

**DEVOLVED GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE
CONTEXT OF CLANNISM IN THE NORTH-EASTERN REGION,
KENYA (2013–2022)**

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DECLARATION

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This research thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Allah, who alone deserves praise and exaltation. His grace was critical in bringing this thesis to realisation and completion. I also dedicate this thesis to my family: Saadia Abdullah, Zainab Abdullah, Hassan, Shukri, Hamdi, Balqeesa, Ruweidha, and Rayan. Without your unwavering support and sacrifice throughout my academic and professional journey, my efforts would have been in vain.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A:	Agree
AIE:	Authority to Incur Expenses
CDA:	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEC:	County Executive Committee
CIDP:	County Integrated Development Plan
CL:	Confidence Level
CRA:	Commission of Revenue Allocation
D:	Disagree
DFID:	Department for International Development
FY:	Financial Year
GoK:	Government of Kenya
HH:	Household
ICG:	International Crisis Group
IEBC:	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IRTC:	Intergovernmental Relations Technical Committee
KES:	Kenya Shillings
KHRC:	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KI:	Key Informant
KII:	Key Informants Interview
KIPPRA:	Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis

KM:	Kilometre
KNBS:	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
M:	Mean
MCA:	Member of County Assembly
MP:	Member of Parliament
N:	Neutral
NCIC:	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
PWD:	People With Disabilities
RA:	Research Assistant
SA:	Strongly Agree
SALW:	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SD:	Strongly Disagree
SD:	Standard Deviation
UK:	United Kingdom
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
WFP:	World Food Program

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Administrative Decentralisation: A process that entails the reassignment of responsibility and authority over resources and decision making in the provision of selected public services to subnational governance units.

Age Group: A collection of individuals based on their age range categorisation for the purposes of data collection. The age groups of interest were youth (18-34 years), middle aged (35-59 years) and the aged (60 and above years).

Clan: A subdivision within an ethnic group whose membership is based on close and distant biological relationships traced from a common reference ancestor.

Clannism: This is the feeling of belonging to a particular clan for the purpose of enjoying the good and advantages that come with such belonging.

Devolution: It is the ceding of political, fiscal, and administrative power and authority supported by law to a subnational government (s) to allow it(them) to have some level of independence in determining and implementing appropriate laws, policies, and actions in the delivery of services and development projects through duly elected officials at the grassroots level.

Devolved Governance Benefits: The outcomes of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralisation.

Elite Capture: A situation where a small group of people take advantage of their economic and political power to take selfish advantage of the benefits of devolution to the detriment of many.

Elites: A small group of people within a clan (consisting of politicians, prominent businessmen, religious leaders, and clan elders) who wield substantial power to influence devolved governance frameworks and share their outcomes.

Elitism: The inclination towards limiting influence over devolved governance frameworks and outcomes to a small group of people.

Fiscal Decentralisation: The transfer of powers of public finance, which involves raising revenues and making and implementing expenditure plans to sub-national governance units.

Governance: This is the application of competencies and interests of various people or communities who have a direct interest in an organization's goals and actions in such a way that mutual positive benefits are enjoyed by all.

National Security: A state in which the ordinary citizen is afforded protection from context-specific dynamics to realise the achievement of economic, food, political, health, environmental, personal, community and political rights and freedom from violence.

Political Decentralisation: A process in which political power and authority are ceded to elected governance officials at the sub-national level.

ABSTRACT

Devolution emphasises and focuses on context-sensitive empowerment and interventions whose benefits have a domino effect on national security. In the North-Eastern region of Kenya, devolution was implemented amid a long history of clan rivalries. However, empirical knowledge on how clannism influenced devolved governance and its effect on national security is lacking. Using theories of decentralisation, institutionalism and an integrated model based on primordialist and instrumentalist theory, this study sought to analyse the impact of devolution on national security in the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region of Kenya from 2013 to 2022. The study was conducted using a mixed method approach anchored on a cross-sectional survey design. The target population were adult household members in the region. Snowball, simple random, and purposive sampling techniques were used to obtain a representative sample of 932 study participants from Wajir, Mandera, and Garissa counties. Data were collected using questionnaires, key informant interviews, and a review of relevant documents. Quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics and presented in the form of graphs and tables. Qualitative data were analysed using critical discourse analysis and presented through narratives and verbatim quotes. The results indicated that while devolution had realised political and fiscal benefits that could enhance security, tensions created through clan-based discrimination, perceived inadequate participatory and exclusionary governance, clan-identity politics, poor resource management and corruption foreclosed the benefits with possible negative effects on security. However, the administrative aspects of devolution fostered inter-clan unity and consequently enhanced national security through infrastructure development, increased access to water, fairly effective disaster management, and the creation of a favourable business environment. Clannism was also found to have influenced the allocation of devolved power and resources, preventing those who were not close to the centre of power from reaping the benefits of devolution; thus, strained inter-clan relationships and increased the risk of insecurity in the region and the country. Additionally, evidence from the study suggests the potential capture of local governments by elites, with the monetization of politics and the entrenchment of clan-based politics, nepotism and cronyism playing a key role. Overall, clannism was found to be a central factor in the region that undermined the residents from optimally accessing the fruits of devolution, thus negating the anticipated security benefits. Moreover, elites use a hegemonic approach to whip clannism to their support to the detriment of security in the region. Based on the findings, this study recommends the implementation of frameworks that promote equity in political representation, diversity in employment, and meaningful public engagement in governance. Furthermore, it calls for more robust measures tailored to nurture inter-clan cohesion that would facilitate a common approach in addressing insecurity challenges in the North-Eastern region to enhance national security.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter provides background on the link between devolved governance and security in different contexts. It outlines the impetus of the study by highlighting the empirical inadequacies that premised the thesis's research questions. Further, it explains why evidence-based approach was critical in comprehending the thesis's research questions and the attendant benefits that would accrue from the study. Besides, it highlights the study's assumptions, scope, and limitations.

1.1 Background to the Study

Burbidge (2019) conceptualised devolved governance, otherwise referred to as devolution, as a legal process in which power and privileges of governance are redistributed in multiple forms from a national authority to those at lower levels. Accordingly, approaches to governance that allow for meaningful participation of all citizens, such as those envisaged in devolution, provide opportunities for framing grassroot solutions to priority issues. This may help to consolidate local support for national political and development agendas and security. This view is accentuated by the World Bank (2017) which argues that inclusive governance approaches are imperative for assuring peace and shared prosperity. Furthermore, it highlights that the relationship between participatory governance, shared prosperity, and security is not always linear. This indicates that the benefits of

devolved governance, particularly its nexus to peace and security, do not have a global empirical consensus, hence this study.

In the United Kingdom [UK], Torrance (2022) explains that devolution has helped in creating a platform for distinctive multi-level decision-making across the entire region, thus contributing to a secure society. Moreover, it has reduced political contestations through a structured way of addressing conflicts in governance across the devolved units. In line with this view, Her Majesty's Office (2014) observed that devolution has enabled the making of responsive decisions that anchor efficient public service delivery, engaged and cohesive local communities, and optimum conditions for growth. Therefore, this study aimed to evaluate the outcomes of devolution and their influence on national security in different milieus.

Indeed, contextual dynamics such as uneven development amid asymmetrical power balance among social institutions such as ethnic groups and clans could result in negative ramifications for a nation's security. In this regard, uneven development may result in skewed realisation of the benefits of devolution in different areas within a given setting. This could be due to consequent features such as unequal human capital and varied levels of infrastructural development. Indeed, the United States Agency for International Development [USAID] (2010), citing cases of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen, highlights that ethnic

groups/clans can easily be sociopolitically mobilised to undermine stability, and as such, development must speak to contextual realities in relation to group and regional dynamics. Failure to which, it further adduces, uneven realisation of development may result in agitation against inequality among the populace in different zones/classes/ethnicity/clans within a particular setting. This could lead to potential negative consequences for national security, especially when violent means of expression are used.

Furthermore, if membership in a particular social institution (e.g., clan) plays a significant role in determining how devolved governance resources and power are distributed, this may result in unequal devolution advantages that could have a negative impact on the social fabric, leading to insecurity. In line with this view, Neuman et al. (2019) highlight that kinship is a key element supporting social cohesion, stability, and economic relationships in traditional civilisations. Accordingly, it can therefore be argued that kinship influences the distribution of power and resources. That said, Hudson et al. (2015) claimed that in most instances clans, which are based on kinship, are socialised to hold prejudicial views of others. Therefore, asymmetrical power and resource distribution could lead to strained inter-clan relationships and may trigger violent clashes and hence insecurity. Certainly, it can be deduced that, those who feel excluded by the governance structures, could be motivated to undermine the optimal functioning of local governments. Despite the significant influence of uneven development

and asymmetrical power balance amongst social institutions in yielding and sharing devolved governance benefits such as employment opportunities and, thus, potential ramifications for national security, they remain largely unexplored.

In Kosovo, Dalipi and Shala (2016) observed that devolved governance in the country has yielded different ratings among different ethnicities with regard to its efficacy in public service delivery and in increasing social ties. The authors contend that the realisation of the full benefits of devolved governance has been impeded by, among other factors, unbalanced development levels in various municipalities, varying human capital capacities, and ethnic patronage. This implies that dominant social groupings may be inclined to preserve and promote status quo at the expense of inclusivity and equity. This disposition in areas of uneven development may further amplify social fissures that lead to insecurity. With respect to this thesis, the aim was to establish the impact of uneven development and social institutions'-based inclinations on the realisation of devolved governance benefits and its implications for national security in other settings..

In India, Das (2018) observed that devolved units' geographical boundaries are delimited in a way that is sensitive to major tribal communities. In essence, such demarcation helps in confining people who have similar social and cultural patterns in one area, thus reducing the potential for conflict. Despite this step, Das

(2018) and Kumawat and Kaura (2018) state that the nation's internal security situation has been fluid, particularly in the north-east region. At times, this has been marked by internal strife by certain minority tribal groups desirous of secession from the main tribes that have been exercising hegemonic power. In this regard, the scholars note that the lack of dexterity amongst government officials in appreciating contextual risk dynamics and its linkage to insecurity has been largely to blame. Therefore, this study's interest was to evaluate the influence of social institutions such as clans and leadership dexterity in other areas hitherto perceived to be marginalised on outcomes of devolution and its subsequent impact on security.

Moreover, elites within a social institution may influence the sharing of the benefits of devolution. This could in turn cause marginalisation and grievances among large sections of the citizenry and hence insecurity. Accordingly, in Pakistan, Ali (2018) contended that devolved governance had not yielded much. He elaborated that power remained with elites and that the benefits of devolution were shared based on patronage. As a result, the author adduced, the country had been embroiled in constant grievances by marginalised communities (religious minorities, women, youth, peasants, and labourers). This, the author highlighted, translated into various incidents of national insecurity such as the penetration of militant groups in regions where grievances were rife. Based on the findings of Ali (2018) on Pakistan, this study aimed to determine the influence of elites or

some groups within a community, in a different setting, on the distribution of the benefits of devolution and their attendant impact on national security.

While devolution might facilitate the redistribution of resources and power to marginalised regions and people, it could engineer new conflicts within the devolved units, thus undermining security. In Brazil, the World Bank (2017) claims that the benefits of devolved governance created a class conflict. It takes note of the 2013 street protests orchestrated by the nation's middle class demanding better education, transport, and health services. Notably, the institution elaborates that while devolution helped the country increase its middle class while cutting down on destitution, the new entrants to the middle class had a low view of the services offered. Based on this finding, this study argues that devolved governance in Brazil has not fully assured national security. This study further contends that social groups' disposition plays a critical role in moderating the link between devolved governance and national security. Thus, the purpose of the current study was to determine whether the division of devolution benefits by social groupings such as clans and elites in different environments influenced national security.

In Africa, several countries have adopted devolution. However, this has not translated into national security in some states. Indeed, citizens in the affected countries on the continent have continued to push for new political systems that

are more inclusive, efficient, and responsive using all means at their disposal with ramifications for security. For instance, in Tunisia, Yousfi (2019) reported constant tensions between the state and several social movements regarding suboptimal service delivery in some devolved units. Therefore, it can be argued that the nation's security situation remains fluid. In Nigeria, Abe and Omotoso (2021) note that, in its federal system, power is highly centralised, with local governments operating more like extensions of state government. In essence, this denies local governments administrative and fiscal latitude. As a result, Pally (2020) argues that this devolved governance architecture has led to different forms of insecurity such as the emergence of Boko Haram (a militant/terror group), ineffective police force, and skirmishes between pastoralists and farmers. Consequently, the scholar explains that there has been a growing agitation for governance reforms to make it more responsive to citizens' needs. Therefore, determining the governance architecture's consequences in the context of clannism and its relationship to security in a different context within Africa was of interest to the study.

In Kenya, Wanyande (2016) explains that the devolved system of governance was implemented in March 2013 following the promulgation of Kenya's Constitution 2010 on 27th August 2010. Mbori (2021) argues that this change in governance was informed by the need to address the over-centralization of government resources which had led to ethnic based domination of the state, inequitable

resource distribution, and politicisation of ethnicity that fuelled violence and insecurity throughout the country. For instance, the scholar cites the outcome of 2007 general election which saw politicians incite inter-ethnic violence to create divisions while simultaneously using ethnicity to mobilise votes. Thus, the current study aimed to assess the outcomes of devolution in a context previously marked by underdevelopment coupled with the potential influence of clan politization on national security.

Kenya's Constitution 2010 through Article 1(1), (3) and (4), Article 10(2)(a) and Chapter 11 gives force to devolution that is based on two tiers (National and 47 County Governments) which are separate yet mutually dependent. Through Articles 202-204 and 209 of Kenya's Constitution 2010, county governments are guaranteed a share of at least 15% of total sharable national government revenue. In the same vein, county governments are legally mandated to raise their own revenue by taxing (in select tax bases) their populace. Therefore, this study sought to determine whether this element of fiscal decentralisation fostered creativity in realising equitable development opportunities, through clan-responsive investments and the implication of such an outcome on security. Indeed, fiscal decentralisation could assist devolved governments in reducing/managing poverty levels at the local level through income redistribution. Therefore, it can be argued that the advantages of fiscal decentralisation could readily reduce structural reasons for violence and reinforce national security.

In the Fourth Schedule of Kenya's Constitution 2010, the devolved units are assigned functions that were previously the province of the national government. These functions include the provision of crop and livestock production services and associated pest and disease control, delivery of primary health care and related facilities/equipment, development and management of local transport infrastructure, management of pre-primary education and vocational training, waste management, disaster management, commerce, and development planning. These are key developmental functions that, if well performed, could improve the human development index in the form of food security, improved life expectancy and standards of living, literacy, and generally the quality of life. Therefore, through the equitable distribution of these human development index aspects, devolved governments could play a major role in influencing the disposition of clans in deciding to keep peace and thus national security. Indeed, the inclination of institutions, in this case devolved governments, according to Fatema and Kibriya (as cited in Bruck & d'Errico, 2019), is crucial for reducing conflict. Notably, while Kenya's Constitution 2010 assigns security functions to the central government, county governments are charged with providing an enabling environment to realise national security.

As illustrated by the devolution legal framework highlighted, devolved governments in Kenya have been assigned vital functions in setting the development agenda and its subsequent implementation, which in turn impacts

drivers of insecurity such as unemployment, inequality, and disputes over land. Therefore, devolved governments provide the building blocks of security while the national government enforces it. This means that, at the local level, the choice of leaders, interests, and influence of dominant social institutions (such as ethnic group and clans) in devolved governance, and previous history of marginalisation amongst other contextual dynamics could have a huge implication on Kenya's national security. For instance, the choice of bad leadership may result in reduced benefits of devolution due to weak governance structures, while the politicisation of social institutions could result in the alienation of others who are minority. This could fuel discontent with the status quo resulting in measures to address the issues which may include the use of violence. Despite these concerns, limited empirical knowledge exist of how devolved governments in the context of clannism have executed their roles specifically in limiting structural causes of violence in Kenya. Besides, there was a paucity of knowledge of how clannism amidst historical uneven development had informed the sharing of benefits of devolution and the attendant ramifications for national security in different milieus within Kenya. Therefore, this thesis aimed at establishing the influence of devolution on national security within the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region of Kenya.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The conceptual and normative assumptions of devolved governance presuppose equitable power and resource distribution in local settings. As such, it is anticipated to lead to inclusive and participatory prioritisation and implementation of developmental concerns at the grassroots, thereby reducing disgruntlement and enhancing national security. Devolution is also expected to provide a framework for preventing or solving conflicts through deepened consultations and unanimity at the grassroots level. This could assure the implementation of home-grown inclusive solutions that are agreeable to all, consequently resulting in durable peace.

In the North-Eastern region however, devolution was operationalised in an environment of historical inter- and intra-clan rivalry. In this setting, the citizenry had unbalanced power as encapsulated in the clans to which they belonged. This raised the question of whether devolved governance yielded the expected benefits in such environments of potential uneven power from the outset. This notwithstanding, there is a paucity of knowledge on how the different clans in the North-Eastern region of Kenya have morphed into a landscape of a new socio-economic and political era anchored on devolution and thus, influencing security.

Questions lingered whether different clans used collective power to influence the distribution of the benefits of devolution to their advantage, whether devolution

had introduced, enhanced, or eradicated potential practises of clan-based patronage, rent-seeking, and corruption at the local level in the North-Eastern region and how this influenced security in the region and nationally. Therefore, it was critical to evaluate the outcomes of devolution in the context of clannism amid elitism in the North-Eastern region and its attendant implications on Kenya's national security.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 Main Objective

The general objective anchoring this study was to assess the influence of devolution on national security within the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region of Kenya.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The following specific objectives guided the study:

- i. To establish the benefits that devolved governance has yielded in the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region and its implications for Kenya's national security.
- ii. To assess the influence of clannism on the distribution of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and its consequences for Kenya's national security.

- iii. To evaluate the role of elites within clannism in determining the sharing of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and its ramifications for Kenya's national security.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What benefits has devolved governance yielded in the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region and what are the implications for Kenya's national security?
- ii. To what extent does clannism influence the distribution of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and what does it mean for Kenya's national security?
- iii. What is the role of elites in the context of clannism in influencing the sharing of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and what are the ramifications for Kenya's national security?

1.5 Assumptions

This study made several assumptions including:

- i. That devolved governance has yielded benefits in the North-Eastern region which have implications for Kenya's national security.
- ii. That clannism influenced the distribution of devolved governance benefits in North-Eastern region with ramifications for Kenya's national security.

- iii. That elites in the context of clannism were critical in influencing the sharing of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region leading to implications for Kenya's national security.

1.6 Justification and Significance

Clans have a significant influence on the disposition of individuals particularly if politicised. If they are of different sizes, they could wield varied powers and influence devolved governance structures, particularly in elective posts. Thus, clans may create a partisan majority vis-a-vis minority divide with ramifications for national security due to marginalisation at the grassroots. In this regard, understanding how clannism and/or elites within clans could create fault lines to negate shared values of devolution can only be achieved through an evidence-based approach. In addition, to acquire an in-depth comprehension of whether devolution in its current state and form has managed to eradicate the marginalisation of communities (at the grassroots) and regions requires empirical investigation. Moreover, knowledge of the mediating effect of clannism and elitism within it in the distribution of dividends of devolution and its consequent implication on national security is important in developing responsive frameworks that could guarantee peace, progress, and prosperity for all.

The findings of this study have generated new knowledge on devolution in the context of clannism and its impact on national security. This knowledge could

help policy makers at both the national and county levels in developing responsive frameworks that could assist in the achievement of the ideals of devolution, which include peace and equal and equitable progress for all. This study assumes that with these ideals achieved, national security will be fostered. Security agencies and Kenya's National Cohesion and Integration Commission [NCIC] could also benefit from knowledge on the interplay of devolution politics, specific context dynamics, and their impact on security. This knowledge could help them tailor strategies for addressing insecurity challenges and social cohesion in the North-Eastern region. Indeed, without understanding the different clan dynamics, values, and attitudes, it would be challenging to devise responsive strategies to guarantee security and social cohesion.

The academia could also benefit from this study as it has broadened the understanding of how devolution has shaped inter-clan relations and security. While the underpinning assumption of devolution is that communities (including clans) will work collaboratively to make decisions appropriate to the local context, as established, this partnership does not always come automatically and thus the unending tales of county governments facing myriad of challenges. Perhaps, through this study's findings, an academic discourse will be stimulated on how best to reorient devolution in Kenya.

The greatest beneficiaries of this study should be the ordinary citizens of the North-Eastern region of Kenya. Through the implementation of this study's recommendations, locals in the region could better enjoy stable peace if structural causes of insecurity are addressed. In this way, they could enjoy a more equitable and equal society where clans are just but social group identifiers.

1.7 Scope/Delimitations and Limitations

While there are many aspects that may influence security in the North-Eastern region of Kenya, this study limited itself to the role that devolution plays in enhancing and/or undermining security as mediated by clannism. In this regard, the devolution period under review was between March 2013 and May 2022. Emphasis was placed on how fiscal, administrative, and political devolution was practised in the context of clannism and its impact on national security in the counties of Mandera, Garissa and Wajir.

Attention was paid to the influence of major clans in the region, namely Ogaden, Degodia, Ajuraan, Garre, and Murule in the devolution and security nexus. As such, the perception of this influence was explored at the household [HH] level in 12 of 22 sub-counties of the North-Eastern region. Specifically, data were collected from a representative sample of HHs drawn from 12 subcounties as follows: Wajir (Wajir East, Buna, Habaswein, and Tarbaj), Mandera (Banisa, Kutolo, Lafey, and Mandera East) and Garissa (Garissa, Dadaab, Fafi, and

Balambala). Views of Key Informants [KI] on various themes of the study were also solicited and integrated to inform the study's findings and recommendations. To give further meaning to the data, theories of decentralisation, institutional and an integrated model based on primordialist and instrumentalist theories were used as analytical lenses.

The varying contextual dynamics prevalent in Kenya implies that the generalisability of the study's findings and application of its recommendations to other regions is limited. Therefore, caution should be exercised in drawing pointers for making devolved governance responsive to internal dynamics in other regions. This study's data were also collected over a short period of time, which restricted the thesis from fully examining how clannism had metamorphized over time in response to devolved governance and thus, its impact on security.

This study also used different sample sizes from the clans of interest to draw its findings and conclusions. The Degodia clan accounted for the largest number of respondents, followed by Ogaden, Ajuraan, Murule, and Garre. It is therefore necessary to proceed with caution when using these results to draw inferences for other regions because the relatively small sample sizes drawn from the Murule and Garre clans may have resulted in prejudice. The study using snowballing as part of its sampling strategy might also have created potential for biased findings. Besides, the failure to report on socio-geographic disaggregated data

findings limits the study's capacity to fully comprehend dynamics due to differences in age groups, gender, clan affiliation, and county of residence. In essence, this limited the study from unravelling differences in findings based on disaggregated data; thus, reported results may be overgeneralised with negative implications on the outcomes of recommended policies. Overall, this thesis may be limited in providing comprehensive implications of clan-based politics on security in Kenya.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.0 Introduction

This study aimed at assessing the influence of devolution on national security within the context of clannism in North-Eastern region of Kenya. Accordingly, this chapter presents the literature on the concepts of devolved governance, national security, and clannism as guided by the objectives of the study. In this chapter, theories that anchor the study will also be discussed. The chapter concludes by providing a conceptual framework. In the conceptual framework, a schematic understanding of how devolution, clannism, elitism, and national security interact is provided.

2.1 Devolved Governance and National Security

Different countries, in pursuit of their own agenda and/or quest for inclusivity, may have varying forms and levels of devolved governance, which suggests varying effects on national security depending on the context. Accordingly, Holmes (2015) advances the view that a state's and its people's interests at a given time guides its decentralisation/deployment of power and resources. Moreover, contextual issues and local capacity militate the realisation of devolution benefits (Smoke, 2015) which could have far-reaching effects on security. Besides, the different aspects of devolution are thought to influence national security in varying ways.

Therefore, the literature review in this section focuses on political, fiscal, and administrative decentralisation and its implications on national security.

2.1.1 Political Decentralisation and National Security

Aalen and Murias (2018) argued that political decentralisation provides opportunities for people at the grassroots to choose their leaders who will be responsible for policy formulation at the local level. In this regard, Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios (2018) postulate that, through the election/selection of preferred political leaders at local levels, determination is made on who manages and delivers public resources and how well they shall be distributed. This implies that there is a nexus between the level of political decentralisation, its leaders, and the overall benefits of devolution. Subsequently, it can be argued, that varying contextual dynamics inform different outcomes of political decentralisation due to the varying extent of political devolution and capacities. This, then shapes the outcomes of political decentralisation and the sharing of its benefits and hence implications for national security thus, the premise for this thesis.

Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios (2018) and the World Bank Group (2001) outline that political decentralisation could lead to increased participation of people in governance at the grassroots through their self and elected representatives who could craft and execute responsive public policies. This may enable citizens to co-exist harmoniously. Moreover, the theoretical benefits of political decentralisation

underpin consensus building and the inclusion of all voices, which are critical elements of citizen-owned and driven national security.

In Spain, Piecuh (2006) explains that the 1978 constitution effected political decentralisation through the establishment of regional and local governments. The scholar notes that, through this, the country managed to increase the participation of its citizens in local governance. This largely calmed political turmoil anchored on a clamour for secession and, hence, national security. Therefore, political decentralisation helped the country attain political security, which is an aspect of national security. What was not clear, however, was whether other countries and regions have realised this outcome.

In Canada, Lecours (2017) explained that a two-tier federation consisting of a federal government and ten provinces is in place. He further outlines that political decentralisation in the country has allowed the leadership in the provinces to exercise policy formulation and implementation in several areas, including tertiary education, law enforcement, civil law, and the management of natural resources. Consequently, the Forum of Federations (n.d.) highlights that it has resulted in more citizen participation in governance and responsive leadership that enables the effective delivery of public goods. Overall, it claims that Canada is among the successful stories in delivering some envisaged benefits of political decentralisation. Therefore, it can be argued that political decentralisation in

Canada resulted in personal, community, and environmental security, which are critical aspects of national security. However, there was a paucity of knowledge on whether devolved governance had resulted in increased political participation and thus deepened consultation and unanimity on policy issues leading to security in the North-Eastern region of Kenya. Therefore, this study endeavoured to fill this knowledge gap.

In South Africa, Feinstein (2015) highlights a three-tier form of devolved governance comprising national, provincial, and local governments. The author further outlines that, this devolved governance, which came into force in 1994, has led to the expansion of electricity infrastructure, the building of decent affordable houses, and increased participation of the citizenry in the prioritisation of development projects, among other benefits. The World Bank (2000) notes that political decentralisation brought relative political stability and thus national security to South Africa. This is because, it argues, it redressed the hitherto political marginalisation of the black population. Therefore, it can be inferred that political decentralisation, if well effected, can result in national security.

In Kenya, devolution is exercised through a national government and 47 county governments. Article 174 of Kenya's 2010 Constitution outlines the objectives of devolution that underpin the envisaged benefits of political decentralisation to the county governments. These benefits include, inter alia, deepened democracy and

accountable leadership, enhanced social cohesion without prejudice to any community/region, empowered locals in participation in governance and decision making in issues affecting them, and effective and efficient public service delivery. Thus, through political decentralisation, Kenya hopes to assure the political, personal and community security facets of national security. Therefore, if political decentralisation is operationalised as expected by the Kenya Constitution 2010, it could enable the citizenry at the grassroots to live harmoniously and enjoy development and hence, security.

Ngigi and Busolo (2019) explain that, through Kenya's Constitution 2010, new elective positions were created in the two levels of governance. In the North-Eastern region, Cannon and Ali (2018) elucidate that the implementation of devolved governance in Mandera County resulted in the election of a Governor, Senator, and 30 Members of the County Assembly [MCAs]. In essence, it increased the number of political leaders through the localisation of governance. However, the scholars did not establish whether the increased number of elected leaders translated to enhanced public participation in governance or any possible outcome of increased participation on national security. This is particularly significant because the study area is characterised by clan-based politics. Neither did the scholars reflect on the impact of political decentralisation on the various aspects of national security.

In Garissa County, Amuhaya (2019), using findings drawn from 13 respondents from among county ministers and chief officers, claimed that ordinary citizens' participation in governance was limited. The author also noted that there were information gaps on the employment of county government officials and on the inclusivity of governance structures in deciding development priorities. This is significant because, local governments' responsiveness to the rights and priorities of their people and those of the clans they govern is critical to ensuring national security. However, the study, did not reflect on the impact of this low inclusion in governance on security. This notwithstanding, the findings of the scholar are inconclusive because of the small sample size, which limits the generalisability of the findings on account of lack of representativeness.

Overall, while the role of political leadership in the county governments of the North-Eastern region of Kenya is to build consensus on the most pressing public policies responsive to local interests and further ensure the employment of experts, there is little empirical evidence of the outcomes of their leadership. In this regard, there is limited evidence-based knowledge on the benefits that have accrued from political decentralisation in the region. Little is known about the robustness of the local political governance structures in the North-Eastern region in delivering the outcomes of devolution in the context of clannism and its implications for Kenya's national security. In addition, the nexus between the outcomes of political decentralisation and national security remains largely

unexplored. Therefore, this study aimed to address this empirical gap by assessing the benefits of political decentralisation (within the realm of merits of devolution) and its influence on national security.

2.1.2 Fiscal Decentralisation and National Security

Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios (2018) and the World Bank Group (2001) outline that fiscal decentralisation could lead to the redistribution of income to achieve equity and equitability. This implies that it may address power differentials occasioned by income differences at the household, clan, and regional levels and may therefore enable citizens to co-exist harmoniously and thus, enhance national security. Moreover, Sow and Razafimahefa (2015) highlight that fiscal decentralisation could result in priority resource allocation to the most urgent and important public goods and services, inculcation of stronger accountability through encouragement of closer scrutiny by citizenry at the grassroots, and improving efficiency through giving control to locals to elect leaders of their choice who shall exercise stewardship role over their devolved unit's resources.

Feinstein (2015) further argued that fiscal decentralisation enhances ingenuity in realising development prospects. Gumede et al. (2019) also claimed that it helps devolved governments lower/manage poverty levels at the grassroots. Therefore, it can be argued that the benefits arising from fiscal decentralisation could easily reduce structural injustices and enhance the human development index and,

hence, national security. Consequently, this thesis sought to establish the benefits of fiscal decentralisation in diverse contexts and further determine the influence of these outcomes on national security.

In England, Her Majesty's Office (2014) observed that fiscal decentralisation granted local governance units some public finance latitudes. For instance, through the Local Government Finance Act 2012, the devolved units could revise taxation and increase their threshold for obtaining loans. This, among other measures, created jobs and infrastructural development. In Spain, Aray (2019), using econometric methods on secondary data, notes that fiscal decentralisation had a significant effect on the economy. Between 1986 and 2010, he explains, the country experienced massive growth in investment in infrastructure. This translated into economic growth in diverse industries. Therefore, it can be argued that fiscal decentralisation in England and Spain has enhanced national security by strengthening economic aspects. However, these countries are in Europe and have different contextual dynamics relative to Africa and Kenya. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the nexus between fiscal decentralisation and national security in other settings.

In Brazil, Fernandes and Santana (2018) observed that the newfound fiscal freedom prompted state governments to borrow heavily in the 90s. This intensified the poor economic growth conditions that Brazil was facing at the

time. Consequently, the federal government had to assume state debt while simultaneously imposing stringent control measures to limit borrowing. This indicates that fiscal independence, if abused, could lead to economic deterioration. Such a predicament could jeopardise a country's national security through macroeconomic instability. Indeed, a debt burden results in a country losing its economic power and hence national insecurity. That said, the empirical findings of the outcomes of fiscal decentralisation in Brazil suggest equivocal effects of fiscal decentralisation. Subsequently, this thesis aimed to investigate the outcomes of fiscal decentralisation (within devolution) and their implications for Kenya's national security in the region.

In Kenya, Kenya's Constitution 2010 through Articles 202-204 and 209 guarantees county governments revenues generated from their own tax bases and from central government transfers of at least 15% of total sharable national government revenue. Besides, the constitution entrenches an equalisation fund that is meant to redress varying levels of development/marginalization among the various counties. In this regard, the equalisation fund is administered by the Commission of Revenue Allocation [CRA] in consultation with Kenya's legislature (Kaburu, 2013). Through the Public Finance Management Act 2012 Sections 125,128, 129, and 130, powers to oversee the preparation, endorsement, execution, and determination of transparency and accountability of budgets are vested in local leaders and general members of the public in each devolved unit.

This implies that through various frameworks, Kenya has entrusted local governments with resources to address development priorities while institutionalising inclusion, which should result in national security.

Mbau et al. (2019) acknowledge that different regions in Kenya could yield varied benefits of fiscal decentralisation due to the asymmetrical nature of the counties in terms of demographics, environmental, and weather conditions. This implies varied implications for national security as determined by the different outcomes of fiscal decentralisation. That said, the North-Eastern region has been a beneficiary of devolved funds of more than Kenya Shillings [KES] 164 billion drawn from the national government since 2013. These funds exclude conditional grants and own generated revenues. Table 2.1 highlights the amount of devolved funds that Wajir, Mandera, and Garissa counties have received from the inception of devolution in 2013 to the 2019/20 Financial Year [FY].

Table 2.1: Disbursement of Devolved Funds to the North-Eastern Region

Financial Year	Garissa County	Mandera County	Wajir County
	KES	KES	KES
2013/14	4,431,683,790	6,569,847,929	5,311,159,779
2014/15	5,190,150,287	7,851,533,937	6,355,760,549
2015/16	6,351,245,243	9,224,728,949	7,470,850,704
2016/17	6,911,228,790	10,084,615,714	8,159,999,887
2017/18	7,518,607,376	10,354,026,318	8,716,567,070
2018/19	8,107,741,132	11,281,577,308	9,418,866,978
2019/20	7,756,509,712	10,376,501,495	8,474,445,051
Total	46,267,166,330	65,742,831,650	53,907,650,013

Source: National Treasury and Planning (2020)

From Table 2.1, it can be established that Mandera received the largest allocation (over KES 65 billion), followed by Wajir (over KES 53 billion) and Garissa (over KES 46 billion) counties. This enormous allocation of public funds provided an impetus to assess how these devolved revenues have translated into benefits to the people of the North-Eastern region and how the sharing of these benefits had enhanced or impeded local and national security.

In Mandera County, Cannon and Ali (2018) explain that devolved funds have largely been embezzled and mismanaged, thus resulting in negligible benefits to the people. Notably, the scholars' findings were based on an examination of the application of devolved funds from 2013/14 to 2017/18. Since then, several developments have occurred, thus invalidating these findings. Moreover, while the study implies a negative impact of fiscal decentralisation on national security through reduced economic prospects, it is not definitive. Therefore, it was imperative to unravel the outcomes of fiscal decentralisation and its impacts on various facets of national security.

In Wajir County, UNICEF (2017), while assessing the county's outcomes of its expenditure on the social sector from FY 2013/14 to FY 2015/16, highlighted that devolved governance did not translate to higher living standards. It outlined relatively low school enrolments in all basic levels of education (Pre-primary, Primary and Secondary), low piped water coverage, and child malnutrition

incidents as indicators of low living standards and thus, poor performance of the county despite the allocation of devolved funds. However, over the years (from FY 2016/17), this might have been corrected, thus invalidating these findings. Moreover, there was a paucity of empirical evidence of what could have transpired from FY 2016/17 to date, hence this thesis.

In Garissa County, limited evidence was found of studies that have endeavoured to investigate the outcomes of fiscal decentralisation and its impact on national security. Notably, overall, from the presented literature, it can be determined that the realisation of the benefits of fiscal decentralisation is mediated by public finance discipline and competencies and, the capacity of a devolved unit to assure transparency and responsibility for the resources entrusted to it. Moreover, the benefits of fiscal decentralisation are contingent on the optimality of taxation policy(ies) implemented, revenues generated, expenditure prioritisation plan, and available key trained labour (Mbau et al., 2019). Such combined competencies, policies, resources, and plans could have a huge impact on national security by either strengthening or weakening its facets, such as health and economic pillars. Besides, they could either remedy or amplify the structural drivers of violence, such as unemployment and poverty, thus impacting personal and community/clan facets of national security. That said, it was not clear whether the counties in the North-Eastern region had, fiscal discipline, an optimal tax system, a prioritised expenditure plan, and human capital. If yes, what were the benefits that arose

from it and thus the ramifications for national security? This provided the impetus for the current study.

2.1.3 Administrative Decentralisation and National Security

Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios (2018) and the World Bank Group (2001) outline that administrative decentralisation could lead to quality and quick turnarounds in public service delivery. They also argued that it may result in responsive structures and frameworks that are in tune with local information and challenges. In this regard, administrative decentralisation could have ramifications for national security by addressing its facets, such as health access. Moreover, it gives a devolved unit power over the employment of persons to deliver decentralised goods/services. In this case, it directly addresses the structural drivers of insecurity, namely unemployment and, to an extent, poverty. As such, it may enhance or negatively affect national security through its economic, personal, and community facets.

The World Bank Group (2001) also acknowledges that these benefits may take a while to be realised or, at worst, may not be yielded. It argues that administrative decentralisation may place the onus of service delivery on devolved units that may lack the requisite human capital. This may lead to ineffective or inefficient services. In addition, the institution claims that such decentralisation may result in a zero sum game as potential benefits are swallowed up by expanded recurrent

expenditures used to pay salaries and emoluments of new employees, among other costs. The limitations of administrative decentralisation mean that its outcomes and implications on various aspects of national security might vary across regions/countries.

In England, Her Majesty's Office (2014) notes that administrative decentralisation resulted in timely, quality, and responsive service delivery to locals. Local expertise in the provision of services had been largely solicited. Moreover, the localisation of services had increased accountability as citizens could easily witness how their taxes are utilised. Such democratic services are associated with harmonious co-existence and security. In Spain, Diaz-Lanchas and Mulder (2021) claim that administrative decentralisation led to devolved units embarking on specialisation and more product standardisation. In doing so, deepening economic integration among devolved units. Thus, it can be inferred that in Spain, administrative decentralisation resulted in high-quality services/goods emanating from specialisation. Moreover, it reinforced interdependence among the devolved units.

The empirical cases of England and Spain seem to suggest that administrative decentralisation led to relatively high satisfaction of its citizens with service delivery and hence national security. Indeed, Torrance (2022) explains that devolution had contributed to a secure society in the UK (to which England

belongs). Moreover, in the case of Spain, it can also be argued that decentralisation led to inter-regional peace through economic integration. Thus, by enhancing economic aspects, the national security of Spain was enhanced. However, as claimed by the World Bank Group (2001), the benefits of administrative decentralisation may vary across different contexts. The implication is that its outcomes and implications on various facets of national security might vary across regions/countries, hence this study.

In South Korea, Heo (2018) explains that administrative decentralisation resulted in mixed implications for national security. Within the devolved units, the author observes, this resulted in deepened democracy. It also led to more participation of people at the grassroots in addressing education issues and, urban and development planning. As such, it can be argued that administrative decentralisation enhanced the personal and community security facets of national security. However, the scholar notes that administrative decentralisation also led to negative political and economic competition amongst devolved units for the share of central government funds. With respect to this thesis, it was not clear whether administrative decentralisation resulted in fluid local and national security situations in other contexts.

In Kenya, the Fourth Schedule of Kenya's Constitution 2010 outline the devolved functions that anchor administrative decentralisation to include provision of

services related to; agriculture, health, transport and public works, education, trade and industry, environmental management, and development planning. In essence, these grants devolved governance units to address the diverse facets of national security, namely, health, economic, food, and environment. However, from the empirical literature presented, it can be argued that the realisation of administrative decentralisation benefits may be moderated by factors such as coherence of supportive frameworks (which includes enabling laws and policies), availability of key trained personnel and local power relationships. These militating factors could have varied impacts on national security.

Ngigi and Busolo (2019) observed that different regions in Kenya are impacted in diverse ways by the militating factors to the full realisation of the benefits of administrative decentralisation. This implies varied realisation of the outcomes of administrative decentralisation with attendant ramifications on national security across different regions. As such, this study builds on empirical literature on the benefits realised by decentralised administrative functions in the North-Eastern region and its ramifications for Kenya's national security. In Mandera County, Cannon and Ali (2018) note that the devolution period 2013-2017 was marked by limited indications of improved health care, road development, and sewerage services, among others, despite significant allocation of resources. However, this study is limited in its generalisability because it used a qualitative approach with

few respondents. Moreover, it did not explore the nexus between the outcomes of administrative decentralisation and national security in its other facets.

In Garissa County, Ali and Farah (2019) conducted a study to assess the impact of devolution on the agricultural sector. Using data obtained from 310 respondents from four out of six sub-counties of Garissa, the authors contend that the devolution did not result in improvements in the agricultural sectors. The scholars claim the agricultural sector faces a myriad of challenges such as unstable market prices, poor and inadequate supportive infrastructure and equipment, and pest and diseases. Moreover, most locals were not involved in the formulation of responsive agricultural legislation and policies. Thus, it can be inferred that devolution did not enhance food security (an aspect of national security) and thus directly affected national security. It was, however, noted that the study was limited in explaining the impact of devolution on national security since it explored just one of its aspects, hence, the impetus for this study.

In Wajir, Bedelian (2019) notes that the county continues to face perennial water problems despite the local government's efforts to dig over 200 boreholes. The author contends that this has affected some facets of national security, such as economic, food, personal, and community security. The scholar highlights that this is due to reduced livelihood opportunities and conflicts over access to pasture and water. She argues that factors such as relatively low budget allocation

towards water management, limited technical capacity of staff, and lack of meaningful participation of the citizenry at the grassroots have generally weakened the success of water governance initiatives.

Although Bedelian's (2019) study explored the nexus of water management with various facets of national security in Wajir County, it was limited to the extent that it did not examine the influence of other devolved functions such as education and health on national security. That aside, there was a general paucity of knowledge on the benefits of administrative decentralisation across the diverse devolved functions in the North-Eastern region. Moreover, there was limited knowledge on the nexus between administrative decentralisation and its implication for national security across its diverse operationalised facets. This study was thus an attempt to build on the knowledge on these aspects.

2.2 Clannism and Devolved Governance-National Security Nexus

Hudson et al. (2015) argue that clans have a huge implication for national security. They contend that within clans, there are generally acceptable ways in which an individual is expected to conduct himself/herself when navigating inter- and intra-clan social spaces. As such, individuals within a clan may be socialised to embrace diversity or to hold discriminatory and low views about other clans, thus leading to marginalisation with significant implications for security. This means that a clan's orientation may enhance or impede social cohesion and,

hence, national security. Therefore, in the context of clannism and of sharing the benefits of devolved governance, this might mean the inclusion or exclusion of others depending on a clan's disposition and thus subsequent influence on cohesion, hence security or insecurity.

2.2.1 Clannism and Political Decentralisation-National Security Linkage

In Palestine, Alijla (2021) stated that clans play an influential role in deciding who governs and adjudicates matters in the judiciary. Halabi (2014) also highlighted that clannism determines voting patterns, and thus dominant clans end up exercising hegemonic power. In this regard, Alijla (2021) elaborates that clannism is largely to blame for subnational factionalism that beleaguers this fragile state. He further expounds that due to poor social cohesion caused by clannism, Hamas (a non-state actor) has been leveraging on these fissures to perpetrate violence and stake claim over the governance of the state. In this regard, he claims that influential clans have been politicised by Hamas to cause insecurity and employed to mobilise support for its claim to governance. Palestine, however, offers a different context that could influence the nexus between clannism, governance benefits, and security. It is generally a fragile state; thus, this study sought to establish the influence of clannism in relatively stable settings.

In Hungary, Jarabik (2017) claims that clan affiliations are an important vessel for assuring community security and accessing the benefits of governance. In this regard, he explains that through clannism, elected officials in the country have managed to limit the requirement for accountability of power and resources entrusted to them. As such, the author contends, the state has been marked with constant periods of political contestations and violence occasioned by different clans' scramble for power. Information gaps, however, exist regarding whether clannism has compromised the participation of minorities in exercising their constitutional right to transparency and accountability in the exercise of political power in other contexts. As such, the impetus of this study was to establish the influence of clannism or lack thereof in the division of devolution benefits and hence its impact on national security.

In Ukraine, International Alert (2019) asserts that clannism has been instrumental in establishing social order and governance, particularly in the Zakarpattia region. In this regard, clannism in the country is highly politicised to the extent that any agitation, even by civil society, is viewed from a clan lens. This is because clan affiliations form the basis upon which decisions are made and issues are handled in that society. However, due to constant changes in governance with no clan, albeit among the major clans, dominating elective political spaces, peace has prevailed. However, the International Alert (2019) notes that, the continued marginalisation of minority clan (Roma) and political jostling among major clans

(Ukrainian vs Hungarian) on control and share of incomes generated from natural resources might lead to conflict. This presents an imminent threat to the political and economic security (facets of national security) of the country.

The study of Ukraine by International Alert (2019) informed this thesis by highlighting how the marginalisation of minority clans and contestations for control over power and resources among major clans in a devolved governance framework could lead to national insecurity. However, it was limited in providing comprehensive insights as it was based on a European context which has different dynamics relative to Africa. Moreover, Ukraine has unique contextual dynamics that may not be replicated in other settings. Besides, the findings were based on a qualitative study with a sample size of 21 respondents. Therefore, this study sought to build on knowledge on the nexus between devolved governance benefits and national security in the context of clannism in another setting using a mixed research approach.

In Somalia, Dahir and Ali (2021) explain that a federal system of governance was adopted in 2012. In this regard, the devolved units were delimited to accommodate clan majorities. This means that, clan sizes and locations were the primary basis of border delimitation among the governance units. As such, they observe, political power has continued to be in the hands of the largest clans. Due to hegemonic clan power, citizens from minority clans have realised limited

benefits of political decentralisation, particularly in service delivery. Accordingly, the authors note that, Somalia has been in a state of fragility for decades as utility drawn from interclan contestations for equality supersede those for national unity. Chonka and Healy (2020) contend that clannism has been a weak link in enabling representative and responsive governance structures. Therefore, it can be inferred that clannism has a huge impact on deciding governance officials, thus injuring the prospects of Somalia's national unity and, hence, security. This provided the impetus for this study to examine the influence of clannism on sharing the benefits of political decentralisation and, hence, its impact on national security in other contexts where the Somali ethnic group exists.

In Kenya, Mbori (2021) argues that Kenya's 2010 Constitution has largely addressed inclusion through measures such as devolved governance. However, the scholar claims that, it is limited in propagating diversity such as espoused by differences in ethnicities or clans. As such, ethnic and clan prejudices pervade the distribution of power and resources in both national and local governance structures (Scott-Villiers et al., 2014). What was not clear though, is the context-specific influence of this ethnic/clan partisan divide on the sharing of benefits of devolved governance and its subsequent impact on national security. This knowledge gap provided the impetus for this thesis to analyse the influence of clannism on the distribution of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and its consequences for Kenya's national security.

Accordingly, in Mandera and Wajir Counties, NCIC and Interpeace (2017, 2021) observed that devolution appears to have heightened clan-based competition to control devolved governance structures and resources. Accordingly, there have been perceptions that the assumption of leadership in the counties enables a clan to wield influence over the benefits of devolution. This, the two institutions hold, has been a cause of inter-clan conflict with ramifications to national security. In this regard, the two studies provided valuable information that explained the tensions created by clannism and how this compromises peace which is closely linked to security. However, the studies by NCIC and Interpeace (2017, 2021) are limited in explaining how devolution and clannism impact national security, which were the concerns of this study. This is because, the two studies did not primarily focus on devolution but on security. Even then, in the studies, national security was narrowly operationalised to constitute personal and community security, while this study looked at it in its broadest view. Besides, the study on Wajir County was limited in its methodological approach. This is because it did not provide concrete evidence of sample size representativeness, particularly with respect to various clans that could be inhabiting the county. This made the findings generally inconclusive. On this account, this study sought to broaden knowledge on the interaction between clannism, devolved governance benefits, and national security (on its broadest sense).

In Garissa County, Rotich and Warfa (2020) highlights that devolution brought in its wake intraclan competition between the subclans of the Ogaden who have a majority presence. This was motivated by the need to assume control of governance resources and power. In this regard, while intraclan competition was outside the scope of this thesis, the study by Rotich and Warfa (2020) pointed to the centrality of clannism albeit at lower levels of kinship in the county. Moreover, while the Ogaden clan dominates this county, other Somali clans also reside in it (ICG, 2015; Rotich & Warfa, 2020). In this regard, little was known about the role of minority clans in devolved governance and the impact of such participation on national security.

Arguably, the envisaged benefits of political decentralisation as provided for by Kenya's Constitution 2010 may assure national security if clannism is positively managed. As illustrated through the literature presented, inter-clan dynamics premised on clannism could be influential in determining how devolution benefits could shape national security. In this regard, if devolution is optimally rolled out to adopt an inclusive approach at local levels, it could assure national security. Notably, there was a paucity of knowledge on the numerical magnitude of the influence of clannism on devolved governance and national security nexus in the North-Eastern region, Kenya, hence this study.

2.2.2 Clannism and Fiscal Decentralisation-National Security Nexus

Application of clannism in sharing the benefits of fiscal decentralisation can intensify power differentials among clans by creating or preserving and promoting the attributes of their dominance at the expense of inclusivity and equity. This could lead to a heightened feeling of marginalisation among the prejudiced clans and could lead to national insecurity through indicators such as deprivation and violence. Therefore, it was important to analyse the influence of clannism on the distribution of fiscal decentralisation benefits and its consequences for national security.

In Hungary, Techet (2022) explains that clannism is entrenched in governance structures and thus has a huge influence on local economies through policies such as taxation and public expenditure. In Ukraine, Romanova and Umland (2019) claim that fiscal decentralisation created avenues for municipal funds to be diverted by those in governance to address partisan clan interests such as the building of schools, roads, and waste disposal infrastructure in their localities. However, in both cases of Hungary and Ukraine, the authors did not explore the influence of clan loyalty on peace and security. Therefore, this anchored the impetus of the study to establish the influence of clannism on the distribution of fiscal decentralisation benefits and thus, ramifications for national security particularly in other contexts.

In Somalia, Ahmed (2020) explains that clans are an integral system of governance and have a huge influence on sharing the benefits of power and resources. The author highlights that a 4.5 formula is used to determine who gets what in the country. The formula implies that while the four dominant clans are assigned an equal share of governance seats, the minorities are assigned half. In this regard, the benefits of fiscal decentralisation are shared based on clan affiliation and fidelity and not on equality and fairness considerations. This implies that clannism has been institutionalised. This power and resource sharing arrangement has not been widely accepted. Consequently, the World Bank Group (2017) notes that the country has been in a state of fragility due to contestations for power and resources amongst the clans. In this regard, the thesis sought to establish if clannism had been institutionalised in other areas which have a dominant Somali ethnic group. Moreover, the study sought to establish the impact of institutionalisation of clannism on the sharing of fiscal decentralisations benefits on national security.

In Kenya, fiscal decentralisation normative assumptions require all counties to establish frameworks that promote participation of all citizens in planning and development and in preparation, review, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of budgets (Kenya School of Government & Centre for Development Studies, 2015). However, little was known about whether these frameworks existed and how they had adapted to clannism particularly, in the North-Eastern

region. Moreover, there was little empirical evidence of how clannism impacted the sharing of devolved governance benefits in North-Eastern region, Kenya, and thus consequences for national security. Therefore, this study endeavoured to address this gap in knowledge.

2.2.3 Clannism and Administrative Decentralisation-National Security Linkage

In Ukraine, International Alert (2019) asserts that a minority clan (Roma) has consistently faced asymmetrical access to services related to education, health, and social services. Within the Roma community, women are further marginalised as their access to employment in the devolved function is restricted to menial jobs. However, the International Alert (2019) study was silent on the implications of this discrimination on Ukraine's national security. That said, little was known about the marginalisation of women in the public sector in the context of clannism in other settings. Moreover, the implications of clannism and its associated prejudices remained largely unexplored.

In Kyrgystan, Gullete (2010) claims that clannism is embedded in its governance so much that individuals are forced to leverage upon it to obtain goods and services. Similarly, in South Africa, Gluckman (2017) explains that clannism pervades local municipal leadership. However, in both the cases of Krygstan and South Africa, the authors did not explore the impact of entrenched clannism

within administrative decentralisation on national security. This study thus sought to address this knowledge gap.

In Somalia, Musse (2020) notes that it is difficult to separate clannism from the administration of the various regions. As such, it can be argued that the provision of decentralised services and goods should be seen from this prism. The author claims that clannism has resulted in protracted conflict in Somalia as marginalised clans seek power. In this regard, this study sought to explore power relations among Somali clans in Kenya and how these informed the sharing of the benefits of devolution and, hence ramifications for national security.

In Kenya, despite devolution, the Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis [KIPPRA] (2020) claims that clan-based imbalances in the public service sector within local governments could be prevailing. This is because, it contends, the County Government Act 2012 glosses over clannism and emphasises ethnic representation. As such, it elaborates that one only needs to allocate 30% employment slots in the devolved functions to other ethnicities from other regions to comply with the law. In this case, the law is silent on who makes the 70%. Accordingly, one clan could take up all slots. Significantly, for the current study, there was little empirical data that showed the representation of various clans in public service in the North-Eastern region. Therefore, dominant clans could exploit the lacuna in law to maintain the status quo by filling the

structures with their own. The motivating factor is because, KIPPRA (2020) avers that there are no sanctions for failure to comply with inclusion and equity considerations as desired by the Kenya Constitution 2010. Besides, Hudson et al. (2015) claimed that clans, by default, are socialised to exclude others who do not belong. That said, limited empirical knowledge existed on the nexus between administrative decentralisation and national security in the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region, Kenya. Thus, this study sought to broaden knowledge on these aspects.

2.3 Elites' Role within Clannism and Influence on the Devolved Governance-National Security Linkage

Abdullahi (2021) contends that elites can be understood to enjoy the support of the bases from which they emanate, particularly in determining the socio-economic and political disposition of their communities and thus national security or lack thereof. In this case, in a devolution setting, it can be inferred that elites lobby and influence the voting patterns of their bases (in the case of this study, clans) to ensure their placement at the centre of power and resources division. Subsequently, elites in the context of clannism have a significant influence on the link between devolved governance benefits and national security. This, therefore, laid the premise for the concerns of this study.

In Pakistan, Tunio and Nabi (2021) claim that devolution has not realised its theoretical benefits due to elitism, patronage, and corruption, among other negative behaviours exercised by dominant groups, particularly elites. For instance, elites have continued to manipulate the election of leaders through the provision of financial support, engaging in voter bribery, and blocking campaign rallies of disliked politicians, among other acts of election misconduct. Therefore, it can be argued that the elites manipulate the benefits of political decentralisation to their advantage and not necessarily for the masses. In this case, the outcomes of political decentralisation in Pakistan further cemented the thesis that there is a nexus between political decentralisation, its leaders, and the overall benefits of devolution. With respect to this study, little was known about the role of elites within clan systems in manipulating the election of political leaders in other contexts. Besides, there was a paucity of knowledge on the impact of elitism on the realisation and distribution of equal and equitable devolution benefits to all and thus on national security in other settings.

In Central Asia, Gullete (2010) observed that elites play a mediating role between their clans and others. In this regard, they act as agents who negotiate power and resource distribution on behalf of their clans. Due to their influential role in power and resource brokerage, the author contends that clan elites have a huge influence on the social fabric. Through their disposition, they can precipitate conflict among clans or, conversely, assure peace. Therefore, in a clannism context, it can be

argued that power is largely concentrated in elites. This study, therefore, sought to unravel the level of influence of clan elites in other contexts and how they determined the share of devolved governance benefits and thus their impact on national security.

In Somalia, Musse (2020) claims that clan elites have had a huge influence on the realisation of the objectives of federalism and on its national security. The author contends that elites exploit their clan bases to pursue their agenda on the national front. This has resulted in numerous conflicts whenever their agendas do not gain traction. Moreover, the author argues that because of the influence of clan elites, ineffective governance structures have manifested, thus limiting the realisation of the objectives of federalism. That said, limited knowledge existed on the influence of elites within Somali clans in devolution and national security in other contexts. This provided the impetus for the current study.

In Kenya, Mbori (2021) claims that elites have always been at the centre of constitutional reforms and intended outcomes. As such, the author argues, elites use their political bases, such as ethnic affiliations, or in the case of this study clans, to attain socioeconomic and political ascendancy. For political expediency, the scholar observes that elites incite and leverage partisanship associated with their ethnic group/clan to reap maximum rewards. In the North-Eastern region which has many Kenyans of Somali ethnic extraction, elites consist of clan elders

and Islamic religion leaders such as Sheikhs and Imams (Abdullahi, 2021). NCIC and Interpeace (2017) further expand elites to include politicians and prominent businessmen. As such, this study included all actors as alluded to by Abdullahi (2021) and NCIC and Interpeace (2017) as constituting elites.

In the North-Eastern region, Haider (2020) highlights that elites have a huge influence on the social fabric and thus national security through its personal and community facets. Additionally, ICG (2015) outlines that clan elites in the region have used their positions within governance structures to alienate important population groups such as women and youth. In this regard, they exploit the influence of the compromised clan elders to execute their machinations. What was not clear, however, was whether they disfranchised other members of their clan as well particularly in the division of the benefits of devolution and, thus implications for national security in its broadest facets.

Besides, ICG (2015) claims that elites have used devolved government structures and resources for their own selfish ends. It elaborates by citing improper awards of tenders to cronies, inflation of contract prices, and outright embezzlement of funds as some ills affecting the region. While the issues raised have a huge implication on the realisation of the benefits of fiscal decentralisation, the author does not relate them to consequences on national security in the broadest sense.

Neither was the research methodology that underpinned the findings disclosed. This made the findings generally inconclusive.

2.4 Summary of Literature Review

The literature reviewed suggested that devolution, could inter alia, result in reduced political contestations through deepened consultations and unanimity at local levels, development of responsive policies that result in development, effective public service delivery, resource prioritisation to most urgent local needs, income redistribution to reflect equity and equality, and increased transparency and accountability. All these were established as critical in resulting in social harmony and enhanced local and national security. However, empirical evidence showed that the linkage between the benefits of devolution and national security remained mixed. In this regard, specific dynamics such as clannism, the role of elites within clans, and uneven development militate the realisation of devolved governance benefits, their sharing and thus national security. Notably, limited literature existed on the practice and results of devolution. Moreover, its linkage with national security in the context of clannism remained largely unexplored.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

Theories act as a foundation for the development of thoughts along specific lines. In advancing the concepts of devolution, clannism, elitism, and national security,

this study was premised on the Theory of Decentralisation, Institutional Theory, and an integrated model based on Primordialist and Instrumentalist Theories of Ethnic Conflict. These theories and how they informed this study are discussed in subsequent subsections.

2.5.1 Theory of Decentralisation

This theory was first postulated by Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). It argues that devolution is needed to de-concentrate power at the apex of society. It further asserts that central power retards the growth and development of society, while public participation in local decision making can promote better service delivery and peaceful co-existence. In this theory, decentralised governance systems such as devolution are perceived to enable government institutions internalise socioeconomic development to better match social services to local needs and interests as well as increase equity in the use of public resources.

The theory argues that the use of locally accountable representatives with real public powers is the best approach for ensuring that local development needs are met. It posits that devolution, which principally includes decentralisation of political, fiscal, and regulatory/administrative processes, as an institutionalised form of participatory approach, is the strongest and highest form of decentralised governance from which the greatest benefits can be derived. In this regard, the proponents of this theory view that the needs of the people can best be met with

lower-level governance and decentralised resources, which include the participation of local people in all decision-making processes.

In relation to the current study, it was expected that devolution would result in context-specific frameworks that speak to uneven development, clan heterogeneity, and accountable leadership. This could result in the inclusion of all clans in governance, local solutions to grassroots problems, and ingenuity in realising development prospects, thereby creating a cohesive society and minimising the potential for conflict. Moreover, accountability and fairness in resource distribution at the county level could promote contentment among clans, thus contributing to the maintenance or realisation of national security. Evidence indicates that most clans and ethnic communities in Kenya, as well as around the globe, often have an incentive to fight when they are excluded or perceive to be from enjoying the benefits of development (Ndiku, 2012).

Be that as it may, Australian Aid and the World Bank (2012) claim that the ideals of devolution have not always produced the best results. They argue that this is because the devolution of finances and political and administrative powers threaten many actors and therefore few have been implemented fully. They further outline that limited literature exists on the practise and results of devolution. Subsequently, this study endeavoured to establish the benefits that devolved governance has yielded in the North-Eastern region and its implications

for Kenya's national security. Despite the relevance of this theory, it was limited in explaining the necessity of optimal functioning and coherence of institutions in delivering devolution benefits and, thus, assurance of national security.

2.5.2 Institutional Theory

Proponents of this theory include Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983). They argue that the type of institutions and system that a country adopts determines the presence of peace and/or conflict in society. Improper and/or malfunction of any institution in this regard could lead to disorder and thus insecurity. In relation to this thesis, two primary institutions, Kenya's Central Government and County Governments, have a significant role in assuring national security. County governments are expected to provide a framework for preventing or solving conflicts through deepened consultations and unanimity at the grassroots level. They are expected to prioritise resources towards urgent human development needs without prejudice. On the other hand, the central government is expected to aid the county governments to ensure the success of devolution by providing all necessary powers and resources. This will potentially enable county governments to attain and sustain economic, food, health, political, and environmental security facets of national security. In addition, they are expected to provide the necessary security organs to aid the county governments in ensuring personal and community security aspects of national security. This, thus, creates a social equilibrium and hence national security.

However, county governments could create tensions through unequal sharing of devolved governance benefits and hence insecurity. Moreover, the central government may not provide the requisite support as envisaged. Therefore, there is a need for optimal functioning of central and county governments in their codified roles. This may help in managing security within the confines of the outcomes of devolution in the North-Eastern, region, Kenya. Although this theory was relevant in explaining the influence of institutions on the maintenance of security within the context of devolution, it failed to explain the role of elites and clannism in influencing devolved governance and national security.

2.5.3 Primordialist and Instrumentalist Theories of Ethnic Conflict: An Integrative Model

This model is based on the work of Afa'anwi Ma'abo Che (2016). The model stipulates that an inclination towards identifying with one's ethnicity/clan arises from dissatisfaction with how power and resources have been shared. When such grievances are expressed in social interactions using all available means, it stimulates self-preservation tendencies in the clan(s) enjoying the benefits while arousing animosity, mistrust, and potential violence from the marginalised. Therefore, insecurity arises due to unequal sharing of power and resources and competition among ethnic groups/clans. In addition, the model holds the view that elites within clans/ethnic groups leverage on shared common bloodlines to politicise their ethnic groups/clans to gain unfettered access to power and

resources. In this case, clannism is used to access power and resources by a few individuals.

With respect to this study, partisan divides amongst major clans in the North-Eastern region, Kenya, in the account of potential unequal distribution of devolved governance benefits could result in national insecurity. Moreover, the level of influence of elites in the region in rallying their clans while disfranchising others in the process, in the context of unequal devolved governance benefits, has potential ramifications for national security. Therefore, through this model, this study assessed the influence of clannism on the distribution of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and its consequences for Kenya's national security.

2.6 Summary of Theoretical Framework

The theory of decentralisation informs on what devolution ought to accomplish. It outlines how devolved governance benefits and their subsequent distribution could enhance or negatively influence national security. Specifically, if it results in the inclusion of all clans in governance, local solutions to grassroots problems, and ingenuity in realising development prospects, local and national security will ensue. On the other hand, institutional theory creates an understanding that the yielding of devolved governance benefits is premised on the optimal functioning and coherence of the relevant institutions. This suggests that complementarity

between national and local governments could be key in ensuring the nexus between devolved governance benefits and national security. Lastly, the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict highlights the important role that clannism and elitism play in distorting the advantages of devolution, with possible repercussions for national security. This illuminated the study by indicating that clannism and elitism could erode the envisaged benefits of devolution through recentralisation tendencies at the local level.

2.7 Conceptual Framework

Figure 2.1 represents the author's conceptualisation of the relationship between devolution and national security in the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region, Kenya. The independent and dependent variables in this study were devolution and national security. Clannism and the role of clan elites were the moderating variables, while institutions were the intervening variables. The arrows show the flow through which the relationship between the variables was understood. The unbroken arrow shows the direction of influence of one variable on another. The dotted line indicates the interdependence/influence of the variables on each other.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Researcher, 2023

As indicated in the left box of Figure 2.1, devolution is expected to yield benefits such as public participation, inclusive decision making, and responsive service delivery. However, the sharing of devolved governance benefits is moderated by clannism and clan elites to influence security. For instance, clannism is likely to influence the sharing of devolution benefits by their dominance to populate devolved governance structures with one of their own. On the other hand, elites within clans could leverage clannism to determine who is included in governance structures and how they work. Be that as it may, strong institutions can moderate the negative impact of clannism and clan elites in the sharing of devolved governance benefits, thus ensuring national security. This can be achieved through optimal functioning and complementarity between local and national government institutions. Therefore, in the absence of strong institutions, the negative influence of clannism and clan elites on the sharing of devolved governance benefits and thus national insecurity is emphasised.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research methodology used in this study to assess the influence of devolution on national security within the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region of Kenya. It explains how the researcher approached the field by outlining the research design, study population, sample size, and sampling procedures. It also highlights data collection tools, data collection procedures, and measures taken to assure the study's reliability and validity. In addition, it elucidates the measures taken to assure adherence to research ethos and statutory requirements.

3.2 Research Design

This study employed a cross-sectional descriptive survey research design with a convergent mixed technique for data collection. Kothari (2004) explains that a cross-sectional design allows for data collection at a given point in time with minimal interference from a researcher and is thus suitable for studies that take a short period, such as this study. This design enabled this study to collect the respondents' demographic characteristics and behaviors at a given point in time. Kothari (2004) further outlines that descriptive survey research design endeavours to collect data about a situation or happening with the aim of explaining and understanding it. In the case of this study, this design helped to gather data on the respondents' thoughts, feelings, or experiences on the linkage between devolution

and national security in the context of clannism. Therefore, it was apt in helping to understand; what benefits have been yielded by devolution and their influence on national security, how the benefits of devolution in the context of clannism influence security, and the role of elites in the context of clannism in influencing the sharing of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and thus, the ramifications thereof for Kenya's national security. In a nutshell, both the cross-sectional design and descriptive survey research design were critical for the study in providing a snapshot of the target population's characteristics/behaviors, but they differed in depth and focus. The cross-sectional design was more focused on capturing a broad overview of the target population's characteristics at a specific point in time while the descriptive research design delved deeper into specific characteristics or behaviors through self-reported data.

That said, to eliminate discrepancies and enable a detailed and concrete knowledge of research questions, the convergent mixed technique of data gathering integrates quantitative and qualitative approaches to a study investigation (Johnson et al., 2007). This approach was appropriate because it makes it easier to triangulate both quantitative and qualitative data. This was critical in assuring the validity of respondents' experiences with devolution benefits, clannism, the role of elites, and national security in the North-Eastern region, Kenya.

3.3 Variables/Categories of Analysis

The independent and dependent variables in this study were devolution and national security. Clannism was the moderating variable. Furthermore, because within clannism, elites have a significant influence on the linkage between devolved governance benefits and national security, they were also considered by this study as a moderating variable. Institutions were the intervening variable.

3.4 Location/Site of the Study

This study examined the influence of devolution on national security within the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region of Kenya. The study region is made up of three counties: Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera. Figure 3.1 shows a detailed map of the study area.




Figure 3.1: Map of the North-Eastern Region, Kenya

Source: ICG, 2015

As indicated in Figure 3.1, the study area shares an international border with Ethiopia to the north and Somalia to the east. As such, it is located close to states marked with fragility, particularly Somalia, whose impact sometimes transcends international borders into the counties of interest (ICG, 2015). In this regard,

fragility from neighbouring states, especially from Somalia, could have negative ramifications for Kenya's national security. This is because displaced clans from Somalia could join their counterparts in the region in a contest for power and resources. It is important to note that the three counties in the study area are predominantly populated by the Somali ethnic group. That said, Burbidge (2017) takes note of the infiltration of foreign influence, particularly from the Somalia-based Al Shabab terror group, in shaping interclan competition for power and resources in the region.

Accordingly, among Somalis, clan identity, solidarity, and contestations for power and resources supersede those for unity (Dahir & Ali, 2021). As such, Somali clans in the region may be politicised and may thus influence the link between devolved governance benefits and regional/national security. The region of the study is also marked by historical marginalisation, uneven development (Wanyande, 2016) and elitism tendencies (ICG, 2015), which might have an implication on the realisation and sharing of devolved governance benefits and, thus, consequences for national security. Therefore, the region offered a suitable study site for examining the influence of devolution on national security within the context of clannism.

3.5 Target Population

This study targeted adult household [HH] members in the North-Eastern region, Kenya as its primary study population. Guyer (1981) defines HH as social structures based on close kinship ties that together make important decisions on mutual interests that impact their social, economic, and political environment. She explains that HHs are important study units in Africa because they typify social, economic, and political dynamics at the micro level of a community. In this regard, HH reflect the general orientation of clans to which they belong. Therefore, the choice of adult members of HH as the primary study population in the North-Eastern region, Kenya, which is within the African continent, was apt. The distribution of HH in the North-Eastern region, Kenya is shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Number of HHs in the North-Eastern Region, Kenya

County	Number of HHs
Garissa	138,940
Mandera	123,954
Wajir	126,878

Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics [KNBS], 2019a

From Table 3.1, it can be determined that according to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics [KNBS] (2019), Garissa County had a total of 138,940 HH, which was the largest number of HH in the North-Eastern region. Next was Wajir County with 126,878-HHs. Mandera County had the least number of HHs with 123,954.

The secondary population of the study consisted of key informants [KIs]. KIs are persons who are competent in the subject matter under inquiry (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2012). In this regard, KI were drawn from amongst; political leaders, religious leaders, local governance officials, businessmen/women, peace and security committee members, youth and women leaders, national government administration officials, commanders of local National Police Service [NPS] divisions, Civil Society Organizations [CSOs], selected HH heads, and clan elders.

3.6 Sampling Technique and Sample Size

HH served as the unit of analysis for the main study population. In this regard, the study only sampled respondents from HHs headed by adults. To draw respondents from the HH, Kenya's North-Eastern region was clustered into three counties: Wajir, Mandera, and Garissa. Subsequently, sub-clustering within the Counties based on Sub Counties and major clans, namely Ogaden, Degodia, Ajuraan, Garre, and Murule, was carried out. These clans are the most numerous in the area under discussion, and they may have been politicised to affect the advantages of devolved governance and national security. Respondents were further sub-clustered within clans based on age and sex categories. This was done to ensure that the sample that was taken was representative. Generally, sampling was performed in various steps as indicated below.

Step 1: Sampling of Locations within the Counties

The North-Eastern region covers a vast land area measuring approximately 127,358 KM². It has 22 subcounties as follows: Wajir (8), Mandera (7), and Garissa (7) (KNBS, 2019). To ensure sufficient coverage of the study area given its vastness coupled by many administrative locations, a simple random sampling technique was employed to select four subcounties from each county of interest. This was 54.5% of the total sub-counties. As such, for each county, the subcounties were assigned numbers, which were written on separate pieces of paper of equal size. The pieces of paper were then carefully folded not to reveal the numbers assigned before being placed in a container. The pieces of paper in the container were then shuffled before randomly picking four pieces of paper by the researcher. Accordingly, each sub-county, in every county of interest, stood an equal chance of being selected by the researcher. From simple random sampling, the following 12 sub-counties were selected for the study: Wajir (Wajir East, Buna, Habaswein and Tarbaj), Mandera (Banisa, Kutolo, Lafey and Mandera East), and Garissa (Garissa, Dadaab, Fafi, and Balambala). Notably, the disadvantage in choosing 12 out of the possible 22 subcounties that make up the North-Eastern regions implies that the results of this study should be applied with caution in drawing inferences/conclusions for areas not sampled. However, the study endeavoured to draw respondents from all the wards in the randomly selected sub-counties.

Step 2: Sampling of Clans within the chosen Locations

The primary concern of this study was how clannism affected the distribution of the benefits of fiscal, administrative, and political devolution in the North-Eastern region and how this impacted national security. As a result, the effect of the region's major clans, namely Ogaden, Degodia, Ajuraan, Garre, and Murule, on the connexion between devolution and security was of interest. In this regard, the leaders of "Nyumba Kumi," a platform that unites ten households in the same vicinity to serve as a starting point for community security at the local level, were critical when choosing the first household associated with the clans of interest.

On identification of the first HH, subsequent members of the same clan were identified through snowballing. This method was found to be critical for negotiating a context with possible interclan conflict and prejudice. Furthermore, it enabled the researcher to acquire the subsequent respondents' trust due to introduction by people they already knew and trusted. In this regard, respondents in the first HH for the survey were critical in identifying their kin and in informing acceptance of subsequent respondents to participate in the study. The weakness of this method was that the inclusion of new respondents was dependent on the knowledge of kinship by previous interviewees. This could have introduced prejudice to the study as the respondents could have influenced each other in answering the survey questions because of their familiarity.

Respondents from each clan were drawn until all potential interviewees from the target clan were exhausted and/or a minimum acceptable sample size was drawn. In line with this view, LaMotre (2016) argues that a sample size of thirty (30) respondents is reasonable to draw valid inferences from a set of data. As such, a representative sample drawn from each of the five clans of interest, namely, Ogaden, Degodia, Ajuraan, Garre, and Murule, was achieved.

Step 3: Sampling of HH Respondents within Identified Clans

Clans tend to prejudice women due to their patrilineal nature (Hudson et al.,2015) while clan elites discriminate against youth (ICG,2015). Therefore, to draw respondents from the HH of target clans, further sub-clustering of respondents within the clans and HH based on age groups and sex was performed. The age groups of interest were youth (18-34 years), middle aged (35-59 years) and older adults (60 and above years). Age group and sex disaggregation was intended to assure representativeness of the sample drawn. However, given that the exact sizes, age, and sex distribution of the clans were unknown, it was not possible to use the statistical sample size estimation technique (Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004).

In this case, HH in every clan in each county and sub-county were sampled in a systematic manner as follows: in the first HH, a male youth was interviewed, in the second, a female youth, in the third, a male middle-aged respondent, in the

fourth, a female middle-aged respondent, in the fifth, an aged male respondent, and in the sixth, an aged female respondent. This process was repeated until all available and willing respondents from each clan, sex, and age bracket were exhausted or had met the minimum acceptable sample size threshold. A total of 893 HH respondents participated in the study, as outlined in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Sampling Matrix for Clans in the North-Eastern Region, Kenya

Clan	Number of HH Interviewed Per County			Total
	Mandera	Wajir	Garissa	
Ogaden	0	102	101	203
Degodia	96	102	99	297
Ajuraan	0	100	100	200
Garre	96	0	0	96
Murule	97	0	0	97
Total	289	304	300	893

Source: Survey Data, 2022

Sampling of Key Informants

Purposive sampling was used to select respondents for the study's KI. In this regard, their selection was based mostly on their breadth of knowledge on the subject under inquiry, which was the relationship between the benefits of devolution and national security. Clarke and Braun (2013) advance the view that in qualitative paradigms, such as in the sampling of KI, a sample size of 12 is adequate to assure comprehensive coverage of an issue under investigation.

Therefore, in the North-Eastern region the study sampled 39 KI as outlined in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Sampling Matrix for Key Informants in the North-Eastern Region, Kenya

Category of Key Informant	Sample Size			Total
	Mandera	Wajir	Garissa	
County Secretary/Ward Administrator/CEC Member	1	1	1	3
County Commissioner/Sub County Commissioner	1	1	1	3
Governor/Senator/MP/Women Representative /Member of the County Assembly	1	1	1	3
Businessman/woman	1	1	1	3
County Commander/OCPD/OCS	1	1	1	3
Women	1	1	1	3
Youth	1	1	1	3
Household Head	1	1	1	3
Local Peace Security Member	1	1	1	3
Religious leader	1	1	1	3
Clan elder Ogaden	0	1	1	2
Clan elder Degodia	1	1	1	3
Clan elder Ajuran	0	1	1	2
Clan elder Garre	1	0	0	1
Clan elder Murule	1	0	0	1
Total	13	13	13	39

Source: Survey Data, 2022

3.7 Research Instruments

This study employed three data collection instruments. These instruments included a household survey questionnaire, an interview guide, and a documentary review. These tools are explained below.

3.7.1 Household Survey Questionnaire

This tool was a semi-structured questionnaire consisting of both open- and closed-ended questions. The closed-ended questions were of the Five (5) Scale Likert type with responses ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Generally, the semi-structured questionnaire for the HH was organised into seven sections. Section A of the questionnaire solicited demographic information about the respondent. As such, information about sex, age, level of education, clan affiliation, and length of stay in the county post devolution was gathered. This information informed the researcher whether the chosen respondent met the study's criteria of sufficient breadth of knowledge on the subject under inquiry.

Sections B, C, and D of the survey limited itself to exploring the benefits of devolution in its three facets, namely political, fiscal, and administrative decentralisation, and their influence on national security. In this regard, indicators from various scholars were customised and adopted by this study as follows: benefits of political and administrative decentralisation (World Bank Group, 2001), advantages of fiscal decentralisation (Feinstein, 2015; Gumede et al., 2019;

Sow & Razafimahefa, 2015) and indicators of national security in its various facets (Barnett et al., 2011; OECD, 2008; Karanina & Loginov, 2017; United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2016; Vhurumuku, 2014; Whitzman, 2007).

Section E of the questionnaire solicited data on clannism and its influence on devolved governance benefits and national security. In this case, the tool explored clannism issues to include, among others, potential discriminatory practises dominance, and patronage in the distribution of devolution benefits and ramifications for national security. Section F of the survey sought to obtain data on the influence of clan elites on the distribution of devolution benefits and their implications on national security. In addition, it required information to help in the identification of clan elites. It also sought to identify local recentralisation tendencies of clan elites, if at all, with respect to the distribution of power and resources and, thus, consequences for national security.

Prior to the study, the HH survey questionnaire was translated into Somali. This was meant to enable the study to address inconsistency of responses due to varied understanding and interpretation of research questions by respondents and research assistants. Moreover, this afforded a chance for the study to also reach respondents with limited formal education (in addition to those with formal

education), hence increasing the reliability and validity of findings through the assurance of study sample representativeness.

3.7.2 Interview Guide

An interview guide consisting of predesigned open questions modelled along the study objectives was used to collect data from the KIs. In essence, the interview guide aimed to obtain information on; devolved governance benefits and implications for Kenya's national security, clannism influence on the distribution of devolved governance benefits and ramifications for Kenya's national security, and the role of elites in the context of clannism in influencing the sharing of devolved governance benefits and subsequent consequences for Kenya's national security. In addition, the guide solicited recommendations to enhance the realisation of devolved governance benefits while strengthening national security in the context of clannism.

3.7.3 Document Review Instrument

Data were collected from an examination of documents outlining; clan and gender balance in elective offices and employment within devolved governance units, legal and policy frameworks enacted to effect devolved functions, and quantitative indicators (e.g., relating to number of hospitals and schools built) of progress made across various devolved functions. The documents reviewed included county personnel/employment records, county assembly members'

records, and development plans and legislation/policy files. The focus of the document review was based on two devolution periods: March 2013 to August 2017 and September 2017 to May 2022.

3.8 Pilot Study

To correct the unclear questions in the research instruments, feedback from the respondents of a pilot study was considered. Accordingly, a pilot study was conducted in Narok County. This county, dominated by the Maasai ethnic group, is characterised by clans that are politicised and play a critical role in the selection of political leaders, the security of the county, and how power and resources are distributed (Joshua, 2021). With respect to this study, the interclan rivalry among the Maasai in Narok County reflected similar dynamics and value systems as the Somali clans in the North-Eastern region. Therefore, they provided a germane populace for the pilot study. Accordingly, the HH survey questionnaire was administered to 116 respondents drawn from the IIsiria, IIpuko, and IIDamat clans of the Masai ethnic group in Narok County to address any potential weaknesses. These three clans of the Maasai have a history of interclan rivalry (Joshua, 2021).

3.9 Validity and Reliability

3.9.1 Validity

Validity refers to the extent to which a study's conclusion drawn from the analysed data is true (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). In this regard, this study endeavoured to assure the integrity of data collection tools and thus the validity of findings and conclusions drawn by enhancing face, content, and construct validity. Specifically, to ensure that the instruments have face validity, the data collection tools were subjected to an in-depth critique by various scholars and peers who are interested in the interface of devolution and security. Comments emerging from the critique on the clarity, completeness, relevance, and objectivity of the tools were integrated to improve the data collection instrument.

To enhance content validity, care was exercised to ensure that all study variables and related facets were comprehensively covered by the research instruments. To this end, expert review by the researcher's supervisors was critical in assuring the completeness of the data collection instruments. Moreover, views from experts on devolution were sought and were thus instrumental in informing study items to test for in the instruments. To ensure construct validity, indicators adopted from several scholars on various variables were adapted and moderated to suit the concerns of the study. Moreover, theoretical and empirical literature review was fundamental in customising the study questionnaire and interview guide to suit the study's context and purpose.

To validate the findings, the study utilised two main techniques. First, on data transcription of the interviews, the initial impressions of the findings were shared with the study participants to confirm their authenticity. Later, data collected from interviews were triangulated with those from the HH survey and examination of county documents on various issues. This was done to assure convergence of findings and minimisation of inconsistencies. Moreover, to increase the validity of the findings, the study actively sought to provide explanations for responses that were contrary to the majority views.

3.9.2 Reliability

Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) define reliability as the consistency of study's data collection instruments to produce comparable findings on multiple occasions in a study area. To assure reliability, the internal consistency of the quantitative data collection instruments was measured using Cronbach's Alpha coefficient(α). Gliem and Gliem (2003) hold that α is used to test the reliability of studies and typically lies between 0 and 1. As such, persuaded by the arguments of George and Mallery (as cited in Gliem & Gliem, 2003), the study considered a Cronbach's alpha score of above or equal to 0.7 as acceptable. In this regard, after reliability analysis, the study deleted some items that had an overall effect of lowering α below .7. At the same time, it retained items that helped to yield $\alpha \geq .700$. From the retained items as suggested, it can be argued that this study

satisfied the reliability threshold suggested by George and Mallery (as cited in Gliem & Gliem, 2003). Table 3.4 shows the results of the reliability analysis.

Table 3.4: Reliability Analysis

Item	α	N	N of Items	N of Items Deleted	N of Items Retained
Political Devolution	.714	893	8	1	7
Fiscal Devolution	.725	893	8	1	7
Administrative Devolution	.756	893	8	3	5
Clannism	.786	893	8	2	6
Elitism	.831	893	8	1	7

Source: Survey Data, 2022

To enhance the reliability of qualitative data, as collected using an interview guide, respondents were invited to validate the initial findings to ensure conformity with their perspectives on the interaction of the study’s variables. Moreover, in transcribing and analysing the collected data, word tables used to identify the frequency of emerging issues from the collected data to help in accurate reporting were generated by two different persons. They were then compared and unbiased findings were reported.

3.10 Data Collection Procedure

Prior to the study, 12 Research Assistants [RA] (one per Sub County) were engaged to assist in data collection. On engagement, the RAs were trained on data collection and research ethos. Furthermore, before commencement of the study,

the principal investigator made courtesy calls to the County Commissioners and County Secretaries of Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera Counties to inform them of the study's objectives and to obtain permission for data collection. Upon consent from the national and county government officials, the study embarked on the data collection phase. In this regard, data collection was conducted in May and December 2022.

During the data collection phase, the HH survey questionnaires were administered by research assistants who were present as the questionnaires were filled before collecting them back. This was done to assure that any needed clarifications were made to the respondent and to ensure the completeness and return of the questionnaires. During data collection, the RAs were closely supervised by the principal investigator to ensure integrity and adherence to the research ethos.

For the secondary respondents, Key Informants Interviews [KIIs] were conducted by the principal investigator with the assistance of the RAs. Before the KIIs, the principal investigator scheduled and booked appointments with the KIs through letters and phone calls. Accordingly, interviews were scheduled based on the convenience of the respondents to avoid rushed responses. Moreover, they were carried out in quiet, private, neutral, and accessible locations for the respondents. This was to avoid interruptions, ensure comfort of the respondents, and manage transportation requirements concerns. During the interview, the principal

investigator posed questions to the KI and recorded the proceedings in a notebook and, where consent had been obtained, in an electronic device. For document review, the executive officers for the County Public Service and Assembly Boards were contacted via phone calls and appointments were made. On the day of the scheduled appointment, the required documents were solicited and reviewed. Where a document was not available at the time of the appointment, allowance was made for it to be availed later.

3.11 Data Analysis and Presentation

This study yielded both quantitative and qualitative data. In this regard, the collected data were analysed and presented as follows.

3.11.1 Quantitative Data

Quantitative data obtained through Likert-type questions in the semi-structured questionnaire administered to the HH were analysed using percentages and frequencies. Subsequently, the analysed data were presented in the form of tables, charts, and graphs where applicable. To this end, the Statistical Package for Social Sciences [SPSS] version 23 and Excel software were critical in the analysis.

3.11.2 Qualitative Data

Information from KIs was analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis [CDA]. In this regard, reflection was made on qualitative data collected to infer the meaning

behind the words and further contextualise them within the devolved governance and national security discourse. Core to this analysis, this study focussed on reflecting on emergent values and beliefs the respondents shared from a clannism context within the wider devolution and security nexus. Qualitative findings and interpretation thereof are presented in this study textually.

3.12 Logistical and Ethical Considerations

This study was premised on ethical and statutory requirements as set out by Kenyatta University and the Government of Kenya [GoK]. Accordingly, data collection in the field began after obtaining clearances from Kenyatta University's School of Security, Diplomacy and Peace Studies, the National Commission for Science and Technology and Innovation [NACOTSI] and GoK (Appendix A5 and A6 documents the research permit and authorisation from the GoK, respectively). In the field, the study was guided by legal and ethical requirements as specified by Kenya's Data Protection Act 2019. In this regard, respondents were made aware of; the purpose of the study, how it intended to benefit them, and any potential harm that could arise from the study before seeking consent to proceed with the inquiry. Participation in this study was purely voluntary. The study also made a deliberate effort to protect its sources of information. The respondents were made aware of this and assured anonymity and confidentiality. Furthermore, the study made conscious efforts to reduce respondents' feelings of apprehension and harassment, and as a result, they were informed of their right to leave the

research process at any time. In addition, the survey only included responders that were older than 18 years.

CHAPTER FOUR: DEVOLVED GOVERNANCE BENEFITS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

4.1 Introduction

This study's primary goal was to evaluate the impact of devolution on national security in the context of clannism in Kenya's North-Eastern region. The specific objectives of the study were as follows:

- i. To establish the benefits that devolved governance has yielded in the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region and its implications for Kenya's national security.
- ii. To assess the influence of clannism on the distribution of devolved governance benefits in North-Eastern region and its consequences for Kenya's national security.
- iii. To evaluate the role of elites within clannism in determining the sharing of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and its ramifications for Kenya's national security.

This chapter thus presents and discusses the study's findings with respect to the first objective of the thesis, which was to establish the benefits that devolved governance has yielded in the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region and their implications for Kenya's national security. To begin with, this chapter examines the study respondents' demographic characteristics, including gender, age, education, and clan membership, which anchored all the findings.

4.2 Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

A total of 932 respondents participated in the study. Approximately 893 respondents were drawn from the Household [HH] survey from an initial target of 1,155-HH. This translated to a response rate of 77.32%, which is excellent (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). About 39 respondents participated as Key Informants [KIs] to the study. In the HH survey, the respondents were asked to provide details related to gender, age, level of education, and clan affiliation. Moreover, details regarding their length of stay in the North-Eastern region post-devolution period and their county of residence were requested. Below are the findings of the sociodemographic analysis of the respondents drawn from the HH survey.

4.2.1 Gender

Figure 4.1 depicts the demographic characteristics of the HH survey respondents (N = 893) according to their gender categorisation.




Figure 4.1: Gender of the Respondents

Source: Survey Data, 2022

Male respondents made up approximately 54.2% (n=484) of the sample taken from the HH, while female respondents made up 45.8% (n=409) of the sample. Based on this finding, it may be concluded that the respondents' gender distribution was fairly even. This was crucial for the study in obtaining a gender-sensitive perspective on how devolution affects national security in the setting of clannism in Kenya's North-Eastern region. The inclusion of women voices and their meaningful participation in all frameworks, including those of governance, are critical in assuring stable peace and security at all levels (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325(2000)). Moreover, the inclusion of women voices is essential in a clannism context since clans are typically patrilineal and may harbour prejudice against women/girls (Hudson et al., 2015). Therefore, the

inclusion of women's voices fairly represents a balanced view of the HH on whether devolution offered a framework to ensure just representation at the grassroots level and, consequently, equitable distribution of benefits of devolution and thus national security.

4.2.2 Age

The study also sought to establish the ages of the HH survey respondents (N = 893). In this regard, the respondents ranged from 18 to 78 years of age. On average, they had a mean age of 34.34 years (Mean [*M*] =34.34, Standard Deviation [*SD*] = 12.25). Accordingly, it can be inferred that, at one SD, 68% of the respondents were aged between 22.09 and 46.59 years. Therefore, it can be argued that no less than 68% of the respondents had sufficient experience and assimilation to the cultural attitudes of their respective clans. As such, the respondents may represent a fair view of the moderating effect of clannism on the link between devolution benefits and national security. This is consistent with the argument of Cohen and Kassan (2018), who hold the view that cultural identity is reinforced by age.

This study further sought to establish the age group distribution of the HH survey respondents in the following categories: youth (18-34 years), middle-aged (35–59 years), and elderly (60 and above years). As explained earlier, cultural identity is reinforced by age; therefore, this categorisation was critical because it enabled the

study to comprehend the intricate relationship between age groups and clan identity and thus influence local and national security. Moreover, different age groups may have varying experiences and concerns related to clannism and devolution and thus may positively or negatively shape security. For instance, while the youth may be more concerned with getting jobs, the older adults might be preoccupied with social protection issues such as access to health care. Indeed, the Kenya Constitution 2010 requires affirmative action to be taken for youth and vulnerable groups such as the elderly to satisfy their governance needs (Wanyande & Gichira, 2021). Therefore, these concerns across different age cohorts and their satisfaction can inform the intricate relationship between devolution benefits and security. In this case, failure to address concerns across different age groups can precipitate social disharmony that may trigger insecurity.

Figure 4.2 outlines the age distribution of the respondents by age group.




Figure 4.2: Age Group Distribution of the Respondents

Source: Survey Data, 2022

According to Figure 4.2, 64.6 % (n=577) of the sample was made up of respondents between the ages of 18 and 34. The sample's middle-aged population (ages 34 to 59) made up 29.3% (n=262). Respondents over 60 years made up 6% (n=54). Therefore, it can be said that young people comprised most of the responders. This finding was comparable and consistent with the KNBS (2019b) census data on population distribution by similar age groups in the North-Eastern region. In its data, the institution indicates that population distribution by age groups is as follows 18-34 years (63.59%), 35-59 years (30.17%) and over 60 years (6.24%). Therefore, it can be argued that the sampling per age group reflected fairly well compared with the general population distribution of the region by age group.

4.2.3 Level of Formal Education

This study also sought to establish the education levels of the HH survey respondents (N = 893). Accordingly, the thesis established that they ranged from no formal education to tertiary education. The detailed results are documented in Figure 4.3.




Figure 4.3: Education Levels of Respondents

Source: Survey Data, 2022

From Figure 4.3, it can be determined that 24.4% (n=218) of the respondents did not have any formal education. About 16% (n=143) had a primary level of formal education. Those with secondary level of education accounted for 25.6% (n=229) of the sample. Respondents with tertiary level of education comprised 33.9% (n=303) of the sample. This implies that most of the respondents had a tertiary education followed by a secondary level education and no formal education. Respondents with a primary level of education were the least. The fact that the study drew its sample more from the tertiary level could be explained by the snowballing technique used. In this regard, respondents were likely to refer the researcher to persons they were well acquainted with.

The longer length of stay together in educational institutions cement this acquaintance. This implies that the study easily obtained the trust of the subsequent respondent. However, the study may have suffered potential bias in the reported findings. Moreover, it could be that those with a tertiary level of education were more amenable to participate in the study because of their comprehensive understanding of devolution concerns (World Bank, 2021). This could include sociopolitical issues related to clannism and their consequent desire to shape devolved governance to override clannism issues to attain optimal benefits, shared identity, and security. Indeed, education plays a significant role in reshaping ingrained cultural attitudes learned from one's environment (Altugan, 2015) and thus may enhance security.

4.2.4 Clan Affiliation

Devolution is about politics, and people may be inclined to take political views that resonate with the clans they belong to. Therefore, it was important to establish the clans the study participants (N = 893) belonged to. The results of the study participants' clan affiliation are highlighted in Figure 4.4.




Figure 4.4: Clans of Respondents

Source: Survey Data, 2022

From Figure 4.4, it can be established that respondents drawn from the Murule clan comprised 10.9% (n=97) of the sample. The Garre clan accounted for 10.8% (n=96) of the HH survey sample. About 22.4% (n=200) of the respondents were from the Ajuraan clan. The Degodia and Ogaden clans accounted for 33.3% (n=297) and 22.7% (n=203) of the sample drawn, respectively. This suggests that the Degodia clan, followed by the Ogaden, Ajuraan, Murule, and Garre clans, accounted for the greatest number of respondents. This means that perhaps some clans were more prevalent in the sampled locations than others and that clans were distributed geographically based on their kinship. This also implies that this study used different sample sizes of clans of interest in drawing its findings and conclusions. These possibilities notwithstanding, the sample sizes drawn ($n \geq 30$)

from each clan were sufficiently large for studies involving comparison (LaMotre, 2016). Thus, this study benefitted from the views of representatives of each of the main clans in the study area.

4.2.5 County of Residence

This study also sought to establish the counties of residence of the respondents.

The results are shown in Figure 4.5.




Figure 4.5: County of Residence for Respondents

Source: Survey Data, 2022

From Figure 4.5, it can be deduced that 33.59% (n=300) of the respondents were drawn from Garissa County. Mandera County accounted for 32.36% (n=289). Approximately 34.04% (n=304) of the respondents were drawn from Wajir County. In this regard, Wajir County accounted for the largest number of

respondents, followed by Garissa. Mandera County had the least number of respondents.

4.2.6 Length of Stay

This study also aimed to determine how long respondents had stayed in the counties of interest during the devolution period under consideration, which ran from March 2013 to May 29, 2022. The results indicated that respondents (N=893) had a mean length of stay of 8.19 years out of the possible 9 years ($M = 8.19$, $SD = 1.22$). Therefore, it might be claimed that respondents generally had sufficient familiarity with the contextual dynamics of the North-Eastern region, and more specifically, of their counties of residence. As was previously argued, exposure to specific contexts (or, in this case, county/region) for a prolonged period provides opportunities to learn about them, which then moulds clan-centric dispositions or otherwise. In turn, this may affect the moderating influence of clannism on the relationship between the benefits of devolution and national security.

4.3 Benefits of Devolution and Implication for National Security

This study examined the nexus between devolution benefits and national security in a context marked by clannism. In this regard, three different data collection tools were used. These tools included an interview guide for 39 Key Informants [KIs], a questionnaire for a household (HH) survey that drew 893 respondents,

and a review of some supporting documentation. Specifically, the HH survey questionnaire was structured to obtain data on the influence of political, fiscal, and administrative devolution benefits on national security. The survey questionnaire was based on a Five (5) Scale Likert type, required responses ranging from Strongly Disagree [SD], Disagree [D], Neutral [N], Agree [A] and Strongly Agree [SA]. The results drawn from the three tools are outlined in subsections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3.

4.3.1 Influence of the Benefits of Political Devolution on National Security

To examine the influence of the benefits of political devolution on national security, respondents (N=893) were requested to indicate whether they SD, D, N, A, or SA with various statements relating to the advantages of giving political power and authority to the people at the grassroots. The results are tabulated in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Influence of the Benefits of Political Devolution on National Security

Item	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total
People choose their local leaders, but clannism impedes effective participation in governance, leading to regional and national insecurity	9.6% (86)	12.1% (108)	8% (71)	57.4% (513)	12.9% (115)	100% (893)
Has increased participation in formulating local development goals and actions but this has not brought benefits to all clans hence, regional and national insecurity	3.4% (30)	15.9% (142)	16.8% (150)	50.4% (450)	13.5% (121)	100% (893)
Devolved resources are not well managed and fairly distributed making some clans to feel marginalised hence regional and national insecurity	9.5% (85)	31.2% (279)	5.4% (48)	46.1% (412)	7.7% (69)	100% (893)
Has not resulted to responsive local service delivery increasing dissatisfaction with governance among all clans hence unstable regional and national security	8.4% (75)	28.9% (258)	11.8% (105)	39.2% (350)	11.8% (105)	100% (893)
Public policies responding to local problems have not been crafted and executed resulting to conflicts among clans hence regional and national insecurity	7.7% (69)	30% (268)	22.4% (200)	34.6% (309)	5.3% (47)	100% (893)
Information relating to projects being implemented is not shared to all thus discouraging closer scrutiny and promoting marginalisation amongst some clans thus contributing to regional and national insecurity	12.2% (109)	29.3% (262)	13.2% (118)	32.1% (287)	13.1% (117)	100% (893)
The county government does not regularly organize public hearings for all to articulate their views on governance and this has led to feeling of marginalisation thus undermining regional and national security	9.9% (88)	18.3% (163)	16.6% (148)	35.6% (318)	19.7% (176)	100% (893)
Overall	8.7%	23.7%	13.4%	42.2%	12%	100%

Source: Survey Data, 2022

According to Table 4.1, a general overview of the results indicates that the respondents were less likely to strongly disagree (8.7%) or disagree (23.7%) with various assertions that were under investigation. However, most study respondents were more inclined to agree (42.2%) or strongly agree (12%) with the statements under examination. Given how the study items were framed, the results seem to indicate that politics of clannism predominate the North-Eastern region. As such, it can be argued that politicians use clans to access and exercise power. Accordingly, enabling devolution frameworks have not been institutionalised at the local level; hence, political devolution has not delivered its expected outputs with negative ramifications for local and national security. The specific results to anchor the generalised view are highlighted in three thematic areas: public participation, management of resources and service delivery and policy making.

4.3.1.1 Public Participation and Security

This thematic area examined whether devolved governance encouraged the participation of local communities in political activities of the counties of interest. This was critical as public participation as envisaged by the theory of decentralisation, without the encumbrances of clannism, may engender community ownership, inclusivity, and accountability, which are critical foundations for security. To this end, the findings indicated that although the general populace participated in the actual voting process, the influence of clan

elders in deciding who was to be in the ballot undermined their involvement and the independent assessment of the qualifications of the candidates. Moreover, it perpetuated clan identity politics as voters were encouraged and/or coerced to vote based on clan affiliations, thus deepening clan cleavages. Additionally, a sizeable percentage of the local populace did not actively and significantly contribute to development goals and actions. Accordingly, the sharing of project information was also not inclusive, thus discouraging accountability and promoting marginalisation among certain clans. Therefore, this reinforced exclusion of the majority, disgruntlement, and social unrest, thus undermining local and national security. The results presented in the subsequent paragraphs support this overarching summary.

According to Table 4.1, 9.6% (n=86) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that through devolution, local leaders were elected by the populace, but clannism prevented effective involvement in administration, which fostered regional and national insecurity. Around 12.1% (n=108) of the respondents disagreed, while 8% (n=71) were neutral. On the other hand, approximately 57.4% (n=513) and 12.9% (n=115) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed, respectively. Cumulatively, this indicates that a minority of the respondents (21.72%) either strongly disagreed or disagreed with the assertion that people chose their local leaders, but clannism impeded effective participation in

governance, leading to regional and national insecurity. In this regard, KI quipped.

Devolution era has seen an increase in the number of contestants and political positions in the region. Consequently, elected leaders have taken up greater roles of ensuring security within their counties, liaising closely with locals to develop appropriate responses to insecurity. The solutions are more suitable to the security needs of the community and take into consideration the cultural and religious dynamics that are dear to the locals (KI 10: December 2022).

The increase in candidates and political positions in the region during the devolution era, as stated in the quotes above, is evidence of the devolution of powers and privileges of governance to lower levels, which is the basis of the conceptual and normative assumptions of devolved governance in Kenya, as outlined in Article 174 of the Constitution 2010. Furthermore, the quotation seems to imply that elected officials work with people at the grassroots to create and put into action adaptable security measures. This indicates the potential seriousness with which some political leaders might be taking on their responsibilities in the region. Indeed, the collaboration between political leaders and locals in governance at the grassroots helps to unravel unique context-specific security challenges and vulnerabilities they might be facing, which is critical in crafting responsive solutions (Mkutu et al., 2014).

This view is consistent with the theory of decentralisation, which contends that community involvement in local decision making can foster peaceful co-existence. Through increased participation in governance by the citizenry,

devolution enables information sharing and fosters accountability of leaders to the local populace, which then informs the addressing of context-specific dynamic security threats. That aside, it is expected that leaders at the grassroots are more conversant with their context and the needs of their community and are better placed to solve them, hence, security.

To further reinforce the minority view, another KI said.

Devolution has given opportunity to the people to elect Governors, Senators, Members of Parliament [MPs] and Members of the County Assembly [MCAs]. In this case, MCAs come from wards which are small political units which are found all over the region. Therefore, all clans are represented in the county assembly albeit in different proportions (KI 6: December 2022).

The quotation above reiterates that devolution created more political positions. It further stipulates that by having political leadership at the lowest level (the ward), diverse clans are afforded an opportunity to participate in governance. Nonetheless, two perspectives might also be discerned. It might be that the different proportions in representation referred to in the quote by KI 6 reflect equity in that the populous clans tend to have bigger representation vis a vis the smaller ones. This could also mean that minority clans within wards that have the presence of dominant clans do not get an opportunity to elect one of their own. As such, due to the use of clan lenses in deciding the unfairness or fairness of sharing of devolved power, the perceived unfair power distribution among the minority clans in such a situation may lead to insecurity. In line with this view, Mkutu et al. (2014) and Hope (2014) argue that various forms of perceived and real

prejudice, such as the one referred to in this study, prevail in various counties in Kenya and have occasioned hostilities. Moreover, this proposition is backed by the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict, which maintains that insecurity may result from dissatisfaction with power-sharing arrangements among various clans. In this case, it may foster hostility, sustain notions of marginalisation, and consequently generate insecurity.

However, most respondents (70.32%) either agreed or strongly agreed with the assertion that people chose their local leaders, but clannism hampered effective involvement in governance, resulting in regional and national instability. To corroborate this finding, a KI had this to say.

Negotiated democracy has been used as systematic way of locking out potential and promising candidates from politics (KI 12: December 2022).

From the concerns of KI 12 above, it can be discerned that consensus candidates are presented for election through a process referred to as negotiated democracy. According to Cheeseman et al. (2019), negotiated democracy is a system in which, before an election, a council of clan elders negotiates and nominates candidates for various political offices using ethnic/clan-based formulas. The nominees are then fronted for election as the respective clan candidates with a rider that any other candidate does not enjoy clan support and is therefore on their own. In this sense, the scholars contend that negotiated democracy can be a

crucial tool in bridging social gaps by creating a panacea for settling potential and existing communal differences/conflicts through clan elders. As a result, clan elders can reduce tensions between and within clans through negotiation and compromise while ensuring security through consensus candidates.

However, negotiated democracy can be double-edged. In line with this view, through negotiated democracy, clan-based considerations may supersede assumptions of political devolution that guarantee opportunities to a community, regardless of their position in society, to elect individuals of their choice at all levels. Therefore, negotiated democracy within devolution denies the general society the opportunity to independently examine the suitability of a candidate in terms of leadership traits/capability and instead imposes political leaders on a community (Abraham, 2021). This, while it does not stop/impede the participation of all in the ultimate voting process, hinders effective involvement in governance and thus could influence security in varying ways. This is because clan elders decide who should be elected and the general community participates only in voting without a voice. In this case, there are few situations of open and transparent procedures that allow members of a clan to share opinions and have a say in how decisions are made. Therefore, those who harbour political interests are suppressed, which could result in tension in the community. Moreover, it marginalised the majority in deciding leadership questions, compromises inclusion, and reinforces disgruntlement and social disharmony, hence insecurity.

Furthermore, politicisation of clans may result in the alienation of the minority and unequal representation. This can increase people's dissatisfaction with the status quo, which might lead to violent methods to deal with the problems and hence insecurity. Issack (2018) corroborates this view by arguing that clan elders in Mandera County, Kenya, had by default sought to entrench existing power hegemonies and in so doing, sowed societal division along clan and gender lines. In fact, 94% of the respondents in the scholar's study expressed dissatisfaction with the central role of clan elders in deciding political questions. This notwithstanding, poor leadership choices brought about by the imposition made by the council of clan elders may limit the benefits of devolution owing to potential weak governance structures due to the election of possible incompetent candidates favoured by the council.

To further corroborate the majority view, another KI remarked:

Most populous clans dominate elected leadership leaving the minorities underrepresented. This has fractured inter-clan relationship (KI 24: December 2022).

The remark by KI 24 seems to suggest that the voting of candidates for elected governance positions is influenced by the different clan populations. It also seems to suggest that voters are rallied and whipped to vote along clan lines. As a result, voting along clan lines has perpetuated marginalisation and recentralised power in the hands of majority clans, disfranchising the minorities and creating discord amongst the various clans, resulting in insecurity. Indeed, when clan identity

politics is entrenched, the minority clans are excluded from governance. Consequently, when the minority feel that their voice persistently does not count in governance decisions, they may feel marginalised and may lose faith in the ideals of devolution, thus resorting to unlawful means such as violence. Alternatively, they may use illegal means to increase their population. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge that the three counties are border towns to fragile Somali, which has similar clans in the border region. Accordingly, those who feel marginalised could be tempted to invite their kin who live in the neighbouring country of Somali, with far-reaching consequences for Kenya's national security.

As observed by Das (2018) and Kumawat and Kaura (2018), power hegemony practised by dominant social groups tends to precipitate internal strife as minorities seek to have their voices counted, and this may adversely affect security outcomes. This finding is also consistent with that of the Kenya Human Rights Commission [KHRC] (2018), which established that ethnic/clan-based identity politics dominate the political landscape in Kenya. As such, social identifiers such as ethnicity/clan were critical in shaping voting decisions. The net effect of this is to overshadow shared national identity and pushing issue-based politics to the periphery. This, the institution notes, has made elections emotive and has resulted in violence in some instances as the marginalised squabble with the majority ethnic groups.

The remarks by KI 24 also suggest that devolved governance at the county level has not been further decentralised to consider inter-clan interests and relationships. This could be a result of the lack of appropriate frameworks that would allow further decentralisation. This is contrary to the spirit of the 2010 Kenyan constitution, which aims to reduce social inequalities within the context of devolution (KHRC, 2018) which may have adverse effects on security. Baron (2015), in a study of the metamorphosis of Catalonia's and Basque's quest for independence from Spain, posited that the motivation for the tensions, sometimes violent, was the reluctance of the central government in Madrid to devolve some aspects of devolved governance further to regional governments. Therefore, failure to further decentralise in the North-Eastern region might have distorted social harmony and thus caused insecurity. Be as it may, the elites in the region, particularly politicians, may not be motivated to put in place such frameworks as it would reduce their grip on control of power and resources. Moreover, it might reduce the attraction of clan identity in exercising power hegemony as minority clans might have access to control over policy decisions and resources in the areas under their control should further decentralisation occur. The net effect of all this is to create conditions for insecurity.

Overall, this finding, as highlighted by the remark of KI 24, is consistent with the integrative model of primordialism and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict. In this regard, the identification of belonging to a certain clan is mostly motivated by

political interests and the quest to attain power. As such, politicians and clan elders are critical in constructing and reinforcing this social identity with the aim of maintaining power hegemony, particularly amongst the dominant clans. Therefore, clans are instrumentalised to assure self-preservation in the benefiting clan(s) while provoking animosity, mistrust, and possible violence from the marginalised. This could then lead to insecurity.

To strengthen the view that populous clans dominated elected leadership, leaving the minorities underrepresented in the North-Eastern region of Kenya, a document review of the counties of interest elective positions file established that out of 117 elective positions (3 governors, 3 senators, 18 MPs, 3 Women Representatives, and 90 MCAs), the various clans were represented in the two devolution cycles of 2013–2017 and 2017–2022, as shown in Figure 4.6.




Figure 4.6: Representation of Elected Positions by Clans

Source: Survey Data, 2022

According to Figure 4.6, it can be deduced that the Ogaden clan accounted for 41.03% (48 elected individuals in total per cycle) of the elected leaders in both devolution cycles. The Garre clan constituted 22.22% (26 elected individuals per cycle) of the elected leadership in each of the two devolution cycles under review. The Degodia clan comprised 22.22% (26 elected individuals in total) and 21.37% (25 elected individuals in total) of the elected leadership in the 2013–2017 and 2017–2022 devolution cycles, respectively. Murule had a representation of 7.69% (nine elected individuals) of the elected leaders in both devolution cycles of interest. Ajuraan accounted for 6.84% (eight elected individuals in total) of the elected leaders in the first cycle and 7.69% (nine elected individuals in total) in the second cycle of devolution.

Subsequently, it can be inferred that, in terms of elective positions, the North-Eastern region of Kenya is dominated by three main clans: Ogaden, Garre, and Degodia. It can also be deduced that the Murule and Ajuraan clans might be underrepresented in political leadership within the devolved governance realm. The finding also implies that the Ogaden, Garre, and Degodia clans might be the most populous in the North-Eastern region. It also lays credence to the claim that voters are rallied and whipped to vote along clan lines in the region. In line with this view, this inference mirrors the finding of Karienyé and Warfa (2020), who aver that politicians in Wajir County mobilise their clansmen and ensure that they are available in their localities to vote for them. In this regard, clans with

disproportionately large populations still control politics and devolved governance.

According to Ala'Aldeen (2020), in such a scenario, the marginalisation of minorities owing to inequitable political representation diminishes the likelihood of various social groupings, in this case clans, working together. This, he argues, may precipitate grievances and ultimately violent conflict if left unchecked. Indeed, as earlier argued, voting along clan identities has the effect of eroding ethnic-based shared identity, negating issue-based politics, and disfranchising minority clans whose voices persistently do not matter in elections, which might result in violent forms of expression and hence insecurity.

This view is further corroborated by Hudson et al. (2015), who explain that clans are socialised to have negative opinions of others. Moreover, within clans are generally acceptable ways in which an individual is expected to conduct himself/herself when navigating inter- and intra-clans' social space; hence, equitable political representation by various clans is critical and, in its absence, violence may occur. Indeed, this view resonates with the findings of Karienyé and Warfa (2020), who document interclan conflict in Wajir County between the Degodia and Ajuraan clans in their struggle to have political representation in every election cycle. In 2018, for instance, the study noted 11 fatalities in the Eldas and Buna sub-counties of Wajir.

The finding on unequal clan representation in elective positions, as indicated in Figure 4.6, also shows that the North-Eastern region may not have accomplished the devolutionary goals set forth in Article 174 of the Kenya Constitution (2010), which include fostering diversity and unity, safeguarding the rights of minorities, and fostering democracy. In the context of the region, this implies, among other things, failure to entrench equity in political power sharing arrangements.

This resonates with the study of the Intergovernmental Relations Technical Committee [IRTC] (n.d.), which found that the extent of public participation in governance as contemplated by frameworks underpinning devolution (e.g., Articles 10, 174 (c) and 174(d) of the constitution of Kenya 2010) had not been met at the national and county levels of governments in Kenya.

This has a significant influence on security as minority clans might feel marginalised through political exclusion. Failure to reflect diversity in power sharing arrangements can precipitate resentment with the status quo and fuel social unrest as minorities agitate for equity. Moreover, it might expose minority clans to potential radicalisation and violent extremism by uncongenial groups such as Al Shabab, which operate in the North-Eastern region. Indeed, the post-election violence of 2007/2008 in Kenya is a fitting case study of the security implications of failure to entrench diversity in power sharing arrangements. The KHRC (2018) explains that voting along ethnic lines and the pursuit of

governance issues through ethnic lenses were some of the reasons that led to interethnic violence following the outcome of the 2007/2008 general elections.

Overall, the finding that majority of the respondents held the view that, through political devolution, people choose their local leaders, but clannism impeded effective participation in governance could lead to regional and national insecurity, goes against the assumptions of the theory of decentralisation. While Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) postulates that devolution equals active participation of the ordinary citizenry in choosing who shall govern them and thus peaceful coexistence, specific contextual social factors have the power to derail even the most effective policy (Reinicke, 1998). Although the literature is dated, the view of the latter scholar seems to hold, as revealed by the findings of the current study. Therefore, the view of this study is that a constructivist approach, in which contextual factors such as clannism are considered, should be implemented when crafting devolution structures. Otherwise, a neutral approach, as assumed by the theory of decentralisation, makes operationalisation of political devolution benefits an elusive goal. This, in turn, has the potential to create and amplify grievances between the competing clans, hence insecurity. Indeed, in Pakistan, clannism, and agitation for equity in political power sharing among minority clans has occasioned violence and subnational factionalism (Alijla,2021).

In terms of participation in formulation of development goals and actions, according to Table 4.1, most study participants from the HH (63.94%) either agreed or strongly agreed to the view that devolution increased participation in setting local development goals and actions, but not all clans benefited from this, leading to regional and national insecurity. In this context, the KIs provided this explanation.

Development goals are meant to be set at the ward level which is a preserve of the MCAs. Some wards are predominantly occupied by one clan. This means that development planning is on clan basis and not on geographical area basis. That said development agenda ought to have input of various people such as elders, religious leaders amongst others. However, the reality on the ground is that is decided by few people especially the executive, the governors, and partly the MCAs (KI 22: December 2022).

An examination of the comment by KIs 22 establishes several inferences as follows: it affirms that development agendas are discussed at the ward level but essentially these wards are clan-based and that part of the citizenry at the local level does not fully and meaningfully participate in the development agenda setting. This implies that participation of ordinary citizens is tokenism as only a few decide what is to be implemented. This may also mean that MCAs from the majority clan may not effectively represent the interests of the minority clans in their areas of governance. Moreover, it might imply that upon election, MCAs and the governor could be subverting the expectations of clan elders, who, in any case, caused their election through negotiated democracy. In this aspect, they pursue partisan clan interests and/or selfish objectives instead of advocating for

and implementing the interests of the larger community. It may also suggest that politicians are preoccupied with clan identification to gain political power and subsequently pursue their own selfish objectives.

As was previously demonstrated in this study, exclusionary politics often result in the disenfranchisement of those who feel left out, in this case, the minority clans. In addition, the failure to engage citizenry fully and meaningfully in development planning could result in context- and conflict-insensitive initiatives. This may result in antagonism and violence in some instances. Accordingly, Edstrom and Smith (2013) argue that the inclusion of all in governance is critical for peace because marginalised groups tend to occasion civil and political strife. In addition, the issue of exclusion from development planning, which underpins resource/wealth distribution, intensifies the possibility of violent conflict (Asal et al., 2016). Certainly, those who feel excluded from governance processes such as development planning may jeopardise the optimal operation of local governments and may cause insecurity because of unresolved complaints. Moreover, fixation with clan identity by politicians could have negative implications for security. Such clan identity politics resulted in violent interclan conflict in Marsabit County, Kenya, leading to fatalities of over 250 people (Abraham, 2021).

Inclusive and meaningful participation of all clans/citizenry in development agenda setting is vital for fostering a collective comprehension of the

development needs of the residents in a specific area. Arguably, this may nurture and maintain widespread grassroots backing for any development plan, while simultaneously reinforcing the social cohesion that unites the various clans and hence security. Indeed, poor public participation on issues that anchor resource sharing incite violence (Asal et al., 2016). Nonetheless, investigating the extent of inclusivity and meaningful involvement of all clans in decentralised governance was not within the main scope of this study. Thus, additional research is necessary on this matter.

Be that as it may, the finding resonates with that of the IRTC (n.d.) on poor public participation in national and county governments in Kenya. It also echoes the findings of Amuhaya (2019), who established that there was limited participation of the citizenry in governance of Garissa County, particularly in decisions on development priorities. Moreover, the findings seem to suggest that more needs to be done to enhance and deepen devolution, particularly in a clannism setting where meaningful public engagement to the lowest level, such as the village, could be paramount in effecting conflict-sensitive governance and thus, development. This may entail promulgating enabling frameworks that demand public participation, inclusion, and civic education to reduce the attraction towards clan identity politics and reinforce issue-based ones.

On information sharing about projects, from Table 4.1, it can be established that most HH respondents, or 45.24%, either agreed or strongly agreed with the assertion that information about projects was not shared with all, discouraging closer examination and encouraging marginalisation among some clans, thus contributing to regional and national insecurity. KI 31 made the following observation in this regard.

People see projects being done but the discussions around that is not clear. This encourages rumours even when projects are being implemented equitably across all geographical areas. Therefore, the opaqueness in information sharing has created some perceptions that maybe one clan is benefitting more than the others (KI 31: December 2022).

The remarks by KI 31 seem to suggest that the lack of information sharing beleaguers the North-Eastern region. Information sharing is critical in devolved governance and particularly so in clannism context as it may provide possibilities for informed decisions, effective participation, transparency, and accountability. The criticality of information sharing underscores the normative assumptions of devolution as stipulated by the decentralisation theory. As such, information sharing is cardinal in laying foundations for greater inclusion, healing inter-clan divides, and creating conditions for security. That said, the remark by KI 31 is also indicative of the possible failure of devolved governments in North-Eastern region to engage the citizenry fully and meaningfully in governance.

It could also imply a failure by county governments to broadly broadcast public engagement forums. That ‘people see projects being done but the discussions around that is not clear’ suggests that decisions on developments are perhaps made in boardrooms or with little participation of the ordinary citizen. This could create room for misconceptions, rumours, and propaganda that could poison the social context, thus making it difficult to heal the inter-clan divide. That there are ‘some perceptions that maybe one clan is benefitting’ indicates a possible fault line in inter-clan relationships in the North-Eastern region. These social rifts are consequent to the perception of marginalisation of certain clans from reaping the benefits of devolution. Such perceptions and consequent social rifts could easily escalate to violence and hence insecurity.

The findings seen through the lens of institutional theory seem to indicate that the devolved administrations in the North-Eastern region are not operating as effectively as they should be. This is because the expectation would be the creation of frameworks that would guide information sharing and public participation and their subsequent implementation. This seems to be missing or inadequate. The lack/inadequacy of these frameworks may have occasioned inarticulateness in governance, thus creating possible conditions for insecurity. Indeed, one would anticipate complete adherence to the word and spirit of Article 10 of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010, which establishes the necessity of public engagement that would have resulted in possible general satisfaction with

governance and hence, local and national security. However, this seems not to be happening, resulting in disgruntlement and perception of bias in a section of the clans in the region.

Public participation through information sharing on projects and regular public hearings could help in improving issues that have been established by this study, such as corruption and clannism, which seem to bedevil the North-Eastern region hence insecurity. In this regard, public participation could amplify the voices of the minorities and marginalised, which could result in context-sensitive governance and hence security. Moreover, it could allow for more scrutiny and accountability, thus reducing corrupt practices and existing inequalities between clans and thus possible conditions for security.

This finding resonates with the views of Umoh (2022), who, in a study conducted in South Africa, observed that limited public participation leads to the marginalisation of certain segments of the population that have historically been on the periphery of power. The scholar emphasises the significance of involving the public in granting legitimacy to those in power and in promoting democracy. He further asserts that by engaging the public, specific local needs and challenges can be addressed responsively. The ultimate outcome of all these efforts is increased public support and peaceful coexistence among diverse communities or clans.

4.3.1.2 Management of Resources, Public Service Delivery and Security

This study also examined devolved resource management and public service delivery primarily because resource mismanagement and poor public service delivery could increase the fragilities of local governments due to the erosion of public trust. Moreover, in a clannism context, it may engender corruption, patronage, and socioeconomic inequalities with catastrophic impacts on peace and security. Accordingly, this study established that, although devolution had led to increased resources reaching lower levels of governance from the central government, clannism, corruption, improper allocation and misappropriation of resources had heightened the division among clans. As a result, devolution had not led to responsive local service delivery. To this end, clannism, corruption, and misallocation/mismanagement of resources were largely responsible. The discernment of resource mismanagement and non-responsive service delivery increased the inter-clan divide, cemented clan identities, reinforced socio-economic inequalities, increased unhealthy competition for power and resources, and created a feeling of disillusion and thus insecurity. The selected results to inform this generalised view are explained in the subsequent paragraphs.

From Table 4.1, finding on the assertion that due to poor management and unequal distribution of devolved resources, some clans felt marginalised, which contributed to regional and national insecurity, returned a range of responses.

About 9.5% (n=85) of the respondents strongly disagreed, while 31.2% (n=279) disagreed. On the other hand, approximately 46.1% (n=412) of the respondents agreed and 7.7% (n=69) strongly agreed. Approximately 5.4% (n=48) of the respondents were neutral. Cumulatively, it may be inferred that a minority (40.76%) of the respondents from the HH either strongly disagreed with or disagreed with the view that devolved resources were not well managed and fairly distributed, making some clans feel marginalised and hence regional and national insecurity.

In the North-Eastern region, the clan is an important segment for consideration in resource allocation decisions. This is because clan identity is an influential element in political governance in the region and perception of prejudice against certain clans might breed conflict (KHRC, 2018). That aside, the Kenya Constitution 2010 through Article 20 (5) (b) espouses the value of equity in the allocation of resources to various segments of society. That said, a KI said the following in support of the minority view:

Even with a most mismanaged county, it is better than what we had. There now more resources going round than what used to happen Dissatisfaction with resource management and allocation is only because of not well-grounded expectations by the people (KI 1: December 2022).

The statement made by KI 1 that "even with the most mismanaged county, it is better than what we had" indicates that devolution could have resulted in more

resources reaching lower units of governance. This may easily contribute to security if context-specific dynamics such as clannism are considered in resource distribution. Such a proposition underlines the normative presumption of devolution in bridging societal cleavages that could otherwise fuel resource-based violence, thus ensuring regional and national security. As earlier argued, the perception of being excluded could fuel inter-clan conflict. In line with this view, Metcalfe (2022), in a study conducted in Bartabwa Ward, Baringo County in Kenya, found that the feeling of being prejudiced among the Pokots had eroded inter-communal trust and had contributed to violence. In the same study, the scholar found that clan-based politics were instrumental in creating conditions for insecurity in Balambala Ward, Garissa. Therefore, the criticality of equity in resource distribution in assuring security cannot be overemphasized.

The statement by KI 1 that “even with the most mismanaged county, it is better than what we had” could also be a sign that mismanagement in the North-Eastern region has become accepted as normal and a reality to live with. It could also mean that even with mismanagement, there are still some resources left that could benefit the county as opposed to the pre-devolution era, where the region might have received limited resources. However, this is contrary to the normative assumption of devolution. Devolved governance is expected to afford equitable distribution of resources in concert with context-specific dynamics (Rodriguez-Pose & Tselios, 2018). While this study is cognisant of the reality that devolution

benefits may not meet the expectations of all, it is the disillusionment and perception of marginalisation in resource management questions that create conditions for insecurity (Asal et al., 2016, Nan, 2019; Nantulya, 2016). Therefore, 'mismanagement' may not be acceptable to all segments of the community and might lead to grievances and hence, insecurity.

On the other hand, most respondents (53.86%) from the HH either strongly agreed or agreed with the idea that devolved resources were not fairly allocated and poorly managed, leaving some clans feeling marginalised and contributing to regional and national insecurity. Hedstrom and Smith (2013), while providing potential solutions to political exclusion, indicate that marginalisation can occur in various forms, such as dominant groups exerting control over resource decisions, lack of representation in places/forums where resource allocation decisions are made, inadequate education for effective representation of minorities and informal arrangements that preclude minorities. It is the resultant marginalisation that accounts for conflict as the minority loses trust in governance and heightens their animosity against the supposedly beneficiary group (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012).

To anchor the view that devolved resources were not fairly allocated and poorly managed, leaving some clans feeling marginalised and contributing to regional and national insecurity, KIs stated the following:

There has been illegal reallocation of resources and under performance by governance officials. In this case, nepotism and clannism has been detrimental to actualisation of development plans (KI 17: December 2022).

Poor management of resources in the North-Eastern region is clearly demonstrated by the qualified audit reports of the county governments under review. There is evidence that devolved resources are not used as intended. When people see glaring misappropriation of resources this could result in disharmony at intra and inter-clan level and to an extent to the national level (KI 5: December 2022).

The quotes by KI 5 and 17 further affirm that the North-Eastern region could be facing mismanagement of resources, corruption, and incompetence, which could be a result of clan considerations overriding due diligence in the choice of leaders. Corruption and nepotism have the potential to reinforce existing poverty levels by limiting opportunities to the general population with low incomes to emancipate themselves from the shackles of poverty and by excluding those who do not belong. In a context where different clans have different wealth levels and access to devolved resources, this could perpetuate the inter-clan divide and thus create insecurity. The comment by KI 5 also indicates that the misallocation and misappropriation of resources has increased the interclan divide.

The foundation of instability/insecurity in any context is the failure to pursue inclusive politics and corruption (Department for International Development [DFID], n. d.). Reflecting on the theory of decentralisation, peaceful coexistence can only result from a situation in which the needs of the people are met with

equitable decentralisation of resources and accountability. This excludes corrupt practises, clannism, nepotism, and other negative behaviours that preclude the full and meaningful participation of all at the grassroots in decision-making processes that anchor resource allocation.

Another KI said the following in support of the majority view:

There is a bit of inequity in the distribution of resources to the clans. What that does, is that there is a bit of animosity against the clans from which the governors come from. This certainly affects local security which has an implication on national security because if its about creation of employment, meritocracy is not used. This then makes youth who are from disadvantaged clans to be easily lured by criminal groups such as Al Shabab (KI 1: December 2022).

The assertion by KI 1 further affirms the possible failure of devolved governments to allocate resources in a conflict-sensitive manner. It further confirms potential corrupt and nepotistic practices; in this case, meritocracy is not utilised in deciding, for instance, who gets employed. Bullock and Jenkins (2020) highlight that in a context where a particular segment of the population is marginalised, corruption has the effect of further reinforcing the social divide in that it makes it difficult for the marginalised and minorities to access resources. It also makes it difficult for the marginalised to participate fully and meaningfully in governance. In addition, it cements the importance of social identities and erodes inter-communal trust. Moreover, the scholars argue that the impact of corruption is particularly significant on minorities and marginalised.

In the North-Eastern region context, it can therefore be argued that corruption and nepotism could fracture the fragile inter-clan relationship, entrench patronage and clan identity politics, increase unhealthy competition for power and resources, and heighten the hostility that minorities have for devolved governments dominated by majority clans, hence, insecurity. In line with this view, Martinez and Kuktschka (2023) posit that there is an established nexus of corruption and insecurity as it exacerbates grievances, undermines the legitimacy of governance institutions, and negatively affects the living standards of the affected populace. The scholars go further and claim that when corruption is exercised in a context where identity politics are practised, such as in the North-Eastern region, violence is likely to occur.

The quote by KI 1 also alludes to the combined effects of unequal resource allocation, corruption, and nepotism as potential catalysts of recruitment to violent extremist groups such as Al Shabaab. According to the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum [GCTF] (2019), Al Shabaab's recruitment strategy is centred on taking advantage of social rifts brought about by unresolved grievances, such as unequal resource allocation, corruption, and nepotism. By doing this, the group has had much success in enlisting young people and adults who are fed up with the way things are. Therefore, it may be inferred that grievances regarding the sharing of devolved governance benefits, particularly the allocation of resources, may have led to insecurity in the North-Eastern region.

Considering the institutional theory that formed the foundation of this study, the resulting instability from grievances on resource allocation, and hence insecurity, is a failure of the institution of the county governments to work optimally. In an ideal scenario, equitable frameworks for resource allocation should have been established to ensure fair distribution without favouring any specific clan. As already mentioned in this thesis, Article 20(5)(b) and Article 43 of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010 uphold the importance of equity in the impartial distribution of resources among various social groups. In addition, mechanisms for extensive consultations among different clans should have been implemented, which could have yielded unanimous decisions. This approach would effectively pre-empt and resolve any possible conflicts arising from resource allocation decisions among different clans. Indeed, the World Bank (2017) contends that inclusive governance strategies, such as the suggested deepened inter-clan consultation, are essential for ensuring peace and security.

Overall, this study's findings resonate with those of Karienyé and Warfa (2020), who found that disputes over the sharing of devolved government resources are a source of conflict among various clans in Wajir county. Moreover, it affirms the claims of Lind (2018) who observed that decisions on resource allocation by devolved governments have added to the triggers of conflict and insecurity in the North-Eastern Kenya as various individuals, in the case of this study clans, wish to be at the centre of these opportunities offered by such decisions. Therefore,

while the spirit of the Kenya Constitution advocates for shared national identity, other social identities such as ethnic/clan are prevalent (Ghai, 2016). Subsequently, as advocated by Hedstrom and Smith (2013), social identifiers, in this case clan identity, need to be used as a basis for informing frameworks that seek to foster inclusivity. It was not surprising therefore that incidents of clannism, corruption, and misallocation/mismanagement of resources could have contributed to nonresponsive service delivery.

While the decentralisation theory assumes that using locally elected officials with real power is the best way to meet local development needs and ensure accountability, instances of clannism, corruption and resource mismanagement may indicate low integrity on the part of the elected officials. In this case, elected officials do not try to institutionalise inclusion of minorities while hiding in the veil of clan identity for selfish ends. Furthermore, while it is not possible to satisfy all people and groups in a county, prudent use of resources may be persuasive in leading to social cohesion. On the contrary, devolution has exacerbated corruption among elected officials in Kenya (Ghai, 2016). This view is further affirmed by Cannon and Ali (2018), who, while citing the case of Mandera County, established that devolved funds were largely misused or embezzled during 2013–2018 period.

According to Table 4.1, most of the respondents (50.95%) drawn from the HH strongly agreed with or agreed with the idea that devolution had not led to responsive local service delivery, thus increasing dissatisfaction with governance among all clans and thus creating instability in regional and national security. In line with this view, the KIs remarked thus.

The whole concept of devolution as envisaged was very good. It has brought a lot of good things in the local level. However, clannism is an issue which has impacted on its effectiveness more so in local service delivery particularly where a clan is not substantively represented on the table. By on the table, I mean the governor, the deputy, the speaker, and the MCAs. In a such a scenario, they are to a large extent prejudiced (KI 39: December 2022).

The decision to have a dispensary or certain development projects in certain areas largely depends on the county governments' executives and specifically the governors. Therefore, I agree responsive service deliveries may not reach all areas (KI 17: December 2022).

Scrutiny of the remarks by KI 39 and 17 draws the following inferences: clannism pervades decisions on service delivery, which are made by few people in power, and that not all locations within the North-Eastern region receive services. In this regard, the impact of clannism on influencing service delivery could explain the claim that some locations do not receive services. That notwithstanding, the two issues, while correlating, could widen the existing inequalities between clans and further reinforce uneven development of different locations, which, in most instances, breed grievances that could be expressed through violent means, hence, insecurity. Indeed, a lack of equitable service delivery might have various

implications on the minorities and marginalised, such as reduced effective political representation due to low levels of education, increased poverty due to inaccessible social services and increased vulnerability to diseases due to lack of health care. All these have the potential to exacerbate tensions between the marginalised and the beneficiaries, resulting in insecurity. Moreover, the fact that few people make decisions on service delivery means that there is possibly no meaningful participation of all citizens in devolved governance in the North-Eastern region. Further, it implies that due to the lack of meaningful participation, decisions made on service delivery lack consensus of all and may not reflect the true needs of the people.

The degree to which service delivery initiatives are sensitive to local dynamics and the extent to which the choice to provide such a service has been reached in consensus and with the involvement of all recipients can be used to gauge their responsiveness/performance. Accordingly, a high level of participation, inclusiveness, and conflict sensitivity could easily translate into responsive service delivery. That aside, the lack of responsive service delivery could be indicative of a lack of frameworks that would assure equity in service delivery in a context marked with clannism, historical interclan rivalry, and potentially uneven development. It indicates that perhaps the county governments in the North-Eastern region are working suboptimally as far as delivery of responsive service is concerned.

When viewed through the lens of institutional theory, a local government or institution that is performing at its best would have worked to provide inclusive service delivery with a focus on efficiency and accountability to all citizens. It would have extensively tried to compare methods of implementing responsive service delivery in a society characterised by inequality and strong clan identities to identify the best conflict-sensitive methods. It would have resisted the social influences related to clan identity that could have affected service provision. By delivering services in an equal and timely manner, it would have hoped to gain the public's support and therefore increase its credibility. All of this might have led to security. However, in this case, suboptimal functioning of county governments in the North-Eastern region through the use of clan considerations to anchor decisions on service delivery and the lack of deepened consultation with all citizenries distort social equilibrium and hence insecurity.

It is because of this weakness, which was highlighted by KI 39 and 17 amongst others and further inferences made in this study, that most of the respondents drawn from the HH strongly agreed with or agreed with the idea that devolution had not led to responsive local service delivery, thus increasing dissatisfaction with governance among all clans, creating instability in the region, and hence undermining national security. This goes against the presupposition of the decentralisation theory. In accordance with this theory, devolution neutralizes dissatisfaction with local service delivery and identity-based politics and thus

security. According to its presumptions, devolution would have prompted responsive service delivery by locally elected officials who are aware of context-specific dynamics. Additionally, it would have ensured the harmonious coexistence of different societal groups by increasing meaningful citizen participation in service delivery, which would have boosted intercommunity trust and hence security. Therefore, the decentralisation theory's underlying assumptions are challenged by the predominance of clan identity politics and the impression of marginalisation in service delivery, which may help explain why insecurity is so prevalent in the North-Eastern region.

This finding also resonates with the views of Said and Matanda (2021), who established a positive correlation ($r = .422$) between public participation and service delivery in Marsabit County governance. In the case of this study, low public participation equalled low assessment of the responsiveness of service delivery. This indicates movement of the variable in a similar direction hence, a positive correlation. However, the finding is contrary to the findings of Lecours (2017) and Feinstein (2015). In Lecours' study, conducted in Canada, the scholar established that political devolution had realised responsive delivery of services to the citizenry, including tertiary education and law enforcement. In the Feinstein study conducted in South Africa, devolution led to, among other things, the expansion of electricity infrastructure and more citizenry participation in

devolved governance. It is important to note, however, that clannism was not a factor in the study contexts of Lecours (2017) and Feinstein (2015).

4.3.1.3 Public Policies and Security

According to the Republic of Kenya (2016), public policy frameworks are critical in enabling devolved governments to attain optimal benefits from devolution. It highlights that through public policies, a local government can align its operations with context-specific realities and needs such as questions on resource distribution, service delivery, and other emergent challenges such as clan identity politics. For instance, through policies on equitable political representation, quotas may be set aside for minority communities, thus ameliorating perceptions of marginalisation. Moreover, it argues that public policies may enable full and meaningful participation of the citizenry in governance, provide clarity in decision making, and assure efficient service delivery. Therefore, the absence of context-specific policies provides opportunities for, among other ills, instrumentalization of clans and reinforcing clan cleavages, thus precipitating possible conditions for insecurity. Thus, it was critical to investigate the link between public policies and security.

To this end, this study established that there were insufficient structures to permit inclusive and participatory governance, clear decision-making, and effective service delivery. The absence of pertinent policies created opportunities for,

among other evils, the instrumentalization of clans, corruption, nepotism, resource mismanagement, and the reinforcement of clan cleavages, thus creating conditions for insecurity. To anchor this view, according to Table 4.1, approximately 7.7% (n=69) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that conflicts between clans are because of the failure of public policies to address local issues, which then has led to regional and national insecurity. Around 30% (n=268) of the respondents disagreed, 22.4% (n=200) were neutral, 34.6% (n=309) agreed, and 5.3% (n=47) strongly agreed. In a nutshell, approximately 37.74% (n=337) of the respondents either strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement. Conversely, approximately 39.86% (n=356) of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed to the view that public policies responding to local problems have not been crafted and executed, resulting in conflicts among clans and hence regional and national insecurity.

This shows that the respondents from the HH were almost evenly split between strongly disagreeing/disagreeing and strongly agreeing/agreeing. Nonetheless, a fairly large number of respondents (22.4%) were neutral. The attainment of a fairly large number of neutral respondents (22.4%) could be attributed to lack of knowledge on the issue being discussed. From the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents, approximately 40.4% of the HH respondents had either primary level or no formal education. This, potentially, makes it difficult for the respondents to be fully conversant on matters policy, therefore

limiting informed judgments, making it difficult to question leaders, perpetuating misconceptions, and reducing civic engagement, which underpins exclusion and hence insecurity. In addition, as explained by Coombs and Coombs (as cited in Visser et al., n. d.), the neutral response could also have been motivated by this study participants' anxiety over the response's potential repercussions. In this regard, respondents refrain from giving a response that would upset or not meet the expectations of the clans they belong to. This could reflect the self-preservation tendencies of individuals in a context where clan identity is strong. Indeed, the different clans in the North-Eastern region are known to have historical rivalry (Chonka & Healy, 2020), hence, self-preservation.

Those who strongly disagreed with or disagreed with (37.74%) the assertion that public policies responding to local problems had not been crafted and executed, resulting in conflicts among clans; hence, regional and national insecurity had this to say.

I would say that public policies are generally in place such those on land and natural resources. The issue is that they have not been well articulated to the ground and therefore you find inter-clan conflict over water and pasture. Moreover, it is in the law that a Kenyan can live anywhere but some clans feel that some geographical areas are exclusively theirs. This is indicative of our failures because through devolution, it is hoped that people are more well informed (KI 8: December 2022).

The comment by KI 8 indicates that appropriate policies are in place. However, it acknowledges that due to the lack of adequate public education and advocacy, the

policies remain largely unknown. This view, perhaps, also explains the fairly large number of neutral responses as the public could be generally ignorant either due to low levels of formal education and/or poor public education and advocacy of the policies. The quote by KI 8 also shows probable clan-centric tendencies in the maintenance of access to resources such as land by certain clans. Therefore, it could be that politicians in local governments in the North-Eastern region, who mostly come from dominant clans, have deliberately failed to conduct public education on available policies to pursue the agenda of their clans and maintain their dominance over the minorities. Moreover, it is important to note that policies may reflect the views and values of those who coin them. As such, in a clannism context, policy making and implementation can be problematic due to patronage and failure to fully appreciate contextual dynamics (Ajulor, 2018). This has the effect of reducing meaningful participation in governance by the minority clans and fuelling the perception of exclusion and, hence, insecurity. Moreover, it is indicative of suboptimal functioning local governments in the North-Eastern region.

Reflecting on institutional theory, public policies provide the rules of the game. They provide clarity, define roles and responsibilities of each involved actor, and outline expected outputs, enabling coherence in governance.

Moreover, they build on the credibility and legitimacy of a governance institution as the rules of the game are known, hence general acceptance by the populace and thus security. However, for that to happen, it is not enough to have policies; they must be implemented as well for them to have any meaningful influence on the linkage between devolution and security. Therefore, ‘that some clans feel that some geographical areas are exclusively theirs’, which may not have a basis in law, indicates the failure of local governments to put in place and/or execute enabling frameworks that would assure harmonious living. In the case of KI 8, the poorly articulated policy on natural resources has occasioned dissatisfaction with how land has been shared, possibly leading to animosity among warring clans with the potential of escalating to violence, which undermines security at both local and national levels.

The views of KI 8 on the promulgation of public policies by local governments were supported by a documentary review, which indicated that some policies responding to local issues had been crafted. For instance, because of literacy and disaster management difficulties, Mandera County, for example, passed the Early Childhood Education Bill 2014 and the Disaster Management Bill 2020. To address school dropout rates, literacy levels, and domestic violence, Wajir County passed the Bursary Act of 2014 and the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Bill of 2019. To ensure the institutionalisation of gender views in all its plans and activities and successful disaster management, Garissa County implemented

Gender and Disaster Risk Management policies in 2022. However, this study did not investigate the implementation and outcomes of these policies in realising the benefits of devolution and its nexus to security. This may require future studies.

The formulation of these policies and laws responding to local issues speaks to the decentralisation theory. The theory holds that devolution leads to the election of locals who are familiar with their contextual dynamics, and through inclusive governance, they can realise responsive policies that speak to the grassroots needs and challenges. In line with this theory, it can be argued that devolved governments in the North-Eastern region have responded to the gaps, challenges, and opportunities within their devolved governance space to enhance and sustain the reaping of devolution benefits. However, clannism, lack of public education and advocacy of policies, and general low levels of education could be a challenge in reaping the optimal benefits of devolution and thus national insecurity due to dissatisfaction among citizens. As held by the integrated model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories, politicians in the region have instrumentalised clannism for their own benefit, but under the veil of advancing the general clan interest, they may have aroused animosity, eroded inter-clan trust and fuelled conflict.

A slight majority of the respondents (39.86%) drawn from the HH strongly agreed with or agreed with the claim that devolved governments' policies intended to address local issues had not been developed and implemented, leading to disputes

between clans and subsequently regional and national insecurity. To support the slight majority view, a KI said the following:

Public policy prior to devolution used to be promulgated at the national level. With devolution, the expectations were that the policies are localised to achieve devolved functions. However, county assemblies have not come up with context sensitive policies at the rate envisaged. Therefore, there are a lot of things that are happening which are not guided by any policy. For instance, food and pasture issues have always been a problem and because we do not have context specific policies, people cannot take their livestock to certain areas because they belong to certain clans. What happens then is that the aggrieved clan forces itself into the prohibited areas which results to conflict (KI 10: December 2022).

From the sentiments made by KI 10, the following inferences can be made: essentially, the respondent agrees that policies could be in place, but they are not sufficient to address all contextual challenges prevailing in the North-Eastern region. This is because, as earlier argued, policies may reflect the values of those who make them and their priorities and not necessarily of everyone. Accordingly, in a given context, the priorities might be so many, such as needs for socioeconomic equity, including the interest of elites, and thus, there might be trade-offs. The remarks by KI 10 also mean that traditional frameworks could persist because the counties are yet to operationalise national legal and policy frameworks in local contexts. This creates potential gaps and opportunities for elites to instrumentalize their clans while selfishly gaining from such legal and policy lacuna. Moreover, it could create opportunities for, among other negative issues, corruption, nepotism, resource mismanagement, and clan tensions

occasioned by agitation for equity. All these were demonstrated by the study as possible realities in the North-Eastern region. The quote also alludes to possible resource-based conflict due to gaps in policies. This inference is supported by another KI who commented.

My clan, historically, occupies 50-60% land on the banks of Dawa River which flows to Ethiopia. As a result, other predominant clans feel that the resource has been taken by my clan. This has been a source of conflict. For instance, during elections, this has always been an election issue with politicians promising to displace us to Ethiopia so as their clans can take over the fertile lands along the river. As such, successive county governments have always sought to displace my clan from its ancestral land. This has not been resolved and may not be resolved soon (KI 28: December 2022).

The quote by KI 28 underscores the following issues: inter-clan conflicts in the North-Eastern region revolve around the sharing of resources (in this case, land and water); politicians mobilize their clans around emotive issues such as land to acquire and sustain political power over them; tensions around resource sharing could escalate to full-blown inter-clan conflict resulting in displacement; and there is a possibility of enactment of devolved governance policies purely based on clan considerations and not the general good of the citizenries. This is because, as argued earlier, policies may reflect the values and ideologies of those who develop them. In the North-Eastern region, these values and beliefs might be anchored on traditions of the dominant clans and/or selfish interests of the elites. This makes equitable and effective governance problematic achieve with possible

impact on security as the public loses trust in governance and agitates for more equity and justice.

This finding goes against the assumptions of decentralisation theory in that devolution in the North-Eastern region may have not resulted to governance institutions promulgating sufficient context-specific frameworks that speak to clan heterogeneity and equitable resource use. Instead, clannism has been a constant factor in governance decisions due to the persisting traditional frameworks of governance that are not connected to context-specific realities, thus stoking interclan differences and insecurity. This could be a deliberate move by the elites to continue perpetuating their clan and own selfish interests and power hegemony. Moreover, the findings do not resonate with institutional theory. In this case, optimal functioning devolved governments would have resulted in the adoption of frameworks, such as responsive policies, that could help pre-empt and resolve conflicts through deepened consultation at the grassroots. It would have resulted in policies that are for the common good without prejudice to any clan.

According to Cheeseman et al. (2016), devolution was implemented in Kenya with the intention of easing political and ethnic/clan tensions at both the national and local levels. It was hailed as the solution to all the problems associated with centralized government policy making. Evidence from this study seems to indicate that while devolution might have improved vertical inequalities, it has not

been responsive to horizontal inequalities. In this regard, it may have led to power hegemonies by dominant clans/ethnic groups at the grassroots. Central to this hegemony is the possible instrumentalization of clans by elites, particularly in the North-Eastern region. In this regard, responsive policies have not been promulgated or where effected, not made known to the public for their effective application thus by design maintaining power and resource access among the dominant clans. In such a scenario, devolved governance could widen existing inequalities at the grassroots and fuel inter-clan conflict due to nonresponsive policies.

This finding is contrary to the Society for International Development (as cited in Mbate, 2017) finding, which document greater achievement by Machakos County Government, Kenya, in promulgating policies friendly to the poor and thus context sensitiveness, which translated to positive perceptions of the responsiveness of governance by the citizenries. The key lesson drawn is that when devolved governance is sensitive to the need of assuring common good, the citizenry become satisfied and thus cannot be inclined towards conflict and violence and hence, security at the local and national levels. In contrast, insensitive governance can result in social disharmony and agitation for equity and justice, which might turn violent and have a catastrophic effect on security.

4.3.2 Influence of the Benefits of Fiscal Devolution on National Security

Examination of the relationship between fiscal devolution and national security within the context of clannism is critical in identifying the risks, difficulties, and opportunities presented by decentralising the powers of public finance. Such an investigation may result in recommendations that would inform best practises that support inclusion and equitable governance, potentially strengthening national security. To this end, this study sought to establish the link between the benefits resulting from the transfer of public finance authority to county governments and national security. The study participants (N=893) were invited to express their views on a range of statements related to this question. The resulting findings are tabulated in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Influence of Benefits of Fiscal Devolution on National Security

Item	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total
Clan considerations inform priority resource allocation thus undermining security in the region	16.6% (148)	23.3% (208)	15.1% (135)	40% (357)	5% (45)	100% (893)
Has not resulted in encouragement of closer scrutiny by all citizenry thus undermining transparency in resource use and national security	6.6% (59)	26.3% (235)	13.5% (121)	42.2% (377)	11.3% (101)	100% (893)
Has not enhanced creativity and imagination in realising development prospects thus negatively impacting on economic growth leading to low incomes irrespective of clans hence increased national insecurity	8.4% (75)	36.2% (323)	14.9% (133)	36.2% (323)	4.4% (39)	100% (893)
Has not resulted to increased alternative livelihood opportunities among all clans leading to dissatisfaction with governance and hence national insecurity	11.1% (99)	37.3% (333)	13.1% (117)	33.8% (302)	4.7% (42)	100% (893)
Has resulted to increased participation in County budgets processes but clannism is still a barrier in addressing grievances and promoting consensus hence affecting national security	9.2% (82)	20.3% (181)	14.1% (126)	46.6% (416)	9.9% (88)	100% (893)
Has not led to proper use of national government allocated funds to prioritised projects/services hence amplifying clan inequalities which in turn has led to national insecurity	8.2% (73)	24.2% (216)	8.2% (73)	49.8% (445)	9.6% (86)	100% (893)
Has not helped in lowering/managing poverty levels at the grassroots among all clans thus leading to despair and low incomes resulting to national insecurity	5.8% (52)	25.6% (229)	11.5% (103)	47.1% (421)	9.9% (88)	100% (893)
Overall	9.4%	27.6%	12.9%	42.2%	7.9%	100%

Source: Survey Data, 2022

An overall analysis of the results, shown in Table 4.2, reveals that the respondents were less likely to disagree (9.4%) or strongly disagree (27.6%) with the numerous assertions that were being investigated. However, most survey participants were more likely to agree (42.2%) or strongly agree (7.9%) with the examined claims. Given the way the study's items were constructed, the results seem to show that a small group of influential people control public finance decisions in a way that maximises the benefits to themselves and their kin. The key to this machination was their use of clan identity to guard against transparency and accountability. The findings also show that clan identity is a key determinant in public finance decisions. A pervasive sense of resource mismanagement, nepotism, and open corruption was observed. Moreover, the study discerned perceptions of real and imagined inequities and inequalities in resource allocation. This might have increased interclan tensions/rivalry and widened rifts within the groups, thus possibly increasing insecurity. The specific findings that serve as the anchor of the generalised view are discussed in three thematic areas: resource allocation, transparency and accountability, and poverty alleviation. These results are as outlined in the following paragraphs.

4.3.2.1 Resource Allocation and National Security

Clan identity-based communities may seek to influence priority resource allocation decisions based on kinship. As such, they may cause resource-based competition, marginalisation, corruption, and nepotism, all of which have a

fundamental negative effect on local and national security. This premised the need to examine the intricate relationship between priority resource allocation and national security in the North-Eastern region. To this end, this study found that clan considerations and decisions made by a small group of people significantly influenced the allocation of resources in the area. In addition, widespread evidence of resource mismanagement, nepotism, and outright corruption was found. Inequalities in resource distribution, both real and perceived, were also determined. All of these unfavourable circumstances increased inter-clan rivalries and tensions, expanded social chasms, and increased insecurity. The results that support this broad perspective are discussed in the following paragraphs.

According to Table 4.2, approximately 16.6% (n=148) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the claim that priority resource distribution was based on clan considerations, compromising regional security. About 23.3% (n=208) disagreed, 15.1% (n=135) were neutral, 40% (n=357) agreed, and 5% (n=45) strongly agreed. In summary, approximately 39.86% (n=356) of the study participants either disagreed or strongly disagreed, whereas approximately 45.01% (n=402) agreed or strongly agreed. Roughly 15.1% (n=135) of the study participants were neutral. As previously argued, the considerable large number of respondents who chose to be neutral (15.1%) could be attributed to ignorance of resource allocation decisions. Either way it is indicative of poor public engagement in governance or ingrained clannism that resorts to self-preservation. That aside, from the results, it

can be argued that a minority of the respondents (39.86%) strongly disagreed or disagreed with the view that clan considerations informed priority resource allocation, thus undermining security in the North-Eastern region. Considering this, a KI remarked.

I think the resources we currently have in the North-Eastern region are much more than we used to have pre-devolution period. I also think, clan considerations do not inform priority resource allocation. Its only that people have higher expectations than can be sustained by the resources available to the county governments. If you review social media sites, you will realise people often overreact when they hear of billions allocated to the counties. They are up in arms when they see very little has been done in their areas. They wrongly think that the reason it so is because the governor does not come from their clan (KI 13: December 2022).

The statement made by KI 13 emphasises and supports the fact that the county administrations in the North-Eastern region have received a comparatively substantial allocation of devolved resources from the national government of Kenya. This study argued that this allocation and considering the status of payments to county governments as noted in the National Treasury and Planning (2020) report, the three counties' apportionment easily featured among the top 20 out of 47 counties who are beneficiaries of large disbursements of devolved funds. The remark by KI 13 also alludes to over expectation that cannot be sustained by devolved resources. This could be indicative of poor expectation management by the county governments. It could also be affirming the poor sharing of information by county governments, thus the citizenry resorting to wild imagination.

The phrase "people overreacting in social media" may be a reference to clan identity-based politics' ability to influence individuals' perceptions of how resources are shared. In communities that are divided and marked with rivalry, such as in a clannism context, those that feel excluded from the centre sometimes feel entitled and have higher expectations for more allocation of resources to solve perceived/real inequitable division. In these settings, the inadequacies of governance institutions are seen through the prism of ethnicity or clan and are perceived as oppressing the marginalised (Orjuela et al., 2016). Indeed, devolution has aroused identity-based politics and reinvigorated perceptions of marginalisation in some communities in Kenya, thus resulting in demands for redress (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012). However, this entitlement and expectation has legal standing as it is backed by the 2010 Kenya Constitution, which requires affirmative actions in resource allocations for marginalised communities (KHRC, 2018). This may entail preferential treatment of groups that were previously excluded to attain equity and create a level playing field. Moreover, according to the decentralisation theory, decentralised institutions are expected to stifle identity politics by ensuring horizontal equity in the distribution of resources among various social groups. Indeed, devolution is anticipated to improve the matching of resources to regional needs and interests. In this case, deepened consultations on effecting equity in resource allocation may have easily reduced grievances and thus potentially provided conditions for peaceful inter-clan co-existence and security.

The reference to ‘people overreacting in social media’ could also affirm the opaqueness of information sharing and lack of forums provided by county governments to allow divergent thoughts on resource allocations. In this case, disgruntled people were using the media to articulate their dissatisfaction with perceived inequitable resource allocation because they wanted to be heard. Persistent feeling of being excluded among marginalised communities feeds on their sense of injustice (Orjuela et al., 2016) and might fuel conflict, hence insecurity.

Moreover, the reference to ‘people overreacting in social media’ highlights the power of social media in governance. Browne (2015) contends that social media in contemporary society can be powerful in enhancing citizenry participation in governance decisions, checks and balances on stewardship of resources, and peace building. In the case of this study, the remark by KI 13 shows that social media forums could be used to perpetuate inter-clan differences and incite violence due to agitations anchored on perceived unfair resource division. Therefore, social media could shape devolved governance perceptions either positively or negatively, thus creating conditions for security and insecurity, respectively. This is also indicative of a missed opportunity by the county governments in the North-Eastern region to use the same medium to build bridges on divisive issues, enhance security, and shape the desired narrative that should anchor devolved governance in the region. This could be accomplished through a

communication plan that incorporates the use of digital diplomacy to bridge social gaps, educational efforts to promote inclusivity and unity, and fact-based messages to dispel myths.

Be that as it may, most respondents (45.01%) agreed or strongly agreed with the assertion that clan considerations informed priority resource allocation, thus undermining security in the region. To buttress the majority view, a KI said the following:

Clannism is so much ingrained in the North-Eastern region to the extent that clan considerations inform on which programs are to be implemented and which should not. This because, the electoral units at the ward level are configured along clans. Therefore, clan members rally together to win power for one of their own. Once elected, the leaders then resort to advance their respective clan interests thus perpetuating marginalization. In this case, anything that leads to inequality and dissatisfaction especially at this time when we have an active terrorist group, Al Shabab, is wrong and can be fodder for recruitment (KI 14: December 2022).

The remark by KI 14 repeats what was established earlier: clan considerations are central in resource allocation decisions in the North-Eastern region. It highlights that electoral units have been, either by design or by default, configured with along clan considerations. However, administrative and electoral boundaries do not confine clans exclusively to one area. As such, we have electoral units with more than one clan with one dominant. It is the dominating clan that facilitates inequitable resource sharing. Transparency International (2017) affirms this view by holding that resources are skewed to favour the dominant social group in

situations of power imbalances and inequalities. That clan considerations are central in resource allocation decisions, disproves the decentralisation theory's premises that by giving local communities the power to decide how to distribute resources, inclusiveness and equal resource distribution will be achieved, leading to increased security. This study shows that political will and an enabling decentralisation framework that promotes inclusivity, transparency and accountability are required for this to be viable.

The remark by KI 14 further highlights that clan-based jingoism dominates the political agenda of elected leaders, thus marginalising minorities, creating social rifts, and increasing the vulnerability of the unrepresented to recruitment ploys by violent extremist groups such as the Al Shabab. Generally, the remarks by KI 14 mirror the findings of Das (2018). In this regard, the scholar established that in India, electoral boundaries were delimited along tribal considerations, but this did not result in security. Tribes with a minority population, in this case, were in constant agitation for separation from the dominant tribes as their interests were not well served in their respective devolved units. In the North-Eastern region, fiscal decentralisation may have established a new power source, which evidence seems to indicate is being leveraged by prominent clans to maintain their dominance while increasing societal rifts. By capturing resources, the dominant clan may be able to control the political environment and increase their control over local governments. Additionally, it can lead to resource-based conflict, with

marginalised clans possibly seeking the aid of relatives from outside the area, including from the neighbouring nation of Somalia. As the economically exploited battle for equity, this setting of historical power and resource disparities among clans could lead to protracted strife in the region and the nation as external players such as Al Shabab meddle in the resource-based conflict.

Another KI said the following in support of the majority view:

There is no clear cut and well thought out resource distribution plan. For instance, there is no further devolution from the county headquarters to the sub counties. The county executive committee members and technical staff are not independent and therefore, they do not sit with the communities to plan and therefore resources are not devolved further to priority areas. Resources are allocated to those who have the governor's ear and/or to the most aggressive MCAs and because of this, some clans feel marginalised (KI 3: December 2022).

The remark by KI 3 that 'there is no clear cut and well thought resource distribution plan' is symptomatic of the lack of systems or policies to effectively roll out devolution as envisaged, which is to bring all in the periphery to the centre of governance decisions. The lack of frameworks thus provides opportunities for elites to pursue clan identity agendas and further enhance inequalities. This has a negative implication of skewing development in favour of dominant clans and further enhancing perceptions of marginalisation and hence insecurity. This viewpoint is in line with Transparency International's (2017) finding that, in situations of power disparities and inequality, resources are skewed to favour the dominant social group. In such a context, the minorities and marginalised might resort to violence triggered by resource-based conflict and

lopsided development in a bid to secure more equity in resource distribution and development.

The reference to County Executive Committee [CEC] members, technical staff, aggressive MCAs, and Governor indicates a small circle of people who make impactful decisions on resource allocation without necessarily involving the participation of all citizens. Moreover, those with the ear of the governor can bargain and articulate their interests. That only 'aggressive MCAs' get their way points to the possible impact of shrewd leadership. In this case, for some, it may be lacking, which may be attributed to clan elders' selection of leaders. Cumulatively, all these point to possible elite capture. Citing various scholars, Shapland et al. (2021) explain that elites take advantage of prevailing worldview notions, in the case of this study clan-centric views that celebrate gains made by one of their own, to selfishly benefit in the name of the community to which they belong. Moreover, Fung and Wright (as cited in Dasgupta & Beard, 2007) explain that elites take advantage of social inequalities among various segments of society, illiteracy, and dissimilar competences on how devolved governance functions to execute their selfish exploitation of the benefits of devolution. In such a scenario, Shapland et al. (2021) notes that the prejudiced communities take longer to become part of the centre where key decisions are made. Therefore, elite capture may serve to reinforce social inequalities among clans and thus may cause

disgruntlement and insecurity. Moreover, it might cause intra-clan squabbles among sub-clans, which are another level of identity within clans.

Moreover, in the situation of elite capture, as referred to in the preceding paragraph, it engenders the possibility of relegating community interest to personal interest. In this case, individuals benefit more from fiscal decentralisation as opposed to the clans to which they belong. This might have the impact of undermining the social fabric at the clan level and introducing intra-clan fragmentation over resources. This might mean sub-clan tensions within the larger clans. Such an occurrence has the potential to create regional and national stability as tensions and unrest occur at the intra- and inter-clan level. Moreover, it might reduce the capability of local governments to perform their functions effectively, such as health and education, thus possibly causing widespread complaints. Besides, it might reinforce socio-economic inequalities at intra- and inter-clan levels, thus causing resentment and tensions to a catastrophic effect on security.

The reference to ‘aggressive MCA’ by KI 3 shows the power of political representation to any interest group. In this case, the minority clans, having less political representation, may be disadvantaged in pursuing their interests and thus attain fairness in resource distribution. Moreover, while it is possible to obtain an aggressive MCA from amongst the minority clans, the likelihood is diminished by

the undue influence of clan elders in selecting candidates to be elected. Nonetheless, aggressive MCAs get their way and create possibilities of cooperation among elites to cement personal gains to the detriment of the wider society (Dutta, 2009), thus creating inter- and intra-clan dissatisfaction with governance. However, there is no empirical consensus on this possible collusion, as some scholars such as Olson (as cited in Dasgupta & Beard, 2007) view that cooperation among elites drawn from different segments of society can only occur through coercion. That said, it does not escape this study that there is a real likelihood for politicians to collude in the pursuit of personal interests of power and wealth accumulation.

The presumptions of institutional theory would be that enabling frameworks would have been promulgated to manage elite capture and entrench community collective decision making. In this case, an optimal functioning governance institution would have moderated the influential role of elites by setting the expected norms and values. Optimally functioning devolved governments with enabling frameworks would have helped navigate the power differentials of the different clans and the high levels of illiteracy, resulting in resource allocation decisions that speak to the common good. This seems not to be happening in the North-Eastern region. In the preceding section, this study noted the presence of inadequate policies. This places local politicians at the centre of either enabling or undermining security through their disposition in carrying out their roles of

representation, oversight, and legislation. However, as established, their narrow interpretation of this role to suit their clan and their own interests has exacerbated insecurity.

Fiscal decentralisation, according to Sow and Razafimahefa (2015), could lead to priority resource allocation to the most urgent and significant public goods/services. This indicates that the distribution of resources is fair and based on the general good and does not depend on clan/elite considerations but depends on the promulgation and implementation of enabling frameworks. Furthermore, it suggests that fiscal decentralisation may lessen resource-based conflict if implemented well. Therefore, the finding that clan considerations informed priority resource allocation, thus undermining security in the region, goes against the assumptions of devolution. Reflecting on the theory of decentralisation, this finding does not resonate well as there are claims that resources have not been allocated in concert with local needs/interest and without equity. As such, resource allocation decisions have been considered divisive in a way that could lead to social agitation for equity.

Examined through the analytical lens of the integrative model on primordialist and instrumentalist theories of conflict, the findings resonate with its stipulations. In this case, elites use clan identities as the basis upon which they make governance decisions in a bid to gain individual or clan advantage. In this regard,

there is a possibility of emergent elite hegemony in the North-Eastern region. As such, this has the likelihood of reinforcing the inter- and intra-clan divide, undermining the effectiveness of devolved governance, and potentially causing insecurity as widespread disaffections are registered. Ultimately, this reduces the likelihood of harmonious inter- and intra-clan relations and hence insecurity. Therefore, unlike Array's (2019) findings that fiscal devolution had led to efficient allocation of resources resulting in economic growth and peaceful co-existence among people in Spain, in the North-Eastern region, it has contributed to social divisions.

In this case, it has further enhanced clannism and divided the community further, resulting in insecurity.

4.3.2.2 Transparency, Accountability, and National Security

According to the research findings, fiscal decentralisation did not result in a rise in public scrutiny, which in turn undermined resource use transparency and national security. While it increased public participation in county budget processes, it was done more to satisfy legal requirements than to necessarily encourage true and meaningful participation from the public. Budgeting processes, as a result, did not have consensus and/or full participation of all citizens at the grassroots level. Moreover, county governments could not allocate resources to priority projects or services. Accordingly, certain dominant clans in

the North-Eastern region held influential positions in the devolved governance system and had extensive penetration into governance frameworks, leading to nepotism and biased decision-making based on clan affiliations, which compromised accountability. This reduced the likelihood of resolving inter-clan differences from deepened consultation and, hence, peace. The following paragraphs present selected results that support this generalised view.

The study participants were invited to express their views on the statement that devolution had not resulted in increased scrutiny by all citizens, thus undermining transparency in resource use and thus, compromising national security. On this account, from Table 4.2, it can be established that the respondents expressed their views as follows: 6.6% (n=59) strongly disagreed, 26.3% (n=235) disagreed, 13.5% (n=121) were neutral, 42.2% (n=377) agreed, and 11.3% (n=101) strongly agreed. Therefore, it can be determined that around 32.92% of the respondents (n=294) either disagreed or strongly disagreed, while 53.53% (n=478) chose to agree or strongly agree. Approximately 13.5% (n=121) of the study participants were neutral.

Accordingly, it can be inferred that a minority of the respondents (32.92%) strongly disagreed/disagreed with the view that devolution had not resulted in encouragement of closer scrutiny by all citizens, thus undermining transparency in resource use and national security. To support the minority view, a KI quipped.

The fact that there are certain clans that are out of the local government means that they act as opposition. They really talk about the ills of the local government. They try to expose some of the things that are not going right (KI 20: December 2022).

The quote by KI 20 that ‘there are certain clans that are out of the local government means that they act as opposition’ signifies that politics in the North-Eastern region are not issue-based but clan-based. In this situation, clannism may prevent logical and impartial critique. Similarly, it is possible that logical and impartial criticism could be viewed via a clan prism and rejected as a result. The statement that ‘they try to expose some of the things that are not going right’ could be indicative of some level of scrutiny in how resources are used. When well executed, such critiques could create checks and balances that would allow devolution to yield its expected benefits that meet the satisfaction of all clans and hence security.

Most of the respondents (53.53%), however, agreed or strongly agreed with the view that fiscal decentralisation had not resulted in encouragement of closer scrutiny by all citizens, thus undermining transparency in resource use and national security. In support of the majority opinion, the KIs expressed the following:

The governors and MCAs certainly come from the most populous clans. Given the kinship bond amongst the elected governance officials, oversight becomes a problem (KI 25: December 2022).

The clan from which the governors come from act as ardent defenders of the local governments. They reduce the amount of accountability and scrutiny just like at the national level. In this case, there was one politician who said that your name betrays you to underline the tendency of Kenyans in trying to protect people who come from their ethnic groups. As such, when a person criticizes, the first thing you would like to know is the clan he/she comes from. Therefore, accountability is not happening as it should. It should be based on truth (KI 17: December 2022).

Inference drawn from the sentiments of KI 25 and 17 suggests that populous clans dominate the devolved governance positions in the North-Eastern region and that nepotism and clan considerations by major clans undermine accountability. This is hardly surprising. Isaksson (2015) explains that power differentials in a society enable the dominant social group to exercise ethnic favouritism through nepotism. Moreover, due to their extensive penetration in governance frameworks, they undermine accountability. In this case, patronage as exercised through clan consideration coupled with nepotism underscores a collusive form of corruption that reinforces power differentials. This has the effect of fuelling discontent amongst the minorities, reinforcing distrust of the credibility of governance (Ramasamy, 2020) and eroding inter-clan trust, resulting in insecurity.

The words by KI 17 that ‘when a person criticises the first thing you would like to know is the clan he/she comes from’ further underline; the mobilisation of clans to protect their own, the discouragement of individuals from taking their own positions away from one’s clan inclination, the centrality of clan patronage and

the marginalisation of voices emanating from minority clans. Indeed, it underlines the impenetrable vast networks of dominant clans in and outside the government that mostly prevent accountability. This heightens the perception of marginalisation as weaknesses in governance by individuals and is seen to exclude minority social groups, thus growing distrust (Orjuela et al., 2016), which can then result in insecurity.

Reflecting on these findings using the propositions of decentralisation theory, devolution is expected to move the powers of public finance to people at the grassroots. It is expected to place the citizenry at the local level at the centre of fiscal decisions through full and meaningful participation, which then encourages transparency and accountability in resource allocation. On this account, the finding that the majority of the respondents were of the view that fiscal decentralisation had not resulted in encouragement of closer scrutiny by all citizens, thus undermining transparency in resource use and national security, goes against the assumptions of decentralisation theory. In this regard, clan favouritism and patronage threaten the envisaged merits of devolution. Moreover, they are a threat to harmonious inter-clan and general community relationships, hence possible insecurity.

This finding mirrors that of Duri (2021), who highlights that generally devolved governments in Kenya have had accountability challenges emanating from,

among other impediments, patronage. In this regard, clan patronage may enable non-participatory decision making that marginalises minorities, nepotism, and corruption. This, therefore, undermines transparency and accountability. As established by this study, insulation from accountability of people in governance positions in the North-Eastern region is drawn from the clans they come from; hence, clan patronage. This may reinforce inter-clan divisions and tensions by occasioning more pronounced socio-economic inequalities. Moreover, it may erode trust in governance frameworks, thus opening possibilities for measures that do not conform with the law, such as violence, in a bid to resolve perceived/real exclusion and inequalities, and hence, insecurity. Reflecting on institutional theory, frameworks that allow for participation in budget processes enable institutions to make optimal decisions on resource allocation. This is because, through the participation of the public, information on context-specific needs may be realised and acted upon. Moreover, such frameworks allow for inclusivity and accountability, which are important foundations for peace and security.

From Table 4.2, most respondents (56.44%) agreed or strongly agreed to the assertion that fiscal devolution had resulted in increased participation in county budget processes, but clannism was still a barrier in addressing grievances and promoting consensus, hence affecting national security. Accordingly, KIs were documented to have said the following:

County governments share information about projects because they are required by law to do that. Accordingly, in every sub county, hearings and public participation on projects, budgets, county development plans is done (KI 35: December 2022).

There is no clear cut and well thought out resource distribution plan. For instance, there is no further devolution from the county headquarters to the sub counties. The county executive committee members and technical staff are not independent and therefore, they do not sit with the communities to plan and therefore resources are not devolved further to priority areas. Resources are allocated to those who have the governor's ear and/or to the most aggressive MCAs and because of this, some clans feel marginalised (KI 3: December 2022).

The remarks by KI 35 outline that public participation is conducted to fulfil statutory requirements and not necessarily to attain genuine and meaningful participation of the citizenry. Since budgets underpin resource mobilisation and allocation decisions, the remarks by K3 that there 'is no clear cut and well thought resource distribution plan' could be indicative of the opaqueness of the budgeting process and execution. The fact that the technical staff are not independent shows the partisan nature of the processes of resource allocation. That 'some clans feel marginalised' underlines the centrality of clan considerations in resource allocation decisions.

Devolution in Kenya was implemented to address the dominance of specific communities and their partisan interests in governance roles, to ensure fair resource distribution, and to heal the social fabric, ultimately strengthening national security (Mbori, 2021). Therefore, this finding does not fit well with

Kenya's devolutionary philosophy. However, this finding resonates with the general state of devolved governance in Kenya. In line with this view, Kimani (2020) observes that most counties have not published simplified budgets that can easily be understood by the general populace to allow for their informed participation. She observes that budget participation and information sharing processes are most often done when there is little time for submission of views that are to be consolidated to the main budget proposal. Notably, members of budget forums reflect the partisan interest of those in leadership. In a nutshell, generally, there is a less participatory budgeting process in the devolved governments in Kenya.

Considering the theory of decentralisation, this finding does not adhere to its stipulation, which presupposes participatory processes, inclusive decision making and responsive resource allocation and thus peaceful co-existence. As such, an interclan divide has been reported due to a lack of meaningful participation in budgeting processes. The finding, however, resonates with the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of conflict. In this regard, partisan interests of a small group of people and clannism considerations inform resource allocation, which then creates social rifts and hence insecurity. Moreover, the finding affirms the assertion of institutional theory that if institutions do not work as envisaged, the result could be insecurity.

4.3.2.3 Poverty Alleviation and National Security

As demonstrated in previous sections, poverty is one of the structural causes of violence and hence insecurity. Accordingly, this study sought to establish whether fiscal devolution had resulted in lowered poverty levels, ingenuity in realising development and thus economic growth, and enabled the creation of alternative livelihoods. To this end, it was established that fiscal devolution may not have reduced or controlled poverty levels among all clans at the local level. There was evidence that the North-Eastern region's poverty levels were rising. In addition, fiscal devolution had not improved ingenuity in realising development potential, which had a negative effect on economic growth and led to low incomes for everyone, regardless of clan. That said, there was some evidence that decentralisation had created new opportunities for other revenue streams. Despite this, alternative livelihood projects had not taken root in all areas and clans. In some regions, they were more visible, and the same was true for clans. As a result, the public could have become increasingly sceptical of their own situations, which increased their vulnerability to radicalisation and violent extremism in a region where Al Shabab has significant presence. Cumulatively, local and national insecurity were made worse by high poverty levels, recentralization of wealth in the hands of a few, and the marginalisation of some clans. The specific findings underpinning this overview are presented and discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

According to Table 4.2, it can also be established that 5.8% (n=52) of the study participants strongly disagreed with the view that devolution had not assisted in reducing or managing poverty levels at the local level among all clans, which in turn caused hopelessness and low earnings, hence national insecurity. In the same vein, approximately 25.6% (n=229) of the respondents disagreed, 11.5% (n=103) were neutral, 47.1% (n=421) agreed, and 9.9% (n=88) strongly agreed. In summary, it may be deduced that about 31.5% (n=281) of the respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed, roughly 57% (n=509) strongly agreed/agreed, and 11.5% (n=103) were neutral.

It can therefore be established that a minority of the participants (31.5%) strongly disagreed/disagreed with the assertion that devolution had not helped in lowering/managing poverty levels at the grassroots among all clans, thus leading to despair and low incomes, and hence national insecurity. To support the minority view, a KI remarked.

Devolution has created more employment opportunities for the locals. This has greatly improved the living standards (KI 2: December 2022).

The remark by KI 2 could mean that the most notable poverty reduction initiative in the North-Eastern region has been the creation of employment. Indeed, devolution, post 2010, created new offices and functions that required to be filled for efficient functioning of devolved governments. Therefore, the fact that

devolution has only created employment opportunities has several implications. For instance, it might have led to increased incomes among the employed and boosted living standards, which could help reduce structural causes of violence. However, it may not be a long-term sustainable strategy for poverty alleviation as it undermines diversification of the economy by inculcating reliance on employment income and may promote misallocation of resources towards recurrent expenditure of paying salaries of employed staff. This then denies other sectors of resources that could diversify the local economies, create alternative livelihoods, and increase its resilience to economic downturns. Moreover, the effectiveness of this strategy in addressing insecurity depends on how it is rolled out. When employment opportunities are concentrated in certain dominant clans, as is expected in the clannism context of the North-Eastern region, it may fuel dissatisfaction with the perceived inequity and occasion social unrest and thus insecurity.

In accordance with the assumptions of the theory of decentralisation, devolved governance is expected to create more opportunities for poverty reduction through efficient resource allocation in tune with local needs. It is also expected to resolve existing inequalities in society, hence improving living standards for all and peaceful co-existence. This could be achieved through developing and implementing frameworks that would ensure equity and income redistribution.

Therefore, the finding that only a minority of the respondents thought that devolution had led to reduced poverty could be an indictment of the recentralisation of resources and opportunities to a few. It could also be an affirmation of inadequate policies, as established in the previous section.

Most of the respondents (57%), however, strongly agreed or agreed to the assertion that fiscal devolution had not helped in lowering/managing poverty levels at the grassroots among all clans, thus leading to despair and low incomes, hence national insecurity. To this end, the KIs said the following.

I think it will be good to check the poverty index for the region since devolution in the last ten years particularly of all clans. Some clans, specifically some individuals in the clans, have benefitted. However, generally, in my view poverty has worsened leading to low incomes and despair in some clans (KI 23: December 2022).

Generally, the people in the North-Eastern region have been poor. A lot of them rely on livestock. Because of persistent drought, people keep on losing their livestock hence remain poor. As such, the number of humanitarian based Non-Governmental Organisations have doubled in the region (KI 6: December 2022).

The remark by KI 23 seems to suggest worsening poverty levels in the North-Eastern region. The remark by KI 23 that ‘some clans, specifically some individuals in the clans, have benefitted’ seem to further affirm the centrality of clannism in resource allocation decisions. Moreover, the suggestion that only a few individuals benefit could be indicative of the elite’s capture of devolved governance and consequent resources. Therefore, poverty persists due to lopsided

actions that benefit few individuals and clans. Likewise, the persisting poverty could be due to the lack of full and meaningful participation of all clans in governance. Indeed, an established nexus exists, for instance, between participation and poverty reduction policy (McGee et al., 2002). In this regard, the scholars explain that participation enables poverty alleviation discourses and actions to speak to contextual realities. This would have improved inequity and to an extent clannism due to deepened consultations and hence security.

That said, poverty and elite capture can both contribute to insecurity by provoking societal unrest and undermining governance institutions, respectively. Furthermore, as people whose self-reported incomes were in the lowest income bracket question their personal circumstances, poverty and elite capture can make them more susceptible to radicalisation and violent extremism. Various studies (e.g., Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, 2019; Makki & Akash, 2022) have linked poverty and marginalisation to insecurity/violent extremism. On the other hand, elite capture reinforces marginalisation and poverty by undermining accountability and corrupt behaviours (Platteau, 2004), which in turn contributes to insecurity.

The remarks by KI 6 further cement the assertion of KI 23 by emphasising poverty levels in the North-Eastern region. Moreover, the respondent further points to a possible vicious cycle of poverty due to the death of livestock because

of persistent droughts. It will be remembered that the livestock industry, as earlier established, is the main livelihood activity in the region. In this case, when livestock losses happen to the marginalised, it results in the loss of livelihoods and hence income. This then results in impoverishing circumstances that further reinforce power differentials between clans. That said, the loss of livestock would have been easily managed through drought-proofing policies and actions by a responsive government. Indeed, there is a nexus between poverty and further marginalisation and exclusion from governance (Hedstrom & Smith, 2013). This then precipitates social unrest and hence insecurity. The statement by KI 6 that ‘the number of humanitarian-based non-governmental organisations have doubled in the region’ is an indictment of the ineffectiveness of devolved governments in providing solutions to the problems affecting communities in the North-Eastern region and/or the prevalence of high poverty levels.

The finding that poverty levels have increased in the North-Eastern region are supported by the KNBS (2023) survey. In the survey, KNBS (2023) operationalized overall poverty as a situation in which a HH has a monthly consumption expenditure of less than KES 3,947 and KES 7,193 in rural and urban areas, respectively. In this regard, the institution, based on data collected in a national HH survey of 2021, documented the three counties of Mandera (71.9%), Garissa (68.3%), and Wajir (66.3%) to have had high poverty incidences compared with the national prevalence of absolute poverty of 38.6%. Notably,

through the said poverty rates, the counties of Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa feature among the top five regions with the highest number of HH that are poor.

The prevailing poverty levels in the North-Eastern region could be attributed to, among other reasons, elite capture. According to Rigon (2014), who supports this point of view, the poor majority is typically denied access to resources that would otherwise be available to them because of the presence of the elite. Through this, elites serve to reinforce marginalisation and impoverishment. Indeed, Dutta (2009) found a connexion between elite capture, marginalisation, and poverty. That aside, the scholar observes that elites fortify their selfish gains and their grip on power in an environment of power differentials in terms of poverty, illiteracy, and social group inequalities. Therefore, it can be argued that elites may not be sufficiently motivated to put in place measures to address poverty, literacy, and inter-clan differences, as this would affect their grip on power and control over devolved resources. Therefore, as argued earlier, the presence of poverty, marginalisation of certain clans, and elite capture could intensify the conditions for local and national insecurity.

To further support the majority view, another KI asserted the following:

The few tenderpreneurs who benefit from devolved funds, who are close to the governors, reinvest them in urban centres such as Nairobi. For example, we have Ole Shaparo Road in South C which is littered with a lot of investment made by people from North-Eastern region. The people left behind remain consigned to permanent poverty (KI 25: December 2022).

The remarks by KI 25 that ‘the few tenderpreneurs who benefit from devolved funds, who are close to the governors’ further amplify possible elite capture, as alluded earlier. Therefore, there are few selected/preferred people who are close to the governor who have access to the devolved funds. In this regard, this study established that tenderpreneurs specialise in making bids for various projects and subsequently use inside connections and unethical practises such as corruption to win bids. Therefore, as stated by Rigon (2014), the elites as represented by tenderpreneurs prevent resources from reaching their intended recipients, which is the general populace. The failure of resources reaching their intended recipient may reinforce the status quo, which is of poverty and marginalisation with negative ramifications for peace and security.

To further explain the prevailing poverty levels in the North-Eastern region, KI 25 highlights incidences of remission of kickbacks/profits made in projects/bids by tenderpreneurs. These gains are re-invested in other areas outside the region. This is evidenced by the statement ‘Ole Shaparo Road in South C, which is littered with several investment made by people from the North-Eastern region’. To this end, the benefits of fiscal devolution are redirected to other areas that are far better than the North Eastern region, thus denying the residents an opportunity to improve their livelihood from devolved resources. Therefore, it can be argued that fiscal devolution may have served as a conduit of resources to align the pockets of the elites. This may have the effect of perpetuating inequitable local relations of

power at both intra- and inter-clan levels and further leaving the root causes of poverty unchallenged (Cornwell as cited in Brock & McGee, 2002). Overall, the possible existence of elite capture has the potential of amplifying the existing inter-clan inequalities and poverty levels. Certainly, the amassing of wealth in the hands of few individuals and the use of clannism as panacea for poverty management is bound to result in disgruntlement from the marginalised with the potential of escalating to violence and hence insecurity.

In addition, focussing on clan interests without clear context-specific policies on the distribution of resources appears to cloud the county government officers and the local communities' intellect to negate methodological innovations in poverty reduction. Further, failure to engage in dialogue denies the locals an opportunity to engage with structures of power and make contributions that could address their local needs. Arguably, a dialogue between the locals and their local governments, in which participants not only put forward their own views but also adjust the views they hold because of the dialogue (Brock & McGee, 2002), could enhance their relations and neutralize clannism, which might change their lives for better. However, as revealed in the findings of this study, there is minimal economic empowerment of the locals, and clannism continues to legitimise inequalities that could lead to heightened insecurity.

To anchor the view that there was minimal economic empowerment, the study established that little or no alternative livelihood initiatives had been put in place. Neither had devolution resulted in ingenuity in the realisation of development, which would have perhaps aided in poverty reduction to context sensitiveness. To this end, a KI said the following.

Devolution has not resulted to encouragement of creativity because of failure to devolve further into the wards. Of course, new buildings have come up, bigger hotels have been built, big hospitals have come up, tarmac amongst other but then, there is nothing creative about it. It is only because devolution has brought more money to the counties, When I think of creativity, I imagine new things and new approaches to effecting development (KI 18: December 2022).

The statement that ‘devolution has not resulted to encouragement of creativity because of failure to devolve further into the wards’ affirms an earlier assertion of this thesis that devolution had not been rolled out further to the lowest governance units. The remark that ‘new buildings have come up, bigger hotels have been built, big hospitals have come up’ is an acknowledgement that devolution has resulted in economic growth, but perhaps, this has not been met with satisfaction by all. Reflecting on the decentralisation theory, devolution is expected to result in more grassroots contextual awareness. This may lead to the discernment of context-specific needs and hence creative solutions to meet them. Thus, dissatisfaction is an indictment of insensitive governance structures due to failure to fully involve the people in governance.

The words, 'I imagine new things and new approaches to effecting development' could reflect the disappointment the populace had in the initial promise of devolution, which was to improve the historical marginalisation of the people of the North-Eastern region they had contended with pre-2010 Kenya's constitution. They could also indicate the frustrations of the underprivileged clan. As such, the respondent passes judgement from a clan's lens. This indicates the limitations of the assumptions of decentralisation theory in that they might not hold in a divided society. In such a society, instead of healing rifts through participatory governance, populations could be politicised to view and judge issues from one's clan's lens. This could be the dilemma of KI 18.

Certainly, in the context of unequal previous development (Wanyande, 2016), unequal clan power, and historical interclan rivalry (Dahir & Ali, 2021), deeper introspection, creative problem solving, and ingenuity may be prerequisites for effecting economic growth and development to maintain peaceful interclan coexistence. That said, if development priorities are arbitrarily set by strong and dominant clan(s) in the society and implemented in a few chosen places, the excluded clans or population will call for equality, which could lead to insecurity. In line with this view, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2012) established that the entrenchment of dominant ethnicities in Kenyan governance—or, in the case of this thesis, dominant clans—was increasingly a source of conflict because minorities viewed all gains through an ethnic lens, rendering all gains to be zero-

sum. With respect to this study, in the North-Eastern region, clannism influences how people view the realisation of the benefits of fiscal devolution. Therefore, in a clannism setting, these complaints may quickly turn into violent confrontations, which would increase insecurity. Therefore, to realise development and ensure peace and security, frameworks that anchor interclan cohesion, inclusion, and equity need to be conceptualised and put into practise.

It was not surprising therefore, that the study established that fiscal decentralisation had not resulted in increased alternative livelihood opportunities among all clans, leading to dissatisfaction with governance and hence national insecurity. To this end, KI remarked.

Devolution has not resulted to new alternative livelihood activities. As a matter of fact, they haven't enhanced the traditional livelihood activity which is livestock rearing. They haven't brought new creativity, new mechanisms for marketing, new ways of protecting those animals during drought so that we don't lose massively in such times etc. We haven't supported the nomadic pastoralists for them to benefit. So, nothing new has come up (KI 18: December 2022).

The remark by KI 18 seems to lend credence to the earlier view that fiscal devolution had not led to creativity in realising development prospects. However, in this case, the respondent was concerned that it had not led to the achievement of food security. Accordingly, the respondent's remark, 'they haven't brought new creativity, new mechanisms for marketing, new ways of protecting those animals during drought so that we don't lose massively in such times', seems to

be indicative of prevailing frustrations. In this case, it points to the context-specific challenge of drought that had been persistent over time, and yet, no innovative strategies for drought proofing livestock have been conceptualised. This has a possible effect of negatively impacting the livelihoods and incomes of the locals. Given that livestock farming is the mainstay livelihood activity for Somali clans, droughts could easily escalate into a prevalent resource-based conflict as they compete for pasture and water (Dahir & Ali, 2021). This is consistent with the findings of the World Food Program [WFP] (2019), which documented six countries worldwide, namely, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, North-Eastern Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as having a food emergency as of July 2019 within the context of an active violent conflict.

4.3.3 Influence of the Benefits of Administrative Devolution on National Security

In the Fourth Schedule of Kenya's Constitution 2010, devolved units are assigned functions that were previously the province of the national government. These functions include provision of crop and livestock production services and associated pest and disease control, development and management of local transport infrastructure, water and sewerage services, disaster management, and commerce. These functions entail the reassignment of responsibility and authority over resources and decision making in the provision of selected public services.

Therefore, this study investigated the relationship between national security and the benefits gained from giving county governments more control over resources and decision-making in the delivery of some public services. To this end, the study participants (N=893) were asked to choose the most suitable response that reflected their views on various statements under examination. The results are tabulated in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Influence of the Benefits of Administrative Devolution on National Security

Item	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total
Has not increased access to piped/borehole water and sewerage services to all clans resulting to inter-clan conflicts and disease outbreaks and hence national insecurity	21.2% (189)	43.7% (390)	7.4% (66)	17% (152)	10.8% (96)	100% (893)
Has not resulted to building of access roads and street lighting to diverse parts of the county thus negatively impacting on community safety and security regardless of clan affiliation and easy access by security agencies	15% (134)	45.9% (410)	6.9% (62)	22.2% (198)	10% (89)	100% (893)
Has not resulted to improved agriculture, livestock production and veterinary services thus negatively affecting food security for all clans and general national security	26.1% (233)	26% (232)	14.6% (130)	25.4% (227)	8% (71)	100% (893)
Has not resulted to improved regulation and trade leading to poor business operating environment, constrained earnings and frustrations by all clans hence affecting national security	20.8% (186)	37.6% (336)	10.2% (91)	24.5% (219)	6.8% (61)	100% (893)
Has led to ineffective pollution control and disaster management leading to disease outbreaks and livelihood loss in all clans which has increased national insecurity	18.8% (168)	40.5% (362)	11.5% (103)	20.8% (186)	8.3% (74)	100% (893)
Overall	20.4%	38.8%	10.1%	22%	8.7%	100%

Source: Survey Data, 2022

The overall analysis of the results shown in Table 4.3 indicates that respondents were more likely to disagree (38.8%) or strongly disagree (20.4%) with the various statements that were being investigated. In contrast, they were less likely

to agree (22%) or strongly agree (8.7%). Since most of the items were phrased in the negative, the results imply that county governments in the North-Eastern region have provided security through administrative decentralisation by providing public goods and services, including infrastructure and supportive business environments. These public goods/services may have reduced negative clannism and thus provided conditions for security. The specific findings that underpin this generalised view are presented and discussed thematically in the sub-sections that follow.

4.3.3.1 Water and Sewerage Services and National Security

Water and sewerage services are critical as they inform the state of public health, which informs security at the individual level by helping to reduce water and sanitation-based diseases. Moreover, such services, in the North-Eastern context where fights over water pasture have been documented (Dahir & Ali, 2021), may reduce migrations in search of water, which in most cases leads to tensions as clans seek to forcibly displace one another. Therefore, it was critical to investigate the link between water and sewerage services and national security.

In this regard, this study established that the enhancement of water supply resulted in conflict reduction by improving the clans' resistance to conflict triggers, adding to the causative variables for peace. Specifically, according to

Table 4.3, approximately 21.2% (n=189) of the study participants strongly disagreed with the view that devolution had not improved the availability of piped/borehole water and sewerage services to all clans, causing inter-clan clashes and disease outbreaks, and as a result, national insecurity. Approximately 43.7% (n=390) of the respondents disagreed, 7.4% (n=66) were neutral, 17% (n=152) agreed, and 10.8% (n=96) strongly agreed. In summary, roughly 64.84% (n=579) of the respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed, 27.77% (n=248) strongly agreed/agreed, and 7.4% (n=66) were neutral.

From the findings, it can be deduced that a minority of the respondents (27.77%) agreed or strongly agreed to the view that administrative devolution had not increased access to piped/borehole water and sewerage services to all clans, resulting in interclan conflict and disease outbreaks, and hence national insecurity. Most respondents (64.84%), however, strongly disagreed or disagreed. To support the majority sentiments, a KI remarked,

There has been significant increase in boreholes but for piped water there is a little that has been done. You can imagine, we have a whole river (Tana) draining into the Indian Ocean yet, nothing has been done to tap into it. When you go there, you will see lots of donkey carts and people trying to access water from the river. This is something that should not happen in the devolution era (KI 4: December 2022).

The statement by KI 4 seems to suggest commendable progress made by the devolved governments in the North-Eastern region in assuring access to borehole

water. It, however, rues missed opportunities in terms of harnessing the use of large water bodies and in reducing distance to water source through piped water. This is evidenced by references to ‘we have a whole river (Tana) draining into the Indian Ocean yet, nothing has been done to tap into it’ and ‘use of donkey carts in the devolution era’. The majority sentiments were further collaborated by county governments’ records on accomplished development. Figure 4.7 shows the status of access to water as established from the document review.




Figure 4.7: Access to Water in the North-Eastern Region

Source: Consolidated County Development Records for North-Eastern Region, 2022

From Figure 4.7, it can be established that in the two devolution periods, in the North-Eastern region, 1,660 HH received piped water, 425 new boreholes were

sunk, and 178 old boreholes were rehabilitated. In each of the devolution periods under review (2013-2017 and 2017-2022), devolved governments in the region endeavoured to sink new boreholes and rehabilitate old ones. Specifically, Wajir had 198 new boreholes, Mandera 130, and Garissa 97. In addition, Garissa rehabilitated 71 boreholes, Wajir 70, and Mandera 37. In terms of water reticulation, Garissa County supplied 1,620 HH with piped water during the two devolution periods, while both Mandera and Wajir Counties' HH had no access to piped water.

Water reticulation, digging new boreholes, and rehabilitating old ones have a significant influence in reducing distances to water sources and increasing food availability by aiding irrigation practises. Thus, easy access to water can reduce inter-clan conflict, particularly if such access is equal among all clans. Indeed, there is a growing nexus between food insecurity and persistent conflict (WFP, 2019). Therefore, easy access to water increases HH resilience to conflict by militating unnecessary resource-based competition. Considering the institutional theory that underpinned this study, institutions play a significant role in ensuring food security and in identifying and reducing vulnerabilities to conflict. In this case, devolved governments in the North-Eastern region have performed to expectation by reducing water-based conflict, which was earlier mentioned as a trigger for conflict/insecurity. This finding agrees with International Crisis Group (2023) observations that competition for water has been a source of conflict

among pastoralist communities in Laikipia and Baringo counties in Kenya. It notes that the provision of water points aids in the reduction of this conflict and increases the resilience of the communities, hence peaceful co-existence.

4.3.3.2 Road Construction and Street Lighting Services and National Security

Road construction and street lighting services are integral to security in a variety of ways, such as increasing access to basic services like health and education, which are critical in enhancing the well-being of individuals and communities and deterring criminal activity through increased visibility. Cumulatively, these services have the potential to increase cohesion by dissuading non-conforming behaviour, such as crime, which could then translate to local security. Accordingly, this study investigated the link between road construction and street lighting services with security. This study found that devolution prompted the building of access roads and streetlights in various parts of the North-Eastern region. All these had a positive influence on community safety and security regardless of clans to which they belonged.

Specifically, from Table 4.3, it can be established that 15% (n=134) of the HH study participants strongly disagreed, 45.9% (n=410) disagreed, 6.9% (n=62) were neutral, 22.2% (n=198) agreed, and 10% (n=89) strongly agreed. In a

nutshell, it can be determined that approximately 60.92% (n=544) of the respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed, 6.9% (n=62) were neutral, and 32.14% (n=287) strongly agreed/agreed. Overall, it can be established that a minority of the respondents (32.14%) either strongly agreed or agreed that devolution had not led to the construction of access roads and street lighting in many regions of the county; therefore, it had a negative influence on community safety and security.

However, it can be deduced that the majority (60.92%) of the HH study participants were of the view that devolution had resulted in the building of access roads and street lighting in diverse parts of the county, thus positively impacting community safety and security regardless of clan affiliation and easy access by security agencies.

In the county headquarters, we have seen massive improvements in terms of new tarmacked/paved roads. In Garissa we have seen new roads coming up. In Wajir, for the first time we have seen tarmacked roads. We have also seen street lighting projects. In Wajir, solar lighting for the streets has been rolled out in a small significant way. This is some achievement in my view. However, in the rural areas away from the county headquarters, there is nothing to talk about (KI 7: December 2022).

The sentiments of KI 7, while supporting the view that there has been massive infrastructure development, alludes to the uneven nature to which such development has been affected. The statement that ‘in Wajir, for the first time we have seen tarmacked roads’ is a testament to the modest achievements of devolution in the region in infrastructural development. The words ‘in the rural

areas away from the county headquarters, there is nothing to talk about' suggest concentration of development in certain areas, particularly in towns, while marginalising others. In support of this view, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2012) alluded to the prevalence of disparities between urban and rural areas. This, it contends, has in some instances caused conflict in the political and social realm. Therefore, it can be argued that the disregard of rural areas in development, if left unchecked, could erode the gains of the devolved governments in assuring security as residents of marginalised areas could agitate for equality with the potential of violent expression.

The findings of the majority were further collaborated by a document review. Figure 4.8 highlights the state of the road infrastructure as obtained from a document review.




Figure 4.8: Road Infrastructure in the North-Eastern Region

Source: Consolidated County Development Records for North-Eastern Region, 2022

From Figure 4.8, it can be established that Garissa County registered road infrastructure development in the two devolution cycles as follows: bituminous roads (12 KMs), concrete roads (40 KMs), murrum roads (660 KMs), earthen roads (1,665 KMs), streetlights (117), and parking spaces (5). During the same period, Wajir County achieved bituminous roads (35 KMs), concrete roads (200 KMs), murrum roads (800 KMs), earthen roads (1,000 KMs), streetlights (132), and parking spaces (2). Mandera County accomplished bituminous roads (40 KMs), concrete roads (200 KMs), murrum roads (750 KMs), earthen roads (1,124 KMs), and streetlights (88). Overall, it can be established that remarkable progress has been made in increasing access to various parts of the North-Eastern

region as follows: bituminous roads (87 KMs), concrete roads (440 KMs), murrum roads (2,210 KMs), earthen roads (3,789 KMs), streetlights (337), and parking spaces (7). Such infrastructure has the capability of opening areas that were inaccessible, thus creating conditions for enhanced livelihood activity such as trade, hence increasing income for the populace. In so doing, may address structural conflicts such as poverty. Moreover, street lighting could deter criminal activities, thus enhancing community security at the local level.

Mashatt et al. (2008) argue that there is an established nexus between the development of critical infrastructure such as roads and peace and security. This is because, they claim, infrastructural development provides a foundation for reaching ungoverned spaces, increases access to basic social services to remote areas, opens new frontiers for economic development, and generally promotes the social well-being of the people. While the referred literature is dated, it provides insight into how infrastructure and security could be related. In this case, in a clannism context, such as in the North-Eastern region, conflict-sensitive infrastructural development could help in increasing the resilience of the various clans to triggers of conflict due to shared prosperity.

Overall, this finding resonates with that of Array (2019), who, in a study of Spain, documents massive investment in infrastructure following devolution. This resulted in the economic expansion of diverse sectors. In accordance with the

theory of decentralisation, devolution has enabled the growth and development of society in the North-Eastern region through infrastructural development. Reflecting on institutional theory, the optimal functioning of the devolved governments by having roads developed across the entire region has afforded shared prosperity, and hence conditions for peace.

4.3.3.3 Agriculture and Livestock Production Services and National Security

Robust and responsive agricultural and livestock production services may be critical in boosting food security and enhancing the resilience of communities to conflict. Indeed, there is an established nexus between food insecurity and insecurity (WFP, 2019). Therefore, such robust and responsive services may be essential in engendering cohesion and stability in a society and hence security. To this end, Njagi et al. (2014) outline the services that devolved governments are expected to provide which include artificial insemination services, farm inputs, mechanised farming services, and extension services. Arguably, these services may have direct implication on agriculture and livestock production outputs and thus food security. Therefore, it was critical to investigate the link between agriculture and livestock production services and national security.

The findings revealed that initiatives meant to boost agriculture and livestock production were very minimal. As such, the decentralisation of agriculture and

livestock production services did not have a significant impact on food security for all clans, thus adding to potential causes for insecurity. To anchor this generalised view, Table 4.3 shows that roughly 26.1% (n=233) and 26% (n=232) of the HH study participants strongly disagreed and disagreed, respectively, that devolution had a detrimental effect on all clans' access to food security and general national security because it had not resulted in increased agricultural, livestock output or veterinary services. Conversely, approximately 25.4% (n=227) of the respondents agreed and 8% (n=71) strongly agreed. Roughly 14.6% (n=130) of the respondents were neutral. In summary, the results show that approximately 52.07% (n=465) of the respondents strongly disagreed or agreed, 14.6% (n=130) were neutral, and 33.37% (n=298) strongly agreed or agreed.

From the results, it can be established that quite a substantial number of respondents (14.6%) were either ignorant or anxious of the consequences of their response to the statement; hence, they gave a neutral response. In this case, it could be that they did not want to cast members of their clan negatively by highlighting their ineffectiveness in service delivery. A minority of the respondents (33.37%) strongly agreed that administrative decentralisation had not resulted in improved agriculture, livestock production and veterinary services, thus negatively affecting food security for all clans and general national security. To support the minority view, a KI remarked.

There has been no substantive improvement in agriculture, livestock production and veterinary services. People are still using traditional agricultural methods and animal husbandry techniques. This is cross cutting across all clans and therefore, it has not been a source of conflict (KI 16: December 2022).

The remark by KI 16 that ‘people are still using traditional agricultural methods and animal husbandry techniques’ implies the use of basic agricultural technology and techniques that frequently result in low production. Therefore, it might mean that the county government, perhaps, has not rolled out mechanised farming services and/or provided modern farm inputs and artificial insemination. The statement ‘this is cross cutting across all clans and therefore, it has not been a source of conflict’ suggests that the initiatives in the agriculture and livestock industry were so minimal as to be noticeably identifiable as favouring certain clan(s).

Majority (52.07%) of HH respondents, however, believed that devolution had enhanced agriculture, livestock production, and veterinary services, which had a beneficial impact on food security for all clans and overall national security. To this end, KIs remarked.

County governments have endeavoured to provide farm inputs to the farmers which has resulted in production of quality food hence food security (KI 2: December 2022).

In Garissa and Mandera, particularly for the clans living along river Tana and Dawa, there has been marked improvement in agricultural activities. However, I would say, these are individual initiatives but not those led by the county governments. Who knows? Maybe the

counties might have done something, but I think they could do much better (KI 12: December 2022).

The statement by KI 2 suggests increased food production due to the provision of farm inputs by the devolved governments in the North-Eastern region. However, while the statement by KI 12 seems to strengthen the views of KI 2 in terms of improved agricultural/livestock production practises, the words ‘these are individual initiatives but not those led by the county governments. who knows?’, seem to affirm earlier contention by the minority respondents that county governments efforts in agriculture and livestock industry are minimal. The remarks of KI 12 aside, the modest infrastructural development in the region could have in a way assisted in spurring agricultural development. Edeme et al. (2020) established a nexus between developments such as road networks and increased agricultural production and employment creation. Indeed, the presence of an improved road network could assist in making it easy for extension services to reach farmers, obtain farm inputs, and reach markets. In this regard, the combined effect of improved agricultural and infrastructural development could easily alleviate causes of conflict, such as food insecurity and poverty, and hence, security.

However, the views of the majority were not collaborated by a documentary review of selected agricultural/livestock production initiatives. Figure 4.9

highlights the performance of the devolved governments in the North-Eastern region in agriculture and livestock production.




Figure 4.9: Selected Agriculture and Livestock Production Initiatives in the North-Eastern Region

Source: Consolidated County Development Records for North-Eastern Region, 2022

From Figure 4.9, it can be established that neither grain silos nor agrovets were built/set up in the North-Eastern region during the devolution period stretching 2013-2022. While no grains are grown on a large scale in the region, the establishment of such facilities would have aided in food availability through storage and thus food security, especially in times of shortages. That said,

minimal achievements were secured in other indicators in the period under review as follows: five animal sale yards, three abattoirs, and seven commodity marketplaces were successfully established in Garissa County. One livestock sale yard, an abattoir, and 14 commodity markets were established in Wajir County. One animal sale yard, an abattoir, and eight commodity marketplaces were built in Mandera County. In total, in the North-Eastern region a total of seven livestock sale yards, five abattoirs, and 29 commodity markets were established between 2013 and 2022.

While the establishment of abattoirs, agrovets, silos, etc., could be considered private sector initiatives, local governments have the duty to address the private sector's diminished capacity and free market failures, especially in the context of prior underdevelopment, such as in the North-Eastern region. This study showed that the area has high rates of poverty, which may limit the private sector's ability to provide the facilities necessary for things like storage, market price stabilisation and food safety, among other things. Abattoirs, agrovets, silos, etc. are critical elements for food security and thus their availability might enhance security. It will be recalled that it was averred that food security and security are directly related (WFP, 2019). Moreover, the presence of these amenities would help create employment and thus boost incomes, thereby reducing prevailing poverty levels. This has the implication of improving the structural causes of conflict and hence, security.

The triangulation of documentary review findings, quantitative survey results, and qualitative findings seem to suggest that the minority view is evidence based. Accordingly, this study holds the view that administrative decentralisation had not resulted in improved agriculture, livestock production and veterinary services, thus negatively affecting food security for all clans and general national security. This finding is upheld by KNBS (2023), which documents high incidences of food poverty in the North-Eastern region. In its study, KNBS (2023) operationalised food poverty as a situation where monthly food consumption per adult equivalent was less than KES 2,331 in rural areas and KES 2,905 in urban area. In this case, against a national prevalence of food poverty of 30.5% adults, Wajir County had 40.1%, Garissa 47.2%, and Mandera 65.5%.

Therefore, it can be concluded that despite administrative decentralisation, agricultural and livestock production have not significantly increased in the North-Eastern region. This has a negative implication for local and national security because, according to Arezki et al. (as cited in Bruck & d'Errico, 2019), persistent food shortages often lead to social unrest and the emergence of violence from the aggrieved. This finding resonates with institutional theory in that failure to put in place relevant mechanisms/systems has resulted in poor achievement of agriculture and livestock production devolved functions. This creates possible conditions for amplifying existing interclan differences as land production constraints persist, hence resource-based conflict.

4.3.3.4 Trade Regulation Services and National Security

The functions of devolved governments in trade regulation services include inter alia issuing business licences, imposition of local taxes, establishing and promoting open air markets, construction of business stalls and promoting investment opportunities available in the counties to other counties and abroad (Wangalwa, n. d.). From these roles, it can be inferred that local governments, through their role in trade regulation, can shape economic security either positively or negatively and thus local and national security. If the business environment is friendly, this may result in an increase in businesses, income, and employment, which may boost living standards and hence security by addressing structural causes of violence such as unemployment and low incomes. The converse may result in insecurity.

In this regard, this study investigated the intricate relationship between trade regulation and national security. Thus, the study found that devolved administrations in the North-Eastern region offered the best conditions for prospering firms, extended opportunities for informal employment, and generally improved individual incomes through the formation of favourable business environments. Thus, the ensuing business expansion was crucial in boosting both local and national cohesion and security.

Specifically, a review of Table 4.3 further shows that approximately 20.8% (n=186) of the HH respondents strongly disagreed with the assertion that devolution had not led to better regulation or commerce, which then negatively impacted national security by creating a bad economic environment, limiting revenues, and stirring up anger among all clans. About 37.6% (n=336) disagreed, 10.2% (n=91) were neutral, 24.5% (n=219) agreed, and 6.8% (n=61) strongly agreed. Overall, it can be determined that 58.45% (n=522) of the HH respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed, whereas 31.47% (n=281) strongly agreed/agreed. About 10.2% (n=91) were neutral.

From the results, it can be established that a minority of the respondents (31.47%) strongly agreed or agreed to the view that devolution had not resulted in improved regulation and trade, leading to a poor business operating environment, constrained earnings, and frustrations by all clans, hence affecting national security. To buttress the minority view, a KI remarked.

I don't know about regulation, but devolution has killed trade. A lot of businesses have closed down due to pending bills that the counties have failed to pay to traders. Sometimes it takes three to four years to be paid. People have committed suicide because of this (KI 3: December 2022).

The remark by KI 3 suggests a constrained business environment due to pending bills. That 'people have committed suicide because of this' indicates the trauma experienced by businesspeople as they try to eke a living. Suffice to say, this

problem is not unique to the North-Eastern region. Pending bills, as affirmed by the Parliament of Kenya (2023), have been a huge constraint to devolved governance in Kenya. The institution attributes this situation to, among other reasons, delays in the release of devolved funds, misapplication of allocations, and poor revenue collection by county governments. In essence, the issue of pending bills and the reason thereof further solidifies earlier findings by the study that devolved funds are misallocated and/or embezzled in the North-Eastern region.

It can also be deduced that the majority (58.45%) of the HH respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed with the view that devolution had not resulted in improved regulation and trade, leading to a poor business operating environment, constrained earnings, and frustrations by all clans, hence affecting national security. To support this view, a KI said the following:

I don't think that the County Governments have added more, but business is free for all as it should be in a free market economy. Therefore, it can be claimed that the county governments have not constrained business (KI 5: December 2022).

The remark by KI 5 'that business is free for all' seems to suggest that county governments provide an enabling business environment by not interfering with market forces of demand and supply. Therefore, it might be inferred that while the fourth schedule of the Kenya constitution 2010 gives powers to county governments to conduct several activities, such as licencing and local taxation,

these activities have been carefully conducted so as not to harm the business environment and competitiveness through, for example, punitive taxes. Therefore, it can be argued that the county governments in the North-Eastern region created optimal conditions for thriving businesses and, in so doing, increased informal employment opportunities and a general rise in individual incomes. Indeed, a nexus exists between economic/business growth, employment, poverty reduction, and higher living standards (Department for International Development, n. d.).

These benefits are critical in improving structural causes of violence, such as unemployment and low incomes, and hence national security. Moreover, business growth and stability measures that are participatory, inclusive, and mutually beneficial are critical factors in enhancing cohesion and security at the local and national levels.

This finding is consistent with those of Timboi (2020). The researcher found that devolved governments had implemented measures to enhance the business environment by investing in business and entrepreneurship projects in the Kenyan counties of Uasin Gishu, Trans-Nzoia, Kericho, and Nandi. This strengthened economic growth and further improved the business operating environment. This finding is also consistent with institutional theory. In this case, when institutions promulgate responsive frameworks in tune with environmental realities, the result

is social cohesion. In the case of the North-Eastern region, it could be said that the frameworks that underpinned taxation and licencing, for instance, were friendly; hence, business flourished to a positive effect on security.

4.3.3.5 Disaster Management Services and National Security

Williams (2020) and Mandel (2002) claim that there exists a nexus between security and disaster management. Arguably, effective disaster management from perils such as floods, droughts, and public health pandemics might be critical in fortifying the resilience of communities to cope with shocks and losses occasioned by them. By doing so, it assures human security and thus local and national security. Accordingly, this study investigated the link between disaster management services and national security in the North-Eastern region. As such, the study established that county governments in the region had effective disaster management and disease control, which were critical in ensuring resilience of the various clans to triggers of violence and in sustaining livelihoods, hence local and national security.

To anchor this generalised finding, the study HH respondents were asked to express their views on the statement that devolution had not resulted in efficient pollution control and disaster management, which has worsened national insecurity by causing disease outbreaks and livelihood loss across all clans. Consequently, from Table 4.3, it can be established that 18.8% (n=168) of the

respondents strongly disagreed, 40.5% (n=362) disagreed, 11.5% (n=103) were neutral, 20.8% (n=186) agreed, and 8.3% (n=74) strongly agreed. In summary, it can be established that approximately 59.35% (n=530) of the HH respondents either strongly disagreed or disagreed. Conversely, approximately 29.12% (n=260) of the study participants either strongly agreed or agreed. Roughly 11.5% (n=103) of the respondents were neutral.

From the results, the claim that devolution had resulted in inefficient pollution control and disaster management leading to disease outbreaks and livelihood loss in all clans, hence national insecurity was strongly agreed upon by a minority (29.12%) of the respondents chosen from the HH. However, the majority (59.35%) of the HH respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed. To support the majority view, the respondents remarked.

First, let us agree there was no better disaster management before devolution. Post devolution, the county governments now have funds which they can use to respond to disasters. Indeed, we now have better disaster response than in the past. It may not be at the desired level, but we at least have some response (KI 18: December 2022).

Recently we had a cholera outbreak in Mandera County, and I must say that the county government did well in its control (KI 22: December 2022).

An examination of the remarks by KI 18 and 22 shows that the county governments have improved disaster management practises as funds are available at the local level and measures taken are fairly responsive. Accordingly, the words

‘it may not be at the desired level’ points to less-than-optimal disaster response. Effective disaster management and disease control by the devolved governments are critical in ensuring the resilience of the various clans to triggers of violence and in sustaining livelihoods, hence local and national security. Indeed, disasters and disease outbreaks could increase the vulnerability of individuals to insecurity through, among other negative effects, disrupting their livelihood activities, displacement, deaths, injuries, and mental trauma.

This is consistent with the argument of Williams (2020) and Mandel (2002), who claim a nexus between security and disaster management. Williams (2020) argues that disasters provide opportunities for nonconforming groups to take advantage of their effects and grievances on the response made. For instance, a disaster may cause significant disruptions in the operations of security agencies as their attention is diverted to response or through taking a direct hit. Moreover, Al Shabab, which operates in the North-Eastern region, is adept at taking advantage of social grievances. On the other hand, Mandel (2002) stipulates that failure to respond to disasters reinforces feelings of not belonging and severely impairs the social fabric. Conversely, effective disaster response has the impact of uniting the people against a common adversary, the disaster, and thus security.

4.4 Summary

This chapter examined the study respondents' demographic details, including gender, age, education, and clan membership, which anchored all the findings. It has also presented findings with respect to the first objective of the study, which was to establish the benefits that devolved governance has yielded in the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region and implications for Kenya's national security. Overall, the findings of the study indicate that devolution affords political, fiscal, and administrative benefits that have the capacity to enhance local and national security. However, due to clannism that fronts for exclusive politics, devolution yielded only limited benefits for locals in the North-Eastern region of Kenya, with possible negative effects on national security. From a political perspective, the study demonstrated an increase in political space that has empowered communities to elect their leaders from the ward level (MCA). However, rather than serving the communities to enhance security, this has only increased clan patronage of elected leaders, which is directed to personal interests while denying local people benefits of political devolution at the expense of local and national security. In general, clannism and its destructive norms have stifled the realisation of the political benefits of devolution in the region, creating a tenuous environment and fertile ground for insecurity.

The study also found that devolution has brought with it fiscal benefits, with the counties receiving huge sums of money, but there was little evidence of these

benefits, especially among the poor in the North-Eastern region of Kenya. This was attributed to the unfair distribution of resources based on clannism, with the Governor's (who is the AIE holder) clan receiving the lion's share. In addition, clan identity politics undermined workers' competence as employment is pegged on clannism rather than merit. Clannism also allowed corruption to spread easily, thus compromising the benefits of devolution. This appeared to create animosity among clans, a factor that could negatively affect security. In a nutshell, fiscal benefits from devolved governance fell short of local expectations and were distributed discriminatorily, thus threatening national security.

With regard to the administrative decentralisation benefits, the study findings show that moderate benefits have been achieved in the counties that were studied. Accordingly, administrative benefits mainly focussed on public utility facets where selfish interests were limited. This included infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, and schools that provided no avenue for clan dominance. To this end, this component of devolution attracted unity of purpose, subordination of individual interests, and equity, among others that helped enhance security. In general, while devolution has the capacity to address the development goals of counties in a way that promotes group cohesiveness to enhance security, clan identity and politics, which is dominant in the North-Eastern counties of Kenya, derails devolution benefits in varying ways with far-reaching effects on security.

The next chapter assesses different ways in which clannism derails the benefits of devolution to negatively impact security.

CHAPTER FIVE: CLANNISM, DEVOLVED GOVERNANCE BENEFITS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

5.1 Introduction

This study's objective was to assess the influence of clannism on the distribution of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and its consequences for Kenya's national security. Clannism is based on kinship which is anchored in blood and social relations. Accordingly, kinship is a crucial component of maintaining social cohesion, stability, and economic relations in traditional cultures (Neuman et al., 2019). Moreover, it is a social boundary marker of us and otherness that could either enhance or derail security.

Therefore, this study examined how clannism affected the distribution of gains from devolution in the North-Eastern area and how it affected Kenya's national security using three distinct data gathering methods. These data collection tools included a questionnaire for the HH survey (HH) that attracted 893 respondents and an interview guide for 39 Key Informants (KIs). The results are presented and discussed below.

5.2 Clannism, Devolved Governance Benefits, and National Security

This study's participants (N=893) were invited to fill in a HH survey questionnaire that highlighted the influence of their sense of belonging to their clans and subsequent desire to take advantage of the sense of belonging to access

benefits of devolution and consequently, impact on national security. The survey questionnaire administered to the respondents (N =893) required responses ranging from SD, D, N, A, and SA. The results are outlined in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Influence of Clannism on the Distribution of Devolution Benefits and Impact on National Security

Item	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total
Personnel employed by the County Government do not reflect equity amongst the diverse clans and thus, clans feel more divided hence national insecurity	13.9% (124)	.5% (272)	6.7% (60)	41.1% (367)	7.8% (70)	100% (893)
There is unfair representation of clans in development and implementation of County plans and strategies anchoring the development agenda which has promoted division and national insecurity	11.1% (99)	28.4% (254)	10.4% (93)	30.2% (270)	19.8% (177)	100% (893)
Social protection programs are accessed depending on clan affiliation resulting to national insecurity	13.1% (117)	26.7% (238)	11.8% (105)	36.1% (322)	12.4% (111)	100% (893)
Specific clans influence and determine distribution of development/project funds by the County Government resulting increased perception of marginalisation hence national insecurity	14.9% (133)	25.4% (227)	10.4% (93)	30.7% (274)	18.6% (166)	100% (893)
Specific clans have preferential access to devolved services such as health and education therefore leading to feeling of discrimination and fragmentation amongst some clans and thus, national insecurity	18.7% (167)	22.7% (203)	9.3% (83)	28.9% (258)	20.4% (182)	100% (893)
Minority clans are not afforded an opportunity to scrutinise County's political and fiscal management hence creating social divisions hence national insecurity	16.7% (149)	26.4% (236)	7.2% (64)	39.8% (355)	10% (89)	100% (893)
Overall	14.7%	26.7%	9.3%	34.5%	14.8%	100%

Source: Survey Data, 2022

The data in Table 5.1 indicate that respondents were less likely to disagree (26.7%) or strongly disagree (14.7%) with the various claims under investigation. In contrast, respondents were more inclined to agree (34.5%) or strongly agree (14.8%). In this regard, the findings seem to emphasise the central role of clannism in the sharing of devolved governance benefits, particularly in county planning and allocation of development funds, employment, and informing participation in devolved governance. Due to its central role, clannism has occasioned the amplification of the interclan divide. Consequently, the emergent majority and minority divide has crystallised in the North-Eastern region with the clan lens anchoring decisions on fairness or otherwise of the division of devolved power and resources. In turn, this may have created conditions for insecurity as the marginalised agitated for more equity in the sharing of the benefits of fiscal decentralisation. The specific findings underpinning the generalised view are discussed thematically under the headings; employment, development planning and implementation, social protection programmes and accountability in the sub-sections that follow.

5.2.1 Clannism, Employment, and National Security

Unemployment was highlighted in the preceding sections of this study as a structural cause of violence and hence, insecurity. To this end, this study sought to investigate the role of clannism in informing hiring practises of devolved governments in the North-Eastern region. Accordingly, the study found that clan

allegiance and belonging were decisive factors in how employment opportunities were shared, resulting in the exclusion of some groups. This reinforced social and income inequality and undermined trust between clans, thus occasioning social unrest and insecurity. The detailed findings are presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.

According to Table 5.1, it is evident that 13.9% (n=124) of the respondents from HH expressed strong disagreement towards the notion that the County Government's hiring practices do not reflect equity among the different clans, which then contributed to national insecurity. Similarly, approximately 30.5% (n=272) of the participants involved in the study disagreed, 6.7% (n=60) remained neutral, 41.1% (n=367) agreed, and 7.8% (n=70) strongly agreed with this viewpoint. Overall, 44.34% (n=396) of HH respondents disagreed strongly or disagreed, while 48.94% (n=437) agreed strongly or agreed.

From the results, it can be determined that those who disagreed/strongly disagreed (44.34%) vis a vis those who strongly agreed/agreed (48.94%) were almost evenly split. This could be indicative that the issue of access to employment could be one of the most contested and perhaps divisive matter among clans post-devolution in the region. A minority (44.34%) of the respondents strongly disagreed/disagreed with the view that personnel employed by the county governments in the North-Eastern region do not reflect equity among the diverse

clans, and thus, clans feel more divided, hence national insecurity. To support the minority view, a KI quipped.

Nobody has done actual breakdown of the county staff by clans or ethnicities and provided the information publicly whether it is the Senate Equal Opportunity Committee or anybody. What we have are just perceptions of inequality but there is no confirmed statistics. So every clan might wrongly feel they are not well represented in the county's workforce (KI 5: December 2022).

The remark by KI 5 that 'nobody has done actual breakdown of the county staff by clans or ethnicities and provided the information publicly whether it is the Senate Equal Opportunity Committee or anybody' indicates the failure of some frameworks to execute their role as envisaged. The Republic of Kenya (2017) outlines the key function of the Senate National Cohesion, Equal Opportunity, and Regional Integration Committee as providing oversight in devolved governance and specifically ensuring equality of opportunity to all without discrimination to allow for quality life for all and integration. NCIC is expected to conduct ethnic and diversity audits in the public employment register to ensure that it reflects the face of Kenya pursuant to Article 7 of the NCI Act 2008 (NCIC, 2016). The Kenya Constitution 2010, which anchors devolved governance, through Article 27 and 232 (1) (h), also expressly prohibits any form of discrimination based on, among other social identifiers, ethnicity, gender, and religion and further requires employees of the public service to reflect Kenya's diversity. This is critical because offering equitable job opportunities is of political significance as it may increase trust in governance and promote

inclination for peace (Ogbuanya & Michael, 2015). Therefore, the two bodies, namely the Senate National Cohesion, Equal Opportunity, and Regional Integration Committee and NCIC, have a role in ensuring that speculation on marginalisation in public employment opportunities does not arise, hence, national security. Notably, however, clannism is not factored into the guidelines. In addition, there is no requirement for mainstreaming of clans in any government documentation. This makes it difficult to verify the speculation.

The words ‘what we have are just perceptions of inequality but there are no confirmed statistics’ by KI 5 underscore the prevalence of potential dismissive attitudes that may be detrimental to local and national security in the North-Eastern region. Such attitudes and perceptions can erode inter-clan trust and harm the credibility of governance institutions. As such, it may exacerbate inter-clan tensions and hence insecurity. As earlier argued, perceptions of marginalisation may at times precipitate violence (Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, 2019) and hence insecurity. This impacts the benefits of devolution as envisioned, hence creating conditions for national insecurity.

That said, in contrast, most respondents (48.94%) believed that the county governments’ employees in the North-Eastern region did not fairly represent the region’s many clans, which made clans feel more divided and contributed to national insecurity. This is hardly surprising, as earlier explained, kinship is a key

element in informing economic relationships in traditional societies and how power is exercised (Neuman et al., 2019). Therefore, it can be argued that since kinship anchors clannism, power on affording employment opportunities is exercised to benefit those who belong. Therefore, when clannism is exercised in determining who gets employed, this might result in the reinforcement of social and income inequalities and undermine the trust of the populace in governance and between clans, hence insecurity.

To buttress the majority view, a respondent said.

Politicians in county governance structures employ those who voted for them, in this case, members of their clans. This is because, it helps them secure their political base and guarantees them subsequent re-election. So the more, the politicians concentrate on rewarding their kinsmen, the more the other clans feel segregated (KI 4: December 2022).

The quote by K4 affirms the centrality of clan allegiance and belonging as a decisive factor in how employment opportunities are shared. This implies that those individuals who are excluded and thus unemployed may feel marginalised. As earlier argued, joblessness and the perception of marginalisation have a profound effect on security. For instance, the massive violence reported during the Arab Spring and internal strife related to Naxalite and Maoist in India is credited to, among other factors, lack of jobs (Synergia Foundation, 2017). In the same vein, perceptions of marginalisation have been documented as a risk factor for crime and violence in Mombasa and Isiolo Counties, Kenya (Mkutu et al.,

2017). Therefore, those who feel persistently excluded in job opportunities may experience conditions of insecurity.

Clan allegiance and belonging as a decisive factor in how employment opportunities are shared also means that those who secure employment are not necessarily competent. An incompetent workforce may lead to inefficient service delivery, ineffective development project implementation, and nonresponsive policies due to lack of know-how. It may also create avenues for corruption and general mismanagement. Therefore, staff incompetence and the overall impression of partisan interests dominating governance structures may have an overall impact of fostering dissatisfaction with governance and eroding trust and hence insecurity. Martinez and Kukutschka (2021) echo this view and further elucidate that corruption, as may be enabled by clannism in determining employment, may incapacitate the capability of a government to resolve existing social conflicts. This has a potential negative security implication for a region that has had a history of inter-clan rivalry (Dahir & Ali, 2021). Consequently, it can be argued that the invocation of clannism in employment may lead to an incompetent work force, which may cause dissatisfaction in the community due to the inefficient attainment of devolution goals and further incapacitate the governance institution's ability to resolve social conflicts and hence, insecurity. Indeed, the Kenya Constitution 2010 assigns vital functions in service delivery and development to county governments, which, if not well implemented by an

incompetent work force, may impact drivers of insecurity such as dissatisfaction by the communities.

To support the majority views further, another KI remarked.

The National Cohesion and Integration Commission is sleeping on the job. Employees in the devolved governments may not be reflecting the image the of region and Kenya. A thorough audit is required (KI 7: December 2022).

The remark by KI 7 ‘employees in the devolved governments may not be reflecting the image of the region and Kenya’ further affirms the increased prevalence of marginalisation perceptions, which do not augur well for local and national security. It also affirms the centrality of ethnic/clan lenses in the politics of governance. This finding resonates with that of Bennett (2018). In a study of Isiolo county, Kenya, the scholar established entrenched identity as opposed to issue-based politics. The academic highlights the increased importance of ethnic and clan-based identity in enjoying the benefits of devolution, such as employment in the county. Consequently, he avers that the security situation in the county was fluid as devolved governance was not based on inclusion.

Therefore, partisan hiring practises based on clan identity in the North-Eastern region have fuelled sentiments of marginalisation to the detriment of interclan cohesion and may have contributed to local and national insecurity. Moreover, failure to adhere to legal frameworks such as Article 232(1)(h) of the Kenya Constitution 2010, which requires diversity in public offices, and failure of

mandated bodies (e.g., NCIC) to perform their roles as intended have been the root causes of devolved governments in the North-Eastern region's failure to provide employment opportunities to all as intended. As such, marginalisation coupled with failure to comply with legal requirements may exclude certain sections of the community from effectively participating in governance. This then may reinforce their sense of injustice, erode their trust in governance, make them vulnerable to non-conventional groups, and may generally fracture inter-clan cohesion, resulting in insecurity.

Reflecting on the theory of decentralisation, devolution gives power to the people at the grassroots to elect their leaders. Therefore, it is assumed that the citizenry at the grassroots will only cause the election of people who are well acquainted with the local context and aware of its needs and hence are able to provide responsive leadership. This theory also contemplates the employment of competent people who are fairly selected, thus resulting in responsive and effective service delivery and policies. Therefore, the theory assumes that through devolution, competent politicians will be elected, competent staff will be hired, elections will be fair, and hiring practises will be based on merit. The cumulative effect of all this is to reinforce trust in governance, enhance social cohesion, and allow for equity in the sharing of devolved governance benefits, which then contributes to security.

However, the findings suggest that devolution in the North-Eastern region may not have yielded responsive political leaders, competent staff, and fair elections/hiring practises. The findings seem to suggest that clannism and monetization of politics may have resulted in inequity, marginalisation, and erosion of trust in governance, which has occasioned possible insecurity. Therefore, clannism and monetization of politics serve to militate against the achievement of the assumptions of decentralisation theory and hence, insecurity. To this end, the findings of this study challenge the proponents of the theory who presume that through decentralisation, people at the grassroots are empowered. Instead, the study advocates a constructivist analysis framework that encourages embedding contextual issues in any social policy and actions. Accordingly, the technocratic approach that is often used in policymaking takes inadequate consideration of local contextual sociocultural knowledge (Ohajunwa, 2022), leading to generic solutions that are limited in contextual relevance. Taking into consideration contextual factors such as clans would provide a more holistic approach in empowering local communities at the grassroots level.

5.2.2 Clannism, Development Planning and Implementation, and National Security

This study investigated the role of clannism in formulating a development agenda and in informing the distribution of subsequent development/project funds and thus, implementation. In this regard, the study findings show that clans were

unfairly represented when county plans and strategies were developed and implemented. Moreover, certain clans had a say in how development/project funding was allocated. Cumulatively, this eventually enhanced feelings of marginalisation, fuelled interclan conflict, and increased national insecurity. Selected results that underpin this generalised view are presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.

Examination of Table 5.1 shows that approximately 11.1% (n=99) of the study participants drawn from the HH strongly disagreed with the view that clans were unfairly represented in the creation and execution of county plans and strategies, which anchor the development agenda, which in turn has encouraged conflict and national insecurity. A further 28.4% (n=254) of the participants disagreed, 10.4% (n=93) remained neutral, 30.2% (n=270) agreed, and 19.8% (n=177) strongly agreed. As a result, it may be inferred that around 39.53% (n=353) of the respondents disagreed strongly or disagreed, while 50.06% (n=447) agreed strongly or agreed.

Therefore, it may be claimed that a minority (39.53%) of the respondents drawn from the HH strongly disagreed or disagreed that there was unfair representation of clans in the development and implementation of county plans and strategies anchoring the development agenda in the North-Eastern region which has promoted polarisation and national insecurity. Conversely, most of the

respondents (50.06%) drawn from the HH were persuaded that there was unfair representation of clans in the development and implementation of county plans and strategies. In support of the majority view, a KI remarked,

Unfortunately, it is the county executive committee that ultimately decides on implementation of County plans. The executive at the top is the governor. The governor belongs to a clan, and he is under intense pressure from his clan to execute development projects that favour them (KI 11: December 2022).

The statement made by KI 11 suggests that County Executive Committee [CEC] plays a key role in carrying out and realising local government initiatives. In this context, Article 183 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution assigns CECs the duty of implementing laws and policies passed by county assemblies and managing the devolved administrations. Therefore, they are the county governments' executive branches, which gives them enormous responsibility for achieving the benefits of devolution. However, respondent KI 11 stated that at the top of the CEC is the governor who is under intense pressure from his clan to execute development projects that favour them, inferring potential coercion by the governor on the CEC to implement the role of devolved governance in a partisan way. This implies that the governor, being at the apex of power in devolved governance, may cause the division of benefits of devolution using clannism as the basis. This has the potential impact of intensifying existing clan inequalities with dire consequences for security stemming from agitation for equality from the underprivileged. To buttress the majority view further, another KI said,

The plans and strategies drawn have absolutely no correlation with what is implemented. Mostly the plans, such as the County Integrated Development Plans [CIDP] are done by technocrats with participation of the people. In this regard, while every sub county is told to list their priorities but when it comes to actual implementation, politics and clan considerations take precedence (KI 15: December 2022).

The words by KI 15 that ‘when it comes to actual implementation, politics and clan considerations take precedence’ suggest a very low level of participation by the ordinary citizenry in the conceptualisation of development priorities. The words ‘clan considerations take precedence’ point to institutionalisation of clan identity in the politics of the region which then informs the sharing of the benefits of devolution. Similar to Isiolo County, Kenya, as established by Bennett (2018), ethnic/clan considerations informed development priorities, resulting in uneven development, thus reinforcing existing power relation inequalities to the detriment of security.

Reflecting on the institutional theory that premised this study, the grievances on development initiatives in the North-Eastern region indicate that devolution frameworks such as policies that would anchor effective and equitable development conceptualisation and subsequent implementation are either non-existent or not fully implemented. Hence, the devolved governments in the region are performing suboptimally. Institutions can only bring about peace if they are backed by responsive frameworks that speak to context-specific realities. Therefore, the lack of frameworks that moderate clannism influence on the

implementation of development initiatives may be responsible for the insecurity that could prevail in the North-Eastern region.

Considering the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict, overriding clan patronage and interests has resulted in unequal implementation of development agendas to the detriment of local and national security. The institution of the clan has been politicised to whip and shape group thinking among those in leadership while isolating those who do not belong. As expected by the theory, clan identity has been strengthened because of disaffection with how development projects have been implemented. This may result in social and economic inequalities, with the marginalised clans inordinately affected. Consequently, it might negatively impact the social fabric by deepening clan cleavages. Moreover, it might erode the trust that the marginalised clans have in governance institutions. Cumulatively, social and economic disparities, weakened community cohesion, and lack of confidence in governance institutions could reduce the resilience of the marginalised in resisting triggers to conflict and violence and hence, insecurity.

Arising from the finding that clannism was instrumental in informing development plans, it was therefore not surprising that the majority of respondents (49.27%) held the view that specific clan(s) influenced and determined the distribution of development/project funds by the county governments, resulting in

an increased perception of marginalisation and hence national insecurity. This should come as no surprise considering that kinship is a key factor in traditional societies that fosters social cohesiveness, stability, and economic relationships (Neuman et al., 2019). Therefore, in this case, belonging to a certain clan is instrumental in determining distribution and access to development funds, which may then engender social inequalities and thus tensions and insecurity.

To support the majority view, a KI said the following:

The clans whose kin are in power influence the distribution of development/project funds (KI 22: December 2022).

The comments made by KI 22 solidify the importance of clans in decisions regarding the distribution of power and resources in the North-Eastern region. In essence, this magnifies existing inequalities and pushes the clans that are underrepresented in power or not at all, to the periphery. This has the possible implication of antagonising those who are not in the seat of power, where resource allocation decisions are made, and hence leading to local and national insecurity. This finding resonates with Jarabik's (2017) study on the influence of clannism in Hungary. In the referred study, the scholar noted that clan considerations had a significant influence on who accessed devolved governance benefits. This, the academic notes, resulted in poor accountability and lack of transparency, scramble for power, and inter-clan violent conflict.

The majority finding is also reflective of the stipulations of the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict. Social bonds based on shared kinship identities are essential in guiding decisions about resource allocation. By solidifying the support of their kinsmen through biased resource distribution decisions, it is hoped that this will aid those in authority in maintaining their positions. Therefore, politicians may present unequal resource distribution as a means of defending and uplifting their clan, thus appealing to the emotional attachment people have to their clan identity. Thus, it is possible to interpret the uneven distribution of devolved resources in the North-Eastern region is due to both deeply rooted clan identities and deft political manipulation. In this regard, politicians, through instrumentalizing clans, may have occasioned insecurity due to inter-clan divisions emanating from the use of clan considerations in premising resource division decisions.

Reflecting on institutional theory, the finding that in the North-Eastern region, specific clans were influential in determining the distribution of development/project funds by the county governments, leading to an increased perception of marginalisation and national insecurity, is also reflective of its stipulation. In this case, both formal and informal institutions play a cardinal role in informing norms and values that anchor decision making on diverse issues, including resource sharing. In this case, clans, which are informal entities, may have historically developed positions of privilege and deeply embedded cultural

norms that support their partisan interests in resource sharing. This may lead to antagonising clans that are disadvantaged, resulting in insecurity. On the other hand, devolved governments, being formal institutions, failure to adopt conflict-sensitive frameworks in the division of development funds may have resulted in insecurity by inadvertently contributing to inter-clan inequalities and tensions.

5.2.3 Clannism, Social Protection Programs, and National Security

Social protection services such as cash transfers to the elderly and the vulnerable in society, bursaries to students from impoverished families, emergency cash transfers during disasters, and food assistance during droughts, among other initiatives, may be critical in increasing the resilience of the community (United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, 2019) and in enhancing social cohesion and thus security. Norton et al. (2001) argue that the objectives of social protection programmes are to assure, among other merits, enhanced perceptions of equity and justice, promote intercommunal unity and solidarity, inculcate higher living standards, reduce poverty, and eliminate hunger. All this could enhance security by reducing socio-economic cleavages that may be prevailing in the society and hence, security. That said, social programmes like bursaries and cash transfers to the elderly might have a link with access to education and health care. Therefore, the intricate relationship between social protection programmes and access to health and education may be critical in addressing structural causes of violence/insecurity such as poverty.

Therefore, this study examined the role of clannism in facilitating access to social programmes to health care and education. Subsequently, the study found that social protection services and thus health care and education services in the North-Eastern region, were accessed depending on clan affiliation. This had the possible effect of increasing people's sense of distance from devolved governments, which had the unintended consequence of amplifying the inter-clan divide and, hence, local and national insecurity. The following are selected results that anchor this generalised view.

The study participants drawn from the HH were also asked to express their views on the claim that clan affiliation determined who had access to social protection services, which then contributed to national insecurity. On this account, from Table 5.1, it can be established that approximately 13.1% (n=117) of the respondents strongly disagreed, 25.4% (n=238) disagreed, 11.8% (n=105) were neutral, 36.1% (n=322) agreed, and 12.4% (n=111) strongly agreed. Overall, it may be established that approximately 39.75% (n=355) of the study participants drawn from the HH disagreed strongly or disagreed, whereas approximately 48.49% (n=433) agreed strongly or agreed. Therefore, it can be inferred that a minority (39.75%) of the respondents drawn from the HH held the idea that social protection programmes in the North-Eastern region were not accessed depending on clan affiliation, hence national security. To buttress the minority view, the respondents had the following to say:

Some of the positions that are responsible for implementing social protection programs are not necessarily held at the helm of the county. These programs are implemented at ward level where perhaps one can only discriminate based on sub clans and not clan per se (KI 6: December 2022).

The big part of social protection comes from the national government such as cash transfers to the aged and in this case, the county governments do not have much influence over it. Moreover, the counties in the North-Eastern region have not done much in social protection programs. However, if you talk about food distribution during drought, the county governments buy the food and equally distribute to all locations. They find it difficult to discriminate on clan considerations (KI 22: December 2022).

The remarks by both KI 6 and 22 seem to suggest that the county governments do not have notable social programmes. As earlier argued, the lack of notable social protection programmes may have negative implications for security as they have a profound effect on the resilience of the community to triggers of conflict. Initiatives such as feeding programmes for vulnerable households and cash transfers to impoverished households, the elderly, and People with Disability [PWD] may help reduce social and economic inequalities in a society and build social harmony and thus create possible conditions for security.

The remarks by KI 6 that ‘these programmes are implemented at ward level where perhaps one can only discriminate based on sub clans and not clan per se’ shows possible sub clan differences in power relations, thus impacting the trickle down of benefits of devolution with possible implications for local and national security. However, the examination of sub-clan power relations and their

subsequent impact on devolution and security was outside the scope of this study. Nonetheless, in a context where social protection programmes are implemented based on kinship, this may have an effect of entrenching the power hegemony of the dominant group, increasing social and economic inequalities between groups, and enhancing dependency of the marginalised/excluded. Cumulatively, this has an effect of disrupting social harmony as resources and power are concentrated on the dominant group, resulting in insecurity.

That said, most of the respondents (48.49%) believed that social protection programmes in the North-Eastern region were accessed depending on clan affiliation, resulting in national insecurity. To reinforce the majority view, a KI said.

Majority of the MCAs come from the same clan in most cases. Moreover, the governor, most often than not, comes from the clan of the majority MCAs. Therefore, in a way, these leaders try to allocate more social programs in the areas they come from and in so doing benefitting their clans (KI 20: December 2022).

The remarks by KI 20 that ‘majority of the MCAs come from the same clan in most cases’ further affirm the entrenchment of clan identity in the politics of the region. The words that ‘these leaders try to allocate more social programmes in the areas they come from and in so doing benefitting their clans’ further amplify the importance of political representation and clan identity in accessing devolution benefits such as social protection programmes. Moreover, this situation could be prevailing because, as earlier indicated in the results in the

preceding section, politicians have a huge dependency on obtaining clan support to ascend to political offices. Therefore, the distribution of social protection programmes in their cantonment and clans should be seen as an attempt to solidify their grip on power and assure subsequent re-election. As such, politicians fuel a sense of injustice and inequality through partisan social protection programme distribution, which excludes worthy but marginalised and disadvantaged clans and communities. This affects societal cohesion and could lead to conflict. Consequently, frameworks that capitalise on the benefits of clan identification while also ensuring fairness and inclusion in social protection programmes are needed to ensure interclan unity and harmony, and ultimately, security.

In support of the majority view that social protection programmes in the North-Eastern region were accessed depending on clan affiliation, resulting in national insecurity, another KI had this to say.

Distribution of bursaries is opaque. No one can tell how much each ward is getting for distribution to the needy students. There is a lot of under table dealings as a result certain clans end up getting more than others (KI 18: December 2022).

The words by KI 18 that ‘distribution of bursaries is opaque’ shows lack of public information sharing and/or failure to fully engage the public in the processes leading to bursary awards. Sharing information may be essential in creating a culture of accountability, openness, and justice in the public sector. Therefore, the

lack of public information sharing creates room for speculation that impact on reinforcing the divide between the dominant and minorities. As a result, this might heighten the feeling of disconnect from devolved governments and, in effect, amplify the perceptions of marginalisation among the minority clans and the marginalised. Consequently, this has a negative implication on the social fabric and hence, insecurity.

The words by KI 18 that ‘no one can tell how much each ward is getting for distribution to the needy students’ could be indicative that the lack of information sharing may have enhanced speculation of unfair practises. In a clannism context, public information sharing may be critical in healing the social divide between clans by mitigating suspicions. Moreover, through public information sharing, perceptions of transparency and accountability may be achieved. Indeed, social cohesion and thus security may be achieved through information sharing. Certainly, the sharing of public information has the effect of enhancing trust in governance structures and of addressing misconceptions (OECD, 2020), which is critical in building social harmony and thus security. Therefore, the lack of public information sharing may have created conditions of insecurity by reinforcing suspicions and undermining transparency and accountability. This could have resulted in a deepened clan divide and social disharmony, and hence, insecurity.

The words by KI 18 ‘there is a lot of under table dealings and as a result, certain clans end up getting more than others’ could be alluding to corrupt practises and the centrality of clannism in some aspects of social protection programmes, particularly those under the auspices of devolved governments in the North-Eastern region. As demonstrated by Martinez and Kukutschka (2023), corruption weakens governance structures as people lose trust in their impartiality and in concentrating power and resources in the hands of few. As such, when this vice prevails in a clannism context, it may reinforce the interclan divide and maintain power hegemonies. This may erode inter-clan trust and thus create tensions and possible insecurity. Therefore, in the case of this finding, perceptions of corruption, underhand dealing, and inequality in the region lay the ground for societal discontentment and insecurity.

Another KI also shared the views below in support of the majority opinion.

Cash transfers normally starts with registration of people who need to be supported. This registration is conducted by Chiefs, Sub Chiefs and Ward Administrators. These national and county government officials belong to certain clans. Therefore, unfortunately during time of registration, they tend to be biased in favour of the clans they come from. As such, their clans tend to benefit more (KI 5: December 2022).

The remark by KI 5 seems to suggest the creeping and/or embedment of clannism tendencies into national government structures. It suggests a possible negative impact on national government operations. While the assessment of the influence of clannism on national government operations and their subsequent impact on

national security was outside the scope of this study, this finding shows the unfortunate circumstances of those clans that are less represented in all levels of government. In this case, they end up feeling aggrieved by both national and county governments, with possible implications of them being less inclined to actively support and participate in initiatives meant to assure local and national security being advocated by these institutions. This is because they could harbour anger and animosity against these institutions and the perceived beneficiaries.

The majority finding that social protection programmes are accessed depending on clan affiliation, resulting in national insecurity, affirms the stipulation of the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict. In this case, the use of clan considerations in providing social programmes has fed into an ‘us against them’ divide as it has amplified interclan rifts. Reflecting on institutional theory, the failure of the county governments in the North-Eastern region to provide information to the public as expected by law (Kenya Constitution Articles 33(1), 35, and 232 (1) (f) and County Government Act 2012 Section 87, 93, 95, and 96), has triggered suspicion, animosity, and mistrust between the clans perceived to be beneficiaries and the clans that are not at the table where decisions on who has access to social protection programs are made. The resulting suspicion, animosity, and mistrust can cause social unrest and make people more susceptible to the attractiveness of non-conventional organisations

such as Al Shabab, which could offer an alternative socio-political system and hence, insecurity.

Unlike Diaz-Lanchas and Mulder's (2021) study in Spain, which documents high satisfaction of the citizenry with service delivery and hence national security, this finding points to a disfranchised society marked with inter-clan rifts due to opaqueness and unfairness in which social protection programmes have been rolled out. From a security perspective, in such a context, the result may include deepened inter-clan divisions, erosion of trust in governance institutions and thus their legitimacy, increased socio-economic inequalities, and humanitarian suffering in cases of disaster and hunger. All these factors may contribute to social disharmony, inter-clan tension, and fragility of governance structures and hence insecurity.

Arising from the finding that clannism was instrumental in informing access to social programmes it was hardly surprising, therefore, that a majority (49.27%) believed that, in the North-Eastern region, specific clans have preferential access to devolved services such as health and education, thus leading to feelings of discrimination and fragmentation amongst some clans and, thus, national insecurity. Indeed, when services such as health and education are easily accessible to all regardless of clan affiliation, the perception of equality may be ingrained in the thinking of the populace. Moreover, such shared facilities may

help in the development of a shared identity as an individual within the populace network in such shared spaces. Besides, equal access might reduce socioeconomic equality among the different clans, thus creating conditions for peace and security.

In line with this view, there is a link between lack of health care, disease, and poverty (United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, 2019). As such, through equal and equitable access to health care, structural causes of violence/insecurity such as poverty are addressed. Moreover, through accessible education, the general populace is more likely to comprehend and be engaged in local and national governance concerns (World Bank, 2021). Furthermore, they may have more access to employment opportunities and increased income potential (OECD, 2012), which might reduce economic inequalities. Therefore, cumulatively, equal and equitable access to health and education services has a possible implication for allowing meaningful participation in governance for all and reducing sociopolitical and economic inequalities. This could yield social harmony and more trust and legitimacy for devolved governance and hence security.

Arising from the majority view on preferential access to devolved services such as health and education, it can be argued that inequitable and unequal access to amenities such as health and education services undermines opportunities for

social networking among various clans, amplifies socio-economic and political inequalities, and erodes potential hopes for shared identity. Cumulatively, they might create distrust for governance institutions and deepen social divides, resulting in animosity and insecurity.

To support the majority view, KIs remarked.

By virtue of developing your backyard like what happens in national politics which is also mirrored in devolved governance, by virtue of this then it can be argued that some clans have better access to hospitals, schools etc Where the minority clans are and where they didn't vote for the incumbent local government, they are likely to have few hospitals and schools hence lowered access (KI 25: December 2022).

Who makes decisions to build schools? Who makes decisions to build hospitals? Who makes decisions to dig boreholes or provide piped water? Unfortunately, these decisions are made by human beings who are members of certain clans. At the top of them all is the governor. Therefore, let us not talk about specific clans but about the clan of the governor. The most powerful clan is the clan of the governor and most of the times the county executive members will be members of his clan. So, what do you expect? (KI 8: December 2022).

The remarks by both KI 8 and 25 underscore the centrality of clans in resource allocation decisions, in this case, in the building of public amenities such as schools and hospitals. The words by KI 25 that 'by virtue of developing your backyard like what happens in national politics' seems to suggest that the occurrences in the North-Eastern region are not unique to it but are the prevailing practise nationally. Indeed, the impetus behind the rolling out of devolution was to remedy, among other ills, ethnic-based domination of the state and unfair resource distribution (Mbori, 2021). Therefore, by developing one's own

backyard and using clannism as a resource allocation yardstick, politicians may be reinforcing existing socioeconomic and political inequalities among clans and localities within the North-Eastern region and further reducing the likelihood of developing a shared identity. As explained earlier, this could lead to social tensions and unrest and hence insecurity.

The words by KI 8 ‘that the most powerful clan is the clan of the governor and most of the times the County Executive Members [CECs] will be members of his clan’ implies that the orientation of the dominant clan(s) towards other clans may enhance or impede social cohesion and thus local and national security in the North-Eastern region. In this case, politicians from dominant clans employ their kinsmen to powerful positions such as CECs and allocate resources on a clannism basis to enhance their social capital within their clans to maintain political power. In so doing, they disfranchise the population that does not belong, resulting in potential grievances that could lead to insecurity if expressed violently. Besides, it also implies that the key to assuring efficient devolution and national security in the North-Eastern region lies in influencing and getting the support of the elites within the dominant clans to shape the socio-economic and political dispositions of their respective clans to be in tune with Kenya’s national values, which include respect for diversity. It could be interpreted that politicians are subtly manipulating their kinsmen and their identity to maintain a grip on power, but in

so doing, have created discord among the minorities, which could have created potential conditions for insecurity.

Overall, the majority finding is consistent with the stipulations of the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict. In this regard, politicians have instrumentalised their clans as avenues to power and resources. Accordingly, decisions on how resources are shared or where public amenities are built are made from a clan's perspective. These decisions by default, underscore who will have access to these facilities and who will not. This has a huge implication on local and national security due to the potential prejudice in accessing the amenities. Therefore, the dominant clan's power orientation to preserve the status quo undermines social cohesion and thus local and national insecurity. Moreover, by selfishly but expertly manipulating clan identities and sense of belonging through skewed allocation of resources, politicians have created unhealthy competition among clans and further amplified the inter-clan divide, resulting in insecurity.

The findings are also in tune with institutional theory. In this case, the absence or failure to comply with frameworks that would have moderated the influence of dominant social institutions/individuals have impaired the efficient functioning of devolved governments. County governments are expected to promulgate these frameworks and/or adhere to them to create an enabling environment for

preventing or managing conflict through mutual consensus and consultations. They are expected to allocate resources based on context-specific needs and not on clan-based prejudices. The resultant insecurity in the North-Eastern region is therefore indicative of the suboptimal functioning of the institutions of devolved governments.

5.2.4 Clannism, Accountability, and National Security

Respondents from the HH group were also questioned about their opinion regarding the statement that minority clans are prevented from examining the political and financial management of the counties in the North-Eastern region, leading to divisions within society and national insecurity. This line of investigation was important because, in a clannism context, the inclusion and participation of the minority is an important step towards overcoming perceptions of marginalisation and historical prejudices. Moreover, it is critical in assuring equity and in engendering openness and accountability in the stewardship of devolved resources. Therefore, inclusion and meaningful participation of minorities in the scrutiny of political and financial management of a local government is important in, among other merits, building social harmony, shared identity, and trust in governance structures. All these merits are important foundations of a stable society and hence, security.

Based on the data presented in Table 5.1, it can be concluded that approximately 16.7% (n=149) of the participants in the study strongly expressed their disagreement, 26.4% (n=236) expressed disagreement, 7.2% (n=64) remained neutral, 39.8% (n=355) expressed agreement, and 10% (n=89) strongly agreed. It can thus be determined that around 43.11% (n=385) of the respondents were in strong disagreement or disagreed, whereas 49.72% (n=444) were in strong agreement or in agreement. It can be concluded that a minority (43.11%) of respondents did not share the view that, in the North-Eastern region, minority clans are not afforded an opportunity to scrutinise county's political and fiscal management, thus creating social divisions and national insecurity. To support the minority's view, a respondent quipped.

More recently small clans have come together to form a block and negotiate. In Wajir County we have the 'downies' which consist of people drawn from other ethnicities in Kenya. They came together and elected their chairman and they have used this coalition to put the county government in check and to pursue their interests. The other counties in North-Eastern region and indeed the whole country is catching up to this new trend (KI 7: December 2022).

The remark by KI 7 that 'more recently small clans have come together to form a block and negotiate' implies that small clans have realised the importance of unity. Such coalitions may be critical in providing counterbalances in political and financial governance decisions by local governments dominated by the most populous clans. As such, when the strategies of the small clans are well planned and executed, it can result in amplified voices, which can serve to reduce

marginalisation on clan affiliation grounds. As a result of enhanced bargaining power, it may also engender more openness and accountability, which might be critical to the stability of the society and hence positive security outcomes.

That said, most HH respondents (49.72%) agreed that minority clans in the North-Eastern region are denied the opportunity to scrutinise county governments' political and fiscal decisions, which results in social divisions and national insecurity. To this end, a KI said the following:

Minority clans are not on the table where key decisions are made. How then do we expect them to scrutinise effectively the political and fiscal management of the county? The only way they can scrutinise is by going to the media, but this requires them to be very vocal (KI 23: December 2022).

The remark by KI 23 that 'minority clans are not on the table where key decisions are made' indicates the lack of inclusion in governance frameworks in the North-Eastern region which could precipitate social agitations. This is due to the possibility that minority interests may not be considered if they are not present when significant decisions are made. In addition, it might imply the maintenance of social injustices, with the dominant clans constantly getting their way. Besides, it entails less accountability and openness. Therefore, the negative consequences of not including minorities could heighten feelings of marginalisation which could subsequently fuel insecurity as the minorities push for greater equity.

The words by KI 23 that ‘how then do we expect them to scrutinise effectively the political and fiscal management of the county’ is a possible pointer to failure to comply with the Public Finance Management Act 2012, such as Section 131(6), which guarantees access to information that is in a form that can be understood by all for the purposes of such as audit. This has a huge implication for security as it may arouse suspicion of mismanagement and corruption, which then might lead to reduced trust in local governance frameworks. Cumulatively, this could lead to protest and unrest among the marginalised minority clans, thus inducing insecurity.

The words by KI 23 that ‘the only way they can scrutinise is by going to the media’ are very revealing. This may be a signal that responsive structures are required to support inclusion in governance. It may also be evidence of the urgent need for a local governance system reform to reduce the influence of clannism in governance by ensuring equity and openness, especially in devolved governance decision-making. This could also imply that minority clans have no other efficient channels for expressing their complaints, except the media. This may be the reason for the minority clans’ possible marginalizations and exclusion from governance, which this study earlier demonstrated would have a detrimental effect on security.

That said, the words by KI 23 that ‘the only way they can scrutinise is by going to the media’ point to the power of social media in governance. Particularly, in promoting social cohesion and good governance. Good use of social media could build harmonious relationships between governments and the populace (Guo et al., 2020). For instance, it could make equitable and responsive local governance decisions more visible, thus engendering support by the general populace, social cohesion, and security. It could also enhance local accountability and transparency, which is important in improving divisive issues, particularly in a clannism context, thus affording less suspicion, more trust, and social harmony, and hence, security.

However, failure to use social media for the general good provides unhindered opportunities to nonconforming groups, such as Al Shabab, to amplify social rifts due to grievances on governance issues in the North-Eastern region hence, insecurity. According to Alava et al. (2017), nonconforming groups have used social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to gain new members and organise activities with notable success. In this context, devolved governance complaints in the region give Al Shabab prospective material to use social media to rally support from marginalised clans and heighten insecurity in the North-Eastern region.

Overall, the finding that minority clans in the North-Eastern region are denied the opportunity to scrutinise county governments' political and fiscal decisions, which results in social divisions and national insecurity, is in line with those of Jarabik (2017). According to the scholar, clan relationships in Hungary play a considerable role in ensuring community security and gaining access to government benefits. In this regard, the researcher explains that elected leaders in the nation have been able to reduce the need for accountability of the power and resources handed to them through clannism. The author argues that as a result, Hungary has consistently experienced periods of political conflict and violence brought on by the struggle for dominance among various clans.

Moreover, this finding mirrors the stipulations of the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict. In this case, clan identities may have successfully been used to suppress minority clans' efforts to scrutinise political and financial decisions to consolidate power in the hands of the most populous clans. Since only a few members of the majority clan are in government, politicians might have expertly applied their belonging to the majority clan to garner their support and limit the inclusion and meaningful participation of the minorities in governance decisions. The marginalisation of certain clans in governance has served to exacerbate existing inter-clan social rifts and further enhanced animosity, resulting in insecurity. Consequently, the intricate relationship between clan identity politics, political scheming, and

insensitive governance decisions may have exacerbated insecurity in the North-Eastern region.

Furthermore, this finding contradicts the presumptions of decentralisation theory. In this case, the exclusion of minority clans from participating in local governance could be indicative of nongenuine devolution. Furthermore, it implies that devolution has not resulted in more oversight, accountability, or most likely, equitable resource distribution. Because minorities are not given the opportunity to engage in governance decisions that affect them, this has led to complaints. This might have harmed social cohesion between clans, resulting in regional and national insecurity. Indeed, the assumptions of decentralisation theory rely on the fact that through participatory governance, transparency and accountability will be enhanced, which then fosters mutual trust and thus local and national security by enabling peaceful coexistence among diverse population groups.

5.3 Summary

This chapter analysed the influence of clannism on the distribution of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and its consequences for Kenya's national security. The findings show a significant role of clannism in the distribution of decentralised governance advantages in the region, which could have an adverse effect on national security. Accordingly, deeply rooted clan identities and deft political manipulations influenced decisions regarding the

allocation of power and resources. Progress, lack of progress, or regression in obtaining decentralised power and resources depended on one's clan. Consequently, voting aligned with clan affiliations, perpetuated marginalisation, and consolidated power in the hands of dominant clans. Clans that lacked or had fewer representation in positions of authority within devolved governance structures received the least or no share of the devolution benefits. This further exacerbated existing clan disparities with possible negative security consequences as the economically exploited sought equality. Therefore, the need for equitable distribution of resources to maximise the benefits of devolution and maintain peaceful coexistence between clans cannot be overemphasised. The next chapter evaluates the role of elites within clannism in determining the sharing of devolved governance benefits and its ramifications for Kenya's national security.

CHAPTER SIX: CLAN ELITES, DEVOLVED GOVERNANCE BENEFITS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

6.1 Introduction

This study sought to evaluate the role of elites within clannism in determining the sharing of devolved governance benefits and its ramifications for Kenya's national security. Elites can be understood to enjoy the support of the bases from which they emanate (Abdullahi, 2021) hence wield substantial power to influence devolved governance frameworks and the sharing of their outcomes. To achieve the set objective, data were collected using a questionnaire for a HH survey (HH) that attracted 893 respondents, an interview guide for 39 Key Informants (KIs), and a documentary review. The detailed findings are highlighted below.

6.2 Elites in the North-Eastern Region

This study first aimed at identifying the classes of influential people in the North-Eastern region. Accordingly, the HH survey participants (N=893) were asked to identify three major classes of influential people in their clans. This means that 2679 (893 x 3) mentions were made per class of influential people in the region. The results were later collated and analysed. Figure 6.1 outlines the classes of influential people.




Figure 6.1: Elites in the North-Eastern Region

Source: Survey Data, 2022

Figure 6.1, shows that, in order of power of influence, the following are the elites in the North-Eastern region; clan elders (29.53%), politicians (29.41%), religious leaders (23.26%), business persons (7.28%), the rich/wealthy (6.38%), committees (3.36%), village elders (0.30%), women leaders (0.22%), teachers (0.11%), professionals (0.07%), chiefs (0.04%), and clans (0.04%). Overall, the results show that clan elders, the political class, and religious leaders wield considerable influence on the distribution of benefits of devolution. As discussed in the first objective, devolution benefits were conceived in terms of political, fiscal, and administrative authority. In this regard, this study sought to establish the influence of elites on the consequent benefits of devolution.

The benefits of political devolution, which entailed the choice of political leaders and service delivery, were established as influenced by clan elders. It was apparent that clan elders had a sway over who was to be elected in county leadership. This may not be surprising as the North-Eastern region has been known to operate on negotiated democracy based on clannism (Abraham, 2021; Cheeseman et al., 2019). To support the view that clan elders were very influential in the North-Eastern region, a KI quipped.

The political base of a governor or any politician for that matter is the clan. It is what gives him/her the job/power. So the clan arithmetic is very important for one to secure maximum votes. This where the clan elder becomes important (KI 14: December 2022).

The remark by KI 14 that ‘the political base of a governor or any politician for that matter is the clan’ outlines its centrality in determining whether one gets voted in or not. Key to this are clan elders that are influential in whipping their kinsmen to vote for one of their own and/or to vote in a certain direction. The clan elders appear to apply the African philosophy of Ubuntu, which means ‘I am because we are’ (Shero, 2014), to select their leaders who are anticipated to have the interest of their community. Accordingly, clan elders are seen as a symbol of unity and custodians of the community’s well-being (Karanja, 2022). To this end, Shero (2014) argues that clan elders are perceived to embody prototypes of clan ideals, which they leverage to mobilise other members of the group to operate collectively to attain shared goals. Therefore, elders who are invested with power

are expected to facilitate accountability by speaking directly to the leaders, escalating complaints to higher authorities, and taking the case to the public.

Reflecting on institutional theory, clan elders can be viewed as social institutions that influence how communities understand devolved governance, their attitudes towards it, and their propensity to maintain peace or resort to violence. They are at the centre of political manoeuvres that affect how different communities perceive one another. Therefore, clan elders can leverage clannism, which is anchored on blood and social relations, to provide a strong foundation for bargaining for political power. Accordingly, kinship creates a bond that solidifies social relations to create trust. This provides a platform for mobilising voters with great success, thus asserting the influence of clan elders in the distribution of the benefits of political devolution.

The central role of clan elders in determining the voting patterns of their folks is affirmed by ICG (2015). In the study, the institution noted that clan elders entered transactional politics with vying politicians in exchange for votes. Moreover, Abdi (2015) further affirms the influential role of clan elders in peace and security frameworks in the North-Eastern region. Citing the case of the Al-Fatah Council of Elders, the scholar notes the significant influence of clan elders in resolving inter-clan conflict in the region over the years. Therefore, clan elders in the North-Eastern region have considerable influence on devolved governance and security.

Regarding fiscal devolution, clan elders also seem influential through their power of mobilising voters to put their clansmen in political positions. For instance, as noted in previous sections of the findings, the office of the governor holds considerable power in the distribution of resources. Accordingly, the Governor holds the Authority to Incur Expenses [AIE]. Therefore, with an understanding of the powers of clan elders, the governor may be persuaded to consider the demands of clan elders. As already observed, clan elders are the prototype of group ideals that inform collective interests. As such, the leaders who were elected with the support of clan elders may be bound to fulfil the clan's interests. In addition, one of the roles of community leaders vested with power is to speak directly on behalf of the communities they represent (Shero, 2014). Therefore, it is possible to argue that the clan that produces the governor, an AIE holder, commands authority to extend the distribution of resources. In line with this view, Neuman et al. (2019) argue that kinship is a central factor underpinning economic relations, social cohesion, and stability in traditional societies. Therefore, clannism may be viewed as the organising principle of day-to-day life (Shero, 2014) of communities in the North-Eastern region. To this end, it is not surprising that clan elders influence the distribution of resources in devolved governments.

Clan elders also play a crucial role in the distribution of the benefits of administrative devolution. Clan elders may operate as gatekeepers for access to devolved services such as water and sanitation, agricultural and livestock

production, and infrastructure development because of their power over who is elected. As a result, clan elders may persuade political leaders to put the interests of their clans first when making decisions through negotiation or coercion. Consequently, clan elders have a significant influence on how administrative devolution is implemented because they are the spokespersons of their communal groups.

The findings in Figure 6.1 also show the growing influence of the political class on the distribution of the benefits of devolution. As previously noted in other sections of the results, politicians in the North-Eastern region could be experts in manipulating clan identity in their political machinations to acquire and consolidate power. It also appears that the political class, which was previously dependent on clan elders' selection, is gaining independence and is at almost the same level as clan elders. It will be interesting to learn how devolution has empowered the political class to have power in the North-Eastern region.

To buttress the view that politicians were an influential group of people, KIs said the following:

Politicians who are currently in office or seeking political office and are close to the governor have a major influence on devolved governance (KI 17: December 2022).

I think the influence of clan elders is slowly eroding as politicians now use money to form new coalitions premised on personal interests (KI 18: December 2022).

The remark by KI 17 seems to suggest that the influence of politicians is drawn from their proximity to those who make governance decisions. This could be seen as loyalists to the governor, drawn in this trajectory out of fear of the tight grip of clans on political power in the region. Citing Ogot on Mau Mau (independence freedom fighting group in Kenya), Anderson (2017) observed that individuals joined loyalist groups to the colonial government due to the unjustified deeds of the rebels. Relatedly, those who align themselves with the governor and/or political elitism could be those disgruntled by acts of clan elders who favour certain people, thus denying them a level playing ground, particularly in bargaining for leadership positions in the society. By gaining proximity to the governors irrespective of their clan orientation, this group of politicians depletes clan power and thus could revolutionise politics in the region. Accordingly, the new political power afforded through devolution seems to reveal the tension between the cultural capital of clannism and the democratic space created through devolution. Gould (2014), in his literary analysis of the American loyalists and patriotic debate, observed that such a space created a productive tension that revolutionised political space. To this end, those loyal to political elitism could bargain to consolidate the authority and independence of devolved governments by first shaping the electoral process to ensure effective participation of all members of the society. This would free the North-Eastern region from the grip of clannism and may enhance local and national security.

Other than revolutionising politics in the North-Eastern region, proximity to the centre of power could allow them to accomplish, among other things, advocate for governance frameworks (legislations and policies) that align to their political agenda and/or their clans, cause the passage of resource allocation decisions friendly to their major voting blocs (in this case, their clans), and appointments/employment of their favoured people into local governance structures. To this end, political loyalism may be seen not necessarily as support for the regime of the governor in office but rather as leverage couched in the hegemonic language for elected leaders to access resources to serve their electorates.

The remark by KI 18 introduces a new variable, money, that is used to influence governance. Indeed, financial resources can be critical in, amongst other things, political campaign financing, establishing social networks and alliances with other competing groups/individuals, in getting more media visibility hence the opportunity to influence political narratives, and in rewarding those who vote in certain ways. The remark by KI 18 also infers corrupt practises in attaining leadership positions, thus making elections not free and fair. To support this view another respondent remarked.

In the North-Eastern region, if you are a politician, two things are influential in getting you to be elected. These are the clan you belong to and the size of your pockets (KI 1: December 2022).

The remark by KI 1 underscores the perverseness of corruption and clannism in elections. It also underlines the importance of deep financial pockets in giving politicians power and influence over their kinsmen and the general population. This finding affirms that of Thibon (2021) on the influential role of politicians in determining how power is attained and exercised in Kenya. It also mirrors the view of the scholar that politicians use corrupt practices/money to obtain and consolidate power. The academic also notes the influential role of politicians in fanning conflict and in resolving them. In line with this view, politicians, for instance, can advocate for more equity in political representation and resource allocation and lobby for governance frameworks that underpin equity and accountability, thus creating conditions for security.

According to Figure 6.1, the other group that has significant influence is religious leaders. Accordingly, it is important to take cognisance of the central place of religion among the residents of the North-Eastern region. Most of the residents are Muslims, which has been embedded in their culture. To this end, it was not surprising that religious leaders had considerable power in the distribution of the benefits of devolution.

In this regard, a KI said the following in highlighting the significant role of religious leaders:

Religious leaders are important because they are the ones who bring together people to the deities they worship. From a societal point of view, they are guards of morality. They are the ones who determine what is right and wrong and, the community listens to them. In the process of passing religious messages, they also spread subtle and overt political viewpoints. In so doing, due to their significant influence, they shape the society to accept their viewpoints as the right ones (KI 3: December 2022).

From the remark by KI 3, it can be discerned that the power of influence for religious leaders comes from their position as guardians of morality. In this case, they may be perceived as epitomes of fairness and equity and hence have significant public trust. In line with this view, Omer and Jibril (2017) explain that religious leaders are seen to be above their clans' interests and generally pursue the interest of the public from a moral standpoint. The scholars also hold that, arising from their public perception of their morality, religious leaders may support and/or contest governance decisions from a moral lens. Therefore, it is not surprising that their congregants listen to them and heed what they say. This has an implication on the peaceful coexistence of various communities and thus may assure security. Having established the clan elites, the next section analyses their role in determining the sharing of devolved governance benefits.

6.3 Clan Elites, Devolved Governance Benefits, and National Security

As discussed in Subsection 6.2, elites have a considerable influence on the distribution of power and resources. Through this influence, they may or may not engender equity in the division of power and resources, assure the inclusion or exclusion of diverse interest groups, and cause the promulgation and implementation of governance frameworks that encumber efficiency and participatory governance. All these have consequential effects on local and national security, and therefore, it was important to evaluate the role of elites within clannism in determining the sharing of devolved governance benefits and its ramifications for Kenya's national security.

To achieve the set objective, data were collected using a questionnaire for a HH survey (HH) that attracted 893 respondents, an interview guide for 39 Key Informants (KIs), and a documentary review. The study HH survey respondents (N=893) were requested to provide responses ranging from SD, D, N, A, and SA on the roles of elites in determining the sharing of devolved governance benefits and consequently, the impact on national security. The results are outlined in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Influence of Elites in the North-Eastern Region on Sharing Benefits of Devolution and impact on National Security

Item	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total
Elites determine clan voting patterns in favour of their preferred candidates in elective offices thus recentralising power to specific individuals while marginalising the majority hence creating national insecurity	10.9% (97)	27.8% (248)	7.1% (63)	43% (384)	11.3% (101)	100% (893)
Elites influence County development plans and strategies to reflect their/clan interest, hence there is no fairness that promotes inter/intra-clan cohesion resulting to national insecurity	12.2% (109)	24.6% (220)	11.2% (100)	29.9% (267)	22.1% (197)	100% (893)
Elites influence employment of preferred personnel from their clan in County Governments leading inequitable access to employment prospects to all resulting to agitations and thus, national insecurity	13.5% (121)	24% (214)	13.1% (117)	35.5% (317)	13.9% (124)	100% (893)
County government awards benefits of devolution e.g., tenders, scholarships, grants etc unfairly to clan elites thus leading to national insecurity	11.8% (105)	24.4% (218)	12% (107)	30.5% (272)	21.4% (191)	100% (893)
Elites use clan affiliation and manipulate clan grievances for political mobilization to gain power and control over resources thus disfranchising others hence national insecurity	14.6% (130)	26.9% (240)	12.3% (110)	37.2% (332)	9.1% (81)	100% (893)

Clan elites control the design and implementation of legislations and policies by the County Assembly to reflect their interest thus prejudicing concerns of the majority resulting to social agitation for inclusion hence national insecurity	15.3%	26.3%	13.4%	31.2%	13.7%	100%
County power sharing arrangements meant to address peace and security amongst clans are controlled by clan elites leading to distrust and weakening of governance institutions resulting to national insecurity	(137)	(235)	(120)	(279)	(122)	(893)
	11.2%	25.4%	13%	38.3%	12.1%	100%
	(100)	(227)	(116)	(342)	(108)	(893)
Overall	12.78%	25.63%	11.73%	35.08%	14.78%	100%

Source: Survey Data, 2022

Table 6.1's overall results reveal that respondents were less likely to disagree (25.63%) or strongly disagree (12.78%) with the various statements being investigated. On the other hand, they tended to agree (35.08%) or strongly agree (14.78%) more. In general, the results seem to indicate that elites may have successfully manipulated clan identity politics to influence voting along clan affiliation and to pursue partisan interests in development initiatives, tenders/grants, power sharing arrangements, devolved governance frameworks, and employment. Consequently, this may have exacerbated inter-clan divisions, perpetuated marginalisation of minority clans and their exclusion from governance and had a negative impact on security. The specific findings

underpinning the generalised overview are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs in the following thematic areas: voting patterns, development plans, employment, tenders and grants, manipulation of clan grievances, legislation and policy making, power sharing arrangements and trust.

6.3.1 Elitism, Voting Patterns, and National Security

This study investigated the intricate relationship between elitism, voting patterns, and security. The study documented the growing influence of financial resources in determining voting patterns. Moreover, clan identity was central to assuming elective office. All these may have weakened governance institutions and yielded perceptions of inequality as dominant clans and wealthy elites easily accessed power. As a result, this might have had disastrous consequences for security. The specific findings to underline this generalised overview are presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.

Table 6.1 shows that 10.9% (n=97) of the study's HH respondents strongly disagreed with the view that, to recentralize authority and marginalise the majority, elites use clan voting patterns to support their favourite candidates in elections, which leads to national insecurity. In the same vein, 27.8% (n=248) disagreed, 7.1% (n=63) were neutral, 43% (n=384) agreed, and 11.3% (n=101) strongly agreed. Overall, it can be established that 38.63% (n=345) either strongly disagreed or disagreed, whereas 54.31% (n=485) strongly agreed or agreed.

Consequently, it can be claimed that a minority (38.63%) of the study participants from HH strongly disagreed or disagreed. Contrarily, it may be concluded that a majority (54.31%) of the respondents from the HH believed that elites determine clan voting patterns in favour of their preferred candidates in elective offices, thus recentralising power to specific individuals while marginalising the majority, thus creating national insecurity. To support the majority view, the respondents remarked.

Traditionally, clan elders would determine who would vie for election and how the clan would vote but recently, elites use a mix of cash, influence and promises to sway decisions in their favour. For instance, they would say, if you vote for me, I will give your clan this and that position. Bribes to other clans are also made for one to be voted in. There is one MP who spent Kenya Shillings 70 million in such bribes. Obviously, a large chunk of this cash goes towards mobilisation, transport and feeding expenses of the voters who are mostly nomadic pastoralists (KI 23: December 2022).

Devolution has brought about a new clan called money that is in the hands of the elite particularly, the governor. Money that is in control of the governor has completely changed the relationship dynamics in the North-Eastern region. For example, in the county of Mandera where a former governor was told by clan elders not to run, he told them, he will run and win. He later defiantly participated in the next elections, used a lot of cash and was re-elected to the consternation of the clan elders (KI 30: December 2022).

The remark by KI 23 seems to allude to the reducing influence of clan elders. It also seems to suggest a growing influence of politicians in the North-Eastern region. This perhaps explains the insignificant difference in the ranking of clan elders (29.53%) and politicians (29.41%) in the earlier findings of this study. The words by KI 30 that ‘former governor was told by clan elders not to run, he told

them, he will run and win' seem to affirm the growing influence of politicians and their boldness when confronting traditional influencers, the clan elders. Both KI 23 and 30 allude to the centrality of deep financial pockets in informing the growing influence of politicians on voting patterns by clans.

The significant influence of deep pockets in acquiring political power brings into play the possibility of inequitable political representation by discouraging the participation of non-wealthy politicians and/or not well-resourced clans, election of incompetent persons, and the prominent role of patronage in governance. This implies that using money, elites may perpetuate existing inequalities through political exclusion of some segments of the populace and may cause inefficient accomplishment of devolution goals such as development due to their possible incompetence. It is also possible that, with resources to influence the population, clan power is diminishing and that this could give electorates equal opportunity to select leaders who would work for them. However, this could only work if those with resources have the interest of the people at heart. All these have the possible implication of resulting in weak governance institutions that do not attract the trust of the general population. It may also yield perceptions of inequality as dominant clans and wealthy elites easily access power. Cumulatively, through these implications, elites may breed distrust of governance institutions, political exclusion, unrest, and agitation for a fair playing ground, hence, insecurity. This point of view is confirmed by DFID (n.d.), which asserted that political

manipulation by elites leads to exclusion, as in the case of this study, and the use of money has a relation to insecurity and inadequate development realisation.

To further buttress the majority view that elites determine clan voting patterns in favour of their preferred candidates in elective offices, thus recentralising power to specific individuals while marginalising the majority, creating national insecurity, another KI remarked.

We have failed spectacularly, especially Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, in public education on voting. There is high level of illiteracy in the North-Eastern region of almost 70%. Therefore, assisted voting is a common place. So, for the pastoralists in the region first they are mobilised by their clans, and then the elites within the clan help them to vote. So the clan through the elites will always know how you voted or as it always happen, the elites will make the ignorant voter vote according to their whims (KI 23: December 2022).

The words by K23 stating that ‘we have failed spectacularly, especially Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, in public education on voting’ is a further affirmation of the failure of public institutions to provide an enabling environment for effective devolved governance as per its ideals. That no and/or inadequate voter education occurs denies the ordinary citizenry their political rights and further makes them vulnerable to making ill-informed judgments in voting. This impact is particularly significant for minority clans. Indeed, in a clannism context such as the North-Eastern region, lack of voter education reinforces the power of dominant clans in governance decision making while consigning ill- civic educated minority clans to political exclusion.

Moreover, when people do not understand voting processes, they consider them unfair, thus perpetuating feelings of marginalisation and unrest and hence insecurity.

Suttman-Lea and Merivaki (2023), in an evaluation of the influence of voters' education in the United States of America, established its importance in increasing meaningful participation in the electoral process, strengthening voters' confidence, and increasing the perception of a free and fair electoral process. Notably, however, it is one thing to put in place a public institution and another thing altogether, to make it work for the population. Public institutions, such as the IEBC, appear to fail in their mandate, thus exposing the weak in society to many challenges. Weak public and private institutional frameworks portend failure, slow growth, and deepened poverty (Aron, 2000). Reflecting on the institutional theory that informed this study, institutions are governed by laws, and if not enforced, they may not work for the public good. Therefore, the finding of this study is that weak institutions are a liability to development in the North-Eastern region.

The words by KI 23 that there is 'high level of illiteracy in the North-Eastern region of almost 70%' are significant. Wesonga (2015) puts the adult literacy level for Kenya at 61.5% against the region level of 8%. This affirms the high levels of illiteracy in the region. As previously mentioned in this study, education

is crucial in altering deeply rooted cultural views that are picked up from one's environment (Altugan, 2015). Furthermore, it is anticipated that persons with higher academic attainment will be better able to make informed decisions in an election process, thus avoiding the negative influence of clannism and elites in the voting process. These have the potential to ameliorate the impact of clannism and elites in devolved governance and hence may assure national security.

However, it does not escape this study that perhaps the high levels of illiteracy are deliberately maintained by elites to reduce the personal agency and civic consciousness of the population. There is a nexus between illiteracy and political exclusion (Hedstrom & Smith, 2013), which then helps the elites maintain their influence over the poorly educated. As such, elites continue to exploit the ignorance of their kin and consolidate power. While doing so, they deftly play on the appeal of clan identity to convince their illiterate clansmen that once they are in power, they will raise their level of living.

The words by KI 23, 'so the clan through the elites will always know how you voted or as it always happen, the elites will make the ignorant voter vote according to their whims', paint a picture of an intimidated voter forced to vote in a certain way due to scrutiny by clan elites. It also paints a picture of a helpless voter, one who has no freedom of choice and hence political insecurity. It points to the manipulative behaviour of elites in getting their kinsmen from their clans to

vote the way they see fit. Empirical evidence as adduced by Holcombe (2021) shows that independent voters tend to vote differently when they are alone compared to when they are under the influence of elites. In such circumstances, the scholar contends, voters tend to vote according to the preferences/political persuasion of the elites. Therefore, it can be argued that through the undue influence of elites, voters are manipulated to reinforce existing socioeconomic inequalities and clan cleavages, particularly when clan identity politics is used. This has the effect of fuelling grievances due to inequalities and animosity from minority clans due to inequitable representation, hence insecurity.

Overall, the finding demonstrates that failure of institutions has created opportunities for the elites to design a pattern of voting that meets their desire to the disadvantage of the larger society. This exposes the North-Eastern region to poor leadership that is not reflective of their needs, thus thwarting the efforts of devolution. To this end, the benefits of devolution are felt by only a few in society, a factor that creates social disharmony in the community. Poor leadership affects the equitable distribution of resources across various groups in the population, thus increasing income inequalities, undermining the effectiveness of social welfare programmes, and ultimately resulting in lower levels of human development (Transparency International, 2014). Therefore, if the influence of elites is not checked, the resources that are meant to bring about equity may as

well be used to divide the region along clannism that could not only affect the security in the region but also the entire nation.

6.3.2 Elitism, Power Sharing, and National Security

This study also investigated the role of elites in power sharing arrangements meant to address peace and security among clans in the North-Eastern region. The study established that elites within the clan had authority over the county's power-sharing agreements. They skilfully used clan loyalty as a means of gaining political support and discouraged dissenting opinions. This led to a lack of trust, disgruntlement, and weakened local government institutions, ultimately resulting in national insecurity. The detailed results are presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.

Table 6.1 indicates that approximately 11.2% (n=100) of the respondents drawn from the HH strongly disagreed with the view that clan elites-controlled county governance power-sharing agreements designed to manage inter-clan peace and security breed mistrust and weaken government institutions and subsequently national insecurity. Roughly 25.4% (n=227) of the respondents disagreed. On the other hand, approximately 38.3% (n=342) of the respondents agreed with the notion, while 12.1% (n=108) strongly agreed. Roughly 13% (n=116) of the respondents chose to be neutral. Overall, approximately 36.62% (n=327) of the

respondents were either in strong disagreement or disagreement, while approximately 50.39% (n=450) strongly agreed or agreed.

As a result, it can be inferred that a minority of respondents (36.62%) did not believe that county governance power sharing arrangements meant to address peace and security among clans were being controlled by clan elites, resulting in distrust, and weakening of governance institutions and hence national insecurity in the North-Eastern region. Conversely, most respondents (50.39%) believed otherwise. Elites' control of power sharing arrangements suggests a lack of transparency and that the discussion leading to the agreed power sharing arrangement might be clouded in secrecy. This implies that the discussions might lack inclusivity, might be unfair, and may not be in the interests of the general community. In any case, when elites control discussions that are meant to yield inter-clan peace and security, they may pursue their selfish interests and thus perpetuate existing tensions and mistrusts between clans, resulting in insecurity.

To support the majority view, a respondent said the following.

Elites are at the centre of power sharing arrangements in the North-Eastern region. They do a lot of mobilisation of their respective clans in the periods leading to elections. The most unfortunate part is that members of the benefitting clan normally don't care of the credentials of the person who is being fronted. Even if he is stupid but belongs to the clan, it is okay (KI 20: December 2022).

The words by KI 20 that 'elites are at the centre of power sharing arrangements' implies the exclusion of people who are not elites. This exclusion can feed on

perceptions of marginalisation and frustration. This could lead to social discontent and tensions that might cause insecurity. The words ‘they do a lot of mobilisation of their respective clans in the periods leading to elections’ is further attestation of the resources elites invest in the electioneering period. This opens the possibility of corruption as elites seek to recoup their ‘investment’ post-election period. This might undermine the realisation of devolution benefits, resulting in joblessness, poverty, and underdevelopment, which contribute to structural causes of violence and hence insecurity.

The words by KI 20 ‘the most unfortunate part is that members of the benefitting clan normally don’t care of the credentials of the person who is being fronted. Even if he is stupid but belongs to the clan, it is okay’, suggests disregard for merit and competence in the choice of political leaders. This implies that clan loyalty might be the primary consideration. This has the possible effect of resulting in the possible election of incompetent people who cannot effectively represent the people. It may also reduce scrutiny and accountability as one’s clan affiliation provides protection. Besides, it may occasion mismanagement of resources and inefficiency in governance, hence reducing the benefits of devolution. All these, among other effects, disrupt peaceful coexistence among and between clans by deepening clan cleavages, arousing resentment, and eroding trust in local governments as stewards of the general community.

Another respondent commented.

One clan in Mandera County has an elaborate clan council. The impetus behind the formation of the elaborate clan elder system is to acquire and retain power. It is not to bring about peace or increase education services or access to health care, it is just to acquire and retain power. They say this our county and we shall control. Any MCA who does not take directives from them are removed (KI 11: December 2022).

The words by KI 11 that, ‘one clan in Mandera County has an elaborate clan council’, suggest concentration of significant power in the hands of a few. This could lead to the choice of political representation that reflects the views of the clan, resulting in inter-clan tensions. The presence of a clan elder system that helps in the consolidation of power in the hands of specific clans suggests exclusivity. In this regard, the clan elder system may result in the marginalisation of other clans in accessing power, which could then result in complaints and dissatisfaction. The concentration of power to decide the fate of a clan in the hands of a few and the possible exclusion of other clans in accessing power can result in conflict as intra- and inter-clan differences emerge over political representation and hence, insecurity.

The words of KI 11, ‘it is not to bring about peace or increase education services or access to health care, it is just to acquire and retain power’, underscore the impetus behind the formation of the elders’ council. It is to acquire and retain power, not development. This perhaps explains the sad state of education levels and the fluid security situation in the North-Eastern region. This undermines the

general welfare of the region and contributes to causal factors of insecurity, such as illiteracy and lack of health care, which were alluded to earlier. Indeed, the concentration of power in the hands of a few is a serious impediment to the realisation of development outcomes (Rigon, 2014) such as education and health care highlighted in this study.

The words by KI 11 ‘any MCA who does not take directives from them are removed’ signal the erosion of the tenets of democracy. In this instance, the elected are expected to be answerable and accountable to the electorates and not to clan elders, as is the case. Being beholden to clan elders, they may be inclined to pursue interests that may not be for the general good of the community. This creates possible conditions for disgruntlement and dissatisfaction with the political leadership and erosion of trust and legitimacy of local governments. All these can result in distortion of social harmony and the realisation of tensions, hence, insecurity. Moreover, it exposes elected leaders not to operate within rule of law. As explained earlier, the rule of law plays a critical role in operationalising governance and its effectiveness by enshrining the rights and responsibilities of the governors and the governed (Hussein et al., 2019; World Bank, n. d.). As such, failure to operate within the rule of law may create possible situations of corruption, abuse of office, inequality, injustice, and impunity. All these create possible conditions for the flourishing of criminality, abuse of human rights, and social unrest, resulting in insecurity.

The majority finding that county power sharing arrangements meant to address peace and security among clans are controlled by clan elites, leading to distrust and weakening governance institutions, resulting in national insecurity, resonates with Musse (2020). According to the researcher, clan leaders in Somalia have had a significant impact on the national security of the country as well as the achievement of federalism's goals. The scholar claims that elites take advantage of their clan networks to push their political agenda on a national level. When their agendas fail, this has led to several disputes. Furthermore, the author claims that suboptimal governance institutions have emerged because of the influence of clan elites, restricting the achievement of federalism's goals. Suffice to note however, unlike in Somalia, KHRC (2018) notes that clan elders' influence in power sharing arrangements in the North-Eastern region does not transcend beyond local politics. In national politics, voters in the region tended to vote according to their persuasion.

Reflecting on the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict, this finding resonates well. In this regard, clan elites appeal to the deeply ingrained clan identities of their kin to acquire power through undue influence on power sharing arrangements. Indeed, clan identity shapes the outlook of individuals and their persuasion to certain views due to their unwavering loyalty. Once they acquire power, clan elites pursue personal interests and, to an extent, their clan interests while potentially excluding other clans from enjoying

the benefits of devolution. The resultant power capture by the elites erodes trust in power sharing arrangements and in local governments. This weakens the governments and potentially makes them partisan in the execution of governance issues. This may have the effect of distorting social harmony by magnifying intra- and inter-clan differences and inequalities. As argued earlier, clan cleavages, marginalisation, and exclusion, resulting from the capture of power sharing arrangements by clan elites, may precipitate insecurity due to social unrest, tensions, and hostilities.

Reflecting on institutional theory, the optimal functioning of formal institutions such as local governments is informed by their adaptation to their environment. In this regard, the institutional environment in the North-Eastern region is shaped by amongst other factors, the influential role of clan elites in informing political power arrangements. The undue and negative influence of clan elites in informing power sharing arrangements and retention of power has occasioned the deviation of local governments from established norms and values that encumber inclusivity and equity in governance. In so doing, the clan elites' influence has transcended into local governments to a possible extent of local governments almost adapting the behaviours of the elites and the clans they emanate from. This has undermined the capacity of local governments to effectively conduct governance as expected, thereby eroding their trust and legitimacy, and creating potential for insecurity. Moreover, clans, as social institutions, play a significant part in ensuring that all

population segments in a society live in wealth and peace. They are required to resolve protracted disputes using systems such as clan elder systems. They are anticipated to favourably influence the perceptions of their communities concerning the causes of conflict. This will then influence their decision on how devolved governance should play out. The adoption of nonconforming social values by the elites thus explains intra- and inter-clan social disharmony and hence insecurity.

6.3.3 Elitism, Manipulation of Clan Grievances, and National Security

Investigating the role played by elites in manipulating clan allegiance for political mobilisation is critical as it impacts inter-clan relations, resource division and trust, and hence, security. To this end, the study established that elites used clan association and manoeuvred clan grievances to rally support and acquire authority and dominance over devolved resources and power, consequently excluding others and resulting in national insecurity. The detailed results are presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.

Table 6.1 shows that approximately 14.6% (n=130) of the HH respondents strongly disagreed with the view that, for political purposes, elites employed clan allegiance and the manipulation of clan grievances, thus disenfranchising others, and contributing to national insecurity. Around 26.9% (n=240) of the HH respondents disagreed, 12.3% (n=110) were neutral, 37.2% (n=332) agreed, and

9.1% (n=81) strongly agreed. In summation, roughly 41.43% (n=370) either disagreed strongly or disagreed, while 46.25% (n=413) agreed strongly or agreed.

It can be inferred that a minority (41.43%) of the respondents from the HH disagreed strongly or disagreed with the view that elites used clan affiliation and manipulated clan grievances for political mobilisation to gain power and control over resources, thus disfranchising others and resulting in national insecurity. In contrast, a majority (46.25%) of the HH respondents had an opposing view. This has a significant impact on security because such manipulation can lead to strained clan relations and cooperation and diminished faith in local governments from excluded clans. Additionally, it may result in an uneven distribution of authority and resources, which can heighten tensions between clans by accentuating disparities and by extension, insecurity.

To support the majority, KI remarked.

Elites manipulate clan grievances. At the moment, all the clans that did not make it in the last election are regrouping. They are strategizing. Key to all this are the elites. They are stoking emotions and fuelling perceptions of marginalisation with an eye towards the next election cycle (KI 11: December 2022).

The remarks by KI 11 underscore the centrality of having a united clan position in accessing power and resources associated with devolution in the North-Eastern region. In this case, the elites identify with their clans as it is a sure way to gain power. The words ‘they are stoking emotions and fuelling perceptions of

marginalisation with an eye towards the next election' indicate the elites' ploy to exercise negative clannism. In this case, clan identity is not used as a social identifier but as a vessel for political ascendancy and access to resources. The 'incitement' by elites also creates conditions for possible violence in agitation for equality.

Therefore, elites strategically play on the emotions of their kin to motivate them and establish a favourable electoral stance. However, this has a detrimental effect on security because it may deteriorate relations between clans and cause elections to become highly charged and polarised along clan lines. The prevailing tensions could easily translate to violence and hence insecurity. As demonstrated earlier in this study, elections in Kenya are highly charged (KHRC, 2018), and as such, the manipulation of grievances can only worsen the situation, with catastrophic effects on security.

This finding also mirrors that of the Humanitarian Foresight Think Tank (2015) view that clan-based political mobilisation by elites is a prevalent practise in the North-Eastern region. The institution also takes note of the growing importance of clan identity as a central feature in the prosecution of grievances and in the sharing of devolution benefits. The key in exploitation of grievances and enjoyment of benefits are elites. As such, elites have managed to ingrain to the masses the need for clan identity and allegiance in the regional political economy

in which inter-clan competition occurs. The institution contends that unfair access to power and resources has precipitated violence and hence insecurity in the North-Eastern region, Kenya.

To further buttress the majority view that elites used clan affiliation and manipulated clan grievances for political mobilisation to gain power and control over resources, thus disfranchising others and hence national insecurity, another KI noted this.

One of the reasons why clan affiliation and grievances is a big thing, is if you look at history, re-election of governors in the North-Eastern region is one of the most difficult thing. People are always mostly one time governor other than in Mandera County, this is the third cycle of devolution, and it is only in Mandera that we had a governor serving the first two cycles. The reason is you cannot satisfy everybody. Once you win, the problem of incumbency is that a lot of people will start having problems with you because you promised certain things or rather there are perceptions that you promised some things which might not be true and, you seem not to fulfil them and therefore, the next time you are running, a whole host of people will be against you not because you are bad, but because you are incumbent and therefore, they think you have not done what you are supposed to do (KI 30: December 2022).

The remarks by KI 30 allude to the unsatisfied expectations of the public regarding the realisation of devolved governance benefits. The reference to perceived and actual unfulfilled promises indicate the manipulative nature of elites as they exploit the vulnerabilities of would-be voters. It also shows the length and breadth to which elites go to access and retain power. This may also be inferred as promises for rewarding the voting constituency. In all this, elites try to

optimise the support of their clan base. Elite manipulation, however, has disastrous effects on security because unmet expectations and broken promises may increase social unrest, grievances, and potential conflict as people feel left out, deceived, and betrayed. This may lead to decreased confidence in local administrations, as well as environments where resentment and frustration thrive, leading to instability and circumstances for radicalisation into hostile groups such as Al Shabab, which leads to insecurity. Assuring peace and security in these circumstances requires addressing these concerns through open dialogue, responsible governance, and keeping promises.

Reflecting on the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict, elites use clan affiliation and their individual clans' natural desire for domination and power to further their personal goals. In this way, elites use promises to garner support for gaining and securing control over resources and access to power while deflecting attention away from real governance issues. Therefore, because of these self-serving efforts, elites may fail to achieve the objectives of devolved governance, which may be due to, among other things, poor management, lack of resources, and political machinations by elites to preserve existing inequities. Accordingly, elites might precipitate local insecurity due to a combination of historical differences between clans and their use of clannism lens in holding local governments to account, hence inter-clan tensions, frustrations, and dissatisfaction among the marginalised population/clans. All

these culminate in reduced trust in local governments and conditions for insecurity as the populace protest over unfulfilled promises and clans clash over historical differences accentuated by false promises made by elites from opposing clans.

6.3.4 Elitism, Development Plans, and National Security

As established earlier in this study, uneven development is one of the causal factors leading to insecurity. Therefore, this study examined the influence of elites in development planning and consequently, their impact on security. To this end, the study established that elites manipulated development plans to largely reflect their interests and those of their clans. This may have resulted in lopsided regional development and socioeconomic inequalities. Consequently, might have aroused anger against the inequities, thus precipitating insecurity. The detailed findings are discussed in the following paragraphs.

According to Table 6.1, it can be established that approximately 12.2% (n=109) of the respondents from the HH strongly disagreed with the assertion that there is no fairness that encourages inter- or intra-clan cohesion since elites influence county development plans and strategies to represent their or clan interests. This leads to national insecurity. In the same account, approximately 24.6% (n=220) of the respondents disagreed, 11.2% (n=100) were neutral, 29.9% (n=267) agreed, and roughly 22.1% (n=197) strongly agreed. In summary, approximately 36.84%

(n=329) of the HH respondents either disagreed strongly or disagreed, while 51.96% (n=464) agreed strongly or agreed.

Accordingly, it can be concluded that a minority (36.84%) of respondents did not believe that elites influenced county development plans and strategies to reflect their/clan interests in the North-Eastern region, resulting in a lack of fairness and inter/intra differences, hence national insecurity. On the other hand, it can be determined that the majority (51.96%) of respondents from the HH shared an opposing view to the minorities. To support the majority view, a KI said the following:

Clan elites particularly the elders and educated are normally under pressure to show the benefits obtained from being in power. In order to maintain grip on power, they skew development plans to suit their clan interests (KI 15: December 2022).

Elites are largely driven by self-interest and not necessarily those of their clans. What they do is that they front what they want as interest of the clan. So basically, what the elites do is to engage in horse trading. They say, for example, we are going to bring you this number of votes and in turn, you are to do A B C (KI 17: December 2022).

The remarks by KI 15 and 17 both affirm horse trading that occurs before the election. It shows entrenched voter bribery and corruption and its consequent impact on undermining participatory governance as enshrined in the assumptions of devolution. Voter bribery, corruption, and the commercialisation of politics all can lead to unequal distribution of wealth and power. Conflict could result from this because people who feel excluded, marginalised, and have had their

complaints ignored may turn to violence. Additionally, if the populace believes that the local administration that results from tainted elections lacks legitimacy and acceptance, the government may lose its ability to solve governance problems that might improve security. Indeed, there is empirical evidence of the intricate relationship between clan identity politics, voter bribery/corruption, fraudulent elections, and violence (KHRC, 2018).

The words by KI 15 ‘in order to maintain grip on power, they skew development plans to suit their clan interests’ underline the centrality of clannism in access to power and in informing resource allocation decisions. At the local level, this may imply potential marginalisation and exclusion of other clans from development. This might cause feelings of resentment and animosity towards the benefiting clan. Moreover, it might feed into social unrest and potential violence as the excluded agitate for fairness and hence insecurity. Moreover, such kind of local politics where development is anchored on clan/ethnic identity, can negatively impact on shared national identity and fragment the society along ethnic/clan identities. This may harm social cohesion and create calls for secession with likely violence.

By skewing development plans to suit their clan interests, elites entrench clannism as the populace conflate having one of their own in power as a sure way of improving their living standards and development. However, in this case, the

political elite also serves his/her own interests to consolidate power. The politicisation of ethnicity and its conflated access to development could make elections hotly contested by clans not in power, and hence may yield violence. KHRC (2018) explains that one of the primary issues that elections seek to address in Kenya is development, and as such, it has been employed to consolidate power. The institution observes that the skewing of development initiatives along identities such as ethnicities/clans has polarised Kenya and increased insecurity.

This study finding that elites influence county development plans and strategies to reflect their clan interests hence, there is no fairness that promotes cohesion, resulting in national insecurity, mirrors that of Gullete (2010). In a study of Central Asia, the scholar found that elites functioned as middlemen between their clans and others. They represented their clans in negotiations for the allocation of resources and power. Therefore, the author argued that clan elites had a significant impact on the social fabric because of their crucial position in the brokerage of power and resources. In the case of this study, they could either ensure peace between clans or spark strife through their disposition.

This study finding also echoes the Humanitarian Foresight Think Tank (2015) result. In a study of the North-Eastern region, Kenya, the institution notes that elites in the region have always sought to influence resource allocation decisions

to suit their respective clans. This, it notes, caused the region to be embroiled in a long-drawn conflict over the allocation of resources and positions. The institution notes that the reported inter-clan conflicts in the region, such as that between the Degodia and Garre clans in Mandera County, were motivated by self-preservation drives of dominant clans seeking to retain unhindered access to power and resources. Central to all this is the elites' negative disposition towards other clans that trigger these conflicts.

Considering the stipulations of the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict, the findings of this study are in line. In this case, elites have politicised clannism and used it as a conduit of access to power for selfish gains. They have entrenched clan-centric thinking into the population by skewing development plans in favour of their clans. In so doing, they have made their kin confuse their belonging to the clan as a sure way for social and economic development. As such, they consolidate the support of their kinsmen and legitimise their flawed distribution of development. This possibly creates us against them narrative with the marginalised potentially engaging in social unrest and violence to redress the situation. Indeed, skewing development plans may create tensions, animosity, and violence from the population that does not belong to the dominant clan as they seek equal access to power and resources. Moreover, underdevelopment in areas and groups not favoured by elites may lead to crime and violence as they might have limited access to education, healthcare,

and employment opportunities. This may result in diseases, unemployment, and poverty, which may cause frustrations among the populace and further make them vulnerable to violence and radicalisation into terrorism. It will be recalled that, in the preceding sections, this study demonstrated the link between lack of healthcare, unemployment, low incomes, and insecurity.

6.3.5 Elitism, Employment, and National Security

Joblessness was documented by this study as one of the structural causes of violence and insecurity. Consequently, this study sought to establish the role of elites in employee hiring practises of devolved governments. To this end, the study established that elites had a significant impact on the hiring of favoured individuals from their own clans in local governments in the North-Eastern region. This led to an uneven distribution of job opportunities, causing unrest, and ultimately posing a threat to national security. Detailed findings are presented and discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

The HH respondents were questioned on whether elites had an impact on who the county governments hired, resulting in unequal access to employment prospects for all, which in turn led to protests and, ultimately, national insecurity. Regarding this, from Table 6.1, roughly 13.5% (n=121) of the respondents strongly disagreed, 24% (n=214 in physical count) disagreed, 13.1% (n=117) were neutral, 35.5% (n=317) agreed, and 13.9% (n=124) strongly agreed. Overall, around

37.51% (n=335) of the respondents either disagreed strongly or disagreed, whereas 49.38% (n=441) strongly agreed or agreed.

It can be inferred that a minority of respondents from the HH (37.51%) disagreed strongly or disagreed with the idea that elites influenced the employment of preferred personnel from their clan in county governments, leading to unequal access to employment opportunities for all, resulting in agitation and, consequently, national insecurity. The majority (49.38%) of HH respondents, on the other hand, believed otherwise. To support the views of the majority, the KIs said the following.

Elites use the names of their clans as vessels of pursuing own interests and for their families. They hold a lot of influence as they are ones who fund the campaigns of the governors and MCAs. The expectation is once their candidate wins, they will have access to benefits such as employment opportunities. And yes, while they influence the employment of their clan members, these are mostly their close family (KI 13: December 2022).

The reason why clan elites spare no resources in mobilising voters is because they want to be on the table where key decisions on devolved governance are made. They want their sons to be the speakers of county assemblies, or county executive committee member, chief of staff, chief of finance amongst other key positions so as they can manipulate things from the inside (KI 9: December 2022).

From the remarks by KI 13 and KI 9, it can be discerned that elites heavily invest in pre-election political campaigns with the hope of a return on investment in the post-election phase. This is affirmed by the words ‘clan elites spare no resources in mobilising voters’ as attributed to KI 9. As such, this has the potential to

engender corruption, patronage, and unfair elections with possible negative effects on security. These findings are also reflective of those of Tunio and Nabi (2021). In Pakistan, according to the researchers, because of elitism, patronage, corruption, and other undesirable behaviours displayed by powerful groups, especially elites, the theoretical benefits of devolution have not been achieved resulting in insecurity.

The words of KI 9 that ‘they want their sons to be the speakers of county assemblies, or county executive committee member, chief of staff, chief of finance amongst other key positions so as they can manipulate things from the inside’ is symptomatic of the elite capture of devolved governance. Such nepotism may hinder the socioeconomic mobility of the general populace as the benefits of devolution are confined to a small group of people closely related to the elites. This could have the impact of reinforcing intra- and inter-clan inequalities. As such, the perceived favouritism of close members may result in a loss of trust in governance institutions and may further lead to social unrest and resentment of the benefiting relatives. This could jeopardise the general security of the clans to which the elites belong and their family members, as the excluded might use violent means to agitate for more fairness.

This finding resonates with Shahow’s (2023) observation that there has been a growing perception by the public in the North-Eastern region, Kenya, that elites

are perpetuating self-interest in devolved governance. The scholar notes a growing trend of elites within and outside devolved governance structures in the region that cause the employment of their relatives without consideration of fair labour hiring practises. In each of the three counties, those in positions of power and influence in devolved governance hired their immediate kin as "ghost workers" so that they could be paid for no work done. In this case, ghost workers can be conceptualised as individuals who are in the employment records and are remunerated but do not do any work. As such, ghost workers perpetuate corruption and cause governance institutions to lose the trust of the public.

The findings of this study also echo the stipulations of the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict. In this case, the self-tendencies of elites, clothed in the guise that their clan(s) are benefitting, disfranchise those who do not belong. It makes the marginalised clans, including the sidelined individuals within the benefitting clan, seek ways, including violence, to attain equality. Moreover, the elite disposition further accentuates intra- and inter-clan inequalities. This has the potential to stir intra- and inter-clan conflict due to increased perceptions of unfair practices, and hence, local and national insecurity.

6.3.6 Elitism, Tenders and Grants, and National Security

The study investigated whether elites influenced the awarding of benefits of devolution, such as tenders, scholarships, and grants. Consequently, the study found that the county governments in the North-Eastern region unfairly distributed benefits of devolution, such as tenders, scholarships, grants, etc., to clan elites, which ultimately resulted in national insecurity by potentially causing certain groups to feel marginalised and resentful. The specific results anchoring this generalised overview are presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.

According to Table 6.1, approximately 11.8% (n=105) of the HH respondents strongly disagreed with the claim that clan elites are unfairly given preference under devolution by the county government to benefits such as grants, scholarships, and contracts, which fuels national insecurity. Approximately 24.4% (n=218) of the respondents disagreed, 12% (n=107) were neutral, 30.5% (n=272) agreed, and 21.4% (n=191) strongly agreed. Overall, approximately 36.17% (n=323) of the HH respondents either disagreed strongly or disagreed, while roughly 51.85% (n=463) agreed strongly or agreed.

Therefore, a minority of respondents (36.17%) did not believe that the county governments of the North-Eastern region unfairly awarded benefits of devolution, such as tenders, scholarships, grants, etc., to clan elites, thus leading to national

insecurity. This may be due to many factors, including inadequate information regarding the extent of elites' preferential treatment, respondents' sincere belief that such awards were given fairly, or the allure of clan identity, which has pre-empted and influenced their perceptions of fairness. That said, to support the minority view, a respondent remarked,

Majority of the times, the beneficiaries are individuals and not clans. There are some tenders where irrespective of the clan, the person who is given the tender is the person who can give a kick back. This overrides plan. And it happens, sometimes you are told that the right-hand person is Mr A, B or C. He is the sleeping partner who determines how the benefits are shared and kickbacks sourced. This person is not necessarily from the Governor's clan but is usually from the Somali community (KI 1: December 2022).

The words 'there are some tenders where irrespective of the clan, the person who is given the tender is the person who can give a kick back,' as attributed to KI 1, further attest to the entrenchment of corruption in devolved governance. As earlier argued, corruption has the potential to reinforce existing poverty levels by limiting opportunities for the general population with low incomes to emancipate themselves from the shackles of poverty and by excluding those who do not belong. Moreover, it limits the opportunities to upset the power balance by consigning the under-resourced population and communities to the periphery, thus confining the benefits of devolution to a select few. In line with this view, in most instances, due to corruption, the destitute are not able to access health and education services (World Bank, 2000). It is the resultant breakdown in service delivery due to corruption that may stimulate animosity and resentment by

marginalised and excluded individuals, creating possible insecurity situations. Moreover, in a context where different clans and individuals have different wealth levels and access to devolved resources, this could perpetuate the intra- and inter-clan divide and thus create insecurity.

The words by KI 1 that, ‘this person is not necessarily from the Governor’s clan but is usually from the Somali community,’ is further affirmation of elite capture of the devolved governance structures in the North-Eastern region. This has the effect of placing power over devolved resources in the hands of a small group of people while prejudicing the majority. It has the potential to stir a class conflict between the haves and the have nots. However, the examination of his potential class war was beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the implication is that elite capture might occasion both intra- and inter-clan inequalities, which can then distort social harmony to the detriment of security.

Contrarily, a majority (51.85%) of the respondents agreed strongly or agreed to the assertion that the county government unfairly awarded benefits of devolution (e.g., tenders, scholarships, grants) to clan elites, thus leading to national insecurity. This is hardly surprising, as evidence has been found that in some instances, elites tend to have undue and unfair access to resources and power when approaches to governance and development that give more power to those at the grassroots are employed (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007). Asymmetrical and

unfair allocation of the benefits of devolution can cause certain groups to feel marginalised and resentful. This could then lead to hatred and complaints, which could produce insecurity due to exclusion and bias.

To buttress the majority view, KI said the following:

Unfortunately, clans applaud once an elite from their clan get benefits such as tenders even if they don't get to enjoy such benefit. The fact that one person from their clan has become rich, even if he doesn't give back to the clan, the clan is happy. In any case, the benefits are a return for their investment after having bankrolled the campaigns of the politicians in power (KI 8: December 2022).

The words by KI 8, 'unfortunately, clans applaud once an elite from their clan get benefits such as tenders even if they don't get to enjoy such benefit,' affirms the entrenched clan-based identities in evaluating the performance of devolved governments in the North-Eastern region. This might imply a sense of clan pride and loyalty that underlines deeply ingrained social and cultural norms of the clans. The quote, 'the fact that one person from their clan has become rich, even if he doesn't give back to the clan, the clan is happy', attests to the strength of clan identities. This confirms the gullibility of the members of the dominant clan to the machinations of the elites. It also reflects potential pride in dominating other clans through socio-economic and political means. This has the potential to exacerbate existing inter-clan inequalities and reinforce perceptions of marginalisation, resulting in insecurity.

The words by KI 8, ‘in any case, the benefits are a return for their investment after having bankrolled the campaigns of the politicians in power’, is another example of the enormous amount of money elites spend on political campaigns. This means that the public in the North-Eastern region—especially members of the ruling clan(s)—are robbed of their civic consciousness and personal agency to vote against their better judgement through the resources invested in the campaign period. This may also mean that the public, having been invested in during the election period, abdicated their responsibility to provide checks and balances. Thus, by reducing scrutiny and accountability, this approach lessens participatory government as intended.

The presumption of decentralisation theory is that participatory governance, transparency, and accountability yield peace. In the case of this study, the lack of this critical assumption of devolution may precipitate unstable peace and hence insecurity. Nonetheless, the accumulation of resources in the hands of a few could fracture the relationship that the elites have with the community due to its impact of reinforcing socioeconomic inequalities. Metcalfe (2022) argues that such a breakdown of relationships could compromise the achievement of governance goals, raise questions on the legitimacy of local governments, occasion social disharmony and potential violence, hence insecurity.

Considering the integrative model of primordialist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict, the finding that the county government unfairly awarded benefits of devolution (e.g., tenders, scholarships, grants etc) unfairly to clan elites, thus leading to national insecurity, resonates well. In this regard, the skewed sharing of the benefits of devolution is informed by a mix of the attractiveness of clan identity and political manipulations. In this case, elites within clans in the North-Eastern region have politicised their communities based on shared bloodlines to achieve unrestricted access to power and wealth while avoiding accountability. Thus, a small group of people reap the benefits of devolution to the disadvantage of the majority drawn from the dominant clan (s) and the minority. Moreover, they exploit interclan divisions to their advantage, causing tension and insecurity. Therefore, insecurity arises because of intra- and inter-clan agitation for equality in access to devolved governance benefits such as tenders.

Reflecting on institutional theory, the unfair awards of the benefits of devolution to clan elites reflect the acceptable norms and values of the informal institution of the clan. Moreover, it could be reflective of the failure of formal institutions, in this case local governments, to put in place mechanisms that would moderate entrenched networks, values, norms, and traditional customs that seem to favour elites from dominant clans. It is also indicative of the failure of county governments to rein in corruption and unfair practises. Moreover, it could be indicative of the suboptimal functioning of some governance frameworks such as

the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya [EACC]. The referred institution has failed, neglected, or is unable to execute its function of providing the envisaged checks and balances of the Kenya Constitution 2010 particularly in the context of the North-Eastern region. Due to these failures, inter- and intra-clan harmony may have been disrupted, leading to insecurity. This is so because, by tolerating such unfair practises, both formal and informal institutions reinforce inequalities and thus potentially breed resentment and hostility by those who are not benefiting, hence, insecurity.

The finding that county governments in the North-Eastern region unfairly award benefits of devolution such as tenders to clan elites, thus leading to national insecurity, affirms the claim of Shahow (2023). The scholar asserts that elites in the North-Eastern region unfairly award themselves devolution benefits such as tenders. He takes notes of corrupt practises such as irregular procurement procedures that are tilted towards benefiting the elites and their close families. He further notes that no legal action has been taken against the perpetrators of these illegalities, thus encouraging impunity from the elites. This implies that the trickle down of devolution may not reach the grassroots. In essence, devolution has amplified marginalisation at the local level by excluding others from enjoying the benefits of devolution, which has a detrimental effect on security.

6.3.7 Elitism, Legislation and Policy Making, and National Security

Hussein et al. (2019) and the World Bank (n.d.) highlight that laws and policies play a critical role in operationalising governance and its effectiveness by enshrining the rights and responsibilities of the governors and the governed. They further explain that by giving the public a voice and encouraging accountability, they can guarantee political stability and by extension, security. In the North-Eastern region, responsive laws and policies could reduce social and income inequalities, ensure timely and efficient delivery services, and strengthen the inclusion of varied interest groups into governance, thus reducing any potential undue influence of elitism and clannism and thus ensuring national security. Given the criticality of laws and policies, it was important to examine the role of elites in their development and implementation, particularly in the clannism context. Accordingly, this study established that clan elites in the North-Eastern region exerted control over the development and implementation of laws and policies by the county assemblies to mirror their own interests, thereby disregarding the concerns of the majority, which consequently led to social unrest and national insecurity. The detailed findings are presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.

Based on Table 6.1, it is evident that approximately 15.3% (n=137) of the HH participants strongly disagreed with the notion that clan elites possessed authority over the development and implementation of laws and policies by the County

Assembly, thus reflecting their interests, which consequently undermined the concerns of the majority, resulting in societal unrest due to exclusion and national insecurity. Approximately 26.3% (n=235) disagreed, while 13.4% (n=120) remained neutral. On the other hand, 31.2% (n=279) expressed agreement, and 13.7% (n=122) strongly agreed. Overall, approximately 41.66% (n=372) of the respondents drawn from the HH either were in strong disagreement or in disagreement. On the other hand, about 44.91% (n=401) of the respondents from the HH agreed strongly or agreed.

It can be concluded that a minority (41.66%) of the respondents from the HH were in strong disagreement or disagreement with the idea that clan elites in the North-Eastern region control the design and implementation of laws and policies by the county assemblies to reflect their interests, consequently prejudicing the concerns of the majority, resulting in social agitation for inclusion and national insecurity. The possible inference of lack of undue influence by elites in the development and implementation of counties' laws and policies is particularly important given the criticality of these frameworks in governance and security, as alluded to earlier. In a clannism context, the lack of undue influence of elites could mean the promulgation of responsive laws and policies that may anchor equity, inclusivity, participation, and effective governance. All of these are critical in engendering trust in governance and in promoting social harmony and hence security. In support of this view, Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios (2018) argue that it

is from devolution that responsive policies and laws are made. This is because context-specific challenges, dynamics, and opportunities are well known by the populace and grassroots leaders. Therefore, the reflection of context-specific knowledge anchored in inclusion and full participation may yield responsive legal and policy frameworks that may assure peaceful co-existence and hence security.

In support of the minority view, a respondent remarked.

The counties only do very little legislations. If you ask me, how many legislations have so far been made? I would say maybe eight. No serious legislation and policy making takes place in the North-Eastern region. In any case, I have not seen any controversial legislation that supports a particular group of people while prejudicing others (KI 7: December 2022).

The words that ‘the counties only do very little legislations’ could be indicative of the limited capacities/competencies of the persons elected to devolved governance positions. This is because, as was already mentioned, clan mobilisation and support may have played a crucial role in the elites’ ascent to power and not necessarily in their ability to articulate and put governance issues into action. It could also be suggestive that elites who wish to consolidate power through ensuring enabling frameworks that would require devolution to be rolled out as envisaged are not there. These had the impact of enhancing elite capture and marginalising the majority, with negative consequences for intra- and inter-clan social harmony and hence, insecurity. For instance, through various machinations, elites can cause the absence of laws and policies that would anchor equity in

resource allocations such as land, natural resources, devolved funds, and economic opportunities. In a clannism context, this would mean inequity in resource distribution, thus contributing to interclan conflicts over land and other resources and tensions due to prevalent inequalities, which would have a disastrous effect on security.

The deductions drawn from the remarks of KI 7 premise the significant impact of different capacities and interests in policy/legal framework formulation and implementation in moderating the link between devolution benefits and national security. Hussein et al. (2019) explained that legal frameworks have a significant impact on how governance unfolds. The scholars further highlight that for successful governance, these frameworks need to be contextualised to speak to local dynamics, challenges, and opportunities. Therefore, it can be argued that the lack of sufficient legislation and policies in the North-Eastern region creates possibilities for corruption, mismanagement, and inequalities, which contribute to tensions, resentment, and ultimately, insecurity.

That said, the majority (44.91%) of respondents from the HH believed that clan elites controlled the design and implementation of legislation and policies by the County Assemblies in the North-Eastern region to reflect their interests, ignoring the concerns of the majority, thus resulting in social agitation for inclusion and national insecurity. The perpetuation of clan elites' interest in county legal and

policy frameworks may have a disastrous influence on security. This is because, as earlier demonstrated, it might result in skewed resource allocation, placing power in the hands of a few through undermining participatory governance and lack of accountability. All these, as previously explained, may engender conflict by deepening the inter-clan divide, creating disillusionment and frustration with governance, and general disputes over resources, hence, insecurity.

To support the majority view, a KI said the following:

By default, elites control design and implementation of legislation and policies. This is because, all this take place at the County Assembly and at the assembly, the MCAs have been elected courtesy of the influence of the elites or through their financial support. Therefore, the MCAs will always do the bidding of the elites (KI 9: December 2022).

The remarks by KI 9 seem to suggest the lack of independence of MCAs as they are dependent on clan elites for financial support and influence. This may have a huge implication on their responsibilities as representatives of the people and in performing governance oversight duties. Indeed, the responsibilities of MCAs as contemplated by the Kenya Constitution 2010 Article 185 are to represent their respective electorates in duties that include legislation, oversight, and deciding on development and resource allocation questions. Therefore, by implication, through responsive policies and laws, MCAs can address contextual issues such as inclusion and equity in governance and thus occasion peaceful coexistence leading to peace and security. Therefore, by abdicating their responsibilities and becoming subservient to clan elites' influence, MCAs run the risk of excluding

the majority through their legislative actions or inaction. This could result in social instability and insecurity because people may feel marginalised and excluded, which could lead to calls for more equitable governance and participation.

To further reinforce the majority views, another KI remarked:

The MCAs are elected on clan basis from the wards. But when they are at the county assemblies, I think it is more of their interest than clan interest that drives legislation and policy agenda. Whether it is a car loan for them, whether it is increasing their mileage allowances or whether it is getting medical insurance. It is more of their interests as individuals. The MCAs therefore become a special clan among themselves (KI 11: December 2022).

The statement that, ‘the MCAs therefore become a special clan among themselves,’ attributed to KI 11, seems to indicate a convergence of interests as soon as the electioneering period is over. These remarks suggest that MCAs have abandoned their constitutional duty of representing the people. The remark ‘whether it is increasing their mileage allowances’ indicates corruption as MCAs raid the county’s coffers to increase their financial muscle in readiness for subsequent elections. This raises the possibility that solving the problem of campaign financing could be essential for ensuring just and representative local governments. The words ‘I think it is more of their interest than clan interest that drives legislation and policy agenda’ further affirm the elite’s capture of devolved governance.

From the findings, it can be deduced that the counties in the North-Eastern region face a governance dilemma. To this end, elites appeal to their clan identity to ascend to power and control resources. Once in power, the interests of the clans are abandoned as elites pursue selfish interests. Moreover, the failure to enact responsive laws and policies means that there could be no clear definition of the roles of the MCAs in their stewardship and oversight roles in governance. Moreover, the implementation of partisan laws and policies makes this situation even worse. A mix of clan interests being abandoned, elites pursuing their own selfish interests, and a lack of responsive policies and regulations may lead to reduced benefits of devolution and security challenges such as corruption, unemployment, poverty, and conflict over land resources. Moreover, it may arouse intra- and inter-clan resentment and hostilities, which may turn violent, resulting in insecurity. Indeed, the elite capture alluded to by this finding can fracture the relationship that the elites have with the populace due to disaffection with the outcomes of devolution, resulting in tensions and violence if left unchecked (Metcalf, 2022).

The finding of prevailing selfish interests of elites affirms the findings of Opongo (2022), who, in a study targeting the counties of Nairobi, Kisumu, Uasin Gishu, Kwale, Turkana, and Mombasa, indicated convergence of interest among politicians, who were identified as elites in this study, during the post-election period. In this regard, the scholar notes that politicians no longer pursued the

interests of their constituents but rather their own interests. While Opongo's study (2022) did not address legislation/policy enactment practises, it provides important points on how politicians could abandon clannism/ethnic tendencies and join hands with others, differences notwithstanding, to pursue self-preservation in access to power and resources. This has the implication of reducing trust in governance institutions and mass discontent as the welfare of the electorate is given little or no consideration. From the resulting disillusion, violent protest might occur, resulting in insecurity.

The majority finding also does not resonate with the theory of decentralisation. It is anticipated that devolution would have led to context-specific laws and policies that address unequal development, clan diversity, and responsible leadership. This could have promoted peaceful coexistence as policies and laws speaking to the local context would have been enacted. However, elite capture, as demonstrated by this study, has led to the majority's exclusion from governance and their needs in favour of a few people's economic and political interests. Consequently, there is a possibility of bias in legal and policy formulation and limited alternative viewpoint considerations whose inclusion could aid in addressing contextual realities such as inequalities. This might cause social disintegration, which would then cause tensions and conflict, and ultimately, insecurity. Moreover, the actions of elites have the impact of disrupting intra- and inter-clan social harmony

through perpetuating inequalities and fuelling animosity, resulting in local and national insecurity.

6.4 Summary

This chapter identified clan elites in the North-Eastern region and further evaluated their role in the context of clannism in shaping the distribution of devolved governance benefits and, thus, consequences for local and national security. The study findings suggest that clan elders, politicians, and religious leaders are the most influential in the region. The study findings further suggest the potential elite capture of local governments in the study area. To strengthen their authority, elites prosecuted clan-based nepotism and cronyism to pursue their self-centred objectives. Consequently, elites reinforced clan-oriented politics as the general population associated having someone from their own clan in power as a guaranteed means of enhancing their standard of living and advancement. Subsequently, elites have further intensified disparities within and among clans, leading to conflicts and increased insecurity at the local and national levels. That said, the emergent trend of politicians allying themselves with incumbent governors, regardless of clan affiliation, may deplete clannism and revolutionise the region's politics, potentially leading to security. The next chapter presents an overall summary, conclusions, and recommendations based on the findings of the study.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

In the context of clannism in Kenya's North-Eastern region, this study sought to establish the impact of devolved governance on national security. In this chapter, major findings are summarised, conclusions are derived from the findings, and recommendations are offered to various players to improve devolved governance's responsiveness to national security. This chapter also identifies potential areas for further research.

7.2 Summary of Findings

Research questions that motivated this study are used as an anchor in the presentation of the summary of the findings. These are:

- i. What benefits has devolved governance yielded in the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region and what are the implications for Kenya's national security?
- ii. To what extent does clannism influence the distribution of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and what does it mean for Kenya's national security?
- iii. What is the role of elites in the context of clannism in influencing the sharing of devolved governance benefits in the North-Eastern region and what are the ramifications for Kenya's national security?

7.2.1 Benefits of Devolution and Implications for National Security

This study examined the influence of the benefits of political, fiscal, and administrative devolution on national security. Outlined below are the key findings of this study on the link between the various facets of devolution and national security.

7.2.1.1 Influence of the Benefits of Political Devolution on National Security

The research established that a segment of the population did not fully and meaningfully participate in governance. In the choice of elected leaders, while the general population took part in the ultimate voting process, the influence of clan elders in deciding who was to be in the ballot undermined their inclusion and in independently examining the competence of the presented candidates. Participation of a significant portion of the population in contributing to the development agenda was also merely tokenistic as those with power pursued partisan clan interests and/or selfish objectives instead of the good of the general society. Accordingly, clan loyalty played a significant role in determining development priorities and subsequent implementation. All these inadequacies reinforced the exclusion of nondominant clans, creating the possibility of exacerbating inter-clan tensions, context- and conflict-insensitive initiatives, and thus intensifying the possibility of violence and insecurity. Besides, it has made elections emotive with reported violence as marginalised clans squabbled with the dominant ones with possible negative influence on local and national insecurity.

Enabling and responsive legislative and policy frameworks were inadequate and largely remained unknown by the populace due to insufficient/non-existent public education and advocacy. Traditional frameworks persisted because local governments were yet to operationalise national legal and policy frameworks. Clannism appeared to foreclose the operationalisation of devolution, exposing communities to risks associated with changes brought forth by devolved governance, such as increased resource allocation. As such, limited tailor-made frameworks suitable for the region have not only hindered participatory and inclusive governance but have also provided opportunities for instrumentalization of clans, corruption, nepotism, and resource mismanagement. This leads to inefficient service delivery with far-reaching effects on local and national security.

7.2.1.2 Influence of the Benefits of Fiscal Devolution on National Security

This study established that the distribution of resources in the region was heavily influenced by clan considerations with decisions made by a few people. This contributed to the possible erosion of inter-clan trust and heightened animosity against the supposedly benefiting clan, thus precipitating conditions for insecurity. There was also scant evidence of precise and well-thought-out plans for resource distribution. Moreover, a pervasive sense of resource mismanagement, nepotism, and open corruption was discerned. Real and perceived inequities and inequalities in resource allocation were determined. All

these negative issues increased the inter-clan divide, cemented clan identities, reinforced socio-economic inequalities, increased unhealthy competition for power and resources, and created a feeling of disillusionment and thus, insecurity. Moreover, the persistent feeling of being left out might have fed into a sense of injustice, thus making the under/unrepresented more susceptible to recruitment efforts by violent extremist organisations like Al Shabaab, with possible negative implications on national security.

The research findings also indicated that fiscal decentralisation did not lead to an increase in public scrutiny, which in turn undermined transparency in the utilisation of resources and national security. Although non-dominant clans exercised some level of scrutiny over resource allocation, their assessments were often biased and influenced by clan considerations that could incite emotions among minority clans and exacerbate inter-clan divisions, ultimately contributing to insecurity. The study findings also revealed that fiscal devolution did not lessen or manage poverty levels at the community level among all clans. These factors cumulatively caused the general populace to question their personal circumstances with the possibility of making them more susceptible to radicalisation and violent extremism in a region where Al Shabaab is known to operate.

7.2.1.3 Influence of the Benefits of Administrative Devolution on National Security

The study established that county governments in the North-Eastern region had enhanced services in water and sewerage, road construction, street lighting, and trade. Enhanced water provision services aided in the reduction of conflict by increasing the resilience of the clans to triggers of conflict; hence, it added to causal factors for peace. The expanded road network enhanced access to ungoverned areas, made it easier for the populace to obtain basic social services, unlocked new opportunities for economic growth, and generally improved people's social well-being. This resulted in employment opportunities and thus addressed the structural causes of violence. The good infrastructural expansion, however, was unevenly distributed, concentrating on certain places—especially towns—while marginalising others. The disregard of some areas could easily erode the gains already made, as the marginalised communities in the overlooked areas could agitate for equality, hence causing possible insecurity.

Responsive services in trade enabled a favourable business environment, which might have enabled expanded options for informal employment and general improvement in individual incomes. Thus, business growth was critical in enhancing cohesion and security at the local and national levels. However, pending bills owed to the business community by county governments, if left

unchecked, could distort the business environment, limit economic growth, and stir anger among the populace to the detriment of local and national security.

However, administrative decentralisation had neither increased agricultural and livestock output nor improved veterinary services and thus had a detrimental impact on food security for all clans and overall national security. Initiatives meant to boost agriculture and livestock production were very minimal and noticeably identifiable to favour certain clans. This might have negatively impacted food security and community resilience to conflict. This is because it created possible conditions of amplifying inter-clan differences on account of agricultural and livestock production constraints, hence, resource-based conflict.

Disaster management procedures have improved due to the availability of resources at the local level hence enabling fairly responsive and timely action. This enabled the counties to manage/reduce disease outbreaks, displacement, loss of property and lives, and mental trauma. Accordingly, effective disaster management and disease control by the devolved governments were critical in ensuring the resilience of the various clans to triggers of violence and in sustaining livelihoods, hence local and national security. Moreover, it helped contain opportunities afforded to non-conforming groups such as Al Shabaab to take advantage of grievances arising from poorly managed disasters and their effects.

7.2.2 Influence of Clannism on the Distribution of Benefits of Devolution and Implications for National Security

Clan allegiance and belonging were decisive factors in how employment opportunities were shared. Local politicians gained and maintained power not necessarily because of their strong leadership qualities and administrative abilities, but rather because of their capacity to reward their clan/kinsmen through means such as employment in local governance structures. This reinforced social and income inequality and undermined trust between clans, thus occasioning social unrest and insecurity.

Clans were also unfairly represented when county plans and strategies were developed and implemented, and consequently, certain clans had a say in how development/project funding was allocated. In this aspect, the general public's involvement in the conceptualisation of development priorities was quite low. Technocrats, who were partisan, were heavily relied upon to conceptualise development goals. Accordingly, overriding clan patronage and interests resulted in unequal implementation of the development agenda, thus negatively impacting the social fabric by deepening clan cleavages. Moreover, clans that lacked representation in positions of authority, key in the design and implementation of development, such as CEC Members or the Governor, received the least or no portion of the devolution profits. Cumulatively, this resulted in social and

economic disparities, weakened community cohesion, and a lack of confidence in governance institutions, resulting in insecurity.

Social protection services were also accessed depending on clan affiliation, resulting in national insecurity. In this regard, political leaders tried to allocate more social protection programmes in the regions they came from, thus helping their clans. It was not surprising, therefore, that some clans had preferential access to devolved services such as health and education through political leaders' decisions to invest in the communities they hail from in the building of schools and hospitals. Consequently, the significance of political representation and clan identity in obtaining devolution benefits such as social security programmes education, and health was emphasised. In general, uneven access to social safety programmes education, and health services increased people's sense of distance from devolved governments, which had the unintended consequence of amplifying the inter-clan divide and, hence, local and national insecurity.

Evidence to support the claim that minority clans in the North-Eastern region were denied the opportunity to scrutinise county governments' political and fiscal decisions was found. This resulted in social divisions and national insecurity. In this regard, minority clans were not represented at the table where important decisions were made. This had a huge implication for security as it aroused suspicion of mismanagement and corruption. Moreover, it might have led to

reduced trust in local governance frameworks, compromised shared identity, and undermined inclusivity, thus creating conditions for insecurity.

7.2.3 Influence of Elites on the Distribution of Benefits of Devolution and Implication for National Security

This study determined that the most powerful elites in the North-Eastern region were clan elders, politicians, and religious figures. Clan elders had a sway on who was to be elected to county leadership due to the application of negotiated democracy based on clannism. In this regard, clan elders were instrumental not only in rallying their respective clan's support to enable them to win elections but also in informing the division of devolution benefits as they were seen as custodians of the well-being of their communities. This study also established the growing influence of the political class on the distribution of the benefits of devolution. In this regard, they were experts in manipulating clan identity in their political machinations and in using their wealth to acquire and consolidate power. Religious leaders were also very influential because of the central place of religion among the residents of the region. The majority of the residents practice Islamic religion, which has been embedded in their culture. In this case, they were seen to be ethical and immune to partisan clan considerations. They were also perceived as paragons of fairness and equity and hence had significant public trust. As such, clan elders, politicians, and religious leaders played an influential

role in moderating the influence of devolved governance on local and national security.

The study established that to maintain control over power, clan elites manipulated clan grievances to rally support, influenced the passage of legislation and policies by the county assemblies to mirror their own interests, manipulated development plans to align with their clan's interests, influenced the hiring of favoured individuals from their own clans and politicised their communities based on shared bloodlines to achieve unrestricted access to power and wealth while avoiding accountability. Through all these, elites solidified clan-based politics as the general population associated having one of their own in power as a guaranteed method of improving their quality of life and progress. This also resulted in localised perceptions of marginalisation and the exclusion of other clans from development and job opportunities. Moreover, elites' unfettered access to devolution benefits such as tenders and grants further exacerbated inequalities within and between clans while maintaining their stranglehold on power. This might have led to anger and hostility towards the favoured clan. Furthermore, the excluded push for justice may have fuelled social discontent and hence, insecurity.

The study also established that elites within the clan had authority over the county's power-sharing agreements, which were created to maintain peace and

security between different clans. This led to a lack of trust and weakened local government institutions, ultimately resulting in national insecurity. In this regard, elites actively rallied their respective clans during election periods. In doing so, they skilfully used clan loyalty to gain political support and to discourage dissenting opinions within the clan. Consequently, the clans that benefited from this system did not prioritise the qualifications of the individuals being put forward. Consequently, there was a risk of electing incompetent representatives who could not effectively advocate for the people. Overall, the concentration of power in the hands of elites had the effect of distorting societal peace by amplifying intra- and inter-clan disparities, leading to insecurity.

7.3 Conclusions

This study sought to assess the influence of devolution on national security within the context of clannism in the North-Eastern region of Kenya. Based on the findings of the study, clannism is a central factor in the region and appears to have foreclosed the devolution efforts to benefit most residents in the region. To this end, the objectives of devolution in the North-Eastern region appear to be paralysed by clannism, which is often used as a vehicle for political power irrespective of the capability to lead. This results in incompetent leadership that has often compromised service delivery with negative effects on security.

Political power, on the other hand, puts individuals in the position of managing resources. However, rather than serving as custodians of community resources, the political elites have amassed wealth that they now use to buy votes, including influencing clan leaders. Therefore, rather than focussing on community development, they focus on their own self-interest but use a hegemonic approach to whip clannism to their support. To this end, the resources of devolved governments have created another clan that was described as ‘money’ to the detriment of security in the region. Notably, clannism is an enabler to positions of power but creates fissures that appear to act as a barrier to accessing devolution benefits with a negative effect on security. Therefore, although there is a consensus that devolution can facilitate equitable distribution of resources, cultural values such as clannism may be a hindrance with far-reaching effects on security. However, it is also observed that decentring power from clan elders to political elites creates positive tension that could neutralise clan politics. Accordingly, close working relationships with the governors, irrespective of their clan orientation, enables politicians to deplete clan power, which may revolutionise politics in the region and hence enhance security.

From a theoretical perspective, the findings of this study challenge the decentralisation theory, which stipulates that through devolution, people at the grassroots may be empowered. Instead, the study proposes that a social constructivist framework should be employed to ensure that contextual factors are

embedded in policies that seek to guide governance institutions. To this end, without much effort to understand how clannism works in the North-Eastern region, tensions could persist, leaving the communities vulnerable to risks associated with changes that devolution has brought, while in the same vein, foregoing the gains that devolved governance could realise.

From a practical perspective, the findings challenge institutional theory. In this regard, it is not sufficient to have laws and regulations for institutions to work effectively. These laws and policies need to be implemented and contextualised for an institution to deliver on its set goals and functions. Further contemplation of the theories that underpinned this dissertation, specifically the decentralisation, institutional and integrated model derived from primordialist and instrumentalist theories, found them satisfactory, except for the limitations highlighted above, in elucidating the correlation between the advantages of devolution and national security in the context of clannism and the influence exerted by elites. In this respect, they established a basis for the progress of ideas, particularly in the advancement of the notions of devolution, clannism, elitism, and national security.

7.4 Recommendations

Arising from the findings, the following is recommended.

- i. According to the study, some clans were potentially underrepresented in political posts, whereas others held the most elective political positions. This situation ultimately contributed to the prevailing insecurity. In this regard, the county governments in the North-Eastern region should adopt laws and regulations that will permit equity and inclusion in leadership roles that are representative of clan diversity.
- ii. The study also found that weak institutions enabled the negative influence of clannism and elites to persist, thus affecting devolution and, hence, national security. The study thus recommends that national institutions such as the IEBC and NCIC should fully implement their mandate to ensure diversity representation in governance. IEBC, for instance, could conduct civic education on elections to enhance personal agency and civic consciousness among the local populace while reducing the attraction of clannism and the influence of elites. NCIC could use social media channels to promote interclan coexistence and the need for issue-based politics. Additionally, EACC should act decisively and stop the theft of public funds and resources. This will eliminate the source of power with respect to the elites and further reduce the premium associated with being in influential local governance positions.
- iii. This study established that a sizable segment of the local populace was not actively and substantially involved in matters of governance. This dynamic caused discord among clans while escalating hostility within and

between clans that were seen as prospering, ultimately causing insecurity. In this context, the county governments in the North-Eastern region should adopt a public participation policy and dedicate more resources to it. These resources will be essential in public education and sensitisation to devolved governance, which will aid the meaningful participation of the citizenry.

- iv. This study demonstrated the effectiveness of public amenities, including easy access to water, schools, hospitals, and roads, in establishing the prerequisites for regional and broader security. To maintain peaceful interclan coexistence and hence national security, county governments in the North-Eastern region should implement more public good initiatives.
- v. This study found that the distribution of employment opportunities was significantly influenced by one's belonging to the dominant clan. Moreover, local politicians won and maintained their positions of authority not because of their excellent leadership and management skills, but rather because of their ability to reward their clan and kin through activities such as employment in local governmental structures. Because of the monetisation of politics, the prominence of clannism, and perceptions of marginalisation within the clans, there was an increase in local and national insecurity. Therefore, the county governments in the North-Eastern region should perform employee audits to identify non-existent employees and potential clan/ethnic distribution issues and take

corrective action. This can entail establishing employment policies and actions that are clan-sensitive and inclusive. Additionally, statutory entities such as the NCIC and the Senate National Cohesion, Equal Opportunity, and Regional Integration Committee should conduct an independent personnel audit and direct the county governments to address inequality in employment to deflect tensions for security in the region and the nation at large.

7.5 Suggestions for Further Research

The underlisted were established by the study as requiring further investigation.

- i. Assessment of inclusion and participation in devolved governance in the North-Eastern region of Kenya.
- ii. Sub-clan power relations and their subsequent impact on devolution and security in the North-Eastern region of Kenya.
- iii. Assessment of the influence of clannism on national government operations in the North-Eastern region of Kenya and its subsequent impact on national security.
- iv. Assessment of the role of elites in illiteracy levels in the North-Eastern region of Kenya.
- v. Influence of political class in North-Eastern Kenya in empowering and constraining the authority of clan elders in devolved governance.

- vi. Evaluation of social demographic characteristics influence on devolution and national security in a clannism context: Case of North-Eastern, Kenya.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Consent Form

Dear Respondent,

My name is **Rashid Elmi**, a student at Kenyatta University pursuing PhD in Security Management. I am currently undertaking research on the influence of devolution on national security within the context of clannism in North-Eastern region of Kenya. This study is purely for academic purposes and all information given shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. That said, your participation in the study is voluntary and thus you can choose to respond to all questions or a part of them or refuse to participate all together with no ramifications whatsoever.

Benefits

Your contribution will help in furthering knowledge on devolution in the context of clannism and its impact on national security. This knowledge could help policy makers at both national and county level in formulation of responsive frameworks that could assist in the achievement of the ideals of devolution which includes peace and equal and equitable progress for all. Moreover, your participation may inform this study's recommendations whose implementation could result to a more equitable and equal society where clans are just but social group identifiers.

Participant’s Declaration

I have read and understood the provided information and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason and without cost. I voluntarily agree to take part in this study.

Participant’s Signature _____ Date _____

Researcher’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I have disclosed all the information relating to the study. Moreover, I have deliberately made it known to the respondent that his/her participation is voluntary, and that all necessary measures will be taken to assure his/her anonymity.

Researcher’s Signature _____ Date _____

Appendix II: Household Survey

Section A: Background Information

A1. Sex Male Female

A2. Age

A3. Highest level of formal education attained

A4. Please indicate your:

a. County.....

b. Clan.....

A5. Please indicate your length of stay (in years) in current County since 2013

.....

SECTION B: Influence of Benefits of Political Devolution on National Security

On each of the following statements concerning benefits arising from the transfer of political power and authority to elected governance officials at the ward and county level indicate by ticking the appropriate box whether you; SD =Strongly Disagree, or D = Disagree, or N = Neutral, or A = Agree, or SA = Strongly Agree

S/NO.	Benefits of Political Devolution and National Security	SD	D	N	A	SA
B1.	Has provided opportunities to people in the County to choose their leaders at the local level but clannism remains an impediment to effective participation in governance and this affects regional and national security					
B2.	Has increased participation in formulating development goals and actions at the local level which has brought benefits to all clans hence promoting regional and national security					
S/NO.	Benefits of Political Devolution and National Security	SD	D	N	A	SA
B3.	Devolved resources such as funds are not well managed and fairly distributed across the County therefore making some clans to feel marginalised hence regional and national insecurity					
B4.	Has resulted to timely, quality, and responsive service delivery to locals which has increased satisfaction with governance among all clans resulting to stable regional and national security					
B5.	Public policies responding to local problems, such as natural resource management, have not been crafted and executed resulting to conflicts among clans hence regional and national insecurity					
B6.	There is no inclusion of varied interest of groups such as women and youth issues within the County Government which has undermined security at clan level hence national insecurity					
B7.	The county government regularly shares information with all citizenries relating to projects being implemented thus encouraging closer scrutiny and feeling of belonging amongst all clans thus contributing to regional and national security					
B8.	The county government occasionally organizes public hearings for all, irrespective of clan affiliation, to articulate their views on governance and this has led to inclusion thus enhancing regional and national security					

SECTION C: Influence of Benefits of Fiscal Devolution on National Security

On each of the following statements concerning benefits arising from the transfer of powers of public finance which involves raising of revenues plus making and implementing expenditure plans to County Governments, indicate by ticking the appropriate box whether you; SD =Strongly Disagree, or D = Disagree, or N = Neutral, or A = Agree, or SA = Strongly Agree

S/NO.	Benefits of Fiscal Devolution and National Security	SD	D	N	A	SA
C1.	Has led to priority resource allocation to most urgent and important public goods and services enhancing security in the region irrespective of the clans					
C2.	Has resulted to stronger accountability through encouragement of closer scrutiny by citizenry at the grassroots regardless of clan affiliation thus enhancing transparency in resource use and promoting national security					
C3.	Has not enhanced creativity and imagination in realising development prospects thus negatively impacting on economic growth leading to low incomes irrespective of clans hence increased national insecurity					
C4.	Has not resulted to increased alternative livelihood opportunities thus depressing household earnings among all clans leading to dissatisfaction with governance and hence national insecurity					
C5.	Has resulted to increased participation in preparation, endorsement, and execution of County budgets but clannism is still a barrier in addressing grievances and promoting consensus hence affecting national security					
C6.	Has led to proper use of national government allocated funds to prioritised projects/services hence reducing clan inequalities and promoting sense of belonging which in turn has enhanced national security					
C7.	Has helped in lowering/managing poverty levels at the grassroots among all clans thus inspiring hope and prosperity resulting to national security					
C8.	Has increased unemployment among all clans thus contributing to structural causes of national insecurity					

SECTION D: Influence of Benefits of Administrative Devolution on National Security

On each of the following statements concerning the benefits realised from reassignment of responsibility and authority over resources and decision making in the provision of selected public services to County Governments, indicate by ticking the appropriate box whether you; SD =Strongly Disagree, or D = Disagree, or N = Neutral, or A = Agree, or SA = Strongly Agree

S/NO.	Benefits of Administrative Devolution and National Security	SD	D	N	A	SA
D1.	Has led to development of early childhood education and vocational schools hence increasing education access and employment prospects for all clans and this has promoted national security					
D2.	Has resulted to development of health care facilities which has improved public health thus increasing satisfaction on governance among all clans and this enhances national security					
D3.	Has increased access to piped/borehole water and sewerage services to all clans therefore minimizing clan conflicts and disease outbreaks and hence national security					
D4.	Has resulted to building of access roads and street lighting to diverse parts of the county thus increasing community safety and security regardless of clan affiliation and easy access by security agencies					
D5.	Has resulted to improved agriculture, livestock production and veterinary services thus assuring food security for all clans and general national security					
D6.	Has not resulted to improved regulation and trade leading to poor business operating environment, constrained earnings and frustrations by all clans hence affecting national security					
D7.	Has led to ineffective pollution control and disaster management leading to disease outbreaks and livelihood loss in all clans which has increased national insecurity					
D8.	Has led to enhanced County planning and development services such as land surveying and mapping but clannism remains a barrier in reducing conflicts over borders/land thus promoting national insecurity					

SECTION E: Influence of Clannism on the Distribution of Devolved Governance Benefits and its Consequences for National Security

On each of the following statements concerning your feeling of belonging to your clan for purposes of enjoying the good and advantages of devolution that comes with such belonging, indicate by ticking the appropriate box whether you; SD =Strongly Disagree, or D = Disagree, or N = Neutral, or A = Agree, or SA = Strongly Agree.

S/NO.	Clannism, Benefits of Devolution and National Security	SD	D	N	A	SA
E1.	Personnel employed by the County Government reflect equity amongst the diverse clans and thus, clans feel more integrated hence national security					
E2.	There is fair representation of clans in development and implementation of County plans and strategies anchoring the development agenda which has promoted cohesion and national security					
E3.	Social protection programs (e.g., older persons cash transfer and bursaries) are accessed by all regardless of clan affiliation resulting to enhanced national security					
E4.	Specific clans influence and determine distribution of development/project funds by the County Government resulting increased perception of marginalisation hence national insecurity					
E5.	Clan size does not have an influence on the choice of political leadership therefore all clans stand an equal chance of being elected to governance promoting sense of inclusion and thus national security					
E6.	Specific clans have preferential access to devolved services such as health and education therefore leading to feeling of discrimination and fragmentation amongst some clans and thus, national insecurity					
E7.	Minority clans are not afforded an opportunity to scrutinise County's political and fiscal management hence creating social divisions hence national insecurity					
E8.	Within clans, women and youth are prejudiced in accessing the benefits of devolution thus creating gender discrimination leading them to joining antisocial groups hence national insecurity					

SECTION F: Influence of Elites on the Distribution of Devolved Governance Benefits and its Consequences for National Security

F1. Please identify three major classes of influential people in your clan who wield substantial power to influence outcomes of devolved governance (e.g., in election, employment, deciding development projects etc).

a.....

b.....

c.....

On each of the following statements concerning the role of elites in devolved governance in your County, indicate by ticking the appropriate box whether you; SD =Strongly Disagree, or D = Disagree, or N = Neutral, or A = Agree, or SA = Strongly Agree.

S/NO.	Elites, Benefits of Devolution and National Security	SD	D	N	A	SA
F2.	Elites determine clan voting patterns in favour of their preferred candidates in elective offices thus recentralising power to specific individuals while marginalising the majority hence creating national insecurity					
F3.	Elites do not influence County development plans and strategies to reflect their/clan interest, hence there is fairness that promotes inter/intra-clan cohesion resulting to national security					
F4.	Elites influence employment of preferred personnel from their clan in County Governments leading inequitable access to employment prospects to all resulting to agitations and thus, national insecurity					
F5.	County government awards benefits of devolution e.g., tenders, scholarships, grants etc fairly without consideration of influence of clan elites thus promoting inclusion hence national security					
F6.	Elites use clan affiliation and manipulate clan grievances for political mobilization to gain power and control over resources thus disfranchising others hence national insecurity					
F7.	Clan elites control the design and implementation of legislations and policies by the County Assembly to reflect their interest thus prejudicing concerns of the majority resulting to social agitation for inclusion hence national insecurity					
F8.	County power sharing arrangements meant to address peace and security amongst clans are controlled by clan elites leading to distrust and weakening of governance institutions resulting to national insecurity					
F9.	Elites from different clans collaborate to arouse the feeling of inclusion of all clans in devolved governance creating social harmony and thus national security					

Thank you for choosing to participate in this study!

Appendix III: Key Informant Interview Guide

Background Information

County.....Designation of Key Informant.....

Date of Interview.....

1. What benefits has devolved governance yielded in the County and what are the implications for Kenya's national security?
2. To what extent does clannism influence the distribution of devolved governance benefits in the County and what does it mean for Kenya's national security?
3. What is the role of elites in the context of clannism in influencing the sharing of devolved governance benefits in the County and what are the ramifications for Kenya's national security?
4. What are your suggested recommendations for the County to experience enhanced devolved governance and national security in the context of clannism?

Thank you for choosing to participate in this study.

Appendix IV: Document Review Instrument

Document # A – County Employment File

1. County.....
2. Percentage of youth and women out of the total workforce in the County.

Population Group	March 2013- Aug 2017	Sept 2017 – May 2022
Percentage of women in the work force		
Percentage of youth (men and women of age between 18 -35 years)		

3. Number of members of the County Public Service Board per clan affiliation.

Description	March 2013- Aug 2017	Sept 2017 – May 2022
Ogaden		
Degodia		
Ajuraan		
Garre		
Murule		
Total number of Members of County Public Service Board (including CEO)		

4. Number of employees per clan affiliation engaged by the County Public Service Board (on behalf of the County Government) to provide services in diverse devolved functions:

Description	March 2013- Aug 2017	Sept 2017 – May 2022
Ogaden		
Degodia		
Ajuraan		
Garre		
Murule		
Total number of employees engaged by County Public Service Board		

5. Clan affiliation (by count/numbers) of the tabulated key personnel of the County Government in the period between March 2013 and Aug 2017.

Description	County Secretary	Chief of Staff	Chief Officers	Directors	Sub County Admin	Ward Admin
Ogaden						
Degodia						
Ajuraan						
Garre						
Murule						
Total						

6. Clan affiliation (by count/numbers) of the tabulated key personnel of the County Government in the period between Sept 2017 and May 2022.

Description	County Secretary	Chief of Staff	Chief Officers	Directors	Sub County Admin	Ward Admin
Ogaden						
Degodia						
Ajuraan						
Garre						
Murule						
Total						

Thank you for choosing to participate in this study.

Document #B – County Elective/Appointive Positions File

1. County.....
2. Number of members of the leadership/County Assembly/County Government in terms of their clan affiliation in the period between March 2013 and Aug 2017.

Description	Ogaden	Degodia	Ajuraan	Garre	Murule	Total
Elected Members of Parliament						
Women Rep						
Senator						
Governor						
Deputy County Governor						
Speaker of County Assembly						
Elected Members of County						
Appointed County Executive Committee Members						
Total						

3. Number of members of the leadership/County Assembly/County Government in terms of their clan affiliation in the period between Sept 2017 and May 2022.

Description	Ogaden	Degodia	Ajuraan	Garre	Murule	Total
Elected Members of Parliament						
Women Rep						
Senator						
Governor						
Deputy County Governor						
Speaker of County Assembly						
Elected Members of County						
Appointed County Executive Committee Members						
Total						

Thank you for choosing to participate in this study.

Document #C – County Records on Legislations and Policies

1. County.....
2. Number of County legislations/bills and policies enacted by the County Government over the years to improve service delivery in the devolved functions.

Description	March 2013 – Aug 2017	Sept 2017 – May 2022
Number of legislations/bills		
Number of policies		

3. Legislations and policies that have been enacted by the County Government to address the listed devolved functions in the periods outlined.

Function	March 2013 – Aug 2017	Sept 2017 – May 2022
Education		
Health		
Agriculture/Livestock Production		
Environmental Management		
Transport		
Trade		
Disaster Management		
County Planning and Development		
Culture		

Thank you for choosing to participate in this study.

Document #D – County Development Plans and Records

1. County.....
2. Progress made by the County Government in respect to the highlighted devolved functions in the periods as indicated.

Function	March 2013- Aug 2017	Sept 2017 –May 2022
Education		
Number of ECD Schools built		
Number of Vocational Schools built		
Number of special needs Facilities built		
Education bursaries disbursed in KES		
Number of Libraries built		
Health		
Number of Ambulances bought		
Number of Hospitals built		
Number of Dispensaries built		
Agriculture/Livestock Production		
Number of livestock sale yards established		
Number of Grain Silos built		
Number of Abattoirs established		
Number of Agro/Vet Shops established		
Number of Markets built		
Transport		
Length of concrete county roads built		
Length of tarmacked county roads built		
Length of gaboral/paved county roads built		
Length of murrum county roads built		
Length of earthen county roads built		
Number of streetlights put up		
Number of parking areas built		
Water & Sewerage		
Number of households with access to piped water		
Number of boreholes dug		
Number of boreholes rehabilitated		
Disaster/Environment Management		
Number of firefighting engines bought		
Number of trees planted		
Culture		
Number of parks/recreation facilities made		
Number of sports stadiums established		
Number of museums established		

Thank you for choosing to participate in this study.

Appendix V: Research Permits

A. From 1 July 2021 to 1 July 2022

 REPUBLIC OF KENYA	 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
RefNo: 609351	Date of Issue: 01/July/2021
RESEARCH LICENSE	
	
<p>This is to Certify that Mr. Rashid Abdi Elmi of Kenyatta University, has been licensed to conduct research in Garissa, Wajir on the topic: DEVOLUTION AND INTER-CLAN POLITICS IN WAJIR COUNTY: IMPLICATIONS FOR KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY (2013 - 2018) for the period ending : 01/July/2022.</p>	
License No: NACOSTI/P/21/11506	
609351 Applicant Identification Number	 Director General NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
	Verification QR Code 
<p>NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document, Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.</p>	

B. From 25 October 2022 to 25 October 2023


KUTUBIKU NI KUNYA


**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION**

Ref/Nac 436355 Date of issue: 25/10/2022

RESEARCH LICENSE



This is to Certify that Mr. Rashid Abdi Elmi of Kenyatta University, has been licensed to conduct research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in Garissa, Mandera, Wajir on the topic: Decentral Governance and National Security in the Context of Clanism in North-Eastern Region, Kenya for the period ending : 25/10/2023.

License Nac NACOSTI/P/22/21147

436355
Applicant Identification Number


Director General
**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION**


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See overleaf for conditions

Appendix VI: Research Authorisation from National Government of Kenya



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
AND
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Telegraphic address: "Rais"
Telephone: Nairobi 2227411
When replying please quote

P.O. Box 30510-00100
Nairobi

Ref No: **MOINA/SEC.7/48**

1st November, 2022


The Regional Commissioner
NORTH EASTERN REGION

RE: FIELD RESERCH ON DEVOLVED GOVERNANCE, CLANNISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE NORTH EASTERN REGION, KENYA RASHID ABDI ELMI C82/CTY/37749/2017

This office has authorized the above-named individual, who is a PhD student at Kenyatta University to conduct field research on the above subject. Notably, he has the necessary statutory requirements for conducting field research as evidenced by NACOSTI permit NACOSTI/P/22/21247 which is hereby attached.

Subsequently, you are requested to inform and authorize all NGAO in Wajir, Mandera and Garissa Counties to provide support to the study.

Please take necessary action.



WILSON G. NJEGA, EBS
FOR: PRINCIPAL SECRETARY/INTERNAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION