

**AFRICAN UNION-LED STATE RECONSTRUCTION INITIATIVES IN
SOMALIA, 2007-2021**

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has never been submitted for any award in any academic institution.

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DEDICATION

In line with the resilient Pan-Africanist aspiration to “unify and uplift the people of African ancestry on a common history and destiny”, I, wholeheartedly, dedicate this thesis to Africa, the African People and the future of Africa and the African People. Dedication to the African Union with its strategic partners whom in their noble objectives, aspire to pursue absolute emancipation of African territory from the cancerous spillover of conflicts, state collapse and state fragility. I further dedicate this thesis to the scholarly community whom in their contributions within the field of international relations (IR) continue to pursue knowledge with rigor and passion towards academic and policy development in Africa and beyond particularly on state reconstruction. Within my inner circle I dedicate this thesis to my dear mother Jennifer Rumenya alias Mama Kiptoo, my lovely wife Sylvia Kandie and my princess daughter Nicole Jerop for being my source of hope, inspiration, resilience and endurance.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APA	American Psychological Association
APF	African Peace Fund
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporations
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPF	European Peace Fund
EU	European Union
EUTM	European Union Trade Mark System
FAO	Food Agricultural Association
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IGASOM	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia
IGO	International Governmental Organization
IRRI	International Refugee Rights Initiative
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
MFDA	Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs
MINUSCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MNCS	Multinational Cooperation's
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NATO	National Atlantic Treaty Organization
POC	Protection of Civilians
PSO	Peace Support Operations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SFG	Somali Federal Government
SFOR	Stabilization Force

SOFA	Status of Force Agreement
START	Stabilization, Transition and Response Teams
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UAVS	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNASOM	United Nations Association of Somalia
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissions for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office of Sierra Leone
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNPKO	United Nation Peacekeeping Operations
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
WHO	World Health Organization
SASE	Safe and Secure Environment
MAF	Mutual Accountability Framework
TNA	Training Needs Assessment
NRF	National Reconciliation Framework
NRC	National Reconciliation Conference
HDX	Humanitarian Data Exchange

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

African Union	It is a governmental agency of 55 African States which aims at achieving state reconstruction in Somalia.
Al-Shabaab	It is a terrorist organization in Somalia and actively participating in the current Somali conflict and inculcates Somali nationalism in to its agenda.
AMISOM	It was an African Union's regional peacekeeping mission that was founded by the African Union with a mandate to reconstruct Somalia.
Capacity building	An initiative of developing and empowering the skills, instincts and abilities of state and state officers aimed at enhancing survival, adaptation, and thriving in a dynamic world
Mandate	It is the binding obligation issued by the Security Council to African Union and bound to be complied during the reconstruction process in Somalia.
Military Intervention	It is the armed intrusion of AMISOM individually or collectively in Somali state's affairs by sending troops or other security and civilian personnel military with intention to achieve peace and security goals stipulated by United Nation Security Council.
Protection of Civilians	A concept that alludes that civilian population and all those not directly involved in combat must not be attacked and instead protected.
Reconciliation	It is a community processes which entail the acknowledgement of past injustices and evolving of retrogressive actions into a progressive relation towards restoring relationships in state reconstruction in Somalia.

Reintegration	It is a process of bringing back into society former combatants and insurgent and ensuring they fully engage in normal social economic activities instead of engaging in the economics of warfare.
Resolution	It is a binding decision adopted by the United Nations intending to promote state reconstruction in Somalia.
Security	Refers to the processes and strategies for alleviating fear from crime of terrorism and violent interclan conflicts/wars in Somalia.
Stabilization	Political endeavors which require aligning international community initiatives; diplomatic and military engagement towards assisting Somali government to peacefully control wars and deter conflicts.
State Reconstruction	It is the process of holistic re-establishment of Somalia's political, economic and social authority with absolute control over state boundaries and territory with an aim to achieve the functions of states as enshrined in the international law and norms.
Strategic partnership	It is a special and formidable relationship between two or more intergovernmental organizations in particular AU cooperation with external states and agencies as well as UN country teams formalized by one or more agreements on security, political, military or signed economic pacts.
Terrorism	It is an action of employing violence, constant fear, tension and tension to achieve particular course or ideological aspirations in domestic and international environments.

ABSTRACT

The intents of military interventions across the globe on state reconstruction continue to elicit intellectual debates as scholars and policy experts weigh in on its viability and practicality. The study interrogated the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on state reconstruction between 2007 and 2021 with the following specific objectives: to analyze initiatives employed by AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia; to assess the strategic partnerships between the AMISOM and UN Country Teams and other international governmental actors on state reconstruction in Somalia and; to assess challenges faced by the AMISOM in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia. Literature reviewed was based on the themes in tandem with the study's specific objectives. The study was anchored by state building, securitization and intervention theories. Methodologically, the study employed case study research design and targeted population entailed key informants across different strata with pertinent information. Interview schedule and observation schedule were employed as key primary data collection instruments while for the collection of secondary data, document analysis was utilized. The study established that AMISOM employed counter terrorism, civil-military co-ordination, protection of civilians, security, institutional capacity building, stabilization, gender-based, humanitarian initiatives, national reconciliation, disarmament, demobilization and re-integration as well as intelligence gathering and sharing and legitimization initiatives. The study established that strategic partnerships significantly contributed to AMISOM initiatives in form of legitimization, funding, resolutions, technical assistance, strategic air lift, coordination, logistics, humanitarian aid, capacity building, donations, liaison initiatives, counter piracy, air combat mission, training, surveillance and reconnaissance, international peace and reconstruction summits on Somalia. The study also concluded that legal and administrative obligations are vital in enhancing efficiency of strategic partnerships towards attaining state reconstruction. Further, state reconstruction should be prioritized in peace support operations. The study also established that encountered strategic, operational and tactical challenges AMISOM encountered in state reconstruction process in Somalia. The study concluded that military interventions in Somalia require adequate technical, financial, logistical, administrative, legitimate support to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in its operations. Adequate funding, conformity to the international humanitarian law and international human rights, proper training and adequate intelligence should be irreducible minimum for any mission sanctioned by UN, AU or and other legitimate actor before embarking on the interventionist agenda. Multisectoral approaches should be embraced in addressing challenges. The study further recommended that: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in partnership within African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), in the context of Africa PSOs, should come up with sustainable resolutions that corresponds with the objectives therefore ensuring state reconstruction is fully attained; the need for proper strategic partnerships that are scope-specific to state reconstruction initiatives; AU should marshal for resources that would sustain peace support operations and; AU should not entirely depend on donor community particularly from the collective west.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

The intents of military interventions across the globe on state reconstruction processes continue to elicit intellectual debates as scholars and policy experts weigh in on their viability and practicality as we approach the second quarter of the 21st century (William et al., 2018; Fisher, 2019; Ghuran, 2020). Military interventions by external actors are arguably the most frequent and the most contentious strategies on state reconstruction (Hermann & Kegley, 1996). Reno (2011) also maintains that external military interventions appear to be *a sine qua non* (a necessity or essential thing) of contemporary international peace and security. Peace Support Operations (PSOs) being a common security and defense approach appear to be highly risky and costly compared to diplomatic paradigms. Interestingly, many scholars, academicians and experts observe that military interventions in support of states are potentially enhancing the state legitimacy and defense capability of the host/target governments (Marangio, 2012; Bruton & Williams, 2014; Ichani, 2021; Shirodkar, 2023). There are also emerging interests on the pursuit for knowledge on the initiatives employed, collaborative actions of foreign actors on state reconstruction processes as well as challenges faced by the intervenors amid history of failed Peace Support Operations in war-torn and terror-ravaged state of Somalia (Okioga, 2009; Muchemi & Ichani, 2021). Foltz (1995) defines State reconstruction as the holistic re-establishment of a political authority with control over state boundaries and territory so as to achieve the functions of government as well as to the capacity of political authority in

resource extraction from international and domestic environment for political, economic and social welfare. Barbara (2008) posits that failed or collapsed states are perceived to present greatest danger to the global order therefore, the need for state reconstruction. State reconstruction is usually a follow-up to or carried alongside military intervention which implies the use of legitimate force by one state or international actors, individually or collectively, to foster or keep peace in another state embroiled in a conflict (Pearson & Baumann,1988). The mandate of any military involvement in foreign state is usually stipulated by United Nations Security Council through resolutions (Pearson et al., 2006). Regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) can also pass such resolution as it was in the case of AMISOM although they are still subjected to the UN authorization. As such, military intervention on state reconstruction aims at achieving its mandate within the international legal framework with focus on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine (Ichani, 2019) which begins with forestalling hostilities before other human insecurities are addressed. Therefore, state reconstruction by international actors, individually or collectively have turned out to be diagnostic framework to any international community intervention due to existing vulnerabilities of conflicts in failed states (Talentino, 2005)

The 2004 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention was deployed to assist Iraq create reliable military upon a formal request by the interim Iraqi administration (NATO, 2004). In line with the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546/2004, NATO mandate focused on reconstruction efforts in Iraq (Belloni & Costantini, 2019). However, the mission was stopped in 2011 because

there was no any binding agreement on the status of NATO operations legally in Iraq and eventually failed to achieve reconstruction efforts in empowering Iraqi governmental institutions (Lynch & Janzen, 2006). Ottaway (2002) asserts that international intervention in Cambodia ensured state survival but failed to attain the tenets of democracy- a critical component of state reconstruction in the modern state. In the context of Bosnia, as of 2002, state reconstruction remained on paper due to long presence of UN-backed mission but there's little possibility that it would exist on its own until later interventions (Ottaway, 2002).

In a similar context of state reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Luckham (2013) alludes that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) was established with a mission to monitor peace processes especially on demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement (UNSCR 1279/ 1999:1291/2000). MONUSCO mandate focused on civilian protection and building any form of “sustainable peace,” which was considered prime components for successful and sustainable reconstruction in DRC (Neethling, 2011). However, there was widespread criticism levelled against MONUSCO. There has been perceived feeling that the reconstruction efforts of MONUSCO which was the largest peacekeeping mission to have existed over two decades, failed to attain sustainable peace and stability in DRC (Lopor, 2016; Romansky, 2020). These led to wide criticism of intervention strategies employed and generally the on-the-ground practices of MONUSCO and the larger UN and UN-backed missions. Nonetheless, the approach the UN speaks about the DRC may also have unprecedented impacts for its efficacy (Martinez &

Eng, 2016). Consequently, MONUSCO's role in DRC was terminated by President Felix Tshisekedi in December 2023 and subsequently voted out by UN Security Council in January 2024.

The initial attempts of military interventions in Federal Republic of Somalia in the 1990s on state reconstruction by the international community met partial successes (Ottaway, 2002). Efforts towards state reconstruction in Somalia began in 1992 when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctioned United Nation Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) whose mandate was to provide support during the ensuing crisis as stipulated by UNSCR 794/1992. However, with the clans' complexities and the challenges of the country's warlords, following the fall of Said Barre regime, the goals set by UNOSOM were never achieved. From lessons learnt, the Security Council approved another mission, larger than the first mission; the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) led by United States (UNSCR 814/1993). UNITAF was mandated to aid UNOSOM II (Allard, 1995). However, both UNITAF and UNOSOM II were faced by myriad of challenges (Tubbs, 1997). Mulugetta (2014) observed that attacks on the personnel and troops in these two missions were high in 1995. Consequently, these forced the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN) to pull out of Somalia. Since then, there has never been any concrete solution towards mitigating Somali situation thus left in the illegitimate rule of warlords and clans competing for power and resources (Mulugetta, 2014). The unprecedented decision by UN and US to exit from Somalia became a missed opportunity in the cumulative efforts and restoring hope to reconstruct Somalia. With lack of substantive state administration, the northern

part of Somalia which is relatively peaceful proclaimed its independence as the “Republic of Somaliland” although it has never been fully recognized as a sovereign state by the community of nations (Lewis, Ascap & Dwyer, 2008).

Notably, following the exit of the UN and US, regional actors within Africa and in this case Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led an extensive peace process in Somalia dubbed Eldoret Peace Process (IGAD,2005). The sub-regional agency even established an intervention force, Intergovernmental Authority Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) to bring peace and stability in Somalia although it was not deployed due to differences among IGAD members states and other logistical challenges (IGAD,2005). These initiatives resulted in semblance of peace in Somalia (Bruton& Williams, 2014). With resurgence of fighting and upshot of jihadist organization destabilizing peace, Somalia relapsed into anarchy once more.

In renewed efforts towards state reconstructions in Somalia, African Union established AMISOM which eventually replaced and subsumed IGASOM in compliance with UN resolution 1744/2007 (UN, 2007). This was in accordance with the 2007 signed and ratified Status of Mission Agreement between AU and Somalia (SOMA, 2007: AU, 2007). The motivation of the intervention was to aid national reconciliation congress and provide a report within 2 months on the possibility of a peacekeeping mission by the UN (AMISOM, 2007). In 2014, UN gave a go ahead to the AU via AMISOM to proceed in its mandate in Somalia until 30th November 2015 (UNSCR 2182/2014). UN further authorized AMISOM to implement “all measures in carrying out support for reconciliation and dialogue by aiding with safe passage, protection of civilians involved in the reconciliation

process and facilitating their movement as well as the protection and movement of all other stakeholders” (AMISOM, 2021). UNSC also issued Resolution 2372/2017 which enabled security mandates to be gradually handed over to the Somalia forces by AMISOM, and was cognizant of the Somalia forces ability and progresses made on political and security fronts in Somalia (AMISOM, 2017: UN, 2017)

State reconstruction was poised to benefit from the peace support operations through joint initiatives of AMISOM and international partners as Somalia reestablishes its government functions. Several milestones were achieved through joint initiatives and strategic partnerships between African Union and its major Intergovernmental and state partners including UN and The United Nations Country Teams (UNCT), US, UK, EU, NATO and Turkey). Some sense of law and order, stability, reconciliation and legitimacy in Somalia was restored. In equal measure, business and economic activities gained life and there is good cooperation and collaboration between the Government of Somalia with neighboring/regional states as well as their nationals. There was also an increase in dialogue between the government and the opposition towards peaceful nation building and progress. The empowered security forces were now at a much better position to counter terrorist attacks from Al-Shabaab and able to take full command of the country’s national security with back up from AMISOM personnel. As a result, Al-Shabaab were displaced from the major population vicinities in the in most parts of southern and central Somalia (Lotze & Kasumba 2012).

Based on these developments, Williams (2018) points that AMISOM achieved its mandate in protecting two transitional regimes, two federal regimes and two national electoral processes. AMISOM also successfully created political atmosphere for Somalia's leadership to address their key national challenges related to governance, reconciliation and state reconstruction (AMISOM, 2021). AMISOM further aided in establishing the necessary conditions for multiple external actors to come to Somalia and initiate state reconstruction through strategic and non-strategic partnerships. AMISOM tough critics concedes that these progressive developments could be impossible without its effort (William et al., 2018). However, it is not clear if all these achievements were as a result of AMISOM presence in Somalia.

In the face of challenging situation that has dragged Somalia in turmoil for close to three decades, international community particularly AU acknowledges the need for strategic partnerships as a framework of towards sustainable state reconstruction and subsequent re-gain of statehood in Somalia (AU,2022). As a distinct feature of the growing international relations order, AU has employed strategic partnership as a model towards attaining state reconstruction in Somalia. Strategic partnerships have become a new norm in the international life and its continued existence in the post-cold war. Lessa (1998 p. 31; 2010, p. 119) asserted that strategic partnerships as “priority political and economic relations, reciprocally compensating, established on the basis of an accumulation of bilateral relations of a universal nature”. Emerson et al.'s (2001) on agential terms defines strategic partnership “as a particular type of relationship that ‘involves two actors

that are powerful and capable of taking strategic action together' (p. 45).” The concept of strategic partnership within AU framework has become essential to navigate systemic and specific issue international challenges particularly on peace support operations in the continental Africa. This study therefore attempted to expound on strategic partnerships between AU and international governmental agencies (bilaterally and multilaterally) with a specific concentration on the initiatives of AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia.

Cognizant of its mandate, there are claims that AMISOM prioritized peace and relegated on state reconstruction. As this may be the case, there is need to establish the role of AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia owing to the fact that there were missed opportunities of peace support operations that that resulted from inability of the missions to exercise control over the entire state. With this in mind, AMISOM needed to ensure its presence throughout Somalia during the intervention. This was necessary for smooth transition plan. AMISOM had a number of state reconstruction tasks a head of it. There was opportunity task of enhancing the capacity of the Somali Police Force through proper military training, modernization of their armory, personnel, capacity building and constant supplies to counter the anti-government groups.

There are emerging reports showing that AMISOM troops faced many challenges in state reconstruction agenda (Loubser & Solomon, 2014). Loubser et al (2014) further allude that retaliation by Al-Shabaab, lack of adequate capacity, logistical constraints, loss of military assets, and the invincible nature of the enemy continue to haunt efforts towards state reconstruction in Somalia. Mohamed (2015)

highlights that three towns which were under AMISOM troops' watch were recaptured by Al-Shabaab, which included Kuntuwarey, El Salundi and Bugda. Mohamed (2015) further argued that in warfare, it was expected of troops to hold the positions captured from enemies such as centers, towns and cities. As such, they were expected not to cede captured ground. However, captured positions were abandoned when the capacity to hold them is inadequate. With regard to increase in enemy activities in the context of Somalia, the supposition is that AMISOM troops were ineffective and inefficient in how the peace support operations were conducted.

The fragile Somalia has to regain its stability and a lasting solution to the more than three decades conflict and state collapse through state reconstruction initiatives. The unprecedented failures of interventions in Somalia present huge gaps that require prompt and deeper investigations. These therefore calls for proper intervention within the academic and policy realms in a bid to foster sustainable state reconstruction in Somalia. It is precisely in these contexts that this study aims at explored AMISOM in respect to state reconstruction in Somalia with an aim of attaining policy and academic contributions in regards in "Somalia unresolved question".

1.2 Statement of the problem

Barre regime's fall in early 1990s led to fractional war and dysfunctional state system in Somalia that has continued to haunt its statehood for more than three decades (Walls, 2009). Credible reports point out that thousands of Somalis have been killed with close to 4 million internally and 1.1 externally and further 0.5

million are asylum seekers. Accounted and unaccounted property worth millions of dollars have been destroyed as a result of dysfunctionality of the state. The situation in Somalia continues to be an existential threat to the regional, continental and global stability. Despite several state reconstruction initiatives in Somalia by the international community; UN (UNOSOM 1 AND 11), US Intervention (1992–1995), Ethiopia (2006-2009) and IGAD (2005-2007), Somalia has never been in a position to holistically re-establish its political, economic and social authority with absolute control over state boundaries and territory with an aim to achieve the functions of states as enshrined in the international law and norms (Charter, 1945). In line with the aspirations of African Union and its strategic partners, AMISOM was mandated to ensure sustainable state reconstruction in Somalia was realized (Ntol & Vrancken, 2000). However, during its tenure, AMISOM with its strategic partners with their formidable strategic partnerships failed to attain what was largely anticipated by international community as the ultimate solution to restoration of Somali nation and liberation of its people from the brutal hands of warlord, terrorist groups and negative clannism. Although the successes of AMISOM within its mandate was partially evidenced on development-oriented programs and peace building in Somalia, much ought to have been tailored on state reconstruction initiatives. Historical trajectories pinpoint AMISOM as multi-dimensional mission which struggled to meet its complex and ever-changing mandate as advanced by AUPSC and UNSC. The AU strategic partnerships with other powerful states and intergovernmental actors seem to have bolstered as well as negated the outcomes of AMISOM operations which faced fraught challenges.

These were attributed to the vested interests of strategic partners which in, most instances, override the major goal of rebuilding Somalia.

AMISOM state reconstruction processes in Somalia were faced with logistical, technical, financial, coordination and challenges; and subsequently limited the mission from protecting Somali population and defeating the principal enemy, the Al-Shabaab. Williams (2013) observed that these challenges limited AMISOM's achievements in executing its reconstruction mandate thus demonstrating the low success rates in the intervention despite the mission's remarkable perseverance and resilience during their tenure in Somalia. Therefore, these brought into question viability and practicality of peace support operations as an approach towards reconstructing Somalia amidst the three-decade of state collapse and state fragility. The urgency of solution-based paradigms to the unending challenges attributed to peace support operations in Somalia, is a glaring reality, especially at the time when the AU and the world is grappling with the costs of wars, state fragility, climate change, global terrorism and rise and unethical use of artificial intelligence in warfare by state and non-state actors. It is on the backdrop of these debates, dilemmas and challenges that this study sought to problematize African Union led state reconstruction initiatives in Somalia with an aim of conceptualizing and contextualizing on this unresolved "Somali question" on state reconstruction.

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.3.1 General objective of the study

The general objective was to explore implications of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on state reconstruction outcomes in Somalia between 2007 and 2021.

1.3.2 Specific objectives of the study

The study's specific objectives sought to:

1. To analyze state reconstruction initiatives employed by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia.
2. To assess the significance of strategic partnerships of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) and other international governmental actors on state reconstruction in Somalia.
3. To examine the challenges faced by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia.

1.4 Research questions

The study's specific research questions were:

- 1 What were the implications of the initiatives employed by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on state reconstruction in Somalia?
- 2 How valuable were the strategic partnerships between the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with United Nations Country Teams

(UNCTs) and other international governmental actors on state reconstruction in Somalia?

- 3 How did the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) navigate through the challenges faced on state reconstruction in Somalia?

1.5 Research premises

- 1 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had a foundational basis to foster state reconstruction in Somalia.
- 2 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had concrete concerns to establish strategic partnerships with United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) and intergovernmental actors on state reconstruction in Somalia.
- 3 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) faced several challenges in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia.

1.6 Purpose of the study

Military intervention on state reconstruction spans from operations during war time period to the moments of tranquility. This implies that military intervention is a complex phenomenal process which requires comprehensive assessment before it is conducted to ascertain possible outcomes. Therefore, the sole intention of this study was to contribute scholarly to the current body of knowledge which narrow gaps within which state reconstruction is modelled. The study serves as a good precedence in improving the conduct of peace support operations under the international laws as may be conducted by the United Nations, AU, regional, sub regional bodies or independent sovereign States. Th study also breed international best practices towards sustainable state reconstructions in the African continent

and beyond which are termed as “war-torn, collapsed, fragile, failed or dysfunctional” states.

1.7 Justifications and significance of the study

Over three-decade state reconstruction efforts in Somalia have been overwhelming, painstaking and fraught. So many military interventions and intergovernmental actors been involved yet the state stability remains elusive hence the need for critical intellectual debates. In terms of academic justification, the study provides an insight view on the peace support operation advanced by AU as a continental bloc. This justifiably provide a fertile ground for investigation on AMISOM in its quest for state reconstruction in Somalia. State collapse and/or state fragility is/are an existential threat to the international community. With the increase of terror activities in the Horn of Africa (World Bank, 2011), deeper scholarly inquiry is justifiably required to establish the outcomes of external interventions in Somalia. The study anticipated to contribute new ideas/concepts in making state reconstruction initiatives more efficient and effective and, therefore, giving in-depth understanding of conduct of PSOs.

In terms of policy justification, as pointed by Hesse, (2014) Somalia remains ranked as one of the most “failed and fragile states” and therefore need a policy revolution within the diplomatic and military realms. International community through their policy actions on Somalia have mounted several interventions (UNOSOM I and II: IGASOM: Ethiopia Intervention) in the past but has terribly failed to liberate or secure Somali people from the brutal hands of war lords and terrorist groups. Even with the AMISOM and its successor the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) as well as currently, the AU Support and

Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), doubts among policy makers on the progress continue to manifest itself. Menkhaus (2014) observes that state reconstruction appears to be too slow if not, none at all. The policies also need to be capable of identifying the variables and factors that successful reconstruction is hinged upon. Further, it will also facilitate access to pertinent information as to the operationalization of the various factors towards successful reconstruction. This study sought to examine the crucial components to successful reconstruction process in Somalia.

Studies done on role of AMISOM have largely focused on peace, security, refugees and terrorism (Elmi & Barise, 2006: Osman, 2007: Rutherford, 2008: Menkhaus, 2011: Ligawa, 2018: Williams, 2013: Musoma, 2021: Amadi, 2014) but little has been explored about AMISOM on state reconstruction. The urgency of solution-based paradigms to the unending problems occasioned in military interventions is a glaring reality, especially at this time when international community is grappling with costs of wars, state fragility, climate change, and rise of artificial intelligence (Williams, 2013: UNGA, 2023). Somalia situation continues to threaten stability of the horn of Africa (Menkhaus, 2014: Stupart, 2011).

Undoubtedly, the study's findings will be significant in making policy contributions especially in the contexts of state reconstruction and interventionism. This study therefore will be an auxiliary to the emerging scope of knowledge and frameworks on capabilities and capacities of the community of nations in extending protection to civilians in the volatile environments largely referred as "failed, "collapsed and "war-torn states". Moreover, the study will

contribute to the greater discipline of peacekeeping operations through provision of a redefinition of practice of peacekeeping which can be compared and reviewed to similar studies. This will lead to development of a more competitive peace framework on state reconstruction using the study findings as a guideline for a new model. This study therefore will be of great essence to actors in international relations. The findings will also be significant in creating a road map towards solving similar cases of state reconstruction.

In the Academic sphere, this study will be vital in the sense that, even though number of academic studies analyses actions of interventions on state reconstruction they are still huge gaps and dilemmas that needs prompt and deeper inquiry from the world of academia. The situation in Somalia with initiatives fostered by the regional blocs offers a good opportunity for investigation on impact of authorized interventions towards sustainable state reconstruction. Academic investigations of this kind present a viable analysis to interrogate understanding of African Solutions for African challenges as advocated by academicians, Pan Africanists and African leaders. Academic institutions will also find the study to be of value during scholarly research and in lecturing thus acting as potential reference points by the various groups in the higher learning institutions. The findings shall also contribute in narrowing the glaring gaps in the contemporary literature which have not been focused in deeper details with regard to influence of AMISOM intervention in Somalia on state reconstruction.

1.8 Scope of the study

The subject matter of this study was based on periodical, theoretical, geographical and thematic dimensions within which the researcher focused and provided a clear understanding of what was being investigated.

Periodically, the study was confined to the time/period between 2007 to 2021. Periodic scope was based on the time when AMISOM mandate was established by the AU Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007; the unanimously adoption of UNSC Resolution 1744/2007 on 20th February 2007 authorizing AMISOM to replace and subsume IGASOM following a consensus between UN and AU as well as the Status of Mission Agreement between the Somalia's TFG and AU signed on 6th February 2007 and Security Council Resolution 2628 of 2022 which authorized the AU to reconfigure AMISOM and replace it with ATMIS with effect from 2022. Periodically, it was between 2007 and 2021 that the AMISOM's civilian, police and military components were active in state reconstruction processes in Somalia.

On the theoretical scope, this study was anchored on the state building, securitization and intervention theories described the extent to which the theoretical reflections were explored in addressing the research objectives. These theories were valuable in providing a proper understanding, explanation and deeper meaning to the study. It further aided in identification of unexplored areas of the research as well as predicting facts in respect to AMISOM's intervention in Somalia on state reconstruction.

Within the geographical scope, the study was conducted in Mogadishu which is the largest port city and administrative capital of Somalia. Mogadishu as study

area hosts head offices of governmental and non-governmental agencies that were pertinent to the study. Mogadishu also hosts international organizations such as UN country teams and diplomatic missions accredited to Somalia. The scope was crucial because it influenced the information collected, the inferences drawn and the general understanding of phenomenon.

Thematically, this scope of the study covered state reconstruction initiatives led by African Union in Somalia with specific focus on the initiatives employed by AMISOM, value of AU strategic partnerships and challenges AMISOM faced as central themes within the confines of International Relations and Diplomacy disciplinary frameworks. The thematic scope was fundamental in guiding the literature review, collection of data, ensuring consistency and coherence as well as enhancing relevance of the study.

1.9 Limitations and delimitations of the study

Mistrust and doubts from the key informants on the intent of the researcher while collecting primary data with regard to the question under study was a key limitation. Another limitation was security challenges from the area of study during the collection of data. Security situation in Mogadishu and its environs has been unstable, unreliable due to potential threats from terrorist organizations and warring political as well as clan factions. Some key informants were not cooperative during the collection of primary data while others were either too busy for the interviews or unwilling to respond due to perceived or real sensitivity of data. The researcher also experienced the difficulty in obtaining information that

was considered highly classified(confidential) from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign and Diaspora Affairs.

In curing deficiencies(delimitation), the researcher employed a delimitation strategy that guided to narrow down the study, enhance manageability and increase relevance to the research objectives. Further, this was mitigated through telephone/online interviews. The researcher opted to replace them with other key informants with similar characteristics. The researcher also instituted trust and confidence on the intentions and goals of study by guaranteeing key informants that the objective was entirely limited by purpose to academia. The study also observed research protocols that ensured that attitudes, perceptions and barriers to research were substantially minimized. In where there was limitation in primary data, the study relied on secondary sources of literature which included articles, books, communiqués, conference papers, theses and dissertations, edited and classical books, internet sources, journals, magazines, memos, minutes, newspapers, relevant regional and international instruments and agreements, reports, speeches and any other available up-to-Date and credible sources.

1.10 Chapter summary

This chapter presented an overview of the background of the study. It illustrated that external military interventions appear to be *a sine qua non* (a necessity or essential thing) of contemporary international peace and security on state reconstruction. It also pointed out that failed or collapsed states are perceived to present greatest danger to the global order. As a distinctive feature of the growing international relations, strategic partnership, as a model towards attaining state

reconstruction in Somalia, is a new international norm continues to be in existence in the post-cold war. The chapter also problematized the study and presented the general and specific objectives of the study in tandem with the research questions and premises. It also presented that justification and significance of the study as well as the purpose of the study. The chapter also presented the scope of the study on the basis of period, theory, geography and themes. It concluded with the presentation of limitations and delimitations of the study. The next chapter focuses on literature review which gives more scholarly insights thus underpinning the need for the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter undertakes the thematic review of the existing and relevant literature as well as the past studies executed in relation to international governmental actors on state reconstruction initiatives. It reviews on three themes in line with the study's objectives to offer an in-depth analysis, synthesis and evaluate current and reliable data sources to get insight of the problem under investigation. The themes interrogated include: initiatives employed by international governmental actors intervening on state reconstruction initiatives; significance of inter- governmental strategic partnerships on state reconstruction and; challenges faced by international governmental actors intervening on state reconstruction.

The chapter further explore the gaps to the study and tethered to the study's objectives as well as the theoretical frameworks guiding and anchoring the study with an extensive focus on state building, securitization and intervention theories. The chapter concluded with the presentation of conceptual framework of the study.

2.2 Initiatives employed by international governmental actors intervening on state reconstruction

The first thematic area of literature review in this section was on initiatives employed by international governmental actors intervening on state reconstruction. The study reviewed on recent scholarly works in line with the theme of the study. It interrogated the works by different scholar with focus on

international actors involved in military interventions and their contributions on state reconstructions with systematic review on the works of different scholars.

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established by the UNSC in 1999 to assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord aimed at ending civil war in Sierra Leone (UNSCR 1270/1999). The mandate authorized UNAMSIL to protect population under potential violence threat through PSOs on state reconstruction (Badmus & Isiaka, 2009). UNAMSIL mandate was: to cooperate with the Sierra Leone government and other partners to the agreement as well as the agreement's implementation; providing support to the Sierra Leone government in executing plans for disarmament and reintegration; facilitate humanitarian support; UN support operations by civilian officers; providing support to elections in Sierra Leone to be carried out according to the state's constitution (United Nations, 1999). In 2000, the revision of the mandate was undertaken to include the following responsibilities with key aim of promoting state reconstruction in Sierra Leone; provision of security at specific locations and national buildings specifically in Freetown and key infrastructure such as airports and intersections; facilitation of free flow of goods, people and humanitarian assistance; provision of security in all disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites; coordination and providing assistance to Sierra Leone authorities in discharging their responsibilities; guarding ammunition, weapons and other equipment retrieved from ex-combatants and providing assistance in their destruction or disposal (United Nations, 1999).

Gilder (2021) in his work delved in to a narrower perspective of human security in pursuing stabilization in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Gilder demonstrated that MINUSCA had a clear focus on extending the state authority beyond the capital Bangui in respect to the extension of the rule of law and reconstructing the legal system. MINUSCA also aided community-based initiatives on consultation and empowering locals to address their own security concerns. MINUSCA is known for its utility of robust military and recent cooperation with Central African Armed Forces (FACA), which may have serious impacts. A wider review of UN documentation views at the mandate and practice of MINUSCA and argues that the mission aims to empower local population, engage in a bottom-up manner and promote constitutionalism and the rule of law (Gilder, 2021). The evaluation also casts light on components of the stabilization which are problematic as in the case of cooperation and militarization with the host state. However, the reports indicate that competing interests in the UN PSOs mandate risk undermining one another where militarization and cooperation with the host state have negative impact on the UN's capacity to establish peace at the local levels, empower societies and aid national reconciliation. In addressing the gaps, the UN needed to take in to account how it aims to proceed in future stabilization missions to minimize a situation where involvement in war-fighting against spoilers or operating closely alongside the state undermines efforts to create sustainable state reconstruction initiatives. Gilder reliance solely on the UN documentations (Secretary-General reports and Security Council meeting minutes) left open questions on whether there's disparity between information

presented and documented by UN officials and the actual situation on the battlefield. Towards assessing the UN PSOs and in the case of MINUSCA, future studies should delve into this deeper to establish whether the way activities peace keeping operations are framed are, in fact, a true representation of the mandate at mission-level.

Musau, Hamasi and Mulu (2023) in exploring on peace support operations and sustainable peace highlighted that UNSOM I was aimed at aiding in the delivery of humanitarian assistance the people of Somalia suffering from civil wars and famine. It later developed in to an attempt to end the civil war and assist in fixing the key institutions required for a functioning state (Daze & Fishel, 2019). The mission was able to bring stability and reconstruction in the zones under their command and control thus resulting in a safer environment. Consequently, the Somali population were able to live their normal lives while facilitating the transit of aid through the protected zones. Despite UNSOM's initiatives, the Somali situation deteriorated and attempts to realize sustainable peace were jeopardized, in some instances to the point of inaction. Lewis (1997) alludes that the famine deteriorated situation from bad to worse. The failure to detect the adverse effect of famine in Somalia situation pinpoints a missed opportunity in re-evaluating the goals of the mission against the prevailing natural circumstances. This therefore manifest a gap in peace support operations by the international community directed to Somalia.

The NATO intervention in Herzegovina and Bosnia was aimed towards state reconstruction (United Nations, 1995: NATO, 1995). Lambert (2002) posits that

the initiatives led by NATO Force (IFOR) deployed in 1995 was purposed with the implementation of militaristic components of Dayton Peace Agreement but was replaced by the Stabilization Force led by NATO (SFOR) after a year of carrying out their mission. Lambert (2002) further asserts that SFOR was purposed with facilitating the country's reconstruction and securing the environment during the war that lasted from 1992 to 1995. The Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed in 1995 in Herzegovina and Bosnia on a one-year operation was mandated under the UNSCR 1031 of 15th December 1995(United Nations, 1995). Consequently, the mandate was not only limited to maintaining peace, but enforcing it where necessary (United Nations, 1995). Thus, IFOR operations were purposed for peace enforcement, which were generally said to be a peace support mission. Similarly, SFOR was mandated with peace enforcement (Lambert, 2002). The main task of IFOR was to guarantee ceasing of hostilities and disperse the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina armed forces on the one hand and the Republika Srpska Forces on the other hand (Dayton Peace Agreement,1995). Lambert (2002) also posits that IFOR was further purposed with overseeing territorial transfer between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, demarcate the inter-entity boundary and remove heavy arms into sanctioned containment areas. With improvement on the circumstances, IFOR started supporting organizations that were involved in overseeing how the Dayton Peace Agreement civilian components were implemented which included the OSCE and the UN as well as the Office of the High Representative. In a rejoinder, Lambert (2002) contends that the primary task of the SFOR was the contribution of secure and safe environment which would be conducive to political and civil

reconstruction. SFOR was tasked with the deterrence or prevention of prevalence of hostilities; promotion of a climate which facilitated an environment for the continuity of peace processes; and provision of selective support within its capability and means to civilian organizations that participated in the peace process (Lambert (2002)). In addition to assisting various other organizations working on the reconstruction in Herzegovina and Bosnia, SFOR launched its own CIMIC initiatives in areas that included transportation and engineering. SFOR further enhanced participation in maintaining and repairing the country's infrastructure such as railways and roads collaborating with various international agencies and local authorities (Lambert (2002)). The role of SFOR in collaboration with other stakeholders played a critical role in the provision of freedom of movement across Herzegovina and Bosnia (Lambert (2002)). NATO missions (IFOR and SFOR) in their quest to reconstruct Bosnia and Herzegovina needed a combination of military, deterrence and humanitarian capabilities; unfortunately, it did not have. In addressing such gaps, the mission should have taken proper mechanisms to adapt to the PSOs environments in more effective ways.

Gallis (2007) pinpoints that NATO in Afghanistan through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) aimed to establish a "new" NATO that was capable to transcend the European theaters of war and combat emerging threats particularly in the case of international terrorism and the possible use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The goal of this mission was to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan following the request by Former Afghan President Afghani. Officials from NATO made a description of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as the "leading edge" of the Allies' initiatives to bring stability in

Afghanistan. NATO's support to the Afghanistan government in the effort to bring stability, resolved the control of the narcotics industry, disarmament of militias, anti-corruption initiatives and development of an economic infrastructure (Gallis, 2007). PRTs agenda was to create extension of the power influence of the central government to the entire nation, provision of security and undertaking of infrastructural development to enhance the Afghan economy. United States PRTs constituted troops, civil affairs officers, the U.S. government representatives, Afghani personnel and other government institutions aimed at promoting state reconstruction (Gallis, 2007). There was no framework for PRTs practice, thus they received mixed reviews. In most instances, those serving in U.S. PRTs attempted to move around surrounding areas, engage the local authorities and people, and showed that the presence of U.S. was bringing desired outcomes (Gallis, 2007). PRTs under the U.S. also had the military capabilities to address to any circumstance which their work force was facing any possible threat. While not openly offensive military instruments, U.S. PRTs were obligated in providing security and responding aggressively to any potential risk (Gallis, 2007). This pinpoints the absence of the universal and progressive notion among the NATO officials on the best PRT models to employ for successful realization of NATO objectives in Afghanistan.

Hill & Manea (2018) asserts that despite NATO making major strides in its POC policy, its phase of implementation was much complex. Many scholars and specialist remain skeptical on NATO's role as a POC actor in future by the fact that it is purely a defense organization and in part due to the huge number of deaths

and destruction caused by its ground and air campaigns during combat missions. Steven Hill, former NATO legal adviser emphasized that while NATO shouldn't undervalue its impact and potentiality in the POC field, it should "avoid overselling NATO's work to date in implementing the Policy" (Rynning, 2017). The initiatives of NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo challenged the organization with many responsibilities and POC related challenges. NATO's IFOR in Bosnia was deployed and was mandated with implementation of the military components of the Dayton arrangement (1995-1996). IFOR mandate was to; "help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement, to partner with other actors in international stage, and to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person" (Dayton agreement, 1995). Therefore, role of NATO in Bosnia would be interpreted as a POC mandate (Recchia, 2024). Gordon (2013) observe that despite NATO's record on POC mandates implementation, the defense organization's old tradition of training and educating enhances its members preparedness, interoperability and defense frameworks. Committed personalities in NATO have improved innovative models to POC training such as the use of "table-top" training as well as virtual reality simulations.

Mulugeta (2009) points out that Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in a number of cases contributed though not effectively to the state reconstruction in Somalia. Through peace and security division, IGAD prioritized the following components of state reconstruction: rule of law, democracy, governance and human rights; prevention, management and resolution of

conflicts; preventing and managing of trans-national security threats; post-conflict reconstruction, development and humanitarian agenda (<http://www.igad.org>). Mulugeta observes that IGAD as a body and through respective member states contributed to addressing the Somali conflict. Mulugeta pointed out the Djibouti initiatives in 1991 bringing warring parties in Somalia conflict which brought together the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) with an aim of fostering reconciliation, ceasefire and forming a provisional government. However, it was unsuccessful due to difference among the warring internal actors (IGADD, 1991). IGAD also mandated Ethiopia to coordinate peace and mediation process and subsequently led to the 1996 Soderre peace process. This led to the establishment of the National Salvation Council “as part of a preparatory course of action leading to the establishment of a Provisional Central Government of Somalia” (UNSC 1997). Mulugeta also point out that IGAD through the Djibouti’s Arta Conference of 2000, a bottom-up approach which considered civil society organizations (CSOs). Accordingly, IGAD declared that “there is no alternative for peace in Somalia to pushing forward with the building block and the bottom-up approach in which the role of warlords is contained and that of civil society is enhanced” (IGAD 1999). Further, Mulugeta, posits that play a key role in the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia through the Eldoret Peace Process which constituted three phases. In the first phase, it was anticipated that Somali internal stakeholders would reach consensus on the outcomes of the process as the desired results of the conference as a preliminary strategy towards owning the process. The second phase entailed

addressing the key issues in the peace processes and constituted 6 reconciliation committees acting on the federal charter/constitution; internal conflicts; recovery of economic; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; regional and international issues and; land and property. In the third phase, the committee's reports would be subjected for plenary for discussion and approval. Thereafter, this phase would address the contentious issues of power distribution with the goal of establishing a broad based and functioning central government. In the quest for stability in Somalia, during a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, IGAD issued a communique on 31st January, 2005 on a plan to deploy troops to Somalia. The communique stated: "the mission would provide security support to the TFG and guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the reestablishment of peace and security including training of the police and the army" (IGAD communiqué, 2005). This was further endorsed by 4th ordinary session of AU and received authorization during the 24th AUPSC meeting held on 7th February, 2005. The decision of IGAD summit was endorsed by the Fourth Ordinary Session of the AU and authorized by the 24th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU held on February 7, 2005. Further, the Security Council authorized IGAD and member states of AU to establish the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) via UNSCR 1725/2006 (United Nations, 2006). Towards implementation, the AU and IGAD facilitated a fact-finding and reconnaissance mission on 14th February 2005 to evaluate the structure, mandate, force, capacity, and responsibilities of the peace support mission. The proposed IGASOM deployment strategy was submitted by the military experts to the IGAD member states, refined by the defense military chiefs, and eventually approved by

the defense ministers at the meeting in Entebbe, Uganda on 14th March, 2005(Mulugeta, 2009). It was intended to deploy up to 10,000 troops across Somalia (excluding Somaliland) beginning from April, 2005. The expected IGASOM cost was estimated to be US\$413 million annually (Mays, 2005). However, the IGASOM aspirations were unrealized due to controversial issues among the member states, lack of adequate funding, negative perspectives from potential donors as well as leadership deficiencies within IGAD (Mulugeta, 2009). These gaps exposed the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of IGAD in leading reconstruction initiatives within the horn of Africa.

Nuh and Kakuba (2022) interrogated the contribution of IGAD towards Peace and Stability in Somalia. Nuh & Kakuba as in the case of Weldesellassie (2011) and Maalim (2013) established that IGAD in partnership with civil society organizations encouraged its member states to enhance democratization process, parliamentary systems, best governance and representation of gender to enable citizens more involved in local and national matters related to development. Nuh and Kakuba (2022) reported that, in 2002, IGAD Heads of state and government at the summit meeting in Khartoum and boldly committed to attaining state reestablishment in Somalia. As a result, they backed the Eldoret Peace and Reconciliation Conference which brought Somali leadership together to establish their national administration. As expounded by Elowson and de Albuquerque (2016), IGAD also drafted protocol on democratic, governance and elections, the code of conduct on IGAD elections and guidelines for observers in elections and highlighted gaps in poverty, administration, terrorism and development among the member states. These allude that IGAD in its reconstruction initiatives prioritized

democratic processes and governance as a strategy for conflict prevention in establishing peace and stability. Asfaw (2017) highlights that IGAD played a vital role in promoting peace, security and stability in the Horn of Africa and in particular Somalia. Thus, it can be debated that regional organizations (ROs) are tools for enhancing regional responses to common problems. Moreover, Nuh and Kakuba (2022) perspectives present IGAD as a regional body which its reconstruction aspiration in Somalia was limited to political discourse. It glaringly didn't factor other aspects such as security, stabilization, Somali population involvement and protection of civilian in their reconstruction discourse.

2.3 Significance of international governmental strategic partnerships on state reconstruction

This section reviews on the second theme of the study. It reviews on the significance of international governmental strategic partnerships on state reconstruction. Successful state reconstruction initiatives are arguably unattainable without active participation and collaboration from other international actors. Some of the prominent actors in the process are sovereign states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) among others that have international legal personality. Every international governmental actor in the reconstruction process has different levels of sovereignty as well as legal obligations as enshrined in their charters, statutes, constitutions and other regional and international instruments (Henderson, 1997). Post conflict states frequently do not have the institutional ability to carry out reconstruction independently and must depend on several external and internal actors to support their reconstruction initiatives. As a result of the high level of vulnerability that prevails, the

intercession of the international networks is required to avert any potential future clashes (Earnest, 2019).

Strategic partnership is a multifaceted terminology considering the nature and varying political and diplomatic practices across the world as well as the variational framings, cultural and linguistic connotations (Tyushka & Czechowska, 2019). *Sensu stricto*, the English terminology for ‘strategic partnership’ possess a closer correspondence in the versions of linguistic i.e. in German (*strategische Partnerschaft*), Russian (*стратегическое партнерство*), Polish (*partnerstwo strategiczne*), Spanish (*asociación estratégica*), French (*partneriat stratégique*), Portuguese (*parceria estratégica*) and Ukrainian (*стратегічне партнерство*) – all taking reference to the binary aspects of the words: ‘partnership’ and ‘strategic’ (Tyushka & Czechowska, 2019).

Emerging out of collaboration on strategic and/or strategic issue, strategic partnerships frequently serve greater objectives and purposes. Empirical studies boldly validated Grevi’s (2013) perspective that “[r]eal-life strategic partnerships are multi-purpose ones, pursuing both bilateral and multilateral objectives and shifting focus across these and other dimensions of the relationship in a fairly pragmatic way”. Therefore, the objective of every partnership evolves from blend of strategic actors’ aspirations to attain ideational, reputational and material aspirations which in their turn come from perceptions of identity, objectives and their position in the international system and how they measure their vulnerability in relation to international interdependence.

Zhovkva (2005) alludes that strategic partnerships are special states’ tools of foreign policy which they utilize to enhance coordination of their diplomatic

activities in the international system with other actors. Zhovkva developed a finite catalogue of SP determining elements that include: “(1) similarity of interests among partners and ideally, their convergence; (2) a high degree of convergence of views and approaches to key issues of regional and/or global politics; (3) ‘the willingness to reconcile one’s own interests with the interests of the strategic partner or the willingness to make decisions in support of the States, international organizations and strategic partnerships partner on the international stage, even if such actions are not necessarily beneficial for one’s own good; (4) common challenges and threats (such as organized crime, illegal migration, arms and drug smuggling, aggressive separatism, terrorism) – and the determination to work together in order to overcome them; (5) a mechanism for implementing the strategic partnership, or the willingness and potential to create such’ (Zhovkva, 2006).” The concept of strategic partnership is defined as a long-time commitment by two or more actors to establish a close relation across a number of policy areas such as trade, commerce, security, science, technology, arts, military among others (Cameron and Zheng 2007, p.4: Zhongping & Jing, 2014: Darkwa, 2016).

Scholars also view strategic partnerships as relations which are vital to the realization of mutually shared goals by the involved parties (Cihelkova, Nguyen, Fabus, & Cimova, 2020: Grevi, 2010). Reiterer (2013) highlights that strategic partnerships are vital tools in foreign policy which should help partners attain their common strategic interests that include: to be influential actors, to share responsibility for global security, to share common goals and collectively with partners respond to the contemporary global challenges. Tyushka & Czechowska (2019) analytically observes that strategic partnerships are salient characteristics

of the emerging international system and represent a new model for organizing international life.

African Union (AU) vision's aspirations aim at attaining an integrated, prosperous, equitable and good leadership in the pacified United States of Africa effectively governed by Africans and represents an innovative and dynamic progressive force (African Union, 2023). The vision creates the need to strategically cooperate with other international actors, attain partnerships to attain her goals, increase international reputation and achieve global influence that would enable Africa and its people have impact in the world scene (African Union,2023). Within its framework, AU has shared vision, goal of enhancing AU portfolio in the globe and places importance to the emergence of strategic partnerships with regional actors and especially growing actors in the global south to attain its goals (The 1st Strategic Plan of Action Horizon 2007: Axis IV). Series of monumental partnerships were developed and commissioned between 2004 and 2008 and in particular; AU and South America, AU and India and AU and Turkey partnerships (The 1st Strategic Plan of Action Horizon 2007: Axis IV). At the same time, existing cooperation frameworks between AU and key traditional partners were formalized by re-defining, invigorating and strengthening the partnerships which included Africa and United States, Africa and Europe Partnership, Franco and African Summit, the Africa-Japan, the Africa-China Forum as well as Africa and Asia Sub-regional Organizations Conference (The 1st Strategic Plan of Action Horizon 2007: Axis IV). There's a growing interest for new partnerships by other international actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as formal expression for partnerships' revitalization between AU and Arab world (African

Union,2023). AU strategic partnership frameworks possess four distinct features (African Union,2023). First, it has continental to continental cooperation with focus on Africa and South America, Africa and Europe, and Africa and Asia. Secondly, continental to state cooperation's such as Africa and India, Africa and Turkey, Africa and China, Africa and Japan, Africa and US and Africa-France. Thirdly, the tier of partnerships between AU and new states or regional actors requesting more specific partnerships. These frameworks can be Subdivided into two namely: gestational partnership e.g. Africa and Arab partnership and Africa and Caribbean partnerships on reconceptualization basis; and prospective partnership as in the case of Africa and Iran which needs integration virtually within the framework of existing relations as a basis for its creation. Fourthly, it is the partnership AU has with other actors such as the Commonwealth, Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), as well as La Francophonie. Frameworks of Africa's strategic partnerships are cornerstones toward state reconstruction in African continent. The sustenance and success of AU PSOs as in the case of AMISOM in Somalia couldn't not be attained without strategic partnerships between AU and other international actors (African Union,2023). In view of these partnerships with AU and its top organs, it is clear that they are still in the processes of finalizing the evaluation of the various partnerships to ascertain the specific aspects in light of their value addition but not limited to state reconstruction.

Critical review on NATO strategic partnerships highlights the regional body cooperation with various partners through different structural frameworks based on their respective geographical regions. In the *Partnership for Peace (PfP)*

initiative, there's bilateral partnership between NATO and 18 individual partner states in the Euro-Atlantic region (Moore, 2024). These states include; Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Malta, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, Switzerland, Ireland (Moore, 2024). NATO under *the Mediterranean Dialogue* established partnership aimed at promoting security and stability in the larger region of the Mediterranean (Razoux, 2022)). This initiative constitutes 7 non-NATO member states namely; Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Jordan, Morocco, Israel and Tunisia (Razoux, 2022). Under the NATO's *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partnership forum* offers partnership with non-NATO states in the larger Middle East opportunity (Mosly, 2024). Four states of the Gulf Cooperation Council joined the Initiative: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and UAE (Mosly, 2024). Beyond the formal partnership *under the NATO'S partners across the globe initiative*, it partners with range of states on individual basis in addressing complex security issues in the global stage that transcends geographical scope (Grgić, 2022). The states include Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Japan, Iraq, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand (Grgić, 2022). Furthermore, NATO partners with international organizations and in Particular European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Lukin, Taran & Tykhonenko, 2025). Within NATO'S partnership framework, the organization seeks to build relations based on reciprocity, mutual benefits and respect and shared values (Lukin, Taran & Tykhonenko, 2025). Further, the strategic objectives guiding NATO's partnership include: promoting democracy and reforms; supporting for NATO-led operations/missions;

enhancing Euro-Atlantic/international, peace, security and stability; promoting regional security and cooperation; enhance awareness of security developments, including through early warning, with a view to preventing crises; Facilitating mutual cooperation on international efforts to meet emerging security challenges (NATO, 2024). In practice, NATO partnership with various actors on bilateral and multilateral basis, have immensely contributed to NATO-led operations and missions through a number of tools established. NATO on partnership mechanisms instituted: reforms on defense, institutional development, capacity-building; counter-terrorism; counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery; emerging security issues (cyber defense, energy security and maritime security), counter-piracy as well as civilian preparedness (NATO, 2024). Conclusive critical review of NATO's scope of strategic partnerships empirically demonstrates a limitation in the application of the partnerships between and among the parties involved with NATO because it factors the interest of the defense organization rather than common interest of both parties. Therefore, these manifest gaps in the application of strategic partnership in the international system.

In assessing the African Union-United Nations partnerships, the two institutions a number of initiatives have been working together towards the realization of successful peace support operations in the African continent (Joint AU-UN framework for enhanced partnership in peace and security, 2017). Considering the unique aspects of UN global character in confronting global issues, in partnership with AU, UN has been in the forefront in: maintenance of global peace and

security; protection of human rights; delivering humanitarian assistance; promoting sustainable development and; upholding international law (Charter, 1948). AU as a regional body is at the forefront of conflict prevention and crisis management in Africa considering the increasing complexities of conflict drivers and trans-national effect of modern armed conflicts (AUPSC,2024). Strategic partnership with UN is important to ensure responses are successful. The United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), formed by the UNGA Resolution 64/288 on 1st July 2010, was mandated to enhance the partnership between the UN and the AU peace and security issues (UNOAU, 2010). Engagements between the UN and the AU on peace and security accelerated in recent times culminating in to the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, signed in 19th April 2017 by the UNSG and AUC chairperson. The framework contributed to a more strategic partnership in the fields of conflicts prevention, political dialogues, national reconciliation, rule of law, democracy and adherence to human rights. Towards enhancing the scope of the AU-UN partnership policy and scholarly undertakings by the IPI and the Institute for Security Studies' (ISS) joint project in 2019 on the UNAU partnership seeks to give the partners a platform to explore on: partnership on the AU's Silencing the Guns initiative; the AU -UN partnership on peacebuilding and assistance to the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN and Norway as co-chairperson of the Friends of the AU-UN Partnership. UNSCR 2719/2023 established a new chapter for peace missions in Africa. The resolution offered a framework for the AU-led peace missions (AU) to access UN financing through assessed contributions thus making the operations effective and sustainable while enhancing management by the AU leadership.

UNSCR 2719 also offers an opportunity for both agencies to innovate the tools, practices, and partnerships necessary to address armed conflicts in Africa. critical reviews conclude that AU-UN partnership has immensely benefited AU through funding, support and hybrid missions, training, aid/ legitimization and authorization, intelligence gathering and sharing, aid, capacity building and logistical support.

The Strategic Partnership Agreement between Africa and EU is the formal framework for its collaboration with continental Africa (Africa-EU Partnership agreement, 2000: Bach, 2010: Michalski, 2019). The African Union (AU) which brings together African states is the EU's political partner (Adebajo, 2021). Beyond the joint high-level meetings that steer the relations, the EU collaborate with multiple partners to build on priorities mutually agreed especially on state reconstruction in Africa (Mangala, 2013). AU-EU Partnership was created at the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in 2000 and continues to be guided by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (Adebajo, (2021). The collaborative actions on EU-AU partnership have been centred on three models namely: EU-AU partnership for peace, security and governance; EU-AU commitment to multilateralism; as well as EU-AU partnership for migration and mobility, have had consequential effect on military intervention and state reconstruction (Africa and the EU, 2022). EU-Africa relations are based on two complementary frameworks, the Africa-EU and the OACPS partnership agreements, (Africa-EU Partnership agreement, 2000). The EU is at the forefront of international support to the African Peace, Security and Governance agendas with political support and substantial funding for

national efforts and those of the African Union and the African Regional Economic Communities (EUAU,2022). EU has been supporting AU and regional economic communities' agenda on governance, security, peace and security with political and financial support (EUAU,2022). Through the African peace facility, the EU funded over EUR 3.5 billion on peace and security. Between 2014 and 2020, the EU supported activities with 28 African states with EUR 650 million, including crisis actions (e.g. Somalia, Sudan, the Sahel and Libya), peace-building initiatives in the CAR and in Mozambique and prevention of conflict initiatives across Africa (EUAU,2022). For 2021 to 2027, the EU committed EUR 1.5 billion to support conflict prevention, peace and security initiatives at in Sub-Saharan Africa (EUAU,2022). Additional assistance was provided under the EPF which will facilitate the EU to provide logistics to the troops of EU partners, in compliance with IHRL AND IHL. Operating together through 11 EU common security and defense policy missions and operations, 3000 European troops, police personnel and magistrates providing capacity building to more than 30,000 African military, police and judicial personnel in the Horn of Africa/ Somalia, Central Africa, Sahel, Libya and Mozambique (EUAU,2022). Analytically, the EU-AU partnership on state reconstruction initiatives entail: combat radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism in the Sahel and West Africa; better empower women, children and youth; promote democratic governance and the rule of law; respect and promote human right; intensify our cooperation on cybersecurity; improve maritime security in critical areas; EU security and defense actions in Africa through EUTM Mali, EUBAM Libya, EU NAVFOR-

ATALANTA; EUTM Somalia EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUTM Mali, EUTM Mozambique, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI (EUAU, 2022).

Darkwa (2016) in his classical works establishes that external partners have supported through technical, fiscal, logistical and capacity building initiatives to African PSOs under the AU and UN framework. With the UN's great experiences and capabilities in peace missions, it has supported peace operations in Africa. Darkwa further states that in the Somalia, the United Nations Support Office (UNSOA) to the AMISOM supported the AU mission with logistics. EU has equally provided financial support to almost every peace operation led by AU. Darkwa highlights on the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the African Union Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA), AMISOM, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and the African Union Regional Task Force for the Elimination of the LRA (LRA-RTF) are beneficiaries of AU strategic partnership with external actors. Reichard (2006) points that NATO in 2005 aided the AU for the deployment of AMIS in the form of strategic lift, training as well as the use of intelligence. Sovereign states as in the case of Sweden, Norway, Saudi Arabia, UK, Japan and US among others, contributed in various ways to peace operations in Africa. In most cases, external partners have provided strategic air and water lift, strategic communication capabilities and personnel remuneration (Darkwa, 2016).

EU and UN have demonstrated common actions that hint on strategic partnership (AU,2023:EU 2023). In 2003, EU established an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) led by France (Homan, 2007). Despite some

limitations, IEMF was credited for protecting civilian populations in its operation zones via force against insurgency leadership. This was the initial POC related collaboration between EU and UN and had positive influence on preceding military to initiatives MONUC's POC (Tomolya, 2015). MONUC and MONUSCO's initiatives served as key foundation for all operations led by UN since 2010 on POC. Many of these models have been adopted by preceding peace support operations with more detailed mandates (Edstrom et al., 2013). Apart from MONUSCO, the other three largest UN peacekeeping initiatives have all employed joint protection teams, liaison assistants and female engagement groups as well as the MINUSCA introduced a rapid force similar to MONUSCO's FIB (Mwanyika, 2021). EU has also been criticized for failure to transform its "ambitious intentions for POC into actual operations." Nonetheless, a closer inquiry in to the EU's scorecard exposes a more complex picture (Kjeksrud et al., 2011).

UNSC core mandate in collaboration with States is to maintain peace and Security in the international system (De Wet et al, 2010). All States are under obligation to carry out the Security Council's resolutions (UN Charter, 1945). This therefore serves as natural strategic partnership between UN member states and the Security Council. When UNSC considers any threat to international peace, its priority is to determine peaceful frameworks to settle the dispute. This is through instituting principles to the actors for a peaceful resolution, appointing representatives, asking the Secretary General to undertake investigation and mediation process. De Wet (2004) further states that, on collaborative basis, UNSC authorizes utility of

military by member states' coalitions or by a regional governmental actor. This is executed as a last resort when all possible diplomatic means have been exhausted, a breach of the peace after a threat to the peace, or an act of aggression have been ascertained to be in existence. UNSC also recommends to the UNGA to admit new membership to the UN and appoint UNSG. The notable collaborative roles are through authorization and legitimization through Security Council resolutions on peace operations and state reconstruction interventions across the globe.

In 1992, the NATO found a new scope of operation in collaboration (Strategic Partnership) with the OSCE and the UN by supporting peacekeeping operations, collective defense responsibility and global crisis management in various states of the world; Somaliland being a top of their list (Leblond, 2017). These led NATO to intervene in Libyan crisis in 2011 with aim of removing President Muammar Gadhafi in power. Regrettably the NATO Intervention in Tripoli created worst political and humanitarian repercussions that are still with us today (Leblond, 2017). UN and NATO have also collaborated with specialist in setting up a NATO-UN POC training course operated by Finnish Defense Forces International Centre (FINCENT) in 2018 (Levomaa & Dumur-Laanila, 2019). These approaches demonstrate growing recognition of the importance of POC and create opportunity for establishing multi-organizational collaboration. POC policy under NATO has also been utilized for drafting national POC strategies template for as in the case of Ukraine (Atkinson, 2022). Kyiv adopted a national strategic framework for POC in armed conflicts in 2020, which "incorporated many of the best international standards, reflecting both by content and structure the NATO Policy

for the Protection of Civilians.” Thus, tremendous progress on within NATO’s policy on POC can also have an impact beyond the military organization. There is an opportunity to comprehensively map and connect allies’ varying models related to POC at the national and international level.

In evaluating the Russia-China strategic partnerships, Gorenburg (2019) in his classical work points that the two powerful states in the collaboration have enhanced military, economic and diplomatic ties. In military aspect, sales of military equipment’s and joint bilateral and multilateral military programs have been a manifestation of their partnership. Diplomatically, the two states who happen to be permanent members of the UN Security Council supported one another in many international agencies and operated closely to create newer multinational bodies(as in the case of BRICS) which would be options to institutions currently dominated by West (Gorenburg, 2019).As collaboration across different spheres progressed, analysts have immensely interrogated and reached consensus that the relations between Russia and China has attained a level of strategic partnership (Gorenburg, 2019). Alexander Korolev point that: “the partnership is neither ad hoc nor temporary and provides clear benefits for both sides: Through this partnership, Russia can gain access to more instruments for promoting its agenda of balancing the United States and enhancing its version of multipolarity in Europe. China, in turn, receives Russia’s political backing and access to Russia’s energy resources and military technologies, which are essential assets for China in its growing tensions with the U.S. in Asia” (Korolev, 2024).). Some scholars in the Russian Federation largely believe that the Sino-Russian

relations trajectory with a view that with time, they might establish a mutual alliance (Gorenburg, 2019). The motivation behind Russia push to partner with China is seen by many scholars as a strategic move to survive in the emerging confrontation with the west particularly NATO taking into the account the Russia invasion on Ukraine and imposed western sanctions against the Russian Federation (Gorenburg, 2019). Gorenburg's views analytically display the essential importance of strategic partnership among international actors; however, it displays a legal and knowledge gap within which the concept is applied by actors on legal and formal basis.

2.4 Challenges faced by international governmental actors intervening on state reconstruction initiatives

The section reviews literature on the third and final theme of this study. It reviews literature on the challenges faced by the international actors in carrying out state reconstruction process with a primary focus on the scholarly contributions by different scholars. In the context of this study, challenges refer to the missed opportunities, hinderance, barriers or stumbling blocks that undermine the strategic framework towards realization of state reconstruction.

Tuvdendarjaa (2022) illustrates that multiple challenges the UN faces are categorized in to three namely; strategic, operational and tactical challenges. At strategic level, the challenges are covered in areas of leadership, legislation, global order and finance. The failure of leadership blended with poor management, discipline, inefficiency and insignificance. Some traditional PSO approaches inefficacy demonstrate the need to reform and improve the structure of UN. For

instance, misunderstanding and undefined bureaucracies between the organizations have impacted negatively on the strategic and operational level activities. This further complicates the peacekeepers capacity to carry out their duty at the tactical levels in their areas of operations. Legislatively, troop and police contributing States had no consensus understanding of PSO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), mandates, rules of engagement and inconsistencies in policy raises issues about effectiveness of PSOs. Based on learned lessons from Rwandan operations in 1990, UN began to focus on protection of population and in 2010 UN adopted the concept of civil protection (Tuvdendarjaa, 2022). In respect to global framework, geopolitical and strategic interests of the most powerful states particularly those in the UNSC as well as competition for monopoly have impacted decision-making at strategic levels of the UN. This has established conflicts of interests to the detriment of the UN obligation in interventions on state reconstructions' agenda. Between 1948 and 1988, UN conducted 13 PSOs with most of the TCCs being Ghana, Canada, India and Scandinavian states. After that, west have tremendously reduced their troops' contribution to UN missions and focused their NATO to pursue collective defense interests (Tuvdendarjaa 2022).

In the work of Anne Marie Goetz on, "Missed opportunities: Gender and the UN's peacebuilding report" asserts that gender issues are important areas of the international community's methodology to promote peace and security. Two UN high-level reports issued on the peace missions and organization's peace-building architectures inculcated significant components on the women's role during and after war. The reports stressed the essence to see women as ambassadors of conflict

prevention and resolution not just victims in need of protection. To the disappointing outcome none of the report succeeds in overcoming women challenges to advocates of gender mainstreaming in peace and security institutions (Goetz, 2015). The reports failed to address the structural issues that amount to women's exclusion and marginalization from peace and security processes at domestic and international systems. Goetz (2015) alludes that the two reports in its content failed to diagnose the challenges of existing efforts to implement agenda that relates to the women, peace and security agenda in the UN system. Therefore, the two reports represented a missed opportunity in identifying a coherent reform to ensure that commitments were fulfilled. This pinpoints the gender gaps that continue to exist in every UN peace mission/operation on state reconstruction.

Oladipo (2017) points out that one of the key challenges that faced UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres was to address critical failures in interventions in Africa. UNMISS faced sharpest criticism after when it was established that it failed to protect civilians following stiff between government forces and former rebels in July 2016. An inquiry by UN found that UNIMISS in Juba had failed to attain one of its key responsibilities stately, "to protect civilians under threat of physical violence [...] with specific protection for women and children". UN claimed sole responsibility for failure to prevent genocide and other war crimes in South Sudan. Oladipo (2017) further argues in the CAR, MINUSCA was also accused of inaction which was evidenced by the fact that more than 75 civilians died in the North during an outbreak of violence in 2016. According to Amnesty

International, MINUSCA was incapacitated and lacked the resources it needs to adequately protect civilians. As a divergent view, the interior ministry of CAR accused the peacekeepers of being in collusion with armed militias.

Eyanae (2022) established that Africa continue to face conflicts and wars that has triggered periodic interventions by the United Nations. Although there's huge concentration of missions under the UN, Africa, little has been achieved in bringing sustainable peace and stability as conflict and wars continue to emerge across the continent. Eyanae established that since it began its operations in 2011, UNMISS has been criticized in regards to its response to attacks on the civilian population. UNMISS also faced huge flaws and obstacles that have undermined its performance. Critical review demonstrated that its challenges emanated from several factors which constitute the mixture of internally related factors within the UN as well as the external factors emanating from the operational vicinities and from other actors involved in the South Sudan conflicts. Eyanae further found that despite of the challenges faced by UNMISS, recent developments continue to demonstrate prospects and opportunities towards successful state reconstruction in South Sudan by the United Nations.

Gallis (2007) points out that NATO's mission in Afghanistan through International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was not spared by challenges. Gallis (2007) alluded that Some NATO member states believed that poor leadership, instead of an insurgency, was the principal problem impeding Afghanistan stabilization. NATO Member states who refused did not contribute troops to the U.S. effort to bring stability to Iraq are present in Afghanistan. NATO

faced complex challenges within its own ranks and on the ground in Afghanistan that concerned ISAF for so many years (Gallis, 2007). Despite the Allies in consensus on their overall mandate to stabilize the nation, difference on the best framework to achieve desired goals and the number of resources to be availed. Despite ISAF not explicitly possessing a counter-terrorism goal, it was clear that the member states believed that combating Taliban, regional warlords and the trade on narcotics would deter the return of Al Qaeda and other radical Islamist organizations could be inimical to the interests of the West (Gallis, 2007). NATO leadership had difficulties in convincing the allies to contribute military personnel to ISAF. Challenges in the initiatives to persuade allies to financially support towards reconstruction of Afghanistan. Some states pledged financial support but failed to make contributions. The major allied governments stated that they were committed to staying for a period of years to stabilize Afghanistan. NATO differences in political approaches on how to manage Afghanistan's future were evidenced in ISAF's operations. The Karzai government declining fortunes and take over by Taliban demonstrated a difficult obstacle in the mission. NATO attempted both to respect the policies of a nascent representative government and urged to better leadership. The Karzai government's own challenges were apparent: discontented warlords, vigorous drug industry, the emergence of Taliban, rudimentary economy and poor infrastructure (Gallis, 2007). In the views of General Eikenberry, "The enemy we face is not particularly strong, but the institutions of the Afghan state remain relatively weak" (Sloan, 2010). There was a widespread view that President Karzai was losing the trust of the Afghani people; Karzai blamed the slow nature of reconstruction and inadequate financial

assistance from the international community. General Ed Butler, the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, stated in May 2006 that; “this year we need to be seen to be making a difference. It is a real danger that if people do not feel safer, we may lose their consent.” In his view, poor leadership and not the Taliban insurgent group is the Afghani’s primary problem, a view that was widely reflected by other officials from NATO and its allies. NATO, in this view, must be prepared to engage with successive regimes of unknown compositions and policies should the Karzai government collapse. Equally, the unprecedented take over by Taliban demonstrated the failure of intervention to attain its long-term objectives despite enormous resources and time committed to the Afghani administration and its people.

Larrabee et al (2012) alludes that NATO is faced with growing financial austerity as well reducing military budget due to global economic crisis facing European regimes who are majorly NATO member states. US as a key factor in NATO’s agenda has shifted its priorities to the Pacific and Asia. NATO expansion after the cold war has been sustained by an elevation in the military expenditures. 2% GDP target formulated as a trial balloon at the 2006 NATO summit in Riga by former NATO Ambassador Victoria Nuland has not been achieved by member states over the last decade. With these uncoordinated budgetary cuts processes continue in the global world with ever changing defense scope, NATO will ultimately lose its defense capabilities and relevance particular on its series of global intervention across the globe on state reconstruction (Larrabee et al, 2012).

Hussein and Mutundu (2021) highlights that a challenge faced by IGAD in peace initiatives was on how to attain and maintain balance, maintaining neutrality, addressing intolerance, conflict of interest within its jurisdiction. Economically, IGAD members are poor states incapable of facilitating negotiation platforms among conflicting states on their own. IGAD was frustrated by lack of progress in peace and reconciliation process in Somalia. Francis, (2005: 230) attributed this to many warring clan factions and warlords uninterested in peace process and benefit from the multiple peace initiatives. Consequently, “IGAD convene a summit in March 1998 and called for an end to ‘the proliferation of competing initiatives’” (a reference to Egypt’s activities) that served to undermine the peace process in Somalia’ (Healy, 2009: 9). Unfortunately, this was not achieved because of the emergence of conflict in 1998 between Eritrea and Ethiopia which worsened the conflict situation in Somalia. Inquiry found that Eritrea armed the Aided faction while Ethiopia supported its proxies in Somalia. This therefore undermined the IGAD processes towards reconstructing Somalia.

Agada (2008) in interrogating the challenges faced by of UNs peacekeeping in Africa, identified long bureaucracy in UN deployment, inadequate personnel and logistical issues as well as non-cooperation of warlords or warring parties. Agada further observes that non-effectiveness of mandates, ineffective arms embargo enforcement, non-participation of troops from developed nations and failure address the root causes of conflict and wars as primary challenges. These challenges impede the effectiveness of UN PSOs in Africa and continue to affect the peacekeeping initiatives globally. Even with the lessons learnt, the United Nations PSOs challenges continue to persist.

Schofield in her analysis of the challenges of UNPKO in the post-cold war intra state conflict highlights that diversity of UN mission mandate strains the UN ability to deliver on all the objective (Reynaert, 2011, p. 13). These unsurprisingly pinpoint the use of the terms “overstretched”, “under resourced” and “overmatched” in debates surrounding the challenges facing UN PSOs (Clement & Smith, 2009, p. 1, Simons, 2016, p. 241; Lederer, 2009). Towards addressing these challenges, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) as well as the Department of Field Support (DFS) through ‘Peace Operations 2010’ and ‘New Horizon’ agendas have been working together. However, some scholars argue that the initiatives by UNDPKO and UNDFS to mitigate these challenges happening at the time when UN missions are in crises (Clement & Smith, 2009, p. 3; Gowan, 2008, p. 453). Analytically, a concern in scholarship is that UN peacekeeping missions should be “clear” (Willmot & Sheeran, 2014, p. 518), “credible” (Gray, 2001, pp. 271-273), and “achievable” (Oxfam, 2012, p. 3). Nonetheless, Stock (2011, p. 3) points that missions mandates lack this certain criterion. In support of Stock’s (2011) assertions, The UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) is a case study. The mandate changed frequently, reflecting a poor consensus in the Security Council of what strategy to employ and as such, ambiguous, inconsistent and under-funded mandates were crafted (Gray, 2001, p. 272). The lack of clarity, credibility and achievability within peacekeeping mandates therefore raises pressing concerns about how advance in the protection of civilians if mandates are not coherent (Willmot & Sheeran, 2014, p. 535).

Lianyang (2014), in his critical analysis on (ECOMOG) identifies operational challenges in the internal assignments among the TCCs. The existence of two chains of command was a challenge that caused enormous operational challenges. The contingent commanders couldn't make decisions, or participate in combat or offensive missions, without the authority of his home government. In essence, prior to any tactical decision is implemented by ECOMOG, each contingent commander consult his own government, resulting in slow phase in implementation thus reducing their effectiveness. The high level of control from the troop contributing states meant that the contingent commander wasn't absolutely answerable to the ECOMOG force commander. Consequently, this led to disciplinary challenges and frustrated ECOMOG's ability as a unified command. Since inception, ECOMOG lacked adequate financial and logistical assistance to its missions. Member states of ECOWAS were not able to sustain the high cost of military operations. TCCs to ECOMOG supported their own military due to lack of sustainable resources. The cost of ECOMOG was borne mostly by Nigeria, because of its relatively adequate means and capacities to support such forces with ECOWAS. Due to lack of universal participation within ECOWAS, ECOMOG's other contingents suffered from logistical challenges throughout their deployment in Liberia and relied on their own governments for transportation, uniforms, food stuff, arms, although Nigeria provided all TCCs with fuel and lubricants.

Enuka (2009) argues that endemic and protracted political conflicts in Africa is one of the key challenges facing PSOs on state reconstruction. Since the beginning

of the 21st century, Africa has witnessed variety of conflicts of varying scales. These has contributed to misery, state fragility, underdevelopment as worst of all human catastrophes. Due to crisis in Liberia which resulted from the intra-state conflict that engulfed the nation from 1989, ECOWAS decided to multilaterally intervene. Under ECOWAS a military body ECOMOG was established and deployed to the war-torn Liberia. Though the ECOWAS role in Liberia was view as a success the intervention was faced with many challenges. Military, funding, technical institutional and political problems hampered the effectiveness of ECOWAS intervention in the management of the Liberian conflict. ECOMOG has no standing army of its own and relied on national contingents as well as weapons from willing member states. ECOMOG lacked the military experience to address challenges within and between member states, so it lacked precedent to fall back on when it had plan to intervene in Liberia in 1990. The chain of command was undefined as the commander didn't know exactly which authority had control over ECOMOG. As Iweze (1993) rightly puts it "The ECOWAS Secretariat was unable to provide definitive leadership at the initial stage" The field commander was forced to play the multiple roles of military director, political leader and diplomat rolled into one (Cleaver, 1999). Though the field commander was technically answerable to the ECOWAS chairman, but he had the Nigeria's domineering influence to contend with. This constant change of commands in ECOMOG certainly had tremendous effect as each successive commander came with different style and political convictions (Fawole 2004). ECOMOG peace operations in Liberia also encountered financial problems. Although it was initially agreed that each of the states sending troops would be responsible for its

contingent for the first three months. The funding challenge of the ECOMOG led to low morale from soldiers, delay in payment, soldiers' engaging into dishonest and indecent behaviors. The force was accused of corruption and looting Liberian resources to the extent that the term ECOMOG was re-coined to mean "Every Car or Movable Object Gone" (Alao, 2001).

The decision-making process in the Arab League faced many challenges such as the inability to mediate between and among member states, lack of efficiency of its internal organs, absence of the authority to implement resolutions as well as to address conflicting issues between the Arab States. This has left the League ineffective in attaining important decisions or mediations (Chen & Zhao 2009, p. 60; Ulger & Hammoura, 2018). The AL Council has the decision power theoretically while the Permanent Committee possess power to establish a huge range of decisions. Many other sub organs (Joint Defense Council and Economic and Social Council) co-share power with the AL Council and enjoy little/temporary decision-making power rather instead of absolute and autonomy (Chen & Zhao 2009, pp. 61-62). Further review demonstrated Arab league failure to provide proper definition of terrorism in a manner that conforms with the generally understanding and how to combat terrorism is a key challenge to the realization of stability in the Middle East and the entire Arab world. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism defined terrorism as not to include "all cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination" (Article 2 of the Arab League Charter: Rishmawi, 2010). These deficiencies places Arab League in

an awkward position in the international arena considering that the region particularly Middle East is grappling with wars, terrorism, extremism, existence of lethal non-state actors (Hezbollah, Houthis, Al-Qaida, ISIS et al), Palestinian-Israeli question and state fragilities in Iraq and Lebanon.

2.5 Emerging gaps

From the above thematically literature reviewed relevant to the study, it is evidentially clear that there are practical knowledge gaps. The reviewed literature demonstrated knowledge gaps in the capacity of PSOs to foster state reconstruction. Despite experiences and lessons learnt, PSOs across the globe on state reconstruction continue to yield undesired results in reconstructing collapsed/fragile states. The gaps emanate from missions' mandate, conflicting interests in the UNSC, command and control capabilities, resources and rules of engagement in peacekeeping. Analytically, a scholarship and policy concerns are that UN peacekeeping missions should be "clear" (Willmot & Sheeran, 2014, p. 518), "credible" (Gray, 2001, pp. 271-273), and "achievable" (Oxfam, 2012, p. 3). Nonetheless, Stock (2011, p. 3) points that missions mandates as advanced by UN regional and sub regional organizations (AU in this case) lack these certain criteria.

Recent scholarly debates on purpose and value of strategic partnerships have been limited to a handful of seminal accounts, including by Zhovkva (2006), Grevi (2013), Blanco (2015, pp. 79–100; 2016), Bang (2017) and Michalski and Pan (2017b, pp. 26–31). In most instances, explanations overlap and therefore indicate an emerging scholarly consensus on the concept. The debates also demonstrate that strategic partnership as a concept is still evolving and more scholarly

contributions on the concept ought to be done. The lack of doctrinal definition on the concept requires further interrogation by scholars and policy makers. The literature on strategic partnership explores much on wider scope of activities in international arena but little is evidenced on specific aspect of state reconstruction thus that the body of knowledge has not been fully developed to eliminate ensuing confusions, unanswered questions and controversies.

Several studies have interrogated the scope of challenges facing peace keeping operations in African continent and across the world. However, despite resolutions and recommendations to mitigate these challenges, the crisis seems to haunt further thus limiting the gains made towards state reconstruction in PSOs. Although there is vast literature on the need of military intervention to attain state reconstruction, little is written on aspect of practicality and reality in ensuring it happens, but much focus is on theoretical orientations.

In conclusion, there is also no formula that is prescribed to guide this critical determinant of successful mission. These are significant gaps that requires filling through more research and scholarly pursuit in interventions on state reconstruction. There is huge necessity to do further investigation on the relationship between military intervention and state reconstruction.

2.6 Theoretical frameworks

The theoretical foundation of this study was confined to the discipline of international relations and diplomacy. Grants and Osanloo (2014) avers that, “theoretical framework is the ‘blueprint’ or guide for research; it is a framework based on an existing theory in a field of inquiry that is related and/or reflects the

hypothesis of a study”. This study therefore was guided and anchored on state building, securitization and intervention theories.

2.6.1 State-building theory

State-building theory in a specific concept in international relations which refer to the historical and political process of establishment, consolidation of institutions, stabilization and sustainability of state development from emergence of state to the contemporary times (OECD/DAC 2008: 14). Within IR, there are many theoretical approaches to complex questions related to the role of various contributing factors in state-building processes. These include social, cultural, ethnic, religious, geo-political, economic, internal, external factors in a state system. State-building has evolved to become an integral part and a specific practice to peacebuilding by the international community (Mallaby, 2002; Rotberg, 2002).

Across the political and academic spectra, observers, have come to view the state-building approaches as a preferred strategy to peacebuilding in a number of high-profile conflicts such as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and wars in Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008) alludes that State-building is the creation of a centralized administrative authority which is concerned with initiatives to create functional state institution. State building as a discipline of interest among the scholars in peace building as well as in documents generated by and for major intergovernmental and national development agencies such as OECD, UNDP, and USAID. For instance, OECD’s Principles for Good

International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations inculcated advice to its member states that international initiatives in fragile states should “focus on state building as the central objective”. This principle on state building was echoed by former UN Diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi who enlightened that:

“The concept of state building is becoming more and more accepted within the international community and is actually far more apt as a description of exactly what it is that we should be trying to do in post conflict countries—building effective systems and institutions of government. Indeed, acceptance of state building as a generic term to describe our activities will help to concentrate international support on those very activities.” (Brahimi, 2007)

In IR, state-building literature largely covers issues on the external actors in reconstructing states. Modern proponents of state building theory (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Fukuyama, 2004) agree that states failure emerge because of man-made political and economic institutions and geography. The general assumption of state-building theory is that without security, other obligations of state reconstruction are impossible. Therefore, the ‘war on terror’ has also enhanced the focus on the conceptual links between security and state reconstruction. A lot of literature on state-building subscribe to the view that state reconstruction is vital not because of human rights issues and global obligation to the poorest, fragile or collapsed states but primarily to protect the wealthy states’ interests as well as preservation of the existing global order.

As a result, when state-building as a practice to peacebuilding is employed in conflict or post-conflict societies, prioritization to create a secure environment in order to enable wider political and economic undertakings possible. The literature on state-building has always been very clear that building states has historically

been a violent process and the outcomes confirm the destabilization and often violent feature of state-building. Under the theory, peacebuilding frameworks entail initiatives required to establish the social foundations for a sustainable peace (ibid).

State-building theory is relevant to AMISOM operations since its fundamental objectives include but not limited to establishment of good governance, constitutionalism and the rule of law, security sector reforms (SSR), rebuilding economy and physical infrastructural development, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and the protection of civilians. Most scholars concur that state-building practices are the interventionist initiatives to restoration of institutions and apparatus of a failed state (Zoe, 2007). Hippler (2004) also asserts that missions need to learn the intricacies of state-building as they can complicate or simplify the process towards state reconstruction. Fukuyama (2004) also places emphasis to primacy of best governance to state building. By assisting and promoting democracy which nurture good governance, missions as in the case of AMISOM played a fundamental role in state reconstruction.

This theory therefore delved in interrogation the general problems that the issue of state reconstruction raises in AMISOM intervention by presenting varying critical perspectives on the nature, purpose and general prospects for international involvement in state reconstruction. It also looked in to very specific AMISOM initiatives of state reconstruction under the auspices of a transitional administrations (Somali administration/s) established by the international community (AU/UN and their strategic partners). The idea of strategic

partnerships between AU/AMISOM and its partners was influenced by state building theory in which international community join hands towards the state reconstruction of Somalia. This was propelled by terror attacks and threats to powerful states and their proxy states emanating from fragile/collapsed states like Somalia and Sudan. As a result, powerful states utilize their influence and veto powers in UN and AU to shape policies largely inclined to state reconstruction. Therefore, this theory was relevant because AMISOM initiatives on state reconstruction were aimed at rebuilding a failed state of Somalia.

2.6.2 Securitization theory (ST)

The theory of securitization has a foundational basis in the Copenhagen School (Stritzel & Stritzel, 2014). The theory is viewed as a blend of constructivism and classical realism in its philosophical method (Buzan, 1998). The word ‘securitization’ was framed in 1993 by distinguished Professor Ole Weaver of IR at the University of Copenhagen (Weaver, 2015). The Copenhagen School played a fundamental role in in conceptual framework of security analysis. It also increased the scope of security study to non-state actors. Securitization emerges with an act of statement in relation to a specific threat by a state leader, regime or international actor (Buzan, 1998). The act aims at shifting a threat from normal political affairs to a security issue at national and international level thus legitimizing extraordinary measures to contain the threat (Buzan, 1998). Securitization explores how a particular concern is transformed into a security matter so as the application of extraordinary actions to counter the concern can be established (Williams, 2003).

In the scope of international relations, debate regarding notions of security were sparked at the end of the Cold War, especially between “wideners” and “narrowers”. “Narrowers” were focused with a state’s security and on an analysis of the military and political stability between the Soviet Union (SU) and the US. “Wideners” on the other hand, were dissatisfied by the “narrowers” perspective, and focused instead on including other threat forms that were not basically militaristic in nature and that had a significant effect on the population more than states. The “Wideners” perspective led to an expansion of the security scheme and included the conceptualization of regional security and human security – as well as notions of identity and culture. Regardless of whether agreement is held with the “narrowers” or “wideners” perspectives, the culmination of the Cold War was an indication that the concept of “security” was largely contested – “a concept that generates debates that cannot be resolved by reference to empirical evidence because the concept contains a clear ideological or moral element and defies precise, generally accepted definition” (Fierke, 2015). Pointing at security’s disputed nature, critical perspectives about security have argued that “security” is not specifically universal or positive, but rather that it is dependent on the subject and context, and sometimes, is even negative.

According to French scholar Professor Thierry, “securitization is a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion.” The acts of securitization mainly involve four elements; foremost, there’s a securitizing agent/actor, which is attributed to the

securitizing statement or move; secondly, there is an existing threat, which the element potentially identified as a threat; thirdly, there's a referred object, which is the element that is threatened and thus needs protection in the prevailing circumstance; and fourthly, there must be an audience, which the target that the agent/actor needs to persuade for the prevailing circumstance to be accepted as a threat to security. Proponents of securitization posit that, "a subject that has been successfully securitized will receive disproportionate attention and resources in comparison with subjects that have not been securitized, even when these other subjects actually cause more harm". An example used by proponents of securitization regards the prioritization of terrorism in security discourse despite the likelihood for people to be harmed by other uncertain events rather than terrorism. Securitization discipline therefore is purposed to fathom "who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions" (Buzan et al, 1998)

Buzan, et al analysis on security identifies with society, environment, military, political and economy as sectors in which securitization can occur. In the context of this AMISOM intervention on state reconstruction has huge relevance on the application of securitization theory. This AMISOM intervention in Somalia following the authorization by UNSC is attributed to securitization of Somalia as a failed state, infiltration of Al-Shabaab, Somali immigration to the neighboring states and Somalia refugee crisis issue. Terrorist infiltration concerns are largely pointed as grounds upon which border should be tightened in the context of

Somalia intervention by AMISOM and other foreign actors. Based on the concepts advanced by Copenhagen school, securitization theory is well suited to this study. In the context of Somalia's peace support mission, AMISOM is the securitization agent. The AMISOM troops' role is ensuring the suppression of the prevailing threat which is the Al-Shabaab as well as other groups threatening Somalia's stability. Federal Government of Somalia is the referred element in the context of the AMISOM intervention. The FGS is responsible for developing security mechanisms through carrying out sector and security reforms under AMISOM's mentorship. Further, the national police force and the national army of Somalia are considerably weak to achieve the country's security demands. The audience in Somalia's context and within the securitization theory is the Somali population. They play a significant role in the intervention's success. The initial step in securitization's success is called a "securitizing move", which theoretically is a method open to any unit because only when the audience has been convinced by an actor that there is legitimacy in the need to go beyond binding regulations and rules, can a case for securitization be identified.

Securitization theory therefore guides in identification of the securitized components which contributed AMISOM to intervene in Somalia in regards on state reconstruction. Through the lenses of securitization theory, the researcher interrogated the military intervention by AMISOM in state reconstruction in Somalia. Securitization process stands in contrast with materialistic approaches of classical security studies (Ligawa, 2017). Securitization theory investigates how a particular matter is transformed by an actor into a security issue. Therefore, for

securitized actions to be termed successful, it must be fully accepted by audience. This implies that the leadership of AMISOM needed to win the hearts and confidence of the Somali populations on the justification of intervening in Somalia in its pursuit for state reconstruction.

2.6.3 Intervention theory

Interventionism is defined as “a political practice of intervention, particularly to the practice of governments to interfere in political affairs of other countries, staging military or trade interventions” (Britannica dictionary). In the context of IR, military intervention as a primary component in interventionism is systemically defined by US constructivist scholar Martha Finnemore, as "the deployment of military personnel across recognized boundaries for the purpose of determining the political authority structure in the target state". (Finnemore, 2013)

Theory of intervention explores the basis and rationale of interfering with another state. Intervention theory is featured by the use or threat of force to change a circumstance nominally beyond the jurisdiction of intervenor on moral or political aspects. This theory was founded in line with Harvard Business School (Argyris, 1970). It largely focuses on a government's intervention in other governments' issues (Stowell, 1921). However, it can also go beyond interventions in others' cultural, religious, and economic aspects (Argyris, 1970).

Modern interventionism emerged from policies of the Cold War whereby the USSR and the USA carried out interventions across the world with an aim of countering one another's influence. International organizations and States have made several interventions across the globe with aims; relieving humanitarian

issues; defending and promoting democracy; promote constitutionalism; enhance electoral processes; degrading hostility and maintaining transnational movement, determining civil war outcomes and building (transforming) institutions and capacity of “failing” or “fragile” states. The intervention theory attempts to explain the rationale and nature of meddling with other states or with actors’ choices. Interventionism is described within the application of force, coercion to change the security, political, economic, or cultural circumstance nominally beyond the political or moral jurisdiction of the actor. The centrality of the conflict dynamic between state territory and transnationalism to the modern world’s development in turn aids in explaining intervention’s prevailing relevance as a coercion modality in the scope of international relations.

Proponents of foreign interventions are of the view that sovereign states have an obligation under municipal and international law to protect their population from human rights violations such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other forms of violations. When states are unable to defend their people from these violations, the international community possesses a responsibility to defend the populations. The states sovereign rights of non-interference are forfeited and sanctioned mission is deployed in such states. This context is a replica of AU intervention in Somalia when the federal government of Somalia failed to perform its obligations as enshrined in the foundational role of the state.

Intervention theory is applied in analysis of policy when referring to issues such as decision making for effective intervention in the achievement of desired results

(Argyris, 1970). Under mission *Restore Hope's umbrella*, UNOSOM did not succeed in achieving its mandates and resultantly, the force was withdrawn in 1995. Operation Gothic Serpent which had the intention of capturing a warlord considered to be notorious was similarly tragic. Through intervention theory, questions on the desirability and appropriateness of intervention are posited, hence one significant aspect to the process of intervention in intervention theory is timing, which is essential for the failure or success of an intervention.

In AMISOM, intervention in Somalia has great relevance to the paradigms of interventionist thinkers. The resolution and authorization to intervene in Somalia by UNSC justified the need to execute state reconstruction in the Federal State of Somalia. Ultimately, the intervention's recipients have the greatest responsibility to internalize the intervention's objectives which include the outcome for positive change in reconstruction of the state. AMISOM intervention was officially launched in 2007. AMISOM claimed to have liberated many areas in central and southern Somalia but still hostilities emanating from the activities of the insurgents continued to be experienced. The port city of Mogadishu during and after AMISOM remains to be insecure to operate in. It is against this ground which the researcher discussed and examined the effectiveness of military intervention through the lenses of interventionism. Successfully intervening in a mission requires the appropriate and useful data for intelligence purpose. The ultimate responsibility resides with the recipients of the interventions to internalize the objectives of the interventions, state reconstruction in these contexts. Therefore,

interventionism is viewed as a norm promotion process, both from the perspective of the intervention's targets as well as from the intervener's perspective.

2.7 Conceptual framework

Conceptual framework is a foundation that the study assume it can explain phenomenon under the study (Kivunja, 2018). Imenda (2014) posits that conceptual framework is the outcome of related concepts brought together in explaining and providing a wider understanding of a phenomenon under study. This gives the implication that conceptual framework is an overview of different studies' findings from empirical evidence that a researcher has reviewed aligned with their study, which thus sets out the agenda of their study and enhances how they understand the intentions of their study. Furthermore, Shikalepo (2020) delineates conceptual framework as a representation of how the researcher has arranged key theoretical concepts and notions, primary findings and other literature pertinent to their study.

Conceptual framework provide coherence (Berger & Patchener, 1988); provide plan for selection and prioritization of interested variables; introduce explicitness to studies (Leshem & Trafford, 2007); enable consumers to be clear on what the study aims at accomplishing and how it shall be achieved (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994); demonstrate coherence between empirical observation and conclusions in concepts (Leshem & Trafford, 2007); and presents an individual assessment facility to ensure harmony and appropriateness in the conceptualization for study conclusions (Leshem & Trafford, 2007).

The conceptual framework is presented in a diagram as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1984) as well as Silverman (2000). Concept Maps are “a schematic device for representing a set of concept meanings embedded in a framework of propositions”. Therefore, the researcher came up with a comprehensive framework and appropriately applied it to their study (Ngulube, Mathipa & Gumbo, 2015; Daley & Torre, 2010; Novak & Gowin, 1984). Subsequently, figure 2.1 demonstrate the frameworks of concepts which guided the study.

Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework



Source: Researcher, 2024

2.8 Chapter summary

This chapter thematically reviewed literature and established that there are practical knowledge gaps in the capacity of PSOs to foster state reconstruction. Despite experiences and lessons learnt, PSOs across the globe on state reconstruction, they continue to yield undesired results in reconstructing collapsed/fragile states. The study also reviewed on the strategic partnerships and established that recent scholarly debates on purpose and value of strategic partnerships has been limited to a handful of seminal accounts and further hinted that strategic partnership as a concept is still evolving and more scholarly contribution on the concept ought to be done. Despite resolutions and recommendations to mitigate challenges on state reconstruction initiatives, the crisis seems to haunt further thus limiting the gains made towards state reconstruction. Although there is vast literature on the need of military intervention to attain state reconstruction, little is written on aspect of practicality and reality in ensuring it happens, but much focus is on theoretical orientations. These gaps require filling through more research and scholarly pursuit in interventions on state reconstruction. The chapter also presented state building, intervention and securitization theories as frameworks guiding and anchoring the study and finalized with diagrammatic representation of the conceptual framework. Upon the extensive literature review, the study in the next chapter explores the methodological framework employed by the researcher.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

The chapter specifically and explicitly explores the methodological frameworks employed by the researcher. Bhattacharyya (2009) and Daniel & Sam (2011) unanimously agree that research methodology is the science of studying how studies are done objectively, analytically, hypothetically and systematically. This chapter presents a detailed discussion on the research design, research locale, target population and unit of analysis for the study. It also highlights the techniques in sampling, sampling frames, sample size, data collection instruments, procedures in data collection as well as instruments validity and reliability. Lastly the chapter offers the data analysis and ethical aspects employed in the study (Kothari, 2004).

3.1 Research design

Kothari (2004) observed that a good research design goal is to offer a comprehensive approach which would enhance accuracy in the evaluation of cause-effect relations between key variables. With an appropriate research design, a researcher is able to justify the conclusions attained in a study, meaning that the study either confirms or rejects the hypothesis (Tetnowski, 2015). Therefore, the research applied case study research design. Yin (2003) precisely asserts that case study, “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña (2014) points that, “a case study is an in-depth investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.” This design was considered suitable because it

provided grounds for an in-depth and comprehensive investigation on AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia (Bryman, 2016). The study's case study design was therefore most appropriate and reliable due to the fact that it offered a comprehensive in-depth analysis that gave valuable insights to the investigation (Harrison et al., 2017).

The design aided the researcher to focus on the study within the confines of space and period on a particular case. It also gave the researcher a room to collect different sets of data as the case of interviews, documents and observations about the case and provided an opportunity to get an in-depth view at individual and the inner workings and interactions of the targeted institutions and individuals. As an outcome it further provided a comprehensive understanding of a bounded unit. It also offered an opportunity to others to inculcate the principles and learned lessons in the case to other cases thus leading to transferability. Furthermore, case study was advantageous since the researcher was capable of identifying the relationships between contexts, persons and phenomenal aspects. Additionally, it also offered the study the ability to seize the realities of life in people.


3.2 Research locale

The study was executed in Mogadishu which is situated in Banaadir region on the Indian Ocean Coast (UNHCR, 2020: amisom-au.org, 2023). Mogadishu (*Muqdisho* in Somali language: “مقديشو” *Maqadīshū* in Arabic) is the Somalia's official capital and a key commercial center on the East Africa coastline. Mogadishu has a population close to 2,610,483 (World Population Review, 2023). Nunez-Ferrera et al (2020) points out that Mogadishu as a city with high fragility and decade's legacy of protracted conflicts and wars revolving around the politics

of unbalanced elite bargaining and hanging constitutional transitional frameworks. Research consortium on African Cities (2021) identify violence and insecurity, the partial absence provision of basic services, governance hybridity and conflicts on land issues deeply rooted in the history of clan rivalry, forced or fraudulent transactions and appropriations.

Mogadishu as a study area is justifiable on the basis that it is host to the targeted institutions and study population that will significantly provide adequate data in examining the influence of the AMISOM intervention on state reconstruction in Somalia. Mogadishu also hosts diplomatic missions accredited to Somalia that were relevant to the study. Key AMISOM strategic partners and in particular US, UK, Turkey, EU. TCCs to AMISOM in this case, Uganda, Nigeria and Kenya also maintain the diplomatic missions and consulates in Somalia. UN Country Teams and special agencies that have been in forefront towards reconstructing Somalia have their headquarters/bases in Mogadishu. These include WFP-Somalia, UNHCR-Somalia, UNDP-Somalia, UNMAS, UNSOS, UNSOA, UNPOS, UNICEF-Somalia, FAO-Somalia and the UNTMIS which succeeded the UNSOM. Relevance to the study, Institute of Diplomacy and Training of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation under the FGS, which serve as vital institution for diplomacy and international relations is situated in Mogadishu. The city of Mogadishu was the seat of AMISOM leadership and its successors ATMIS and AUSSOM. Mogadishu was a key battlefield in the Somali civil war which destroyed the city during different periods between 1991 and 2011. Figure

3.1 below show the Map of the Port City of Mogadishu in Somalia Republic with the District boundaries.



Source: Researcher & Moi University Department of Geography & Environmental Studies GIS Lab, 2023

3.3 Target population

Kothari (2004) asserts that target population constitute the entire group of individuals which possess common observable features. Kothari's views as emphasized by Kombo and Tromp (2006) observed that population constitute a

group of items, objects and individuals (real or imaginary) from which a sample is measured. The composition of the target population was vital because it set clear approach on the scope, types of data and objective of the research and defined characteristics of the participants who qualified for this study and established the scope of entire population for determining sample size to be utilized (Ayala & Elder, 2011). Cognizant of the fact that this study employed case study, the use of key informants was essential and ideal to the course in targeting the desired and reliable population. Tremblay (1982) suggests that informants provide varying kinds of information, thus identifying '*definitional, objective and judgmental*' each contributing to the objectives of the research. Marshall (1996) and Lincoln & Guba (1985) allude that, "the principal advantages of the key informant techniques relate to the quality of data that can be obtained in a relatively short period of time." These also include utilizing key informants instead of large data collection techniques to make the research process fast (Marshall, 1996; Pauwels and Hardyns, 2009). Bognor, Littig and Menz, (2009) support these views of expert interviews, noting:

"Conducting expert interviews can serve to shorten time-consuming data gathering processes, particularly if the experts are seen as "crystallization points" for practical insider knowledge and are interviewed as surrogates for a wider circle of players."

The study targeted relevant key informants in Academic and professional spectra particularly those with knowledge, intellectual base, experience and more importantly expertise in foreign policy especially on state reconstruction. The study further targeted Somali elders, Somali political and business elites, Somali political leadership and Somali diaspora community as well as Somali NGOs.

Diplomatic missions based in Nairobi related to the theme under investigation such as officials in Embassies were also targeted. Most importantly, targeted population included civilian and military components drawn from different sectors who had pertinent and reliable information to the study. The study targeted key informants in the Ministries of State for Defense, Interior and National coordination, Foreign and Diaspora Affairs in Kenya who provided concrete and reliable data with regard to the study.

3.4 Unit of analysis

Silverman & Solmon (1998) observe that, “a unit of analysis is the key subject which the researcher intends to comment on the study and usually determined by the research questions”. It is ideally the 'who' or 'what' that the study seeks to interrogate. Therefore, the unit of analysis was the African Union Mission in Somalia and sought to inquire the extent of state reconstruction between 2007 and 2021. To attain the study’s objectives, the study inculcated researchers, experts, those who served in AMISOM and academicians who were useful with pertinent data.

3.5 Study variables

Researchers in the social science usually engage in manipulation or measurements of variables to test cause-and-effect relationships (Bhandari, 2022). Traditionally, researchers (Hager & Hasselhorn, 1995: Silverman & Solmon, 1998: Kothari, 2004: Bhattacharyya, 2009: Daniel & Sam, 2011) agree that the “the independent variable is the cause (its value is independent of other variables in the study) the dependent variable is the effect (its value depends on changes in the independent variable in the study)”. Therefore, the study assessed African Union led

reconstruction initiative in Somalia from 2007 to 2021. The independent variable of the study was African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) while the dependent variable was state reconstruction.

3.6 Sampling techniques

Sampling technique is a process whereby individuals are selected for participation in a study and who are representative of the larger entities from are picked from (Guthrie, 2010). Sampling technique employed was to enable the researcher to give a proper analysis even in the case of large populations or huge universe and at the same time protect the integrity of the study. The study employed purposive sampling to select targeted institutions and respondents. Purposive sampling is usually employed in qualitative studies for the identification and selection of information-rich cases for the most effective utility of limited resources (Patton, 2002). This entails identification and selection of individuals that are knowledgeable or experienced with a particular phenomenon (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Bernard (2002) and Spradley (1979) further notes, “the value of availability and willingness to participate, and the ability to communicate experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner.” A purposive sample is defined as a non-probability sample that the researcher selects basing on the population’s features as well as the study’s objective. Adolph Jenson observes that,

“A purposive selection denotes the method of selecting a number of groups of units in such a way that selected groups together yield as nearly as possible the same average or proportion as the totality with respect of those characteristics which are already a matter of statistical knowledge.” (Rai & Thapa, 2015: 5(1), 8-15)

Further, purposive sampling was applied to determine the professionals in academic institutions who bear expertise in foreign policy, international and national security and AMISOM intervention. Merriam (2009) indicates that the initial step in purposive sampling involves the determination of selection criteria used for case study selection. Given the nature of the current study, purposive sampling was considered appropriate in determining the individuals involved in AMISOM intervention on state reconstruction in Somalia. Purposive sampling involved the determination of which type of purposive sampling to employ, whether typical, unique, maximum variation, convenience, chain or snowball sampling. Snowball (chain) sampling was employed in the study involved the researcher locating the relevant institutions and individuals with the most relevant information in addressing the research question. The accessibility and availability of the targeted respondents also constituted the framework for sample selections in the embassies and relevant offices of concern. The main aim of purposive sampling was to allow the researcher to focus on specific features of a population that they were interested in, which provides them with an informed way in which to answer the research questions. This was largely influenced by the by Neuman (2014) and Sandera et al, (2012) recommendations which pointed that purposive sampling was preferential for a study in selecting cases which are particularly informative.

3.7 Sampling frame

A sampling frame is a device in which a sample is established (Ishak & AbuBakar,2014). It is a list that delimit, identify and allow access to the components of a targeted population (Acharya, Prakash, Saxena & Nigam, 2013). The sampling frame was designed to include all the key informants in the study. The frames adopted a design which took into consideration the strata, classifications, institutions, Somali community, professionals, academicians, status, gender and age. The study ensure that the sampling frame captured, in statistical dimensions, a balanced target population. In line with the recommendation by statistical division of UN secretariat (2003) as advanced by (Turner, 2003), the study ensured that the sampling frame was complete, accurate and up-to-date(current). Consequently, the frame enhanced the quality of data collected as well as utility in cost and time during the study.

3.8 Sample size

Vasileoiu et al. (2018) defines sample size as “a key quality marker of qualitative research”. Determination of a sample size is an act whereby the researcher selects the number of respondents which will participate in the study (Singh & Masuku, 2014). The sample size’s primary goal in any research is to allow the researcher to make summations regarding the study’s population. To determine the sample size, researcher’s decision on this study was influenced by sample composition, nature of the topic, data quality, design, time and activity, environment.

In determining the sample size, this study relied on the precedents as advanced by Guest, Bunce & Johnson (2006), Morse & Niehaus (2009) and Padgett (2008). The determination of number of key informants was based on the types of analysis

proposed. Creswell & Baskarada, (2009) asserts that few participants who can describe their experiences or knowledge are the focus of qualitative studies. Bryman (2012) advised that, “rather than relying on others’ impressions of suitable sample sizes in qualitative research, researchers certainly better to be clear and confident about the sampling method they employed, why they used it, and why the sample size they achieved is appropriate.”

Most importantly, the study placed emphasis on theoretical saturation by obtaining a clear understanding by proceeding to sample until there was no newer data was attained as informed by Miles and Huberman (1998). Based on this criterion, this study therefore utilized a sample of 62 key informants which was picked across different target groups that had pertinent information on the study as depicted in the Table 3.1

Table 3.1: Sampling frame and sample size

No.	Targeted key informants/	Classification	Sample size
1	Academicians, scholars and experts in higher learning institutions in Kenya.	Civilian	12
2	Defense and security experts/personnel drawn from Department of Defense & National Police Service- Kenya	Military	10
3	Ambassadors and diplomatic staffs of TCCs in the diplomatic missions - Nairobi	Diplomatic/ Civilian	5
4	AMISOM Strategic partners in their Diplomatic Missions in Nairobi	Diplomatic/ Civilian	3
5	Foreign affairs Personnel: Peace and Security Division and Somalia desk drawn from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora Affairs- Kenya	Diplomatic	6
6	Former AMISOM officers in the combat and non-combat tasks drawn from the Ministries of Defense -Kenya	Military	10
7	Somali elders	Civilian	4
8	Somali diaspora community.	Civilian	3
9	Somali youth	Civilian	3
10	Somali women	Civilian	4
11	Somali political leadership	Civilian	2
12	Grand Total Sample Size	NA	62

Source: Researcher, 2023

3.9 Data collection instruments

3.9.1 Interview schedule

The study used interview schedules as primary data collection instrument. The interview allowed the researcher to explore and probe respondents' responses in order to gather more data about their perception/views with regard to the research questions (Whyte, 2003). The researcher, through the interview schedule, was able to examine the respondents' values, concerns, interests or attitudes with regard to

the research question (Gay & Airasian, 2002). Interview Schedule was an indispensable tool in the study's focus on AMISOM intervention in Somalia on state reconstruction since face-to-face conversation offered the researcher with a way to ascertain the respondents' opinions (Lambert and Carmen, 2008).

The study also implemented the use of interview schedules to collect data from the respondents who included the individuals in academic institutions who are experts in themes surrounding the research question (Sandelowski, 2002). The interview schedule included open ended questions and was constructed in accordance to the study objectives so as to capture the respondents' perspectives and opinions on the theme under investigation.

Through this research instrument, elite interviews for policy experts, academicians, specialists and persons in position of authority were preferred because they were well-informed and knowledgeable (Hochschild 2009).

3.9.2 Observation Schedule

Gorman and Clayton (2005, p. 40) defined observation studies as, "those that involve the systematic recording of observable. phenomena or behavior in a natural setting." Therefore, observational method is a technique in data collection through observation and documentation of behavioral or phenomenal aspect as they occur naturally in their respective environment (Pope & Allen, 2020). This study there employed less structured observation schedule as a method of data collection. In this context, the study paid key attention to situational and behavioral features of the key informants. The schedules were more effective in situation where less data existed about the study. Observation employed covert and overt approaches which was ideal for non-verbal conducts during research processes

(Tesch,1990). This study also employed observation method in ascertaining and documenting important data relevant to the study. Selected forms of observation were utilized to compliment and supplement data collected from the interview schedule.

3.9.3 Document analysis

Document analysis a method of data collection in social sciences is “the study of recorded human communications, such as books, websites, paintings and laws, journals, books conference papers, minutes, dissertations, theses, online libraries, policy documentations, periodicals, academic papers and books in addressing the research question” (Babbie 2010, p.530). Document analysis was an essential component of many schemes of triangulation, combination of methodological frameworks of the common phenomenon (Prior, 2014). Corbin & Strauss (2008) and Rapley (2007) points that document analysis demands examination and interpretation of data in order to provide meaning, understanding, and development empirical knowledge. Glenn A. Bowen, described document analysis, “... as a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material. Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, document analysis required that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge”. Bowen (2009) alludes that in document analysis, the researcher interprets a series of documents such that they provide meaning on the particular subject under the study. Bowen (2009) further posits that analysis of documents inculcates coding of contents into themes identical to how interview transcripts are analyzed.

Document analysis employed a combination with other qualitative research approaches as a means of triangulation— “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (Denzin, 1970). To seek convergence and corroboration, the researcher used at least two reliable resources through using varying information sources. The researcher further used multiple sources of evidence; to seek convergence and corroboration through the use of different data sources and methods. By triangulation, the researcher attempted to provide “*a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility*” (Eisner, 1991, p. 110). By examining data collected through different procedures, the study corroborated findings across sets of data and therefore reduced the impact of potential biases which existed in a single study. Triangulation guarded the study against the blames that research’s findings are merely an artifact of a single technique or source. Triangulation goal was to provide a confluence of evidence to institute credibility (Bowen, 2009). In summary, document analysis was extensively used in the collection of data from secondary sources in addressing the research questions. Document analysis was justifiable as a data collection method because it facilitated the collection of voluminous and credible data without necessarily interviewing many informants thus supplementing other methods employed in this study (Wanjohi & Dimba,2014).

3.10 Validity and reliability of instruments

Validity and reliability are vital tools in the evaluation and assessment of instruments of measurement for a good study (Taherdoost, 2016). Validity entails accuracy of inferences and therefore determines whether the right concepts of the

study were measured with regard to research outcome. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) and McBurney & White (2010) assert that, validity is the degree that results represent the phenomenon under study. It is therefore the estimation of the accuracy of data in the study. Content validity was applied in this study. Kothari (2004) regarded validity as the level to which a research instrument measures what it is intended. Therefore, the analyzed data represented the actual phenomenon or variables of the study for accuracy and meaningful conclusions. Content validity tested whether the data collected using an instrument is representative for the contents of the concept or domain of indicators (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). Content validity ensured that the items in the research instrument are correctly formed in order to avoid any participatory shortfalls with the respondents when the instrument was administered at the time of carrying out the study. Inaccurate and unclear items in the instrument were modified for accurate measurement of the study's concepts. To enhance the validity, the researcher also benchmarked with scholars and supervisors were also be approached to judge whether the instrument covers the depth and breadth of the research questions. The researcher sought the expertise of professionals, supervisors from Kenyatta University and other higher learning institutions for verification of the data collection tools. The study also adopted construct validity for the accuracy and meaningfulness of theoretical concepts in correspondence with the objectives of study as well as the conceptual frameworks. Construct validity was concerned with the extent in which the tests or measures are accurately assessed what it was supposed to. It was vital to operationalize constructs into concrete and measurable features based on the ideas of the constructs and their dimensions.

Drost (2011) observes that reliability is “the extent to which measurements are repeatable when different people perform the measurement on different occasion, under different condition, supposedly with alternative instruments which measure the construct or skill”. The study being qualitative developed confidence on the consumers of data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This study determined the trustworthiness level of the data collected by use of credible and reliable informants to promote reliability. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) further alludes that reliability denotes the stability of instruments and consistency whereby the instrument yields same outcomes when repetitively administered to the same key informants. Therefore, the instruments were pre-tested to ensure that respondents have a clear grasp of the questions and that their interpretation of questions in the instrument is uniform, therefore bearing similar meaning to all respondents.

To further enhance reliability and validity, the study was subjected data collection instruments to peer and professional assessment. The findings were placed on triangulation to verify authenticity by checking of data from multiple dimensions. The findings were also subjected to congruency dependability test through corroborations and cross referencing with secondary data sourced from interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary analysis of documents.

3.11 Data collection procedures

Oral and written interviews and observations were conducted in collecting primary data (Kothari, 2004). In this context, the researcher gathered and measured data on variables of concern to the study in an analytic manner which enabled the study to answer the questions, to test hypotheses and evaluate the outcome. The primary

data was collected from key informants through interviews. These interviews were conducted physically and in some instances through the online interviews. Interview schedule was employed by the study to collect data from the public officials and technocrats from the ministries of state for defense, Foreign and Diaspora Affairs and professionals in academic institutions who were well versed with the scope and content of the study. The interview schedule was primarily composed of structured and unstructured questions to enable the key informants to offer in-depth responses without hesitation or restraint in revealing information relevant to the study. Comprehensive approach was inculcated to ensure that the data collected was systematic and exhaustive in answering the stipulated research questions.

In the collection of secondary data, document analysis was employed. Document analysis was an essential component of many schemes of triangulation, combination of methodological frameworks of the common phenomenon. It entailed a systematic process of review or documentary evaluation in a methodological manner. It entailed examining and interpreting data to get the meaning, understanding and attain formidable conclusions. Glenn A. Bowen, described document analysis, "... as a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material. Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge". Secondary data constituted the important components of the study and was collected through analysis of literature in journals, books, conference papers, minutes, dissertations,

theses, online libraries, policy documentations, periodicals, academic papers and books in addressing the research question.

Approvals were sought from the Graduate school and a license to conduct research was obtained from NACOSTI which enabled the researcher to proceed with the study. Prior to carrying out the interviews, permission was sought from the institutions which enabled the researcher to carry out the study. Formal appointments were also sought with the laid-out study's purpose to the respondents and enable the researcher to collect data. Thereafter, researcher visited the key informants in their respective offices/location to carry out the interview sessions and other instances conducted online interviews.

3.12 Data analysis

Data analysis process entails inspection, cleansing, transforming, and modeling data to discover pertinent information, conclusions, and to support the researcher's decision making (Kothari, 2004). Shamo and Resnik (2003) point that "many analytic procedures provide a way of drawing inductive inferences from data and distinguishing the signal (the phenomenon of interest) from the noise (statistical fluctuations) present in the data." Vital factor in ensuring data integrity is the accuracy and appropriateness in the analysis of findings. The findings were analyzed in three analytical frameworks namely; content analysis, documentary reviews and reflections on theoretical frameworks.

The data collected was qualitative and therefore thus the data was analyzed through content analysis. Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) posit that "content

analysis is a technique for making inferences by a systematic and objective identification of specific characteristics of messages and using related trends”. Content analysis key steps entailed preparation of data, definition of unit of analysis, categorization and coding scheme, test of code scheme on a sample of text, assessing of coding consistency and drawing inference from data which has been coded. Finally, it entailed reporting of methodological frameworks and findings. Thus, the data collected through interviews was transcribed into text, combining the notes taken. The notes were then be organized by using various thematic data categories. The thematic categorization of data enabled the study to minimize wide variety of data to more limited set of attributes constituting variables to draw conclusions on the research questions. Conclusions of findings from collected data were presented descriptively.

Through the theoretical analysis, the study encompassed theories and their explanatory narratives on how it engaged in applying theories and their underlying tenets/assumptions to interrogate the problems under the investigation. The study utilized state building, securitization and intervention theories in discussion and analysis of AMISOM intervention on state reconstruction in Somalia with the focus on the concepts. As Grants and Osanloo (2014), avers that, “theoretical framework is the ‘blueprint’ or guide for research; it is a framework based on an existing theory in a field of inquiry that is related and/or reflects the hypothesis of a study”. Theoretical analysis provided the background which supported investigation and offered the reader justifications for the research problem.

Towards further interrogate the objectives of the study, documentary analysis (comprehensive analysis) of secondary data was employed by the researcher. Documentary analysis was important part of triangulation schemes. It involved analyzing and interpreting data generated from the analysis of true records and credible documents pertinent study. The researcher was involved in intensive and voluminous reading of written material which helped in scanning of documents on to laptop and utilizing qualitative analysis package. The documentary analysis of data through analysis of literature in journals, books conference papers, minutes, dissertations, theses, online libraries, policy documentations, periodicals, academic papers and books in addressing the research questions.

3.13 Ethical considerations

In pursuits of knowledge, there's no absolute approach to attain truth and solve a problem without employing ethics (Resnik, 2012: Resnik & Shamoo, 2017). Every study must maintain ethical path in the entire research process. Ideally, research ethics defines frameworks for conducting research in a professional, systematic and logical manner. Ethics as a discipline and a philosophical component teaches and regulates studies to ensure that there's strict compliance of a strict code of ethics when conducting research (Israel, 2014: Sutrop, Parder & Juurik, 2020). As a formal process the study started when approvals, permits and authority to conduct this research were obtained from the Graduate School and research license from NACOSTI (Appendices VI, VII and IX). Furthermore, the researcher made formal requests and got positive response to the target institutions where classified information would be acquired from the assigned key informants (Appendices X, XI AND XII). Equally, the research sought informed consent from the key

informants prior to the study (Reference to Appendices II). The study strictly adhered to professionalism as well ethical guidelines of research throughout the duration of this study. The study was concerned with confidentiality as well as adherence to respondents' willingness to comply to participate in the study (Walker, 2007: Akaranga & Makau, 2016). The researcher ensured that there is no biasness or falsification while conducting the study thus ensuring that the study's findings are truly representative (Kour, 2014). The researcher also ensured that it acknowledged and cited all the relevant literature to promote the originality of research (Resnik, 2011) and also alleviate possible cases of plagiarism (Appendix XIII). Welfare of the respondents was of key essence. All the sources upon which secondary data was collected were properly referenced and cited in line with APA format, 7th Edition (References on pages 242-281).

3.14 Chapter summary

This chapter interrogated the methodological framework employed by the study. The study employed case study research design because it provided grounds for an in-depth and comprehensive investigation on AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia. The chapter further presented a detailed discussion on the location, population and unit of analysis for the study. It also highlighted the techniques in sampling, sampling frames, sample size, data collection instruments, procedures in data collection as well as instruments validity and reliability. Lastly the chapter offered the data analysis and ethical aspects employed in the study. In the next chapter, the study analyzed and discussed state reconstruction initiatives employed by AMISOM.

CHAPTER FOUR
STATE RECONSTRUCTION INITIATIVES EMPLOYED BY AFRICAN
UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)

4.0 Introduction

State reconstruction initiatives refer to strategies employed by AMISOM towards the holistic re-establishment of a political, economic and social authority with absolute control over state boundaries and territory with an aim to achieve the functions of states as enshrined in the international law and norms. In respect to the first objective of this study, this chapter analyzed initiatives employed by AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia. The chapter discussed and analyzed on Counter Terrorism (CT) Initiatives, Civil-Military Co-ordination (CIMIC) Initiatives, Protection of Civilians'(POCs) Initiatives, Security Initiatives, Institutional Capacity Building (ICB) Initiatives, Stabilization Initiatives, Gender-Based Initiatives (GBS), Humanitarian Initiatives, National Reconciliation Initiatives (NRI), Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-Integration (DDR) Initiatives, Intelligence Gathering and Sharing(IG&S) initiatives and Legitimization Initiatives-promotion of state and political legitimacy

4.1 Counter terrorism initiatives (CTIs)

Although terrorism in Somalia came to the fore in the early 1990s, terrorism can be traced back to the ancient practice by the zealots of Jewish heritage who attempted to drive out the Roman army from Palestine between A.D. 6 and A.D. 135 (Henderson, 1998). Terrorist sporadic episodes have occurred within the discourse of history with focus on government of the terrorist own state

(Henderson, 1998). Since 1960s, the modern patterns of terrorism acquired distinctively transnational character with advantage of travelling and operating from multiple jurisdictions. Terror networks across the globe continue to assist one another on issues related to training camps, intelligence, ideologies, human resource, technology, forged passports, ammos and finances (Henderson, 1998).

Analytically, there is no agreed definition for terrorism. Scholars and policy experts have therefore, suggested numerous definitions but failed to reach consensus in coming up with a universal legal definition of terrorism. These continue to bring complexities in the designation of entities as terrorist organizations in the current international system. The so called “rogue” states have also been engaging in state sponsored terrorism who in their behavior of their atrocious and unacceptable character to the international community. As of 1993, US State Department identified Cuba, Iraq, Iran, former Soviet Union, Libya, Sudan and Syria (Perl & Perl, 2001). These continue to impede a universal approach by international community in combating domestic and transnational terrorism.

In 1994, UNGA condemned terrorism through UNGA Res. 49/60 by applying the political connotation stated as follows:

“Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.” (UNGA, 1994)

Further, the United States categorically explain terrorism as:

“Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (U.S. Code: Schmid, 2011; Groll-Yaari, 2012).

Existence of terrorist organizations in any jurisdiction leave alone Somalia possess threats to existence of state and possible state reconstruction initiatives. Al-Shabaab main agenda in Somalia has been to wage nationalistic battle against the FGS (US State Department,2023). In the causes of its terrorist endeavors, Al-Shabaab openly claimed responsibility in many instances of bombings and suicide missions in Somalia mostly targeting AMISOM and Somali authorities as well as perceived allies (US State Department, 2023). Al-Shabaab has also been responsible for the execution of peace activists, aid workers and media personnel. In undermining the humanitarian initiatives, Al-Shabaab also blocked the delivery of humanitarian assistance from some European relief bodies during the famines which caused deaths to thousands of Somali populations in 2011 (US State Department, 2023). Consequently, these actions of Al Shabab have continued to haunt state reconstruction efforts.



Figure 4.1: The terrorist attacks pattern from 1970s to 2020

Source: Global Terrorism data Base, 2022

In analyzing global terrorist activities over time, figure 4.0 above presents the pattern of terrorism attacks from 1970s to 2020. It demonstrates a significant increase from 2005, and at the highest incidences of attacks in around 2015 and significant drop towards the year 2020. Analytically the decline has direct correlations with AMISOM objectives and successes in the counter terrorism initiatives.

The motivation behind AMISOM intervention in Somalia was to counter terrorism by reducing the threats posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed extremist groups (UNSCR 1744/2007 & 2372/2017). As advanced by French scholar Professor Thierry in line with securitization theory, terrorism remains an existential threat to state reconstruction processes in Somalia. Therefore, AMISOM in line with the securitization theory prioritized counter terrorism in security discourse despite the likelihood for people to be harmed by other uncertain events rather than terrorism. AMISOM intervention in Somalia following the authorization by UNSC was attributed to securitization of Somalia as a failed state, infiltration of Al-Shabaab to the neighboring states and potential threat to global security. Securitization discipline therefore is purposed to fathom “who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions.”

As a principal actor in countering terrorism in Somalia, AMISOM was credited for removing Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and its vicinities following intensive urban warfare between 2011 and 2012. To sustain the counter insurgency initiatives, AMISOM extended its operations beyond Mogadishu following the

enjoinment of contingents from Kenya and Djibouti in 2012. This enabled AMISOM to push many of Al-Shabaab elements out of the major population in Somalia's southern and central zones. AMISOM also accomplished in "dislodging militants and reclaiming several strategic bridge towns south of Mogadishu in 2019 and 2020" (Tchie, 2022). These relieved the Somali population from the cruelty and brutality of Al Shabab administration in Somalia and subsequently created a good opportunity for more local authorities to emerge.

AMISOM's gains were also noticeable when Al-Shabaab suffered a blow between 2011 and 2012 following increased number of defections by its fighters on complaints that, Al-Shabaab attacks and suicide missions were not line with Islamic doctrines and interpretation of Jihad as well as their contradictory views to the application of extortionists and negative attitudes toward humanitarian assistance from some relief agencies. These defections were viewed as a strategic gain towards AMISOM counter insurgency initiatives because most defectors provided adequate and reliable intelligence about Al-Shabaab operations to AMISOM troops.

Reports from AMISOM and FGS analyzed suggested that the number of defections in 2012 were unprecedented and indicated that the war against terror was gaining momentum because of diminishing cohesion and authority in Al-Shabaab structures. In June 2012, FGS stated that close to 500 militants' defections and more were defecting almost daily. Al-Shabaab brutal actions in the face of foreign intervention alienated local communities was identified as a motivating factor for the massive defection. In 2012, two large contingents of

militants surrendered to the authorities in Afmadow and Garsale. In supporting the initiatives, AMISOM played a significant role in assisting Somalia's defection programs. These defections in themselves were an ancillary to AMISOM in its efforts towards reducing the Al-Shabaab influence and authority in Somalia. Nonetheless, Al-Shabaab remained a critical force with capability to reinvent itself to retain relevance while other armed groups like Islamic State continues to haunt Puntland administration (Tchie, 2022). Tchie asserts that despite elimination of senior leaders of Al-Shabaab by drone strike by United States, AMISOM endeavors to clear zones in partnership with SNA did not deter Al-Shabaab mobility across Lower and Middle Juba, Mudug, Gedo, Bay, Bokool, Galgadud, Lower and Middle Shabelle, Hiraan as well as Puntland. To the contrary, the group increased series of unprecedented attacks across the regional administrative headquarters.

Despite achieving great miles in the counter insurgency initiatives, analysis from experts and academicians gathered by this study indicated that Al-Shabaab remains an existential problem to the state reconstruction processes in Somalia. Lieutenant General Ndegeya (Former AMISOM Top Brass) on 18/03/2022 in Mogadishu emphasized that insurgency was a real threat to Somalia and degradation of the groups was a major agenda as AMISOM transitions to ATMIS. He observed:

“From a threat assessment, it is observed that Al-Shabaab remains the main security threat in Somalia. Its strong sanctuaries remain present in Jubaland, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, and Galmudug. The use of Improvised Explosive Devices remains Al-Shabaab’s weapon of choice to carry out large scale atrocities” (Lt. General Ndegeya/ Adopted from AMISOM Magazine,2023).

The views expressed by General Ndegeya as quoted in AMISOM Magazine agree with the findings of Llewellyn & Nweke (2020). Llewellyn & Nweke points out that Al-Shabaab had organized, executed and claimed responsibility for multiple terrorist actions which have negatively impacted the security of Somali, Kenya, and other neighboring states while their agenda continue to have international and global ramifications as they delved into piracy and arms.

4.2 Civil -military corporation (CIMIC) initiatives

Civil–military cooperation’s (CIMIC) describes the relations between military institutions and local citizens, Civil Society Organizations and other civil governmental agencies (Forman & Welch, 1998). CIMIC ideally incorporates a diverse activities and practice which cuts across management, social science and policy realm (Owens, 2010). Majority of AMISOM strategic partners in Somali reconstruction process have unique and distinct CIMIC definitions which directly influenced their approaches to the AMISOM initiatives.

Under the Standardization Programme for Armies drawn from America, Britain, Canada and Australia, CIMIC is defined as:

“CIMIC is the relationship of interaction, cooperation and coordination, mutual support joint planning and constant exchange of information at all levels between military forces, civilian organizations, agencies and in-theatre civil influences, which are necessary to achieve an effective response in the full range of operations.” (ABCA, 2001:2)

NATO’s CIMIC definition is provided as:

“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.” (NATO,2000:1)

European Union equally provided definition of CIMIC as:

“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.” (EU, 2002:9)

US Defense Department utilized the words “Civil Affairs” and “Civil Military Operations” to describe CIMIC and provide their definition as follows:

“Civil-Military Operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include the performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.” (USA, JP 3–57, FM 41–10 and JP 1–02).

Based on these definitions by different inter-governmental institutions in strategic partnerships with AMISOM, a consensus is empirically evidenced by the fact that

CIMIC initiatives encompass the relations between the civilian administration of a given state and its military authority. The major goal behind CIMIC initiatives be it a state or foreign actor is to harness military capability in advancing national security and defense interests (Besenyő, 2010). In the context of AMISOM, range of CIMIC activities were geared towards the realization of the state reconstruction in Somalia. In 2014, AMISOM distributed books and foodstuff targeting the orphan and needy children from poor background with an aim of boosting their education standards as part of CIMIC initiatives. AMISOM Troops under the leadership of Maj. Habil Nakhumwa and Capt. Patrick Makundi of the Civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) office also targeted Kafaalo primary and secondary schools in Farjano district, Kismayu town (AMISOM, 2014). Somali top government official (Haadi) appreciated AMISOM for the immense support to peace building processes in Kismayo and encouraged the troops to continue assist the Somalis who were in dire need of education:

“We can never thank AMISOM enough for their unwavering support to Somalia. Jubbaland is recovering from a state of conflict and is currently returning to normalcy, and it will continue to provide a safe environment for the children to pursue their education dreams,” (AMISOM/Haadi, 2014).

On 12th October 2017, Kenyan contingent to AMISOM in collaboration with SNA conducted CIMIC initiatives in Abdalla Biroole town, 40km South West of Kismayo (AMISOM, 2017). They offered free medical treatment to the local community and children who especially those affected by respiratory tract infections and other medical conditions (AMISOM, 2017). These activities were undertaken to address the community medical requirements as well as fostering

stronger community-military relations thus aiding key mandates of ensuring improved security and state reconstruction.

On 24th December 2021, in Kismayo, AMISOM through CIMIC initiatives supported educational and sports activities in Jubaland State (AMISOM, 2021). AMISOM presented new classrooms, learning materials, sanitation amenities and sports-related equipment. Other equipment; laptops, office tables, desks, chairs, cabinets, stationery, blackboards, games facilities to the school management of Abdalla Birole Primary (AMISOM, 2021). These initiatives were done under the Quick impact Projects as an extension of CIMIC initiatives to foster good relations with the population residing in the mission area (AMISOM, 2021). The then Justice and Religious Affairs Minister in Jubaland, (Mohamed Yussuf), officiated the handing over event and appreciated AMISOM for their CIMIC duty to reconstruct Somalia's education institutions support:

“On behalf of the Jubaland government, I thank AMISOM for the continued support. This is a responsibility that was supposed to be executed by ourselves but we are still growing. Therefore, we thank AMISOM for doing it for us,” (AMISOM/Yusuf, 2021).

Separately, AMISOM Sector 6 Commander (Brig. Gen. Abebaw Yimer) also presented sports equipment (uniforms and trophies) to the Minister in charge of Youth and Sports affairs in Jubaland, (Faduma Abdi) (AMISOM, 2021). Brig Gen. Yimer informed that the support to the community was intended to impact the young population by promoting recreational activities and physical fitness:

“I am optimistic that the support and continued collaboration between the Kismayo community and AMISOM will ultimately strengthen peace and security in the region,” (AMISOM/Yimer, 2021)

On 24th December 2021, in Beletweyne, AMISOM at Ugas Khalif International Airport established a solar system and sanitary facilities for IDPs in Hirshabelle State under the Quick Impact Projects. These CIMIC initiative were aimed at enhancing the safety of the airport as well as improving the public health of the communities and the IDPs camping in Dugane, Shabelle River and Haliye (AMISOM, 2021). In emphasizing the importance of the project, AMISOM Police commander in Beletweyne (Maj. E. Benson), stated that the solar project would enable the Somali police to execute their mandate at night and enhance the airports security:

“For the past one year, the Somali Police Force was eager to get this solar panel in order to better secure the airport. Somalia’s international partners, together with AMISOM, have made this possible. I know the police personnel will put it to effective use,” (Benson /AMISOM, 2021).

In acknowledging the importance of the project, Hirshabelle Ast. Police Commander (Col. Hassan Ibrahim) stated that it would help security agencies to effectively perform their mandates:

“We are grateful to the Indian government and our AMISOM partners for this solar power project. AMISOM built the airport police station and continues to support us in capacity building, in operations against terrorists, and in advancing our policing standards,” (Hassan/AMISOM, 2021).

Through CIMIC, AMISOM in partnership with Somali National Army (SNA) participated in community development initiatives such as roads and school’s rehabilitation, drilling of boreholes and construction of safe water points, provision of medicine and medical services as well as sports facilities. Majority of the respondents were of the view that, through the implantation of these CIMIC

projects, AMISOM and its strategic partners, addressed the immediate and essential needs of the Somali society and at the same time build trust, confidence and believe in CIMIC-based initiatives. This approach was also embraced by former AMISOM Deputy Force Commander (Operations and Plans), who called on the CIMIC officers under his command to work closely with the communities in the areas liberated so that they are to develop confidence and a good relationship with the population. He advised the CIMIC officers that:

“You must focus on creating harmony with the local population and observe International Humanitarian Law and respect human rights if you are to win the hearts and minds of the people, that is a tool you can now use to initiate a project, a project starts from identification; but identification that is based on needs..... “That is a tool you can now use to initiate a project, a project starts from identification; but identification that is based on needs,”” (Maj Gen. Lakara/Adopted from AMISOM Magazine, 2019)

Maj Gen. Nakibus Lakara sentiments were in conformity with the views of Col.

Francis Kangwanda (former AMISOM Chief CIMIC Officer) alluded that;

“CIMIC activities help in shaping the operational environment to the mutual benefit of both the military and civilian actors and therefore allows a (military) commander to achieve more.” (Maj Gen. Lakara/Adopted from AMISOM Magazine, 2019).

Col. Kangwanda further stated that the training would enhance joint AMISOM-SNA missions, in compliance with the implementation framework of the Somalia Transitional Plan. He reiterated that;

“Our objective is to build the capacity of SNA and AMISOM CIMIC officers to mentor one another and cooperate with local communities while on the field. Training together enables AMISOM to achieve the mandate to mentor SNA,” (Col Kangwanda/AMISOM, 2019).

The SNA Chief CIMIC Officer, Col. Abdullahi M. Ahmed stated the training would enable better coordination with AMISOM.

“The SNA command is committed to implementing the civil-military coordination strategy given its importance in boosting relations with the public and countering violent extremism,” (Col. Abdullahi/AMISOM, 2019)

Col. Abdullahi M. Ahmed statement views above were reinforced by Zamzam Hassan (SNA CIMIC) officer, affirmed that she would employ the knowledge acquired to execute reconstruction duties through CIMICs;

“We will endeavor to apply the knowledge to build good relations with the public,” (Zamzam/AMISOM, 2019).

From the above complimenting excerpts from Somali official is drawn from AMISOM magazine, it is evidenced that CIMIC initiatives were effective taking into consideration that their outcomes enhance the relations and local partnerships between the mission and the Somali general public. These views were also complimentary to the views of a critical informant interviewed online on 29/06/2024 in Nairobi, enlightened that;

“Towards state reconstruction in Somalia, CIMIC initiatives since AMISOM tenure has become an essential tool in winning the hearts, the souls and the minds of Somali population. AMISOM embarked on the pacification of the areas liberated and consequently, CIMIC became a critical tool used in executing state reconstruction processes within their deployment jurisdiction. In addressing challenges that combat operations could not address, AMISOM embarked on CIMIC initiatives in addressing the flaws, and divisions that existed among the Somali clans. It also contributed to success in the security sector reforms, basic needs of the communities, sharing in of vital information. Most importantly, CIMIC model changed the perceptions among the Somali population that AMISOM was a foreign aggressor with selfish intention to a multi-dimensional intervenor gathering the needs and future of Somali nation.”

During the opening of a five (5) day CIMIC capacity building workshop organized by AMISOM and UK-Mission Support Team on 16th July 2021 and attended by officers from both SNA and AMISOM, Maj Gen. William Kitsao Shume (former-AMISOM Deputy Force Commander - Operations and Planning) from Kenya, highlighted that the CIMIC training would help both AMISOM and SNA personnel to build greater relations with Somali society. He stated that:

“Civil-military coordination is an art of warfare used to win the hearts and minds of the civilian population in conflict areas,” (Maj. Gen. William Shume/AMISOM Magazine, 2016).

According to Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur (Former Somali Minister), CIMIC actions under ATMIS would bring Somali society to feel the beneficial outcomes of the AU intervention in their daily lives and would work together towards reconstruction of Somalia (Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur/AMISOM Magazine, 2024).

As pointed out by an International Relations Expert interviewed in Nairobi through an online interview on 4th July 2024, he pointed out that:

“AMISOM CIMIC created a secure environment which has enabled Somali administrative and social institutions to embrace dialogue (negotiations and mediation) in addressing their issues. This has reduced incidences of violent conflicts in Kismayo. Community-based organization meetings provided peace actors with reliable intelligence about the conflict situation, therefore enabling them to take cautionary steps such as preventive deployment of troops in hotspots or dispatching clan elders to engage in preventive diplomacy.”

Semblance to the above informant’s views, towards state reconstruction in Somalia, AMISOM CIMIC also helped Jubaland Administration to consolidate

power in areas that were initially controlled by insurgents (Emil & Philip, 2020). Professionalized Jubaland Security forces regained main centers such as Bulagadud, Abdale Birolle and Kuday. Most importantly, the security function provided safe and secure environment within the district making it easier for public servants to take services closer to the citizen (Emil & Philip, 2020). These assisted in building trust and confidence of the administration amongst the population to the disadvantage of Al-Shabaab whose intent and operational strategies employed propaganda to distance and brainwash the locals in on to abhor AMISOM initiatives while rallying support for them. Muchemi (2021) further observes that CIMIC operations in Somalia was a determining factor for successful peacekeeping mission and a tool for enhancing state reconstruction in Somalia. Muchemi (2021) examined the wider arrays of approaches to CIMIC roles undertaken AMISOM troops in Somalia (Kismayo district) from year 2011 to 2020 and established that the successes were notable from growing tendencies of civilian and military players complementing efforts in the attempts to stabilize and reconstruct Somalia.

The opinions of the majority of the respondents also acknowledged that CIMIC filled the social and military gaps between the Somali civilian population, AMISOM and Somali National Army; a prerequisite requirement towards attaining sustainable state reconstruction in Somalia.

In as much as CIMIC is a vital tool during AMISOM initiatives on state reconstruction, it had underlying doctrinal deficiency. AMISOM employed UN doctrinal approaches which had a foundation on the Western Christian philosophy that is odd to Somalia. Somalia as a state has strong components of Islamic

fundamentalism and nationalism which are not receptive to European approaches because they perceive as an intrusion of Christianity in their way of life. As such, AMISOM in its CIMIC structures were not localized in the face of real situation in quasi-Islamic state. Therefore, AMISOM CIMIC framework and models did not put into considerations the Somalia stakeholders' input in the state reconstruction initiatives. Key informants (Somali youth, women and elders and scholars) were also of the universal view that lack of comprehensive approaches in conducting CIMIC initiatives contributed to a situational circumstance where some critical players were conflict insensitive therefore complicating/frustrating the CIMIC outcomes.

4.3 Protection of civilians (POC) initiatives

Protection of civilians is a concept that constitute actions established to enhance the security of a population and those at risk with compliance and adherence to the rights of subjects recognized in the regional and international instruments (African Union, 2012). The regional legal instruments include; the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa as well as the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (African Union, 2012). International instruments constituted the international legal frameworks with reference to Refugee laws, the Laws of Armed Conflict as well as International human rights law (African Union, 2012). In the AU, the Draft Guidelines for the Protection of civilians in the AU missions provided the legal basis which guided AMISOM mandate towards state reconstruction (African Union, 2012).

Protection of civilians as a peace support operation's initiative in Somalia was essential to AMISOM successes in state reconstruction. POC lied at the middle of an AMISOM operation's mandate to ensure that a Somali State emerging from wars could create durable peace and stability (Abdulhamid, 2021). As advanced by Copenhagen school, protection of civilians was the first "securitizing move" pursued by AMISOM in its bid to foster reconstruction. Therefore, it was also significant to the AMISOM's efforts on protection of civilians considering that the inherent rights and physical safety of civilian population could not be fully protected in an environment that conflicts/wars are perpetual or re-ignites.

While emphasizing the contributions of AMISOM in the POC agenda in Somalia, a critical informant (a KDF Officer and former Combat Officer in the AMISOM) interviewed on 2nd of July 2024 pinpointed:

"Without doubt, AMISOM had a well-managed peace process that provided for the best form for protection of civilians. Every component of AMISOM had proper implementation strategy to ensure that protection of civilians was guaranteed. The most important aspect in the protection of civilians in the combat zones was enhance flexibility in responding to the ever-changing environments in the course of the mission. Most importantly, adherence to the AU and UN guidelines on protection of civilians as the best practices in peace missions offered a rich and experienced approach that ensured that the civilian population in the AMISOM sectors were protected from conflicts, combat actions and potential retaliation from insurgents. In a nutshell, AMISOM had an integrated, planned and comprehensive models in addressing multiple challenges related to the protection of civilians and in compliance to the regional and international instruments"

The informant's views clearly demonstrated the AMISOM strategic framework in line with AU and UN guidelines as well as compliance with international laws in the protection of civilians. These views were further supported by another key

informant (IR specialist and Somali national) interviewed in Nairobi, stated that AMISOM had power to employ any obligatory methods in prevention, deterrence or response to threats of any form of violence against the civilian population. She further stated that that effective POC implementation in AMISOM required a comprehensive and integrated framework to mitigate the multiple challenges missions was facing within their mandate.

The study also established that AMISOM, in the combat and non-combat tasks, engaged with parties to the conflict and affected Somali population, provided physical protection and established a protective environment; engaged in dialogue and advocacy in support for reconciliation, peace agreements, liaising with the government and armed actors or the resolution of local conflicts; engaged in human rights investigations and reporting; took actions to provide physical protection, usually by deterring attacks on citizens through protective presence and regular patrolling. Effective patrols were informed by community liaison assistants (CLAs), early warning systems, public information, community alert networks and reporting systems. AMISOM peacekeepers also provided safe passages or refuges to assist civilian population to escape violence. When there was necessity, the mission employed all necessary means (including deadly force) to physically protect population.

Analytically, AMISOM also contributed to the establishment of a protective environment where civilian population were less prone to violence. AMISOM initiatives also constituted strengthening the Somali administration capacities to protect civilians through the rule of law, security reforms and accommodative political process. AMISOM personnel participated in building the capacity of

Somali National and Federal authorities to enhance promotion and respect human rights as well as improving the capacity of communities and civil society. Under the state building theory, these approaches were essential in establishing the social foundations for a sustainable peace and civilian protection guarantees (ibid).

Experts and scholars interviewed were in consensus that the POC initiatives employed by AMISOM were in tandem with the Draft Guidelines for the Protection of civilians in AU Peace missions. These entailed protection from physical violence categorized into four levels: prevention is the first level and refers to the actions initiated to discourage groups from designing hostile actions. These included patrolling as well as winning hearts and minds of the warring factions and was aimed at minimizing the risk of escalation of conflict. The second level entailed pre-emption and entailed the measures to defeat a potential threat or to gain advantage over a spoiler group before it launches a designed violent activity and in most instances was evidenced through the tactical redeployment of AMISOM troops. In the third level response was the primary strategy, this required the proportionate application of fire to neutralize or to render non-effective the spoiler faction following the outbreak of violence. The last level entailed consolidation in which actions necessary to control a post-conflict situation including denying combating factions the ability to restore fighting capacities.

4.4 Security initiatives

Security as a discipline and as a concept in IR has attracted many definitions and descriptions (McSweeney, 1999). This is because many scholars and policy experts approach this concept from their own ideological contexts thus making it

broad, fluid and elusive. In absence of defined boundaries, concept of security is applied as enticement for many political actions both at municipal and international levels. Williams (2012) argued that “security is a powerful political tool in claiming attention for priority items in the competition for government attention”. Pointing at security’s disputed nature, critical perspectives about security have argued that “security” is not specifically universal or positive, but rather that it is dependent on the subject and context, and sometimes, is even negative (Krause & Williams, 2002).

In this study, Makinda’s definition of security was valuable in interrogating the AMISOM security initiatives towards attaining state reconstruction in in Somalia (Makinda,1998). Makinda (1998) asserts that all the agencies, regulations as well as structures connected with society includes its populations are to be defended from “military and non-military threats”. This implies that the views of the leadership determine the initiatives that are witnessed in the width and depth of the security of that society. Makinda’s definition appears to concur with UNOCHA definition which, widely defined security calls in a huge range of security scopes covering:

“economic (employment opportunities and anti-poverty initiatives); food security (initiatives against famine and hunger); health (initiatives against maladies, toxic food, malnutrition as well access to healthcare); environmental (initiatives against natural calamities, environmental issues, depletion of resources); personal (initiatives against violence, child labor, crimes and terrorism); community (initiatives against inter-ethnic, religious as well identity tensions); political (initiatives against human rights violations and political repression).”

Within the concept of security (human security), UN employs its main criterions which includes seven dimensions (reference to threat identification) and the two implementing models of protection and empowerment, are demonstrated in the figure 4.2 below.




Figure 2: UN HS Approach

Figure 4.2: Human Security model

Source: UNDP. Human Development Report, 1994

AMISOM arrival in Somalia in the early 2007 immediate mandate was to address the prevailing security situation and create a favorable environment for political process to overcome the decades of conflict in Somalia (SOMA,2007). AMISOM secured the regime change between the ICU and the installed TFG, implemented a national security plan and trained the TFG security personnel. From the security point, AMISOM supported the FGS in its war against Al-Shabaab (AMISOM, 2007). In addressing the maritime security, AMISOM and other international actors have worked jointly to piracy and other high seas crime under the international law (US State Department, 2008). Towards attaining a better Somali

state blue economy, the Federal Member states and FGS maritime components developed comprehensive strategic policy frameworks, capacity building and enhancement initiatives. These initiatives were undertaken by International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), EUCAP Somalia and other actors.

In 2011, AMISOM'S Police Component (drawn from Uganda and Nigeria) deployed Formed Police Units (FPUs) to Mogadishu constituting 280 police personnel. FPUs were deployed to HELP the SPF in securing urban centers under the FGS' control (AMISOM, 2011). FPU's were involved maintaining law and order Mogadishu and played an important initiative in supporting the SPF's 24-hour patrols, as well as stop-and-search operations which improved the security situation significantly in the capital. Consequently, AMISOM FPU's presence with Somali police enabled local business thrive at night; an indicator of a growing state economy. According to Benson Oyo- Nyeko, former acting Police Commissioner in AMISOM in Mogadishu acknowledged that Mogadishu witnessed improved security since the FPU'S and SPF began joint operations.

Towards sustainable state reconstruction in Somalia, through the lens of securitization theory, AMISOM prioritized security as an important factor in ensuring that stability is attained in the fragile and collapsed state. On security aspects, AMISOM was mandated under Resolution 2372(2017) was to; "help the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia and; Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali

security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia as security strategic objectives.”

After 2012, AMISOM’s expanded security operations that enabled tremendous progress in securing major road networks entering and exiting from Mogadishu. The roads were initially controlled by insurgencies. Clearance of insurgence presence in these major roads proved that the security initiatives provided conducive space for political dialogues and national reconciliation to happen among Somali political elites. It also assured the political elites of security in the event they were to travel for dialogue in the city. Regrettably, instead of seizing the opportunity, Somalia’s national and regional leaderships failed to utilize these opportunities and wasted a lot of time and resources.

By providing military escort and transportation for participants at numerous conferences, AMISOM contributed to establishment of Southern and Central Somalia’s interim regional administrations, namely; Jubbaland, South West, Galmudug and Hiraaan and Middle Shabelle in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively. However, the slow phase of the regional administrations’ establishment undermined progress of forging for a political consensus in addressing essential issues relating to the federal constitution as well as national security architecture which were vital for AMISOM to achieve its goal and secure its smooth exit strategy.

During a high-level meeting (Security and Justice Committee meeting) in Mogadishu on 1st December 2020, presided over by Somali PM which brought together AMISOM, UN, FGS and Federal Member States, emphasized the

significance of improving the security and the rule of law for the future of Somalia (UNSOM,2020). Formed in 2017, the Committee creates a platform for FGS, FMSs and international partners to partner in improving security and justice in Somalia. It also serves as a policy body designed to foster coordination on many issues relating to security and justice in line with the Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF), that was ratified during the Somali Partnership Forum in 2019(UNSOM, 2020). During the meeting, former Somali PM, Mohamed H. Roble highlighted:

“Effective governance of the security sector is not only crucial for stability, but also for the long-term consolidation of democratization and sustainable economic and social development. This is the goal of the Federal Government of Somalia. This is the aspiration of the Somali people,” (UNSOM/Roble,2020).

Data analyzed from various credible reports within the scholarly community as well as UN and AU documentation established that the AMISOM managed to establish concrete security foundation which enabled international and domestic actors such as diplomatic community, international aids agencies, INGOs, Somali government officials to operate freely in and outside Mogadishu as they perform their respective duties. This also helped humanitarian agencies to operate out of Somalia’s capital and in particular south-central Somalia in delivering aid and relief food. Resurrection of new embassies such as United States embassy will not have been in existence without the security initiatives by AMISOM. In the same context, AMISOM provided security to hundreds of visits by various dignitaries

which impacted on greater global attention to Somalia reconstruction process in several international forums and medias.

From the above analyses, AMISOM security initiatives in Somalia conform with the Fran N. Trager and F.N Simonie views that national security is a component of government policy having it as goal in the establishment of national and international values against existing and potential adversaries (Buzan, B., 2008). Buzan (2008) further alludes that, in the current international system, territorial state that is sovereign is the standard unit of security. Buzan further emphasized that, primarily, security is about the destiny of human collectivities and secondarily entails personal security of individual beings. Ian Bellany (1996) also points security in itself as “a relative freedom from conflict attached with high expectations “that will not amount to any war that should occur while Laurence martin emphasized security as an assurance of wellbeing (Buzan, 2008). More importantly, the general assumption of state-building theory is that without security, other obligations of state reconstruction are impossible. Therefore, conceptual links between security and state reconstruction were factored by AMISOM and strategic partners as important elements in rebuilding Somalia.

4.5 Institutional capacity building initiatives

Institutional capacity building initiatives entail the establishment and strengthening of capacities, capabilities, skills, processes and resources which a state requires to survive, adapt and thrive in the everchanging world (UNSDG, 2023). In line with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) No. 17 on Revitalization of the Global Partnerships to attain sustainable development, capacity building initiatives by AMISOM were vital in the Somali state reconstruction. Police

components of AMISOM in cooperation with UNSOM's police components supported the development of efficient and effective Somali Police Force, through implementation of federal policing model as stipulated in National Security Architecture that was formally adopted in June, 2018. AMISOM also supported both the Somali's regional and national police structures through screening, vetting, recruiting, training and mentoring programs. This was evidenced in specialized training on investigations, anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency which to a great extent improved the capability of Somali police force.

In 2012, AMISOM was credited with providing capacity-building to Somali police force in many disciplines (Williams, D'Alessandro, Darkwa, Helal, Machakaire & Rupesinghe, 2018). For example, in collaboration with the UN and two regional administrations of Puntland and Galmudug, police component drawn from AMISOM trained hundred Somali police for joint patrols which was aimed at implementing the Galkayo Ceasefire Agreement. Jubaland and South West Regional Administrations also benefited from training of 600 police personnel by AMISOM. More importantly, the mission supported Hirsh belle in recruiting and training of 800 strong police personnel that were placed in the regions of Jowhar and Beletweyne. In supporting the initiatives towards sustainable governance in Somalia, police component of AMISOM also provided training for police officers in South-West State and Jubaland in 2017 to enhance the capacity building base in training elected officials within the regions (Williams et al, 2018).

On the development of institutional capacities with the community policing, AMISOM police component undertook biometric registration of the SNP personnel with the aim of identifying the number of personnel, their bio-data, their

skills, their respective areas and their deployment areas. Training on the use of the biometrics was provided and was later launched in their administrative centers (AMISOM, 2017). AMISOM supported in the re-training of SPF to ensure they acquire the necessary expertise, skills, capabilities and attitudes that meets policing requirements for a stable Somali state. AMISOM also developed Standard Operating Procedures and Guidelines for the various aspects of police roles. AMISOM also supported the re-activation of Somalia's National Bureau of INTERPOL which was aimed at helping Somalia's combat against organized crime (Williams, D'Alessandro, Darkwa, Helal, Machakaire & Rupesinghe, 2018). Development of Somali police infrastructure through the building new police stations, refurbishing the existing ones, as well as the providing of equipment and furniture were key components of AMISOM contributions (AMISOM,2012).

On 18th January 2012, in Brigadier General Kahiye Police Academy, Mogadishu, AMISOM Police Component launched a capacity building and training on leadership which contributed to the training of 97 Somali Police Force (SPF) junior police commanders (AMISOM, 2012). The training was aimed at equipping the personnel picked from various police posts with skills and knowledge to execute their mandate in the liberated areas. During the training, Dr Benjamin (AMISOM Police Training Coordinator) emphasized on the importance of the exercise which was launched upon consultation between Somali Police Force and AMISOM Police component. He pointed out that:

“We were eager to contribute to this training because it was in line with our mandate to build the capacity of Somali Police Force (SPF) so that they can deliver services to the people. Our contribution to the SPF training will equip Somali police station commanders with the skills and knowledge to effectively perform their duties as police station commanders in newly liberated areas of Mogadishu.”
(Benjamin/AMISOM, 2012)

Benjamin views pinpoint collaborative roles of AMISOM police component towards the realization of a Somali Police Force (SPF) that is capable of enforcing the laws, maintaining law and order and more importantly realization of a stable Somali state with functional security agencies.

In 2013, the AMISOM Civilian Unit delivered theoretical training followed by on the job mentoring of Somali Civil Servants. AMISOM Political Unit facilitated a course for Somalia Civil Servants in Bujumbura, Burundi bringing together 120 protocol officers, secretaries and administrators from various ministries of the Somali Government with a goal to support of the Federal Government’s policy of reconstruction of state institutions (AMISOM, 2013). The AMISOM’s Political Unit initiatives not only delivered key improvements in the lives of the Somali people but also towards creating a conducive environment for the political reconstruction of Somalia.

In April 2013, 197 Somali Police personnel (182 men and 15 women) graduated in specialized Public Order Management training in Djibouti facilitated by the AMISOM Police Component and were deployed in local police stations with aim of transforming the force into a credible and effective institution (AMISOM, 2013). AMISOM Training and Development Department also completed a comprehensive Training Needs Assessment (TNA) report which assessed on the plight of the police force in Somalia in developing a comprehensive training

curriculum (AMISOM, 2013). It was involved in the development of short- and medium-term plans and programs for training and retraining as well as training in building partnerships with local and international organizations interested in rebuilding the capacity of the Somali Police Force. Remarkably, in 2013, AMISOM together with international partners trained over 1000 Somali Police personnel, making the year in AMISOM history a success in the Somali Police Force capacity building initiatives.

In expounding the contributions of AMISOM, as adopted from AMISOM MAGAZINE 2013, the former AMISOM Police Coordinator on Training and Development, Dr Agordzo informed:

“The AMISOM Police Training and Development Unit is responsible for developing a training curriculum that successfully trains both new recruits and old SPF members in all levels of Police work. Carrying out crash courses for existing members of SPF has been very beneficial, these Police officers have been out of work and training for a long time. This year has been one of the best times for the AMISOM Training and Development Unit since we arrived in 2012. We are achieving great results and are happy with the developments. We hope transformation of the SPF continues to great heights” (Agordzo/AMISOM, 2013)

Further, in a bid to build the capacity of the Somali security institutions, an informant (an independent police officer to AMISOM 2016-2017 in Mogadishu) further informed that AMISOM Police Training Unit delivered more training programs on child and women rights, community policing, gender and sexual based violence, protection in conflict and post-conflict environments and training of trainers which positively impacted Somali capacity building strategy.

To help Somalia’s decision-making processes, AMISOM planned and facilitated overseas benchmarking initiatives for the Somalia political leadership, security

personnel and civil society sectors. For instance, 9 senior members of Somalia police force visited Nigeria to acquire primary information on their model of policing to help them determine the type of federal policing model which Somalia should adopt for effective command and administration. Co-location of AMISOM police and SPF in several jurisdictions and IPOs were assigned to support the local police stations through enhances mentorship and monitoring due to close proximity. This framework facilitated elections management during the 2012 and 2016-2017 Somali Presidential and Parliamentary elections as well as helping their colleagues in providing security during the periods of Ramadan (2017 and 2018). According to one of the key informants who participated in AMISOM between 2015 and 2016 as a Service Officer under the KDF interviewed on 25th July 2024 highlighted that:

“During my time in AMISOM we executed a number of capacity building initiatives in Somalia. First, we instituted training to military and civilian personnel from local and national Somalia authorities; ensured that there was sanctity of human life; developed key infrastructures but not limited to roads, bridges, offices; created a good environment for social and political development; governance; accountability and; ensuring that rule of law and constitutionalism is entrenched in the lives.”

Another key informant (academician/international relations expert) interviewed on 25th July 2024 pointed out that:

“In my view, AMISOM in the entire spectrum of Capacity building adopted the UN framework which inculcated every sector involvement in Somalia with direct reference to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be attained by 2030. AMISOM in particular within its mandate embraced SDG Goal No. 17 which advocated for international assistance for capacity building in developing Somalia to support the nations strategy to implement its state and federal member states agenda. Through AMISOM, Capacity building actors engaged in Somalia towards the greater realization of state reconstruction.”

The perspectives of the key informants as cited above clearly conform with the consensus approach of international community on capacity building initiatives. The approach as established by the World Bank, UN and European Commission comprises of five areas: “a clear policy framework, institutional development and legal framework, citizen participation and oversight, human resources improvements including education and training, and sustainability.” Major focus revolved on training and educational aspects. For example, in Somalia, capacity building initiatives employed by AMISOM and its partners focused on the training and educational perspectives in their assessment framework instead of actual performance objectives.

4.6 Stabilization initiatives

The fluidity of the term stabilization continues to haunt the outcome of missions. This is attributed to the failure by the UN and other intervening actors to come with a formidable and operational definition of the terminology. Towards the understanding of the concept, the study interrogated several schools of thoughts in expounding the term. The US Department of Defense Directive (3000.05), provides a definition of stabilization as, “an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning US Government (USG) efforts — diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense - to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.” In the context of NATO, Stabilization “is an approach used to mitigate crisis, promote legitimate political authority, and set the conditions for long-term stability by using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-

establish security, re-establish Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), and rule of law, and end social, economic, and political turmoil” (Allied Joint Publication, Military Contribution to Stabilization; ADRP 3-0, pg. 3-3, 11th November 2016). Bruton & Williams (2014) & Kaplan (2009) hints that stabilization is a several sector process which requires many distinct instruments that seeks to protect the basic necessities of a society as well as aid the development of state reconstruction to enable initiatives to be sustainable and build formidable nations with viable legitimacy. Therefore, stabilization is a vital concept to states that are fragile or failed; where basic services are lacking or inadequate as well as where conflict/war are influential variable.

The study observed that AMISOM between 2007 and 2012 didn’t develop a definition of stabilization. This essentially undermined the strategic approach towards state reconstruction. On a positive note, in 2013, AU/AMISOM came up with a definition of stabilization which was informed by the need to bring clarity and enhance the mandate of the mission as:

“Any post conflict or combat activities undertaken in order to facilitate and promote early recovery of the population and institutions in a locality that has been recovered from Al Shabab.” (AMISOM, 2013).

The mission upon formally developing the above operational definition of stabilization significantly provided clarity in the meaning, scope and nature of operations within the mission’s mandate. Most importantly, the definition, acted like a compass in providing the mission with multiple potential directions to proceed in attaining state reconstruction in Somalia. With the operational

definition, AMISOM components engaged in stabilization initiatives, with its military component securing areas under the Al-Shabaab control, the police component operated in promoting public order, adherence to the rule of law and constitutionalism, while the civilian component undertook initiatives “in support of the military gains in Somalia.” Majority of the informants interviewed pointed out that the overall objective of the stabilization was to help the Somali administration in promoting security, human safety, legitimacy, reconciliation and promoting better governance to foster “normalcy” in the secured areas from insurgents and warlords.

In reinforcing the significance of stabilization, an informant interviewed at the KPS Headquarters on 30/06/2024, informed further on the concept of stabilization in AMISOM that; “The whole concept covered huge number of issues, the National Stabilization Strategy was created in a horizontal dimension to help stabilization parties engage in structured conversations on mutual disciplines of concerns and linkages between activities, policies and strategies. These created synergies between community policing strategies and community recovery projects development.” This implies that stabilization is necessary and determinant in the success of any Peace Support Operations.

Lotze & Williams (2016) points out that while acknowledging the contributions of AMISOM on stabilization, an idea that AMISOM could contribute in Somali stabilization gained acceptance and recognition within the UN system. The UNSC in 2011 agreed with the recommendations to improve the security situation in Mogadishu and further formally requested AMISOM to partner with Somali

administration to come up with a comprehensive stabilization strategy for the Mogadishu (AMISOM Provisional Guidelines on Stabilization Activities, AMISOM internal document, 2013, p. 1). The UNSC also acknowledged the significant role of an effective police presence could contribute towards stabilization of Mogadishu and placed emphasis on the need to establish a reliable Somali police force. Therefore, Lotze & Williams, (2016) points that the Security Council authorized African Union's strategy to establish a component that constitute police force within the structures of AMISOM. UNSC Resolution 2036/2012 obligated AMISOM to "support delivery of stabilization plans developed by the IGAD and the Somali TFG in areas it had already secured. Additionally, it called for AMISOM to create police component to assist in stabilization of Mogadishu". Resolution 2093/2013 further mandated AMISOM to, "authorize the current government to stabilize areas where al-Shabaab previously occupied and shifted AMISOM into more of a supporting role."

Towards stabilization, in 2011, AMISOM and TFG effectively removed Al-Shabaab from "Mogadishu and other strategic towns of Kismayo, Beledweyne and Baidoa in South-Central Somalia", and also merged 4,000 Personnel drawn from Kenyan military into the wider AMISOM family in Somalia (AMISOM & KDF, 2011). The activities of AMISOM, beginning of 2012, revolved around recovery and stabilization of settlements in the South-Central Somalia that were in the control of Al-Shabab. The success of stabilization initiatives needed involvement of military that supports a strategy that is politically viable. This was complex to attain when the military and political aspects of stabilization were

disagreeing/conflicting and being executed by different and uncoordinated players. AMISOM recovered many settlements from Al-Shabab between the year 2014 and 2015. Regrettably, there was no effective holding uniformed personnel or interim governance structure to stabilize them. Both the military and political components were required. It is traditionally a political obligation to develop an effective local security sectors and non-violent political processes which need a degree of military jurisdiction. AMISOM as a military component could not deliver stabilization agenda alone, considering the fact that it was configured by the UNSC to counter terrorism and counter offensive operations (Williams, 2018). Stabilization in Somalia needed police and civilian components that are effective and capable which unfortunately neither AMISOM nor the Somalia administration possessed. Until recently AMISOM did not have police or civilians situated permanently outside Mogadishu city. Equally, Somali authorities did not have an effective “holding” force and civilian administration to deliver a peace dividend to population living in these settlements.

In 2015, AMISOM in partnership with SNA through “Operation Juba Corridor”, was able to dislocate the Al-Shabaab from “the Gedo, Bakool, and Bay regions of Somalia between the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders”. Operation’s main goal was to “destroy, secure and consolidate which ultimately resulted into stabilization process.”

Tchie (2022) pinpoint that, in 2014, with the increased scope of AMISOM mandate, the FGS was able to develop a stabilization plan prior to the commencement of Operation Eagle. The 2014 stabilization plan for Somalia was aimed at coordinating between Somalia’s Interior Ministry and Federal

administrations in Somalia (FGS, 2014). This stabilization plan was however, not factored in the AMISOM military operations. As a result, the internal FGS stabilization initiatives were carried out in isolation from the larger AMISOM stabilization processes. Tchie (2022) further alludes that comprehensively, the components of the AU's policy focused inherently on state-building as a wider concept of stabilization. Therefore, AU peace support operations have primarily focused on stabilization of regimes in Africa. Consequently, this focus and assumption hindered AMISOM from creating a clear comprehensive and cohesive stabilization strategy needed for Somalia.

This study also established that Somali political elites and members of Somali diaspora were in concurrence that promoting state reconstruction in Somalia from conflict was beyond, security, humanitarian and developmental aspects. They pinpointed that the stabilization of Somalia as fragile state was an essential component of state reconstruction. Experts and academicians interviewed also acknowledged that stabilization processes in Somalia during AMISOM were primarily undertaken in partnership with western powers and other international actors. These constituted a mixture of issues on political, economic, defense, and humanitarian goals, resources and activities to tackle threats via short term security operations.

AMISOM as a combat-based missions created a conducive environment for Somalia's stabilization through the empowerment of its police and civilian components. These achievements strategically created a paradigm shift in AMISOM from being a combat force into a highly multi-dimensional mission on

stabilization of Somalia as advanced by Amadi (2014). These findings also agree with Lotze and Williams study on “the surge to stabilize referring to lessons for the UN from the AU’s experience in Somalia”, that concluded that; AMISOM underwent transformation from combat initiative to stabilization initiative (Lotze, & Williams,2016).

In line with the tenets of state building theory, the study established that AMISOM in the stabilization initiatives secured Somalia from a complex situation through creation of a peaceful environment which facilitated the social, political and economic progress of Somalia as a state emerging from state collapse. Another important aspect of stabilization was to create a state of Somalia that is at peace with itself and the entire region. The litmus test of Somalia stabilization processes revolved around the constitutional adoptions, commitment to the electoral process in 2016 and the establishment of acting regional administrations.

According to one of the key informants (IR Specialist) interviewed on 2nd July 2024 at Moi University through an online interview, observed that:

“Stabilization in the case of Somalia is never a linear initiative from conflictual to peaceful Stage. It represented lengthy and extensive processes which are characterized by struggles for power and bargaining among elites. For instance, electoral processes and the emergence of democratic institutional bodies required long processes towards establishment of political parties and independent electoral body as well as international community desire for quick success. Despite the complexities in the stabilization process, AMISOM with limited capacity and weak partner (FGS) in the course... immensely contributed to reconstruction of Somalia”

These assertions correspond with Lotze & Williams (2016). Lotze & Williams point out that the change was aimed to evolve AMISOM from being a military mission into a more multi-dimensional peace support operation which would

support the stabilization of Mogadishu and potentially of South-Central Somalia when the security situation guarantees. Informants' views also highlighted the need for employing diplomatic approaches to realize stabilization initiatives within and outside the mission.

Varying school of thoughts have emerged among scholars on how best to stabilize Somalia. Some scholars subscribe to a narrow paradigm that aims on stabilizing state authority, while other scholars support a broad-based paradigm to stabilization operations that focuses on a comprehensive approach (Philipp Rotmann, 2016). The study also established that lack of stability in Somalia was largely associated with poor governance driven by clan-centrism and its inability to perform the functions of states and service delivery to the people as well as selfish and competing interests of Troop contributing Countries (TCC), major powers, members of UN Security Council among others. From the findings it was distinctively clear that the stabilization process of fragile states as in the case of Somalia is usually tied with leadership and service delivery for the population as well as international development partners. Somalia faces challenges in delivering public services and good leadership when compared to non-post-conflict states because of reduced state capacity in implementation of reforms, the presence of donor institutions, inadequacy of human capital and legacies of local governing systems.

4.7 Gender-based initiatives (GBIs)

Gender-based initiatives are considered to be integral components in state reconstruction. Women in Muslim states have specifically been excluded in peace

issues due religious and cultural reasons which appears to favor patrilineal path of social existence. Somalia is ranked the 4th last on the “UNDP Gender Inequality Index with a score of 0.776 (where the maximum score of 1 denotes complete inequality).” Successful state reconstruction in the contemporary system lies in the involvement of women in the process (Carey, 2019). Rai & Lievesley, Eds. (1996) inform that involvement of women is central to success across all spectrum of attaining statehood. Williams et al (2018), described women involvement in four fundamental pillars: participation of women in peace initiatives; prevention of girls and women from enduring all forms of violence; providing protection of women and vulnerable groups; as well as assistance in relief and recovery priority initiatives. Further a 2023 UN report asserts that “women are increasingly at-risk in conflict and underrepresented in peace processes”. In fostering Gender-Based Initiatives, Williams et al, 2018, alludes that AMISOM had mixed results in the advancement of women agenda in Somalia.

In compliance with UNSCR 1325/2000, AMISOM developed Gender Strategic Framework in 2013 which covered five years. This strategic framework was aimed at promoting gender mainstreaming within the mission as well as in the external context of Somali society. In implementing this strategic plan within the mission area, AMISOM ensured that women participation was high, ranging from huge number of females deployed either as civilian components or as military and its branches or individual and formed police units in Somalia. Statistically, in the military component, there was rise from the initial ten women deployed in 2007 to 850 women by 2018. These numbers of women in military contingents implied that there were four women for a hundred soldiers deployed thus, 4 % all troops

were women by March 2018 (Williams et al, 2018). Although AMISOM didn't achieve the desired male-female ratio of 10% for female troops as required by the UN Peacekeeping operations it clear that there was tremendous increase in the number of women deployed in AMISOM. In the civilian component, AMISOM had 15 female personnel out of 72 officers. (Williams et al, 2018) The deployment of the first gender officers to Mogadishu in 2012 and their civilian component as of 2018, increased to two within the cluster in charge of protecting, upholding human rights and gender issues (Williams et al, 2018). Williams et al. (2018) further point out that "AMISOM completed training of its new *gender focal points* to work across the mission's sectors in 2014."

Involvement of women was not only confined within the areas of operations but also outside the mission areas. On outside the mission, despite limited capacities, AMISOM assisted women's involvement in official political, peace and security initiatives in a community where women's' rights are limited. These initiatives constituted development of national gender policy as well as championing for the 30% quota for women representatives as legislatures. AMISOM Police component also supported involvement of women by demanding that at least 30% of the personnel it trains must include female gender (Williams,2018). AMISOM police component actively supported specific provisions to promote gender protection by conducting training and standards as well as to creating gender desks in police stations specifically meant to address gender matters.

AMISOM established awareness among the public on women peace and security issues via strategic communications by releasing radio packages in compliance with UNSCR 1325/2000 and supporting education of gender related issues. In

partnership with a Somali NGO, AMISOM introduced the toll-free crisis (CEEBLA) line (dialing a toll-free number 5555) which allowed anonymous reporting of incidences related to sexual exploitation and abuse (Somali Women Development Centre, 2015).

During the AMISOM celebrations on International Women’s Day in Mogadishu on 9th March 2022, themed: “Gender equality today for a sustainable tomorrow”, the Deputy Special Representative of the AUC Chairperson for Somalia, Fiona Lortan, in her keynote address stated:

“Since the establishment of AMISOM in 2007, the number of women deployed under the mission has increased over the years, with several women taking up frontline and active roles in driving combat vehicles like the tankers and Armored Personnel Carriers, and being positioned in the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs),” (Lortan/AMISOM, 2022)

During the event, UNSOM official Ms. Q. Sadozai appreciated Somali women for being the beacons of hope and resilience in the quest toward reconstructing Somalia. He stated:

“Somali women have demonstrated their resilience during the protracted conflict and complex humanitarian crises, holding the families and communities together and keeping hope alive. We need to recognize that women and girls are effective and powerful leaders and change-makers.” (Sadozai/AMISOM, 2022)

The above sentiments by Lortan and Sadozai demonstrate the importance of women in fostering state reconstruction within and outside the mission. The presence and participation of women constitute a supplementary and complimentary role in ensuring that rebuilding of Somali society is fast tracked especially in the areas of combat in Forward Operating Bases, change makes,

leaders and public service. In support of Lortan and Sadozai views, an article written by Sahra Ahmed Koshin and published by World Bank Blog on 30th March 2022 on the achievements of women in Somali in leadership towards sustainable state reconstruction especially security, development and peace processes, descriptively, pointed out that:

“.....In 2012, Fawzia Yusuf Adam became the country’s first female Foreign Minister and then Deputy Prime Minister. Asha Haji Elmi, a peace activist, helped form the women’s network Sixth Clan to draw attention to the importance of women in the peace process. As a result, women were represented as an individual group in the peace talks for the first time. Ifrah Ahmad, experienced female genital mutilation; like almost 90% of young Somali girls. She refused to stay silent and joined voices of other Somali women advocating to end this violence with community-based solutions. Mama Hawa Aden Mohamed, founder of the Galkayo Education Centre for Peace and Development (GECPD), has created spaces where displaced women and girls, victims of all sorts of abuse and violence, can find safety, opportunity and be protected and sheltered. She has educated more than 1,000 women and girls in Puntland since 1994, despite being threatened and even shot at multiple times. For her courage, she was the recipient of the 2019 TRT World Citizen Educator Award and the 2012 UNHCR Nansen Refugee Award.....” (Koshin, 2022: Adopted from World Blog, 2022)

Sahra Ahmed Koshin (2022) assertions as quoted above, demonstrate a paradigm shift in the contribution of women towards state reconstruction in Somalia. Women have overcome unique challenges to possess a voice in a largely male-dominated community. These inform the international community that Somali women potentials are not limited to being mothers and homemakers but key actors in their contribution towards state reconstruction in Somalia considering the fact that they are increasingly defying the odds and breaking barriers. These developments are attributed to direct and indirect role of AMISOM and partners in ensuring that gender considerations are factored in the peace support operations.

Majority of the key informants agreed that Somali society is drastically evolving and appears more tolerant and supportive of women in political leadership. Regrettably, a general perception that when compared to the men, women are viewed as weak and can't make independent decisions without the assistance of men. These perceptions are informed by their socio-cultural and religious norms that are deeply rooted in Somali society.

One of the critical informants from an INGO aimed at empowering women and children in Somali society interviewed on 24th August 2024 in Nairobi enlightened that:

“Women have successfully held key leadership and administrative positions has positively impacted the people they are serving in the Somali society. Women play a fundamental role in the stabilization process by being mediators/negotiators/mentors to their sons and husbands through advocating for peaceful co-existence and by resolving of clan rivalry. They coordinate with the security agencies to reduce attacks from the violent extremists. consequently, these women have been positive role models for the younger generation that an important tool towards state reconstruction”

These views corroborate with the findings of Amei (2019). Amei points out that there was a key relation between role of women and peace building in Mogadishu, Somalia. The study also agrees with the previous studies as in the case of O'Reilly, Súilleabháin & Paffenholz (2015). They stressed positive relationships exists between women contribution and peace building initiatives. Broadening Participation Project by the Geneva Graduate Institute also analyzed the contributions of women's groups in 40 peace and transitional initiatives and concluded that women involvement in peace agreements were more likely be successful and had an enhanced probability of durability and sustainability. The study also analyzed the views of majority of the key informants and established

that it was increasingly becoming complex and untenable to take for granted the significant contributions of women in state reconstruction processes. Therefore, urgent need in mitigation of situations to establish a favorable environment for women to actively voice their ideas and suggestions to the decision making in peace processes and state reconstruction. African union and UN should therefore factor greater strategic involvement of women, in practice, reforms and policy implementation, on Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

4.8 Humanitarian Initiatives

Humanitarianism as an ideology and practice that centers on human life and existence where human actions embrace treatment and assistance to other humans with an aim of reducing suffering and improving the conditions of humanity for emotional, altruistic and emotional grounds (Götz, Brewis & Werther, 2020). Humanitarianism is particularly employed to describe international doctrines behind the emergency responses to humanitarian crisis. Humanitarian principles governing peace support operations were endorsed by UNGA Resolutions 46/182 and 58/114 and are the guiding frameworks for all actors working in the humanitarian sphere. In expounding on humanitarian principles, Ex-Executive Director of Médecins Sans Frontières, USA (Doctors Without Borders), Nicholas de Torrente argued that:

“The most important principles of humanitarian action are humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality, which posits the conviction that all people have equal dignity by virtue of their being human based solely on need, without discrimination among recipients. Humanitarian organizations must refrain from taking part in hostilities or taking actions that advantage one side of the conflict over another, the action serves the interests of political, religious, or

other agendas. These fundamental principles serve two essential purposes. They embody humanitarian action's single-minded purpose of alleviating suffering, unconditionally and without any ulterior motive. They also serve as background document to develop operational tools that help in obtaining both the consent of communities for the presence and activities of humanitarian organizations, particularly in highly volatile contexts.” (De Torrente, 2004)

Nicholas de Torrente's views takes the dimension of non-state actors' approach to the compliance of international law. It places emphasis on humanitarian principles as sacred obligation that aims at alleviating suffering and protecting human life in volatile zones. The adoption of humanitarian principles guarantees non-combatants in the battle field neutrality, humanity and impartiality. It also attempts to refrain humanitarian actors from taking part in hostilities or in any manner that leads to violation of international law.

In compliance with the humanitarian principles, AMISOM facilitated and aided humanitarian actors in Somalia to execute their mandate. AMISOM humanitarian initiatives in Somalia were important phases on state reconstruction. However, AMISOM humanitarian mandate was limited scope to facilitation (AMISOM, 2023). According to the mandate's stipulated scope, AMISOM was to; “Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).”

In line with the humanitarian mandate, AMISOM liaised and coordinated with humanitarian partners to facilitate access and delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable Somali population. It coordinated flights to deliver 29.61 metric tons

of food aid on behalf of humanitarian affairs and disaster management ministry-Somalia (MOHADM) to Qansax Dheere. It also delivered food aid and water to households in Gedo region (Ceel Waq and Garile). These initiatives were supported by AMISOM civilian component through the assistance of the Somali vulnerable population and support in delivery of critical public service (AUPC Report 995th Meeting on 11th May 2021, PSC/PR/2. (CMXCV). In describing the scope of AMISOM in the humanitarian agenda, majority of the respondent placed emphasis on the indirect role of the mission towards creating stability and conducive environment within which humanitarian actors were free and able to execute the humanitarian mandate. Ideally, other initiatives which were non-combat in the AMISOM indirectly contributed to the humanitarian development.

In executing its humanitarian role, AMISOM since 2007 secured the required humanitarian corridors and in particular the seaports, airports and major streets in the port city of Mogadishu to enable access to the Somali needy population. AMISOM also provided military escorts for humanitarian convoys headed to distribution centers in Somalia (AMISOM, 2023). Through AMISOM Humanitarian Liaison Unit, AMISOM coordinated and cooperated with humanitarian agencies in Somalia. AMISOM partnered with the UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, WFP and other UN specialized agencies as well as NGOs/civil society to establish a unified model and sharing of data. AMISOM also partnered and collaborated with the state ministries in charge of resettlement, health, humanitarian affairs and other relevant in agencies Somalia in enhancing humanitarian agenda. (AMISOM, 2023).

Key informants interviewed elaborated that the medical personnel of AMISOM provided medical care services to the citizen of Somalia caught in the conflict areas to promote medical health. This was possible by extending the medical facilities meant for the deployed personnel under the mission to the locals as CIMIC strategy. Cognizant of the health and humanitarian situation in Somalia, AMISOM Medical facilities became key medical points where the civilian population around Mogadishu relied on. According to AMISOM reports, three hospital departments treated more than 12000 patients on monthly basis averagely. Their medical requirements ranged from chronic conditions to surgical operations both acute as well as complicated cases. Most of these incidences were from the local Somali population including TFG officials and forces and those in need of emergency surgical interventions (AMISOM, 2023).

Another humanitarian agenda AMISOM medical staff offered was corrective surgery to patients with palate deformities as well as cleft lip and attracted no charges (Williams et al, 2018). AMISOM troops also provided adequate humanitarian assistance to Somalia population by providing water, food supplies, blood as well as medical supplies to local health institutions. AMISOM also participated in multiple initiatives aimed at building harmonious relations with local communities. This included construction of waterpoint and borehole, school's refurbishment, building bridges as well as road construction. This was done excellently by AMISOM contingent from Djibouti because of their linguistic and cultural identity that has huge resemblance with local Somali society (Williams et al,2018).

In 2011, donors (WFP, UK, US among other partners) helped AMISOM to gather 14 shipping containers full of medical supplies, clothing and other assorted items for Somali population in need. AMISOM distributed close to 50% of the aid and offered the remaining to the Somalia's Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Resettlement. Another humanitarian initiative which began September 2011, provided improved healthcare for close to 1,000 young mothers and their children in South-Central Somalia. AMISOM also on humanitarian initiatives worked with the Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization (COGWO) in convening seminars in which Somalis could gain healthcare education and get medical treatment when required.

An informant from Kenya Police Service who served as an Independent Police Officer in the AU Observer Mission in 2016/2017 in Somalia interviewed on 9th June 2024 in Nairobi:

“AMISOM in its bid to foster state reconstruction in Somalia, despite limited scope, by greater extent, was involved in series of humanitarian initiatives. The mission worked assiduously in response to the humanitarian situations apart from executing mission obligations to support the Somali administrations. AMISOM provided free medical care to more than 12,000 people every month at two AMISOM medical facilities in the Somali capital. AMISOM also provided estimated 60,000 liters of drinking water per day to Somalis residing near AMISOM bases. These humanitarian programs enhanced the welfare and health of Somali people; a critical component to state building”

The above informant's views emphasized on the importance of humanitarian initiatives towards state reconstruction in Somalia. AMISOM actions as emphasized conforms with the humanitarian actions by other humanitarian actors

in Somalia. In the quest to reconstruct the state full realization of this initiative, AU ought to develop a formidable framework aimed at inculcating other humanitarian actors.

Further, according to the Communique adopted by the AUPSC during the 978th session on 9/2/2021 upon considering Commission Chairperson's report on the Somalia situation and the implementation of AMISOM mandate, acknowledged the missions' contributions in humanitarian initiatives and provided the need by the international community to support the mission. The communique, in part, stated:

“Commends AMISOM for its humanitarian assistance efforts, including its assistance to health workers in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions it imposes on population movements in Somalia; and calls for additional international dedicated support, including funding and required resources to enable AMISOM to more effectively support humanitarian efforts in all its Sectors, particularly due to the compounded humanitarian challenges currently facing Somalia against the background of the pandemic, devastating floods and desert locust infestations”(AUPSC 978TH Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9th February 2021/ PSC/PR/COMM.(CMLXXVIII))

The above quoted partial contents of the communique highlight the significant contributions of AMISOM in the humanitarian sphere particularly in addressing health issues and natural calamities. It further calls on the international community to support AMISOM towards attaining humanitarian mandate; a vital element in state reconstruction.

While positively criticizing the way in which international actors pursue international humanitarian interventions on peace support operations as in the case

of Somalia, social criticist and political activist Avram Noam Chomsky argued that;

“for one thing, there’s a history of humanitarian intervention. you can look at it. and when you do, you discover that virtually every use of military force is described as humanitarian intervention.”

Chomsky’s views clearly inform that everything is invalid with the approach humanitarian interventions are usually justified and executed: there is always sense of urgency to resort to military force without reliance of military as the last resort itself; there’s also an ulterior intention which seemingly incline a resolution to intervene; and, most instances, interventions themselves are unauthorized and unilateral. These therefore limit missions approaches to attain reconstruction mandate. Humanitarian initiatives are achieved more when the interveners are guided by international laws placed for them to conform to its *modus operandi*. Analytically, findings established that external interventions in Somalia should have an autonomous component of humanitarian intervention guided by international legal frameworks.

4.9 National reconciliation initiatives (NRIs)

National Reconciliation is one of the vital components in conflict and post conflict state reconstruction process (Elmi, 2021) and aims at healing the grievances and wounds of the victims, perpetrators as well as war/conflict rivalries with a fundamental goal to establish co-existence and coherence based on truth and justice (Brouneus, 2003). Although different views on whether the national reconciliation is a process or an end goal of a peacebuilding initiatives or whether the approaches created from top-down or bottom-up. Many scholars agree that

national reconciliation is a vital aspect in post conflict peacebuilding initiatives which constitute achieving sustainable peace and stability for the reconciling populations (Brounéus, 2003). Lerche (2000) points that reconciliation “deals with different levels in that it is currently applied on a variety of levels; from small encounter groups, to high profile truth commissions to presidential apologies for past wrong.”

The Background of Somalia national reconciliation process is traced back to the 2008 Djibouti-based peace process which came up with a comprehensive agreement between the TFG and SLA, aimed at ending all conflicts in Somalia. Consequently, AMISOM process, in the quest to reconcile the Somali clans, led to expansion of Somalia’s legislative arm from 275 to 550 as well as enlargement of the cabinet following inclusion of SLA members and subsequently became a great step in the national reconciliation process which ended the TFG in 2012. These led to election of a new parliament and President of Somalia in 2012 (Barawani, 2017).

According to one of the key informants interviewed on 25th June 2024 in Nairobi observed;

“To attain reconciliation in the Federal Republic of Somalia, there must be a profound change and willingness between and among the five Somali clans. This will create a reconciled and united Somali society where its population will have freedom, liberty, development, unity and more importantly a common vision for statehood and prosperity. Taking in to consideration these aspects, AMISOM as a mission, by great extent created a conducive atmosphere within which Somali state and non-state actors as well as international community would pursue national reconciliation”

In line with the above informant's views, UNSCR 2372(2017) mandated AMISOM among other strategic objectives support Somali in reconciliation and peace building in its bid to reconstruct Somalia. In this context, AMISOM played key roles in facilitating state and non-state actors in the reconciliation processes by providing security and conducive environment within which reconciliation could take place. The approach of reconciliation also enhanced by the diplomatic approaches that were employed by the mission in addressing non-combat assignments with the Somalia government. AMISOM reconciliation framework also took in to considerations the role of women and youth in the validation of peace agreement and that wider reconciliation scope inculcated Somali social and cultural initiatives and community development programs. Informants drawn from Somali populations informed that enforcement of peace was essential for success of reconciliation processes in Somalia.

Out of the cumulative efforts of AU and international partners (UNDP, Somalia Joint Fund and UNSOM), recent developments on reconciliation process portrays a green picture of a Somalia society that is progressive. The development and launch of The National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) as a tool employed at various levels across Somalia hint at the milestone in the reconciliation process (UNDP, 2024). NRF constitute varying pillars such as mental health and trauma-healing pillars. The trauma-healing pillar seeks to address the adverse effects of the three decades of civil war on the local Somali communities, that largely remained unattended. The framework provides a comprehensive guide for local communities, various institutions such as the judiciary and police, involvement

from council of elders, religious organizations, women’s and youth organizations towards achieving lasting, sustainable solutions in Somalia (UNDP, 2024).

During the launch of the NRF on 30th April 2024 in Mogadishu, Somali PM Hamza A. Barre emphasized that reconciliation among Somalis is a “DNA” in their culture:

“Sitting under a tree, discussing our disputes, and coming up with peaceful solutions is symbolic of Somali culture. Dialogue means reconciliation,” (Barre/UNDP, 2024)

In acknowledging the importance of NRF, Zainab Mohamod, a member of Berghof Foundation (Civil Society organization) highlighted:

“I believe this framework benefits the entire population, especially the youth. There are many components to this, each part of a larger puzzle. Advancing these pieces will significantly help the youth. It’s better than what the situation used to be. This is a step forward.” (Muhamod /UNDP, 2024).

In summarizing the chronology of the development of National Reconciliation Conference (NRF) against the key timelines on reconciliation, in 2007, the first National Reconciliation Conference was held in Mogadishu; in June 2017, a call for inclusion reconciliation framework was made; in October 2017 consultations and workshops in Helsinki was conducted; in August 2018, consultations at national level started (UNDP, 2024). In December 2018, draft of NRF was submitted for approval; in February 2019, Validation Conference on the NRF draft was done in Mogadishu; in 2020–2021, the discussion on the document centered on the inclusion of women in the in the peace processes; on 30th April 2024, FGS launched the NRF and currently undergoing series of implementation towards the

realization of the sustainable reconciliation process (UNDP, 2024). Notably, these developments are credited to the foundational role of AMISOM in its success as well as support from strategic partners.

The success in AMISOM National Reconciliation initiatives relied on political frameworks, peace-building processes and constitutional arrangements largely on the negotiation process. Abdullahi (2015) asserts that due to the negative past history of the reconciliation process for reasons of past regimes and that the current reconciliation process entails small groups of professionals with no motivation towards realization of national reconciliation. Findings established that the national reconciliation process in Somalia has always been influenced by subjective factors such as lack of trust, hostility, fear, negative perceptions and suspicion among Somali clans due to a long bad history of conflicts.

Somalia required a bottom-up true reconciliation model running from the grassroots to the national level. In this model, AMISOM initiatives at the grassroots were intended to address reconciliation and provide vital assistance to FGS at the national level. However, AMISOM overlooked bringing clans together to decide on how fundamental issues were to be addressed to promote national reconciliation and justice. In the context of Somalia, AMISOM did not achieve to transform the relationship between victims and perpetrators, heal and build confidence between and among clans which would have an important role in the Somalia national reconciliation processes. Nonetheless, AMISOM national reconciliation was a vital approach to address the key issues such as federalization, disarmament, demobilization, constitution, security and reintegration. Paul Quigley (2018)

posits that where clan conflicts existed, AMISOM reconciliation on its own was insufficient and other key components such as peace building, economic development, social welfare among other initiatives were essential for sustainable stabilization and state reconstruction.

The approach corresponds with Bloomfield (2006) who asserted that reconciliation after fierce confrontations constitute extensive, broader and deeper inter-societal relationship-building processes in which integral elements contain truth, healing, justice and reparation. These components include; as they are the foundation of reconciliation; therefore, they have ability to operate in one other towards parallel harmonization towards the similar way; are primarily complimentary and interdependent; jointly contribute to the overall relationship-building process needed for progress towards the goal of a reconciled society/community.

Montville (2006) posits that, true reconciliation entails three steps in sequence: “First, acknowledgment when oppressors truly accept what they have done to the public or victims, the recognition becomes a reality, and victims are at least assured that the past does not repeat. Second, apology/remorse, the next significant step is to accept responsibility for past acts, showing guilt, sorrow and specifically asking the victims to forgive. Third, forgiveness, the oppressors' first two measures allow true final forgiveness, which is the victim's voluntary forgiveness of past injuries by oppressors”. Regrettably, Somali reconciliation processes that were held in Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, Yemen, Djibouti and Sudan lacked these three essential components. Those involved in the reconciliation processes were various Somali clans’ representatives and were not willing to appeal for

forgiveness, apology and acknowledgment among themselves and their victims (Debora, 2019). In a nutshell, despite limited progress promoting national reconciliation in Somalia, it is distinctively clear that AMISOM shaped the policies, institutional culture and paradigms that set the current phase of reconciliation and the adoption of the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF).

4.10 Disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) initiatives

The contemporary concept of DDR traces back its origin to the multiple peace dealings concluded by Southern Africa and Latin America at the end of the cold war (African Human Rights Policy Paper 1, 2020). The best practices and successes of DDR initiatives were attributed to the diplomatic resolution of conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala in the Americas and Africa's Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa in post-apartheid Southern Africa (Maslen, Solademi & Kilonzo, 2020). Several DDR processes have been executed in different parts of the globe. Multiple hard lessons have been learned by the international community. Two UN reports have significantly promoted DDR in post-conflict reconstruction; *An Agenda for Peace*, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report recommended for shifts in the UN's traditional peacekeeping tools and championed for a reconceptualization of peacebuilding to inculcate disarmament and destruction of arms; and the 2000 Report of the Panel on the United Peace Support Operations (*The Brahimi Report*), that underpinned the significance of DDR in peace processes and recommended the establishment of a global Fund for DDR (Maslen, Solademi & Kilonzo, 2020).

Relevance of DDR has also been enhanced through the emergence of definitions to the DDR within and outside the UN system. United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) defines:

“Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is a process through which members of armed forces and groups are supported to lay down their weapons and return to civilian life. As a complex process, it comprehends political, security, social and economic dimensions aimed at creating an environment where a peace process, political and social reconciliation, as well as sustainable development, can take place”. (UNITAR, 2023)

Furthermore, the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPKO) as an agency providing political and executive coordination to UN peacekeeping missions maintains contacts with the UNSC, UN Country AND Humanitarian Teams, TCCs and donors, and in particular au and AMISOM, provide a comprehensive definition of DDR:

“Disarmament is the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatants; it should comprise the development of arms management programs, including their safe storage and final disposition which may entail their destruction; *Demobilization* refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of former combatants, some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs, discharge and transportation to their home communities It may be followed by recruitment into a new unified military force; *Reintegration* refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and their families of adapt, economically and socially, of productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind-compensation, training and job and income-generating projects”. (UNDPKO, 1999, p.15).

Blended with reconciliation, AMISOM DDR played a key role in state reconstruction because it established a stable atmosphere for sustainable peace and development in Somalia. DDR was directly connected to the possibilities of

improving the entire Somali security sector. The bottom-up reconciliation processes led by Somali offered an opportunity to enhance inter-clan trust and build a common foundation for establishing a new secure Somali nation. AMISOM's DDR framework was to promote peace agreements between and among clan fighters, rebuild and restore relations among clans, and promote empowerment of clan fighters. Regrettably, the product of these DDR initiatives by AMISOM was far from ground realities in Somalia (Ali & Pandey, 2020).

The SNA in its state couldn't efficiently exercise power on the areas operated by various clan militias. These armed militias continued to exist with the SNA and were better equipped and more effective. They operated out of government jurisdiction and were owning heavy weapons. This was detrimental to Somalia security and the peace building initiatives (Ali & Pandey, 2020). Therefore, AMISOM mandate was to embrace a reliable DDR initiative through disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating the clan militias into the Somali society. Since DDR is observed as a key field in the cohesion, peace, security and development in Somalia and also a key pillar for stabilization and reconstruction (Robin, 1993). Integration of different clan militias and other regional troops into SNA was the primary goal of the Somali authorities and AMISOM.

Practically, no integrated strategies were developed for DDR to support clan militias into a productive life (Ali & Pandey, 2020). These amounted to the AMISOM failure to contain conflicts because of the lack of political agreements and trust on the DDR processes, therefore complicating AMISOM mandate (Ali & Pandey, 2020). In conformity to the UN DDR Standards the key aspects that were complied with during AMISOM included; surrender of arms, successful

discharge of insurgents and reintegration of ex-insurgents into the Somali society. AMISOM therefore was to discharge the active clan militias, surrender their arms, and re-integration into the community, provide essential training for the Somali military to increase capacity to take security mandates of their own state. AMISOM in partnership with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), launched national initiatives for clan militias and other insurgent groups, despite public criticism from Somalis.

Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, and Beletwyane formed at least four transition centers to deal with armed disengagement groups (Ali& Pandey, 2020). AMISOM and FGS were expected to facilitate the return of combatants back into the Somali society in the protection of these centers. AMISOM supported FGS in the development of a national strategy on efficiently reintegrating insurgents into their society in spite that DDR of armed groups was still posing a huge challenge to the state building, peacebuilding and stabilization of Somalia (Ali & Pandey, 2020). These processes required a comprehensive agreement between Clans, a component that was not attained during AMISOM.

In May 2017, the agreement on the security architecture came to a political settlement but suspicions and doubts among clans did not allow them to engage in disarmament because they view their weapons as only necessity for their self-protection. Many clans felt insecure and vulnerable if AMISOM would seize their arms. This implies that successful disarmament required greater inclusivity through balancing the clans' power as well as to strengthen the national security institutions as well as developing accommodative and trusted security process.

This strategy would have contributed to sustainable state reconstruction in Somalia (Ali & Pandey, 2020).

According to one of the informants (academician) interviewed in Nairobi on 24th June 2024 enlightened that:

“Somalia DDR initiatives entail a commonly shared, all-inclusive and highly trustful approaches which should involve all state and non-state actors involved in the process. DDR happens when trust and confidence among the clans, Somali government and AMISOM is realized and consequently this led to strengthening accountability, justice, delivery of essential services, security, stability and more importantly contributing to state reconstruction.”

The informant's views pinpoint on the requirement of inclusive, trustful and open process to attain sustainable reconciliation by AMISOM in partnership with state and non-state actors in Somalia. Despite being the best initiative towards state reconstruction, AMISOM lost a strategic opportunity in utilizing reconciliation as a primary tool. Notwithstanding, AMISOM created conducive space for peacebuilding, reconciliation and possibility of DDR in future in the Somalia. Notably, DDR processes remain the best paradigms for the possibility of successful state reconstruction in Somalia.

Experts observe that the establishment of the National Commission for DDR should have been incorporated in the DDR process in Somalia which it would in turn facilitate the planning of programs and oversight operations at national-level. This would have promoted comprehensive consensus among Somali clans, international partners and Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). However, AMISOM missed opportunity to create the national agency to steer the DDR initiatives.

4.11 Intelligence gathering and sharing (IG&S) initiatives

Henderson (1998), in his classical works, defines intelligence as a process that entail collection and analyzing of information to assist policymakers in making informed and formidable policy decisions (security, defense, economy et al). In the case of peace support operations or military interventions, military intelligence is “a military discipline that uses information collection and analysis approaches to provide guidance and direction to assist commanders in their decisions”.

The key objective of intelligence gathering and sharing is to provide data that help policy makers make informed decisions. Intelligence sharing and gathering frameworks gained emphasis and adoption globally following US 9/11 attacks (Gill, 2010). As a growing discipline, Intelligence gathering and sharing continues to gain scope on its forms and techniques. The forms include covert and overt intelligence. The techniques as explained by Henderson (1998) and Kunwar (2021) point out Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT) and Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT).

Peace support operations are supposed to be driven by intelligence (civil and military intelligence) and there’s need for strategic link to the intelligence community in the international arena. Key informants and security experts opine that terrorism in Somalia is a form of warfare which employ guerilla, military and conventional warfare against their adversaries or targets and can best be challenged and won through intelligence gathering and sharing among different actors within the continuum of security. This was in conformity with the views of former Kenyan spymaster, Boinett Wilson who asserted that;

“The fate of any nation may well rest on the accurate and complete intelligence that serves as the guide form decision making on policy and action in a troubled world.”

Thus, Intelligence sharing and sharing was to a greater extent, an effective initiative which was adopted by AMISOM to bring stabilization and eventually state reconstruction in Somalia.

To address terrorist agenda emanating from non-state actors emerging from Somalia, AMISOM TCCs took the initiative of enhancing an intelligence community in its broader scope with intentions to gather and share data and further engage in covert acts that would destroy existing transborder terror cells established in some of the TCC states, as in the case of Kenya. Stepanova observe that, “the need to combat terrorist threats in a post-conflict environment involves coordinating activities and sharing information between different security components”. Williams (2018) posits that “AMISOM and the TFG’s combined military intelligence sharing managed to deter and drive Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and keep them out and also reclaimed and held territories liberated outside of the capital”. Therefore, intelligence strategy was positively viewed as an effective initiative which enabled AMISOM as a multi-dimensional mission to attain state reconstruction. According to AMISOM official website, on 5th December 2021, military personnel (20) from the AMISOM and SNA finalized intelligence training in Mogadishu, aimed at enhancing intelligence capacity to strengthen partnership in executing joint combat operations against Al-Shabaab in Somalia (AMISOM 2021). The training was sponsored by the UK Mission Support Team in conjunction with the AMISOM force headquarters. During the

session, Lt. Gen. Ndegeya (former AMISOM force commander), emphasized on the importance of the training (AMISOM, 2021). He stated that;

“Intelligence or information is a critical capability in military operations, and indeed critical to both AMISOM and SNA. With the effective use of information, we can analyze the enemy and uncover his intentions, while helping to protect and support our own forces,” (Lt. Gen. Ndegeya/AMISOM 2021)

Further, former AMISOM Chief Military Intelligence Officer (Col. H. Nyange) during the training highlighted that the initiatives would enhance the efficiency of the actors in the intelligence sphere. He emphasized that:

“After they finish their training, we expect that they will go back to their respective units and they will be able to give us information in the manner which we expect and also help to secure their FOBs and bases where they operate from, just to make sure that AMISOM delivers on its mandate as expected,” (Col. Nyange AMISOM 2018).

During third Intelligence and Information Sharing Conference for Intelligence Personnel drawn from AMISOM, Somalia and major international partners, on 19th March 2018, former AMISOM Deputy Force Commander (Maj-Gen Charles Tai Gituai), advocated for highly reliable frameworks on intelligence sharing amongst players to ensure that they attain the best outcomes (AMISOM 2018). He asserted:

“Intelligence must be collected and used in a way that ensures operational efficiency without threatening the legitimacy and impartiality necessary for the peace mission to carry out its work effectively.... Intelligence is fundamentally important to the peace mission, to give decision makers multi-dimensional situational awareness through coordinated analysis of information by the different components of a mission” (Gituai/AMISOM 2018).

The views by Maj-Gen Charles Tai Gituai, Col. H. Nyange and Lt. Gen. Ndegeya on the usefulness of the intelligence gathering and sharing conform with the guidelines of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. According to UN Peace Keeping, Peacekeeping-intelligence is a process to involves acquire, process and analyze information to enable mandated operations enhance safety and security of personnel and inform missions related to the POCs. It also assisted the mission in understanding their combat environs, maintaining a strategic overview of events, and predicting potential threats and opportunities towards effectively execution of the mandates. Intelligence gathering and sharing is critical to addressing potential challenges to state reconstruction process. Peacekeeping-intelligence therefore is a vital tool assisting peacekeepers to operate effectively. A key informants from National Police Service interviewed on 8th July 2024, pointed out that the emphasis of intelligence gathering and sharing in AMISOM was to primarily enhance facilitation, identification, deterrence and swift response to evolving existential terrorism risks and threats in a coherent, comprehensive and reliable structures and systems that should also aid the actors in the combat theatre, and institutions in aiding efforts to suppress any threat that undermines the road to Somali statehood. At the same time, the intelligence sources from AMISOM and intelligence community were applicable in ensuring that the TCCs in their own states were not attacked or revenged by terrorist considering the fact that the contemporary terrorism as in the case of Al-Shabaab and its affiliates, financiers and sympathizers possess transnational character in their operations. These findings concur with the findings of Sebastian Bay under the Swedish Defense Research Agency who researched on the intelligence and state building

(Bay, 2010). He demonstrated that “there is no simple link between a nation’s situation and the importance of intelligence.” Using case studies on intelligence and state-building, “intelligence and state-building derived a number of lessons on the relationships between the two variables.” He concluded that the fields of intelligence gathering and sharing are vital for all sovereign states as they mandatory components for state reconstruction and their survival. States being the primary actors in peace support operations relies heavily on the data from intelligence community to attain their mandate as it was the case of AMISOM and AMISOM TCCs.

4.12 Legitimatization initiatives; principally, state and political legitimacy

State legitimacy is an important concept in state reconstruction process because it demonstrates how national power is applied in a manner that the citizens accept consciously. Political/State legitimacy is “the core of political organization” (Alagappa, 1995), the grounds for the creations of political society which is the foundation of political science. Beetham (1991) pointed that state legitimacy is “the central issue in social and political theory”. Crick (1993) pointed that state legitimacy is “the master question of politics”. Based on these assertions, AMISOM played a number of roles in promoting state legitimacy in Somalia.

The signing of the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on 6th March 2007 between the TFG and AU on AMISOM in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia was a foundation of state legitimacy in Somalia (AU, 2007). During the signing of the SOMA by the then AU Commissioner for peace and security, Ambassador Said Djinnit and then Somalia Ambassador, H.E Abdikarin Farah, the commissioner

reiterated that agreement was a demonstration of strong commitment of the AU to the state reconstruction processes in respect to peace, dialogue and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development long term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction (Relief Web, 2007). On his part, Somali ambassador appreciated the AU efforts of deploying AMISOM and acceptance by the Somali authorities, religious leadership, Women Associations leadership, Civil Society Organizations, Business groups, the clan leadership and deep commitment by the Somali people to work with AMISOM towards realization of reconstruction and sustainable development in the Federal Republic of Somalia (Relief Web, 2007). As result, the SOMA agreement brought state and political legitimacy to both the TFG and in the AU quest to deploy AMISOM. These also marked the TFG recognition by international community as the primary legitimate state entity in the war-torn Somalia which was to work with to reclaim Somalia's statehood by bringing peace and stability.

As noted by majority of the key informants drawn from Somali elders, youth, women and the political class acknowledged that the legitimacy of Somalia administration was attributed to the legitimization initiatives of AMISOM. A key informant summarized:

“The AMISOM intervention in Somalia created a new perception among the Somalis that the international community is concerned about their plight to have their state reconstructed. With the AMISOM partnerships with the local regimes and federal authorities in Somalia, the sense of political legitimacy and administrative credibility was felt. The local population felt the presence of government to gather their needs and services. Most

importantly, the signing and implementation of Status of the Mission Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and African Union (AU) on AMISOM in Addis Ababa, made TFG and successive regimes legitimate entities to represent the people and territory of Somalia in the local and international affairs. Consequently, the presents of strong support among the Somali elites, different clans' leaderships as well as the general population aided the government of Somalia to substantially recruit and extract political and material resources to augment its authority. This process of legitimization in its entirety, during AMISOM, became a cornerstone in attaining statehood in Somalia. This also facilitated the voluntary repatriation of refugees who had fled Somalia during the collapse of Siyad Barre Regime in 1991.”

This statement was further supported by a key informant (International Relations Scholar) interviewed on 23rd June 2024 who categorically stated that:

“Intervention in every aspect by the international community immensely enhance political, defense, economic, financial, social and security capacity and capability in favor of the host government. Subsequently, this shifts the balance of power to tilt to support the host government (Somali legitimate administrations at national and federal levels) thus disadvantaging the key rivals (in this case Al-Shabaab and other insurgencies). In the long run every administrative action towards the Somali society gains acceptance and approval from the public and thus promoting of state and political legitimacy. Therefore, final outcome is the attainment of state reconstruction”

Notably, the above informants' views clearly demonstrate that the significance of state or political legitimacy in initiating and promoting state reconstruction in Somalia. In as much as there's support and authorization from the international community, it was incumbent upon the Somali federal and federal member states' administration to gain acceptance and approval (internal legitimacy) from Somali population by ensuring that they offered basic service and execute the functions of the state.

The intervention by Ethiopia in Somalia (2006–2009) significantly undermined the legitimacy of TFG. The Ethiopian involvement attracted created huge public focus when its forces were deployed in to Somalia on July 20, 2006. The then regime(interim) in Somalia was opposed to advancement by Islamic Courts Union troops north to the last unoccupied Baidoa city. The presence of Ethiopia’s military became a key source of Al-Shabaab’s influence and their deployment significantly hindered the legitimacy of the TFG administrations. The existence of AMISOM facilitated Ethiopia’s withdrawal from Mogadishu in 2009.

AMISOM also significantly contributed to the protection of two iterations of the TFG. The first one was with Ethiopia People National Defense forces while the second one was solely by AMISOM forces following Ethiopia’s withdrawal. It was impossible for the second TFG under the presidency of Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (2009-2012) to survive without presence and immense support of AMISOM. The AMISOM’s main strategic goal was to secure the political and social space that the different actors in Somalia’s political situation could resolved their issues through dialogue and negotiations (Williams et al, 2018). AMISOM attained this goal by creating conducive environment for the political transitions. It watered down Al-Shabaab as a primary threat to the Somali state legitimacy and secured multiple transitional and electoral processes in Somalia therefore enhancing state legitimacy. However, the enhancement of legitimacy regrettably complicated by the absence of SFG until September 2012 and the federal administrations in southern and central Somalia only to be established between 2013 and 2016. In

absence of these frameworks, it was not possible for Somalia to resolve its political crisis.

In addition, AMISOM made vital indirect contributions to these processes through security and stability although it did not have a mandate over the political process (Williams et al, 2018). The opportunity created was misused by Somalia's political leadership. Key issues remained unaddressed such as finalizing of constitution, strengthening of allegiance to the Somali state, development of a professional security sector and judicial institutions as well as provision of public goods and social services (Williams et al, 2018).

Towards enhancing the legitimacy of Somali governments (federal and federal member states), AUPSC through 1068th Meeting Communiqué and UNCR via resolution 2628/2022 mandated ATMIS(formerly AMISOM) to comprehensively implement Somali Transition Plan (STP) under four phase: reconfiguration of the mission; joint shaping and clearing operations and the subsequent transfer the operating bases to Somali military; proper operations and transfer of other operating bases and; finally withdrawal from Somalia as well as liquidation of the assets. This phase of transition implores of an ability of Somali state structures to run their internal state affairs and consequently gaining internal legitimacy among the internal actors; clans, federal member states, local communities, local NGOs, local humanitarian actors among others.

Unending hostilities among ruling Somali political elites at both regional and national levels undermined political legitimacy and possibility for national reconciliation. In some instances, it helped to strengthen loyalty to their respective

clans instead of the state of Somalia thus frustrating the major political gains made by AMISOM and other international partners. Political consensus among Somalia's political elite is essential for state reconstruction.

Finalization of Somalia's Federal Constitution remains vital factor for state reconstruction. Absence of legitimate structures of governance immensely contributed to the proliferation of informal leadership structures which were largely militarized and based on retrogressive clan dynamism. Williams et al (2018) alludes that the finalization of the finalized constitution could also help address key issues facing Somali statehood as well as viable framework to promote transitional justice.

These findings corroborate the perspectives of Gilley (2006) and Walzer (2002: 35) on state and political legitimacy. Gilley allude that legitimacy is a key determinant of both structural and operational components of the state. There's a general presumption that lack of legitimacy has huge effects for the way in which nations behave towards its citizen. States that do not have legitimacy devote much of its resources to maintaining state power and little on effective and efficient governance which eventually lacks popular support and being on the verge of vulnerability to be overthrown or collapse. Among the elites in power, doubts and suspicion on their legitimacy affect their self-esteem which leads to splits that accelerate this process. State legitimacy is a central component of the contemporary political discourse due to the emancipatory effect of globalization. Gilley, B. (2006) further asserts that legitimacy inculcate the subjects (citizens), objects (state holding and exercising political authority), orientation (rightful), variable type (more/more) and expressions (treated) on legitimacy on state. Walzer

(2002) stressed the creation of ‘locally legitimate’ government characterized as possessing ‘sufficient popular support’ in the glamour of interventions. In conclusion AMISOM significantly legitimized the positions of Somali successive administrations of both Somali national and federal state levels at national and international levels.

4.13 Chapter summary

This chapter interrogated the first objective of this study which was to analyse initiatives employed by AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia. It discussed and analyzed on Counter Terrorism (CT) Initiatives, Civil-Military Co-ordination (CIMIC) Initiatives, Protection of Civilians’(POCs) Initiatives, Security Initiatives, Institutional Capacity Building (ICB) Initiatives, Stabilization Initiatives, Gender-Based Initiatives (GBS), Humanitarian Initiatives, National Reconciliation Initiatives (NRI), Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-Integration (DDR) Initiatives, Intelligence Gathering and Sharing(IG&S) initiatives and Legitimization Initiatives-promotion of state and political legitimacy. The researcher also observed the nexus between and among the initiatives employed in peace support operations to attain state reconstruction. The next chapter assesses the significance of strategic partnerships between African Union/African Union Mission in Somalia with UN country teams, and other international actors engaged on state reconstruction initiatives.

CHAPTER FIVE
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN THE AFRICAN UNION
MISSION IN SOMALIA(AMISOM) WITH UNITED NATIONS
COUNTRY TEAMS(UNCTs) AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS ON STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN
SOMALIA.

5.0 Introduction

This chapter interrogates the second objective which was to assess the significance of strategic partnerships between AU/AMISOM with United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs), and other international governmental actors involved on state reconstruction in Somalia. This chapter discussed three categories of strategic partnerships. The first category was on global inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) with a specific concentration on the UN and UNCTs on state reconstruction in Somalia. The second category entailed regional actors in strategic partnerships with AU/AMISOM with specific focus on the National Atlantic treaty organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The third and last category entailed individual sovereign states with specific focus on United states (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Turkiye. The analyses in these trilateral categories were aimed at interrogating the significance and evaluability of these partnerships in regard to the Somali state reconstruction processes fostered by AMISOM.

The rationale for these analyses is that the military interventions by AU/AMISOM would be fruitless without collaborations and partnerships as the mission demands UN authorizations, legitimacy, huge financial and human resource as ability to

sustain the course towards state reconstruction. The basis that state reconstruction as a holistic process in which AMISOM as a multidimensional mission required greater involvement of international actors towards the realization of the stipulated initiatives demanded the need for strategic partnerships towards the realization of the set goals by the mission.

5.1 African Union strategic partnerships with United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) on state reconstruction in Somalia.

5.1.1 Analytical framework of African Union-United Nations (AU-UN) strategic partnerships on state reconstruction in peace support operations (PSOs)

Since 2002, the AU and the UN have developed strategic frameworks founded on unique partnerships anchored on the complementarity principles, mutual respect, ownership and has continued to gain space in a multilateral world (Bokeriya, 2022). These strategic partnerships between UN and AU were formally provided under UNSCR 2719/2023. Under this resolution, any mission approved or authorized by AU automatically receives financing from UN. The UN also carries joint strategic assessments of AU missions' operations in consultation with UNSC as well as the host state. UNSCR in these instances would decide whether to authorize/legitimize the mission/s. Proper planning is undertaken jointly by the bodies, and the peace keeping/support operations must be compliant with both UN and AU fiscal regulations, accountability frameworks and human rights measures. Any mission would be under the "direct ... and effective command and control of the African Union". The basis of partnership between AU and UN country teams

is attributed to the grounds that these two significant institutions are key in implementation of PKOs to maintain peace and security in the Africa (African Union 2000: Article 3).

The top leadership of the UN and AU formidably endorsed closer collaboration between the two agencies especially on peace and security resulting to stronger strategic partnership (Joint UN-AU Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, 2012). This framework has equally been endorsed by the DPA/DPKO/DFS Strategic Review of UNOAU and the UN Policy Committee. In compliance with the AUPSC Protocol as well as the UN provisions in regards to the regional arrangements mandate in maintaining peace and security, the AUC committed to enhance more the relations with the UN (Chapter 8, UN Charter). This relations in compliance with APSA also encompassed the RECS/RMS, who were consulted on the framework in a second phase of engagement, along with the entire AUC and the UN system (UNSG Report, Dec 2011/Jan 2012: AUCP Report, 2012).

In full realization of UN- AU Strategic Partnerships, UNOAU and AUPSC created and subscribed a Joint Framework that considers holistic and practical approaches to make the partnerships highly systematic, efficient and goal-oriented (UNSG Report, Dec2011/Jan2012: AUPSC Report, 2012). This framework aimed at to bring the AU and UN into common action from the initial indicators of potential conflicts and the conflict prevention planning stage, and to strengthen collaboration across the subsequent phase of the response to conflict as in the case of management of conflict and resolution and reconstruction after the conflict as

well as peace building initiatives (UNSG Report, Dec2011/Jan2012: AUPSC Report, 2012).

On 28 January 2018, during the commencement the 30th AU Summit of the Heads of State and Government, in emphasizing on the significance of UN-AU strategic partnerships, UNSG António Guterres stressed that:

“The partnership between the UN and the AU on peace and security is fundamental to building a safer world for all” [AU, 2022].

In concurrence with the above statements, Guterres further stressed the viability of the AU-UN partnership at the UNSC during 9149th meeting on 11th October 2022 that:

“The unique partnership between the United Nations and the African Union remains a cornerstone of multilateralism, which must be adapted to local contexts, with the support of the international community, including the Security Council”. (9149th Meeting (AM) SC/15058 on 11th October 2022).

The above statements in different international platforms by the UN Secretary General António Guterres pinpoints on the need for the international community through strategic partnerships on peace support operations by AU and UN towards the realization of state reconstruction in Africa particularly Somalia. Furthermore, the former Chairperson of AUC during the UNSC 9149th Meeting on 11th October 2022 stated that “*other things beyond declarations*” the two bodies should bolster to enhance peace and security and deal with the formidable issues facing the continent of Africa. He pointed out that:

“70% of peacekeeping missions are in Africa and that it is always top of the UN agenda and that there’s need for deepening partnership between UN specialized agencies and AU to bring in true renaissance of multilateralism which is current characterized by damaged, reduced, biased as well as unprecedented and dangerous decline.” (Statement during 9149th Meeting (AM) SC/15058 on 11th October 2022).

Boutellis and Williams (2018) posits that since 2007; there have been meetings between UNSC and AUPSC with discussions centering on country specific items as well as many themes on the scope of peace and security in Africa. Secondly, the partnership witnessed series of reforms in mid-2010. Boutellis and Williams (2018) further pointed out that in July 2010, UN established a new body to AU based Addis Ababa with an aim of establishing synergy in the monitoring and assessment of results as well as strategies. UN and AU also formed joined task force in charge of peace and security chaired by UN Under-secretaries General in charge of UNDPKO, UNDP, UN Field Support and AU Commission (Peace and Security and for Political Affairs). The UNSC pays much focus to the challenges in Africa therefore focusing its initiatives to maintaining international peace and security. Forti & Singh, (2019) points that, in 2018, 50 % of the UNSC meetings on states were devoted to African continent especially on peace support operations. Therefore, the AU mandate is to provide strategic guidance and authority and coordinate international support through the AUPSC (Darkwa, 2016).

As informed by T.J. Otieno (International Relations Expert/Consultant) interviewed Online in Nairobi on 7th July 2024 enlightened:

“The strategic partnership between the UN and AU positively shaped the outcomes of the AMISOM operations in Somalia towards state reconstruction. The two institutions jointly identified several areas for partnerships. The first areas of partnership included enhancing common understanding on causes of conflict in Somalia through exchange of information and analysis, annual meetings of AU-UN desk to desk sessions, and review of research on indicators and root cause of the conflicts. The second aspect entailed preventing re-emergence of conflicts in Somalia through sharing of early warning data, potential hotspot analysis and conflict prevention. The third aspect entailed addressing the conflict in Somalia through coordination, from mediations, management of conflict to peace support operations and finally state reconstruction. The fourth aspect is peace building with a focus on developing capacity of Somali national institutions to address conflicts. The fifth aspect Involves the review of partnership frameworks put in place to guarantee state reconstruction in Somalia through the Regular UNOAU-AUPSD engagement of partnership implementations. Sixth and lastly, resource mobilization to the peace mission considering the major challenges facing the AU in ensuring sustainable and predictable financing. In this context the UN and AU through UNOAU work harmoniously and innovatively to identify mechanism to mobilize resources for AU led state reconstruction initiatives in Somalia.”

The above informant’s views conform with the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhancing Partnership on Peace and Security on widening the subject matter of cooperation to include disarmament, peacebuilding, counter terrorism, human rights, prevention of conflict and early warning systems initiatives. It also conforms with Guterres views that on peace and security initiatives, the UN and AU should operate together on compliance frameworks of AU missions to ensure adherence to the humanitarian standards and international human rights as stipulated in the international law. Basically, the course of operational cooperation between the two agencies, a model for separation of areas of activity was created and empowered following the signing of the 2017 strategic partnership agreement (UNOAU, 2017). The major financial and military aid to AMISOM was guaranteed by great partnership between UN and AU. UNSOM mandate was to

work in a coordinated framework with AMISOM through strengthening the strategic partnerships between the UN and the AU/AMISOM. The two agencies have a fundamental obligation in aiding state reconstruction processes in the federal state of Somalia (Mulugeta 2009: 49; UNPOS,2013).

From the interrogation of the UN -AU strategic partnerships, African Union-led missions funded by UN, Security Council Resolution 2719/2023 provided an opportunity for both the UN and AU to innovate the tools, practices, and partnerships required to address Africa's armed conflicts. However, the missions faced logistical, financial and sustainability challenges bringing in to question the viability of the partnerships. The major success in the development of the strategic partnership is attributed to UNSC Resolution 1809/2008 [United Nations, 2008], which impacted positively in strengthening the UN-AU collaboration with a goal to collectively solve security in Africa as well as creating a funding framework to assist the operations.

5.1.2 Strategic contributions of UN Country Teams (UNCTs) in strategic partnerships with AU/AMISOM in Somalia on state reconstruction

The UN and its Country Teams in partnership with OAU/AU/AMISOM in Somalia has been involved in state reconstruction initiatives since attaining her independence in 1960 (United Nations, 2024). As of 2024, UN in Somalia through specialized agencies and Country Teams implementing reconstruction mandates. Currently, UN in Somalia operates through resident and non-resident 26 bodies, funds and programs, a mission on political aspects and another on logistical assistance (UNSOS, UNSOM, 2024). On 1st January, 2014, UN structurally

integrated with its agencies operating in partnership as well as joint reconstruction programs across UN Country Teams (UNCTs) and UNSOM with focus on state reconstruction initiatives in Somalia (UNSOM, 2024). This sub-section therefore interrogates the contributions of specific UNCTs in Somalia on state reconstruction.

In line with UNSC Resolution 2102/2013, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was founded on 3rd June 2013 following the UN assessment on state reconstruction in Somalia through the establishment of Somalia Federal Government. Moreover, UNSOM mandate since 2014 has constantly been renewed through UNSC Resolutions (UNSC,2024) The mandate of UNSOM included policy advisory to the FGS and the AMISOM on state reconstruction included a multisectoral approach such as governance, security reforms, rule of law, establishment of a federal system (including state formation), constitutionalism, democracy (2016 political transitions) and coordination of donor support from the international community (UNSOM, 2024). UNSOM has also supported in building FGS' capacity to ensure respect for human rights is guaranteed, promoting empowerment of women's, child protection, strengthen justice agencies, preventing conflict-based gender-based and sexual violence (UNSOM, 2024). Further, UNSOM monitored, investigated and reported to the UNSC on abuses committed against women and children as well as human rights violations under international humanitarian and human rights law committed in Somalia. UNSOM also assisted in the implementation of the National Security Architecture which was endorsed by the FGS and Federal States in 2017 as well

as the Comprehensive Approach to Security Framework in Somalia. In the spirit of strategic partnership, UNSC factored the significance of ownership of the process by Somali citizens, close alignment with UNCTs activities led by Special Representative of the SG with priorities of UNSOM, FGS, IGAD, AMISOM, IGAD, EU, UK, US, and other strategic partners (UNSOM, 2024).

In line with UNSCR 1863/2009, under the UN Department of Field Support (DFS) Security Council established UNSOA as “a logistical field support operation to the AMISOM” (Wondemagegnehu & Kebede, 2017: Saether, 2018: Darkwa, 2016). UNSOA was established to with a goal to “establish a United Nations Peace Keeping Operations in Somalia as a follow up force on AMISOM”, (UNSC,2009, Ibid., para. 6(a-e). However, UNSOA failed to support civilian staff working in Mogadishu between 2009 and 2011. Due to expansive scope of AMISOM in the number of forces, police and civilian personnel in the mission drawn from seven African TCCs, UNSOA’s mandate emerged alongside as evidenced in the sequential Resolutions in the UNSC over time. UNSCR 2182/2014 extended the AMISOM mandate with 22,126 troops to 30th November, 2015 and made request in the progressive review the benchmarking for the UN peacekeeping operation’s deployment, and the effect of the temporary surge authorized under UNSCR 2124; and proposals for the next steps in the military campaigns by 30th May 2015; and highlighted that following the 18-24-month surge, a decline in AMISOM's troop’s capacity could be factored. UNSCR 2182 also requested enhancement in AMISOM planning and strategic management as well as coordination between military personnel, sectors and common operations with SNA; and observed that

operations must be followed by initiatives to empower governance mechanism in reclaimed zones and the basic services delivery; and also provided encouragement in the responsive delivery of Quick Impact Projects in aid of FGS stabilization efforts. The resolution further requested AMISOM and SNA “to accord priority to securing key supply routes to improve the humanitarian situation and requested the Secretary-General to report on progress; and urged member states to provide up to 12 military helicopters to AMISOM, as well as force enablers and multipliers identified in the 2013 United Nations-African Union benchmarking assessment; provided for upgraded marine surveillance and interdiction to counter violations of the charcoal and arms embargoes; and invited prime attention to issues of reported sexual exploitation and abuse.”

The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was created to enhance coordination and facilitation of Somali reconciliation initiatives among concerned parties (UNPOS, 1995: UN, 2013). United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) is mandated to control and evaluate all the actions executed by UNPOS (UNDPA, 2012). The UNPOS boss is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia and closely assesses the situation in relation to Somalia and help the Secretary-General in the provision briefings and reports to the Security Council on quarterly basis. UNPOS mandate entailed organizing, coordinating and raising finances for humanitarian agencies operating in Somalia. It also encouraged regional/neighboring states to engage reconciliation processes to establish dialogue amongst conflicting Somali factions (Mulugeta 2009:48: UNPOS 2013: 1). It further supported multiple peace initiatives including Eldoret

peace initiative, Arta Peace Conference and Djibouti agreement. The main strategy of the UNPOS was based on three disciplines; first, the political agenda with the aim of supporting the newly established Somali administration in building state agencies as well as creating administration that has stability and inclusivity administration through discourses and mediation (UN 2009: 4). Second, UNPOS in Somalia enhanced security in the entire state through financing of the federal institutions in a manner that it creates effective and reliable security architecture. Third, UN strategy in progressive execution of UN humanitarian obligations through support of SFG to establish an effective framework to get assistance from the international actors (UN, 2009). In its agenda to reconstruct Somalia, UNPOS was the major force towards the signing and implementation of the Djibouti Agreement in 2008 which brought together the key opposition factions and the TFG. Djibouti Agreement outlined a structural which would for simultaneously spur political, security and reconstruction development in Somalia (UNPOS, 2008). In addition, UNPOS organized multiple High-Level Conferences such as the Istanbul Conference for Somalia, the International Conference in support of SSF and AMISOM in Brussels, SRSG International Contact Group meetings as well as the Joint Security and High-Level Committees (Development Aid, 2024). UNHCR in Somalia has been working to enable repatriation(voluntary) of refugees is sustained and returnees are integrated into the Somali society (UNHCR, 2023). According to UNHCR official website, Somalia accounts close to 3.1 million people of interest to UNHCR. They also include more than 30,000 refugees and those seeking asylum majority coming from Yemen and Ethiopia. Through UNHCR initiatives, more than 92,000 refugees have repatriated

voluntarily to Somalia with the many returning from Libya, Eritrea, Kenya, Yemen, Djibouti and Sudan. Moreover, about three million people are equally displaced internally in Somalia as a result of insecurity and the adverse effects of droughts and floods brought about by climate change. (Hyndman & Nylund, 1998). More importantly, UNHCR has been supporting the Somali Government through provision of humanitarian aid, development and peace investments through prioritizing through return and reintegration (Hyndman & Nylund, 1998). UNHCR has been in the forefront in addressing the plight of Somali refugees in Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya through repatriation. Facilitation of repatriation of Somali refugees would constitute a huge workforce for state building in the post conflict state. In reinforcing UNHCR role in state reconstruction, a Somali political elite based interviewed online on 9th September 2024 in Mogadishu informed:

“UNHCR in partnership with AU in Somalia continues to deliver humanitarian assistance towards address challenges such as insecurity, conflict and natural calamities. UNHCR has continued to assist the Government of Somalia in drafting laws that ensure protection and rights of displaced and stateless persons in accordance with international laws.”

UNICEF in Somalia has been to save children's lives, defend their rights and to assist them achieve their potentials from early childhood through adolescence stage (World Health Organization, 2012: UNICEF Somalia, 2023). Key informants drawn from Somali youth in diaspora concur that UNICEF in Somalia in partnership with AU/AMISOM have contributed in reconstructing the Somali health system and helping Somali children and mothers with immunizations, diseases prevention, administering treatment, enhancing nutrition, improving

water systems and sanitation, promoting academic progress and providing humanitarian reliefs in response to calamities. Williams& Cummings (2017) posits that UNICEF provision of educational service and other essential services in in areas where fragility and conflict is prevalent is a viable means of building positive peace and stability. However, service provisions in such context fails when state is absent or dysfunctional to carry out mandate. UNICEF in Somalia supported education between 1996 and 2010 as its core mandate. Although UNICEF working on education in Somalia took a presiding role when Somalia state was in turmoil, Williams & Cummings (2017) further asserts that facing variable instability and lack of functioning administration, UNICEF took the moment by shifting opportunity to provide education to the thousands of children as well as adults in Somalia. The longstanding presence and practical assistance of UNICEF on Somali children population welfare gave the institution a huge legacy (<https://www.unicef.org/somalia/>). UNICEF partnership with local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) enabled wider reach to different societies and ability to utilize emerging opportunities (UNICEF,2023).

World Food Program (WFP) Somalia as the biggest humanitarian body in Somalia whose mandate entail saving human lives through provision of food and nutritional aid to population in crisis (<https://www.wfp.org/countries/somalia>). The operations of WFP are through over 100 partners in the security zones and faces challenge of access (WFP, 2023). Somalia also host WFP's largest use of anticipatory action across African continent, helping drought-affected homesteads to prepare for a possible fourth poor rainy season with monetary transfers as well

as campaigns on information (WFP, 2023). Nold & Rutland allude that the WFP efforts include distributing food, but every time a woman receives food or gets a medical check-up, they also receive education (WFP Somalia, 2024). Also, the food they receive are fortified food, meaning it provides even more of the nutrients they are missing than their regular foods would provide (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012). The humanitarian works spearheaded by WFP Somalia would not have been possible without collaboration and partnership with AMISOM. A Somali elder interviewed in Nairobi on 8th September 2024 further informed on the contributions of WFP in state reconstruction:

“AMISOM in strategic partnership WFP offered support such as building capacity for emergency preparedness and response, managing supply chains and logistics, promoting social safety programs and strengthening resilience against climate change in Somalia and this has contributed to the state building initiatives.”

Through UN-AU partnership, FAO Somalia has helped Somali national and regional governments, AMISOM, development agencies to coordinate their initiatives to improve and develop agriculture, fisheries, land and water resources, conducting research, providing technical assistance to projects, operating educational/training initiatives and collecting data on agricultural, production, and development outputs(<https://www.fao.org/somalia/fao-in-somalia/en/>). The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has also implemented several reconstruction initiatives in Somalia to help achieve that goal (FAO, 2015). These initiatives include vaccinations of livestock as well as children and cash for work schemes (FAO, 2015). The vaccination of livestock helps protect herds from epidemic diseases and outbreaks. This helps protect both the livelihood of pastoralists and

the meat supply of the country (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012). The cash for work schemes provided workers a source of income as they work to benefit the community infrastructure. Jobs include building storage catchments for drinking water, building roads that improve market access, and digging irrigation canals to benefit the crops (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012). As these programs continue and animal health services and disease surveillance are increased and the infrastructure improved, Somalia will eventually be able to support itself without the extra help (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012).

As a vital UNCT, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has also contributed to state reconstruction in Somalia (UNDP Somalia, 2024). UNDP's objectives focus on human development and thus advocates for change; connecting nations to the knowledge, experience and resources to help national administrations enhance the quality of citizens' life (UNDP Somalia, 2024). UNDP work towards building states that can overcome crisis and long-term growth and sustainable development. In Somalia, UNDP faces the concerns of operating with a medium- and long-term agenda where immediate humanitarian and political aspects carry precedence (Farkah & Kampala, 2021). This is also a problem UNDP Country Office aims to achieve on its mandate in an environment that needs considerable flexibility owing to security, access, humanitarian requirement as well as political imperatives. UNDP Somalia has been working with the many actors (state, communities, clans and traditional leaders) to promote development that transcend economic growth and quick win initiatives; development that ensure that the civilian population enjoy inclusivity, equitability

and accountability, improved service delivery, human security, access to justice as well as respect for inherent rights. UNDP presence in the central and southern parts of Somalia as well as Somaliland and Puntland, strategically places the agency as the primary actor to support good governance, human security, rule of law, reconciliation process, peace building and state building, (Farkah & Kampala, 2021). Key informants (NGO personnel based in Somalia and foreign service officer) interviewed were of the view that UNDP in partnership with AU/AMISOM has helped Somalia towards reduction of poverty index, attain sustainable economic and human development which in turn enhance capacity of Somali institutions to run its state affairs. This was supported by a study UNDP data in their official website which pinpoints the UNDP assist Somalia in coming up with strategic paradigms to address poverty related issues by expanding to opportunities and linking Somalia to larger goals and policies and encouraging trade reforms, debt relief and foreign investment.

Collectively with AMISOM and key strategic partners, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)-Somalia supported state reconstruction in Somalia (UNOPS Somalia, 2024). UNOPS Somalia has been working closely with AU/AMISOM and other vital partners to assist Somalia in national ownership and capacity development through strengthening of capacity of state institutions and primarily focuses on peace and security, health and governance as priority initiatives (UNOPS Somalia, 2024). Through Somalia Crisis Recovery Project initiatives, it assisted in recovery and infrastructural development which contributed to urban reconstruction and rehabilitation initiatives which enhanced

resilience and promoted economic development within Mogadishu and administrative headquarters of federal member states in Somalia. It also contributed the establishment of Somalia operational national blood bank in partnership with UNFPA, WHO and Federal Government of Somalia which helped ailing health sector in addressing blood shortages and enhanced blood storage capacity. It also supported peace and security initiatives through rehabilitation and construction of police institutions, capacity building, support on oversight and governance as well as strengthening the rule of law (UNOPS, 2024).

In support of AMISOM initiatives, the United Nations Office for The Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - Somalia advocated for protection of civilians and compliance with IHL as well as IHRL; championed for advocacy on humanitarian crisis facing Somali people, promote mobilization of aid, data sharing and supported humanitarian initiatives (UNOCHA Somalia, 2024). UNOCHA Somalia has also been briefing UNSC on the humanitarian situation and access in Somalia. In respect to coordination, UNOCHA- Somalia promoted interactions between civilian and military institutions in addressing to humanitarian challenges, bridging of the gaps in environmental response management and mapping of emergency relief stockpiles on behalf of the international humanitarian community (UNOCHA Somalia, 2024). UNOCHA-Somalia also promoted initiatives to prepare vulnerable Somali population in disaster-prone contexts, so they are less exposed to the impact of a sudden-onset emergency. It also worked with FGS, AMISOM and other agencies in testing and implementing measures that help save lives in an emergency, and provided tools

such as and early. In aspect of funding, UNOCHA- Somalia worked with humanitarian actors to identify the most critical humanitarian assistance, responses in planning and determination of budgets required to address them (UNOCHA, 2024). These contributed to encouraging newer and effective funding in tandem with the evolving nature of humanitarianism in the territory of Somalia. Consequently, the UNOCHA initiatives have saved lives, alleviated suffering and maintained human dignity thorough donor funding pooled through Humanitarian pooled funds, Central Emergency Response Fund and Country-Based Pooled Fund ((UNOCHA Somalia, 2024)). In Informing, UNOCHA- Somalia provided credible information which positively impact the response by international humanitarian community respond to crises. Acting as a unique hub for information management and dissemination, the body provided data to other UN agencies, AMISOM, local and international NGOS. It also stewarded of humanitarian tools and services which helped inform decision-making across the response which included Relief Web, which provided 24-hour coverage to humanitarian community on disaster, conflict and crisis, as well as Relief Web Response, a platform and resource repository for humanitarian players (UNOCHA, 2024). Furthermore, through Centre for Humanitarian Data, OCHA's runs the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX), a platform which provide humanitarian data on real-time basis (UNOCHA, 2024).

In the mandate to connect with strategic partners and achieve the highest level of health, World Health Organization Somalia (WHO)-Somalia executes a fundamental role towards state reconstruction in Somalia (WHO, 2024). WHO

Somalia has been on the forefront in addressing endemics and pandemics existing in the Somali health environment particularly covid-19, HIV, diarrheal diseases, measles, polio, malaria and tuberculosis and chronic diseases (WHO, 2024). As pointed out by an informant (Somali elder), informed that, in partnership with AMISOM and Somali government, took initiatives that confront health challenges facing Somali community. According to WHO Somalia country office official website, the agency in a bid to promote a healthy society has been involved in state reconstruction process through surveillance, vaccinations, funding, medical research, partnerships, international health regulations, independent oversight and advocacy committee on health matters in partnership with Somali health ministry (WHO Somalia, 2024).

As a UN Country Team in Somalia, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in its mandate engage in addressing sexual and reproductive health with the objective to deliver a Somalia where “every pregnancy is wanted; every childbirth is safe and every young person's potential is fulfilled” (UNFPA Somalia, 2024). UNFPA Somalia operates with health sectors and partners to reduce maternal mortality by strengthening community midwifery and the supply of commodities ((UNFPA Somalia, 2024)). Initiatives have focused on conducting nation-wide population estimation surveys and in collaborations with the AMISOM (currently ATMIS), Somali administrations and non-state agencies to provide services for vulnerable young people, through promotion of reproductive rights and the eradication of female genital mutilation (FGM) and other common harmful cultural practices (UNFPA, 2024). UNFPA Somalia agenda as guided by the 1994 Cairo’s

International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) aspirations, which resolved women's empowerment and autonomy; a basis for sustainable economic and social progress and the 2019 Nairobi Statement which recommitted to initiatives on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, thus path towards state reconstruction in Somalia (UNFPA, 1994, 2019 & 2024). UNFPA also launched initiatives to attain three transformative outcomes by 2030 which include; "ending unmet need for family planning, ending preventable maternal deaths and, ending gender-based violence and harmful practices" (UNFPA, 2024)

For more than three decades, in a bid to reconstruct the state of Somalia, UN Habitat Country Team has been involved in urban development initiatives in key towns in Somalia (UN Habitat Somalia, 2024). UN Habitat's interventions evolved from addressing the urgent urban needs to systematic initiatives of addressing sustainable urban growth through integrated human settlement programs (UN Habitat Somalia, 2024). This has been accomplished through interventions that strengthen the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding nexus in the areas of livelihoods, youth engagement, governance and sustainable urban development (<https://unhabitat.org/somalia>). Towards state reconstruction, UN habitat Somalia has been in collaboration and partnership with local and international NGOs, Somali administrations at federal and district levels, AMISOM (currently ATMIS) and other UN agencies based in Somalia particularly in Somaliland, Juba land, Mogadishu, Puntland, South west, Hirshabelle and Galmadug federal member states (UN Habitat Somalia, 2024). Key legacies of UN-Habitat in Somalia include development of systems and

regulatory frameworks for fiscal administration at the local structures leading to increased local revenue generation up to 300% (case study of a town in Somaliland). Since 2007, UN-Habitat in Somalia created more than 3,000 stable jobs, capacity building initiatives to more than 1,000 personnel and enhanced access to basic services in urban settings to over 200,000 homes (UN Habitat, 2024). UN-Habitat in Somalia also constructed 5,500 housing facilities offering shelter to 36,000 Somali population as beneficiaries (UN Habitat, 2024). Furthermore, UN-Habitat in Somalia increased the water capacity for delivery in Hargeisa city by 150% through installations of 23 KM key pipeline system, pumping stations, water pumps and power generators and drilling, equipping and connection of three boreholes at Hora Hadley (UN Habitat, 2024). The country team also published 9 urban profiles aimed at unlocking more resources towards implementing community action plans as well as projects geared towards improving the standard of living for communities affected by displacements (UN Habitat, 2024). UN-Habitat in Somalia handed over 10 community infrastructure projects which among others included health facilities, constructed educational facilities, market structures and roads accessing the informal settlements. (<https://unhabitat.org/somalia>). In a bid to empower young population, the country team developed regulatory frameworks which significantly increased democratic involvement of youth in politics (45% youth in South West State parliament: 27% in Jubaland), amplification of voices where more than 350,000 young people across Somalia have utilized innovative technologies to achieve this and creation of One Stop Youth centers in Kismayo and Mogadishu (UN Habitat Somalia, 2024).

As a tripartite country team in Somalia, the International Labor Organization (ILO) champions for social justice, human and labor rights with its founding mission that labor justice is essential to sustainable peace (ILO Somalia,2024). Under the municipal and international laws, ILO trilaterally unite the Government of Somalia (federal and federal state levels), workers and employers, to establish labor standardization, create policies and programs which enhance decency in work environments (private and public sector) for all humanity (ILO, 2024). Somalia has been a member of the ILO since 1960 and ratified 26 ILO Conventions and 1 protocol (ILO,1960). The first generation of the Somalia DWCP was launched in 2023. Towards rebuilding Somalia, ILO Somalia in partnership with other actors creating a tripartite platform between the national and federal member states government, employers and workers to enhance better and quality collaboration in the labor sector with an aim of enhancing social protection. ILO also through the Better Regional Migration Management (BRMM) initiative, and the AU-ILO-IOM Joint Labor Migration Programme (JLMP) in partnership with the Somali Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) convened State Level Consultative seminar on the Development of Gender sensitive Labor Migration Policy and Action Plan in Mogadishu which validated the report on situational analysis and added recommendations for the action plan to enable grass roots dimensions are incorporated in the Somali national development(ILO, 2024).

Under the mentorship of UNPOS, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Somalia started its mandate in 2008 with greater focus on the

capacity building initiatives and monitoring and evaluation of human rights. (OHCHR Somalia,2008). Upon attaining its autonomy following the implementation of UNSCR 2102/2013 and subsequent succession of UNPOS, UNSOM Human Rights and Protection Group (HRPG) started its mission on 3rd June 2013(UNSCR 2102/2013). According to the official website, the Country Team was mandated to “execute monitoring and capacity-building as well as mainstream human rights within the activities of the UN Country Teams and Humanitarian Country Teams which included; monitoring and reporting on the situation of human rights, engaging civil society and other partners, support for the government, strengthening security forces compliance with human rights standards and norms, implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), engagement with other governments and diplomatic missions” (UN Human Rights in Somalia, 2024). In 2012 and 2016, OHCHR initiated the facilitation of formal engagement between the government and civil society in the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review which fundamental commitments (OHCHR, 2012 &2016). In the 2016 UPR processes, recommendations were made to empower accountability frameworks for security sector and to further enhance the initiatives towards prevention of children recruitment and sexual violence in conflicts (OHCHR, 2016). A National Human Rights Roadmap Action Plan towards implementation of the UPR and other commitments assisted in designing the human rights initiatives in across institutions in Somalia. This road map received a complimentary from action Plans on recruitment and use of children, killing and maiming of children as well as a National Action Plan on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict. HRPG offered

technical guidance to the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development to ensure that the National Development Plan (NDP) prioritized UPR recommendations and further offered extensive technical proposal and support in the foundation of the National Human Rights Commission. In 2016, the list of persons of the human rights Commission, composed of women, minorities and people with disabilities was tabled in the Cabinet before submitted to the legislative arm for approval. Pursuant to its mandate “to monitor, help investigate and report to the Council” on human rights violations, HRPG published several public reports, including two on freedom of expression, “The Right Freedom of Expression: Striving to Widen Democratic Space in Somalia’s Political Transition” in 2016 and “The Precarious Enjoyment of Freedom of Expression in Somalia” in September 2018. The reports highlighted the challenges and recommended that prompt, independent, impartial and thorough investigations be conducted into human rights violations and abuses affecting freedom of expression. They further recommend that “perpetrators be held accountable, s that protection mechanisms be established to prevent and address all forms of threats and attacks against political actors, journalists and other media workers so as to ensure accountability when such acts occur”. HRPG also implemented initiatives designed to reduce the impact of the armed conflicts on civilian population. In this respect, on 10th December 2017, HRPG made publication on a report on “Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia”, with a focus on violations of IHL and IHR committed in the territory of Somalia and signified a first trial by UNSOM to quantify human casualties. In 2017/2018, HRPG also supported the system-wide HRDDP

implementations for all UN assistance to AMISOM and the Somali security sector particularly in the framework of the comprehensive approaches to security. HRPG provided technical advice to UN entities on their policy obligations and supported the development and adoption of risk assessments which identify measures to mitigate risk of violations. HRPG supported the implementation of these measures through training and capacity-building on IHRL/IHL, screening troops for children, monitoring and reporting of violations and cooperation to enhance accountability mechanisms. In 2018, HRPG launched “Securing Political Participation: Human Rights in Somalia’s Electoral Processes,” with focus on violations that occurred before, during and after the 2016-2017 National Elections in Somalia. It recommended that the 2020 elections should consider systematic representation of all the citizens of Somalia including IDPs, PWDs, minority and marginalized groups, youth as well as women in conformity with the principle of “one person, one vote” (HRPG, 2018).

As an international financial agency under the UN system, World Bank Group (WBG) gives loans and grants to the low- and middle-income states for the aims of economic progress (World Bank, 2024). Under the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), WBG has been in the forefront in promoting state reconstruction in the global south(<https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/home>). The financial agency supports

Somali public institutions to promote proper governance, speedy recovery of economy and creating job opportunities (World Bank Somalia, 2024). Through Digital Uplift Project, WB support increased in access to basic digital fiscal and government services targeting Somali population particularly women involved in entrepreneurship and employment opportunities. On 12th September 2019 UN, World Bank called for sustained financing for Somalia to address humanitarian aspects a food security which threatens the Somalia population (UNDPA Somalia, 2019). On 13th December, 2021, the World Bank announced \$150 million for electricity recovery project to enhance power supply in Somalia (UNSOM, 2021). In a press release 29th February 2024, in aiding Somalia's Shift from Fragility to Resilience and Growth, WBG announced Somali Country Partnership Framework (CPF) which would establish a stable state with capacity and legitimacy to execute basic public services, champion private sector development and establish resilience with a sustainable basis for restoration of social contracts and facilitation of emergence of Somalia from fragility and conflict. The CPF support Somali's Vision 2060, building on key country analytics including a 2023 Systematic Country Diagnostic Update, a Risk and Resilience Assessment and lessons learned from the CPF Completion and Learning Review. In emphasizing the significance of CPF on Somali state reconstruction process, Country Manager in charge of World Bank Somalia, Kristina Svensson stressed that;

“Somalia has a unique opportunity to leverage the momentum created by achieving HIPC Completion Point in December 2023 to look forward and invest in growth, people and resilience, The CPF will provide financial and technical assistance to support the ambitious development agenda.” (Svensson, 2023)

In normalizing relations with Somalia, on 27th February 2020, WB announced “good standing” after 30 years and noted that IMF secured “sufficient financing pledges” to provide comprehensive debt relief to Somalia. Over 100 IMF member states pledged to offer financing of US\$334 million to Somalia (IMF,2020). Following IMF announcement, the African Development Bank (ADB) AND African Development Fund (ADF) approved a framework to clear Somalia’s \$122.55 million arrears. Through the partnerships, Somalia’s stands a potency to attain debt relief under the “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative”. In a press interview with Voice of America, WB Country Manager Hugh Riddell pointed out that;

“The relations with World Bank do not mean that Somalia will have access to lending, there will be no loans from the World Bank; the financing that will come will be purely grants, Somalis need not worry that this will lead to borrowing by the Somali government, and the World Bank money will be purely 100 percent grants” (Hugh Riddell, 2020)

The Somali PM Hassan Ali Khaire appreciated the resolutions by the WBG and the ADB, and termed it as a “landmark milestone.” He stated on official twitter account that;

“#WB & #AfDB announce to reengage #Somalia, clear arrears & ultimately relieve the country of the debt burden under the HIPC Initiative, paving the way 4 tremendous foreign direct investment! Our commitment to reform begins to pay dividends. Deeply indebted!”

Domiciled under the UNPKO, The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) mandate in the coordination and implementation of activities to counter the threats posed by IEDs, land and sea mines and remnants of war explosives

(UNMAS Somalia, 2023). UNMAS act on country specific, in support of PSOs, and through the development of norms, policies and standards (UNMAS Somalia, 2023). The United Nation Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has been conducting traditional mines initiatives of locating and disposing mines and explosives that were abandoned through the previous Somali wars as well as training and equipping AMISOM TCCs to counter threats related to IEDs (Williams, 2022). In Somalia, UNMAS goal has been ensuring that the population are more safe and secure due to the ability of Somali administration and security agencies to reduce the threat posed by explosive ordnance (EO) including IEDs (UNMAS Somalia, 2023). Since 2009, UNMAS-Somalia supported the AMISOM by delivering tailored seminars on explosive-threat mitigation as well as carrying out before and after deployment briefs (UNMAS Somalia, 2023). In 2024, for instance, UNMAS Somalia has initiated capacity building for over 1,200 personnel and facilitated the movement of over 50 convoys along main supply routes. In addition, UNMAS Somalia deployed explosive detection dog groups to enhance the safety and security of strategic premises housing UN, government, AMISOM bases and offices. To support stabilization initiatives in Somalia, UNMAS identified and cleared 18 locations contaminated with EDs. Furthermore, UNMAS Somalia conducted more than 60 villages and 60 roads assessment/reassessment along key supply routes supporting AU operations. UNMAS Somalia employs Risk Education Talking Devices, an innovation to reach communities in remote and marginalized areas where More than 6,000 Somalis received risk education (66 % beneficiaries being children). UNMAS Somalia in its state reconstruction agenda has been providing the Somali government with technical and policy advise on

management of weapons and ammunition in compliance with Sanctions obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargo. UNMAS Somalia also facilitates the effective management and storage of arms to reduce the risk of unprecedented explosions and the proliferations and diversions of small arms and light weapons and ammo.

During the launch of “five-year safe ground campaign (2019-2023) with the goal of creating awareness and resource to victims and survivors of wars through support of sustainable development goals and sport activities in 2019”, the UNSG A. Guterres stressed that safer grounds establish football playfields out of areas free from mines:

“Sport develops community, it brings people together, and Safe Ground aims to clear sport-oriented infrastructure, stadiums, sporting complexes, or spaces where sports can be played, so girls and boys, men and women, with or without a disability can play.”
(Guterres, 2019)

Guterres views pinpoint on the significance of the role of UNMAS Strategic Plan 2019-2023 and its mission in line with UN SDGs. In partnership with the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), UNMAS Somalia continues to protect Somali communities in contaminated zones by conducting mine action activities such as creating risk awareness, conducting survey and mine clearance, thus restoring land access and facilitating humanitarian access, employment opportunities and resumption of livelihood.

UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) Somalia was established with the mandate to “assist developing countries in the development of their economies by supplementing existing sources of capital assistance by means of grants and loans”

(UNGA Resolution 2186/ 1966). UNCDF aims to “strengthen financing mechanisms and systems to contribute to transformation pathways such as green economy, digitalization, urbanization, inclusive economies and gender equality and women's economic empowerment” (UNCDF Somalia, 2024). Currently, UNCDF offers financial solutions for the poor that provide access to public and private resources, at domestic level, to reduce poverty and further support local economic development (UNCDF, 2024). UNCDF Somalia has been in existence since 1981 with mandate of improving public service delivery and enhancing local government access to financing infrastructure. Under local transformative finance, UNCDF implemented a Joint UN Program on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery (JPLG) for Somalia, which developed local governance capacity, broadened civic awareness and participation, and supported fiscal decentralization and local development through a Local Development Fund (LDF) to aid local transformative projects in 32 districts countrywide. The JPLG was a multi-UN agency initiative comprising UNDP, UNCDF, ILO, UN Habitat and UNICEF and its implementation have been in existence since 2008.

As a UN specialized agency and UN Country Team, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Somalia mandate is to promote industrial development for environmental sustainability, inclusive globalization and poverty reduction (UNIDO, 2024). UNIDO Somalia has been working towards developing Somali private sector which has faced multiple challenges arising from conflict and post-conflict situations, droughts and famine, and recently the COVID-19 pandemic. In a bid to reconstruct Somalia, UNIDO Somalia has been involved in

a number of initiatives: support for Somalia's fisheries and Blue Economy, which has a vast potential and opportunities for sustainable growth, to drive development and innovation; through UN Peace building funding trained youth to develop technical skills in Kismayo; supported women initiatives such as skill training programs for food industry as in the case of Talowadaag Women Development Organization as well as Tie & dye training at Awaale women group in Kismayo. On 7th November, 2024, in Addis Ababa, World Without Hunger Conference, organized by UNIDO in partnership with African Union and Ethiopia with technical assistance from FAO. This marked the start of a new and intensified stage of global action to end hunger presented Innovative solutions, forged new partnerships, and mobilized concrete investments in Africa. It concluded with the Addis Ababa Call to Action, “a concrete roadmap for the international development community and the public and private sectors to join forces to scale up investments in key areas to end hunger.”

In emphasizing the role of UNIDO in state reconstruction, UNIDO Director General Gerd Müller emphasized that:

“UNIDO stands ready as partner in achieving this important goal. I am very pleased to announce the opening of the China–Africa–UNIDO Centre of Excellence here in Addis Ababa, which will drive sustainable industrialization, agricultural modernization, and skills development across Africa, using the latest technologies, AI, and renewable energy.”

Towards championing for gender equality in Somalia, UN Women Country Programme in partnership with successive Somali administrations, civil society organizations and AMISOM in the formulations of laws, policies, programs and services needed to enable gender equality standards are effectively and efficiently

implemented in the interest of women and girls (UN Women Somalia, 2024). Powered by the UNSC landmark resolution 1325/2000 which affirms that “peace and security efforts are more sustainable when women are equal partners in the prevention of violent conflict, the delivery of relief and recovery efforts and in the forging of lasting peace”, the UN Women Somalia, advances the role of women in state reconstruction process through their recognition of the critical roles that women play in peacebuilding and state building initiatives in Somalia efforts. Furthermore, the UN Women Somalia derived its mandate from the National Action Plan, UN Somalia Gender Equality Strategy, UN Women Africa Strategy, UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework Guiding Principles and Guidance, Somalia Common Country Analysis (CCA) and the CCA companion document by SDG (UN Women Somalia, 2024). In addition, UN Women Somalia in state reconstruction processes in Somalia is guided by the series of National Development Plans (NDPs) by the FGS and currently under the NDP-9 which focuses on “focusing on promoting women’s political participation and leadership and women, peace and security agenda with strengthening women’s access to justice, promoting durable solutions; gender in humanitarian action and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence with the focus on women IDPs and refugees, climate resilience, and advancing women’s economic empowerment adopting the triple nexus”. Within its state reconstruction agenda, UN Women Somalia seeks to make the vision of the SDGs a reality for women and girls and champions for women’s equal participation in all aspects of life, focusing on the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) strategic priorities; “functional, inclusive, accountable, and transparent democratic systems across all

levels of government and governmental institutions; all Somalis particularly women live in a peaceful, inclusive, and cohesive society; security reforms; rule of law and ; economic and social development” (UN Women Somalia, 2024). In its partnerships, UN Women Somalia key strategic partners on reconstruction process in Somalia included AMISOM (currently ATMIS), the Somali Ministries of Religious Affairs and Endowment, Youth and Sports, Planning and International Cooperation, Interior and National Security Women and Human Rights Development (MoWHRD) at the Federal and Federal Member States, as well as Office of the Attorney-General, Parliament and Independent Electoral Commission among other agencies. UN Women Somalia also partnered with non-state actors such as the CSOs, NGOs, youth and women-led groups, Somali clan elders and religious bodies (UN Women Somalia, 2024).

Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1863/2009, United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), previously referred to as the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was established to provide logistical assistance to the AMISOM, which was reconfigured to ATMIS following the adoption of UNSCR 2628/2022. The existing UNSOS mandate is based on UNSCR resolution 2748/2024. In supporting the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), UNSOS is provide logistical support to up to 12,626 ATMIS uniformed personnel and 85 civilians. the assistance to ATMIS is in form of assessed budget and voluntary contributions from member states to ATMIS Trust Fund (UNSOS, 2021). The logistical assistance constituted food, water, fuel, medical supplies, evacuations, transportation (land, sea, and air); engineering assistance; counter

IED assistance; equipment repairs and maintenance; communications; IT support; strategic communications and; capacity building. In Supporting Somalia Security Forces (SSF), UNSOS was mandated in 2013 to offer logistical assistance to 10,900 SNA in joint or coordinated operations with AMISOM. Through the UNSC, the mandate was expanded to cover 20,900 from SNA and SNPF which include state and federal police who were integrated into SSF in conformity with the National Security Architecture (UNSOS, 2024). In Supporting UNSOM, UNSOS provided logistical and administrative assistance to enhance its presence as a political mission across all regions in Somalia. It provided support in form of food, transport, medicine, office/living accommodation as well as personnel and fiscal resources. Towards reconstructing Somalia, UNSOS in support of the UNSOM mandate, indirectly facilitated reconciliation process and state building initiatives by providing conference facilities, transportation of government officials and security in support of election processes. As an enabler UNSOS supported the international community in Somalia and further offered logistical assistance to the diplomatic missions and UN Country Teams in Somalia on a cost-reimbursable terms (UNSOS, 2021).

Integrated Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia (DSRSG/RC/HC) mandate in Somalia largely involved coordination of UN operations in Somalia on developmental, humanitarian and partially political responsibilities in support of the Strategic Priorities of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Somalia (2021-2025) in line with Somalia's peace- and state-

building priorities in accordance with the National Development Plan and the Sustainable Development Goals (<https://somalia.un.org/en/about/about-the-resident-coordinator-office>). The Office is a service provider in coordination roles formulated to enable effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, transparency and coherence of UN, UN Country and Humanitarian Teams interventionist missions in Somalia (DSRSG/RC/HC, 2024). It is also obligated to advance the UN's 'Delivering as One' agenda and is strategically designed to enhance promotion and operationalization of "the New Way of Working across the development, humanitarian, peace, security and state-building pillars of the UN's work in Somalia." In its resident coordination capacity, the integrated office has: communications and advocacy; strategic Planning; data and results management and reporting; economics and; partnerships and development finance as five key functions (United Nations Somalia, 2024). The Office also hosts multiple thematic units that offer coordination, mainstreaming and advisory support to its various clients including the DSRSG/RC/HC, the broader UN system, and strategic partners, fostering joined-up planning and programming towards collective outcomes and promoting multi-disciplinary approaches on durable solutions, youth empowerment, stabilization, gender equality and women's empowerment, aid coordination, environment and security, preventing and countering violent extremism and risk management. Furthermore, The Office offers secretarial assistance to the UN Communication Group, the Programme Management Team (PMT), the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), UN Country Team (UNCT), Durable Solutions and Peacebuilding Fund Working Groups, the Inter-Agency Youth Working Group and provide strategic link between UN specialized agencies

and UNSOM on policy, planning and operational issues (<https://somalia.un.org/en/about/about-the-resident-coordinator-office>). Through the Risk Management Unit, the Integrated Office offers a leadership role in the provision of risk management services which guarantee that the UN, AU, strategic partners and donor community understand better and control the risks associated with operations in Somalia.

From the above extensive discussions on the contributions of UN country teams based in Somalia, it is evidentially clear that AU-UN partnership particularly on AMISOM directly and indirectly contributed to state reconstruction in Somalia. In as much as the AU-UN strategic partnerships have been in existence, it has been subject to limitations in respect to the state reconstruction processes in Somalia. Despite AMISOM readiness to conduct counterterrorism operation, lacks of functionality to execute the peace agreements undermined the process [De Coning, 2019]. Despite the established partnerships, the joint actions process for peacekeeping operation continued to encounter challenges both at the strategic and operational levels (Bokeriya, 2022). The partnership between the UNSC and AUPSC was characterized by an unequal collaboration since both institutions vary in aspects related to political status, authority, power, prestige and resources [Forti et al, 2019]. The UN-AU relation is quite intense while at the same time they are increasingly becoming interdependent. For instance, AUPSC possess adequate data about situations in conflict zones while the UNSC possess military and financial prowess to execute peacekeeping operations.

5.2 AU/AMISOM strategic partnerships with regional organizations on state reconstruction in Somalia

In this subsection, the study examines AU/AMISOM strategic partnerships with regional organization on state reconstruction in Somalia with a focus on bodies; European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Regional inter-governmental organizations incorporate international memberships and constitute geopolitical bodies which operationally go beyond a single state although their memberships are characterized by boundaries defined to a unique geography such as continents or economic blocs. They are established to foster cooperation, partnership, political, defense and economic development among states within a restrictive geopolitical or geographical setting.

5.2.1 African Union – European Union (AU-EU) strategic partnership on state reconstruction in Somalia

The European Union (EU) is regional body of 27 states which seeks to promote democracy in its member states and focuses on an economic and political cooperation (Fabbrini, 2015: Alesina, Angeloni, & Schuknecht, 2005: EU, 2024). The EU interest is to strengthen economic and political partnership across the continental Europe after the second World War (Hodson, Puetter, Peterson & Saurugger (Eds.), 2022).). The main purpose of the alliance is to bind the European nations closer in the spheres of economy, social and security (EU, E. 2012). The AU-EU strategic partnership traces its foundation to the Africa – EU summit held in Cairo, Egypt in April, 2000 whose vision was to: *“reinforce political relations; strengthen and promote issues of common concern; promote effective*

multilateralism; and promote people-centered partnerships” (African Union/European Union,2000). The Partnership frameworks exist at multiple levels including Commission-to-Commission meetings, Heads of State summits, Ministerial meetings, and other forums for the Private Sector, civil society and legislature (African Union,2023).

In the context of Somalia, AU has been in collaboration with EU in its obligation to reconstruct Somalia. At first, EU was hesitant to support AMISOM in its mandate due to conflict of interest arising from the deployment of Ethiopian forces in Somalia who were already receiving support of the US and AU. Therefore, EU States were less enthusiastic about the AMISOM. (Balossi 2011, p. 79: Williams, 2022). However, change in heart of the EU Council when it decided on 23rd April 2007 to extend its defense assistance to African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to include military assistance to AMISOM. The EU since 2007 has been providing support to Somali state on developmental initiatives, humanitarian assistance and diplomacy through the African Peace Facility (APF). Operationally, EU issued approval for assigning of four specialists in the fields of commutation, budgeting and human resource and civil engineering to Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU) of AMISOM with the aim of providing vital strategic and technical directives (Williams, 2022). EU also initiated three peace support operations to alleviate security threats in the fragile Somalia; First it initiated, EUNAVFOR/Atlanta Operation (the EU Naval Force) aimed as detecting and combating pirates off the coastline of Somalia and to assist AMISOM in protecting WFP vessels distributing food to needy Somali population; Second, it initiated

EUAFOR/Atlanta Operation (the EU Air Force), EU Border Force Operation (the EU Border Force) and the European Union Military Training Mission (EUTM) which would train the Somali security force, and thirdly, it initiated the EU Combined Action in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP-Nestor) which was to enhance the navy capabilities of states in the Horn of Africa (EU 2012).

On the diplomatic fronts, EU sponsored multiple peace process initiatives and participated in many meetings/summits with international actors to back National Peace Conferences on Somalia (Giovanni et al. 2009; Williams, 2022). In terms of financial aid, EU contribution to AMISOM between 2007 and 2013 amounts to €579.3 million. In September 2013, the EU donated €1.8 billion aid to AMISOM to account for costs for communication, medication, allowances, transportation, payment for law enforcement officer's accommodation, civilian personnel and housing. EU also made financial commitment of more than € 200 million to AMISOM in 2013 (African Peace Facility Annual Report 2013; Williams, 2022). Norheim (2013) asserts that although EU made considerable contributions to AMISOM, it didn't send its military to Somalia. The initiatives of the EU on Peace Support Missions in Africa can be assumed as a form of peacekeeping through proxy by providing political and financial assistance for the mission. It would appear that EU were hesitant to send their naval assets to the Somali coastline (Ehrhart and Petretto 2012; Williams, 2022).

In addressing piracy, EUNAVFOR failed to fulfill the obligations of its objectives. Though it reduced the activities of piracy in marine waterways, the criminal inclination towards piracy continued to thrive. The piracy continued to enhance

their capabilities which allowed them to collect more ransom. EUNAVFOR also succeeded in discouraging pirates from seizing WFP vessels but failed to prevent the theft of relief assistance by criminals, militias and the TFG troops, therefore not reaching needy population (ibid). The grounds that most of the detained pirates (90%) were freed without trial due to lack of interest and competence contributed to the proliferation of piracy. Despite international jurisdiction for the prosecution of piracy, there's no binding international obligation to reinforce. According to Van et al. (2012), this means that it is that state on discretionary basis to decide to bring charges against the suspected pirates.

In partnership with EU, Somalia undertook political reforms in line with the “New Deal principles for fragile states”, in compliance with the 2011 agreement (EU, 2011). The relations between Somalia and the EU and other international partners were guided by the 2013-2016 New Deal. During the 2013 EU-Somalia summit, EU and Somalia parties endorsed the Somali Compact which provided a comprehensive strategy for partnership between the two parties and further established five key peace and state building objectives for Somalia. the objectives included security, revenue service, building inclusive politics, justice and economic foundation which were supported and funded under the 2014-2020 National Indicative Programme for Somalia.

EU also played a key role in supporting Somali initiatives to become a stable and democratic country that can operate on its own. in economic sphere, The EU committed assisting Somalia to developing a strong, sustainable economy that can sustain the Somalia's state reconstruction processes in line with the Economic

Recovery Plan (EU, 2007). This has been through EU partnership focus on generating job opportunities, enhancing livelihoods, and promoting inclusive growth. On peace and security, EU role in state reconstruction in Somalia has been through achieve a stable federal Somalia through an inclusive political process, and Establish effective Somali federal security institutions which provide basic safety and security for citizens (Delegation of European Union to Somalia, 2024). EU through the National Indicative Program provided €100 million for state reconstruction processes between 2014 and 2020. On development cooperation, EU through the National Indicative Programme for Somalia Between 2014 and 2020 provided €286 million to assist Somalia attain its development goals. Funding from the indicative programme was allocated as follows: State-building and peace-building (€100 million), Measure in favor of civil society (€14 million), Education (€60 million), Support measures (€26 million) and Food security and building resilience (€86 million) (Delegation of European Union to Somalia, 2024). On humanitarian aid, EU supported Somalia since 1994. In 2016, the EU committed €46.5 million to assist aid missions in Somalia helping over 2 million people. The support covered aspects such as nutrition, food security, emergency preparation and response, water and sanitation as well as and providing shelter (Delegation of European Union to Somalia, 2024).

EU Council in June 2023 approved reaffirmation of its commitment to its partnership with Somalia. EU commended Somali authorities for its initiatives to build a peaceful and stable Somalia as well as to ensure delivery on the security transition in line with the relevant Security council Resolutions (Williams, 2022).

EU stressed that the goal of the partnership presently implemented jointly the “EU-Somalia Joint Operational Roadmap which is a Renewed Focused Engagement and maintenance the positive dynamism”. Williams, (2022) asserts that the EU pinpoints importance of Somalia to advance human rights, rule of law, good governance, democracy and fight against corruption. EU continued to marshal its assets in helping Somalia through EPF, Global Gateway, NDICI-Global Europe humanitarian aid as well as the CSDP missions/operation (EU, 2023).

According to the official Message from the former EU Ambassador to Somalia, Ms. Veronique Lorenzo in 2017 in celebration of 10 years anniversary of EU-AU partnership, in part, alluded that:

“The European Union did not hesitate. Critical issues were at stake: the safety of the Somali people at the Centre of it, but also the stability of the Horn of Africa region and the importance of continuing to lend support to the African Union as the main provider of security in the continent. What started with the establishment of the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) as a short-term operation of 6 months, turned into the longest partnership ever between the European Union and an African peacekeeping mission. And we are proud of it and the achievements made together over the years in Somalia for the Somali people.The European Union is ready and willing to be fully engaged in this process, with the Somali Government and our partners in the international community, starting with the African Union. We want Somalia to rise again, and Somalia can count on the European Union to fulfil that aspiration.”. (AMISOM Public Information Unit, 2017/ amisomhom@africa-union.org).

Lorenzo’s views demonstrate the European Union commitment towards state reconstruction in Somalia and stronger partnership with the African Union/ AMISOM towards realization of a stable Somalia and horn of Africa region. Lorenzo’s statement was validated by Somali foreign officer interviewed in Somali Embassy in Nairobi who acknowledged that AMISOM’s initiatives in

Somalia were made possible European Union (key strategic partner), without whom state reconstruction process might have been impossible. Achievements by AMISOM are a tribute to EU continued assistance, friendship and partnerships.

5.2.2 African Union- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (AU-NATO) strategic partnership on state reconstruction in Somalia

NATO is a regional inter-governmental defense alliance of 31 states in North America and Europe created after the second World War, following the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington D.C. in 4th April 1949 (Williams, Ed. 1994: NATO, 2023). With the dynamics in the international system NATO continue to adapt to the ever-evolving security environment by coming up with new models of security that guarantees resilience not only in the defense sector but also in the in civil structures, essential resources as well as public service (Yaniz, F., 2020: Masters, 2019). Since 2005, NATO partnership with AU has been evolving following a request by AU for logistical assistance and airlift support program for its mission in Sudan (Sæther, 2018). The partnership emerged based on mutual respect, parity and reciprocity. Allies of NATO have also been committed in expanding the partnership from support framework to define cooperation with AU with intention of making the partnership integral part of NATOs initiatives with partners in addressing security problems emanating from the global south (Sæther, 2018). Saether further asserts that the primary basis of interregional security cooperation between NATO and AU is aimed at building of the military capabilities of the African Standby Force and that this partnership founded on shared ‘militarized’ understandings on human security as well as the threat that insecurity in African soil poses to global stability.

In May 2007, AU initiated a request to NATO seeking strategic airlift assistance for AU states willing to part of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in Somalia under AMISOM. In June 2007, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) accepted AU's request was initially authorized until August 2007. Strategic sealift was later offered in principle by NAC in September 2009 and later continued to be renewed annually even in the case of ATMIS. NATO's assistance was authorized for the period ending 21st August 2007 in accordance with the AMISOM mandate under UNSCR 1744/2007. In 2009, NATO further deployed warships as a program to protect maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean from piracy and also empower the navies and coast guards of nations within the Horn of Africa. The operation was approved by the North Atlantic Council and involved warships mainly from the US although ships from many other states were also involved. *Operation Ocean Shield* main goal was to protect the *Operation Allied Providers* ships that were distributing humanitarian aid from the World Food Programme (WFP) in Somalia. The mission was aimed as dissuading and suppressing piracy incidences, protect ships and more importantly enhance security in the region. This significantly contributed in AU and AMISOM enhancing stability in the Somali coastline (Pryce).

The NATO leadership during the Warsaw summit in 2016 made commitment to increase cooperation in the fields of politics and practice with AU (NATO,2016). The allies of NATO approved NATO's plan for the global south aimed at integrating and Fast-tracking approach by NATO to address the challenges with greater focus to sophisticated capabilities, enhanced response and boosting its

partnerships and building capacities (NATO,2016). Furthermore, AU and NATO signed a formal agreement in November 2019 to promote practical and political partnerships (NATO,2019: AU, 2019). Subsequently allies of NATO in March 2020 approved more engagement aimed at maturing NATO-AU collaboration from an Ad-hoc support to strategic partnership with substantive practical engagement (AU,2020). This framework laid the basis of NATO involvement in AMISOM.

NATO was vital on the AMISOM initiatives towards state reconstruction with major contributions on operational and structural assistance as well as liaison and coordination issues. Operational support initiatives included airlift, sealift and coordination assistance to the mission. In the capacity building initiatives, NATO through its facilities on training and education made enrolment of AU personnel to attend courses through the Mobile Education and Training Teams. Structural assistance initiatives focused on aiding ASF Concept and its associated initiatives such as joint exercises, early warning systems and disaster response preparedness. Institutionally, NATO formed a liaison body at the AU's headquarters under the leadership of Military Liaison Officer and support team of experts following the request of African Union (AU). NATO further coordinated its AU-related initiatives with other international players and in particular UN and EU.

In positive affirmation to the AU NATO partnership initiatives towards peace and stability in Africa and in particular Somalia, NATO SG's official statement to the AU during the occasion of Exercise Second Amani Africa which took place in South Africa on 6th November, 2015, in part, affirmed that:

“Cooperation between NATO and the African Union has deepened steadily for a number of years, in a spirit of good will between our two organizations. At the request of the African Union, NATO has been providing various forms of assistance, such as planning and other support for the African Union’s current operations, as well as for its longer-term peacekeeping capabilities, including through the operationalization of the African Standby Force. We have stepped up our training and education activities, in accordance with the African Union’s identified needs, including through Mobile Education Training Teams. At the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa, a NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer is helping to enhance our technical cooperation as well as our political dialogue. The AMANI AFRICA II exercise provides a further example of our excellent cooperation. NATO experts have supported the preparation phases of the exercise, and played an active role in the execution phase. NATO’s support to the African Union complements that of the United Nations, the European Union, and African regional organizations, as well as that by individual nations. We all share the vision of African nations cooperating ever more closely and effectively in matters of peace and security.” (NATO, 2015: AU,2015: Jens Stoltenberg, 2015).

On 4th November, 2019, NATO and AU further signed a newer cooperation agreement superseding the one signed in 2014 laying the ground for closer practical and political cooperation between the two bodies (NATO/AU, 2019).

During the signing, NATO’s Deputy Assistant SG for Operations remarked;

“This is an important step towards bringing our two organizations closer together. We are strengthening our political and practical partnership with the African Union so we can better respond to common threats and challenges.” (NATO/Parish, 2019)

In as much as the there’s logistical, military, technical and financial support to AMISOM/FGS in the AU-NATO strategic partnership, skepticism still exist among the Somalis, experts and scholars on whether the interests of the defense alliance are based on genuine concerns of state reconstruction or otherwise its military enlargement agenda in the Horn of Africa. This therefore pinpoints the need for the two agencies to work on mutual, legitimate and legal basis towards

formidable partnerships in rebuilding fragile states in Africa and in particular Somalia.

5.3 AU/AMISOM strategic partnerships with sovereign state actors on state reconstruction in Somalia.

In this section AU/AMISOM strategic partnerships with three states is analyzed.

They include: United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Turkiye.

5.3.1 African Union–United States (AU-US) strategic partnerships on state reconstruction in Somalia

The African Union–United States partnership came into effect following the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two bodies in 2013 (U.S. Mission to The African Union (USAU), 2013). The MOU formalized cooperation on multiple disciplines including economy, trade, investment, development, peace and security, as well as democracy and governance (Williams, 2020). Towards enhancing strategic partnership with AU, United States Mission to the African Union (USAU) in many frameworks engage in promoting peace and stability, strengthening democracy, supporting sustainable economic development and improve the lives and health of African people (USAU, 2024). Support for the Somali state reconstruction agenda has been part of US initiatives. Since 2006, US major goal in respect to Somalia has been to neutralize the threats posed by Al-Shabaab seeking to remove the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (Williams, P. D. 2020). In supporting AMISOM initiatives in Somalia, US seek to promote peace and stability, prevent from being safe haven for global terrorism, and address the protracted humanitarian situation (US State Department, 2013).

Since 2000, Washington aimed at assisting to stabilize Somalia by partnering with local and international actors and in particular EU, AMISOM/AU, UN, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and subsequent Somali regimes. Washington's goals have been to establish an effective Somali state institution as well as counter insurgency initiatives. However, these initiatives have been hindered by Washington's unwillingness although justifiable to commit support into Somalia's divided and corrupt political institutions (Williams, 2020).

The US, since 2007, supported AMISOM with the FGS in combating Al-Shabaab in which Washington designated as a Terrorist group in 2008 (US State Department, 2008). Despite some success in creating an effective SNA and the drafting a new national security architecture in 2017, the fight against Al-Shabaab was at a stalemate (Williams, 2020). AFRICOM's investigation for the last quarter of 2019 suggested that there was stalemate towards the goal of establishing a 'security cocoon' around Mogadishu which created demotivation (Williams, 2020). Successive US regimes considered Al-Shabaab as an 'associated force' of Al-Qaeda for the purposes of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (Williams, 2020).

In 2010, due to drought and famine in Somalia, the humanitarian advocacy community convinced US and UN to grant an exception for action under the Somalia regime chocked with sanctions. This was meant to allow relief to flow across the zones where they were needy population under the insurgents control. This led to hundred US troops deployed in Somalia and operated on several commands namely; Joint Special Operations Command, Combined Joint Task

Force-Horn of Africa, US Army Africa, a Military Coordination Cell and AFRICOM in Mogadishu since 2014. In 2016, the Obama administration expanded its military action in Somalia aimed at defending US, AU and Somali security personnel in areas which were not officially considered ‘areas of active hostilities’. Trump administration went further to consider parts of Somalia as ‘area of active hostilities’ in March, 2017. This enabled US military commanders’ capability of defining targets and approving airstrikes (Williams, 2020).

Washington acknowledges security in Somalia as one of its vital issues. Upon recognizing the Somali government in 2013, Washington predesignated a diplomatic unit on Somalia issues at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi as its mission to Somalia in 2015. In 2016, Washington named its first ambassador to Somalia after close to a quarter of a century. A permanent diplomatic set up in Somalia was re-established in 2018 and the Embassy was reopened officially in 2019. The diplomatic situation was complicated by the Trump Administration’s decision in 2017 to enlist Somalia as a state whose citizens would be barred from receiving certain types of visas to enter the US. In emphasizing the US agenda in Somalia, President Trump stated:

“A persistent terrorist threat ... emanates from Somalia’s territory. The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven. Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects. Terrorists use under-governed areas in northern, central, and southern Somalia as safe havens from which to plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations. Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States” - (Presidential Proclamation of September, 2017)

Trump's Presidential Proclamation of September, 2017 as cited above demonstrate US foreign policy towards Africa and Somalia in particular the approach in addressing terrorism in the horn of Africa as a strategic partner to AU in the fight against terrorism and bringing stability in the horn of Africa. Trumps views also highlight the terror activities in the territory of Somalia are real threat to the national security and interest of the United States thus implying that US interests have been countering terrorism in Somalia other than Somalia state reconstruction. As part of strategic partnership, Washington provided adequate support to AMISOM TCCs, both domestically in training and equipment as well as in Somalia through their personnel receiving field mentorship. US also provided security assistance to SNA to establish greater stability and facilitated AMISOM's downsizing and strategic exit from Somalia (Williams, 2020).

According to congressional service report (CSR) (2020), Washington was largest humanitarian donor in Somalia with over \$450 million contribution in humanitarian aid in FY2019 and close to \$49 million for Somali refugees. Washington contributed more than \$285 million in FY2019 for AMISOM. The US Administration in the FY2020 foreign aid request proposed cuts to health, social service, education governance and agriculture initiatives (CSR report, 2020). From 2010-2020, US provided support of over \$2.5 billion for AMISOM and Somali efforts to counter Al-Shabaab. It also provided 500 million dollars in security assistance for SNA. In late 2017, US suspended support due to corruption claims. However, assistance for Danab units, Washington mentored elite continued. Some support to other units resumed in June 2019(CSR report, 2020). U.S. troops were estimated at 700 in Somalia by 2019 and engaged in "advise,

assist, and accompany” missions. Air strikes have been part of us defense policy in Somalia. US conducted airstrikes targeting Al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab insurgents for more than a decade and killed key senior Al-Shabaab operatives including Ahmed Abdi Godane in 2014. AFRICOM reported 35 strikes in 2017, 47 strikes in 2018 and 63 strikes in 2019. Al-Shabaab tried though in futility to launch attacks on an airfield used by the U.S. troops in central Somalia. (CSR, 2020).

According to foreign service personnel interviewed in Peace and Security Division, State Department of Foreign Affairs, Kenya on 8th September 2024 observed:

“Undoubtedly, US has been a key strategic partner to AU/AMISOM. US provided extensive training for AMISOM contingents from different TCCs. In 2012, Force Recon Marines from Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force 12 (SPMAGTF-12) trained military personal from the Ugandan contingents. In the same year Marines from SPMAGTF-12 also trained military from Burundi. Members of the Texas Army National Guard also participated in a separate training missions with the BNDF in Mudubugu, Burundi. Washington also sent its trainers to Djibouti to work with an army unit there to enhance their capacity and capabilities towards state reconstruction in Somalia. U.S. troops supported in training the Sierra Leone Armed Forces towards their deployment to Somalia in 2012.”

The above informant’s views demonstrate the greater intensity of US involvement in Somali reconstruction and strategic initiatives to improve the capacity and capabilities of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AMISOM.

Furthermore, according to the US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs; Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet on U.S. Relations with Somalia, on 18th March 2022 clearly expounded on the US policy towards Somalia as follows:

“U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to promote political and economic stability, prevent the use of Somalia as a safe haven for international terrorism, and alleviate the humanitarian crisis caused by years of conflict, drought, flooding, and poor governance. The United States is committed to helping Somalia’s government strengthen democratic institutions, improve stability and security, and deliver services for the Somali people. Since 2013, the FGS has made progress establishing government institutions, negotiating relationships with regional authorities, and supporting community stabilization. The United States supports the FGS’s state-building agenda for completing federal state formation, completing a review of the provisional constitution and holding a constitutional referendum, preparing for democratic elections, promoting reconciliation, and strengthening responsive and representative governing institutions. The United States recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia within its 1960 borders in accordance with the Somali provisional constitution, which includes Somaliland and Puntland. The United States also has supported the efforts of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali national forces in driving the al-Shabaab terrorist organization out of strategically important population centers and in extending security throughout Somalia.” (US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs; Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet on U.S. Relations with Somalia, on 18th March 2022)

The factsheet on U.S. Relations with Somalia highlight important areas which the United States prioritized as a major actor in the re-establishment of Somalia and Counter Terrorism. In response to the issues in Somalia, US has been working with the FGS and the Federal administrations, in coordination with the AU, the UN, and other partners working toward stabilizing and rebuilding Somalia along federal and democratic lines.

5.3.2 Africa Union–Turkiye Strategic Partnerships on state reconstruction in Somalia

The relationship between Turkiye and Africa Union was officially signed at 2008 Istanbul Summit which led to adoption of the Istanbul Declaration as well as the Framework for Cooperation Agreements (Ozkan & Orakci, 2015). The framework

focused on peace and security among issues of significant collaboration between Africa and Turkiye. The increasing humanitarian and development assistance delivered by Turkiye to Africa could be considered as strategic cooperation model. Turkey has been involved in strong economic and political ties with African states since 2007. The Turkish security engagement in Somalia demonstrates itself as an influential actor in Africa politics and more importantly protect its interests (marine, diplomatic and security) in the Indian Ocean, Horn of Africa and the Red Sea (Abdulle & Gurpinar, 2019).

At the height of Somali civil war, Turkiye joined international missions (UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia) to restore peace and delivering of humanitarian aid to the people of Somalia. Humanitarian aid agencies from Turkey contributed to the international humanitarian initiatives in the Somalia with a goal to alleviate the catastrophes. Dine & Yetim, (2012) alludes that Turkish foreign policy has been undertaking transformation process in every aspect. Consequently, the 1998 ‘Africa Action Plan’ was declared under the leadership of the former foreign minister Ismail Cem (Sezal, 2016) and in 2005 marked as the ‘Year of Africa’ (Yukleyen & Zulkarnain, 2015; Abdulle, & Gurpinar, 2019).

The visit to Somalia by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2011 and re-opening of Turkish embassy in Mogadishu enhanced the Turkiye’s opening policy on Somalia. The major goal of the visit was considered to contribute in addressing humanitarian situation in Somalia due to famine. This marked the turning point in Turkish involvement in Somalia. This led to Turkiye deepening its cooperation with Somalia. According to Abdulle & Gurpinar (2019), Reopening of Turkish Embassy in Somalia (2011), the hosting of Istanbul-Somalia Summit (2012) as

well as taking lead in OIC's aid initiatives to Somalia where Turkey key agenda towards demonstrating its impact in Somalia. Wasuge (2016) alludes that Turkiye positioned itself as a key humanitarian actor in Somalia as security, diplomatic as well as economic interests come into effect.

In interrogating the Turkiye's strategic roles on state reconstruction in Somalia, a policy brief no. 92 Nairobi/Istanbul/Brussels published on 8th October 2012, boldly, in part, highlights:

“Lay out a public, clear and realistic long-term strategy for its Somalia policy, backed by secure funding and an increase in the number of specialists in both Mogadishu and Ankara dedicated to its efforts in Somalia, and in particular build up its knowledge of Somalia and coordinate with other countries and international agencies active in the country; remain impartial in internal politics and avoid being manipulated by Somali politicians long experienced in outwitting foreign newcomers; expand targeted assistance to peaceful regions outside of Mogadishu; priorities institution building and knowledge transfer, including investing in the return of educated diaspora Somalis; help with political party development, constitutional reform and the creation of accountable institutions; take a more active role in UN peacebuilding efforts; manage Somali expectations of how much assistance it can provide; establish a standardized and transparent bidding process for contracts and subcontracts to avoid empowering predatory businesspeople; offer mediation expertise and financial assistance to peace and reconciliation efforts; stop being indifferent to the endemic Somali corruption and tie diplomatic and development assistance to upholding the rule of law and establishing accountable and effective institutions; provide more support to AMISOM and integrate security assistance within existing international mechanisms, rather than embarking on a parallel and duplicate process; help Somalia create a professional, decentralized police force, which, rather than external forces such as AMISOM, will be responsible for the consolidation of peace and security; coordinate with other countries and international agencies to prevent overlap and ensure aid is provided strategically; ensure Turkish businesspeople operating in Somalia neither exploit vulnerable Somalis nor are exploited by Somali elite; and support the Joint Financial Management Board agreed to at the London and Istanbul conferences to ensure that government revenue and intern is used appropriately and efficiently.” (International Crisis Group, policy Briefing: Africa Briefing N°92: Nairobi/Istanbul/Brussels, 8 October 2012, Page 1 and 2)

The above Policy briefs are in tandem with the Turkiye's foreign policy towards Somalia. Turkey's active foreign policy in Somalia traditionally, has been on humanitarian and development sphere which has enhanced Turkiye's recognition and its emergence as a vital strategic actor in the AU. The brief further corroborates the findings of Siradag (2017). Siradag pointed that Turkiye has been useful to reconstruction of Somalia through its initiatives of establishing markets and contributing in defense development. Turkish airlines flights to Mogadishu has contributed to mutual development of the Somali relations with the regional states, and the international community. The policy has also deepened AU and led to the establishment of more strategic partnerships and Ankara's vital experience during the phases of Somali state reestablishment.

Baird (2016) points that Turkiye interest in Somalia was 'humanitarian aid, commerce, and security. Possessing geostrategic advantage was Turkiye considerable interests in Somalia (Yalçın, 2017). This was justified from the Military Training Cooperation Agreement between the Turkey and Somalia in 2010 which was implemented in 2012 (Turkish Official Gazette, 2011). This entailed Participation in the Joint Security Committee meetings where Somali authorities and its international partners (AMISOM in this context) coordinated the security sector reforms (Crisis Group, 2012: Abdulle & Gurpinar, 2019).

Turkiye relations with Somalia was successful and received public acceptance from Somali population. This was due to the fact that there was enhanced economic ties, shared Islamic identity, historical relations, accepted humanitarian models, common agreement by international community to establish Somalis

national security architecture. This created a smooth process for the creation of a defense “base” in Somalis territory. Within the Somali-Turkiye strategic partnerships, a military training facility ‘Turksom Military Training Center’ in Mogadishu was inaugurated on September 2017. Media termed the defense facility “as part of Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman foreign policy”. The construction of the facility began in 2015 with estimated that it costed around 50 million dollars.

Speaking during the inauguration ceremony the defense facility, the then Chief of Staff of Turkish military who later became the defense minister, Hulusi Akar stated that the facility’s main goal was to training the Somali armed forces. He stated that;

“This facility will increase Turkish efforts in ensuring regional and international peace and security.”

The Somali PM at the time also pointed out that the “base” was a part of states wider plan to re-establish its army.’ The “base” was intended to train approximately 10,000 Somali troops with a maximum capacity 1,000 troops at a time. Rossiter & Cannon (2018) posits that the trainings were to be conducted by 200-300 troops from Turkey military.

Despite good intentions and desired goals towards state reconstruction in Somalia, Turkiye initiatives had less coordination and partnership with the community of nations and little involvement with regional countries appears to be problematic in the sustaining the reconstruction course (Yalçın, 2017; Yukleyen & Zulkarnain, 2015). Turkiye engaged with different regional administrations such as Puntland and Somaliland which was inadequate. The fear that trained army by Turkiye could be “Turkiye’s proxy force” and would lead to clash with other players such

as the contingent trained by other foreign state (Rossiter & Cannon 2018). This may negatively and partially influence the interests of both Turkiye and Somalia. Turkiye's intervention in Somalia was problematic discourse to Al Shabab. The insurgencies certainly assured that "they don't accept foreign presence in Somalia (Yalçın, 2017), and any facility, base and/or training center is a potential target for them." The Turkish Mission attack in Somalia with a suicide car bomb on July 2013 by Al-Shabaab's attack (Yalçın, 2017); the claims that Turkish Airlines as well as defense facility were terror target for the 2016; Daallo Airlines (Mohamed, 2016; Vogt, 2016); the deadly attack in Mogadishu on October 2017 (Maruf, 2017) and targeting of Turkish citizen in May 2019 (Maruf, 2019) were the affirmations that challenges that Turkish initiative are facing for Al-Shabaab. Therefore, Turkiye required to develop strategic initiatives to deal with the challenges emanating from Al-Shabaab. Although it appears illogical, negotiating with the insurgents just as a viable practice by some aid bodies do would be an alternative mechanism for Turkey to address these challenges.

The Security Pact which was approved on 2017 by the Somali authorities and endorsed with international partners stipulates the priorities of security in Somalia in its path to state reconstruction. Major priorities remain to be political stability and military reconfiguration processes. SNA was obligated to prepare itself for formal hand over of the security mandate when AMISOM's Transition is in effect in 2021. The AMISOM exit strategy pushed the Somali authorities to accelerate rebuilding its army. Therefore, Turkish initiatives were seen a potential strategic partner in the security sector (Abdulle & Gurpinar, 2019).

While congratulating AU on its 61st Anniversary, Turkish foreign ministry in a statement on 25th May 2024 re-affirmed Ankara's commitment to the AU/AMISOM partnership on state reconstruction in Somalia:

“Our relations with the strategically important African continent and its nations are conducted "in a holistic, institutional, and systematic framework, based on the principles of mutual respect and equality. The main objective of our cooperation with African countries is to ensure that peace, stability, and development take root throughout Africa” (Turkish foreign ministry/Merve Berker, 25.05.2024)

This statement highlights Turkish foreign policy towards Africa and the growing strategic partnership with the African Union especially in the areas of peace, stability, and development in the African continent. The Turkish-Africa relations, considering Turkish-Somali bilateral relations pinpoints a formidable and sustainable grounds towards state reconstruction in Somalia during ATMIS as it was the case during AMISOM.

5.3.3 African Union-United Kingdom (AU-UK) strategic partnerships on state reconstruction in Somalia

The relations between AU and UK aimed at establishing a long-term and mutually beneficial partnerships founded on mutual interests for a future that safe, healthy and more prosperous (Vines, 2019: Joint Communiqué on the AU-UK Partnership on February 22, 2019). The partnership focuses on 5 key disciplines namely: unlocking accommodative development on economy in Africa; stability and security; sustainable natural resource management and climate change; investments in jobs, education, health; wider UK involvement and presence in the

Sahel region (Apuuli, 2019; Murithi, 2012). United Kingdom (UK) as a strategic partner to AU and AMISOM supported many international developmental initiatives through long term cooperation. Most importantly, UK and Somalia maintain strong bilateral relations and The British Embassy in Mogadishu symbolizes their diplomatic links. In respect to AMISOM state reconstruction in Somalia, UK foreign policy placed emphasis on “Sustainable development” in its bid to support stable, secure and prosperous Somalia.

On 28th January 2016, then UK Secretary of State in charge of International Development, Hon On 28th January 2016, then UK Secretary of State in charge of International Development, Hon Priti Patel shuttled to Somalia where she made re-affirmation on the significance of the UK- Somalia partnership as well as deep commitment to AMISOM (AMISOM,2016). Patel met the top brass of AU/AMISOM to discuss initiatives to enhance prospects for peace and security ahead of the Somalia’s London’s Conferences held in May 2016 (AMISOM,2016). Patel commended the ongoing initiatives made by AMISOM and highlighted the essential mandate AMISOM continued to execute in enabling Somalia to take up its security responsibility. The then Minister announced that London would provide more humanitarian funding amounting to £10 million to address urgent needs due to worsening drought situation in Somalia. This support delivered through three UN specialized agencies including UNICEF, WFP, FAO to address food security, nutrition and health services.

The then UK Secretary of State stated further stated that:

“AMISOM together with UK military support are playing a crucial role in helping to deliver a stable, prosperous and secure Somalia... Great progress towards peace has been made, but significant challenges remain. That’s why Global Britain is bringing the international community together in London (2016 London’s Conferences on Somalia) to agree future support to Somalia and ensure the country’s future stability” (Patel/AMISOM, 2016)

The then UNSG Special Representative in Somalia Michael Keating on 13th December 2016, appreciated the UK administration for the deployment of troops to support the AMISOM. Speaking at the UN base in Mogadishu for the UK contingent who had served for the 3 months in Somalia during a UN Special Service Medal Award stated that;

“It’s already evident the changes that are coming as a result of your presence. I just want to acknowledge that and say that I’m very proud of the work you’re doing. I’m very grateful for the work you’re doing. I know that a lot of you have been in hardship duty stations and assignments. This isn’t the easiest in the world but I hope you’ve enjoyed it..... We’re trying to create the space, both physical and political, for the Somalis to sort out their problems. And the electoral process is an important part of that. Providing security for the electoral process is also an important part” - (Keating /AMISOM, 2018)

SRSR further stated that UNSOM was supporting security forces of the FGS through training and equipment. He pointed that:

“The hard part of security, that is, having security forces that are capable whether they are police, or army or intelligence or maritime and who can work with the African Union. But it’s also the softer parts of security” -Mr Keating added in regard to efforts the UN was doing to stabilize Somalia (Keating /AMISOM, 2016).

Speaking at the same event, the then head of UNSOS, Hubert Price, appreciated the contingent and stated its personnel had displayed dedication to their assignments despite difficulties. He added that:

“I’d like to take this opportunity on behalf of UNSOS to thank you for the immense contribution you have made to the Somali people, to AMISOM and the UN family. I commend the spirit and dedication you showed to your duties despite the challenges encountered.....By training AMISOM troops, the Somali National Army, UNSOS personnel and contractors, you offered direct support to UNSOS and ensured effective utilization of the logistics support we provide By training engineers and medical personnel, you supported areas central to the operations of AMISOM. We recognize and appreciate the tasks you have accomplished over the three months of your deployment. I thank the UK government for this initiative. The support of our partners goes a long way in aiding the stabilization process in Somalia”, (Price/AMISOM Magazine 2016).

Through the Operation TANGHAM (codename accorded to the UK military initiatives in combating Islamic extremism in Somalia), British Army personnel since 2017, were deployed in Somalia to support three institutions: UN, AMISOM and direct support to the SNA (UK Ministry of Defense, 2017). The UK military were aimed at providing stability and security to the Somalis. They provided training to SNA on medical, leadership, intelligence, engineering, logistical and human rights aspects UK Ministry of Defense, 2017).

In 1st July 2018, UK donated equipment amounting 5.6 million pounds to AMISOM to assist in clearing key supply routes as a strategic step towards enhancing the Somali transition process (AMISOM, 2018). The equipment included backhoe and front-end loaders, tractor trucks, bulldozers, forklifts and module dump tipper which were utilized in Sectors 1, 2 and 5 together with the Enabling Units situated in Mogadishu. During the handover of the equipment, former UK Ambassador to Somalia (David Concar) stated that UK administration was proud to partner with AMISOM in its initiatives to bring stability and sustainable peace and security in Somalia (AMISOM, 2018). He enlightened:

“What we are doing today, transferring 5.6m pounds worth of equipment is, we hope, going to make a real difference to the ability of AMISOM to clear roads, supply routes and to press ahead with stabilizing Somalia and working in partnership with Somalia’s own forces as they get stronger.....We thank you AMISOM for everything you have done and the troop contributing countries and above all the troops who are out there in these dangerous environments often paying for the stability and progress we have seen with the ultimate sacrifice,” (AMISOM News/ Concar, 2018)

While receiving the equipment and acknowledging concurs submission, former Force Commander to AMISOM, Lt Gen Owoyesigire stated that the equipment would play an important role towards the realization of successful transitional processes(<https://amisom-au.org/2018/07/uk-donates-heavy-equipment-to-amisom/>). He thanked the UK Government in supporting AMISOM as with the force enablers (AMISOM, 2018).

In a press statement published by Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development on 27th September 2018, UK, Italy, Ethiopia and Somalia brought together international partners in support of Somalia’s state reconstruction (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2018). Former Minister for Africa Harriett Baldwin co-hosted the meeting at the UNGA in New York, with Somalia’s Foreign Minister (Ahmed Isse Awad), Ethiopia’s State Minister (Hirut Zemene) and Italian counterpart (Enzo Moavero). AUPSC Commissioner Chergui and Neven Mimica, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development were also in attendance. Baldwin acknowledged resilience and contribution of AMISOM and the Somali forces in bringing stability and counter insurgency initiatives in Somalia (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2018). The former British Prime Minister, Theresa May during her visit to Kenya on 30th

August 2018, announced over 7 million pounds of extra financing to support AMISOM and further called on international community to provide funds to AMISOM to enhance successful transition (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2018). In demonstrating Somalia commitment during the meeting, former Somali Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (HE. Ahmed I. Awad) emphasized that:

“The Federal Government of Somalia remains committed to implementing the key political, economic and security reforms that will help Somalia emerge from the many difficult years it has experienced. The support of the international community has been vital to Somalia thus far. We look forward to continued engagement and support with our international partners as we advance our reform agenda and the transfer of responsibility for Somalia’s security from AMISOM to Somali security forces.” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2018)

In an article, “Mired in Mogadishu: An Appraisal of UK Engagement in Somalia” Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies Published in 2023 clearly informs on the UK priority towards state reconstruction in Somalia and further identifies FGS and AMISOM as principal partners towards the realization of the mandate;

“UK policymakers have long framed Somalia as a strategic priority, particularly in relation to tackling ‘radicalization, terrorism, piracy, and unregulated migration’.⁶⁴ As a corollary of Al-Shabaab’s resilience and the country’s ongoing insecurity, the basic premise of British engagement has not changed for much of the past decade. References to stabilization and conflict resolution in the 2021 Integrated Review reflected similar themes to those shared across the UK Government Strategy – Somalia (including Somaliland) (2014–17), UK Somalia Strategy (2017–22), and an unpublished country action plan. In each case, security and development programming was nested within a wider state-building approach designed to ‘reduce the threat ... posed to UK national interests by building a more stable, peaceful, and prosperous Somalia’..... As the second-largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor country to Somalia between 2011

and 2020, a significant proportion of UK bilateral official development assistance (ODA) has been devoted to social infrastructure. Specifically, this includes government assistance, public sector policy and administrative reform, public financial management (PFM) and support for subnational governance. Successive versions of the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF), a multi-donor instrument led by the Department for International Development (DFID), for instance, were paramount in the formation of second- and third- generation FMSs. The UK has similarly worked to strengthen the building blocks for FGS legitimacy and accountability in line with successive National Development Plans, from judicial efficacy and service provision to encouraging inclusive commercial growth. Additionally, long-running investments have been made in security sector reform and enabling law enforcement, with UK personnel leading the policing strand of Somalia's Comprehensive Approach to Security framework, and supporting related projects on stabilization and countering violent extremism/deradicalization. Efforts continue to find a sustainable political settlement at the federal level.” (Rusi,2023 / www.rusi.org)

The then visiting UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Rt. Hon. Mark Lancaster) on 10th April 2018, appreciated AMISOM troops for securing Somalia and minimizing terrorism. The Minister also had engagement with the then AU Special Representative to Somalia (Amb. Francisco C. Madeira) and the AMISOM Force Commander (Lt. Gen. Jim B. Owoyesigire). They discussed the arrangements on transition of security mandate from AMISOM to the Somali security system, the nature as well as volume of support to the AMISOM by UK.

Mark Lancaster pointed out that:

“I have just met with Ambassador Madeira and the Force Commander. I want to start by paying tribute to the work of AMISOM over the last eleven years and indeed the sacrifices that have been made, because without doubt, unless the good work of AMISOM over the last eleven years had happened, then Somalia would not be on the course of progress that it is today,” (Lancaster/AMISOM, 2018)

In a rejoinder, Amb. Madeira after the meeting with Mr. Lancaster added that:

“We were delighted that the UK has taken so much interest in what we are doing here, that they sent a Minister of State for the Armed Forces. That visit in itself is very significant in the sense that we have a very high and senior member of the UK government with us in this battle front” (Madeira /AMISOM, 2018)

Madeira highlighted that AMISOM enjoyed good partnership with the UK Mission Support Team in Somalia and appreciated the support they accorded AMISOM. He stated that:

“I had the opportunity through the minister to thank Her Majesty’s government for the immense support that the UK government is giving us. We have the UK 70 who are doing so much work in so many areas with us and are enabling us to be more effective on the ground. We have an entire ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) system, that they have helped to put in place and is now fully operational” - (Madeira /AMISOM, 2018).

The then Minister of State for Africa (Harriett Baldwin,) in 2019 stated that the UK will pump over 30 million Euros into development and security initiatives across Africa as it fasttrack its investments. The financial assistance came as UK and the AU signed a new strategic partnership and solidifying the involvement between the two institutions (Business Day, March 4, 2019). Prior to the signing of the partnership at the AU Commission Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Baldwin stated:

“Our new partnership will also cement our relationship with the African Union, building on growing economic ties to forge new opportunities for young people and reinforce our close bonds.” - (Business Day, March 4, 2019)

On 30th October 2023, the inaugural High-Level Dialogue in London between UK and AU Commission was held with a bilateral discussion between the then UK Secretary in Charge of Development and Africa (Rt Hon. Andrew Mitchell, MP)

and the AU Commission Chairperson (H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat). They discussed on UK engagement with Africa, UK's partnership with the AU and the multilateralism in respect to the AU's admission as a permanent member of the G20. Concurrently, series of discussions between AU Commissioners HE Bankole Adeoye (Political Affairs, Peace, and Security) and HE Josefa Sacko (Rural Development, Agriculture, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Development) and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office senior officials took place covering governance, peace and security, climate and agriculture, respectively (Commonwealth and Development Office, 2023). Minister Mitchell and the Deputy Prime Minister affirmed the UK commitment to enhance the UK-AU partnership across priorities of mutual importance. Minister Mitchell further announced more funding to assist the AU Agenda 2063 as well as flagship project Silencing the Guns campaign: £10 million (stipends) to assist troops in Somalia, bringing the total commitment to ATMIS/AMISOM since 2022 to over £57 million; £3 million contributions via the FCDO's Tackling Deadly Diseases in Africa Programme to assist the Africa Centers for Disease Control and WHO to address preparedness and response to emergencies in Africa. The partnership was enhanced through a renewed MoU for UK-AU cooperation, formalizing agreed fields of partnerships over the next few years and commitment to hold biennial high-level meetings going forward (Commonwealth and Development Office, 2023). In the course of the meeting, AU Commission Chairperson, emphasized:

“The UK has a longstanding historical connection with the African continent and has actively partnered with the African Union in multiple domains, particularly in the realm of peace and

security. I'm very glad to have been received in London for these important and successful talks" (Moussa Faki Mahamat, 2023)

The then Minister for Africa (Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP) further reinforced by stating that:

"The UK is proud of our partnership with the African Union, and together, we're committed to a peaceful and prosperous Africa. I'm delighted that we've signed an MoU with the AU, which shows the strength of our relationship. A bright future for Africa is a brighter future for us all – from peace to climate, health, and trade we'll continue to work hand in hand with our African partners to build stability and security" (Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP, 2023)

In a nutshell, AU-UK Strategic Partnership contributed immensely to the achievements of AMISOM mandate to reconstruct Somalia. The engagements between the AU and UK high-ranking officials demonstrate the viability of the partnership in areas of funding, logistical support, training and conferences on peace. The AU and UK relations has established a long-term and mutually beneficial partnerships founded on mutual interests for a future that is safe, healthy and more prosperous. Somalia stability is a common benefit to both parties and the world because international terrorism has no boundaries in their extremist agenda.

5.4 Chapter summary

This chapter addressed the second objective of this study which to assess the significance of strategic partnerships between AU/AMISOM with UN country teams, and other international actors engaged on state reconstruction initiatives. This chapter discussed and interrogated the AU strategic partnerships with UN Country Teams in Somalia, NATO and EU as well as sovereign states with specific focus on US, UK and Turkey. The chapter established that strategic partnerships

significantly contributed to AMISOM initiatives in form of legitimization, funding, resolutions, technical assistance, strategic air lift, coordination, logistics, equipment, intelligence gathering, humanitarian aid, advisory, capacity building, donations, liaison initiatives, counter piracy, air combat mission, infrastructure development, training, surveillance and reconnaissance, international peace and reconstruction summits on Somalia. The subsequent chapter presents findings and discussions on challenges faced by AMISOM in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia.

CHAPTER SIX
CHALLENGES FACED BY THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN
SOMALIA (AMISOM) IN CARRYING OUT STATE
RECONSTRUCTION IN SOMALIA.

6.0 Introduction

This chapter addressed the third objective of the study. It interrogated the challenges faced by AMISOM in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia. In analyzing this objective, in conformity with the paradigms employed by scholars, practitioners, AU and UN official working group, the study classified the challenges into three dimensions namely; strategic, tactical and operational challenges. This chapter also offered a detailed analysis on how these limitations in PSOs can be overcome to ensure that there's relatively a framework towards addressing future peace support operations particularly in the African continent and beyond.

6.1 Strategic challenges

This subsection analyses the strategic challenges encountered by AMISOM in the execution of state reconstruction initiatives in Somalia. In the context of this study, strategic challenges basically refer to the key limitations that AMISOM encountered in attempting to attain its long-term strategic initiatives towards state reconstruction. These challenges emerged out of internal and external variables and demanded a proper planning and decision making at both AUPSC and UNSC. The pinpointed strategic challenges largely focus on the issues that relate to legislation, leadership systems, global order and funding.

6.1.1 Complexities and dynamics in the mission's mandate

AMISOM mandate constituted a complex assignment that previous international missions (UNISOM 1: UNISOM 2: UNITAF: Ethiopia Intervention) failed to achieve their goals (Ligawa, 2017). The complexities and dynamics in the mandate were evidenced by the fact that the mission could not solely be executed by AU but in partnership with other international agencies. The series of resolutions by the security council in regard to the mandate of AMISOM as a multidimensional force were huge, varied, complex and kept on evolving from time to time between 2007 and 2021 and continues to evolve in nature and scope as in the case of ATMIS and now AUSSOM. The mandate in itself has never been commensurate with the support in which UNSC and other relevant parties gave to the AMISOM. Between 20th February 2007 and 21st December 2021, UNSC passed over 45 resolutions in respect to the dynamics, nature and scope of AMISOM mandate (UNSC, 2024: AMISOM, 2024). These made a problematic and challenging discourse in the execution of the stipulated mandate. As propounded by the securitization theorists, securitization of the mandate was the key component in the facilitation of peace and security initiatives in Somalia. Williams (2013) observed that AMISOM mandate was very impossible to be executed within a short period. Musoma (2021) also points that the provided mandate was too ambitious to be practically executed and at the same time operated in the war space with a few numbers of troops. Consequently, the incompetent mandate made AMISOM an easy target for insurgents and this led to the numerous casualties from the enemy.

The models employed by AMISOM guaranteed partial success because a voluminous work was to be done but quite limited in means (Ligawa, 2017). Ligawa further alludes that AMISOM mandate was renewed every other time by UNSC and was subjected to political dynamics, financial implications and other unprecedented factors beyond the control of the AU, AMISOM and the Somali Authorities. Consequently, AMISOM had various mandates to undertake and required various forms of assistance so that they would be attained. For success to be accomplished by AMISOM troops, other stakeholders in the process needed to play their respective roles. In the same context, UNSC kept on changing, amending and reviewing and extending the mandate of AMISOM. In conformity with the theory of securitization, adequate support of the AMISOM mandate remained key component in the successful facilitation of peace initiatives in Somalia. When the UNSC adopted Resolution 1772(2007), it authorized AMISOM to take “all necessary measures to inter alia protect the institutions of the Transitional Institutions of the Somali government and support dialogue and reconciliation by providing protection and safe passage to personnel involved.” In line with Resolution 2036 (2012), the UNSC was more specific in authorizing AMISOM “to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia”. In spite of the political goals, the mandate of AMISOM was outlined by the entire scope and resolutions of the Security Council, and was originally viewed as a military intervention intended to create a conducive environment and part of a wider political strategy which was still taking shape.

According to a Foreign Service Officer in the State Department of Foreign Affairs (Peace and Security Division Department) in the Kenya's Foreign Affairs and Diaspora Ministry interviewed on 25th July 2024 enlightened that:

“Support of the AMISOM mandate remained a complex phenomenon for the success of state reconstruction. It entailed a multicultural undertaking which required support of various kinds; logistical, financial, legal and technical support. The scope of the mandate should have been comprehensive and clear and any amendments would require deeper assessment to achieve the desired outcomes. Unfortunately, this was not the case in AMISOM”.

This was further reinforced by an informant interviewed on 23rd July 2024 enlightened:

“The mandate of AMISOM was enormous to the extent that African Union alone could not execute the peace support operations. Security council, in their own wisdom and proper assessment, should have considered logistical, operational and military factors before issuing series of resolutions that would in the long run not be effectively implemented”

These statements acknowledge the fact that the AMISOM mandate was not commensurate with its capacity and capability. The statements further agree with the previous finding by Amadi (2012); Williams (2017) and Ligawa (2017). The glaring reality in these contexts pinpoint the need to implement the Brahimi Panel recommendations on UN peace operation in 2000 ([https://www.unv.org/sites/default/files/Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations \(Brahimi Report\) - A-55-305.pdf](https://www.unv.org/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20the%20Panel%20on%20United%20Nations%20Peace%20Operations%20(Brahimi%20Report)%20-%20A-55-305.pdf) retrieved on 9th October 2024). The report asserts that AU peace support operations have far reaching implications especially in the logistics, areas of coordination, training, doctrine, capacities and capabilities.

6.1.2 Inadequate funding to the mission

The positive outcome of any PKO/PSO squarely lies in its funding capacity to address logistical, technical, personnel and operational components. The logistical challenge constitutes communication and equipment as well as the troops capability to maintain its modern infrastructure and supply systems. For AMISOM to make strides in Somalia, adequate financial assistance from the international community and donor partners was needed to support its initiatives. Many experts and scholars allude that inadequate funding hindered AMISOM from attaining its desired strategic responsibilities. Within the concept of operations, voluminous resources were needed for efficacy. De Coning and Freear (2013) assert that AMISOM was unable to fund itself with TCCs contributions which made it to be largely dependent on external financing. The procurement of military hardware largely depended on the availability of financing which the AU could not relinquish to foreign donors. European Union as the major donor announced plans to cut down on their financing on AMISOM (Ligawa, 2017). EU stated that the cut on funds was as a result to austerity measures caused by the financial challenges on the African Peace Facility (APF) which funded AMISOM and reflected huge demands placed on the facility to assist peace and security efforts in Africa (Ligawa, 2017).

The financing of AMISOM operations required astronomical figures of financial packages. AMISOM received funding of 1 billion dollars covering allowances for the 22,000 military personnel, payment for police, international and local civilian personnel as well as operational costs for civilian offices based in Nairobi. For

example, EU provided 1 billion dollars to AMISOM between 2007 and the end 2015 (Mahmood & Ani (2017). EU cut down financial contribution to AMISOM by 20 % from January 2016. AMISOM required close to \$300 million on a monthly basis. AMISOM forces were paid an allowance of \$1,028 monthly with no other allowances. For every KDF soldier, government deducted an administration cost of \$200 implying that every military personnel got \$828. This cut created discontentment among the troops considering the risks in the pacification of Somalia (Ligawa, 2017). As a mitigation measure, AU with other partners such as EU, UK, France, US China and UN were prompted to have discussions on how they could mitigate on the budgetary issues to avoid “waste and duplication of functions”.

An analysis on the reports by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) shows how funding challenges in the AMISOM elevated the debate on external support for the mission; raised issues over AMISOM’s legacy after decade of operations and spurred the development of concrete agenda for AMISOM’s withdrawal by 2020/21. Majority of the key informants acknowledged that funding was a major issue for AMISOM activities and this called the need for AUPSC to explore mechanism to fund the mission. Both the experts and scholars concur that limited financial and logistical base hindered the performance of AMISOM. These call for international community to develop structural and budgetary frameworks before deploying peace support operations in Africa.

According to one of the critical key informants (Foreign Service Personnel) interviewed at the Peace and Security Division- State Department of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi on 28th July 2024 highlighted that:

“AMISOM was fiscally constrained, the lack of requisite operational and logistical capabilities and capacities as well as lack of force enablers and multipliers immensely undermined the mission’s goal towards state reconstruction in Somalia. AU within its budget should develop a kitty that should support its peace keeping operations within the African continent. That would be one of the best approaches towards addressing budgetary challenges facing existing AU missions”

A defense expert (Military Personnel) interviewed online on 20th July 2024 from Ministry of Defense (DOD H/Qs), Nairobi further enlightened:

“During the time we were in the mission (AMISOM), financial Support of the mandate was the biggest challenge for the success of the operations. From the scope of activities, the operation required astronomical figures of funds due to multidimensional undertakings that required support ranging from salary and remuneration of both civilian and military components, logistics, operational costs, equipment among many other needs. The personnel doing their mandate couldn’t achieve much because they were not fully facilitated in their pursuit to accomplish the set objectives.”

The key informants’ views above correspond with Hull & Svensson (2008). Hull & Svensson argue that AMISOM’s ability to perform its mandate was frustrated by due to lack of adequate resources and the failures in deploying adequate military personnel, a predicament that even other AU missions and many PSOs across the globe faces generally. The risky environment, perpetual conflict as well as a slow phase of reconciliation, in combination with the delays in deploying troops means that that AMISOM had very little effect on the prevailing circumstances in Somalia. Nonetheless, the AMISOM was able to execute some limited responsibilities successfully towards state reconstruction.

6.1.3 Inadequacies in the overall mission's capacity and capability

Insufficiency in the number of personnel to assure stabilization of zones liberated from Al-Shabaab and to continue with its mandate was an issue that undermined the effectiveness of AMISOM. The expansive Somalia with a total land area of 637,660 km² (246,202 miles²) and a total coastline stretch of 3,025 km (1,879.6 miles), (World Data, 2023) required huge number of militaries, police and civilian personnel for AMISOM to have significant control. Through UNSCR 2036, AMISOM troops capacity was increased from 12000 to 17,731 positively impacted on the military operations towards attaining its mandate. Although there was an increase, the number was still below the desired figure to stabilize and pacify the entire territory of Somalia and due consideration of the asymmetrical nature of the threats posed by Al Shabab (Ligawa,2017). Due to limited military personnel, the efforts were limited to a few districts in Mogadishu (Kromah 2010). Consequently, presence of AMISOM in Mogadishu was confined to vital sectors such as the harbors, airports, government buildings and mission posts (Boon, 2012).

Scarce nature of military equipment and supplies was another issue connected to resource restrictions. The shortage of equipment particularly aviation equipment prohibited AMISOM from conducting offensive air operations thus a huge limitation to the efficacy. AMISOM military personnel would have moved effectively and safely with this form of supplies (Tres, 2014). AMISOM also faced budgetary challenges for wages and reimbursements for state-owned equipment among TCCs. This included absence of assistance for troop enablers as well as multipliers. The operations of AMISOM were harmed due to the

inadequacies. AMISOM was overburdened to the situation that it was not able to increase its geographical scope of military operations. The outcomes of these contexts were extremely hazardous to regional peace and security (Australian Universities, 2013). Furthermore, the AMISOM and SNA personnel were forced to abandon or sell their military equipment's due to lack of payment (Kiyonga, 2015). Despite high levels of training of troops, they could not defeat contemporary insurgencies without necessary and modern military assets. Ideally, troops should not deploy to warzones without adequate military hardware because defeat would be the outcome in an already complex situation. In absence of the necessary armor, initiatives towards state reconstruction in a fragile situation like Somalia would be an exercise in futility. This frustrated the credibility and weakens the peace missions which are responsible. AMISOM 's greatest challenge was specialists with reliable expertise and skills in different fields such as medicine, intelligence gathering and engineering. To cure this deficiency, AMISOM was dependent on external actor to provide finance, training and equipment's directly to TCCs as it was in the case of Kenya and Uganda.

One of the key informants (Somali NGO officer) interviewed on 13th June 2024 in Nairobi enlightened that:

“AMISOM forces were inadequately equipped to execute their combat and non-combat tasks. Some insurgents possessed more superior weapons than the AMISOM forces. Inadequate military armor, inadequate air support, few powerful machine guns and Mine Clearance Vehicles were some of the challenges in relation to equipment. Consequently, these led to increase in civilian and military casualties”

These views agree with the findings of Williams (2012). Williams observe that the AMISOM troops did not have sophisticated mortar radar equipment which would have helped in reducing levels of civilian casualties. When troops lack basic military equipment then they are vulnerable to IED attacks and ambushes. In spite of the high level of training of AMISOM soldiers, defeating the contemporary insurgencies in absence of sophisticated and state of the art military equipment, the outcome of the mission was futile. The contemporary insurgencies are more equipped than some of the conventional military forces. Troops should not be deployed to combat zone when there's little or no adequate military hardware.

Ligawa (2017) alludes that peacekeeping and peace enforcement trainings are separate and distinct. PSOs needs training in the form of mine/booby-trap handlings, cease-fires supervisions, media liaisons, patrols, checkpoint operations, law and order maintenance and the rebuilding of infrastructures which are vital to Africa's PSOs. The AMISOM training was specific to mission and made provisions for "complex, integrated, multifaceted operations geared towards support and facilitation of comprehensive peace agreements." More importantly, the focus of PSO was evolving gradually from peacekeeping to peace-building contexts. SNA in itself was not prepared to conduct operations. AMISOM could not develop an exit strategy if the Somali national security mechanism was not able to maintain security after the AMISOM exit.

As observed by an informant (Academician) interviewed in Nairobi on 28th June 2023;

“The training curriculum and strategy of the Somali national army did not have adequate infrastructural mechanism. There were personnel to be trained but there were no resources and proper curriculum to empower the personnel. The personnel were not paid little stipend to sustain them in the military training camp and this killed their morale and passion towards serving in the mission. Within the structures, the registration and vetting framework meaning elements of Al-Shabaab and their sympathizers could be getting the skills, expertise without the knowledge of both AMISOM and Somalia authorities.”

As informed by the above key informant, such limitations made training SNA personnel very complex. Most of forces deserted and left training half-way while others came for the training at their own discretion and time. Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) lacked institutional, logistical and operational capabilities and were not able to integrate fully into AMISOM initiatives. Objectives of training could not be attained. SNA was a conglomerate of multiple militias including clan militia and remnants of the defunct SNA.

According to one of the critical key informants (Security Expert) interviewed on 18th July 2024 at in Nairobi on 28th July 2024 informed that:

“Beyond combat missions in peace keeping operations as in the case of AMISOM and currently ATMIS require adequate and broader training in respect to intelligence, CIMIC, technology, compliance with international law, protection of civilians. The training in AMISOM was undermined by the sectorization of the TCCs, a glaring gap that the UNSC and AUPSC ignored from the beginning. There was no way military from different countries with different training curriculum, different levels of training and with different doctrine could work effectively without a harmonized framework of training which should be guided by the AU/UN guidelines.”

Towards harmonization, common doctrinal paradigms for training modules should have been adopted for unity of purpose. Regrettably, trainings were done haphazardly by various actors; the training packages were not synchronized. Every

Actor wanted to train based on their respective doctrines therefore creating immense confusions. These call for a singular established recruitment and training facility where they could be trained based on a common doctrine which has the best global practice which appreciates the unique nature of the operation and the environment. These would have promoted the efficacy of AMISOM and consolidate reconstruction milestones in Somalia (Ligawa, 2017).

6.2 Tactical challenges

This section analyzed the tactical challenges that AMISOM encountered during the mission. Tactical challenges refer to the obstacles that conceptual actions implemented as one or more specific tasks encounters. Tactical capability is the ability to maneuver and disposition of AMISOM troops in the combat mission. At the tactical levels, challenges were analyzed in context of a common understanding of the operation, cooperation, discipline and code of conduct in the mission.

6.2.1 Invisible and challenging enemy: the Al-Shabaab

Attacking an enemy which is invisible in its approaches is a complex challenge in any peace support operation mission. It is always difficult to differentiate between the local population and Al-Shabaab because of its guerrilla approach to dealing with circumstances of their missions. With its invisible nature, Al-Shabaab launched wide-scale conventional attacks on AMISOM and SNA by executing mortar attacks on the key international compound within the precincts of Mogadishu Airport. The successful attacks on military bases and convoys also enabled Al-Shabaab to seize huge amounts of military arsenal from both the AMISOM and the SNA. Ligawa (2017) posits that Al-Shabaab claimed to have

launched 418 attacks between October 2017 and April 2018. Many of these were military attacks (166 cases), Improvised Explosive Devices (101 cases), series of assassination (67 cases), attacks by use of grenade (43 cases), and suicidal attacks (10 cases). Ligawa points that 54% estimate of Al-Shabaab attacks were aimed at SNA and allied militias while 28% targeted AMISOM contingents. The frequency of attacks was evidenced in Mogadishu and its environs (125 cases), with the next highest number of attacks happened in Afgoye (28 cases), Bosaso (22 cases), Baraawe (19 cases), Qoryoley (17 cases) and Beledweyn (16 cases). This statistical information was synonymous with the official data by AMISOM that suggested Al-Shabaab attacks were more than once against the mission every other day. Key supply routes from Mogadishu to Barawe and Baidoa were the most targeted by the insurgents.

Apart from its fighting capabilities, Al-Shabaab collected adequate revenue through extortion of local populations as well as illegal commercial activities. In certain parts, Al-Shabaab maintained sophisticated systems of administration which were premised on coercion and fear to the local population. At the same time, they provided a modicum of justice which was viewed as more reliable as compared to the Somali government. In Mogadishu, for example, Al-Shabaab exercised huge control and ability to infiltrated tax institutions and even top government officials as well as extorting traders through protection rackets.

In this context, AMISOM principal mandate was to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and additionally provide stability within which Somali population can pursue their state reconstruction. However, this created a harsh and resistive feedback from Al-Shabaab which concentrated its combats on AMISOM across

major sectors with unprecedented assaults on major supply routes between Mogadishu, Barawe and Baidoa. Funds raised from hijacking, piracy and individual states and diasporic assistance aided Al-Shabaab to pay salaries of its members (ibid). Moreover, Al-Shabab's resilience was enhanced by the development in technological, scientific developments and Artificial Intelligence (AI) which allowed Al-Shabaab to communicate, network and enlist the assistance of global terror networks (Wise 2011).

The military wing of Al-Shabaab were composed of militants from local and transnational backgrounds, and the fact that it constituted disparate segments caused a huge obstacle to the success of AMISOM because it was unable to define and focus on a specific-gravity context.

The combatants in the group were from a local guerrilla fighter as well as global Al-Qaeda terror networks. Consequently, AMISOM faced dilemma in determining who was a member of Al-Shabaab (ibid). Al-Shabaab's nature also posed a severe threat to AMISOM. Dagne (2011) observed that the group was created in 2003 with the major intention of irredentism and creation of a greater Somalia.

An Al-Shabaab suicide bomber (Abdisalam Ali) made a viral video publication of martyrdom before killing himself on 29th October 2011 in Mogadishu stating;

"My brothers and sisters, do Jihad in America, do Jihad in Canada, do Jihad in England [and] anywhere in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in China, in Australia — anywhere you find kuffar [infidels]. Fight them and be firm against them" (Sourced from Appendix C of Parliament of Australian Report– Statement of Reasons – Al-Shabaab, 2024)

Furthermore, on 16th November 2011, a member of Al-Shabab, Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage warned:

"We are telling Kenya that they still have the opportunity to back away from the hellfire it was dragged into and leave our soil, otherwise they will continue suffering"(Sourced from Appendix C of Parliament of Australian Report– Statement of Reasons – Al-Shabaab, 2024)

On 29th December 2011, an Al-Shabaab spokesperson vowed that the terror group would launch retaliatory attacks in Kenya if authorities did not withdraw troops from Somalia:

"Kenya has peace, its cities have tall buildings and business is flourishing there. If your government ignores our calls to stop its aggression on Somali soil, we will strike at the heart of your interests"(Sourced from Appendix C of Parliament of Australian Report– Statement of Reasons – Al-Shabaab, 2024).

The above citations sourced from Appendix C of Parliament of Australia Report– Statement of Reasons – Al-Shabaab, (2024), clearly demonstrated the extent of Al-Shabab actions to ensure that they achieve and advance their aspirations among them challenging AMISOM quest to the realization of its reconstruction mandate and existential threat to the neighboring and regional states stability as well as the international community. The unconventional approaches and guerilla tactics they employed in wars against AMISOM conventional approach presented a dilemma that state reconstruction in Somalia may not be easily realized. The extremist jihadist doctrine entrenched in the aspirations further demonstrated the resilient nature of their quests.

In 2012, United States under the rewards for justice program issued bounties the leadership of Al-Shabaab. US offered 33 million in bounties for information that

would lead to capture insurgent leaders with 7 million USD and 5 million USD for then Al-Shabaab 's emir Godane, and the then his deputy Robow respectively. In a challenging response, Al-Shabaab through Fu'ad Qalaf mockingly issued bounties of its own by promising 10 camels to any individual who had information that would lead to the capture of the then U.S. President Obama. Moreover, a less-valuable rewards of 10 cocks and 10 hens for information that would lead to the capture of former U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. As a counter response by the then US high ranking envoy Johnnie Carson, on his official visit to Mogadishu, dismissed the counter offers as “absurd”. These demonstrated the attitude and resilience that Al-Shabaab had in the amount of bounty and subsequently belittling counter offer on the United States.

In reinforcing these views, a key informant (Academician with specialty in International Relations) interviewed on 3rd June 2024 in Nairobi highlighted that:

“Through its media outlets Al-Shabab strategically exploited both real and perceived grievances by many Muslim youths in Kenya in respect to what they observe of government of Kenya and societal marginalization and persecution. Influentially, the insurgency employed the widespread anger on the Kenyan government following the extra judicial killings of controversial Muslim preachers in Mombasa in 2012 in which human rights agencies accuse Anti-terror police units of the brutal murders. Al-Shabab also maintained media presence in media outlets as the case of Radio al-Andalus, Radio al-Furqan, Somali MeMo and Calamada, as well as maintaining links with other Somali non-insurgent news media agencies. They also interacted with local and international medias like Somali news and radio channels as well as international media houses and in this case Al Jazeera and BBC. These salient actions influenced their relevance and resilience in their global terrorism agenda”

These sentiments from the key informant collaborate with the findings of Anzalone (2017). Anzalone posits that Al-Shabab still has the capabilities to plan and execute coordinated mass attacks across the Somalia and even “secure” areas in cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Al-Shabab executed a huge number of coordinated attacks in 2016 on hotels or restaurants frequented by SFG, AMISOM and international officials by using suicide bombers and gunmen. Government institutions particularly the SFG’s Criminal Investigative Police Division Headquarters and a local government building in Galkayo and Mudug region were targeted.

6.2.2 Lack of Internal Coherence and Coordination

AMISOM components were divided on geographical basis with the political affairs and strategic planning section located in Addis Ababa and the operational section situated in Mogadishu. The separation of these structures undermined the internal cohesion and when it comes to handling tactical and operational issues within the mission. Williams (2013) asserted that the approach in which AMISOM leadership was instituted decreased the opportunities for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The fact that AMISOM headquarters was based in Nairobi, Kenya until the closure of 2012, showed bad political signals to the Somali population and the world. The Commanders in AMISOM were allowed to act as top representatives in the political sphere. The AMISOM capability was undermined by travels by civilian staff to and from Mogadishu and Nairobi. The regular travels had significant impact on the performance of the mission. For instance, when civilian staffs wanted to leave the protected zones in Somalia, they must be

escorted by military which affected the little resource of the military personnel (Kromah 2010).

Another coordination challenge that was evidenced in AMISOM was inadequacy in cooperation between teams in the task force was a problematic concern given the difficulties of patrolling the highly volatile operation zones (Block et al., 2012). Internally, AMISOM faced a challenge of weak leadership in the political discourses. The AU Chairperson, the AU Commission Chairperson and the AUPSC Commission showed weaker leadership at the time in handling the situation in Somalia. Because Nairobi rather than Somalia being the mission headquarters, successive military commanders competed for the intermediary political roles between the TFG and the AU. This means that TCC had higher degree of autonomy thus impacting negatively on the outcome (ibid). Neus (2013) alludes that AMISOM had tall order in bridging several gaps in order to be viewed as a trustworthy and legitimate entity by Somali populace. Ligawa (2017) asserts that AMISOM in its command-and-control structural framework was inadequate enabling military personnel to operate in a divided and incoherent model. Djibouti summit stressed the essence of effective AMISOM command and control to achieve synergies in efforts to combat Al-Shabaab and therefore directed AMISOM contingents to fully assist the Force Commanders in exercising an effective and transparent command of military components and equipment assigned to AMISOM, under the general leadership of the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson and the Head of AMISOM Mission.

Majority of the respondents alludes that the AMISOM command structures were likely to be controlled by foreign actors because the forces were not entirely under the AMISOM command. The TCCs dictated where their troops were to be deployed within AMISOM sectors (Ligawa, 2017). The AMISOM command was also overstrained with most of its military bases situated distance apart therefore making its control and command complex and response period for beef up such zones took relatively long time. Al-Shabaab maximized on the AMISOM'S weakness by dominating these areas with frequent patrols. Al-Shabaab also conducted ambushes and IED attacks at their will. There were limited established contact points where liaison initiatives would be done with freely with allied forces. These justify the grounds where an outpost in Gedo region was overrun by Al-Shabaab and rescue initiatives didn't happen for close to 5 days. With a strong command and control, reinforcement should have been deployed on time to help the distressed troops at El-Adde.

Analytically, varying interests among the TCCs to AMISOM was a key component that undermined its mandate on state reconstruction in Somalia. AMISOM in its aspiration desired for a stable and prosperous Somalia but the aspirations of TCCs to an extent suggested the contrary. Consequently, these enabled AMISOM and its TCCs to pursue their interests instead of the stipulated goal thus affecting their primary objectives to help those they were tasked with responsibility to protect. Initial mandate of the mission called for conducting peacekeeping operations in Somalia and TCCs had the latitude to pursue their own strategic goals in Somalia which directly and indirectly negatively affected the

realization of the AMISOM mandate. For Instance's Kenya as a TCC to AMISOM located in Sector 2 pursued its strategic objectives thus conflicting with the mission's objectives. Kenya was also accused of undermining peace dialogues and reconciliation initiatives by exacerbating instead of mitigating rivalry and tensions among warring factions. This interfered with the smooth implementation of Somali National Security strategy in total violation of AMISOM aspirations towards achieving state reconstruction. Chopra (2014) and Mohamed (2022) assert that these actions by TCCs undermined initiatives to bring sustainable peace and stability in Somalia

Musoma (2021) alluded that AMISOM lacked comprehensive analysis, adequate intelligence and focus on its framework of management and this clearly demonstrated that the entire process was filled with inadequacies and unnecessary bureaucracies. Equally intelligence community did not adequately aid the AMISOM with reliable and timely intelligence that would have enhance its capabilities and minimize civilian and military casualties. Incidences of deadly offensives by the Al-Shabab on the AMISOM bases left many defense/security experts and policy makers to wonder if there was any intelligence gathered and shared on the ground earlier. Most of the assignments were executed blindly as in the case of patrols, scouting and overall road movements. This led to several casualties from enemy actions which would have been evaded. Furthermore, with the alleged new form of terrorism in Somalia, human intelligence was required; signals intelligence alone could not be adequate. The long civil war in Somalia created a breeding ground for foreign combatants. Al-Shabaab links with global

terror networks like Al-Qaeda and Boko haram was pure existential threat to AMISOM and these could only be mitigated through transnational intelligence (Ligawa, 2017). The AMISOM intelligence gathering and sharing framework was not fully developed. The intelligence gap was fully exploited by the Al-Shabaab because every TCCs executed their missions disjointedly.

According to one of the key informants who served in AMISOM as a Combat Officer who was interviewed on 26th July 2024 enlightened that:

“The failure in intelligence gathering and sharing in the AMISOM worked in favor of the enemy (Al Shabab). The intelligence framework did not have the matrix for liaison objectives. The non-state actors who supported the AMISOM mandate should have been collaborated to promote intelligence capacity and capability with the AMISOM’s intelligence cell”

This assertion corresponds with Wanderi (2021). Wanderi posits that the challenges in the use of intelligence gathering and sharing in fighting transitional terrorism entail pressure to comply with many legal and bureaucratic frameworks in a multi-agency setting. Despite immense capacity to collect intelligence, collating the data against time was another challenge. The limited technology in the intelligence processes is another problematic concern. The privacy and confidentiality of information remained to be a challenge on the usefulness of the intelligence. Notably, with the intelligence framework, for many years, Al-Shabaab developed sophisticated data-gathering techniques to counter potential threats. Al-Shabaab also established its own intelligence agency called the Amniyat which its core function is to focus on tactical efficiency, counter-intelligence measures as well as propaganda to outshine their adversaries.

6.3 Operational challenges

Operational challenges refer to the limitations that AMISOM encountered in lacking the adequate capabilities with proper operational framework to deploy capable and adaptable military, police and civilian personnel. This section analyzed the operational challenges in terms of the nature of the armed conflict, methods of operation, and readiness in the AMISOM mission.

6.3.1 Negative clannism and clan difference among the Somali population.

Ligawa (2017) observed that Somali society is characterized by homogeneity which is ethnically and religiously that is deeply rooted in clannism as their social and political foundation of their existence. Luling (2006, p. 473) points that Somali society trace their genealogical origin to a single male ancestor, Hiil, and his two sons (Sab and Samaale where Sheikhs from Arabia married into this lineage. Menkhaus (2004, p.153) pinpoints that. Somalis identify with both aspects of their lineage, divisions (clans and sub-clans) have become more vital since the early 1990s. The Somalia clans are sharply divided and they largely display their loyalty to the clan than the Somali state. Somalia has 5 major clans with numerous sub clans in the social structure. Hawiye clan is closely linked to extremism and constitute 25% of the Somali population. Traditionally, Hawiye clan are found in the vicinities north of Mogadishu and steps below the Puntland. The Isaaq clan constitute 22% of Somali population are located in the Northwest Somaliland and Eastern part of Ethiopia. The Darod clan is the most widely distributed clan network and constitute 20% of the Somali population. The Darod clan covers Puntland and a quite further south as well as the areas that border Kenya.

According to one of the critical key informants (IR scholar) interviewed at KU City Campus on 28th June 2024 highlighted:

“The Somali people are a Cushitic ethnic group native who share a common ancestry, common culture and common history. They share common mother tongue of ethnic Somalis and common religion (Islam). Despite rich cultural and ethnic history, they are deeply divided by clannism which has continued to haunt their state and statehood. Shunning negative clannism would bring stability as evidenced in Puntland and Somaliland where peace and tranquility is the order of the day”

The key informant's views above pinpoint clannism as a stumbling block towards a stable Somalia. This is because Somalis pledge allegiance to their clans instead of their state; Federal Republic of Somalia. As a result, state legitimacy is washed down by clan dynamics and subsequently state reconstruction processes are fruitless. These hostilities among these clans have undermined state reconstruction process in Somalia. Clan conflict as a result of the legitimacy disputes was a major impediment to AMISOM's capacity to stabilize Somalia. Apart from AMISOM, majority of the SNA were made up of coalitions of clan militia that were basically unified by their hatred for Al-Shabaab. There have been incidence of government forces attacking one another. Due to the considerable tensions among clan militias, it has been extremely challenging for all the clans to come together under common umbrella and offer adequate support to AMISOM. Tres (2014) observed that rivalry among clan militias largely undermined AMISOM's effectiveness to deploy troops outside Mogadishu.

AMISOM and Somali regimes came in to force following the signing of status of agreement between Federal Republic of Somalia and African Union on 6th March 2007 (AMISOM, 2007). The content of the agreement anticipated that AMISOM

and Somalia will cooperate and work together towards reconstruction of the state of Somalia. However, that has never been the case during the time of AMISOM. Somali political regimes had weak and fragile system that makes it difficult to operate independently. The Somali leadership needed to partner with AMISOM to realize gains made in stabilization efforts. The weak nature of regimes made has made Somali administration vulnerable and continuous lack of legitimacy. Menkhaus and Ortmayer (2000) asserts that getting authority with legitimacy has been a key obstacle to peace and reconciliation frameworks during conflicts. The lack of an administration recognized by Somali people has hampered Somalia's efforts to stability. Furthermore, Tim (2005) avers that:

“Government of Somalia is characterized by a violent, fractured and diverse hybrid structures of formal and informal institutions steered by clan militias with battle for seat of authority in Mogadishu. Access to power and resources were the clan's key motivational factors that was proven to be a considerable stumbling for AMISOM.”

Tim's views expound on an inseparable structure between the state and clannism in pursuit for power. Within the clan systems, there was no consensus on the desire and nature on what ought to be the future of Somalia. Majority Somalis were distrustful of the national government's interference with local issues, a perception that was inspired by Barre's regime. Frazer (2012) observe that major clans champion for a federalism in which the different parts of the Somalia are autonomous, enabling sovereignty over a specific region of Somalia. Consequently, the efficacy of AMISOM relied on the national administration capability to command legitimacy among Somalis. This was be demonstrated by

AMISOM in ensuring the efficiency and timely supply of goods, services and the security of freed areas.

6.3.2 Violations of international laws and Norms

Within the normative frameworks, peace keeping operations entails full compliance with the International Human Rights law and International Humanitarian Law. It is a sacred norm that missions must executed in compliance with international laws as enshrined in the UN Charter and must genuinely promote human rights in their mandates (UN Charter, 1948). International humanitarian law (IHL) as stipulated in the Geneva Conventions, Hague Conventions and other additional protocols puts limitations on tactics that can utilized in the armed conflicts (Bellal & Casey-Maslen, 2022: Bothe, 2013). They are aimed at protecting civilian population that are not directly involved in conflict/wars. It also protects the basic rights of population, victims and non-combatants caught in the midst of conflict.

Mohamed (2022) posits that the ROE of AMISOM were negatively impacted by the structural and operational restrictions that contributed to a compromise in the mission's ability to carry out its obligation. AMISOM was also in violation of human rights especially on infliction of damage, death on civilians and its troops engaging in sexual exploitation as well as abuse of women and girls (Mwangi, 2015: Mohamed, 2022: Badri & Muscati, 2014). Initially, AMISOM dismissed the reports of sexual assaults but they later took some initiatives to address the issue. Prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse draft policy was

produced by AMISOM in 2013 and started placing measures to investigate on incidences on sexual exploitation and abuse (Ibid).

According to one of the respondents (Security expert) who was interviewed on 5th July 2023 enlightened that:

“Based on the claims by the local Somali population, AMISOM troops overtly and covertly engaged in sexual abuse and maltreatment activities in Mogadishu. Incidences of rape and other unspecified human rights violations were witnessed while combat operation against the Al-Shabaab was ongoing in the Lower and Middle Shabelle.”

This was further supported that another respondent (Academician) interviewed on 4th June 2024 in Nairobi, pointed out that:

“It is public knowledge that AMISOM troops under the UPDF command engaged in sexual exploitation and assault on Somali women and girls at the military bases in port city of Mogadishu. In some cases, they were given aid, medicine, food and other basic necessities in exchange of sex. These claims were also confirmed by AMISOM investigations. This was blatant violation of human rights as enshrined in the UN charter for personnel mandated by UN and AU”

The key informants’ views as quoted above were in tandem with the findings in the Human Rights Watch and International Refugee Rights Initiatives (IRRI) reports. According to the reports: “Some girls were being taken to Uganda and were in a dire situation. A few girls have been infected with HIV. Sexual and gender-based violence and exploitation were common”. This pinpoints the need to develop legal and legislative frameworks that ensures international laws are fully complied during peace support Operations. Recommendations from human rights needs to be implemented to ensure that gaps on violations are minimized and civilian population is protected as enshrined in the IHL and IHRL.

6.3.3 Uncertainty and fragility in the Somalia political atmosphere

Somalia's political situation is characterized by a fragmented, fragile, heterogenic, local and hybrid-based structural institutions which has formal and informal manifestations and largely controlled by clans and their respective militias. The feature in itself is an impediment to the realization of statehood. Ligawa (2017) alludes that the fluidity of Somalia political structure with access for power and economic resources being the source of conflict among clans, was an enduring challenge toward Somali state reconstruction.

Beyond the clan issues, there was a disagreement on the federalism structure or even the desire for statehood. Most traditional Somalia society has always been nomadic and suspicion on possible interference by central authority in their traditional affairs, have drawn reflection from the past experience of tyrannical military regimes. The major clans were in favor of federalism with autonomy. However, this approach led to a federated and further fragile state which eventually gave some Somali clans control over their own areas. AMISOM success was therefore partly reliant on whether centralized structures could display political/state legitimacy among the Somali citizenry.

Scholars allude that lack of political legitimacy demonstrated in the state with allegations that the local governance which took the positions former Al-Shabaab leaders weren't coming from the major clans in their regions but were viewed as puppets of the Somali National Authority. Consequently, Somali government continues to struggle to attain the required political legitimacy (Ligawa,2017).

Ibrahim (2010) points that Al-Shabaab's commitment to global jihadism and connections to Al-Qaeda and ability to capture and control territory was another emerging concern. Al-Shabaab and other Somali radicals are viewed as a threat to the Somali Transitional Federal Government, to the Horn of Africa as well as the entire international community.

According to one of the key informants (an officer in an Islamic NGO) interviewed on 24th June 2024 in Nairobi informed:

“Somalia is very fragile and unpredictable and this has created uncertainty and international pessimism among the actors particularly initially AMISOM and currently ATMIS and their partners. The re-emergence and resilience of Al-Shabaab and their links to Al Qaeda continues to distract the initiatives towards state reconstruction in Somalia. This is because the peace and stability atmosphere continue to be polluted by uncertainties and pessimistic views in the Somali political environment”

The above key informants' statements corroborate the findings of Amadi (2012). Amadi posits that widespread pessimism (perceived or real) about embarking on the mission which was deeply rooted in the previous legacy of UN missions in 1990s. However, in view of the uncertainties and pessimism, AMISOM contributions in Somalia outshines any previous mission in the execution of the mandate.

6.3.4 Incidences of piracy in the territorial waters and high seas off the coast of Somalia

Maritime piracy in the Indian Ocean has become a key concern to the international community initiatives towards state reconstruction in Somalia. Piracy continues to pose security threat to thousands of ships sailing through the Somali coastline. The

famous attack and hijacking of the Indonesian ship (MV Sinar Kudus) by pirates; where the ship and the crew were held captive for 46 days and released upon paying \$ 4.5 million as ransom (Ismunadi, 2011). Karawita (2019) points that piracy in Somalia presented several challenges to the international community since the beginning of this century. Addressing piracy in Somalia implies to confronting Somalia's unemployment, poverty, as more importantly creating frameworks that shall serve as the best approaches to deal with piracy. The road to state reconstruction was hindered by piracy activities and the fact that AMISOM did not have marine component to address the vice.

International community is also faced with the enforcement and legal challenges to provide long-term solutions to piracy. The main legal framework for piracy lies in the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Marciniak (2012) points that UNCLOS is the international legal framework that binds all non- parties and parties customarily.

Under article 101 of UNCLOS, defines piracy as;

“(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)”.

Jurisprudentially and in its application, this definition is subject to limitations. Chalk, Smallman, & Burger (2009) points that the circumstance for an action to qualify as piracy are actions committed for private ends constituting at minimum

two ships and occurring on the high seas. This definition basically does not factor many actions of piracy committed on territorial seas. The definition places emphasis actions executed for private ends meaning actions influenced by political discourse never qualify as piracy under international customary law (Kao, 2016). In the case of piracy in Somalia, the critical issues regard Article 100 of UNCLOS that states:

“All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”

Chalk, Smallman, & Burger (2009) observed that UNCLOS provided a legal basis to prosecute these actions; regrettably, law relied on whether states have sufficient municipal laws and will to bring pirates to prosecution. Warner (2013) points that the issue is that captured Somali pirates are often released without prosecutions in Somalia due to the lack of an effective government and judicial body to administer justice. The seizing states are in most instances reluctant to employ such extensive powers in prosecution as this represents a huge burden to the seizing states. If Somali pirates were to serve their sentences in other states, their return to Somalia would be not be possible. Additionally, the longevity of detentions before being prosecuted or receiving legal aid are possibly violation of human rights laws (Treves, 2009; Warner, 2013; BBC, 2011). These show the clear gap on how to deal with captured pirates (Treves, 2009). Consequently, effective international activities were cut down off the coasts of Somalia, that led pirates released without facing any criminal charges (Treves, 2009). The different measures employed

since 2008 had a positive consequence on the number of pirate activities near the coastal Somalia, demonstrating a sharp decline.

Data from the International Maritime Bureau shows that 15 attacks were registered off the Somalia coastline in 2013 compared to the 75 incidences in 2012 and 237 incidences in 2011, which was the apex of Somali piracy (ICC, 2013). Patinkin (2017) points out that no piracy was successful piracy was registered in 2016. A report published by the International Maritime Bureau demonstrated decline of piracy. From January to June 2017, 87 piracy activities were reported. This decline was attributed to the through naval initiatives and preventive actions by the international community. Although there was decline in piracy in 2012, the region was not completely free of piracy and continued initiatives were executed to ensure safety. Many scholars and experts observed that the creation of stable and peaceful Somalia was vital mechanism of eradicating piracy and security in the international maritime route bordering Somalia.

As a regional instrument, Kampala Process focused on maritime security and coordination with AMISOM, UNPOS, Somali National Administration and Regional Authorities (Somaliland, Galmudug, Mogadishu and Puntland) to address piracy in the Indian Ocean waters off the coast of Somalia (UNPOS, UNODC, IMO and FAO, 2013).

In a report released on 16th November 2009, Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, recommended the necessity to assist AMISOM and Somali Authorities to address piracy problems in the Indian ocean and Somali coastline. He recommended that:

“One of the ways to ensure the long-term security of international navigation off the coast of Somalia is through a concerted effort to stabilize the situation ashore, as pirates have become more sophisticated in their methods and techniques of attacking...we reiterate our continued and full support to the Transitional Federal Government, its efforts to achieve peace, security and reconciliation through the Djibouti Peace Process, and the work of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)” (UN, 2009).

In his recommendations as quoted above, Ban Ki-moon’s report to the UNSC on the situation in territorial waters as well as high seas off the Somali coast, acknowledged that the increase in maritime presence by States played a significant role in the region’s stabilization. In acknowledging the magnitude of the negative consequences of piracy in the horn of Africa and beyond, a key informant (International Specialist) interviewed on 12 August 2024(online interview) highlighted that since pirates’ prey on ships in the most traversed sea route in the globe, they subsequently threaten central artery of the world economy thus potentially leading to global instability and insecurity.

Remarks to the Center for American Progress by Andrew J. Shapiro, former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in Washington, DC on 27th March 2012 in respect to Piracy Off the Horn of Africa, in part, stated

“Despite the romantic notions surrounding piracy of previous centuries, modern day piracy represents a new and complex threat to the international community. While piracy at sea is certainly not a new problem, its modern re-incarnation has an impact of a different magnitude. Piracy off the coast of Somalia threatens one of the principal foundations of today’s modern interconnected global economic system – and that is freedom of navigation on the high seas. In a globalized world, the impact of piracy in one area of the world can cause a ripple effect greater in magnitude than ever before. We live in an era of complex, integrated, and on-demand global supply chains. People in countries around the world depend on secure and reliable shipping lanes for their food,

their medicine, their energy, and consumer goods. By preying on commercial ships in one of the world's most traversed shipping lanes, pirates off the Horn of Africa threaten more than just individual ships. They threaten a central artery of the global economy, and therefore global security and stability. When the Obama administration came to office the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia was snowballing out of control. In 2007 and 2008 pirate attacks began to escalate dramatically. A vicious and reinforcing cycle was forming. Motivated by escalating ransom payments – which grew into the millions of dollars – and a lack of other employment opportunities, more and more Somali men took to the waters. Piracy, as a result, went from a fairly ad hoc, disorganized endeavor to a highly developed transnational criminal enterprise. Flush with money, pirates were also able to improve their capabilities and expand their operations further and further away from shore. To make matters worse, Somalia offered pirates near ideal conditions. Piracy is a prime example of the dangers and problems that can arise from the presence of ungoverned spaces in our globalized world. In places where pirates operate – through the coastal areas in Puntland and parts of central Somalia – the lack of governance and weak institutions provide them with a safe haven. Additionally, with more than two thousand miles of coast line and with the Gulf of Aden to its north, Somalia sits along one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. International seaborne trade traversing through the Suez Canal to get from the United States or Europe to Asia must also travel through the Gulf of Aden and therefore along Somalia's coast. This high volume of trade means that there is virtually an endless supply of ships for Somali pirates to target. Piracy emanating from Somalia therefore represented a perfect storm for the international community – a weak state in a strategically essential location that harbors a rapidly growing transnational criminal enterprise and which threatens a vital artery of the global economy. Action *had* to be taken.”

Shapiro's remarks as cited above pinpoints the changing and complex nature scope of piracy in the off the coast of Somalia and the need for the international community to intervene in a process to mitigate that challenges. Its further act as a determinant to the international community aspirations of reconstructing Somalia in relation to the addressing the piracy challenge.

An informant conversant with maritime affairs interviewed on 13th July 2024 observed that:

“Piracy activities in the Indian ocean waters since the beginning of this century has affected every aspect of state reconstruction. It has continued to disrupt economic, political and economic aspects of Somalia society. It has also hindered humanitarian aid to the horn of Africa particularly Somalia. International agencies such as WFP, UNDP, UNHCR among others, who play fundamental reconstruction roles to Somalia population, were largely affected by piracy. There as need for urgent intervention by the international sphere in both operational and legal angles to address piracy. Failure to address this issue by the regional states and other relevant actor will continue to undermine major gains made by AMISOM towards state reconstruction in Somalia.”

This statement corroborates the Williams, (2013). Williams points that Indian ocean maritime route was vital in enabling ships of any kind to sail from the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and all the way to the Indian Ocean. He observed that re-emergence of piracy is an existential threat to global security. Williams further points that Piracy negatively impacted on global trade, economic development and humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa.

6.4 Chapter summary

This chapter interrogated the third and final objective of the study which was to assess the challenges faced by AMISOM in carrying out state reconstruction. The study concluded that AMISOM faced several strategic, tactical, operational challenges. Strategic challenges refer to the key limitations that AMISOM encountered in attempting to attain its long-term strategic initiatives towards state reconstruction. These challenges emerged out of internal and external variables

and demanded a proper planning and decision making at both AUPSC and UNSC. The pinpointed strategic challenges largely focused on the issues that relate to legislation, leadership systems, global order and funding. These included: Complexities and dynamics in the mission's mandate; inadequate funding to the mission and; inadequacies in the overall mission's capacity and capability. Tactical challenges referred to the obstacles that conceptual actions implemented as one or more specific tasks encounters. At the tactical levels, challenges were analyzed in the context of a common understanding of the operation, cooperation, discipline and code of conduct in the mission. Invisible and challenging enemy: the Al-Shabaab and lack of internal coherence and coordination were key tactical challenges that the study interrogated. Under the operational context, the study interrogated challenges in terms of the nature of the armed conflict, methods of operation, and readiness in the AMISOM mission. It extensively explored: negative clannism and clan difference among the Somali population; violations of international laws and norms; uncertainty and fragility in the Somalia political atmosphere and incidences of piracy in the territorial waters and high seas off the coast of Somalia. ideally the success of AMISOM in attaining state reconstruction was measured on how it addressed the challenges. The next chapter offers a detailed discussion and analysis on the summary of the findings, conclusions, recommendations and areas of further research of in the study.

CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

7.0 Introduction

This last chapter summarized aspects examined in the study in line with the specific objectives. They included: to analyze state reconstruction initiatives employed by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia; to assess the significance of strategic partnerships of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with UN Country Teams and other inter-governmental actors on state reconstruction in Somalia and; to assess the challenges faced by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia. The chapter also discussed the general conclusions and recommendations for the study. This chapter concluded by suggesting areas for further research.

7.1 Summary of the findings

In respect to chapter one, the study presented the background of the study and conceptualized the problem by demonstrating the gaps in the literature. The general goal of the study was to explore implications of AMISOM on state reconstruction outcomes in Somalia between 2007 and 2021. To attain this, the study was guided by the following objectives: to analyze initiatives employed by AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia; to examine the significance of strategic partnerships between the AMISOM and international actors on state reconstruction in Somalia and; To assess the challenges faced by the AMISOM in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia. The chapter also executed the

introduction of the research problem, objectives, questions, purpose, significance, justification and significance as well as the limitations of the study.

In respect to chapter two, the study extensively reviewed the existing literature relevant to the study. The study employed thematic literature review. The thematic literature review constituted the organization and synthetization of the existing literature with basis on recurring themes instead of sequence in chronology or methodology. The researcher opted for thematic literature review because it was more viable in addressing complex research questions which inculcate multiple facets considering the fact that it allows a more in-depth exploration of particular themes within the larger scholarly contexts. Thematic reviews facilitated the integration of literature from multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary dimensions thus offering a holistic view of the study. The chapter reviewed various scholarly works which have been in line with the objectives of the study. In addition, the chapter discussed the summary of the literature review and identified emerging gaps. It was evidentially clear that there are gaps in the literature and there is little consensus on the concepts. Military intervention on state reconstruction is perceived differently by various scholars. It was also clear that the body of knowledge on intervention has not yet fully developed to eliminate ensuing confusions, unanswered questions and controversies. Global interventions have been studied in relation to state reconstruction but it has not yielded desired practical results because the outcome of the processes seem to have suggested the contrary. It is a problematic concern that the interventionist roles continue to fail to achieve its objective as stated in their mandate. This necessitates the need to do further investigation on the relationship between military intervention and state

reconstruction. Even though there is vast literature on the need of military intervention to attain state reconstruction, little is written on aspect of practicality and reality in ensuring it happens, but much focus is on theoretical orientation. There is no formula that is prescribed to guide this critical determinant of successful intervention mission. These were significant gaps that requires filling through more research and scholarly work in state intervention on state reconstruction., the chapter ends by exploring at the theoretical frameworks anchoring the study with focus on the state building, securitization and intervention theories. Lastly the chapter concluded with the conceptual framework and its diagrammatic representation.

In respect to chapter three, the study clearly outlined and justified the methodological frameworks employed in the research process. The chapter pinpointed case study research design and considered suitable for the study because it allowed for an in-depth and comprehensive study on AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia. Furthermore, the chapter presented detailed discussions on the research design, research locale, target population, unit of analysis, sampling techniques, sampling frame, sample size, data collection instruments, data collection procedure, validity and reliability of instruments, data analysis. The chapter ended by demonstrating the ethicality employed in the course of the research.

In respect to chapter four, the chapter began by discussion and presentation of the first objective which was to analyze initiatives employed by African Union

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on state reconstruction in Somalia. The chapter analyzed and discussed on the importance of military intervention with specific assessment of AMISOM initiatives in Somalia between 2007 and 2012. The initiatives in the contexts of this study's objective by constituted contributions made by AMISOM in ensuring that state reconstruction was attained. The study extensively interrogated on Counter Terrorism (CT) Initiatives, Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) Initiatives, Protection of Civilians'(POCs) Initiatives, Security Initiatives, Institutional Capacity Building (ICB) Initiatives, Stabilization Initiatives, Gender-Based Initiatives (GBS), Humanitarian Initiatives, National Reconciliation Initiatives (NRI), Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-Integration (DDR) Initiatives, Intelligence Gathering and Sharing(IG&S) initiatives and Legitimization Initiatives-promotion of state and political legitimacy.

In respect to chapter five, the study addressed the second objective of the study which was to assess the value of assess the significance of strategic partnerships of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with UN Country Teams and other inter-governmental actors on state reconstruction in Somalia. The study extensively focused on three categories. This chapter discussed three categories of strategic partnerships. The first category was global inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) with a special focus on the United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) based in Somalia. The second category entailed regional actors in strategic partnerships with AU/AMISOM. These included the National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The third and last

category are individual sovereign states in strategic partnerships with AU/AMISOM with specific concentrations on United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Turkiye. The rationale for these analyses was that the military interventions by African Union/AMISOM may be fruitless without collaborations and partnerships as the mission demands UN authorizations, legitimacy, huge financial and human resource as ability to sustain the course towards state reconstruction. The mission was also multiagency stipulated in mission's objectives.

In respect to Chapter six, the study addressed the third and final objective of the study which was to examine the challenges faced by the AMISOM in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia. This chapter interrogated the third and final objective of the study which was to assess the challenges faced by AMISOM in carrying out state reconstruction. The study concluded that AMISOM faced several strategic, tactical, operational challenges. Strategic challenges refer to the key limitations that AMISOM encountered in attempting to attain its long-term strategic initiatives towards state reconstruction. These challenges emerged out of internal and external variables and demanded a proper planning and decision making at both AUPSC and UNSC. The pinpointed strategic challenges largely focused on the issues that relate to legislation, leadership systems, global order and funding. These included: Complexities and dynamics in the mission's mandate; inadequate funding to the mission and; inadequacies in the overall mission's capacity and capability. Tactical challenges referred to the obstacles that conceptual actions implemented as one or more specific tasks encounters. At the

tactical levels, challenges were analyzed in the context of a common understanding of the operation, cooperation, discipline and code of conduct in the mission. Invisible and challenging enemy: the Al-Shabaab and lack of internal coherence and coordination were key tactical challenges that the study interrogated. Under the operational context, the study interrogated challenges in terms of the nature of the armed conflict, methods of operation, and readiness in the AMISOM mission. It extensively explored: negative clannism and clan difference among the Somali population; violations of international laws and norms; uncertainty and fragility in the Somalia political atmosphere and incidences of piracy in the territorial waters and high seas off the coast of Somalia. Ideally the success of AMISOM in attaining state reconstruction was measured on how it addressed the challenges.

7.2 Conclusion

Pursuant to the main/general objective of the study which was to explore African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on state reconstruction in Somalia between 2007 and 2021, the study concluded that AMISOM offered the best framework towards state reconstruction in the Federal Republic of Somalia. AMISOM achieved success in where previous missions failed. AMISOM within its complex and challenging mandate remained steadfast and exited Somalia with a clear strategy thus enhancing gains made between 2007 and 2021. AMISOM is credited for many reconstruction efforts and in particular counter Al-Shabaab, women involvement in peace and security, humanitarian agenda, institutional capacity building initiatives, national reconciliation initiatives, disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration initiatives and promotion of state legitimacy in Somalia. As a multidimensional military intervention, AMISOM established international precedence guiding military interventions. International community should be optimistic, swift and responsive in supporting the PSOs to attain its stipulated objectives.

In line with objective one of this study which was to analyze initiatives employed by AMISOM on state reconstruction in Somalia, the study concluded that AMISOM despite the difficult circumstance of the peace support operations in Somalia, immensely contributed towards state reconstruction in Somalia. The numerous initiatives employed by AMISOM substantively impacted positively on the strides towards statehood in Somalia. The administrative, operational and military capacities of peace support operations on state reconstruction needs to be reconciled with the stipulated mandate by the security council to ensure that it sufficiently attain its intended goals as it conforms with timelines, international laws and norms. The study also concluded that the authorization agencies of PSOs should holistically build a nexus among all the state reconstruction initiatives in order to enhance the overall outcome of the missions' mandates.

Pursuant to objective two of the study which was to assess the significance of strategic partnerships of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with UN Country Teams and other inter-governmental actors on state reconstruction in Somalia, the study concluded that strategic partnership as a new concept and emerging practice in peace support operations on state reconstruction ought to be explored to achieve the strategic and operational objectives of military

intervention on state reconstruction in Somalia. The study also concluded that within the frameworks of strategic partnerships, there's need for legal and administrative obligations that will bind the parties involved in state reconstruction processes. Strategic partnerships shouldn't not be mere declarations but actionable and binding initiatives towards attaining intervention goals. Apart from peace, stability, security and other related components, strategic partnerships on comprehensive state reconstruction should be prioritized by UN and Country Teams, security council, regional and sub-regional organizations to enhance the outcome of peace sport missions. More importantly, strategic partnerships should be governed by the spirit and intentions of the stipulated objectives and not the direct or indirect interests (perceived or real) of the intervenors, proxies or international actors seeking hegemony. Strategic partnerships are distinct features of the evolving international system and represent a new framework for planning international life. Strategic partnership also reconfigures to be the necessities of PSOs to adapt to the systemic and issue-specific international challenges as we close the first quarter of the 21st century.

Pursuant to objective three of the study which was to examine the challenges faced by AMISOM in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia, the study concluded that military interventions in Somalia require adequate technical, financial, logistical, administrative, legitimate support to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in its operations. African Union Commission should ensure that limitations and lessons learned in the previous missions in Somalia are addressed in both the UNSC and AUPSC so that a formidable framework is attained in

guiding and enhancing missions that succeeded AMISOM as in the case of ATMIS. Adequate funding, conformity to the international humanitarian law and international human rights, proper training and adequate intelligence should be irreducible minimum for any mission sanctioned by UN, AU or and other legitimate actor before embarking on the interventionist agenda. Multisectoral approaches should be embraced in addressing challenges. UNSC and AUPSC ought to be rationalistic, considerate and objective in ensuring that resolutions they made are timely, practical, realistic and within the financial ability of the missions assigned. The further concluded that strategic partnerships significant contributions in support of AMISOM state reconstruction initiatives in peace support operations revolve around legitimization, funding, resolutions, technical assistance, strategic air lift, coordination, logistics, equipment, intelligence gathering, humanitarian aid, advisory, capacity building, donations, liaison initiatives, counter piracy, air combat mission, infrastructure development, training, surveillance and reconnaissance, international peace and reconstruction summits on Somalia.

7.3 Recommendations of the study

In the context of this study, recommendations were made based on the findings and conclusions which were aimed at playing fundamental roles in formulation of policies and scholarly development. Recommendations facilitate access to pertinent information as to the operationalization of the various factors towards successful state reconstruction. Recommendations contribute to the greater discipline of peacekeeping operations through provision of a redefinition of practice of peacekeeping which will lead to development of a more competitive

peace framework on state reconstruction using the study findings as a guideline for a new model. The recommendations are also vital to actors in creating a road map towards solving similar cases of state reconstruction through interventionism.

Based on the first specific objective of the study which was to analyze initiatives employed by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on state reconstruction in Somalia, the study recommends that military interventions should prioritize state reconstruction initiatives in their mandate. This is because state reconstruction covers a huge, varied, complex and relevant scopes that enable missions to achieve major strides in line with mission's stipulated objectives. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in partnership within African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), in the context of Africa PSOs, should come up with sustainable resolutions that corresponds with the objectives therefore ensuring state reconstruction is fully attained. The study also recommends that there should be post conflict reconstruction plans. Foreign interventions should also be in tandem with desires and aspirations of states and people they intervene on, so that legitimacy and realization of statehood calls are attained with acceptance and less or no frictions. The study also reinforces the need for civic-military partnership or coordination as a strategic framework to attain state reconstruction in war-torn, fragile and collapsed states.

Based on the second specific objective of the study, which was to assess the value of strategic partnerships between the African Union/African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with UN Country Teams and other international actors on state reconstruction in Somalia, the study recommends the need for proper

strategic partnerships that are scope-specific to state reconstruction initiatives. Strategic partnerships are recommended as a vital tool in foreign policy which should help strategic partners attain their common strategic interests in peace support operations that include: to be positive influential actors, to share responsibility for global security, to share common goals and collectively with strategic partners respond to the contemporary global challenges. The study also recommends AU within its practical frameworks to have a shared reciprocal vision, strategic goals of enhancing AU portfolio in the globe and place importance to the development of strategic partnerships with regional actors and especially growing actors in the global south to attain its goals. The study further recommends the need for strategic partnerships to be legally and formally binding between and among actors.

Based on the third specific objective of the study which was to examine the challenges faced by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia, the study recommends that AU should marshal for resources that would sustain peace support operations. AU should not entirely depend on donor community particularly from the collective west. In the spirit of In the Constitutive Act of the African Union and Pan Africanism, the study recommend that African Union should develop and implement models that seeks for African solutions for African challenges. The idea of depending on western powers appears to be partly detrimental to the discourses. In respect to legitimacy and lack of trustworthy from Somali populace as well as Somali authorities as liability partner in the state reconstruction process, the study recommends a bottom-up approach that establishes the root cause of the problem and mechanism

within which cordial relations between missions and population are enhanced. National commission for reconciliation and as well as a state agency for DDR initiatives within Somali national security architecture should be established should be developed as an auxiliary to the mission's objectives. The fact that military paradigms alone cannot bring state reconstruction, the study recommends the need to employ diplomacy as tool in engaging the warring Somalia clans and insurgency groups. Al-Shabaab employs a determined Somali nationalism and Islam to its agenda and calls for Islamic emirate of Somalia. Therefore, there's need to employ diplomatic paradigms to the discourse. Most importantly, intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing remains a fundamental component for successful military intervention. The study therefore recommends the need for AU, its member states, global intelligence community as well as the strategic partners, to develop an overt and covert intelligence database that will facilitate intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing to peace support operations in an effective, responsive, timely, swift and manageable manner. The study further recommends the need for AU to have its own standing military and civilian force and to procure huge and modern military assets for air, ground and naval missions, to enhance its effectiveness and avoid proxy wars and state interests attributed to Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs).

7.4 Suggestions for areas of further research

This research focused on AMISOM state reconstruction initiatives in Somalia between 2007 and 2021. Cognizant of the subject matter and limitations of this study, the researcher suggests the following areas for further studies.

In line with first specific objective of the study, further research needs to be done on the impact UNSC Resolutions on peace support operations towards state reconstruction in in Somalia. The series of resolutions in respect to external intervention in Somalia ought to be studied to ascertain its viability. There also need for study on the ATMIS as AMISOM successor to establish whether new initiatives and scopes by AU are progressive or problematic. Viability of the state reconstruction initiatives on PSO requires further scholarly interrogation. Further investigation on the effectiveness of multidimensional PSOs on state reconstruction in Somalia ought to be done.

In line with second specific objective of the study, further research needs to be pursued to ascertain the legality and obligations of strategic partnerships on military interventions aimed at bringing state reconstruction initiatives. It will also be instrumental to study when further inquiry on the significance of strategic partnerships between AU and other emerging powers such as china, India, Russia, Iran among other international actors with specific focus military intervention on state reconstruction in Africa and in particular Somalia. The study also suggests further study on the effectiveness of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AU PSOs within and without the African continent (Somalia being the case study) on state reconstruction.

In line with third specific objective of the study, further research needs to be done on whether military or diplomatic interventions in Somalia is a sustainable and lasting deal to stability of Somalia; The influence of overt and covert Proxies in Somalia Intervention needs to be investigated to ascertain its impact. Further inquiry to the Somalia question on stability, there's need to determine whether Somalia is a victim of game theory in the international system. Federalism being a prominent feature in state reconstruction, the study further suggests that the influence of federalism on Somalia's state reconstruction frameworks needs to be studied. The study also crusades for scholars and policy actors to develop common, holistic framework on the mechanism to address recurring, dominating and limiting challenges in peace support operations in the African continent amidst the dynamics in the nature and scope of PSOs. With the thousands of good UN, AU, NATO reports and other policy and scholarly recommendations on challenges and solutions to AU peace support operations and in particular the Somali question, urgent call to towards conclusive, practical and viable solutions to "unprecedented, unending and recurring challenges "ought to be done collectively by scholars and policy actors.

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United Nations Security Council Resolution 2142/2014

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2158/2014

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: PhD Thesis Timelines

SESSIONS	ACTIVITIES	DURATION
1.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of Concept Proposal 	1 Month
2.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of Research Proposal 	3 Months
3.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defense of the Research Proposal 	1 Month
4.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Processing of Proposal at the School, approval and Substantive registration by Graduate School • 	3 Months
5.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtaining Relevant Research Permits and Authorizations from Graduate School, NACOSTI, and Other Applicable Institutions 	2 Months
6.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collection of Data • Analyzation of Data Collected 	5 Months
7.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Writing of Thesis • Notice of Submission and Submission of Thesis 	6 Months
8.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thesis Defense 	3 Months
9.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revising and submitting corrected Thesis 	2 Months
10.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Editing of Thesis at Graduate School and Final Thesis Submission 	2 Month
•	TOTAL	28 Months

Source: Researcher 2023

Appendix II: Interview Consent Form


Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: Request for Informed Consent on the African Union Intervention on State

Reconstruction in Somalia between 2007 And 2021

I am Dennis Kiptoo Kandie, a PhD student at Kenyatta University, carrying out research on *“African Union intervention on state reconstruction in Somalia between 2007 and 2021”*. I wish to request for your interview participation by providing information to questions that I wish to ask. The response will be confidential and its academic purpose shall be limited to this research. Your assistance to this process shall be highly appreciated with utmost ethical considerations.

Thanks in advance.

A photograph of a handwritten signature in blue ink on a light-colored surface. The signature is cursive and appears to read 'Kandie'.


Kandie Dennis Kiptoo,

Appendix III: Map of Africa Union highlighting Somalia as the study area.



Source: Moi University Geography Department GIS Lab.

Appendix IV: Map of Somalia highlighting AMISOM Sectors.



Source: Moi University Geography Department GIS Lab.

Appendix V: Thesis Estimate Budget

NO.	ITEM	AMOUNT
1.	Secretariat and other operating services	15000
2.	Stationery	10000
3.	Editing expenses	2000
4.	Travelling	20000
5.	Field expenses	20000
6.	Communication expenses	6000
7.	Binding	10000
8.	Piloting	5000
9.	Accommodations	20000
10.	Internet services	5000
11.	Publication	25000
12.	Library services	5000
13.	Procuring of Books	10000
14.	Supervision costs	20000
15.	Research Assistance Services	20000
16.	GIS labs cost	5000
17.	Editing service	5000
18.	Airtime	6000
19.	Miscellaneous services	6000
20.	Contingencies	10000
21.	GRAND TOTAL	180000

Source: Compiled by the Researcher

Appendix VI: Research Authorization Letter- Kenyatta University

Graduate School



KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke

Website: www.ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 8710901 Ext. 57530

OUR REF: C82/CTY/20433/2022

Date: 18th March, 2024

The Director General,
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation,
P.O. Box 30623-00100,
NAIROBI

Dear Sir/Madam,


RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FOR KANDIE K. DENNIS REG.NO. C82/CTY/20433/2022

I write to introduce Kandie who is a Postgraduate Student of this University. The student is registered for Ph.D. Degree programme in the Department of Security, Diplomacy & Peace Studies in the School of Law, Arts & Social Sciences.

Kandie intends to conduct research for Ph.D. Thesis entitled "African Union Led State Reconstruction Initiatives in Somalia, 2007-2021"

Any assistance given will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,


PROF. ELISHBA KIMANI
EXECUTIVE DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

FLO/cao

Committed to Creativity, Excellence & Self-Reliance

Appendix VII: Research Approval Letter- Kenyatta University Graduate School



KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100

NAIROBI, KENYA

Tel. 810901 Ext. 57530

Website: www.ku.ac.ke

Internal Memo

FROM: Dean, Graduate School

DATE: 18th March, 2024

TO: Mr. Kandie D. Kiptoo
C/o Department of Security, Diplomacy & Peace Studies
Kenyatta University

REF: C82/CTY/20433/2022

SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF RESEARCH PROPOSAL

We acknowledge the receipt of your revised Research Proposal entitled "African Union Led State Reconstruction Initiatives in Somalia, 2007-2021" as per recommendations raised by the Graduate School Board 14th February, 2024.

You may now proceed with your Data collection, subject to clearance with the Director General, National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation.

As you embark on your data collection, please note that you will be required to submit to Graduate School completed supervision Tracking and Progress Report Forms. The Forms are available at the University's Website under Graduate School webpage downloads.

Also, please ensure that you publish article(s) from your thesis before submitting it to Graduate School for examination as per the Commission for University Education and Kenyatta University guidelines. By copy of this letter, the Registrar (Academic) is hereby requested to grant you substantive registration for your Ph.D. studies.

Thank you


JACKSON EUVUSI
FOR EXECUTIVE DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

c.c. Registrar (Academic) Att. Mr. Richard Chweya
Chairman, Department of Security, Diplomacy & Peace Studies

Supervisor

1. Dr. Xavier F. Ichani
C/o Dept. of Security, Diplomacy & Peace Studies
Kenyatta University
2. Dr. Evans O. Onyango
C/o Dept. of Security, Diplomacy & Peace Studies
Kenyatta University

Committed to Creativity, Excellence & Self-Reliance

Appendix VIII: Research Instrument

Interview Schedule

African Union led State Reconstruction Initiatives in Somalia, 2007-2021

Introduction

Policymakers, experts, actors and scholars question the viability and practicality of military interventions in Somalia on state reconstruction. The aim of this study is to gather information on AMISOM intervention on state reconstruction in Somalia between 2007 and 2021.

Note

1. The interview sessions will take approximately 20-30 minutes.
2. The interview sessions will be audio/video recorded primarily for academic purposes.
3. Data provided will only be utilized for the purposes of research and will be handled with utmost confidentiality.
4. Quotation/s shall be subject to the consent of the key informant/s.

Name of the key informant: _____

Location: _____

Institution: _____

Position of key informant:

When did you join the Institution?

Section A: Initiatives employed by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on state reconstruction in Somalia.

1. How did AMISOM employ the following initiatives on state reconstruction in Somalia.
 - a) Stabilization Initiatives
 - b) Protection of Civilian (POC) Initiatives
 - c) Civil -Military Corporation/Partnerships (CIMIC) Initiatives
 - d) Counter Terrorism Initiatives
 - e) Women Involvement in Peace and Security Initiatives
 - f) Security Initiatives
 - g) Institutional Capacity building initiatives
 - h) National Réconciliation initiatives
 - i) Initiatives on the Promotion of State Political legitimacy

2. To what extent did AMISOM initiatives contributed towards state reconstruction in Somalia?

Section B: Strategic Partnerships between African Union on African Union

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and international actors on state reconstruction in Somalia.

1. How has the strategic partnerships between African union/ AMISOM and United Nations and its Specialized agencies contributed towards state reconstruction in Somalia
2. How has the strategic partnerships between African union/ AMISOM and National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contributed towards state reconstruction in Somalia
3. How has the strategic partnerships between African union/ AMISOM and European Union (EU) contributed towards state reconstruction in Somalia
4. How has the strategic partnerships between African Union/ AMISOM and United States contributed towards state reconstruction in Somalia
5. How has the strategic partnerships between African Union/ AMISOM and United Kingdom contributed towards state reconstruction in Somalia
6. How has the strategic partnerships between African Union/ AMISOM and Turkiye contributed towards state reconstruction in Somalia
7. To what extent has these strategic partnerships with African Union/AMISOM on State Reconstruction in Somalia been effective?

Section C: Challenges faced by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in carrying out state reconstruction in Somalia.






1. How did the following challenges affect AMISOM in its role on state reconstruction;
 - a) Complexities and dynamics in the Mission's mandate
 - b) Uncertainty in the Somalia political environment
 - c) Invisible and Challenging Principal Enemy: The Al-Shabaab
 - d) Lack of Internal Coherence and Coordination
 - e) Violations of international laws and Norms
 - f) Inadequate and unreliable intelligence gathering and sharing
 - g) Inadequate Funding to the Mission
 - h) Enmity and difference among the Somali clans
 - i) Troops capacity and capability,
 - j) Maritime Piracy
2. How did AMISOM address these challenges?

Concluding Remarks

Is there any other information about African Union Led State Reconstruction Initiatives in Somalia 2007-2021 you would wish to share?

Thank you!

Appendix IX: NACOSTI Research License

 REPUBLIC OF KENYA	 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
Ref No: 225708	Date of Issue: 22/May/2024
RESEARCH LICENSE	
	
<p>This is to Certify that Mr. Dennis Kigoo Kandie of Kenyatta University, has been licensed to conduct research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2012 (Rev.2014) in Baringo, Kericho, Nairobi, Uasin-Gishu on the topic: AFRICAN UNION LED STATE RECONSTRUCTION INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA, 2007-2021 for the period ending : 22/May/2025.</p>	
License No: NACOSTI/P/24/25947	
225708 Applicant Identification Number	 Director General NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
	Verification QR Code 
<p>NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document, Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.</p>	
See overleaf for conditions	

The National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation, hereafter referred to as the Commission, was established under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act 2013 (Revised 2014) herein after referred to as the Act. The objective of the Commission shall be to regulate and ensure quality in the science, technology and innovation sector and advise the Government in matters related thereto.

CONDITIONS OF THE RESEARCH LICENSE

1. The License is granted subject to provisions of the Constitution of Kenya, the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, and other relevant laws, policies and regulations. Accordingly, the licensee shall adhere to such procedures, standards, code of ethics and guidelines as may be prescribed by regulations made under the Act, or prescribed by provisions of international treaties of which Kenya is a signatory to
2. The research and its related activities as well as outcomes shall be beneficial to the country and shall not in any way:
 - i. Endanger national security
 - ii. Adversely affect the lives of Kenyans
 - iii. Be in contravention of Kenya's international obligations including Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN).
 - iv. Result in exploitation of intellectual property rights of communities in Kenya
 - v. Adversely affect the environment
 - vi. Adversely affect the rights of communities
 - vii. Endanger public safety and national cohesion
 - viii. Plagiarize someone else's work
3. The License is valid for the proposed research, location and specified period.
4. The license and rights thereunder are non-transferable
5. The Commission reserves the right to cancel the research at any time during the research period if in the opinion of the Commission the research is not implemented in conformity with the provisions of the Act or any other written law.
6. The Licensee shall inform the relevant County Director of Education, County Commissioner and County Governor before commencement of the research.
7. Excavation, filming, movement, and collection of specimens are subject to further necessary clearance from relevant Government Agencies.
8. The License does not give authority to transfer research materials.
9. The Commission may monitor and evaluate the licensed research project for the purpose of assessing and evaluating compliance with the conditions of the License.
10. The Licensee shall submit one hard copy, and upload a soft copy of their final report (thesis) onto a platform designated by the Commission within one year of completion of the research.
11. The Commission reserves the right to modify the conditions of the License including cancellation without prior notice.
12. Research, findings and information regarding research systems shall be stored or disseminated, utilized or applied in such a manner as may be prescribed by the Commission from time to time.
13. The Licensee shall disclose to the Commission, the relevant Institutional Scientific and Ethical Review Committee, and the relevant national agencies any inventions and discoveries that are of National strategic importance.
14. The Commission shall have powers to acquire from any person the right in, or to, any scientific innovation, invention or patent of strategic importance to the country.
15. Relevant Institutional Scientific and Ethical Review Committee shall monitor and evaluate the research periodically, and make a report of its findings to the Commission for necessary action.

National Commission for Science, Technology and
Innovation (NACOSTI),
Off Waiyaki Way, Upper Kabete,
P. O. Box 30625 - 00100 Nairobi, KENYA
Telephone: 020-4007000, 0713788787, 0715444245
E-mail: dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke

**Appendix X: Authorization from the Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs-
Kenya**

kuu: +254203319205
254-20-2240096/341935-144351
communications@mfa.go.ke
or www.mfa.go.ke
replying please quote Ref. No and date



TARAKSHI C. NYAMBU
P.O. Box 3051-00100
NAIROBI, KENYA

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AND DIASPORA AFFAIRS
STATE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

MFA/CONF/SEC/10

24TH JULY, 2024

Mr. Dennis Kiptoo Kandie
P.O. Box 365-30400
Kabarnet.

**RE: DATA COLLECTION ON AFRICAN UNION LED STATE
RECONSTRUCTION IN SOMALIA, 2007-2021**

The State Department for Foreign Affairs acknowledges receipt of your letter dated **18th June, 2024** on the above subject.

In line with your request, the Peace and Security Division has nominated Mr. Kevin Ndegwa Gatitu and Salim Omar Mohamed Third Secretaries Cadets to participate in the study on the stated dates of **28th June to 28th July, 2024.**

We wish you a successful engagement.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Lenah M. Nyambu'.

Lenah M. Nyambu, HSC, "ndc" (K)

DIRECTOR/ PEACE AND SECURITY DIRECTORATE

Appendix XI: Authorization from the National Police Service -Kenya



KENYA POLICE SERVICE

Telegraphic address: "VIGILANCE", Nairobi
Telephone: Nairobi 341411-6
Fax: 330495
When replying please quote

POLICE HEADQUARTERS
P.O. Box 30983-0010
NAIROBI

Ref. No. **KPS/DIG/SEC/HRD/6/VOL 11/ (35)**

25th June, 2024

The Commandant
General Service Unit
P. O. Box 49506 - 00100
NAIROBI

RE: Data Collection on African Union Led State Reconstruction Initiatives in Somalia 2007-2021 by Dennis Kiptoo Kandie a PhD student at Kenyatta University.

The above named person is a PhD student at Kenyatta University. He has applied to carry out a research on African Union led State reconstruction initiatives in Somalia between 2007 and 2021. He intends to use an interview schedule as his tool targeting a senior officer who has had a stint in the African Union led peace keeping mission preferably in Somalia. The Deputy Inspector General Kenya Police Service has approved the request and identified **Mr. Christopher Mumo SSP**, for the assignment.

To this end, you are requested to inform and hand over a copy of the interview schedule to the officer to enable him prepare adequately for the interview that is scheduled for between 28th June and 28th July, 2024 as it may be convenient to him. The interview will be both in person and online. A copy of the interview schedule is hereby attached. For any clarification please contact the student through the following cell phone: 0723425285


DONATHA KIPLANG'AT
For: **DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL**
KENYA POLICE SERVICE

CC: Dennis Kiptoo Kandie

Appendix XII: Authorization from the Ministry of Defense-Kenya

RESTRICTED



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Telegrams: "DEFENCE" Nairobi
Telephone: 020-2721100

Email: cmootw@mod.go.ke
When replying please quote

DHQ/OPS/104M/CMO&OOTW

Defence Headquarters
ULINZI HOUSE
P O Box 40668 - 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Fax: 020-2723446

9 July 2024

Dennis Kiptoo Kandle
P.O Box 365 - 30400
Kabarnet.
Email: denniskandle2022@gmail.com

RE: DATA COLLECTION ON AFRICAN UNION LED STATE RECONSTRUCTION INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA, 2007 - 2021

Receipt of your request on subject matter is hereby acknowledged and contents therein noted.

The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) has the honor to inform you that the request has been granted for you to work in partnership with the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) which is KDF premier institution mandated to collaborate with research stakeholders in promoting peace and stability.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'P O Walwa', written over a circular stamp.

P O WALWA
Lieutenant Colonel
for Chief of the Defence Forces

Appendix XIII: Turnitin plagiarism index report

turnitin

K J DENNIS KANDIE THESIS UPDATED DECEMBER 2024.docx



		All Sources	X
		Match 1 of 93	
<p>AFRICAN UNION LED STATE RECONSTRUCTION INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA,</p> <p>2007-2021</p> <p>KANDIE DENNIS KIPTOO</p> <p>C82/CTY/20433/2022</p> <p>A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR</p> <p>OF PHILOSOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ir-library.mmust.ac.ke Internet Source - 3 urls 2% docslib.org Internet Source - 13 urls 2% www.researchgate.net Internet Source - 11 urls 1% dokumen.pub Internet Source - 11 urls 1% ebin.pub Internet Source - 13 urls 1% "The Palgrave Handbo... Publication 1% www.un.org Internet Source - 5 urls 1% dspace.trakya.edu.tr:8... Internet Source 1% 	

Appendix XIV: Research publication 1:

Path of Science: International Electronic Scientific Journal

The screenshot displays the journal's interface with a red navigation bar at the top containing links for HOME, ABOUT, LOGIN, REGISTER, SEARCH, CURRENT, ARCHIVES, ABSTRACTING AND INDEXING, and BOOK PUBLISHING. A search bar is located on the right. The main content area features a PDF viewer for the article "State Reconstruction Initiatives of the African Union Mission in Somalia (2007-2022)" by Dennis Kiptoo Kandie, Xavier Francis Ichani, and Evans Odhiambo Onyango. The article is from the journal "Path of Science, 2025, Vol. 11, No 4" (ISSN 2413-9009). The abstract discusses state reconstruction by international actors and the diagnostic framework for Peace Support Operations. The authors are affiliated with Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya. The article is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0. The interface also includes a sidebar with "OPEN JOURNAL SYSTEMS", "CURRENT ISSUE", "TOOLS" (Grammarly, Library of Congress, American Economic Association, APA Style), and "KEYWORDS" (Azerbaijani language, COVID-19 Education Implementation, Management, Marketing Nigeria, communication court, culture discourse, education efficiency, enterprise judge justice, language legal regulation, linguistics national, security social media). On the right, there are sections for "Focus and Scope", "Author Guidelines", "Publication Ethics", "Author Fees", "LANGUAGE" (with flags for UK, Russia, and Ukraine), "ABOUT THE AUTHORS" (with ORCID iDs for the authors), and "ARTICLE TOOLS" (Abstract, Indexing metadata, How to cite item, Finding References, Email the author).

Appendix XV: Research publication 2

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Mission After Mission: Challenges of African Union Mission on State Reconstruction in Somalia

[Sh](#)

Dennis Kiptoo Kandie, Xavier Francis Ichani and Evans Odhiambo Onyango
[Additional contact information](#)

International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 2025, vol. 9, issue 4, 5656-5672

Abstract: The unending challenges attributed to Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Somalia, is a glaring reality of how the African Union (AU) and her global partners are grappling with the costs of civil war, state fragility and international terrorism in Somalia which has turned out to be mission after mission. Anchored on state building and securitization theories, this study interrogated the challenges faced by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in carrying out state reconstruction. Three key challenges namely; strategic, operational and tactical are analyzed. An in-depth analysis and synthesis of the current relevant literature reviewed to unearth existing gaps in Somalia state reconstruction efforts. This study employed the case study research design. The targeted population was from AU, AMISOM, and experts in PSO from which a sample of 62 informants was purposively drawn. Interview and observation schedules were employed as key instruments of primary data collection while secondary data was collected using document analysis. The analyzed data was presented qualitatively. This study established that AMISOM faced three key strategic challenges namely, complexities and dynamism in the mission's mandate, inadequate funding, and the overall inadequacies of the mission's capacity and capability. AMISOM also endure two key tactical challenges. Firstly, the challenge of fighting the invisible enemy and secondly, the lack of internal coherence and coordination in the AMISOM command. Four operational challenges were identified. Firstly, negative clannism and clan differences among the Somali population. Secondly cases of violations of international laws and norms. Thirdly, uncertainty and fragility in the Somalia political atmosphere and fourthly, incidences of piracy off the Coast of Somalia. This study recommended that military interventions such as AMISOM require adequate technical, financial, logistical, administrative, and legitimate support to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. African Union Commission should ensure that limitations and lessons learned in the previous missions in Somalia are addressed in both the UNSC and AUPSC so that a formidable framework is attained in guiding and enhancing missions that succeed AMISOM. Further, multisectoral approaches should be embraced in addressing challenges encountered in PSOs.

Date: 2025
References: [View complete reference list from CitEc](#)
Citations:

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