RETHINKING FRANTZ FANON IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KENYAN DECOLONIZATION EXPERIENCE, 1895-1992

BY

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university

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This thesis has been submitted with our knowledge and approval as the University Supervisors

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to all the sons and daughters of Kenya who have been abused, detained, displaced, exiled, harassed, maimed and killed for fighting to dismantle the formal and informal variants of colonialism in our beautiful country.

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ABSTRACT

There is no doubt that the problematic of decolonization remains one of the most intriguing subjects in contemporary scholarship. With regard to the African continent, the mention of the term decolonization evokes profound emotions, debates and controversies, just as it raises some very fundamental questions. One of the questions that is often raised with regard to this subject is this: when did the process of decolonization in Africa actually begin and when did it end? Another question related to the foregoing one concerns the definition of the term decolonization. If, for Africa, decolonization implies the dismantling of the European imperialist structures on the continent, has this so far been achieved? Is it possible to argue that, over forty years into the independence experience, Africa can confidently boast to be free of colonialism? These and many other stimulating questions have perennially consumed the intellectual energies of scholars and political theorists grappling with the historically complex relationship between the African continent and the Euro-American axis.

Frantz Fanon is, possibly, a leading scholar and political theorist on the discourse of decolonization in Africa. Born in Martinique in 1925, Fanon spent most of his adult life in French North Africa. Indeed, he became the chief architect of the Algerian revolution that resulted into the political collapse of the French regime in Algeria. Throughout his writings, Fanon tackled critical colonial issues that embraced but were not confined to alienation, racism, exploitation, political participation, class struggle, liberation, socialism, culture, the nation-state, national leadership, neo-colonialism, tribalism and above all, violence. No doubt, these issues are crucial entry-points for anybody wishing to interrogate the structure of European colonialism in Africa. This study highlights and critiques some of these issues within the context of Kenya's decolonization experience.

Given that Fanon's discourse on colonialism was derived from his own experience under French imperialism, this study appropriates some of his ideas to an alternative British colonial situation in Kenya in order to ascertain if his conclusions could polymorphously be employed to interpret any given imperial situation. Guided by

Fanon's pessimism about what seemed to be Africa's premature celebration of independence in the early 1960s, the study adopts the view that, in Kenya, the formal colonialism which began in 1895 did not end with the political collapse of the British rule. Rather, the study looks at the attainment of Kenya's independence in 1963 as a well-calculated transitional move by the British to re-invent and Africanize colonialism so as to maintain their hegemony over the African country. Consequently, the study treats both the Kenyatta and Moi states as continuities in the colonial project which began in the late 19th century. To capture this reality, the study has employed the analytical devices of the postmodernist and the postcolonialist theoretical dispositions. Notably, through the post-modernist perspective, the study finds space to generally question the grand narratives of the West, some of which came to justify the installation of colonial rule in Africa while others have tended to influence the way in which the discourse on decolonization has been developed. On the other hand, the postcolonial theoretical standpoint has enabled the study to question Eurocentric forms of knowledge which seem to give Africa and its people certain identities of disability and inferiority and which have, in turn, justified colonialism in both its formal and hegemonic dispensations. Thus, through the postcolonial domain, the study enriches the counter-hegemonic discourse that remains fundamental to the realization of the goal of true liberation in Africa. The study derived its data from both primary and secondary sources. While secondary data was fundamentally limited to library research, primary data was procured from the Archives and from the oral respondents.

Finally, this study demonstrates that there is a lot of literature dealing with Kenya's experience with formal and informal variations of colonialism (for example Odinga 1967, Kanogo 1987, Ngugi 1980, 1981, 1986; Furedi 1989, Edgerton 1990, Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, among others), but no study has so far been undertaken to specifically interrogate Fanon in the light of the Kenyan decolonization experience. Consequently, this study undertakes a modest intervention to address this intellectual gap.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Context of the Problem

1.1.1 Colonialism

The penetration of colonial capitalism into the African continent during the closing decades of the 19th century marked a fundamental turning point in the history of the African people. This change was inevitably accompanied by the introduction of new ways of life to the hitherto unique but immensely rich traditional African lifestyle. European colonialism was itself a culture with diverse manifestations. The new culture which, by and large, created a permanent crisis of identity among the African people had serious social, political and economic implications. Colonial capitalism had a culturalizing force when it was ruthlessly introduced to Africa in order to expedite social and economic exploitation.

The leading colonial powers in Africa were Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Germany. Each of these powers practised a distinctive colonial system with unique characteristics. For example, the British colonial philosophy of indirect rule was different from the French policy of assimilation. While the British indirect rule set out to exploit the African people without necessarily transforming them into British citizens, the French assimilation policy had the objective of creating black Frenchmen who could even attend the French National Assembly in Paris. As well, the authoritative German paternalism was different from the British form of indirect rule. Yet despite the structural

differences amongst these colonial systems, all of them seem to have been driven by the objective of exploiting the African people so as to enrich the Western economies.

In Kenya, British colonialism could be examined from two fundamental angles. The first level of colonialism was the formal one when the British took on active control of the affairs of the country and directly oppressed the Africans. This period begins from around 1895 and ends in 1963. The second phase, is the post-independence era. This is the period which followed the symbolic withdrawal of the British from Kenya. It was marked by the retention of neo-colonial British hegemony over the new nation. The struggle against the two forms of colonialism is what should constitute decolonization. This study represents a conscious effort to study the various attempts made by the Kenyan people to dismantle colonialism, both in its formal and informal dispositions.

1.1.2 The Colonial State

Generally, the imposition of colonial rule in Africa also signalled the birth of the colonial state. In Kenya, British colonialism worked for the creation and subsequent development of the colonial state. There are many definitions of the state as there are ideological perspectives (Salim, 1984:1-5). But for purposes of this study, the state will be defined as an organ of society which arises out of the development in society of irreconcilable antagonisms or struggle, among social classes or groups of people with conflicting interests (Ochieng and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995:xiii). Thus, when society is divided into separate classes, the ruling class has the opportunity to create a strong organization which helps to control the rest of the society. But the need to control the rest of the society also implies that relationships between groups of people in the society are often based on some form of suspicion and oppression. Within this experience, it is

important to note, the state becomes the institution which the dominant social class creates to wield coercive power over other classes or groups of people it seeks to rule, dominate and exploit. Under colonial capitalism, the colonial state in Kenya seems to have been set up to deliberately coerce, dominate and exploit Africans. It set out to establish, protect and enhance the economic, political and cultural interests of the British. These interests were secured through the normal Montesqieuan separation of powers rationalized in three separate arms of the state namely, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. In Kenya, like in other parts of Africa which came under colonial rule, the branches of government in the colonial state were manned by many officials including policemen, judges and soldiers. These officials formed a formidable machinery that protected the wealthy Europeans against the poor Africans.

1.1.3 The Nation-State

It has to be stressed that the colonial state ruled over a colonial society that had both minority Europeans, Asians, Arabs and majority Africans. The oppressive tendencies of the Europeans forced Africans to protest and ask for self-determination. This marked the beginning of the nationalist struggle against colonialism. By our critical reading, anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power (Chatterjee, 1992:6). It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains – the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the 'outside', of the economy and the statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and to which the underdeveloped world had succumbed (Ibid.). In this domain then, Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments

carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an 'inner' domain bearing the essential marks of cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one's spiritual culture. This formula, it seems, was a fundamental feature of anti-colonial nationalism in Africa and Asia (Chatterjee, 1986).

There are several implications from the foregoing reasoning: First, nationalism declared the domain of the spiritual its sovereign territory and refused to allow the colonial power to intervene in that domain. But because the colonial state was determined to control every aspect of the colonizer's life, the stage had been set for serious conflict. In this way, the colonial society became a site of contestation in which the colonizer insisted on maintaining his coercive state while the colonized made relentless efforts to maintain his sovereignty by fighting for the recognition of his cultural entity called a 'nation', a nation that had developed out of the spiritual domain. But in its post-independence arrangement, the spiritual domain of the new nation was not entirely African nor was it exclusively European. It embraced a hybrid of values informed by linguistic and social modifications that had the capacity to unite various groups into some loose but formidable political force.

Consequently, it is important to note, the struggle for decolonization in Kenya seemed to have coalesced around the cultural/spiritual domain of the African people in the colony which created the nation even before the anti-colonial war began in the 1950s. Within the spiritual domain, therefore, the nation of Kenya was already sovereign even when the state was in the hands of the colonial power.

At independence, the same Africans who had been fighting against colonial oppressors now took the reigns of power and began to replicate colonial laws and institutions. This implied the shameless use of state power (the material domain of the nation-state), by the African leadership, to oppress, intimidate and exploit citizens. Furthermore, it signified the continuous appropriation of tribalism* as an effective tool of dividing the various ethnic communities in order to entrench an unpopular political dispensation. Thus, like their colonial predecessors, the new African leaders became enemies of the spiritual domain of the nation and, by extension, nationalism. Yet, these leaders had come to power precisely because they believed the colonizers were enemies of the spiritual/cultural entity called the 'nation'. Notably, the new leaders celebrated the birth of the 'nation' but continued to rule the society by perpetuating the fundamental tenets of the colonial state. As a result, Frantz Fanon, observes:

> The state which by its strength and discretion ought to inspire confidence and disarm and lull everybody to sleep, on the contrary seeks to impose itself in a spectacular fashion. It makes a display, it jostles people and bullies them, thus intimating to the citizen that he is in continual danger (Fanon, 1967:132).

*By tribalism, we mean that the tendency to whip up ethnic chauvinism in order to achieve certain social economic and political objectives. The cancer of tribalism can, therefore, serve to give unwarranted privileges and opportunities to some ethnic communities while at the same time marginalizing and discriminating against others.

But in replicating colonial institutions, leaders of the new African states also highlighted a fundamental dilemma. While their spiritualism was with the nation, their materiality was with the colonial state. The crisis of managing dual identities on the part of the African leadership, it seems to me, remains one of the chief causes of conflicts, instability and economic degeneration in Africa today. The result emanating from the crisis of identity in the African nation-state is that those who believe in the spirituality of the nation have often undertaken to continue fighting for decolonization even when the colonial state was already patronized by Africans.

Eghosa Osaghae has observed that in its post-independence arrangement, the nation-state has become an instrument of international capitalism. (Osaghae, 1994:2). Eshetu Chole (1995:2) reiterates the same point when he argues that the post-independent era in Africa represents a generalized failure of gigantic proportions in the political, social and economic spheres. This was mainly because bureaucracies were too large, governments were too wasteful, planning was not properly done, prices were not right and farmers had no incentives (Berg, 1981). However, the story is more complicated than that. In its post-independence disposition, the nation state is also an imposing site of spiritual/cultural contestations which inform the new struggle against neo-colonialism. In sum, the nation state in Africa, born at independence, was a product of the material (the European), and the spiritual (the African) domains of the colonial society.

1.1.4 Frantz Fanon: A Brief History and the Foundation of his Intellectual Anti-Colonial Discourse

With regard to the entire Third World struggle for freedom and democracy during the twentieth century, there is probably no revolutionary thinker and political activist who

has surpassed Frantz Fanon. Indeed, of all black writers and intellectuals, Frantz Fanon is perhaps the most written about (Hansen, 1978:1). Frantz Fanon, the West Indian political theorist as well as medical practitioner was born into French colonialism on the Principle Island of Martinique, West Indies, on the 25th of January 1925. Martinique, with its fine habours, had been used by Western nations to deliver slaves to the Caribbean. Furthermore, the colonizers saw in Martinique a country ideally suited for the establishment of plantations which would produce much needed raw materials such as sugar, coffee and vanilla (Panaf, 1975:10).

Since Martinique's indigenous population had been exterminated by Western brutality, through conquest, it had became necessary for Europeans to import slaves in order to meet the increasing demand for labour. Importation of slaves from Africa was done on a larger scale in the early 17th century. Thus, Fanon's ancestors came from Africa and he himself was a grandson of a slave (Ibid.: 10). When slavery was abolished on the island, the slave mentality still persisted. The blacks considered themselves inferior while whites looked upon themselves as superior beings. Thus, the end of slavery did not signal the achievement of freedom for former slaves. Rather, former slaves continued to experience French colonialism in its peculiar dispensation of political power.

Throughout its colonies, France employed the policy of assimilation in handling its colonial citizens. The policy socialized French colonial subjects in French culture and language. The ultimate objective for this project was to create culturally transformed French citizens in the colonies. For the black people in Martinique, assimilation became an industrial complex for manufacturing black skins moulded in white masks.

Consequently, Fanon's early education followed strictly the lines laid by the French assimilationist policy. The only books available were official school textbooks concentrating on the glories of metropolitan power and the French Empire. As a department of France, Martinician students read the same books and took the same examinations as white students in metropolitan France (Ibid.: 14). They were taught the history of France as if it was their own history (Geismar, 1971:15). Their classrooms were decorated with pictures of the wine harvest in Bordeaux and winter sports in Grenoble (Ibid.: 15). Fanon and his brothers learned French patriotic songs, French language, French literature, French history and French mannerisms. French culture was accepted with uncritical adulation as the *only* legitimate and universal way of life. The effects of this on students was deep and permanent. Students developed a profound sense of personal identification with the French culture and the French way of life while at the same time dismissing the African ways of life as backward. The universal truth then was France. Frantz Fanon recounts that even at home, training was not different. Everytime he misbehaved, he was told by his mother to stop acting like a 'nigger' (Fanon, 1970:191).

Mainly because of the French policy of assimilation, Martinicans, like the older generation of black Americans, accepted racist stereotypes about Africans. Consequently, Martinicans spent evenings talking about the savage customs of the Africans the same way as whites did. Fanon recounts his experience:

> As a schoolboy, I had on many occasions to spend whole hours talking about the supposed customs of the savage Senegalese. In what was said, there was a lack of what was at the very least paradoxical. Because the Antillean man does not think of himself as a black man; he thinks of himself as an Antillean. The Negro lives in Africa. Subjectively, intellectually the Antillean conducts himself like a whiteman (Ibid.: 148).

Thus, having been intensively socialized in a colonial education system which judges itself as superior and which despises African culture, Fanon ended up identifying himself with French culture. He also despised African cultural practices. Several years later Fanon was to write:

> I am a white man. For unconsciously, I distrust what is black in me, that is the whole of my being (Ibid.: 191).

But until he got a chance to live in France, Fanon did not realize the futility of considering himself more French than African. While in France, he would be known not as a 'student' but 'a black student'. Later on, he discovered himself to be not only black but also Negro (Panaf, Op.Cit: 17). Whether or not he liked this discovery is a matter that might unfold as we discuss his intellectual project and its impact on the decolonization thought.

Fanon received both his primary and secondary education in Martinique. Secondary education brought him face to face to school teacher and distinguished philosopher, Aime Cesaire. At the time when black cultural values were highly despised in Europe, Cesaire became a strong believer in the doctrine of *Negritude*. By *Negritude*, he meant that there was nothing wrong with one being black. Glorifying blackness, Cesaire asked his fellow countrymen with an African ancestry to be proud of being black. Ideas about the veneration of black people came to pre-occupy the thinking of Fanon. In high school, and while pondering the meaning of *Negritude*, he began to read literary and philosophical works, a practice that introduced him to the ideas of prominent European thinkers such as Friederich Nietzsche, Karl Jaspers, Kierkagaad and Hegel (Geismar,

Op.cit.: 43). These thinkers were to be important contributors to his existentialist neo-Marxism in the years that followed.

In 1947, Fanon left Martinique to study medicine in France. He first enrolled in dentistry in Paris but after three weeks of introductory courses, he abruptly left for Lyon to study medicine, complaining, with a rather racist overtone, that there were too many 'niggers' in Paris (Ibid: 43). Probably, Fanon wanted to be in a place where he could not be reminded of the black 'savages', the Senegalese. He might also have preferred Lyon to Paris because the former, having the lowest proportion of black population, might have provided him with better opportunities to get assimilated into French culture than the latter. Precisely, as he himself exclaims in Black Skin, White Masks,

> What is all this talk of a black people, of a negro nationality? I am a Frenchman. I am interested in French culture and French civilization, the French people..... I am personally interested in the future of France, in France's values, in the French nation. What have I to do with a black empire? (1970:203).

Ghanaian scholar, Emmanuel Hansen, attributes these painful comments from Fanon to the internal conflict the West Indian intellectual had been was experiencing at the time. Hansen makes futile attempts to defend Fanon arguing that Fanon's exclamations might have developed from the demands of assimilation and the need for autonomy (Hansen, 1978:21). This, however, does not in any way lessen the impact of Fanon's disgust for fellow Africans. The project of assimilation seems to have transformed Fanon into a black Frenchman.

After a year's work in Chemistry, Physics and Biology, Fanon entered Medical School where he worked hard to earn the respect of his peers and his professors. Besides Medicine, Fanon continued to read existential philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger,

and Sartre. He also read Marx, Lacan and Lenin. In addition, he attended the course of lectures of Jean Lacroix and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It was Marleau-Ponty whose ideas on humanism and violence were later to influence the thinking of Fanon. While a medical student, Fanon immersed himself in playwriting producing for himself three plays between 1949 and 1950. The plays are still unpublished because, as his widow revealed, Fanon wished them to remain so (Hansen, Op.Cit.: 22).

In November 1951, Fanon defended his medical thesis, submitted to the Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy at Lyon. The thesis focused on neurological research but it employed the ideas of existential philosophers such as Sartre, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Marlean-Ponty and Heidegger. Furthermore, the thesis gave a critical analysis of mental disorders by situating them in their social and cultural contexts (Perinbam, 1982:20). The last section of the thesis is a free-flowing discussion predicated on humanistic values of man's place in society. Thesis notes reveal that Fanon was influenced by socio-psychologists Jean Jacques Lacan (1910-1978), Marcel Maus (1872-1950), and the social anthropologist Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1957-1939). After a reveting defence which took several hours, Fanon went through and was awarded his degree by his professors. But the professors were shocked that, throughout the defence, Fanon had extensively quoted Nietzsche's 'God is Dead' (Geismar, 1970:51-52). This shock was hardly surprising given that Nietzsche was then a leader of a subversive intellectual movement in Europe which questioned the universalizing tendencies of Western modernity and culture. In fact Nietzsche's 'God is Dead' prophesized the end of Western civilization.

From Lyon, Fanon moved on to do his residency at St. Alban hospital under Professor Francois Tosquelles. At that time, Tosquelles was carrying out innovative

experiments in the field of socio-therapy. Fanon worked with Professor Tosquelles for two years, during which time both of them published a number of research-papers on psychiatric medicine. In 1953, Fanon became a qualified Psychiatrist and was quickly offered the directorship of a Martinican hospital. He, however, turned down the offer and instead headed for Algeria to practice medicine (Hansen, Op.Cit.:28). Fanon wanted to leave France and go to Africa which at that time was in a state of nationalist ferment. Ghana was for example making rapid advances toward self-government and Nigeria was following rapidly behind. In Uganda, there was political unrest following the British meddling with the institution of the Kabaka leading to the deportation of the latter. In Kenya, political agitation had turned militant as Mau Mau violence threatened to dislodge colonial domination (Roseberg and Nottingham, 1966).

In Algeria, Fanon became one of the six divisional directors of the French Psychiatric Hospital at Blida - Joinville. Situated about thirty five kilometers from the capital city Algiers, the hospital now named after him, - a large picture of Fanon hangs in the main reception hall - lies in a spacious walled compound where trees provide occasional shade. At the hospital, Fanon provided medical assistance to all those who found their way to the Psychiatric clinic. He treated Algerians alienated and devastated by colonial war. As well, he treated those Europeans involved in the dirty work of the torture and mistreatment of Algerians. It is here that Fanon realized that colonial violence had serious effects on both the colonizer and the colonized.

He learned that in a colonial territory such as Algeria - characterized by economic oppression, political violence, racism, torture, murder, and human degradation - the psychiatric disorders which the people suffered were the direct result of the social

situation. Accordingly, he came to terms with the fact that it was futile to treat a patient and send him back to the same environment. What, therefore, had to be changed was not the people but the social and political conditions prevailing in Algeria (see Poussaint, 1972, Grier and Cobs, 1969). As a result, Fanon concluded, the colonial system should be destroyed so as to transform the social situation (Fanon, 1969:53-54). From here on, Fanon became a rebel in hospital. Voluntarily, he resigned his job and in January 1957 and later participated in the strike of doctors sympathetic to the nationalist movement directed by the Front for the Liberation of Algeria (F.L.N.). The authorities responded by expelling Fanon from the country (Hansen Op.Cit.: 33).

The expulsion drove him back to France. He stayed in Lyon for a short time with his French wife's family and then left for Tunisia, another French colony, to work for F.L.N. In Tunisia, Fanon worked as member of staff of El Moudjahid, the F.L.N. mouthpiece (Ibid.:3). By this time, Fanon had become a professional revolutionary. He transformed the F.L.N. mouthpiece into a radical paper that variously commented on the social, political and economic aspects of the Algerian Revolution. In the El Moudjahid, he churned out political write-ups which fueled the violent course of the revolution. Under the pseudo name Dr. Fares, Fanon taught medicine at the University of Tunis (Geismar, Op.Cit.: 132).

In addition, he practised medicine at a government psychiatric hospital at Manouba. At Manouba, his innovative and revolutionary ideas did not get a warm reception from his colleagues. Being a perfectionist, Fanon tried to impose on others the same dedication that he applied to his work. Doctors accused him of being overbearing while others began to refer to him cynically as the 'Nigger'. Things got worse when the

head of his medical unit Dr. Soltan tried to fire Fanon on the ground that he was a spy for Israel. This accusation came about because earlier on Fanon had taken a stand against anti-semitism (Fanon, 1970:88-9).

During his short life-time, Frantz Fanon wrote four books. The first one was 'Black Skin White Masks (1952) which was a psycho-sociological update of his medical thesis. The second book was the Wretched of the Earth (1961) which was a painful analysis of the depressing social and psychological living conditions of colonial subjects. It is in this book that Fanon argues in favour of the critical role of violence in the decolonization process. Other books written by him are Toward the African Revolution (1969) and A Dying colonialism (1980). Toward the African Revolution was released after his death and it was a collection of some of the editorials he wrote for El Moudjahid as well as some of his own presentations at international conferences. In A Dying Colonialism, Fanon makes a case for the inevitable victory of colonial subjects over their masters. This was his book of hope for the colonized people of the world who were then fighting against Western domination.

In order to understand Frantz Fanon's political ideas, it would be prudent to first examine his treble experience that took him from Martinique to Europe then to Africa. Secondly, we should look at his vicissitudes during the Second World War. Finally, we should not only examine some of the readings he made but also look at how those readings shaped up his thinking which he then applied to specific colonial conditions obtaining in Africa.

As we have noted before, when slavery was abolished on the island of Martinique, slave mentality still persisted. France has boasted that in its relationship with

its colonial subjects, there was no question of colour discrimination. This deception worked for a while, for compared to the British, the French assimilationist system involved the creation of a class known as *evolues*, members of which had opportunities and certain legal rights (Panaf, Op.Cit.:10). While the British relied on tribalism and religion to implement the policy of divide and rule, the sophisticated French added another division in the creation of *evolues* among the black communities. In Martinique, the division was along class lines. Out of the colonized, who were both oppressed and exploited, the French system created a class of *evolues* to which it granted the political, economic and social privileges accorded to its own middle class (Ibid.: 11).

At the time of Fanon's birth, France had established local municipal councils based on adult suffrage and the people could elect a senator and two deputies to the French Assembly in Paris. On the British side, however, no colonial subject found his way into the British House of Commons. Consequently, a Martinican could boast then that theoretically he was a French citizen because he could become a member of the French Assembly. As Fanon notes:

> Those who were privileged to go to France spoke of Paris..... And those who were not privileged to know Paris let themselves be beguiled (1969:29).

Evidently, to most Martinicians, Paris and of course France, represented the most adored master-narrative, beyond which nothing else existed! Paris and France were the ultimate dream of black Martinicans.

It is hence important to observe that before the Second World War, the conscious section of the Martinicans saw exploitation which cut across colour lines. Fanon wrote

that in Martinique it was rare to find hardened racial positions since the racial problems were covered over by economic discrimination. He says thus:

> Despite the greater or lesser amount of Melanin the skin may contain, there is a tacit agreement enabling all and sundry to recognize one another as doctors, tradesmen and workers. A Negro worker will be on the side of a Mulatto worker against the middle class Negro. Here we have proof that questions of race are but a super-structure, a mantle, and obscure ideological emanation, concealing an economic reality (Ibid.: 28).

In such an arrangement, the sky was theoretically the limit for the *evolue* in Martinique because he saw the same opportunities being offered for personal advancement by the French system to members of the island's own black petty bourgeoisie. Therefore, the *evolues'* aspirations became those of the entire people, and it was they who transmitted the idea to the people that they were French and not a colonized people. Such was the experience into which Frantz Fanon was born and raised.

Second, let us look at the vicissitudes that characterised Fanon's life during the Second World War. During World War II, Fanon interrupted his secondary education by joining the French army which was then engaged in difficult battles against the Germans. First, he fought and successfully helped to liberate Martinique and Dominica before being deployed in France, Morocco and Algeria. From the point of view of the colonized peoples of the world, the war accelerated the growth of nationalist movements in both Africa and Asia. But the war had its own lessons. The oppressed colonial subjects within the camp of the allied forces joined the conflict because it was a war between the older imperialist powers and the rising Fascist countries represented by Germany and Italy.

To win the minds of the oppressed, the colonialists said that the war was being fought against Fascist dictatorships and racism as exemplified by Nazism. The war was thus fought in order to preserve democracy, freedom and equality. Irreversibly, the war experience which shook Martinique as it did to the rest of the world had the effect of awakening the minds of the oppressed including the likes of budding scholars like Fanon. As a result, oppressed peoples came to realize that they too could win their freedom and their independence. It was thinking along such lines which finally had the effect of liberating them from their slave mentality (Panaf, Op.Cit.: 12).

Fanon's Martinique was affected in concrete and practical ways by the Second World War. News from the war front indicated that it was only a matter of time for the Germans to wipe out the French Empire from the phase of the Earth. Apart from gaining French territorial space in Europe, the Germans overran the French in Vietnam. The Germans too installed a puppet pro-Nazi regime in Paris. Fanon argues:

> The downfall of France, for the West Indian, was in a sense the murder of father. This additional defeat might have been endured as it was in the Metrapole but a good part of the French fleet remained blockaded in the West Indies during the four years of the German occupation (1969:32).

The blockaded soldiers did not engage in production but consumed the surplus which the people produced. The soldiers were also arrogant, chauvinistic and racially inclined. Like the poor whites of South Africa and America, the soldiers regarded themselves as superior to the colonial subjects. The Martinicans felt the full impact of racial arrogance and prejudice during this time. Commenting on this situation, Fanon wrote:

> The four years during which they were obliged to live shut in on themselves, inactive, a prey to anguish when they thought of their families left in France, victims

> of despair as to the future, allowed them to drop a mask which when all is said and done was rather superficial and to behave as "authentic racists" (Ibid.).

For the first time since the outbreak of the war, Fanon noticed the differences between the white Frenchmen and blacks. Generally, because of the war experience, Martinicians came to grips with the reality that racism rather than class struggle alone informed the relationship between blacks and whites. In Martinique, resistance against French racism took the form of coloureds and blacks refusing to take off their hats whenever the French national anthem was being played. But lack of political organization and consciousness seemed to have worked against the possibility of a serious revolutionary outbreak on the island. Fanon seemed to have taken his lessons.

While serving in the French military units in Europe and in North Africa, Fanon was surprised at finding similarly unpleasant racial tensions and attitudes as those he had already witnessed in Martinique. For example, while on the trip to North Africa, he witnessed how French Troops had attempted to 'requisition' the sexual services of a group of black female volunteers from Martinique and Guadeloupe (Geismar Op.Cit.: 31). He was deeply upset by this incident as conflicts began to develop in his mind about the nature of the reality of the black-white relationship and the hypocrisy of the white world (Hansen Op.Cit.: 180).

During the actual operations, Fanon observed, black troops were always sent to the worst areas of the war; they were also quartered in some of the most inhospitable places. He noticed that white troops were treated differently and preferentially (Ibid.). They had different rations and more often than not, better living quarters, hot water and other conveniences not given to black troops. He also discovered that even though

considered inferior to whites, Arabs too routinely despised blacks while blacks from the Caribbean looked down upon blacks from the African continent. In Toulon, France, Fanon had to watch white Frenchwomen dancing with Italian prisoners of war after turning down requests from black servicemen who, needless to say, had risked their lives to save the French from the Italians and the Germans (Geismar Op.Cit.: 38-39).

However, despite the Arab and European racism, Fanon was deeply angered by the German destruction of North Africa. He was also touched by the poverty, famine and destitution which defined French Algeria. By the end of the war, Fanon had become cynical about France and the French values he had been taught to admire both at home and in school. He seriously began to consider the possibilities of fighting against French colonialism.

Third, a brief look at Fanon's intellectual life. Earlier on, we intimated that Fanon read the works of distinguished European political thinkers and philosophers. It was remarkable that one who was barely 25 years could speak and write so knowledgeably about a variety of subjects. Being a psychiatrist, it is not surprising that he frequently mentions Lacan, Adler and Jung in his books. He also knew about the writings of Enlightenment philosophers such as Rousseau, Voltaire, Kant and Hegel. Fanon scanned the works of classical French novelists like Balzac and Zola. His reference to Alan Paton showed that he was also concerned with the political situation in South Africa (Panaf, Op.Cit.:27). Most probably, Fanon's frequent admiration of Western values might have stemmed from this intellectual socialization.

Fanon was initially drawn to the idea of *Negritude* and called on the black intellectuals to turn to Aime Cesaire for inspiration and guidance. But later he saw the

limitations and dangers of such a concept, and rejected it. Deep inside, he seemed to think that *Negritude* was a form of black racism. In the concluding chapter of Black Skin White Masks, he stated his position very clearly when he quoted Marx:

> The social revolution cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped itself of all its superstitions concerning the past. Earlier revolutions relied on memories out of world history in order to drug themselves against their own content. In order to find out their own content, the revolutions of the 19th century have to let the dead bury the dead. Before, the expression exceeded the content; now the content exceeds the expression (Fanon, quoting Marx, 1970:159).

It is obvious from the above that Fanon had not only become intoxicated with the ideas of the Enlightenment philosophers but was not ready to listen to anything else except the Marxian interpretation of social transformation. Yet we cannot help asking some questions concerning the above quotation. How can a revolution draw its poetry in the future when in fact it is meant to fight against injustices which occurred in the past and which continue to haunt humanity in the present? It appears Fanon failed to historicize the struggle for national liberation. In the case of colonialism, how can a meaningful struggle against colonialism not mention the past atrocities of imperialism and how those atrocities had destroyed the people's social, political and economic achievements? In our consideration, it is the past which should provide the poetry for a meaningful revolution so that past mistakes are not repeated in the present and in the future.

Though profoundly influenced by Marx and Engels, Fanon made efforts to develop his own brands of Marxism which dealt with the unique situations that confronted his experience. This was necessary because, the focus of the classical Marxist thinking was on the European societies that had similar cultural and economic conditions.

However, Fanon's life was defined by European colonialism that was deeply rationalized by racism. Thus his Marxism had to be responsive to colonialism and racism.

For example, Marx and Engels had spoken of the alienation of the workers in the capitalist society after analyzing the capitalist mode of production. Fanon saw similar alienation amongst the masses of the oppressed. Marx had said that the only way to solve the contradiction between capital and workers was by the latter expropriating the former's power. From Marx, Fanon borrowed the concept of 'historical materialism' which looked for all causation in matter as opposed to metaphysical or primary causes. Similarly, he adopted the Marxian mode of production analysis, thereby recognizing that material life determined social relations of production, as well as the political and spiritual processes of life. In his economic analysis, he applied Marx's theories of classes and of surplus value to the colonies, all of which provided the philosophical justification for change by violence.

Furthermore, through the existentialist prism of Jean-Paul Sartre Fanon accepted Marx's historical necessity by claiming the conjunction of the inevitable revolutionary process in history with the confirmation of it by the revolutionary elect. Claiming the peasants as his revolutionary elect, he never tired of re-assuring them that 'at last in the full glare of history they will finally be on the winning side' (Perinbam, 1982:90). Notably, Fanon combined the Marxian materialism with the Sartrean existentialism to develop the concept of existential Marxism.

The philosophy of existentialism was challenge to the Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism. In the twentieth century, and especially during Fanon's years, Marxism-Lenism had became a dominant trend of revolutionary workers and peasants

with success stories being reported in the Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam, North Korea and Albania (Panaf, 1975: 44). But freedom for the state did not necessarily mean freedom for the individual. Existentialism, instead of turning the searchlight on capitalist society, focused attention on the plight and problem of the individual. Sartre and his group attacked Marxism for dividing the world into the objective and subjective and for giving primary place for the object.

In our view, the ideas of the Sartrean project questioned the universal project of the Enlightenment movement which had the habit of recommending meta-discourses and meta-binaries. Indeed, in Sartre we see the first serious effort to deconstruct Marxism and to direct the searchlight to the grey neglected area, the individual. As a result, we see Sartre's contributions and his existential philosophy as profoundly useful in enriching the postmodernist intellectual discourses during and after the 20th century. Nevertheless, in Fanon we see evidence of an attempt to synthesize existentialism with Marxism.

Fanon held the view that a Marxist-socialist revolution was the only path the African nations could take so as to overcome the political, social and economic obstacles created by European imperialism on the continent. However, influenced by the Satrean existentialism, Fanon insisted that a true socialist revolution must accommodate the protection of individual freedoms and rights. According to him, this was the only way African nations could avoid the catastrophe of having a free country in which its individual citizens were encased and subjugated. Fanon's marxist existentialism was further enriched by his readings of the psychoanalytical works of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. Psychoanalysis enabled Fanon to analyse the mental effects of colonialism on the colonized peoples of the world. In all fairness, it is extremely

tempting to describe Fanon as a Marxist, a neo-Marxist, an existential Marxist and a psychoanalytical Marxist.

But Fanon's brands of Marxism were drastically different from the neo-marxist variant of the dependency and underdevelopment theories postulated by such thinkers as Paul Baran and Gunder Frank. While advocating a socialist revolution as Fanon did, the dependency and underdevelopment theorist were neither existentialist nor psychoanalytic in their approaches. Unlike Fanon's, the discourse of the dependency school ends with the analysis of the economic relations between the peripheral and central capitalist societies without taking stock of the mental and existential effects of those relations to the individual citizens of those societies.

But the most influential philosopher who seems to have exerted the most profound impact on the thinking and perceptions of Frantz Fanon other than Sartre, Heidegger and Nietzsche was German philosopher and doyen of European thought, G.W. F. Hegel. Given his deep interest in the unequal relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, Fanon was naturally drawn to Hegel's paradigm of unequal power struggle (Hegel, 1977:111-119). It is from Hegel that Fanon was able to understand conflict within a social setting. Through Hegel, Fanon learned that when two people meet, they are at first distinct and separate. But in the process of exchange, their personalities begin to interact thereby heightening their mutual awareness. In this experience, a struggle or conflict ensues as each person tries to dominate the other in order to maintain self assertion and self maintenance.

Later, the struggle translates into a life and death matter. But as the struggle continues, the two people begin to recognize each other. However, conflict will always

persist as long as the struggle continues. As they *recognize* each other, the two people will then resolve to live within the value system that tends to be a hybrid or synthesis of both. It was from this presentation that Hegel gave to us the triad of conflict. The two hypothetical people above represent the thesis and antithesis respectively. Through conflict, the thesis and antithesis becomes synthesis. Fanon was so excited by this philosophy that he undertook to examine colonial relations within this Hegelian paradigm. Yet as we shall demonstrate, this paradigm is only applicable in instances where those engaged in conflict share the same racial and cultural values. Colonial societies have peculiar cultural differences which negate the Hegelian analysis.

We have already explained that to some extent Fanon was also influenced by Jacques Lacan, Marcel Maus and Lucien, Levy-Bruhl. From Lacan, Fanon borrowed the ideal of 'desire' which latter appeared in the characteristic Hegelian form of desire-for-recognition in unfulfilled repose (Lacan, 1970:89-97). From Levy-Bruhl, he explored the idea that the primitive never separated himself from nature; and that his theology, symbolism, imagery, rituals and above all his myth, reinforced his 'essential homogeneity' with nature. Maus too discussed the internal dynamics of the primitive world and, for Fanon and Bruhl, the primitive mind was in Africa. Fanon's bias for African cultural values might therefore have developed from this specific experience of reading Bruhl and Maus.

A fundamental feature associated with Fanon's arguments on decolonization is violence. In the Wretched of the Earth, Fanon says:

> Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized and educated by its leaders makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of practice and

> action, there is nothing but a fancy parade and the blare of trumpets..... (1967:118)

Fanon's belief in the primacy of violence in executing a revolutionary programme was premised on his commitment to the logic that since colonialism had been installed by violence, it had to be overcome by violence. Thus, Fanon viewed colonial regimes as regimes of violence that had to be dismantled by the counter-violence developed by the colonized. Generally, Fanon uses the term violence in several senses. He uses it, for instance, to indicate a purposeful act of physical injury, outright force, military radicalism, political pressure, physiological injury, murder, detention and revolutionary change (Hansen, 1978: 90-94). All these forms of violence, it seems to us, have been part and parcel of the historical process of the Kenyan decolonization experience.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Looking at our brief historical survey of the life of Fanon and his intellectual texturing, we realize that his ideas were as diverse as the subjects he tackled. It is not, therefore, possible to handle all his ideas in one single study. As a result, the current study attempts to examine, rethink and appropriate only those ideas of Fanon that seem relevant to the problematic of decolonization. Specifically, the study analyses his perceptions on the emancipatory capacity of colonial violence and the relevance of these perceptions to the Kenyan post-colonial history. It also explains how Fanon's socialization in Western discourses shaped his analysis of colonialism and decolonization. Further, using the Kenyan experience as the basis, the study explores and analyses the pessimism of Fanon about the authenticity of political independence in Africa. Thus, central to the investigation of this research project is a deliberate effort to answer the following questions:

(i) What were the Western roots of the Fanonian intellectual and political ideas?

(ii) How did Fanon apply some of these ideas to the overall analysis of colonial situations in both Africa and his native Martinique?

(iii) How can the Fanonian discourse on violence and liberation struggle be used to explain colonial relations in Kenya?

(iv) In the Fanonian sense, why did Kenya's political independence in 1963 have little impact on the creation of a free, independent society?

(v) What were the main elements of both the Kenyatta and Moi neo-colonial states and how did these features reflect ideas and assumptions of the Fanonian discourse on decolonization?

1.3 Research Objectives

This study has been guided by the following objectives:

(i) To demonstrate that the Kenyan decolonization struggle did not end with the attainment of independence.

(ii) To show that the post-independence era in Kenya witnessed the birth of the neo-colonial state that was for all practical purposes informed by Eurocentric forms of knowledge and a leadership deeply socialized in European values.

(iii) To illustrate that Fanon's ideas about the emancipatory capacity of violence are relevant in analysing both the colonial and the post-independence histories of Kenya.

(iv) To explain how Fanon's pessimism about the viability and authenticity of post-independence entities in Africa is rooted in colonial history whose narratives ought to reflect efforts to create new forms of knowledge and structures that go beyond Eurocentrism.

(v) To demonstrate that the post-modernist and the post-colonial perspectives have the capacity to inspire fresh thinking that would hopefully make the African post-colonies more relevant and more responsive to the needs of the people than might have been the case before.

1.4 Research Premises

The study revolves around four fundamental premises. It proposes that:

(i) Frantz Fanon's ideas on decolonization can adequately account for all the intricate aspects of Kenya's colonial experience.

(ii) Conflict in colonial Kenya revolved around issues of social injustice, political marginalization and economic exploitation.

(iii) Pervasive violence in colonial Kenya was driven by the fact that violence is part and parcel of any society and was not unique to colonial Kenya.

Colonialism in Kenya did not end with the attainment of independence.

1.5 Review of Literature

The body of literature on Kenya's struggle for freedom is enormous. Unfortunately, most of this literature gives the impression that colonialism ended with the symbolic withdrawal of the British in 1963. Furthermore, specific literature which attempts to rethink Frantz Fanon's ideas within the context of the Kenyan decolonization

experience is lacking. Apart from showing that colonialism continued beyond independence in 1963, this study interrogates some of the Fanonian ideas in the light of the Kenyan colonial experience. It is, nevertheless, important here to highlight some of the contributions of several scholars to the historiography of colonialism.

In the book entitled The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon (1967) produced what many scholars have described as a manifesto for the Third World countries. Borrowing heavily from the fields of medicine, philosophy and history, Fanon makes an exquisite interdisciplinary exposition of the economic and psychological effects of imperialism. He concludes that colonial capitalism had been installed through violence and it had to be overcome by violence. Although Fanon feels that colonial capitalist systems should be replaced by socialist entities, he was nevertheless doubtful about the viability of the African nation- states within their post-independent experience. In sections of The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon makes scattered references to the decolonization struggle in Kenya. This study relies heavily on the ideas raised in this piece of work in order to meet the challenges of revalidating and appropriating Fanon to the historical discourse of the Kenyan decolonization experience.

Fanon's other book, Black Skin White Masks (1970), is an enriching piece of work on the humiliating psychological effects of colonialism. It is also in this work that one comes across the scholars who shaped Fanon's thinking. Here, Fanon devotes five pages to Hegel and Sartre, showing the influence of the phenomenology of the mind. Like Hegel, Fanon experienced the long journey of consciousness looking for itself. He discovered a shocking contrast between his own self-image and how others, especially the French, looked at him. As a result, he became pre-occupied with the question of

identity and self-definition. Besides, Hegel supplied Fanon with the triad of conflict with which he was able to analyse colonial relations. But Sartre, on the other hand, gave Fanon an existentialist approach to life which opened Fanon's mind to the reality that state freedom did not often imply individual freedom. That was the basis of his Marxified existentialism.

But Hegel and Sartre are not, however, the only ones who influenced Fanon's thoughts. As already stated, he also read Lacan, Levy-Bruhl, Maus, Kierkegaard, Marx Lenin and even Nietzsche. While bearing in mind the scholars who influenced Fanon's intellectual discourse, this study has utilized the ideas raised in Black Skin White Masks to argue our case that the Kenyan decolonization which began soon after the imposition of colonial rule in 1895 continued beyond the independence watershed in 1963.

In Toward the African Revolution (1969) and A Dying colonialism (1980), Fanon expresses the inevitability of victory by the colonial subjects. He assures colonial people, with characteristic optimism that their struggle for self-determination was bound to succeed. Emphasizing that no force could possibly stand on the way of a people's determination to achieve freedom, Fanon raised the hopes of colonial peoples across the African content. In this study, however, we demonstrate that the force of neo-colonialism in Kenya was overwhelming enough to block the authentic realization of true liberation.

A number of biographers have made intellectual efforts to analyse the thoughts of Fanon. Among the most distinguished of his biographers are David Caute (1970), Renate Zahar, (1970), Peter Geismar (1971), Irene Gendzier (1973), Emmanuel Hansen (1978) and B. Marie Perinbam (1982). This study has employed the guidance of these

biographers in order to develop a discourse on the Fanonian perspective and its relevance on the narratives of the Kenyan decolonization experience.

Padmore (1953) analyses the main causes behind the Mau Mau outbreak. He first attributes the movement to the alienation of African lands by Europeans. Secondly, he points out that, as a result of that alienation, Africans were condemned to reserves and to unemployed life causing them to rebel. Padmore also emphasizes that the Mau Mau rebellion resulted from adversities caused by forced labour, economic marginalization and political domination. Since the Mau Mau movement was a crucial element in Kenya's struggle for decolonization, this study utilizes Padmore's views as a basis for understanding the socio-political and economic hopelessness of the African people during the colonial period. Although Padmore does not talk about Frantz Fanon, his arguments are useful to this study in reconstructing and accounting for the actual instances of Mau Mau struggle.

Carothers (1955), attempts a psychological explanation of the Mau Mau movement from a medical standpoint. He argues that the movement emerged from the development of an anxious conflictual situation in people who, from contact with alien culture, had lost the supportive and constraining influence of their own culture but who had less solid foundation in new ways. An important question arises, was the struggle for decolonization in Kenya a contest of culture?

Mboya (1963), states the fact that Kenya was violent because Africans faced the perennial problems of unemployment, low wages, discrimination, indirect rule through chiefs, lack of political representation in the legislature, racism and, above all, land alienation. Like Fanon, Mboya seems to attribute violence to the inevitable need to

resolve social conflicts in Kenya's colonial setting. Although Mboya does not mention his encounter with Frantz Fanon in the 1950's, his ideas seem to embody a Fanonian emancipatory motif that is useful to our study.

Rosberg and Notthingham (1966) recognize the weight of such grave issues as land alienation, taxation, education and racism in Kenya's political life. Although this work does not deal with the Fanionian ideas, it raises fundamental issues about decolonization. Odinga (1967), sums up his political beliefs and tells the story of his transformation from a local teacher to emerge as an international figure. Odinga gives an account of neo-colonialism in Kenya and contends that those who sacrificed most for Kenya's independence had lost out for those who had played safe. Its theme of 'not yet *uhuru*' resonates with the Fanonian notion of flag independence in Africa. In general, the book is a scathing indictment of Kenyatta's neo-colonial state which in Odinga's view had began operating as if it were another colonial entity, thereby rendering the whole celebration of independence (which he calls '*uhuru*') fake and worthless. Odinga states that independence in 1963 was a fraud. It appeared to him that colonialism had not ended with the hoisting of the Kenyan flag. The study examines Odinga's views and interrogates them within the context of both the Kenyatta and the Moi states.

Singh (1969), argues that Kenya's trade union movement was part and parcel of her nationalist struggle. Trade unionism was, therefore, a tool for resisting imperial colonial rule as well as an avenue for winning and consolidating national independence. Singh emphasizes that Africans in Kenya fought against land robbery, forced labour, low wages, long working hours, compulsory registration system, racial segregation, colour bar and other practices. Along with his colleagues in the trade union movement such as

Jesse Kariuki, Joseph Kang'ethe, Bildad Kaggia and James Mungai, Singh became one of the leading personalities in the struggle for Kenya's decolonization. Singh's colonial trade unionism was part of the decolonization saga which seems ignored in the analysis of Fanon. The phenomenon of trade unionism needs to be revisited and interrogated within the context of Kenya's quest for freedom.

Itote (1979), provides us with a deeply rooted inside story of the Mau Mau movement, exposing some of the secret techniques and devices used by the Mau Mau warriors. Itote, himself an active participant in the movement, describes the activities of the intrepid men and women of Kenya who fought for their country under difficult conditions. As such, the work is an important source of reference to our study given that Fanon makes direct references to the Mau Mau struggle.

Kanogo (1987), gives an analytical history of the Kikuyu squatters (basically landless peasants) and their important role in the Mau Mau movement. Given that squatting or labour tenancy was an important ingredient of the colonial political economy, this work is relevant to our research in the sense that Fanon preoccupies himself with the question of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry in his discourses. Although Kanogo does not talk about Frantz Fanon, as she had other objectives, her ideas on squatting are invaluable to our present study. Notably, Kanogo contends that establishing colonial rule in Kenya and attempting to turn the country into a white settlement had a profound effect on the local African population. In her view, land alienation in Kenya led to the squatter system.

Furedi (1989), seeks to demystify the Mau Mau movement using solid fieldwork and documentary research. He uncovers the social and economic problems of colonial

Kenya which led to the Mau Mau outbreak. Like Kanogo's, Furedi's work lays special emphasis on the issues of squatting and land alienation. This commendable piece of work like the other foregoing accounts does not appropriate Fanon to the Kenyan decolonization process.

More recently, works on the Kenyan decolonization process have been produced. For example, works by Edgerton (1990) and Kahiga (1990) are useful to our project because both authors delve into the intricate issues of the Mau Mau movement in particular and the entire Kenyan decolonization experience in general. Berman (1990), another author on the politics of Kenya's decolonization, examines the development of Kenya's colonial state as a structure of power and an instrument of domination from a Marxist perspective and from the liberal organizational theory standpoint within which he analyses the colonial bureaucracy in Kenya. Indeed, Berman argues that the colonial state was shaped by contradictions between maintaining effective political control with limited coercive force and ensuring the profitable articulation of metropolitan and settler capitalism within African communities. In his Marxist view that departs from Fanon's neo-Marxism, the dialectic of domination resulted from the uneven transformation of administrative control in the inter-war period. Berman enlightens us on how colonial contradictions led to the political crisis of the Mau Mau era which, in turn, undermined the colonial state.

In the first book he co-authored with John Lonsdale entitled the Unhappy Valley 1 (1992), Berman addresses several important themes in the history of colonial Kenya. The themes include conquest, origins and subsequent development of the colonial state, the contradictory social forces that articulated African societies to European capitalism

and the creation of new political communities as well as the changing meanings of ethnicity in Africa in the context of social differentiation and class formation. Further, the work makes a deeper historical contribution on the development of the contemporary Kenyan society and highlights on the British and Kikuyu origins of the Mau Mau and the Emergency of the 1950s. In their second book the Unhappy Valley 2 (1992), both Berman and Lonsdale focus their attention on violence and ethnicity. Since violence and ethnicity are critical pillars of both the Kenyatta and the Moi States, this work is intellectually enriching. The subject of violence, it is important to observe, is central in Fanon's discourse on decolonization.

Maloba (1993) traces the structural origins of the Mau Mau movement, arguing that the rebellion was essentially an uprising of the peasants of Kenya. He situates the movement within the nationalist struggle and explores its internal divisions as well as its relationships with the conventional party politics of the Kenya African Union. Maloba demonstrates that the movement's aim, like that of other peasant revolts, was the overthrow of colonial domination and the attainment of national independence. Although this work hardly focuses on Fanon's relevance to the Kenyan decolonization experience, it provides interesting data and interpretations which are useful to this study.

In the book Decolonization and Independence in Kenya (1995), B.A. Ogot and W.R. Ochieng edited various materials tackling the dilemmas of African nationhood. The book demonstrates that decolonization does not necessarily entail the transfer of alien power to sovereign nationhood; it must entail the liberation of the worlds of spirit and culture as well as economics and politics. The book seems to be oblivious of Fanon,

nevertheless, it has rich data that may be utilized to interrogate Fanonism in the light of Kenyan decolonization experience.

In our view, contemporary Africa's nation-state is in a deep crisis of identity and stability. This is because the nation-state in Africa was born out of the wider project of Western imperialism. As a result of this, the African nation-state is often defined and informed by Eurocentric forms of knowledge, most of them irrelevant to the tackling of local problems. In a stimulating book, Postcolonial-Identities in Africa (1996), edited by Richard Webner and Terence Ranger, the problems of African postcolonies are raised by several scholars. Among others, these scholars include Patrick Chabal (on 'The African Crisis'), Donal B. Cruise O'Brien (on 'The lost generation in West Africa'), Filip De Boek (on 'Postcolonialism, Power and Identity in Zaire'), Hani Englund (on 'Transition to Multi-party politics in Kamuzu Banda's Malawi'), and both Cyprian Fisty and Peter Geschiere (on 'Witchcraft, Violence and Identity in post colonial Cameroon'). Both the editors and the authors of this book recognize the futility of periodizing African history in specific historical epochs by falsely placing breaks where non exist. Instead, these authors argue, intellectual efforts should be directed in analyzing colonial legacy, its nature and its impact on the problematic of the crises facing the African nation-state. Since part of our theoretical framework revolves around the conceptual idea of postcolonialism, this work has been immensely useful to the current research.

In Decolonizing the Mind (1986), Kenya's foremost intellectual powerhouse as well as freedom fighter, Ngugi wa Thiong'o is heavily influenced by the Fanonian thought and therefore sees the English language as representing the colonial legacy in Kenya. Rejecting the use of English in the teaching of literature in Kenya, Ngugi in a

neo-Marxist nuanced discourse, argues that English justifies the continuation of colonial legacy in formerly colonized societies. This work is critical in our understanding of the struggle against colonial hegemony in post independent Kenya. Other books by the same author which highlight the problems of colonialism in its hegemonic form include; Petals of Blood (1978), Detained (1981), Devil on the Cross (1982) and Writers in Politics (1982).

In line with analysing the brutalizing effects of colonialism on the African nation-state, Kenyan scholar Pal Ahluwalia (1996) has produced what seems to us the first informative work on Kenya's postcolonial experience. Although Ahluwalia's postcolony seems to be falsely equated to the post-independent political entity, nevertheless, his work delves into the political and economic problems which faced Kenya at the height of Cold War politics. Ahluwalia's work concludes that the Kenyan nation-state has, in its post-colonial experience, served the interests of Western imperialism. At the conceptual level, this work has been crucial to our study.

Aseka (2000) demonstrates his cynicism for the postmodernist approach in accounting for and critiquing modernity and its social projects. He declines to accept postmodernism as viable tool for deconstructing modernity. He, therefore, declares that postmodernism is a theory without theoretical rigor. Quite correctly, Aseka sees postmodernism as representing a fundamental attack on the rationality of modernism and modernist epistemology. But he also observes that neo-colonialism has metarmophosized into post-colonialism, arguing that this imprudent wisdom is couched in what appears to him post-modernist obscurantism. While respecting the views of Aseka, this study has made efforts to explain that postcolonialism is not the same as postmodernism. In other

works (Aseka, 1997: Aseka, 2003), he conceives the postcolonial theory as a dimension of postmodernism and rejects its sub-altern assumptions which he argues derive from the revisionist Marxism of Antonio Gramsci. In Aseka (2003), a serious attempt is made to re-examine Fanon's discourse on decolonization and national culture. In our view, postcolonialism does not begin with the attainment of independence in polities that were formely colonized. The experience of postcolonialism begins soon after the imposition of colonial rule. Therefore, neocolonialism is only one of the phases within the postcolonial discourse.

The foregoing literature review is hardly exhaustive but all the same it demonstrates that no comprehensive research has so far been done to revalidate Frantz Fanon's liberation ideas in the context of the Kenyan decolonization experience. However, it is noted that the body of literature on the decolonization of Kenya is huge.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

During the past forty years, a great deal of intellectual capital has gone into the study of the nation-state in Africa. Within that period, both scholars and lay people have expressed concern that the African nation-state has failed to serve the interests of the African people. In grappling with the problematic of the nation-state, some scholars suggested that the African nation-state could be made more relevant and more useful through a deliberate project of modernization. The modernization theorists including Rostow (1960), Hagen (1962 and 1968), Myrdal (1968), for instance, recommended that development in Africa would only be achieved through the simultaneous transfer of Western political, social and cultural structures together with the diffusion of the

economic and technological complex from the West (Hoogvelt, 1975:53). Implicitly, therefore, Africa's progress could only be achieved against the background of European values.

The basic assumption of the modernization scheme was that Africa had been left out of modernity when the Enlightenment era struck Europe around the 15th century. Consequently, the logic goes, Africa could not make any meaningful progress in its social, political and economic fields until it espoused the principles of Western modernity, science and rationalism. Therefore, as a concept, modernization came to be the only universal truth that would rescue Africans from their state of hopelessness. Indeed, to some people, the establishment of the colonial state in Africa was a deliberate mission to bring Africans to the heart of modernity and civilization.

Thus, colonialism was seen as an instrument of modernization. Emerging in the early 1960's, modernization was deemed as the panacea for the depressing African condition (Amin 1976, Rodney, 1976). But a few years into independence, newly freed African states began to confront the reality that the modernization theory presented a general framework for development toward modern statehood conceived mainly within the Western mould of thinking. African nation-states had to come to terms with the irrelevance of modernization to the African condition because this project had overlooked the African reality and achievements. Worse still, many African countries appeared to be political fictions because their sovereignty was virtually non-existent, their control over economic flows across their boundaries, virtually minimal, and their external dependency alarming. Modernity and independence had become counterfeits.

Because of this situation, a couple of scholars with a Marxist persuasion had by the mid-1960s come to the conclusion that the spread of Western modernity from the European metropole to the African periphery was the cause of the underdevelopment in the African states, during the colonial and post-independence eras. According to several scholars including Gunder Frank (1967), Samir Amin (1976) and Walter Rodney (1976), Chilcote and Edelstein (1974), among others, the Westernization of Third World economies had created a culture of dependency whereby these economies could not stand on their own without the support of Western metropoles. The experience of Africa in the 1960s and 1970s shows that in the name of modernization, Western countries undertook to interfere with the internal affairs of African states and went further to maintain autocratic leadership that supported the preservation and sustenance of Western cultural, political and economic values on the continent. As a result, Africa became more and more underdeveloped because, in its post-independence era, the continent continued to play similar cultural, economic and political roles of supporting Europe's progress as it had done during the era of formal colonialism.

The neo-Marxist perspective of underdevelopment recommends that, to develop, Third World nations should first and foremost stop supporting Western Europe and America, through the continuous supply of primary goods, and instead espouse projects which would break down the dependency syndrome. This syndrome would, in the view of neo-Marxist thinkers, be destroyed if there was a profound alteration of the political, social and economic relationships between the West and the underdeveloped world. The alteration of relations would inevitably involve the overthrowing of the capitalist market

economy and the mobilization of domestic populations in a nationally-oriented effort (Fanon, 1967).

Furthermore, the neo-Marxist thinking was against Africa's dependence on foreign capital which did not invest its surplus in the underdeveloped nations (Rodney, 1976). Foreign investment in formerly colonized states had been carefully planned to favour the sale of manufactured goods of the developed world while at the same time stagnating the economies of young nations with an irrational emphasis on agricultural rather than industrial development. Thus, development would require the elimination of foreign penetration which supports the status quo, and the creation of a socialist context of development (Chilcote and Edelestein, 1974:28).

However, like its forerunner, Marxism, neo-Marxism was permanently transfixed on economic determinism as if economics had the capacity to explain all the diverse aspects of humanity. Indeed, it was evident that the socialist agenda which the neo-Marxist scholars recommended for Africa turned out to be just another Western grand narrative because it had been developed and authored by European-educated scholars such as Marx and Lenin. Notably, African countries such as Tanzania and Ethiopia, which espoused socialism, had by 1984 reported little success. There was hence no denying that both capitalism and socialism were Western variants of social organisation of society for purposes of development which needed to be cautiously applied to Africa.

From the early 1980's, the African condition deteriorated despite the continent being rigorously forced to embrace the Western ideologies of development, within the parameters of capitalism and socialism. This state of hopelessness raised new challenges for scholars. These challenges began to be tackled through the emergent postmodernist

and postcolonialist thinking. In the last twenty years, these theoretical formulations have received a great deal of attention from African and Africanist scholars.

Postmodernism, it is crucial to understand, is not about what comes after modernity because, to be fair, modernity has not yet come to an end. Rather, postmodernism highlights the crisis of modernity and rebels against the universal categories of Western civilization. It is a condition of being entangled and trapped in modernity as something from which we cannot escape but in which we can no longer put or find faith (Pangle, 1992:36). Because of our lack of faith in modernity, we begin questioning its 'normalizing' and universalizing tendencies until we conclude that modernity remains authoritarian as long as it continues to force the rest of humanity to espouse Western European values. Thus, in its broadest sense, postmodernism represents a deliberate counter-discourse against modernity. Consequently, the postmodern theoretical perception enables us to put our faith in a new reality that human life was full of opposing landscapes, fissures, change points and phases which are infinitely temporal but which cannot be explained in one simple meta-narrative.

For instance, European science is just one variant of the many sciences that humanity has; its culture, just one of the many cultures; its economic organization, just one of the many economic systems; its political order just one of the many political orders that humanity has so far developed. This experience teaches us that European forms of knowledge, cultures and systems are not and should not be seen as universal givens. Yet, in the service of Western rationalism, colonialism was imposed on Africa with a mission to destroy African values while at the same time preaching and enhancing the universalization of European ideals. Our study embraces the postmodernist

theoretical framework in interpreting colonialism in Kenya because, this conceptual standpoint gives us an opportunity to argue that the struggle against colonialism in Kenya was a contest against European modernity and universalism.

On the other hand, post-colonialism is first and foremost a counter-discourse of formerly colonized *others* against the cultural hegemony of the West with all its imperial structures of feeling and knowledge (Xie, 1997:8). Within this logic, there is a need to embrace a radically different narrativization of history. In many ways, therefore, post-colonialism signifies an attempt by the formerly colonized to re-evaluate, rediscover and reconstruct their own histories and cultures. It is also an act of rethinking the history of the world against the inadequacy of terms and conceptual frames invented by the West. It represents an urgent need and determination to dismantle imperial structures in the realm of culture. However, it does not signify the demise or pastiness of coloniality (Ibid.: 14). Rather, it points to the colonial past that remains to be interrogated and critiqued. It also admits an indebtedness to the past and responsibility to the future.

As one of its cardinal duties, the post-colonial discourse includes but goes beyond the anti-colonial nationalist struggle. This is because anti-colonialism was primarily a nationalist movement for political and economic independence. However, since the heydays of anti-colonialism, nation-states have emerged in formerly colonized spaces and the imperial structure has been dismantled in political terms (Ashcroft, Griffins and Teffin, 1989:6-7). But as many critics have pointed out, formal independence for colonized countries have rarely meant the end of the First World's hegemony (Shohat 1992:104). Rather, Westerners after their withdrawal from these countries continued to rule morally and intellectually (Chakrabarty, 1992:8). It is this crisis of hegemonization

that gives birth to the experience of neo-colonialism. Thus, neo-colonialism emerges as a regeneration of colonialism through hegemonizing Western economy, technology and ideology.

As we have intimated above, postmodernism is a counterdiscourse against modernity itself. The counter-discourse began around the end of the 19th century when the German scholar and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche started questioning the universality of Western civilization. According to Nietzsche and his loyal student Martin Heidegger, the late 19th century ushered in a historical period that for the first time permitted humanity to have a clear view of the fully evolved meaning of the commitment to science and rationalism that came increasingly to dominate Western civilization in the preceeding centuries (Pangle, 1992: 36-38). In the view of the two philosophers, Western civilization must now be recognized as the culmination of a tradition whose history reveals the unfolding 'nihilistic' (belief that nothing has meaning or value) consequences of the attempt to ground life in reason. Celebrating this line of argument, Nietzsche signified the collapse of Western civilization by declaring that 'God is Dead' (Heidegger, 1950:193-247). Critics of modernity have advanced powerful arguments contending that rationalism is incapable of providing an acceptably profound, diverse, creative and historical account of what is truly human (Kisiang'ani, 2000:14).

Reason, in seeking or demanding fixed and universal standards, necessarily corrodes the diverse faiths and decisions supporting the endlessly competing standards of justice and moral judgement. The contemporary rationalist movement toward equalization of values or equalization of objects of value, the stress on tolerance, the easy-going 'agreement to disagree', and the liberal open society are symptomatic of

dissolution of standards and the loss of dedication in life (Heidegger, 1961:37-100). Rational self-consciousness is no doubt an essential tool for the clarification of a peoples' highest values but hypetrophic reason, at least in the Western experience, endangers and banalizes 'values' by its tendency to reduce to a lower common level what is distinguished. Colonialism came to define what was distinguished to the African people by giving a privileged status to Western European values.

Modernity, with its authoritative trust in scientific reason has tragically led the Western World into the tendency of totalizing reality and setting untenable universal parameters for human behaviour and existence. As a result, in its original form, Western civilization seems to recognize no other civilization and is thus authoritarian and oppressive. As a rule, truth, both truth in general and truth about any existing thing must conform to Western standards. Whatever does not appear to fit in the Western categorization of truth is treated as a myth or relics of tradition or as products of naivete, pretense and ignorance. Carrying this tragic attitude against *others*, European colonialists entered the African continent with set minds about truth. They undertook to destroy African cultural values and made great efforts to realign the African lifestyle along the lines defined by Western civilization and modernity. Colonization was hence a project within the modernist project.

In this study, Kenya is treated as a postcolony which is grappling with imperial hegemony. Overall, Simon During's definition that postcolonialism represents the need in nations or groups which have been victims of imperialism to achieve an identity uncontaminated by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images (During, 1990:113-131) is adopted. Postcolonial criticism, as Gyan Prakash points out, forces a radical

rethinking and reformulation of forms of knowledge and social identities authored and authorized by colonialism and Western domination (Prakash, 1992:8). As is evident in many colonial discourses authored in the West, the colonized have been given the identity of the *other*, the *inferior* the *savage* (Said, 1979).

The thrust of postcolonial thinking is, therefore, to recognize the existence of the *otherness* and dismantle formulations which inform discourses on *otherness*. When the modernist project was introduced to Africa through colonialism, it not only brought in some universalizing European cultural values to be followed by the colonized *others* but it also gave certain identities to non-European peoples; identities of laziness, backwardness, savagery and sexual hyperactivity among others. It is these values and these identities that a non-Western colonial subject is faced with in a post-colonial setting.

A leading postcolonial theorist, Gayatri Spivak, has argued that the imperial project which institutionalized economic and social hegemony has in turn created a category of voiceless colonial subjects. Spivak calls this suffering lot, the subalterns (1990). The term 'subsaltern', it has to pointed out, did not originate with Spivak. Rather, the term assumes profound political and social significance through the works of Italian scholar Antonio Gramsci (1992). Originally, 'subaltern' was term for subordinates in military hierarchies. However, Gramsci used it to refer to groups of people who are outside the established structures of political representation. Postcolonial theorists have found this term especially appealing in describing the appalling conditions of colonial subjects who has been permanently sidelined to the periphery in the enigmatic power game initiated and controlled by the West. In appropriating the postcolonial

theory to the Kenyan decolonization experience, this study has been enriched by the philosophical assumptions of subalternism as a tool of analysis for conceptualizing and confronting formal and informal colonialism in Africa.

But when does the postcolonial begin? In the postcolonial, as Linda Hutcheon reminds us: 'on the one hand *post* is taken to mean after 'because of" and even unavoidably 'inclusive' of the colonial; on the other, it signifies more explicit resistance and opposition, the anticolonial' (1995:10). The post-colonial, therefore, designates moments within colonialism and beyond. To be realistic, the post colonial era in Kenya does not begin after independence in 1963. Rather, Kenya's post-colonial experience commences soon after the imposition of colonial rule in 1895. The conflict between the African people and the Europeans over issues of taxation, land, labour, education and racism represents an effort to radically rethink and reformulate forms of knowledge and social institutions authored and authorized by colonialism and Western domination. In doing this, and unlike the postmodern theory, post-colonialism enables those marginalized *others*, within the colonial domain, to undo the colonial contamination by embracing distinct political agendas and theory of agency which postmodernism threatens to cancel.

When formal colonialism in Kenya ended in 1963, the informal type, the neo-colonial experience, assumed a privileged position making it even more urgent for Africans to increase their pace of rethinking and reformulating Western values in their country. Independence did not thus mark the beginning of postcolonialism but it constituted a mere transition from what Abdul Jan Mohammed terms the dominant phase of colonialism to the hegemonic phase of colonialism (Jan Mohammed, 1985:61). It is

this hegemonic phase which forms the spinal cord of neo-colonialism. Without doubt, therefore, neo-colonialism is a fundamental component of the post-colonial discourse.

This study adopts both the crucial elements of post-colonialism and the essential features of postmodernism in an integrated theoretical approach. There is little doubt that the postcolonial discourse benefits tremendously from Derrida's and Foucault's deconstructions of Western thought. This provides a basis for a powerful critique of the rule of modernity that the colonies experienced in a peculiar form. It is probably because of this realization that Arif Dirlik, a critic of the postcolonial theory, shares the assumption that post-colonialism is a progeny of postmodernism (Dirlik, 1994:331). Yet despite post-colonialism's indebtedness to postmodernism, it is dangerous to regard postcolonialism as a mere figure of postmodernism. For this position represents a general tendency to turn post-colonialism into a West-centred discourse against West-centered universalism and rationalism. True, postcolonialism owes most of its sophisticated conceptual language to postmodernism, but it emerges as a distinct discourse with a set of problematics different from those of postmodernism. Indeed, postmodernism is a tool for critiquing modernity from the European standpoint while post-colonialism is an instrument of interrogating modernity from the point of view of the *other*, the colonized. Thus post colonialism looks at the specific effects of modernity, propagated by colonialism, on people who were never part and parcel of European culture.

But postmodernism, while rigorously challenging the fundamental assumptions of Science, Truth, Religion, Order, Subjectivity and Sign institutionalized since Plato and sublimated by modernism, tends to universalize its problematics. Yet postcolonialism historicizes postmodern thematics deploying postmodern arguments in the service of

decentering world history as well as vindicating and asserting the identities of the formerly colonized (Xie, 1997:8). Consequently, to identify post-colonialism as a function of postmodernism is to cancel the difference between post-colonialism and postmodernism, to universalize the problematics of postmodernism and ultimately to ignore the uneven development of history.

In analysing the Kenyan political entity, we recognize the fact that this post-colony was from the very start organized and shaped by the Eurocentric forms of knowledge which, by and large, had their roots in the rationalism of modernity and Enlightenment. Applied to the Kenyan people, this rationalism gave birth to the *other* who had 'no role in civilization' and who was racially 'inferior' to the West. During colonialism, Africans were profoundly affected by the universalizing habits of Western modernity and rationalism. Living within the discourse of the *other*, Africans lost their identity to the point that they could neither accept themselves as a distinct entity nor could they be accepted in the West as part and parcel of European civilization. It is this experience which created the need by the marginalized *other* (the Africans) to have distinct political agendas and a theory of agency (post-colonialism) while at the same time recognizing the futility of grounding human existence in universal parameters (post-modernism).

To summarize our theoretical position with desperate brevity, a number of observations are in order. We now know that the postmodernist thinking represents a subversive movement that was developed by European thinkers to question their own modernity – a modernity which excluded the Africans. Thus postmodernism advocates for diversities within the European cultural dynamic. Consequently, applied to the

condition of the colonized peoples' of Africa, the postmodern intellectual dispensation faces some crises. The first crisis is cultural because, having been developed within the European cultural fabric, postmodernism does not have the ability to embrace the cultural diversity of the colonized lot in Africa. The second crisis is purpose. Postmodernism questions European universalities and advocates for the toleration and accommodation of certain European values, habits and customs which have been subverted by the totalizing paradigms of Eurocentricity.

Given the foregoing, postmodernism only becomes relevant to Africa with regard to its questioning the universalizing tendencies of Western civilization but not at all with regard to addressing the unique experiences of the African people both before and after the colonial onslaught. If colonialism was a project aimed at spreading Western modernity to Africa, then the African people should be careful on how to deal with the problem. Interrogating colonialism, strictly within the postmodernist perspective, will of necessity only yield Eurocentric alternatives and diversities which in turn might enhance European hegemony in Africa. And here is where postcolonialism becomes a relevant subversive movement against Western modernity, operating outside that same modernity.

By questioning Eurocentricity outside European modernity, the post-colonial discourse embraces a sense of purpose not only to highlight the plight of formerly colonized *others* but also to exploit the possibility of decentering world history from the Euro-American complex to other parts of the world. This implies a deliberate effort to put in the spotlight non-European cultures, political systems, economic programs, educational policies, scientific knowledge and social values. Thus, this study borrows heavily from the fundamental assumptions of the two theoretical positions as it makes

efforts to tackle the complex issues of decolonization in Kenya, both at formal and informal levels.

1.7 Justification and Significance of the Study

As it has emerged from the literature review, no scholarly work has been done on the appropriation of Frantz Fanon's ideas to the Kenyan decolonization process. Furthermore, no study has been undertaken to study the Kenyan decolonization process by way of engaging postmodern and postcolonial problematics. The current study illustrates the importance of doing this. Accordingly, the study represents a crucial entry into documentary analysis of data. As well, this study undertakes to develop a theoretical conversation hitherto shunned in the historiography of the Kenyan decolonization process.

1.8 Scope

The study focuses on Kenya's decolonization experience between 1895 and 1992. Essentially, 1895 was the time when the political construction called Kenya was declared a British protectorate, heralding the establishment of colonial rule. This study does not view the period of independence of 1963 as the end of colonialism but rather a transition to the neo-colonial experience. Beyond 'independence', therefore, the struggle for decolonization continued throughout the Kenyatta and during the Moi states. The year 1992- the time when Kenya espoused multiparty political culture by holding the first genuinely multi-party elections since the end of formal colonialism- represents the peak of that struggle.

1.9 Methodology

First and foremost, this study has derived its data from library research. Data was collected from local libraries including the Moi library at Kenyatta University, the Jomo Kenyatta Memorial as well as the Institute of Development Studies libraries at the University of Nairobi. More secondary data was gathered from the Public Affairs Section of the American Embassy in Nairobi, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) centre in Dakar, Senegal, and the O'Neil library at the Boston College in the United States of America.

The primary data has been harnessed from the Kenya National Archives and the Macmillan library in Nairobi as well. The two centres have huge collections of primary documents including newspapers, autobiographies, journals and government reports about colonial Kenya's long history of decolonization. It needs, however, to be mentioned that in Chapter Two, quantitative data compiled from records available at the Kenya National Archives, has been reconstructed into tables signifying the various taxation and education trends which obtained during the era of formal colonialism. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the study has employed quantitative techniques. Rather, those tables have been given strict qualitative interpretations without diluting the overall objective of the study.

Through the purposive sampling procedure, oral data for the study was obtained from some of the survivors of Kenya's struggle for freedom. Furthermore, lay persons who have experienced the traumatizing effects of colonialism in its formal and informal shapes provided us with crucial data for this study. The purposive sampling procedure was used to identify African colonial administrators, farm boys, policemen, civil

servants, teachers and above all freedom fighters. In each category of respondents, ten people were interviewed. The data was edited and analysed within the problematic of decolonization.

Special attention was paid to the relevance of the data to the critical issues of colonialism, in its formal and informal shapes, including those of political participation, racism, land, forced labour, education and taxation. In general, two methods were used to analyse data. First was the content analysis method and second was the document review analysis. Both were employed to examine data from key informant interviews and life histories, and to interpret primary and secondary documents as well. This helped us to strike a middle ground on issues which elicited diverse points of view and opinions.

Rather than engage these important informants in a structured questionnaire, this study employed a free-discussion approach in an effort to achieve a fulfilling explanation of the nature and content of Western imperialism in the Kenyan postcolony. Furthermore, focused group discussions were organized by the researcher. These discussions targeted informants who were relevant to particular themes. For example, on matters of education, teachers were targeted for group discussions. The researcher posed questions, members of the group responded and ultimately the researcher took notes. It should, however, be observed that this study is chiefly a philosophical rather than an empirical inquiry of the Kenyan decolonization experience. Thus, much of its research is based on library sources. Consequently, oral sources have been consulted mainly to authenticate the written sources so as to enrich this philosophical inquiry.

With regard to information about the formal era of colonialism, the study targeted informants who were above 60 years. The age limit is significant because Kenyans

within this age demarcation must have experienced the hardships of formal colonialism and they too witnessed the transition to neocolonialism. Yet for the informal era of colonialism, informants had to be above forty years because this age limit provided us with an opportunity to target people who could competently comment on both the Kenyatta and the Moi states. In total, the study interviewed sixty respondents. The overall data collected has been analysed through the prism of the postmodernist and postcolonialist theoretical dispositions.

1.10 Conclusion

In this introductory Chapter, we have outlined the main features of our research project and argued that the imposition of colonial rule in many African countries resulted in the deliberate displacement of African social, political and cultural systems through the introduction of European values. Thus the process of decolonization (in which Africans began to question the European entry and presence in Kenya) began immediately after this displacement took place.

It has been shown that due to the complex nature of the problematic of decolonization in Kenya, an integrated theoretical framework of both postmodernism and post-colonialism would be appropriate in highlighting the critical issues involved in the process. The chapter has also demonstrated the theoretical importance of the ideas of Frantz Fanon to the Kenyan decolonization experience. It has further been pointed out that colonialism in Kenya began in 1895 but continued beyond the 'independence' year of 1963, only that in its post-independence shape, colonialism was directly supervised by the local elites. Accordingly, the scope of our study focuses on the period between 1895

and 1992. In the next chapter, we examine the development of conflict in Kenya's colonial structures.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT IN KENYA'S COLONIAL STRUCTURES, 1895-1952

2.1 Introduction

Before 1895, a political entity called Kenya did not actually exist. In the 1880's, the inland areas of present Kenya comprised a web of domestic economies of complimentary nomadic and sedentary pastoral forms of production (Berman, 1990:49). The sedentary pastoralists, located largely in the hillier areas of eastern and western highlands flanking the Great Rift Valley also practised a limited shifting cultivation of annual cereals based on female labour on a minute fraction of the grazing area. Conflicts tended to occur within rather than between economic zones. There was massive abundance of land which made land tenure rules redundant (Kitching, 1980:282). Yet, even within the hybrid experience of nomadic and sedentary life, interior Kenya had historical contacts with Arab and Swahili traders who were more interested in ivory and slaves than in colonization.

It was thus the British who laid out both the external and internal geographical boundaries that defined a polity which later became Kenya. Therefore, Kenya is a deliberate cultural, political as well as an economic construction of the West. With the establishment of colonial rule, came the birth of the colonial state which undertook to dismantle and rearrange the political, economic, and social institutions of the African people and realign them along the exploitative frameworks of capitalism. In this way, the colonial state became an urgency of the metropolitan British imperialist state (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992:13-15).

From the very beginning of the imperial project and the operationalization of its institutions in Kenya, the majority of the African people were condemned to the voiceless cadres of the society. They were both socially and economically dispossessed by the new power regime fronted by Western imperialism. In the perception of some post-colonial theorists, these colonial subjects were the subalterns of the colonial process (see Spivak, 1987, 1988, 1990; Rodrigues, 2003; Ashcroft. Griffiths et al., 1989).

European control of what was later to be called Kenya began with the missionaries of the 1840s led by such personalities as John Rebmann and Ludwig Krapf (Scanlon, 1966, Kieran, 1966). The two established mission stations in the coastal region. Later in the 1860's, missionaries were followed by explorers and adventurers like Joseph Thompson, James Grant and John Speke, working for such European organizations as the Royal Geographical Society as well as the Church Missionary Soceity (CMS). In the 1870's and 1890's, a chartered company by the name the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) was given permission to control the affairs of the region on behalf of Britain until colonial rule was finally installed in 1895.

From the mid 1870s onwards, European interest in Kenya, which had innocuously started off in the earlier decades as mere spiritual, explorational and missionary enterprises, turned commercial as competing European nations installed their respective chartered campanies in the region (Zwanenberg and King, 1975 chapters 8 and 9, Marris and Somerset, 1971:30-3). The Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) under William Mackinnon carried the British cause while the German East Africa Company under Karl Peters directed the German agenda. At this time, Britain was desperate to

control the headwaters of the Nile so as to secure its interests in Eastern and Northern Africa.

Although the initial objective of the IBEAC was to exploit the areas around Uganda and Congo, which were rich in animal and mineral resources, time proved that the hinterland of Kenya carried enormous agricultural potential which could hardly be ignored. The fertile soils of the Kenyan highlands coupled with the region's wildlife variety attracted the attention of Europeans. It was not going to take long, especially after the 1884 Berlin conference which gave Kenya to Britain, before the British could declare a protectorate over the new territory. Consequently, on the 18th of June 1895, most of the country we know today as Kenya was officially declared a British Protectorate (Bennett, 1963:3). The move came soon after the IBEAC had become bankrupt and demonstrated obvious inability to run the affairs of the territory on behalf of Britain.

Colonial rule gave rise to serious conflicts between the African people and the Europeans. Kenya's people, before imposition of colonial rule were like the American nation, made up of strangers, both adventurers and refugees (Mwakyembe, 1986:32). Therefore, the transformation of Kenya from a polyglot of strangers into a coherent state was the work of force. According to John Lonsdale, the British employed violence on a locally unprecedented scale and with unprecedented singleness of mind. Furthermore, the imposition of colonial rule in Kenya entailed the process of Westernization and capitalist penetration of African economies. Logically, colonialism effected the articulation of indigenous modes of production with the capitalist mode of production and

the integration of the African economies into the Western capitalist system of market relations (Lonsdale, 1987:7). All this was achieved through force and violence.

As early as 1890, for instance, most Africans who had experienced the traumatizing effects of European conquest had become apprehensive and hostile. The Kikuyu, for example, were reported to have been implacably hostile to European agents of the IBEAC, who had established one of their forts at a place called Dagorretti in Kikuyu territory (Edgerton, 1990:4). Here the Kikuyu resisted force, rape, theft of their crops as well as the slow encroachment on their land by Europeans. In 1893, an IBEAC official, Francis Hall, mounted two punitive expeditions that killed 90 Kikuyu with a similar number being wiped out the following year (Ibid.). Hall believed that the only way to help the Kikuyu was to wipe them out (Muriuki, 1974:155). In the ten years between 1895 and 1905, the British employed a similar strategy of force to acquire land at the coast, central Kenya and the Rift Valley region and to set up a harshly politicized colonial state (Ochieng' and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995:xiv).

In this Chapter, we examine the development of conflict in Kenya's colonial structures using the Fanonian logic of violence. As Fanon himself observed while describing the initial imposition of colonial rule:

> ..their first encounter [settler and native] was marked by violence – that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler was carried on by dint of a great array of bayonet and cannons (Fanon, 1967:28)

Uppermost in our discussion is thus a deliberate attempt to examine the three zones which, in Fanon's Algeria, were most susceptible to conflict and violence. These are the land question, the European town and finally the administrative frontier. In Kenya,

however, unlike Algeria, conflict included but went beyond the three zones. The Kenyan experience, as we shall see shortly, registered conficts in the fields of land education, labour as well as in the sphere of political marginalization.

2.2 The Land Question

No discussion of the history of colonial Kenya would be complete without a critical understanding of the role of land in shaping up the colonial state. The arrival of European speculators, adventurers and prospective farmers signalled the loss of land for the African people. The initial encouragement of white settlement in Kenya was given by Sir Charles Eliot (Bennett, Op.Cit.: 10-13). As a British commissioner with immense administrative experience in Asia, Eliot saw European settlement in Kenya as a way of protecting the Uganda railway from the 'hostile' tribes. The Uganda railway was crucial in exploiting the agricultural potential of Kenya's hinterland. In general, however, European settlement in Kenya as it was elsewhere in Africa was informed by certain fundamental ideological assumptions.

Throughout Africa, the colonial ideology had to develop within two major sets of constraints – those imposed by the ideological presuppositions introduced into the situation by the new governing class, and those originating in the exigencies of the local social situation which the colonial administrators had to bring under their own control (Brett, 1973:43). Within these limits, there can be discerned two broad types of social theory whose relative dominance depended upon the nature of the structure of production created in the export sector. The distinction here was between those areas in which agriculture came to be based upon expatriate family class and those in which African peasant producers were dominant. The former lay in regions of temperate climate –

South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Algeria and regions of Northern Rhodesia, Malawi, Tanganyika and Kenya (Smuts, 1930:56). The latter was dominant in the remainder of the continent where it was generally assumed that cash-crop production would be predominantly in the hands of African peasant producers. Nevertheless, both expatriate and peasant production aimed at enhancing the European exploitation of Africa. Consequently, the two forms of production required colonial security and control so that the colonial political economy could reap maximum profits. Because of its crucial economic role, land became the focus of colonial security and control.

Of profound significance was the European belief in the notion of Africa's essential 'immaturity' with reference to the problems created by modern industrial society (Brett, 1973:45). Thus, the colonialists expected many African communities to react negatively to the introduction of "modernity" in their lives. Europeans, assumed that Africans could only be induced into civilization through close and continuous contact with established European community, hence the need for permanent settlement and control in the Kenya colony by the British.

But settlement and control also implied the establishment of permanent imperial administrative structures organized around the prefectural model. This model gave the colonial governor and his administrative staff powers to ensure that the local population complied with the European colonial policies.

Settlement and control, it is worthwhile to note, would thus enable the European colonial officials to constantly monitor the hostile tendencies of the African communities towards the introduction of modern values of life. In Kenya, this policy was useful in preventing the local population from destroying such economically important

infrastructure as the Uganda railway. But what really, is the meaning of modernity? If as it were, modernity embraced the universalizing habits and customs of the Western European person then it must from the beginning be considered oppressive to the African colonial subjects and subversive to their cultural systems. The postmodernist enlightenment illuminates this idea when it argues against the logic of universalizing values of certain sections of humanity by forcing those same values on the rest of humanity.

Thus, the need to bring Africans to 'civilization' and to bring African resources into the British sphere depended upon the establishment of European settlement in Kenya (Smuts Op.Cit.:64). It was in November 1929, when South African apartheid leader Jan Smuts delivered the Rhodes Memorial lectures at Oxford, dealing at length with the general questions of European settlement and native policy in Africa. Summarizing the social philosophy behind permanent European settlement in Africa, Smuts stated thus:

> No flash in the pan of exploitation will overly help the course of African civilization.... Only an ever-present, settled European order can achieve that high end. The call of Africa for civilization, the call of the world for tropical products, the call for these islands for migration and employment combine to give very real force to the case which I am making today (1930:66).

Within the fabric of the modernist project, British land alienation was being done in the name of civilization – to educate the African people in European social, economic and political values (Mitchell, 1947:3). These values, including agricultural techniques, educational projects, economic practices were purely those of the Western European man. The values were presented as universal givens for the entire family of humanity. But as we have already signified before, Freidriech Nietzsche found these totalizing

tendencies of Western Europeans, not only oppressive but also untenable. The postmodernist theoretical perspective moulded in the Nietzschean framework thus helps us to question these tendencies. The nationalist struggle against the land alienation practices of the British should hence be seen as a struggle against, the totalizing habits of Western imperialism.

Through Eliot's encouragement, and in the light of the foregoing theoretical presumption, the settlers acquired land in Central Kenya and the Rift Valley. Some of the areas most affected by massive European invasion included Kikuyu, Kiambu, Thika, Kinangop, Ol Kalaou and the Mount Kenya regions of the central part of the colony. In the Rift Valley, land alienation was formidable in such areas as Gilgil, Naivasha, Subukia, Njoro and Elburgon. Further west, Kitale, Kericho and Kapsabet areas too lost land to Europeans. George Padmore, quoting an Italian expert on colonial affairs, reports that there were only thirteen British settlers in Kenya in 1901. But between May 1903 and December 1904, two hundred and thirty two thousand acres of land was alienated from various ethnic communities in Kenya and distributed to 342 Europeans. The same source reports that the number of European settlers had increased to 3, 175 in 1911, it reached 9,661 in 1921 and 16,812 in 1930 and totalled 28,997 ten years later (Padmore, 1953:357). The increasing population of settlers signified the proportionate loss of productive agricultural land by the Kenyan communities.

Individual settlers in Kenya were given hundreds of acres of land on easy terms that bordered on free acquisition. From 89 holdings totaling less than 5,000 acres in 1903 the number of holdings allocated jumped to 263, totaling 368, 125 acres in 1905 (Ridley, 1968:56). During the colonial period in Kenya, land grabbing was enormous. For

example, in 1903 Lord Delamere received from the British Commissioner 100,000 acres in the Rift Valley. A few years later, he received 60,000 acres. Eventually, Delamere owned 176,768 acres of good land (Sorrenson, 1967:232).

The original leases of land in Kenya were for 99 years but on settler complaints that the period was too short, leases were extended to 999 years. By 1920, 5.5 million acres of land had been confiscated for European use. Of this, the total Kikuyu land taken away was 1,640 square miles or 1,049,600 acres (Frost, 1978:108). Rober Edgerton reports that in 1902, the Kikuyu were so enraged by the massive grabbing of their land by Europeans that they intensified their resistance. In that year, one Kikuyu village in Dagorretti was outstanding in its reaction. Thus:

> A white settler was pegged to the ground, his mouth wedged open with a stick then an entire Kikuyu village, men, women and children urinated into his mouth until he drowned. The angry Africans also cut off his genitals.... (Edgerton, 1990:5).

By 1952, some 9,000 settlers had exclusive rights to 16,700 square miles of land, including 4,000 square miles of Forest Reserve. This happened as several million Africans sought to eke out a livelihood within their congested locations called reserves (Bernett and Njama, 1966:32). Indeed, less than 0.7 per cent of the entire Kenyan population - a figure which included all Europeans - held what has been estimated as 20 per cent of the colony's best land (Ibid).

Acquisition of African land was a symbolic assurance of political control. In turn, political control guranteed economic safety. But ownership of African land was not just a prestigious affair for the settlers. African lands were acquired by force so as to turn these critical assets to economic benefit using the Africans themselves. Consequently, the force that was deployed to acquire land was also appropriated in similar ways to

recruit African labour. Organized African labour, it was thought, was the only way the settlers could be sure of a constant flow of tax revenue from the natives.

Therefore, the British conquest of Kenya went hand in glove with the violent acts of land alienation. Using armaments from the Royal Army as well as Navy, the British depended on both local African manpower and auxiliary Nubian and Arab troops from Northern Africa. Systematically, these troops were then joined by expert British soldiers. The result was conquest of the Swahili dynasties at the coast and later the take-over of the white highlands in the interior. Forceful seizure of African lands gave way to a centralized state which rested on force and the new imperial ideology of progress (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992:14). The new imperial ideology of progress glorified property ownership and racially exclusive property rights. After the conquest, Kenya became a more harshly politicised economy.

Among the Nandi of the Rift Valley, the entrenchment of British rule and the subsequent grabbing of land caused an explosive situation. Between 1895 and 1904, they caused constant trouble to the British. They also raided the newly built Uganda railway stealing bolts, spikes and other material (Bennett, 1963:21). The British fought hard pushing the Nandi into designated reserves and killing the Nandi Laibon to pave way for European settlement (Ngeny, 1970:11-123). Similar expeditions for white settlement were launched among the Kipsigis of Sotik. Earlier on, the British had raided the Babukusu of Western Kenya with the same objective. The foregoing examples would seem to confirm Fanon's view that colonial rule was installed by violence. Indeed, the violence we witness here is a combination of physical injury and outright use of force

which, as Fanon observes, 'is an indication that between the oppressors and the oppressed everything can be solved by force' (Fanon, 1967:56).

The Kenyan colonial land policy was similar though not entirely the same as that which obtained in Fanon's colonial Algeria. In Algeria, settlers too owned most of the arable lands. They acquired land by just any means available including force. In 1954, when the liberation war broke out, European settlers and administrators either owned or controlled close to 40 percent of the arable land, although they only made up about ten per cent of the total population (Ruedy, 1967). The first-conquered lands included those originally under Turkish Suzerainty and those belonging to Muslim populations which resisted the French. Appropriated between 1830 and 1920s, they included some of the best lands in Mitidja coastal plains together with good lands in the Kabylia Mountains and the High Plateaux. The second -habus - were inalienable lands held in pious trusts and used sometimes for charitable purposes. By 1844, this land was available for settler occupancy. The third - collectively owned tribal lands - become available for occupancy between 1844 and 1846 (see Perinbam, 1982:59). Finally the French adopted the 'vacant' land policy which permitted settler occupancy of privately and collectively owned agricultural grazing land. By the end of the nineteenth century, the emergence of the landless Algerian peasantry about whom Fanon spoke had already become a reality.

In colonial Kenya, the establishment of capitalist estate production - of wheat, dairy products, coffee, sisal and tea among others - depended on the appropriation of African land. Bruce Berman, one of the leading European scholars on Kenyan history argues that:

> It is not clear, however, that this separation of Africans from their means of subsistence had an immediately deleterious effect

> on their well- being save in the case of the pastoralist, who suffered in terms of gross acreage, immeasurably larger than the African cultivators (1990:58).

Berman's remarks are untenable because they tend to underestimate the brutalizing effects of European land alienation. Oral evidence undermines Berman's comments. William Malisia (0.1:2001) a retired school teacher who began his teaching career in 1956, observes that his *Abakitwiika* clan lost large tracts of land from the colonialists in the 1930's. The respondent explains how his own grandfather, the late Wabuteya Bunguswa had informed him how, in the earlier decades, the clan had been impoverished and starved when Europeans seized African land in the present Kamukuywa settlement scheme of Bungoma District. According to Malisia, the *Abakitwiika* was mainly a clan of cultivators who shifted from one area to another in search of fertile lands. The clan grew finger millet, sorghum, yams, cassava, sweet potatoes, corn and even green grams. The respondent reported that European invasion in Bungoma caused his clan massive loss of land, starvation, landlessness and loss of identity. This is the reason why some of Berman's arguments on land alienation in Kenya should be treated with caution.

However, it should be pointed out that the continuous alienation of African land as well as its use and control was supervised by officers of the British administration in the colony. As principal agents of imperial control, these officers confronted issues related to African activities with a religious zeal. The prefectural administration possessed a status of power that enabled it to pursue and implement land policies which favoured Europeans. In addition to maintaining a peaceful political order, this administrative bureaucracy worked hard to ensure native compliance with the central directives, through the exercise of authoritarian control (Berman and Lonsdale, Op.Cit.:

231). The prefectural bureaucracy was staffed by an elite cadre of administrators who were expected to be skilled in the exercise of power and to back their orders with force if necessary – 'to hold the line' literary for the regime (Fesler, 1965:536-66). As result, the regime's security and stability depended on 'such administrative personalities as the governor, the provincial and district commissioners. The administrators assisted by the police, represented the violent muscle of the European rule that facilitated the alienation of African lands.

The historic passing of the Crown Lands Ordinance by the colonial government in 1915 meant that virtually all African land in Kenya was declared Crown Land and consequently put under the jurisdiction of the British (Bernett, Op.Cit.: 370). Land alienation had the ultimate effect of preventing Africans from producing sufficient subsistence crops, destroying their economic independence and forcing them to work as wage labourers on European farms. In justifying this arrangement, Lord Delamere argued that Africans had to be forced into the labour market by cutting the amount of land available to them so that wage work would be their only means of survival (Kenya Government, Evidence and Report of Native Labour Commission, 1912-1913:108). To the African communities, loss of land meant loss of their most important resource for survival. The situation was untenable, that is why throughout the colonial period land was not only the focus of friction between Africans and Europeans, but it also constituted the most powerful single grievance in Kenya's struggle for liberation.

2.3 The European Town

The second conflict zone on the French frontier which Fanon identified was the

European town. From the European perspective, towns were central as they separated the 'civilized' from the 'barbarian'. For landed settlers in rural areas, towns were places to escape the inert, passive and sterilizing pressure of the native environment. In Fanon's analysis, however, towns became symbols for the division of the Manichean colonial world into two different species and centres from which 'native' population were decided for, acted upon, manipulated, controlled coerced and heavily taxed. Outside the town was the native town which Fanon refers to as reservations. Here the colonial 'species' 'moved around like crouching animals, daring only to cross into the town when required by economic necessity' (Fanon, 1967:30-32).

In Algeria, European urban development began shortly after the conquest. Towns most affected by the expanding frontier were Algiers, the capital city, Oran in the west as well as Bougie and Annaba in central and eastern Algeria respectively. The last two towns were occupied in 1833. Before long, the French were in Arzew and Mostaganem (1834) in the west as well as Blida, where Fanon was later to take up residence at the Psychiatric hospital (Perinbam, 1982: 425-430)..

The Kenyan experience was similar. In constructing the Railway line to Uganda in the late 1890's, the British established small towns and forts along the way. Although Mombasa was already relatively developed, other towns like Voi, Nairobi, Nakuru and Kisumu developed during the era of colonialism. In agricultural areas, towns such as Kiambu, Thika, Kericho, Eldoret and Kitale also came up, signifying the arrival of 'civilization' in the interior parts of Kenya. Invariably, Europeans in a small urban frontier exercised disproportionate power over majority of the Kenyan people.

As Fanon observed, the rural masses, the subalterns of Gramsci and Spivak remained relatively aloof (Fanon Op.Cit). Until the 1930's, the majority of the Muslim population in Algeria remained in the countryside. Impoverished, landless and demoralized by French 'pacification' many seemed - as Fanon puts it - to be 'retrograde obscurantist, petrified and bogged down in fruitless inertia'. By the 1920's and 1930's, however, the situation began to change. Driven by rising birth rates, persistent rural penury, epidemics and famines, land hungry Muslim masses began converging on the cities (Perinbam, 1982:427-45). After the 1930's, the 'Manichean' or the rural urban dichotomy which had 'mercifully' separated Europeans from the mass of population began to close. By the 1940s, the shanty towns about which Fanon spoke were already in existence.

In regions of Kenya where land alienation was massive, many people were rendered homeless. The most affected areas include, central Kenya, Rift Valley, some parts of the coastal region and the Western part of the country. Some of the displaced people sought refuge on newly acquired European farms while others who could not cope with life in the African locations called reserves migrated into towns in the hope of finding manual jobs. Furthermore, towns seemed to promise good life, jobs and opportunities for one to become rich. But because African entrants into the urban centres could not share common residence with Europeans, African shanty towns developed in cross proximity with the European town. The conflict between the European and African town is vividly explained by Fanon when he says:

> The zone where the natives live is not complimentary to the zone inhabited by settlers. The two zones are opposed but not in the service of higher unity. Obedient to the rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of mutual exclusivity. No reconciliation

> is possible.....The settler's town is strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is brightly lit town, the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage cans swallow all the leavings, unseen settler's feet are never visible, except perhaps in the sea; but there you are never close to see them. His feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler's town is a well-fed and easy-going town; it is a belly of good things. The settler's town is a town of white people, of foreigners (1967:30).

But in contrast, the situation in the town of the colonised people was depressing enough. As Fanon observes:

> The town belonging to the colonized people or at least the native town, the Negro village, the Medina, the reservation is a place of ill-fame, peopled by men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other and their huts are built one on top of the other.....The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees. It is a town of niggers and dirty Arabs (Ibid.)

Indeed, the profound difference between the European and the native towns explains the depth of conflict between the 'natives' and the colonizers. As Fanon explains:

> The look that the native turns on the settler's town is look of lust, a look of envy; it expresses his dreams of possession; to sit at the settlers table, to sleep in the settler's bed, with his wife if possible. The colonized man is an envious man. And this the settler knows very well; when their glances meet he ascertains bitterly always on the defensive 'They want to take our place'. (Fanon, 1967:30).

A typical colonial town in Kenya had specific names for the native town. Almost all the major cities of colonial Kenya had shanty enclaves defined by names like *Majengo* (shanty buildings) and *Huruma* (sympathy). Other names which defined native towns were *Kariokor* (a place of World War I African Carrier Corps), *Kamukunji* (meeting place), *Kaloleni* and *Kambi Somali* (a camp for the Somali) among others. All these names had a territorial and racial significance with regard to defining the native town. However, the European enclaves were basically known by European names of places and their historical heroes.

In the highly compartmentalized colonial world, the native in the native town does not just want recognition from the settler as in the Hegelian experience but he also covets the quality of life the colonizer lived. The economic reality of colonialism was defined by inequality and the immense difference of ways of life between natives and Europeans. Furthermore, when as Fanon said several times, you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world was to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race. In the colonies, the economic substructure was also a superstructure. The cause was the consequence: 'you are rich because you are white and your are white because you are rich' (Ibid.: 31).

In colonial Algeria, just as in Fanon's native Martinique, the French adopted the assimilationist policy of administration. By this strategy, the French urged 'Frenchinization' among its colonial subjects, encouraging urban elites to be French-speaking and French- educated. The philosophy behind the assimilationist policy was to create Frenchmen out of Africans as well as Muslims. But reminiscent of his own experience, Fanon noticed that even though some *evolues* followed the letter of the law, even converting to Christianity, the French never ceased to remind them of their Muslim origins. The latter usually connoted something pejorative that the 'Muslim' was an oversexed predator; or lazy; or that he had criminal instincts; or that in biological terms he was not far removed from the reptile world (Gendzier, 1970: 170-172).

Turning to assimilation policies affecting the legal status of Muslims, Fanon noted that the French had extended the area of French civil territories into predominantly Muslim zones. Assimilation was, therefore, a French cultural policy deliberately put in

place to destroy the identity of the colonial subjects in all its dependencies including Algeria.

Socially, colonialism was racist. The era of modern imperialism in the 19th century, which of course marked European expansion in Africa, was also the era of scientific racism. As part of the most vibrant branch of Social Darwinism, racism and racist mythology were compatible with mainstream Western science deep into the 20th century (Thompson, 1985:13). Western scientists and academics articulated the theory of a 'great chain of being' in which white people were at the top of the chain, and black people at the bottom of the human part of the chain, close to orangutans at the top of the non-human part (Ibid.: 13; Hansen, 1978:80). Given 'scientific' respectability, this racist reasoning was a distinct part of the culture of imperialism as Europeans advanced in Africa and was often used as a justification for this expansion. Franz Fanon argues that racism was a necessary counterpart of colonial rule. He observes that:

> It is not possible to enslave men without logically making them inferior through and through. And racism is only the emotional, effective, sometimes intellectual explanation of this inferiorization (1967:52).

In Toward the African Revolution, Fanon reiterates the same point when he concludes that:

> Race prejudice in fact obeys a flawless logic. A country that lives, draws its substance from the exploitation of other peoples, makes those people inferior. Race prejudice applied to those peoples is normal (1969:40-41).

Thus, the position Fanon wishes to emphasize here is that racism was the consequence and not the cause of the system of exploitation of one group by another.

In British colonies such as Kenya, economic inequalities and racism defined the difference between the European and colonial towns. The myth of inherent European superiority and African inferiority rationalized colonialism in Kenya. The feeling that skin colour determined the mental and physical abilities of a person was entrenched in the European mind even before the colonization of Africa. Racism in colonial Kenya permeated through every aspect of the people: education, labour, taxation, land tenure, administration, housing and socialization. Africans here were prevented from possessing firearms, from using white toilets, from consuming hard liquors such as whisky as well as from patronizing such exclusive areas as the Norfolk and the New Stanley hotels in Nairobi (Edgerton, 1990:20-35).

During World War I and II, Africans served in segregated units of the army and, on return from the wars, the soldiers were given nothing beyond a few shillings despite the fact that they had, during the war, committed their lives to defend British imperialism (Kilikinji O.I, 2002). This was unlike the British soldiers who, after the war, received large tracts of land in settlement schemes including those in Nandi, Kinangop, Trans-Nzoia, Njoro and Laikipia areas (Haberson, 1973: 7-8).

Although the British adopted the policy of indirect rule by which the local chiefs and village elders would effect colonial laws while at the same time allowing Africans a leeway in continuing with their own cultural practices, the final result was the same: to prove the British superiority and African inferiority. Because racial mixing was unacceptable in colonial Kenya, the African reserves and locations were created. With time, both the reserves and locations became the frontier of poverty and misery because they received little attention from the colonial authorities with regard to provision of

services, (Mbaria O. I, 2000). The shanty towns of Majengo in both Nairobi and Mombasa were homes for the wretched of the earth. But there was a difference between the way these wretched people looked at themselves and the way Europeans viewed them. While the poor people of Kenya considered themselves as adults with rational minds, Europeans believed that, indeed, Africans were just children. In her personal reminiscences, Charity Waciuma summarizes Kenya's colonial situation thus:

> I rapidly grew up to dislike these white men who made people work like slaves and paid them half a shilling a day for it, who sometimes struck the grown men as if they were children and indeed threatened us as if, mentally, emotionally we were permanently children (1969:52).

The thrust of Waciuma's observation is that colonialists in Kenya did not recognize the maturity of the Kenyans and in fact treated adults as if they were children. Nothing could be racially depressing than this. Subsequently, racism came to be one of the most touching issues in the colonial period and it remained a crucial grievance for the nationalist leaders during their struggle for decolonization.

2.4 The Administrative and Military Frontier

The administrative set-up of colonial rule was based on the prefectural model. Prefectural administration in the colonies was an adaptation of an administrative apparatus with deep historical roots in the rise of the European nation-state and the early development of capitalism. Like their later colonial offspring, the original prefectural administrators played contradictory roles, caught between the imperatives of centralization, uniformity and order and claims of local rights, particularism and differential rates of change (Berman, 1990:75-76).

Thus, in deploying prefectural administration as the foundation of the colonial state, European powers draw upon a form for which they had an historic repertory of experience. For France, in particular, where prefectural administration achieved its arch-typical development, it represented a well known and practised instrument of control. For Britain, it was a state form unknown at home, but had been explicitly adopted and refined in the encounter with indigenous social forces in the non-white colonies of the Empire, particularly India and Africa (Low, 973: chapter 2; Scott 976:96-8|). In virtually all the European colonies, prefectural governors were the principal agents of the construction of centralized state power, exercising primary responsibility for the stimulation of production and trade and the maintenance of public order (Berman Op.Cit: 75).

During colonialism, the administrative and military frontier - Fanon's third colonial frontier - was purely undisguised violence. As with the town frontier discussed above, the administrative and military frontiers served different ends in the diverse colonial society. While, for white settlers, the lines of demarcation guaranteed political and legal separation, for Algerians, it was sometimes a form of apartheid: complete with unequal civil and political liberties; together with highly visible institutions of coercion and oppression. In his analysis of violence, Fanon discussed the effects of institutionalized and violent apartheid on administrative and military frontiers where the 'geographical layout' was marked by barracks and police stations and where the official liaison or representative of the settlers and of the oppressive regime was the policeman and the soldier. It is they who, Fanon thinks, controlled civil populations in their 'reservations' with force and with threats of violence (Fanon, 1967:29).

But the civil population was not just a simple unit. The civil African population was complex yet broadly defined by two fundamental identities: race and tribe. The shift from race to tribe was pioneered by the British and articulated in the policy of indirect rule. As Mohamood Mamdani has pointed out:

> It was a transition made by every colonial power. For there were compelling reasons that flowed from the very nature of the colonial encounter. Occupying powers learned that if popular resistance could not be smashed frontally it would have to be fragmented through reform..... Race as the main way of defining the social status of the colonized had two important disadvantages: first it defined the colonized as a racially oppressed majority; and second it was difficult to legitimate this mode of control by anchoring it in any traditional context. As the cutting edge of social life, racism compounded rather than eased the problem of rule in colonial context for its thrust was not to divide and rule but to unite and rule (Mamdani, 1996:90).

Consequently, the alternative to racism – as the main way of the social, legal and political status of the colonized – was tribalism. Unlike race, tribe would dissolve the majority of the colonized into several tribal minorities. In Kenya, as in colonial South Africa, the administrative and military focus of British rule was on promoting tribalism through the appointment of tribal chiefs who in turn 'mediated' between the African tribes and the colonial authorities. This ensured proper control of the 'natives' by the colonial rulers. The strategy was effective in establishing and controlling the African homelands such as Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana where the apartheid policy of separate development was implemented (Devenish, 1987:30). But in Kenya, this policy brought about the creation of tribal reserves, in the rural areas, which were allowed some limited 'self rule' that was legitimated through brutal tribal chiefs appointed by the colonizers. The African chiefs were directly answerable to the European governors rather than to their own tribesmen and women. It thus goes without

saying that formal colonialism employed hegemonic tendencies when it used African chiefs as bridges to reach the native population.

In theory, the institution of the African chief was used by Europeans to hoodwink the world that, after all, Africans were in charge of their own destiny because they were being ruled by personalities from within the black race. However, in practice, the institution of the chief perpetuated, protected and signified the Western hegemonic programmes and values over the African people. These programmes and values gave rise to a highly alienated category of human beings within the native population, dispossessed of cultural, material, economic and political freedoms. It is the category of hopeless people that Antonio Gramsci once referred to as the subalterns.

In Fanon's Algeria, administrative centres were complex structures designed to divide rural populations according to ethnic and religious identities. For example, in the arid southern regions of Algeria, occupied almost entirely by Muslims, the French presence was primarily a military one (Perinbam, 1982:61). Operating through various administrative instruments, military personnel specialists in Arabic dialects and cultures, administered these Southern departments either directly or through local dignitaries such as *bachagas*, *aghas*, *qodis* and *sheikhs* (Ibid).

But in areas where European populations existed to some degree, but in small minority, the administrative formular was different. Here, a type of administration known as mixed commune was applied, where official policies ensured the submission of Muslim populations by permitting limited participation in municipal elections and by leaving local affairs in the hands of *qadis* or local officials who administered according to Muslim law. Departmental matters in these mixed communes were, however, handled by

French authorities. Yet in areas where European populations dominated, self-governing communes prevailed. Here, like in France, an elected mayor administered according to French laws, customs and municipal traditions.

The administrative and military fabric in colonial Algeria was a combination of policies which separated the rural elements within the Algerian society. These policies favoured settlers who, for the most part, lived in jurisdictions separated from the rest of the Algerian populations. Although there were of course some exceptions, all too frequently, settler attitudes encouraged discriminatory and authoritarian practices. Seeking to ensure supremacy at the price of separation, many settlers preferred plural institutions, which restricted representations, to unitary ones with wider representation as was the case in more homogeneous societies. Thus, except in those urban areas where assimilation policies were effectively implemented, the administrative and military frontier became increasingly conflictual and violent in proportions especially when social unrest increased in the few years before the outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence in 1954.

In contrast with Algeria, colonial Kenya did not have any self-governing regions. Yet the question of land and property rights remained emotive and sensitive. In the coastal regions for example, the question of land become acute after Europeans took control. Under Bantu law, no individual owned land but tribal authority allocated land to families for cultivation (Trimingham, 1964:145). Land could also be allocated to strangers and Arabs were given permission to settle upon making a regular series of presents to tribal authorities. They planted coconuts and cultivated by means of slave labour but the land was not regarded as theirs, only trees and crops which alone could be

sold. Africans who had embraced Islam continued to observe traditional land tenure practices which empowered indigenous people to make decisions about land use.

Although the British administrative policy was that of indirect rule, the highest ranked African administrative official was the chief who served under colonial District and Provincial Commissioners. The latter two were all white regardless of which geographical area one was looking at. The head of the colonial administration was the Governor. The Governor relied, in his administration, upon selectively recruited colonial staff most of them with an elitist social and economic background. Many officials of the administrative staff in colonial Kenya went to school in Britain's leading public schools such as Eton and Balliol (Furse, 1962: 216-232). After 1910, recruitment of administrators targeted those with Oxford or Cambridge University degrees (Armstrong, 1972:152). For British administrators, emphasis on good education in privileged institutions was consistent with the British imperial policy of creating a unified higher state administrative cadre of the dominant class in Britain sharing, whether they were of aristocratic or bourgeois origin, a common background, culture and ideas. So the administrative officers who were recruited for Kenya had this unique background. But they too were officers who fiercely believed in the project of imperialism.

The imperial administrative staff, it was realized, could not directly deal with and handle the native because of complex linguistic and cultural reasons. Accordingly, the post of chief was created to bridge the gap between Europeans and Africans. Chiefs were chosen from among 'progressive' and collaborating African adults whose loyalty was skillfully secured through allocation of limited leadership and material responsibilities (The Nairobi Law Monthly, April/May 1991:27). The chiefs had express authority to use

force where necessary to ensure that imperial policies were effected. In addition to mobilizing people to work as labourers on European farms, chiefs played a fundamental role in collecting tax money. Representing the brutality and heartlessness of the colonial state, African chiefs in Kenya extorted money from virtually everyone in the district, took land and livestock and demanded attractive women to sleep with, thus misusing their powers. Agents of Chief Nabongo Mumia of the Wanga 'sub-tribe' in Western Kenya were particularly notorious for this kind of behaviour (Mwaturo O.I, 2001). In addition, chiefs took bribes to manipulate cases before them, particularly those relating to taxation and land (Muriuki, 1974: 168-169).

For most Africans in Kenya, the white administrator was the colonial state but chiefs were an extension of that state. As colonial functionaries, chiefs were assisted in their work by a tribal police. The police force was deliberately established by the colonial government to instill fear in the African and to force him to obey colonial laws. Members of the force were drawn mainly from the non-educated ranks of the African population (Ruoro I.O, 2001).

By the orders of chiefs, some 'disobedient' Africans experienced such brutalities as being forced to work through hailstorms, being punched, handcuffed and inhumanly kicked (Nyongesa O.I: 200). Other resisting Africans were, on the orders of the chiefs, caned to death or critically injured by a hippo-skin whip (Wasike, O.I:2001). The offences punished by death with the express approval of African chiefs and their European superiors included tax evasion, labour avoidance and subversion (Sifuma, 0.I, 2000). In general, the British administrative machinery signified violence, brutality and suffering for the majority of the African people. It is, therefore, no wonder that when the

conflict turned irrepressibly violent, chiefs and European administrators become leading targets of the African violence.

But having considered Fanon's three frontiers of conflict, we found out that in Kenya there were three more avenues of serious conflict between the Europeans and the Africans which, for some unexplained reasons, Fanon did not seem to give greater prominence with regard to colonial Algeria. These avenues existed in the fields of labour and taxation, education and finally political marginalization.

2.5 Labour and Taxation

From the very start, the colonial regime set out to control indigenous labour. Europeans considered taxation as the most critical method of compelling the 'native' to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work (East African Standard, February 4, 1913). The same source reports that raising the rate of wages would not increase but diminish labour because higher wages would enable Africans to easily meet their tax obligations as well as their domestic needs. But low wages would motivate Africans to work harder and for longer periods in order to pay taxes and still spare some little money for domestic use.

As we have intimated elsewhere, Frantz Fanon argued that colonialism was established and maintained by violence. This violence was realized through conquest, through education and through land alienation among other things. We hasten to add that colonial taxation and labour practices were crucial avenues for sustaining European violence against the Africans. Africans were taxed without being given an option of saying no. They were also captured and forced to work on newly acquired European farms. Between 1919-21, for instance, an acute shortage of labour on European farms

forced the then British Governor in Kenya, Sir Edward Northey to use force (Berman, 1990:46). These actions were a fundamental reflection of the structure and content of European colonial violence in Kenya.

Taxation and the concomitant effects of low wages were, therefore, effectively employed to stimulate the flow of cheap labour from the reserves. The point of conflict here is that Africans sold their important labour at low prices decided by Europeans! As a result of providing non-competitive labour, the standards of living for most African families remained comparatively low throughout the colonial period. Most households could not afford such basics as blankets, cooking fat, soap and even a balanced diet (Wakasa O.I: 2001).

The highest proportion of labour on European farms was provided by squatters. Squatting or labour tenancy was a creation of white settler colonialism in Kenya. By the squatting arrangement, Africans were said to have accepted to work on the white man's land in order to be temporarily allocated plots on the same land to raise their own food (Kanogo, 1987). Before 1920, life on European farms was unregulated. On the average, however, a squatter worked three to six months in a year for his master. In turn, the squatter could theoretically cultivate as much European land as he wished; he could also graze his livestock on European farms. But in practice, legal impediments prevented the Africans from utilizing the settlement farms as they wished. During the time the squatter worked on a European farm, he earned four shillings and a ration of posho (maize flour) in a month (Furedi, 1989:40). Posho was given because most Europeans believed that the nutritional demands of an African did not go beyond maize meal.

However, from 1920 onwards squatters worked under service contracts which ran from one to five years renewable with 180 working days per year (Ibid.). If in the process of serving his contract, ownership of land changed, squatters, too passed into the hands of new owners to complete the contract. This system resembled Europe's mediaeval serfdom. Furthermore, the squatters, and indeed all the labourers on European farms had no say in the price of their labour. They were paid what Europeans thought was appropriate for the African workers. It has to be observed too that even when squatters raised some food crops such as maize while on European farms, it was the white man who fixed the prices of such commodities (Wakasa, O.I, 2001).

As early as 1919, 16,000 Africans, mostly Kikuyu, lived and worked on the land of white settlers in Naivasha and Nakuru areas of the Rift Valley (Furedi, 1978: 108). The total white population then in the two areas was only 215 people including women and children (Ibid.). But just before the outbreak of Mau Mau, there were about 250,000 contract wage labourers in the entire Rift Valley working as squatters (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:23; Kanogo, 1987:244). In the 1920 and 1930's the colonial government in Kenya moved aggressively to systematize labour as a source of revenue.

Chiefs were empowered by colonial authorities to use force to procure labour. Thus, the only way Africans could pay their taxes was by working as wage earners not only on state projects, but also on European farms as well. Attempts too were made to deny Africans alternative means of making a living because of fear of labour flight from European farms. For example, Africans were barred from growing such high-paying cash crops as coffee, tea and wheat that would have enabled them to easily settle their tax obligations and to decline to work on European farms. Under the Native Registration

Ordinance rules, first passed in 1915, but only brought into force in 1920, the '*kipande*' (labour pass) system was introduced to keep track and control of the men on the farms (Bennett Op Cit.: 37-40; Clyton and Savage, 1974: 132). This required every male African over the age of fifteen (15) to register before an administrative officer, when his finger prints were taken and he was issued with a registration certificate, the *'kipande'*. In line with the British policy of 'divide and rule' the pass bore the name, tribe and fingerprints of the carrier, his past employer's recommendations and the present employer's stamp (McGregor – Ross, 1968:189). The *'kipande'* had to be carried at all times when moving or living outside of the reserves, usually in a metal cylinder, hung around the neck. Each time an African entered or left employment the employer had to sign him on or off on the certificate (Berman, 1990:147). By the end of 1920, 194, 750 certificates had been issued and this climbed to 519, 056 by the end of 1924 and to 1, 197, 467 by 1931 (McGregor-Ross, Op.Cit.:, 189-193). Essentially, the pass was a mark of servility, but more importantly, it enabled employers to keep control of their labourers (Padmore, 1953:359).

The Registration Ordinance also created a category of 'crimes' as Africans became liable to fine or imprisonment for failing to carry, for losing, or destroying the *'kipande'*. In addition, penalties were provided for employers who failed to demand the *'kipande'* when hiring labour, failed to file with the Registrar the particulars of the Africans and employed and failed to sign off a worker when his contract was finished (Berman, 1990:147). Thus the '*kipande*' assisted as well in maintaining the cheapness of labour by restricting both a man's freedom to leave his work and his freedom to bargain with an employer for a wage not necessarily related to his previous employment'

(Clayton and Savage, 1974:132). Finally, the '*kipande*' also created opportunities for abuses by both employers and officials especially with regard to the harassment of men identified as 'trouble-makers' or 'bad hats' Berman, Op.Cit.: 147). In the Fanonian sense, the system was a form of psychological violence meted against the Africans by Europeans. This was deliberately done to deny Africans their freedom of choice, and movement in addition to promoting the stereotype of the inherent inferiority of the black man.

Every year the colonial government collected large sums of money in taxes. The important feature about the tax collection was that Africans, in comparison with either Europeans or the Asians, seemed to carry the highest tax burden in the colony. Let us examine the following tax statistics (Table A) from two colonial districts namely Kiambu and Fort Hall (Murang'a).

TABLE A: TAXATION PATTERNS ALONG RACIAL LINES

District	Year	Approximate African pop. Figures	European pop. in Figures	Asian Pop. in Figures	Total Revenue in Shillings	African Poll & Hut Taxes in Shs.	African Tax Burden in %
Kiambu	1927	103,053	973	860	589,420	466,420	79
	1932	115,007	-	-	361,702	340,200	94
	1937	133,721	64	259	397,961	374,515	94
	1942	142,187	-	-	449,741	387,920	86
Fort	1927	162,890	483	705	817,149	768,120	94
Hall	1932	171,734	61	432	779,940	729,204	93
(Murang'a)	1937	195,366	52	379	729,055	706,440	97
	1942	192,208	-	508	723,363	666,657	92

SOURCE: Adopted from the Annual Reports for Kiambu and Fort Hall (Murang'a) Districts for the years indicated (see Bibliography). These reports are readily available at the Kenya National Archives (KNA), Nairobi.

A number of conclusions could be drawn from the above statistics. In all the years targeted, the African population heavily outnumbered both the European and Asian

population. The imbalance in population was effectively used by the colonial authorities by forcing Africans to carry the main tax burden.

Yet in terms of income and accessibility to resources, both the Asians and Europeans were far ahead of Africans (Ochieng and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995:xv, Zeleza, 1989: 35-36). In their unrestrained eagerness to posses everything, the colonial oppressors in Kenya developed a conviction to safeguard their strictly materialistic concept of existence. Money became a measure of all things and profit became the primary goal. For these oppressors, what was worthwhile was to have more – always more – even at the cost of the oppressed having less or nothing (Freire, 1973:44). Therefore, taxation became a significant avenue through which colonial authorities in Kenya maintained their opulent status and a platform for perpetuating the underprivileged status of the oppressed.

Indeed, payment of tax by the oppressed people of Kenya was a colonial requirement and this requirement was effected by the use of force for those who attempted to question it. Thus within the Fanonian perspective, colonial taxation could be said to be a form of violence both at the physical, economic and psychological levels. For all practical purposes, therefore, taxation was a significant battleground that perpetuated colonial violence and conflict. Not surprisingly, the African came to target taxation as one of their grievances against white domination.

Table A above reveals that the African taxation formed almost all the revenue collected each year. For example, in 1927 the African tax burden in Kiambu District was 79% of the total revenue collected; it rose to 94% in both 1932 and 1937 and dropped slightly to 86% in 1942. The same trend obtains in Fort Hall District. We need,

however, to stress that even after paying the poll and hut taxes, Africans still had to pay part of the tax burdens for the remaining percentages of revenue collection. In 1927, for instance, Africans in Kiambu District paid taxes amounting to 79% of the total revenue collected that year. But the remaining 21% of the revenue, it is important to state, was not exclusively drawn from Europeans and Asians. In this small percentage, Africans also contributed through the payment of rents, native registration fees, court fines, forfeitures, trade license fees and a host of other small taxes created by the colonial government (DC/KBU/1/20:12). The Europeans and Asians, on the other hand, contributed their tax share to the remaining 21% through the payment of non-native poll tax, education tax, trade license tax and motor vehicle fees.

The above explanations make it clear that the percentages of the African tax burden as indicated in Table A were, every year, actually higher than they appear. The tax trends in Fort Hall and Kiambu are a fair representation of tax trends in other districts across colonial Kenya. Records for other colonial districts including West Pokot, Meru, North Nyanza and Kitale among others (readily available at the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi) all point to similar tax trends throughout the colonial period. It may be helpful to add that many Africans who were employed by government as junior clerks, teachers, demonstrators and messengers, too, paid taxes and experienced the trauma of earning low wages.

In 1952, over 46,000 Africans employed in colonial services received less than two pounds per month (Padmore, Op Cit.: 360). With every few exceptions, Europeans occupied the top of the colonial economic, political and social pyramid. Their salary scale was the highest in the colonial state. In 1960, for instance, there were only 61,000

Europeans as compared to 169,00 Asians, and 7.8 million Africans. Yet despite these demographic differences, about 40 per cent of the total wage bill accrued to Europeans during that year (Ochieng and Atieno-Odhiambo, Op.Cit.: xv). However, despite earning more, Europeans paid less in terms of taxes.

In general, African labour produced most of the wealth which was taken to Europe for long-term investment. However, some of the taxes collected went into the maintenance of the colony's administrative set-up as well as in the construction of physical facilities. The facilities included exclusive hotels, schools, good houses, good roads and postal as well as telephone networks which collectively defined the European town. Several Kenyans protested the harsh labour conditions and the exploitation of Africans by Europeans through taxes. Still more 'deserted' labour farms while others refused to register as colonial citizens (Berman Op Cit.: 146).

But keeping labourers on the jobs remained a continuing problem. In the face of the grueling work demanded, the frequent cruelty of European and Asian employers and the generally poor housing and diet, many African labourers 'deserted' duties by running away from work. In doing this, runaway African labourers also undertook to perfect the art of evading the payment of taxes. On hearing stories of runaway labourers about the brutalities of labour policies on European farms, some potential labourers in the reserves made efforts to avoid the ritual of registering as colonial citizens (Berman, 1990:46).

But any infringement of labour laws was considered a very serious crime in colonial Kenya and the heaviest penalties were imposed on those found 'deserting' labour duties (Aaronovitch and Aaronovitch, 1947:113). Through the Kenya and tribal police, the provincial administration periodically constrained African movement outside of the

reserves and limited their freedom to enter and leave employment. Punishment for labour offences ranged from physical flogging, monetary fines to imprisonment (Wangamati O.I, 2000). The entire system of labour and taxation was violent.

It, therefore, seems obvious that both labour and taxation were strategically appropriated by the colonialists to promote uneven development in favour of Europeans. It is our argument here that both labour and taxation were important zones of conflict during the period of Kenya's decolonization.

2.6 Education

Another avenue of colonial conflict was education. Apart from being designed to prove the black man's inferiority, colonial education aimed at training individuals for the service of colonial society (Nyerere, 1968:269). Furthermore, it had the objective of training Africans, not for independence but for subservience (Odinga, 1967:63). Settlers, according to Daniel Sifuna, held the view that African education should be directed towards a useful labour force (Sifuna, 1985:4). The introduction of Western education in Kenya undermined the value of traditional African education.

Traditional African education emphasized human relations and behaviour. It also stressed the importance of communal activities. In the multi-tribal society of Kenya, tribal cohesion was vital for survival. Each tribe had to foster its own identity and having done that ensure that identity was preserved. One aspect of education, therefore, was the maintenance of this unity while a second one prepared the individual for his rights and responsibilities in the family, clan or tribe (Mutua, 1975:9). Thus traditional education

transcended all economic considerations and was not concerned with teaching the individual to earn a living.

Western education, on the other hand, was not only individualistic but also materialistic. While traditional education taught individuals to be members of a cohesive society, Western education was based on individualism and had little relation to society (Kenyatta, 1968:12). With the coming of Europeans, economic considerations became paramount in education (Ibid, 1975:10). During colonialism, Europeans created a need in some Africans to make an individual living and Western education provided the means to do this. By introducing the 'certificate cult', the colonial government set the African people on the road to the modern economic world defined and perpetuated by Eurocentric forms of knowledge and values.

It is, however, practically impossible to obliterate a civilization without exterminating the people who hold that civilization. The intention of the white immigrants into Africa was to suppress the African ways of life and to superimpose their own form of civilization on the indigenous people. The method of achieving this end was seen as vital. All aspects of African life had to be covered to ensure total cultural strangulation. This was covered in a one-pronged approach, literacy, education, civilization and Christianity. These four aspects of European life were introduced together with no distinction between them (Isiye O:I, 2001). If one wanted to become literate, one would only do so in a mission school where one was forced to be a Christian.

After their initial resistance to Europeans, the Africans became inspired with a desire for Western standards, chief among which was literacy. Under the circumstances, prevalent at that time, literacy guaranteed economic progress. Furthermore, literacy came

to be equated with Christianity and Christianity too became equated with economic progress. But as time passed by, especially with the increase in indigenous literates, Africans came to realize that Western education was all about literacy and foreign ways of life. It was thus incapable of helping them cope with social, economic and political conditions that had been imposed on them. Furthermore, they realized that in its Western form, education had been tailored to keep them perpetually subservient to the Europeans (Wekesa O.I, 2002).

Colonial education, which was an extension of Western education imposed on the African mind certain binaries including those of colonizer/colonized, primitive/ civilized, European/Other as well as religious/superstitious. These binaristic mapping of power relations gave the impression that through colonialism, civilization and modernity would flow from the centre which was the West to the periphery which was Africa. This false notion had to be forced down the throats of the oppressed African people with the result that colonial subjects surrendered their identity to the West. In this way, education seems to have been transformed into a critical instrument for destroying the African identity.

It is crucial to observe that the entire project of colonial education brought to the fore two critical issues – humanization and dehumanization. With the objective of sustaining the control of the Africans, colonial education was designed to dehumanize the people of Kenya. A fundamental feature of this education was its narrative character. Through narration, the oppressed people were made to be passive recipients of the colonial teacher. The contents and values of the narrative were those glorifying the superiority of the white people. The curriculum was alien and unable to articulate the local reality.

Narration led African students to memorize mechanically the narrated content that was for all practical purposes British in structure (Wangila O.I 2002). As our oral respondent Joseph Wangila recalled, his school days were marked by singing 'God save the King', every mornings and every evenings (Wangila O.I, 2002). Distinguished Brazilian philosopher Paulo Freire himself a follower of Fanon's, summarizes this experience when he says of the oppressor's narration that:

> Worse yet, it turns them (students) into 'containers', into receptacles to be 'filled' by the teacher. The more completely he fills the receptacles the better a teacher he is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are (Freire, 1972:58).

Education thus becomes an act of depositing in which students of the oppressed lot are the dispositories and their teacher (a colonial functionary) is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which students patiently receive, memorize and repeat. In Kenya, students of the oppressed lot were supposed to memorize content which articulated the so-called inferiority and savagery of the African people and to highlight the perpetual superiority of Europeans. Paulo Freire calls this, the 'banking' concept of education in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filling and storing deposits (Ibid.: 58).

In the 'banking' concept of education, knowledge was a gift bestowed by those Europeans who considered themselves knowledgeable upon those Kenyan Africans whom they considered to know nothing. Yet projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a character of the ideology of oppression, seems to me to negate education and knowledge as processes of inquiry and invention. Tragically, the imperial education project allowed the colonial teacher to present himself to his African students as their

necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justified his own existence.

Alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic, the students accepted their ignorance, thereby justifying the teacher's existence. But with time, the African students came to realize that like the Hegelian slave, rebellion against this oppression was possible. If we consider colonial education as dehumanizing, we should also accept that the same education imposed a violent psychological experience on the indigenous people, thereby perpetuating what Ngugi wa Thiong'o calls ' mental colonization (Ngugi, 1986). By rejecting this system, the natives were throwing a violent blow to the Europeans who had initially rejected and worked hard to destroy Africa's educational values.

In Kenya, three parties controlled African education. They were the missions, the government and the settlers. Almost unanimously, the three parties concurred that vocational, industrial and religious instruction should constitute the African curriculum. Imbued with racial feelings of superiority, most whites considered spiritual, vocation and industrial education as best suited for Africans (Berman, 1975a). The first mission centres (for instance the Rabai mission near Mombasa) date back to the 1850s. Missionary education emphasized the Christianization of the black soul because Christianity was viewed as the universal religion of mankind. Every other non-Western religion was, in the European consideration, superstition or witchcraft (Mugo O.1, 2000). But in his rebellious disposition, Fanon remarks that:

> Christianity..... preaches subservience kills the spirit and values of the native. It is like D.D.T which destroys parasites (1967:32).

True, missionary education in Kenya killed the African spirit and destroyed the African identity, creating a highly obedient class of Africans who became a fundamental tool for the capitalist exploitation of colonial Kenya.

It seems to me that some of the Africans who had gone through missionary education detested it later. This was because, apart from being of low quality, missionary education had been designed to keep them out of politics and critical reflection (Njoka, Ruoro O.I, 1999). European and Asian children went to special, rather than missionary, schools that had the facilities to prepare learners for secondary and university education. Higher education for Europeans and Asians could be acquired abroad but it also guaranteed high positions of management and responsibility. This situation had the effect of nurturing the fertile grounds for hostility between Africans on the one hand and Europeans and Asians on the other.

Industrial education in the colony could be traced back to 1909, when J. Nelson Frazer, a colonial official from Bombay was commissioned by the British government to recommend an appropriate system of education for the East African Protectorate (later known as Kenya colony). Fraser advised the colonial authorities

> ...not (to) put forward plans for literary education for Negroes but to consider the possibilities of developing industries among them (The Leader of East Africa, October 30, 1909)

In the spirit of Fraser's recommendations, Africans were denied literary education because it was considered too superior for the black intellect. Accordingly, the British authorities embarked on aggressive projects to train Africans in basic skills with regard to smelting, carpentry, agriculture, tailoring and typing. Influenced by the ideas of Booker T. Washington, the African-American scholar who advocated vocational education for

blacks, the then director of education in colonial Kenya J. Orr circulated a memo to mission schools urging them to undertake more industrial education as way of helping 'docile natives' (King, 1971: 104).

Following the recommendations of the Phelps-Stokes Commission of 1924, the Jeans School for industrial education was established in Kabete, Nairobi (Ibid.). More industrial schools were established in Narok, Loitokitok and Kipkelion. Mission schools in Kikuyu, Kibwezi and Nyeri started setting up workshops for industrial education. Indeed, by 1949 the colonial government had established the Beecher Commission with the aim of reviewing African education. The Beecher report, among other things emphasized the need for having pupils retain their rural attitudes. As well, the report stressed the teaching of rural science and handicrafts to intermediate schools.

Most importantly, at the time when hostilities between African and Europeans were at fever pitch, the Beecher Commission warned against any attempts to teach literary education that would produce a subversive force that would be inimical to colonial authorities (African Education: The Beecher Report, 1949: vii-viii). The fear of teaching literary education was grounded in the colonial officials' belief that such education would excite the Africans politically. Yet exciting Africans politically went against the principal of 'banking' education. In its broadest sense colonial 'banking' education sought to minimize or annul the students' creative power and to stimulate their credulity. Colonial authorities were, therefore, swift in dismantling any efforts to change the status quo in education. As Freire notes:

> Thus, they (oppressors) react almost instinctively against any experiment in education which stimulates the critical faculty....(Ibid.: 60).

The racial attitudes of providing quality education were also reflected in the field of funding. Despite the fact that in sheer numbers, school-age African children outnumbered Europeans at any given time during the colonial period, African education received very little funding (Ingham, 1963:337). In 1925, for example, the colonial government spent Kshs. 524,835.85 on European education which represented 33% of the national budget on education as compared to Kshs. 424,279.47 on African education which represented 26.6% and Kshs. 23,862.68 on Indian education which represented 15%, with the remaining 25.4% going to administrative costs (Educational Annual Report, 1925:2-6). Below, is presented concrete statistical data for the years 1943 and 1944 to demonstrate once again that European education received more funding than either African, Asian or Arab education (see Table B).

TABLE B: EDUCATION EXPENDITURE IN SHILLINGS AND PERCENTAGES

YEAR	ADMINIS-TRATION COSTS	AFRICAN	ARAB	INDIAN	EURO-PEAN	EXTRA	TOTAL
1943	425,820 8.8%	1,502,360 31%	98,520 2%	1,040,800 22%	1,756,900 36%	-	4,824,40
1944	430,260 6.8%	1,879,360 30%	157,280 3%	1,272,940 20%	2,392,620 38%	171,800 3%	6,304.26

SOURCE: Education Annual Reports, Kenya National Archives (KNA) 1943 and 1944.

From the table, there appears to be some progressive consistency in the enrolment of European and Indian pupils in school. However, the irregularity of the African enrolment seems evident. This inconsistency could be attributed to the violent and disruptive capacity of colonial land and administrative policies which affected the African people

more than any other person who lived in the colony. Yet despite the irregularity (either the sudden drop or rise in numbers) African pupils were always numerically more than either European or Asian students. Yet as Table C (below) shows, despite the demographic superiority of the African enrolment, the colonial government spent very little money on the education of individual African pupils.

TABLE C: COMPARATIVE PER-CAPITA EXPENDITURE FOR THE EDUCATION OF THE DIFFERENT RACES

YEAR	RACE	NO. OF PUPILS	TOTAL EXPENDITURE IN SHS.	PER CAPITA IN KSHS.
1925	Arab and African	26,269	35,612	1.4
	Indian	1,475	11,768	7.9
	European	554	23,107	41.7
1930	Arab and African	13,312	83,088	6.2
	Indian	3,537	30,582	8.6
	European	1,144	49,189	43
1931	Arab and African	22,940	82,323	3.6
	Indian	4,285	34,348	8.0
	European	1,164	49,189	42.2
1935	Arab and African	99,165	74,097	0.7
	Indian	6,627	34,064	5.1
	European	1,168	44,041	37.7

SOURCES: Times Education Supplement, No. 554 of 28/11/1925 p.52. Education Annual Reports 1925, 1930, 1931, 1935 (K.N.A.).

Looking at the per capita expenditure for the education of the different races, we note that less money was comparatively invested in an African pupil (lumped together with Arabs) than in either the European or Asian. This discrepancy in funding seems to have underscored the colonial government's belief in the inferiority of the back people (Huxley, 1932:389-92)

The consequence of providing uneven education opportunities and resources as evidenced in the above statistics was that African pupils had to live with such problems as congestion in classrooms, shortage of teachers and other inconveniences related to insufficient funding. The racial overtones which accompanied the provision and funding of African colonial education seemed to imply that the programme of Western education was deliberately being tailored to produce 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' (Dodd 1960:14). That is why Africans did not passively accept the colonial discriminatory policies in education.

Several areas of conflict which emanated from the crisis of colonial education in Kenya could be cited. Since the first education programmes were associated with missions, the first conflict was between missionaries and the indigenous people. In the first decades of the 20th century, education was aimed at children and adolescents (Anderson, 1973:106). This meant that it interfered with tribal rites and instruction and many Africans opposed it because it tore away children from their tribal way of life. Further, children played an important role in the family economic life. The parents did not see any immediate benefits to be gained by sending their children to school when they should have been herding cattle, goats and helping in the gardens. To make matters worse, the parents expected youths who went to mission stations to be paid as labourers

for helping in the construction of mission houses and for working on mission gardens. This situation raised conflicts that affected school enrolment.

In the second place, the Africans conflicted with missionaries because of the issue of land. When missionaries were identified with the land grievance and their form of education failed to meet the circumstances of the times, criticism of and opposition to missionary influence deepened to erupt in the 1929-31, 'circumcision controversy'. As a result of land 'purchase' by the missionaries, existing villages came under mission control with all that this meant in terms of access to the local people and pressure on them to attend catechism and send their children to mission schools (Mutua Op.Cit.: 29). A general conflict developed as the missionaries sought to tear people from traditional society and ways of life condemning all rites and rituals of ancestral worship as 'idolatry' (Ibid). It thus became evident that the missions were beacons of irrelevant education; they signified the demise of traditional life and they epitomized European land alienation in Kenya. All these were contributory features to the process of violently destroying the African cultural life and the subsequent replacement of African traditional lifestyles with European customs.

In the 1920's, two major African protest movements against British educational policies are on record. First, nascent political associations such as Young Kavirondo Association petitioned the colonial government to provide among other things, secondary education hitherto completely neglected. (Nairobi Law Monthly, April/May 1991). The second protest came around 1929. This time, the Presbyterian Church of the East African Mission based at Kikuyu banned its members from carrying on with the ritual of clitoridectomy (female circumcision!) without considering the ritual's relevance to the

African society. It was a common practice for missions to ridicule African cultural values. The acrimony which followed the proscription of the African ritual at Kikuyu, forced some Africans to withdrew their children from the mission schools and the church (Mutua, 1975:33). The rebels formed the *Karing'a* Association (*Karinga*- meaning traditionalists) which laid the foundation for the establishment of the Independent Schools Association (Ibid.: 34). With the focused objective of setting up African schools and churches, the *Karing'a* Association moved quickly to establish schools in Kiambu, Murang'a, Embu, Meru and the Maasai country. This was a typical case of conflict within the education zone. But underneath this conflict was the African peoples' realistic search for an independent identity and recognition.

The first reaction of the colonial authorities to the Independent School movement was to detain some of its leaders. But on second thought, the colonial government allowed the registration of independent schools in the hope that such schools would provide a safety value through which African tensions could escape (Mugweru O.1, 2000). But this supposition was wrong. Lacking in everything from books to teachers, independent schools became crucial centres for promoting anti-Western sentiments. Indeed, independent schools became centres of agitation against colonialism.

Evidently, several leaders of the independence struggle in Kenya including Mbiu Koinange and Jomo Kenyatta worked at the independent schools. Koinange, for example, taught at the Githunguri Teachers College which was born out of the womb of the Independent School Movement (Mutua, Op Cit.: 34). Not surprisingly, during the Emergency, the British governor closed all the independent schools and colleges. Thus, the struggle for quality and relevant education represented the quest by the colonial

subjects of Kenya to humanize themselves by dismantling the discriminative educational policies and programmes that were the hall-marks of colonial rule.

2.7 The Problem of Political Marginalization

Leon Blum once defined colonialism as the forceful domination and exploitation of natural resources by the colonizer in a way which was disavowed by law, by modern standards of morality and by all that belongs to the history of humanity (as quoted in Mandouze, 1961:48). Blum, a former French governor in Algeria made these remarks after being upset that his white French Algerian legislators had declined to approve a bill to offer citizenship to some 20,000 Algerian Muslims. Though a white colonial functionary, Blum's observations seem to agree with Fanon's reservations about colonialism.

The central theme of British colonialism in Kenya was domination and exploitation. In the modernist sense, political democracy meant the will of the majority freely expressed through the ballot box while respecting the rights of minorities. In the Kenya colony, the African majority had neither the ballot nor the freedom to bring change. Under colonialism, democracy was narrowly interpreted as the right of a small white minority to rule over an overwhelming black majority. As a result of this attitude, the political peripheralization of the African people in the Kenya colony became institutionalized. Africans had no rights to vote and were not for many years represented in the colonial assembly in Nairobi. The European master thought for and represented Africans in virtually every economic, political and social spheres of life.

Colonialism too demanded the exclusion of Africans from government because an African participation was seen as a threat to the survival of the colonial project (Ake,

1978:82-89). In political terms, therefore, colonialism was a dictatorship. It was imposed by violence and maintained by violence. Ruling with utter indifference to the opinion by the governed – the Africans – colonialism perfected a reign of terror by silencing its opponents through detentions, exile, even outright extermination (Maloba, 1995:9). There is hardly an African country that does not have its list of martyrs of freedom – those that were killed, imprisoned or detained for opposing specific or general colonial policies. The job of persecuting and harassing colonial subjects was done by colonial administrators. But these administrators were appointed and not elected. They owed their allegiance to foreign centres of power, represented in the colonies by governors. They were not accountable to Africans for their actions nor did they pretend to be constrained in their actions by local opinions. Because they were part of a dictatorial system, they relied on force of arms to implement policies.

Frantz Fanon once observed that:

> Decolonization which sets out to change the order of the world is obviously a programme of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a national shock, nor of a friendly understanding. Decolonization as we know is a historical process that is to say that it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content (1967:27).

As early as 1917, returning African World War I veterans seemed to worry the colonial authorities because of the worldwide exposure these veterans had gained in war. (The Nairobi Law Monthly, April-May 1991:27). Subsequently, the colonial government put in place a deliberate strategy to encourage tribal instead of countrywide nationalism. This strategy was fueled by the British tactics of 'divide and rule'. Between 1920 and 1940, several ethnically based organizations petitioned the colonial government on very

serious issues. Unfortunately, for the British, as time went by most of the issues raised by the African tribal associations assumed not just a national pedigree because they affected every African across the colony, but they also reflected the deep political marginalization of the colonial subjects.

The first African association, the Kikuyu Association was formed just before 1920 by such colonial chiefs as Koinange wa Mbiu, Josiah Njonjo and Kinyanjui wa Gathirimu (Spencer, 1985:25). The Association was not in essence opposed to the colonial rule; rather its members merely sought to improve the people's material conditions within the colonial framework. The toothlessness of the Kikuyu Association forced Harry Thuku, then a young Kikuyu telephone operator in Nairobi, to form his own Young Kikuyu Association in 1921 (Thuku, 1970:20). Thuku's Association attracted an urban membership drawn from various East African communities residing in Nairobi. Thuku travelled extensively to several parts of the colony to popularize his Association and to deliver it from a tribal cacoon.

Unsuccessfully, Thuku petitioned the colonial government, against colonialism. He also published the first African newspaper *Tangazo*, which articulated the African grievances (Mungean, 1960:489-508). Sensing trouble from his activities, the colonial authorities arrested and subsequently deported Harry Thuku to Kismayu (Ibid.: 523). A peaceful pro-Thuku mass demonstration of about 5,000 Africans was held in front of the present-day Nairobi's Central Police Station, prompting the police to open fire which left at least 21 people dead. Further, the Kikuyu Association was proscribed.

The case of Thuku is a typical expression of violent conflicts which characterised colonial relations. Frantz Fanon explains that the naked truth of decolonization 'evokes

searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it' (1967:28). The crushing of the pro-Thuku demonstration was a clear signal by British authorities that they would not tolerate meaningful political agitation from the African people. Further, it was a warning to all the African nationalists who wanted to articulate trans-tribal issues that they would also be crushed. Indeed, elsewhere, Fanon stated clearly that colonialism was separatist. It did not just simply state the existence of the tribe but it in fact reinforced it. Thuku was going beyond his tribe and he had therefore to be crushed.

Other ethnic organizations which followed the Kikuyu Association included the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the Ukamba Members Association (UMA), the Kavirondo Taxpayer's Association (KTWA) as well as the Taita Hills Association (THA). All these Associations pursued a tribal agenda but nevertheless they established a base of confrontation and conflict against which the nationalist struggle was later tailored. In general, the grievances of these Africans associations ranged from struggle to retain the dignity of African culture, the petitions against poor education and taxation policies to the demand for the African participation in government.

In the 1940s, a number of events in the colony transformed the conflict between the Africans and Europeans to new levels. First, African World War II veterans led by Bildad Kaggia teamed up with the few educated Africans led by James Gichuru to found the Kenya African Union (KAU) (Bennet, Op.Cit.: 111, Spencer, Op.Cit.: 115-147). KAU broke ranks with tribal organizations and established its branches countrywide. KAU aimed at uniting all Africans in Kenya and fought for equality between Africans and Europeans. KAU too asked the Europeans to return the African land (Ibid.: 132). Led by Governor Philip Mitchell, the European settlers condoned the activities of KAU,

at least for the time being, since the party was considered moderate and peaceful in its demands. But these peaceful demands occurred against a humiliating backdrop of European violence in the colony. This violence was realized everywhere as the settler government made deliberate efforts to implement educational, political as well as social and economic policies (see Chapter 3). Increasingly, some African leaders began to appreciate the futility of pursuing peaceful methods to bring about desired change. Thus, violence became an inevitable force to counter violence.

Contributing to the problematic of the struggle against colonial domination, Frantz Fanon observed that decolonization was always a violent phenomenon (1967:27). True to this prediction and interpretation some members of KAU began to embrace violence in order to liberate Kenya. From 1947 onwards the young men of KAU decided that a more radical approach was crucial in forcing the Europeans to address the African problems (Edgerton, 1990:51). Led by Bildad Kaggia, John Mungai and Fed Kubai, the young men established a radical wing within KAU that later sparked off the violent Mau Mau war of liberation (Rosberg and Notthingham Op.Cit.: 220).

Besides KAU, Africans expressed their disgust about British colonialism through trade unions and newspapers. In the late 1940s Trade Unions such as Fred Kubai's Kenya African Road Transport and Mechanics' Union, Bildad Kaggai's Clerks' and Commercial Workers' Union, Chege Kibacha's African Workers Federation and Makhan Singh's East African Trade Union Congress eschewed the traditional distinctions between labour and politics and became powerful tools for political articulation and mobilization, especially in urban areas (Kaggia, 1975: 78-79). Within this spirit, the East African Trade Union Congress demanded independence for Kenya, in 1950 (Singh 1969:273-80.

In response to this demand, the colonial government acted decisively by arresting Makhan Singh and later detaining him without trail at the remote North-Western fort of Lokituang where he stayed for 11 years (Ibid.). Other trade union leaders such as Kubai were also intimidated by several short-lived arrests. The African people reacted to the colonial government's purge on trade unionists by going on a strike which paralyzed Nairobi for nine days (Ibid.).

The African newspapers published during the late 1940's included, Wiyathi, Baraza, Uhuru wa Mwafirika, Rongo ya Meru, Wasya Wa Mukambo, Mumbi, Hindi ya Kikuyu and Muramati among others. These newspapers wrote mostly in local languages and they dealt variously with critical social economic and political issues which affected Africans within the difficult colonial experience (Clayton and Kilingray, 1989:114-116). In general, the newspapers helped to raise the people's level of political consciousness which was necessary for any meaningful struggle for freedom.

Conflict between the colonial government and Africans was also noticed in the activities of African religious sects. Such independent religious groups as *'Dini ya Musambwa'* and *'Dini ya Kristo'* put pressure on the colonial government to bring changes. In addition to condemning the European occupation of African land, African religious sects campaigned for the preservation of African cultural values. African religious sects too insisted on the freedom and independence of the African people (Ogot, 1977: 276-282). Indeed, these and many other indigenous African religious groups legitimized the spirituality against which the inner-domain of the nation-state (which we discussed in Chapter One) was founded). The colonial government reacted to African

religious pressure by frequently arresting and detaining religious figures such as Elijah Wa Nameme of *Dini ya Musambwa* and by driving others underground.

2.8 Conclusion

In this Chapter, we set out to demonstrate how colonialism in Kenya gave rise to serious conflicts between the African people and the Europeans. The Chapter addressed the three zones of conflict which Frantz Fanon viewed as platforms of conflict between the colonizer and the colonized. Fanon's three zones include the land question, the European town and finally the administrative Frontier.

Recognizing that Fanon's three zones were mainly derived from French colonial Algeria, this Chapter has shown that, in British colonial Kenya, there were more zones of conflict than those that obtained in the Fanonian analysis. In going beyond the three Fanonian zones, the Chapter identified and critiqued more zones of conflict in colonial Kenya including those of education, labour and taxation, and finally the sphere of political marginalization and African participation. These zones were avenues through which colonial rule was ruthlessly maintained. However, the same zones came to be platforms on which the indigenous people of Kenya, operating as the dispossessed subaltern community within the colonial equation, launched their resistance and counter-violence against British imperialism. In Chapter three, we explore the making of colonial violence from Mau Mau insurgency to the independence watershed.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 THE MAKING OF VIOLENCE IN COLONIAL KENYA: FROM MAU MAU TO INDEPENDENCE, 1945-1963

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter two, we identified a number of critical avenues through which colonial conflict was registered. It was pointed out that conflict in the Kenyan colony manifested itself in such spheres as the native town, the land crisis, the administrative frontier, the taxation and labour fields and, of course, the education arena. Through these fundamental spheres, colonization undertook to violently deny the African people all basic rights. The ultimate result of this situation was the systematic alienation of the African people from their true identity, their cultural institutions and their land. Violence, became a crucial strategy to overcome this state of hopelessness.

But what really is the meaning of violence? It need not be lost on us that violence is any relation, process or condition by which an individual or group violates the physical social and psychological integrity of another person or group. From this perspective, violence inhibits human growth negates inherent potential, limits productive living and causes death (Coser, 1966:298-303).

Distinguished German philosopher and economic theorist, Karl Marx saw, every society as inherently conflictual. According to Marx, societies are in ceaseless conflict because human beings are always struggling for a better living. In their struggle for a living, in their dialogue with nature, men develop certain instruments, tools and forms of labour and experiences which Marx described as productive forces (Fischer, 1970:25).

Marx described as production relations, the relations governing men's existence, which are essentially dependent on who owns the means of production.

Because there is a continuing struggle over the ownership of the means of production social relations of production are not permanent. They keep changing as men struggle to appropriate the social product which results from specific social relations. From the Marxican perspective, social conflicts define and explain the demise or the development of such economic and social systems as communalism, slavery, feudalism and capitalism (Ibid.). The overthrow of any of these systems entails a revolutionary process. Marx saw the possibility of a peaceful revolution but he was convinced that a violent revolution was often inevitable to smash the machinery of the state. He observed thus:

> We must declare to the governments; we know that you are the armed power which is directed against the proletariat. We shall proceed against you by peaceful means where possible, and by force of arms if necessary (Fischer quoting Marx, 1970:132).

Clearly, the Marxian violence is rooted in the social relations of the entire society and it is not thus owned by any one distinctive group.

But Frantz Fanon's notion of violence differs from that of Karl Marx in one fundamental way. According to Fanon:

> The violence which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world, which has ceaselessly drummed the rhythm for the destruction of native social forms and broken up without reserve the systems of reference of the economy, the customs of dress and external life, the same violence will be claimed and taken over by the native... (Fanon, 1967:31).

Evidently, Fanon reasons that it was the colonizer who introduced the culture of violence into the colonized. Thus, the logic goes, once the colonized internalized the oppressors' violence he, in turn, used it against the latter. According to Fanon, resistance to the colonizer's violence constitutes counter-violence. He contends that without this variant of violence, freedom was fugitive. However, the Fanonian contextualization of violence seems to miss the point that violence was a permanent feature of every society and cannot thus be claimed by any race, ethnic community or social group.

By thinking that the violence of the colonized was the same violence he had acquired from the colonizer, Fanon demonstrated very little understanding of the intricate social structures of colonial societies in general, and the African communities in particular. In Africa, violence had a certain social justification. It was legitimized resistance against oppression and was also justified as a self-defence mechanism. This is because it is as unafrican to obediently accept oppression without putting up a resistance. However, a recourse to violence in Africa was often the last resort. Consent and consensus were critical tools employed by the African societies to resolve social conflicts so as to avoid unnecessary violence. Thus, African societies valued the virtues of compromise and reciprocity in social relations. At the heart of every conflict resolution process in Africa were respected traditional institutions patronized by elders. Did Fanon trace the historical base for mediating violence in Africa?

In the Fanonian context, violence does not seem to have an end. Yet we know that, in Africa, violence could still be terminated through consensus. Might colonial violence be a reflection of the failure on the part of the colonial authorities to master and understand the various ways of managing conflicts in Africa? Could this, we may ask, be

the same problem the postcolonial regimes in Africa have faced since the early 1960s? Probably because of his Martinican displacement in the African Diaspora Frantz Fanon was unable to theorize on violence from the African standpoint.

But the foregoing theorization does not constitute a senseless dismissal of Fanon's thesis on violence. It raises many valuable arguments. For instance, there is no question that colonialism oppressed its subjects through violent intimidation and outright use of force. Frantz Fanon has demonstrated - in Black Skin White Masks as well as in The Wretched of the Earth – that colonial oppression and one of its expressions, racism, legitimized structural violence that permeated through the cultural and material arrangements of society (Yeats, 1994:42). To overcome this violence, Fanon reasons, the colonized had no alternative but to fight for the colonizer's recognition. Relying on Hegel, Fanon avers that the oppressed and the oppressor were each other's key to sanity. Only by recognizing the other, the logic goes, can we come to recognize ourselves. This, however, cannot occur when any notion of inferior or superior prevails. Taking this dialectic further, we can argue that in Africa the violent and oppressive colonial policies signified a lack of mutual recognition between the Africans and the Europeans. Thus, the violent African responses to European negation came to demonstrate a great struggle for recognition. Fanon was certain that only the mutual recognition of the belligerents could ensure the permanent liberation of individuals and the society.

Our objective in this Chapter is to demonstrate that the Mau Mau uprising signalled the peak of colonial violence in Kenya. Mau Mau was, therefore, the logical outcome of years of conflict between the colonial authorities and the African people. Besides, we also show that the Mau Mau violence was in itself a fundamental quest for

identity by the African people. Furthermore, we point out that Mau Mau violence was not a generalized phenomenon of all Kenyans seeking to free themselves from colonial rule.

3.2 Gathering the Storm of Violence, 1945-1952

Promoted by the 1939 White Highlands Order in Council, European settlers in Kenya sought to increase their numbers through closer settlement and their acreage through expanded production (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995:27). Consumed by the culture of what historian David Anderson describes as the 'tyranny of property' and eager to consolidate Kenya as a 'White Man' Country', European settlers increased the pace of land alienation after 1945 (Anderson, 1987, 249-268). This program was achieved at the cost of great pain resulting from physical and psychological violence meted against the Africans.

In addition to closer settlement involving the settling of young white soldiers on land, there was the provision of settling up Egerton College in Njoro for their exclusive use. More significantly, the process of mechanization of settler agriculture began during the Second World War years, became more intensified thereby rendering the squatters' labour obsolete. In both cases, there was loss of land to Europeans and lose of a livelihood by the squatting community (Atieno-Odhiambo, Op.Cit.:27). Physically, capital and technology drove the squatters from the surface of the land, terminating the contract between them and the settlers and ultimately causing both physical and psychological pain on the African populations. The rapid changes in land alienation and land use programmes affected the more than 250,000 African squatters living in forests

and settler lands within the Rift Valley (Youe, 1987:210). Half of these were Kikuyu. In the ensuing years, it was this population that had to be cut down through a combination of state coercion and settler rejection.

Similar measures taken against squatters in the Njoro region were also affected among the Tugen pastoralists in the Lembus Forest (Anderson, 1987:262-265). In the Uasin Gishu plateau, squatters faced colonial assault in the years after 1946, where repatriation of their stock to reserves was a common feature of their lives. In 1950 for instance, 53,000 head of cattle were voided out of the district into the surrounding reserve (Youe, 1988:59). Yet in the reserves, there was little room to keep the animals. The white authorities were thus practicing violence against the Africans who were being rendered homeless and property-less in the lands of their birth.

Through the 1939 White Highlands Order in Council, the British government set up more White Highlands to protect their European interests. This caused congestion in the reserves prompting some African communities to raid adjacent reserves in search of pasture and land. For instance, the Ilchamus pastoralists found themselves locked in struggle against the Tugen for access to pasture; the Nandi against the Luo and Luhya in Nyando and Kipkaren valleys (Atieno-Odhiambo, Op.Cit.:29). This sort of violence in which the African saw his fellow African, rather than the settler, as the ultimate enemy was envisaged by Frantz Fanon when he stated thus:

> While the settler or the policeman has the right to strike the native, to insult him and to make him crawl to them, you will see the native reaching for his knife at the slightest hostile or aggressive glance cast on him by another native; for the last...resort of the native is to defend his personality vis-à-vis his brother. Tribal feuds only serve to perpetuate old grudges deep buried into the memory. .....By throwing himself with all his force into vendetta the

> native tries to persuade himself that colonialism does not exist ..... (1967:42).

But for how long would this pretense continue in Kenya? For how long would the African embrace the habit of avoidance behaviour? It was just a matter of time and the African would come to direct his violence to the right target – the settler.

The congestion in the reserves caused serious damages on the delicate ecosystems. Rampant in many African reserves were, therefore, cases of soil erosion. To arrest the consequences of land deterioration in the reserves, the colonial government demanded that Africans provide free and unpaid labour to construct bench-terracing. This demand was unpopular countrywide because Africans felt that the white man wanted the programme to succeed in order to access the reclaimed lands (Huxley, 1960). Resistance was thus witnessed among the Kaya, Duruma and the Giriama at the Coast, the Marachi in Sio Port, Busia, the Kipsigis in Kericho, the Luo in Nyanza as well as the Maragoli in Kiboswa (Atieno-Odhiambo, Op.Cit.:; Bates, 1989).

Serious psychological violence was increased in the years after the end of World War II and it became common place in everyday life. Professor Atieno-Odhiambo has observed that everyday life was 'constant annoyance' in the Kenya colony of the 1940s. The colour-bar – the exclusion of Africans from goods and services enjoyed by Europeans – was a signifying marker of the period. Europeans, Asians and Arabs alike had a stake in *Kala-ba* (i.e the practice of racial discrimination) and dished it out with impunity (1995:32): Houseboys were *shenzi* (fools) and African women were prostitutes (*malaya*). Arabs abused Africans with terms like *pumbavu* (stupid), *kafir* (worthless, *afriti* (devil) and *mshenzi* (fool). Whites retorted to Africans with deregatory terms like

fogoff (fuck off) or *fakini* (fuck in). Other irritating, terms were *sokwe mtu* (chimpanzee), *kuma nina* (your mother's vagina!) which were obscene and humiliating. This unbearable situation was compounded by frequent arrests of Africans by the police on tramped-up charges (Ibid.). Furthermore, Africans were expected to remove their hats and salute whitemen and women passing by, regardless of their status. All these frustrations resulting from various forms of settler violence could only be overcame by one word *uhuru* (freedom) (Mboya, 1963). The Mau Mau organizers and adherents fed on these frustrations and undertook to answer colonial violence so as to eject Europeans out of Kenya and thus pave the way for *uhuru*.

3.3 The Genesis of Mau Mau

The exact time that the movement we call Mau Mau began is still contestable. According to Spencer, the Mau Mau movement began in 1944, soon after the return of the detained Kikuyu Central Assocation (K.C.A) leaders from Kapenguria (Spencer 1977:2001). However, recent research done by Edgerton (1990) and Kahiga (1990) indicates the movement actually began in 1947, one year after the formation of the politically moderate and non-violent Kenya African Union (KAU).

A group calling itself the 'Forty Group' broke ranks with other nationalist forces in KAU and formed Mau Mau. The 'Forty Group' was uniquely composed of young men, most of them circumcised around 1940 (Njoka I.O 2001). In addition, some of these young men including Bildad Kaggia, Fred Kubai and John Mungai had, by 1947, just returned from active military service in World War I where they had witnessed the intensity of European violence (Kaggia O.I:1999). It was thus the failure to strike a

consensus between the moderates and the radicals which caused the latter to temporarily break away and found Mau Mau. The moderate wing of KAU was, however, led by such personalities as James Gichuru, Jomo Kenyatta and Eliud Mathu who felt strongly that Kenya's independence from Britain could be won through non-violent peaceful means. Therefore, this group supported the pathway of constitutional negotiations as strategy for winning autonomy from the English.

But the radical wing (the Forty Group) was convinced that the employment of violence was the only effective method through which Europeans could be ejected out of Kenya. At this point, some Africans in Kenya had reached a point where they had as Chester Fontenot argues, been awakened to the need for self-revolution and self-evaluation (Fontenot, 1978:95). This, for the radical wing members, was an exciting period where the past reached forward to resuscitate the present. They had witnessed many years of land alienation, social deprivation and political oppression. They had then come directly in contact with their real selves and realized that colonialism had destroyed their past. It was clear that African culture had been reconstructed, rewritten, literally whitewashed to advance exploitation. The truth of the matter had dawned on them that because the oppressor could not come to recognize the dignity of the African, the oppressed should employ force, instead of peaceful negotiations, in order to earn that recognition.

In espousing the strategy of violence, the radical wing of KAU undertook to employ physical force that would ensure the death of the oppressor. More importantly, this native violence that Fanon came to characterize as counter-violence, focused on the destruction not only of the oppressors' lives but also on the obliteration of institutions and

property that had given these oppressors a false sense of superiority. Targeted for this counter-violence, therefore, were colonial settlers and administrators, their families, their houses, farms and livestock; the colonial transport system, the administrative infrastructure as well as the African collaborators. Generally, it is accepted that when Africans in Kenya took up arms in the new spirit of violence as advocated by the Mau Mau, they called themselves the Land and Freedom Army (Itote, 1979:191). The twin demands of land and freedom were central to the resolving of problems caused by many years of colonial domination.

3.4 The Mau Mau War, 1947-1952

In 1947, despite KAU's public opposition to militancy, Kikuyu workers went out on a strike against the mangement of the Uplands Bacon Factory near Lari in Kiambu. Though initially appearing as a normal labour conflict in which African workers demanded better terms of service, the colonial authorities attributed the unrest to a movement that later became known as Mau Mau (Muchiri O.I, 2000). Some colonial administrators, too, associated the strike with Chege Kebacha's, African Workers' Federation that had been secretly linked to Mau Mau (O.I., 2001). The Uplands' strike was met with the full force of colonial police with the result that three people were killed while six more were injured (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966: 238). Ngure was Kamande, who says that he served as a casual worker at the Bacon factory comments:

> Africans were not supposed to ask for their rights. They were not supposed to ask for better working conditions. They were not human beings. They were beasts who only understood the language of violence. That is how the white man looked at us and that is how he treated us (O.I, 1999).

The same source reports how Jomo Kenyatta, a moderate KAU advocate, made abortive attempts to stop the Bacon strike.

At the beginning of 1948, a dispatch from the resident Labour Inspector of Nakuru reported that an illegal squatter organisation had been discovered on Ngata Farm near Nakuru. The dispatch noted that:

> ....there was an illegal squatter Association to which people were being asked to subscribe the sum of Sh. 100/= to collect funds to promote strikes and other trouble. Three of these squatters refused to attend this association and were beaten up by the other squatters (KNA, MAA/124. 'The Central Co-ordinating Committee for Resident Labour' No. 18, Report, From the L.O Labour Commissioner, 13th March 1948).

Subsequent investigations by the intelligence forces revealed that the new squatter association had branches in several other areas of the colony (Ibid.). Later in the year, Kikuyu squatters boycotted Indian shops in Nakuru district, accusing Indians of exploiting Africans by undercharging a bag of potatoes by Shs. 8.00, buying it for Shs. 4.00 and selling it for Sh. 12 (East African Standard Nov. 19, 1948). At the end of 1948, the Chief Native Commissioner reported that in the Rift Valley,

> .... There is definitely evidence of a go slow policy among young labourers though the older generation remains unaffected (African Affairs, Annual Report, 1948:64).

Soon, the government authenticated reports of mass oathing among the Kikuyu and other sympathizers of the new African protest movement. Oathing was a crucial

element in the recruitment process of the Mau Mau adherents. As Mutegi Njeru, a Mau Mau fighter in Meru explains;

> The administration of oaths to the Mau Mau adherents should not be viewed as primitive because even modern governments and political parties have mechanisms of eliciting loyalty and commitment to a cause including the institution of oaths (Njeru O.I, 1999)

Indeed, oaths created a life-time commitment of the Mau Mau adherents to the cause of fighting the white people and throwing them out of Kenya. Furthermore, oathing, done within the African cultural perspective, tended to reinforce the spirituality of the nation which was considered sovereign and which was not open to European penetration. It is hence this spirituality which came to consummate the agenda for the African struggle for decoloniation.

At the time of heightened political temperatures, oathing practices caused profound worries to European settlers in Kenya. A memorandum by the Director of Intelligence and Security reports thus:

> Mau Mau started its activities towards the end of 1947 and 1948 when several oath ceremonies are known to have taken place in the Naivasha District (KNA, Government House, 3/71).

True, between 1948 and 1949, may squatters in the Rift Valley, especially in areas like Nakuru, Elburgon, Molo, Nyahururu and Olenguruone were oathed on the instructions of the Mau Mau Central Committee members in Nairobi (Chege O.1, 2001). In 1950, members of the Central Committtee along with their recruits took a new oath whose wording was extremely aggressive. The 1950 oath-taking exercise came in the wake of the massive eviction by the colonial government of some 12,000 squatters from the

prosperous farming area of Olenguruone. The majority of these squatters ended up in the Lari area of Kiambu District. Squatters were evicted mainly because of being linked to oathing practices. The 1950 oathing activities whose aim was to kill white people (Mugo O.I, .2001) involved the recitation of specific words and the performances of certain rituals which included the slaughtering of goats. Recruits were forced to eat raw meat and drink raw blood from the goats. They were also sprinkled with the animals' intestinal waste. In some cases, recruits drank the urine of women (Maria O.1, 2001). After the sacrifices, the recruits recited words which ran like this:

> If you ever disagree with your nation or sell it, you may die of this oath; if you ever sell a Kikuyu woman to a foreigner, may you die of this oath, if you ever report a member of this society to the government, may you die of this oath (Edgerton, 1990:52).

Initially, oathing in the Rift Valley was done voluntarily by squatters because, after all, many of them lived under appalling physical conditions and anything that would bind them against Europeans was often welcome. However, when colonial surveillance over the oathing ceremonies became severe, some Africans started fearing for their lives and subsequently declined offers to be oathed. As a result, Mau Mau leaders found it inevitable to force people to take oaths. One had to choose between death and oath-taking. Njagi Wamuchiku, who was forcefully oathed, reports that those who declined to be oathed were beaten up, strangled or killed (Wamuchiku O.1, 1999). Another man who was forced to take oath was Joseph Murithi Kiboi. He reports that during the oath taking exercise, he was forced to swear the following words:

> I swear that I will fight for the African soil that the

> White man has stolen from us. I swear that I will try to trick a white man or any imperialist into accompanying me, strangle him, take his gun and any valuables he maybe carrying. I swear that I will offer all available help and further the cause of Mau Mau. I swear that I will kill if necessary anybody opposed to this organization (Murethi and Ndoria, 1971:15).

The intensity of the Mau Mau movement was also felt among trade unions. In 1950, for example, Fred Kubai, a senior member of the Central Committee of the movement and leader of the East African Trade Union Congress (EATUC) initiated a strong campaign to thwart the move by the British government to grant Nairobi, a royal charter (Kubai quoted in Kisiang'ani, 1993:194). The proposed charter aimed at making Nairobi a 'whites only' city. Kubai said that during his campaign against the British move, he had learnt that some prominent African personalities both inside and outside KAU seemed to support this segregatory move (Ibid.). Notable among these 'traitors' were people like Tom Mbotela, a pro-government KAU leader and Muchiri Gikonyo a Nairobi City Councillor. It, therefore, came as no surprise that Kubai and his fellow militants targeted Mbotela and Gikonyo for assassination (East African Standard May 19, 1950). A special suicide squad was established to kill Mbotela and Gikonyo. Somebody, however, leaked the plan to the authorities before it could be effected. Nevertheless, along with Makhan Singh, another prominent Asian trade unionist, Kubai demanded immediate independence for East Africa (Edgerton, Op.Cit.: 54).

In response, the colonial government arrested the two leaders causing many of their sympathizers to proclaim a general strike which paralysed Nairobi for over two weeks. The strike erupted into a violent confrontation between the police and the protesters. The police crushed the strikers with tear gas and armoured cars leaving

several people dead and others injured (Ibid.). The intensity of violence was described by Jamson Gitau a resident of Nairobi in 1950:

> .... the armoured vehicles chased people in all directions and many were trampled on as they tried to escape the reign of terror unleashed by the police. Those who could not ran fast enough were choked by teargas, arrested, flogged and bundled into waiting lorries (O.I, 1999).

Contributing to the prolematic of colonial conflict and liberation, Frantz Fanon put violence at the centre of his analysis. Fanon argued that:

> National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people; commonwealth; whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization is *always* (emphasis mine) a violent phenomenon (Fanon, 1967:27).

Although Fanon does not come out clearly to say what he means by violence, our readings of him help us to make reasonable conclusions about his meaning of the concept. Certainly, Fanon's violence means physical injury, force and coercion; it could also imply psychological harm. The question which, however, remains uppermost in our intellect is whether or not to agree with Fanon's deterministic argument that decolonization *is always* a violent process.

So far, we have demonstrated how the African people in Kenya resisted colonial domination. We have seen physical violence in the Bacon factory strike that left three people dead. We also saw that the oathing of people bound them to violently attack Europeans. Soon there was the general boycott of Asian-run shops because of the blatant exploitation of the African people over the pricing of potatoes. Then came the plot to assassinate Mbotela and Gikonyo. Finally, it is already evident, the African people publicly demanded independence for East Africa. These incidents were profound expressions of colonial violence both from the colonizer and the colonized.

But if we can only be human by recognizing the humanity of the other - violence as a method promises to enslave everyone whether it is white-instigated or black-instigated. Violence can sometimes be necessary but those who wielded it systematically cannot help becoming brutalized by it (Coser, 1966:298-303). Of course, Fanon advocated only to expel the settlers but he was contradictory on this score because he never clearly defined the term. Often, Fanon uses violence and force interchangeably. In The Wretched of the Earth, he even mentions 'peaceful violence'. It is confusing. In fact, Fanon's resilience on the notion of violence prevents its clear definition as a dynamic within decolonization: violence, used to explain everything, explains nothing (Dane, 1994:36).

We need, therefore, to emphasize that right from 1944, when Eliud Mathu joined the Legico to 1950 when Kubai and his associates demanded independence, African political activities which were geared at breaking down colonial chains were intense but those activities could hardly be described as violent in a general sense. Mathu, Gichuru and later Kenyatta believed in constitutional approaches to bring change in Kenya. Violence was not thus part of their strategy. In fact, Jomo Kenyatta, who later became Kenya's first African President after the end of formal colonial rule, himself denounced Mau Mau on many occasions. In one such occasion, during the trial of Mr. Rawson Macharia, a supposed government collaborator, Jomo Kenyatta told the British prosecution counsel Mr. Dennis Pritt in the 1950s that it was the policy of KAU to denounce Mau Mau because KAU believed in non-violent methods and that there was no connection between KAU and Mau Mau (1991:265).

So far, it appears somewhat untenable to totally embrace Fanon's view that decolonization was always a violent process. Peaceful negotiations, it is important to stress, could also lead to some form of freedom. As the Kenyan example will show later, it was the peaceful constitutionalists rather than the violent radicals who carried the day during the count-down to the achievement of political independence. The theoretical conception in this study is post modernist and postcolonialist. From the post-modernist understanding, Fanon's authoritative and seemingly universal contention about the deterministic nature of violence in decolonization seem to hamper our freedom to gain a critical and non-authoritative but persuasive understanding of the history of the Kenyan decolonization. If we were to be consumed by this determinism, then we would possibly be forced to argue that everything that happened in the count-down to independence was violent, which, however, was not the case. Both violent and non-violent methods were invariably employed by the African people to answer European violence. It is also the contention here that all those who cooperated with and those who violently opposed the colonialists had an underlying objective of gaining some anatomy and weakening European control.

Fanon's deterministic celebration of violence was based on the binaries which pitted the European against the African (the *Other*). To a larger extent, the binary mapping is easily provable. However, the case of Makhan Singh, an Asian nationalist shows clearly that colonial relations in Kenya were not based on simple racial binaries. Between the distinct binaries lay the in-between space that was often complex and intricate. It was this space which accommodated the non-European and the non-black

Africans who may not have considered issues of independence as urgent but who nevertheless wished that Kenya was delivered firm colonial domination.

By its nature colonialism crushed African cultures and introduced oppressive values within the colonies. In the struggle for freedom, whether during Mau Mau or during the 1928 circumcision crisis, culture became a critical issue. By denouncing African cultural values as primitive (something Fanon never freed himself from), Europeans forced the native to fight for the master's recognition in the Hegelian paradigm. But the native's self actualization was, however, realised through the establishment of independent churches in the early 1930s and the use of traditional remedies in the treatment of ailments especially during the Mau Mau warfare in the 1950s. So the struggle for freedom translated into the struggle for identity. On the other hand, Europeans used force against the Africans because the struggle by the latter threatened the privileged position of the former. But this is not to rule out the fact that even as hostilities were developing in the early 1950's, several moderate African politicians and chiefs were involved in peaceful negotiations with Europeans (Ngei O.I, 2000).

Because of the revolutionary mood prevailing in Kenya, Mau Mau violence became a frequent topic of conversation and concern among settlers in 1950 (Nakuru District Annual Report 1950:31). During that year, attacks on European-owned farms became a common feature. At the same time, there were also reported cases of Mau Mau road blocks at night. In October, telephone wires in both Marashoni Forest and Elbgurgon were cut by suspected Mau Mau adherents (Furedi, 1989:111) and Europeans in Nakuru District had their machines and farm implements destroyed. For instance, a

farm in Njoro suffered damage of farm machinery worth over $500 (Nakuru District Monthly Report Labour Reports, October 1950).

Towards the end of 1951, a fighting group (*Kiama Kia Bara*) had penetrated the Mau Mau ranks. The group provided security guards for oathing ceremonies, messengers and recruiting officers. In addition, *Kiama Kia Bara* members accompanied oath administrators to deal with any uncooperative squatters in the Rift Valley (Mbugua, 0.1, 2000). In response to the deteriorating security situation, the government initiated programmes of mass evictions of squatters from the European settled areas. At the same time, newly established African advisory councils, most of them full of African collaborators, were empowered to deal with the Mau Mau menace (Furedi, Op.Cit: 115).

3.5 The Mau Mau Violence, 1952 - 1955

It is clear from the foregoing that in the years 1947, 1949, 1950 and 1951 there was a looming security problem in the Kenya colony. The problem was made worse by the culture of violence which then rationalized every action both from the European and the Africans. This violence could be seen from two angles. First, because of the illegality of their actions, European colonizers undertook to employ violence so as to intimidate Africans into submitting to the dominating and totalizing cultural practices of the West. Within the discourse of post-colonialism, one should view the Mau Mau protest as counter-violence against the European colonial establishment's determination to force Africans to submit to Western European cultural and economic values – thereby leaving Africans with absolutely no chance to assert their own identity.

At the beginning of 1952, the security situation in Kenya had moved from bad to worse. European settlers began to agitate for firm actions against Mau Mau (East African Standard, April 4, 1952). In response to the settler demand, the government embarked on tight security measures to protect whites. In May 1952, the colonial authorities arrested and detained 150 squatters suspected to be Mau Mau adherents in Subukia (East African Standard, May 9, 1952). District Commissioners of Kiambu, Fort Hall (Murang'a), Meru, Nyeri, Nanyuki, Naivasha and Laikipia were given sweeping powers to deal decisively with Mau Mau adherents.

Frequent police raids were also noticeable in some areas of Nairobi, suspected to shelter Mau Mau adherents (Kairo O.1, 2001). Surprisingly, in August, the wealthy Christians among the Kikuyu met in Kiambu and supported the colonial government's position on Mau Mau. In a six point resolution issued after the meeting, the Christians condemned Mau Mau and vowed to assist the government in fighting the movement (Times, London, August 23, 1952). In September, 1952, 546 Kikuyu were placed under preventive detention because of their Mau Mau activities (East African Standard, September 5, 1952). On 26th September, Reuters reported that Mau Mau raiders had killed 100 sheep and 84 cattle on European farms. It was also reported in the Legislative Council that 23 Africans including two women and children had been murdered by Mau Mau worriors (Edgerton, 1990:63-64). More reports came in pointing at the murder of several Europeans. Cases of assault and arson became commonplace. For example, at the beginning of October 1952, a Mr. A.M. Wright, who lived near Thika was stabbed to death by assassins suspected to be Mau Mau (Ibid.).

But the most shocking murder came on the 7th of October 1952, when a trusted African colonial Chief, Waruhiu wa Kungu was brutally assassinated while returning from Nairobi to his Kiambu home (East African Staandard, October 9, 1952). The murder of the Kikuyu Chief triggered celebrations among his people who had all along considered him a traitor of the worst type. As Maina Kibugi, a resident of Kiambu at the time of the murder, says:

> Waruhiu was a tyrant who ruled his people with an iron hand. He lived like a white man and disliked African customs and values . He collaborated with the thieves of our land. Many people wanted him to go and they were happy when he went (Kibugi O.1, 2000).

Clearly, Waruhiu was racially black but culturally white. The assassination of Chief Waruhiu coupled with the apparent breakdown of law and order almost everywhere in the Rift Valley and Central Kenya forced Governor Evelyn Baring to embark on long deliberations leading to the Declaration of Emergency on October 20, 1952 (East African Standard, October 21, 1952). The State of Emergency signalled the banning of all African political organizations and trade unions, the proscription of African newspapers, the closure of independent schools and the arrest of prominent African political leaders in the famous "Operation Jock Scott' (Furedi, 1989:118).

The Declaration of the State of Emergency by the colonial authorities and the subsequent use of excessive force, coupled with the persistent crackdown on the Mau Mau followers drove many young people into the forests. On the British side, the scale of violence was measured in terms of its military muscle. Six battalions of the King's African Rifles, drawn from Kenya, Tanganyika and Mauritius were put on active duty.

Further, several battalions and police stations in the British Empire were put on alert for possible shipment to Kenya (Edgerton, Op.Cit: 67).

Inside the colony, there was indiscriminate arming of settler population. Tracking dogs trained in chasing Africans were imported from South Africa. Loyal Kikuyu were ordered to be homeguards (a special African semi-military wing) in defence of the settler system (Pankhurst, 1986.86). This was followed by intensified British repression. As R.K. Pankhust observes:

> On the European side, power slid more firmly into the hands of militant settlers who were transformed overnight into an armed phalanx. Settlers' commandos were recruited. In the situation of panic thus more than 500 settlers from all over Kenya gathered at Kalou to reiterate their traditional demand: Government of Kenya by Kenyans under European leadership and a free hand without interference from overseas politicians. On the African side, wholesale arrest of moderate responsible leaders produced panic and confusion, which necessarily placed policies of moderation and responsible action at a discount whilst opening the field to any advocate of more drastic measures (Ibid.: 88).

During this confusion, about 187 people thought to be Mau Mau elders were arrested. Among these were Jomo Kenyatta, a moderate KAU leader who had several times in the past denounced Mau Mau. Others arrested inlcuded Bildad Kaggia, Kung'u Karumba, Paul Ngei, Achieng Oneko and Fred Kubai. In the operation, the authorities confiscated one and a half tons of books and documents belonging to Jomo Kenyatta (Clough, 1977). The operation leading to the arrest of Mau Mau suspects was done with the usual unrelenting brutality and top urgency. Suspects were attacked at night while in their sleep, kicked, handcuffed, slapped and thrown into car boots, (Kaggia O.1, 1999). Bildad

Kaggia laments that some of the brutal arresting officers were Africans working in the service of Europeans (O.1: 1999).

But the British efforts to intimidate the Mau Mau fighters did not bear immediate fruit. Between October 20 and December 31, 1952, more incidents of the African guerrilla activities were reported. During this period, another loyal African colonial administrator, Chief Nderi of Nyeri, was ambushed and killed in an operation believed to have been organized by a Mau Mau general, Stanley Mathenge (Wanyoike O.I, 1999). In Kikuyu, Kiambu, Erick Bowker, a British veteran of the two world wars was found murdered. In Nyahururu, Ian Jock Meiklajohn, a retired British army commander enjoying life in Kenya was killed and his wife badly injured (Kisiang'ani, 1993:204). In the Rift Valley, an African informer at Ndoswa village, near Njoro, was assassinated (Nakuru District Annual Report, 1952). This was followed by the killing of a white settler at Leshau in Laikipia District, an incident which prompted the colonial authorities to burn down the whole village (East African Standard, November 26, 1952).

In 1953, the confrontation graduated to new levels. Mau Mau generals such as Dedan Kimathi, Stanley Mathenge, Waruhiu Itote, Muriuki Kimotho (General Tanganyika) had consolidated their positions in the forests and were now in charge of the proceedings. The power of Mau Mau was felt through the increased assassination of Europeans and their African collaborators. This forced the government to transfer the control of the Kenyan security from the police to the British Army (Ndirangu O.1, 1999).

The skill, determination and effectiveness of the Mau Mau warriors was baffling to the colonial authorities. More killings were reported. Early January 1953, two European farmers, Richard Bingley and M.C.H. Ferguson, were killed and their guns

taken by what the East African Standard described as 'a gang of panga-armed Africans (January 3, 1953). On the 5th of January 1953, another trusted colonial administrator, Chief Hinga Waiganjo was killed in his hospital bed at the Kiambu Native Hospital where he had been admitted for other ailments (East African Standard, January 6, 1953). On January 25, 1954, Roger Rucker, his wife Esme and their six year old son Michael were killed by Mau Mau warriors at Kikuyu (Edgerton, Op.Cit.: 72). The government, in response, evacuated more than 100,000 Kikuyu servants and labourers working in the white highlands. The evacuation was done without prior warning. Africans were evacuated at gunpoint leaving behind their household possessions and personal effects (Leigh, 1954). Frantz Fanon observes that:

> ...the violence of the colonial regime and the counter violence of the native balance each other in an extra-ordinary homogeneity (1967.69).

Indeed, despite the white reprisals, violence from the Mau Mau continued. Instead of the movement becoming weaker, it grew stronger. During the year 1953, two more incidents reiterated the power and resilience of the Mau Mau. The first incident was the Naivasha Attack, the second, the Lari Massacre.

The Naivasha attack was executed on March 26, 1953 and it targeted the Naivasha Police Station. The brain behind the attack was General Mbaria Kaniu whose men had only three rifles, one shot gun and a pistol (Leigh, 1954:17; Wachanga, 1975:57). In this incident, about 80 Mau Mau soldiers raided the station at night and hacked to death a police constable on duty (East African Standard, March 28, 1953). The warriors broke into the armoury, took 18 submachine guns, 29 rifles and 20,000 rounds

of ammunition (Ibid.). Before they drove off in a police truck, they had successfully released 173 prisoners, many of them Mau Mau followers (Wachanga, Op. Cit.: 57).

The second incident was the Lari massacre which took place about half an hour after the successful Naivasha attack. At this time, the Lari population was composed of a sizeable number Rift Valley squatters who had been expelled from Olenguruone in the late 1940s (Kariuki O.1, 2000). Lari was itself a farming area inhabited by the Kikuyu evenly divided between government loyalists who owned the land and landless tenants who had been thrown out of the Rift Valley because of their suspected Mau Mau affiliations. The loyalists were led by Chief Luka Wakahangara who was reportedly cruel and brutal to his subjects (Karanja O.1, 2000). Joseph Mugo one of the residents of Lari at that time observes:

> The tenants hated the loyalists. Tenants felt that loyalists had been given land because they had accepted to sell their country to the while man.... (O.I. 2000)

As a result of the hostility between loyalists and tenants, the latter, many of them Mau Mau supporters launched vicious night attacks on the former. In what culminated into the Lari Massacre, 87 people including Chief Luka Wakahangara and his 8 wives were killed. About 32 people were seriously injured and over 200 houses were burned down. As well, more than 1,000 head of cattle belonging to the loyalists were maimed (Sorrenson, 1967:101). Jairo Kimotho, a survivor of the Lari Massacre, says that the government killed over 1900 Africans in retaliation, (O.I, 2000).

The deteriorating security situation in the Kenyan colony forced the colonial government to revise its strategies of dealing with the problem. The colonial authorities set up special tribunals to try arrested suspects (Kiriga, 1992:80-145). Those found guilty

(and many of them were convicted) were jailed or detained. But in the Aberdares, over 94 newly recruited warriors under the leadership of General Kago (Chege Kariuki) were ambushed and killed. By the end of 1953, the Mau Mau had lost 3,064 warriors, 100 were captured and an unknown number wounded or unaccounted for (Majadalany, 1962:188). Furthermore, almost 100,000 supporters of Mau Mau had by this time been arrested, 64,000 of these brought on trial (Ibid.).

During the year 1954, the government started arming homeguards. Homeguards worked alongside newly created pseudo-gangs in the daunting task of crippling the Mau Mau movement. The gangs were composed of both Europeans and Africans, with the Europeans painting themselves black so as to lure Mau Mau warriors into deadly traps (Mathui, O.I, 2000). However, the most decisive military action against the Mau Mau movement came in April 1954 when the colonial government launched the famous 'Operation Anvil' (Wa Githumo n.p, 1986). In this operation, many male Kikuyu were arrested and taken to concentration camps where they were detained without trial. To deal with the forest warriors, the colonial authorities resorted to air strikes, pounding the Aberdares and the Mount Kenya regions with heavy bombing. By 1955, the Mau Mau movement had actually been defeated with most of its leaders killed or put under preventive detention.

3.6 The Fanonian Dialectic of Violence in the Kenyan Context During the Mau Mau Era

In discussing the nature of violence in the process of decolonization, Fanon Observes:

> The naked truth of decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it (1967:28).

So far, this point of view is partially true because we have just witnessed above how the conflict between the Mau Mau supporters and the colonial authorities turned violent to the point of shading a lot of blood through the bullets. But we have also to recognize that not all Africans in Kenya were part and parcel of this blood-letting process. There were many Africans who supported peaceful negotiations to freedom (Walucho Maruti O.I, 2001).

Franz Fanon recognized this when he variously referred to the ambiguous role played by the national bourgeoisie. He argued that at times the nationalist elite negotiated with the colonists and betrayed the people. Commenting on the betrayal of the national bourgeoisie Fanon says:

> One step more, and the leader of the nationalist party keeps his distance with regard to that violence. He loudly proclaims that he has nothing to do with these Mau Maus, these terrorists, these throat slitters. At best he shouts himself off in a no man's land, between the terrorists and the settlers and willingly offers his services as a go-between. This is to say that as the settlers cannot discuss terms with these Mau Mau he himself will be quite willing to begin the negotiations (Op.Cit.: 49).

The story of Jomo Kenyatta and his colleges in KAU during the Mau Mau struggle in the 1950s is a powerful testimony to Fanon's revelations. In his view, the actual revolutionary process takes place when the wretched sections of the society, dominated by the peasantry resolve to take up arms to dismantle the colonial system (Ibid.: 36-60). Fanon trusted this cadre of people because they never benefited from the colonial system

and had, therefore, nothing to lose except their misery and their land. Those are the people who become 'new men' as a result of espousing violence. According to Fanon:

> the colonial world is a world cut into two, the dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and police stations. In the colonies, it is the policeman and soldiers who are the offically instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and rule of oppression (1967:29).

It is imperative to observe that a nationalist leader such as Kenyatta could denounce a movement which was pursuing the same goal of liberation as himself. In an apparent reference to Jomo Kenyatta, Fanon demonstrates what Mau Mau meant to some nationalist leaders. To some sections of the nationalist movement, Mau Mau adherents were 'terrorists and throat slitters'. But to other sections of the nationalist leadership (especially the militant groups) the Mau Mau worriors were genuine freedom fighters in the service of Kenya's liberation struggle.

The official position of the European countries, with regard to the Mau Mau movement, was articulated by the Western press and this position seemed to agree with the perception of the movement by some moderate nationalist leaders including Jomo Kenyatta. To the West, Mau Mau was a secret subversive society owing its power to the practice of witchcraft (East African Standard, September 9, 1952). It was also a tribal organization confined to the Kikuyu (Ibid.). The Manchester Guadian described the movement as childish and babaric (October 17, 1952). Oliver Lyttleton was quoted by the New York Times, October 20, 1952) as having described Mau Mau as an anti-white gangsterism. From the foregoing, there were definitely many Mau Maus to many people and this has been acknolwedged by several scholars who have undertaken to study the history of the liberation struggle in Kenya (Maloba, 1993:3). But whatever position is

taken, there is little doubt that the movement grew out of the brutalizing economic and social conditions perpetuated by British colonialism in Kenya. Scondly, the movement's adherents believed in the strategy of violence as a means to achieve their ends.

In our sub-section 3.4 above, we enumerated the details of confrontation between the Mau Mau and the British imperialists. But we hasten to add that the colonial world could not be oversimplified to be just one cut into two, between the colonizer and colonized. The colonial world was much more complicated than that. As a matter of fact, while the binary division existed, we also had African collaborators in the form of policemen, chiefs and loyal servants who possessed the hybrid qualities of both the colonizer and the colonized. Some were culturally attracted to the colonizer but naturally, because they were Africans, they remained part of the colonized. Indeed, in Kenya, these Africans who had been alienated from their own people formed the frontier that seemed to divide the colonizer and the colonized. The African collaborators, not the barracks and the police stations, were it seems to me, the officially instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler rule and oppression. The police stations and barracks came in only when law and order was threatened.

The point we are making here is that people like Chief Nderi, Luka Wakahangara and Chief Waruhiu were Africans but they could not effectively fit in the Fanonian binaries of the colonizer and the colonized. They were both. That is why in studying colonial situations in Africa, we shall be more efficient if we dispense with the rigid dichotomies of the modernist approaches and espouse the hybridities as well as the decentring visions embraced by postcolonial scholars such as Hommi Bhabha (1994). It would be problematic to give the impression that the struggle for decolonization was a

straightforward affair between the colonizer and the colonized. The murder of the Kikuyu chiefs and any spies of the colonial rulers is a testimony to the complexity of the colonial situation as several people within the colonial equation possessed dual or multiple identities.

Perhaps it is worth our while to ask why some Africans either wanted to collaborate with whites or why others wanted to negotiate for freedom in a peaceful manner. The critical point here is power. Those who collaborated hoped that the white man would surrender power to them one day. Those who asked for peaceful negotiations wanted to inherit European power structures which they adored. For this group, there was no going back to the good old days and so they did not see the need to destroy what they would have needed soon after the expected departure of the colonialists from the country (Kilikinji O.1, 2001). In the same way, those who espoused violence wanted to seize power by force.

Frantz Fanon has argued that from their first encounter, the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized was marked by violence. Again the binary of colonizer/colonized is used here with a lot of caution. But the contention of Fanon that from the word go violence marked the life of the colonizer and the colonized is debatable. Although conflict existed between the two groups (assuming that the colonized were a homogeneous entity with same interests and objectives) there were also peaceful moments between the groups. Colonial life was not all about violence. Colonial life was about other things including, going to church, grazing, marriages, sexual habits, African customs, harvesting, beer parties, name it!

We are told by Emmanuel Hansen, that pedantic reviewer of Fanon's that:

> (settler violence) is an integral part of the capitalist society where alienation is the feature of each person's life and where each person treats the other as an object (1978.99).

Hansen's argument fits well into the Western discourse which has often reduced human existence to the lowest common denominator of economics. But in this study, we say that human life is not the same thing as economics; it is more diverse and complicated and economics is just a small section of that overwhelming diversity and complication. Thus, the above dialectic should be stretched further to include all aspects of social, cultural and political dimensions of the human society. Indeed, its noteworthy, at least from Fanon's standpoint, that since violence was initially introduced by the colonizer into the colonized, the colonizer internalized the same violence and used it against the master. However, it seems difficult for us to conclude that the violence we see among the African peoples in Kenya right from 1895 to the peak of Mau Mau activism was an oscillating spiral of force inherited from Europeans.

Such line of argument is demeaning because it is disrespectful to the African mind. Like all other members of the human species, the African people carried and they still carry a latent arsenal of violence. This sort of violence can be activated anytime conditions allow. As Bulhan reminds us, violence is integral to relations and social conditions. Violence is in any relation, process or condition by which an individual or group violates the physical, social and/or psychological integrity of another person or group (Bulhan, Op.Cit.:192). Colonial conditions of deprivation, marginalization and exploitation called in the inherent violence from the back-stage of the African psyche. It is, therefore, our submission here that violence is part and parcel of every society and is not thus unique to particular people of particular colonial situations.

The problem with Fanon, however, lies in his adoration of Hegel. In the master-servant representations, Hegel gives the master immense powers over the servant. The Hegelian master thinks for his bondsman. Frantz Fanon was almost irreparably consumed by this unequal relation where the servant was inferior to the master that when it came to analysing colonial situations, the West Indian theoretician felt that without the master's violence, the bondsman could never originate his own form of violence.

Despite the excessive bombardments, police and army reprisals directed at the movement, the Mau adherents fought with alarming courage and commitment. Two things, at least from the Fanonian perspective, explain this undiminished courage of the warriors. First, all Mau Mau warriors had been oathed to kill and to destroy colonialists by all means necessary. Oathing bound the recruits to the cause of violence. As Fanon put it:

> The practice of violence binds them together as a whole since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain a part of the great organism of violence (Fanon, 1967:73).

On the critical issue of loyalty to the cause of liberation, through violent methods, Fanon observes that:

> You could be sure of a new recruit when he could no longer go back into the colonial system. This mechanism it seems existed in Kenya among the Mau Mau and it required that each member of the group strike a blow at the victim. Each one was thus personally responsible for the death of that victim. To work means to work for the death of the settler (Ibid.: 67).

Indeed, as Fanon observes, in this sort of conflict, each party seeks the annihilation and death of the other; the settler wants to kill the African and African too is determined to kill the settler.

A few comments should, however, be made with regard to the issue of oaths. This is because Mau Mau oathing practices were often viewed in Western scholarship as primitive and anachronistic. Oath-taking is part and parcel of every society. Modern governments administer oaths to their servants in order to cultivate trust and commitment to service. In the modern military establishments, oath-taking is mandatory for all soldiers. Depending on which society we are looking at, oath-taking may take different dimensions. Some oaths could involve simple recitations and the reading of the holy scriptures while others may involve the drinking of human and animal blood. The Mau Mau oaths had a complicated cuisine, some of which bordering on the absurd! But this complication is not the same as primitivity. Frantz Fanon, possibly looking at the contents of the Mau Mau oaths and relating these with the African dances he detested, seemed convinced like his mentor Hegel that the African mind was primitive (see Fanon 1967:45). If we, however, adopted that kind of argument then we will not even find any rationale in situating the Mau Mau struggle withing the domain of the Kenyan decolonization process. Oaths bound people to violence because the colonial authorities had refused to address most of the crucial grievances of the African people.

To the colonialists, the African counter-violence was a wake-up call about the deteriorating colonial situation. However, for the African, their violence served several purposes. In addition to unifying and binding members of the fighting group, violence served an existentialist purpose. Frantz Fanon observes thus:

> ... at the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction, it makes him fearless and restores self-respect (Ibid.:74).

Two observations could however be made from this. First, is non-violence in all its forms a reflection of inferiority, despair and inaction? When, for example, a husband beats up his own wife who refuses to cook, does that mean the man is fighting his own inferiority? Does it also imply the man is cleansing himself? Indeed, the point we are making here is that there were other forms of violence in colonial Kenya, purely unrelated to colonial conditions but very prevalent among brothers, families, children, friends, relatives and which had no relationship with Fanon's generalized discourse of inaction, despair and inferiority.

Our criticism is that Fanon's violence and its cathartic implications need not pass as a general rule for human existence. Further, even within the colonial situation such as Kenya's, we had moderates in parties like KAU, we had African Christians, collaborators, spies and chiefs who did not embrace violence. Can we say because they did not practice violence, they were inferior, inactive and fearful? Within the Hegelian paradigm, the master is already superior to the bondsman. If that is the case, then what inferiority was the colonial settler trying to prove when he employed excessive violence against the native during the Mau Mau era? Or is Fanon saying that settler violence was normal while native violence was an instrument for restoring to them superiority and confidence?

The Mau Mau violence involved a great deal of risk-taking both for the fighters and Europeans. But in the face of death, risk-taking was the ultimate creation not only because it guaranteed survival in the face of stubborn opposition but because it was the most critical gateway to change. We have argued that in the Hegelian and by extension the Fanonian perspective, people involved in a reciprocal conflict created themselves through mutual recognition and eventually through self-actualization. While the Mau

Mau war was reveting in all its forms, there was no evidence of mutual recognition between the fighters and the European colonialists. In our Kenyan context, events leading to and including the Mau Mau itself indicate the abstract negation of the bondsman (the colonized fighter).

According to Frantz Fanon, the absolute negation of the bondsman by the master usually leads to the former turning to some transient pleasures. Transient pleasures become a way of self-actualization in the face of such negation. Can we say the Mau Mau turned to transient pleasures at any one time? It is common knowledge that many Mau Mau fighters envied the privileges and comfort of the colonial masters. Accordingly, their violence was partly aimed at destroying the master so that they could take over those privileges. This attitude by the fighters, in fact, negates the view that violence necessarily leads one to the platform of self-actualization and freedom. In the Mau Mau case, African violence seemed to confirm the inferiority of the natives. This was because the natives undertook to violently overthrow Europeans so as to inherit the comfortable privileges of the colonialists. By extension, this would deliver the Africans into a new status of superiority hitherto occupied by Europeans.

3.7 The Path to Political Independence

By mid 1950's, the sustained attacks on Mau Mau hideouts by the British had weakened the movement to the point of no return. The colonial state appeared once again to be firmly in control (Berman 1990:377). Many Mau Mau supporters and fighters had been killed or detained. Detention camps were established in such places as Hola, Manyani and Langata where the living conditions were appalling and inhuman (Times

London, May 7 1954). In these centres the colonial authorities employed both physical and psychological violence to neutralize opposition against British imperialism. The British violence against Africans oppositionists had paid dividents by the late 1950s. At the time, only sporadic outbreaks of Mau Mau attacks from small bands of warriors still holed up in the forests occurred. The movement had been defeated, its leaders detained and Kenya retained its status as a colonial state.

As already observed, Frantz Fanon believed that decolonization will always be a violent process. But the defeat of Mau Mau in Kenya seeks to disapprove this contention. This is because the neutralization of the movement hardly brought about any meaningful decolonization. Furthermore, the defeat of Mau coincided with an increase in political activity between the colonialists and those members of the African moderate factions who believed in peaceful negotiations for the constitutional transformation of Kenya. The colonial government encouraged the entry of African moderates such as B.A Ohanga and Daniel arap Moi into the Legislative Council. Ohanga and Moi had on several occasions denounced Mau Mau and did not overtly say they wanted Kenya to be independent from Britain.

The struggle against Mau Mau had obviously exacted a price from the British imperialists. Their military occupation of Kenya could not last indefinitely, but neither could they return the country to the status quo (Ogot, 1995:48). Reform had became imperative. But what kind of reform was being envisaged? It was a reform which was to be skillfully prepared to Africanize colonialism while at the same time safeguarding European influence and control. Thus, the colonial regime now saw the need to broaden the basis of collaboration at the national level to include Africans within the political and

economic structures of the colonial society. The main objectives of these colonial reforms were to create a base upon which collaborative African leadership could emerge and undermine the support of Mau Mau fighters. Such programmes could hardly be described as one that enhanced the process of decolonization. Rather, the basic aim of the project was to be thwart serious nationalist efforts as those embraced in the Mau Mau activities and to reinvent colonialism and repackage it for British convenience.

But to repackage colonialism also implied undertaking certain reforms that would persuade the uninitiated that Kenya was undergoing a certain decolonization. The first areas of attention was land. In 1954, the year of draconian and Nazi-type 'Operation Anvil' that put thousands of Africans in detention camps, a new land programme called the Swynnerton Plan was initiated. The Plan provided the funding and rationale of land consolidation programmes and enclosure movement so as to revolutionize agricultural practices in African areas. The main objective of the Swynnerton Plan was to create family holdings which would be large enough to keep the family self-sufficient in food and also enable them to practice animal husbandry and thus develop a cash income (Ibid.). It was envisioned that 600,000 families would have farming units of ten acres a family, which would raise their average productivity in cash sales from £10 to £100 a year after providing their own needs. The land reforms were accompanied by the removal of the remaining restrictions against African production of lucrative cash crops such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, hybrid maize and dairy products (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1954).

The Swynnerton Plan hoped to achieve its objectives in about 20 years from 1954. The programme appropriated the legal provisions of the Forfeiture of Lands Act of 1953,

to confiscate land individually owned by the so-called 'terrorists' and to put it in the new reform programmes. It is estimated that by 1956, 3,510 people had already forfeited their land under this Act (Lamb, 1974:11). Moreover, the 'villagization' policy (based on the model of the fortified villages of the Malaysian emergency) that accompanied land consolidation was explicitly designed to break links between Mau Mau soldiers and their supporters, buttress the position of loyalists and seal the landlessness of the former. These reforms were not the ones that the Mau Mau fighters had envisaged and could not thus be seen as positive moves by the British towards decolonizing Kenya. Nevertheless, between May 1954 and August 1956, about 1,077,500 Kikuyu and Embu people had been herded into 854 villages (Ibid.). Similar moves were made though with less severity in parts of Nyanza and Western provinces.

The second move to re-invent and repackage colonialism was made by the Carpenter Committee Report of 1954. This committee proposed minimum wages for African families (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: Report of the Committee on African Wages, 1954). The conditions imposed by the State of Emergency and the desire of the imperial government to create a middle class among the African population enabled the government to adopt these reforms of wage structure. The Kenya Labour Department encouraged the formation of employers organizations to help facilitate the growth of collective bargaining. The department also assisted in the maintenance of trade unions. It is against this background that fiery spokesmen of workers such as Tom Mboya emerged (Ogot, Op.Cit.:49). But Mboya was only going to operate within the rules set by the British industrial system and was therefore not different from any workers' leader in Britain then.

Thirdly, there was the Lidhury Commission which accepted the principle of equal pay for equal work. Government employees of all races were to receive equal salaries and conditions of service. On paper, this recommendation was an important move in the deracilaization of the Kenya society, but in practice things were different. In literally every aspect of Kenyan colonial life discrimination, against Africans continued. Africans were often the last ones to be hired and the first ones to be fired. Europeans and Asians continued to enjoy better salaries and better terms of service than Africans (Malisia O.I, 2002).

The final effort to reinvent and repackage colonialism was channeled through the African political activities. At the height of the Mau Mau insurgency in 1954, the government came up with the Lyttelton Constitution to derail the struggle towards true decolonization. The new constitutional dispensation introduced a new central government structure based on a ministerial system and which included African and Asian Ministers. It also conceded to the principal of multi-racial representation. Historian B.A. Ogot observes that in undertaking these reforms,

> The colonial regime hoped that the 'middle class' Africans would become part of shared interests integrated into the colonial order (Op.Cit.:5).

These hopes were achieved through the emergent political activities of the African leadership.

As brutal torture and mass arrests of dissidents continued, as forced labour campaigns and detention without trial persisted, the colonial authorities in Kenya encouraged the formation of district rather than national/political associations. Although these associations were basically tribal and at times regional, some African leaders did

not mind them. Among others, these district associations included the Nairobi District African Congress (under the leadership of C.M.G. Argwings-Kodhek) and the Nairobi Peoples Convention Party (under Tom Mboya). Others included the Mombasa African Democratic Union the African District Association (Central Nyanza), the Nakuru African Progressive Party, the Nakuru District Congress as well as the Abaluhya Peoples Association (Ibid.: 52). The only nationalist party KAU had been banned in 1953 as a result of having had links with Mau Mau (Crowley, 1967:98). District and tribal organizations only helped to enhance the colonial agenda of 'divide and rule' as Africans stepped on each others toes in the narrow pursuit of tribal and regional interests while at the same time craving for European attention and recognition. These were hardly good signs for genuine decolonization.

True to form, many of the leaders of these district and tribal political groups did not envisage independence for Kenya. B.A. Ogot has demonstrated that such tribal figures as Daniel arap Moi, B. A. Ohanga (appointed first African Minister in 1954), J. Kebaso, J.D. Otiende, W.W.W Awori, D.N. Mumo, Francis Joseph Khamisi, Ronald Ngala and J.M. Kasyoka, among others, who were leaders in those tribal or district political organizations either believed that Kenya would never be independent nor did they make decolonization their main political agenda (Ibid.: 51-59). All that these leaders sought were reforms that would lead to the African acceptability into the colonial cultural set-up. This attitude must have impressed the colonial authorities as it contributed immensely to the derailment of the decolonization process by deliberately Africanizing, instead of dismantling, colonialism.

Celebrating the increasing number of loyalists who did not necessarily wish to dismantle colonialism but who instead asked for accommodation in a system which had brutalized Kenya for years, the colonial authorities undertook constitutional reforms which increased the number of Africans in the legislative Council. In October 1957, the Lennox-Boyd constitution was conceded extending the multi-racial formation by raising the African representation in the Legislative Council to fourteen (Mboya 1963, Odinga, 1967).

Between 1958 and 1960, Jaramogi Odinga Oginga led members of the Legislative Council to petition for the release of Jomo Kenyatta, the detained KAU leader. Following his defence in Kapenguria in 1954, and considering the fact that on several occasions Kenyatta had himself denounced Mau Mau, one could be excused for thinking that members of the Legislative Council including Odinga knew that Kenyatta was for all practical purposes a loyalist, like them, who had been mistakenly associated with Mau Mau. Like Moi and many other members of the Council, Kenyatta detested Mau Mau. As the Legislative Council members negotiated for the repackaged colonialism called independence, there was need to bring on board Kenyatta not only because he did not represent the aspirations of Mau Mau but also because Mau Mau had to be isolated from the nationalist forces.

From the European political standpoint, the period between 1955 and 1958 was critical. All indications from London and from settler circles were that Kenya would remain a white man's country for a long time to come. This shows that Mau Mau violence had had little impact on the British attitudes about political change in Kenya. Not surprisingly, in January 1959, Colonial Secretary Allan Lennox-Boyd presided over

a conference attended by the Governors from Britain's three East African colonies where it was decided that independence would probably come to Kenya by 1975 (Swainson, 1980:189).

Since independence was a long way to come, the British continued to exact violence in the colony. Already the Emergency had authorized the use of excessive force to subdue rebellion and ensure African compliance. In March in 1959, the British security forces killed hundreds of Mau Mau detainees in the Hola detention Camp (Murray-Brown, 1972:312). This genocidal incident of violence - the Hola Masscre - exposed the brutal side of the British psyche. The massacre was intended to send a clear message that the British had not been moved by the Mau Mau 'menance' and were willing to use any amount of force and brutality to secure the Kenyan colonial state. In April, Lennox Boyd told the British parliament that he was unable to envisage a time when it would be possible for any British government to surrender their ultimate responsibilities for the destiny and well-being of Kenya. The same message was echoed by Governor Evelyn Baring when he assured settlers that Kenya would continue to be a 'fotress colony' and that independence was not going to be given soon. At this point, some extremely conservative European Kenyans led by the Royal Air Force (R.A.F) Group Captain L.R. 'Puck' Briggs and A.T. Culwick still demanded white supremacy including racial segregation. But settler leader Michael Blundell made efforts to convince Europeans that Kenya could peacefully be transformed into a multiracial society with a multi-racial government (Edgerton, 1990:202).

Most of Kenya's white settlers breathed a sigh of relief when Harold Macmillan's Conservative Party won the British General Election in 1959. The Labour Party, they

feared, would not have protected them and their interests. Surprisingly, however, Macmillan was determined to bring independence to Britain's African colonies as quickly as possible. On February 3, 1960, while addressing the South African parliament, the British Prime Minister declared that 'a wind of change is blowing through the continent and whether we like it or not this growth of political consciousness is a political fact and our national policies must take account of it' (Ogot 1995:540. This came as a profound surprise to European settlers in Kenya.

But Macmillan had learned from France's bloody struggle in Algeria that there could be no military solution to the rising tide of nationalism in Africa. By the end of 1959, 12,000 Frenchmen had died in the war along with nearly 150,000 Algerians (Bogonko, 1980). Macmillan understood that even the British victory over Mau Mau could be temporary and that if whites were to retain power in Africa, the British government would have to be willing to kill large numbers of Africans. Macmillan wanted to avoid bloodshed. He too knew that Britain no longer had the strength to hold on its African possessions (Macmillan, 1972:1972). The Africanization of colonialism through the granting of political independence was thus less costly and more beneficial to British interests than the retention of formal colonialism. While on a tour of Ghana in 1960, Macmillan did not mince his words about the African independence when he said:

> We (the British) share the strong tide of feeling among Africans that this is their time of destiny.....saying that the rise of nationalism in Africa was a fact British policy would have to acknowledge (Fisher, 1982:233; East African Standard, January 19, 1960).

Evidently, Britain had come to acknowledge the profundity of African nationalism. But if African nationalism had to be 'meaningful' to Britain, it had to be

channeled through men who were acceptable to British values and traditions. For the case of Kenya, such men could not definitely be found among the Mau Mau. Through the efforts of Ian Macleod (Macmillan's new Secretary of State for colonies), the Kenyan march to independence was hurried specifically to isolate the Mau Mau and their violent supporters.

Contributing to the problematic of decolonization in Kenya, Gary Wasserman contends that the major goal of colonial administration in Kenya from 1960 onward was to thwart the development of African political organizations which might challenge the inherited political economy (1976:16). Accordingly, decolonization was a dual process of bargaining and socialization, with independence as the ultimate end. From this perspective, the decolonization process was not so much the upward development of an indigenous African political movement (as it should have been), as the downward manipulation of the movement into a system (as it was) (Ibid.: 166). Wasserman's concensual-decolonization in which the British liberal colluded with the local elites to lock Kenya into a neo-colonial web finds echoes in much of the dependency literature in Kenya (Leys, 1988).

But the debate on the nature and structure of the decolonization process has been stretched beyond the views propagated by Wasserman and Leys. Both scholars argue that the 'decolonization' of Kenya which translated into the granting of independence in 1963 was a planned phenomenon. On the contrary, however, the most popular view on this issue is fronted by nationalist claims that the violence of the political struggle forced the British authorities to grant independence to Kenya. But Bruce Berman sees it differently. According to him:

> The decolonization of Kenya was.....neither a triumphant struggle for national liberation nor the essential maintenance of structures of colonialism through the co-optation of the nationalist movement, although the nationalist struggle and efforts to maintain structural continuity were clear features of the process (Berman, 1990:378)

Fundamentally, Berman attributes the decolonization process that translated into political independence to economic factors dictated by the articulation of indigenous forces into the world economy. Through these changes, and with specific emphasis on the creation and development of the indigenous peasantry and petit bourgeoisie, Kenya was transformed from being a colony to a 'developing nation'. This transformation, Berman contends, took place between 1954 and 1969 (Ibid.).

From the arguments posed by Berman, three observations could be made. Clearly Berman's views seem to support our standpoint in this study that the significance of the 1963 independence watershed has been overplayed because it reflected just one small aspect of transition within the colonial state. As it is evident, Berman's 'transformation' gives prominence to the years 1954 and 1969 and ignores the independence year of 1963. Indeed, what Berman describes as the articulation of indigenous forces into the world economy, through the empowerment of the dominant African class, was part and parcel of the process we have termed the 'Africanization of colonialism'. But more importantly, Berman seems to give little room to the emancipatory role of colonial violence. By underplaying the importance of the nationalist forces (especially the militant Mau Mau wing), Berman poured cold water on the Fanonian thesis that decolonization was always a violent phenomenon.

In January 1961, Macleod invited both white and African delegations from Kenya to a conference at Lancaster House, an ostentatious London mansion. Macleod worked out his plans with dexterity and skill. After five weeks of exhaustive talking, Macleod declared that Kenya would become a parliamentary democracy based on universal franchise (Edgerton, 1990:206). The white delegates were stunned. African rule was on the way. But people who took part in the Lancaster conference including Martin Shikuku, Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, James Gichuru and Jeremiah Nyagah, among others, were moderate political leaders who were highly socialized in Western European languages and traditional values. These are the same people that Europeans wanted to hand over power to. Ultimately, therefore, the African delegation at Lancaster agreed with their European counterparts about the type of constitution that would be put in place in the new democratic dispensation that accommodated the interests of both parties.

From the very start, members of the delegation demanded the release of Kenyatta as a pre-condition to the 'Africanization of colonialism'. But knowing very little about Kenyatta, Macleod was reluctant to meet this demand. Yet as will be shown in Chapter Four, the Kenyatta Presidency was from the word go derisive of Mau Mau. Kenyatta was not a Mau Mau follower and he treated all Mau Mau leaders with suspicion. After long deliberations involving Macleod and Governor Patrick Renson as well as the Kenyan nationalist leaders, the colonial authorities released Kenyatta and began negotiations for the country's independence. Once the British were convinced that Kenyatta and his allies in the Lancaster delegation were not violent, a smooth transition to independence was assured.

But the Africanization of colonialism which was later epitomized by the granting of independence in Kenya had its own transition. Both the settlers and the colonial administrators began to make a tactical retreat to pave way for constitutional wrangles amongst African factions in their efforts to secure regional and ethnic interests. It was not thus a coincidence that in the heat of these tempests, two main nationalist parties were soon formed after the colonial authorities lifted a ban on political parties with a nationalist outlook. The two new parties were KANU and KADU.

At the time of Kenyatta's release in 1961, the moderate wing of the original KAU had already transformed itself into the Kenya National African Union (KANU) led by James Gichuru (Ogot, Op. Cit.: 65). Competing for power with KANU was the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) led by Ronald Ngala, Masinde Muliro and Daniel arap Moi. KANU coalesced around two major ethnic communities, namely the Luo and the Kikuyu. However, KADU became the party of the small ethnic communities, including the Mijikenda, Maasai, Tugen, Nandi and Luhya, of Kenya. One the encouragement of the settlers who now came to consider themselves as a minority, KADU pledged to defend the interests of minority ethnicities against the possible domination of the big tribes. It is important, however, to observe that many of the leaders of KANU and KADU who spent a great portion of their time in the 1950s to condemn the Mau Mau were still influential in the ultimate creation of the Kenyatta state in 1963. Returning to Fanonian theorization on violence, we thus find it hard to buy the argument that violence can deterministically lead to freedom and decolonization. Furthermore, even if one was to consider the symbolic move by the British to grant independence as

some form of decolonization, one would appreciate that this process was not achieved through violence but through round table negotions.

3.8 Conclusion

With special reference to Kenya, this Chapter has highlighted the making of violence, right from the formative stages of Mau Mau to the ultimate Africanization of colonialism through the granting of independence. But it has also been pointed out that the colonizer's violence did not emanate from the colonizer because violence was inherent in all human beings and was thus part and parcel of every society.

The Chapter has taken us through the genesis of the Mau Mau movement and argued that the insurrection developed out of the need by some African people to get back their land and freedom from the Europeans. We have demonstrated that in the quest to achieve this objective, some moderates in KAU such as Jomo Kenyatta, James Gichuru and Eliud Mathu espoused peaceful methods of constitutional negotiations for the African liberation. These moderates denounced violence. On the other hand, we have pointed out that a radical wing of KAU preached the use of force and advocated the employment of violence as the only viable strategy for winning Kenya's independence. The militant wing comprised of such personalities as Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, Kungu Karumba and even Makhan Singh.

When hostilities reached a peak in 1952, the British Governor in Kenya, Evelyn Baring, declared a State of Emergency which forced many Mau Mau supporters into the forests. We have demonstrated the damage the Mau Mau guerrillas meted out on human life and property. The response from the British authorities was equally lethal. Through

air strikes and sustained military action, the Mau Mau movement was defeated by 1955. Kenya remained a colonial state with its structures intact. Mau Mau supporters and leaders were either detained or killed in action. Excessive force was used to liquidate opposition against colonialism. This disapproved Frantz Fanon's view that decolonization was always a violent process as Mau Mau violence never actually brought about an end of colonialism in Kenya. The path to independence was skillfully prepared to exclude Mau Mau warriors. As the negotiations for Kenya's independence were going on, several Mau Mau leaders were still in detention.

Furthermore, the danger of using modernist binaries in analysing colonial situations such as Kenya's has been highlighted because the Kenya colony was not a simple binary of the colonizer/colonized. As has been evident in our data, there were several African chiefs who supported colonialism and some paid the price of that support by losing their lives to the Mau Mau warriors.

Indeed, the colonial government began to prepare to hand over political power to people who had a pathological hatred for the Mau Mau violence - further disapproving Frantz Fanon's contention that violence could bring about decolonization. In the next Chapter, we undertake to examine the Kenyan post colony conceived as a nation-state, within the post-independence disposition.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 THE BIRTH OF THE NEO-COLONIAL STATE IN KENYA: THE KENYATTA STATE, 1963 - 1978

4.1 Introduction

The Kenyatta state, conceived out of the political transition to Africanize colonialism, was born in 1963, when the British authorities ceded political power to the new African leadership under Jomo Kenyatta. It was an experience which witnessed the birth of a 'new' nation: the neo-colonial, nation-state. The state was neo-colonial because even though it had changed its political leadership, it retained the critical pillars of formal colonialism. There were many people who celebrated this change with pomp but the events which unfolded after the hoisting of the Kenyan flag seemed to make a whole mockery of the newly gained freedom.

But what were the salient features of the new nation state? The new sovereignty born of nationalism had two distinct features. First, the newly independent state had the inner feature which was premised on the differences between the cultures of the colonizer and the colonized. As Partha Charttarjee, once observed, the more nationalism engaged in its contest with the colonial power in the outer domain of politics, the more it insisted on displaying the marks of 'essential' cultural difference so as to keep the colonizer from that inner domain of national life (Chatterjee, 1993:26). In the outer domain of the state, however the supposedly material domain of law, administration, economy and statecraft nationalism fought relentlessly to erase the marks of colonial difference. Difference could not be justified in that domain because, as in the case of Kenya, the new African leaders undertook to retain British institutions.

In this domain, the newly independent states of Africa, through the guidance of its nationalist leaders, began reasserting the claims to the universality of the modern regime of power. And in the end, by successfully 'terminating' the life of the colonial state, nationalism demonstrated that the project of that modern regime would be carried forward only by superseding the conditions of colonial rule (Ibid.). From the post-colonial theoretical standpoint, the new state was still entangled in the mess of forms of knowledge authored and authorized by the West but camouflaged in the Africanity of its leadership.

This Chapter examines the anatomy of neocolonialism in Kenya by highlighting a number of issues. First, it highlights the formation, challenges and pillars of the new state and second, it scrutinizes how neocolonialism manifested itself in such fields as politics, land, education, repression and culture as well as in the opposition politics. Finally, the chapter explores how these fields doubled up as sites upon which the decolonization process continued within the post-independence dispensation.

4.2 The Challenges of the new Nation

Frantz Fanon's celebrated essay 'The Pitfalls of National Consciousness' (in The Wretched of the Earth), puts the African independence on trial. In this essay, Fanon re-articulates the inherent conflict between the national middle class, in the newly independent African state, and the masses. The former embracing the values of the colonial system (as manifested in the acquisition and display of opulent cars and lives), is conceptually incarcerated by the habit patterns established by the mother country (Fairchild, 1994:196). Fanon suggests that this middle class, which assumes power at the end of the colonial regime, is inadequately prepared to replace the colonial system

because of lack of its training and resources. Consequently, the new middle class must resort to sending 'frenzied appeals for help' from the mother country (1967:149). Thus, instead of independence, the 'decolonized' nation-state remains fiscally dependent and indebted to the colonial power as national leaders recreate the rule of Western colonial powers. The Kenyan nation state, it seems to me, was not an exception to this Fanonian pessimism.

At independence, it was evident that many years of colonial rule had disrupted the social, political as well as economic patterns of public life in Kenya. The economy displayed typical characteristics of underdevelopment with heavy reliance on foreign capital and the production of primary commodities for export (Ochieng', 1995:83). This underdeveloped economy meant that independent Kenya would have to formulate policies that would not only arrest Kenya's mounting urban and rural poverty and decay but also strategies that would put the economy into indigenous hands. It was also important for the new state to empower local investment to boost local development and to reverse the trend whereby what was produced during the colonial period never returned for the development of the economy.

The main strategy for Kenya's is new development agenda was contained in the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, entitled '*African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*'. In brief, the paper noted that the people of Kenya had no voice in government; the nation's resources were organized and developed mainly for the benefit of non-Africans; and the nation's human resources remained largely uneducated, untrained, inexperienced and unbenefitted by growth of the economy (Atieno-Odhiambo and Wanyande, 1989:116). Consequently, the Kenyatta state undertook to mobilize its

resources to attain a rapid rate of economic growth for the benefit of the people. The newly installed KANU government hoped to achieve this broad objective by promising to urgently address certain fundamental issues including the nurturing of political democracy, the development of mutual social and political responsibility, redistributing various forms of property so that nobody would have too much power and ensuring that citizens enjoy freedom from want, disease and exploitation and finally developing a progressive taxation regime that would narrow the gap between the rich and the poor (Ochieng', Op.Cit.: 84). Evidently, therefore, the promise for democracy, good life and freedom punctuated the pronouncements which marked the formative years of the Kenyatta state.

4.3 Facing the Challenges: The Main Pillars of the Kenyatta State

It has already been pointed out that once the colonial authorities became sure that Kenyatta was anti-Mau Mau, they allowed him to take part in the transition to independence. On his release from detention in 1961, Kenyatta was easily elected the indisputable KANU leader. Soon, he jointed together two large influential ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo into the largest party and mobilized nationalist forces (Bennett and Roseberg, 1966). From there on, Kenyatta marched forward to negotiate for power in the new political dispensation. His immediate opponents were not the Europeans. Rather, his actual enemies were members of the opposition parties who had coalesced around the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). While KANU pressed for a unitary state, KADU advocated for a regionalist (*majimboist*) political disposition. Several KADU leaders, supported by the settlers, feared that since KANU derived its powers from the big ethnic groups it was impossible for it to cater for the interests of the

smaller communities (Ogot, 1995:69). Thus, KADU undertook to organize regional centres of power in Kenya so as to neutralize KANU's dominance of the political scene.

During the 1963 elections, Kenyatta emphasized the need for unity as a precondition for rapid economic and social development. KANU represented that spirit. Division of power along regional lives, Kenyatta felt, was going to destroy *uhuru*. The voters' were taken in by Kenyatta's persuasive skills when they handed KANU a resounding victory. But even after KANU's victory, the new constitution which political parties had agreed upon before elections was a fundamentally a hybrid combination of federal and unitary demands of the new nation (Ibid.:70-73). The constitution covered several areas from the composition of the Central Government, the separation of powers to the powers of the regional authorities with regard to finance, taxation and local government.

More importantly, however, the constitution retained the fundamental elements of the Westminster system of governance. This system proceeds from the three branches of government – the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary – and moves on to emphasize the rule of majority, under the majority party; the sanctity of the rule of law and the acceptance of opposition parties. Evidently, at independence, Kenya's political structure was based on the Westminster master-narrative of Great Britain. This master-narrative, it was thought, would assist in the rapid modernization of the new nation-state. It is a little difficult to imagine that as their main objective of taking up arms to fight colonialism, the Mau Mau fighters would have wished to enhance the installation of a more refined British political system than that of formal colonialism itself!

4.4 Political Intrigue and Intolerance

During the formative years of his rule, Jomo Kenyatta targeted for intimidation and frustration of those who did not agree with him. Frantz Fanon anticipated this intolerance in post-independence Africa. As regards internal affairs and in the sphere of institutions, Fanon argues, the national bourgeoisie will give equal proof of its incapacity. He avers:

> In a certain number of underdeveloped countries, the parliamentary game is faked from the beginning. Powerless economically, unable to bring about the existence of coherent social relations, and standing on the principles of domination ..... the bourgeoisie chooses the solution that seems to it the easiest, that of the single party (1967:132).

Fanon's views came to gain intellectual significance within the post-colonial theoretical discourses. By its nature, colonialism robbed the African leadership of its custodianship of the indigenous peoples' material culture, social values and political legitimacy (Aseka, 2003:82). At independence, this trend continued because the new African leadership which emerged had one fundamental problem. Only recently, the new leadership had escaped (because of the attainment of independence) from the subaltern movement for change to positions of privilege that had hitherto been the preserve of the European managers.

In Kenya, for example, the subaltern leaders of the independence struggle of the 1940s and 1950s, led by Jomo Kenyatta and James Gichuru, among others, were from 1963 onwards transformed, into black Europeans representing Western hegemony in the country. Such leaders became irrelevant when they forgot about the needs of the dispossessed peoples they had previously represented. In a nutshell, the post-

independence African leadership in Kenya became ruthless in defending Western modernity in Kenya by implementing imperial administrative, social and economic policies (Aseka,2003:78).

Ultimately, the sudden transformation of the new African leadership into instruments of Western hegemonic leadership in Kenya, created a deep gap of leadership within the ranks of the dispossessed subalterns. To fill this gap, a crop of leaders who had been in the independence movement but whose views could not be accommodated under the Kenyatta state began to rally the oppressed peoples of Kenya into a new form of subaltern resistance against Western hegemony. In addition to embracing Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kaggia and J.M. Kariuki, the emerging resistance movement absorbed both the scholars and artists who thus became the voices of subalternism in the new nation-state.

In order to consolidate centralization, the Kenyatta state denied KADU an effective secretariat. Furthermore, the government undertook to maintain close control of the civil service (Gertzel, 1966: 201-251). Through underhand political dealings, corruption and use of money, Jomo Kenyatta's government began to persuade opposition members to cross the floor and thus dissolve KADU. Three major strategies were deployed by the government. First, opposition leaders were offered cabinet posts. Second, the government threatened those who opposed it with detention or imprisonment. Finally, the government, blatantly refused to develop opposition areas (Mwenya Muniafu O.I, 2001). Consequently on the 10th November 1964, KADU announced its dissolution and Kenya became a 'de-facto' one-party state. This political development occurred soon after Jomo Kenyatta had given a passionate *Madaraka Day* speech in June 1963,

guaranteeing his government's commitment to protecting the constitution which among other things had recognized formal opposition in parliament (Reporter, Nairobi, June 29 1963, p.10). Through the single party political arrangement, a modern form of dictatorship of the ruling clique, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous and cynical (Fanon, 1967:32) had been born in Kenya.

The central government took another important step to strengthen its position. There was the requirement that all regional drafts of legislation be referred to the central government before being introduced in the regional assemblies (Ahluwalia, 1996:35). Besides, KANU increased the problems of KADU when it made a decision to delay the implementation of the financial provisions as laid down in the constitution (Gertzel, Op.Cit.: 33). To complicate the matter more, the leadership of regions made matters worse for themselves by substantially raising their incomes while school teachers in those regions were not paid (Ghai and McAuslan, 1970:33). Such actions by regional assemblies eroded public sympathy as they were seen to be hindering the development process. Jomo Kenyatta took full advantage of this to install authoritarian pillars in his new regime while at the same time weakening *majimboism*.

In addition to frustrating political opponents, Jomo Kenyatta assumed the powers of the colonial government and maintained an authoritative political Centre inherited from Britain. The Centre, which formed the dominant discourse, became the point of departure and reference by all the citizens of Kenya. As a result, opposition within the Kenyatta State became treasonable and Kenyatta's word was law (Nakhosi O.1, 2001). Thus, from the onset, the Kenyan 'independent' nation-state had a serious problem of political identity. Report Maxon has observed that:

> ..... the main thread that runs through Kenya's social history during this period [post independence era] is, as in the political and economic spheres, the strong continuity that linked the initial years of independence firmly to the years that preceded it (1995:110).

Encapsulated in Eurocentric forms of knowledge, the new state espoused the oppressive tendencies of the outgoing colonialists and even continued to preach the stereotypical images the colonizer had about Africans. The new rulers rejected opposition, and threatened dissenting voices with detention in a characteristic fashion of the colonial state. With the one party state deeply entrenched, both the Lower and Upper House (Senate) were merged into one and a new National Assembly was put in place to help rubber-stamp Kenyatta's whims and aspirations. Constitutional changes were passed even before they reached the House because every elected member of parliament owed his political survival to Kenyatta (Barasa O.1, 2001).

The tool of oppression within the first Kenyatta government revolved around the civil service. The provincial administration (whose structure remained colonial in every aspect) became accountable to the Office of the President instead of the Minister for Home Affairs (Odinga, 1967:243-245). It was therefore the administrative officer rather than the party official who was in 1965 the major link between the executive and the people (Gertzel, 1970:203). The Provincial and District Commissioners became chairmen of Security Intelligence Committees, signifying the assertion of power by the Office of the President. Like their equivalents working under the colonial Governor, Provincial and District Commissioners in post-independent Kenya were given powers to control the political process and had the responsibility of licensing public meetings,

including meetings held by members of parliament (Ibid.: 36). In this way, the Executive usurped the powers of the Legislature and the Judiciary.

4.5 The Land Crisis

One of the most contentious issues in the Kenyatta State was land and the allocation of resources. Most members of parliament, especially those outside Kiambu felt that land allocation in Kenya during the Kenyatta regime favoured the inner Kiambu group where Kenyatta himself came from. But to the Kenyatta state, nationalization quite simply meant the transfer, to the select few, of those unfair advantages which are the legacy of formal colonialism (see Fanon, 1967:122)

No one tried more conscientiously than former freedom fighter Bildad Kaggia to put the government on the road to a land policy that would be good for the expansion of the Kenyan economy, by protecting the interests of the landless and the poor people who had elected the *uhuru* (freedom) government. As early as September 1963, Kaggia had written to Bruce Mackenzie, the then Minister for Agriculture, and told him:

> Everyone in this country is well aware of the land hunger that has existed among Africans as a result of the robbery of their land by the British colonial imperialists. The logical method to solve the problem posed by this robbery would have been to nationalize all big estates owned by the Europeans and make them either state firms, so as to alleviate unemployment or to hand them to co-operatives formed by landless Africans (Odinga, 1967:266).

Apart from advocating free land distribution to the landless, Kaggia also called for free education and free medical facilities for the people. Nobody in the Kenyatta government listened. Instead on 22, May 1964, Kenyatta wrote to Kaggia expressing serious concern at Kaggia's repeated attacks on the Ministry of Lands and Settlement and at Kaggia's interference with land consolidation in Murang'a (Ibid.). Kenyatta too challenged

Kaggia to resign if he felt that the government was not doing the right thing. Kaggia took the challenge and resigned as the parliamentary secretary in the Ministry of Education arguing that:

> As a representative of the people, I found it very difficult to forget the people who elected me on the basis of definite pledges, or to forget the freedom fighters who gave all they had, including their land, for the independence we are enjoying (Ibid.: 267).

Both Kenyatta and his closest ally Tom Mboya made it clear that there would be no free things, including land in the newly independent Kenyan state (Mboya, 1970:80). Yet despite this assertion, Kenyatta continued to dish out, for free, large tracts of land to his friends and relatives from Kiambu.

On the other hand, another political colossus, Oginga Odinga wanted a government which handled fundamental national issues such as land distribution, nationalization of resources and foreign policy by taking into account the aspirations and needs of all ethnic groups. However, despite peaceful calls for reform in distribution of resources, Kenyatta went ahead and utilized most of the £5 million British loan for resettlement to give land to his own tribesmen. Through this programme, the Kikuyu obtained huge junks of former white highlands in central Kenya and the Rift valley province. Kenyatta himself acquired thousands of acres around Nakuru town which his family owns up to date. To effect the acquisition of land, several African squatters, some of them poor Kikuyu, were thrown out of the former European farms as a precondition for political stability (Segal, 1967:47). This action reminds us of the brutal eviction, by the colonial authorities, of squatters from Olenguruone in the 1940s.. Kenyatta was right on course with political as well as economic violence which had defined and sustained formal colonialism.

Furthermore, Kenyatta set up land settlement schemes and asked Kenyans to pay deposits so as to obtain loans for final purchase. At independence, many people were poor and could not raise the deposits. Consequently, the majority of those who obtained land were those who could enjoy political as well as financial support from Kenyatta and his allies (Khayota O.I, 2001). But Kaggia, just like Odinga, felt that land vacated by white settlers should actually have been given free to the African people (Kaggia, 1975). He made his efforts in parliament but failed. Along with Kaggia, Odinga argued in favour of the nationalization of resources but again the Kenyatta government rejected the move.

A number of observations could be derived from the struggle which emerges within Kenya's political elite. First, Kenyatta's derision of Kaggia's protestations is not far-fetched. The two personalities belonged to different wings of the nationalist struggle. Kenyatta was a member of the educated and moderate wing of KAU while Kaggia belonged to the militant faction of the struggle. Thus, in many ways, Kaggia believed that Kenyatta did not deserve the leadership of independent Kenya, since he never fought hard enough for the liberation of the country. On the other hand, Kenyatta saw in Kaggia an irrational and illiterate militant who had little touch with modernity.

However, the disagreement between Odinga and Kenyatta can be looked at from two angles. First, though both of them were fairly educated, they had deep ideological differences on the appropriate strategies to employ in order to improve the quality of life for the people of Kenya. While Odinga felt socialism was the correct way for the country, Kenyatta espoused capitalism.

The rift between the radicals and the conservatists in KANU had by 1966 reached a peak as Odinga and Kaggia received countrywide condemnation for espousing the communist ideology. Evidently, the new nation-state came to be torn between two Western authoritative meta-narratives – capitalism and communism. Coming at the height of the Cold War politics, the struggle between KANU radicals and conservatists alienated Odinga and his allies as the Western capitalist nations including Britain threw their weight behind the Kenyatta state. Indeed, on receiving assurance of Western support for his government, against communist elements in Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta undertook to enhance political repression and intolerance.

If we take capitalism as one of the grand-narratives of modernity as defined by the West, then we should also accept communism as another variant of Western modernization. After all, both modern capitalist and communist theories of social development were conceived in Western European cities. Contributing to problematic of the evils of capitalism, Frantz Fanon recommended socialism, which is the central thesis in communism. In the postmodernist spirit, Fanon was right to question capitalism. But having been caught up in the Modernist web, he questioned one grand-narrative, capitalism, and suggested another grand-narrative socialism - both of them being part and parcel of Western philosophical thought.

Thus like Fanon, Odinga, Kaggia and their socialist colleagues in Kenya, were also entangled in modernity to the extent that they fought one aspect of modernity with another when they questioned Kenyatta's capitalist state by suggesting that it should be replaced by a communist entity. The Kenyatta state, it has to be admitted, needed decolonization and the first step to do so was to question its relevance as Odinga and his

allies were doing. But to address Kenya's problems by suggesting another alien solution emanating from the same philosophical tradition was untenable. This is probably why the post-colonial discourse is appropriate in addressing the condition of the formerly colonized *others* because it takes cognizance of the unique cultural identities of these *others* and ultimately introduces a certain sense of urgency in tackling their problems.

Apart from allocating resources to his friends, 'tribesmen' and relatives, Kenyatta embraced the colonial agenda of not turning Kenya into an industrial state because such move would have denied the European world the much-needed African unfinished products for European industrial production. Further, the Kenyatta government believed that industrialization would be capital-intensive and thus create urban unemployment. Consequently, like the formal colony that Kenya was, the neo-colony maintained its faith in the production of agricultural products such as tea and coffee, which Europeans bought at very low prices, shipped to Europe, processed and then resold to Africans at very high prices. Was this not a crisis in the Kenyan post-colony?

Ultimately, disagreement over how the affairs of the new nation should be conducted led to a major split in KANU, with Odinga condemning Tom Mboya - Kenyatta's ally -for his untailored relationship with the West (Ahluwalia, 1996:43). The attack exposed Odinga to furious admonition from those KANU conservatists who had been waiting on the wings. On the instigation of Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, then Secretary General of KANU announced that KANU would hold its delegates conference in March 1966 (Gertel Op.Cit.: 71). The outcome of the conference at Limuru seemed to signal the end of Odinga's political career. Being the country's Vice President, Odinga was shocked to learn that a plan had already been mooted to change the KANU constitution so as to

establish eight provincial Vice Presidents. In a series of events which complicated the political scenario, Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia broke off from KANU and established a new party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) (Ibid.: 144). Odinga was joined by 30 other members who defected, including Nairobi M.P. J.D. Kali and J.K. Tanui - the Baringo South M.P. Others on the defection list were Achieng' Oneko, Joseph Nthula, Zephania Anyieni, Tom Okello Odongo, Oduya Oprong, J.D. Akumu, O.O. Maka-Anyengo, F.E. Omido and U.G. Wachira (Ochieng', 1995:98; East African Standard, April 26, 1966

Justifying the defection, Odinga questioned the authenticity of Kenya's independence arguing that Kenya was being ruled by an 'invisible government'. He said thus:

> This government represents first, the international forces purely concerned with ideological colonization of the country and has no genuine concern for the development of the people. Secondly, it also represents the commercial interests, largely foreign , whose primary concern is big profits for the shareholders. Here too the interest of the people of Kenya is only secondary and understandably not their concern (East African Standard, 15 April, 1966).

Summarizing the reasons for his resignation, Odinga went on:

> It is fairly clear that there is pressure and desire that I should leave the government. The authority concerned has however shown reluctance to say so ..... However, *wananchi,* my honest opinion is that the present government has reached a point of no return..... can only do for the people the little that the underground master allows it to. Its guiding star is personal gain. I therefore find it impossible to be part of it, and my decision is that from now on I should be free to join wananchi in demanding that their voice be heard (Ibid.).

About one year after defection from KANU and the subsequent formation of KPU, Odinga increased his political efforts to question the spreading disease of neo-coloniality when he published his book Not Yet Uhuru meaning 'Not Yet Free" in 1967. The book

was a damning indictment of the Kenyatta regime as well as a critical examination of the pitfalls of national independence within the African post-colony. He saw the colonial state in its post-independence dispensation as a continuation of brutality, political intolerance, economic mismanagement and exploitation, selfishness, nepotism, land grabbing as well as social marginalization perpetuated by the ruling class (Odinga, 1967:253-314). Consequently, Odinga saw the attainment of independence as having had little impact on the dismantling of colonialism. The struggle had to continue.

Consequently, upon the defection of Odinga and his allies, KANU declared that all those who had crossed the floor should seek re-election. In the 1966 Little General elections, the government frustrated KPU members and their supporters and ensured that that KPU did not hold public rallies. Public rallies called by the opposition were violently disrupted while the rebel leaders were intimidated. KANU candidates were openly campaigned for by the government media, making it impossible for many KPU leaders to make it back to parliament. In the outcome of the elections, KANU forced a majority of 151 seats against KPU's 9. So the combined force of KANU in both the House of Representatives and the Senate was formidable (Koff, 1966:60). Notably, the peaceful struggle for change by Odinga and Kaggia should be viewed as a fundamental effort in the decolonization in Kenya. Yet, even though the opposition endeavor was non-violent, the government reactions often exposed its readiness to use force in order to subdue dissent.

Despite the growing dissent to his government, Jomo Kenyatta did not reconsider his stand and that of his government with regard to addressing the problems facing the people of Kenya. Instead, Kenyatta saw in his opponents as paid 'agents' of communism

whose mission it was to dethrone him. In a Kenyatta day rally held at Kamukunji, Nairobi on 20th October 1967, the Kenyan President lost his cool and delivered a violent speech to intimidate his opponents. Answering Odinga and his colleagues in the opposition, Kenyatta told the rally:

> Brothers, there are those who ask, 'what is the government doing ?' And there are those who say, the government has done nothing yet. But I am telling you, even if we have done nothing, I think every citizen should be proud of being free, and that he is Governing himself is a very important thing.... We all fought for *uhuru* and it is only the cowards who used to hide under the beds while others were struggling who go about [questioning] what the KANU government had done.... You know KPU.... Ask them where they fought for *uhuru*. As from today K.P.U are to be regarded as snakes in grass.....KPU beware. The fighting for our *uhuru* is on. Whoever has ears to hear, let him heed this? (Kenyatta, 1968:340-348).

Obviously, snakes are dangerous creatures. Human beings deal with snakes by hitting them hard and violently on the head and killing them all together because snakes carry poison which threaten lives. Kenyatta was on a war path to neutralize, by use of force, fellow countrymen who had fought hard not only for the end of colonialism but also for his release from prison. These nationalists had to him, transformed into snakes!

In the above quotation, Kenyatta undertook to justify the ineptitude of his government by saying that such ineptitude was occurring in an environment of freedom, which to him was more important than providing services required to all citizens. In addition, Kenyatta reminds the Kenyan people about the heroism of those who fought for independence and implies that his post-independence opponents were actually cowards. The idea here was that Kenyatta wanted to pacify the people and make them insensitive to his abuse of power and his inability to deliver. Frantz Fanon captures this behavioral pattern reminiscent of post-independent African leadership when he states:

> For years on end after independence has been won, we see him [the leader] incapable of urging on the people to a concrete task, unable really to open the future for them..... we see him reassessing the history of independence and recalling the sacred unity of the struggle for liberation. The leader, because he refuses to break up the national bourgeoisie, asks the people to become drunk on the remembrance of the epoch which led up to independence. The leader, seen objectively, brings the people to a halt and persists in either expelling them from history or preventing them from taking root in it (1967:135).

Annoyed with the behaviour of the bourgeois leadership in newly independent states, Fanon declares that 'in fact the bourgeois phase in the history of underdeveloped countries is a completely useless phase' (Ibid.: 142).

4.6 Tribalism

A distinctive feature of the Kenyatta State was tribalism. Tribalism is simply the extension of political, social and economic favours to members of one's ethnic community without any regard to the aspirations and interests of other communities.

The colonial period had formalized and hardened ethnic divisions as the colonial rulers established a system of administration based on division of Kenya by key 'tribes'. This and the colonial policy of 'divide and rule' had created forms of ethnic identity and solidarity popularly dubbed 'tribalism' (Lonsdale, 1977:123-130). Such ethnic identity was based on differences in language. Linguistic divisions provided ready-dug lines of cleavage along which other conflicts would be politicized as it became more and more important to the ordinary people that the levers of social action should be in 'friendly hands' (Ibid.). True, decolonization should have changed all this. But the situation was little altered after independence. Ethnic identity continued to be an important factor, in Kenya's social equation, under the Kenyatta state. As ethnic paranoia persisted, it

became politically correct to be Kikuyu or to speak the Kikuyu language. Average citizens sought solace and security in ethnic-based social welfare organizations as they looked more favourably on the leadership of those who spoke their language. Kenyatta himself used to address the nation in Kikuyu, thus enhancing the status of the community within the postcolony.

Frantz Fanon once argued that tribalism was a major challenge of any newly independent African nation. In the new nation-state, the nation passed over for race and the tribe was preferred to the state (1967:121). During the first cabinet of the new Kenyan republic in 1964, Kenyatta's tribal mind was manifest. Out of the 19 cabinet positions, Kenyatta himself included, there were six occupied by the Kikuyu ethnic community members as opposed to four by the Luo, two by the Kamba, one by the Meru, one by the Kisii, one by the Luhya, one by the Kalenjin, one by the Maasai and one by the European (Khapoya, 1980:28-29). This trend of Kikuyu dominance was maintained even after the 1966 Little General Election except that that time the Luo cabinet numbers dropped to three (Ibid.:29). By 1969, Kikuyu leaders had concretized Kenyatta's ethnic propensities by organizing oaths, in the President's Gatundu constituency to bind the Kikuyu community to ruthlessly fight to retain the national flag in their background (Ahluwalia, Op.Cit.:56).

Between 1966 and 1969, the Kenyatta government embarked on the programme of persecuting and harassing K.P.U supporters and leaders. Although the party's opposition figures came from across the country, the highest concentration was in the Nyanza province. It was easy to discern that the contest between the Kenyatta state and K.P.U. was being trimmed down to a Kikuyu/Luo rivalry. The Kenyatta government

went ahead and detained several K.P.U leaders with some like Odinga being put under house arrest. During this time, K.P.U was treated the same way as did the Mau Mau in the 1950's. Inside KANU, however, the increasing popularity of Tom Mboya, a Luo politician, was worrying the Kikuyu political clique. The hatred for Mboya became an open secret because the Kikuyu elite feared that Mboya could easily wrest power from Kenyatta. On July 5, 1969, Tom Mboya was mysteriously assassinated on a Nairobi street (Daily Nation, July 6, 1969).

It was profoundly suspected that, through a hired assassin, Kenyatta masterminded Mboya's death. Here the Fanonian dialectic of violence can hardly explain this occurrence. First and foremost, Mboya was Kenyatta's trusted Minister. Second, Mboya had not meted any violence on the Kenyatta regime. Consequently, Kenyatta's violence would seem unreasonable yet it also exposes the inherent weakness in the Fanonian dialectic of violence. One of the limiting factors in the Fanonian notion of violence is that violence has an emancipatory objective. Yet, Kenyatta's violence which might have caused Mboya's death had nothing emancipatory in it. Secondly, Kenyatta's violence was unprovoked and therefore responsive to a non-existent threat of violence.

Nevertheless, Mboya's death culminated into fierce Kikuyu/Luo rivalry that threatened to destabilize the Kenyatta presidency. Riots broke out at Mboya's funeral and Odinga was officially recognized as a Luo leader. Later on a tour of Kisumu, Kenyatta's convoy was stoned and several people were in the process killed or injured. The reaction of the rioters fits perfectly in Fanon's notion of counter-violence but does it emancipate anybody? Like its colonial counterpart - post independence violence in Kenya only

worsened things. Kenyatta attacked Odinga and KPU for plotting to overthrow the government through riots. As a result, Odinga and seven other MPs were detained and KPU banned. (Africa Confidential, November 1969).

Despite frequent attacks on tribalism by political leaders, ethnic identity and loyalty continued to manifest a srong influence in the Kenyan society during the Kenyatta era. Political support, sports organizations (particularly football where we had Abaluhya, Luo Union and Gema football clubs), employment patterns and harambee efforts all reflected the pervasive influence of ethnicity (Maxon, 1995:122). While expanding educational opportunities, and the use of Kiswahili and English had the potential for breaking down ethnic barriers, the inherited education system guaranteed that the majority of students attended schools with fellow ethic-group members at the primary level.

During the month of December 1969, with the opposition effectively removed from the political scene, Kenyatta scheduled the second general election in what turned out to be an all-KANU affair. All suspected sympathizers of the opposition were voted out. In the new political arrangement, Jomo Kenyatta formed a cabinet comprising of twenty members. Out of this, there were seven from the Kikuyu. If you add one Meru who is a close relative of the Kikuyu's then the figure moves to eight. This compares unfavourably with only two Kalenjin ministers, two Luhya, two Kisii, two Luo, one European, one Taita and one Giriama (Khapoya, Op.Cit.: 30). The Kikuyu dominance over the rest of the Kenyan communities was still upheld.

Even during the 1974 elections, the trend of the Kikuyu dominance in the cabinet was maintained within the same ratio (Ibid.: 30). The situation was much more critical in the

civil service. The Kenyan civil service was controlled by members of the Kikuyu ethnic community. For instance, out of the eight provincial commissioners that Kenyatta employed throughout his regime, at least five were from his Kikuyu community. The majority of District Commissioners, District Officers and Permanent Secretaries were also Kikuyu. This civil service imbalance was Kenyatta's deliberate strategy to exclude Kenya's diverse ethnic groups from participating in public life. In terms of domination, the Kikuyu replaced the Europeans and took over all the privileges of the latter in the newly 'independent' postcolony. So the struggle against these tribalistic tendencies was a struggle for decolonization of Kenya.

4.7 Education and Culture

The concept of education and culture are closely intertwined. Indeed, education is part and parcel of a peoples culture. Colonialism utilized the critical significance of culture to enhance the domination of the African people. Frantz Fanon was convinced colonial culture was incapable of procuring for the colonized peoples the material conditions which might make them forget their concern for dignity (Fanon 1967:167). Contributing to the problematic of culture, Fanon made a couple of observations. First he advocated for national rather than African culture. This was because, he felt, African culture did not really exist. He gave the example that there was no common destiny to be shared by the people of Senegal and Guinea but there was a common destiny between the Senegelese and the Guinean nations because both states were colonized by the French.

Hence, in a characteristic hybridity later adopted such by such colonial thinkers as Homi Bhabha (1994) and Gayatri Spivak (1986), Fanon indicated that every African nation had its own unique problems which required unique and sometimes localized

solutions. Thus, in a postmodern fashion, the problems of the African nations could not be dealt with in a homogeneous programme called African culture. But knowing the dilemma in which the African people found themselves at the end of formal colonialism, Fanon warned against the tendency to go back into the past and glorify past cultures that had no relevance to the present conditions (Fanon, Op.Cit.: 178-180). In the same vein he says that people of different African nations should in their post-independence dispositions, avoid the temptation to uncritically espouse European culture whose exoticism and past oppressiveness make it irrelevant in tackling local problems.

Consequently, Fanon saw national culture as an important instrument for liberation. He observes that:

> no speech-making and no proclamation concerning culture will turn us from our fundamental tasks: the liberation of the national territory; a continued struggle against colonialism in its new forms..... (Ibid.: 189).

Every African nation is, at present, faced with many problems. Among these are problems of famine, indignity caused by colonialism, political instability, poor governance, illiteracy, diseases, poor communication and incompetent political leadership. These and many other crises require specialized attention based on the diverse conditions which operate at national rather than continental levels. The implication of the Fanonian notion of culture is that it must bare a national dimension and it should respond to the national rather than the African condition. Fanon adds that:

> a national culture is not a folklore nor an abstract populism that believes that it can discover the people's true nature. It is not made up of the inert dregs of gratuitous actions, that is to say actions which are less and less attached to the ever-present reality of people. A national culture is the whole body of efforts made by a people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify and praise the action through which that people has created and keeps

itself in existence (1967:189).

Evidently, Frantz Fanon's arguments on culture have their own merits. By empahsizing diversity instead of transcedentalism, Fanon becomes extremely attractive to scholars within the postmodernist and postcolonialist movements. More importantly, his emancipatory perspective of culture is profoundly friendly to the ideas of several postcolonial thinkers, including Shaobo Xie (1977) Gyan Prakash (1992) Ella Shohat (1997) and even Edward Said (1979 and 1994), who see postcolonialism as a theoretical movement which aims at achieving true decolonization for the formerly colonized *others*, by dismantling forms of knowledge authored and unauthorized by the West.

Yet it is important to observe that by rejecting the universalism of European culture as well as African culture, Fanon might not have succeeded to move us into a fresh intellectual territory. What he calls national culture also thrives on the universalism which Fanon attempts to run away from. This is because national culture becomes oppressive when it claims to represent local cultural diversities. Must we ignore these diversities in the name of national culture? How can we appropriate national culture in ways that address localized ethnic, gender, regional, economic and political differences which operate within the overwhelming fabric of a nation. It seems to me that Fanon did not go far as to address these issues.

The second problem with Fanon's thesis on culture is his failure to recognize the role of public morality in bringing about desirable change. Fused within the fabric of culture, public morality could be a useful asset for dealing with political, economic and administrative crises in Africa. Many African societies are founded against the backrock of honesty, fairness and accommodation. Could these virtues be appropriated in order to

give more meaning and more effectiveness to the emancipatory agenda of national culture than might have been the case before? Again Fanon does not delve into the dynamics of public morality among the African societies yet we know that traditional African societies do not condone abuse of power, corruption and the plundering of resources. Are African countries facing some of these problems just because the traditional aspects of public morality among the African societies have been ignored as important cultural components for the continent's postcolonies? It appears to me that the arguments of Fanon on culture are deficient because they do not embrace the cultural tenets of African communities and should thus be accepted with some caution.

Finally, Fanon's thesis on national culture is that it should not glorify the past. To Fanon, national culture should be concerned with the present and the future but not the past. But as we have pointed out in Chapter One, this argument lacks historical consciousness. There is no way societies could deal with the present without understanding how this present came into being. It is true that some of the things which happened in the past could be irrelevant to the present. But it is also suicidal to assume that every aspect of our past has little suitability to the present and the future.

Upon the achievement of internal self government on 1 June, 1963, the Prime Minister of Kenya identified three enemies – ignorance, disease and poverty – to be overcome by an independent Kenya (Sunday Nation, June 2, 19630. Soon, the government appointed an education commission headed by Prof. S.H. Ominde to survey the country's education resources and advise the government on future strategy. The Ominde Commission of 1964, as it was known, endorsed free primary education. It also recommended the need to increase school enrollment (Republic of Kenya, Education

Commission Report Part II, pp v-vi, 1964). Further, it endorsed integration with a single curriculum, but different fee structures, for Kenya's racially divided school system.

By 1970 major reforms had been achieved in Kenya's education system. The number of secondary schools rose by 80% and the number of pupils enrolled rose by 76%. And the country had established its first national university in Nairobi (Maxon, 1995:127). Emphasis on the expansion of higher education also meant that the country was able to produce skilled manpower to take up jobs left by Europeans. In 1973, the government abolished fees in primary school to pave way for increased enrollment (Sifuna, 1990:162-164).

However, the picture painted above could also serve to obscure certain harsh realities. During the era of formal colonialism, education was used as an instrument of marginalization whereby Africans were taught only those things that made them useful to the colonial political economy. Similarly, colonial education despised African cultural values making the man of colour to constantly engage himself in efforts to run away from his individuality, to annihilate his own presence (1970:60). This situation seems to have been maintained during the lifespan of the Kenyatta state. Frantz Fanon calls this, alienation.

In the Kenyatta era, education was meant to produce skilled manpower to take up vacant jobs left by the colonialists including those in the teaching, administrative, legal, medical, agriculture and financial professions. Because the post-independence political economy had strong threads of continuity with that of the colonial period, these professionals had to be well-schooled in colonial knowledge. Thus, in the area of curriculum, the English medium programme first began in the African schools in 1961,

spread widely in primary schools. The Ominde Commission recommended its adoption and, by the end of the 1970s, English formed the medium of instruction in virtually all Kenyan schools (Sifuna, 1980:139-143). As an instrument of perpetuating the values of the colonial system, English language remained a mark of civilization and modernity within Kenya's post-independence experience.

But to adopt the language of the colonizer is to assume his cultural forms and thought patterns. Fanon underlines the importance of language when he sates:

> I ascribe a basic importance to the phenomenon of language. I find it necessary to begin with this subject, which should provide us with one of the elements in the coloured man's comprehension of the dimension of the *other*. For it is implicit that to speak is to exist absolutely for the *other* (1970:17).

In the colonial territory, the language of the colonizer has a great prestige value. This prestige was enhanced in the post-independence era. As Emmanuel Hansen observes, the sentence, 'he speaks English well' or 'he speaks French well' denotes not only a reference to linguistic ability but also the level of acculturation and acceptance of the whiteman's ways of life (Hansen, 1978:73). In Fanon's own words:

> To speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of civilization (1970:17-18).

Under the Kenyatta state, the curriculum for primary and secondary education was localized to some extent but the bulk remained as it had been inherited from the colonial period. It was thus elitist and inegalitarian in nature as it was designed to meet the interests and the needs of a very small proportion of those who enter the school system (Ibid.: 104). The heavy emphasis on literary education and the preparation for white-collar jobs is certainly open to question since by the end of the 1970, considerably

less than 20% of those finishing school were unable to enter government secondary school (Todaro, 1981:276). Evidently, the main feature of education during the period was one of linear expansion rather than structural reform (Court and Ghai, 1974:10). The neo-colonial experience was still thriving.

Neocoloniality was also witnessed in the way in which the school system was organized. During the period of formal colonialism, there were three types of schools: European, Asian and African. As we noted in Chapter Two, European schools received most of the financial and administrative backing from the government while the African schools were virtually neglected. The logic was that European schools would produce students who would later take up lucrative jobs in the colonial government. But European schools were also expensive and difficult to access.

At independence, schools originally reserved for Europeans and Asians such as Nairobi School (then Duke of York) and Lenana School (Prince of Wales) became centres of 'manufacturing' neo-colonial rulers out of the African youth. Economically privileged African elites took their children to such schools where Western capitalist values were held in great esteem. From these schools, the children of the African elite proceeded to university and later came back to take up jobs being vacated by their parents (Kenya Education Commission 1965:199). The rest of the Kenyan children went into ordinary schools that prepared them to be good 'neo-colonial' subjects under the elites in the new political dispensation of neocoloniality

Let us briefly go back to the issue of culture. Culture might mean many things to many people. However, the mention of the term also signifies certain critical commonalities which seem to recur in its application. Immanuel Wallerstein

differentiates between culture as 'the set of characteristics which distinguish one group from another' from culture as some set of phenomenon which are different from some other set of phenomena within any one group (Wallerstein, 1990:33). From a purely anthropological standpoint, culture represents a way of life, values and beliefs of a people (King, 1991:2). The important point to note here is that the definition of culture includes emphasis on human differences. Thus, the diverse groups of the human race have ways of life, values and beliefs which set them apart from other groups but which are in no way superior to the ways of life, beliefs and values of other groups within the human race.

Consequently, any efforts to impose one's cultural values on other people negates human freedom and violates the sanctity of human difference and diversity. Culturally, colonialism had the tendency to impose its values, beliefs and ways of life on the colonized, thereby violating the sanctity of human difference and diversity. The culture of the various ethnic groups of Kenya includes but it is not confined to indigenous languages, eating and sexual habits, educational practices, dress, belief systems, song, dance and theatre. Since the birth of the Kenyan postcolony, indigenous cultures have often conflicted with and lived in an unequal relationship with European cultures.

It has already been explained that the inner core of the nation-state is its spiritual and cultural domain. It is this domain that legitimizes claims to the nation. Thus nationalism is a cultural expression of a people. This point was put more vividly by Frantz Fanon when he stated:

> For culture is first the expression of a nation,the expression of its preferences, of its taboos and of its patterns. It is at every stage of the whole society that taboos, values and patterns are formed. A national culture is a sum total of all these appraisals; it is the result of internal and external extensions exerted over society and also at every level of society (1967:196).

Elsewhere, Fanon, observes that a national culture under colonial domination is a contested culture whose destruction is sought in a systemic fashion. It very quickly becomes a culture condemned in secrecy (Ibid.: 191). During the colonial period, the cultural preferences of the African people, their taboos and their patterns of life – all were either modified, ignored or abused in order to pave way for the modernist values of Eurocentrism. Under this experience, African culture become condemned as a culture of secrecy. The struggle against colonialism was thus mainly hinged on the need to restore the dignity of African cultural values and, by extension, the dignity of the African nation.

With the achievement of independence, there was a general consensus about the need for the new Kenyan nation-state to develop a national culture as means of enhancing national unity, pride and patriotism. There was moreover the urge to assert the utility of African cultural traditions which had been subjected to a multifaceted assault by colonialism. A new national culture would hence find expression through the nation's unique artifacts, diversity of song, art dance, theatre, literature and other traditions (Maxon, Op.Cit.: 139).

However, the Kenyatta state made a number of errors which came to undermine the objective of building a national culture. Although Swahili was widely spoken at independence, and it carried the capacity to be a powerful instrument of building a national culture, it was not given the boost required. Public servants addressed people in Swahili not because they were proud of it but because it was the only language through which to communicate with the uneducated (Mwaturo O.I, 2002). Furthermore, as has already been pointed out, English was always given official preference. Although Swahili came to be accepted as a national language, English became not only the medium

of instruction at all levels of education but also the official language in Kenya. How could one say decolonization had been achieved at the attainment of independence when English, the biggest tool of perpetuating colonialism and Western modernity, was still widely preferred to Kiswahili?

More importantly, the Kenyatta State enhanced the continued encroachment, of Western culture, thus inhibiting the emergence of a national culture. Apart from the language policy which not only undermined the power of Kiswahili but also encouraged ethnic languages to flourish an radio and in schools, the Kenyatta State did little to change the influence of the West on dress and music. R.M. Osotsi summarizes the situation vividly when he observed that the Western educated elite who took over Kenya at independence fell back on the Western-oriented culture they absorbed during the formative years. He says:

> Boarding school, baptism, total alienation from traditional education process had raised nothing but contempt for their own culture. This elite was now considered ready to take all the cultural reigns of the new and young nation. Nothing more disastrous could have happened culturally (Osotsi, 1990:212).

The problems which were witnessed in the fields of education and culture began to resonate in minds of the new intellectuals of the 1960s and seventies. With the establishment of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Nairobi in mid 1960s, Kenya witnessed the emergency of a crop of new original and creative minds including Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Okot p'Bitek, Owour Anyumba, Taban Lo Liyong, William Ochieng, Elkana Ongesa, Janet Bujra, Achola Pala, G.M. Manani, H.S.K. Mwaniki, Washington Omondi and B.A. Ogot among others (Ogot: Op.Cit.: 219). Some of these were historians, others were creative artists, while a few were song writers. All

of them undertook to write several books and papers reconstructing African history and culture. Their writings exemplified the on-going decolonization in the field of culture. They were sending message that decolonization was not yet over. Indeed, some artists went even further by publishing works in mother languages. They include, Okot P'Bitek, (Wer Pa, Song of Lawino 1965), Grace Ogot (Miaha, 1968) and Ngugi wa Thiong'o (Ngaahika Ndeenda, 1977). By writing in indigenous languages and by reconstructing and highlighting African history and culture, these authors were creating a post-colonial discourse which revolves around the sense of agency to interrogate forms of knowledge authored and authorized by the West. Notably, however, the cultural decolonization which we see taking place in Kenya during the Kenyatta state, through the foregoing artists, can hardly be described as violent. Thus contrary to what Fanon has maintained, decolonization is not always a violent process.

4.8 Opposition and Repression

Sustained by foreign capital, the Kenyatta State retained foreign economic policies as the masses suffered poverty, deprivation, unemployment and landlessness. Following indepedence, the KANU leadership was pressured by Europeans into thinking that any break with major economic and social policies established during the colonial era would prove to be detrimental. Consequently, the Kenyatta state undertook to indiscriminately espouse Eurocentric values and without taking into consideration local conditions and diversities. European values were accorded a privileged position, making it impossible for the newly independent nation-state to build up its own unique identity. Postmodern history is known to challenge the metanaratives of modernity that have

defined historical inquiry. In his work, Beyond the Great Story (1995), American scholar Robert Berkhofer supported this view when he argued that:

> no longer can any single master-interpretive code be privileged over another as if one were somehow correspondent to the 'real' past than the other (Berkhofer, 1995:350).

The failure of the Kenyatta leadership to deconstruct the colonial state heightened opposition against his government as more and more forces questioned the expansion of colonial hegemony in the country.

Accordingly, both in and outside parliament, the Kenyatta State came under considerable attack in the early 1970s. During this time, there was also a growing disparity of incomes between a small elite (Fanon's Pseudo-middle class) and the mass of population. This observation was confirmed by the International Labour Organization which reported thus:

> In many respects, economic growth has largely continued on lines set by earlier colonial structures. Posts have been Africanized and there there has been expansion but the structures which led to and have sustained inequalities still remain. The centre still grows and at the expense of the periphery and important parts of the economy are still controlled by expatriate interests (ILO, 1972:100)

The conclusion of ILO not only relayed a sense of urgency but also stressed the need to deal with a series of problems which were interrelated. The I.L.O observed:

> Employment, in our analysis of the Kenyan situation, is inseparable from an overall strategy of economic and social development. Thus, any frontal attack on the problem of unemployment and employment in Kenya has to deal with the whole gamut of measures related to the economic and social inequalities, equity and low incomes (ILO, Op. Cit.:_30)

Kenyatta responded to these observations half-heartedly and promised to promote the rural and informal sector. However, not much action was taken on the ground. Beginning 1971, things took a turn for the worse. Some K.P.U sympathizers in government raised their voices even at the price of getting detained. Frantz Fanon was prophetic while analyzing political intolerance in post-independence Africa when he said in 1961 that:

> We should add that in Africa, a certain number of governments behave in this way. All the opposition parties which moreover were usually progressive and would therefore tend to work for the greater influence of the masses in the conduct of public matters and who desire that the proud, money-making bourgeoisie should be brought to heel, have been by dint of baton charges and prisons condemned to silence then to a clandestine existence (1967:147).

As the economic conditions worsened, it was revealed that a plot to overthrow the Kenyatta government by the Kenya Armed Forces led by Major General Ndolo and airman Frederick Omondi had been foiled (Ahluwalia Op.Cit.: 66). The abortive coup reflected the people's frustrations from within and without the army as well as the civil service. Many people felt the need to fight Kenyatta's colonialism so as to achieve true freedom (Amadi O.I, 2001). Kenyatta dismissed the coup plotters as 'puppets of foreigners' (Africa Report, 1971). But the write off of the plotters was as a little paradoxical. Who between the masses of Kenya and Kenyatta was truly a puppet of foreigners? Wasn't Kenyatta and his allies serving colonialism in its hegemonic arrangement?

Earlier in March 1969, distinguished Swahili poet, Abdilatif Abdalla had been detained by the Kenyatta government after being accused of inciting people to overthrow the government through armed struggle (Abdulla, 1973:viii). Abdulla was also accused of

distributing, in the coastal region of Kenya, what was considered seditious literature under the title Kenya: *Twendapi?* ('Kenya: where are we moving to?'). By questioning the political direction Kenya was taking, the pamphlet cast aspersions on Kenyatta's leadership. Kenyatta's response to this intellectual violence was detention. And as we know, detention causes psychological and physical injury to the victims. It is one of the worst forms of violence. Between 1969 and 1972 when Abdulla was incarcerated he undertook to utilize his detention period to write deeply philosophical Swahili poems about the deteriorating political situation in Kenya. These poems were later assembled and published in 1973 under the title *Sauti ya Dhiki* (Voice of Agony').

The poems were thematic and informative. For example in *Usiniue* (p.51) ('Do not kill me') (1973:56), the author presents a metaphorical picture of a mother who wants to abort an unborn baby. Through this imagery, Abdulla pleads with the Kenya government not to kill him and others with similar opposition views before they could contribute to the decolonization and development of their country. In *Yatakoma (p.28)* ('It Will End'), Abdulla gives hope to millions of Kenyans then suffering because of the brutalizing effects of neocoloniality, telling them that one day their tribulations would come to an end. In *Mamaetu Africa* (p.36) ('Mother Africa'), the author laments the pitfalls of the African independence arguing that Africa was embroiled in quarrels among brothers; it was full of poverty, divisions and political intolerance. Africa, he adds, had witnessed its people turn into wild animals; people who looted the continent in the face of poverty.

In *Ndiya Panda* (p.79) ('crossroads), the author talks about the dilemma of the newly independent nations of Africa. But having been convinced that the struggle for

decolonization must continue in the face of sustained oppression perpetuated by the indigenous leaders, Abdalla calls on the people to wake up and fight. This theme is captured in *Zindukani* (p.69) ('Wake up'). In general, the book demonstrates clearly that decolonization in Africa had not been achieved just by the mere attainment of independence. Abdalla's publications represented an open letter of disapproval of the workings of Kenyatta's postcolonial state. Coming from the cultural field of artists, Abdalla spoke for the dispossessed intellectuals and the suffering peasants as well as workers living under the brutalizing experiences of the post-independence leadership in the Kenyan postcolony.

Within parliament, fiery political figures took up the struggle against Kenyatta. Distinguished leaders such as J.M Kariuki, Martin Shikuku and Jean Marie Seroney became the ardent spokesmen of Kenya's 'wretched of the earth'. They articulated the voices of the unemployed, the frustrated job seekers, the working poor, the landless, the young radicals, the informal sector and the squatters (see Mutiso, 1975). As tensions heightened, discrepancies between a wealthy elite and the masses continued to grow. These were exacerbated further by ethnic overtones due to Kenyatta's persistent *Kukuyunization* of Kenya's public service. As the situation deteriorated, Kenyatta employed force and threats to subdue his opponents. But as Colin Leys has observed:

> In 1973, when the inflationary crisis finally imposed a seemingly decisive halt to the country's post independence record of economic growth, the critics became more vocal and it is probable though at present unverifiable that Kariuki's efforts to mobilize a political alliance of the rural landless poor and middle peasants, and the urban unemployed and workers intensified (Leys, 1979:304).

During the 1974, October 14th Elections, Kenyatta fought so hard to have the KANU rebels defeated but unfortunately for him J.M. Kariuki, Martin Shikuku and Marie

Seroney were returned with majority votes. The election was equally depressing for Kenyatta because he lost some of his most trusted political ministers such as Njoroge Mungai, Willian Odongo Omamo, Juxton Shako and Eliud Ngala Mwendwa (The Weekly Review's Voter Handbook, 1979).

In a characteristic colonial tendency, opposition is usually unwelcome to imperialists. In a colonial setting, dissent is treasonable and all dissenters must always be controlled. Political parties in the neo-colonial states, as Fanon observes, often surrender their powers to party leaders, where militants are isolated and the police and the army became pillars of intimidation (Fanon, 1967:136-139). In Kenya, Kenyatta was a typical case of Fanon's pessimism. Before long, one of his critical opponents, J.M. Kariuki, was mysteriously assassinated (The Standard, March, 13 1975). J.M.'s death demonstrated the depth of regime violence on its citizens.

As a result of the assassination, Nairobi University students demonstrated in the streets, demanding an objective inquiry into the matter. The government reacted violently, beating up students and closing the university (Ogot, Op.Cit.: 1980). This episode marked a turning point in the relation between the government and the university community. Thereafter, a climate of distrust and confrontation emerged with the state regularly using force to curtail academic freedom. The aftermath of this tragic event were felt far and wide. Several critics of the government both in and out of parliament including Martin Shikuku, J.M Seroney and Ngugi wa Thiong'o and George Anyona were incarcerated.

Like Mboya, Kariuki's appeal cut across ethnic lines and he genuinely threatened the popularity of Kenyatta. His popularity could easily be discernible in some of the things he said. We reproduce a few of his statements:

> A small but powerful group of greedy, selfseeking elite in the form of politicians, civil servants and businessmen has already steadily but very surely monopolized the fruits of independence to the exclusion of the majority of the people - we do not want a Kenya of 10 millionaires and 10 million beggars,..... I believe firmly that substituting Kamau for Smith, Odongo for Jones and Kiplagat for Keith does not solve what the gallant fighters of our Uhuru considered an imposed and undesirable social justice. This is a deplorable state of things. Nepotism and tribalism have set in.....These are evil and must be condemned in no uncertain terms. We must all join hands to eliminate them and restore credibility to public life. We must strive to ensure that the next generation will not blame us for having failed to correct the strains of public life (Daily Nation, Nairobi. June 4, 1975).

J.M's observations summarizes aptly the crisis, the problems, the structures and the pitfalls of the Kenyatta state. Independence had become a fraud. Thus, since colonialism had not ended with formal independence, the struggle against it had to be sustained.

A select committee headed by the then Bungoma East Member of Parliament, Elijah Mwangale, was set up in the House to probe J.M's murder. But during the investigations, the committee received very little cooperation from the government (The Standard, June 4, 1975). However, as it turned out, the committee implicated, in J.M's murder, some of the leading loyalists of the Kenyatta state including, Silas Mburu Gichua (Nakuru Mayor), Waruhiu Itote (Former Mau Mau General and then Deputy Director of the National Youth Service), Police Commissioner, Bernard Hinga, the Head of Criminal Investigations, Ignatius Nderi, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police for Rift Valley Province, Mr. James Mungai, General Service Unit Commandant Ben Gethi and Senior Superintendent of Police Joginder Singh Sokhi (The Standard, June 4 1975).

In parliament, Attorney General Charles Njonjo attempted to rally the House to vote against the Mwangale Report but members were outraged and even some senior Ministers in the Kenyatta government such as Masinde Muliro, Minister for Works, along with his assistant, John Keen voted against Njonjo's motion. Peter Kibisu, Assistant Minister for Labour too opposed Njonjo's move. The result was that Muliro, Keen and Kibisu were all dropped from the Cabinet - a confirmation that the Kenyatta state had abetted in the assassination of J.M. Kariuki. Members of the J.M. Select Committee were harassed by security forces leading to an acrimonious exchange in parliament between Martin Shikuku and Marie Seroney on the one hand, and the government led by Vice President Daniel arap Moi along with Cabinet Minister Stanley Oloitiptip on the other. At the end of the debate, the KANU rebels moved a verdict of guilty against the government and declared that KANU was 'actually dead' (The Standard, February 7, 1975). Later, Shikuku and Seroney were picked up by security forces, from the precincts of parliament and detained without trial.

Meanwhile, Kenyatta floated the tribal card in order to overcome the crisis. First, he encouraged the Gikuyu, Meru, Embu (GEMA) association led by Kihika Kimani, then member of parliament from Nakuru, to launch a nationwide campaign to absolve Kenyatta's government from the J.M. murder. In Kiambu, with the knowledge and encouragement of President Kenyatta, large-scale oathing aimed at dismembering other ethnic communities as well as some members of the Kikuyu community opposed to Kikuyu leadership took place. The oath, 'Mumo wa Mai Chania Na Mai Mahiu' represented a commitment to the idea that presidential motorcycles should never cross the rivers Chania and Mahiu which represent a dividing line between Kiambu and Nyeri

(Ahluwalia, Op.Cit. 78). Ethnic chauvinism under the Kenyatta state could never get worse. But suspicion, political repression and economic stagnation continued.

4.9 Winding Up: Panic, Restlessness and More Repression in the Kenyatta State

The last three years of the Kenyatta state were characterized not just by the economic and social hopelessness but also the politics of succession. Succession debates were highly ethnicised through such tribal organizations as the Abaluhya Union of East Africa, Luo Union and the Gikuyu, Meru, Embu Assocaition (GEMA) among others. Each of the tribal groupings worked hard to stamp their authority on the Kenyatta state. This was not a surprise because, as we have observed elsewhere, the Kenyatta state had been sustained by the divisive and retrogressive culture of tribalism.

By 1976, it had become clear that Kenyatta was ailing and his health had deteriorated drastically. The poor health of the President charged the political batteries of his own tribesmen as they panicked over the possibility of losing the presidency to another ethnic community. Key Kikuyu political figures interested in ensuring that the presidency did not leave their hands began to openly discuss the Kenyatta succession. GEMA, a pseudo-cultural, economic and political organization was dominated by opulent Kikuyu politicians and businessmen including Njenga Karume (Chairman), Duncan Ndegwa (Vice Chairman and Governor of Central Bank), Stanley Njeru (National Secretary), Wilson Macharia (Assistant Secretary) and Dixon Kihika Kimani (National Organizing Secretary) (Weekly Review, May 19, 1975).

Closely allied to the GEMA leadership were members of the Kenyatta family. The central figures of the family and their relationship to the president were: Dr. Njoroge Mungai, nephew, Udi Gechaga, son-in-law, Peter Muigai Kenyatta, son, Ngengi Muigai,

nephew, Margaret Kenyatta, daughter, Ngina Kenyatta, wife, James Muigai, brother, and Beth Mugo, niece. The years 1976-1977 saw the replacement of a thoroughly weakened KANU with GEMA. As the Weekly Review observed then:

> Gema was the most influential organization within KANU, a position which it had strengthened further by having many of its national and branch executive officials elected to parliament and various local bodies (Weekly Review, Nairobi May 19, 1975).

We have already explained that KANU began as a party of two major tribes in the early 1960s. During the sunset years of Jomo Kenyatta, it became GEMA. This situation was anticipated in Fanon's writings on the problematic of decolonization when he argued that:

> As far as national unity is concerned the party will also make many mistakes, as for example when the so called national party behaves as a party based on ethnical differences. It becomes, in fact a tribe which makes itself a party. This party which of its own will proclaim that it is a national party, and which claims to speak in the name of the totality of the people, secretly, sometimes even openly, organizes an authentic ethnical dictatorship (1967:147).

The *Gemanization* of KANU was a prophetic testimony to Fanon's concerns

The chief objective of GEMA officials was to ensure that in the event that President Kenyatta died while in office, his constitutional successor, Daniel arap Moi, a non-Kikuyu Vice President should not be allowed to take over power. Accordingly, GEMA mobilized its forces in and out of the Kikuyu enclaves to begin an anti-Moi crusade which culminated into the 'Change the Constitution Campaign' in late 1976. On 26th September 1976, a powerful Kikuyu politician from Nakuru and prominent executive member of GEMA , Kihika Kimani, launched the attack at a public rally when he demanded that the Kenyan constitution should be amended so that no future Vice-President may assume the presidency automatically in the event of the reigning president

retiring or becoming physically or mentally incapacitated or in the case of death (The Standard, Nairobi September 27, 1976).

Soon, Kimani received overwhelming support from the Minister for Lands and Settlement, Jackson Angaine, a Meru (also at the same public rally), James Gichuru (Defence Minister) and Njenga Karume. Paul Ngei, a Kamba Minister, joined the fray to support the 'Change the Constitution Group'. In October, Kihika Kimani repeated his earlier calls that if a Vice-President automatically assumed office for 90 days (as stipulated in the constitution) before substantive elections were held, he might use his office to eliminate political rivals and maneuver his way to become President (The Standard, Nairobi, October 4, 1976).

The first politician to condemn the new move to change the constitution was a Mombasa M.P Shariff Nassir, a close ally of Moi's and member of the minority Arab community at the coast (The Standard, Nairobi October 5, 1976). The following day, Attorney General Charles Njonjo declared that discussions concerning the life of a sitting President were criminal and treasonable. For some strange reasons, probably related to his own scheming to out-do Moi without the support of GEMA, Charles Njonjo denounced the change-the-constitution group (The Standard, Nairobi October 8, 1976). Jomo Kenyatta supported Njonjo's position (The Standard, Nairobi October 12, 1976).

Meanwhile efforts were made between 1976 and 1977 to hold the KANU national elections without much success (The Weekly Review, Nairobi April 11, 1977 p.8-10). By 1976, KANU had not held its elections for ten years which was illegal. On a number of occasions, KANU elections were called and postponed on the last minute in what looked like the failure of the GEMA group to marshall enough support to control KANU

so as to take over the Presidency. By 1977, however, a significant rift had developed within GEMA which in fact worked in favor of the Moi supporters. Inside GEMA , there was an abrasive conflict between the Kiambu Kikuyu on one hand and the Nyeri, Nyandarua and Kirinyaga Kikuyu on the other.

The critical point of concern for the non-Kiambu Kikuyu was that the Kiambu Kikuyu had benefitted disproportionately from independence. Kiambu, they observed, had more cabinet ministers, more businessmen and more people in the civil service than had any other district in the country. Consequently, this factionalism among the Kikuyu complicated ethnic politics. The Kiambu Kikuyu wanted the Presidency to remain among the Kikuyu but did not want it to go beyond Kiambu District. This means that even the Kirinyaga, Murang'a and Nyeri Kikuyu were excluded from any possibility of assuming the Presidency. It is probably because of this scenario that no Kikuyu from Nyeri was ever involved in the bid to alter the constitution. Mwai Kibaki, the most prominent Nyeri politician then chose to side with Moi and that probably explains why Moi appointed him his first Vice-President after Kenyatta's death.

As the battle for the Presidency continued, paranoia gripped the Kenyatta state when it stepped up its repression against opponents. Thus, the sunset years of the Kenyatta state witnessed an escalation of political intolerance to opposition on the part of the President. His moods were unpredictable and his reactions ruthless. Since detaining Abdilatif Abdalla in the late sixties, many more people including parliamentarians such as George Anyona, Philomen Chelagat, John Keen, Peter Kibisu and Masinde Muliro had suffered the president's brutality. A leading Kenyan novelist, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, was detained by Kenyatta in 1978. This was soon after Ngugi had published the Petals of

Blood, (1977), a book that attacked capitalism and scorned the leadership of Kenya. Ngugi's problems had been compounded, when he established a traditional Kikuyu theatre at Kamirithu near, Limuru where anti-government plays written in Kikuyu were acted. Among the most prominent of the plays was *Ngaahika Ndeenda* ('I Will Marry When I Like').

In Book x of Plato's Republic, Socrates states that 'hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our state' (DeLombard, 1995:49). More than two thousand years later, a similar philosophy governed the treatment of artists and intellectuals in neo-colonial Kenya. Although it was anything but an ideal state, the Kenyatta state resembled Socrates's model republic in that it banished poets and other writers whose work was not politically useful to the state. The struggle to decolonize Kenya become seditious. As exposed in his prison diary, Detained (1981), Ngugi's detention, was a culmination of several years of questioning the usefulness of the Kenyan neo-colonial state and its leadership to the people of that country. Kenya's political leadership led by Kenyatta met dissent with persecution and detention. This was a manifestation of violence.

But the tendency to detain political opponents in Kenya had its own history. Being a pragmatic student of Western capitalism, Kenyatta manipulated the constitution to assume massive political power. During his rule, there were record thirteen constitutional amendments which strengthened his grip on power (Ochieng', 1995:1940). One of those amendments tackled the issue of political opponents. In 1966, an amendment was rushed through the House to legalize detention without trial. Called the Preventive Detention Act, the new legislation authorized the President to detain, in the

interest of public security, individuals without recourse to courts (Okech-Owiti and Mbaya, 1997:32). This legislation intimidated people to forced obedience and drove critics of the government into silence. But those like Ngugi and Abdalla who insisted on fighting on, the solution was to detain them. This experience makes it impossible for one to differentiate between the Kenya of White colonial rule and the Kenya of the black African leadership.

The problem with the Kenyatta state is that the ruling political party – KANU – also doubled up as the government. Detention of opponents was thus approved by both the party machinery and the state. Frantz Fanon says that in an underdeveloped country, the bourgeoisie in political leadership never stop repeating that the direction of affairs should be controlled by a strong authority and a dictatorship (Fanon, 1967:146). Thus, the political party plays an understudy to the administration and the police and controls the masses, not in order to participate in the business of governing the nation, but in order to remind them constantly that the government expects from them obedience and discipline (Ibid.).

Detention without trial in the Kenyan post-colony was one way the country's dictatorship exacted obedience and discipline from members of its population. At the individual level, detention had the effect of imposing physical and psychological violence on the persons affected. It interfered with individual freedom and personal will. Yet the whole purpose of man's existence is to realize this goal. As Fanon put it in Black Skin White Masks, 'no attempt must be made to encase man, for it is his destiny to be set free' (1970:12). KANU's methods of governance through intimidation and detention of its opponents was an effort in negating man's freedom first and society's freedom second.

But freedom had to be achieved within the context of justice and equality. As we have demonstrated, the Kenyatta state was informed by the vices of tribalism, economic mismanagement, social degradation and political persecution. These crises worked against the creation of a society based on justice and equality. It must also be pointed out that individual freedom depends on what the state does in legitimizing itself. The Africanization of colonialism under KANU created some sort of freedom for the Kenyatta state. But when the state began terrorizing its opponents, it actually destabilized the existential freedom of the Kenyan people in their individual capacities. Like Marx, Fanon recognizes that the state can be free without the individual being free. In Kenya, political freedom merely, indicated the Africanization of European colonialism. This confirmed Fanon's cynicism about formal independence that it was:

> A fancy parade and a blare of trumpets. There is nothing save a minimum of re-adaptation, a few reforms at the tops, a flag waving; and down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the Middle Ages, endlessly marking time (1967:118).

As the confusion in GEMA continued, KANU elections never took place. President Kenyatta's health moved from bad to worse. Suddenly, on August 22 1978, Kenyatta died peacefully in his sleep while on holiday in Mombasa (Daily Nation, August 23, 1978). And because the constitution had not been so far changed to prevent the Vice-President from assuming office in the event of the President's death, the GEMA/Kenyatta family alliance became merely academic and insignificant. Moi moved fast and assumed power thus becoming Kenya's second President.

4.10 Conclusion

It was the objective of this Chapter to demonstrate that the neo-colonial state of Jomo Kenyatta served the interests of Western imperialism and ignored the plight of the Kenyan people. We have shown that soon after political 'independence' Kenyatta assumed the role and privileges of a colonial Governor only that this time he espoused tribal tendencies in his efforts to rule Kenya. Thus, the picture which this chapter has come out with enriches Fanon's pessimism about the nation-state and political independence in Africa.

The Chapter has demonstrated that as a believer in tribalism and social inequality, Kenyatta established and built a state which favoured his own Kikuyu tribesmen. As a result, the Kikuyu dominated Kenya's public life beginning with the cabinet right down through the civil service and the military. In order to sustain himself in power, Kenyatta kept his faith not just in all Kikuyu but most significantly in his Kiambu homeland group. He allowed the group to grab land and entrench itself in Kenya's political theatre. The Kiambu group also helped Kenyatta to make important political decisions including those touching on the fate of the regime's opponents.

We have demonstrated in this chapter, that while the Kenyatta state was chiefly preoccupied with the idea of maintaining strong political power, Kenya's social and economic problems multiplied. These problems revolved around the critical issues of tribalism, land, education, culture, political intolerance and the distribution of national resources. The failure by the Kenyatta State to seriously address these issues condemned the new nation-state into the abyss of neo-coloniality. Yet as we have demonstrated, certain sections of the Kenyan society opposed Kenyatta's tendency to Africanize

colonialism by nurturing the neo-colonial state. These forces were detained, intimidated out of politics, imprisoned or in some extreme cases assassinated in the name of safeguarding the newly independent state. The chapter acknowledges that all efforts made by various groups and personalities to free the Kenyatta state from neo-colonial dispositions were significant moves to decolonize Kenya. The next chapter interrogates the Moi state.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 THE MOI STATE, 1978-1992

5.1 Introduction

The critical problems of identity which confronted and defined the Kenyatta state continued to aggress the Moi state. Despite serious obstacles placed on his way by Kikuyu tribal chauvinists, Daniel arap Moi dribbled his way to power after Kenyatta's death. Having been Kenyatta's Vice-President for almost twelve years, since January 1967, Moi understood the workings of his predecessor's state.

As we have seen, in its neo-colonial setting, the Kenyatta state served the interests of the West by embracing Western political, economic and social policies. Being friendly to the West, the Kenyatta state became an exemplary beacon of capitalism upon which Western Europeans launched their attacks against the spread of communism in Eastern Africa. In this way, the Kenyatta state continued to enjoy financial as well as political support from the West, even when it condoned corruption, tribalism, land grabbing, human rights violations and political intolerance.

Soon after taking over power in August 1978, Moi pledged to follow Kenyatta's 'nyayos' (footsteps) (Ahluwalia, 1996:110). *Nyayoism*, implied that Moi would continue to strengthen the major structures of Kenyatta's neo-colonial state and thus uphold the vices which tended to punctuate the experience of neo-coloniality. In this Chapter, we briefly highlight this reality and argue that the struggle for the decolonization of Kenya continued under the Moi regime.

5.2 Neo-colonial Continuity

Decrying the ineptitude of the national middle class in addressing the problems of newly independent states, Frantz Fanon observed that:

> In an underdeveloped country, an authentic national middle class ought to consider as its bounden duty to betray the calling fate has marked out for it and to put itself to school with the people: in other words to put at the people's disposal the intellectual and technical capital that it has snatched when going through colonial universities. But unhappily we shall see that very often the national middle class does not follow this heroic, positive, fruitful path; rather it disappears with its soul set at peace into the shocking ways – shocking because anti-national.... (1967:121).

Although Daniel arap Moi did not himself go to any university, he as president, became a pivotal custodian of the majority of the Kenyan middle class. He thus possessed the capacity to direct the energies of the middle class towards the goal of improving the quality of life in Kenya. But did he do this?

On the issue of political parties Fanon observed that most of them were consumed by slogans of independence, leaving the rest of the country's destiny to the unpredictable events of the future. These parties do not therefore understand what to do in order to improve their countries' economies because, indeed, they are ignorant of many things about their own countries. Under the tutelage of new leaders, political parties in the new nations continued executing the sale of primary commodities to Europe while at the same time Africanizing national resources. Africanization in this context meant the transfer, into selected native hands, of those unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period (Ibid.: 122). As we have witnessed, Kenyatta moved to transfer these advantages to his Kikuyu relatives and friends as well as supporters from without. Change was thus

measured in terms of the number of ethnically correct people appointed as administrators, barristers, trade agents, directors of prastatals, ambassadors, ministers and permanent secretaries.

In terms of values and tests, Fanon indicates, the political leadership in the new nations tended to encourage the middle class and the general public to ape Western lifestyles. In this arrangement, the middle class came to quickly assume the role of what Fanon calls 'new colonists' (Ibid.:124). The Kenyatta state which we analysed in the last chapter nurtured these new colonists by aping and reliving the comforts and privileges of their counterparts within the experience of formal colonialism. It was the case 'black skins dressed in white masks' (Fanon, 1970). In this section, we argue that while Kenyatta implanted neocoloniality in Kenya, Moi continued to nurture the process with more vigor and determination under a political party called KANU. But how did the Moi State maintain neo-colonial continuity? Let us look at some selected areas.

5.2.1 Tribalism and the Politics of Ethnicity

When he took over, Moi maintained a cabinet whose majority were Kikuyu. In fact his first cabinet consisted of only two Kalenjins, seven GEMA, three Luo, two Luhyia, one Taita, one Kisii, one Kamba and one Maasai (The Weekly Review, Nairobi, October 13, 1978). Moi was, nevertheless, aware that Kenyatta had undertaken to *Kikuyunize* the military, the civil service and the cabinet. Being new in State House, Moi undertook to maintain the status quo, for the time being at least, so as to mask his final intentions. But, at the back of his mind, there existed the germ of vengeance directed at all those who had opposed his rise to power. More importantly, however, he wanted to

follow Kenyatta's footsteps by first de-*Kikuyunizing* Kenya's public life and second by *Kalenjinizing* many aspects of the Kenyan state-the military, the civil service and the cabinet. It is worthwhile to note that since the process of de-*Kikuyunization* involved denial of privileges and status hitherto enjoyed, it implied psychological violence on the Kikuyu as a community and as individuals.

By 1980, the new president was safely in control. Yet he knew that he had to purge the anti-Moi forces within the Kikuyu. To do this, he used sections of the Kikuyu that were hostile to the political dominance of the Kiambu group to achieve his goal. It was a case of 'divide and rule'. Top on Moi's list of Kikuyu friends were his new Vice-President Mwai Kibaki from Nyeri and G.G. Kariuki from Laikipia. Charles Njonjo, though from Kiambu was trusted by Moi because he had refused to support the change-the-constitution group in 1976.

A carefully staged drama was put in place to displace the Kiambu faction. As early as October 1978, Charles Njonjo, then Attorney General, revealed in parliament a plan by certain groups associated with some Kiambu politicians to assassinate Moi, Kibaki and Njonjo himself (Karimi and Ochieng', 1980:158-95). The plot was associated with the 200 strong sub-unit of the Stock Theft Unit, based in Nakuru. The plotters, later known as *Ngorokos* (bandits), were accused of plotting murder. As it turned out, some of Kenyatta's leading Kikuyu personalities in the police force were also linked to the 'Ngoroko' affair. In response to this, Moi suspended the Assistant Commissioner of Police in Charge of Rift Valley, James Mungai. Mungai fled the country to Sudan, then Geneva only to return a few months later after being assured of non-prosecution. At

Police headquarters in Nairobi, Bernard Hinga, the Police Commissioner (himself a Kikuyu) was forced to resign (Ibid.).

The president's vengeance hit Gatundu – Jomo Kenyatta's political base - during the 1979 elections. To undo the Kenyatta ghost, Moi and the ruling party KANU supported Zachariah Gakunju against Kenyatta's nephew Ngengi Muigai. Although the election outcome favoured Muigai, Moi had made his point that he was not going to tolerate people who still lived in the dreams of the Kenyatta state. Indeed, the President's next move was to hit on GEMA. Several GEMA top directors including, Njenga Karume and Kihika Kimani were arraigned in court to answer charges of corruption and failure to file the company's annual returns (The Weekly Review, Nairobi, February 2, 1979). Meanwhile Moi started isolating powerful Kikuyu political figures from Kiambu such as Mbiu Koinange, James Gichuru, Peter and Ngengi Muigai as well as Njenga Karume. Instead, the president dealt with their juniors and made efforts to build the careers of some insignificant political personalities such as Arthur Magugu from Githunguri (The Weekly Review, Nairobi, March 2, 1979).

During the Kenyatta era, Kihika Kimani and his supporters had become a power to be reckoned with in the Nakuru area. Kimani was one of the chief brains behind the *Ngwataniro* Farmers' Company. This was a land buying company which had helped many Kikuyu especially those from Kiambu, to settle in the Rift Valley. Moi did not like this development but he could not have raised any objections while still serving under Kenyatta (Kimtai O.I, 1999). However, once in power, Moi set out not just to weaken the Kikuyu company but also to liquidate the powers of Kimani and his associates. In the

company elections which followed early 1979, Kimani and all his 14 directors refused to seek re-election because they already sensed a government-instigated defeat.

But it has to be said that the Kikuyu were not the only headache for President Moi. The Luo, arguably the second largest ethnic community after the Kikuyu, were his next target. During the Kenyatta era, as we have already intimated, Oginga Odinga and several senior politicians from the Nyanza province had formed an opposition party, the Kenya Peoples Union (K.P.U.). K.P.U. had been banned in 1969 thereby sustaining Kenya as a de facto one-party state. However, despite the ban, former K.P.U leaders were never allowed into KANU during the Kenyatta era. But as the country's new President, Moi tried to rehabilitate K.P.U supporters by releasing those in detention and appointing Oginga Odinga as Chairman of the Cotton Lint and Marketing Board (Standard, 1 December 1979).

However, soon Odinga dug his own political grave by issuing public statements which implied that Moi was his junior and that Kenyatta was a land grabber (Ahluwalia, Op. Cit.: 123). The rehabilitation process was halted and Odinga was sacked and subsequently barred from participating in KANU politics. This was a clear signal from Moi that his government approved the way the Kenyatta state had conducted national affairs. It was also an indication that those who attacked the Kenyatta state should in many aspects be considered as enemies of the Moi state. The punitive measures taken to neutralize Odinga drove him and his supporters into the opposition.

Although Moi's cabinet after the 1979 elections maintained a Kikuyu majority, underneath he worked tirelessly to remove Kikuyu civil servants sympathetic to the GEMA alliance. Further, Luo personalities suspected to have been closer or

sympathetic to Odinga were also mysteriously removed from public service. Permanent secretaries, Provincial Commissioners, District Commissioners as well as District officers were reshuffled in favour of the Kalenjin community (Saisi O.I, 2002). Discontent against Moi began developing from two major forces. First was the GEMA group vouching for a Kikuyu President and second was the Luo, supporting Odinga's alternative policies for developing a better Kenya. A series of complications, many of them created by Moi's own suspicions and his ethnic biases, almost drove the country to anarchy when soldiers attached to the Kenya Airforce attempted to overthrow the government on the 1st of August, 1982 (Daily Nation, August 4, 1982).

On the political front, the President developed a pathological hatred for dissenting voices. Faced with the threat of opposition groups, President Moi responded with a severity that surprised even Kenyans who had been critical of Kenyatta's intolerant policies. Moi viewed parliamentary opposition as being tantamount to treason. At the beginning of 1982, the President's paranoia increased. Holding the Kikuyu in great suspicion, he began to rely on new sources of support. It was inevitable that he turned to Rift Valley politicians from his own Kalenjin community for advice. Some of his new confidants had no administrative or political competence to advise any Head of State but because they were ethnically relevant, the President trusted them. Top on the list of advisers were names such as Henry Cheboiwo, Henry Kosgey (hardly three years old in politics by 1982), Isaac Salatt, Stanley Meto, Vincent arap Too and Nicholas Biwott (Africa Confidential, Vol. 23 No. 8 April 14, 1982 p.4). These Kalenjin personalities identified sources of dissent and recommended to the President the actions to be taken to overcome any opposition to his rule.

Commenting on this form of recklessness fronted by the post-independence political leadership in Africa, Fanon once observed:

> We no longer see the rise of a bourgeois dictatorship, but a tribal dictatorship, the ministers, the member of the cabinet, the ambassadors and local commissioners are chosen from same ethnological group as the leader, sometimes directly from his family (1967:147).

More importantly, however, the coup also exposed the instability and the chaotic pluralism of the African post-colony. In the public domain, the political situation in Kenya did not look too explosive until the coup itself. President Moi had weeks before the coup, addressed several political rallies and functions which demonstrated that he had overwhelming support from the citizens. Serious opposition seemed small and manageable. Everywhere the president went, he was publicly cheered by supporters and the armed forces did not show overt signs of any disaffection. All seemed to be well and under control. Yet underneath this lull and these cheers, existed some very explosive disapproval of the structure, content and policies of the Moi state. The irony of the situation leading up to the coup confirms one major characteristic of the post-colony: unpredictably and instability.

As Achille Mbembe puts it, what distinguishes the post-colony from other regimes of violence and domination is not only the luxuriousness of style and the down-to-earth realism that characteristise its power, or even the fact that it is particularly raw power it prefers to exercise. Peculiar also to the post-colony is the way the relationship between the rulers and the ruled is forged by means of a specific practice: Simulacrum and Pretense. (Mbembe, 1992:10). This, Mbembe concludes, explains why dictators can go to sleep at night lulled by soars of adulation and support only to wake up the next

morning to find their golden calves smashed and their tablets of law overturned (Ibid.). The applauding crowds of yesterday would, indeed, have become today a cursing, abusing mob. That is to say, people whose identities have been partly confiscated by an authoritarian state have been able, precisely because there was this pretense, to glue back together the bits and pieces of their fragmented identities and to assume a more realistic role in decolonizing the post colony. The change of habit by the people reduces their disempowerment, cleanses them as Fanon would say it, and turns them from what was hitherto things to some sort of dignified beings.

5.2.2 The Economy

It is noteworthy to observe that Moi's troubles were compounded by his blatant failure to fix the deteriorating economy as well as the runaway inflation. Until the mid 1970's, the cumulative annual growth rate for the Kenyan economy was estimated to be close to 6% in real terms. In 1975, however, the growth rate fell to 1.2% when the economy was affected adversely both by world-wide recession and rising oil prices (Hazelwood, 1979). The situation got worse when it became clear that the Kenyatta administration abetted corruption, nepotism and general economic mismanagement. During this time, inflation maintained double digit levels while the terms of trade declined, leading to a serious balance of payments problem. Urban unemployment and rural underemployment posed serious problems for the country, particularly in the in the light of a population growth rate of over 4% per annum (Gertzel, 1978:84-100).

Thus, Moi inherited the Presidency in 1978 when export prices were falling and import prices rapidly escalating. Generally, Moi took over power at the time when the Kenyan economy was moving close to the intensive care unit. Instead of fixing these

problems, the President followed Kenyatta's footsteps of mismanagement thereby worsening the economic status of the nation. The economic hopelessness which the people had experienced under formal colonialism was taking a turn for the worse under the neocolonial experience.

By 1982, the economic picture was still bleak (Maxon and Ndege, 1995:153). The situation was aggravated by the fact that then and for many years to come, the Moi state continued to support a cash crop economy at the time when prices of such crops as tea, pyrethrum and coffee were falling on the international market (Ibid.: 162-164). The lack of creativity in dismantling Kenya's over-dependence on one economic truth as supplied by the West became one of the saddest legacies of the Moi state. At this time, Kenya's foreign debt stood at US$1,000 million while inflation continued to rise. Charges of inept management and corruption were now made against the Moi administration. An example was the scandal in which the then Attorney General, the Minister for Labour, Deputy Public Prosecutor and C.I.D officials were involved in corrupt dealings with the Bank of Baroda (The Weekly Review, April issues, 1982).

Popular perception in Kenya, encouraged by the opposition, was that economic problems were deeply located in government corruption. Such perception was not without foundation as Moi and his business associates bought vast holdings of real estate in Nairobi and other parts of the country. As one observer noted:

> Kenyans no longer try to figure out which buildings Moi owns; they try to figure out which buildings he doesn't own (Maren, 1987: 212).

By 1987, the President's business interests, although difficult to document, included prime real estate holdings worth conservatively $US150 million, a construction

company, interest in transport and haulage, fuel and petroleum products distribution through Kobil (Kenya Oil company and Mobil Oil, Kenya) and interest in Fox theatres which also had a monopoly of importing films in Kenya (African Confidential, June 24, 1987). Added to these were shares in a large Kenyan bank, Firestone's Kenyan operations, food wholesalers and myriad of other high-ranking businesses (Ibid.). His close allies too had been assisted to acquire government tenders to supply goods and services. Both Moi and his allies (especially his tribesmen) had acquired thousands of acres of land across the country some of it marked for public utilities including forests, parks and other social amenities. Some Kalenjin personalities such as Nicholas Biwott, Henry Kosgey and Joshua Kulei who had been paupers in 1978 were, by way of association with the President, already millionaires in 1987. Yet the situation for the bulk of people, including the landless and urban rural poor remained critical (Ahluwalia, 1996:188).

Instead of dealing directly with his corrupt administrative officials, Moi blamed the economic woes of the country to Asians. He accused the Asian community of being involved in all social evils in the country (Africa Report, March-April 1982:36). Asians were accused of hoarding and smuggling essential commodities and some were even threatened with deportation regardless of whether or not they were Kenyan citizens. In flashing the racial card, Moi hoped to crystallize public opinion against a non-existent enemy while real economic mismanagement continued within his administration. Within a short time of being in power, Moi had hit at the Kikuyu, isolated the Luo and now he had taken his divisive war on the Asians. Like the colonial governors of the 1920's, 1930's, 1940's and 1950's, Moi employed the strategy of divide and rule, ultimately

succeeding to destroy the country's economy by allowing his friends and Kalenjin tribesmen to loot the national coffers.

5.2.3 Repression and the Struggle for Decolonization

Francis Fukuyama, probably America's leading political theorist, once argued that there was a strong correlation between stable democracy and levels of economic development. He noted that:

> the reasons why economic development should lead to democracy are complicated and contingent. Education corrects people to the large world of ideas including ideologies that provide concepts of political legitimacy.....Education and rising socio-economic status, moreover bring in their train a much greater awareness of one's personal status and dignity and thus make people unhappy with authoritarian political systems that fail to recognize them as free adults..... (Fukuyama, 1991:72).

Following Fukuyama, it seems to me, the neo-colonial Moi state was immersed in a serious economic mess. If as Fukuyama observes, economic problems make people unhappy with authoritarian regimes, how would the situation be when economic woes are compounded by the vices of corruption, tribalism and irrelevant education policies? The situation can only get worse.

Consequently for Kenya, the situation became worse when, in the face of social and economic crises created under the Moi state, the enlightened members of the society undertook to put their lives on the line by confronting the regime with a sole purpose of liberating the country from neo-colonialism. It has to be observed that Frantz Fanon believed that violence was a creation of colonialism. However, we should abandon that proposition for a while and argue, as Conor Cruise O'Brien did, that colonialism is itself a form of violence (O'Brien, 1965:674).

Similarly, because neo-colonialism emanates from formal colonialism, neo-colonialism is also a form of violence. The diverse methods used under the Moi State to sustain Western hegemony in Kenya and to curb societal and individual freedoms were themselves acts of violence. Reactions from the people against the growing adversities of neo-colonialism appeared through physical and psychological forms of violence which Fanon anticipated. Three fundamental sections of the nation-state organized rebellions against the Moi state. They include the military, the university community and the cadre of political activists as well as members of Moi's own party KANU.

The rebellion by the military was epitomized by the attempted coup led by the Kenya Airforce personnel on August 1, 1982. The soldiers seized several strategic positions in Nairobi including two airbases, the international airport, the post office and the radio station. With an emancipatory agenda embraced in their military violence, and through radio broadcasts, rebel soldiers denounced corruption, nepotism, economic chaos and the dictatorial regime of Daniel arap Moi. After some hesitation, forces loyal to the President retook the main rebel positions in Nairobi by noon, but fighting continued for several days at the Nanyuki Air Base near Mount Kenya and there were reports of nationwide unrest, looting, rape and acts of brutality committed by security forces in Nairobi's shanty towns - including Mathare, Kibera and Kawangware - for two days before the government could restore order.

Violence had been met by counter-violence. Army troops were ordered to shoot looters on sight. The government admitted to 150 dead but unofficial tallies put the death tool to 600 and 1800. The coup demonstrated the deep hatred the Kikuyu and the Luo had developed against Moi. It is significant to note that a majority of the coup leaders

were many but they include Pancras Okumu, Hezekiah Ochuka, as well as several senior officers in the Airforce such as Commander, General P. Kariuki. In dealing with the coup, Moi also demonstrated his vengeance and deep hatred for members of the two communities by ruthlessly handling the rebels. The coup organizers were sentenced to death, imprisoned for life or detained under very difficult and unhygienic conditions. But the significance of the 1982 coup attempt should be put in its correct perspective. The coup attempt was a sad reflection of the decaying nation-state in Africa. In its neo-colonial format, the Kenyan nation-state had come to represent a political as well as a socio-economic monster. Tired of the monster's excesses, the military wanted change founded against the dead body of the same monster.

Dissent at the University was led by lecturers and students. In September 1979, the students of the University of Nairobi criticized, through demonstrations, the government move to bar Odinga and three other former opposition figures from contesting in the general elections. The government responded by closing the university and expelling the students' leaders. The Nairobi University Students' Organization (NUSO) which had emerged as a strong proponent of the autonomy of the university, was proscribed (Ogot, 1995:1998). In the following year, the authorities banned the University Academic Staff Union and prohibited outside speakers from entering the campus, sparking a spate of riots. As a result of the riots, the passports of twelve lecturers regarded as critical to the government were seized, thus denying them their existential freedom. Among the lecturers affected were Micere Mugo, Ooko Ombaka, Michael Chege, Mukaru Ng'ang'a, Okoth Ogendo, Atieno Odhiambo, Anyang' Nyong'o and Shadrack Gutto (Ibid.).

Later in June 1982, President Moi accused the lecturers of plotting to cause chaos in the country and assisting in the establishment of another political party. He vowed to root out plotters and agitators (Daily Nation, 7 June 1982). During the same month, the President's threat became a reality when a number of lecturers were picked up and later imprisoned or detained. They included, Maina wa Kinyatti, a lecturer in History at Kenyatta University, Kamonji Wachira, a geographer at the same university, Al-amin Mazrui, a linguist from the same university and Edward Oyugi, a psychology professor from the same university. From Nairobi University, those affected included Willy Mutunga (Law), George Mkangi (Sociology) and Mukaru Ng'ang'a) (history). Apart from Kinyatti who was jailed for being a member of an underground organization called *Mwakenya*, the rest were detained. These lecturers were arrested violently and brutally, often in the middle of the night, blindfolded and taken to *Nyayo* House* torture chambers for interrogation. They were tortured while naked, denied food and kept incommunicado (Njoka 2003:1, 10-13; Bindra 2003:18). This experience reminds one about the crackdown on Mau Mau dissidents by the colonial authorities in October 1952. Again at stake was not just the society's freedom but also the individual freedoms of the dons.

Following the coup attempt in 1982, the crackdown continued against lecturers and students. For instance Titus Adungosi, Chairman of the newly formed Students' Organization of Nairobi University (SONU) was arrested. He was sentenced to ten years in prison where he died on 27 December, 1988 under mysterious circumstances (Ogot,

* This is a tall building in Nairobi constructed in the 1980s. Situated along the city's Kenyatta Avenue, this building houses important government departments including the Security Intelligence, the Nairobi

Op.Cit.: 199). Sixty-seven other students were held from August 1982 to February 1983. Six more were jailed for five or six years (Ibid.).

In March 1986, the *Mwakenya* problem resurfaced as a socialist organization that was fighting to liberate Kenya from neo-colonial oppression. *Mwakenya* is an acronym for *Muungano wa wazalendo wa Kuikomboa Kenya* (Union of Nationalists for the liberation of Kenya). It was a social subaltern movement and a tool for decolonization. The movement published 'seditious' material including *mzalendo* (patriot) and *mpatanishi* (reconciliator). *Mwakenya*, like the Mau Mau before it, was bound by oaths of secrecy and subversion (Amnesty International, 1987:5).

But besides *Mwakenya*, there was the December Twelfth Movement', which was also linked to the university lecturers and students and which was credited for publishing *pambana* (struggle). It is important to note that although principally organized by the intelligentsia, the ideology of *Mwakenya* and the 'December Twelfth Movement' had a significant base among the country's influential middle class-clerks, bankers and farmers (Maren, 1987:209-229). Interestingly, the rural strongholds of *Mwakenya* were the same areas that were the hub of the Mau Mau activity in the 1950s. These were the rich farmlands of Nakuru and Nyeri. The farmers from these areas were the main sources of funding for *Mwakenya* and they helped to smuggle arms into the country from neighbouring Uganda (Africa Confidential, 24 June, 1987).

In the course of 1986, *Mwakenya* announced in one of its publications that it had moved to a new phase of struggle for decolonization when it pledged its intention to engage in guerrilla warfare. A short time later, a railway clerk was charged with plotting to sabotage a train. In a separate case, a Government Agricultural Officer, along with

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Provincial Headquarters and a few government ministries.

two university graduates were jailed for attempting to derail a freight train (Daily Nation, 5 July 1986). In 1987, violent protests rocked the University of Nairobi after students' representatives were denied passports to travel to Cuba to attend an international students' conference. The government attributed the unrest to the *Mwakenya* subversion and went ahead to crackdown on more lecturers and students. It was during this time that student leader Wafula Buke was jailed for five years (Ogot, Op. Cit.: 200).

But the frequent detention of lecturers and students did not, however, deter those who wanted to bring meaningful change in Kenya. Detention was itself an act of physical and psychological violence but did the dons answer back their frustrations with similar violence? Several university scholars churned out articles and books highlighting the humiliating effects of bad governance thereby exacting psychological violence on the Moi state. As early as 1980,history scholar Maina wa Kinyatti released his political bombshell, Thunder from the Mountains (1980). In his book, Kinyatti translated into English some of the Mau Mau war songs of the 1950s and highlighted the need to give the people of Kenya their dignity and their land. Using this book as the basis, the author encouraged the Kenyan people of the 1980s to embrace the courage and bravery of the Mau Mau worriors so as to overcome oppression and neo colonialism under the Moi regime.

By mid 1980s, another university scholar, Al-Amin Mazrui had published *Kilio Cha Haki,* (Cry of Justice), (1985). Mazrui's play focused on the struggle between the workers and their foreign oppressors. The struggle against oppression, was led by a liberated woman Lanina who conscientized her fellow workers to gain courage and fight for liberation. Indeed, from the book, one gets the impression that Mazrui had viewed the

Moi regime as a mere continuation of a bad colonial system that required urgent dismantling. Through the characters of Lanina, Musa and Dewe, Mazrui encouraged the citizens of Kenya to fight oppression. But even more impressive was the way Mazrui developed the character of government prosecutors and policemen who like their colonial counterparts, worked hard and ruthlessly to sustain an oppressive system

Three more authors highlighted the problems of independent Kenya and raised the consciousness of the people under the Moi regime in the 1980s. First were A.S. Yahya and David Mulwa in their piece *Mkimbizi* 1989 (translated as 'fugitive'). Here, potraying the example of a school that had been founded on oppression and corruption, the authors present a school head Katela, who had been hired by, Honourable Makeli of *Mwandani* country to help the school grow into a university. But Katela hates corruption and cheating. This creates conflict between Katela and Makali that results into the exposure of the corrupt system. As university scholars, the authors used their play to explain how deeply entrenched corruption was in Kenya. Further they seemed to say that informed citizens such as Katela should defy their leaders in order to fight corruption and cheating.

Another author who exposed the problems of the Kenyan postcolony was Professor Chacha N. Chacha in Wingu Jeuzi, 1987 (translated as Dark Cloud). His leading character Magebo is an influential leader in a country that thrives on corruption and hypocrisy. The book, through its characters condemns those who seize power unfairly and who misuse the constitution for their own interests. Such leaders, the author implies, cast a dark cloud on the destiny of many countries. It is this dark cloud that citizens, especially those who are young in affected countries, should fight to neutralize in order to achieve true decolonization. The history of the Kenyan post colony in the

1980's was the history of corruption, hypocrisy, detention, abuse of power, economic mismanagement and political intolerance. Chacha's Magebo could easily have been Kenya's Moi in the 1980s.

Once released from incarceration, prominent university scholars such as Shadrack Guto, Kimani Gecau, Anyang' Nyongo', Micere Mugo and Ngugi wa Thiong'o fled the country in order to escape political repression obtaining in post-independence Kenya. The fleeing lecturers signified the partial defeat of the movement for decolonization, thus indicating that psychological violence exacted on the state by the intellectuals had not brought about decolonization. This disapproves Fanon's view that decolonization should always adopt a violent path.

Within the 1980s, Ngugi produced some of the most critical literary works on post-independence Africa. Using Kenya as an example, Ngugi interrogated the African independence, through Detained (1981), when he graphically exposed the brutality of the African government against its own citizens. This work gave shocking accounts of life in Kenya's detention cells, where detainees such as Martin Shikuku and Ngugi himself were denied food and other basic necessities in more or less similar ways the nationalists of the 1950s had ruthlessly and brutally been treated by the colonial authorities. Through this work, and others like Devil on the Cross (1982), Writers in Politics (1982), Decolonizing the Mind (1986), Ngugi demonstrated variously that despite the change of leadership, Kenya had remained a colonial state. He, therefore advocated for a deliberate program to free Kenya, if possible through force, in order to restore the dignity of the black man.

But the struggle for decolonization in Kenya was not confined to *Mwakenya* activities alone. It was not even limited to Odinga and his supporters; neither was it a

phenomenon of the intellectuals alone. The National Christian Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) as well as the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) figured prominently in their criticism of the Moi government (Ahluwalia, Op.Cit.: 179). They spoke out against corruption and dictatorship within the Moi State. Apart from condemning detention without trial, the church took a stand against the queuing proposals that were to be applied in 1988 general elections, arguing that the requirement that voters line up behind their preferred candidates compromised the privacy and security of the citizens. It also intimidated many people who did not wish to be identified in the open with certain candidates, to keep off from the election and thus undermine the democratic process.

Of special concern to LSK and NCCK were constitutional changes which were initiated under the Moi state in 1989, giving sweeping powers to the President to interfere with the judiciary. By the changes, the President was allowed to sack the Attorney-General, the High court and Court of Appeal Judges without recourse to a tribunal. In addition, new repressive mechanisms were introduced allowing the police to hold suspects for up to 14 days before bringing them to court, as opposed to the previous requirement of 24 hours (Ajulu, 1992:84). Those who, in LSK and NCCK, stuck out their neck were many but they include such personalities as Mutava Musyimi, Alexander Muge, David M. Gitari, Timothy Njoya, Gibson Kamau Kuria, Kiraitu Murungi, Gitobu Imanyara, Paul Muite and Martha Njoka. The above changes in the legal statues were carefully tailored to secure the neo-colonial state.

But dictatorships often create discontent from within and without. The political intolerance of Moi state attracted opposition from within the ruling party as new centres of power began to emerge from 1982 onwards. Soon after the 1982 attempted coup,

information started filtering in that former Attoney-General and long serving confidant of President Moi's, Charles M. Njonjo had been planning to capture the Presidency through the buying of support from civil servants and parliamentarians. The matter, later christened the 'traitor affair', was divulged by President Moi at a public rally in Kisii during the month of May 1983 (Ogot, Op.Cit.: 1995; Ahluwalia, Op.Cit.: 173). It was claimed that the traitor had sought the assistance of foreign governments to effect his plans.

At the Commission of Inquiry set up by the government to probe Njonjo, it emerged that Njonjo had worked out a two-pronged strategy for ousting President Moi from power. He tried to get the majority among MPs to pass a vote of no confidence in the President, and as well, he made attempts to influence KANU sub-branches and branches to support him for Presidency (Miller Commission Report on Njonjo Inquiry, 1984). With the identification of the traitor, disloyal elements in the party were identified and subsequently expelled. In all, fourteen associates of Njono including, J.J. Kamotho, former Minister for Higher Education, G.G. Kariuki, former Minister of State in the Office of the President were thrown out of the party. In the military as well as the Civil Service, suspected pro-Njonjo figures were purged. During the 1983 elections, state apparatuses were used to make sure that those sympathetic to Njonjo were not re-elected.

Although the Njonjo affair can hardly be termed as an effort within the decolonization process, it is significant in two fundamental ways. It demonstrates that when dictatorships reach their peaks, they begin collapsing from within as each of the main players within the dictatorships strive to set up alternative centres of power. The resultant situation is often useful and convenient for the operations of the revolutionary

forces of liberation. Thus, secondly, the Njonjo affair exposed the weaknesses in the Moi state, thereby, giving hope and impetus to the on-going struggle for Kenya's liberation in the 1980s.

The struggle against the Moi state also coalesced around powerful political personalities who had been locked out of KANU but who could not be allowed to form an opposition political party. The leading voice of this group was former Vice President Oginga Odinga. Responding to the problems created by Kenya's neocolonial experience, Odinga launched the Kenya Socialist Party in May 1982. At the launching ceremony in London, he criticized the government for refusing to allow political parties to function. Further, he lamented the rampant abuse of power by many African leaders arguing that in order to consolidate their position, these leaders:

> ... proceed to stampede parties out of existence through constant harassment and detention of opposition leaders. Sooner rather than later, these one party systems became non-party systems. The Presidents arrogate to themselves the role of law-maker and law-giver. They rule by undeclared decree. They set up cahoots of sycophants around themselves and run court cabals which are united in only one intention: the exploitation of broad masses..... For the common man, African governments are evidently more ruthless than colonial regimes we struggled against (The Standard, May 21, 1982 p. 4).

True, Odinga's comments summarized the structure of the Moi state. The state had legitimized unemployment, and the general exploitation of people yet it was not ready to listen to dissenting voices. In concluding that African governments were more ruthless than the colonial regimes Africans had fought against, Odinga confirmed our position in this study that decolonization does not and did not end with the attainment of political independence. As Frantz Fanon observed, decolonization was quite simply the replacing of certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men (1967:27). It was a change from

white colonialists to black imperialists. The pillars of repression and economic exploitation of the people continued in Kenya even after formal independence had been granted.

Following Odinga's observations, George Anyona, an ex-detainee from Kisii, declared that, in fact, Kenya was a multiparty-society and that nothing had constitutionally changed since the 1960 Lancaster House conference which mooted out a constitution for independent Kenya. Sensing trouble, and in view of the fact that Kenya was a de jure multi-party society, President Moi went on a warpath. First, he declared Odinga expelled from KANU and encouraged his supporters to follow him (The Standard, Nairobi, May 21 1982 p.1). Second, the President ordered the detention of George Anyona, Mwangi Murithi and Odinga's lawyer, John Khaminwa (Ahluwalia and Stevees, 1986:93-115). Later in the year, Odinga's own son Raila was detained. Odinga Oginga himself was put under house arrest.

In Kenya, the people close to President Moi enjoyed comfortable life. But to make sure that such comfort was not interfered with by dissenting voices, Moi initiated a constitutional move to transform Kenya into a de jure one party State. This development, pushed through parliament on June 3, 1982, became law six days later (Ahluwalia, 1986:136).With the new constitutional amendment, all prospective political parties remained dissolved. Consequently, like the case was during the colonial days ,power in the Moi state came to revolve around himself and a few of his supporters and 'tribesmen'. The President commanded absolute powers similar to those held by the colonial governors and he consistently used the provincial administration to intimidate and harass his opponents (Chemiati I.O,1999)

Looking at Kenya's sad story, one is tempted to believe Fanon's observation that African states did not require a bourgeois phase in their path to development (1967:142). Fanon made a scathing attack on political party dictatorships and argued that in the name of the nation, parties preached peace and unity while the majority of people lived in poverty, illiteracy and famine (1967:133). President Moi himself is on record to have invented what he called the *Nyayo* philosophy that preached love, peace and unity (Moi, 1986). In every formal and informal functions, Moi invoked these virtues with unswerving passion. Yet the camouflage provided by the virtues of love, peace and unity did not prevent the middle class bourgeoisie, which Moi headed, from engaging in corupt and pleasure seeking deals.

5.2.4 Accomplishing A Critical Hurdle: Towards A Multi-Party Political Culture

The entire decade of the 1980s was a political as well as a social nightmare for Kenya. As the Moi state became more and more intolerant of opposition, a number of essential services began to collapse. Beginning with the education sector, distinguished scholars began to flee the country, followed by doctors and other experts. A new system of education, often referred to as the 8-4-4, was inaugurated without proper consultation leading to massive wastage and unemployment. Corruption in high places increased as the President's own appointees interfered with the judiciary and the operations of the entire public sector. Government parastatals such as the Kenya Railways, the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation started experiencing zero growth rates due to looting by its chief executives. The health sector collapsed because of poor remuneration for staff and lack of drugs. The communication infrastructure also collapsed.

In the agriculture sector, things moved from bad to worse as farmers could not get loans to finance agriculture inputs. Yet in the wake of all these problems, the Moi state successfully maintained a rubber-stamp parliament which drove the nation into depression and hopelessness. Most members of parliament had been elected through rigging and so they owed their allegiance to only one man - the President. In return to the political support given to them by the President, ministers were expected to pledge unswerving loyalty to the Head of State. President Moi, in one of his dictatorial performances, was quoted as saying:

> I would like ministers, assistant ministers and others to sing like a parrot for..... where I put a full-stop, you put a full-stop (The Weekly Review, 1984:4).

In such an atmosphere, the interests of the nation were not important. There was hence all material for great combustion. It needed just one spark to set everything ablaze.

Thus, a turning point in the fortunes of the Moi state came in 1989 when the Berlin Wall collapsed and Communism in Eastern Europe came down tumbling. Soon, the Western European nations which had all along tolerated the Moi state now began to change their attitudes towards Kenya. In their mind, Kenya had ceased to be a strategic partner because Communism had collapsed. Furthermore, the dramatic collapse of one-party communist regimes in Europe gave a fresh impetus to the decolonization movement in Africa. Accordingly, in privacy and in public, Moi was asked by the West to democratize by espousing a multi-party political culture. Essentially, the government was asked to widen the political space. As the then British Overseas Development Minister Linda Chalker later remarked:

> We want to see multiparty democracy in Kenya; we have been told that it may happen early next

year. That must happen in fact (Africa Confidential, December 6, 1991).

A further boost to the decolonization movement was provided by the press. New Magazines such as, Nairobi Law Monthly, Society, Finance and Beyond, and well established newspapers such as the Daily Nation and the Standard became the *Wiyathi*s of the pre-independence days by giving crucial support without which the Kenyan dilemma would not have been known to many Kenyans and to the rest of the world. In response, the government intimidated the reporters and editors of these magazines and newspapers through unwarranted arrests. Some of the editors were jailed and publications such as Society and Beyond were finally proscribed.

However, between 1989 and 1991 the Moi State doubled its resistance to multi-party 'democracy' and even went ahead to intensify the crackdown on and the detention of those crusading for a new political dispensation in Kenya. During this time, the decolonization movement in the country was spearheaded by veteran politicians who included Oginga Odinga, George Nthenge, Masinde Muliro, George Anyona and Martin Shikuku among others. Also outstanding in the struggle were prominent clergymen, such as Henry Okullu, Bishop of Maseno South, David Gitari, Bishop of Mount Kenya Diocese and Presbyterian cleric, Reverend Timothy Njoya, just to mention a few.

It was a time when the clamour for change, had then focussed on the introduction of multi-party politics and the radical review of the Constitution as necessary conditions for expanding political space. On the New Year's Day in 1990, Njoya declared that it was time Kenya espoused multi-party politics. He was supported by George Anyona and Bishop Okullu. On his part, Okullu demanded the scrapping of Section 2A of the

Constitution which had made Kenya a single party state (Mpaka, 1997: 1-27). Furthermore, the bishop called for the dissolution of the sixth parliament which he regarded as illegitimate, arguing that Kenya required an urgent constitutional convention. But the Moi State reacted angrily to this by insisting that a multi-party system would trigger ethnic tensions in the country.

Meanwhile in February 1990, one of Moi's most trusted ministers, Dr. Robert Ouko was murdered in mysterious circumstances. This event was akin to the 1969 assassination of Tom Mboya. While the public knew all along that Mboya was Kenyatta's confidant, they were surprised to learn that Mboya's assassination stemmed from the fact that he had increasingly become a threat to the Kenyatta Presidency. Similarly, the popularity of Robert Ouko both nationally and internationally seemed to depress close allies of the Moi government to the extent that they undertook to eliminate him so that he could not get a chance to get to the top of the Moi state.

The murder of Ouko was significant in three days. First the assassination enhanced domestic impetus towards reform. This was because, two, the subsequent Commission of Inquiry in the murder, led by retired Scotland Yard detective, John Troon came to reveal substantial improprieties in the official version of events surrounding the murder and suggested that the murder was politically motivated (Africa Confidential, 31 May, 1991 p.5). Later, the inquiry named two trusted allies of Moi's as accomplices in the muder. Industry Minister, Nicholas Biwott and Internal Security Chief, Hezekiah Oyugi were the culprits. Thus, it became clear to those clamouring for change that the Moi state had not only become intolerant to external opposition but it was also unable to take challenges from loyal allies within the system. To some people, the state was hence

operating at its weakest point because it was facing opposition from within and without. Consequently, opposition figures felt that, following Ouko's murder, the already weakened Moi state would easily collapse if sustained efforts to break it up continued. Thirdly, and more importantly, the assassination of Ouko – a leader from the Luo community – alienated the Luo support for the Moi State (Ibid.: 5). This worsened the President's position as he had already lost the Kikuyu support.

Views expressed by the clergy captured the attention of the nation when two former cabinet Ministers and KANU expellees, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia raised loud voices against the dictatorship of single-party political systems. As a follow-up to their contestations, the two leaders asked for a license to hold a public rally in Kamunkunji Nairobi to prove to the government that Kenyans were yearning for real change and political pluralism. The license was not given. Instead, beginning June 1990, the government carried out a major offensive against all those fighting for change. Together with Raila Odinga, Rubia and Matiba were arrested and detained (Ogot, Op.Cit.: 241). For Matiba detention was a double blow because he was hit by a stroke that completely destroyed his life and his political career. But frustrated by the government insensitivity to their plight, thousands of people still turned up for the 'illegal' meeting on July 7th, 1990, sparking widespread rioting in Nairobi as Police used force to disperse the crowds. Several people were killed or injured Daily Nation, July 8 and 9th, 1990). The struggle for the 'second liberation' had already turned violent.

Between January 1990 and December 1991, the political temperatures in Kenya graduated to new heights. In an effort to endear itself to the people, the Moi state undertook, to restore the security of tenure for the judges, Controller and Auditor General

as well as the Public Service Commissioners. Secondly, the Moi State conceded to the demands for political pluralism when it approved the abolition of the contentious Section 2A of the Kenya Constitution. In between these events, however, a number of things happened within the movement for decolonization. In February 1991, Oginga Odinga's efforts to register a new political party – the National Democratic Party – was turned down by the government. This forced Odinga to issue a manifesto for change entitled 'Our Stand' that among other things asked Kenyans to demand the change of government through constitutional means (Nairobi Law Monthly, February 1991, p.30).

In August 1991, a new political movement – the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) – was launched (Ogot, 1995:244). The movement brought together perennial opponents of the Moi state including Oginga Odinga, Muliro, Shikuku, Nthenge, Ahmed Bamahriz and Philip Gachoka. FORD pledged to restore democracy, human rights, multi-partyism, good governance, accountability, the rule of law and social justice. Early December 1991, FORD became a legal party when the KANU government bowed to pressure and approved a constitutional amendment that restored a multi-party political culture. But the question that is rather disturbing is this: How do you restore what was not in the first place there? Under what past political arrangement did Kenya enjoy democracy and good governance? And at what time in history did the Kenyan people lose this democracy and good governance? It seems to me that from the beginning the vision for FORD was based on a false premise. The truth of the matter was that Kenya was in dire need for the installation, not the restoration, of a new political culture.

Not surprisingly, as the 1992 general elections draw closer, FORD split along ethnic and regional lives thereby giving the Moi state another life line (Kenya Times, 28

August 1992:1-2). During this time, the Kikuyu electorate was patronized by two parties – FORD Asili identified with Kenneth Matiba and the Democratic Party of Kenya identified with the newly baptized opposition leader, former Vice-President and KANU defector, Mwai Kibaki. Sections of the Lulya and the entire Luo community remained in another faction, FORD Kenya. This was a terrible betrayal of the decolonization programme. In the much-awaited general election which was held on 29th, December 1992, KANU won by garnering 100 out of the possible 188 seats in parliament (The Weekly Review, January, 8, 1993). The opposition was beaten, the Moi state was secured and the decolonization proponents had no alternative but to go back to the drawing board in order to bring about meaningful change in Kenya.

Franz Fanon is on record as having lamented that the heads of government in post-independence Africa were the true traitors of the continent because they had the habit of selling their countries to the most terrifying of all its enemies: stupidity. He commented that:

> The tribalizing of the central authority it is certain, encourages regionalist ideas and separation. All the decentralizing tendencies spring up again, and triumph and the nation falls to pieces, broken in bits (1967:148).

The advent of pluralist political culture finally legitimized in December 1991 - threatened to dismantle the Moi state. Accordingly, new methods were designed by Moi to withstand the new political development. Within the pressure of multi-party politics, highly inflammatory speeches were made by Maasai and Kalenjin leaders from the Rift Valley. The leaders who included Nicholas Biwott (Kalenjin), Kipkalia Kones (Kalenjin), George Saitoti (probably a *Maasainized* Kikuyu), William ole Ntimama (Maasai), Wilson Leitich (Kalenjin) and Francis Lotodo (Kalenjin) among others asked

'foreign communities' in the Rift Valley region of Kenya to stop abusing the hospitality of the indigenous people or quit the province (National Electoral Monitoring Unit, 1993). Consequently, the leaders called for the establishment of a *majimbo* (federal) system of government which they argued would preserve indigenous zones and resources for native populations.

In a characteristic KADU spirit of the 1960s, some KANU leaders attacked the big tribes for undermining small ones (Human Rights Watch, 1997:5). Targeted for attack were members of the Luhya, Kikuyu, Luo and Kisii communities. In the end, tribal clashes broke out causing the death of hundreds of people from these communities; still, tens of thousands were also displaced (Ibid.: 36). Sick people, as well as school children were in the end condemned to a life in unhygienic makeshift camps set up at selected church compounds and market places. More painful was the fact that both the young and the old were either widowed, orphaned or maimed through this deliberate project of ethnic cleansing. It was evident that the great majority of ethnic victims came from ethnic groups associated with political opposition. By 1993, the Human Rights Watch estimated that 1500 people had died in clashes while some 300,000 were displaced through state-sponsored terrorism (Ibid.: 36).

Four things emerge from the clashes. First, Moi condoned clashes because he knew multiparty politics would threaten his grip on power. Second, through clashes, he could easily displace the Kikuyu and other communities who had acquired land in the Rift Valley soon after independence and thus affect voting patterns in favour of KANU. Indeed, there was the feeling that indigenous land in the province had been grabbed by 'foreigners'. Third, through clashes the Moi state sent across a clear message that

although it preached KANU's unitary system of government, the reality was that the Kenyan President was still nostalgically attached to the Federal Constitution of the KADU party which he once headed in the early 1960s. Like any other ordinary Kalenjin, Moi hated the Kikuyu dominance of Kenyan's public life. Fourth, and most importantly, political leaders in Africa, it seems to us, think and live ethnically. Perhaps at this stage, it is important to revisit the pessimism of Frantz Fanon about the sustainability of newly independent states in Africa. He says thus:

> History teaches us that the battle against colonialism does not run straight away along the lines of nationalism.... The fight for democracy against the oppression of mankind will slowly leave the confusion of neo-liberal universalism to emerge... It so happens that the unpreparedness of the educated classes, the lack of practical links between them and the mass of people,their laziness and let it be said, their cowardice at the decisive moment of the struggle will give rise to tragic mishaps (1967:119).

Indeed, both the Kenyatta and Moi states failed to seize decisive moments, thereby leading the country into mishaps such as detentions, economic corruption, assassinations and ethnic clashes. Fanon continues:

> National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of the people, will in any case only be an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been. The faults that we find in it are quite sufficient explanation of the facility with which when dealing with young independent nations, the nation is passed over for the race and the tribe is preferred for the state (Ibid.).

Nothing could be more prophetic. Both under the Kenyatta and the Moi regimes, the Kenyan state became highly tribalized. The country approached the 1992 first multiparty elections highly divided along ethnic lines that Moi and KANU manipulated the resultant

situation to remain in power (Africa Confidential, 8 May 1992, Weekly Telegraph June 1992).

The movement for change was conspicuously supported and encouraged by policy statements from Western nations and the World Bank that in future financial assistance would be linked to respect for human rights, transparency, accountability and democratization (Decalo, 1992: 7-36; Hyden and Bratton, 1992). Thus whatever the opposition said had to be acceptable to a Western audience of patrons, benefactors, and well-wishers. And this takes as back to the problematic of hegemony first articulated by Gramsci but later domesticated by Spivak. Spivak's essay 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' (1988) – perhaps best demonstrates her concern for the complex problems which face postcolonial voices in the so-called Third World. Spivak was obviously worried that post colonial critics would ironically end up to reinscribe, co-opt and rehearse neo-colonial imperatives of political domination, economic exploitation, and cultural erasure. In other words, is the postcolonial critic unknowingly complicit in the tasks of imperialism?

There is little doubt that postcolonial critics in Kenya included but were not limited to literary artists and political thinkers. Personalities such as Oginga Odinga and a host of political critics of both in the Kenyatta and Moi states were actually subaltern voices of resistance: they represented the suffering and dispossessed masses. However, in coming up with Western-friendly ideas and programmes, these voices also confirmed the dilemma which is captured in Spivak's writings. Socialized in Western culture and values, can such voices possibly make a true representation of the subalterns? How could this be possible when the lifestyle and values of the subaltern leadership were the same values the subaltern movement aimed to dismantle?

The Kenyan experience was a characteristic case of Western hegemony and neo-colonialism invading the opposition ranks and forcing the new political movement to confine itself to programmes which sustained Western metanarratives about social progress. Disillusioned by this development, Kenya's foremost historian, B.A. Ogot, comments:

> These were the people (Western patrons) who could give them (African oppositionists) fame and protection..... They had to support neo-liberal policies of the Western governments in order to earn recognition (Ogot, 1995:240).

Elsewhere, Ogot decried the lack of innovation on the side of those leaders who were clamouring for the second liberation. From their writings and statements, published in papers, journals and magazines, it was evident that Kenya's opposition leaders had simply swallowed the whole Western political tradition, with human rights forming the main principle behind their civil society (Ibid.: 240:241). Some like Odinga and Anyang' Nyong'o had only a few years back been Marxists (another Western variant of social transformation) but were now supporting Western neo-liberalism. This was rather tragic because by oscillating from one Western metanarrative to another, the leaders overlooked the input of the African cultural values in bringing about meaningful change to their set goal of decolonizing Kenya.

Consequently, the lack of political creativity in both the Kenyatta and Moi states seemed also to be the disease of the opposition. As one person summarized the opposition in Kenya:

> They are all former KANU functionaries and they will be worse off than Moi if they were allowed to take over government (Kisuya O.I., 2000).

Both groups in the political process were hence preoccupied with chasing after Eurocentric ideologies, values and forms of knowledge, only to miserably end up proving the European stereotypes of African people that blacks were lazy, irresponsible and unable to create anything of their own (Hegel, 1944:93:94). While Moi's repression was sustained by the all-embracing Western colonial political and social structures, Odinga's socialism was derived from the universalizing European political thought called Marxism. Both Odinga and Moi were therefore bitter enemies who were merely contesting over the appropriateness of European ideologies in resolving the social problems of Kenya. On their own, Odinga (along with his supporters in the opposition) and Kenyatta or even Moi, had nothing to offer in terms of building a unique cultural and political entity which carried a real African or, as it were, Kenyan identity.

The foregoing assessment captures the fundamental crisis facing the decolonization of Africa, today. The Post-colonial theoretical prospectus invites scholars to appreciate this reality by suggesting that true liberation should be found in the realm of culture because it is only in that domain that formerly colonized *others* could dismantle forms of knowledge authorized and authored by West. The process involves recognizing the value and identity of cultural features of formally colonized *others* struggling against European hegemony. However, notwithstanding the shortcomings in the struggle for liberation in Kenya, the ultimate embracing of a multiparty political culture marked a meaningful, though modest, step into the decolonization track. Multi-party politics still has the capacity to expand the political as well as the cultural space that are crucial to true decolonization. It seems to me that by the year 1992, the struggle against

colonialism, had not yet been won by the people of Kenya. Thus, the struggle had to continue.

5.3 Conclusion

In this Chapter, we have outlined the workings of the Moi state. It has been observed that in establishing his neo-colonial state, Kenyatta displaced Europeans and embarked on a deliberate efforts to *Kikuyunize* Kenya's public sector. Similarly, on taking over power, Moi pledged to follow ' Kenyatta's footsteps, (translated in Kiswahili as 'nyayos'). However, by following Kenyatta's footsteps, Moi was not going to retain Kenyatta's Kikuyu supporters. Following footsteps meant using Kenyatta's methodology in order to strengthen his own grip on power. Slowly but carefully, Moi began to de-*Kikuyunize* the public sector, while at the same time *Kalenjinizing* the cabinet, civil service and the military. In doing this, he maintained a methodological and structural continuity with the Kenyatta state.

Once he was secure in power, Moi employed the services of political advisers from his own ethnic community led by such powerful figures as Nicholas Biwott and Henry Kosgey. These advisers determined the direction of the political process and the fate of political opponents. Like the Kenyatta state, the Moi state was intolerant to opposition. The new Moi neo-colonial state was sustained by brutal repression, detention, as well as the political intimidation of perceived opponents. The state also thrived on corruption, as well as on economic and social mismanagement. Unfortunately for Moi, the end of the 'Cold War' forced him to espouse multi-party politics because the Western nations (on whose support the neo-colonial state of Kenya depended) did not find the country strategically viable any more.

But the Moi state invented new methods of maintaining itself in power. State-sponsored terrorism, often called tribal clashes, became Moi's new strategy to fight off the opposition. Close allies of Moi's, most of them from his own Rift Valley Province issued inflammatory statements asking 'foreigners' to leave the province. In this onslaught, ethnic communities such as the Luo, Kikuyu and Luhya were targeted because they were perceived to be anti-Moi. Citing Fanon, we have demonstrated, through the Moi state, the inability of the nation-state in Africa to meet the expectations of the people. It has not been lost on us that under the Moi regime, just like under the Kenyatta state, the struggle for decolonization was undermined by the tendency to fight one Western metanarrative by striving to substitute it by another Western grand-narrative. Opposition figures in Kenya were victims of this tragedy. By 1992, most of the forces involved in the decolonization process had been scattered, detained forced into exile, intimidated and defeated. Kenya had not, strictly speaking, been decolonized. Nevertheless, we have argued that the struggle against the Moi state, whether violent or non-violent was the struggle for decolonization. In the next Chapter, we attempt a summary of the findings of the study while at the same time making a couple of conclusions.

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Over the last five chapters, efforts have been made to interrogate Frantz Fanon in the light of the Kenyan decolonization experience. In Chapter One, the main features of the research project have been outlined. It has been pointed out that, in addition to creating a permanent crisis of identity among the African people, imposition of colonial rule in Kenya carried with it far-reaching social, political and economic implications. The chapter has also demonstrated that British colonialism in Kenya embraced two fundamental phases namely, the formal and the informal variants. Formal colonialism begins around 1895 and ends in 1963. On the other hand, the symbolic withdrawal of the Europeans from Kenya as a result of the granting of independence ushered in the era of neo-colonialism. We have referred to this phase as representing the Africanization of European colonialism.

With the installation of colonial rule, the colonial state was born. The state was installed to fight societal antagonisms, to control the people and effect economic and social policies. In many ways, the colonial state in Kenya domesticated most of the values and contents of a modern Western state. Thus, the colonial state in Kenya was also an instrument for propagating Western modernity together with its universalizing and totalizing tendencies. It has been demonstrated too that under formal colonialism, the colonial state worked side by side with a repressed 'nation'. Evidently, the colonial state represents the material or the outer domain of the colonial society, but the nation marks out the spiritual or the inner domain of the same society. In this case, the material level was controlled by the Europeans but the spiritual by Africans. Nationalism in

Kenya developed our of the spiritual domain which was sovereign to the Africans. At independence, the political entity that was born was a hybrid of materiality and spirituality. The struggle for independence derived its poetry from the spirituality of the nation. But once independence had been won, the new leaders continued to rule using the principles embraced in the materiality of the colonial state. This marked the birth of a nation-state, together with its dilemmas and its numerous crises of identity.

Because the entire research project revolves around the appropriation of Frantz Fanon's thoughts to the Kenyan decolonization experience, a brief history of the thinker has been attempted in Chapter One. Fundamentally, we have highlighted Fanon's African roots, his early childhood in French Martinique, his experiences with French colonialism, his participation in World War II and his ultimate migration, first to France then later to Algeria. Furthermore, the brief history has illuminated the Western roots of Fanon's thoughts. Indeed, the influence on Fanon by such Western scholars as Marx, Lenin, Lacan, Maus, Satre and Hegel has also been underscored. Understanding the influence of these Western thinkers has helped us not only to appreciate the various ways in which Fanon interpreted colonialism, but also the strategies he advocated in order to dismantle Western imperial domination. Fanon came to believe that with all its brutalities, racism, forms of alienation and economic exploitation, colonialism had been installed and maintained by violence. Consequently, he concluded, colonialism had to be dismantled by counter-violence.

The literature review presented in Chapter One has demonstrated that various works have so far been produced on the decolonization of Kenya. However, all the works indicate that first, no effort has been undertaken to rethink the ideas of Frantz

Fanon within the context of Kenya's struggle against formal and informal colonialism in Kenya. Second, most of the works seem to celebrate the end of decolonization as a result of the granting of independence in 1963. Thus in terms of justification and significance, our current research has addressed the above gaps. Furthermore, it has tried to subject Fanon's ideas, which developed out of a French colonial system, to an alternative British colonial framework in order to ascertain if his conclusions are applicable to all forms of colonial arrangements.

In Chapter two, we have made efforts to identify and address some of the major zones of conflicts during the colonial period. Specifically, we have dealt with the land problem, the administrative and military frontier, the European town, the educational imbalance, the taxation and labour crisis as well as the calamity of political marginalization. Some of these zones of conflict, especially those dealing with taxation, education and political marginalization were ignored in Fanon's analysis of Algeria. However, in analyzing the Kenyan experience, we have gone beyond Fanon and highlighted these important omissions. Generally, the Chapter has argued that the source of conflict in colonial Kenya revolved around the resilience of the colonial authorities in wanting to prove and maintain the African inferiority, on the one hand, and the struggle by most African dispossessed groups to reject this prejudice, on the other. True, we have shown that Africans did not take colonial oppression passively. Africans resisted colonialism through the establishment of independent churches, through ethnic political organizations, through demonstrations, through the press and through the trade union movement. Colonialists responded to the African protests by intimidating the voices of

dissension. In many ways, conflicts obtaining in the above signified some forms of violence from the colonizer and the colonized.

Chapter three focuses on the making of violence in colonial Kenya and pays special attention to the Mau Mau era. Given that Frantz Fanon believed that violence was a liberating force in any colonial situation, this Chapter is significant. We have demonstrated that colonial violence came from both the colonizer and the colonized. However, we have also dismissed Fanon's view that the violence of the colonized necessarily emanated from the colonizer's violence. This dichotomy overlooks the fact that every human being regardless of race has an inherent potential to be violent. Thus, it would be wrong to imagine that Africans lacked this inherent capacity to violence just as it is untenable to think that the African counter-violence is the one which had been absorbed from the conquerors, internalized and released back to Europeans. Such logic assumes that without European violence, there would be no violence among the African people.

The chapter has also examined how the land alienation policies, and the psychological abuses embraced in obscenities provided a conducive atmosphere for the eventual outbreak of the Mau Mau movement. The fundamental aspects of European violence and African counter-violence during the Mau Mau era have also been highlighted with special emphasis on the destruction of property and loss of human lives. However, while the Mau Mau espoused violence, moderate political figures such as Kenyatta and Gichuru denounced the movement and declared their intentions to pursue independence through peaceful means. We have attempted a Fanonian interpretation of this by attributing the activities of the moderates to their Western socialization and their

reluctance to demolish structures of a system they so eagerly wanted to inherit. On this point, Fanon refers to the likes of Gichuru, Kenyatta and Mathu as traitors who, by being members of the bourgeoisie middle class, could not be entrusted with the responsibility of decolonizing their respective communities and dismantling colonialism as well. It is in the peasantry class that Fanon invested so much hope and expectations with regard to the programme of deceolonization. This cadre, Fanon believed, was appropriate because it had not benefited from Westernization and colonization. Their memory of colonialism, unlike the middle class, was a memory of brutality and misery.

Yet, the move by the moderates to negotiate with the colonizer raises critical question marks about Fanon's generalized assumption that decolonization, was always a violent process. Indeed, it is true that the Mau Mau violence led to the murder of Chief Waruhiu, Chief Nderi and even Chief Luka Wakahangara. It is also true that both the Mau Mau and European violence destroyed lives and property. Europeans worked hard to bombard Mau Mau hideouts while at the same time detaining, intimidating and sentencing to death those captured alive or those suspected to be supporters of the movement. But, even in the glaring face of this violence, it was the moderate political personalities who finally negotiated for eventual independence- thereby, once more, disapproving the view that decolonization is always a violent phenomenon. The struggle for decolonization in Kenya was both violent and non-violent. Both strategies, though aimed at decolonization, ended up without achieving that noble objective of freeing the country from Western domination and exploitation. The violent forces were militarily defeated while the non-violent factions were socialized to accept the Africanization of European colonialism.

It has also been demonstrated in the chapter that the modernist binaries of for instance, self/other, colonizer/colonized do not give us a fulfilling opportunity to analyse and understand colonial relations in Kenya. Colonial Kenya was a diversity with some Asians such as Makhan Singh fighting alongside Africans while some Africans including chiefs like Nderi and Waruhiu throwing their sympathies behind Europeans. The path to independence, it has been observed, was skillfully prepared to exclude violent factions including Mau Mau warriors. In fact, as we have argued, Jomo Kenyatta almost missed his seat at independence because the Europeans had falsely suspected him of being Mau Mau. At independence, the British handed over power to political figures who had the characteristics of a Western European man except for their skin colour. In this way, the main pillars of colonialism were maintained beyond British rule in Kenya.

It cannot be emphasized enough that the attainment of political independence in Kenya did not signal the end of colonialism. At independence, the colonial state simply transformed itself into a neo-colonial political entity. Chapter Four has highlighted this reality by focusing on the chief characteristics of the Kenyatta state. It has been observed that, from 1963 onwards, Kenyatta replaced the colonial Governor and continued to base his rule on the fundamental pillars which defined colonialism in its formal perspective. It has been noted that during colonialism, the Governor favoured his fellow Europeans, accorded them privileges and comforts which the Africans never enjoyed. The chapter has demonstrated that under the Kenyatta State, the president transferred settler privileges and comforts to members of his family and to several personalities from his own Kikuyu ethnic community. Apart from enhancing Kikuyu appointments in the Civil Service, the

cabinet and the military, the President extended favours and allocated national resources to his family, friends and ethnic community members.

Formal colonialism perpetuated poverty, landlessness, poor educational facilities and political as well economic peripherization. Under hegemonic colonialism, the Kenyatta state continued to perpetuate these ills. Furthermore, like its Euro-colonial counterpart, Kenyatta's neo-colonial state was sustained by intimidation and harassment of political opponents, assassinations and detention of opposition personalities. Thus, in its neo-colonial disposition, the Kenyatta state violated individual and societal freedoms. As a typical Hegelian Master, Jomo Kenyatta refused to recognize his bondsmen (the colonized or is it the neo-colonized?). But instead of the bondsman espousing inactivity, because of self-negation, as Hegel and Fanon would have expected, the Kenyan bondsman, under Kenyatta's overlordship, fought against oppression in various ways. Through leaders like Bildad Kaggia, Oginga Odinga, Jean Marie Seroney, Martin Shikuku and J.M. Kariuki, the people of Kenya expressed their disaffection against the neo-colonial state presided over by Jomo Kenyatta. Furthermore, literary scholars such as, Abdulatif Abdalla, Grace Ogot, Okot p'Bitek, Taban Lo Liyong and Ngugi wa Thiong'o, among others added their voices against the Kenyatta State. Yet just like the colonial state before it, the Kenyatta State had been structured to withstand and defeat popular opposition against it, through repression, intimidation and manipulation. Consequently, upon his death in 1978, Kenyatta left behind a glaring legacy of a much more strengthened neo-colonial state. Since nothing, except the skin colour of the colonizer, had changed, Kenya remained under the yoke of colonialism and continued to serve the interests of the Western imperial project.

Fundamentally, Chapter Five argues that when Daniel arap Moi took power after the death of Kenyatta, he continued with the colonial tendencies which informed his predecessor's state. This Chapter has outlined the chief elements of the Moi state and demonsrated that while Kenyatta *Kikuyunized* Kenya's public life, Moi followed a similar path when he undertook to *Kalenjinize* the social institutions of neo-colonial Kenya. We have demonstrated that Moi enlisted the services of advisers from his own ethnic community including such politically inexperienced figures as Nicholas Biwott and Henry Kosgey.

Apart from highlighting biases evident during the Moi rule, this chapter has also brought to the fore, cases of political intolerance, economic mismanagement and land grabbing. In addition, the chapter has pointed out the various aspects of the struggle between the Moi state and the university students and lecturers; the Moi state and its own internal rebels in KANU, the Moi state and the church, the Moi state and the Law Society of Kenya and the Moi state and the political dissidents outside KANU. The repressive policies of the system which legitimized torture, police brutality and detention without trial and politically instigated ethnic clashes have been pointed out. It has, however, been recognized that although various groups in Kenya fought hard to decolonize the country by dismantling the basic structures of the Moi state, in the end, the state survived the onslaught by manipulating and defeating the liberation forces. The problems of the liberation forces in Kenya were compounded further when it became clear that most of the members of the movement for change were unable to create any meaningful political agenda beyond the Eurocentric tradition. It was a case of condemning one form of Eurocentric variant of development and replacing with another Eurocentric alternative.

By 1992, when Kenya espoused a multi-party political culture, true decolonization remained a mirage.

In his informative essay, 'The Pitfalls of National Consciousness' (already cited), Frantz Fanon has demonstrated that the new nation-state in Africa would fail to meet the expectations of its people. Obviously, the structures of both the Kenyatta and Moi states represent a telling confirmation of Fanon's pessimism. However, like all socialist-oriented personalities in Kenya, Fanon's socialist prescription for the deteriorating African condition turned out to be yet another Western meta-discourse. The challenging question is: should we in Africa always look to the West in order to obtain solutions to our social problems? Can't we, on our own, be creative enough to solve our own problems. Isn't it time the West began to borrow from us rather than us borrowing unreasonably from the West? These and many other questions represent the moral spirit behind the current research.

The research project was based on four fundamental premises. First, the study proposed that Fanon's ideas on decolonization could adequately account for all the intricate aspects of Kenya's colonial experience. Our research has pointed out a couple of limitations in the Fanonian conclusions and argued that generalized assumptions could hardly give satisfying analyses of such complex diversities as the Kenyan colonial experience. For example, we have pointed out that Fanon's Western European intellectual background influenced him to prescribe untenable European-based solutions to the African condition. Fanon, for instance, condemned capitalism, which was a European economic system, and advocated for socialism which was another European-

based social arrangement. But as we have argued, both socialist and capitalist regimes were a gigantic failure in Africa.

Taking into account the unique African cultural situation, there is an urgent need to generate new strategies for the continent's social transformation. Only through this creative approach can Africa hope to achieve true and authentic decolonization.

Concerning Fanon's emancipatory capacity of violence, the study has raised a couple of objections. For example it, has been observed that not all violence is cathartic and not all violence is a reflection of inaction, despair or inferiority complex. However, the study agrees that violence could still serve as a unifying force. Yet when one looks at the moderate politicians who negotiated for Kenya's independence, one notices that these personalities were united by their common hatred for political violence which again weakens Fanon's standpoint.

Second, the study proposed that conflict in colonial Kenya revolved around issues of social justice, political margainalization and exploitation. By giving examples of several crises in the fields of land, education, taxation, the European town, racism, political peripherization and labour, we confirmed the validity of this premise. However, despite that confirmation, the study recognizes that every-day life in colonial Kenya was not always centred on these issues alone. We have alluded to the fact that life in the Kenya colony also embraced, eating habits, sexual attitudes, culture and many other issues which scholars never have time to address as they write the history of Kenya. The questions which linger on are: were all Kenyans interested in the struggle against colonialism? Can we say that every black Kenyan wanted Europeans to go? Can we also state that in the struggle against colonialism, each and every Kenyan wished to dismantle

both the Kenyatta and Moi states? The overall answer to these questions is, No! Generalized conclusions about diverse entities such as Kenya's could be misleading to scholars.

Third, it proposed that pervasive violence was occasioned by the fact that violence was part and parcel of any society and was not therefore unique to colonial Kenya. We have already signified that every human society regardless of its colour or creed, could be violent depending on the crises confronting it. We have dismissed the view that African violence in colonial Kenya was originated and controlled by Europeans. Certainly, Africans were also capable of expressing their own violence in their own ways without necessarily internalizing the violence from the external forces. Our first premise was therefore confirmed.

Fourth, the study proposed that, in Kenya, colonialism did not end with the attainment of political independence. In the spirit of the postmodernist and the postcolonialist thinking, our study has gone beyond the 'great story', the 'obvious story' we are used to. We have refused to adopt the tiresome story which equates independence with decolonization or which views the Africanization of colonialism as being equivalent to the end of the decolonization struggle. Quite strongly, this study views the period between 1895 and 1992 as symbolizing a reveting struggle against colonial domination in Kenya. Notably, both the Kenyatta and Moi states epitomize not only crucial stages of imperial continuity in Kenya, but they also exemplify colonialism in its most intricate composition.

Overall, this study has interpreted its data through the post-modernist and post-colonialist theoretical categories of analysis. Through the post-modernist standpoint we

have been able to argue that colonialism was part and parcel of the modernist project which had its cardinal objective, the inspiration to spread European modernity from the center which is Europe to the peripheral which includes Africa and many non-white zones of the world. Through modernization, the rest of the world has been subjected to certain universalizing values and institutions that are only relevant in Europe but not at all in other parts of the world. The postmodernist thought questions these universal parameters within the European cultural dispensation. Thus, when scholars like Nietzsche and Heidegger questioned the dictatorship of modernity they had in mind the hope that, within the European cultural fabric, there is diversity and difference which needs to be celebrated.

On the other hand, the post-colonialist thinking represents a specific movement, outside European modernity, against Eurocentric forms of knowledge which have come to define the identity of the colonized people. Our post-colony begins soon after the imposition of colonial rule in the 1890s and continues beyond the independence watershed. Thus, formal colonialism and neo-colonialism are critical variants of and stages of the post-colonial experience. As it has been argued, postcolonialism brings into focus the need to dismantle structures and forms of knowledge authored and authorized by the West. Postcolonialism is, therefore, a rebellion against the Western representation of the *Other* and a deliberate effort by the *Other* to free themselves from such representations. As we have noted, postcolonialism unlike postmodernism, has a sense of agency upon which new structures could be established in order to restore a respectful identity for the dispossessed subalterns of the colonial experience.

Thus, postcolonialism has a liberation agenda. But it is not the sort of liberation which the West would approve of. It is not obviously the sort of liberation Kenya was hoodwinked to celebrate about in 1963. It is a liberation that takes cognizance of the peoples' diversities and differences. It is a liberation which fights inferiority complexes and which restores the dignity of the colonized people. Indeed, it is a liberation which does not privilege European culture and its structures. Given that our independence was fake, because we still continued with the values and standards set by Europeans, decolonization was never realized even after independence. The postcolonial theoretical domain accounts for this intricate post-independent colonialism. Precisely, post colonialism, as we have argued, represents a critical focus on colonialism both in its formal and in its hegemonic phase. In brief, by employing both the postmodern and the postcolonial devices, the current study represents a conscious effort to celebrate intellectual diversity and difference that are crucial for the realization of true freedom, and true liberation in human societies.

In conclusion, it needs to be observed that such a complicated and contradictory personality as Frantz Fanon is not easy to study. At one time, he poses as a pure medical doctor. At another, he is a political activist and social theoretician. We see Fanon espousing European values and their prejudices against blacks. But later, we also notice a Fanon who is struggling to defend the African people against European biases. Frantz Fanon prescribes the grand narrative of socialism for Africa yet he articulates profound pessimism about the viability of the new African nation-state. Consequently, bearing in mind the enigmatic personality of Fanon, this study has made attempts to appropriate

only some of the man's ideas to the Kenyan decolonization process. This is because it is not practical to handle the ideas of Fanon all at once.

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Timothy Ruoro	O.I	May 20, 2001
William Nyongesa	O.I	March 24, 2001
Festo Mwaturo	O.I	March 9, 2001

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Chemjor Kimtai	O.I	April 26, 1999
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Maina Mugo	O.I	May 17, 2000
Jackson Wangamati	O.I	June 2, 2001
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Kanampiu Wa Mugweru	O.I	February 26, 2000
Kaggia Bildad	O.I	May 14, 1999
Dedan Wanyoike	O.I	April 10, 1999
Kimani Muchiri	O.I	November 17,2000
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Jamson Gitau	O.I	July 4, 1999
Dismas Chege	O.I	November 18, 2001
Ngure wa Kamande	O.I	March 5, 1999
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Mburu wa Mbugua	O.I	January 28, 2001
Wairimo Karanja	O.I	January, 29, 2000
James Kairo	O.I	February 27, 2000
Maina Kibugi	O.I	March 8, 2000
Joseph Mugo	O.I	May 12, 2000
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Tom Isiye	O.I	March 17, 2001
Andrea Nakhosi	O.I	March 19, 2001
Mwenya Muniafu	O.I	March 20, 2001
Mark Barasa	O.I	April 3, 2001
William Malisia	O.I	April 4, 2001
Emmanuel Kimtai	O.I	January 10, 1999
Peter Kisuya	O.I	February 17, 1999
Moses Ndirangu	O.I	February 23, 1999
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