

POLITICS OF TRANSITION AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA - Keynote Address

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Introduction

The Crisis of Transition in the Transfer of Power

This paper examines the political transition in Africa and highlights the practices that undermine a smooth transfer of power and social justice. A smooth transition process calls for the creation and nurture of not only good constitutional provisions and institutional arrangements but also of the exercise of responsible political leadership by those transiting into retirement and the exercise of transitional justice. There can be no good political transition where there is no responsible leadership and good leadership has a clear ethical implication. Hence there must be put in place a constitutional and ethical referent on which the political behaviour and process of transition is based including the practice of transitional justice. Uncivil behaviour ought to be avoided at all costs. There is need for a national culture that builds rather than destroys the heritage of a country and its social repertoire of values, ideals and visions.

A well-managed transitional process is a function of a well-ordered society. In this society, there is need not just for a series of ceremonies of handing over that are not just symbolic but that formalise the entry of the new regime. There is need for inculcating a congenial public ethic that will guide leaders in establishment of a just government in the nation. This motif guides them in dealing with those who have lost an election so that they are not retributive. This public ethic also must guide former ruling parties and enforcing their big wigs to accept the outcome of democratic elections. All contestants must be forced into an agenda of moral participation that does not seem to be emphasized in the political science lexicon of political participation. There should be a law not just governing resignation of former officials when a new regime is coming in but also enforcing a professional and fraternal handing over.

There should be a team of designated professionals to specifically receive briefings from outgoing officials to help their incoming counterparts along with all other necessary details. The outgoing team must be made to be as helpful as possible by law as part of the exercise of transitional justice. In this notion of justice that goes beyond punishing those who have committed economic and political crimes, consultations between the leaders of the two regimes are necessary to ensure commitment to a smooth transfer of power without a major reshuffle in the bureaucracy if that bureaucracy was developed on the principles of merit, efficiency and competence.

The mechanics of power transfer aside for the moment, perhaps a word on the mechanics of the electoral process is called for. Apart from the iniquities of campaign financing from public coffers, of which many African political parties are guilty, other practices equally undermine the integrity of elections across the continent. That is why Jean and John Comaroff are perhaps right to talk of the political function of witchcraft in their *Democracy and its Malcontents*. It is a known fact that politicians against their opponents practice a lot of witchcraft during and after elections in Africa. This in itself is highly immoral and it undermines the morality and democratic credentials of any political culture.

In Africa, politicians resort to covert politics and the occult to attain power by unconventional means. There are many instances of public discussions of bad traditional medicine practices that have bad political effects, and instances of witchcraft activities have been reported even in the media as well as village gossip circuits. Tribalism is the other immoral practice that also undermines the democratic pretensions of any regime whose political schemes are driven by a power calculus that basically responds to the impulse of ethnicity. Politicisation of ethnicity to pursue narrow tribal interests inevitably short-circuits the process of national construction. Ethnicity is not a suitable basis of undertaking a national project in a multi-ethnic society in Africa. The big wigs of coalition movements

who still wear tribal tags only create tribal alliances. They are basically tribal boss-men who lack an intellectual and ideological basis of building a national outfit of alternative transformative leaders. The spectacle of tribal alliance building on the political manoeuvres of tribal boss-men and boss-women is a big set-back in Africa. Many African politicians are surviving on a new brand of ethnic populism! The use of this populism to strike political deals is a game of political convenience in the name of preservation of power or power-sharing and not political commitment. Many leaders have struck political deals on devious social projects instead of enhancing the cause of social justice by underwriting a concrete political deal based on clear ideological goals and principles of political morality. There cannot be any political morality worth talking about if there is moral obligation. Where there is no moral obligation, there is viciousness in the practice of moral integrity. Where there is no moral integrity, there is inevitably a loss of moral authority.

There seems to be a worrisome decline of consciousness to the national project in much of Africa because of ethnicity and corruption. Ethnicity in itself is not evil except for the merchants of culture who demonise other communities to achieve their narrow political projects. Such self-serving cultural mercantilism is dangerous because it leads to the vigilantism of political marketeers and syndicateers that often culminate in political banditry. Many vigilante groups have their roots in perverse culturalism, showing how narrow-minded ethnic merchants of culture can abuse cultural homogeneity. These are civil society organisations that are patronised by social groups that are manipulated by power barons who are bankrupt of both political morality and civility of leadership. Globalization and its neo-liberal logic have emphasized the project of political and economic reform in which the demand for human rights and individual liberty are writ large in an erroneous assumption that human liberty is the greatest social good. Its embedded logic of the market that allocates value to the powerful that generates a disturbing category of market identities who set activities point to what Adam Smith's wealth of Nations alluded to in the name of the name of anarchy of the market. The market place also needs a moral ethic that goes beyond the Protestant ethic that merely spawns workaholicism or the Sumaritan ethic. In the name of collective social responsibility, the latter merely underwrites tokenism and corruption.

Africa is struggling with the establishment of an effective democratic leadership. Democracy as a concept refers to the way in which the state, the political parties and civil society interrelate in a well-ordered society. Democracy consists of rules of just government whose validity depends on the willingness of given national communities to observe them (cf. Nodia, 1994: 7). Democracy as a matter of principles and rules of a just government demands ethical conduct.

There can be no justice without fairness. Indeed, the modes of social relations and governance that emanate from deliberate interventions in the political process have influenced recent experiences of regime change and subsequent patterns of political behaviour in the so-called multi-party era in Africa. What is Africa's political project in this era of neo-liberally conceived politics of leadership and the adoption of economic reform? A lot of importance ought to be attached to the struggle for leadership power and its moral management in spite of the preponderance of Machiavellian principles of retention of power in actual political practice in Africa that ignores moral principles and values. Integrity rests on virtue and virtue has a powerful moral imperative. Power is conceived as social force that is supposed to be a means towards a collective moral cause of justice and social well being that therefore calls for responsible management and not its Machiavellian abuse or the Hobbesian creation of a political monstrosity called the leviathan leader.

Responsible management carries with it a major moral imperative. The question of moral responsibility points to the need to deploy a new phenomenology that departs from the Enlightenment philosophy with its phenomenology and its various forms of modern re-incarnation in the ideology of postmodernism. It should inspire a personology that breaks loose from the Cartesian duality. This is a personology that offers an understanding of personality dynamics that influence leadership processes in Africa as perceived within the framework of the human triadness of identity of being and political action. The focus on the triad nature of human beingness is necessary given that power expression is related to consciousness and consciousness is a social expression of this triad being. The power process is a dynamic social process whose statement takes the form of authority and political dominance that we call hegemony and force. Its deployment is a function of a synthesis of pneumatic, psychic and somatic processes and their cultural and institutional mediation.

Hegemony should have a moral interpellation of key social values. According to Gramsci, be morally interpolated as cited by Buchana (2000), hegemony is the expression of power in a political situation. It constitutes a moment in which the philosophies of society fuse or are in equilibrium. It is an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations of moral, religious, and customary spheres (Buchanan, 2000:102). As a full society, society is constituted of key domains of morality and the intersection of all its elements. That is why we should talk of a new project of a moral ideological hegemonisation of the totality of social space in African societies in which ideology, culture and religion are key markers of political behaviour.

The ideology of individualism under capitalism completely fills the space with its own subjects and concepts (Callari and Ruccio, 1998:x) and neo-liberalism and postmodernism are ideologies that codify true capitalist interests with seductive but deceiving fragrance of liberties in the market and liberties in the political arena. There are dangers of ethnic populism. The cultural specificities that are being defined by a new wave of ethnic populism constitute dangerous theatres for political catastrophe. They are worrisome social and material conditions for the implantation of divisive social values that undermine good political transition and prospects of realizing national projects. They do not provide institutional and transformative conditions for the process of interpolation of harmonizing moral values.

This process has pneumatic, psychic and somatic dimensions and means of self-expression and the reinforcement of not only alternative but just forms of identity and entity consciousness that adheres to a national project of social transformation. Gramsci as cited in Buchanan (2000) talks of moral authority through the creation and perpetuation of legitimating symbols with which ruling groups maintain their domination and hegemony. Therefore, hegemony occurs under concrete political and economic conditions that have an ideological justification (Buchanan, 2000: 108). It must be an ideology that is conscious of moral presuppositions.

Forgacs (1989) points out that Gramsci was also concerned with the moral function of culture and had a sense of the interplay among traditions (Forgacs, 1989: 74). In addition, for him, Neo-Gramscians argue that capitalist rule in the West was secured through the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in the ideological and cultural spheres rather than through coercion (Forgacs, 1989: 81). In itself, coercion is a violation of social justice and so do corruption and ethnic exclusivism. They spawn bad transitional politics.

Power can be a means of punishment, impoverishment or empowerment. For Foucault, (1972, 1973), power is a force that limits, controls, forbids, withdraws, and punishes exchanges and subjugates. Thus, the ultimate product of power is the subject himself/herself. He talks of order in society through the network of relations and therefore has a sense of existing power relations in society. He however argues that this order in society is not given through consensus since societies are loci of struggle (Keeley, 1990: 100). There can be no good political order without a moral commitment to principles of justice and excellence. Foucault's view of society as loci of struggle is an indicator of the dangers inherent in politics of power acquisition and its retention based on narrow definitions of interest based on differentia specifica of so-called tribes.

Power is an important organizational or destructive force that must be exercised with responsibility without succumbing to the corrupting influence of ethnicity and the corrupting influence of wealth or money. Responsibility is an expression of character and therefore it takes good character in leadership to exercise power responsibly. The exercise of power responsibly should be seen as the crucial determining factor in the leadership mediation of social inequality through culture and religion.

As an organizational force it is a crucial factor in the legitimization of the social function of various categories of financial and social capital and their material expression. This organizational force is termed as social power. Olsen states that force, dominance and authority are the three categories of social power (Olsen, 1970:7). It has also been argued that legitimacy is authorized power and without moral authority there ensues a crisis of legitimacy. In other words, authority is institutionalized power while force is manifest power. Power therefore is a latent force (Hawley, 1970:13) that must be handled carefully and not carelessly. Through formal organization, power is transformed into authority and social organization requires two important elements; numbers of people and resources (capital). In other words organized social groups and their cultural repertoires, values and social norms may be termed as social capital.

The Comaroffs state that the world is dualistic everywhere. All social fields are swept away by waves of unity and diversity, by forces that diffuse power and meaning and by counter forces that concentrate and fix them. For them the roots of ethnicity lie in the fact of human cultural difference and ascribed status group affiliation (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992: 31, 50).

But cultures are not static and they can be negotiated and be re-invented with prospects of creating new national identities with new national consciousness. For them the emergence of ethnic groups and the awakening of ethnic consciousness are the products of historical processes that structure relations of inequality between discrete social entities.

The establishment of mutual recognition between subjects and the subjects' recognition of themselves in a fraternal society is essential. This should be foundational to the establishment of an ethical basis of behaviour that citizens recognise as constituting a foundational referent of their manner of behaviour. Self-centred market identities are immoral actors without any semblance of business ethics in their activities. They operate as cabals of marketeers, profiteers and syndicateers who enter into patrimonial relationships with state officials through tokenism and corruption by oiling and benefiting individuals in bureaucracies and ruling parties and therefore badly undermining the legitimacy of their regimes and bureaucratic machines.

Revisiting the Legacy of Corruption and ethnicity in African Leadership

A narrow political agenda creates transitional problems because of the bad political legacy it leaves behind. A neo-liberalism that does not allow leaders to reflect on collective inter-ethnic interests in society and the emerging global cultures and the values which need to be enhanced in our societies' encounter with various forms of globalisation is not useful to Africa in the long run. A good leader's future realization of his potential takes the form of a morally inspired reclamation of unrealised potential that he or she knows he or she has. He or she looks for a chance to express and demonstrate this in pursuit of a given vision. It must go beyond Moism as a leadership style in Kenya that was clouded in the obscurantist epithet of Nyayoism that became completely distinct from Kenyattaism. It must go beyond Museveni's movementism that has renewed the ethnic agenda with the revival of retrogressive monarchies that has left a loud cry for sectarian interests of reinstatement of traditional leaders and their being accorded increased clout in public affairs. It must go beyond the socialist populism of Obote or Nyerere's communalistic agenda of Ujamaa in the name of Africa Socialism that described socialism as a mere attitude of the mind in a rare philosophical demagoguery. These narrow leadership projects created transitional setbacks in their own unique ways in their respective countries.

The much talked about Nyayoism as a philosophy of continuity was characterised by its intellectual vacuity. Nyayo is a Kiswahili word for footsteps. Its slogans of love, peace and unity were Moi's expression of humanism against a mission background that made even his attending of church service national news. A huge retinue of sycophants, those, who sought to get his ear, followed him. Where Moi worshipped on any given Sunday became a matter of national importance and was constantly flashed as news on the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation radio and television stations. He however failed to put in place programmes that would help Kenyans who had been degraded over the years through bad leadership to recover their full humanity and dignity. Nyerere of Tanzania had once referred to Kenya as "the men eat men society". Moi assumed the Presidency after Kenyatta's death and promised Kenyans that he would pursue Kenyatta's footsteps in terms of political practice and policy.

The building of the Nyayo hegemony, in spite of its philosophical vacuity and political viciousness, was the key in the construction of the oppressive Nyayo State. This process was to be reinforced by a deepening system of authoritarianism that smirked of colonial instincts of political control that the Moi government did not pretend to avoid at any cost. Authoritarianism was an instinct of political self-preservation and it was necessitated by the simultaneous re-moulding and revival of KANU both to serve Moi's objectives and recover ground which the party had lost to the tribal conglomeration that called shots in Kenyatta's leadership called GEMA. Surprisingly, the leader of the defunct conglomerate, Njenga Karume, decamped from the opposition and joined the Moi wagon of Uhuru Kenyatta in 2002 electoral struggle for the presidency, Uhuru lost the race to Mwai Kibaki of NARC.

Despite the notion of Foucault of society as the loci of struggle that rules out consensus and good political will,

democracy calls for moments of consensus building. Public management reform requires dynamic and visionary leadership. However, management reform takes time. First, it takes considerable time to be able to determine and then focus upon realistic and significant targets of reform opportunity. Second, it takes time to build the sense of trust with the relevant officials and policy makers, stakeholder organisations and individual citizens, which must precede any effort to introduce significant management reform. Ideological interpolation is a historical process in which values of social justice are formulated in processes of encounter, interaction, negotiation and synthesis. These processes take place in clearly constituted forms of consciousness. Political discourse and playing politics are key elements in societal theatres such as our own. Politics is about articulation of conflicting opinions and their reconciliation through public institutions. The peaceful and democratic resolution of differences requires a consensus on certain fundamental values and public morality is one such value. Consensus is so valuable for the realization of political stability that in itself is very important in entrepreneurial activity.

Visionary leadership generates directional factors that come from the immediate goal setting. Instead of embarking on a clear transformative agenda, the party under Moi became a vehicle of mounting attacks on the integrity of those who were opposed to the President's manner of rule. Insults were hurled at government critics rather than reasoned responses (Chege 1995, 58). Consensus was undermined. There is a crisis of values in today's leadership process not only in Kenya but also in the rest of Eastern Africa. Unlike Kenyatta and Moi, post-Moi leaders need to recognise the importance of developing a culture of integration in which all human beings are respected. Command-mediated systems violate the prospect of consensus building. The big man syndrome of the Kenyatta and Moi regimes is characteristic of command-mediated and command-dominated political systems. Command based leadership that is characterised by the issuance of presidential directives by dictator-like rulers encourages the development of a deviant leadership that has no transformative agenda. Good leadership is also moral leadership.

The general tendency of gradual universalization of the neo-liberal economic model and political discourse concerning competitiveness and market efficiency and forms of political governance has legitimated new forms of constitutionalism under which government policies have become increasingly accountable to international capital and therefore to market forces.

The post-colonial state is criminalized and bashed and the market logic with the anarchy it spawn has left Africa divided and weakened. It is no longer an autonomous actor in global politics and the politics of self-determination. Corruption in the Kenyatta and Moi eras, not to mention the impact of corruption under Amin and even Museveni in Uganda and corruption under Mwinyi and Mkapa in Tanzania, violated the formal rules governing the allocation of public resources by leaders in response to offers of financial gain or political support. Corruption, which is the exercise of power and discretion without accountability, has exacerbated the atrocities of euro-centric planners whose social and economic packages in the name of reform in effect deny the humanity of Africans and their right to live, work and realise their potential. Transparency and accountability have strong moral imperatives. They go beyond populist and financialist connotations with which they are associated. Bribing is an attempt to change rules governing allocation of resources and rights (Khan 1998, 18). Bereft of their ethical import, they remain mere diversionary ploys in political power games.

Leaders need to be ethically grounded in a public morality of useful moral insights and intuitions. That is why Nyerere says tyrannies and dictatorships do not have constitutions or if they have them on paper, they are disregarded and irrelevant to practice citizens, however, have a right to call the leaders to be accountable at all levels. If they find things are going wrong, they have a right to expect explanations and immediate correction (Nyerere 1995, 2).

A transformative anti-corruption strategy has become necessary as a basis of laying a strong long-term social foundation to rout out corruption that has become systemic. Social empowerment is required which expands and protects the range of political and economic resources and makes alternatives open to citizens of Kenya at this critical hour of transition from Moism to Kibakiism. There should be an empowerment which entails strengthening civil society to enhance its political and economic vitality providing more orderly paths of access and rules of interaction between state and society and balancing economic and political opportunities (Johnston 1998, 84). There have been some recent moves by some African governments to abandon rigid systems of political rule in favour of much more open systems. This effort comes after years of internal pressures for democratisation. These moves

have influenced communities differently. What efforts are being put in place in East Africa to make the so-called civil society civil? The idea of civil society has been deemed relevant to the political project of democratisation. The social process of interpellation should be socially re-engineered. This should be with aim of providing for the infusion of moral civility in all social and political groups in Kenya African countries. Leadership culture should define the scope of moral civility based on not only tradition and custom but also on encapsulating acceptable and consensual public moral values and virtues. These moral values and virtues encoded as public leadership ethics must be expected to guide leadership behaviour as attendant forms of social and political action. It is not possible to speak of civil society where there is no organisational principle (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999: 20).

It makes sense to argue that the end of society is social justice and the meeting of social needs in order to improve human welfare. This is the sense in which transitional justice should be conceived given that there can be no justice without fairness. Rawls talks of justice as social welfare and develops a liberal theory of justice that needs to be re-thought in the light of the Gramscian concepts of ideology, hegemony and civil society.

Rawls argues that justice has a role in social co-operation (Rawls, 1993:54) and this notion needs to be reformulated in terms of Gramsci's ideas on language and politics and be posed in terms of the human triad of identity and its corresponding forms of consciousness.

Rawls does not relate his theory of justice to the legitimacy of resistance and violence where justice is abused in leadership, ethno-cultural projects and where the impact of neo-liberal political processes and the exercise of power and its abuse by holders of public office is profound. To what extent is a nation's political culture a product of hegemonic dominance? To what extent is it a legitimisation of partisan politics and neo-patrimonial political behaviour? What are the social and cultural consequences that emanate from community leadership's creation of norms, values and styles of management that monopolise power? Culture has its materiality that derives from human interactions with nature in ecological and historical arenas. It is conceptually much more than a mere cumulative result of experience, values, religion, beliefs, attitude, meanings, knowledge, social organisation, procedures, timing, spatial relations, concepts and possessions which a community of people has acquired or created in the course of generations through individual or group effort and interactions.

Culture is a social process and also a historical condition whose values and other normative repertoires are manifested in language, behaviour and social activities. Moore and Woodrow argue that it provides models and norms of acceptable day-to-day interactions and styles of communication (Moore and Woodrow, 1999:4). Culture is a concept that crystallises a great deal of thoughts, reflections on and critiques of modernity in the post-structural intervention in the political. In a number of these reflections on modernity, aspects of social life such as social movements, problems of power, social relations, ethical questions and social fiction are studied and analyzed (Diagne and Ossebi, 1996:6). Given that reflection on culture in Africa is still very weak compared to the Northern Academy, this paper examines and discusses culture from the standpoint of community politics, leadership and social justice.

For Guy Arnold, power and influence is the ability to act, to influence an outcome to get something to happen or not happen, or overcome resistance. Therefore, for him, the key in managing and coping with conflict comprises symbols, actions and events, which constitute traditional mechanisms in the management of conflict (Arnold, 1999:8). Foucault on the other hand sees war as a strategy. It is a continuation of politics and politics is a continuation of war. As a continuation of war, politics is a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder. It is a technique of internal peace that is sought to implement the mechanism of the disciplined mass, of the docile.

For Foucault, discipline must be made national (Foucault, 1997:168). The Foucauldian assumption that there is a docility of the masses is contrary to the Fanonian perception of the emancipatory role of violence in decolonisation. This therefore leads him to developing a highly perfidious notion of the global panopticon deriving from the liberalism of Jeremy Bentham. It is a panopticism in which certain democratic values, norms and standards have to be established globally and enforced in a policemen'ship of liberal democracy that he likens to Bentham's prison panopticon. He avoids discussing the question of the very essence of democracy, mark you post-structuralism has no time for essentials, a system of governance that ought to underwrite the realization and protection of human freedoms, justice and the satisfaction of social needs.

It is society's moral duty to ensure the realisation of justice. Even in the liberal Rawlsian logic, a theory of justice is a theory of moral sentiments and for him there is need to set out the principles governing our moral powers (Rawls, 1993:54). The question of moral sentiments needs to be re-interpreted in terms of party and governmental discipline and also in transitional terms. It ought to define proper intellectual roles in social transformation without which there may be a cultural crisis emanating from an organic crisis. Intellectuals are supposed to provide the theoretical nucleus for social transformation. Stephen Gill sees prevailing forms of civil society and state as being in a situation of 'organic crisis' (Rosengarten, 2000:15). There can be no potent production of socially transformative organizational power without there being in place proper strategic intellectual reflection and discourse competitiveness which reflects on intellectual and moral responsibilities of leadership. Stability of character is a statement of discipline and discipline is required in the exercise of leadership in transition politics because leadership goes with responsibility and responsibility is the ability to act judiciously.

The African governments' approaches to reducing poverty must be redefined in terms of social justice but specifically transitional justice with its distributive imperative, in terms of moral values of social empowerment of the ruled. This is a mark of civility in a well-ordered society since macroeconomic policies and national poverty strategies adopted heretofore have not created the anticipated impacts. Poor internal economic management, weak governance, civil conflicts and political instability coupled with an external environment of international indebtedness and global competition have undermined efforts to alleviate poverty (Civic Agenda, 2&3 September 1999).

Conclusion

The whole question of eradication of poverty in terms of the current approaches that the leaders of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and the whole of Africa seem to talk repeatedly about is a charade of sheer populism bereft of justice. The question of corruption is linked to poverty and exploitation. In my view, there can be no poverty without exploitation and leadership lethargy and there is need to examine the different forms of exploitation in society and devise ways of their eradication before we can talk of possible eradication of poverty. The domination of the domestic polity over the commercial polity and vice versa has a corrupting influence in the social relationships that it reproduces. Capitalist management standards have no ubuntu (human-beingness) yet they exert dominance over other standards of management. Corruption and poverty affects all sectors, the local peoples and also central administrations and the private institutions. Instances of those leaderships-developing propensities to embezzle and misuse public funds are many in a number of countries. Corruption undermines transitional justice. It is simply monopoly of power plus abuse of discretion minus transparency and accountability.

Where there is a monopoly of power over goods or services by leaders, there is no transitional justice, an immoral tendency and practice called corruption becomes rampant. Leaders are not just agents of individual rationality, as neo-institutionalists would have us believe, but also embodiments of moral integrity and selflessness in service to humanity and the polity. Leaders have committed themselves to chimeras, what they termed poverty eradication or poverty alleviation programmes as we have seen in various populist regime pronouncements. But these leaders who enjoy immense powers have a discretion, which they have not exercised well, to decide who will receive what and how much.

Therefore where there is a display of favouritism (on the basis of some tribal or nepotist myopia) and arbitrariness, where merit is liberally abused and hard work frowned upon and where moral values have been eroded, corruption thrives in the community. Moreover, corruption is inevitable in a society of generalized poverty (Civic Agenda, No. 2&3, September, 1999:37). That is why there is need to study the community as an institution that plays an important role in socializing African economic and political operators. Community rights are conditioned by certain moral obligations towards the same community.

Incidentally, without understanding the complexity of the leadership problem in pneumatic, psychic and somatic terms, African leaders imagine that poverty is an eradicable social economic problem. In Kenya, as is the case elsewhere these political leaders and their allied organic intellectuals and party ideologues have not produced any worthwhile exegesis on poverty in theoretical and practical terms. This is the case despite the fact that economic and social philosophers like Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Robert Malthus and Karl Marx and their disciples have examined the problem of poverty at great lengths within the contexts of their studies of political economy.

The problem of poverty is perceived from the perspective of the need to develop economic society based on the principles of liberalism and its democratic leadership that is committed to the so-called transparency, accountability and good governance. These concepts which became catch phrases in the 1980s and 1990s with the tide of liberalization have remained conceptually vacuous. They were embraced at various levels by the leadership in Kenya including the liberal economic perception of development and the phenomenon of poverty and possible means for its eradication. They have adopted structural adjustment programmes that are themselves loaded with these ideas with which the World Bank and the IMF sought to introduce democracy in Africa in a very instrumental way. The process of democratization has itself been short-circuited in Kenya because of individualist oriented leadership styles and power plays driven by social forces such as ethnicity, class, gender, religion and race.

Poverty must be addressed in the politics of transitional justice. Poverty is a big problem facing civil society yet even the very conception of civil society is within the ideology of liberalism and its economic approaches as are other notions such as new economic policy and institutional analysis that have given a new intellectual impetus to the public choice theory. Interactions between institutions and organizations are conceived as the foundation for social change in neo-institutionalism. The public choice theory that is linked to this theory is linked to the rational choice theory and pluralist theory in general. The public choice theory therefore offers what has been termed the most prominent and powerful vision of the utilitarian vision of the state. The state is disaggregated and every bureaucrat or political leader is perceived to behave like an economic actor, following the principle of maximizing profit.

Ethnic particularism also undermines transitional justice. This kind of particularism was, as a consequence, the greatest challenge to Kenyatta's politics of national integration. Shifts and tides of ethnic particularism had firmly been secured within the social-political and economic mainstream of the previous era. As various communities of the country were transformed, new interest groups were created, which were to inject a new element in the politics of the colony. The growth of the African sects had been stunted by the demands of discriminative colonial policy and adverse racial struggles over production and trade. It was a struggle that subordinated the Africans and blocked their prospects of economic and social betterment.

This discriminatory policy had only allowed for the emergence of petty African middle class embedded in tribal images. This rendered it amenable to the politics of ethnic persuasion. It produced a type of politics that corresponded to its stunted growth, a politics that was ethnically based because its propagators were products of inhibited African economic growth still shrouded in ties of kinship obligation. Thus, its inhibited growth characterized its parochialism, ethnic orientations and sub-ethnic rivalries that were to bedevil the post-colonial era. This was an era littered with political blunders, fascinating ethnic, clan or even lineage based and quick-willed power plays.

Quite clearly the African nationalists in Kenya led by Kenyatta had taken over the mantle of the post-colonial state still littered with these ethnic and kinship allegiances. This process took place before having sufficient time to build a community of trans-tribal interests. This was unlike in the Western world where politics of democracy have always been predicated upon ownership of property and formal freedom to dispose of this property. Thus, Western capitalists essentially came to political power after building social power. They therefore assumed political dominance to consolidate that social power.

The post-colonial African political elite suffering from the excruciating pains of the colonial scars of deprivation merely concentrated their efforts in building their economic stature before buttressing social bases of power and therefore generated politics of dissent that had to be managed calculatingly. The issue of public ethics was not placed at the centre of the administrative and political agenda. Promotion of employment of ethics and morals, punishment of offenders, respect of codes of regulations and depoliticization of the civil service are some of the steps that require to be undertaken as remedies for mal-administration.

Poor leadership and mal-administration includes bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, and arbitrariness among others. There should be spelt out clear civil service disciplinary procedures. Society needs to be conscientized. Habermas talks of structures of consciousness where reason is incarnated in structure of the life-world and contexts of communicative action. He argues that the paradigm of consciousness is exhausted and therefore the problem of language has taken the place of the traditional problem of consciousness (Habermas, 1987:xvii).

This paradigm is exhausted only in so far as one is pursuing social discourse in terms of human duality of consciousness. However, when examined from the perspective of the triunity of human consciousness a new horizon of perception has just unfolded. It is inexhaustible. The whole question of public morality needs to be examined in terms of the human pneumatic, psychic and somatic triad and not the superfluous duality, within which Habermas considers the subject of consciousness exhausted.

Public services are always provided within a politically defined framework. A political framework, which is oblivious of the need to transcend existing modes of constructing leadership consciousness, may not achieve much since social processes cannot be adequately analyzed only in terms of changes in language. In my view language is only a tool of consciousness. Kant's transcendental philosophy of consciousness needs to be relocated into the triad perspectivalism to offer a framework for the construction of civic virtue in citizens. The Duality from which Wittgensteinian transcendentalism deflected social discourse by declaring the subject of consciousness a dead end needed a clear-minded thinker to break through the impasse by posing the new prospect of a triad structuring of consciousness.

Leaders need to be ethically grounded in a public morality of useful moral insights and intuitions. That is why Nyerere says tyrannies and dictatorships do not have constitutions or if they have them on paper, they are disregarded and irrelevant to practice. Since they are disregarded, leadership is left at the mercy of charlatans and crooks. But there is no perfect constitution in the world and therefore what is primary is leadership integrity and the moral commitment to the popular ideals of the nation as enshrined in the constitution and its principles.

The people need to be empowered to act in defense of the constitution when their leaders, their representatives become immoral and begin to act in contravention of public interests and constitutional ideals. Citizens have a right to call the leaders to account at all levels. If they find things are going wrong they have a right to expect explanations and immediate correction (Nyerere, 1995:2). An ideology of laissez-faireism pervades much contemporary practice in East Africa that has permitted a lot of gangsterism and cronyism to take over the state.

Nyerere decried corruption that had become more blatant in Tanzania in his regime and worsened under a Mwinji led laissez-faire regime. A domineering bureaucracy became scandalously corrupt as the free private press exposed numerous scandals committed by the bureaucracy under Mwinji laissez-faire regime that he came to be called **Bwana Ruksa** (Mr Permissiveness). The government came under fire as being inept especially in tax collection and management of public funds. The officials misused public funds buying non-existing services and paying ghost workers. Non-payment of taxes from rich businessmen was due to collusion and bribery while poor workers and peasants were overburdened with heavy tax loads. In many of the East African countries, corrupt officials often collude with taxpayers to understate tax liabilities. How far have these governments gone in reducing this collusion? Can tax systems be redesigned in ways that can squeeze out corruption especially the collusion between officials and taxpayers? East Africa needs institutional reforms enhancing transparency and accountability in state and economic institutions. This is indispensable in any anti-corruption strategy because a strong long-term social foundation is called for especially where corruption is systemic.

Social empowerment is required which expands and protects the range of political and economic resources and makes alternatives open to citizens. This is an empowerment, which entails strengthening civil society in order to enhance its political and economic vitality providing more orderly paths of access and rules of interaction between state and society and balancing economic and political opportunities.

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