses them. For example, while sexual intercourse gratifies our biological needs, over indulgence may be dangerous to one's health. While one is aware of this, he may continue to indulge in sex unreservedly which may be unhealthy for he may catch diseases. Socrates explains being overcome by pleasure to his Sophist friend Protagoras in these words:

⁵Plato, Protagoras. Trans. by W.K.C. Guthrie (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1956), 352D-E.

We take it that you say this happens to you when for example, you are overcome by the desire of food or drink or sex which are pleasant things, ... and though you recognize them as evil, nevertheless indulge in them. ... In what respect can we expect any other answer than this, that they are not evil? ... Can we expect any other answer than this, that they are not evil on account of the actual momentary pleasure which they produce, but on account of their consequences, diseases and the rest? ... So the only reason why these pleasures seem to you to be evil is, we suggest, that they result in pains and deprive us of future pleasures⁶.

According to this view, anything that is painful would be avoided. This is albeit the fact that it produces momentary gratification. What happens is that people look for what is beneficial in the future than what is for immediate gratification. *The* implications of this position is that we may prefer that which is painful presently but pleasant in the future.

⁶Ibid., 353C-354A.

So, we find that man essentially pursues pleasure as a good. He shuns pain because it is evil. To Socrates, pain is evil and good is pleasant⁷. Man essentially does that which is pleasant and thus good and not evil. The decisions that man has to make, therefore, calls for correct calculation of pleasures and pains that are consequent of a possible action. The calculation is possible through a science of measurement. This calculation is by the help of knowledge that one has. since all human actions are aimed at that which is pleasant and painless, then knowledge facilitates the calculation. Eventually, one does that which is pleasant. Thus, pleasure is the ultimate good, when calculated for properly. Socrates asserts:

If the pleasant is the good, no-one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course when he might choose the better ... Then it must follow that no-one willingly goes to meet evil or what he thinks to be evil. To make for what one believes to be evil instead of making for the good, is not, it seems, in human nature;

⁷Ibid., 354C-D.

⁷Ibid., 354C-D.

⁷Ibid.

and when faced with the choice of two evils no-one will choose the greater when he might choose the less⁸.

In the above quotation, Socratic paradox is expressed clearly. In it, Socrates asserts that it is not in human nature to choose any other course of action other than that which leads preponderantly to good. If an alternative is consonant with an agent's interests he will then choose it. In the Euthydemus Socrates still shows that we all want to be happy. This entails searching for that which is good and not evil⁹. He further supports this assertion in the Meno. Here, he rejects Meno's suggestion that a person Q may know that action R is evil and still choose R.¹⁰

If in action a person fails to avoid the greater evil, then such a person acts out of ignorance. In the words of Socrates:

⁸Ibid., 358 B-D.

⁹I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 223.

¹⁰Plato, Meno. Trans. by W.K.C. Guthrie (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1956), 77C-78B.

When people make a wrong choice of pleasures and pains-that is, of good and evil-the course of their mistake is lack of knowledge ... a science of measurement ... so that 'being mastered by pleasure' really is ignorancell.

Ignorance is a false opinion. The person who fails to avoid greater evil is mistaken on the knowledge or belief of what is good for himself. Such ignorance is of what is most pleasant. What is most pleasant is important since it promotes a person's happiness. The person who fails to act as is required lacks the science of measurement or knowledge. He therefore doesn't differentiate between the nearer and farther goods. Thus, he lacks the knowledge of good and evil. Otherwise, this means that if he had knowledge then he would act correctly.

In Gorgias, Socrates contends that the wicked do what seems good to them, but not what they really desire¹². Since the desire for good

¹¹Plato, Op. Cit., 357D-E.

¹²B. Gibbs, "Virtue and Reason" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Suppl. Vol. XLVIII, 1974, pp. 23-41.

is universal in human nature, the wicked like all other men forcefully desire true good. However, ignorance defeats their endeavour for achievement of this good. Such people therefore, waste their lives in search of things that are not for their good.

With knowledge, man is bound to act correctly. He always acts when he has the knowledge. When he doesn't have it, then this is ignorance and is not for his own good. Once one knows what is for his own good, then he strives to achieve such good. He achieves this good by acting in away that is consonant with such knowledge of the good. Socrates' thesis that all men desire good and act to achieve it, contradicts with most men's beliefs that one can know and yet act against such knowledge.

We may conclude by saying that Socrates understands akrasia as action. This is because, when one knows what is for his own good then one acts to achieve the good. It also means that one always tries to avoid evil. This is because the love of what is good is universal in human nature. There is also no conflict on what is

for one's good once a person has made a judgement. This is facilitated by the knowledge that one has. Knowledge is such:

a fine thing quite capable of ruling a man, and if he can distinguish good from evil, nothing will force him to act otherwise than as knowledge dictates¹³.

To Socrates, nothing can counteract the endeavour towards action. Once a person has the proper knowledge of a situation, he acts as is required of him. For example, if I know that stealing is bad and I see ripe bananas in my neighbour's garden, then I will not steal the bananas. This is because, the society holds the principle, that, 'stealing is punishable by a jail term'. Since, I do not want to go to jail, then I will abstain from stealing. This also shows my love for virtue. Thus, our behaviours manifests our actions in line with the knowledge that we have.

¹³Plato, Protagoras. Op. Cit., 352C-D.

3.20: F.H. Bradley: Self-Realization as Every
Man's Aim

Self-realization as a desire and aim for every human being is emphasized in Bradley's book: Ethical Studies. Self-realization attempts to bridge the gap that seem to exist between an individual and the social consequences of moral behaviour. Self-realization is possible only within a social framework of rules and relationships¹⁴.

According to Bradley, the whole essence of morality is the realization of the whole self. That is, realization of all that make a good personality. It means doing good and rational actions. In every individual, when the question of why one should be moral is asked, the answer is found in the word 'Self-realization'¹⁵. Self-realization is an end to be realized in morality. For morality, the end implies action. The consequence of the action therefore implies self-realization. Self-realization is the

¹⁴R. Straughan, I ought to But ... (Windsor: NFER - Nelson Publishing Company Ltd., 1982), p. 28.

¹⁵F.H. Bradley, Op. Cit., p. 64.

bringing up to bear all the potentialities that make up the good of the whole person. This implies that, a person has to engage in those actions that promote the person's welfare. While the 'Self' means all that is inherent in the person, 'realize' means to translate an ideal content into existence¹⁶. Thus, the intrinsic end of morality is the realization of the whole self by doing that which promotes its welfare. The whole self consists of two elements:

... these are myself as the will of this or that self, and again the universal will as the will for good; and this latter I feel to be my true self, and desire my other self to be sub-ordinated to and so identified with it; in which case I feel the satisfaction of an inward realization¹⁷.

Bradley would be interpreted to mean that, there is a universal and a particular self. The particular self should however issue from the universal self. The universal self is born when one translates the objective moral world into himself. These are the requirements as

¹⁶Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 178-179.

demanded of a person. The personal self is the self as a part of the objective moral world. When the two selves are in harmony and in many ways Bradley believes they are, they culminate into the realization of the whole self.

He asserts:

The unity of the two factors we may call the individual whole or again the concrete universal ... it is the finding and possessing ourselves as a whole we aim at ... both in theory and practice¹⁸.

Whatever we judge at the theoretical level, we always will try to see this potentiality translated into actuality. Through this translation, the 'will' is realized as the self. However, the realization of the whole self is possible only as a part in the social organism. The social organism is the human community - the family, the wider society and the state. Man therefore derives his moral content from his society. Bradley explicitly puts it:

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 72-73.

To be moral, I must will
my station and its duties ...
There, I realize myself
morally, so that not only
what ought to be in the
world is, but I am what
I ought to be, and find my
contentment and satisfaction¹⁹.

The nexus between man and morality is sealed when he is seen in the social perspective. Man realizes himself not in doing wrong but by doing what is right. What is right is stipulated by his society for him. The society wills for its people the good but not the evil. The society inculcates in man the desired good. Man on his part is therefore disposed to act in the ways of his society for in this, he gets satisfaction. Other than satisfaction:

The Soul within him (man) is saturated, is filled, is qualified by, it has assimilated, has got its substance, has built itself up from, it is one and the same life with the universal life and if he turns against this, he turns against himself, if he thrusts it from him, he tears his own vitals; if he attacks it, he sets his weapon against his own

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 180-181.

heart. He has found his life in the life of the whole, he lives that in himself, 'he is a pulse-beat of the whole system'²⁰.

The attachment of an individual person to his society means that he cannot act in a way that antagonizes his society. This is because he derives his livelihood from the society. If he acts wrongly then he jeopardizes his own existence. Therefore, what a person wills is the will of the society or the universal. Since he is part of the universal, he cannot will that which is against himself.

The emancipation of man in morality is doing that which is good. The individual sees himself as others and others as himself in his society. The other regarding becomes a disposition in the schedule of man's daily activities. Wisdom and virtue, according to Bradley, culminate only in the individual living agreeably to the Ethos of his people²¹. The Ethos of a people

²⁰Ibid., p. 172.

²¹Bradley, p. 187 quotes Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit p. 256-8 (1841) to support his contentions.

always enacts what is good. The Ethos aim for harmonious co-existence between people. This aids in the realization of the particular and the universal. It is thus absurd for a person to enact that which is contrary to the Ethos of his society. To enact what is against the Ethos would mean that such a person hates the good and:

"To hate good is to hate oneself, and no-one can altogether hate himself"²².

This can be interpreted to mean that, non-one in his right senses can choose to do that which is contrary to his judgement. This is because, such judgement borrows its content from the norms of the society and must be good. Going against such judgement is a move towards destroying the good-will of oneself. In destorying the goodwill, then one obstructs the realization of the self which one aims for. Therefore, man avoids what is contrary to the judgements. He acts on the judgements made. This is because doing the good is the only true self-realization.

²²Ibid., p. 307.

To some extent, Bradley is not oblivious of the fact that man may slip in his will. He is however of the opinion that the universal will (societal norms) normally wins. The person's will endearment towards wrong is usually unsuccessful. The person usually:

Finds that the willing against the will of the superior is useless and besides, gives pain to himself both by the displeasure of the superior, and also by the more direct unpleasant results. In short, he discovers that there is a will outside of him which is not only dear, but also irresistible ... he learns in general that the accordance of his will with the higher is pleasant and discord painful²³.

Bradley has here developed a 'good-magnetism' which man finds himself always entangled with. Since it is highly attractive, man finds it pleasurable to identify his will with the good. Furthermore, while echoing an Aristotelian²⁴ view, Bradley believes that habit is important in integrating the individual into the society. He observes that:

²³Ibid., p. 285.

²⁴Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a 14-1d. Where he says that moral goodness is the result of habit.

The child is taught to will a content which is universal and good, and he learns to identify his will with it, so that he feels pleasure when he feels himself in accord with it, uneasiness or pain when his will is contrary thereto, and he feels that it is contrary. This is the beginning of personal morality²⁵.

So, doing that which is contrary to the norms of the society is foreign to human nature. This is supported by the assertion that when a person tries to act contrary to what is good, he feels pain and thus goes against his personal morality. Like Socrates, Bradley bridges the gap between principles and consequent action. Principles are the norms of the society which guide the individual as he strives towards self-realization.

We may say that, Bradley understands akrasia as acting in such a way that a person realizes what is good for himself. It means doing what is also good for the society. This is because man is part of the society. Man is action, but action that is good. In other words, man is always

²⁵F.H. Bradley, Op. Cit., p. 178.

striving towards that which is fulfilling for self and others. What he knows and judges as good he always tries to achieve it. He realizes himself when he engages in good action. Thus, self-realization is doing that which is good.

3.30: J.J. Rousseau: Natural Goodness as an Attribute of Man

Rousseau's understanding of akrasia can be well understood by a close study of his books: Emile and The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. According to Rousseau, the natural goodness of man makes it inappropriate for anyone to think of any conflict between human nature and a man's morality. Human nature is essentially good and what is bad results from some external source. Rousseau asserts:

Let us lay it down as an incontestable principle that the first impulse of nature are always right. There is no original perversity in the human heart (sic). Of every vice we can say how it entered and whence it came²⁶.

²⁶J.J. Rousseau, The Emile. W. Boyd (Ed.) (London: William Heinmann Ltd., 1956), p. 40.

Rousseau would re-assert the same philosophy in his letter to Christophe de Beaumont, Archbishop of Paris, that:

The fundamental ethical principle is that man is naturally good and that there is no original perversity or sin in human nature²⁷.

It is therefore, very foreign to human nature to do that which is evil. Man is always good and this manifests itself in the actions that he engages in. Rousseau presents man in a state of nature, when he has not been influenced by civilization. Man is endowed with the capacity to do good to fulfil his own existence. By doing good he overcomes the evil in the world.

Due to the goodness inherent in man's nature, man acts in ways consonant with his own self-preservation and self-love. With this end in mind, then doing wrong is absurd. It would be contradictory. The goodness is bound to influence man to make judgements that are for his good.

²⁷F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy. Vol. 6. (New York: Image Books, 1964), p. 83.

Man's wants gives rise to his passions. The wants are merely physical and self-preservation therefore becomes a supreme desire. Due to this desire:

Our first duties are to ourselves. Self is the centre of the primitive sentiments. The natural impulses all relate in first instance to our preservation and well being²⁸.

Indeed, the basis of all passions, the only one that is born with man is self love. Self-love is primitive, instinctive and precedes all other passions, which in essence are modifications of it. However, self-love is not egoism. Rousseau thinks that, egoism arises only in a society and this leads man to prefer himself to others. This may be interpreted to mean that the root of all actions and judgements is self-love. It is an end that is composite with the natural form of man. It determines all his actions. Any action that would be against this end is contradictory to man's nature. It would mean self-hate. Self-hate and self-love are opposed and this is

²⁸J.J. Rousseau, Op. Cit., p. 44.

against Rousseau's thesis. Man thus acts with good in mind but not evil.

The natural man according to Rousseau, is usually in need of his fellows. He is therefore, moved by an element in him to a closeness with his fellows. This element is natural pity. It is a feeling of sorrow for the troubles and the suffering of others. It is pure impulse of nature, anterior to all manner of reflection by man²⁹. This impulse comes into operation, only when man has taken cognizance of his fellows. Man does not reason to the need of compassion or natural pity. He simply feels it. It is a natural impulse.

Thus, Rousseau draws on an inner element of human nature. This element draws men towards concern and doing that which promotes their welfare. when pity moderates the activity of self-love, preservation of the whole species is guaranteed³⁰. Pity is independent of self-love. We may say that, the concentration of individualism is reduced to

²⁹J.J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality: L.G. Crocker, (Ed.) (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1967), p. 202.

³⁰Ibid., p. 204.

a level compatible with communalism. That is, man integrates what is for his own good with that which is good for the society. Man does not delight on his own happiness when his fellows are suffering.

Indeed:

The compassionate heart is affected by the suffering of his fellows. He thrills with delight when he meets a comrade. If the warmth of his blood makes him quick to anger you see the goodness of his heart a minute later in his effusive repentance³¹.

The repentance comes about due to the natural sentiment of pity. Pity is the first social sentiment that affects the human being according to the order of nature. It is a principle of communication of the feelings of one man to another. Man feels pity because he identifies himself with his fellows. When pity is coupled with love for self it posits total harmony in the individual as well as his fellows. This means that, there is harmonious co-existence. When one loves himself, there is also love for the other person. Nobody is therefore willing to do that action

³¹J.J. Rousseau, Op. Cit., p. 102.

which will hurt his fellow friend or neighbour. It is pity which inspires the maxim of natural goodness in man. To do good to himself with as little prejudice as possible to others³².

Accordingly, we may give an example and say:

No man would, knowing it would hurt him if he were in the shoes of his neighbour commit adultery with his neighbour's wife. Thus, a harmonious society is manifested by its members good actions.

Rousseau like Socrates, and F.H. Bradley reduces the gap between what we know and action. However, doing is facilitated by self-love and pity. These have a foundation in the natural goodness of man. He always does that which is good for himself and his society. Man therefore, mean's action. What he knows obtains by action as manifested by his behaviour. Thus, to Rousseau like the other Precisionists, akrasia means action. It means doing and doing what is good.

³²J.J. Rousseau, Op. Cit., p. 204.

3.40: R.M. Hare: Language as Prescription
For Action

Like Socrates in the Protagoras, Hare gives an understanding of akrasia that is an extreme form of the Precisionist Perspective. Hare presents a formal view of morality. This is highly articulated in his two well known works: The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963). Prescription is the lever of any moral discourse. Prescription in this sense is understood as advising or ordering of the agents of morality on what to do. Moral judgements are fully prescriptive. They entail an imperative, an injunction or an influence to the decisions to act. In other words, moral judgements are strong reasons which motivate action. Thus, the primary function of moral judgements is to prescribe or order what courses of action to follow. For example, 'stealing is bad' this is a moral judgement. As an agent of morality, this is supposed to guide my actions. That is, even if situations allow or favour my intention to steal for example, I should always observe the moral judgement. In other words, the judgement orders me not to steal. This is because 'not stealing' is what is contained

in the language of the judgement.

The title of Hare's book: The Language of Morals points towards understanding what prescription is all about. It aids in the conceptualization of morality just as a language. According to Hare, the special function of language is to guide conduct. Since a language entails principles, these principles are conduct guiding. The language tells us what action to do. The language that a moral judgement is expressed in facilitates our endeavour to act as directed by the judgement. In Hare's words:

The function of moral principles is to guide conduct: The language of morals is one sort of prescriptive language³³.

Moral language answers the question, 'What shall I do?'. A judgement is therefore, moral only when it tells a person what to do. For example, a person has an obligation to help his/her parents. This judgement or principle is moral since it tells one that he/she must take care of his parents. Thus, human action is

³³R.M. Hare, Op. Cit., p. 1.

closely integrated with moral language. When a person is for example, asked what his principles are, the efficient way of getting an answer with substance is to study his actions.

Ought sentences according to Hare are usually prescriptive in nature. Therefore, their primary function is action guiding³⁴. That is, the sentences do not only give information but they prescribe. When it is just information that is conveyed, a person may never act on such information. Therefore, language as action guiding is important. Due to this fact, Hare holds that, if a person assents to a moral judgement, he must then assent to an imperative sentence which is derivable from such moral judgement. To assent to a moral judgement is to resolve to do or act in conformity with it. Hare says:

If ... we assent to a second-person command addressed to ourselves, we are said to be sincere in our assent if and only if we do or resolve to do what the speaker has told us to do; it is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a second-person command addressed to ourselves,

³⁴Ibid., p. 159.

and at the same time .
not perform it, if now
is the occasion for
performing it and it is
in our (physical and
psychological) power to
do so³⁵. [Emphasis his]

So, if one is psychologically and physically healthy or normal, then, one must act on commands, or judgements or principles enacted for us or enacted by one self. This shows that, man is action oriented. As long as he has principles then such principles are acted on. When however, a person fails to do as is required of him, his thoughts are accompanied by feelings of guilt. Such a person is said to have done what he ought not have done. Therefore, there are degrees of sincere assent to a principle³⁶. The person who fails to act feels contrition for whatever contrary action that he does. He is bound to act on the principle next time. He will assent fully to the principle. This will mean acting correctly.

³⁵Ibid., p. 20.

³⁶Ibid., p. 169.

We find that the prescriptive nature of moral language emphasizes practice. It emphasizes action. The action however results from the commands that are given or those that we enact for our selves. Thus, if I assent to the principle: 'You should never be late for classes', then I must always act and will, by going to all my classes early. Thus, we may say that prescription means that a person cannot make a judgement and then not act on it. In Freedom and Reason (1963) weight is given to the unreality of not acting on value judgements once accepted. This interpretation of prescriptive nature of judgement is clear when Hare asserts:

I proposed to use the word, 'Value judgement' in such a way that 'the test, whether someone is using the judgement, "I ought to do X" as a value-judgement or not, is "Does he or does he not recognize that if he assents to the judgement, he must also assent to the command "Let me do X"?³⁷

³⁷R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 79.

So, when a person makes a value judgement, then such a person will have committed himself to doing as the value judgement requires. It also means that value judgements which I assent to in one situation, I should also be prepared to make and assent to in any similar situation³⁸. That is, value judgements are also universalizable. This means that for example, if one assents not to steal in a situation which favours stealing now, he must not steal if a similar situation arises next time.

Finally, we may say that, Hare like the other Precisionists understands akrasia as basically action. That is, when one makes a judgement, the consequence is action thereafter. It is also means acting in a way that is consonant with principles as enacted. It is plausible to say that the behaviour manifested by agents are good, since, rarely will value judgements be given which promote bad behaviour. Man comes out in prescriptivism as action oriented. There is rarely a gap between what he knows to be a good thing to do and subsequent action. Man conforms to his judgements.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 72-73.

3.50: Synopsis of the Chapter

The Chapter has looked at the understanding of akrasia as given by philosophers who are illustrative of the Precisionist Perspective. What has come out as the major characteristic of the understanding of akrasia is that there is conformity between what a man knows and what he does. In other words, there is no gap between a judgement made by a person and what he does by way of action. In essence, akrasia means action. It is good action manifested by man. This means that man is all action. He is action oriented.

Socrates on his part emphasizes the fact that knowledge is sufficient for virtue. No-one with knowledge will act as against such knowledge. Man is always influenced by what is his nature to do that which is good and pleasant. He does not do that which is evil for he hates pain. This means that once a person has knowledge of what is to his advantage then he acts on such knowledge.

F.H. Bradley gives self-realization as the aim of all beings (rational) especially man. In the endeavour to realize this, he associates positively with his society. This he does by doing what is good for himself and his society. The desire for self-realization is so strong that he always acts. He does that which is desirable. He shuns what is detrimental to himself and his society. One is usually taught by his society what is good and usually makes a point of doing as required. This he does because if he were to act against his society's norms he realizes that he is hindering his self-realization which he desires. Thus, man acts and acts in a way that is praiseworthy.

J.J. Rousseau emphasizes the fact that human nature is good. Man therefore, strives to do that which promotes his own welfare and that of his fellows. This is achieved through the natural elements of self-love and pity. While he must strive to achieve his ends, he shares the feelings of others and their sorrow with himself. This means that he acts in away as to promote the society's welfare. He acts and in a good way. This is manifested by his behaviour.

R.M. Hare on his part emphasizes language as prescription for our actions. Moral judgements means action on our part. This is to mean that, if one is party to a judgement by virtue of his being a member of a society for example, then one must act on it. In normal circumstances anyone who assents to the principles or commands acts on them. Principles are therefore action guiding and actions manifested by people are consonant with such principles.

From the various understanding of akrasia that the Precisionists have postulated we may say that: Knowledge, natural goodness, self-love and pity as good attributes that man has, means that man always acts in a way consonant with such attributes. Self-realization as an end that man aspires for, means acting in a way that promotes the end. Prescription as a quality of the language that is used to enact principles to guide action, means that, man acts in conformity with the principles. All these points to man as action oriented in all situations. Man is all action. This makes it plausible to assert that the Precisionists understand akrasia as action. There is therefore, no gap

between the judgement made by man and the actions that he does. Man is all conformity.

In Chapter four, which is the basic chapter in this thesis, a synthesis of both the Competitivist and Precisionist understanding of akrasia is given.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.00: AKRASIA AS WILL

Chapters two and three have shown the various criteria for akrasia as given by different philosophers. The philosophers, depending on the criteria they propose, have been labelled Precisionists and Competitivists. In this chapter, a synthesis of the criteria is given. This is the endeavour to come up with a proper definition of akrasia.

In the synthesis, I consider some similarities which are encompassed both in the thesis and antithesis. These similarities are intention, knowledge, decision and the will. However, it is the contention of this thesis that will is basic. Therefore, intention, knowledge and decision are not given prominence. They are analyzed briefly and then left in favour of the will. The will is taken to give strength to the use of knowledge, to give impetus to the realization of intention and even decisions. Reasons for giving the will preference will become clearer in the course of the analysis given.

4.10: Intention

In both thesis and antithesis the element of intention is prominent. Albeit the fact that the Precisionists stress action and the Competitivists stress intellect, they both show that basic to a person's endeavour, there is a purpose. That is, human action is intended. To say that an action is purposive is to explain it by the laws of the form, $x = f(p)$ where 'x' is the behaviour and 'p' the purpose considered as a separate entity which is normally the cause or antecedent of x^1 .

Thus, in the intention, a person is aware of an end that he is out to achieve. For the Precisionists, the end in view is the good. The Competitivists on the other hand have an end in view but which may not be realized. The end in view usually remains at the intellectual or theoretical level. For the Precisionists, intention is realized since any person who assents to

¹C. Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1964), p. 6.

a principle consequently acts on it².

We may say that, intention is a self imposed disposition whose impetus to act in a certain way shows itself by the outer behavioural manifestations of the action. What somebody does usually emanates from a source. The source sets the desires of an agent towards the achievement of an end. Therefore, when we say that intention is an element behind our actions then, it comes out as an element that sets our minds towards certain ends that we come to value. An agent's intention refers to an outside world. This is the world of anticipated results as foreseen by the agent³. Thus, the end of actions may be thought of, as the desire or object of intention.

Sometimes, our intentions are never acted on. This is because of the influences that counteract our endeavours. We may therefore say that for actions, intention alone is not adequate. There is need for the will as a power that would aid

²R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 20.

³P. Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and Involuntary. Trans. by E.V. Koha'k (New York: North-Western University Press, 1966), p. 89.

the realization of our purposes. Without the will, the intention remains intellectual or theoretical.

4.20: Knowledge

Reflecting on the thesis and the antithesis, knowledge presents itself. This is clear on the premise that whenever a person acts, this shows some kind of an awareness on his part. This is if the action is to count as his. The Precisionists hold the proposition that it is only when a person acts in a way such that it is for his good that this may count as knowledge. This shows that a person is aware of what is for his own benefit. Thus, awareness is knowledge.

The Competitivists argue that whereas a person may be aware of what is to his advantage, he may fail to act on such knowledge. In other words, both the man who has knowledge without exercising it and the man who is actually exercising it are said to know⁴. Thus, knowledge is something that is there in a person, when he is acting or

⁴Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by W.D. Ross (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), 1140b 5-10.

not acting. The only difference comes in, only after the result of an action performed by a person. Any acting shows that a person really knows what he is doing. Annette Baier holds such a view when she asserts that:

"To act is to know what one is doing"⁵.

Knowledge is coupled with actions. A person usually knows and he is disposed to act in a certain way. However, the way that a person acts is not fixed. He does not always act in a way such that he achieves what is good for self. He may act in a way contrary to his good. For example, Kamau may say that: 'Adultery is wrong'. He may apply such a principle to a particular case, for example, ought he sleep with Mrs. Achieng and consequently that he ought not to, for such a principle violates his principle, yet he makes advances and proceeds to sleep with Mrs. Achieng. Kamau has the knowledge that adultery is wrong. But, he acts against the same principle of which he is aware of the possible consequences if ever

⁵A. Baier, "Intention, Practical Knowledge and Representation", in M. Brand and D. Walton (eds.) Action Theory. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1975), p. 29.

Mr. Achieng was to know. Kamau violates his principle knowingly.

Knowledge is therefore not enough for action. Kamau is taken to have consent to the course of action that he takes. It is a component of his consent to take a particular direction. He acknowledges the direction as well as the end of such action. Whereas the agent knows that the end of his action will be this or that, a person must have a will to give tenacity to knowledge so that he may act in a way consonant with such knowledge. Therefore, like intention, knowledge is not enough for action. If Kamau had a good will, then he would have acted in a way consonant with the knowledge that sleeping with another man's wife is wrong.

4.30: Decision

In ordinary usage the concept of decision implies an act of choice between alternatives. Decision is the end state of a dynamic process which is deliberation. Deliberation is itself a form of reasoning which is aimed at a plan of action. In deliberation we desire to know what

to do. The Competitivists argue that:

Deliberation ... occur when two desires conflict in the case of a man consciously striving to do what is right. There may be two obligations which he desires to fulfil, that cannot be fulfilled at the same time or there may be a strong desire that is in conflict with the desire to do his duty⁶.

Whichever of the opposing sides wins, the resolution of the opposition results in decision. In the formation of decision, it shows that deliberation has been completed and we thus become committed to a certain course of action.

The Precisionists on their part argue that one, in a decisive case ultimately completes the deliberative process by choosing to act in a way consonant with his knowledge. One acts in a way that promotes his good. The Precisionists therefore, argue that:

Indeed when faced with the choice of two evils non-one will choose the greater when he might choose the less⁷.

⁶P. Ricoeur, Op. Cit., p. 31.

⁷Plato, Protagoras. Trans. by W.K.C. Guthrie (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1956), 358D.

Thus, a person makes a decision to act on the lesser evil. This is a commitment to the good. As we said earlier that the way a person acts at all times is not fixed, it is plausible to say that it is possible for people to make decisions and not act on them. This is why it is fair to say as we have maintained that, knowledge, intention and now decision are not adequate for action. Hence the constant contention that the will is the most important of these elements or similarities. Wilson also holds the view that a person may form a decision and not act on it. He thus asserts:

It is both logically and empirically possible for S to make a sincere and genuine decision and not to carry it even though he could do it⁸.

Therefore, though a person may have the ability to carry out his decisions, this may not materialize. Decision as a plan to act in a certain way needs the will to actualize it. Thus, to assert that a person has decided to act in a

⁸J. Wilson, The Assessment of Morality. (Windsor: NFER Publishing Co. Ltd., 1973), p. 63.

particular way is to say that if he tries to actualize this decision, then he may meet with at least some success if he has the will to realize the same.

4.40: The Will

We have so far acknowledged and analyzed the criteria of knowledge, intention and decision as similarities in the Precisionist and Competitivist positions. However, after analysis of individual element (criteria) it has been found that, they are not adequate for action. This is in the sense not materialize. In essence, it has been proposed that, for action, the will is important as a power to the achievement of a desired action.

The will is emphasized as the fundamental element for action. However, one should note that even if one may have the will, intention, knowledge and be decisive, action may not follow due to social and other physical constraints that affect man. This means that proper physical and psycholological conditions needs to exist in a situation so as to facilitate the endeavour of the will in helping man to respond to a situation in a desired way. The will due to its importance in action is adopted as the proper definition of akrasia.

The will as adopted shows itself as an element that is inherent in both the philosophical positions on akrasia as considered both in Chapters two and three. At this point, there is a need to show the implications of the will as it is contained in the two chapters.

4.50: The Precisionists

As treated earlier, the Precisionists are those philosophers who emphasize action. That is, whenever we make a judgement for example, then what follows is definitely an action. However, the type of action the agent engages in is a good action. Whenever we therefore think of action as always resultant of our judgements, then a person may be said to always have that will to act. A person acts in a way consonant with what his knowledge tells him. He acts on the decisions that he makes and so on. The will is in essence contained implicitly in the action that a person engages in. This means that, whenever a person has a particular knowledge of a situation, then if such a situation demands action, then the thought of action has that attractive power to urge the person to

perform it. A person acts and acts properly.

The Precisionists thesis is: A person has that willingness to do good for self. This signifies the will that urges him to act and act in a praiseworthy way. Such strong disposition is evident when a person assents to a command addressed to himself. Such a person finds himself performing the requirements of such a command when the occasion demands⁹. The assent to a command is a will, a resolution, an urge to act. In action-which must always follow our judgements, all is contained there in. Indeed:

"To act you must will something and something definite"¹⁰.

In the Precisionist position, a person wills for that which is good. The end is therefore anticipated as a benefit to an agent. Consequently, the agent strives to achieve the end. That which is good being attractive, the tenacity to achieve

⁹R.M. Hare, Op. Cit., p. 21.

¹⁰F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 153.

it is such that an action results. The action resultant is consonant with the desired end and judgement prior to the action. The will for Precisionists shows itself by the action that always follow judgements. A person in a society has that urge to identify his will with that of his society. He potrays such will by his overt behaviour. A person:

... feels pleasure when he feels himself in accord with it (will of the society) uneasiness or pain when his will is contrary thereto¹¹.

Therefore, a person has that will to act in a praiseworthy way. He therefore manifests the will to perform an action in a way that is for his own good and that of his society. Therefore, the Precisionists due to their emphasis on action, show that the will is in action. It is in the action which always attracts a person. Action urges the person that it must be accomplished. This is due to the will inherent.

¹¹Ibid., p. 178.

4.60: The Competitivists

The constant thesis of the Competitivists is that of intellect. They emphasize rational knowledge but which usually remain theoretical. Reason is emphasized as the dominant element in a human person. This is in the domain of action. Reason should rule the emotions or the inclinations that may hinder action. This has led to the propositions that emphasize conflicts or contest in the person. In most cases our judgements, our knowledge, intentions and decisions are hardly acted on. They usually remain theoretical. We rarely act as we should. An action it may be said materializes only when a person has a stronger will to overcome the overriding inclinations.

For the Competitivists, a person is supposed to act for the sake of duty. When he however acts, then a good will is manifested in the consequence of action¹². We may say that for the Competitivists, the will is teleological. Will is prior or before the action. In this, a

¹²I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. by T.K. Abbot (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), p. 257.

person may not actualize his knowledge, his intentions and decisions so made. This may be due to the inclinations which are a problem to practical reason, which is supposed to lead to action. Indeed:

Unless reason takes the reins (sic) of government into its own hands the feelings and inclinations play the master over the man¹³.

When the inclinations press on reason and wins, it is the deficiency of the will that is manifested in the action that a person performs. Such action is not consonant with the person's judgement. Such a person may act as against virtue which is the moral strength of a man's will in his obedience to duty¹⁴. When a person acts as against his judgements, then this shows lack of power to stick to his judgements and act on them.

¹³I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics Trans. by T.K. Abbott (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Inc., 1952), p. 378.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 377.

Thus the portrayal of the will as strong or weak is determined by whether reason wins over the inclinations or not. When it wins, then a desired action follows and this shows a strong will. If on the other it gives in to the inclinations, then the will is weak. Judgements previously made therefore, remains theoretical.

For the Competitivists therefore, the will shows itself when a person judges, makes decisions and shows intent to act in a certain way. Whether such judgements become a reality depends on the quality of the will. This way, the will is prior to the action. Finally we may say that both the Precisionists and the Competitivists have the will as a factor in the detemrinations of our actions.

4.70: The Ethical Will

The will in this analysis is restricted within the realm of human action as it relates to value. There are basically two ways in which 'The Will' is broadly used as concerns human action.

Roberts C. Roberts¹⁵ gives such two ways which I adopt. In the first case, we normally designate inclinations and disinclinations, desires, aversions and motivations. If for example, Njoroge goes to a football match; then he goes gladly or at least with a minimum of distaste. Thus, a person with a will or a wilful person is that one who does just what he wants to. He does it with a minimum consideration for other things that may come in his way and distract his endeavour to act as he wishes. In this way, it shows that a person concentrates on the task at hand. The will helps the person to set his mind wholly on the task.

The second meaning of will is when the will is employed to designate capacity to resist adverse inclinations. These are inclinations that are for, example opposed to the dictates of reason. Reason shows a person that such a is the most

¹⁵R.C. Roberts, "Will Power and the Virtue" in Philosophical Review. Vol. XCIII, April, 1984. pp. 227 - 247.

rational thing to do. The mind is set on an objective that is worthy but, inclinations counteract such objective. The capacity to resist or the will must crowd out the other objectives as imparted to the mind by the inclinations. To overcome the inclinations, the will must be strong. In this case, what is referred to is the presence of such qualities as perseverance resoluteness, patience, courage, one pointedness toward desired action, decisiveness, promptness, persistence and self-control. When however one speaks of 'efforts of will' this refers to acts and activities corresponding to qualities as the control of one's emotions, resisting of temptations and perseverance in the face of discouragement.

According to the two senses of the will as delineated above, I will consider anything ethical as that which is in consonance with reason. This will therefore be a good thing. In this sense, non-ethical will be anything that is not rational. Such as thing will therefore be bad. In the light of this, ethical will is that will which is

consonant with reason. Such ethical will is good. A non-ethical will is that will which is not rational. It is therefore bad.

The Competitivists and the Precisionists also considered the will from the ethical viewpoint since what occupied them is; what action result from our judgements, our knowledge or decisions? Depending on the will, a person will do a good thing or a bad thing.

In my opinion, the will as the capacity to make and implement judgements or choices, is the culmination of all human actions. Indeed, any function of will produces an effect in our relation with others. What is of value to a person and society may thus be achieved only when there is an ethical will. The will therefore forms the basis of praise or blameworthiness of our actions. Our Kenyan society for example, holds that stealing is wrong. If I go ahead and steal, then I portray a bad will, since I have not followed reason and seen the justification of why the society holds that I should not steal. My action is

blameworthy when the society comes to know of my wrong action. If with a good will then I would not steal. If I was stealing because of a problem, for example, stealing food because of hunger, with an ethical will, I would have approached the person from whom I stole for help. I would have avoided stealing. I would have asked for food. The will plays part in the determination of whether I act in a way consonant with reasons and also the norms of the society.

Virtue shows the moral strength of a man's will as he goes about his everyday activities. The will as a power means the production of intended effects, acting on knowledge, decisions and the judgements that a person makes. All in all, the will is the ability to bring about the desired effects that are compatible with one's reasons albeit the fact that they must also be consonant with what is reasonable according to one's society. It is also important to note that the desire of the will is not absolute. The will modifies itself to circumstances. This is because a person will find that he is affected by many other factors in his society that will make him sometimes deviate

from intended acts. In the light of this, then it becomes necessary when talking of virtual and the will to associate it with the society. This is because, it is normally the society which passes judgement on any and all human action. I am of the opinion that, we can never talk of the ethical will if what the will makes a person do, does not in any way affect the members of the community that he comes from. What I must will and do affect much more than myself. When and what I do affects others, then this is an ethical life which must go hand in hand with my will.

An ethical will must not be mistaken to be just a stubborn and obstinate refusal to be swayed or influenced against reasons that leads to our judgements and decisions. There must be room for other factors that may alter or enhance our actions for the better. An ethical will is that will which makes a person act in a way that whatever the resultant action, it is compatible with reasons which facilitate any judgement or opinion as held by the person. The coupling of reason with our actions leads to a unified course

of conduct that will later be judged on its effect to the person and his society. Depending on whether the action a person performs is praised or condemned the will, if the action is praised by the society will then to some extent always support the repetition of such an action.

However, if the action is condemned, then 'The Will' will take cognizance of the conditions that led to such action. It will be flexible to admit of new adjustments to be able to support appropriate actions. Therefore, the will is also a correlate to the end in view, since, it acts as a motive to its achievement. The end should be such that, its effects will have been clearly assessed. The ethical will is thus not constant but dynamic or operational. It bears on actions.

We should also be aware that due to social and other physical constraints the propensity to act in a virtuous way as directed by the will may not obtain. This involves a failure to possess enough of the capacity to stick to reason in our judgements or decisions so made. This means weakness of will if for example, Mungai judges that he should not take a glass of whisky and be quite

consciously tries to resist doing so, Mungai may still form the intention to take one. The question we may ask is this, may he not have exhibited weakness of will? Though he may not be able to take the glass of whisky since the glass is empty, Mungai has already failed in the kind of inner struggle with his inclinations. He fails by forming an intention to drink since it is against his original judgement. This therefore, manifests a weakness of will.

Coming back to the will and action, there is work done when one acts in a certain way. This may be said to happen if one has the proper will. This has observable effects. Such work of will we may hold, manifests the fact that, the will is nothing else but a disposition to act in a certain way. Whether the action be said to be incontinent or continent, that is whether supported by weak or strong will, the will per-se, is a disposition. To be able to translate any endeavour judgements or otherwise to action, a person must have a disposition towards the desired. This is the will. It helps in checking of aversive motivations. when the will qualifies our actions as compatible or incompatible with

our judgements or the precepts of our societies, it is then that we may be justified in talking of the ethical will. Ethical will characterizes my actions as they relate me to my neighbour and everyone else. On the beneficial part, ethical will should be the will that aids a person in doing things that are for the comfort of and welfare of himself and the society.

4.80: The Two Components of Ethical Will

Ethical will we have said is that will which is consonant with reason. It helps in our deliberations on what the implications are of our actions to our neighbours and to our society. Essentially we hold that the will is thus the ability to bring about the desired effects that are compatible with one's reasons and as to the effect of such reasons and consequent action to the society of which one is apart.

However, to obtain all our ends and the ends as required by the society, ethical will must be complete. To be complete is to mean that it is able with minimum deviation to meet its obligations. That is help man achieve his ends. The two components that make the ethical will complete are: understanding or knowledge which is achieved through reason and action which must always follow. Understanding is the clarity

on meaning, nature or explanation of a situation to the optimal satisfaction of a person to whom the situation demands attention. These could be value judgements, information given to persons and so on. Action is taken to mean the process or movement towards realization or actualization of an endeavour.

Principles as enacted for individuals in a society needs to be understood by the people. If the principle is for example, 'Stealing is wrong for Kenyans'. For the principle to have the effect, there are a few things that need clarity: What is stealing? What is the nature of stealing? What are the basic conditions of stealing? What does it mean to call an act wrong? And why is stealing wrong for Kenyans? When these questions are answered for the agent, then it becomes clear to him what the principle means. He understands it better. He is clear on what is required of him at all times. The agent readily assents to the principle since he understands it.

With proper understanding or proper knowledge there should be a movement towards achievement of what is required of an agent. That is, he must act

in a way consonant with the knowledge that he has. In the above situation, an agent once he is clear that stealing is wrong for Kenyans, and he is a Kenyan, will act in a way consonant with the principle. He should not steal. When and if a situation is conducive for stealing even without the slightest detection, such an agent ought not to steal. He remembers the obligation he has to his society. Thus, the second component of the will is fulfilled when a person acts in a way consonant with the understanding he has. The understanding must be compatible with what the the society thinks is for the promotion of the person's and its welfare.

The two components are therefore important if the desired behaviours of a people are to obtain. In any situation, a person should have a proper understanding of what is required. This aids proper response. When the understanding is acted on, then we can talk of the ethical will. It is then complete and a power for the achievements of our ends and those of the society. Ethical will manifests itself in our behaviours only when we act in a praiseworthy way. An ethical will should come out clearly when a person

potrays: The will to know what to do or understanding of situations and the will to do or act in a way compatible with the knowledge acquired. The two components of the ethical will makes it possible to realize our judgements, decisions and principles. When one of the components lack or is emphasized over another, then what is desired may not obtain. When for example, we emphasize, 'do' and not a balance between 'understand' and 'do', then we prescribe failure for our endeavours. 'The will to do' without there being 'the will to know what to do' or vice-versa does not help in the actualization or realization of virtue. Both must obtain.

4.90: The Importance of Ethical Will in Society

The ethical will has been defined as that which always raises one up to the realization that his actions also affect others. An individual is part of a society and therefore, he ought to follow the precepts of the society. Thus, a person should have that will to do good. It is the will which energizes the endeavour to act in a way consonant with what the society demands.

The major reason for taking the will as the most important element is based on a conviction that, having knowledge for example does not mean that I must act in a way consonant with such knowledge. For example, Onyango knows that if he snatches a woman's handbag at the Central Bus Station and is seen to do so by other people who know that the act of stealing is bad, they are going to beat him up when caught and the end may be instant death. However, Onyango goes ahead and snatches the handbag with the consequence that the woman yells 'catch thief'. In the course of running away he is caught by irate public and beaten very badly and is only saved by Police Officers who happen to be nearby. For a person like Onyango, that may not have been the first act of stealing. He does it with full knowledge of the consequences. The knowledge does not make him act as is comtable with such knowledge. However attractive the contents of the handbag in terms of money contained therein, Onyango if he had ethical will would have abstained from stealing. Ethical will is achieved through a critical attitude of all the situations that a person finds himself in. One in such a case

deliberates on the merits and demerits of his/her intended actions. The final judgement should be consonant with reasons that also bear the norms and values of one's society. If Onyango had an ethical will, and reasoned properly then he would have behaved properly. In essence therefore, the ethical will would have urged him not to harass the woman. He would have reasoned to the effect that the woman is human like him. By snatching the handbag he is dehumanising himself and the woman. If would have told him that there is need for respect for other people's property. The will would have reminded him of what he amy undergo - possible death. All in all, it would have told him to do what is worthy of being called a good human action. A praiseworthy action. He would have engaged himself in productive work. To work with his owne hands and be paid for such as the society deems fit. That way, he would have contributed to the welfare of the society, rather than destorying the framework of good behaviour as set by the society.

In stressing the will, I also hold it that intention alone to act is not enough. Maina for example, has the intention of going to the village to help his mother in terms of financial assistance. At the Bus-Stop he meets with a lady prostitute acquaintance of his, who promises him the delights of sexual intercourse to which he obliges. He consequently spends the money intended for his mother on this lady, thereby failing to honour his intention. His intention was thwarted by the imaginations of the enjoyments that he would have if only he accepts the offer from this lady. For such a case, the will is important as a backbone to intentions that people like Maina have. Indeed, intentions alone without the support of the will may remain theoretical. An ethical will would have told Maina to go home. It would have reminded him that his mother solely depends on him. It would have reminded him of the days his mother used to struggle to educate him. That, at this time when he was young and could not feed for himself, the mother was there. It would have reminded him that, at that time it was his mother's obligation to look after him. Now it is his obligation to look after his mother who can

no longer provide for herself because of old age.

When it comes to decision, like intention, a person may form a decision and not act on it. I may sincerely form the decision not to smoke since today is the Worlds Health Day, but by the evening since the urge to smoke is intense, I thereby go ahead and smoke. I thus act in a way that is against my decision. It needs the will to live up to the decisions once made. Sore'n Kierkegaard gives an example of a gambler who struggles to stop gambling by forming a decision not to gamble. He succeeds only by the help of his will. Kierkegaard says:

Suppose there was a gambler who said to himself, "Very well, thou shalt be allowed to gamble all the rest of thy life, every blessed day-but tonight thou shalt let alone", and so he did ... this is a way of hoaxing lust ... lust is strong merely in the instant¹⁶.

¹⁶The Contentions are quoted from R.C. Roberts, Op. Cit. as they appear in Sore'n Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves. Trans. by W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 69.

The alertness of the will helps the gambler to keep on telling himself that, every new day, he must remind himself that, he will gamble the rest of his life. He may therefore not gamble today. Finally, he overcomes such lust when the abstaining becomes a habit. Without the will to support the decision to hoax the lust, the gambler cannot stop gambling.

While ethical will is important, lack of it is reflected in various places of public life in Kenyan society. For example, every new day, we find problems that need our attention. Instead of reflecting and finding solutions, we put the problems aside and do other things. For example, there are constant flood problems in Nairobi city. Very little if anything is done to avert the floods. Drainage systems remain unblocked. The rivers that cut across the city remain filled with dumped waste which prevents smooth flow of water. This contributes to the floods. This is an indication of lack of ethical will to find solutions to the most urgent problems that threaten human life. With the will, there is no big problem that cannot be solved. Yet, the floods are a constant phenomenon.

The lack of ethical will is evident even in Government offices which are at times turned into illegal market for various goods. The Government loses taxes which would otherwise be utilised in the provision of needed social amenities when such practices are carried out. In a feature article in the Daily Nation, one Joseph Njuguna observes:

In Government and private offices, Kenyans are busy buying and selling in what has been described in some circles as the black-economy or moon lighting, a thriving operation of untaxed and unrecorded business activity through which the government is losing money in taxes¹⁷.

More to this, in Government offices, Kiosks selling tea, cigarettes, bread and all assortment of good are supported whole-heartedly by Government workers. Yet, these workers are taken to be the most observant in the enactment of government policy. Njuguna observes succinctly:

¹⁷J. Njuguna, "Black market in the office" in the Daily Nation, April 20, 1988, p. 13.

In many Government offices ... unlicensed entrepreneurs operate kiosks selling tea, bread, eggs and cigarettes in addition to their regular jobs. The kiosks which are normally operated from the cleaners store are a convenience that many Government workers support whole-heartedly¹⁸.

This is the inclination of workers towards their own ends. It is a conflict of what the Government desires and personal satisfaction. This desire for personal gains other than a balanced self interest, that of the country in terms of rendering the proper services that one has been hired for, shows the non-commitment of such workers. Personal ends out weigh the society's ends; it is the lack of ethical will which as we said should help a person to achieve his own ends and at the same time not forget the betterment of his society. Such inclinations, as to spend time attending to personal ends when one is supposed to be serving the public for example, actually borders on greed. Greed is strong desire for more personal gains than is right or

¹⁸Ibid.

reasonable. Greed should not manifest itself where there is an ethical will in a people.

It is from considerations as above that I made up the philosophical conviction that the will is more important for human behaviour and action. The will is a major disposition which determines what type of actions that result from our judgements. I am convinced that it is useless for persons to form judgements, to be said to be knowledgeable, indeed form sincere decisions, adopt policies and not act on them. Francisco Romero supports my view when he asserts that:

The will is that energy which is often creative and tends to infuse a powerful life to expressions of human desire. It works ... on plans and sketches of an intellectual type, on anticipations or tentative projects¹⁹.

The will acts on knowledge, or intentions and plans that we make. Thus, the will forms the prime base of all resultant human action.

¹⁹F. Romero, Theory of Man. Trans. by W.F. Cooper (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 23.

We have acknowledged the fact that inclinations cannot be done away with if we have to view man as normal and not ideal. The will consequently, becomes the most prominent candidate to lead a man's actions. This is if they have to be thought of as proper and praise-worthy. When stronger wants entice us to give up, or yield, the will if strong, will give us the power to resolutely say: 'No, at all costs, I must stand up and go the whole length of knowledge, the judgements, the decisions that I have formed and show their realization by action. I must win'. When a person does that, then he also shows himself as will. When assailed by insinuating and the seducing temptations that always cross our paths, the will raises us from the looming acquiescence. We thus keep on trying until we achieve our goals. The will shows itself when members of Alcoholics Anonymous²⁰ act on the principle of abstaining which is: 'One day at a time'. Whenever the alcoholic renews his commitment to the principle every new day, the hoarding of the lust to drink becomes a habit. The contribution to the formation of the habit is nothing else but the will to succeed against alcoholism.

²⁰It is an Association of people who were once addicted to alcohol.

When it comes to what type of actions that a person manifests by his overt behaviour, we need to know the importance of the will to society. We must first acknowledge that, we as human beings, we all too often act non-rationally. What we have in mind fails in instances to conform to what we are prepared to bring about as actors. While thinking of one anticipated action, we are frequently swayed to act so as to bring about an entirely different result. It means that, to steady our stand on actions, then the will needs to be there.

It is plausible to therefore say that, the world can get no good from anybody's thought unless such thoughts are translated into action. When a person keeps his thoughts or they remain theoretical then they may not affect his neighbours. If the thoughts were for the good of the society and what results is what is against judgement, then what affects the society is what is detrimental not what is for its welfare. Unless for example, our Scientists act on their discoveries for example, that AIDS²¹ is a deadly disease and try to get the cure for it, then they might as well

²¹This is the Acquired Deficiency Syndrome.

not have informed the public of the presence of such a disease. All that is proposed here is that, human thought must be practical. Human progress is impossible without practical aspect of human thought. The will must be the lever towards the translation of such thought of action.

I therefore put it that, when it comes to action, then everything that we may desire to call ethical must be practical. This derives from the fact that morality necessarily bears on conduct. It bears on the intentions, the decisions and judgements that we make. These plans unless actualized are useless. Overt behaviour shows what sort of values we have as persons in a society. The Doctor who discovers Malaria²² and also finds that Chloroquine is a cure for Malaria is a help to his society. Thus, the actions that a person engages in should be a manifestation of his convictions and good judgements. The will must however intervene when necessary to ensure that all the endeavours of persons should obtain in proper deeds. The will when made use of ensures

²²This a febrile disease caused by a protozoan.

that, a person as a member of a society is not a spectator in a drama acted by others but an actor.

The will as a force behind action is therefore a companion of consent to a certain mode of life, of conduct and of impetus towards the achievements of a given society. The will is thus accompanied by an anticipation of a pre-conceived end in view and of the direction of preference of a society. The pace of development of Kenya for example, will depend on the will we have as Kenyans. How much development in terms of literacy do we for example need?

When people in a society are true and faithful to themselves, make choices, decisions and judgements and acts on them in a way that the overt behaviour is consonant with such, then the people show an impressive standing in such a society. Such a society definitely advances. It develops to the level so desired, albeit depending on what development to such a society means. When there is will, a people in a society establish priorities and issues arising

are faced bodily. A people are able to say yes to the choices that are thought to implement and promote the basic or core aims and objectives. Those choices that may promote or advance false substitutions are rejected. Thus, a people in a society with a will are not liable to say that: 'We should have selected this course of action, but we didn't'. The will manifests itself by the reduction of the intricacies of conflicts in a society. The will functions in deciding what is to be done. It helps in applying all the necessary means for the realization of a people's goals and the persistence of all the tasks at hand. This task of the will is important when it is remembered that men are at once both theoretical and practical, but they are rarely both to the degree they can and should be. Thus, the will assumes a role similar to that performed by a helmsman of a ship. The helmsman knows what the ship's course should be and keeps her steadily on it. This is albeit the drifts caused by the winds and currents in the sea.

Without the helmsman, the course taken by the ship would be without purpose. It would be directed not to a specific direction, but on destinations as directed by the currents and the

winds in the sea. To avoid or keep the currents and the wind at bay when a person is called upon to act in a certain way as a situation demands, he must be guided by the will. Of health, integrity, purity and such, they are but a product of the human will. The good man who for example, does not infect anyone (with his deeds) is the man who has a tremendous will power²³. The importance of the will is also given in distinct words by Iago the villain in William Shakespeare's The Tragedy of Othello when he says:

Our bodies are our gardens
to which our wills are
gardeners, so that if we
will plant nettles or saw
lettuce, set hyssop and
weed up thyme, supply it
with one gender of herbs
or distract it with many -
either to have it sterile
with idleness or manured
with industry- why, the
power and corrigible
authority of this lies
in our will²⁴.

Whatever is thus our overt behaviour, this depends on our wills. If on one hand we are theoretical then it means that we do not have a

²⁴W. Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Othello.
A. Kernan (ed.) (New York: New America
Library Inc., 1963), pp. 61-62.

will to be industrious. Industry as displayed by a people is nothing else but a manifestation of their will. Will shows itself and its importance by outward behaviour of a people. Among the Kikuyu, Edmondo Cavicchi says that when he came to Kenya he found a people with a will to solve their difficulties and approach to life in general. In his own words:

They - men and ladies, old and young struck me as being ... very cautious and thoughtful of all details in action; extra ordinary respectful in behaviour and speech ... never surrendering in the face of difficulties, being always bent on finding a way to solve, or to come out of them, ... full of initiative and always with something on hand or in their minds to do, in order to earn a living, ... bearing with extreme endurance physical pain and heart's sorrows without so much as an eyeblink or a sigh²⁵.

The above quotation shows the importance of the will. The will in the Kikuyu traditional society made it possible for the virtues as said,

²⁵E. Cavicchi, Problems of Change in Kikuyu Tribal Society. (Milan: Pontifical Institute Institute for Foreign Mission, 1977), pp. 21-22.

never giving up in the face of difficulties and courage even when poised to undergo through physical pain, for example, circumcision. Life therefore is, but the creation of one's own effort, the will as it gives impetus to our actions. The will makes it possible even in the face of difficulties to find a solution. With a will, a people in a society have that sense of responsibility for all that they do.

In present Kenya, for example, there might be said to lack the will as it should show itself in the actions that Kenyans do. Many things are said but which seem to lack the impetus to be actualized. There is hue and cry as concerns the way drivers conduct themselves on our roads. Every new day the radios and newspapers announce deaths on our roads due to recklessness of drivers. They simply do not exercise courtesy. They lack a responsible will to, for example, acknowledge that human life is important. The economic loss due to such deaths never bothers the road users. In towns, at road junctions, near schools and shops and other places, the authorities to contain the recklessness of drivers have erected road bumps. Thus, the driver's reckless force is met with the

use of force in the erection of the bumps. Professor Joseph Nyasani clearly gives this lack of responsible will in the Kenyan population when he says:

The erection of bumps has brought one thing to light, namely; the inability of Kenyans to demonstrate a minimum basic sense of responsibility and concern for other peoples welfare²⁶.

Such lack of ethical will is also potrayed by the motorist who goes home at night and honks for his already asleep servant to open his gate. Nyasani says of such a motorist:

He is neither responsible nor considerate. He is selfish, oppressive and totally oblivious of other peoples welfare and comfort²⁷.

Such a delineation as given by Nyasani may in summary show that, will in a society is important if we have to achieve and engage in actions that are desirable in a harmonious society.

²⁶J. Nyasani, "Moral Implications of the Road Bumps" in the Standard. Nov. 18, 1987, p. 13.

²⁷Ibid.

A society where people consider the comfort of others. Lack of ethical will shows itself when a society always speaks of evils which recur again and again. This is the case as in Kenya's situation as concerns road accidents. A person should endeavour to find out the needs of others, acquire the skills in order to provide them (needs) as necessary for his own good and that of others. Thus, for example, only when people in Kenya will have that will to realize and learn that driving on the roads is a science and a science of grace for that matter will deaths be a thing of the past. Ethical will, will be manifest.

4.91: The Will and Akrasia

Having shown the importance of the will, that is, the ethical will as it relates to human action, I here now want to briefly show the relationship of the will and akrasia. We have argued that the will is the most important factor in the determination of the quality of our actions. Where and when the will is not there, the action resultant may be unsatisfactory. It may be an action resultant from wants which are

against the norms or judgements that a person makes. In such a case, we have said that this shows a failure of will or weakness of will. On the other hand, when a person acts as he judges, then he shows a will to assert himself.

In either of the two cases, we attribute a quality to a person's will. We in essence show that, strong and weak are just but attributes of the will, that for example, may belong to a person as he goes about to perform actions. In my opinion, the Competitivists and the Precisionists defined akrasia on the polarities. The Precisionists definition of akrasia is idealistic (utopian). It pictures man as always practical or action oriented. Akrasia is action. Man always sticks to his judgements. This definition ignores the aspects of the human person which may make his judgements remain at the intellectual or theoretical level. According to the Precisionists the disposition to act never falters. The will is such a stubborn factor that their ideal person always acts like a machine. The Competitivists definition on the other hand is exaggerated. Man is to a large extent very theoretical. Man simply does not act on his

judgements. This is to a large extent due to factors that are always opposed to reason. Man is always in conflict which prevents action. The will if there is very weak. This definition ignores the fact that man acts to some extent and is not always in conflict. Akrasia to the Competitivists means intellect or knowledge.

When judgements are acted on, this shows a strong will. When they are not acted on, then this shows a weak will. Thus, the will has both the qualities of strength and weakness. The will also has qualities of goodness and skillfulness. When the will manifests itself by helping a person engage in good actions praiseworthy actions, then this will is good. The way or approach to the actions manifests the skill of a person's will. Thus, Akrasia is nothing else than the will of the human person. It means both knowledge and action integrated for these components make the ethical will complete. This claim may be made clear by the use of analogy. When we say that Kenya is a rich country, then Kenya qualifies to be in the group of rich countries. Thus, we may identify Kenya with the rich. That is, Kenya means rich. Similarly, we have given the will as

the proper definition of akrasia. Knowledge and action make the will complete. They qualify it just like coffee and tea, for example, contributes to make Kenya rich, so does knowledge and action make the will complete. Thus, just like Kenya means rich, the will means akrasia. The will as a power or a disposition to act in a certain way may, depending on its quality, strong, weak, good or skilful, (which depend on the components, knowledge and action) make a person to act in a way that is consonant with his judgements or contrary to the same. Will as a disposition is a human feature. Indeed, akrasia is a normal human feature.

Akrasia is thus the will as delineated above. The definition we have given of ethical will is that, it is that will which depends on reason. This will will however be only complete when both knowledge and action are in operation. This means that when one

the proper definition of akrasia. Knowledge and action make the will complete. They qualify it just like coffee and tea, for example, contributes to make Kenya rich, so does knowledge and action make the will complete. Thus, just like Kenya means rich, the will means akrasia. The will as a power or a disposition to act in a certain way may, depending on its quality, strong, weak, good or skilful, (which depend on the components, knowledge and action) make a person to act in a way that is consonant with his judgements or contrary to the same. Will as a disposition is a human feature. Indeed, akrasia is a normal human feature.

Akrasia is thus the will as delineated above. The definition we have given of ethical will is that, it is that will which depends on reason. This will will however be only complete when both knowledge and action are in operation. This means that when one

of them is in operation we cannot talk of 'the will' and neither can we completely say that we know that akrasia is.

Even when one reasons, and has knowledge and can act, one also needs skill which is supposed to be the ability after reasoning to help in the achievement of desired results. The human person has desires, habit patterns etc. These are constraints that sometimes need to be overcome. There is therefore need for the activation and utilization of those aspects that have a tendency to aid the endeavour towards the achievement of our needs and this requires skill.

However, having a will and being able to reason is not all. The will even after reasoning may be directed towards the achievement of evil as in Hitlers Nazi Germany. Such a will has detrimental effects to the society. For ethical considerations therefore, the reasons must be good. A good will is that one which considers others and the self and is *able to sustain the resolution of a person to act* in a way that is consonant with good reasons and what is desirably good in the society. We may conclude by saying that if we know the will then we know

akrasia. Akrasia is the nothing else but the will. This suffices to show that man is neither purely theoretical or purely practical but a synthesis of the two. He is both action and knowledge. This is will, and this means akrasia.

4.92: Synopsis of the Chapter

Knowledge, intention and decision as criteria in both the Precisionist and Competitivists thesis were analyzed briefly but were left in favour of the will. The will was taken as the most important of the criteria in the determination of human actions. That is, whereas one has to have knowledge, make decisions and have intentions, they can only be translated into action if the will is there. The will as argued for, is the will as it relates to human action and what affects the society. Thus is the ethical will which is good for it depends on reason. For a strong society it was argued, ethical will must be there. The will was finally given as the proper definition of akrasia. In other words, akrasia means the will.

In chapter five which is the education component in this thesis, the significance of the will in Kenya's educational policy is examined.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.00: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WILL IN KENYA'S EDUCATIONAL POLICY

In Chapter four, we found that the will is an important factor in the realization of our endeavours. The will was found to consist of two components, namely, knowledge or understanding and action. This is if ethical will has to manifest itself in all that we do. In the light of this definition of the will, we shall in this chapter look at the significance of the will in Kenya's educational policy. Our purpose is to inbuild or construct a theory to our educaiton. This theory is constructed by the utilization of the definition given on the will.

In Kenya, there are varicus educational reports which represents our educational policy. These reports implicitly assume the will and this, is not very clear or explicit. We therefore endeavour to clarify the will in Kenya's educational policy. The documents used to delineate the educational policy are the Ominde Report (1964), Gachathi Report (1976) and the

Mackay Report (1981). In this documentary study, we consider the will as it relates to the economic values. The Commissions were appointed by the Kenya Government with the intent to review and recommend the best course of action to take about education and what it should do.

It is important that we be clear on what we mean by a policy. The concept of policy can be understood in two ways. First, it means a plan of action, statement of aims and ideals as aspired for, by a Government, a company or a political party. Second, it means a written document containing a contract of Insurance. It is the first meaning that is used in this study. Educational policy in Kenya, therefore, means a plan of action, directives, statements, propositions, goals and objectives which are initiated by the government through its appointed agents. These plans of actions and directives are directed in such a way as to have an effect upon the whole educational set up. That is, institutions and those involved in the process of education. Ominde, Gachathi and Mackay Reports being an output of such an endeavour are tangible as educational policy documents. They have reached

some general, though provisional conclusions (until effected by the government) about what the Kenyan people ought to and be brought to learn and achieve through an education process.

5.10: Analysis of Educational Documents

5.11: The Kenya Education Commission (Ominde Report
- 1964)

At the time of independence in 1963, Kenya faced a severe shortage of skilled manpower to assume the multiplicity of responsibilities that had previously been held by the departing whites. Thus, Kenya had to address itself to the system of education which would be in line with its needs and goals. In the light of these circumstances, the Kenya Government appointed the Ominde Commission. At this time, the major demand was manpower development. The Commission was in essence to address itself to the type of education system which would respond to rapid manpower development.

In its report, the Commission recognized the most important educational objective among others that; education was to subserve the needs of national development¹. Albeit this important role that education was to play, there was a most significant deficiency in Kenyan education. This was its failure to give adequate training in manipulative skills. Such manipulative skills are for example, woodwork, metal work, needle work, crafts like fine art and so on. Indeed, the education seemed to prepare the students for white-collar jobs. The Report asserts:

The secondary school has prepared boys for the clerical and administrative cadres of white collar jobs and has therefore come to be associated with an escape from arduous, and from agriculture in particular²

According to the Commission, the only way to supply the real needs of Kenya especially with regard to development was to have a much more

¹Government of Kenya, Kenya Education Commission. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1964), p. 25.

²Ibid., p. 68.

positive attitude towards practical and especially agrarian occupations. Indeed:

We believe that the economic significance of a new attitude towards manual skills is so great as to justify radical measures³.

Therefore;

We seek, then a freer access for the practical subjects to the charmed circle of secondary education⁴.

Practical education or education that invokes manual orientation is thus emphasized instead of theoretical education. This was a step towards a positive orientation towards agriculture as the principle industry of Kenya. This when combined with the most important education objective essentially shows that education is emphasized as a tool for economic development. This is clearly stated in the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965:

³Ibid., p. 82.

⁴Ibid., p. 69.

"At Kenya's stage of development education is much more economic than a social service"⁵

The change of theoretical education towards practical education was essentially seen in the light of possible economic development that would be resultant. Practical education especially as related to manual labour was vital for the worthwhile participation by the Youth in Kenya's development especially economic.

5.12: The National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policies (N.C.E.O.P.) - Gachathi Report - 1976.

A committee connotes a group of persons appointed by the government for example, and charged with a specified function. They attend to issues pertaining to education as in the case of N.C.E.O.P. . The committee was to examine the problem of education in the country since the first post independence education commission of 1964 launched the education system in Kenya.

⁵Kenya National Assembly, Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 39.

The Committee was constituted because it was apparent that ten years after independence there had emerged several problems. There was a large population of young people who were under-employed or unemployed. The argument put forward was that the expansion of education had produced raw products because of the lower quality education offered by the society⁶.

School leavers and their parents viewed education as the main if not the only way to success especially in acquiring white-collar jobs. To the school leavers, it meant that having an education was a way of escaping from the difficulties of village life. Education meant a well paid job especially in the Civil Service and more so in the offices. Such aspirations of the school leavers according to the N.C.E.O.P. was leading the school leavers to flow in great numbers to the urban areas. The N.C.E.O.P. observes that:

The education system has tended to be influenced duly by the white collar-job values of the modern

⁶H.O. Ayot, Understanding Social Studies. S.N. Mutunga (ed.) (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 1986), p. 28.

sector economy. There is now an urgent need for the education to develop and elaborate on these ideals of society to guide and enhance the adaptability of the Nation especially the youth to new and changing circumstances⁷.

To find ways of eliminating the white-collar job values, the Government was prompted to look at the progress of Kenya's development and the effect of education on it. That is, what had been achieved and what the education should do in Kenya's changed circumstances.

Education in Kenya is taken as a means of improving the well being of the people and society in general. Thus, education is believed to be a good. For a person to be educated, this implies a preparation for a meaningful role in society. Thus, the aim of the Government was to create a people who could more effectively aid in economic development. This commitment is highlighted in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry of 1971 when it asserts that:

⁷Government of Kenya, National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policies. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1976), p. 2.

Education must prepare and equip the youth of the country so that they play an effective role in the life of the Nation, whilst ensuring the opportunities are provided for full development of the individual talents and personality of the Nation⁸.

In the light of the good of the Nation and the individual, the N.C.E.O.P. proposes that one of the goals of education should be the furtherance of economic values⁹ which are vital in the development of Kenya. Education means readjustment of the values people have to be consonant with the needs of the country. That is, to re-orientate the hitherto held view that education is only for the modern sector employment, thus ignoring the sectors like agricultural. The N.C.E.O.P. asserts that:

One of the basic requirements is ... for the education system to impart new economic values and goals for young people and their parents, including

⁸Government of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry (1970-71). (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971), p. 146.

⁹Op. Cit., p. 11.

positive values for rural careers and local technological production¹⁰.

Education seemed to inculcate values that were in opposition to the idea of rural careers. Such opposition never augered well for the economy. The committee therefore, suggested that Kenya's education system should move away from theoretical education to production oriented education. Such education it is believed would facilitate self employment. The Report puts it thus, that practical oriented education is of more value than theoretical education and even practical laboratories or classroom exercises which are discarded after examinations have been done. Indeed:

Production oriented education and training would mean the installation of production units at educational and training institutions in which items would be made under conditions which stimulate real occupation conditions in which the student will eventually be productively self employed¹¹.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., p. 16.

The production oriented education, it is contended by the committee provide the opportunity for the students to use their initiatives in relation to the aspects of National development which they must contribute to. Thus, education and the training systems should amongst other things:

First, expose youth to productive labour and to eradicate negative attitudes towards work, especially manual work and second, make formal education induce the most appropriate and positive attitudes towards productive labour with special reference to self employment¹².

The solution therefore to unemployment and economic development should be felt to lie in practical oriented education.

¹²Ibid., p. 12.

5.13: Report of the Presidential Working Party
(Mackay Report - 1981)

This report was instrumental in the change of Kenya's educational system. Primary education was changed from 7 to 8 years and the 'A' level segment of secondary education scrapped off. University education was increased from 3 to 4 years. The system as developed is popularly known as 8-4-4 system of education. On the objectives of education, the Report says that education must serve the needs of National development. This is achieved when education is:

Aimed at enabling the youth to play a more effective role in the life of the Nation by imparting to them the necessary skills and knowledge and inculcating the right attitudes. In practice, however, formal education has tended to concentrate on imparting knowledge for the sake of examinations. Higher education institutions should therefore emphasize the need to relate all the attributes of learning to the real problems of society¹³.

¹³Government of Kenya, Report of the Presidential Working Party. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981, p.7.

What the report emphasizes is the need for education to be such that it changes the attitudes of those who pass through the education process. The learners are hoped to have eventually acquired positive attitudes towards practical work. Therefore, in the restructuring of the education system, the Report argues that education must be offered with practical orientation as recommended by the N.C.E.O.P.¹⁴

The vital thing behind the success of the development of Kenya must lie in men and women who are motivated by a sense of service and not driven by greedy desire for personal gain. They must be moved by the dynamic spirit of hardwork and self reliance. This will motivate the Government to inspire the people of Kenya to great and still greater efforts. This is for the betterment of their communities. It is in the hope that this obtains that education must aim at producing graduates who freely interact with the people, who live comfortably in their own society

¹⁴Ibid., p. 10.

in the rural areas. Graduates who are effective in serving all, are innovative, hardworking and committed¹⁵.

In the light of the recommendations given in this Report, the Government reacted by adopting the restructuring of the education system with a major emphasis on a practical oriented curriculum. The Ministerial Report on 8-4-4 system of education says:

The concept of 8-4-4 system is aimed at responding to the challenge of National development and the participation of the young in development. Previous reports on education indicated that the education system did not respond adequately to the needs of the country and its people. The new system of education is aimed at redressing this shortcoming¹⁶.

This solution lie in the provision of practical or work oriented curriculum. Indeed, such practical education would develop skills and attitudes which leads to productive activities. Specifically, the education received would enable the students to:

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 35-37.

¹⁶Government of Kenya, 8-4-4 System of Education. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1984), p. 1.

First, appreciate and respect the dignity of labour and second, develop desirable social standards and attitudes¹⁷.

The learner should therefore make positive contribution to economic development of Kenya. This is backed by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development in Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1986¹⁸. Education is emphasized as the tool for economic development between now and year 2000. Education should promote new skills (in manual work and agriculture in particular), the modern attitudes to labour and commercial entrepreneurship. The children in school will be farmers and the skills and attitudes so developed should be actively utilized in and applied to the economic growth of the country.

So, Kenya's education policy as concerns economic values is that, education must lead to production of a citizenry who should contribute to the development of the country. The behaviour of

¹⁷Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁸H.O. Ayot, Op. Cit. pp. 2-3 Cited from Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1986.

the citizens should be such that they act after the skills so achieved in practical oriented curriculum. Education means action.

5.20: The Will as Implied in the Educational Policy

The above delineation of Kenya's educational policy as concerns the economic values and their place in the development of the country has brought one thing to light. Education must contribute greatly to the achievement of the aims and objectives of the country. The policy emphasizes economic development of the country which encompasses the social welfare of the learners. The development must however be made through the change of attitudes towards manual work and agriculture in particular which contributes greatly to the country's economy.

The Reports as analyzed have one common line of argument. They emphasize the changing of negative attitudes of the learners towards manual work. The change of attitudes of the learners is important. This means working in those sectors which contribute to the economic welfare of the country. It also means employment since unemployment due to

white collar jobs values made the school leavers detest the blue-collar jobs, which are readily available.

When the Reports talk of attitudes towards work especially manual work, we may ask what they mean. The core concept is attitude. What is the meaning of attitude? The concept of attitude can be understood in two ways. First, it means a manner of placing or holding the body. For example, we may say that, Kamau stood there in a threatening attitude. Here it may be meant that Kamau stood there in an unfriendly way or he was ready to strike, hit or kick whomever his wrath is meant. In another expression we may say that, Njoki painted the model in various attitudes. This means that Njoki painted the model in various expressions. A change in body positions or facial expressions. Second, attitude means, way of feeling, thinking or behaving. For example, in asking a school leaver the question, what do you think about manual work? This is essentially a way of trying to weigh the school leaver's feeling about manual work. In asking this question we want may be to know the view about say, the hardships of manual work, is it satisfying like other jobs,

and so on. The school leaver may say that manual work is dirty. He/She may say that it is not for people with education. The answers reflect what values the school leaver has. These answers, or the behaviour manifest from the school leaver shows his/her attitude towards manual work. It is this second meaning that will be adopted to be the meaning attached to attitude as delineated in the educational policy.

The educational policy has shown that the behaviours and feelings the school-leavers has after receiving formal education is negative as it relates to manual work. When we talk of negative attitudes towards manual work, this means that the feeling and behaviours manifested by the school leavers show disfavour of manual work. From this, we may rightly say that, the policy in talking of negative attitudes mean that the school leavers manifest a weak-will as it relates to manual work. It is a will that does not respond to the situations as required. There were no readily available openings in modern-sector economy, the only openings being in the manual labour sector. The school leavers should readjust and readily engage themselves productively in

manual work which they do not do. This behaviour thus manifests weak will.

So, it is plausible to argue that the concept of attitude as is used in the policy means the will. The will that the school leavers have is weak. In saying that there should be a change of attitudes towards manual work, this means that there should be a strong and proper will to engage in manual work. A proper and strong will where a person must contribute to the welfare of the society is an ethical will as we found in Chapter four. With an ethical will, the school leavers would contribute to the economic development of themselves and the society as a whole.

The policy to curb the weak-will in the students, to promote the ethical will has emphasized a practical or work oriented curriculum. The curriculum emphasizes action on the part of the recipients. The policy contributes greatly to the improvement of the will in the learners who must help in strengthening the country's economy. The will is important in this respect to the country. In emphasizing action as the end of education. the policy shows the fact that without action then

human endeavour may be useless or reduced to nullity. In the emphasis of action as creation of the ethical will, the answer to the question whether our education had not prior to the work oriented curriculum given false hopes to the students, that is, that they would get white collar jobs which they find non-existent, is answered. With the ethical will, they should re-adjust to the new circumstances that they find themselves in, of false hopes, and engage themselves in manual work. Thus, the paradox of our education is solved by a change to a practical oriented curriculum which means action. This, it is hoped, strengthens the will to engage in manual work.

The will is implicit in the practical education given. This is because such education is supposed to make the students willing to engage in manual work. Thus, the education means will. But the will as given in the policy means action. The policy achieves a lot by realizing that action is important. This is a good contribution towards understanding the importance of the will in our endeavours. However, according to our definition of ethical will in chapter four, the ethical will to really manifest itself in all

that we do and our behaviours, must be composed of two components, namely, knowledge and action. That is, we need proper understanding of all situations that our attention is called for. There is also need for a movement towards realization of the situations. That is, we need proper understanding and action in order to realize our aims and objectives. The will is complete when we have an understanding of why we must act in a certain way and not as we have acted before and there is movement towards the actualization of what is expected of us. The will shows itself when we portray the will to know what to do and the will to do. We need both understanding and action if we have to count as actors or knowledgeable and also fulfil our human endeavours. If the two components are not there, then the will is not complete. It means non-realization of aims and objectives. What one may do may be very contrary to what is desired. Therefore, for an ethical will we should have an intellectual satisfaction or understanding as well as a movement or action on this intellectual satisfaction to count as contributors to the welfare of ourselves as well as the society.

The Educational policy as delineated is strong in the action component of the will. It emphasizes doing. This is the will to do. The will to engage in manual work. Thus, the policy understands the will as action. In this, we have said that the policy acknowledges the importance of the will in any society. However, the weakness of this policy is its understanding of the will. The will in the policy lacks the knowledge component. The will is thus incomplete and thus cannot be the ethical will. From the fact that this is a one component definition of the will, and the will is not explicit in the policy, we may say that the will in Kenya's educational policy is not clear. It (Policy) lacks a complete theory of the will as an important aspect in human life and which any education must be cognizant of completely.

The educational policy emphasizes the preparation for the achievements or ends as a good of the individual and the country. This is because it emphasizes action. To some extent the intellectual satisfactions of the means to achieving the ends is ignored. It essentially ignores the intrinsic value but emphasizes the

extrinsic value of the will and consequently education in relation to economic development. Thus, Kenya's educational policy is utilitarian in all respects. The emphasis is on ends and the good from the ends. P.K. Wainaina has made such a conclusion as above. He asserts:

After analyzing some educational policies formulated after Kenya attained its political independence it is realized that they are based on distorted version of utilitarianism¹⁹.

Education is seen as a preparation for ends as action rather than also for the development of satisfactory intellectual dispositions. For the ethical will to be explicit, the two components of knowledge and action must be given equal emphasis in Kenya's educational policy. By also integrating the knowledge component that is lacking in the understanding of the will, we build what is lacking in this policy. In doing this, we will inculcate into the learners both intellectual satisfaction which is internal as well as action which is external and will be manifest in outward behaviour. This way, the ethical will, will be

¹⁹P.K. Wainaina, "A Critique of Robin Barrow's Utilitarian Justification of Education" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1985), p. 187.

manifest in all that we do. Then, we will be able to accomplish our economic values.

5.30: General Recommendations

We have said that an educational policy must take care of both the action and knowledge components of the will. In Kenya's educational policy, we found that the will is understood as action and thus is based on only one of the components that make the will complete. In essence, it ignores the knowledge component. In view of this, a number of recommendations can be made in the areas of curriculum, teaching methods, education administration, planning, discipline and character formation.

First, we will consider the curriculum.

Curriculum is understood as a programme of activities designed so that pupils will attain objectives of education. Specifically, a school curriculum may be understood as a means by which the learner's behaviour is changed towards a desired direction. The school curriculum is understood as above. Thus, we find that, the subject curriculum for example, include, History, Mathematics, Geography, Physics, Biology, Chemistry, Social Education and Ethics etc.

The curriculum also includes objectives and methods.

Here, we will recommend on the approach to the achievements of the ends desired. The approach taken about the subjects is purely an emphasis on action. Students are expected to show by behaviour that they can perform certain activities. There is a behaviouristic approach to the curriculum. For example, in Mathematics, a student should show that he can add, subtract, divide and so on. This is in itself good as a way of evaluation, but the basic question is really whether there is a proper understanding of these basic concepts to some extent no. The practical orientation of the curriculum is evidenced by the objectives of various lessons. It is taken that lesson aims are stated behaviourally for this makes it relatively easy for the teacher to determine whether the learner can achieve the set goals or behave in a way that is desirable and to what extent. This is good, but the question of understanding still remains.

An example of a specific objective in a Mathematics lesson may make this clear. It may be stated thus: The student should be able to add and multiply numbers. The student will definitely show that he can add and multiply by doing this in the exercise book. In most cases, the students are

never told the difference between the addition sign (+) and an inverted multiplication sign (x) and vice versa. Neither are they told the difference between a cross and the mathematical signs. If and when these differences are given, the students understand the nature of addition of numbers and multiplication and their differences. They do not add like automatons but intellectually. Understanding aids in mathematics behaviour. However, the curriculum being action oriented does not aid to a large extent the understanding.

Emphasis on a purely work oriented curriculum as proposed in the policy ignores the intellectual aspect of education. This deficiency is reflected in all the subjects of the school curriculum. There ought therefore, to be a synthesis of knowledge or understanding and practice not behaviouristic over-emphasis in the approach to the curriculum. That is, we should not only be content to see the overt behaviours of the students, for they may be reproducing what we tell them without proper understanding. They may essentially portray the behaviours we want but not the behaviours that is resultant of good understanding and good teaching. We should not only give the

will to do as we want to be portrayed but the will to know and understand how to behave as desired. This way, the will to realize the ends and objectives through the school curriculum is taken care of. Each and every curriculum approach should encompass understanding or knowledge and action. What is learnt by 'doing' is not objectionable for it is also valuable in many ways. However, this is not enough justification for as we have already said, this is only one aspect of the will. To make the will complete in the curriculum, understanding should be catered for. This is because, curriculum should not only be just a question of whether what is learnt has a utilitarian end, it is also a question of intrinsic value and satisfaction. Thus, the conceptual structures as set in the school curriculum should be understood, and then they will be acted on as desired.

Second, we will consider the methods of teaching. By teaching methods, we mean the types of activities pursued by teachers and pupils together, in discussion, group work, surveys, demonstrations and so on. These activities are geared towards bringing about learning. In line with the objectives of education, where

education is practical oriented, then the objectives in the classroom and instructional strategies reflect this practical aspect. This is taken so as to fulfil the requirement of guiding the education to social and economic values or realities of the country.

Due to this emphasis on utility, this is imparted to the students through the presentation of materials by teachers. In most cases, expository methods, for example, lecture methods, demonstration and history methods are used in our schools. This traditional chalk and talk method is practised in primary, secondary and universities in Kenya. Students in this methods usually take a passive role. They normally get information that in most cases they hardly understand. In the final analysis they must show when evaluated that, they know. This they do by recalling and reproducing the full texts of the lectures in examination papers. In the end of it all they are said to have passed depending on whether they reproduced the texts or lectures as given or not. Students in schools and the university strive to recall, memorize what they have been given by the teachers in the hope of showing that they know. Recalling does not

necessary mean that a person really knows or he/she understood the content of a given course.

Methods used are such that, what is taught is also reproduced at the end of a course. In the University for example, what lecturers give must certainly be reproduced in the examinations. Lecturers are substituted for the textbooks. The aim of reproduction of materials as given by the teachers shows a deficiency in the teaching methods and evaluations that are used. They point to the fact that our methods create passive beings. They have no creativity since they do ^{not} understand the whys and hows of the content other than 'this and that' is what is required for the student to pass. The propositions to be mastered, the number of formal skills to be acquired and displayed are highly emphasized by the methods adopted.

As much as we must teach the display and formal skills that we must test, we must integrate both the expository and the heuristic methods in our teachings. In other words, we should balance the teacher activities with the pupil activities. For example, Discovery and Inquiry, Discussion

in groups where the teacher takes a consultancy position and so on. In discussion, for example, the students gain a deeper insight than, just what is presented in a lecture. The knowledge gained in Discussion stimulates critical thinking and this consequently must aid in what is observable, the art of problem solving. When we give students understanding, the action or behaviour that we want, will be easily accomplished. Students are able to give reasons for their answers, statements, methods they follow to come to conclusions and rules as in mathematics. Students are able to show the 'why' and 'how' of what they do. They move from the passive level of saying that they are doing something as the teacher did it. For example, that they are solving a mathematical problem as the teacher solved it, when asked why he/she has used the method to the solution.

In mathematics for example, students are taught problem-solving. The students reproduce this very articulately. Unfortunately, they do not know any mathematics beyond this. However, by also teaching mathematics by Discovery, by Discussion, Mathematical projects that emphasize

original thought, students are stimulated to construct and solve original problems. They are able to establish theorems with original proofs. They discover and state relationships in their own words. This way, we take care of both understanding and action in our teaching methods. We give facts and at the same time increase intellectual potency. There is then a better understanding of the nature of inquiry in our subjects and an assured doing of what the inquiry demands. Rather than the methods aiming only at a fixed final product, methods used should also take care of the intermediate effect of the process towards making of the desired product. They must make sure that understanding of what is taught takes place by varying of methods, not only depending on only lecture, history, methods or expository but also heuristic methods.

Third, we will consider Educational Administration. The concept of Administration can be understood in three ways. First, it means management of affairs. This is mostly so in public affairs and government policy. Second, it means, that part of government that manages public affairs. Third, it means the application of justice, an oath, a

sacrament, a remedy or a punishment and so on. It is the first meaning that is used in the understanding of the concept of educational administration. Educational administration means therefore, the direction, the control and management of all matters that relate to education. Direction imply leadership within the school and the community. Control and management are the means to the interpretation of educational policies and plans. In all these, the major purpose of educational administration is to provide the best possible educational programme for the students. Essentially, it involves both the human and physical resources if the plans and policies are to be put into operation.

Having understood educational administration as such, we ultimately see that in Kenya, the objectives and policies as found are such that the whole educational process is practical-oriented. In essence, this must emphasize, the direction, the management and direction of education such that the end as desired by the educational policy is achieved - more so, the utilitarian aspect or end. All in all, educational administration means action.

In Kenya, educational administration is mostly control, as viewed in most cases by those who are affected, teachers, students and everyone else. Mostly, the purpose is to make certain that everything is done in accordance with procedure. This involves the fact that the policy makers normally give orders of implementation of education plans and policies without first convincing at least those who are directly concerned with the education process, the teachers. Human relationship should be viewed as essential to understanding of what is required. Informing, consulting, persuading others from the ministerial level to the school is very important. The policy makers and the implementers learn, they understand what the plans and policies aim to achieve. When this happens, then a lot is achieved since there is proper interpretation to the plans of education. Educating and being educated helps in education administration. While administrators should be both coordinators and cooperators, they only assume the role of coordinators. They issue directives to be implemented and that is all. They normally emphasize plans and policies implementation without making them clear to those who are concerned.

Administration thus has put premium upon initiative, creative thinking and the will to experiment on the part of teachers. Teachers normally do not question what is told to them by the Headmasters. In most cases they do as they are told since if they ask the validity or the rationale of objectives and plans, then this means insubordination. Thus, a staff organization is developed which is passive, becomes a clearing organization, of implementation of policy, programmes that are not understood. The teachers carry on the action-oriented requirements of the policies to the students. This is reflected in the objectives and prevalent in the instructional methods used.

Education administration is unfortunately, directives, orders that are unquestioned, which are in most cases unclear. Yet, they must be acted on. In most cases, the policies are interpreted differently in different places of the country. Rationale of various undertakings should be made clear to those involved in education enterprise. As we have said before, education administration should not only insist on directives, control, coordination alone, there must be a coordination and co-operation in the policy makers

and the implementers. There should be explanation, consultation, intellectual persuasion, proper studies to see the impact of plans and their validity. When we do this, education administration achieves its ends. All those involved become creative in one way or another and contribute to proper control, management and direction of educational process. There is created the will to improve and implement the findings. When there is understanding of what is required and the final end of a plan or a policy, antagonism is removed and there is a movement towards the achievement of the required policy or plan.

Fourth, we will consider Educational Planning. The concept of educational planning may be understood as the application of rational and systematic analysis to education process to make it more efficient and effective. In Kenya, education is geared towards the production of a people who eventually are worthy in the contribution to the economic growth of the country. With this in mind, the emphasis has been on a practical-oriented curriculum. This is because it is believed that the school leavers after exposure to such a curriculum will engage in manual work. Prior to

this, education had been viewed as only for office work. Due to this view, it was felt that people must be changed. They must be given an education which prepares them to contribute in the other sectors of the economy like agriculture which contribute greatly to the country's economy. However, in this change as we have shown, such a change is based on only one component of the will, that is action component. Intellect is ignored.

In the planning of education, education must not be viewed from only the utilitarian or behaviouristic aspect, what the learners will do with their education. What they can contribute for themselves and the country. Education should also be so planned as to give intellectual satisfaction and serve utilitarian purposes. We in essence should plan to inculcate both intrinsic and extrinsic values in our learners. When we take care of both components, the knowledge and action components, we anticipate efficiency or the actions as desired but with a higher intellectual performance. Therefore, the economic contribution that the country desires is achieved smoothly. That is because the reasoning of such learners is at a higher level. They are creative and this creativity

when translated into action will be beneficial to the country. In this, we not only take care of the practical aspects that we desire in the learners but also their intellectual growth and creativity which is important for any nation.

In planning the aims and the needs of various educational plans should be convincing. Information must be adequate. This makes understanding of the plan in education possible. When this happens, then everyone makes effort for effective implementation. This takes care of both the will to know and the will to implement the education plan.

Fifth, we will consider discipline in schools. Etymologically, the concept of discipline is mostly rooted in a learning situation. It conveys the idea of sub-mission to rules or some kind of order. Discipline is in most cases connected with conforming to rules. Rules are used as guides to the student's conducts. However, from the utilitarian aspect of our educational policy, rules are taken to help in the deficiency in altruism of the students. They are taken to require the threats of coercion to encourage them to seek majority interests rather

than their own. In essence, the rules in our schools are seen as reinforcers to behaviour patterns of proven utility.

The students must follow rules in schools. They regulate their behaviour. Normally, when a student joins a school the first day, he/she is given a list of rules which he/she must follow for the rest of the days in the schools. This is more so in secondary schools. The rules for example, have the following form: One, In school A, toxic drugs are prohibited. Should a student be caught taking them, he/she is going to be suspended forthwith. Two, students should be in school by 7.00 a.m. and leave by 5.30 p.m. Three, Teachers in this school should be obeyed and respected, etc.

So, in our schools, the rules emphasize what the student should do and not do. These rules do not go beyond the 'shoulds' and 'should nots', they emphasize doing. The students are not given proper understanding of why the rules directed to them are important. The rule of coming to the school early - at 7.00 a.m. should, for example, be made explicit to the students.

The student should be made to understand the cumulative effect of being late for a lesson to his performance in school work, and the effect such lateness means to himself and the society in general.

The understanding of rules should be done through dialogue between the students and administration. In this, the students are able to ask questions about why of a particular rule and not another. This creates understanding of the necessity of rules and why they must be followed. This removes the possibility of the students of oppressors, who give out orders without justification of the orders. It appears to the students that the rules are not for his/her benefit but for those in the offices-the headmaster and the teachers.

At present, discipline is viewed as a facilitator for education. This is why rules are given and never made explicit for whom they are intended. The students are just recipients but not participants. This should not be the case for discipline. Discipline should be an educational

objective in our education. This means understanding and practice of a particular virtue as it relates to a particular type of a situation which is of a great practical importance. Discipline must therefore encompass both understanding and action.

Sixth and lastly, we consider character education. The concept of character is understood as having the courage, the will and skill to live up to those judgements, convictions and edicts that one finds enacted in the society that he comes from. Such edicts play a central role in his life. Thus, character involves consistency, coherence and control in the manner that the individual exhibits his actions. Character education must apart from telling the learners the goods that the society expects from them and how to do the right things, give the learners the skills as well as the will for proper conduct.

The 8-4-4 System of Education in Kenya has social education and ethics as a subject of study. This is a subject that is supposed to teach virtue. That is, what is desirable for people to be able

to live in a Kenyan society. This is a step in the contribution towards character education. However, this teaching of virtue should be based on the will. It should emphasize both understanding and action. When students understand, then with proper motivation they will translate such understanding into action.

What character education does require is proper behaviour. This behaviour may not obtain if we only tell the learners, 'do this', 'do that' without telling them why they have to do it. Character education should thus emphasize on initiative, flexibility, insistence, persistence and courage to face difficult situations and industry. This is important, for example, the concerns of Kenya are the welfare of its citizens. To realize this, this imperatively demands a continued exercise of both understanding and action. This is the ethical will. Ethical will must aid in the realization of desired virtues. It aids as an effort in the execution against possible obstacles that may hinder our endeavours.

In the social education and ethics syllabus, dignity of labour is one of the virtues that must be taught. For the students to realize the

importance of labour, then this requires an approach that shows the why and importance of labour and the incentives that are given in appreciation of what labour does to the country. For example, labour connotes mental or physical endeavour to change the environment. When it is understood that when a person works, he then contributes to his well being as well as that of his society, this acts as a motivation towards labour. However, he must be given the incentives to strengthen his will. In this, the understanding develops in the learners a sense of service and desire to improve the world they live in. When a person has already understood what labour means and that it contributes to the society's welfare, then the doing or accepting to work should ultimately be there. In the process of thinking and doing or acting, learners come up with creative ways that may improve the methods of labour. When monetary incentives are given, labour of any form becomes attractive and dignified. Coupled with the will to know how to improve labour methods and consequently to use them helps in dignifying labour. In other words, such labour is not relegated to the work of serfs. Such labour also shows itself as a contributory to economic development like the

modern sector. Teaching of virtue must therefore emphasize both knowing and acting not acting alone. In doing this, creative beings evolve.

In making these recommendations it is hoped that the will as knowledge and action is inbuilt into our educational policy and practice. In essence therefore, the one sided emphasis of the will in our education is corrected. This gives our educational policy a sound theory or foundation in the will which we found is a must for any society if it has to realize its aims and objectives. It means integrating in a balanced way, both understanding or knowledge and action in all that takes place in the education process, curriculum, administration, methods, planning, discipline character education etc. When we have a proper understanding of a situation, then we must act. In this, we ingrain the will to know what to do and the will to do. This way, we are able to realize our economic values among others.

5.40: Synopsis of the Chapter

The chapter has looked at the significance of the will in Kenya's educational policy. This has been done through the analysis of three education reports. They are Ominde, Gachathi and Mackay Reports. These Reports, it was argued, represent Kenya's educational policy especially on our study of the will and more so in economic values.

The educational policy was found to acknowledge the importance of the will in realization of the economic values. The will is defined as action because of the practical oriented curriculum emphasized in education. For this definition of the will as action, the policy was praised for giving one component of the will. However, this understanding of the will was found to be deficient since we had found that the will is composed of two elements, namely; understanding or knowledge and action. It was therefore found to be necessary to correct this one sided understanding of the will in the policy by also integrating understanding so that the ethical will is ingrained in the learners. This way, the

realization of all our endeavours is assured.

Finally, six general recommendations on integrating the ethical will as action and understanding in the educational policy are given. The recommendations cover the curriculum, teaching methods, educational administration, educational planning, discipline in schools and character education.

Chapter Six gives the conclusion to this thesis.

CHAPTER SIX

6.00: CONCLUSION

The thesis has thus far exposed the two philosophical positions as they inform the notion of akrasia. We have maintained that the two views on akrasia are polarities. We thus talked of the Competitive and Precisionist perspectives. The Competitive perspective was considered as the thesis while the Precisionist perspective was the antithesis. However, in order to arrive at an adequate definition, we resorted to a synthesis of these two. In so doing, we followed the Hegelian advice to the effect that to find the truth of the thesis and the antithesis we have to find a synthesis which takes the opposed views into consideration and comes up with a compromising position. Therefore, in the synthesis, 'the will' was found to be the compromising definition of akrasia. As 'the will', akrasia is therefore a feature that is normal in a human life.

The will is composed of two components, namely, knowledge and action. This will is the ethical will since it considers the human actions as they relate to virtue. The two components make the will complete.

As concerns educational policy in Kenya, the following conclusions are made; One, education in Kenya emphasizes practice. This is a good thing, but over emphasis on practice is wrong for the theory is ignored. Theory and practice should be the essence of education.

Two, the notion of man as always action oriented is over-emphasized and therefore wrong. Man is both theoretical and practical and should be viewed as such when designing any education for him.

Three, the will in our education is not explicit but implicit. The will is understood as action. This is good as the education realizes that the will is important in human endeavour. However, the understanding is based on only one component of the will. It is therefore deficient. The will should be understood as both knowledge and action.

Four, the education policy is based on an incomplete and improper philosophical foundation. This is because it is based on action component of the will. It should be based on both the action and knowledge.

Five, the will in any education as it encompasses both knowledge and action means an ethical will. An ethical will is important if any education aims and objectives as they relate to the needs of the country are to be actualized.

Six, to ingrain the will in our education, the will as action and knowledge should be reflected in: First, the curriculum should be both theoretical and practical. That is, it should take care of both the intrinsic and extrinsic values of education.

Second, educational administration should be an affair of both so-operators and coordinators. Educational administration should be a co-operative affair where both the policy makers and the implementers are participants in the administration of education. Administration should not be bureaucratic, just giving orders to be followed but

should also include clarification of what is intended to be achieved by the education given.

Third, teaching methods should be both expository and heuristic. This way, students understand better and act in an intellectual way on the content given. They develop a creative attitude towards situations as they demand their attention.

Fourth, planning of education should be such as to be both utilitarian as well as intrinsic. It should be planned as to elicit practical as well as theoretical manifestation in our behaviours.

Fifth, discipline should be seen as an educational objective on its own merit not just as a facilitator of education. It should call for a dialogue between the administrators and students to facilitate both understanding and action. It should give the will to know how to behave and will to behave.

Sixth, character education apart from telling the learners the goods expected of them by society, should give the skills as well as the will for proper conduct. Character education should therefore emphasize initiative, flexibility, the courage to face difficult situations boldly and so on. It should make learners understand the virtues as well as create the will to act on the virtues.

Finally, I hope that I have achieved what is considered as the essence of philosophy of education. That is, to bring to light and correct the assumptions which are concealed or taken for granted or made about education.

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL WORDS

- Akrasia - Greek term for weakness. The term derives from the Aristotelian distinction between the morally weak man and the man who can resist temptation.
- Teleology - A theory or study of purposiveness in nature characteristically, certain phenomena seem to be best explained by ends or aims, intention or purposes.
- Rational - A commitment to reason in one's actions, ideas or in behaviour.
- Non-rational - Not based on reason.
- Irrational - Basing of one's actions and opinions on feelings.
- Intention - A plan that one has; a purpose.
- Knowledge - A disposition to behave in certain ways, for example in the case of practical knowledge, to perform certain tasks successfully.

- Decision - An act of choice or judgement between alternatives.
- Action - A word sometimes applied to things (for example, the action of acid on metal) but primarily relating to the doings of purposive agents.
- Vilitation - An act of will preceding a physical movement.
- Disposition - A general tendency of character or behaviour.
- Attitude - A way of feeling, thinking or behaving.
- Will - A disposition to choose one's actions.
- Hegelian Dialectic - Dialectic is Hegel's name for the logical pattern that thought must follow. Thought must proceed by contradiction and the reconciliation of contradiction, the overall pattern being one of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

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