

KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

**CHANGING POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN KENYA AND
SOMALIA; 1963-2014.**

CASPAL MAINA MOMANYI

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Name: CASPAL MAINA MOMANYI

Reg. No: C50/CE/23746/2013

Signature.....Date.....

This thesis has been submitted for review with approval as university supervisor:

Dr. Susan Mwangi Owino

Department of History, Archeology and Political studies

Signature.....

Date.....

Dr. Lazarus Ngari

Department of History, Archeology and Political studies

Signature.....Date.....

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work with lots of love to my loving wife Joyce Moraa, my daughters Speicy, Fremernover and sons Spencer and Fernando. Your love and motivation gave me energy to sail through this academic ocean.

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To produce work of this nature, it requires the effort and advice of several individuals from various realms of life. However for pragmatic reasons it is hard to individually and personally thank those who through their input and efforts contributed to the successful completion of this job.

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ABSTRACT

We live in an increasingly interconnected world with a lot of potential and significant benefits to our everyday life. The rich complexity of international relationships (political, economic and cultural) provides a puzzle that we must endeavor to understand. Political relations among nations cover a range of activities which include; diplomacy, war, trade relations, alliances, cultural exchanges, participation in international organizations and so forth. Kenyan foreign policy has historically alternated between internationalist (regionalist) and isolationist moods. Instability in Somalia and the terrorist attacks of 2014 renewed public support for Kenyan intervention in the Somali conflict. Kenya's engagement in Somalia is founded on multilateralism instead of unilateralism. Therefore, this study explored the relations between Kenya and Somalia from 1963-2014. The study sought to understand the changing dynamics of these relations especially after the 1998 twin bombing of Kenya and Tanzanian US embassies and interrogate whether the emergence of *Al-shabaab* impacted on the relations between the two countries. The study achieved this by focusing on the following objectives: To explore the relations between Somalia and Kenya in the period 1963-1990: To examine the impact of the 1998 twin bombing on the relations between the two nations and finally interrogate the emergence and growth of terrorism especially *Al-shabaab* and its activities and how these have informed relations between Kenya and Somalia. The study was guided by: Securitization theory and Just War theory. The study employed Descriptive and Explorative research designs where interviews were used as the main source of primary data and as well as secondary sources of data. Target population was selected through the use purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. The findings indicated that the relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1963 to 1978 were very poor and between 1978 to 1990 the relations between the two countries were cordial. It was also established that between 1990 to 1995, the policy of free movement of people and goods between Kenya and Somalia existed but this changed between 1998 to 2006 when there were terror activities in Kenya and Tanzania. These created mistrust and tension between Kenya and Somalia thus complicating the relationship. The study also indicated that the emergence of *Al-shabaab* and the war of terror have reconfigured the relations between Kenya and Somalia since cases of insecurity in Kenya have increased leading to vetting of the Somali people seeking asylum or working in Kenya twice and also the country want the Somali refugees to go back to their country. This has really strained the relations between the two countries. The study is significant for policy makers and in particular those in the foreign relations docket as it will help inform policy formulation relating to how relations between the two states may be crafted.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
EAC	East African Community
IGAD	Inter- governmental Authority on Development
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HOA	Horn of Africa
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Center
UN	United Nations
NGOS	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSIS	National Security Intelligence Service
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
ICU	Islamic Court Union
NFD	Northern Frontier District
USC	United Somalia Congress

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Anti-terrorism: this means defensive mechanisms aimed at reducing vulnerabilities of targets to the attacks of terrorists that do happen.

Balance of power: this is a situation whereby the power of one or more states is used to keep check of another state or states.

Collective goods: these are tangible or intangible goods available to all group members regardless of their individual contributions.

Collective Security: Formation of a wide alliance of most major actors with an aim of coming together to oppose aggression by any actor.

Counter-terrorism: Implies forceful and offensive steps taken to prevent, respond and stop terrorist acts.

Dominance: A principle for solving collective goods problems by imposing solutions hierarchically.

Domestic Terrorism: This is a terrorist act that is planned and happens within national boundaries without targeting or having agents from abroad.

Foreign policy: These are all the decisions that are made on behalf of any given political unit.

Globalization: Refers to integration of the world in terms of communication, culture and economics.

Horn of Africa: This is the area in African continent that includes Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Uganda.

Humanitarian intervention: Use of force by a state or group of states aiming at stopping a humanitarian emergency.

Liberalism: A school of thought that emphasizes on one's rights, markets and democratic government.

Liberal imprudence: The idea that liberal foreign policy is susceptible to mood swings between excess interventionism and isolationism

International system: This describes how world nations are structured and organized by certain rules and patterns of interaction.

International system: This is an assemblage of states united by some form of regular interaction at international level.

Multilateralism: A process by which ends are sought through cooperation

Political relations - These are the social relations involving intrigue to gain authority or power.

Rational choice: An approach that aims to explain outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints

Realism: A tradition that explains international relations in terms of power

Responsibility to protect: Holding the government responsible for protecting civilians from genocide and crimes against humanity

Soft balancing: A realist theory that explains constraint action against a unipolar

Sovereignty: A state's rights to do whatever it wants within its own territory

Terrorism: This refers to a pre-meditated, violence that is politically instigated aimed at non-combatant individuals by sub-national persons mainly intended to influence a given audience.

Transnational terrorism: This is when a terrorist act happens in more than one state and may have clear international impacts.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

This chapter comprises of the background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, research premises, justification and lastly the scope and limitation of the study.

1.1 Background to the Study

We live in an interconnected world and no state can stand on its own. For this reason since the 1648 Westphalia Treaty, countries have continued to establish relations, modeled according to certain rules and patterns of interaction, for the benefit of peace. States may be vital actors in international relations but they are strongly influence by a number of non-state actors. These actors are called trans-national actors when they operate across international borders. Such non-state actor are United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), Civil Societies, *Al-Qaeda* and *Al-shabaab*.

Political relations are often conducted at a higher level of heads of states and governments. These would include presidents and their trusted senior confidants. Heads of states, heads of governments, foreign ministers or secretaries of state, parliaments, parliamentary committees, political parties are the most important actors making foreign policy decisions. These are the politically responsible decision makers, democratically elected or not acting internally on behalf of the politics they represent. They should be distinguished from a wider array of civil servants and experts who are also involved in the conduct of relations. In addition while these political actors are usually domestically based they are often in contact, even acting in consult with their

counterparts in other countries as well as with various governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations both domestic and international.

Implementation of foreign policy can be a purely a technical executive matter. For the most part however, it is as political and therefore as ethical a dimension as any other aspect of foreign policy “Hill Christopher” page 166.

Terrorism has become a global common since it violates fundamental human rights and freedoms and countries have had to deal with various forms of terror related activities. Since the year 1990, governments have thus set up funds to deal with this challenge. Terror threats have also impacted on relations between and among countries.

It was however the September 11, (2001) US bombing that changed the ways in which countries’ association have been articulated and negotiated. The bombing of the twin towers brought to bear the need for certain alignments and non-alignments. After the incidence, the former US president George W. Bush coined the phrase “you are either with us or against us”. This phrase still informs international relations today as countries strive to deal with the challenge of terrorism.

Africa was not left behind in the search for partners to help them fight terrorism especially against insurgency groups such as those in Nigeria like Boko Haram, Ogoni in the Niger delta and *Al-shabaab* in East Africa. In Africa, terrorism has resulted in fear, destruction and death. Anglophone countries of Africa as well as countries in the Franco-phone zone have all come together under the auspices of the African Union to discuss modalities of cooperating in the fight against terrorism.

Globally Kenya has related with several countries. However Makinda, (1983) notes that the foreign policy in Kenya is shaped by the need to attract more foreign capital, maintain security and safety within her borders, establish mutual or beneficial trade relations with her neighbors and build up a strong domestic power.

Okumu, (1977) contends that to achieve these objectives, the country has used two strategies which include the maintenance of dependence on the East Africa large market and dependence on security agreement signed with Britain.

Relations between Kenya and the United States of America (U.S.A) can be traced back from the famous airlifts that enabled Barrack Obama senior to study in Hawaii in the U.S.A.

Thereafter young Kenyans would travel to U.S.A to study (Ombonyo, 2015). The same views are echoed by Whitacker (2008) who articulate that Kenya has been an ally of U.S.A for a long time especially with the Kennedy airlift that allowed Kenyan students to study in U.S.A. After independence in Kenya, President Jomo Kenyatta and Moi worked on strengthening the relations through agreements that allowed U.S.A military to access Kenyan ports providing training and equipment to Kenyan troops. Since 1998 authorities in Kenya have worked with U.S.A officials in countering terror (Whitacker, 2008). On the same note, Blanchard (2013) observes that the U.S.A and the Kenyan governments have since 1998 cooperated in fighting terrorism. The cooperation has also been witnessed in giving of aid and technical support by U.S.A to Kenya with an aim of fighting international terrorism and Kenya being a host of U.S diplomatic missions in Africa. These relations have continued in the 21st century whereby for example in 2013 the governments agreed to cooperate in intelligence sharing, regional peace initiatives, security training among other areas (Ombonyo, 2015).

There are strong symbiotic relations in the areas of economy, politics and culture that Kenya and Britain share. Otenyo (2004) points out that the government of Kenya supports in the fight against international terrorism and this has enabled the British army soldiers to access unrivalled training facilities in Kenya and this has helped them to launch their military operations in countries like Afghanistan. In return, the British government provides additional support in Kenya on maritime security. As a result, this has improved military capabilities for both sides; allowing for concurrent jurisdictions.

Jackson (2006) notes that the two countries have signed a new security pact underlining the U.K and Kenya's resolve to tackle the shared threat of terrorism.

For instance, they are cooperating to fight against *Al-shabaab* who pose a threat to Kenya as well as other neighboring countries and restore sanity in Somalia (Namunane, 2015).

Germany and Kenya have for a long time shared close partnership based on political, economic and social aspect. Germany was the first country to recognize Kenya after it gained independence (Kleinberg & Hull, 2009). Furthermore, Kenya's regional political clout makes her an important partner in a crisis-ridden region. Thus, Germany has assured Kenya of support in the war against terrorism in the region and in turn, Kenya is one of the principal partner countries of German development cooperation (Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010).

In West Africa, Omatayo (2014) contends that Kenya has had bilateral relations with Nigeria for a long time. However, Kimani (2016) notes that political or economic relations between Kenya and Nigeria intensified under the regime of president Uhuru Kenyatta where several trade agreements and cooperation were signed between president Jonathan Goodluck, president Buhari and president Uhuru Kenyatta. For instance in 2015 the two presidents agreed for the

establishment of a joint commission of cooperation in 2015. Additionally, Ochieng' (2016) notes that president Buhari and Kenyatta jointly celebrated the lives of Kenyan soldiers who died in Somalia fighting terrorism at Moi barracks Eldoret. The author further notes that the two agreed to cooperate in areas such as trade, tourism, agriculture, education and technological cooperation. In addition Tignor (2015) outlines that in the 2013 the two countries signed treaties on oil and natural gas matters and pledged to address cooperation, radicalization and violent extremism and terrorism which are common challenges to the two nations. Other scholars such as Bienen (2015) have noted that trade cooperation between Kenya and Nigeria has been made possible with the launch of a five year business visa for the business people operating in both countries. The move is aimed at establishing a duty free zone in order to increase trade volumes.

Mutambo (2016) point out that Kenya and South Africa have entered into agreements that are aimed at enabling the two countries to cooperate in security, Defense, trade and investment. More importantly is the signing of deals in defense matters that will help improve the working relations between the two states in combating security threats. Additionally the agreements will enhance continental and regional security. Similar views are echoed by Fabricus (2016) who notes that relations between Kenya and South Africa had been dormant until 2016 when the two countries signed six agreements. These agreements aimed at improving cooperation of police and defense forces with an aim of countering terrorism, cyber security among other security related issues.

In the Horn of Africa, Oduogo (2005) writes that despite the diverse colonial background Kenya and Ethiopia traded with each other between 1963-1991. The author further argues that the security factor led to the mutual relationship between the countries. Somalia seemed to be a threat to Ogaden and Northern Frontier District of Ethiopia and Kenya respectively (Mahmoud,

2003). Accordingly, the presidents of the two countries, swore to protect their territories in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s and this would be fully achieved if the two countries cooperated. Basically security factor brought the two nations to cooperation.

Kenya and Sudan have had strong relations which started before independence of south Sudan in 2011 (Odhiambo & Mutuvi, 2014). The relationship was further strengthened when Kenya was involved in the Sudanese Peace Process that she played as a mediator on behalf of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). During the negotiations, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed which according to Fowler (2011) gave way for the referendum and eventual independence of South Sudan. The signing of the pact took place in Kenya and it remains a symbol for friendship and strong ties for the two countries. The relationship between Kenya and South Sudan has had a lot of benefits for the two states both economically and socially and for the stability of the Horn of Africa (Kayalo, 2012).

With regard to Kenya- Somalia relations, *Al-shabaab* element has been very significant in shaping how the two states relate. Through AMISOM, the Kenyan government has been at the forefront in the fight against terrorism and in particular in the attempts to dismantle the strongholds of *Al-shabaab* in Somalia. At the same time, the Somali government has collaborated with African military forces and stronger ties have in turn emerged in attempts to bring about human security in a region that geopolitically is considered important by the US and her allies (Otiso, 2009, Hoeffler, 2010 and Opongo, 2013). Rather than see a decrease in terror-related threats and activities by terrorist groups, cases of suicide bombing, bombing of public service vehicles and increased fear among many public vehicles travelers, in urban areas and social places became common places in Kenya. The epitome during Westgate attack which marked a new phase of terrorism, where people were held hostage for four days (Mutuma, 2014).

The increased cases of terror-related activities within Kenyan soil brings into sharp focus the need to revitalize the relations between Kenya and Somalia in fighting terrorism. This is because the Westgate attack greatly had a bearing on how Kenya began to relate with Somalia diplomatically. The government initiated diverse measures such as: refugees being hurled back into either the Dadaab camps or efforts at forceful repatriation. Eastleigh in Nairobi which was seen as a center for harboring terrorism was also constantly under surveillance as government soldiers fought suspected terrorists believed to have been trained in Somalia. This strained relations between Kenyans and Somalis living in and outside Kenya as Kenyans perceived all Somalis as terrorists while Somalis treated Kenyans with suspicion. Despite the strained relations, studies on emerging relations between Kenya and Somalia have largely been descriptive with scanty information. It is within this context that this study examined the political relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1960-2014.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Political relations between Kenya and Somalia have been shaped by five major events; colonialism, the secessionist attempts which gave birth to the Wagalla massacre, the collapse of the Siad Barre regime and the war on terror which saw KDF dispatched to fight the *Al-shabaab* militia inside Somalia. However there is very scanty information on how political relations between the two countries have unfolded over time and in particular how the 1998, 2001 and current *Al-shabaab* activities in Kenya have seen a strain of relations between the two countries.

This study is an endeavor in that direction. It sought to interrogate the changing political relations between the two countries from 1963-2014. It began by interrogating relations between the two countries immediately after independence especially with increased tensions between the Kenyan Somalis and the Jomo Kenyatta government. The study then proceeded to examine how

these interactions changed with the collapse of Siad Barre and the eventual bombing of the Kenyan American embassy in Nairobi in 1998.

The emergence of *Al-Shaabab*, and *Al-Qaida* affiliated militia stationed in Somalia adversely affected the relations between the two countries. Kenya dispatched a contingent of KDF group to deal with the terrorist group. But rather than reducing the cases of terror reported in Kenya since 1998, bombings, kidnapping and hostage related incidences have continued to be reported. The study thus concluded by discussing the ways in which political relations between the two countries have morphed and what this has meant for the war on terror. It also provides suggestions on how the relations between the two countries can be improved for the mutual benefit of the two parties.

1.3 Research objectives

The following research objectives guided this study:

- a) To trace political relations between Somalia and Kenya between 1960-1991
- b) To interrogate the impact of the collapse of Siad Barre's regime and the 1998 twin bombing of Kenya and Tanzania on political ties between the Kenya and Somalia 1992-2002.
- c) To examine the emergence and activities of *Al-shabaab* in Kenya and its implications on the Kenya-Somalia relations in the period 2003-2014

1.4 Research questions

The study sought to answer the following questions;

- a) To what extent did Somalia and Kenya relate politically between 1960- 1990?
- b) To what extent did relations between Kenya and Somalia change with the collapse of Said Barre and the 1998 twin bombing of Kenya and Tanzania?
- c) How has the emergence of *Al-shabaab* and the war on terror informed the relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 2003-2014?

1.5 Research Premises

This study is premised on the idea that;

- a) The relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1960-1990 were largely cordial.
- b) The 1998 bombing of Kenya and Tanzania generated tension between the two countries.
- c) The emergence of *Al-shabaab* and the war on terror has reconfigured relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 2006-2014.

1.6 Justification and significance of the study

Studies on relations between Kenya and Somalia abound (Munene2005, Mahmoud2010, Branch 2011, Halakhe 2014 and Ahmed 2014).Most of these studies of international relations however, are generally descriptive and hardly employ the historical method to analyze the relations. The scholars have also largely explained the economic and border causes of conflicts between Kenya and Somalia. Others have paid attention to the secessionist debates of the 1964 after the Wagalla massacre noting the deaths and suspicion that ensued between the Kenyan Somalis and the Kenyan government. Still others have focused more attention on Somali refugees in Kenya and in particular in Dadaab and Eastleigh within the context of globalization and increased threats

and realities of terrorism. Very scanty in-depth information is available from a historical perspective that focuses on the changing dimensions of relations between Kenya and Somalia. This study filled this academic lacuna by analyzing the transformation in relations between the two states in the period 1960-2014.

Very scanty focus has been given to the study of political relations between Kenya and Somalia. This study addresses this omission. The rise of a multiplicity of non-state actors in international relations over the past two decades has lessened the powers of the African state. The implications for the Horn of Africa, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the cold war in Europe were immediate. There was the stoppage of the Soviet military, political and economic support for countries like Somalia. This study puts different perspectives into historical context.

For over two decades now, Somalia has operated as a failed state. This study seeks to understand how a state like Kenya with full state apparatus can relate with a stateless or failed state. The study intends to understand the context in which a recognized state can relate with a stateless state. Most studies do not look at the political dynamics of such relations and the increasing role of non-state actors in international relations. Politics is about power. Very few studies have looked at relations from a historical perspective. The study traces changes in relations between Kenya and Somalia between 1963-2014.

1960 was chosen as the year to start this study since this is the year that Somalia gained independence thus emerging as a nation. The year 2014 is important based on the upsurge of terrorist attacks experienced in major towns. Between 2008 and 2015 *Al-shabaab* executed 272 attacks in Kenya. The major attacks in Kenya are given below:

NO.	DATE	LOCATION	CASUALTIES
1	October 2011	Down town Nairobi Grenade attack	1 person killed
2	October 2011	Nairobi Bus terminus bomb explosion	5 people killed
3	January 2012	Garissa Restaurant attack	5 people killed
4	July 2012	Garissa church attack	17 people killed
5	September 2012	Garissa attack	2 police officers killed
6	November 2012	Eastleigh attack	10 people killed
7	September 2013	Westgate Mall attack	70 people killed
8	May 2014	Nairobi Gikomba market attack	10 people killed
9	November 2014	Mandera bus attack	28 passengers killed
10	December 2014	Mandera quarry attack	36 people killed

11	April 2015	University of Garissa attack	150 students killed
12	July 2015	Mandera Quarry attack	14 people
13	July 2017	Lamu attack	A senior government official Mariam El Maawy was killed
14	August 2018	Lamu roadside bomb explosion	5 soldiers are killed
15	January 2019	Dusit Hotel Complex Nairobi attack	21 people killed

Somalia and Kenya are selected for this study because they have so much in common. The Wagalla massacre, the collapse of Siad Barre and the emergence of *Al-shabaab* with its base in Somalia has tremendously brought to focus on relations between the two states. Geopolitically, Kenya is strategically placed in the fight against terrorism. Relations between the two states are thus very important and crafting the parameters for the relations that would benefit the two states would be important. This work is therefore important for policy makers and in particular those in the foreign relations docket as it would help inform policy formulation relating to how relations between the two states may be crafted. It will generate literature for reference by future scholars on relations between states generally, Kenya and Somalia in particular.

1.7 Scope and limitations of the study

This study analyzed the changing dimensions of Somalia-Kenya relations in the period 1960-2014 and was based in Nairobi city which is cosmopolitan. However while the study was set to be done within this time frame and geographical space, where necessary the researcher went beyond this time frame and space to collect data to enrich this study.

For security reasons it was difficult for the researcher to go to Somalia .However, the study was limited in areas in Nairobi County where people of Somalia descent are concentrated including Eastleigh. However, where possible, the researcher went beyond Nairobi County for instance in Dadaab to collect data from the Somali refugees.

Additionally, sensitivity of the topic was a challenge. As a result the focus group discussions conducted were not many since many of the respondents' preferred oral interviews for confidential purposes. This was mitigated by informing the respondents that the work is purely academic. Another challenge encountered in this research was language barrier which was mitigated by the use of the services of two research assistants conversant with the language of the respondents.

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter reviews the existing literature in international relations including theory and methodology. It also deals essentially with principles, instruments, institutions and techniques of international relations as well as contemporary world politics, international terrorism, and radicalization studies as it relates to Somalia, Kenya and the Horn of Africa in general.

Kenya has had long standing conflictual relations with Somalia. The roots of the conflict can be traced to the Berlin conference of 1884-1885 declarations which demarcated Africa into international borders. Some Somalis found themselves in Kenya, Ethiopia and others remained in Somalia. Lewis (2002) points that the Berlin Conference gave Britain an area of influence along the coast and inland across Kenya, some parts of Juba land and the port of Kismayu was under Italians. The Somalis in Kenya were restricted to the Northern Frontier District (NFD). The quest by Kenyan Somalis to re-unite and live together in the larger Somalia was consistent during Kenya pre-independence and after independence". After independence, many Kenyan- Somalis inhabiting the Northern Frontier Districts in Kenya agitated to be merged into Somalia in 1962. They were supported by the Somalia government something Kenya was against. This diplomatic issue between Kenya and Somalia negated social-economic engagements between the two countries. The Shifta war of 1963-1968 pitting the Kenyan government against rebel Kenyan Somalis with the support of Somalia government allowed no diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia.

The coming into power of Siad Barre in 1969 witnessed the continuation of hostilities and the government suppression heightened leading to the Wagalla massacre of 1984 .The work of the author is relevant to the current study since it shows the historical perspective of the political relations between Somalia and Kenya. However, the study deviates from the current study since

it does not look at the current aspects that affect or even improve the relations between the two states which is also a main concern of this study. This is the gap the current study intended to fill.

Studying Kenya's foreign relations with South Sudan, Kayalo (2012) points out that Kenya and South Sudan have had strong relations which started before independence of South Sudan in 2011. The relationship was further strengthened by the role Kenya played in Sudanese Peace Process as a mediator on behalf of IGAD. The author further notes that during the negotiations, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed and it paved way for the referendum and independence of South Sudan. The signing of the agreement took place in Kenya and it remains a symbol for friendship and strong ties for the two countries. The relationship of Kenya and South Sudan has had a lot of benefits for the two states both economically and socially and for the stability of the Horn of Africa. However, the study was on the relations between Kenya and South Sudan whereas the current study examines the relations between Kenya and Somalia. It should be noted that Obama has a personal connection with Kenya.

Nzau (2016) Studying relations between Kenya and Britain points out that Britain is the most significant ally in the West to Kenya. The two nations have maintained friendly relations since independence and Britain remains Kenya's principal trading partner and its main source of military and economic assistance. The author further notes that for a long time, Britain has practiced quiet diplomacy with Kenya a policy it considers to bring about the greatest influence in Kenya. The author informs the current study on matters pertaining some of the significances of the relations between the two countries and also some of the historical perspectives of the relations. However the study looked at the relations between Kenya and Britain whereas the current study looks at the relations between Kenya and Somalia. This is a gap that this study intended to fill.

Studying U.S policy towards Kenya, Barken & Cooke (2001) points out that relations between the two countries in the 1960s were very uneasy due to Oginga Odinga's inclination to the Soviet Union. However, this changed in the 1980s when the two states signed an agreement to permit the Americans military to use Kenyan sea and air bases and in exchange Kenya to get economic and military assistance. The author further notes that the visit of president Obama to Kenya marked a milestone in deepening Kenya-U.S bilateral relations. The author informs this study as far as showing the transformation of political relations between the two states. However, the study mainly deals with relations between U.S.A and Kenya while the current study interrogated relations between Kenya and Somalia. This is the geographical gap that this study intended to fill.

Nyong'o (1995) points out that despite the fact that Ethiopia and Kenya have had different colonial backgrounds and different ideologies; the diplomatic relations remains good since the two states have cooperated well for more than two decades. The author further notes that some of the factors that have contributed to such good relations between the two states is the sharing of peace borders, security factors and trade, which have also contributed to the growth of the mutual relationship. The ideas of the author inform this study as far as showing some of the factors that have contributed to the growth of the mutual relationship between the two states. However, the study does not give a historical perspective of the diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the study mainly looks at diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia whereas the current study dealt with political relations between Kenya and Somalia giving a special eye on the historical perspective of the relations. This is the gap this study intends to fill.

Shay (2014) focuses on the dramatic events in Somalia since 2006 and the new opportunities for restoration of the country because of the "road-map", improved security conditions and the

potential for massive international support. The author notes that the crises in Somalia pose the danger not only to the Horn of Africa but also to the security and economics of the region. The work of this author shed light on the current study by informing on the effects of Somalia crises on different countries in the Horn of Africa. However the current study focused on the political relations between Kenya and Somalia that have been occasioned by the Somalia crisis.

Abdi (2014) focuses on Somalia and the Diaspora community. The author reflects on the Geo-history of Somalia during the last two centuries to identify the social- political and cultural related patterns that contributed to the civil war and the Spatial-temporal formation of the Somali diaspora in different countries. The author further studies how these changes have impacted on the self of the clan, religious and political leaders. He particularly focuses on the four terms (MELD-stadia) of dialectical critical realism.

In his book “Critical Realism: Somalia and the Diaspora community (2004) he also discusses the notion of philosophical meta-reality. This book equips new researchers with a simplified knowledge of critical realism which is essential in studying relations between states. Moreover it offers a step by step example of research using all levels of critical realism.

The issue of identity particularly tribal consciousness is very important in Somalia culture and the author looks beyond the current political factors in Somalia which are believed to be the main cause of the exodus of Somalia refugees to all corners of the world. The above author shed light to the current study as far as knowledge on critical realism of understanding relations is concerned through focusing on Somali relations with the diaspora. However the current study focused on political relations between Kenya and Somalia.

Max (2013) notes that terrorists' aggressions on the civilians, rarely force governments in making policy concessions. Max goes ahead to analyze the record of terrorist organizations and how they achieve their policy objectives. He asserts that the move of attacking civilians undermines the ability of terrorists to attain their target. He suggests the act of attacking civilians undermines the ability of terrorist to achieve their ends. The aims of terrorist aggression and attacks conclude that they only need to destroy the civilians and their societies and hence refuse to make concessions.

Target selection is a better explanation as to why the terrorists fail in their campaigns and they also do not often make to meet their objectives once they target to attack the civilians. Terror attacks on democracies often shifts the electorate towards the right. He argues that determining what terrorists want is the key to devising respective counter-terrorism strategies. The work of the above author informed the current study by providing an insight on terror activities and their impacts on the lives of civilians. However the current study focused on Kenya-Somalia political relations.

Agbibo (2014) points out that the activities of *Al-shabaab* accelerated in 2006 with the fall of Siad Barre. This created instability in the country leading to increase of militias and sending of peace troops in the country. Over the years, *Al-shabaab* has portrayed its capability in fueling violence through launching attacks in Kenya and other countries. The work of this author informed the current study by shedding light on the emergence and activities of *Al-shabaab* but failed to address the political relations that emerge as the result of terror activities. This is the gap that the current study intended to fill.

Ali (2014) articulates that due to conflicts in Somalia that are mainly fueled by *Al-shabaab*, influx of refugees have been witnessed in Kenya. As a result, the influxes of refugees in Kenya

have created a sense of fear and mistrust between Kenyans and Somalis. The author further notes that the Somali refugees have been pointed out as being avenues of circulating small arms and light weapons in Kenya leading to increased insecurity in Kenya. This work informed the current study by providing knowledge on the influx of refugees which is as result of *Al-shabaab* activities. However the current study focused on Kenya- Somalia relations by focusing on political relations between the two countries.

Mcknight & Anderson (2014) note that Kenya's war on terror in Somalia has been witnessed since 2011. This was when Kenya's armed forces invaded South Somalia with an aim of crushing *Al-shabaab* militia. This invasion has been noted by the authors of fueling wider political dissent within Kenya and also straining relations between Kenya and Somalia. The work of these authors shed light on the current study by informing on relations between Kenya and Somalia that have been occasioned by terror attacks. However, the current study deviated from their work by focusing on political relations between Kenya and Somalia without primarily focusing on terror.

Menkhaus (2015) points out that *Al-shabaab* is a major cause of violence in the Horn of Africa. The author notes that since 2008, *Al-shabaab* has expanded and deepened its network through assassinations, recruitment and terrorist attacks in Kenya. As a result, Northern Kenya has witnessed more violence from *Al-shabaab* in form of bombings and massacre of non-Muslims. Additionally, it is noted by the above author that in 2014 the *Al-shabaab* attacks in Kenya became intense threatening the security and general development in Kenya. The work of this author shed light on the current study as far as Kenya- Somalia relations are concerned. It aids the researcher in establishing how terror attacks in Kenya by *Al-shabaab* have led to strained relations between Kenya and Somalia. However, the current study deviated from the above work

through focusing on political relations between Kenya and Somalia and not necessarily focusing on terrorism.

Fergusson (2013) Points out the issue of Islamic terrorism also returned to the region with developments in the stateless Somalia. The poverty and instability of Somalia has contributed to the somewhat the unexpected growth of piracy in the seas off its coast. In a short time, the range of operations of the pirates extended to hundreds of miles offshore extending to the Kenyan coast while the number of ships attacked and in some cases seized for ransom rose to a level which led to new international action to try and keep the shipping lanes free. The search for state security globally has led to both international alliances and rivalries with terrorism emerging as a growing concern. The work of the above author shed light on strained relations between Kenya and Somalia as a result of terrorism. However the current study focused on political relations between Kenya and Somalia without focusing mainly on terrorism.

Andrew (2006) in his book “The Strategies of Terrorism” elaborates that terrorism usually works. The terror activities puts fear in target population and force the leadership to enter into concessions and provokes governments to react in manners that assist the terrorist cause. He succinctly puts it that terrorism tries to persuade audiences that the terrorists are committed to their cause. The strategies used by the terrorists include but not limited to provocation, spoiling, intimidation, outbidding, etc. They seek to explain terrorists’ choice of goals and strategies and the effectiveness of strategies chosen and how to respond to terrorism. They observe that terrorism is usually not senseless violence but a set of actions intended to achieve one or more political goals. They identify five goals that terrorists often tend to pursue namely; regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control and status quo maintenance.

They conclude by arguing that information is a vital part of counter-terrorism strategy. States with accurate information will for example avoid indiscriminate retaliation for terrorist attacks because they will have the information that enables them to discriminate. They also emphasize the importance of regime change. Democracies seem more susceptible to attrition and provocative strategies. Understanding the strategic logic of terrorism and intelligence gathering and target defense are parts of an effective counter-terrorism strategy which may help to do away with root cause of terrorism. The author informs this study as far as showing some of the effects of terrorism on the relations between states such as creating a strong bond between two states to fight terrorism or even to create enmity between two states. However the study does not look at other factors that can affect or even build a strong relation between two states which is a main concern of the current study giving a special eye on the political relations between Kenya and Somalia.

1.9 Theoretical framework

There are several theories that can be used to explain relations among states in the globe. Such theories include the dependency theory and the decision making theory. The study applied two theories to explain the wide range of relations between Kenya and Somalia. These were the Securitization theory and the Just war theory.

Graham Allison coined Decision –Making theory. This theory is concerned with how decisions are made. This theory has three models namely rational actor model, organizational process model and bureaucratic model, which help analyze foreign policy. Rational actor model assumes that the government knows what is good for the people thus choose the best policies for them. The bureaucratic model assumes that decisions are reached because of bargaining among the components of bureaucracy and decisions depend on the alternative powers of bargainers. In the organization process model, it assumes that decisions are seen because of several organizations only partly coordinated by government leaders.

From the above analysis, Decision-Making theory is concerned with how decisions are made by states. Therefore, it is considered inadequate for this study because it does not explain why different states relate. Thus the theory will be inadequate in explaining the continuity and changing political relations between Kenya and Somalia.

Ali Mazrui and John Galtung are proponents of Dependency theory. The theory focuses on the origin of under-development. According to the theory, under-development in developing nations is due to exploitation by developed nations and backward internal values (Hays, 1964). However, this theory is inadequate since it focuses on how the underdeveloped countries depend on

developed countries to survive. Therefore, it will be inadequate in explaining the continuity and changing political relations between Kenya and Somalia. Given the weaknesses of the above theories, the study made use of Securitization theory and Just war theory as discussed below.

1.9.1 Securitization theory

This theory of securitization can be traced in the 1990s and has since then emerged a major critical approach to the study of security. The theory is rooted and stemmed in the Copenhagen school conceptualization of security called ‘‘securitization’’. This theory initially came from the writings of Ole Waever. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan et al 1998)

The theory is a synthesis between constructivism and classical realism approach to security. It describes securitization as the inter-subjective and socially constructed process by which a threat to a particular referent object is acknowledged and deemed worth protecting. According to Bruzan (1998) securitization often consists three major steps namely; the identification of existential threats, emergency actions and effects of inter-units relations by breaking free of the rules. The components of securitization theory are; the securitizing agent, Referent being threatened that requires to be safeguarded and victims who are the target of the securitization act that needs to be persuaded and accept the issue as a security threat (Bruzan et al, 1998) views securitization as an extreme politicization thus is a process of making an issue to have urgency in dealing with it and if there is a failure to tackle it then everything will go astray.

According to Kihara (2013), Kenya defense forces (KDF) entered Somalia to fight *Al-shabaab* because of the attacks of kidnapping two aid workers at Dadaab refugee camp and many attacks perpetrated by *Al-shabaab* in Nairobi and other towns. These acts of terrorism violated Kenya’s territorial integrity and were a threat to Kenya’s social-economic well- being. Kenya as a state deemed the attack by *Al-shabaab* as a threat hence the reason to securitize it. The attacks had a

direct impact on tourism as it made tourists to view Kenya as an insecure place to visit as various countries including the United States and Britain issued travel advisories to their citizens to shun Kenya. Kenya was interested in protecting her people, their properties and her economy. In the case of Kenya's invasion of Somalia, the conflict was securitized as a societal problem that is human rights violations of innocent Kenyans and Somalis and even foreigners visiting the countries. The September 11th issue is a concern for safety and security of the people has taken attention away from economic factors.

Bruzan et al (1998) says that securitization is far from being open to all units and their respective subjective threats but rather largely based on power and capability. The Kenyan government used the power at its disposal to rally Kenyans and the international community to fight the *Al-shabaab* threat because this was the preserve of the government due to the restrictive nature of who to securitize an issue.

The KDF has continued staying in Somalia long even after the defeat of *Al-shabaab* hence has raised the question of lack of exit strategy by Kenya in a securitized issue giving rise to the question of de-securitization. The theory is significant in explaining how the perception of *Al-shabaab* as a security and social threat to Kenya led to the KDF invasion in Somalia. However the theory does not give a concrete solution to terror related threats facing Kenya. Instead according to Taurek (2006), it is a theoretical tool that can be used to facilitate practical security analysis. This inadequacy was reduced by the use of the Just War theory to explain the phenomenon of *Al-shabaab* in relations to the attacks in Kenya.

1.9.2 The Just War Theory

This theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought. It has its origin in Christian theology especially Saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. St Augustine referred to the bible by referring some wars as necessary to amend an evil. Thomas Aquinas came up with three criteria for just war that is:

- a) should be waged by a legitimate authority
- b) should have a just cause and
- c) Have right intentions.

Justification can either be theoretical or historical. Theoretical aspect is concerned with ethically justifying war and the forms that warfare may or may not take. Historical aspect deals with the historical body of rules or agreements that have applied in various wars across the ages for example, The Hague and Geneva conventions. Michael Waizer (1935) in his contributions insists on the importance of “ethics” in wartime.

The study used Just War theory as a vehicle to analyze the morality of the Kenyan intervention because the components of Just War theory clearly outline the morality of war by defining the pr-requisites for deciding to intervene, parameters for behavior while in war and appropriate actions at the conclusion of the war. The Just War theory provides clear standards and norms for Kenya proceeding with armed intervention and war.

In the recent past in the international relations, there have been concerns of ethical responsibility and justice in war. This focus has been precipitated by the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq led by the United States. The just war tradition is one of the several approaches to the ethics of war. Just war tradition recognizes that in times of war traditional ethics seem to be suspended in a certain sense and yet there are still ethical guidelines that should be followed in times of war. It

attempts to mitigate these horrors of war by providing an ethical framework for nations to determine whether or not it is right to go to war and for nations to govern their actions during a conflict.

The principles of a just war are: Having a just cause, being a last resort, declared by a proper authority, possessing right intentions, having reasonable chance of success and proportional to the means used. In October 2011, the Kenyan government launched operation “Linda Nchi”, an armed intervention in Somalia to counter the growing terrorist threat and impart stability and governance.

The study applied the classic Just War theory to Kenya’s decision to go to war against Somalia which is an application of the full classic Just War theory to a broad range of facts relevant to the war decision. Just war theory in the Western culture are those procedures set by Medieval European thinkers building on ideas in Greek and Roman writings for deciding whether a war is just or not.

The decision by Kenya to intervene in Somalia was a very lengthy and strategic decision and the government had coordinated the preparation for the intervention for months prior to actual invasion into Somalia in October 2011(Gettleman 2011).

The KDF entry into Somalia in 2011 illustrates an intervention that any neighboring state committed to the international rule of law would have found provoking. *Al-shabaab*’s aggression against neighboring Kenya posed an implicit threat to the security of the tourism industry in coastal Kenya. Visibly other liberal factors were also at work for instance *Al-shabaab*’s Sharia campaigns and its fragrant abuses of Somalia population had to be contained.

1.10 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

1.10.1 Introduction

The chapter provides methodology that guided the study. It contains the research design, the site of the study, the target population, and the sampling techniques. In addition it contains validity and reliability, data collection instruments, procedure in data collection, analysis of data, management of data and ethical considerations.

1.10.2 Research design

This study has adopted a descriptive research design to interrogate the relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1963- 2014. The design is very significant in that it allows for the in-depth collection of data ascertaining attitudes, opinions and feelings of the respondents as far as the relations between Kenya and Somalia are concerned.

1.10.3 Study locale

The study was carried out in Nairobi County in Kenya. Kenya's territory lies on the equator and overlies the rift covering a diverse and expansive terrain that extends roughly from Lake Victoria to Lake Turkana (formerly called Lake Rudolf) and further South East to the Indian Ocean. It is bordered by Tanzania to the South and South West, Uganda to the West, South Sudan to the North-West, Ethiopia to the North and Somalia to the North- East. The capital city is Nairobi. This city has been a target of terror attacks and its security agencies; Kenya Defense Forces, National Intelligence Service and the Kenya Police Service. Nairobi also hosts a number of diplomatic missions who include: Somali embassy, Kenyan ministry of foreign affairs headquarter, thousands of Somali citizens live in Nairobi, ambassadors and high commissioners have offices in Nairobi.

Nairobi County has seventeen constituencies for instance Makadara, Kamukunji, Starehe, Langa'ta, Dagoretti, Kasarani and Embakasi. The county has nine sub-counties, 27 locations and 135 sub-locations. The county borders Kiambu county to the north and west; Kajiado County to the south and Machakos County to the east. The county covers a total area of 696.1 Kms.

1.10.4 Target Population and sampling techniques

The study targeted people of Kenya and Somalia. More specifically, it targeted Somali embassy officials, Kenya and Somali citizens living in Nairobi, officials of Kenya's foreign affairs ministry, AMISOM, IGAD, UNHCR, Kenya Defense Forces, and the general populace of Nairobi. Nairobi is largely a cosmopolitan city with a very diverse population that is not only representative of the target population but it is easily accessible to the researcher.

Sampling techniques

The study used purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. Purposive sampling technique was used because the participants are considered by the researcher to be having the vital information for the research. Snowballing sampling was used in the selection of Somali immigrants and the youth to enable the researcher to easily access these particular groups which are not easy to access yet their contribution is of great significance to this study.

The sample size consisted of 103 respondents drawn from diverse gender, age and nationalities. The sample size consisted of 26 key informant interviews, 21 oral interviews and 3 focus group discussions. Each Focus Group Discussion consisted of 16 individuals drawn from different ages, gender and occupations.

1.10.5 Data collection instruments

The researcher used both primary and secondary data. The primary data of the research was mainly oral sources from the interaction with participants through interviews with individuals, FGD's and key informants. The secondary data has been found from a keen study of government documents, books, journals, newspapers, theses, conference proceedings and dissertations from Kenya National Archives and Kenyatta and Nairobi university libraries. Archival data were also utilized to form an important source of information. These will include political record books, government annual reports, handing over reports, personal letters, diaries etc. Other useful primary sources used include: visual and, audio materials drawn from the media.

1.10.6 Validity and Reliability

Triangulation method was employed to guarantee validity of the findings. Triangulation was seen appropriate as it allows the comparison of information gathered from different instruments. Triangulation involves the need to check and cross check using different approaches and methods as well as asking different people. The researcher also made use of mixed method approach of inquiry which combined both qualitative and quantitative. It involved the use of both approaches in tandem so that the overall strength of the study is greater than either qualitative or quantitative.

1.10.7 Data analysis

Data analysis began in the field to avoid loss of vital data. Tape recorded data was transcribed and then coded into themes.

The qualitative data was analyzed into themes according to the research objectives and the study periods. Analyzed data was presented in form of narrations followed by first-hand quotations from the primary source.

1.10.8 Data management and Ethical considerations

Transcription of collected data was done promptly to ensure no loss of information. Transcription is tedious work requiring a lot of time. It normally takes about six hours to transcribe a one-hour interview. Data display involved organizing and summarizing large amounts of information to enable the researcher analyze them. The logical outcome of coding is generation of themes or common ideas emerging from the data. Before the start of data collection, the researcher obtained the necessary permits from the relevant authorities. The respondents were then chosen on voluntary consent with their willingness to participate in this research and were informed that the research is for educational purpose and that their identity will not be revealed without their consent.

CHAPTER TWO

EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF POLITICAL TIES BETWEEN SOMALIA AND KENYA; 1960-1990

2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, we discuss the political relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1960-1990. However, it is significant to note that while this work is on political relations, it was difficult to separate this from diplomatic, economic and social relations. This is because political announcements have a direct bearing on diplomacy and economic engagements. Additionally to comprehensively address relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1960-1990, there is need to discuss the history and profile of the two nations before 1963. Accordingly, in the next immediate section we discuss the history of Kenya and Somalia. It is noted that the two states are located in the Horn of Africa and they border each other. Moreover, the two states shared colonial masters i.e. the British. In the same chapter, it is noted that Kenya gained independence in 1963 while Somalia gained hers in 1960. However, in the years to follow their independence, the two nations had sour relations over territorial boundaries. It is argued that the NFD was the major issues of conflict between the two countries in the period 1963-1990.

2.1 The birth of Somalia state; 1960-1963

Somalia is a country located in the Horn of Africa. Somalia consists of the republic of Somaliland in Northeast, Puntland in the North and Northeast and Southern Somalia or South central Somalia. Somalia is bordered by Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (Lewis, 2002). The country covers a surface area of 637,540 sq. KM with a long costal line of 2960 KMs, which has rarely been exploited. The country is semi-arid with a

number of plateaus and plains, few mountains and no permanent rivers called the Guan (Burnt land). The presence of the rains has brought many pastoralists into the plains to the west for pasture but in the arid areas of the South and East conflict over pasture is the order of the day. The western area called Haud with its rich pastures extends into Ethiopia's Ogaden Province which is a center of constant conflicts (Lewis, 2002).

A youth interviewed at Wajir revealed that fishing is one of the major important economic activities in Somalia (youth, O.I, 2017). Explaining this economic activity, an elderly Somali man interviewed at Eastleigh noted that the term Somali comes from two Somalia words *soo* and *maaal* which means go and milk. This is an indication that Somali people are traditionally, nomadic pastoral society who keeps cattle, camel, goats and sheep for both subsistence and commercial purposes (elderly man, KII, 2016). This agrees with History central (2016) which reports that the economy of Somalia as a country is principally centered on Livestock keeping, mainly camel, goats, cattle and sheep. In addition, the national encyclopedia (2016) notes that agriculture is the most important sector in Somalia comprising of 60 % of the Gross Domestic Product with livestock keeping accounting for approximately 2/3 of the total value of agricultural output. The only permanent rivers in Somalia are Juba and Shebelle. Furthermore, since the two rivers originate from Ethiopia, they have become a weapon by the Ethiopians who often divert the waters to avoid reaching Somalis' farmlands. The food and Agricultural organization (FAO, 2016) contends that Juba and Shebelle are Somalia breadbasket providing water for irrigation in the country. However, the two rivers have been used as a fighting tool between Somali and Ethiopia in their Trans boundary issues since they originate from Ethiopia.

Comparing it with Ethiopia, Somali is poor and only 15% of Somali land is arable. About 60% of the population is nomadic, 15% are farmers and the rest are urbanites. There are three ports

along Somali's coastline. Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, Mogadishu and Kismayu on the Indian Ocean (government official, KII, 2017). Berbera was built by the Soviet Union and is a military port facility currently extended to support the interest of the USA.

A government official interviewed noted that Somalia was colonized by three foreign powers which include Italians (South Somalia), British (North central Somalia and Northeast Kenya) and French (Northwest, now Djibouti) (government official, KII, 2017). His remarks agrees with Laitin, (1977) who notes that starting in the late 19th century, Somalia had fallen into the control of European powers which included Italy, France and Britain. Since the time of the Reconstruction of America in 1870s until WWII in 1942, Britain was able to take over the Italian parts of Somalia. However a university lecturer noted that in 1887, Britain became concerned with keeping the route to India open through the Suez Canal, which was opened in 1869 leading to Britain proclaiming Somalia as a British protectorate, British Somaliland (university lecturer, KII,2017).

In the early 20th century, uprisings challenged British control. Accordingly, scholars such as Hess (1966) have noted that in 1910, the British abandoned the interior of Somaliland controlling many of the regions that the British had left. Towards the end of the 19th century, Somalia took part in the general Somalia movement reaction in North Africa against colonialism. However, in 1899, Mohamed ibn Abdullah Hassan launched a 20 years rebellion against the colonial occupation (Retired general, KII, 2017). His ideas agree with Putman & Noor (1993) who notes that in 1899 Somalis launched a 20 years' war against the colonial rule in their country. Shill (2010) asserts that the movement took over most of the Somalia and became the first African nation that was used for flying warplanes by the British.

In 1935, Somali Youth League Movement and Fascist Italy, under Benito Mussolin attacked Abyssynia (Ethiopia), with an aim to colonize it (Lewis, et-al, 2008). A top government official in Kenya highlighted that the attack was not welcomed by the League of Nations and hence condemned, with very little attempts made to stop or to liberate occupied Ethiopia (top government official, KII, 2017). As such in 1940, troops of Italy that included Somali units, from Ethiopia attacked the British Somalia and successfully took over a Berber from the British (Lewis, 2003). This led to the British force to launch a campaign early 1942 from Kenya to release British Somaliland and Italian-occupied Ethiopia and conquer Italian Somaliland. In 1945, after WWII, Italy surrendered her control over Somali regions and Somalia was handed over to the United Nations (Lewis, 2003). However following the uprisings in 1949 the U.N. gave Somalia as a protectorate to Italy.

The province of Ogaden in Somalia was granted to the Ethiopian government that had just re-established. This was done by the British Kingdom, which kept British Somaliland under its rule. For one decade Somalia was regarded as a UN trust territory under Italian administration until 1960, when Somalia was granted independence, united with the former British protectorate leading to the formation of Somalia republic under president Aden Abdulla Osman Dara, Prime Minister Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke, and a 123-member National Assembly representing both territories.

A worker in the ministry of foreign affairs noted that, even with this independence, the colonial government failed to unify the Northern Frontier District (NFD) to Somalia in 1960s and this will later in 1963 generate a crisis between Kenya and Somalia (foreign ministry worker, KII, 2017). His ideas agrees with Njeri (2015) who contends that at Somali's independence the

British failed to give the Northern Frontier District back to the country leading to a boundary dispute between Kenya and Somalia in the years that followed.

It is important to note that Somali borders are all controversial since the country does not recognize the treaties that established these borders. It is significant to note that most of the boundaries in Somalia with her neighbors were drawn by the colonizers and the presidents of her neighbors (Lewis, 2003). For instance the boundary between Somalia and Ethiopia was drawn as an agreement between Emperor Haile Selassie and the Italians. On the other hand, the boundary between Kenya and Somalia was drawn by the British colonizers who failed to give the Northern Frontier District to the Somali land after independence in 1960s (Lewis,2003). Due to the fact that Somalia never participated in the drawing of these boundaries, the country has never accepted these boundaries and thus has ever sought all means to acquire its presupposed lost territories.

Accordingly, a Kenyan government official noted that after the creation of the greater Somali movement, the flag that came out have a five-pointed star as its main design. Each star apart of Somali people (Top government official, KII, 2017). Of these, two represent British and Italian Somaliland, which became Somalia and the other three points, represents the lost territories that are outside the border of Somalia. These include most parts of Djibouti, the northern part of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (Top government official, KII, 2017). Kenya World atlas (2013) assert that the five pointed star of unity in the flag of Somalia, symbolizes the people of Somalia origin found in Djibouti, Ethiopia , Kenya and the former colonies associated with the British and the Italians. In addition, the Research maniacs (2015) contends that the large five point star represents the five areas in the Horn of Africa that are occupied by the people of Somalia. These include British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, the Ogaden, Djibouti and the Northern

Frontier District (NFD). Somalia has often times attempted to gain these areas and the major conflicts have emerged in the Horn of Africa (HOA).

2.2 The emergence of Kenya; 1963

There are several versions that are used to explain the origin of the name Kenya, making the origin of the name quite unclear. Kenya was initially known as the British East Africa protectorate or British East Africa until 1920 when it was officially named Kenya (Waweru, 2010).

Parts of history have it that the name Kenya originates from the Kamba language corrupted pronunciation of Mount Kenya's traditional name, Kirinyaga and Kiinya. The mountain, from a far, appeared black on the side and white on its snow-capped glaciers and thus they named it Kiinya (the place of the male ostrich) which is black and white (Waweru) 2010.

Explaining the origin of the name, a professor of History noted that the name is linked to the words Kirinyaga, and Kiinya which are Kikuyu, Embu and Kamba names meaning God's resting place (professor, KII, 2017). Kenya is a country located in the African continent specifically East Africa. Kenya borders the Indian Ocean to the South East, Ethiopia to the North, South Sudan to the North West, and Tanzania to the South, Uganda to the West and Somalia to the North East (Unit & Britain, 1987). The climate of the country is as varied as the topography. Climatic conditions vary from region to region for example, in the Kenyan coast the climatic conditions are tropical humidity, and in the hinterland the climate is dry. Most regions in the country have two rainy seasons; long and short rainy seasons (K.I.I. 2017).

A lecturer in one of Kenyan universities noted that Kenya is not a homogeneous country since there are more than forty ethnic groups in the country (Lecturer, O.I, 2017). Majority of these ethnic groups are Bantus such as the Luhya and the Akamba. Others are Nilotes such as the Luo,

Kalenjins, the Maasai and the Turkana. The Cushitic people include; the Turkana, Rendille and Samburu. Around 13% of the Kenyan populations are non-African descent for instance the Arabs, Indians and Europeans (Juma, 2012).

A lecturer interviewed noted that the economy of Kenya is mainly agricultural which dates from the pre-independence period and is usually supported by the manufacturing sector (A lecturer, O.I, 2017). In the agricultural sector, maize is the principle staple crop along with tubers such as cassava and sweet potatoes. In this view the nation encyclopedia (2012) reports that although less than 8% of land is used for crop and feed production in Kenya, agriculture remains the primary economic activity in the country. In addition World Bank report (2005) indicates that agriculture accounts for 35% of the GDP in Kenya and constitutes 40% of the export earnings. Moreover, over 80% of the Kenya people engage in agriculture or food processing. The country also exports tea, coffee, cut flowers and vegetables. Tea exports provide the largest share of foreign exchange earning followed by tourism which is an important foreign exchange earner.

Socially, an elderly man noted that there exist division of labor by gender for example among herders, in the pre-colonial period men are responsible for caring of animals while women concentrated on trade among trading communities such as the Akamba (Elderly man, O.I, 2017). Majority of the women also concentrated more on the domestic sphere such as taking care of the children and fetching water. In addition, among the traditional communities in Kenya, polygamy was allowed and men could have five to six wives. On the advent of colonialism, this practice started facing opposition from the Christian missionaries leading to its decline. On matters of inheritance, property was passed from father to son among traditional Kenyan communities. Informal education was practiced before colonialism where boys and girls were taught basic

education skills by their parents and relatives. In addition, there existed different traditional religions where religious practices of various ethnic groups varied.

In a key informant interview with a government officer in Kenya, he noted that the origins of the colonial history of Kenya dates back to the Berlin Conference in 1885, when East Africa was first divided into territories of influence by the European powers. This agrees with Rosenberg (2004) who notes that the 1884-1885 Berlin conference was aimed at negotiating the question and control over the African countries. The author further asserts that out of this conference Kenya fell under British sphere of influence together with Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Ghana.

The British Government founded the East African Protectorate and soon after, opened the fertile highlands to white settlers (Government officer, KII, 2017). The key informant interview further pointed out that even before it was officially declared a British colony in 1920, these settlers were allowed to have a voice in government, while the Africans and the Asians were banned from direct political participation until 1944. His remarks agrees with Ochieng (1985) who notes that as early as before 1920, before Kenya would be declared a colony, the Africans and Asians had witnessed political discrimination. During this period thousands of Indians were brought into Kenya to work on building the Kenya - Uganda Railway Line and subsequently settled there, while inviting many of their kin who were mainly traders from India to join them (government officer, KII, 2017). Colonialism in Kenya came to an end in 1963 when Kenya gained its independence.

After critically examining the profile of both Kenya and Somalia, we now proceed to examine how the two countries related to each other after their independence.

2.3 Kenya - Somalia political relations 1963-1978

As noted in the foregoing discussion, Kenya gained independence in 1963 while Somalia gained her independence in 1960. Howell (1968) notes that at independence, Kenya's foreign policy was based on Non-Alignment, promotion of African unity and eradication of colonialism from the continent. Further, Kurgat (2000) observes that, Kenya's foreign policy focused on the preservation of its territorial integrity while joining democratic movements in Africa to eradicate imperialism, racism and all forms of oppression.

2.3.1 Artificial boundaries in the Horn of Africa

One of the major causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa is with regard to boundaries that were drawn during the colonial period. The boundaries in Africa were drawn arbitrarily and people of common origin and history were divided creating suspicion as they claim particular boundaries (Lewis, 1999). This has been the case in Ethiopia where Somalis have been fighting the Tigreans over the claim of ownership of boundaries in Elwak. In Eritrea, the case has been more complicated with Ethiopia having similar ethnic groups living in Eritrea and Kenya and Somalia over the Northern Frontier District (Selassie, 1980).

When Ethiopians defeated Italians in the battle of Adowa they also concluded that they had to acquire colonies in Africa. They entered into treaties with the governments that controlled neighboring territories such as France, Britain, Egypt and Germany. Lines were drawn and surveyed and the territories they went through unexplored.

The first to claim was Italy in 1896. This gave Italy great control over Eritrea and this has remained a conflicting issue with Eritrea arguing that they were part of Ethiopia. Menelik II would not have accepted to relinquish it to Italy (Mburu, 1999).

Makinda (1982) notes that in 1897 and 1902, Menelik II also signed treaties with the British, which defined borders with British Somali land and Sudan. In 1897 and 1908, he signed treaties with Italy clearly defining parts of the border between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland (Sheik-Abdi, 1977). The areas gained by Ethiopia had not normally been under Ethiopian control. It is in this context that Drysdale (1964) notes that all treaties were indeed vague and subject to varying interpretations since future negotiations were always accompanied by payment to Menelik II. Murphy (1990) contends that differing in treaty interpretation laid the basis for conflict in the Horn of Africa (HOA) with Somalia being the major player.

2.3.2 The Northern Frontier District and colonial boundaries

Between 1963-1967, Kenya Somalia relations were very poor. A county commissioner interviewed noted that the strained relations between Kenya and Somalia have historical genesis. It began when the colonial government failed to unify the NFD to Somalia in 1960 when granting freedom to Somalia (County commissioner, KII, 2017). Branch (2011) asserts that since the British colonial government and Kenyan nationalist leaders refused the demands of Kenya's Somali people to be allowed to join with Somalia at independence, the association between Kenyan and Somalis and the state has been uptight.

Farah (2009) observes that Britain had, for instance, sent a survey commission to the former Northern Frontier District in 1962 to survey the border. The team ignored the overwhelming support among the people for unification with Somalia. Instead, Britain granted Kenya independence in line with colonial boundaries, leading to the breaking of diplomatic relations with Somalia. Britain's interest in supporting Kenya was motivated by the interest of colonial settlers in Kenya.

After gaining independence, Kenya was also not ready to give up the NFD to join Somalia. A former politician interviewed noted that in September 1963 Kenyatta cautioned the colonial government against negotiating away the NFD, which the Somalia government was claiming (former, politician, KII, 2017). Since then Somalia has harbored claims of the part of Kenya's territory referred to as NFD. A former government official in Kenya noted that this posed a serious threat to Kenya's territorial integrity in the 1960s (former government official, KII, 2016). In this regard Branch (2014) notes that Kenyatta concentrated in protection of his regime from threats of military coup and looked to Britain for military support in the event of a coup or threat of invasion from Somalia

2.3.3 The Shifta war; 1963-1967

The tension between Kenya and Somalia as at this time led to the outbreak of a guerilla movement known as Shifta war launched by Somalia against the Kenyan security forces. A retired police officer noted that;

The Shifta attacks were through incursions and by means of voice of Somalia radio based in Mogadishu aimed at taking over the Northern East part of Kenya (retired police, KII, 2017).

The remarks above concurs with Kurian (1992) who notes that between 1963-1967, for a period of four years the group of fighters called *Shifta* launched an attack on the Kenyan army through incursions and voice of Somalia radio based in Mogadishu. This then implies that within this period the relation between Kenya and Somalia was marked with violence and wars. However in 1967 the situation cooled down with changes in the Somalia government (Kurian, 1992). However, from the findings, it was noted that no harmony was achieved since Somalia was never ready to denounce its claims over the territory.

2.3.4 The Somalia- Ethiopia war 1968-1978

It was further revealed that in 1967 the Arusha Declaration was launched. Kenya and Somalia under the representation of a vice president Daniel Moi and the Somalia prime minister met in Tanzania for mediation (County Commissioner, KII, 2017). The Arusha Declaration (1967) reveals that both Governments expressed their desire to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of paragraph 3 of Article III of the OAU Charter. Additionally the two Governments agreed to resolve any outstanding differences between them in the spirit of paragraph 4 of Article III of the OAU Charter. Also the declaration reveals that Kenya and Somalia have pledged to ensure maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing destruction of human life and property as well as to refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and the press against each other. The Somalis agreed to withdraw their claims and the relationship between the two countries improved up to 1975.

In 1977, Somalia went into war with Ethiopia. Somalia wanted part of the Ethiopia; Ogaden, which it claimed, was its territory under Italians. An oral source revealed that with this, Somalia organized guerrilla forces that harassed the Kenya and Ethiopian government officials (oral source, KII, 2017). This agrees with The Economist Intelligence Unit (1998) which notes that in 1977 Ethiopia and Somalia went into wars and Kenya stood to offer support to the Ethiopians. The Kenyan support for Ethiopia worsened the relations between the two countries. Kenya considers Somalia the aggressor.

Until that time Somalia was described as a Soviet "Client state" while Ethiopia was formerly a United States Ally in Africa. The two states then swapped their alliances for the superpowers in the middle of the resulting war with Ethiopia joining the Soviet bloc. The cold war for instance

represents a significant factor influencing Kenya-Somalia relations. The U.S.A and U.S.S.R viewed the Horn of Africa as a key battle ground of the cold war and the United States was convinced that the Soviet Union represented a greater threat to the Horn of Africa. For Somalia's political leaders, the cold war presented an opportunity for a small nation to exploit the Soviet-American rivalry in order to gain financial and military appropriation. "Both sides intensively deployed Soviet build bombers while Cuban advisors became involved on the Ethiopian side followed by the Soviet and the Israel machinerie's". Cooper Tom (2015).

With these provocation harassment received from Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia decided to adopt deterrent foreign policies. Makinda (1982) asserts that Jomo Kenyatta and Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie signed a defense pact. They closed their borders to Somalia and blocked the Somalia nomads from grazing lands and water. Although ostensibly formed by the two countries to protect and come to each other's aid if either were attacked, at the heart of the treaty was, and still remains, Somalia - their civil-war-troubled neighbor (Makinda, 1982). A former Kenya army noted that this action forced Mogadishu to come up with a policy of détente (Former army, O.I, 2017). Basically by the end of the day the Somalis were defeated and removed from Ogaden. Since then Somalia accuses Ethiopia and Kenya for a hidden agenda in Somalia since the pact between Ethiopia and Somalia still holds to date.

This led to the eruption of the past poor relations with the two countries. A government officer noted that the situation became worse when Kenya's relations with Arab nations worsened after Kenya seized an Egyptian plane transporting arms to the Somalia force (Government officer, KII, 2017). His ideas agrees with the African studies Centre (2016) which notes that the poor relations between Kenya and Somalia were worsened when Kenya's relations with Arab

countries deteriorated after Kenya apprehended an Egyptian plane carrying arms to the Somali forces. Arab countries were in support of Somalia during the conflict with Ethiopia.

However, 1978 marked a landmark in Kenya's history. President Kenyatta died and accordingly president Moi took over as the second president of Kenya (Tamarkin, 1979). With this in mind we proceed to discuss the relations between Kenya and Somalia under Moi regime up to 1990s when the Siad Barre regime collapses and Kenya becomes a multiparty state.

2.4 Kenya Somalia relations under Moi regime 1979-1990

2.4.1 Introduction

As noted in the foregoing discussion under the Kenyatta regime the relationship between Kenya and Somalia were very poor. However, under Moi government the situation changed. Perhaps this was based on the idea that foreign policies are personalized in away. This implies that how a county related with another one depends on the person in power. In this case, the top leaders in discussions are the presidents.

2.4.2 President Moi Foreign Policy on Somalia; 1979-1983

A former KANU official noted that Under Moi's regime, Kenya maintained foreign policy of good neighborliness. Non-interference in internal affairs of neighboring countries was identified as the foundation stone to all neighboring countries (Former KANU official, KII, 2017). The views agree with Maberu (2016) who argues that following in the footsteps of Kenyatta, President Daniel Arap Moi continued to follow the policy of 'good neighborliness while pursuing to carve and confirm Kenya's position as a sanctuary of peace in a turbulent region. This was a good strategy since Kenya stood to gain since it was more economically advanced. However, in the 1980s, Kenya went through an economic decline due to the oil crisis of 1979

and the collapse of the East African community. In this view, Hazlewood (1979) asserts that the East African Community collapsed in 1977 when the member states failed to approve the 1977-1978 budgets. This then implies that Kenya had to look beyond the East African Community (EAC) for its economic sustenance thus keeping good relations with all her neighbors had to be a priority. However, the events in February 1984 would make the relations between the Somalis in the NFD and other Kenyan citizens blurred.

2.4.3 The Wagalla Massacre; 1984

In the early 1984, there was a mixed clan conflict between the Adjuran and the Degodia leading to the intervention by the Kenya police force, Kenya army and the general service unit. Oywa (2011) notes that the roundup of over 5000 Degodia men of ethnic Somalia was due to their reluctance to surrender arms as their Adjuran counterparts had surrendered. An oral source revealed that although the government violated the rights of these men, the root cause was their reluctance to surrender weapons leading to security operation and later collective punishment at Wagalla airstrip (retired politician, KII, 2017). The Kenyan Somalis and the Somalis in Somalia have a common descent. They are the same people.

Surprisingly, the Kenyan government denied such act and only reported that only 15 people had been killed in a security operation (Anderson, 2014). The massacre created suspicion and mistrust between the Somalis in the NFD and Kenyans in general as the Somalis felt victimized and marginalized and more specifically the Degodia. Despite such, president Moi still maintained his political relations with Somalia as discussed in the next section.

2.4.4 Moi's visit to Somalia: Revived political relations

Events in the late 1984 indicated attempts of revived political relations between the two countries to an extent of the top leaders paying each other a visit. An oral source revealed that the tension

between Kenya and Somalia eased after president Moi made unprecedented visits to Mogadishu in 1984 to negotiate border claims and promote trade cooperation (former minister, KII, 2017). In this regard, the US department of state reports that as from 1981, the Somali Government and Kenya embarked on a reunion that brought discussions between senior Kenyan and Somali officials in May 1983, and a visit to Mogadishu by Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi in July 1984.

These efforts were successful and the relations between the two countries improved. An oral source revealed that President Siad Barre declared that he had no claim to Kenya's territory. To him, he had more important domestic problems that eventually forced him into exile and accelerated the collapse of Somalia (worker ministry of foreign affairs, KII, 2016). Her ideas agrees with Ghalīb (1995) who contends that at this time Somalia was faced with insurrection in the south, the operation of the Somalia national movement in the North, emergency of insurgent groups and poverty, challenges that needed immediate attention. In his visits Moi offered to help Siad Barre to find a peaceful solution to the dispute with Ethiopia. In a focus group discussion, workers in the ministry of foreign affairs noted that following this visit, many Somalia members of exile group responded to the government amnesty and returned to Kenya (workers in the ministry of foreign affairs, FGD, 2017). Additionally, the organization of these members in Somalia was closed down. A key informant interviewee noted that the following December, Kenya and Somalia concluded a border security agreement (Ghalīb, 1995). The following year, 1985, other top Shifta leaders responded to the second general amnesty bringing to an end the thirty-year period of war.

Despite these efforts, major landmark issues hit the two nations in this period. For Somalia, the government had become totalitarian and Siad Barre was facing resistance from other groups in

Somalia (Ghalīb, 1995). When the situation became difficult he fled to exile. A Somalia top official in Somalia embassy noted that Barre escaped his palace through Kenya in a tank (Somalia official, KII, 2016). This agrees with Clark (1992) who notes that in 1991 Barre was forced by his opponents to flee Mogadishu and eventually fled to Kenya and later on to Nigeria. This led to the collapse of the Somalia government. On the other hand, Kenya was facing multiparty politics heat. Present Moi was under pressure from both local and international actors to allow political pluralism in Kenya. In this regard, Throup & Hornsby (1998) notes that in 1990s, the west forced president Moi to re-introduce multi-partism. In early 1990s, especially in 1992, section 2A of the constitution was repealed, giving way for political pluralism in Kenya. With such events, changes were bound to occur in the relations between Kenya and Somalia in the subsequent years.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter sought to examine the relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1963-1990. However to achieve this profiles of the two nations were first discussed. It was noted that both Kenya and Somalia are found in the horn of Africa and that they border each other. Moreover, it was noted that Kenya and Somalia shares a colonial master (Britain). However, one unique aspect of Somalia emerged out. Somalia was colonized by three powers, which include Italians, British and French. It is because of this division that Somalia would later on have conflict with her neighbors over boundary disputes. This is because Somalia does not recognize any of the treaties signed during the formation of these boundaries. Additionally, it was noted that Somalia gained independence ahead of Kenya in 1960. However, the British did not give way to the NFD to Somalia at this time nor did the Kenya government accept to surrender the territory back after independence.

From the findings, it was revealed that in the period 1963-1978 Kenya relations with Somalia were very poor. The genesis of these poorer relations was seen to be the conflicted NFD in which each of the two nations claims to be hers. With such a conflict, Somalia waged a war against Kenya just the way it did to Ethiopia. This is what is famously known as the Shifta war. In 1967, Kenya and Somalia met in Tanzania to negotiate over the border disputes. This led to the coining of the Arusha declaration and the cessation of hostility.

In addition, it was revealed that when Somalia attacked Kenya and Ethiopian top government officials, Kenya and Ethiopia adopted a deterrent policy and closed their borders from Somalia intrusion. After the 1967 political relations Kenya and Somalia were normalized all the way until 1977 when Somalia invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Kenya offered her support to Ethiopia and this worsened the relationship between Kenya and Somalia. Additionally, Kenya seized an Egyptian plane carrying arms to Somalia forces. This worsened the relationship not only with Somalia but also with other Arab states that were sympathetic to Somalia. Eventually with the help of other international actors including the Soviet Union, Somalia lost to Ethiopia in this war. In the following year Kenyatta died and Moi took over power as the president.

It was also noted that under Moi regime, Kenya's relations with Somalia improved. In 1984, Moi visited Somalia and pledged to help Barre achieve a lasting peaceful solution to the dispute with Addis Ababa and the two agreed on trade cooperation, with Barre declaring that he had no claim over Kenyan territory. Following this, those who were in exile returned to Kenya and a security agreement was signed between the two nations. This marked a new chapter of cordial political relations between Kenya and Somalia.

However, at the end of the 1980s, the political landscape in the two countries was changing. Barre was facing resistance in Somalia and this led to him flee into exile through Kenya. The

above led to the collapse of the Somalia government. On the other hand, Kenya was facing the pressure to introduce multiparty politics and in early 1990s, Section 2A of the constitution was repealed and multiparty politics introduced. With these changes, changes were expected in the relations between the two countries.

In the next chapter, we will discuss the impacts of the collapse of Siad Barre regime and the 1998 twin bombing of Kenya and Tanzania on relation between Kenya and Somalia.

CHAPTER THREE

KENYA'S TIES WITH A STATELESS SOMALIA; 1991-2002

3.0 Introduction

As noted in the previous chapter in 1990 major political changes took place in both Kenya and Somalia. The Siad Barre regime in Somalia collapsed and Kenyan politics became pluralized. In the same period, and more specifically in 1998 the USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed. Accordingly, in this chapter we discuss the impacts of the collapse of Siad Barre's regime and 1998 bombing in Kenya on Kenya- Somalia relations.

3.1 The collapse of Somalia government 1991-1997

Towards the end of the 1980s, as Siad Barre begun to lose control over Somalia, the local political and economic elite came together to sign the Mogadishu pact that required Barre to resign. Accordingly, on 27 January 1991, when Siad Barre fled Somalia, the country was thrown into anarchy. A Somalia retired military officer noted that immediately, Barre fled from the country, the United Somali Congress (USC) set up an interim provisional government headed by a provisional president, Ali Mahdi (Somalia retired military personnel, KII, 2017). This concurs with Bradbury & Healy, (2010) who articulates that Somali's collapse was fastened when the cold war ended. Furthermore, as Somali's strategic usefulness to the West ended, the foreign assistance that helped the nation was no longer sent. Thus, without means and resources to keep the patronage political system of Siad Barre, the president lost control of the country and also the army. Furthermore, in January 1991, he was driven out of Mogadishu by the forces who got their support from Hawiye clans in South Central Somalia. Siad Barre fled the capital and also the country (Ambroso, 2002). Siad Barre fled his country through Kenya and eventually to

Nigeria. In a way this left an impression that Kenya was in support of the political leader that the country had wanted to do away with. In a way Kenya played a significant role in shielding Barre from his enemies as he left Somalia in anarchy.

Overly, the country became politically unstable and the central government was no more. In a focus group discussion, a Somali citizen noted that without the central government, Somalia was left at the mercy of warring factions (Somalia citizen, FGD, 2017). This concurs with World Peace Foundation (2015) which articulates that with the departure of Barre from the capital, one group of USC declared Ali Mahdi Mohamed as President whereas another group of USC led by General Mohamed Farah opposed the decision and as a result, a civil war erupted in Mogadishu between the groups. The author further points out that while violence raged in Mogadishu, other parts of the country were enveloped in fighting between clan based militias. The phenomenon of a failed state has drawn increasing attention due to the consequences of the collapse of order with a nation- state legal boundaries for a state's people, its neighbors and the international system as a whole. State failure can be defined in terms of ; stability, political order, state laws of its monopoly over the means of coercion, complete collapse of central authority and inadequate performance of social-economic functions. Failed states lack the functional authority to provide basic security within its borders. Somalia has been the prime example of a collapsed state. Currently the internationally backed regime of the federal republic of Somalia barely maintains a token presence in Mogadishu.

Bradbury & Healy, (2010) further points out that this period of Somali collapse is referred to as *Burbur* by the Somalis meaning catastrophe because the nation was disintegrated as a result of clan based factions and warfare that caused great havoc. The conflicts led to the killing of people, massive displacement and also disruption of the livelihood of agro-pastoral communities

resulted in a famine in the beginning of 1992. The chaos also gave rise to Somali refugees in Kenya (World Peace Foundation, 2015).

3.2 Refugee and proliferation of illegal arms in Kenya; 1992-1997

With political instability and lack of central government in Somalia, the relations between Kenya and Somalia would not be well explained diplomatically. In a way, the relations became silent. However, the chaos in the nation gave rise to the refugees with many fleeing to the northern part of Kenya (Agbiboa, 2014). A worker in the United Nations High Commission for refugees noted that many who fled to Kenya in 1990s settled in the Dadaab refugee complex (UNHCR Worker, KII, 2017). Her ideas agreed with the oral submissions of a worker in the department of refugees in Kenya who noted that many refugees in Dadaab complex in the 1990s were majorly of Somalia origin who came to Kenya following the events that led to the collapse of Siad Barre's regime and also after the collapse that led to the state of anarchy in Somalia (worker department of refugees, KII, 2017). This agrees with Hammond (2014) who articulates that the first significant refugee displacement out of Somalia to Kenya began with the events that would lead to the collapse of President Barre's regime in 1991.

An example of an event is the civil war in North-West of the country in 1988 which displaced very many people resulting into refugees in the neighboring countries.

Ali (2014) notes that due to the conflict and the collapse of the government in Somalia, the Somali citizens witnessed death, starvation and insecurity of the highest order forcing many to flee to Kenya with a hope of getting refugee. In addition, Hyndman & Nylund, (1998) notes that as the state of Somali began to fragment and collapse, people withdrew into their clans for

security even as warlords and clan militia leaders fomented hatred between themselves and their followers to further their quest for resources and power.

Therefore, violent clashes between clans combined with the effects of severe drought in 1992 sent people fleeing for a safe haven in the neighboring countries like Kenya (Ambroso, 2002). As such the cause of huge numbers of refugees leaving Somalia to Kenya was multifaceted in a number of factors. Such factors include clan conflicts, state collapse and drought. However it should be noted that all these emanated from the major political instability that had been founded on clannism in the late 1980s. According to UNHCR (1994) Kenya had hosted approximately 30,000 refugees in the beginning of 1991 but within the year, the number increased to nearly 300,000 refugees. From this period onwards, the Somali refugees have remained the most consistently protracted displaced population in the Horn of Africa.

PERSONS RECOGNIZED AS REFUGEES UNDER THE 1951 UN CONVENTION.

Country or territory of asylum or residence	Country or territory of origin	Year	Refugees	Refugees assisted by UNHCR	Total refugees and people in refugees
Kenya	Somalia	2014	424691	424691	424691
Kenya	Somalia	2013	475304	475304	475304
Kenya	Somalia	2012	512069	512069	512069
Kenya	Somalia	2011	517666	517666	517666
Kenya	Somalia	2010	351773	351773	351773
Kenya	Somalia	2009	310280	310280	310280
Kenya	Somalia	2008	259121	259121	259121

Kenya	Somalia	2007	192420	192420	192420
Kenya	Somalia	2006	173702	173702	173702
Kenya	Somalia	2005	150459	150459	150459
Kenya	Somalia	2004	153627	153627	153627
Kenya	Somalia	2003	154272	154272	154272
Kenya	Somalia	2002	155767	155767	155767
Kenya	Somalia	2001	144349	143180	143180
Kenya	Somalia	2000	137376	137216	137216
Kenya	Somalia	1999	141088	140886	140886
Kenya	Somalia	1998	164657		
Kenya	Somalia	1997	174119		
Kenya	Somalia	1996	171347		
Kenya	Somalia	1995	172164		
Kenya	Somalia	1994	206268		
Kenya	Somalia	1993	219049		
Kenya	Somalia	1992	285619		
Kenya	Somalia	1991	95887		
Kenya	Somalia	1990	330		
Kenya	Somalia	1989	320		
Kenya	Somalia	1988	680		
Kenya	Somalia	1987	140		
Kenya	Somalia	1986	110		
Kenya	Somalia	1985	90		

Kenya	Somalia	1982	80
Kenya	Somalia	1980	100

SOURCE: United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)

While this was happening in Somalia, Kenya was also thrown into post-election violence immediately after the 1992 multiparty general elections. An oral source consulted noted that Kenya witnessed ethnic clashes where ethnic group stage managed her own militia to protect her people (former Kenyan politician, KII, 2017). This concurs with Onyango (2014) who notes that Kenya experienced inter-ethnic conflicts during and after the 1992 multi-party general elections. These conflicts mainly occurred in Rift Valley, North Eastern, Nyanza, Western and some parts of the coastal provinces.

The concept of Jeshi (Militias) has taken roots in Kenya and the country had landed into political instability and chaos. In an oral interview, a university professor contended that the violence was widespread to an extent that even the use of illegal arms and small weapons was witnessed in the fight especially in the northern part of Kenya and the Rift valley (university Professor, O.I, 2017). Mwakikagile, (2007) agrees with the above statement pointing out that inter-ethnic conflicts in 1992 was politically motivated, ignited and fueled by unscrupulous politicians. Furthermore, the violence was also sparked by pure hatred and xenophobic fear among some people in the nation especially in the coast, the Rift Valley province and also the northern part of the country. The author further notes that weapons that were mainly used were for instance

guns, clubs with nails, machetes, arsons, illegal arms, bows and arrows. From the foregoing discussion one significant aspect stands out, the political instability that was witnessed by both Kenya and Somalia at the wake of 1990s and this affected the relation between the two countries (Mwakikagile, 2007).

A retired Army general explained that the beginning of the civil war in Somalia and the election violence in Kenya in 1992 saw a considerable proliferation of illegal arms and weapons which led to the destabilization of social structures and inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya (retired general, KII, 2017). This agrees with Menkhaus (2005) who notes that the civil war in Somalia in the 1990s saw a considerable proliferation of small arms across the southern border in Doble area. The main reason for this is because Doble area had high level of insecurity and banditry thus transporting illegal arms through the border was easy. Kiswii (2013) further points out that in Northern Kenya, the presence of illegal arms was strongly felt and was having wide range repercussions like clan conflicts and cattle rustling.

In some areas for instance along the borders, guns were so common that they were openly carried. Explaining the phenomena a border resident in North – East of Kenya noted that refugees from Somalia often came in with weapons, which they sold cheaply to the local population in Kenya thus precipitating violence in Kenya (Border Residents O.I, 2016). This agrees with Nation Reporter and Agencies (2011) which points out that due to the influx flow of refugees in Kenya, sophisticated weaponry found their way into the North - Eastern region of Kenya thus promoting banditry, cattle rustling and general violence in the region.

On the other hand, in the 1990s Kenya served as a safe haven for Somalia citizens who were fleeing their country. However, it is important to note that the consistent influx of refugees from

Somalia to Kenya's Dadaab complex led to the competition over resources with the local community. A Kenyan citizen remarked that:

Illegal Somali immigrants in Kenya were putting pressure on Kenyan government in the provision of necessities (Kenyan Citizen, O.I, 2016).

On the other hand, Somalia refugees noted that;

For sure settling in Kenya was not easy. The local people regarded us as intruders and competitors of their resources and at times conflicts were bound to happen (Somali Citizen, O.I, 2017).

The remarks from the two respondents above reveal that the influx of refugees into Kenya from Somalia affected the relations between the two nations. The Somali refugees in Kenya considered themselves marginalized and discriminated in Kenya, whose foreign policy since independence is at the interest of the nation's benefit. For the local communities near the Dadaab camp they considered themselves marginalized because the living conditions of the refugees was better than theirs since they got support from aid agencies and the government. This concurs with IRIN (2011) which points out that the influx of refugees from Somalia to Kenya led to competition of resources especially food and water with the local communities. Therefore, due to lack of food and water, many people even registered themselves as Somali refugees so as to be able to access free food brought by aid agencies into the Dadaab complex.

Hammond (2010) notes that in March 1991, Kenya hosted about 30000 Somali refugees although the Kenyan government was not ready to relocate them further into the interior due to security concerns. This is an indication that although during the Moi regime relations between the two countries were cordial, after the instability in Somalia, the relations were marred with

suspensions which were perhaps founded on the 1963-1967 Shifta war that intended to secede Somalia from Kenya. In this way, the government feared that relocating the Somalis inland would give them a strong chance to take over Kenya and more specifically the Northern Frontier District(NFD) which was a bone of contention between the two countries.

It is also important to note that from 1991 to 1995 Kenya and Somalia had a free movement of people and goods policy. Despite this, the relationship between Kenya and Somalia remained silent until 1998 when Kenya was hit by a terrorist bombing.

3.3 The 1998 Twin Bombing of USA Kenyan embassy and its impacts on Kenya Somalia relations

On seventh August 1998, Kenya and Tanzania witnessed a twin bombing on the United States of America embassies (Agbibo, 2013). For the first time the bombing brought Osama Bin Laden and his *Al-qaeda* group to the attention of the entire globe (Mutua, 2016). Explaining the preparation and the execution of the bomb, a top security officer in the Kenyan government noted that the USA embassy in Kenya was bombed as retaliation of the USA invasion of Somalia. In addition, he remarked that Osama Bin Laden bombed Kenya because he felt that the plan by USA to partition Sudan was being hatched in Nairobi and also the involvement of USA in restoring peace in Somalia in the 1990s (top security officer, KII, 2017). This concurs with Frontline(1998) which points out that the *Al-qaeda* conspiracy targeted the US government because the Kenyan government had apparently not supported Osama bin Laden after he left Sudan in 1995 but they supported USA in partitioning the country. On his part, an official in the ministry of foreign affairs remarked that Kenya was bombed since Bin Laden felt that the Rwandan genocide was hatched in Nairobi (Official ministry of foreign affairs, KII, 2017).

From the above it can be deduced that no matter the explanations given to why Kenya was bombed, one thing that stands out is, Kenya was bombed due to its association with USA thus the USA embassies were targeted. In away Kenya was used as a tool of fighting between Al-Qaida and the USA. Immediately after the bombing, the United States Bureau of Diplomatic Security added Kenya to its list of Anti-Terrorism Assistant Programme (ATAP) which originally was created in 1983(worker in NIS, KII, 2017). While this addition was formally to reaffirm America's commitment to fighting terrorism in Kenya, it nevertheless triggered the genesis of active bilateral anti-terror campaigns between the USA and Kenya.

A former worker in the department of disaster management articulated that the USA rapidly increased its monetary aid to Kenya (former worker department of disaster management, O.I, 2017).Blanchard (2013) concurs with the above remarks pointing out that Kenya was ranked among the top US foreign aid recipients in the world. Bilateral assistance has totaled more than US \$600 million annually in recent years. This was after Kenya was added to the list of Anti-Terrorism Assistant Programme to fight against terrorism in the world. Thus, the country received significant development, humanitarian and security assistance. Furthermore, the country even started hosting the largest USA diplomatic mission in Africa. This is based on the fact that the country is strategically positioned.

A worker in the Foreign Services Institute revealed that the new diplomatic relations between Kenya and USA impacted negatively on Kenya and Somalia relations (Worker Foreign Services Institute, KII, 2017). Campell, (2015) notes that after the bombing of 1998, Kenya inherited massive investment in the militarization of Horn of Africa by the USA in its objective of global war against terror which was affiliated to the Muslims after the Al-Qaida bombed the U.S.A World Trade Centre. This is because U.S.A was already regarded as an enemy to the Muslims

and Somalia and by collaborating with Kenya was regarded as an enemy especially to the *Al-Qaeda* affiliated groups.

The situation became worse when it was rumored that terror suspects in the attack of USA embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and on the paradise beach, hotel Mombasa in 1999 crossed the Kenyan Somalia border and used southern Somalia region as both a transshipment point and a safe havens in those attacks. A top official in the ministry of foreign affairs noted that with this information Kenya would no longer trust Somalia citizens either living in Kenya or travelling to Kenya. Even the free movement of people became limited. A worker in the African department in the ministry of foreign affairs echoed the same views;

After 1991 Somalia and Kenya has free movement of people and goods. This lasted up to 1995. However, there after the policy changed. More badly, with the mistrust posed by the 1998 bombing, the policy was never to be revived again (director of African department ministry of foreign affairs, KII, 2017).

The above remarks concurs with Long (2012) who articulates that in the 1990s, Kenya closed its borders at Liboi and Mandera due to fear of insecurity in the country caused by conflict in Somalia. As a result, the closure halted the movement of people, goods and services. Furthermore, Kiswii (2013) points out that this fear of insecurity was accelerated by memories of the Shifta war in the 1960s that waged secessionist wars in North - Eastern province supported by Mogadishu. This was because of Somali's claim of expanded Somalia into Kenya's North-eastern province.

Also, *Al-Qaeda* accepting responsibility for the attack also played part in the uneasy Kenya Somalia relation. Explaining such mistrust, a worker in the ministry of foreign affairs noted the

attack aimed at driving USA out of Muslim countries Somalia included (worker ministry of foreign affairs, KII, 2017). This concurs with Frontline (1998) who points out that the *Al-Qaeda* conspiracy targeted the US government because they opposed its involvement in the Gulf War in 1991 in the operation known as 'Restore Peace,' in Somalia in the year 1992 to 1993. Moreover, many of the suspects who were identified were Muslims and created tension between the Muslim and Christians in the two countries until in 2001 when the World Trade Centre in New York was bombed.

3.4 September 2001 attack on World Trade Centre (WTC)

Three years after the attack on the USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, on 11th September 2001, the world witnessed another terror attack in the USA (Goodrich, 2002). This was one of the most deadly attacks in the history of the United States of America. Four USA commercial airliners were hijacked by a Muslim movement, Al- Qaeda under the leadership of Osama Bin laden.

In his famous speech President Bush declared a global war on terror saying no distinction would be made between terrorists who commit terror and those who harbor them (Esses, Dovidio and Hodson, 2002). Briefly, one was either with the USA or with the terrorists. A former minister interviewed noted that after the attack of September 11, all the countries allied to the USA rallied to its support and Kenya was not an exception (former minister, KII, 2017). The remarks concurs with Elshain (2004) who notes that on September 11, 2001, President Bush declared a global war against terror in the world after the 9/11 attack by the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda*. Due to this, all countries in the world allied with this decision including Kenya. The global war on terror then turned to be global war on violent movements associated with Jihadists and those in Somalia and Kenya would not be spared. However, since then Al-Qaida also changed and expanded its cells.

The fight against Al-Qaida became complicated due to several cells that were born in different parts of the globe. An oral source revealed that fighting terrorism became complex since other groups based in Yemen, Iraq and Somalia became more active (ATPU officer, KII, 2017).The remarks concurs with Global Policy Forum (2011) which points out that the war on terror was a military campaign launched by the Bush administration to mitigate the acts of terror and strengthen security in the world. However, this war took a new turn creating fear and repression that created enemies and promoted violence in countries like Yemen and Somalia (Global Policy Forum, 2011).

A worker in the National Intelligence Service (NIS) noted that since 2001 Islam Jihadists travelled to Somalia for training while groups that pledged their loyalty to Al-Qaida also emerged. With this, the relationship between Kenya and Somalia became even more complicated (NIS worker, KII, 2017).The remarks concurs with The Guardian (2013) which articulates that war against terror created fear and repression that created enemies such as Islam Jihadists who went to Somalia for training. Due to this, it led to the creation of the *Al-shabaab* military group in 2006 which fought against the country's western backed government. Specifically with the emergency of *Al-shabaab* in 2006, terror activities in Kenya and Somalia affected the relations between the two countries even the years that followed. This agrees with Elstain (2004) who notes that due to the rise of *Al-shabaab* terror group, Kenyans view Somalis with suspicion for either being *Al-shabaab* militants and sympathizers. In a nutshell, the period after 1998 bombing created a sense of mistrust between Kenya and Somalia. Kenya was being regarded as a friend of USA who in the face of Somalis was an enemy.

3.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to explore the impacts of the collapse of Siad Barre's regime and the 1998 twin bombing on the relations between Kenya and Somalia. It was established that in the beginning of the 1990s, there were major political changes in the two nations; Kenya became a multiparty state while the regime of Siad Barre collapsed in Somalia.

The findings indicated that the collapse of the Somalia government paved way for anarchy and political chaos. Lack of a central government in Somalia would not allow Somalia to have any serious political ties with any state. From the findings, it was also revealed that in the period 1991-1995, there was free movement of goods and people between the two countries. However, the policy was terminated after 1995. Moreover, it was noted that the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia gave rise to an influx of Somalia refugees in Kenya. As they fled, others came with arms that were used to fuel fights among Kenyan ethnic groups.

Additionally the findings indicated the 1998 twin bombing of USA embassies led to silent and complicated relations between Kenya and Somalia. This was because Kenya obtained technical and military assistance from USA. Moreover, after the 2001 September attack of World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York the relations would be all time low. Those countries that rallied with USA were seen to be enemies of Yemen, Iraq, Iran and Somalia. These poor relations continued until 2006 when *Al-shabaab* was born.

In the next chapter, we discuss emergency of *Al-shabaab* activities and its impacts on the relations between Kenya and Somalia 2006-2014.

CHAPTER FOUR

TO SUPPORT OR TO REJECT: KENYA'S STRAINED TIES WITH SOMALIA IN THE CONTEXT OF *AL-SHABAAB*; 2006-2014

4.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we discussed the impacts of the collapse of Siad Barre's regime and the 1998 twin bombings of Kenya and Tanzania on relations between Kenya and Somalia. It is worth noting that in every relation that Kenya has with other states, Kenyan interests are at heart. This explains why the political relations between Kenya and other nations differ from one nation to another. Generally, relations between states are premised on different interests.

In this chapter therefore, we proceed to discuss how the emergence and activities of *Al-shabaab* in Kenya have informed the political relations between Kenya and Somalia. The chapter argues that increased *Al-shabaab* activities in Kenya and more specifically in the Coastal region, Northern part of Kenya and Nairobi County have led to fragile relations between the two states. Further we argue that the KDF entry into Somalia and AMISOM under the ICJ case with regard to the Kenya Somalia territorial sea, have created a huge sense of suspicion between Kenya and Somalia.

4.1 Militia and the Kenyan State; 2006-2010

Immediately after the 2005 constitutional referendum in Kenya, the cabinet in Kenya was dissolved and some ministers majorly had aligned themselves to the Orange (No) side were left out. As such from 2006, Kenya witnessed the re-ethnization of politics. Intensified politics based on ethnic grounds led to the emergence of the new militias and the old ones resurfaced. A

politician interviewed noted that with such climate, small arms storage and circulation by civilians intensified in Kenya with many of these being acquired from Ethiopia and Somalia (politician, KII, 2017).

It is against this background that the 2007/2008 general elections culminated into violence where militias played a major role in unleashing violence. With such climate of violence, for the warlords it became their right time to make proceeds from the supply of weapons. The external terror groups also used the same opportunity to recruit and spread their ideas across borders. After the violence in 2010, Kenya passed the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act (2010) as a strategy to curb militias. For example, the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act of 2010 indicate that a person who involves themselves in criminal activities as specified in section 3 of the Act, commits an offence and is liable to a fine of five million Kenya shillings or five years imprisonment or both (laws of Kenya, 2010). Furthermore, Ombati (2010) points out that the government of Kenya outlawed thirty three criminal gangs in 2010 with *Al-shabaab* being among them. Among the groups banned included for example the Amachuma, Sungusungu, Jeshi la Embakasi, Chinkororo, Jeshi la wazee among others.

Another law that came into play at this time was the Banking Law that was aimed at scrutiny of bank accounts and financial transactions to suspicious organizations, who funds them and how they use their cash. A government officer noted that most banks and Saccos that were negatively affected on by this law were the Somali and Muslim owned organizations operating in Nairobi and Eastleigh. Closure of such banks and finance institutions was regarded as marginalization and victimization of the Somalia citizens and the ethnic group in Kenya thus constraining the political, economic and social relations between the two countries.

Other policies include the Penal Code, and Anti-money Laundering law among others. These Acts hold it that it is an offence for an individual or an organization to engage in terror activities (O.I with a government officer, 2017). This is in agreement with Bradbury & Kleinman (2010) who note that for example the 2012 prevention of terrorist act criminalizes terror activities with provisions of a jail term of thirty years. However, despite such policies terror activities have been on the rise because the Anti-terror Acts after 1998 was not received well by Somali and Kenyan Somalis because it was perceived to target Muslims and their ventures in places such as Eastleigh.

4.2 Terror attacks in Kenya after 2010

Scholars point out that terrorism and *Al-shabaab* activities in Kenya have been on the rise resulting in insecurity in the nation (Hellsten, 2016). As a result, security measures have been put up by the government of Kenya for example through guarding of public places such as shopping malls. However, Hellsten (2016) point out that such measures and policies are at times in vain with immigrant personnels allowing illegal immigrants into the country without proper screening after being given bribes. This has been acknowledged as a great obstacle in the fight against *Al-shabaab*.

In an oral interview, a top security officer pointed out that the major terror attacks in Kenya include; the West Gate mall attack that claimed lives of about sixty-five civilians and injuring about eighty. Another terror attack included the Garissa university attack that claimed the lives of about one hundred and forty seven students followed by another attack in Mpeketoni (Security officer, O.I. 2017). This is in agreement with Hellsten (2016) who notes that after 2010 terror activities have been on the rise in Kenya with the West gate mall and Garissa University being the deadliest. However, Felbab Brown (2016) points out that despite terror attacks in Kenya

being claimed by *Al-shabaab*, often many of the assassinations and attacks are works of politicians, clans and businessmen. These individuals intimidate rivals to attack each other over contracts and land disputes. This then puts terrorism in Kenya after 2010 as multifaceted such that it is not exactly those behind some of the attacks.

Despite such dilemma, terror activities have often been connected with Somalis leading to difficulties in accessing travel documents such as Kenya- Somali passports further constraining the relations between the two nations. For example, in an oral interview with a Somali refugee it was noted that the Somalis are vetted twice while applying for passports due to the notion that the Somalis are generally secretive (Somali refugee, O.I, 2017). These remarks agree with those of Lochery (2012) who note that security and Kenyan immigration policies have tightened the screening process for many Somali's especially due to rise of *Al-shabaab*. However it is worth noting refugees have to go through a rigorous vetting process not only in Kenya but across the globe.

It is against this threat to Kenyan security that the then Kenyan grand coalition government released its KDF to Somalia to fight under AMISOM.

4.3 Proliferation of conflicts and the entrance of KDF into Somalia under 'Operation Linda Nchi'.

The civil war in Somalia, has led to considerable proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons, which has led to destabilization of the social structure and inter-tribal conflicts in Kenya. These findings agrees with Regional Centre on Small Arms (2016) which indicate that insecurity in Somalia is closely linked to the intense proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons due to the protracted conflicts in the region since Somalia's civil war. Additionally, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has escalated the conflict between communities

such as the Turkana and the Borana of Northern Kenya and it hassled to radicalization and recruitment of Kenyan Muslim youths to fight for *Al-shabaab* in Somalia (Helling, 2004).

Furthermore, findings indicated that the conflict in Somalia is the main cause of insecurity in the coast of East Africa and this acts as a catalyst leading to escalation of prices of goods in Kenya (Security officer, O.I, 2017). This agrees with Gilpin (2016) who contends that causes of insecurity in Eastern Africa have been attributed to violence and political instability in Somalia. These conflicts later spilled over as clans fought over control of resources such as pasture affecting their neighboring countries such as Kenya.

In an oral interview with a Kenya defense official, it was revealed that the piracy coming out of the collapse of the Somali state and subsequent anarchy in Somalia have affected the shipping industry and the security sector leading to Kenya intervening to fight and contain the *Al-shabaab* menace through sending Kenya defense forces troops in Somalia under AMISOM in August 2011. This operation came to be popularly known as the operation “Linda nchi (K.I.I, 2017).” Charles (2016) assert that KDF although operating under AMISOM has often been in the limelight with Ugandan, Rwandese and Burundi soldiers being heard minimally despite them being part of the operation. These views concur with those of Cheboi (2013) who observe that ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ that is conducted by the Kenya Defense Forces came into the limelight in 2011 and is very vibrant compared to other deployed security forces. Moreover, Odhiambo (2015) point out that this operation became a major land mark as far as countering global terrorism is concerned. This being the case, KDF has been central in keeping peace in Somalia with different persons having different views about the operation.

Additionally, scholars such as Atta-Asamoah (2015) point out that there has been heightened insecurity in Kenya since Kenya began deploying troops in Somalia in an operation named

“Linda Nchi.” As a result, *Al-shabaab* has been retaliating through terror attacks in the country with an aim of coercing the Kenyan government to withdraw the troops from Somalia. On the other hand, the operation has been noted successful by some individuals while to others it is a waste of time and resources. For example, a woman interviewed noted how a loss of her son in the Garissa attack affected her. She remarked that;

“I am a very bitter woman and were it not for the government keeping those officials in Somalia, I would not have lost my son. Do you know how it feels to lose a child after struggling so much to see them through school? I just pray that this wouldn’t happen to another parent like me because it is very devastating.” (A woman in Nairobi O.I, 2017).

With regard to the above remarks, Odhiambo et al (2012) further explains that series of kidnappings and attacks of Kenyan soldiers in cross- border conflicts raised concerns for the Kenyan government to protect the national security interest of Kenya. As a result, KDF were sent to Somalia with an aim of flushing out *Al-shabaab* from Kenya. However, from the findings it was revealed that although the KDF operations were aimed at providing a supportive role of maintaining security and peace in Kenya and Somalia, it has ended being politicized with Kenya being blamed of harassing innocent Somalia citizens residing in Kenya (O.I with a Somali man in Nairobi, 2017). These views agrees with those of Lochery (2012) who contend that residents of Somalia in Kenya have complained of being harassed by Kenyan police and use of excessive force in screening.

This has resulted in suspicion between Kenyans and the Somalis that have been heightened by terror attacks whereby reports of torture, extra-judicial killings and arbitrary detention of terror suspects, Somali refugees and Somali citizens have been rampant (Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom,

2015). For example a young Somalia man interviewed noted that he is often termed as an *Al-shabaab* due to the physical looks. He remarked that;

“Due to increased terror attacks in Kenya, our lives are always full of fear due to false allegations that majority of us are involved in terror activities. I cannot even board a bus peacefully without being viewed at with a lot of suspicion by *watu wa nywele ngumu* (Kenyans).”(Somali man, O.I, 2017).

From the above remark it can be deduced that some respondents view KDF as a source of misery rather than a peace keeping mission further heightening the suspicion between the two countries. This suspicion escalated during the regime of Uhuru Kenyatta as the president of Kenya. Accordingly in the next section we discuss KDF in Somalia under Uhuru regime and its impacts on the Kenya Somalia political relations.

4.4 Withdrawal or retention: The politics of KDF in Kenya and Somalia; 2013-2016

When the Jubilee government came into power in Kenya in 2013, several incidences of terrorism had been reported. For instance in October 2011 there was a terror attack on a Blue collar bar in Mfangano Street in Nairobi (Momanyi, 2011). As a result the government intensified war against terror and increased the number of KDF troops under AMISOM (Nduwimana, 2013). This move although aimed at reducing terror activities in the country, led to more terror attacks and more youth radicalization.

This period also saw heightened, suspicion between the KDF soldiers and the Somalia soldiers who were fighting *Al-shabaab* in Somalia. Explaining this, a KDF soldier who was in Somalia noted that for example in an incidence of massacre of soldiers in Somalia only KDF were killed. The Somali soldiers had escaped earlier thus raising the questions as to why the Kenyan soldiers

were not warned by their Somali colleagues. This raised suspicion between the soldiers in the two countries because Kenyan soldiers during that massacre believed that it was the Somali government that arranged the attack. A KDF soldier remarked that;

“Generally, there is mistrust; it is only that the presidents in two countries don’t want to declare it.” (Kenya Defence Force officer, O.I. 2017).

A member of the ministry of foreign affairs noted that the presence of the Kenya Defense Forces in AMISOM is an issue of contention too. He pointed out that perhaps this explains why the Somali parliament once voted that KDF should withdraw from Somalia and may be this explains why KDF soldiers were attacked alone during a massacre of KDF in 2016 January where 141 KDF officers were killed (staff ministry of foreign affairs, O.I, 2017). This assertion agrees with the world weekly (2015) which noted that about 160 Somali parliamentarians voted for a motion of removing KDF from Somalia arguing that the soldiers are involved in illegal charcoal and sugar trade and not fighting *Al-shabaab*. In the motion it was also argued that it was the plan of the Kenyan government to build a wall along Somalia Kenya boarder.

However, a Kenya defense official interviewed noted that in September 2015, *Al-shabaab* major stronghold of Kismayu was captured making the operations a success despite some citizens in Kenya and Somalia being against the operation (Kenya defense official, KII, 2017). These findings agree with Odhiambo (2015) who contend that some people have viewed KDF positively as a highly effective war machine due to the perseverance and the zeal to fight terror in a highly dangerous, uncertain and harsh region that has been without a stable government since 1991.

It was also revealed that during president Uhuru's era, the relations have become worse especially whereby the Somalis are blamed for radicalization and terror in Kenya. This is due to the fundamental Jihad teaching of Islam which advocates for holy war (O.I, 2017). This concurs with Helling (2004) who notes that attacks by *Al-shabaab* especially those that target non-Muslims have increased religious tensions in Kenya. From the findings it was revealed that the suspicions due to radicalization have escalated even in inter-marriages where Kenyans marrying Somalis are usually ridiculed (Kenyanman, O.I, 2017). This agrees with Tamuka (2014) who articulates that Somalis from war ravaged Somalia find it difficult to inter-marry with Kenyan Somalis. This is because some Kenyans view Somalis as loners and secretive thus do not often inter-marry and if they do the marriages are coupled with challenges such as separation. However, for the past few decades the Somali men could only marry their fellow Somali women but over the years the Somalis have started crossing borders and marry other women from other ethnic groups.

4.5 Kenya and Somalia in the International Court of Justice over the Maritime Border

Okumu (2010) observe that conflicts in Africa over resources are inevitable and Somalia and Kenya are not an exception. The Five star flag of Somali (Juba land, Somali land, Italian-Somali land, British Somali land and North Frontier District Somali land) has been mythically connected to fight over resources (Hesse, 2010). The relations between Kenya and Somalia is thus conflict laden due to fight over resources and competition especially on the Northern part of Kenya that according to the five star flag belongs to Somalia.

A top government administrator interviewed articulated that in the 21st century, the Somali people living in the Northern part of Kenya are reluctant to go back to Somalia unlike in 1963 when they were willing to go back (A top government administrator, O.I, 2017). Additionally, a

County Commissioner observed that the competition for resources was witnessed in the year 2014 when the Somali government took Kenya to the International Court of Justice over maritime border that divides maritime areas between Kenya and Somalia along the Indian Ocean (Lamu region). He remarked that;

“Typically, Somalia wants part of Kenya either the northern part or the coastal region and this has remained the major worry of Kenya. The Somalia government has made the Kenyan government to doubt the Al-Shaabab mechanism and the war against terror by Somalia. According to my opinion the terrorists receive government support from Somalia to destabilize Kenya with an aim of getting the above regions (A top government administrator, O.I, 2017).”

Echoing the same remarks, a lady in the ministry of foreign affairs observed that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case has not been finalized thus there is no excellent relationship nor is it hostile. This is due to the fact that Somalia has no legitimate government thus cannot hold any substantial diplomatic and political relations with any nation. Explaining her worry, she remarked that;

“If Somalia wins, Kenya would have lost a large section of its coastline. (A lady in the ministry of foreign affairs, O.I, 2017)”.

Menkhaus (2005) contend that Kenya and Somalia are in dispute over resources. This may explain why Somalia took Kenya to the International Court of Justice to solve the six year coastline border dispute, despite the two countries having agreed to solve the dispute outside court in 2009. This has worsened both the diplomatic and political relations between the two

states. This is based on the idea that it is difficult to separate economic, political and diplomatic relations as they go hand in hand.

In a focus group discussion respondents noted that the friendship that exist between Kenya and United States of America in fighting terror and specifically the *Al-shabaab* has constrained the relations between Kenya and Somalia governments. For *Al-shabaab*, who are suspected to be from Somalia, United States of America is an enemy and thus Kenya has to pay for collaborating with an enemy against *Al-shabaab* (Focus group discussion with Somali residents in Eastleigh, 2017). This agrees with Helling (2004) who notes that Somalis often feel discriminated due to the connection of Islam and *Al-shabaab* and argue that not all Muslims are terrorists as most people perceive.

4.6 The Daadab refugee camp question: Implications on Kenya- Somalia Ties

As discussed in chapter three of this work, most refugees from Somalia in Kenya live in the Daadab refugee complex in the northern part of Kenya. For over two decades, these Somalia citizens have stayed in the camp depending on aid from the UNHCR and protection from the Kenyan government. According to an official in the United Nations High Commission for refugees, Daadab camp was set up in 1991 and is a home of about 300,000 Somali refugees. However, since 2014 there have been attempts to repatriate these refugees back to their motherland, Somalia. In 2016, the repatriation question became so profound that it caught the attention of the international community. Explaining the major cause of such a move to repatriate Somalia refugees, a worker in the ministry of foreign affairs cited terror attacks being planned in the camp thus threatening the national security (worker in the ministry of foreign affairs, O.I, 2017). This concurs with Tanuka news (2013) which point out that terror activities in Kenya by

Al-shabaab have been attributed to high number of refugees in camps like Daadab and Kakuma. In addition Odhiambo (2015) points out that due to porous borders between Kenya and Somalia, over half a million refugees in connection with *Al-shabaab* militias have been accused of providing foothold for terrorists to operate easily. This has resorted into the idea of closing Daadab refugee camp which hosts about four hundred thousand refugees by the Kenyan government with members of the national assembly passing a motion to support this move.

The Somalia government did not receive this idea kindly citing that any Somali who lives in Kenya is not a Somalia citizen. On the other hand, the international community felt that Kenya was wrong to take back people to a country that has not stabilized. This put the government of Kenya in dilemma which in addition to terror threat cited the economic burden of hosting the Somalia refugees in Daadab refugee complex. This complicated the relations between the two countries. Kenya was left in dilemma on whether to send the refugees away or not. Explaining the situation on the ground, an official in the government during an oral interview hinted that the decision has been made that repatriation cannot take place but it has been kept as a secret (A government officer, O.I, 2017). Perhaps this explains why the entire repatriation question faded away and the Daadab refugee Complex is still operating in Kenya.

In a focus group discussion, it was observed that the refugee issue is a way of Somalia trying to take over the northern part of Kenya, which has been their motive historically. A respondent in the FGD remarked that;

“The question is why does the government of Somalia want Kenya to continue accommodating the Somali refugees in Kenya?” *hawa watu wanataka kuiba Kenya yetu* (these people are out to take over our country Kenya) (A focus group discussion with Kenyans in Nairobi, 2017).

From the above remark, it can be deduced perhaps Somalia has an intention of pursuing and reviving her historical claims over parts of Kenya. These are fears that cannot be fully ignored.

However, despite the constraints in the relations, a miraa trader in Nairobi noted that the refugee camps have been a source of revenue for both countries especially in the miraa business. He pointed out the export of miraa to Somalia that has boosted the Kenyan economy especially in the development of Meru County and Kenya in general. In addition, a Somali refugee student pointed out that, the Somalis in refugee camps take part in business and have invested heavily in business enterprises especially in Eastleigh region in Nairobi. With bitterness, the students explained that;

“The Somalis have bought half of the Nairobi city and run a number of businesses especially in the food industry. Consequently they pay tax in Kenya and employ Kenyans in their hotels and business. Somalia children pay school fee in Kenya. We Somalis are part and parcel of Kenya’s economic development. We are not a burden as some Kenyans perceive (A Somali refugee student, O.I, 2017)”

Perhaps, the above remarks explain why the Somalis are viewed with suspicion by Kenyans as discussed earlier in this section.

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we sought to examine the emergence and activities of Al-Shaabab in Kenya and how this has affected the relations between Kenya and Somalia. It was revealed that since the beginning of civil war in Somalia, there has been a considerable proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons, which has led to the destabilization of the social structure and inter-tribal conflicts in Kenya. As a result of the civil war, *Al-shabaab* menace has escalated and hit

the Kenyan nation tremendously leading to insecurity in various parts of Kenya. Moreover, Kenya has witnessed major terror attacks for example the west gate mall attack, Garissa university attack, Mpeketoni attack among others.

Additionally, as a result of the insecurity, the relations between Kenya and Somalia have been affected more on a negative note. As noted above, the two nations seem to have hiccups for example in issuing travel documents for the Somalis have become a problem since they have to be vetted twice, the International Court of Justice case against Kenya over the maritime boundary dividing Kenya and Somalia along the Indian ocean and competition over northern part of Kenya which Somalia consider part of Somalia and have even included it in their five star flag. The relations between Kenya and Somalia have had their highs and lows throughout the years.

In this chapter it was also noted that the Daadab issue has strained the relations between the two nations whereby some respondents noted that, the desire for Somalia to have their refugees prolong their stay in Kenya might have hidden motives of acquiring the disputed borders between the two nations. On the other hand, the Somali refugees view their stay in Kenya as a source of revenue for Kenya especially due to the miraa business. The above mentioned areas of contestation have thus strained the relations between the two nations.

In the next chapter we provide the summary, conclusions and recommendations of this research.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, we discussed the changing political relations between Kenya and Somalia. This chapter contains the summary of the findings. Based on the findings, the chapter offers conclusions, recommendations and suggested areas of further research.

5.2 Summary and conclusions

The major focus of this study was to examine the changing trends in political relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1963-2014. The two countries were chosen since there was scanty and fragmented piece of scholarly work on the relations between the two countries. Nairobi town was very significant to this study since it offered a cosmopolitan plural space upon which different participants would be interviewed.

In chapter one, the background upon which the study problem is contextualized, it was revealed that although a lot has been written about Somalia and Kenya individually, very little attention has been granted to the changing trends in the relations between the two countries. In the same chapter the objectives, questions and premises that guided this study were clearly highlighted. The significance of the study and the scope and limitation of the study was given too. It was noted that language barrier, the sensitivity of the study and the vastness of the two countries were major constraints to this study. However this was delimited by hiring research assistants, assuring respondents that the study was meant for academic purposes only and limiting the study to Nairobi. In the same chapter, the literature review was done to identify the study gaps that this

study anticipated to fill. The theoretical framework and the methodology that guided the study were also discussed.

In chapter two, the study examined the nature of relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1963-1990. It was noted that both Kenya and Somalia are found in the Horn of Africa and that they border each other. Moreover, it was noted that Kenya and Somalia share a colonial master (Britain). However, one unique aspect of Somalia emerged out. Somalia was colonized by three powers, which include Italy, Britain and France. It is because of this division that Somalia would later on have conflict with her neighbors over boundary disputes. Additionally, it was noted that Somalia gained independence ahead of Kenya in 1960. However, the British did not give way the Northern Frontier District (NFD) to Somalia at this time nor did the Kenya government accept to surrender the territory back after independence.

Moreover, it was revealed that in the period 1963-1978 Kenya's relations with Somalia were very poor. The genesis of these poorer relations was seen to be the conflicted NFD in which each of the two nations claims to be hers. With such a conflict, Somalia waged a war against Kenya just the way it did to Ethiopia. In 1967, Kenya and Somalia met in Tanzania to negotiate over the border disputes. This led to the coining of the Arusha Declaration and the war ended in a ceasefire.

In addition, it was revealed that when Somalia attacked Kenya and Ethiopian top government officials, Kenya and Ethiopia adopted a deterrent policy and closed their borders for Somalia intrusion. After the 1967 war Kenya and Somalia remained silent until in 1977 when Somalia invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Kenya offered her support to Ethiopia and this worsened the relationship between Kenya and Somalia. Additionally, Kenya seized an Egyptian plane carrying arms to Somalia forces. This worsened the relationship not only with Somalia but also

with other Arab nations. Eventually with the help of other international actors, Somalia lost to Ethiopia in this war. In the following year Kenyatta died and Moi took over power as the president.

It was also noted that under Moi's regime, Kenya's relations with Somalia improved. In 1984, Moi visited Somalia and pledged to help Barre achieve a lasting peaceful solution to the dispute with Addis Ababa and the two agreed on trade cooperation, with Barre declaring that he had no claim over Kenyan territory. Following this meeting, those who were in exile returned to Kenya and a security agreement was signed between the two nations. However, at the end of the 1980s, the political landscape in the two countries was changing. Barre was facing resistance in Somalia and this led to him flee into exile through Kenya. In this chapter, the premise that the relations between Kenya and Somalia in the period 1963-1990 were largely cordial was proved as untrue.

In chapter three the study sought to examine the impacts of the collapse of Barre's regime and the 1998 twin bombing on the relations between Kenya and Somalia.

It was established that in the beginning of the 1990s, there were major political changes in the two nations; Kenya became a multiparty state while the regime of Barre collapsed in Somalia. It was noted that the collapse of the Somalia government paved way for anarchy and political chaos. Lack of a central government in Somalia would not allow Somalia to have any serious diplomatic ties with any country. Moreover, it was also revealed that in the period 1991-1995, there was free movement of goods and people between the two countries. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Barre regime in Somalia gave rise to an influx of Somalia refugees in Kenya. As they fled, others came with arms that were used to fuel fights among Kenyan ethnic groups.

The 1998 twin bombing of USA embassies led to silent and complicated relations between Kenya and Somalia governments. This was because Kenya obtained increased aid from USA. Moreover, after the 2001 September attack of World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York the relations got complicated. Those countries that rallied with USA were seen to be enemies of Yemen, Iraq, Iran and Somalia. These poor relations continued until 2006 when *Al-shabaab* was born. In this chapter, the premise that the 1998 bombing of Kenya and Tanzania led to tension between Kenya and Somalia was proved as true.

In chapter four, the study examined the emergency of *Al-shabaab*, its activities, and its impact on the relations between Kenya and Somalia. It was revealed that *Al-shabaab* menace has escalated and hit the Kenyan nation tremendously leading to insecurity in various parts of Kenya. Moreover, Kenya has witnessed major terror attacks for example the West Gate Mall attack, Garissa University attack, Mpeketoni attack among others. Because of the insecurity, the relations between Kenya and Somalia have been affected more on a negative note. The two states seem to have hiccups. Moreover, the International Court of Justice case against Kenya over the maritime boundary dividing Kenya and Somalia along the Indian ocean and competition over northern part of Kenya which Somalia consider part of Somalia still remain a bone of contention. It was also noted that the fate of Daadab refugees has strained the relations between the two states

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings above we propose the following recommendations. To begin with there is need to address the border dispute between Kenya and Somalia to end the territorial disputes. Additionally, the International Court of Justice ought to bring out the verdict on the Kenya Somalia maritime border case to reduce the tension between the two states. Moreover, the fight

against *Al-shabaab* and terror should not be pursued to any state but should be a global concern. This will help reduce the tension between Kenya and Somalia over the motive of KDF in AMISOM. There is need to negotiate peace in Somalia to ensure stability. This will lead to the formation of a unitary government or a government of National Unity. With this then relations between Somalia and other countries will be easily defined. Finally, there is need to address the issue of Somalia refugees in Kenya especially those in Dadaab refugee camp. To achieve these international actors ought to come in as mediators in a nonpartisan manner.

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PRIMARY SOURCES

ORAL MATERIALS

The materials include key informant interviews, focus discussion groups and individual narratives. They have been organized according to the individuals providing the information

Oral Interviews

NO	RESPONDENTS	AGE	PLACE	DATE
1	Security officer	48	Eastleigh	2017
2	Somali man	40	Dadaab refugee camp	2017
3	Somali man	50	Eastleigh	2017
4	Staff	35	Ministry of foreign affairs	2017
5	KDF officer	36	Dadaab refugee camp	2017
6	Kenyan man	30	Nairobi town	2017
7	A government administrator	53	Ministry of Foreign affairs	2017
8	A government administrator	40	Dadaab refugee camp	2017
9	A lady	28	Ministry of foreign affairs	2017

10	Politician	47	Nairobi town	2017
11	A woman	38	Nairobi town	2017
12	A government officer	40	Ministry of foreign affairs	2017
13	UNHCR officer	42	Dadaab refugee camp	2017
14	Somali refugee student	22	Dadaab refugee camp	2017
15	Businessman	37	Eastleigh	2017
16	Lecturer	44	Nairobi town	2017
17	Academician	30	Nairobi town	2017
18	Elderly man	75	Eastleigh	2017
19	Retired army officer	69	Nairobi town	2017
20	Border resident	29	Dadaab	2017
21	Kenyan citizen	23	Nairobi town	2017

Key Informant Interviews

NO.	PARTICIPANT	AGE	PLACE	YEAR
1	KDF officer	37	Nairobi town	2017
2	Government official	43	Ministry of foreign affairs	2017
3	Elderly man	70	Dadaab refugee camp	2017
4	Retired general	70	Nairobi town	2017

5	Foreign ministry worker	35	Nairobi town	2017
6	County commissioner	62	Nairobi town	2017
7	Former politician	65	Nairobi town	2017
8	Former government official	70	Nairobi town	2017
9	Retired police		Eastleigh	2017
10	Former KANU official	55	Nairobi town	2017
11	Former minister	68	Nairobi town	2017
12	Somali official	67	Eastleigh	2017
13	Somali retired military personnel	78	Eastleigh	2017
14	UN worker	47	Nairobi town	2017
15	Worker in the department of refugees	36	Ministry of foreign affairs	2017
16	Retired university professor	80	Nairobi town	2017
17	Director multilateral relations	47	Ministry of foreign affairs	2017
18	Worker National intelligence service (NIS)	50	Nairobi town	2017
19	Director foreign service institute	41	Ministry of foreign affairs	2017
20	Director ministry of foreign affairs	50	Ministry of foreign affairs	2017
21	Former diplomatic and political liaison officer	70	Nairobi town	2017

Focus Group Discussions

NO.	PARTICIPANTS	PLACE	YEAR
1	Somali people	Eastleigh	2017
2	Workers at the ministry of foreign affairs	Ministry of foreign affairs	2017
3	Somali citizens	Dadaab refugee camp	2017

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APPENDIXES

Appendix I: Interview Guide

1. Does Kenya have diplomatic relations with Somalia?
2. What is your view on Kenya-Somalia relations? Are they cordial? Or conflictual?
3. If cordial why do you think so?
4. If conflictual why do you think so?
5. What were the relationship between Jomo Kenyatta and Siad Barre?
6. What were the relationship between president Moi and Siad Barre?
7. What is your understanding of terrorism? What are some of the acts of terrorism?
8. What do you think led to the Wagalla massacre of 1984?
9. How did the twin bombing affect relations between Kenya and Somalia
10. How do Kenyan Somalis regard their colleagues in Somalia
11. Do you support Kenya's entry to Somalia? If yes why so?
12. What is your view on Somalia's claim on the North Eastern Frontier of Kenya?
13. What were the reasons for the Shifta menace of 1970s?
14. Have you ever heard of *Al-shabaab*?
15. What are some of the effects of terrorism in Kenya?
16. What do you think of relations between Kenya and Somalia?
17. Do you think there is any relationship between terrorism and refugees in Kenya?
18. What do you think is the relationship? Explain
19. Do you think Kenya's action to repatriate Somali refugees from Kenya will help contain terror activities by *Al-shabaab* in Kenya?
20. Do you think Kenya Security Agencies are doing enough to contain *Al-shabaab* in Kenya?

21. To what extent have security measures put in place by security agencies to safeguard Kenya helped secure Kenyans?
22. What do you think are the intervention of Kenya through KDF will mitigate terrorism in Kenya?
23. What are some of the recommendations you can propose in relation to this topic?

Appendix II: Map of the study Site



Appendix III: Budget of the Study

MATERIAL/SERVICES	AMOUNT (KSH)
Stationary	12,000
Laptop	35,000
Transport and accommodation	10,000
Literature	10,000
Other expenses	20,000
Photocopying, typing, printing and binding	15,000
TOTAL	117,000

Appendix IV: Research Permit


THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. CASPAL MAINA MUMANYI
OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 11-46200
NISEU, has been permitted to conduct
research in Nairobi County

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/17/12425/17835
Date Of Issue : 7th July, 2017
Fee Received : Ksh 1000

on the topic: CHANGING POLITICAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN KENYA AND
SOMALIA, 1963-2014

for the period ending:
6th July, 2018

.....
Applicant's
Signature


.....
Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation