

**LOGISTICS AND PREPAREDNESS OF THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY
FORCE FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

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S202/OL/CTY/32408/2016**

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES
IN THE SCHOOL OF SECURITY, DIPLOMACY AND PEACE
STUDIES OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY**

JULY 2019

DECLARATION

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASF:	African Standby Force
AMIS:	African Union Mission in Sudan
CEWS:	Continental Early Warning System
CLB:	Continental Logistics Base
CMCC:	Continental Movement Coordination Center
EAC:	East African Community
EASF:	Eastern Africa Standby Force
EASFCOM:	Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism
ECCAS:	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MOU:	Memorandum of Understanding
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
PSC:	Peace and Security Council
RECs:	Regional Economic Communities
RLD:	Regional Logistics Depot
RMCC:	Regional Movement Coordination Center
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
KII:	Key Informant Interviews

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Complex humanitarian emergency: This is a situation that is occasioned by gross violation of human rights leading to collapse of public support delivery system.

Conflict: A situation where there are two or more distinct groups pursuing incompatible goals in conscious opposition to each other.

Contingent: This is a combat troop contributed by a particular country for a peace support operation.

Follow-on forces: When the task at hand is overwhelming, additional forces are deployed to reinforce the troops deployed initially.

Full operational capability: This term has been variedly defined in the AU context as the capacity and readiness of the AU through the regional Standby Forces to deploy a multidimensional force composed variedly of military, police and civilian components within the APSA structure, in situations of actual or potential violent conflict eruption, to intervene in respect of grave circumstances within the stated periods.

Intervention dilemma: A situation in which the command leadership has to strike a balance in protecting the civilians, protecting own force and destruction of the insurgents while at the same time accomplishing the mission.

Interoperability: The ability of different national armies being able to operate in a joint exercise or mission.

Level I, II & III Hospitals: The UN has variedly categorized hospitals in peace support operations, grading them from Level I (lowest) to III (highest) based on the

availability of different categories of facilities and ability to offer varied levels of services.

Logistics: In the context of a peace operation, logistics is defined as the science of planning and conducting the movement, sustenance and maintenance of forces and equipment. This study will focus on in-service and operational logistics, which entails the acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of the equipment and stores that are needed for operations, the transportation of personnel to the mission area (strategic lift), within the mission area (in-country movement), and from the mission area, the acquisition or furnishing of services such as catering, medical, cleaning and postal services.

Mandate: This is a military assigned duty that should be accomplished by the troops at host country.

Military intervention: This involves the threat to use or actual use of military forces across international boundaries by a nation or coalition of nations with the aim of preventing or ending widespread grave human right violations of individuals or communities. This may happen without the consent or authorization of the state whose territory is the object of the intervention.

Missions: These are military assignments that are meant to neutralize the belligerents thus ending the hostilities.

Mission scenarios: Guidelines under which EASF is supposed to operate.

Peace support operations: These are military operations that are conducted in an area undergoing violent armed conflicts. It's geared towards making the armed groups submit to ceasefire agreement.

ABSTRACT

Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) is one of the sub-regional forces of the African Standby Force (ASF) whose objective is to maintain regional peace and security. EASF structure is composed of three main branches, namely the EASF Headquarters, the Logistics Base and the Planning Elements. The EASF had purposed to achieve full operational capability by developing an operationally ready, multidimensional integrated Standby Force, equipped and ready for deployment by 2015, having attained initial operational capability in 2010. However, whether this has been achieved is still debatable. The Force has been faced with many challenges in its endeavor to be fully operational. The general objective of the study was to determine the relationship between logistics and the preparedness of the EASF for Peace Support Operations. The specific objectives of the study were: to establish the relationship between personnel logistics and preparedness of the EASF for Peace Support Operations, determine the impact of facilities and related services on for Peace Support Operations EASF, and determine the impact of equipment readiness on preparedness of the EASF for Peace Support Operations. Descriptive research design was adopted as it enabled the collection of relevant data which helped in answering the questions concerning the topic of study. The target population for the study was EASF planning element staff based in Karen Nairobi. Simple random sampling was used in selecting 50 military staff, 14 civilian staff and 5 police staff which formed 69 sample size from the target population. Semi structured questionnaire was used in data collection. Data obtained was analyzed using SPSS version 20 and narrations from open ended questions. The study found that logistics played a pivotal role in preparedness of EASF. Proper logistics for personnel, facilities and related services and equipment readiness had significant relations to the preparedness of EASF for peace support operations. Limited funds, environmental issues, lack of airlifts and adequate shipping transportation means, Personnel logistics, lack of sophisticated and high level technological equipment were challenges affecting the preparedness of EASF. The study recommends more cohesion among member states in supporting EASF through funding and pledged forces and equipment. The study further recommended improvement in participation of police and civilian components in most of the operation. Lastly the study recommended the need for enhancing early warning systems and acquisition of high level technologies equipment that can outdo those of the negative forces.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

This chapter outlines the background information, the global and local perspective of logistics and preparedness, statement of the problem, research objectives and the research questions, justification, scope and possible limitations of the study.

1.1 Background to the Study

In the post-cold war period, an escalation of conflicts and wars in different parts of the world was evident a fact that made collective responses and cooperation at the global, regional, sub-regional and national levels necessary. The United Nations (UN) is an organization that was formed with the aim of maintaining international peace and security by promoting a collective security system that would deal with major issues that adversely affected global peace and security (Menkhaus, 2013).

According to Prunier, (2014) the UN is the foundation upon which the current concept of collective security in the world is built. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for “*pacific settlement of disputes before referring such disputes to the United Nations Security Council*” by regional organizations for example the EU and the AU. Despite the existence of challenges, the UN as the present basis of collective security organizations has provided the framework for managing conflicts thus reducing tensions among states in the international community.

The thought of establishing a military force for Africa has its origins in the early 1960s when President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana suggested that African High Command should be established to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity

of African states that had just acquired independence (Girmachew, 2015). However, this noble idea could not be realized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) because of many reasons, among them being the prevailing Cold War conflicts and politics, personal ambitions and differences of the African leaders and structural weakness of both the OAU and its member states (Dier, 2013).

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) sought to have a more robust role than its predecessor in handling issues of peace and security within the continent (Van der Waag, 2014). In order to harmonize the continent's numerous security initiatives and to ensure the efficient utilization of resources, the AU, through its framework of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), established the concept of an African Standby Force (ASF) as an agency for collective security in the continent.

The African Standby Force (ASF) was established after the adoption of two important documents. The first document is the Constitutive Act of the AU, which provides the organization with the right to intervene in member states during crisis; while the second is "The Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union" (PSC Protocol), which led to the establishment of ASF which was to be used to implement of the right of to intervene (Wolfers, 2012). The ASF is therefore the wing that is used by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to execute its mandate.

The African Standby Force consists of standby forces from five sub-regional brigades based on Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (these are Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS));or Regional Mechanisms (RMs) as is the case with the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) (Spillman et al., 2013).

The EASF is the ASF for Eastern Africa region whose aim is to contribute peace and stability in the region and the continent at large. The EASF was initially under the coordination of IGAD, a situation which was resisted by the non IGAD member states. This resistance led to the formation of Eastern Africa Brigade Coordinating Mechanism (EASBRICOM) as an independent body to coordinate its activities. EASBRICOM was later renamed the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) (Robinson, 2014).

One of the objectives of the EASF is to have a Logistic System that is able to support the deployment and sustainment of the regional force, fully operational by the end of 2015. Effective logistic support is a critical requirement if the civilian, military and police personnel are to be able to fulfill their mandates in deployment in complex peace support operations. It is essential for the health and safety of peace operators, as well as the mission's capacity to provide support to other actors in the area of operation, including the host nation governmental and non-governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies. Moreover, the way in which logistics support is provided has the potential to undermine or support the peace process (Coleman, 2014).

Since attaining full operational capability in the year 2014, the EASF has not undertaken a major peace support operation in the region or elsewhere. However, it has played some limited roles in peace support activities, to include; training,

providing military advisors, conducting observer missions and fact finding missions. For example, it sent a fact finding mission to Somalia when the AU requested so as to aide in decision making (Bouhuys, 2011). Notwithstanding, the force is yet to deploy in a peace support operation despite the prevailing circumstances that may have necessitated such a deployment.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In 2004, under the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework, the Africa Union (AU) established the African Standby Force (ASF), a multinational peacekeeping force that was to intervene and bring to an end violent conflict in the continent. However, the African continent continues to face many security challenges (Dickson, 2014). Eastern Africa region has suffered some of the world's longest and most bloody wars with notable conflicts still continuing in Somali, Sudan and southern Sudan. These have resulted in many deaths, influx of refugees and IDPS (Coleman, 2011).

Despite the attainment of full operational capability, the EASF is still ill prepared for a peace support operation deployment. This was aptly illustrated by the Burundi Crisis in December 2015, when after violent clashes between the Burundian Army and the rebel groups, the African Union authorized the deployment of a 5,000 strong peace keeping mission. Despite the challenges in the diplomatic front towards securing legitimacy and consent, there was a major challenge in mobilizing a force for deployment.

Although one of the goals of the EASF is to have a logistics system that is able to support the deployment and sustainment of the regional force, there is limited knowledge on whether the system in place is effective. The failure by the EASF to put this system into practice by deploying a force when opportunities to do so have been present is an indicator of underlying challenges (Bayeh, 2014).

There is limited research examining the relationship between logistics and preparedness of the EASF for Peace Support Operations. Studies done have focused on political challenges facing the EASF. For example, Ochieng (2012) studied the challenges facing the Eastern African Community in conflict intervention: a study of Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) as Regional Security Mechanism. Bayeh (2014) studied the Eastern Africa Standby Force: Roles, Challenges and Prospects. These studies are limited in explaining the logistical challenges that the organization faces. This study therefore aimed at establishing the relationship between logistics and preparedness of the Eastern African Standby Force for Peace Support Operations.

1.3 General Objective

To determine the relationship between logistics and preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were:

- I. To establish the relationship between personnel logistics systems and preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations.
- II. To find out the impact of facilities and related services on preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations.
- III. To determine the impact of equipment readiness on preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations.

1.4 Research Questions

The research questions for the study were:

- I. What is the relationship between personnel logistics and the preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations?
- II. To what extent does facilities and related services impact on preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations?
- III. How does equipment readiness challenges impact on the preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study is of great value to the EASF which may use it in policy implementation and capacity building in order to make the institution stronger and better prepared to meet future challenges. The research enables the regional governments of Eastern African nations to make policy decisions which can help strengthen the EASF. The study is also significant to the entire continent of Africa and more so to the Regional Standby Forces in their endeavor to ensure collective security. The study may also offer a guide to other collective security mechanisms whether within the African Continent or across the globe.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study addressed the relationship between logistics and the preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations. Within this scope, the study was interested in identifying the different ways in which logistics influence the preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations, establish how personnel movement, evacuation and hospitalization impact on preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations, examine the impact of facilities and related services on the preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations as well as well as to determine the equipment readiness challenges to the preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations. The study was conducted at the EASF Headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya.

1.7 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

As anticipated access to information for the study was a limitation because of the military nature of the organization. To counter this, the researcher made appointment with key respondents and explained the purpose of the study and had to send online sheet due to unavailability of some respondents. Some of the information were accessed from the organization website such as reports, meetings progression etc. The study maintained high level of confidentiality in handling any information given by the respondents. The information was grouped to ensure it does not openly reveal the name or suggest who the respondent was.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a brief review of critical literature that was considered important in this research. The chapter highlights the theoretical review which outlines different variables, a well-defined conceptual framework, an empirical review, critique and a summary of the whole chapter and research gaps identified from the reviewed literature.

2.2 Empirical Review

2.2.1 Relationship between Personnel Logistics System and EASF Preparedness

Hodali (2017) posits that EASF is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents of civilians, police and military components from different member states, ready to quickly deploy in 6 different conflict scenarios. He further noted that missions like African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) lacked the required number of personnel to fulfill its mandate of protection of civilians in Darfur. According to (Kasumba and Debrah, 2010) EASF peace keepers are selected and trained for joint missions to be rapidly deployed in six different scenarios corresponding to the type of crises prevailing.

Despite the fact that the AU RECs/RMs have signed MOUs on troop contributions, Debrah (2013) asserted that troop deployment and MOUs are two different things altogether. She stated that in an instance, Ghana pledged a helicopter squadron to ECOWAS for PSOs but could not redeem the pledge when it was called upon because it had earlier on deployed that same Squadron under a UN Peace Mission. Therefore,

she stated, “signing a MOU is the means but the actual deployment is a political decision depending on political-will and determination”.

According to Berouk (2014), EASF biggest problem is not one of raising the troops required, though this too remains a challenge to the AU peace endeavors. The biggest challenge, however, is having the capability for strategic lift and inland movement required to relocate forces from where they are to where they are needed and to provide sustenance for them. Given the huge expanse of Africa, and the limitations in terms of transport infrastructure, the only viable options of moving and supplying a Peace Keeping Force would be either by air or by sea.

According to Batware, (2011) few African nations have Naval Forces, and even then, they have very limited sea-lift capability, if any. This lack of sea lift, coupled with the poor rail linkages and poor road networks implies that the mode of transport that could be used to deploy a standby force would be airlift, but even this is really very limited. For instance, the EASF would be required to deploy over 5,200 troops, over 350 vehicles and tones of equipment, food, ammunition and other supplies. Moving this will pose a logistical nightmare to the ill equipped Eastern African states.

William and Hashi, 2016) posits that AMISOM troops do not have the necessary logistic resources to put an end to the terrorist actions of the Al-Shabaab militia. They further noted that the mission is at risk as the personnel lack helicopters and ships for mobility across the whole of Somali territory.

Derblom e al., (2008), noted that EASF is inadequately staffed in terms of numbers and professional experience. Staff appointment at EASF are made based on lines of national, political or equal geographical representation versus genuine and professional experience in related fields.

Conning and Kasumba (2010), observed that there are few trained and capable civilian and police elements ready for deployment if need arises thus compromising the aspects of multidimensionality. Although there is the Aide memoir by AU which outlines decision making procedures of all staff actions in missions, EASF is yet to adopt and implement most of these guidelines. They also discuss the importance of civilian training for peace keeping missions as most training have focused on military roles.

2.2.2 Facilities Support

Infrastructure availability is key for the effective and successful deployment of a peacekeeping force and also to enable it execute its mandate. The ASF is no exception and therefore emphasis must be laid upon the availability of the equipment and infrastructure (Pham, 2009). If these support infrastructures lacks, the effective execution of the mission will be in great jeopardy, implementation of the mandate hampered and the ability to respond to crises undermined.

According to Derblom e al., (2008) logistics and availability of troops are important but one needs also to have the capacity including; equipment, communication and transportation for sustained operation. The former force commander of the AU/UN Hybrid mission in Darfur, General Martin L. Agwai clearly illustrated this, in an interview. He stated thus: “The minimum, not the ideal but the minimum is 18 utility helicopters, and about 12 to 18 combat helicopters that can go to do reconnaissance and other things. As of today, there is no country in the world that has volunteered to give us that capability – zero. You must have heard about the attack we had on our camp in Haskanita when we lost 10 of our peacekeepers. After the attack we wanted to go to the area to move the injured. It took us about eight hours because the civil pilots could not take the risks if we had military helicopters, we would have been able to arrive much earlier and we may have been able to save may be one or two lives”. (Pham, 2009)

The AU has proposed to create one continental logistics base and regional logistics depots for each of the Regional Standby Forces. The objective of the continental logistics base will be to provide support for the establishment and provision of start-up equipment of mission and sector headquarters, Mission Forces (Troop/police

Contributing Countries) if there is critical inability by the country to meet their requirements, and provide non-military equipment and materiel for Military Experts on Mission, police and international and local civilian staff. Locations for the Logistics Bases have been identified, with the Continental Logistics Base situated in Douala, Cameroon and the EASF Logistics Base being located in Adis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, the bases are yet to be fully operationalized. In May 2009, the African Chiefs of Defence Forces made a decision in a meeting to speed up the establishment of the regional logistics depots and to slow down the development of the continental logistics depot. (Declaration at the sixth meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff and Heads of Safety and Security, 2009)

2.2.3 Equipment Readiness

According to Berouk (2014), successful Peace Support Operations require adequate logistics and equipment. Of critical importance are equipment such as helicopters, artillery assets and ground defense systems. However, African Militaries are plagued with ‘notoriously’ weak logistics capabilities. This has made most African states to be dependent on foreign governments and organizations such as the UN and AU to provide logistical support whenever they pledge forces for Peace Missions. EASF is not in a position to logistically support a PSO because it lacks adequate funding and is dependent, mostly, on external supports.

Robinson (2014) argues that better military hardware such as attack helicopters and artillery may be needed in certain situations, such as genocide. However, most African states would not sign up on the use of such equipment. This is because such weapons can be used in any states including those who contribute it, which is against

their national interests and thereby limits their commitments. The availability of air assets to move heavy equipment is also in doubt.

While rapidly deploying within 14 days, the force needs to be self-sustainable logistically at least for a month (Cilliers, 2015). However, how well equipped is EASF to do this is very doubtful. Hence, there is a lot to be done to develop a genuine logistical capability. This is because the question of logistical infrastructures comes before any deployment of force.

2.3 Summary of the Literature and Research gaps

Whereas logistics has been seen to play a major role in success of military operations, little has been studied on its relationship with preparedness of Regional Standby Forces in the AU context. It is therefore clear that there is need to examine this relationship in depth as regards the Eastern Africa Standby Force.

Hamad (2014) investigated the challenges affecting the implementation of the full operational capability by the Eastern Africa Standby Force. However, he only made a passing mention of logistics and failed to give it the weight it deserves. Roberts (2014) on the other hand based his study on regions outside Africa and since it can be argued that the military conditions of developed and emerging economies are somewhat different from those of a developing economies of the Eastern Africa Region, this study is likely to produce different outcomes.

Hodali (2017), studied the implementation of the responsibility of protect (R2P) norms by the African Standby Force in Sub-Saharan Africa. In his study he observed that lack of finance and logistic capabilities affected implementation of R2P. Logistics in this study were transport, communication and equipment. This study however did

not explore the relationship between personnel logistics and related services in the preparedness of EASF. The study covered all missions within Sub-Saharan Africa for AU, IGAD and ECOWAS.

Finally Conning and Kasumba (2010) explored the civilian dimension of the African Standby forces. This report concentrated on treatment, training and facilitation of civilian and police elements in various missions. This study reported inadequate staff at ASF, lack of professionalism and inadequate training. The study was however limited in exploring the relationship between logistics and preparedness of EASF for missions.

2.4 Theoretical Review

The study was guided by the following theories: Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and the Neo Liberal Institutionalism Theory.

2.4.1 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

In 2003, Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver published their book, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security” through which they advanced the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). In this theory Buzan and Weaver (2003) posits that security complexes cannot be narrowed down to the interactions of the state and the relations between states and politico-military issues; other types of security units and issues must also be put into consideration (Rummel, 2013).

In Eastern Africa, the effect of boundaries in regional security is significant. Most borders are not properly demarcated and therefore there are existing simmering tensions between neighboring states which have led to or have the potential to lead to overt conflicts. The RSCT and security complexes can be useful in providing a good

framework to discuss issues of threats and vulnerabilities that are endemic in the region (Curtis, 2014). If the solution can be found from within the context of the complex, then national security and international security policies for states can be made from within this context as well.

RSCT provides a framework for understanding the level of cooperation and coordination needed in the international system in order to bring to bear a credible logistical system and organization necessary for deployment of a peace support operation. The logistical capabilities are most often with the troop contributing countries and donor countries. The Regional security bodies, especially in Africa like the EASF still have no inherent logistical capacities or equipment of their own and their preparedness is hinged on the member countries pledges to provide them or support from donors.

2.4.2 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism Theory

The major proponents of this Theory are Robert Keohane, Robert Powell, and Joseph Nye. The Theory postulates that states can overcome their fear of the chaotic and anarchic international system through international cooperation by the formation of international institutions of cooperation (Daniels, 2012). The Neo-Liberal Institutionalists are optimistic of international institutions and advocates for their existence. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism assumes that states are utilitarian and rationalistic: they make their decisions based on cost and benefit analysis. Also, states are rational unitary actors which are interested in absolute gains (Omar, 2014). The theory advocates for cooperation among states in an anarchic international political environment that does not acknowledge hierarchy. It supports the existence of international institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United

Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) and further argues that these institutions facilitate international cooperation.

The coming together of African states to form the African Union (AU), with a common agenda depicts international cooperation, which aims at enabling states to maximize absolute gains, while trying to attain a common goal. In this situation, the common agenda here is peace and security for Africa and the operationalization of the EASF to serve as a force for actualizing peace and security goals of the continental body.

According to Oran R. Young, Joseph Nye and Robert Powell (2014), international institutions encourage compliance from states through the application of their mechanisms and states do attach great importance to the existence and the functioning of these institutions and preserve them regardless of cost. States support regional security bodies by financing their infrastructure, equipment and provision of other logistical support. For states to enjoy the benefits of regional cooperation and integration, they must also be willing to meet the costs of the regional body's existence.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework is a diagrammatic representation of variables within a study. It is important as it helps in interpretation of how various variables that is the independent and dependent variables interact or influence each other. This study adopted a conceptual framework where personnel logistics, equipment and facilities and related services were the independent variables under investigation on how they influenced preparedness of EASF which formed the dependent variable.

The study was interested in understanding how preparedness as a dependent variable was influenced by personnel logistics, equipment readiness and facilities and related services. However the study also noted that there were other intervening variables which are usually considered as other factors outside the ones under the study that would affect preparedness of EASF. For this study political will, interference by world powers and boundaries tension were considered as intervening variables. These is illustrated in figure 1 below.




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the practical procedures that were used in conducting the study. It provides the details on the research design adopted and its rationale and benefit to the entire study. The target population of study is also discussed and the reason as to why the choice impacted on the study. The chapter also elaborates the study sample and sampling procedures, discusses data collection instruments and the reason as to why the study employed them and presents data analysis technique and ethical considerations used for the study.

3.1 Research Design

The study adopted a descriptive survey design. This design was preferred because it was more effective and enabled the researcher to collect relevant data that answered the research questions. In addition, descriptive research helps to study and report on the situation as it exists and also helps a researcher in describing the attitudes, values and characteristics of a phenomenon (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). Orodho (2003), states that descriptive survey involves information collection through interviews or administering questionnaires to a sample population. This approach enabled the researcher to get an understanding of the relationship between logistics and preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force for Peace Support Operations.

3.2 Study Area

The study was conducted at the Eastern Africa Standby Force secretariat located in Karen, Nairobi; Kenya and partly the Logistics Base in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The secretariat consisted of the EASF planning elements and the Department of Peace

Support Operations. The study area was chosen because they are the headquarters and logistics center of the EASF and therefore provided adequate information and insights into the organization.

3.3 Target Population

According to Mugenda (2008), the target population is the entire set of similar items or objects that a researcher identifies in his or her research. The study targeted the staff of the EASF Secretariat based in Karen, Nairobi, Kenya and the Logistics Base in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Table 3.1: Target Population

Department	Population	Percentage
Military Component	62	60%
Police Component	15	15%
Civilian	26	25%
Total	103	100

3.4 Sample Size and Sampling Technique

Sampling is the process through which a researcher identifies the people, places or things to be studied (Kombo & Tromp, 2006). The study employed random purposive sampling and snow balling sampling in reaching respondents for the study. Thus 62 military component staff, 15 Civil Police component staff and 26 civilian component staff were sampled making a total of 103. Random purposive sampling was considered appropriate as it offered credibility of the data collected and in accessing respondents due to the small sample size. Snow balling was instrumental in ensuring

the researcher collected data from relevant group and also for accessing respondents of the military component.

3.5 Data Collection Instruments

3.5.1 Questionnaire

Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected in this study. The questionnaire was the instrument for used in collecting primary data from the lower and mid level cadre staff of the Civilian, Military and Police components. The questionnaire comprised of questions, which were based on the objectives of this study. The questionnaire entailed both close-ended and open ended questions. The questionnaire was divided into two sections, the background information and the research questions sections. Furthermore, the research questions section was divided into sections according to the research objectives on a Likert scale. The advantage of using both structured and unstructured questionnaires is that they are easier to analyse and also permit greater depth of response whereby respondents are given responsibility of giving their own personal response. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) argue that these types of scales are used to measure perception, values and behavior. This helps in minimising subjectivity and makes it possible to use quantitative analysis.

3.5.2 Key Informant Interviews

This technique was used in collecting qualitative data through in-depth interviewing of key informants. Key informants were drawn from head of logistics at Nairobi and Addis Ababa, senior civilian heads of communication and the head of police unit. This tool was important as it helped the researcher explore realities within EASF logistics and preparedness for missions.

3.6 Pilot Test

A pilot study is described as the preliminary test conducted before embarking on the actual study. This study undertook a pilot study at the International Peace Training Centre which has some similarities with EASF to measure validity and reliability of the research instruments. Those selected for piloting were not part of the main study sample as they were from a different airport though within Nairobi.

3.7 Validity and Reliability

In social sciences, measurement issues differ in that they are related to the quantification of abstract, intangible and unobservable constructs. In many instances, then, the meaning of quantities is only inferred. Most concepts in the behavioral sciences have meaning within the context of the theory that they are a part of. Therefore, the research instruments chosen must be able to measure the concepts meaningfully, accurately and efficiently.

3.7.1 Validity of the Research Instruments

Validity is the extent to which an instrument is true to what it purports to measure (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). It is an indicator of the extent to which the inferences made from the research results are accurate and meaningful. The research instruments were validated in terms of content and face validity. The researcher sought experts' opinion in assessing validity of the instrument. The questionnaire of the pilot study was assessed and weakness identified for example few blank spaces, inaccurate responses, and inconsistency on the instrument. The questionnaire was then modified accordingly and pretested on subjects who were not the actual sample. The subjects

were encouraged to write comments and suggestions concerning instructions, clarity and relevance of the statements.

3.7.2 Reliability of the Research Instruments

Reliability refers to the consistency of data arising from the use of a particular research method. Mugenda and Mugenda (2008), states that reliability is the measure of the extent to which a research instrument will give the same result consistently after repeated trials over a period. In this study, split-half method was used to test the reliability of the research instruments. Tests were divided into two halves of odd and even items. The sets were then separated into two different groups. Correlation coefficient for the two sets of scores was calculated to show the extent to which the two sets of the test provided the same results for internal consistency of the test. Spearman Brown Prophecy Formula below was used:

$$\frac{2 \times \text{Corr. between the Halves}}{1 + \text{Corr. between the Halves}}$$

$$r = \frac{2r}{r + 1}$$

Where r = reliability of the coefficient resulting from correlating the scores of the odd items with the scores of the even items. The study obtained an r= 0.75 which indicated that the instruments reliability was high and acceptable for the study.

3.8 Data Analysis and Presentation

Because both closed-end and open-end questionnaires were used in the study, both quantitative and qualitative data was collected. Content analysis was applied in the

analysis of qualitative data whereas descriptive statistics was applied to analyze quantitative. For content analysis, data was scored by calculating the percentages, mean and frequencies. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (IBM SPSS Version 23) software was used for this analysis. SPSS is considered appropriate because it provides a clear path to follow and a set of quantitative data analysis procedures which lead to increased data validity and reliability and helps in bringing out the relationship between the variables. SPSS also assist in producing frequency tables for descriptive analysis. For inferential statistics, multiple regression analysis will be used.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

Before data collection, the researcher sought authorization from the EASF to carry out research. The researcher also assured the respondents of confidentiality of the information obtained and farther that the information was solely be used for the purpose of the study. Individuals will be given the option to refuse to participate if the so wish. The dignity, privacy and interest of the participants was treated with utmost respect. Research data from this study was confidential and all participants remained anonymous. Where required and deemed necessary, due credit was given to parties contributing to the research. Bryman (2011) states that it is the researcher bears the responsibility of carefully assessing the possibility that the research may cause harm to the participants, and to the extent that it is possible, the possibility of harm should be minimized.

CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents analysis and discussion of data obtained from the field. The chapter is divided into four major sections with subsequent subsections in each area. Section one covers the response rate from the study followed by demographic information of the respondents. Section two presented data obtained for objective one which sought to establish the relationship between personnel logistics systems and preparedness of EASF. Section three presents analyses for data on the impact of facilities and related services on preparedness of EASF. Lastly data on the impact of equipment readiness on preparedness of EASF which formed the third objective for the study was presented.

The data in this section is presented in tables and figures and discussed using percentages and frequencies. Some qualitative data from interviews and literature review are also included.

4.1 Response Rate

The questionnaires were hand delivered while some were sent online to the respondents who could not be physically reached. The study targeted 103 respondents and managed to collect data from 62 respondents who returned duly filled questionnaires. This translated into a response rate of 60.2%. This is considered to be sufficient for analysis as recommended by Mugenda, (2010) that a response rate of at least 50% is adequate. Some of the respondents were unreachable for the study due to work engagements.

4.2 Demographic Information of the Respondents

The study sought information on gender, age and level of education of the respondents. Results obtained are as discussed below.

4.2.1 Gender of the Respondents

Respondents were asked to indicate their gender. Data obtained is as presented below;




Figure 1: Gender distribution of Respondents

According to results in figure 2, majority of the respondents were male while 29% were female. This implies that the study had few female participants which was expected due to the limited participation of women in peace and security engagements.

4.2.2 Level of Education

Information on education level of the respondents was important for the study. Data obtained was analyzed and segregated by gender as shown in figure 3.




Figure 2: Education level of Respondents

According to figure 3, majority of the respondents (54%) were post graduates holder, 32% had degree while 14% had diploma. Majority 88% of diploma holders were female while majority of male respondents were degree (67%) and post graduate (57%) qualified. The researcher although noted that most of the military and police components had undergone other military specialized training in addition to their academic qualification.

These results show a growth in number of post graduates and graduates in the EASF which could be attributed in EASF efforts for training and offering various courses in partnership with institutions of higher learning across the globe.

4.2.3 Designation of the Respondents

The study was interested in composition of the respondents in terms of their designation. Respondents were asked to indicate their designation by category. Data obtained is presented in figure 4.




Figure 3: Designation of Respondents

Majority of the respondents 68% were military, 16% were civilians while another 16% were police components. This implies that most of the military components of EASF participated to the study. An interview with the head of logistics at Nairobi headquarters revealed that EASF is heavily military. He noted that efforts are being made to bring more police and civilians on board.

This result implies that EASF is still dominated by military despite calls from various stakeholders to increase number of police and civilian components. The same was observed by (Robinson, 2014 and Hull et, al., 2011) who recommended the need for multidimensionality of the EASF to incorporate not only the military but also the police and civilian components.

4.2.4 Respondents Duration of Working in EASF

The study sought information on the duration the respondents had worked in EASF. Basing on the fact that most of the employees of the EASF are on secondment and rotated every two years, the respondents were asked to indicate the months they had

worked in the organization. This information was valuable in understanding the knowledge of respondents on relationship between logistic and preparedness of the organization towards missions.




Figure 4: Distribution of Duration of Work of the Respondents

According to figure 4 above, most (36%) of the respondents had worked for 17-20 months, 32% indicated 12-16 months, 18% less than 12 months while an equal of 7% had worked for 21-24 months and more than 2 years respectively.

This implies that majority of the respondents had worked for more than 1 year which was long enough to understand and provide information of how logistics and preparedness work within the organization.

4.2.5. Nature of Emergencies by EASF

The study sought to understand the nature of logistical assignments that the EASF had undertaken since inception. Data obtained was categorized into three main emergencies issues responded to by EASF and presented in table 4.1 below:

Table 4.1: Distribution of Response on Nature of Missions and Emergencies

Nature of emergencies	Civilians n=10	Military n=42	Police n=10	Total
Military Advice	1 (10%)	30 (71%)	3 (30%)	34 (54.8%)
Observer missions	5 (50%)	20 (46.1%)	1 (10%)	26(61.9%)
Training needs assessment	2 (20%)	5 (11.9%)	7 (10%)	14 (22.5%)
Peace Mission	1 (10%)	40 (95.2%)	6 (60%)	47 (75.8%)
Disaster Management	0 (0%)	42 (100%)	8 (80%)	50(80.6%)

Analysis from table 4.1 indicate the majority (80.6%) of the respondents had undertaken a disaster management task, 75.8% had served in peace keeping missions while 61.9% mentioned that they had served as observers in missions. A good proportion (54.8%) had served as military advisors while few (22.5%) respondents said they had attended training needs analysis.

Further analysis indicated the nature of emergencies varied by type of components whereby most (50%) of the civilians were involved in observation missions as compared to other missions. Majority 80% of police component had attended disaster management missions as compared to other missions. This was followed by 60% who had served in peace keeping missions.

The military component dominated most of the categorized missions with majority 95.6% having served in peace missions, 100% disaster management, 71% attended military advisory missions, and 46.1% observer missions. During an interview with communication logistics consultant for EASF, she mentioned that EASF had

deployed personnel and equipment to AMISOM, Somalia and Namibia during elections. She however noted that there has been no real mission done as the EASF is finalizing on an MOU with member states. Almost same sentiments were shared by head of logistics from Nairobi and Addis Ababa bases. They also indicated that participants for missions depended on the nature of the mission. Some of the missions require heavy military participation; others like humanitarian missions require police and civilian components.

This results shows that the military are more involved in EASF missions as compared to police and civilian components. The same was observed by Mwanzia (2015), who in his study reported that EASF had a lot of military participation as compared to police and civilian components. He also reported that there was minimal participation of police and civilian women in peace keeping missions. The finding however contradicts that of Hodali (2017) who posits that EASF is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilians, police and military component from different member states, ready to quickly deploy in 6 different conflict scenarios.

4.3 Personnel Logistics Systems and Preparedness of EASF

The first objective of the study sought to establish if there was a relationship between personnel logistics systems and preparedness of EASF. The respondents were asked to indicate frequency of recruitment, and share their opinion of the extent to which various issues within personnel logistics systems influenced preparedness of EASF. Further this section asked challenges facing personnel logistics system and strategies to improve the system of employment and deployment of personnel.

4.3.1 Frequency of Personnel Recruitment

Most of the respondents mentioned that the recruitments were occasional once or twice per year. These results show that recruitment of personnel was an occasional event. This was so due to limited funding and pledges from most countries on provision of personnel when required. An interview with head of logistics revealed that EASF had conducted various verification exercises on most of the pledged troops and felt that they were satisfactory for mission.

Another interview with the head of communication and senior police revealed that recruitment process was complex as some of the personnel came on second from member states whose recruitment depended on national interest and politics of the day among the members. The civilians on the other hand were recruited for consultancy on specified periods while a few were permanent staff of EASF. Police recruitment was based on what a member state had pledged to offer in the MOU.

This result implies that there is no systematic system used at EASF for recruitment which could be affecting quality and professionalism required for preparedness at the EASF. Similar finding were shared by Conning and Kasumba (2010), who asserted that EASF staff appointment were made based on lines of national, political or equal geographical representation versus genuine merit and professional experience. This according to them led to inadequate staffing and poor quality staff need for effective preparedness of EASF.

4.3.2 The Influence of Personnel Logistics Systems on Preparedness of EASF

Respondents were asked to state which of the following aspects influenced EASF preparedness. Where (1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4= Agree, 5=strongly agree).

Table 4. 2: Distribution of Factors Influencing Personnel Logistics

Statements	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
The EASF personnel mobilization system is effective and improves preparedness		8 (12.9%)	4 (6.5%)	20 (32.2%)	30 (48.3%)
The EASF personnel welfare system in place enhances preparedness.	6 (9.7%)	11 (17.7%)	15 (24.2%)	21 (33.9%)	9 (14.5%)
The force rotation increases flexibility leads to improved preparedness	10 (16.1%)	9 (14.5%)	10 (16.1%)	13 (21%)	20 (32.3%)
The security force decision making skills acquired through training improves their preparedness	10 (16.1%)	2 (3.2%)	12 (19.3%)	16 (25.8%)	22 (35.5%)
The member states signed MOU on troop deployment in case of emergencies is effective	10 (16.1%)	30 (48.4%)	15 (24.2%)	5 (8.1%)	2 (3.2%)
There is a political good will and determination to have adequate personnel in the member states	24 (38.7%)	12 (19.4%)	10 (16.1%)	10 (16.1%)	6 (9.7%)

According to the table above majority (48.3%) strongly agreed that the EASF personnel mobilization system is effective and improves preparedness, 32.2% agreed while 12.9% were neutral about this statement. This contradicted sentiments by logistics head who during an interview reported that;

“Mobilization of personnel is still an issue due to geographical position and poor transportation infrastructure in African states. This has greatly affected rapid response and jeopardized EASF preparedness.” KII2

This statement contradicts results that show majority agreeing that personnel mobilization system is effective. This finding concurs with that of Debrah (2013) who asserted that troop deployment and MOU are two different things that affects mobilization for preparedness of EASF. He also reported further that;

“We try our best but it is difficult to mobilize personnel for mission within shortest time possible. However some countries take long to respond to calls and the transport network within Africa is very poor for rapid response.” KII2

These results show that there was a disagreement on whether the mobilization system is effective. Findings by Bayeh (2014) reported a poor mobilization system as EASF was ill prepared for Burundi intervention due to lack of personnel mobilization system. Similarly Derblom e al., (2008), noted that EASF is inadequately staffed in terms of numbers of professional experience. Staff appointment at EASF are made based on lines of national, political or equal geographical representation versus genuine and professional experience in related fields.

Respondents were asked to rate their agreement on if force rotation increased flexibility leading to improved preparedness; 32.3% strongly disagreed, 21% disagreed, 16.1% were neutral,14.5% agreed while 16.1% strongly agreed. During an interview the logistic officer complained stating,

“The rotation and matrix system for personnel hampered EASF preparedness. It does not work for the EASF but to serve interest of different countries. The staff placed on second and rotation system lack experience, professionalism and commitment since they are just selected without merit” KII2

According to this statement it is clear that EASF staffing affects preparedness as the rotation system does not favor commitment required for effective working and logistical preparation of the unit.

When asked whether the EASF personnel welfare system in place enhances preparedness, 33.9% agreed, 14.3% strongly agreed, 24.2% were neutral while 17.7% disagreed with this statement. This implies that the respondents were somehow satisfied with the personnel welfare system.

Most 35.5% strongly agreed that the security force decision making skills acquired through training improves their preparedness while 25.8% were in agreement. Some 19.3% were neutral while 16.1% strongly disagreed with this statement. An interview with logistic head revealed that decisions on undertaking missions were highly dependent on countries with the crisis, other organizations such as AU, UN and IGAD. This according to him formed a bottleneck on preparedness of EASF for mission. He referred to one mission in Burundi which failed as the Burundian head of state did not accept support from EASF.

“In 2015 during elections in Burundi, President Nkrunziza did not accept EASF to move in Burundi when the country was facing a crisis as he believed he was in charge of the situation. This is one incident where a countries head of state blocks intervention of EASF challenging its preparedness to counter conflict in the region” KII3

This statement clearly reveals the bureaucratic difficulty that affects EASF preparedness incase the head of state refuses to give consent for intervention. Such resistance is usually based on the interest of protecting a nation’s sovereignty or an

exercise by Head of state to exercise impunity and dictatorship contrary to the mission and vision of EASF. A discussion with senior police officers on second to the EASF noted that the organisation's preparedness was further impacted by the bureaucratic system of decision making since the heads of state needed to meet assess the situation and agree unanimously for entry of EASF in a crisis situation.

Analysis from table 4.2 shows most 48.4% disagreed that the MOU signed by member states on provision of troops was working, 16.1% strongly disagreed while 3.2% strongly agreed that the MOU was effective. Information from key informants revealed that MOUs existed and member countries had pledged personnel, equipment and facilities.

During the interview one respondent noted that he MOUs were not binding and largely depended on countries political goodwill. In his statement he said,

“As much as there are MOUs and various pledges from different countries. There is no framework or regulation that makes the MOUs binding or any consequences for not honoring pledges and MOUs among the member states” KII3

According to this statement it is clear that EASF has existing MOUs however they are not effective and pose a challenge to the preparedness of EASF due to lack of binding framework and commitment by member states to abide with the terms of the MOUs. The lack of a framework that stipulates consequences for parties that do not abide by the agreed terms in the MOU portends a serious challenge as there lacks commitment to the mission and vision of EASF. Similar findings were reported by Tlalka, (2013) who noted that although the MOU and policy framework existed they were not legally binding. In the same vain (Mumma-Martinon , 2010) noted that despite the presence of personnel trained in the region from various Training Centers of Excellence, there

is little possibilities of utilizing them at time of deployment as this depended on countries political will.

This implies that EASF preparedness was greatly hindered by lack of Member State's commitment to the signed MOU on provision of troops and other support. Mwanzia (2015), observed the same in his study which reported that there was minimal commitment from some member states. More findings have revealed that member states commitment also varied by other foreign powers, especially former colonial powers who greatly influenced a country decision and membership in some of the organizations.

Finally 38.7% strongly agreed, 16.1% agreed that there was a political good will and determination among member states in preparing adequate personnel for functioning of EASF. Interview with key informants contradicted this finding as they mentioned lack of political good will as the main challenge to preparedness of the EASF. During an interview the logistics head asserted that,

“Although member countries have pledged good number of troops and personnel for mission, the main challenge is different countries political interests which they protect despite having an MOU. This has failed in various missions where countries like Tanzania refuse to send their troops to certain missions.”

This statement implies that there lacked political good will among the various stakeholders of the EASF. This statement concurs with findings by (Mungai, 2011) who brought out an existing mistrust between Kenya and Ethiopia who are the key players of EASF. According to him this discrepancy persist as a challenge to smooth running of EASF and clearly shows lack of political good will among EASF members.

4.3.3 Challenges Affecting Personnel Logistics for the EASF

The study sought information on challenges that affected personnel logistics. Data obtained was summarized presented in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Challenges of Personnel Logistics on Preparedness of EASF

Challenge	Frequency	Percentage
	N=62	
Inadequate strategies for personnel mobilization for rapid response	33	53.2%
Inadequate training on personnel capacity for quick response	47	75.8%
Limited funds to recruit and support personnel welfare	52	83.9%
Non participation of civilians and police in peace making decisions	41	66.1%

According to table 4.3 the major challenge for personnel logistics system were limited funds that enabled recruitment of enough specialized personnel 52(83.9%); inadequate training on personnel capacity for quick response 47(75.8%) and non-participation of civilians in peace making decisions was mentioned by 41(66.1%).

A total of 33(53.2%) respondents mentioned inadequate strategies for personnel mobilization for rapid response to emergencies. Similar findings were shared by (Munene, 2015) who noted that EASF consistently struggled to marshal the requisite military personnel and range of military assistance needed for complex peace keeping missions as experienced in the proposed Burundi intervention in 2015.

4.3.4 Suggestions for Improving Personnel Logistics to Enhance Preparedness of EASF

Data was also collected on respondent's suggestion on how personnel logistics could be improved.

Table 4.4: Suggestions for Improving Personnel Logistics Systems

Suggestion	Frequency
	N=62
Independent personnel logistic plan	25
Improve enumeration for mission personnel	30
Acquire infrastructure for personnel mobilization at times of emergencies	53
Enhance gender inclusion for peace making with more of women involvement in peace making negotiation and observation	47
Enhance participation of civilians and police components	32

Majority (53) suggested that there is need to develop infrastructure for personnel mobilization at times of emergencies, 47 advocated for more gender inclusion and increasing women involvement in peace keeping, negotiation and observation.

Some of the respondents suggested the need to improve remuneration for mission personnel. Other suggestions were to enhance personnel logistics towards preparedness of EASF and enhancement of civilian and police components participation in planning and decision making for peace keeping missions.

Development of independent personnel logistic plan was also suggested as a strategy for minimizing bureaucratic red tapes from the AU and other agencies.

4.4 Influence of Facilities and Related Services on Preparedness of EASF

Respondents were to indicate the extent to which they disagreed with the statements on the influence of facilities and related services on preparedness of EASF. Data obtained was analyzed and presented in tables.

4.4.1 Influence of Facilities and Related Services on Preparedness of EASF

Respondents were asked to indicate the influence of facilities and related services on preparedness of EASF. Data obtained on a likert scale was analyzed and presented as follows.

Table 4.5: Distribution of Influence of Facilities and Related Services on Preparedness of EASF

Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
There is adequate training infrastructure to enhance preparedness	15 (24.1%)	22(35.5%)	10 (16.1%)	11 (17.7%)	6 (9.6%)
There is adequate accommodation	19 (30.6%)	30 (48.4%)	3 (4.8%)	3 (4.8%)	7 (11.3%)
There is adequate maintenance of the facilities to enhance preparedness	27 (43.5%)	18 (29%)	5 (8.1%)	8 (12.9%)	4 (6.5%)
EASF has sufficient medical support during missions	5 (8.1%)	31 (50%)	9 (14.5%)	10 (16.1%)	7 (11.3%)
Availability of facilities and related services greatly influence preparedness for missions	14 (22.6%)	12 (19.4%)	20 (32.3%)	8 (12.9%)	8 (12.9%)

Analysis from table 4.6 shows that 24.1% strongly disagreed, 35.5% disagreed while 16.1% were neutral that there were adequate training infrastructure to enhance preparedness at EASF. On the other hand 17.7% agreed and 9.6% strongly agreed

that the training infrastructures were adequate for preparedness. This was further echoed by logistics heads who revealed that the training facilities were not adequate enough to meet even 50% of the Africa's needs. This he said was due to unpredictability of conflict and raising number of conflict within the continent.

A total of 48.4% respondents disagreed and another 30.6% strongly disagreed that there was adequate accommodation facilities for preparedness for missions. 11.3% strongly agreed followed by 4.8% who agreed and 4.8% were neutral on the same statement. Information obtained from EASF annual reports revealed that the startup kit for accommodation could support 70 troops at a go with all facilities like hot shower and bush cooking equipment. This was considered a very modern accommodation facility however they were insufficient in accommodating maximum number of troops as each mission takes a minimum of 5200 troops. During an interview the logistic head confirmed that EASF had modern fully equipped mobile kit that can accommodate up to 70 troops at ago.

On whether there was adequate maintenance of facilities to enhance preparedness, 43.5% strongly disagreed, 29% disagreed, 8.1% were neutral, 12.89% agreed and 6.5% strongly disagreed. This implies that the respondents felt that there were inadequate maintenance of the facilities which affected preparedness of EASF.

Further analysis reveal shows 50% of the respondents disagreeing that EASF had adequate medical preparedness for emergencies. This was followed by 16.1% who agreed, 14.5% were neutral while 11.3% strongly agreed to this statement. This result implies that EASF preparedness towards medical support is not adequate for an effective mission. An interview with logistics head revealed that some of the services needed for mission were pledged by the member states and EASF does not

have its own unit for medics which would affect logistics especially in time of injuries of EASF troops.

When asked if availability of facilities and related services greatly influence preparedness of EASF, 32.3% remained neutral, 22.6% strongly disagreed, 19.4% disagreed while an equal 12.9 agreed and strongly agreed with the statement. This implies that role of facilities and related services on EASF preparedness was limited or was not among the first requirement for a successful mission.

4.4.2 Suggestions for improvements of facilities to enhance preparedness of EASF

Table 4.6 Suggestions for improving facilities to enhance preparedness of EASF

Suggestion	Frequency N=
	62
Review of curriculum to be specific and to focus on asymmetric warfare	55
Improve methodologies for protecting civilians during warfare	45
More collaboration	43
Exchange programs for force facilities among member state	47

According to table 4.7 respondents suggested the review of curriculum to be specific (55) and to focus on asymmetric warfare and enhance more collaboration. Other suggestions were to improve methodologies for protecting civilians during warfare (45), more collaborations and partnership for enhancing funding (43) and implementation of exchange programs for force facilities among member states (47).

4.5 Equipment Readiness and Preparedness of EASF

The study further sought to establish the relationship between equipment readiness and preparedness of EASF. Respondents were asked to indicate frequency of equipment supply/purchasing, rate adequacy of the trainings on use of equipment, measure various aspects of equipment as well as mention challenges and suggest strategies to improve equipment for effective preparedness of EASF. Data obtained for each section was analyzed and presented as follows.

4.5.1 Frequency of Supply of Equipment

Respondents were asked to indicate frequency of receiving equipment. Majority 81% indicated 1-5 times while 19% indicated 10-5 times. This implies that the frequency of acquisition of equipment is less than 5 times which is little considering number of conflicts and nature of conflict in the region.




Figure 5: Number of Times EASF has Received Equipment

A follow on question for respondents to explain some of the equipment received and their conditions reported that EASF had received communication equipment, start-up kit for rapid deployment of self-sustaining forward force that accommodates 70

personnel. This was confirmed during an interview by the logistic and communication head. Who reported that EASF received had received equipment from friends for EASF in the years 2015 and 2017?

4.5.2 Response for training on equipment use

The study sought information on training offered for use of equipment.

Data obtained revealed that personnel were always trained on use of various equipment. A follow-up question on adequacy of the training found that majority 72.5% of the respondents indicated that the trainings were adequate while 27.5% felt that the training was inadequate in addressing the realities of usage in areas of operation. An interview with logistic head noted that training on communication and appliances of start-up kit needed very specialized personnel who are mainly from donor countries and might not be always available when needed.

4.5.3 Statements on the influence of equipment to preparedness of EASF

The study was interested with information on the influence of availability of equipment on preparedness of EASF for missions. Respondents were asked to show on a scale of 1-5 the extent to which they agreed with some statements whereby (1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4= Agree, 5=strongly agree).

Table 4.7: Influence of equipment to preparedness of EASF

Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
The organization has enough communication equipment	5 (8%)	11 (17.7%)	2 (3.2%)	22 (35.5%)	30 (48.4%)
EASF has adequate airlifts for ease access to mission field	20 (32.2%)	30 (48.4%)	10 (16.1%)	-	2 (3.2%)
We highly dependent of the external support on the provision of the modern equipment which affect our preparedness	2 (3.2%)	4 (6.5%)	8 (12.9%)	16 (25.8%)	32 (51.6%)
There is adequate trained personnel on the maintenance of the equipment to enhance our preparedness	10 (16.1%)	12 (19.4%)	5 (8%)	20 (32.2%)	15 (24.2%)
We have adequate accommodation to support staff for 90 days in mission field	7 (11.3%)	10 (16.1%)	10 (16.1%)	20 (32.2%)	15 (24.2%)
We have sufficient sea lift for transportation of equipment and troops	40 (64.5%)	12 (19.4%)	3 (4.8%)	5 (8%)	2 (3.2%)

According to table 4.8 48.4% strongly agreed that EASF had enough communication equipment 35.5% agreed while 17.7% disagreed. This implies that communication equipment at EASF was enough and adequate in facilitating preparedness. An interview with communication civilian revealed that EASF had been recently supplied

with good quality communication equipment that could operate under the dynamic conditions in the various African regions. According to the consultant effective communication equipment played a critical role in ensuring missions success and other logistic matters are attended to.

Majority 48.4% disagreed that EASF had adequate airlifts for ease access to mission field, 32.2% strongly disagreed while 16.1% were neutral and 3.2% agreed. An interview with police unit head of EASF reported that transport in terms of helicopters, ships and land movers vehicle were limited and mostly EASF depends on other countries outside Africa for helicopters during missions. This finding concurs with that of Berouk (2014), who observed that Africa was limited in terms of transport infrastructure such as air and sea lifts which were critical in ensuring g mobility due to huge expanse of the continent. These results indicate that the EASF did not have enough airlifts which would be affecting their preparedness to missions.

Majority 51.6% strongly agreed and 25.8% agreed that EASF preparedness was highly affected by dependence on external support for provision of modern equipment. A total of 12.9% were neutral, 6.5% disagreed while 3.2 % strongly disagreed that dependency on external support for modern equipment affected EASF preparedness. EASF 2015 annual report however noted that the organization depended on funding and equipment support from friends of EASF and other countries like Britain and Denmark. This implies that dependency on external support for equipment was hampering the state of preparedness of the EASF as no country in the membership had the capacity in supplying high technology equipment needed for exercises and operations.

A considerable number 32.2% and 24.4% were in agreement that EASF had adequate trained personnel on the maintenance of the equipment to enhance preparedness. When asked whether EASF had adequate accommodation to support staff for 90 days in mission field 32.2% and 24.2% were in agreement while 11.3% strongly disagreed. A report by Dickson (2014) however noted that the start-up kits available were not able to sustain the troops for the stated mission days before the intervention of UN.

Finally 64.5% strongly disagreed, 19.4% disagreed, 4.8% were neutral, 8% agreed while 3.2% strongly agreed that EASF had sufficient sea lift for transportation of equipment and troops. An interview with logistics head revealed that EASF sea lift is limited and this greatly hindered preparedness of EASF.

4.5.4 Challenges related to the equipment available for preparedness

Table4.8: Challenges related to the equipment

Challenge	Frequency N=62
Inadequate training on use and repair of equipment	33
Limited interoperability with member states on communication	49
Limited airlifts	40
Inefficient sea lift logistic from Ethiopia	48

Analysis from table 4.8 reveals that inadequate training on use and maintenance of equipment (33), limited interoperability with member states on communication (49) and insufficient air (40) and sea lifts (48) affected preparedness of EASF.

During the interviews one respondent mentioned that

“What I can say is that EASF is equipped well with field necessity like communication devices, accommodation kits and kitchens. However it is largely under equipped with military necessities such as pledged artillery units for grave circumstances such as genocide and strategic and tactical air and sea lifts for fast movement into and within operation areas.”KII1

This sentiment clearly reveals lack of artillery, sea and air lifts as a challenge for EASF preparedness for mission and its functionality in the unpredictable and often volatile African nations’ conflicts spectrum. Similarly William (2012) pointed out that the EASF lacked sophisticated military hardware which could have helped in reducing civilian casualties if needed to deploy in order to save lives. According to him EASF preparedness was inadequate compared to modern militia groups who are more equipped than even some national armies with armored personnel carriers, Mortars and heavy vehicular mounted guns.

Batware (2011) contradicts lack of equipment as the main challenge as he highlights that troops are greatly limited by poor road networks which affects mobility of equipment making the whole logistics process a nightmare. Findings by Munene (2015), reports EASF main challenge to preparedness as the location of logistic base which is situated in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, a land locked country that cannot support shipping of equipment for rapid deployment in cases of emergency.

4.5.5 Response on Strategy to Improve Preparedness

Respondents were asked for general suggestions on improvement of preparedness of EASF. Data was summarized and presented as follows.

Table 4.9: Response of strategies to improve preparedness

Response on strategy to improve preparedness	Frequency n=57
Maintain full Operation	37
Continuous high level training on equipment	28
Having a complete roster for civilian components	15
To enhance clarity in terms of commitment for provision of equipment from member states during emergencies	36
Establishment of an effective conflict analysis	41
Develop a clear corporate identity and define the role of police component	23
Enhance mechanism of reducing unpredictability of conflict	12

According to table 4.9, respondents suggested various strategies among them were; Establishment of an effective conflict analysis before engagement, maintain full operational capability, enhancing clarity in terms of commitment for provision of equipment from member states. Other suggestions were having continuous high level training, having a complete roster of civilian component, development of clear corporate identity and define the role of police component. Lastly the enhancement of mechanisms that reduces the unpredictable nature of conflict in Africa was suggested as a means of improving preparedness of EASF. Key informants on the other hand recommended the improvement in air and sea lift capacity through enhanced pledges from member states. There was also need for a more strategic location of the Logistics

Base by moving it from Ethiopia, a land locked country to a more suitable location. Key informants also echoed the need of streamlining and strengthening the MOU and legal frameworks to make them binding in an effort to reduce political interference of member states. Key informants further recommended more unity among member states in pushing for a regional security agenda, proper management of logistics and finances as well as standardizing training.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This chapter presents summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations on the relationship between logistic systems and preparedness of EASF. Recommendations for further studies are also presented in this chapter. Each section is presented as in line with the research objectives.

5.1 Summary of findings

Generally the study found that there existed gender disparity among the employs at EASF. There were 71% of male representation as compared to 29% female. Women were few in military as well as police components. Military component highly dominated EASF overshadowing the role of civilians and police elements in the operation of the organization. Military participants for the study were 68%, civilians 16% and police 16%.

5.1.1 The relationship Between Personnel Logistics Systems and Preparedness of the EASF for Peace Support Operations

The study established that there existed a significant relationship between personnel logistics systems and preparedness of EASF. Force mobilization, force rotation, force decision making procedures, signed MOU and countries political will had high influence on personnel logistics which hindered preparedness of EASF for missions. Personnel welfare systems had low influence on EASF preparedness as EASF depended majorly on seconded staff from Member States.

5.1.2 Impact of Facilities and Related Services on Preparedness of the EASF for Peace Support Operations

The second objective sought to find out how logistics for facilities and related services influenced preparedness of EASF. The study found that facilities and related services had a low influence on preparedness of EASF. A total of 22.6% strongly agreed, while 32.3% were neutral that availability of facilities and related services had a great influence on preparedness of EASF. Findings show majority 43.5% strongly disagreeing that there were adequate maintenance for mission facilities while another majority of 48.4% disagreeing that the accommodation and medical services for supporting missions were adequate. More finding show more 35.5% of the respondents disagreeing that the EASF training facilities enhanced preparedness for mission. These findings thus shows EASF preparedness in terms of facilities still has a long way to go. There is need to increase accommodation and medical facilities, training on maintenance of mission facilities and build more training facilities in other Member States.

To ensure facilities and related services had an impact on preparedness of EASF; respondents recommended a review of the current curriculum to focus on asymmetric warfare training, improvement of civilian protection methodologies and encouragement of exchange program between Member States to foster unity.

5.1.3 Impact of Equipment Readiness on Preparedness of the EASF for Peace Support Operations

Finally the study sought to establish the influence of equipment readiness on preparedness of the EASF for Peace Support Operations. The study found that equipment had a significant impact on the preparedness of EASF. Findings indicate

48.4% of the respondents strongly agreeing that there were adequate modern communication equipment at EASF which enhanced preparedness of EASF for missions. A total of 48.4% disagreed that there were adequate airlifts that supported timely access of mission areas. A majority 51.6% strongly agreed that EASF was dependent on external support for equipment. 24.2% strongly agreed that there were adequate trained personnel who can maintain equipment while 32.2% agree that there were adequate accommodation to support staff for 90 days in mission. A majority 64.5% strongly disagreed that there was adequate sea lift capability in EASF. Further findings revealed that logistics for personnel and equipment transportation to the field was limited by poor infrastructure in terms of poor road networks, location of logistics base which is in a land locked country and tensions within borders that limited movement of equipment in time. It was also noted that equipment availability, adequate induction on usage and maintenance of equipment and strategic location of the equipment for deployment were key logistic issues for effective preparedness of EASF.

5.2 Conclusion

Following findings from the study the study concludes that:

EASF still leans heavily on the Military component with limited police and civilian component involvement in decision making, planning and execution for mission.

There is a strong relationship between logistics and preparedness of EASF. According to the findings although EASF has enough troops pledged from the various member states. However, mobilization of these troops is a major logistic challenges that affects EASF preparedness in terms of its capability for rapid response to conflict and crisis.

Facilities and related services have low influence on preparedness of EASF. Review of training curriculum to incorporate emerging challenges such as asymmetric operations and improved methodologies for civilian protection, member state commitment to providing pledged capabilities as well as donor involvement have been suggested to increase the significance of facilities and related services in preparedness of EASF.

The EASF has operational equipment donated as startup kit. However air and sea lift capability is inadequate and this greatly affects its preparedness. There is also a challenge in terms of resource mobilization and limited funds.

5.3 Recommendations

Following the findings, the study recommends that; Due to the weak links that affects mobilization of personnel the study recommends that the member states enhance commitment to EASF in terms of personnel and capability pledges and finances. There is also a need to increase participation of female peace keepers in efforts to enhance peace keeping initiatives as opposed to militarization of conflict. More strategies for incorporating civilian expertise during conflict management, prevention and early warning, mediation as well as peace building programs is necessary. There is need for review of bureaucratic procedures for deployment by the AU and other organs influencing EASF operations to ensure that EASF is provided the capacity to respond rapidly.

To enhance preparedness through facilities and related services EASF need to expand its partnerships and collaboration to ensure enough funding and good will among nations. There is also need to develop clear frameworks for provision of medical and other related services support.

Finding reveals that equipment plays an important role in preparedness of EASF. So far EASF is ill equipped to rapidly respond in case of grave circumstances like genocide. On this basis the study thus recommends that there should be pledged standby air lift, sea lifts and artillery capabilities which should be available to the EASF on short notice to respond to various situations within mandated time. The study also recommends that member states and EASF come up with sustainable strategies for raising funds for the organization to reduce dependency on donors.

The study further recommends need for enhancement of cultural diversity among member states as well as interoperability which would support smooth running of the organization and preparedness.

5.4 Suggestions for further studies

The following studies are suggested for further research

1. To further understand the role of civilians in efficiency of EASF operations, there is need to conduct a study on the impact of civilian component in preparedness of EASF for various mission.
2. A comparative study on factors for effective logistics between EASF and other similar organization in Africa and outside Africa.
3. The cultural influence in operations of EASF across the African continent.
4. The effectiveness of conflict resolution approaches by the EASF.

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APPENDICES

Appendix i: Introduction Letter

Dear Respondent;

I am a postgraduate student at the Kenyatta University in the **Department of Conflict, Peace and Security Studies** carrying out a research study. The role of the research is to collect information on “**Logistics and preparedness of the Eastern Africa Standby Security Force for Peace Support Operations**”.

I request your participation through completing of the questions in all sections of the questionnaire in regard to the topic of study so as to facilitate the research study. Your information confidentiality will be highly guaranteed. The identity of your response will be treated as anonymous and will be used only for academic purposes and thereby do not include your name.

Your participation is highly appreciated.

Thank you.

Evans Oduma

Appendix ii: Questionnaire

This questionnaire has been designed to collect information for purely academic purposes. Please answer the questions. The information obtained through the questionnaire will be treated as confidential and will be used only for the study.

PART A: Background Information

1. Gender: Male [] Female []
2. Age: Below 25 years [] 25-30 yrs [] 30-40 yrs [] 40-50 yrs [] above 50 yrs []
3. Level of education: Certificate [] Diploma [] Degree [] Postgraduate []
Others []
4. Nature of employment: Contract [] Permanent []
5. Designation: Military [] Police [] Civilian []
6. Your working experience: Below 5 yrs [] 5-10 yrs [] Over 10 yrs []

PART B: Personnel Logistics

7. How often is recruitment done in the force?

- Once in an year ()
 Many times an year ()
 After many years ()
 Never ()

8. Tick on the corresponding figures showing the extent to which you agree /disagree with the following statements. (1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4= Agree, 5=strongly agree).

		1	2	3	4	5
A	The EASF personnel mobilization system is effective and improves preparedness					
B	The EASF personnel welfare system in place enhances preparedness.					
C	The force rotation increases flexibility in security performance leading to improved preparedness					

D	The security force decision making skills acquired through training improves their preparedness					
E	The member states have a signed a MOU on troop deployment in case of emergencies in the states where deployed					
F	There is a political goodwill and determination to have adequate personnel in the member states					

9. Kindly list the benefits and challenges of personnel logistics for the standby force in the region.

a)Challenges

.....

.....

.....

b)Benefits

.....

.....

.....

PART C: Facilities and Related Services

11. Tick on the corresponding figures showing the extent to which you agree /disagree with the following statements. (1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4= Agree, 5=strongly agree).

	Statements	1	2	3	4	5
A	There is adequate training infrastructure to enhance preparedness					
B	There is adequate air and sea lifts transport of choice to enhance preparedness					
C	There is adequate maintenance of the facilities to enhance preparedness					
D	It is necessary to supply the force with adequate goods for their operations					

12. Suggest how this force facilities and related services can be improved to boost preparedness

.....
.....

PART D: Equipment Availability

13.a) Indicate the numbers of times you have received new equipment for the operations in the last one year.

More than 10 times ()

5-10 Times ()

Less than 5 times ()

None ()

4 Explain the nature of the equipment received.

Very good ()

Good ()

Not good ()

5 Explain

.....
.....

14. Are forces taken through training before using the equipment?

Always ()

Sometimes ()

Never ()

15. Evaluate the quality of the induction offered after training on the use of the equipment.

Adequate ()

Inadequate ()

Not Relevant ()

b) Explain your answer

.....
.....
.....

14. Tick on the corresponding figures showing the extent to which you agree /disagree with the following statements. (1= **strongly disagree**, 2= **Disagree**, 3=**Neutral**, 4= **Agree**, 5=**strongly agree**).

s.no	Statements	1	2	3	4	5
A	Formal Training courses on the usage of the equipment offered are relevant towards improved employee performance.					
B	We have adequate logistics and equipment supplies to enhance preparedness.					
C	We highly dependent of the external support on the provision of the modern equipment which affect our preparedness					
D	There is trained personnel on the maintenance of the equipment to enhance our preparedness					

15. Suggest how these equipment can be improved to boost preparedness

.....

.....

PART E: Preparedness

Preparedness of the East Africa Standby Security Force can be measured over a period of time while looking into number of personnel, equipment and facilities and services provided. Please rate them over the period of time indicated below.

(a) Number of Personnel

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Increased by less than 10%					
Increased by 10%					
Increased by more than 10%					

(b) Facilities

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Increased by less than 10%					
Increased by 10%					
Increased by more than 10%					

(c) Equipment

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Increased by less than 10%					
Increased by 10%					
Increased by more than 10%					

Thank you for your cooperation.

Appendix iii: Key informant interview schedule

1. Gender
2. What is your designation?
.....
3. What is your understanding of the role of EASF logistic base
.....
.....
4. What would you say is the influence of personnel logistic on preparedness of EASF?
.....
.....
5. How does facilities and related services influence EASF preparedness?
.....
.....
.....
6. How does EASF obtain its equipment?
.....
.....
.....
7. What is the relationship between equipment logistics and preparedness of EASF?
.....
.....
.....
8. In your opinion what aspects influence EASF preparedness?
.....
.....
.....
9. What logistics challenges does EASF encounter in readiness for missions?
.....
.....
.....
10. What would you suggest for the effectiveness of EASF preparedness for mission?
.....
.....
.....

Thank you for your Cooperation

Appendix iii: Work Plan

Activity	Time	Responsibility	Expected Outcome	Critical Assumption
Development of concept paper	1 Week	Researcher	Concept paper	
Draft Proposal	2 Weeks	Researcher	Proposal	Availability of supervisor
Developing research Strategy	1 Week	Researcher	Research topic developed	Availability of research funds
Develop Research Instruments	1 Week	Researcher	Draft instrument	Draft developed
Review of Draft Instruments	1 Week	Researcher and moderators	Instruments revised	Draft instruments developed in time
Develop a Sampling Frame	1 Week	Researcher	Sampling frame	Sampling frame is not available
Sampling Done and Subject Identification	2 Weeks	Researcher	Sample	Sampling frame developed
Pre-testing Instruments	1 Week	Researcher and assistant	Pre-tested instrument	Training of assistants conducted
Development of Dummy Table	1 Week	Researcher and assistants	Dummy table	Pre-testing data available
Collect Data in The Field Work	3 Weeks	Researcher and assistants	Raw data	No major constraints in the field
Data Analysis and Interpretation	2 Weeks	Researcher and data analyst	Draft report	Data analysis done on time
Writing of Draft Research Report	2 Weeks	Researcher	List of suggested revisions to the report	Report writing complete
Submit Final Report	1 Week	Researcher	Final research report	Review workshop held and revisions done


Appendix iv: Budget

Items	Quantity	Amount (Kshs)
Photocopying paper	10 Reams	6,000
Typing and printing services	10 Reams	10,000
Binding	Proposals and Final document	10,000
Other stationery		5,000
Travel	500 KM	15,000
Internet	20 GB	6,000
Miscellaneous expenses		20,000
Total		72,000

Appendix v : Nacosti Permit

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. EVANS OTIENO ODUMA
of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 0-100
Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct
research in Nairobi County
on the topic: LOGISTICS AND
PREPAREDNESS OF THE EASTERN
AFRICA STANDBY FORCE
for the period ending:
17th August, 2019

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/18/53373/24501
Date Of Issue : 20th August, 2018
Fee Received :Ksh 1000




Applicant's Signature


Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation

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