VOTER BEHAVIOUR IN GENERAL ELECTIONS IN KENYA, 1992-2007: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

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A THESI SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

SEPTEMBER, 2014

DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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To my late mother,

Elemina Weta Kakai.

For she knew.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AD	Anno Domini
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
APA	Abaluyia Peoples Association
APP	Akamba Peoples Party
ASAL	Arid and Semi Arid Land
BC	Before Christ
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
CPP	Convention People's Party
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
FDP	Free Democratic Union
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FORD	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
FORD ASILI	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Asili
FORD KENYA	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya
FORD PEOPLE	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People
FPP	First-Past the Post
GoK	Government of Kenya
ICC	International Criminal Court
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IED	Institute for Education in Democracy
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPPG	Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KAU	Kenya African Union
K-DOP	Kenya Domestic Observation Programme
KIE	Kenya Institute of Education
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KShs.	Kenya Shillings
KTN	Kenya Television Network
MADU	Mombasa African District Union
MP	Member of Parliament
MMS	Mixed Member Systems
MUF	Mwambao United Front
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDP	National Development Party
NEP	North Eastern Province
NPP	New Patriotic Party

NTV	Nation Television
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCEA	Presbyterian Church of East Africa
PNU	Party of National Unity
PR	Proportional Representation
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
USA	United States of America
US$	United States Dollar
WARSAW	Alliance of the East European Socialist States
WB	World Bank

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DEFINITION OF TERMS

For clearer understanding of the terms used in this study, below are their meanings:

Democracy---------- A system of government controlled by majority and committed to social justice.

Elections----------Formal procedures by which citizens cast votes to choose an individual to hold public office.

Electoral System -------A set of principles and procedures of determining the outcome of elections in a representative democracy.

Ethnicity ----------Categories which individuals belong, identify with, or belong to in the eyes of the community based on shared cultural heritage (sense of history, language, ancestry, and beliefs).

Franchise ----------The right to vote in public elections.

General Elections ---- The election of president, Member of Parliament and local authority councillors.

Individual Agency---- Capacity of individual persons to act independently and make free choices.

Liberal Democracy----------A liberal democracy is a form of representative democracy with free and fair form of elections procedure and competitive political process based on universal suffrage.

Lineage----------A permanent, corporate group sharing a common ancestor (real or imagined) with attendant rights and obligations.

Purposive Corporate Actors----Deliberate and consciously created social organisations (collectivises, such as the state, political party, religious and media organisations et cetera).

Primordial Corporate Actors --Fixed, sentimentally created social organisations such as family, neighbours, associates, ethnic and/or clan et cetera .

Psephology----------The scientific study of voting behaviour.

Region----------Formally delineated administrative area (in this case province, district or constituency) with inhabitants sharing a sense of history.

Religion----------Self-identity with the attendant rituals and belief in the groups worship of the supernatural.

Social Bonds----------An attachment to people or groups of people based on a sense of common identity such as political party membership, ethnicity, religious group membership, et cetera.

Social Capital----------Real or potential benefits one accrues from being a member of a social network such as a political party or ethnic group.

Socio-demographic Factors---These are variables that contain information necessary to define homogeneous sub-groups (context) to establish causal relationship between attitudes and social facts. (Such as gender, age, educational attainments, occupation, region of residence et cetera)

Socio-economic Status--------An individual or groups position within a social structure with education attainment levels, occupation, income, place of residence, religion used as a means of predicting behaviour.

Voting Behaviour----------The culmination of the decision-making process and the attendant social factors influencing how people vote.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank all those who have graciously spared their time and energy to this work by their contributions and encouragements to my progress. In particular, I would like to recognize the commitment, dedication, love of work, penetrating and critical instructions which I greatly needed and general good humour of the lead supervisor Professor Paul Achola.

Special thanks to Professor C. O. Ochieng', Dr. Godwin R. Murunga and Mr. Robert Omondi Oswago for their invaluable assistance in making valuable suggestions without which this thesis would not have taken this shape. I am deeply grateful to Mrs. Lucy Kang'ara for her untiring assistance in the production of manuscripts to this final one. My research assistants who helped me collect data, I thank you all for your self-drive and enthusiasm that really made work easier.

Dr. Daniel Muia, Chairman Department of Sociology, Dr. Wilson Otenga, the serving chairman of the postgraduate committee, colleagues and friends for their incessant concern over my progress reminiscent of high school master-style. This forced me to put in some extra effort and to them I say *ahsante sana* (thank you). Lastly, but most important, I sincerely thank the staff of the Department of Sociology for their friendliness, academic community and unforgettable learning experiences they shared with me which were remarkable.

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study was to examine voter behaviour in general elections and its implications on the development of liberal political democracy in Kenya. An examination of voting behaviour in general elections might shed some light to the country's pursuit of a 'stable' political democracy. Consequently, this study endeavoured to examine the factors that structure voting behaviour, namely; purposive corporate social bonds, primordial corporate social bonds and socio-demographic variables. The study adopted a cross-sectional survey research design with a multi-stage sampling technique involving purposive and systematic random sampling methods to select 600 informants from six constituencies of which two were urban and four were rural in four regions of the republic of Kenya. Because of delimitations in terms of resources and logistics, only four regions were sampled out of the possible then eight provinces of Kenya. These four regions were the then Nairobi Province, NEP, Western Province and Nyanza Province. The four regions were chosen based on their unique voting behaviour in general elections. The main data collection instrument was structured questionnaire and where necessary secondary data were used to augment the study findings. SPSS was used in data management and analysis. The descriptive statistics used in this study included frequency distributions; percentages, means and later cross-tabulations were computed. Inferential statistics such as ANOVA, t-test and linear regression were also employed to test relationships, predictions and draw conclusions. Focus group discussions were carried out, summarised, categorised and emerging themes used in the discussion to augment quantitative information. Research findings obtained revealed that region, religion and income were the best predictors of voting behaviour. Voters in the then Nyanza (Luo) were highly influenced by social bonds in their voting behaviour , while Islam had a persuasive influence in shaping voting behaviour of its adherents more than any other religion. Voters earning more than Ksh. 10,000 were found to be independent of social bonds in their voting behaviour. On the basis of these findings, the research concluded that this might be some kind of modern day *functionalism.* Some form of 'function'-tangible or intangible that some regional or religious affiliation performs for voters which is why they are more likely to stick to one of their kind (or against as the case may be) or vote the highest bidder for those with low incomes. It was also concluded that it is because of lack of civic education coupled with strong primary social bonds (i.e in-group identity writ large). This means that voters are more likely to vote for candidates who originate from their regions, confirming voters' strong attachment to the notion of "home district". The notion of "home district" or region in Kenyan politics is a surrogate for ethnicity and/or clanism. On the basis of this finding, this research recommended that a policy framework be worked out for IEBC, NCIC and other players involved in civic education to engender liberal civic principles and consciousness in their curriculum that will inculcate in the citizens liberal democratic ethos necessary for the development of liberal democracy in Kenya.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Kenyans held an opinion that people of modest circumstance around the world have voiced for a century or more: that the vote is a major weapon of the weak in struggles for human, civil, and material rights. wa Gĩthĩnji & Holmquist, 2008

1.1 Background to the Study

Democracy as envisaged by the ancient Greeks meant that the people will rule themselves through direct personal participation of the citizen body in the government of the city-state (Arblaster 1996; Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). This took two principal forms; one, there was the ecclesia or assembly which every citizen was entitled to attend and which took the final decisions on governance – it was the sovereign policy. The ecclesia under normal circumstances met ten times a year. It was the concrete embodiment of the principle of popular sovereignty, not the people choosing a government once every 4, 5, or 7 years, but the people continuously governing themselves from month to month and year to year (Kelsen, 1955:2).

The second feature of the Athenian democracy was the filling of all offices of government and administration of the laws by citizens chosen, not by competitive elections, but by lot. The system of the citizens filling offices by random rotation and of having the right to take part in the assembly meant that Athens between 462-322 BCE came as near as any community ever to achieving the democratic ideal of government by the people themselves, rather than the modern substitutes of representative or delegated rule manifested in complex electoral projects. The present-day complex democratic culture has had a long history. There are two principal sources, the Reformation

Protestantism and the Enlightenment project (Borgebund, 2010:50). From these sources evolved the theory and culture of toleration, reason, autonomy and resistance to established order as revealed in the two major socio-political revolutions of the United States of America and France in late 18th century. The belief that God spoke directly to individuals gave Protestants courage and confidence in themselves and a resolve to their course (power of individual choice) hitherto unknown to the people of the West. This protestant religious fervour eventually spread throughout the Western society and gave birth to the *modern* era's first experiment of popular will. This notion of the general will (legislative power) is implicit in the French Revolution great theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau's seminal work, ***The Social Contract****; conceiving of society as the construct of free calculating individuals bent on maximizing their own interests* (Melossi, 1990: 24-28). In the same spirit, Bentham writing in 1817 wondered what principle could be more impregnable than the people acting politically for themselves in pursuit of individual wellbeing.

This is the political debt that the modern era owes to the rationalist tradition (Enlightenment project), namely; liberal democracy. A democracy constructed on an exaggerated notion of individual autonomy fortified by a bundle of rights premised on three principal ideals of: Equal political rights; impartiality; and liberty. This is realised through universal adult suffrage regardless of race, gender or property ownership. Liberal democrats believe that through universal adult suffrage, we shall have an aggregate total of best interests affording the utilitarian objectives of greatest happiness to all (Nodia, 1992:6).

This is the democracy that Western Europe bequeathed the world at the time of its expansionist project in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.

The second half of 20th century dubbed the century of the common man, witnessed the extension of "democratic frontiers" to most parts of Africa, Kenya included (Cowen & Laakso, 1997). But as the franchise was being extended, the definition of democracy was being revised and watered down to render it compatible with the persistent liberal belief in the necessity and virtue of rule by elites.

In Africa, Ghana signalled the first wave of democracy in 1957 by holding elections based on universal suffrage and with no restrictions on candidature or party. After independence euphoria, the ritual of elections continued in most parts of Africa from the 1960s, 70s and 80s. For instance, Kenya had ten elections (1963,1969,1974,1979,1983,1988,1992, 1997,2002,2007) of which five were single party elections and five multiparty elections. In most cases, none of them managed to be effective in terms of regime change as the case was in most parts of Africa (Young, 1993). It was in the 1990s when African governments, responding to international political processes, notably changes in the former Soviet Union and Latin America coupled with the internal disquiet against one party (mis) rule that signalled political changes across Africa. These changes were dubbed as the second wave of democratization. It was in this second wave of democratization that governments in Benin, Zambia and Cape Verde changed in 1991 following elections. These changes occasioned the abandonment of highly and sacredly

hitherto held ideological rhetorical positions of ‘socialism’, ‘capitalism’ or ‘non-alignment’ as political elites and political ‘entrepreneurs’ rushed to embrace virtues of elective multiparty democracy across Africa .

This second wave of democratization in Africa did provoke acrimonious public and intellectual debates to the extent that notions such as “democracy”, “human rights”, “liberty” “freedom” “independence” were questioned as to their intrinsic meanings. African scholars such as Chole (1995:3), Hutchful (1995:101), Mafeje (1995:26), Mkandawire (1995:85), Nyong’o (1995:40), Ibrahim (1995), Mamdani (1995:52) among others carried sharp debates around these concepts. The debates questioned the issues of form and/or content of democracy as practised in Africa. The contention was whether liberal democracy as understood and practised in Western Europe and North America could be grafted to the African situation successfully without theoretical and practical readjustments.

Mafeje, Hutchful and Mkandawire (Chole & Ibrahim, 1995) particularly argued against foreign involvement in the second wave of democracy on the African continent and raised issues of sovereignty as points of concern if democracy was externally sponsored. Mafeje claimed that sponsored democracy will give rise to a comprador class inclined only to the promotion of Structural Adjustment Programmes and their political twin sister of liberal multiparty elections with minimal accommodation of nationalist political agenda. Nyong’o applauded the external forces for their catalyst role as he celebrated the second wave of democracy on the continent as substantive

(Nyong'o, 1995:40). Mamdani was sceptical of this received wisdom of democracy understood as multiparty elections solely premised on political parties and lacking the dynamo of grassroots social movements organised around social structural issues of grassroots concerns. Mamdani's thesis is profound, in that he posits that democracy is only possible if there is equal and concrete arguments and concerns for all groups especially the grassroots groups in society.

But a historical glance at the two democratic waves in post-colonial Africa paints the second wave of democratisation as leveraged by external forces. The reasons are not far-fetched as it is now generally agreed that what transformed and catalyzed African citizens' protests to democracy was the confluence of monumental changes in the world political order notably the collapse of the Soviet power especially the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall, the overthrow of Nicolae Ceaucsecu of Romania and the publication of the World Bank's long- term perspective study on Sub-Saharan Africa (*From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*) ushering in SAPs with attendant decline in economic fortunes and increase in material poverty in most countries (Lemarchand, 1992:105; Mensah, 2003:158). The resultant world order after the end of the cold war privileged the tenets of liberal democracy especially regular multiparty elections and neoliberal economic blueprint of free market dubbed as Washington Consensus. Between 1985-1991, no less than twenty (28) authoritarian regimes were forced to liberalize the political arena. By 1997, about three quarters of African countries were under 'democratic rule'

succumbing to the logic of periodic elections, albeit mostly with questionable content: (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1992). In common with Mahmood Mamdan (1996) and Omotola (2009:21), this research is in opposition with this kind of practice positing that this kind of elections from above without full involvement of the grassroots people even if free and fair are insufficient instruments of democratization in Africa.

This hegemony of liberal capitalist ideology led to the, "Internationalization", of privatisation and liberal democracy issues. The object of liberal democracy therefore, became a major issue in bilateral and multilateral development cooperation between Africa, North America and the Western world. Multilateral institutions like the Commonwealth, OECD, the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Word Bank and the United Nations began to promote the doctrines of liberalism as issues of concern in their continued cooperation with Africa. Major donor countries like the United States, Canada, Britain and France also made liberal democratic issues prerequisite for continued aid flow and economic management (Sandbrook, 1990:676; Rijnierse, 1993:648; Sandbrook, 1997:490; Holmquist & Ford, 1998:238; Broad & Cavanagh, 1999; Naím, 2000; Williamson, 2000; Williamson, 2003; Williamson, 2004; Omotola, 2009). In cognition of the foregoing discussion, were African states instituting World Bank, IMF and their conglomerate of NGOs democracy or African people's democracy? For example, the urge to allow the re-introduction of multiparty elections in Kenya was influenced by this development, when in 1991, Western donors decided to

freeze $350 million (out $1 billion) in quick disabusing aid to the country. Daniel Arap Moi the then president of Kenya, therefore, grudgingly agreed to a raft of constitutional changes that allowed multiparty elections in December, 1992 (Hempstone, 1997). The same thing happened to Ghana's Rawlings, who announced the transition programme on 10th May, 1991 four days before the crucial donors conference in Paris from May, 14 -15,1991 (Qyaye, 1995). This is very clear that most regimes in Africa were arm-twisted to embrace liberal democracy by the donor community (Hempstone, 1997). It was not in their visible interest or plans to introduce multiparty politics and elections.

In Kenya, internally critics (Oginga Odinga, Martin Shikuku, Jean Marie Seroney, Masinde Muliro, Bildad Kagia, J.M. Kariuki, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Chelagat Mutai among others) of one party dictatorship of KANU had been active since the 60s, 70s, and 80s. Buoyed by the winds of change on the international scene in the late 1980s and early 90s internal critics were on the ascendancy. Oginga Odinga, Moseti Anyona, Masinde Muliro, Martin Shikuku, Ken Matiba, the famous 'Young Turks' and others defied government's refusal to grant them licences for public political meetings by convening rallies at the historic Kamkunji grounds in Nairobi. At these rallies, speakers demanded that Kenya should return to multipartysm as the Independence Constitution provided by repealing Section 2A of the Constitution which transformed Kenya into *a de jure* one party state. (Chelang'a, Ndege et al., 2009:20). Odinga's attempts to launch National Democratic Party (NDP) and Forum for the Restoration of Democracy

(FORD) were ruthlessly denied in 1990 and 1991, respectively. This buoyed push by Oginga and other advocates of pluralism played a significant role in forcing Moi's government to accede to the repeal of Section 2(a) of the Constitution and officially re-introducing multiparty democracy in Kenya. This political transition in Kenya and Africa as a whole was apparent from the emergence and/or resurgence of relevant institutions such as political parties, vibrant civil society and liberalised mass media, as well as regularized electoral events (Liviga, 2009:5). It is against such background that Kenya found itself embracing the transition to multiparty democracy of competitive elections.

Surprisingly, over twenty years now and Kenya's transition and consolidation of democracy is still in doubt. Even after 1991 and sequel to the revamping of the relevant institutions, the political landscape, texture and tone remain largely unchanged. Kenyan citizens voted back to power the authoritarian KANU regime of Moi twice 1992 and 1997 general elections but with a number of powerful ministers falling along the way reminiscent of the pre-1991 days ((Bates, 1989; Odhiambo-Mbai, 1998:43; O'brien & Ryan, 2001:483; Barkan, 2006:17). The same scenario obtained in the 2005 referendum and the bungled 2007 general elections compelling one to look beyond the enactment, revamping or transformation of institutions as the sure route to liberal democracy (Suzanne Mueller, 2008, quoted in Southall, 2009:448). This study hypothesised certain underlying structural characteristics of the Kenyan voter's behaviour as a critical factor in this shaky

democratisation process. Comparative electoral researches from advanced democracies suggest that the vote has become more individualised and less structured by groupings (Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993; Sears, 1993: Shamir & Arian, 1999:265).

In many Western democracies, issues constructed around state employment, healthcare, gender issues and the gay question have currency that voting is more individualised and less structured by the glue of social interaction. Such assumptions by the promoters of liberal democracy in Africa are under scrutiny as the interest in voting behaviour and the consequent implications to the development and consolidation of liberal democracy in Africa and Kenya in particular in this study is undertaken to examine how much the vote is shaped by individual agency or group structure be it primordial or purposively constructed social bonds. This is relevant because electoral democratic processes in Africa usually raise questions hinging upon basic collective identity dilemmas, territorial and social communal boundaries among others. The current study deemed it necessary that the above mentioned issues will be best understood through voting behaviour in the context of the following variables: Primordial corporate social bonds, purposive corporate social bonds and socio-demographic variables.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Kenya, like most African countries, operates within a liberal democratic system. This system gives primacy to periodic elections and voting as the

main form of political participation and the means by which citizens renew their contract with their political representatives. However, doubts have been cast at the efficacy of periodic elections as a way of guaranteeing democratic and responsive governance in Kenya. This is mainly because elections are treated as an event that is accomplished at the ballot rather than a process that encompasses the electioneering duration and beyond. This study examined voting behaviour and its implications for the development of liberal democracy in Kenya using the first four multi-party general elections since the repeal of Section 2(a) of the Constitution in 1991. Since a study of voter behaviour requires locating balloting in its social context, this work easily lends itself to sociological analysis. In accomplishing this task, the study interrogated how purposive corporate social bonds, primordial corporate social bonds and socio-demographic variables structure voting behaviour during general elections in Kenya. Based on the outcome of the investigation, the study has made inferences on the implications of the identified variables on the development of liberal democracy in Kenya.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study was to explain voting behaviour of Kenyan voters in general elections held since the repeal of the *de jure* one party state in 1991(repeal of Section 2A of the Constitution). The specific objectives of the study were to:

i. Examine the influence of purposive corporate social bonds on voting behaviour.

ii. Interrogate the influence of primordial corporate social bonds in shaping voting behaviour.

iii. Examine the influence of gender on voting behaviour.

iv. Examine the influence of socio-demographic variables on voting behaviour.

v. To discuss the implications of the identified variables on the development of liberal democracy in Kenya.

1.4 Hypotheses and Propositions

The general proposition of this study is that voting behaviour in Kenya constrains the country's transition to a mature liberal democracy. From this general proposition, and the literature reviewed in this study, it was hypothesised that there are certain qualities or characteristics of the Kenyan voters that lead them to vote in certain ways, thereby determining the pace of the country's transition to a mature democratic political system and this study focused on the following as stated in the **hypotheses** below:

i. The stronger one's loyalty to a purposive corporate actor, the more one would vote for the candidates it supports.

ii. There is a strong congruence in voting for candidates among members of the wider family.

iii. There is a strong congruence in voting for candidates among friends.

iv. Candidates who originate from traditional leadership lineages are more likely to be elected than their colleagues from non-leadership lineages.

v. Candidate's socio-economic profiles influence voting behaviour.

vi. There is no relationship between the gender of the candidate and voter behaviour.

vii. Voters will be strongly influenced by candidate's clan or ethnic identity in their voting behaviour.

1.5 Justifications and Significance of the Study

It was the intention of this study to find out factors that structure and condition voting behaviour and its impact on the realization of liberal democracy in Kenya. The study results revealed specific underlying factors that structure and condition voting behaviour in Kenya as; purposive corporate social bonds, primordial corporate social bonds, and socio-demographic variables.

The study should be of importance to scholars of African psephology, especially those interested in the process of democratization in Africa. In this direction, this study reaffirms that primary group solidarities predominate over individual agency in structuring voting behaviour and pattern in Africa. To

this extent, the current study dovetails with findings of Wanjohi (1984) in Kenya, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) in Ghana, Gibson and Long (2009), and Norbert (2009) in South Africa in revealing that individual agency is not necessarily the primary determinant in voting behaviour. In this sense, psephologists interested in African politics will be challenged to debate why much effort to inculcate liberal democratic civic competencies by civil societies and foreign partners have failed at least in the Kenyan case to yield the desired behaviour. This study is also significant to researchers of African voting behaviour in confirming that it is possible to undertake studies of voter behaviour at local and national levels. Hence, studies of a similar nature to this one can be replicated by other scholars for purposes of comparative discourse.

The study contributes to existing literature in the following distinct ways: First, it builds on existing studies of voting behaviour (Wanjohi, 1984; Young, 1993; Coleman, 2001; Lindberg, 2003; Coleman, 2004; Lindberg, 2004; Lindberg, 2004; Lindberg, 2004; Lindberg, 2005; Lindberg, 2006; Lindberg, 2006; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008; Gibson & Long, 2009; Kagwanja & Southall, 2009; Lindberg, 2009; Lindberg, 2009; Norbert, 2009; Southall, 2009; Young, 2009; Lindberg, 2011) and shed, some new light on the debates by resolving some of the key conflicts that have emerged and calling into question some of the past conclusions. This is important because failure to resolve such debates means that the confusions involved are likely to recur in new form; this work is an attempt to clarify and resolve some of the issues involved. In so doing, this study expands the liberal and/or elite frameworks

(e.g Norbert, 2009, Young, 2009) or the over-sophisticated abstractions of Marxist class analysis (Mahmood Mamdan's *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*) by developing a broader socially-embedded sociological framework that incorporates sociological, political, and cultural structures into the analysis of the nature and functioning of voting behaviour.

The study also constitutes a significant advance in interdisciplinary methodology and analytical frameworks for analysing future hypotheses about voting behaviour. The study draws on a number of disciplines including politics, economics, law, social anthropology and sociology. The main findings of this study have powerful implications for policy. The limited terms in which voting behaviour in Kenya have been posed yielded too quickly to the advocacy of questionable political and legal strategies.

Finally, this research should be of practical importance foremost to ordinary Kenyan citizens, as the result reveals factors that determine their voting behaviour for self re-examination and diagnosis. This has the potential for a corrective attitudinal change towards a pro-liberal democratic behaviour. Furthermore, this study is of special use to those involved in civic education as they will be called upon to transform non-democratic orientations and substitute them with pro-democratic civic practices such as; issue-based, merit-driven voting behaviour and tolerance of different political opinions and cultural orientations and inclinations.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

The study examined voting behaviour in Kenya's general elections since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991 when Section 2A of the constitution was repealed. This repeal facilitated the holding of four multiparty elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. It is these four multiparty elections that this study focused on and not those elections held before the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1992.

The study focused on voting behaviour in general elections because in Kenya, the three elections constituting the general elections (presidential, parliamentary and local government elections) are held simultaneously. As such, the underlying and structural factors shaping voting behaviour in the three were deemed to be the same partly because of coat-tugging.

The study focused on voting behaviour; specifically on how variables such as, purposive social bonds, primordial social bonds and demographic variables shape voting behaviour. The findings are used to review their implications for the development of liberal political democracy in Kenya. The study concerned itself with issues of organization of elections, constitutive and regulative structures of elections, issues of monitoring and international observation of elections, among others tangentially when it proved necessary. While these areas are important, to include them in this study would have made it unmanageable.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

*...the franchise is understood as a trust in the hands of whoever holds it...*Atkinson, 1858

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter was to review the available literature on voting behaviour and to assess the implications of voting behaviour on the development of liberal democracy in a polity. This chapter also attempted to broaden our theoretical understanding of the effectiveness of the studied voting behaviour in other polities and its attendant implications on the development of liberal democracy. The chapter takes the following format:

A. The evolution of voting and franchise

B. Elections and democracy

C. Electoral systems, party systems and party politics in Africa

D. Voter behaviour and voting patterns

E. Theoretical and conceptual frameworks utilised in this study

2.1.1 Historical Background to the Evolution of Voting and the Franchise

Whilst there have been many studies concerning the failure of liberal democracy in Africa, they remain inconclusive. It will be shown that this inconclusiveness is partly due to lack of conceptual and analytical synthesis of the Western liberal democratic ideals and peculiar local social structures

and their attendant norms operating within many non-Western political systems and partly due to emphasis on wrong questions. A study on voting behaviour is a good starting point in an attempt to reconcile and domesticate liberal democracy in Africa. A historical perspective of voting is a good entry point.

For the last 200 years, the exercise of voting has undergone tremendous change from the ancient Greece and Rome practices. In ancient Greece and Roman assemblies, voting was often, by show of hands or acclamation by voice (viva voce). The term ballot, referring to a slip of paper on which candidates' names were written, was already popular by the time the 12th Amendment to the United States Constitution was passed. This form of paper ballot presented a number of challenges at the time, chief among them being, lack of privacy and the principal of 'one-man one vote'.

Despite the many challenges, this style of voting persisted into the 19th century. By mid- 19th century, all parties were printing party tickets listing all the offices for which they had candidates. This method was developed to the extent that voters were denied the chance of split vote. That is, no one could vote for candidates from two different parties, the rationale being that the emphasis should be on parties rather than on individuals (Allen, 1910; Petersen, 1972).

It was not until 1858 in Victoria Australia that an election was held using standardized ballot paper. This method eventually came to be known as the

Australian secret ballot. This standardized ballot paper listed all candidates for office and were printed and furnished at government expense and distributed at polling station one per voter. The USA adopted this method through a number of bitterly fought ballot reform laws across the different states starting in 1888. This method with minor modification across the world is the most used in elections today in order to secure pure, free and unintimidated ballot (Binney, 1893:104).

This history of the evolution of the ballot is imperative in the quest to examine voting behaviour as the current study has set up to do. It has been illustrated that the transition from viva voice and other open methods of voting was ostensibly meant to free the voter from corruption, intimidation and manipulation of the politicians who were keen on giving voting cues so as to influence voting outcome (Atkinson, 1858; Binney, 1893; Petersen, 1972; Heckelman, 1995; Heckelman,1998). The case of 1993 Los Angeles mayoral election suffices here. It is reported (Heckelman, 1993:120) that on the eve of elections, the Democratic Party backed Michael Woo and the Republican backed Richardo Riorda were polled even. To better their chances of winning the race, Democratic Party offered bribes in the form of six doughnuts to any potential voter at a cost of US$ 100,000. In spite of this costly expense, the Democratic Party still lost to the Republican candidate by an 8 per cent margin points. This is proof that voters today are able to benefit from the Australian secret ballot as they make their uncontaminated choices in the secrecy of the voting booth. The foregoing discussion on the evolution of the vote is,

therefore, central to understanding the current study of voting behaviour under liberal democracy. This is so because Liberal Democracy with its emphasis on individualism and civil liberties is only possible under the Australian secret ballot as the Los Angeles case demonstrates.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world, and especially Africa, became increasingly incorporated into the Western notion of liberal democracy with its emphasis on the notion of individual autonomy. It should be noted that this culture of individuality is not necessarily in tandem with the African thought process, which is overly embedded in group consciousness. This mentality (Nyamnjoh, 2005) which manifests itself along primordial lines has been the bane of liberal democracy designed around an atomised individual with one vote. The current research is cast against such an African background in its attempt to sociologically examine factors structuring voting behaviour and its impact on the development of liberal democracy in Kenya.

After the ballot had been secured, the next frontier of political struggle was the definition and extension of the franchise. Nations struggled with the decisions of who had the right and capacity to use the ballot (consent of the governed) with the greatest benefit to the whole nation (Smith, 1914). Historically, consent of the governed in ancient Rome meant,

> "*...consent of those who were actually or potentially fighting units. Voting was invented in early communities to find out whether the rank and file of fighting men would or would not support proposals put forward by their leaders*" (Smith, 1914:82).

This tradition was borrowed or inherited into the history of medieval Europe. For instance, in England, the remnants of these *fighting men* in the name of feudal aristocrats (landed propertied class) perpetuated the theory that parliamentary franchise existed to protect property. This ideology survived the 19th to the 20th century where in many polities in Europe contestation was between property and mere numbers. The crux of the argument being amount of property held or majority of numbers and this might be a kernel of the problem of defining democracy till today.

Property qualifications among other qualifications such as religion, colour, race, sex, or previous conditions of servitude among others restricted the franchise to a few privileged people in the new world of America, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Africa (Atkinson, 1858; Brooke, 1859; Warwick, 1866; Cobbe & Willett, 1877; Hill, 1878; Warwick, 1899; Smith, 1914; Lothian, 1932; Casper, 1976; Neil, 2013). Even for those who qualified to vote, the weight of the vote differed (Brooke, 1859:12). Before the Reformation Act of 1832 in Britain, the City of Manchester had two representatives in the House of Commons, which was the same with Old Sarum with only seven inhabitants. Other forms of inequities stemmed from traditional patterns of representation that privileged some persons to have more than one vote. In Britain before 1948, graduates of Oxford and Cambridge universities were allowed to vote for members of parliament both in their home constituency and in a special university constituency representing their *Alma mata* (Blewett, 1965:50; Lexa 1966:480).

Nevertheless, the trend has been generally encouraging in the sense that the suffrage has been extended, restrictions minimized not just in Europe and North America but most of the developing world, Africa included.

In Africa, the institution and practice of elections are a colonial creation as it became widespread late in the 1950s towards independence. With the exceptions of Francophone countries such as Senegal where under the French ideology of assimilation universal suffrage was introduced much earlier (Sandbrook, 1988:258; Jinadu, 1995:70). Although the pre-colonial political systems in Africa had some trappings of democracy embedded in them, the concept of voting and the notion of political majority and minority were not part of the African political traditions (Simiyu, 1987; Albert, 1992; Buijtahuijs & Rijnierse, 1993; Udogu, 1994:207). Dialogue, consensus and political collectivism were emphasized as opposed to the individualism, atomization and the winner-loser notion reminiscent of the Western liberal democracy (Adejumobi, 2000:62).

It is the transformation from colonialism to independence that ushered in this new political dispensation where citizens were to democratically participate in the governance process of their nation through elections. For the first time in the history of Africa, citizens acquired political primacy as electoral democracy made them the centre of competing interests between politicians. This was the context within which liberal electoral democracy was introduced in Kenya.

Nevertheless, in Kenya, the extension of the franchise was premised on a racial and minimalist conception of democracy in the sense of white dominion (Blundell, 1959:221; Chweya, 2009:114-147). The argument was that black majority did not at that particular point in time possess the intellectual infrastructure necessary to the process of electoral democracy and as such if given the vote majority, black Africans would cast it on the basis of race and/or ethnicity. Therefore in Kenya, the first elections were held under such a limited franchise. Thus in 1905 when the first legislative council was formed and when subsequently the elections were held in 1909, majority black Africans did not participate in these elections (Okech-Owiti, 2008:8). This practice continued and was consummated in the Lyttelton Constitution of 1922 and later concretised in the Coutts Commission (Adar, 1998). The electoral democracy principle proper was institutionalized much later between 1960 and 1963 through the various Lancaster conferences.

From the forgoing literature, it is apparent that there has always been a group of people keen and full of determination to structure the legal frameworks to advantage their social locations in society as part and parcel of the history and struggles of electoral politics. The legal structuring and re-structuring is always in the form of who casts the vote (franchise), for this action has the attendant fundamental impact on the policy choices that the elected representatives make (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005:891). These policy choices have far-reaching ramifications of how the society's resources are distributed across the population (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005:892). Therefore, the

decision to extend the franchise has been very moderate and many times not out of the benevolence of elites but for their fear of revolution staged by the disenfranchised. This behaviour is well-captured in an 1831 speech by the then British Prime Minister Earl Grey while introducing the electoral reform bill in parliament:

> *There is no one more decided against annual parliaments, universal suffrage and the ballot than i am...the principal of my reform is to prevent the necessity of revolution...iam reforming to preserve, not to overthrow (quoted in Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000:1182).*

The above quotation is sufficient evidence that the uniformity of qualification to participate in politics transforming the hitherto privilege to a right to vote has had a chequered history. As the franchise was being extended to Africa, there seems to be a common historical thread connecting the 1831 feelings of Earl Grey the then British prime minister to the feelings of the former president of Uganda the late Milton Appolo Obote that elections are a means of controlling the masses and not a lever of the masses to hold their representatives accountable (Rose 1978; Joseph, 1990). Then the extension of the franchise is in vain if that which is presented and that which is represented is not identical, as the above scenario portends. This has the potential of painting the exercise of voting as invariably a manipulated process devoid of the influence of obtaining social structures.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) also argue that the struggle for the extension of the franchise was significantly boosted by the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment movement involved a change in the social values of the elites.

The changing social values included an emphasis on equality and liberty. This principle of equality encouraged the extension of the franchise. Robert Dahl among others believes that this total inclusiveness in combination with requisite procedures results in a polyarch (Caraway, 2004:444). Whether this inclusiveness *per se* or popular participation in governmental decisions is the promise of democracy is a debatable point in Kenya. In the next section, this study examines the relationship between franchise and democracy.

2.1.2 Elections and Democracy

Joseph Schumpeter quoted in Diamond (1999:10) defines electoral democracy as: A civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage.

This conception of liberal democracy belongs to the minimalist school also called procedural or processualist that understands democracy in terms of procedures and inclusiveness as Schumpeter suggests in the above quotation. This conception limits democracy to participation through universal suffrage and contestation understood as free and fair elections where representatives compete over citizen's vote (Schumpeter, 1947:170; Lipset, 1959:71; Sandbrook, 1988; Dahl, 1991:31 & 72-75; Ndue, 1994:45; Cheibub & Przeworski, 1996:222; Sandbrook, 1996:85; Diamond, 2002; Lindberg, 2002; Diamond, 2003:; Brown, 2004:335; Bogaards, 2007; Lindberg, 2009:315; Lindberg, 2009; Lindberg, 2009). Conceptually, elections symbolize popular sovereignty and the expression of the "social pact" between the rulers and the

people, which defines the basis of political authority, legitimacy and citizens' obligations. It is actually the kernel of political accountability and a means of ensuring reciprocity and exchange between the governors and the governed (Sandbrook, 1996:75, Wanjala 2002:195). Some scholars of political democracy seem to concur with this theoretical assertion which reduces liberal democracy to an event of choosing political leaders regularly (Adejumobi 1998:42; Adar, 1998). Lindberg (2006:139) contends that frequent and successful elections have the capacity to engender democratic ethos among voters.

But by no means is the ongoing discussion suggesting that democracy is reducible to and compatible with the logic of regular and competitive elections. The minimalist school has been accused of defining democracy institutionally, thus allocating citizens participation in governments decisions a truncated role (Hedrick, 1999; Caraway, 2004:444; Ghai 2008:218). Scholars such as Diamond and Myers, (2000:366) contend that elections must be more than regular and/or competitive to achieve democratic promise defined as the will of the people. Above regularity and competitiveness, elections must be *free* and *fair*. It is argued that elections are "free" when the legal barriers to participate are reduced to their bare minimum, when the electioneering process including campaigns are free of violence and the voting is by secret ballot. And the elections will qualify as "fair" when the political environment or context permits all contestants to participate.

The political context will be conducive if the electoral body managing the elections is competent and independent from undue influence from partisan quarters, and the following actors are neutral: the police, the military, judiciary and the media (Lansner, 2006). These are the basic constitutive requirements pursuant to the process of electoral democracy at least in form (Holmquist & Ford, 1998:228; Nasong'o, 2007:85). But a polity cannot qualify to be democratic courtesy of form or procedures (institutions) alone; these institutional infrastructures must be undergirded by principles that privilege the realisation of popular will or popular control over collective decision-making (Beetham, 1999:111; Knutsen, 2010:109). These principles are crucial since that is what the institutions were created to safeguard. It is what people experience within the inter-election period in terms of governance results that is critical. We discuss this issue next.

To start with, democracy has to be defined according to certain basic principles. Beetham has isolated the core principles embodied in the historical conception of democracy as "rule of the people" to mean popular control and political equality (Lively, 1975:45; Holden, 1988:6; Beetham, 1993:6). According to Beetham, the first principle of popular control is underpinned by the value assigned to citizens as self- determining agents who should have a say on issues that affect their lives. The second principle of political equality is underpinned by the assumption that every adult citizen has an equal capacity for self-determination and therefore, an equal right to influence collective

decisions and to have their own interests considered when decisions are made (Dahl, 1992:45).

It follows then that there should be necessary correspondence between acts of government and the equally weighted express wishes of citizens with respect to those acts. This is the "responsive will" that all the democratic polities are expected to pursue (May, 1978:13; Saward, 1994:; Danevad, 1995:335). The equality assumption defines democracy in terms of outcomes (responsive rule) as opposed to mere procedures (form). These procedures may take a variety of forms in contexts but their democratic character will be diminished in so far as they are not designed to maximize responsiveness because anything less than full correspondence suggests that other values other than democracy are taking precedence over the realization of democratic *modus operandi*.

Additionally, the social stratification theories of the elite and Marxist analyses offer alternative viewpoints on the linkage between elections and democracy and point out the limit of the former in realizing the latter. For the elite theory of democracy, the organization of society presupposes the existence of an oligarchy which controls the lives and actions of the people; hence the concept of representative democracy only provides a legal and political framework to justify and legitimize this minority rule (Bollen, 1980: 372). Put differently, elections do not represent the expression of any popular range of choices available before the people or how those choices were arrived at. As Gaetano Mosca observes "The representative is not elected by the voters but as a rule, has himself elected by them" (Bottomore, 1964:5). As such, the notion of

competition germane to elections is a fraud (Adejumobi, 1998: 43). On the other hand, the Marxist analysis in questioning democratic validity of elections, argues that elections constitute a system of political and ideological reification of the hegemony of the dominant class (Sandbrook, 1988:249). It is a system of social acculturation through which dominant ideologies, political practices and beliefs are reproduced. Within the context of class differentiation and inequalities, political rights as enshrined in elections present little or no choice into the dominated classes as choices of candidates and agenda oscillate among members of the dominant class (Beckman, 1989; Lipset, 1993:46).

The result, therefore, as Claude Ake (1995) points out, is a dissociation of voting from choosing and the denial of the voters' right from the exercise of political power (Kante, 1994:104). Along the lines of Marxist concerns, Antonio Gramci argues that all you need to win an election for four or five years is supremacy of passions on the voting day in spite of the fact that the majority of the electorate will dissociate themselves from its legal expression once passions have died down (Gramci, 1952:158-9 quoted in Adejumobi, 1998:48). In essence, the Marxist paradigm argues that elections guarantees little hope for political accountability, political responsiveness and as such democratic development. But despite these limitations, Marxist theory acknowledges elections as a positive but insufficient step towards the struggle for democratic development. The question then is what criteria underscore meaningful elections necessary to the process of democratic development?

In Africa, the ecology of elections has undergone tremendous improvement in an attempt to make elections a viable vehicle to democracy as seen in the reforms targeting constitutive and regulative democratic instruments including constitutional reforms, civil service reforms especially the police and judiciary and above all reforms in the electoral systems and governance structure as seen in Kenya (Kenya, 2010; Adar, 2001:10 & 17). But Diamond and Myers (2000) in common with Suzanne (2008) quoted in Southall (2009:448) argue that these formal structures alone are necessary but not sufficient catalysts for consolidation of democracy in a polity. They suggest that political elites must entrench pluralism in the four basic arenas of society, namely; economic, political, organizational and intellectual life (ideological). First, the economic arena comprises the marketplaces of factors of production, goods and services. Second, the political marketplace is the space of contestation for power by a multiplicity of actors; while the third marketplace includes social organisations, movements and interest groups organising themselves. Finally, we have the ideological marketplace which is the arena for competing ideas such as norms, values and ideologies.

Once the centre of power in a regime has granted some measure of autonomy to the last two marketplaces, they have the potential to initiate other processes. These processes may include elites mobilising the masses towards cultural change, economic development and a reorientation or transformation of norms. Seymour Martin Lipset quoted in Diamond and Myers (2000:376), contends that these reconfigurations are always from a traditional society with

close family ties towards modern society with emphasis on individuality. This kind of social change will usher in a culture privileging values that will make liberalism a way of life as norms in major spheres of life will undergo reconfiguration embedding the spirit of autonomy and personal agency among individual voters. This is the inevitable result of the interaction of the four marketplaces that is likely to make voters efficacious in their voting behaviour within a liberal democratic dispensation. A democratic constitution should endeavour to socially engineer such scenarios in an attempt to midwife liberal democracy in illiberal societies.

A democratic constitution can provide for a poliarchy, a delegative democracy or a heterarchy (Dahl, 1971; O'Donnell, 1994; Bruzt, 2002). A poliarchy is a system of representation from the citizen to the state based on free and fair elections whilst a delegative democracy is a system in which,

> ....*only a single platform of public good dominates the functioning of the executive in the political cycle* (Bruzt, 2002: 65).

The delegated representative has free rein in poliarchic and delegative democratic systems because these systems lack effective mechanisms for forcing incumbents either to stick to original programmes promulgated during electoral campaigns or to consistently rebalance the representation of public good or interest. Poliarchies and delegative democracies contrast sharply with heterarchies. A heterarchy is:

> *A specific type of democracy that represents diverse associations of heterogeneous interests within the state, prevents any of them from*

> *dominating, and bases the making of binding decisions on the orderly clashes and compromises among institutions representing diverse ideas about public good…the specific organization of representation makes a state a heterarchy, enabling it to uphold the freedoms of citizens, preserve its freedom from capture, and regulate relations among ---actors in a way that maintains competition and facilitates mutually beneficial cooperation* (Bruzt, 2002: 55).

In developed liberal democracies, individuals contribute to public policy-making through engagement with political parties, civil societies and academia. This nationally binds economic and political decisions made on the basis of orderly clashes and compromises between parties or individuals representing diverse ideas about the public good or interest. This is the essence of the democratic promise that can only be realized through a heterarchic democracy. Kenya has never been a heterarchy. It has oscillated between a poliarchy and a delegative democracy. By suppressing effective political party opposition between 1969 and 1991, the KANU election manifestos or government economic policies could not be assumed to be aligned with the public interest due to lack of exit options for those who disagreed with the sole ruling party. For all practical purposes, electoral pedagogy in most African countries, Kenya included, took place under colonial rule, and this process instrumentally produced three sharp contradictions or paradoxes for post-colonial electoral politics and behaviour (Cohen, 1983:73).

First, colonialism by its very nature and character was antidemocratic. It was constructed on the fount of authoritarianism and domination. Thus ‘midwifing’ the post-colonial electoral process, particularly when the colonial regime itself was deeply interested and involved in the politics of power

transfer, suggests a very complex and problematic situation. The extent to which the pre-colonial electoral process was impartial and hence fair is questionable.

Second, although the democratization project launched as part of de-colonization was woven around liberal democratic principles and the ideals of self-determination and social justice, the emergent political elite had been educated and socialized under a highly centralized and authoritarian colonial order (Chazan, 1993). This was to later influence their political behaviour. Third, the statist and paternalistic character of colonial rule, which survived into the post-colonial era, was to later determine the subject and terrain of electoral competitions in post-colonial Africa with deleterious implications.

The emergent post- colonial electoral political order was thus constructed on the logic of neo-partrimonialism, a relic of primordial system of cultural etiquette of social bonds arranged in a hierarchical solidarity basis of reciprocal engagements characteristic of traditional pre-colonial Africa (Chazan, 1982; Haugerud, 1993:46-51). Springborg (1986) contends that primordial networks are pre-eminently contractual and reciprocal in nature through familism, affective, affinal, patron-client relations and other social structures and systems of power. The unit of political activity under this system is the group not the individual. These primordial systems of networks are deeply embedded in the African tradition and still exists alongside modern ‘’rational’’ institutions and more often than not these same modern rational bureaucratic institutions simply act as surrogates of primordial structures in

helping political and state bureaucrats to accumulate wealth and patronise their kin and kith as the post-independence political history of Kenya and much more Botswana posits (Chazan, 1982:173-178; Springborg, 1986:187; Kagwanja, 2009; Kagwanja & Southall, 2009:265-267; Kamungi, 2009; Kanyinga, 2009; Muhula, 2009;Southall, 2009:449). But is also noted how these historical meanings of reciprocity have been selectively twisted by political entrepreneurs such as President Moi of Kenya (Baba wa Taifa meaning Father of the Nation) and President Mobutu wearing leopard skin (Pitcher, Moran et al., 2009:129-131). In the words of Lindberg (2003:122);

> *neopatrimonialism is a system where politics is transacted through personalised loyalty and coercion anchored on a patron-clientele web of networks throughout the polity leading to the privatisation of the state*

This is something akin to corruption for the politician gets money probably from the state coffers to the voters in exchange for votes (Vincente & Wantchenkon, 2009). Once this kind of political behaviour is institutionalised, the politicians strive to satisfy their core bases through all sorts of loyalty building exchanges such as meeting school fees, burial expenses, wedding expenses, courts, police bails and hospital bills. Most often, this kind of behaviour favours big ethnic groups at the expense of small ones and the nation at large. This was the political culture imbibed by many African political elites from their departing colonial tutors. A system that privileged patron-client behaviour over liberal democratic political ethos during the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. Haugerud, (1993) argues that this is what informed the many constitutional changes under Mzee Kenyatta and Moi regimes to

create a strong presidency and one party system to make the institutions of governance in sync with hierarchical and personal nature of African primordial patronage culture.

The nature of elections in post-colonial Africa, therefore, tilted towards a state-elite regulated non-competitive model. In countries like Togo, Benin, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, Sudan and Kenya (from 1981), there was *de jure* one party rule; in such countries, make-shift elections were organized to legitimize the political order. In countries like the Gambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Senegal (post 1976) and Kenya (1992&1997) although periodic multi-party elections were held, a *de facto* one party rule existed where elections altered neither the leadership, state administration nor the regime. Hermet (1978) describes this kind of elections as pluralist coercive elections while others call them massage elections (Adejumobi, 1998: 48). Massage in the sense that electioneering process offers palliative effect to citizens' problems but in effect cures none and this might explain why a country like Kenya still struggles with her three independence enemies, namely; ignorance, disease and poverty after five decades of electoral democracy.

For the cast votes to translate into governance, the political system requires formulation of an effective electoral system. In the next section, the current study reflects on the relationship between electoral system, party system and party politics in Africa with their attendant potential in structuring voting behaviour.

2.1.3 Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Party politics in Africa

Designing an effective electoral system is crucial in a democratic polity based on popular sovereignty, for the people need to be both represented and governed. Theory and practice alike prove that different ways of tabulating votes produce different winners and that these different ways are neither perfect nor politically neutral (Norris, 1997:298). But the cardinal principle is that the distribution of seats in the legislature must strike a balance between these two needs of representation and governance. Usually, experts diagnose the causes and nature of conflict (cleavage structures) in a political system and prescribe electoral methods and rules designed to help ameliorate the conflict and foster a nascent democracy. Some scholars (Norris, 1997; Reynolds & Sisk, 1998:21-25; Nasong'o, 2007:84) claim electoral systems should generally aim to achieve:

i. *Representativeness,* which reflects the social group composition of the society and thus gives the government legitimacy;

ii. *Accountability,* to constituents in terms of services;

iii. *Inclusivity and accessibility,* which create support for the democratic process (even among minority groups) and therefore, prevent feelings of alienation on the part of sections of the constituents;

iv. *Stability of government,* which is derived from the will of the

people and enables the government to both enact and enforce legislation;

v. *The development of a party system,* which is split along political ideological lines rather than ethnic, racial, or regional clusters; and

vi *The ability to engender reconciliation,* which is especially significant in emerging, post-conflict democracies.

Scholars (Nasong'o, 2007:90; Teorell & Lindstedt, 2010:435) agree that there are three crucial components of an electoral system that can help achieve the above desiderata namely; ballot structure, constituency magnitude and the manner of allocating seats in the legislature. These are the generic dimensions upon which various electoral systems are differentiated. But the choice is not polemical but a continuum of varying formulas depending on the objectives of a particular polity. According to Gladdish (1993), the four things that shape and define the electoral formula are the following; the size, geographical distribution, ethnic or racial composition and, socio-economic profile of the population. The electoral formulas used in translating votes into legislative seats are basically three:

1. Single-member-constituency plurality or majoritarian system

2. Proportional representation

3. Derivative preferences of the above two categories.

The research presented in this section compares these alternative decision rules to determine which best suits the Kenyan voting behaviour. Well aware of the fact that the constitution of Kenya (2010) advises Majoritarian (first-past-the- post) system for Member of Parliament (Senate, Lower house and Women representative) and Majoritarian (50+%) for presidential vote. We discuss each of these three electoral systems in the following sections.

2.1.3.1 Majoritarian System

Majoritarian electoral system is the oldest electoral formula dating back to the 12th century. It has two major variants; Single-Member-Constituency Plurality and majority (simple of 50+ %) or absolute majority. Westminster system plurality voting of "first- past –the- post" is simple in that the candidate with largest number of votes is the winner. This system is popular and is majorly used in the elections of the lower house (parliamentary) in 43 countries including United Kingdom, Canada, India, United States, Kenya and many commonwealth states (Norris,1997:301). These are electoral systems based on simple majority principle. Other factors such as how many candidates they were, how many voters abstained among others are ignored as inconsequential. In the event that there are only two parties in the field as is always the case, the margin might be too small, if such a scenario is repeated all over the country, then the winning party will have a narrow majority of voters and yet an overwhelming majority in the legislature (Southall, 2009:445-450). Chief among the defects of plurality systems is lack of

proportionality between the total national party votes and party parliamentary seats (Norris, 1997:299).

With three or more parties in the field and election decided on the first past the post (FPP) basis as is the practice in Kenya, there is a high probability of many minority candidates being elected as the 1992 general elections provides a classic example. KANU won 26.6 per cent of the popular vote with 93 seats in the legislature (16 uncontested) compared to 73.4 per cent combined opposition popular vote but with 87 seats (31 seats for FORD Kenya, 31 seats for FORD Asili, 23 seats for DP and 2 seats for two minor parties). While President Moi won the race with a minority 36 per cent victory against opposition's combined 74% (Throup, 1993:394). Surely, representatives elected on a minority vote, though legally elected have no valid claim to represent the majority of their constituents. Under this system, representation is sacrificed at the altar of effective governance.

Absolute majority rule prescribes that the winner of a contested seat must garner more than 50% of the votes cast. In other situations, decision rules may call for extra-ordinary majority or absolute majority, requiring that the winner receives some higher proportion of the votes cast such as two thirds or unanimity. Here, the winning candidate or party must gather more votes than the opposition combined, ensuring majority support for the winner often courtesy of the second ballot as traditionally practised in France, Australia and now in Kenya regarding the presidential vote. This model is favoured because it has the tendency to produce stable governments. But it must be noted that

this model has the potential of deteriorating into a dictatorship of the majority, especially in a country where a section of the voters can marshal 50+% as happened in Kenya's 2013 general elections. This has a debilitating effect on small factions who feel excluded. It is in recognition of this major failure of majoritarian system that we now turn our survey to the other major electoral system namely; proportional representation, in the next section.

2.1.3.2 Proportional Representation

The Proportional Representation (PR) method comes in many variants. There is the extreme rigid version of list PR with no geographical constituencies; the whole country is treated as one big constituency, where parties draw up lists of candidates and the order in which their names appear on the party list determines their relative chances of election. Voters choose party or a coalition of parties and have no chance of altering the party list (Diskin & Diskin, 1995:41; Kretzmer, 2006:61). There are no by-elections and vacancies occasioned by resignation or deaths are filled by the next name on the party list. The main strength of this system is that with a threshold as low as 1.5% affording a party a seat in parliament, it secures fair representation of parties and increased citizen participation. Almost all parties that secure representation in parliament stand for genuine interests, whether ethnic, religious or socio-economic (Bogdanor, 1993:68; Norris, 1997:301 & 311; McGee, 2008:14). This might have the implicit consequence of emboldening voters to value their vote(s) despite their numbers. This kind of scenario with

repeated elections will improve the voting efficacy of citizens an act that has capacity to hasten Kenya's transition to mature liberal democracy.

This is in contrast to *First Past the Post* electoral system that distorts the translation of votes into seats undermining the enthusiasm of small party supporters and minorities. It is this enthusiasm by small party supporters and minorities that make PR electoral system superior in terms of stronger partisan preferences and voter turn-out, an act that affords voter efficacy (Karp & Banducci, 2008:312-313). Israel and the Netherlands are the best known democracies in the world that use a nation-list system without any constituency element. The result is that Dutch MPs have no constituencies and Dutch voters have no local representatives in the legislature (Gladdish, 1993: 56). This kind of situation can help break and destroy the pervasive patron-client voting behaviour obtaining in Kenya between MPs and Voters in Kenya's single-member constituency plurality. The result will be to elevate the voter to issue voting pedestal with no attachment to individuals. This is a highly cherished property of liberal democracy. We shall return to this point in the recommendation section of this thesis.

Proportional representation requires that the distribution of offices be proportional to the distribution of the popular vote among competing candidates and parties (Sisk, 1993:81; McGee, 2008:14-16). This system attempts to overcome distribution distortions that are associated with simple majority or plurality formulas, so that the representative institution can reflect the true opinions of the electorate. Under this arrangement of proportional

representation parties with neither a majority nor plurality of the popular vote can still win legislative representation. Netherlands was among the first countries to adopt proportional representation when in 1914, plural single member constituency system was proving unsuccessful to provide coherent representation. A similar scenario was witnessed in Lesotho's 1993 and 1998 elections when opposition parties failed to secure more than a single seat in parliament despite acquiring more than 25% of the cast national vote. The overall strengths were resorted to at the cost of a direct linkage between voters and representatives.

Jasiewicz, (1992:64) contends that the nature of this representation has its own consequences to the conduct of national politics. One such cost is the meticulous registration of party strengths with no minimum threshold, resulting in a multiparty legislature from which party leaders forge governments often with considerable delay and with no reference to voters as the 1991 Poland elections attest. It took almost two months of intensive interparty negotiations after this Polish election to produce a working government and a succession of changes thereafter (Gladdish, 1993: 59). This is why PR has been accused of scattering the people's will and failing to provide a basis for the emergence of a democratic majority.

Nevertheless, from a standpoint concerned purely with translating votes into representation, a proportional system may appear at least in principle to deliver the democratic goods. In fact, it is argued that PR government will be stronger, given that PR system will reduce the risk of polarization and

alienation of minorities (Lindberg, 2005:44-45; McGee, 2008:15). This is done by removing the notion that the winner takes it all; in fact, it fosters national alliances instead of encouraging coalitions based on mere ethnic arithmetic ((Lijphart, 1985; Horiwitz, 1989:31; Jasiewicz, 1992; Lijphart, 1995; Lijphart, 1996; Lustick, 1997; Lijphart, 1998).

2.1.3.3 Derivative Preferences of the Above Two Categories (mixed-systems)

The other variant is one that combines the PR system with the majoritarian system called the mixed system (Gladdish, 1993:54; Sisk 1993:79, Southall, 2009). In the mixed-system, the voter is actually provided with two ballots; one contains a proportional party list (regional or national) and the other a list of candidates elected by plural methods. German, Australia, Russia, New Zealand, Israel and Lesotho are among the known countries practising mixed electoral system.

In the German mixed system, each elector casts two votes, the first for a constituency representative to parliament and the second for a closed regional list in which there is no choice of candidate, but the voters may split their votes for example, between CDU and FDP. This German electoral system is popular because it combines the merits of the Westminster model and the proportional representation votes cast in order to secure seats in the Bundestag (Gladdish, 1993:58; Bogdannor, 1993:69-78). Israel also experimented with mixed electoral system between 1992 and 2003 when majoritarian system was grafted on the purely proportional system as the voter was given two ballots:

one for the proportional party list and the second one for the direct election of the prime minister. This reform experiment had far-reaching and almost opposite consequences (Diskin & Diskin, 1995; Kretzmer, 2006). The aim of the reform was ostensibly to weaken the sectarian powers of myriad small parties and enhance governability which did not happen and hence the reversal to the original electoral system. Kenya, through the constitution review process of 2010, has opted for mixed member proportional system. This was ostensibly created for minority groups (Southall, 2009).

There is also the single transferable vote method advanced by Thomas Hare in 1859 and strongly advocated by John Stuart Mill. It is a system of proportional representation known then as Hare's method that is domesticated in its modern derivative in the shape of a single transferable vote. Its basic argument is that if there is a group of people (electors) desirous of making a member their representative, they should be given that opportunity. Its essence is bringing together like-minded electors as opposed to pitting against each other of unlike minded electors. This system if adopted in Kenya could rescue quite a number of very liberal- minded individuals such as Honourable Mukhisa Kitui, Paul Muite, Martha Karua, the Late Wangari Mathai, Shem Ochuodho, Gitobu Imanyara among others whose like-mindedness is dispersed around the country with no strength in any single constituency to secure any of the parliamentary seats.

It must be borne in mind that these rules are not based on some abstract metaphysical whims; they represent sociological, political, socio-economic

and cultural structures and more important the patterns of political mobilization in a particular jurisdiction. Sequel to the above statement, electoral rules shape turnout decisions and voting behaviour due to perceived fairness, competitiveness and representativeness. Stable polities will prefer majority or plural rules while societies with traditional ethnic, linguistic and religious tensions, class cleavages will opt for proportional vote (Norris, 1997: 307; McGee, 2008:10; Singh, 2011:647).

First Past the Post electoral (FPP) system is the norm in most Anglophone states in Africa. This tradition is more of a colonial vestige that the British colonies in Africa adopted at independence. Kenya's independence constitution drafted in Lancaster bequeathed the nation with a majoritarian electoral system despite the fact that realities on the ground were dissimilar to the British socio-political realities that had evolved over the years to yield two dominant political parties that were germane to a plural electoral system (Conservative and Labour parties).

From the above discussion and in cognition of Kenya's political reality since independence, I propose proportional electoral system. Because the Kenyan political landscape is highly fragmented along ethnic, regional, age, class, religion among other cleavages, it is a little difficult to coalesce around two or three political parties as the tradition in *First-Past-the Post* plurality. The result is a plethora of political parties crafted along the above mentioned cleavage lines with a duplicity of manifestoes. These would have served Kenya better if the crafters of our constitution would have settled on the PR

nationwide or regional list system. By virtue of this system as observed earlier, politicians would be compelled by law to be inclusive in their mobilization and recruitment in terms of our diverse political groupings (Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999:32; McGee, 2008). This will mean that each political party's list must be inclusive in terms of age, gender, class, ethnoregionalism and other marginalised populations of our society as demanded by the constitution before the PR list is legally accepted by the IEBC (Southall, 2009:261). By this act alone, Kenya will have embarked on the path of inclusivity to Singh's (2011:654) question, *Do I have a dog in the fight* and above all will be a corrective measure on the elusive national character of political parties (Kenya,2010).

From the foregoing literature, an electoral system has the potential of fostering a political system with either many political parties (fragmented) or few political parties (concentrated) depending on whether the electoral system is proportional or majoritarian (Norris, 1997:307; Mozaffar et al., 2003:376-380). For a better understanding of how this has played out in Africa, it is imperative to examine party politics in Africa and Kenya in particular. This will help understand how cleavage structures have responded to the influence of the electoral systems in creating the obtaining party systems and the attendant voting behaviour.

2.1. 4 Party Politics in Africa

Political parties constitute the central intermediary institutional structure between the individual and the government in a democracy (Mantzavinos,

North et al., 2004:77; Checkel 2005; Haan, 2007) and North (1981:201-202) quoted in Haan (2007) define an institution as,

> *...a set of rules, norms or standard operating procedures that is widely recognised and accepted, structuring or constraining individual's actions in the interests of maximising the wealth or utility of principals in a particular arena.*

A crucial condition for a stable democracy and responsive government is the presence of these qualities in major parties with large and virtually permanent bases of support among voters (North, 1991:97). It is necessary that this institutional imperative should be the one conditioning party support so as to survive clear-cut policy failures and scandals by its leaders. We have in mind here the kind of support that the US Republican Party enjoyed during the depression years and the Watergate Scandal in the early 1970s to manage a comeback in 1980s. Without such deep loyalties, parties will be eliminated and forced into extinction as was the case of the Hamiltonian Federalist Party of 1800 USA, Party of Action in post-war Italy or Solidarity in Poland (Lipset, 1993:47-48). But when this loyalty is based on fissured factions animated by personal, religious, mercenary and/or ethno-regional ambitions, where institutional imperatives play no role, political parties will cease to be effective democratic agents (Udogu 1999; Orvis, 2006:96; Lavender, 2009; FES, 2010). For instance, the voting in the Ancient Roman Empire was always predetermined by patronage or by manipulation to the extent that North (1990) quoted below termed the voting experience as *frozen waste:*

> *---in that its implications was that voting behaviour in the assemblies could be regarded as totally divorced from the opinions, interest, and prejudices of the voters themselves* (North, 1990:7).

Africa is littered with such evidences especially where political parties are constructed around a personality (the big man syndrome) and/or ethnicity. For example in Ghana, CPP was premised on Kwame NKruma's charismatic personality or Kenya's KANU on Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and later Arap Moi. The bastion of this political culture in Africa is embedded in the colonial political history (Salih, 2009:41).

For instance, the first political body in Kenya was an East African outfit by the name East African Association in 1919. It was formed ostensibly to agitate against hut-tax, forced labour and the *kipande* system (registration system requiring blacks to hang the registration card around their necks). The activities of the East African Association led to riot shootings of March 1922 with the resultant deportation of Harry Thuku, Waiganjo Ndotono and George Mugekenyi (Sanger & Nottingham, 1964:1). After this unfortunate incidence, the colonial government in Kenya in conspiracy with missionaries encouraged the development of provincially based tribal associations such as Kikuyu Central Association, Kikuyu Provincial Association, the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association, the Taita Hills Association, and the Akamba Members Association. The first Kenyan African nationalist political body was formed in 1944 known as the Kenya African Union (KAU). But the colonial government frustrated its agenda and stifled its activities until 1953 when KAU was officially proscribed (Sanger & Nottingham, 1964:2). This act of the colonial government effectively undermined the growth of national institutions and gave rise to a plethora of ethnically-oriented associations among the African

populations (Throup, 1993:372-373; Adar, 1998; Berman, 1998:310; Orvis, 2006:1).

As hinted to earlier, the preceding discussion must be understood within the context of Africa's colonial history. The Africa's colonial experience created administrative units below the state called provinces. In the case of Kenya, there was consistently a dominant ethnic group in each province. This scenario heightened ethnic consciousness which spilt into political organisations as observed by Bratton and Kaimenyi (2008:272) that in Kenya, province (region) and ethnicity interact to reinforce ethnoregionalism (ethnic territorial hegemony), where political parties or consociationalism of political parties simply reproduce ethnoregionalism (Lavender, 2009:51).

This ethnoregionalism and personality culture persisted and survived the 1980s and 1990s which were the second wave of democratisation. This was surprising because at this point in our political history, the new political parties had their roots in civil society organisations, labour unions, law society and church organisations (Van de Walle, 2003). These bodies are known to cherish liberal values and were expected to inculcate this kind of philosophy into their offspring (the political parties). But contrary to these expectations, the emergent political parties succumbed to personality and ethnnoregional politics. This is perhaps in response to the failure of the post-colonial state under Mzee Kenyatta and Arap Moi to use the national public goods to unite the nation. These two regimes squandered the opportunity by privatising the state and its attendant goods such as jobs, healthcare, infrastructure, education

and other resources largely to the benefit of their ethnic groups and therefore, making ethnicity the primary cleavage of political life (Miguel, 2004:328; wa Gĩthĩnji & Holmquist, 2008:348; Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008; Cheeseman, 2008:167; Southall, 2009:456; Kagwanja, 2009).

Given the above background, Kenyans found it difficult to trust anybody who was not from their ethnic group, a scenario that informed the political circumstances of the second wave of democratisation with the following examples in Kenya: Ford Asili on Kenneth Matiba, Ford Kenya on Jaramogi Oginga, DP on Mwai Kibaki, but also heavily spiced with ethnoregionalism fervour among the supporters as opposed to the ideas contained in the manifestoes. Table 2a contains the results of the 1992 general elections showing the leading four candidates. Information contained in the table reveals that each of the leading contenders secured at least 70 per cent of the cast votes in his ethnic stronghold region (Moi-Rift Valley, Odinga-Nyanza, Matiba-Central, and Kibaki-Central). The same fate followed their political party performance at parliamentary level as illustrated by information carried in Table 2b where the political parties received much support from those regions ethnically associated with their party leader.

Table 2. 2a: The 1992 presidential voting trend by province

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING TREND PER PROVINCE						
PROVINCE	**KIBAKI DP** No. of voters	**MATIBA FORD-A** No. of voters	**MOI** **KANU** No. of voters	**ODINGA** **FORD-K** No. of voters	**OTHERS**	**TOTAL** **VOTERS**
NAIROBI	69,715(18)	165,553(44)	62,410(16)	75,888(20)	7,588(2)	100%
Seats won	0	6	1	1	-	8
COAST	32,201(10)	33,999(11)	188,296(62)	42,420(14)	9,660(3)	100%
Seats won	1	0	17	2		20
NEP	3,259(5)	7,188(11)	46,420(72)	5,084(8)	3,082(4)	100%
Seats won	0	0	8	1		9
EASTERN	392,481(50)	79,436(10)	290,372(37)	13,673(2)	7,849(1)	100%
Seats won	9	0	1	1	1	12
CENTRAL	373,147(35)	630,194(60)	21,918(2)	10,668(1)	2,320(2)	100%
Seats won	10	14	0	1		25
RVP	98,302(7)	214,727(16)	918,488(71)	75,465(5)	1,509(1)	100%

Seats won	2	2	32	2		38
WESTERN	14,404(2)	214,060(38)	219,187(39)	98,822(17)	28,808(4)	100%
Seats won	0	7	9	3		19
NYANZA	51,988(6)	10,299(1)	117,554(15)	581,490(75)	25,894(3)	100%
Seats won	1	0	7	20		28
TOTAL VOTER No.	1,035,507	1,354,856	1,927,640	903,886	60,650	5,232,734

*All figures in parentheses are percentages
Source: Electoral Commission of Kenya, presidential election results per election results per province, 1993

Table 2. 2b: Parliamentary seats by province: the 1997 Kenya elections

PARLIAMENTARY SEATS BY PROVINCE					
PROVINCE	KANU	DP	NDP	FORD-K	SDP
Nairobi	1	5	1	0	1
Coast	18	2	0	0	0
North Eastern	9	0	0	0	0
Eastern	14	8	0	1	10
Central	0	17	1	0	5
Rift Valley	39	7	0	3	0
Western	15	0	0	9	0
Nyanza	8	0	19	4	0
TOTAL	104	39	21	17	16

Source: Electoral Commission of Kenya, parliamentary election results per election results per constituency, 1998

Table 2. 2c: The 1997 Kenya presidential elections voting pattern

1997 KENYA ELECTIONS PATTERN					
PROVINCE	MOI KANU	KIBAKI DP	R. ODINGA NDP	WAMALWA FORD-K	NGILU SDP
NAIROBI	75,272 20.56%	160,124 44%	59,415 16.23%	24,971 6.82%	39,707 10.85%
COAST	229,084 61.05%	50,540 13.4%	22,794 6.07%	11,156 2.97%	37,707 10.85%
NORTH EASTERN	46,121 73.08%	11,741 18.60%	210 0.33%	4,418 7.00%	466 0.58%
EASTERN	368,801 35.87%	296,262 28.81%	7,755 0.75%	7,009 0.68%	332,578 32.35%
CENTRAL	55,822 5.5%	885,382 88.73%	6,812 0.68%	3,067 0.31%	29,473 2.95%
RIFT VALLEY	1,140,109 69.00%	343,529 20.90%	36,022 2.19%	102,178 6.22%	11,345 0.69%
WESTERN	314,669 44.67%	9,755 1.38%	13,458 1.91%	338,120 48.00%	3429 4.04%
NYANZA	215,923 23.52%	138,194 15.05%	519,259 56.55%	14,623 1.59%	15,309 1.57%
Total	2445801	1895527	665725	505542	469807

Source: Electoral Commission of Kenya, presidential election results per election results per province, 1998

Political parties make no sense in a society where interests groups are essentially primary groups couched in ethnoregional groupings (Ake, 1993:243). This ethnoregional polarisation is not consistent with the goals and ideology of Western-style liberal democracy that emphasises individual agency. Former Tanzanian President Mwamlimu Julius Nyerere maintained that Western-style democracy must be domesticated to suit the governance conditions of pre-colonial Africa embedded in primary group dialogue and consensus (Owusu, 1992:370; Snyder, 2001:128-131). Former Kenyan President Moi has also been reported asserting that ethnicity has waxed and not waned since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya (Daily Nation, various). John Githongo (2008), the anti- corruption Tsar of Kenya asserts that Kenyans have faith in the system of democracy but he is quiet on whether liberal democracy as a system of governance is suitable for them or not. Then, the billion shilling question begging for an answer is what will make Kenyan society suitable for a liberal democratic system of governance?

This makes it imperative to assess the impact of interaction of primary group ties and the politics of patron-clientelism in order to understand voting behaviour in Kenya. Leonard (1991) for instance, argues that patron-clientele and ethnic basis of electoral politics in Kenya can lead to cooptation or political predation on voters by political elites. Leonard distinguishes between patron-clientele politics (that characterises Kenyan politics) and associational politics (upon which “real” political party politics ought to be based). Whereas associational politics leads to the direct representation of the common interests

of the large or powerful group in society, patron-clientele politics masks the interest of the voters, for they are represented in the system by advantaged patrons whose personal interests are usually significantly different. While the associational politics tend to result in "public goods" (services and policies that will serve the common interests of the masses), some sort of symbiotic relationship between ambitious politicians and voters in need of political voice; patron-clientele politics tends to focus on the creation of "private goods"; discrete products and services that are then distributed through clientele networks. As Leonard succinctly puts it:

> *To the extent that patron-client system produces any public goods, such goods will tend to be those that will benefit the elite groups of patrons and add to their personal wealth on which they can draw to maintain their clientage networks* (Leonard, 1991:81).

When class interests are presented as ethnic interests in a society like Kenya where ethnicity has been used as a criterion for resource allocation (Adar, 2000) then, it is plausible that voters will support élite politicians whose only goal is to secure "private goods" provided that the elite politicians present personal and class interests as ethnic interests (Bienen, 1974:132. Indeed, it has been argued that Kenyatta and Moi ruled Kenya on the basis of patron-clientele networks that were dominated by a capitalist clique of Kalenjin and Kikuyu favouring certain regions and people at the expense of others (Bienen, 1974:5; Bates,1989; Orvis ,1997; Adar, 1998; Adar, 2001; Ochieng', 2005; Lavender, 2009:54;). This is the scenario that obtained in Kenya at the time of re-introduction of multipartism in the late 1980s. It is imperative to assess how

this obtaining political atmosphere informed voter patterns and the attendant voting behaviour as reviewed in the next section.

2.1.5 Voter Patterns and Voting Behaviour

Voter turnout refers to the proportion of registered voters that actually go to the polls and vote. The voting process requires a voter to make two decisions. One, they must make a choice between rival parties and candidates. Two and more important, they must decide whether to vote or not to vote at all. The second decision is very crucial, for it will show the influence of that single partisan decision that has huge impact on party fortunes. Citizen participation in voting is highly crucial to a republican state, for low turnout is undesirable because it might lead to skewed results (Grober & Schram, 2006). Many citizens usually marshal their resources and energy to reach the polling stations and register their votes. Many reasons have been propagated in an attempt to explain this eagerness which is a paradox especially in view of economically motivated explanations such as rational choice theory. But sociologists ignore this paradox and turn to social embeddedness approach explaining the decision to vote by socio-economic characteristics, civic duty of the voters but ultimately sociologists point out at the influence of social environment as a determinant of voting behaviour (Straits, 1990:65).

It has also been observed that the type of election (general, by-election or primary), population density (high or low), distance to voting stations, weather conditions, contact between voters, political consciousness level, social ecology, age, religion among other reasons dictate voter turnout to some

reasonable degree. But the fact is that Kenya towns have the highest turnout than rural areas. From the exposition, it can be concluded that voter turnout is largely a function of social embeddedness, which eventually impacts and condition voting behaviour.

If the elected representatives have to be accountable to the citizens, the voters must understand the significance of the election process. There must be and voters must know that there is real competition for their votes. More important voters must know the difference, if any between the proposals being presented to them (Plamenatz, 1973: 190). There would be no democracy if all voters decided how to vote by tossing a coin or simply voting the candidate whose name appears first on the alphabet as it happened in Britain for a long time (MacLean, 1978:28; Kelley & McAllister, 1984:454: Bartels, 2008:50). There would be no need to hold free elections because voters would not be interested in making considered choices, which is the criterion for political responsibility. Voting behaviour therefore, is the decision making process attendant to the pattern of voting such as voters in agricultural rich Rift-Valley region of Kenya choosing a party whose manifesto prioritises agricultural issues or those in Northern region of pastoralist communities identifying themselves with parties that have commercial pastoralist friendly policies or platforms.

Before the culture of mass parties of today, candidates were often local notables virtually known to everybody. This scenario made campaigning a little easy, for it was a matter of public meetings canvassing and knocking

their kneels on people's doors as candidates solicit for votes. Today, public meetings as a form of electioneering are complemented by national campaigns on radio, television, internet and newspaper and other mass media instruments.

Majority of voters' partisan decisions at the polls are influenced by these sorts of issues, for others additional forces are brought into play such as preferences of primary groups they are associated with or their positions in the social structure (Baloyra & Martz, 1977:550; Andersen & Heath, 2003:301). This might be true of wives who vote their husbands' preference either against their own will or for their failure to develop independent perceptions of the political environment.

Socio-political sub-culture (milieu) requires not only a sufficient quantity of people with common belief systems, personal experiences and living conditions but also certain patterns of social communications and integration such as social cleavages; regional, religious, ethnic, class, age etc (Hyman, 1959; Bean, 1999). These are systems of communication transmitting fundamental orientations towards human behaviour (Nassmacher, 1980: 31). That is, when one is confronted with something like an election, we do not act in isolation, because we have distinctly embedded political characteristics anchored on our statuses in the social structure. What Corstange (2013) refers to as the tyranny of friends and neighbours. This is usually in response to social environmental stimuli (informational exchange) such as T-shirts, caps, car stickers or mass media information concentrated on a particular interactive group. The main reference groups in society are our families, friends,

neighbourhoods, civil societies, churches, ethnic leaders, the media or state bureaucrats.

For instance in Kenya, the Anglican Church, the Catholic Church , the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) and Islam did use their expansive network in the country and a host of social services (education, hospitals, vocation schools) they offer to create a web of connections of all ages, class, professions, ethnic backgrounds and localities. They then used this infrastructure to among other things socialise Kenyans into some political ideals they deemed necessary for the process of democratisation (Haynes, 1997:709-711; Sabar-Friedman, 1997:25-30; Pattie & Johnston, 2000:42; Haynes, 2005:1327; Mantilla, 2010).

Apart from purposive actors such as the church, primordial structures such as ethnicity and/or clanism has been an enduring organising principle of voter behaviour in Kenya. This scenario is akin to what Bratton et al., (2011:1) call ethnic census where cultural demography becomes the most significant variable in structuring voter behaviour during elections. The explanation for this enduring voter behaviour has been the nature of our patron-clientel politics of reciprocity between politicians and voters. This understanding among candidates and voters was so strong to the run up to 2007 general elections that presidential candidates spent much of their time persuading voters from other ethnic groups rather than those from their own ethnic groups (Chandrah, 2007; Horowitz, 2009:2). Gibson and Long (2009:500) writing on Kenya's 2007 bungled elections admit that ethnicity structures voting

behaviour to a larger extent but it is not the only determinant. They make a compelling case for government performance and electoral campaign issues and strategies. It must be pointed out that, voting behaviour anchored on primordial social bonds is illiberal but necessary when other basic social cleavages are apparently subordinated as it happened when Negroes voted as a group during the civil rights issue (Pomper, 1966:95). From the ongoing discussion, this study proceeds to examine voting behaviour with the following dimensions in mind: transactional voting, identity voting and convictional voting and their implications in Kenya's transition and consolidation towards liberal democracy using an eclectic theoretical approach.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The study uses an eclectic approach in which Elite theory, Marxist theory and the sociological theory of voting are used to explain voting behaviour within a liberal democracy as practised in Kenya. Following the eclectic tradition, these three strands of theoretical orientations were treated as complementary in explaining voting behaviour in Kenya.

Eclecticism is a conceptual approach that does not hold rigidly to a single paradigm or set of assumptions, but instead, the strengths and weaknesses of various theories are creatively evaluated and combined towards a more integrative one. The idea behind the eclectic approach is synthesis. Thus, the strengths and weaknesses of various theories are considered, evaluated and combined towards a more logical explanation of the phenomena under

investigation. The rationale for eclectic approach is that no single theory has all the answers in addressing a complex phenomenon such as voting behaviour. The current study begins by employing Elite theory, Marxist theory, and Sociological theory of voting and finally integrates them using the embeddedness approach to explain voting behaviour in Kenya.

2.2.1 Elite Theory of Democracy

The emergence of elite theory as a paradigm of explaining social reality is credited to the works of Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), Roberto Mitchels (1876-1936) and Charles W. Mills (1916-1962). Central to all of their arguments is that inevitably a small minority rules the masses in society.

Mosca emphasizes the ways in which a small minority manipulated and ruled the masses because of their material, intellectual or even moral superiority as seen in their organisational abilities. Pareto on the other hand asserts that some individuals (elites) were born with differential intrinsic intellectual endowments which he chose to call residues. And that social mobility in an ideal society will favour those endowed with these residues but in an actual society, social mobility favours those individuals endowed with the power of persuasion and force. Borrowing from Pareto, elites are persons who by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organisations and movements are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially (Femia, 2001; Higley, 2006). In other words, these are individuals who by virtue of their strategic locations wield the capacity to influence real political

change in any given society. These are the people C. W. Mills has come to characterise as power elites. Using his insight of the USA, Mills (1956) identified the most powerful institutions as the corporations, the government and the military. Over time, the leaders within these institutions (i.e the chief executives, political party leaders and military generals) use their strategic locations in society to constitute the power elite. They ensure purity and continuity of their stratum by strictly recruiting leaders from the same social backgrounds. Mills argues that these are the individuals who exercise power in the USA as opposed to the popular democratic belief that the people are in charge through elections. The rule is perpetuated through media and other propaganda apparatus, where an enduring illusion of control is created.

According to the elite school of thought, voters are objects of political activity with passive roles (Walker, 1966). Robert Michels studying the German Social Democratic Party claimed that the creation of organisational authority inherent in party politics confer most of the resources (personal status, visibility, finances, monopoly over means of communications) to the party leaders (Coleman, 1990; Bartels, 2008). In cognition of the foregoing observations, elite democracy is a strategy for power or an ideology in service of the elites not an instrument of empowerment as citizens can be reduced to mere pawns in the game of political power as was observed in 2007 general elections in Kenya (Ake, 1993:240; Omotola, 2009). During 2007 general elections, as elections approached, politicians entered into deals dubbed by the media then as “horse trading”, where alliances were drawn on the basis of ethnic

arithmetic. Party members were left with no options but to vote for leaders chosen for them by their party elites with little regard to their wishes. Instructively in this respect, PNU came into being by collapsing a number of political parties into one (PNU), without consulting members of those collapsed political parties. The justification was that party bigwigs knew what they were doing and that whatever they did was in the best interest of members. The task of justifying the actions of the Kenyan elite was left for the media.

According to this school of thought, democracy should and is based on the wisdom, loyalty and skill of the elites not the populace. Because at the heart of Elite theory is the presumption of the average citizens political inadequacies. The argument for the elite rule is partly based on the assumption that liberal democracy is endowed with the necessary infrastructure to arbitrate elite conflicts and protect their privileged positions when and if they arose. For this reason, it is believed Elites are bound to protect the liberal democratic system even if the general populace preferred another alternative (Walker, 1966:286-7). The reason for this gerrymandering, liberal democrats argue that classical democracy with its emphasis on popular participation is utopian hence the need to transform its normative foundations to bring it in sync with the obtaining political behaviour.

Critics of the elite democracy claim that the elites are more interested in the development of the system as opposed to the development of the individual. The elite school substituted individual development with stability and

efficiency of the system. This is in contradiction with the classical school which posited that the individual through popular participation will come to understand the intrigues of the society's working and hence a higher sense of responsibility beyond the confines of private life.

Another criticism of the elite claim is that voters are naive and passive in participatory rates across the world. This shows that voters are not naive for they are responding to the socio-political environment. And even if apathy was admitted as a fact among voters, this has many causes ranging from personal inadequacy, fear of endangering important personal relationships, lack of interests in issues and lack of group stimulation. It is some of these unconvincing explanations for apathy and political inadequacies of the populace that elite theory fails to explain voting behaviour and we turn to the Marxist school as an alternative.

2.2.2 Marxist Theory of Democracy

Marxist school of democracy evolved in reaction to the Elite Theory. Karl Marx (1818-1883), a German of Jewish descent is regarded as the precursor of this school of thought together with his life-long friend Fredrick Engels. Marx's fundamental intellectual objectives were threefold: one to understand and explain the human condition as he found it in the capitalist society; second, to lay bare the dynamic of that society and to lift the veil on its inner workings and impact on human relations; and finally to obtain a theoretical grasp of the mechanisms at work in the overall process of historical change in which capitalism is but one. Historical materialism is Marx's theory of

society, the gist of which is that economy is of primary influence on the formation, development and functioning of social structures and the ideas which people espouse about themselves and their social conditions. Marx argues that economic relations constitute the base of society on which is erected the superstructure of non-economic institutions such as politics and religion, the nature and scope of which are deeply determined by the base (economy). That is to say that in the final analysis, it is the productive relationships that people engage in that inherently have the decisive influence on their social interaction. This argument is central to Marx's conception of human nature and behaviour. To this extent, then democracy and all the activities associated with it including elections and voting are a facade of the economic interest of capitalist mode of production and its attendant social relations.

Writing in 1842, Engels cautioned that in every principle (form), we must strive to discern the material interests (content). Using the English House of Commons as an illustration, Engels argues that it is alien to the people and had little relationship to the will of the electorate because the whole lot was elected as a result of bribery and corruption. Thus, the whole concept of legislative elections is activities (form) meant to legitimize the capitalist class stranglehold on the government. In their treatise, *The Jewish Question,* Marx and Engels argued that we must examine the relationship between the form (activities such as elections) and the content (human freedom) which is the essence of the whole democratic project.

If the vote does not deliver voters from hunger or fear among other material benefits, then the ultimate claim of the vote as a vehicle to deliver the democratic ideals of freedom evaporates. It is from this logic that Marxists argue that liberal democracy as practised today may not deliver freedom to voters but instead deliver them to the needs of the capitalist class. Kenya exemplifies captivity of voters through the ideology of ethnicity. Politicians who are otherwise business associates turn against each other particularly during elections, in the name of ethnicity. But voters fall to this ethnic ploy because as a social category, they have no means of social interaction which creates social context of shared meaning, concerns and interest between individuals. In ignoring such primordial corporate bonds as ethnicity, Marxist theory turns out to be an inadequate framework in explaining voting behaviour in a country such as Kenya; therefore, sociological theory was considered as a complementary theory in explaining voting behaviour. The next section is devoted to an explanation of this theory.

2.2.3 Sociological Theory of Voting

The empirical study of voting is marked by three major schools; the sociological model (the Columbia School), the psychological school (the Michigan School) and rational choice theory (the Rochester School). This study was guided by the first model, the Columbia school which focuses on the influence of social factors on voting behaviour (Bartels, 2008:146).

The Sociological School or Colombia School is undergirded by three seminal works; *The Peoples choice* ((Lazarsfeld, Berelson et al., 1944; Berelson,

Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld & Mcphee, 1954) and *Personal Influence* (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). Lazarsfeld group hypothesized that the act of voting is an individual act, affected mainly by the personality of the voter and his or her exposure to the media. The results of their research however contradicted this hypothesis to the extent that it revealed that voting was more affected by the social group the voter belonged to than media exposure (Bartels, 2008). The association between social groups of a voter and his or her voting decision was so strong that they concluded that voting behaviour can easily be explained using three factors, namely; religion, region and socio-economic status (Eldersveld, 1951).

This revelation led them to argue that voting behaviour is dependent on contextual factors; that is, social structure and culture. In other words, this school considers membership in demographic groups such as ethnicity, socio-economic status, region, religion and corporate actors (primordial and purposive) as key determinants of voting behaviour because differences in social positions are associated with different concerns and political interests (Quinn, Martin et al., 1999; Anderson et al., 2003:301). The major problem with this model is its failure to account for the existence of certain group differences still associated with voter choices coupled with the fact that behaviour is subject to change over time.

From the preceding discussion, none of the three theories is sufficient enough in explaining the complexity of the nature of voting behaviour in a country such as Kenya. Paradoxically, each theory might become correct under

different circumstances. Nevertheless, for all the differences, these theories have one fundamental commonality: they all underscore the centrality of social structure in shaping social behaviour. Therefore, to fully explain voting behaviour in Kenya, the current research has eclectically combined and collapsed elite, marxist and sociological theories of voting into the social embeddedness approach.

The embeddedness school of thought argues that human behaviour is heavily constrained by the ongoing social relations and interactions. The embeddedness school believes that it will be a grievous mistake if one was to compartmentalize or atomise individual actions in the process of explaining human behaviour including voting behaviour. This perspective stands in sharp contrast to the liberal democratic school which is premised on the exaggerated notion of an autonomous, self-interested, atomised rational individual (Granovetter, 1985:481).

This research is about voting behaviour , it has been the view of many including elite, marxist and the sociological theorists that human behaviour is heavily embedded in existing social relations of a particular society. Socialisation structures people into being overwhelmingly sensitive to the opinions of others and hence obedient to the dictates of consensually developed systems of statuses, norms, and values (Granovetter, 1985:483). This means that in the process of interaction, individuals model their behaviour in concrete, reciprocal systems of social relations and structures.

The resultant social context is the glue that gums atomised individuals captured by the calculus of voting logic (Abrams, Iversen et al., 2005).

The social embeddedness approach as explained above seems to solve the paradox of voting as contained in Downs' Seminal work, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957). In this work, Downs wonders why an individual will bother with the process of voting when chances of affecting the election outcome are nil. This paradox is strongly accepted by economists but not sociologists. Sociologists see no paradox. Their argument is rooted in the belief that voting is not an individual act based on calculations of costs and benefits but an event embedded in the normative assumptions voters share with others they interact with (Moody & White, 2003:111). That is to say that voter's choices are significantly refracted by the social relations within which they function to the extent that an individual's vote is in consideration of the likelihood of choices other voters will make (Coleman, 2004; Großer & Schram, 2006:235; Corstange, 2013).

It is, therefore, prudent to say that efficiency or efficacy of voting behaviour is dependent on the social environment in which it is embedded. But voters like any other social actors in a social milieu are pliant to whatever social forces are present in the social environment. From this vantage, it will be prudent for the current study to interrogate the nexus between voting behaviour vis-à-vis the political, socio-economic and cultural structures impacting on the voters. This makes the nature, characteristics and objectives of the actors involved in voting (state operatives, primordial actors, candidates, voters, and media etc),

and the attendant structural factors, key variables in the examination of voting behaviour.

This notion challenges the idea of rational voter inherent in the liberal view of democracy and necessitates the need for an expanded examination of the structural relationships that condition voting behaviour. It is also the fundamental characteristic of voting behaviour from which it derives its potential advantages and disadvantages. By virtue of this arrangement, voters do not bargain for what they need directly with government or any other authority. They do so through their elected representatives; therefore, the responsive act of the government or any authority for that matter will not reflect the voter bargain directly but their delegates and the government. How the delegates bargain is a function of the present prevailing socio-economic and cultural structures and the relationships between the delegates and voters, delegates and government. The main strength of the embeddedness approach is that it provides for dynamism. That means that it has the capacity to show that the behaviour of the Kenyan voter is not atavistic and static but embedded in the ever changing socio-economic and cultural milieu.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework shown in Figure 2.1 was developed to illustrate how voting behaviour is shaped by various social bonds, social structures and socially ingrained values, ideas, perceptions or symbols.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework of Voting Behaviour



Figure 2.1 shows that underlying factors determine the electoral political orientation of voters thus impacting on the nature of voting behaviour. The underlying issues include purposive social bonds (such as political parties), primordial social bonds (such as clan and/or ethnic affillation), gender, and region. But this orientation is many times refracted through structural factors such as education, socio-economic status, age, associates of the voters. One cannot tell a priori, which of these (underlying and structural) factors has the greatest influence on voting behaviour in Kenya. It would appear from the literature review that primordial bonds (ethnicity) and gender are particularly important in the African case (Nassmacher, 1980; Ojo, 1981; Horowitz, 1985; Cliffe, 1989; Horowitz, 1989; Horowitz, 1993; Suberu, 1993; Horowitz, 1999; Horowitz, 2001; Brown, 2004; Holmquist & Githinji, 2009; Horowitz, 2009; Heinz, Dirk Kohnert et al., 2010).

But the underlying and structural factors are not the only influences on voting behaviour, political ideology, issues raised by candidates and communication channels may also impact on and/or be impacted on by voting behaviour. Voters are not passive recipients of commands from the attendant social milieus and other structures but an active creative users of cultural symbols as constructed and refracted through their consciousness, beliefs and purposiveness. For example, if other agents in the milieu behave ethnically, the actor will creatively take cue and respond. The final decisions on which of these factors were most relevant with respect to the social embeddedness of voters behaviour in Kenya was determined on the basis of regression analysis

of evidence gathered from the field. The next chapter examines the research methodology used in this study.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research methodology and procedures used in conducting this study. It covers the area of study, research design, population and sampling techniques, data collection, data analysis and finally it closes with problems and ethical dilemmas encountered in the field.

3.1 Site Description

The study was conducted in four out of the then (pre-2010 constitution) eight provinces of the Republic of Kenya, namely; Nairobi, North Eastern, Nyanza and Western provinces. The selection of these provinces was purposive based on their perceived unique voting behaviour in general elections in Kenya (IED, 1998, K-DOP, 2003). Nairobi Province houses the capital city of Kenya and is the seat of power. Nairobi was chosen because of the cosmopolitan nature of its inhabitants. Being the capital city, it has attracted people from all over the republic and from other countries. It was therefore, deemed, necessary to include Nairobi so as to examine whether cosmopolitanism reduces or heightens primordial political attitudes and behaviour (Harell & Stole, 2010:238-239).

North Eastern Province (NEP) is the far-flung province of Kenya in the northern parts of the country bordering Ethiopia, Somalia and Southern Sudan. It is an ASAL region and sparsely populated mainly by the pastoralists Kenyans of Cushitic extraction. Its inhabitants have been politically and economically marginalised and may thus be less nationalistic than the rest of

Kenyan citizens. Nyanza Province is one of the largest provinces of Kenya and also a hotbed of Kenya's politics. It is mainly inhabited by the Luo and the Kisii. This study was based on the areas of Nyanza Province inhabited by the Luo people. The province borders the Luhyia of Western Province, Rift Valley Province, the United Republic of Tanzania and Lake Victoria. Lastly, Western Province is situated in the western parts of the country bordering the Republic of Uganda, Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces. It is a rich agricultural area mainly inhabited by the Luhyia ethnic group. These regions were purposely selected based on their apparent differences in terms of geography, economic activity, political consciousness levels, population sizes, urbanization and voting trends.

3.2 Research Design

Design is used in research to refer to the researcher's plan of how to proceed with the collection and analysis of research data (Kumar, 2005:84). This study adopted a descriptive and diagnostic study design whose thrust was to describe behavioural characteristics of Kenyan voters during general elections and how this behaviour affects development of liberal democracy. In this respect, the study design pays special attention to the cannons of descriptive and diagnostic study design, namely; the definition of what the study is about and the objectives of the study. Since the study investigated different regions of Kenya, a cross-sectional survey that was majorly quantitative in nature was utilized to get the data. This is mainly because cross-sectional design is traditionally the most dominant mode for the study of political behaviour

(Shaw & Wright 1967; Niemi, F.Wesberg et al., 2010:4). It thus provided this study with a wealth of proven approaches and techniques to draw from.

There are admittedly other ways of studying voter behaviour but the most direct and often the most valid way of explaining why people vote the way they do is to ask them (Niemi, 2010). Pursuant to this tradition, survey design was employed. Survey is a design that facilitates the collection of the same data from each respondent in the sample at only one point in time. The respondents are usually combined and information they give is analysed statistically to look for patterns within the data, regularities and relationship between variables studied (Green & Browne, 2005). The strength of survey is that it can generate good generalizable data. It is with this understanding that this study employed survey method to examine the last four general elections. Further, this research embraced quantitative research approaches, to permit the use of robust statistical procedures to explain the findings (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In this study, data on voter behaviour during general elections were discussed and explained primarily on the basis of quantitative analysis. Qualitative approach was adopted only tangentially where and when it was deemed imperative to augment quantitative data in identifying similarities and variations in voter behaviour between 1992 and 2007 general elections in Kenya.

The qualitative approach adopted was focus group discussion. Focus group discussion is a method of collecting data that tap in the dynamism of human social interaction on a chosen topic. Under the stewardship of the moderator

(researcher) in an informal setting, focus group discussion affords the participants to reflect on the topic under study in relationship to their lived experiences as a cultural group. The informality allows the researcher and the participants more in-depth analysis of the research questions more than what survey can harvest (Folch-Lyon & Trost, 1981:445; Kitzinger, 1995; Morgan, 1996:131; Kaplowitz, 2000; Kidd & Parshall, 2000; Webb & Kevern, 2001:799-803; McLafferty, 2004). Folch-Lyon and Trost (1981:443) contend that focus group discussion is the best way of carrying out research on the determinants of human behaviour. The combination of approaches was a strategy to increase precision and obtain fuller explanations on voter behaviour during general elections and its implications on the development of liberal democracy in Kenya.

3.3 Study Variables

The independent variables used in this study were socio-economic status, religion, region, ethnicity and/or clan affiliation, purposive corporate actors and ascriptive leadership traits. The dependent variable was voting behaviour. The effects of confounding variables also called intervening variables were analysed. ANOVA was employed to examine the relationship between various independent variables and the dependent variable. The resulting relationships are reported in chapter four.

3.4 Population

Population refers to an aggregate of people, things or the entire set of relevant cases that a researcher has in mind from which one can obtain a sample to

study in a bid to give answers to stated research objectives (Keya, Makau et al., 1989; Nachmias & Nachmias 1996:179; Fraenkel, Wallen et al., 2011). The targeted population in this study were the registered voters in six sampled constituencies in Kenya during the elections of 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007.

3.5 Sample and Sampling Procedures

A sample is a subset of the population in which a researcher is interested in gaining information and drawing conclusions about the phenomenon (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Kothari, 2009). The ideal task for this study would have been to carry out an investigation of all registered voters in the sampled regions of Kenya. However, due to logistical and scientific considerations, samples provided the next best alternative (Ary, Jacobs et al., 1996). Pragmatically, the sampling strategy started with purposive sampling technique to select the provinces and constituencies. The provinces and constituencies were selected on the basis of their perceived uniqueness in voting behaviour across the country.

Purposive sampling technique is where the researcher selects individuals to be studied because they are expected to have important information for the study. For example, North Eastern Province has had the tendency to vote with the government of the day, while Nairobi was sampled because of its cosmopolitan nature. Specifically, the interest was to find out if voters in the two constituencies of Lang'ata (predominantly Luo) and Starehe (predominantly Kikuyu) have been detribalized by the cosmopolitan urban environment to devalue ethnic-oriented voting. Western Province was sampled

because in the last four general elections, the voters were heterogeneous in their preferences of the major political parties and the Luo part of Nyanza Province was sampled because since the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992, the electorate there have overwhelmingly voted for a single political party. In addition, there was interest in finding out whether there was any variation between South Nyanza and North-Central Nyanza in terms of voting behaviour. This is because South Nyanza is not as vibrant as North-Central in terms of their political heritage and history. North-Central Nyanza has since before independence been a hotbed of politics in Kenya pioneered by the doyen of opposition politics in Kenya, the late Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Achieng Oneko.

Once the constituencies were identified, the study applied systematic random sampling method to get individual registered voters to provide the required voter information. Systematic random sampling technique was employed using the constituency voting centre registers in the six purposively sampled constituencies as the sampling frames. With regard to sample size determination, the study had a sample size of 600 informants. These respondents were distributed as shown in Table 3.1 below. Nairobi and Nyanza have each two constituencies purposely. For Nairobi, the researcher was interested in examining the cosmopolitan effect on the two most politicised ethnic groups, namely; the Luo in Lang'ata and the Kikuyu in Starehe. The same was elucided in Nyanza to examine the effects of political heritage as explained in the earlier section between South Nyanza and North-

Central and also re-evaluate the earlier claim by (Sanger & Nottingham, 1964:34) that Luo voting pattern follows clan rather than party.

Table 3.1: Samples of the Study Respondents

Constituency	Sample Size
Matungu-Western	100
Ugenya-Nyanza	100
Mbita-Nyanza	100
Lang'ata- Nairobi	100
Starehe- Nairobi	100
Dujis- NE	100
Total	600

3.6 Data Collection

Primary data were used as the main basis on which the study made attempts to provide answers to the objectives and research hypotheses with regard to voters behaviour during general elections. Where relevant, supplementary secondary data were used to augment the study findings. In effect, the database for the study came from three main sources: field survey interviews, focus group discussions and published information and records.

Standard Interview Schedule involving face-to-face interaction was utilized to elicit information from the 600 registered voters. Most of the questions were

in closed-ended format while a few open-ended questions were added to document the respondents' views and perceptions in regard to voter behaviour. A standardized interview schedule was prepared to garner uniformity in collecting data. The instrument (Standard Interview Schedule) was translated into respective local languages (Luhyia, Dholuo, Suba, Somali and Kiswahili). The purpose was to avoid any misunderstanding or ambiguity to be faced by the respondents and to protect data collection team from any complexity. The overall technique also allowed more probing of responses to get more clarity. Furthermore, face-to-face interviews enabled the interviewer to note situations of evasive responses or resistance to give responses, which are themselves, research findings linked to validity and reliability of obtained responses.

Qualitative data were collected using a group of six to ten participants in twelve focus groups led by trained research assistants. The participants were to prove that they are adults aged 18 and above using the national identity card. To ensure cultural appropriateness segmentation was necessary along gender lines. The researchers moderated the discussions using the same broad interview guide in each of the twelve interviews. Participants and the moderator were arranged in a circular manner to avoid notions of seniority and as much as possible each of the members present was given equal chances to contribute his or her opinions regarding factors influencing voting behaviour. Specifically, the moderators' duty was to stimulate discussion by funnelling questions from general to particular. The discussions were recorded verbatim.

In addition, secondary sources of data like relevant reports, theses, dissertations, books, journals, and manuals were reviewed to supplement data gathered through survey, focus group discussions and the various electoral policies governing the general elections process, political campaigns and voting laws enacted in parliament and other government policy instruments were used. Thus, the study adopted a triangulation method, to benefit from the strength of each approach, especially in clarifying primary information and to enhance validity and reliability of the data.

3.7 Techniques of Data Analysis

Data analysis is the process of systematic interrogation and processing of information collected from field research (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982:145). Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was employed in data coding, editing and analysis, as the quantitative data collected required some systematic organization, processing, interpretation and presentation. Basic analysis such as frequency distribution, means, percentages and later cross-tabulation were computed. Cross-tabulation was employed to find out the relationship between the variables of interest. The 5-point Likert scale was converted into an interval level of measurement with the maximum score being 60 and minimum score being 5 in respect to each of the three elective positions. Eventually, hypothesis testing was carried out that allowed higher order analysis such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), t-test, and Regression to test relationships and effects. Especially, these inferential statistics were

utilized to predict and draw conclusions on major factors that structure voting behaviour in Kenya's general elections.

Qualitative data were also coded creating categories for the emerging themes. The researchers then classified and drew together similar themes comparing their relationships and examined how they relate to the variables within sampled population.

3.8 Problems Encountered During Fieldwork and Their Solutions

A number of problems were experienced during the study. First, because I was self-sponsored, there were instances when financial constraints slowed down some research activities such as fieldwork data collection. This necessitated postponing data collection engagement on such occasions. Second, transportation was a challenge in some of the constituencies sampled for data collection. Some of the roads were impassable especially during rainy season. Some areas were also susceptible to banditry. This caused rescheduling of our fieldwork and at times the help of the provincial administration was sought to provide armed escort.

Third, given the nature of the study, there were open suspicions over the choice of the constituencies given that the data collection exercise was carried out after the 2007/2008 post-election violence. More precisely, some respondents questioned why their constituency and not the others were sampled for the study. This problem was solved by giving an elaborate explanation that the intention of the study was not to involve all constituencies

and the study was not meant to investigate issues related to post-election violence. These explanations were generally satisfactory to the respondents.

Fourth, during the interview, some informants took the opportunity to elaborate on their political frustrations. While this was obviously time-wasting for our study, it could have appeared rude if we shelved their narratives. This problem was solved by carefully shifting back the discussion to questions contained in the interview schedule.

Finally, there was the problem of other voters staying on as we held interviews with their colleagues. Accordingly, we had to make it clear that the interviews were confidential; in the process, the respondents saw the sense and excused themselves from those present. In the next chapter, a detailed presentation of the univariate analysis of the key variables of the study is presented.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

In this chapter, primary data are presented using descriptive statistics such as measures of central tendency and percentages with a view to showing the nature and trends of variables measured and thereafter subjected them to inferential statistics. The rationale behind this is to show different voter characteristics across the six constituencies. The six sampled constituencies were Matungu in the former Western Province; Ugenya and Mbita in the then Nyanza Province, Lang'ata and Starehe representing then Nairobi Province; and Dujis in the former North Eastern Province. The discussions in this chapter are therefore, largely based on the primary data drawn from these constituencies.

4.1 Description of the Sample

This section presents socio-demographic characteristics of voters that have the potential to shape voting behaviour in elections. The factors included region (province and constituencies of residence), gender, age, marital status, religion; level of education, occupation and income levels. These are some of the factors that are used as independent variables in this study. We first present the distribution of respondents by demographic variables.

4.1.1 Demographic Characteristics

(a) Distribution of Voters by Gender

Data on the distribution of sampled voters in the six constituencies by their gender revealed a more balanced score between male and female voters. This disparity counts to six per cent (52.7% males' and 47.3 % females).

(b) Age of Respondents

Because of the wide scatter of the age-range of sampled voters, it was decided to group the respondents into birth cohorts on the basis of period of birth as shown in Table 4.1a. It was also hypothesised that political partisanship is influenced by generational and life-cycle processes. The data on the age of sampled voters showed that the independence generation (1962-1982) comprised the modal age at fifty-six per cent while the youngest and the oldest age cohorts were about the same in proportion. Overall, the age cohort distribution gives a good spread among the informants to facilitate meaningful cross-tabulation analysis.

Table 4.1a: Distribution of Sampled Voters by Age

Age cohort by period of birth	Number of respondents	Percentage
1962 or Earlier	126	21.00
1963-1982	336	56.00
1983 or Later	138	23.00
Total	600	100.00

The other demographic variable that was deemed germane to voting behaviour is the marital status of the sampled respondents. This is presented in the next section.

(c) Marital Status of Voters

The results of responses on marital status disclosed that 71.5 per cent of the respondents were married, about one fifth (24.5%) were single and a meagre 4 per cent were divorced. In view of the fact that nearly 72 per cent of the respondents were in marital unions, voting is most likely shaped within a web of a wider marriage based social networks. This perhaps explains that voting in these constituencies is mobilized along closely nit family ties. Another relevant variable linked to voting behaviour was respondents' religious affiliation. Distribution of respondents by religion is presented next.

(d) Religion of Voters

The distribution of sampled voters by religion indicated that eighty-five per cent were of the Christian faith. This finding is consistent with the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics which reported Christianity as the dominant religion at 82.9 per cent while Muslims were a paltry 11 per cent of the population (KNBS, 2010: 18-22). Nevertheless, adherents of Protestant religion were dominant at 63 per cent. The Muslims were also well-represented in the sample.

Table 4.1b: Distribution of Sampled Voters by Religion

Religion	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Protestants	378	63.00
Catholic	73	12.20
Islam	148	24.70
Total	599	99.90

Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents are represented next.

4.1.2 Socio-Economic Characteristics

The socio-economic characteristics considered relevant to voting behaviour in this study were respondents' educational attainment, occupation and income.

(a) **Distribution of Voters by Level of Education**

The distribution of sampled voters from the six constituencies by their level of education is presented in Table 4.2a. The data show that about two-fifths of the voters had completed secondary level of education. A further 3 per cent had university education. In other words, a large proportion (41.2 %) of the sampled voters had adequate education to comprehend the voting process.

Table 4.2a: Distribution of Sampled Voters by Level of Education

Level of Education	Number of Respondents	Percentage
None	82	13.70
Primary level	201	33.50
Secondary incomplete	70	11.70
Secondary complete	229	38.20
University	18	3.00

Nonetheless, the results in Table 4.2a confirm that nearly 60 per cent of the sampled voters had attained low levels of education that may not facilitate understanding the intricacies of the electoral process. In fact, the low levels of educational attainment of the sampled voters are reinforced by their rather modest occupations as shown in the next section.

(b) **Distribution of Voters by Occupation**

Information in Table 4.2b reveals that a little over 50 per cent of the sampled voters were largely engaged in non-skilled occupations such as small-scale farming or pastoralism and casual work.

Table 4.2b: Distribution of Sampled Voters by Occupation

Occupation	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Casual worker	70	11.70
Small scale Farmer or pastoralist	231	38.50
Small scale Businesspersons	183	30.50
Permanently employed	116	19.30
Total	600	100.00

Significantly, due to the low levels of educational attainment of the sampled voters, only 19 per cent of them were in regular salaried employment. The remaining 30.5 per cent were petty traders, what in the Kenyan parlance is called *jua kali* (small and micro- enterprises- SMEs). Many of those currently involved in SMEs have modest levels of education.

The other socio-economic variable included in this study was the respondents' income. The distribution of respondents on this variable is presented in the next section.

(c) **Income of Voters**

Results of research carried in Table 4.2c indicate that less than 20 per cent of the sampled voters had incomes above Kenya shillings 15,000 per month.

Alternatively, 52 per cent of the sampled voters had incomes of no more than Kenyan shillings 5000 per month. In the Kenyan context, more than majority of voters have incomes that can hardly support their households. This state of affairs perhaps explains why voters are normally ready to accept bribes during election campaigns.

Table 4.2c: Distribution of Sampled Voters by Income

Income level per month (Ksh.)	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Below 2000	165	27.50
2001-5000	147	24.50
5001-15000	80	13.30
15001-20,000	41	6.80
20,001-30,000	38	6.30
30,001 and above	20	3.30

It will be recalled that the main interest in this study was to find out the link between purposive corporate social bonds, primordial corporate social bonds, socio-demographic variables and voting behaviour (i.e placing the vote in a social context). This is the concern of the next section.

4.2 Social Bonds, Socio-demographic Variables and Voting Behaviour

In this section, the indices of association among the major variables in the study are computed and interpreted using inferential statistical techniques.

Importantly, the analysis of data in the chapter is guided by one major concern. That is, to identify variables that significantly structure voting behaviour during general elections in Kenya. We begin by analysing social bonds.

Social bonds include familiarity, attachment, benevolence, commitment to social norms and the belief in the moral imperative of the attendant activities (Rodriguez & Wilson, 2002). The above social bond activities develop through social interaction, which offers a wealth of political resources and networks. This study follows the above understanding of social bonds and limits the conception of social bonds to interaction, familiarity, reciprocity and nodes of social attachment. Instructively, this research proceeded to examine how operation of these social bonds structure voting behaviour. Accordingly, the determinant social bonds explored here were purposive corporate actors, voters' wider family, candidates' family, voters and candidates' socio-demographics, gender of the candidate, ethnicity and/or clan influence. Cross tabulations were done to determine the magnitude and in a number of cases, the direction of the association between variables.

The study utilized cross-tabulation and chi-square ($\chi 2$) statistics in this section. Cross-tabulation is a quantitative research technique suitable for analysing the relationship between two (bivariate) or more (multivariate) categorical variables. In cross-tabulation, the data are organised in tables known as contingency tables. Contingency table is where distribution of cases by their values on two or more variables is displayed for observation. The advantage of

using cross-tabulation is that by use of contingency tables, the research data assume some observable structures. These resultant structures make analysis a bit easier by showing how the dependent variable changes from one case to another thus aiding in uncovering the relationship between variables otherwise unclear.

On the other hand, chi-square ($\chi 2$) statistic is used both as a test of goodness of fit (comparing frequencies of one nominal variable to theoretical expectations) and as a test of independence (comparing frequencies of one nominal variable for different values of a second variable). In this section, chi-square is employed as a test of goodness of fit. All the analyses in this thesis were carried out using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) which has been designed specifically for this type of analysis. We examine the link between each of these variables and voting behaviour in the sections that follow.

4.3 Purposive Corporate Actors and Voting Behaviour

The hypothesis linking corporate actor to voting behaviour was stipulated thus:

The stronger a group's loyalty to a purposive corporate actor, the more they are likely to vote for the candidates it supports.

What is meant by this hypothesis is that the *voter*s who are attached to corporate entities such as political parties, media houses, religious affiliations, provincial administrative leadership (such as chiefs) will largely vote on the basis of these attachments.

A: Influence of Political Party of the Candidate

Information contained in Table 4.3a indicates that political parties heavily influence voting behaviour for the three elective positions shown in the table. Over eighty per cent of the voters interviewed stated that they were strongly influenced by the party of the candidate in their choice of councillor, member of parliament and president. It is also indicated from the values of chi-square tests that the influence of political parties on voting behaviour for the three elective posts shown in the table are statistically significant ($p \leq 0.001$ in all cases). This is to say that the influence of political parties on voting behaviour is real and not a chance factor.

Table 4.3a: Influence of candidates' Party on the Three Elective Positions

	Councilor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of party influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	485	80.80	506	84.30	500	83.30
Some influence	69	11.50	56	9.40	57	9.50
No influence	46	7.70	38	6.30	43	7.20
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=610.51;df=2; p=0.001		**X^2=703.08;df=2; p=0.001**		**X^2=675.49;df=2; p=0.001**	

Political parties as any other social institution are embedded in ongoing social relations and interactions. To this end, political parties have the capacity to constrain human behaviour in any direction as evidenced from this finding. In

history, political parties evolved in response to the developing socio-economic cleavages as democracies were extending the franchise in the Western world (Sandbrook, 1988:248; Van de Walle, 2003: 297). Therefore, political parties became intermediary mechanisms between the politicians and the particular cleavage of electorates (FES, 2010:1; Bratton, Bhavnani et al., 2011:3).

This study seems to concur with this assertion as over ninety per cent of the respondents cited candidate's party as having influenced their voting behaviour across the three levels of president, MP and councillor. But with hindsight from 1992-2007 general elections, it is clear that in Kenya, political parties have not played their role well to warrant the above democratic definition of them as vehicles of representative democracy. Ideally, political parties have a number of institutional roles assigned to them such as being the mouthpiece of societal interests, socializing political leaders, carrying out political education among its members, political mobilization and recruitment of political leaders. This is what we believe informed the struggle for the repeal of section 2(a) of our constitution to return Kenya to multiparty politics (FES, 2010:4-5). But political parties in Kenya between 1992 and 2007 had a tendency to effectively disappear from the scene and appear only during election period to emotionally mobilise members for the sole purpose of elections. Politicians manage to repeat this behaviour of disappearing and appearing during elections because most if not all political parties have no original political ideology or policy agenda as their platform to negotiate with members for their votes. This kind of political behaviour might be the bane of

liberal democracy in Kenya as politicians view elections as an event rather than process.

In fact, political parties in Kenya are surrogates for ethnicity and that may explain the above findings that parties structure voter behaviour to a larger extent (Elischer, 2008; Basedau, 2009). Thus ethnic affiliation rather than political party programmes may be the underlying force structuring voting behaviour in general elections in Kenya. This scenario is in contradiction with the Political Party Act 2007(section 14*)* which was domesticated in the new constitution in 2010*;*

> *...that political parties formation should not be based on ethnicity, age, tribal, racial, gender, regional, linguistic, corporatist, professional or religious basis* (Kenya: 2010:95).

The importance of ethnicity as a political mobilization force is evident from the manner leading politicians from populous ethnic groups shift from party to party without losing their fixed primordial following. Good examples are leading political personalities in Kenya' post-colonial dispensation. We interpret these scenarios to be based on fixed primordial ties because this movement between political parties is not accompanied by substantive agenda shifts and many times nobody attempts to explain to members if there is any agenda shift and what the implications are. This is in common with the findings of the focus group discussions that revealed that individual characteristics were more important than party affiliation in shaping voting behaviour in Kenya. Over half of the participants mentioned the party leader as having influenced their choice of party than the manifestoes. The next

section examines components of mass media as corporate actors that pattern voting behaviour in general elections.

B: Mass Media

Over the years, the meaning of press has varied, from describing the physical positions reporters sat while documenting the discussions in the House of Commons (an echo-chamber of the other three Estates), to more complex ideals connected with the task of criticizing those in positions of power and influence. This is the process that earned the press, the title of the Fourth Estate, distinguishing it from the other organs of the state namely; the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. But over time, it evolved to the present stature charged with the social responsibility of holding the mighty and powerful accountable to their actions. The base of this noble duty of enlightening and sustaining democracy today is anchored in article 19 of United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Lansner, 2006:190; Esipisu & Khaguli, 2009:7). Article 19 charges the press with the duty of educating and sustaining the democratic fervour in the world by watching the activities of those in power. But the lure for the next shilling at times compromises the media efforts to achieve this claimed duty of watch dog as financial imperative of the highest bidder erodes the independence of the media (Schultz, 1998).

There are two issues that are of special interest in analyzing the role of media in the democratization process of Africa, especially the second wave. The first and of special interest is the diversity that exists in the media industry today.

There exists a great variety not only within a particular group of media but also types of media. That is, there are more newspapers and radio stations than were before independence in Africa, and information communication technology has compounded this impact by providing a wide variety of other platforms (Coleman 2001; Stromer-Galley, 2003). The second is the special watch dog role media plays in society vis a vis the other forces. But in connection to this watchdog duty a few concerns a rise:

> ....*who gave the watchdog this mission? Did the public buy the watchdog for this purpose? If so then the press belongs to them, they own it and they have a perfect right to expect it to protect them against their own government. But if this is not so, the people do not own the press (dog) it cannot therefore be their watchdog. Under these circumstances, the press has no specific duties except those that the press wants to accept. That is, the press do not consider themselves watchdogs belonging to anybody; no master and have not leashes* (Merrill, 1974:118).

Given such a scenario, it becomes debatable if media really contributes to the development of liberal democracy (Rambaud, 2007). Newspapers, radio or television stations owners, internet platforms, indigenous or foreign and journalists, in many instances are personalities with political interests. For instance, in the run up to the 2007 general elections in Kenya, presidential candidates employed vernacular radio stations to rally up their ethnic supporters. Inooro FM and Kameme FM radio stations, popular with the Kikuyu ethnic group supported Kibaki, while Musyi FM supported Kalonzo Musyoka, a candidate from the Kamba community and Fish and Ramogi FMs supported Raila Odinga from the Luo community (Rambaud, 2009:74-75). Under such circumstances, the media these persons own or work for are used as mouthpieces of their agendas rather than serving the claimed Fourth Estate

role, namely: public interest. These media houses and journalists tend to become undisguised apologists for individual politicians or parties in the process reinforcing the politics of belonging as observed by Nyamnjoh (2005:231) and Osborn (2008) in common with what is being alleged by the ICC that Kass FM was used by partisan powers in the then Rift Valley Province of Kenya and Kibera slums in Nairobi during the 2007 general elections to incite and cause violence (Kadhi & Rutten, 2001:253-268; Namwaya, 2008:94; Osborn, 2008). Joe Kadhi and Marcel Rutten (2001) argue that in Kenya, more often than not the press has treated citizens to the drama of *game strategy* (image and style of candidates' campaign) of elections as opposed to the substance (manifestoes) of elections. It is in this vein that this study within the embeddedness approach, examines the influence of mass media as corporate actor in Kenya showing how it helps structures voting behaviour and the consequences of this structuring on the transition to a mature liberal democracy.

A number of scholars ((Temin & Smith, 2002; Lansner, 2006; Cheeseman, 2008:169; Namwaya, 2008:104; Willis, 2008:265; Esipisu & Khaguli, 2009; Yaser, Mahsud et al., 2011) assert that media matters especially in countries in transition trying to consolidate their emergent democracies. By providing a forum for information exchange on partisan programmes, the media shapes voters' perceptions about political issues. This process in fact cements the symbolic relationship between various political actors such as media and political parties, media and religious organizations or even media and

particular ethnic group ((Temin & Smith 2002:586; Yaser, Mahsud et al., 2011:4). Herman and Chomsky (1988:1) reiterate that the function of media is among others to socialise individuals with the values, beliefs and codes of behaviour deemed good in society. This view of Herman and Chomsky supports our expectation that the media in Kenya inculcates political values, beliefs and codes of behaviour necessary to the effective functioning of liberal democracy.

The current role of the media contrasts with the first democratic wave in the 1950s and 1960s where the independent freedom fighters who doubled up as journalists used papers such as Nkruma's *Evening New*s, Jomo Kenyatta's *Mwiguthania,* Nnamdi Azikiwe's *West African Pilot* among others to react to the excesses of the colonial regimes. These freedom fighters used their papers in the claimed Fourth Estate tradition to articulate the people's sufferings under colonialism and their demand for freedom (Goran, Leslie et al., 2002). But it must also be remembered as we interrogate this variable that the independence struggle was straightforward as the stake was single, namely; self-determination as opposed to today where the media has to contend with conflicting demands from polyadic groups. Let us examine the role of radio, television, mobile phone and internet as critical media components in Kenya today in shaping voting behaviour.

B (i) The Influence of Radio

In recent electioneering in Kenya especially after the IPPG pact that ordered equal coverage of campaign to all political parties by the state owned Kenya

Broadcasting Corporation (KBC Act, 1997), candidates have found the radio a useful medium in conveying their political campaign agenda and personal profiles. This has come out of the realization that the radio in Africa is widely available in many households and conveys messages understood by virtually everybody who speaks the language of the radio broadcasts irrespective of literacy levels (Temin & Smith, 2002:599; Rambaud, 2009:74-75). A study by Namwaya (2008:85) revealed that radio penetration stands at 85%. While Synovate, a leading pollster company claims that on average, one individual listens to a minimum of three radio stations per week amounting to 37 hours of listening. This was buttressed by the findings of the focus groups, where many participants mentioned radio especially the independent radio stations as having significantly shaped their voting behaviour. It is within this context that it is expected that the radio should have a strong influence on citizens' voting behaviour.

Findings shown in Table 4.3b indicate that the influence of radio on voting behaviour increases in strength as the elective position becomes more important. Stated differently, influence of radio on voting behaviour declines as the elective position becomes local in catchment. Chi-square tests computed for the three elective posts shown in table 4.3b reveal that radio influence on voting behaviour is significant ($p \leq 0.001$).

The results reveal that radio had an increasing influence from the election of councillor to the president. This is probably due to the fact that councillors are well-known local community leaders who can traverse the whole electoral unit

(ward), while for parliamentary and more so for the presidency, the radio is heavily used to reach the masses because of distance and time. If the mandate of Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights has to be realised, then it is advisable to use radio in the Kenyan context from results of this study coupled with the Synovate polls.

Table 4.3b: Influence of Radio on the Three Elective Positions

	Councilor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of Radio influence	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much influence	90	15.00	183	30.50	388	64.70
Some influence	152	42.00	265	44.20	128	21.30
No influence	258	43.00	152	25.30	84	14.00
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=90.84;df=2; p=0.001		**X^2=34.09;df=2;p=0.001**		**X^2=269.92;df=2;p=0.001**	

B (ii): Influence of Television

The other media actor considered linked to voting behaviour was television. In recent Kenyan mass media history, television has become more available to people of all classes in urban areas and to middle class persons in rural areas (50 % penetration levels). Therefore, in urban areas, television should enable candidates for political office to easily reach diverse social groupings regarding their political platforms and integrity. The television should also

permit such candidates to access rural middle class persons who are in any case opinion shapers. Use of television is, therefore, expected to influence voting behaviour for all the three elective offices. Reports from Synovate claim that television viewership stands at 26 hours per week per person spread across the leading three television stations (Citizen TV, KTN, and NTV).

Evidence presented in Table 4.3c shows that influence of television increases as the geographical catchment of the elective office increases in size. Less than 30 per cent of respondents were influenced by television in making electoral decisions for the position of councillor and member of parliament as compared to slightly over 50 per cent of the respondents who were influenced by television in making electoral decision for the position of president. Results of chi-square tests computed from figures shown in Table 4.3c indicate that television influence on voting behaviour is significant and not a chance issue ($p \leq 0.001$).

Table 4.3c: Influence of Television on the Three Elective Positions

	Councillor		Member of Parliament		President	
Degree of TV influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	78	13.00	157	26.20	323	53.80
Some influence	170	28.30	196	32.70	108	18.00
No influence	352	58.70	247	41.10	169	28.20
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=194.44;df=2; p=0.001		**X^2=20.37;df=2;p=0.001**		**X^2=122.77; df=2; p=0.001**	

The results show that television just like radio is very crucial when it comes to structuring the vote for presidency more than for parliamentary and councillorship in that order. Television is important because that is the campaign platform that reaches majority of people countrywide at the same time. Moreover, given the power of moving picture and real-time technology, discussions interrogating the various candidates and their programmes can be witnessed all over the country. During campaign periods, most political parties and other interested groups in Kenya usually appear on television talk shows across the three leading television channels (KTN, NATION TV, CITIZEN TV) analysing and arguing at times raising hidden stakes for voters to understand. Programmes such as Kibaki Succession 2012, Bulls Eye, Truth Meter, Spotlight, became very popular with viewers because of their lively political content. At the time of this survey, television coverage had penetrated many rural households in Kenya through local social places.

B (iii) Internet Influence

Internet platform is the hallmark of the information, communication and technology revolution. Like anywhere else in the world, internet is in vogue with the youth and given that they comprise the majority of voters in Kenya (Esipisu & Khaguli, 2009:61), it is expected that internet should play a significant role in shaping voting behaviour. From 1997 general elections in Kenya, there has been a deliberate strategy by candidates to employ the internet as a campaign medium. It is reported that mobile penetration has reached 62.7 per 100 people (Synovate Kenya, 2011). With the development in technology where mobile phone is fitted with internet services; internet penetration is bound to increase (Zegeye & Muponde, 2012:124; Chiumbu, 2012) in particular, the capacity of social networks such as twitter and face book (public space) increase interaction among groups offering considerable opportunities of transforming these groups into constituencies of shared interests and concerns (Tanjong, Heo et al., 2003).

Evidence contained in Table 4.3d shows that over three-quarters of the sampled respondents indicated that internet platform did not influence their voting behaviour regarding the three electoral positions of president, member of parliament and councillor. The table shows less than 15 per cent of the respondents were influenced in respect to the three electoral positions. Chi-square tests presented in Table 4.3d revealed that the influence of internet across the three elective positions of president, member of parliament and

councillor are significant, meaning that the failure to influence voter behaviour is not accidental.

Table 4.3d: Influence of Internet on the Three Elective Positions

	Councillor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of internet influence	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much influence	20	3.30	29	4.80	68	11.30
some influence	85	14.20	105	17.80	83	13.90
No influence	495	82.50	466	77.70	449	74.80
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=663.25;df=2; p=0.001		X^2=545.11;df=2;p=0.001		X^2=565.5;df=2;p=0.001	

This is probably due to the low penetration of internet services in Kenya, especially in the rural areas compounded by sizeable literacy levels among the voting populations.

C Religious Affiliation

Religious organizations have been important players in the Kenyan political arena before and after independence. Drawing from religious's socialisation capacity across the country, the church in Kenya embarked on this mission with zeal to inculcate citizens with some values the Church thought necessary for democratic governance (Sabar-Friedman, 1997). Despite Ngugi wa Thiong'o 's disquiet with Christianity arguing that it was part of the colonial machinery, he also acknowledges the indelible role the Church has played in shaping identities and thought patterns in Kenya' political social milieu

(Siundu & Wegesa, 2010:9**).** In fact, for a long period in the political history of Kenya, these bodies were the only alternative voices apart from the government and not only offered citizens a platform but also promoted public discourse on some of the very politically sensitive issues in the 1980s and 1990s (Adar, 2000:7; Okuku, 2002).

The religious organizations' activities have grown to be embedded with human behaviour politics included and its influence on voting behaviour is expected to grow in Kenya. This is true as observed from the events of 2007 general elections campaigns where the presidential candidate Raila Odinga signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Muslim leaders in the run-up to the elections (Kotler-Berkowitz, 2001; Ellis & Haar, 2007: 385; Cheeseman, 2008:168).

Information contained in Table 4.3e indicates that religious leaders' influence on voting behaviour increases in strength as the elective position becomes less local. This is so partly because at local level, religious homogeneity is more likely to minimise effect of religion as a cleavage factor. Overall, the chi-square tests confirm that the influence of religious leaders on voting behaviour is significant for positions of councillor and member of parliament but not for presidency. That is to say that the influence of religion on voting behaviour is real and not accidental for the two positions shown in Table 4.3e. Hence, religion remains an important political socialisation agent among Kenyan voters in sync with Takyi, Opoku-Agyeman et al., (2010) findings in Ghana.

Table 4.3e: Influence of Religious Leaders on the Three Elective Positions

	Councillor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of religious leaders influence	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much influence	129	21.50	148	24.70	181	30.20
some influence	196	32.70	209	34.80	197	32.80
No influence	275	45.80	243	40.50	222	37.00
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2 =53.41; df= 2; p=0.00		**X^2 =23.17; df=2; p=0.00**		**X^2=4.27,df=2, not significant**	

D Provincial Administration

The provincial administration has been a very important institution in Kenyan politics before and after independence. Of all the purposive corporate actors, provincial administration is perhaps the most potent and ruling cliques have always employed this actor to leverage their performance in Kenyan politics including the outcome of general elections (Adar, 1998; Adar, 2000:77; Orvis, 2006:95-98). Provincial administration has been an instrumental actor at the disposal of the incumbent regime at different times of our political history since those days of colonial rule until 1997. Before the 1997 general elections, the then KANU government of President Moi bowed to pressure from a combination of actors, namely; civil society, opposition parties, the Church and donor community to agree to a raft of minimum reforms famously known as the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG). Among the many changes resulting from the IPPG pact was the weakening of the coercive and manipulative powers of the provincial administration (Orvis, 2006:105).

Notably, the IPPG pact provided for the repeal of the Public order Act (cap 56) and the Chiefs Authority Act (cap 56). These two acts were instrumental in giving the incumbent regimes political leverage especially through the chief's massive coercive and manipulative powers. Incidentally, the process did not manage to delink the provincial administration from KANU (Adar, 2001:4), thus enabling the provincial machinery to manipulate and structure voting behaviour especially in areas where KANU held sway until 2002.

Information carried in Table 4.3f indicates that the influence of provincial administration cadre on voting behaviour increases in proportion with the size of the electoral catchment area. The results of chi-square tests show that the influence of provincial administration on voting behaviour for the three elective positions of president, member of parliament and councillor are statistically significant. In essence, this means that the provincial administration influence on voting behaviour is real and not a chance factor. This result shows that even after the IPPG pact in 1997 and the consequent defeat of KANU by the united opposition force under NARC in 2002, the provincial administration is still a significant component of the social structure in Kenya (Cheeseman, 2008:167). This is worsened by the unfortunate union between the ruling party and state apparatus, where state bureaucrats double as party operatives working in a partisan fashion for the incumbent regime. This explains the current storm both in and out of parliament over the appointment of county commissioners by president Kibaki contrary to the provisions of the new constitution. The accusations are that the president is trying to re-

introduce the provincial structures back into the constitution so as to continue favouring the incumbent in the coming elections of 2013 (Daily Nation, various, The Standard, various). The focus group discussion showed that majority of the older participants cited provincial administration as having influenced their voting behaviour contrary to the younger generation participants who unanimously reported not being influenced by the provincial administration in their voting behaviour.

Table 4.3f: Influence of Provincial Administration on the Three Elective Positions

	Councillor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of local administration's influence	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much influence	50	8.30	63	10.50	95	15.80
Some influence	229	38.20	232	38.70	234	39.00
No influence	321	53.50	305	50.80	271	45.20
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=189.91; df=2; p=0.001		X^2=154.09;df=2; p=0.001		X^2=86.11; df=2; =0.001	

4.4 Membership in Wider Family and Voting Behaviour

The hypothesis linking the wider family of the voter to voting behaviour was stipulated thus:

There is a strong congruence in the voting for candidates among members of the wider family.

What is proposed here is that members of a given wider family or household or lineage are more likely to vote as a block for the same candidate, given that they may influence one another to honour compliant voting**.**

Family is the primary social institution charged with the duty of socialization; therefore, the voters' family is a very important sociological variable in the analysis of voting behaviour (Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2009:726-727; Urbatsch, 2011:1-3). Evidence from Table 4.3g indicates that about two thirds of the sampled respondents reported having been influenced by their families in making electoral decisions for the three positions of president, member of parliament and councillor. Chi-square tests regarding the influence of voters' family on voting behaviour for the three elective positions of president, member of parliament and councillor are statistically significant ($p \leq 0.001$). This means that the influence of voters' family on voting behaviour is real and not a chance occurrence. In Kenya, these results tend to apply because the individual behaviour is embedded and constrained by ongoing social relations within the structure of the family as a basic agent of socialisation. For most people, the first political conversation they overheard or contributed might have been within their family setup. The lower percentage might be attributed to reduced family contact hours in most homes. This can also help explain the huge number of youth participants in the post-elections violence (Daily Nation, various; The Standard, various).

Table 4 .3g: Influence of the Voters' Family on the Three Elective Positions

	Councilor		Member of Parliament		President	
Degree of family influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	151	25.20	161	26.80	140	23.30
Some influence	239	39.80	246	41.00	248	41.30
No influence	210	35.00	193	32.80	212	35.40
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=20.11; df=2; p=0.001		**X^2=18.43;df=2; p=0.001**		**X^2=30.24;df=2;p=0.001**	

4.5 Voters' Associates and Voting Behaviour

The hypothesis linking voters' friends to voting behaviour was stipulated thus:

There is a strong congruence in the voting for candidates among friends.

The proposition here is that friends and people around you are likely to have a strong constraining effect on an individuals' behaviour including voting behaviour as observed under the embeddedness approach. This proposition is in line with an age-long debate that the immediate social environment of individual voters influences their voting behaviour (Pattie & Johnston, 2000: 41; Rutten, Mazrui et al., 2001; Gona 2008:10; Omotola, 2009)**.** The results shown in Table 4.3h shows that a little over two thirds of voters were influenced by friends in their voting behaviour for all the three elective positions of president, member of parliament and councillor. The chi-square tests confirmed significant relationships between the influence of friends and

voting behaviour for the three elective offices ($p \leq 0.001$). This means that the influence of friends on voting behaviour is important.

Friends or peers of an individual usually have an impact on the individual's social behaviours. This might be true of Kenya's general elections which have been always euphoric since 1992. This finding is in common with earlier studies by Wanjohi (1984) that associates (friends and neighbours) had a significant influence on voting behaviour in the 1983 parliamentary elections in Kangemi constituency as the candidates garnered most votes from their home locations and Gona (2008:245) studying voting at the coastal strip of Mombasa between 1992-2007 found that social networks of familiarity, familism and ethnicity played a role in shaping how voters, voted.

Table 4.3h: Influence of Voter's Associates

	Councilor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of voters associate's influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	153	25.50	154	25.70	134	22.30
Some influence	249	41.50	261	43.50	272	45.30
No influence	198	33.00	185	30.80	194	32.40
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=23.07;df=2;p=0.001		**X^2=30.31;df=2;p=0.001**		**X^2=47.88;df=2;p=0.001**	

4.6: Family of the Candidate and Voting Behaviour

The hypothesis linking family of the candidate to voting behaviour was stipulated thus:

Voters will have a higher preference for candidates who originate from traditional leadership lineages than for candidates from non-leadership lineages.

The suggestion here is that individuals are more likely to vote for candidates from families, clans or lineages associated with traditional leadership roles and traits than candidates from non-leadership traditional family origins. As a rule, such candidates have more social visibility than their colleagues from ordinary lineages. This is because these family traits or names also function as symbols among populations as they arouse nostalgic memories of a golden past and as such a rallying point. Braungart et al., (1986:214) complement the above point by observing that these individuals are believed to have imbibed knowledge necessary to the process of leadership from their parents and/or grandparents and as such are properly socialised in the science and art of leadership.

Information carried in Table 4.3i conveys one cardinal message, namely; that the family leadership profile of candidates, whether running as councillor, member of parliament or president enters into voters' calculation in choice of candidates. The other important message in the table in common with Gona (2008:245) is that for geographically contiguous candidates such as councillors and members of parliament, their family background has more influence than is the case for "far away" candidates such as for the presidency. Instructively in this respect, more of the sampled voters stated that the family background for councillorship and parliament had influence in their voting trajectory than was the case for candidates for the presidency.

The chi-square tests confirm that the influence of family background of candidates had significant relationship with voting behaviour ($p \leq 0.001$). In effect, this result supports hypothesis three that there is significant relationship between candidates' family leadership profile and voting behaviour.

In Kenya, this behaviour has had debilitating effects on our nascent democracy because a number of councillors and members of parliament are in those elective positions largely because of their ascribed status rather than their democratic credentials. Some conspicuous examples include names such as Wamalwa, Odinga, Kenyatta, Nyaga, Mudavadi, Ngala, Moi, Laboso and Kones.

Table 4.3i: Influence of the Candidates Family

	Councilor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of Family Influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	175	29.20	168	28.00	140	23.30
Some influence	241	40.20	253	42.20	257	42.80
No influence	184	30.60	179	29.80	203	33.90
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=12.81; df=2; p=0.001		**X^2=21.37; df=2; p=0.001**		**X^2=34.29;df=2; p=0.001**	

4.7 Candidates Socio-demographic Characteristics and Voting Behaviour

The hypothesis linking candidate socio-demographic profile to voting behaviour was formulated as:

Candidates' demographic and socio-economic profiles influence voting behaviour.

The proposition here is that candidate' demographic and socio-economic statuses taken as nodes of attachments or glues of social interactions are likely to have some influence on voting behaviour for a particular candidate in the general election. This might be in tandem with the findings of Clark et al., in Canada that candidate' characteristics such as titles significantly structure voting behaviour (Clarke, Jenson et al., 1982; Kelley & McAllister, 1984:456). In Kenya, this might be true given the profile of the 11th parliament and even the 10th one. Achieved titles such as Dr., Professor, Senior Counsel, learned friend litter the roll call of the members.

A Candidates Education

Evidence contained in Table 4.3j shows that Kenyan voters take educational attainment of candidates seriously. About 80 per cent of sampled respondents indicated that educational attainment of the candidate has much influence irrespective of the elective position. Instructively, less than 7 per cent of the sampled respondents stated that educational attainment of a candidate is of no importance. The influence of educational attainment of a candidate on voting behaviour among the studied respondents is statistically significant across the three elective positions ($p \leq 0.001$). This result indicates that the Kenyan voter is conscious of the importance of educational attainment in performance of leadership roles and will tend to go for the best educated candidate. This finding is the same as Hornsby's (1989:286) revelation about the early

parliament between 1963-83 and the findings of focus group discussions that supported the issue of candidate education as being central to voting behaviour. In fact, one participant noted, "the current parliament (2007-2013) is full of lawyers and professors, without proper education you will not manage to participate".

Table 4.3j: Influence of Candidates' Level of Education

	Councillor		Member of Parliament		President	
Influence of level of education	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	474	79.00	474	79.00	482	80.30
some influence	92	15.30	108	16.30	80	13.30
No influence	34	5.70	28	4.70	38	6.40
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=571.48; df=2; p=0.001		**X^2=575.32;df=2;p=0.001**		**X^2=600.84;df=2,;p=0.001**	

B Candidate's Associates

Candidate's associates are an indicator of his or her socio-economic status and social profile. Therefore, it was hypothesized that this group of people a particular candidate interacts with will have an influence on voting behaviour. Results shown in Table 4.3k in common with Gona (2008:245), show that candidate's associates influence voting behaviour. Information contained in the table reveals that around two thirds of the sampled informants reported having been influenced by the candidates' associates. Once more, the influence of associates is statistically significant ($p \leq 0.001$). The old adage that birds of a feather flock together seems to be vindicated with these results. The results also indicate that for the position of councillor, the candidates'

associates matters more than the other two positions, maybe because of the closeness and familiarity of the voters and the candidate as wards are small areas compared to constituencies or the country. It is understood that one's company shapes one's behaviour a great deal; therefore, if one associates with personalities considered as public enemies, he or she is likely to suffer consequences associated with accusations the public has labelled against them. This was proved true in 2002 when majority KANU politicians lost their seats because of their close relationship with the then KANU bigwigs. Likewise others rode on the bandwagon of NARC to parliament or county councils because they were associated with leading lights of change at that time.

Table 4.3k: Influence of Candidate's Associates

	Councilor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of candidates associates influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	186	31.00	172	28.70	157	26.20
Some influence	231	48.50	256	42.70	265	44.10
No influence	183	30.50	172	28.60	178	29.70
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=7.23;df=2; p=0.001		**X^2=23.52;df=2; p=0.001**		**X^2=32.99;df=2;p=0.001**	

C: Candidates Issues

There have been arguments that electoral politics is wrought with class or socio-economic issues (Sherif, 2001; Lindberg, 2005). It is in this logic that this study chose to examine the influence of these issues on voting behaviour. Evidence contained in Table 4.3l reveals that more than two thirds of the sampled voters are strongly influenced by the candidates' agenda across all the

elective positions. When this evidence is considered along with those who indicated "some influence", then over 90 per cent of the voters were influenced by the candidates' issue platform. In effect, less than ten per cent of the sampled voters reported no influence from the candidates' agenda on their voting behaviour across all the three elective offices. The results are statistically significant across all positions ($p \leq 0.001$). Thus, the influence of candidates' agenda on voting behaviour is real and not by chance occurrence. What has to be explained is that more often than not these agenda in Kenya are couched in primordial terms, thus reducing and arresting the growth of the liberal democratic vision of universal individual autonomy in processing and using information.

Table 4.3l: Influence of Candidates' Agenda

	Councillor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of candidate's issues influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	393	65.50	423	70.50	434	72.30
Some influence	154	25.70	123	22.20	110	18.30
No influence	53	8.80	44	7.30	56	9.40
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=304.57;df=2;p=0.001		**$X^2$392.77;df=2;p=0.001**		**X^2=417.96;df=2;p=0.001**	

The above scenario is very unfortunate because the candidate's agenda and issues he or she is espousing are very significant to the voters as individuals in their different stations of life. This is the consideration that the candidate

provides in the bargain for the individual's vote. It is interesting to see leverage of this factor in Kenyan politics in the coming future.

D: Candidate's Money

The most known indicator of socio-economic status of an individual is how much money (real or imagined) he or she has. Holomquist (1984) documented how money was used by politicians leverage their chances of winning through the Harambee (self-help) movement during the KANU era. Therefore, this study opted to examine the effect of money on voting behaviour as shown in Table 4.3m. The most important message contained in Table 4.3m is that money is a crucial leverage in the voting behaviour of the sampled voters in Kenya. Over two thirds of the respondents, in respect to all the three positions, admitted that money is a strong incentive in structuring their voting behaviour. The calculated chi-square tests revealed that influence of money on voting behaviour is statistically significant.

Table 4.3m: Influence of Candidate's Money

	Councillor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of money influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	287	47.80	278	46.30	296	49.30
Some influence	112	18.70	121	20.20	107	17.80
No influence	201	33.50	201	33.50	197	32.90
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=76.57;df=2; p=0.00		**X^2=61.63;df=2; p=0.00**		**X^2=89.37;df=2;p=0.00**	

The above scenario may help explain the recent emergence of noveu-rich (*sonkocracy* in Kenya) where candidates get elected on their maiden attempt because of the money they are able to dish out to voters. Two well publicised recent cases in Kenya include the maiden election of Honourable William Kabogo in the 2002 general elections and Honourable Mike Mbuvi alias Sonko in the 2010 by-election of Makadara constituency in Nairobi.

E Candidate's Age

> *If you are not a liberal when you're 25, you have no heart. If you're not a conservative by the time you're 35,you have no brains (attributed to Winston Churchill)*

Age is one of the most basic social categories of human organisation and a primary factor in all societies for assigning roles because of the social and historical influences on members of an age group (Braungart et al., 1986:215). Age is central particularly in African societies because of the traditional African gerontological system of authority. Information displayed in Table 4.3n seems to agree with the above assertion. Well over majority of the sampled respondents admitted that age of the candidate was a primary consideration in their voting pattern; in fact, this importance of age of a candidate increases with the prestige of the elective office. As was the case with the candidates' issue platform, when the category of those who indicated that age of the candidate had "some influence", then over 88 per cent of the respondents admitted that age can influence their voting behaviour. Chi-square obtained from the results shown in the table show that the influence of age on voting behaviour was statistically significant across the three elective

positions. This finding is in tandem with those of Tilley (2002) and Cheeseman (2008) who found that age is a significant structuring variable in British partisan politics.

Table 4.3n: Influence of Candidate's Age

	Councillor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of Age influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	330	55.00	353	58.80	367	61.20
Some influence	199	33.20	198	33.00	174	29.00
No influence	71	11.80	49	8.20	59	9.80
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=167.71;df=2;p=0.00		**X^2=231.07;df=2;p=0.00**		**X^2=242.23;df=2;p=0.00**	

The result from this study shows that age is a crucial factor in structuring voting behaviour, which corroborates Hornsby's (1989:280) findings that age influences voting behaviour in Kenya. In Kenya, every time there is an election the concept of "Young Turks" comes into vogue. The age especially for the presidential candidates has been part of Kenya's political debate since independence days when there were schemes to bar the late Tom Mboya from the presidency by raising the presidential age threshold. Political elites in Kenya have taken the issue of age to a new dimension by dyeing their hair to remain black so as to radiate youth exuberance and reach the young voters by association. Slogans such as *Vijana na Kijana* (youth are with their fellow youth) are some of the tricks that politicians use. This reaching out on the basis of age and not ethnicity may be utilitarian. Such a cross-cutting cleavage

if well-harnessed might help de-tribalize the nation and marshal Kenya towards a liberal democratic path.

4.8 Gender and Voting Behaviour

The hypothesis linking the gender of the candidate to voting behaviour was stipulated thus: **There is no relationship between the gender of the candidate and voting behaviour**

The gist of the hypothesis is that male and female candidates will not be discriminated against by respondents on the basis of their gender. Gender-based politics has been very rife in the Kenyan body politik for a long time (Hornsby, 1989:281). This is because since independence, women have been thought of as unfit for political career. But this has not been taken lightly by women in Kenya since 1969 when the first woman was elected to parliament. This gender-based political struggle is partly explained by patriarchal structures that advantage the opportunities of the male gender against the female gender with its attendant social roles and the socialization process (Nzomo, 1993; Kelley & McAllister 1984:455). These gender-based political struggles eventually fed into Kenya's constitutional review process. From 1997 when the constitutional review process was received lukewarmly until its successful implementation in 2010, women issues especially democratic participation has had a marked presence in the review process resulting into the now celebrated gender affirmative action. More important is Chapter seven of the Kenyan Constitution which is dedicated to the representation of people. Specifically, part 1 (b) of this chapter makes it mandatory that no one gender

should fill any public elective body with more than two thirds (Kenya, 2010). With this kind of revolutionary inclusiveness, gender considerations should be expected to play a significant role in influencing voting behaviour in future general elections.

Results carried in Table 4.3o reveal that gender is a central variable in voting behaviour. The information contained in the table shows that over 80 per cent of the sampled respondents indicate that gender of the candidate influenced their voting behaviour. This finding cuts across all the three elective positions shown in the table. Chi-square tests were significant confirming that the gender of the candidate is a major consideration in voters' conceptual map. This is partly due to the embeddedness of Kenyan politics in our pre-colonial African social structure with norms that discriminate against women.

Table 4.3o: Influence of Candidates' Gender on the Three Elective Positions

	Councillor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of gender influence	**Number of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	259	43.20	293	48.80	310	51.70
Some influence	227	37.80	219	36.50	188	31.30
No influence	114	19.00	88	14.70	102	17.00
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=58.08;df=2;p=0.001		**X^2=107.77;df=2; p=0.001**		**X^2=109.24;df=2;p=0.001**	

The strength of gender factor seems strongest at presidential level. Over fifty per cent of voters were certain about the gender of their choice. This is partly explained by the fundamental role socialisation plays in life where women's place has been thought to be in the family and not public career and women are conditioned to believe that men are capable of adequately representing their interests (Nzomo, 1993).

This in tandem with electoral traditions elsewhere, especially in the USA after the 19th Amendment that extended the franchise to women in 1920. Prior to 1984-women were not seen as a distinct constituency separate from men. That is to say that gender was not seen as structuring variable in voting behaviour rather factors such as political affiliation, geographical location, educational levels and socio-economic status. Men and women voted similarly largely due to their shared life contexts. In the 1984 US elections, women did not vote the Democratic Party on the basis of gender (Geraldine Ferraro was the running mate of Walter Mondale) as expected but instead voted overwhelmingly for Ronald Reagan because of the issues he espoused targeting women situation such as single working women, married working women, elderly women among other contextually women issues (Banducci & Karp, 2000:814-816; McElroy & Marsh, 2010:821).

4.9 Candidate's Clan and/ or Ethnic background

It was hypothesised as follows: **Voters' will be strongly influenced by candidate's clan or ethnic identity in their voting behaviour.**

The crux of the matter here is voters' perception that candidates from some clans or ethnic groups are more electable than others. This is in line with the conventional view among Kenyans and scholars of Kenyan politics that the Kenyan voter remains attached to primary and especially primordial group solidarities especially ethnicity or by clan and/or locational factors (Lijphart, 1969; Bienen, Affairs et al., 1974; Horowitz, 1985; Hefner 1987; Hornsby 1989; Ajulu, 1992:97; Horowitz, 1993; Throup, 1993:394; Lustick, 1997; Ndegwa, 1997:600; Njogu, 1997; Orvis, 1997; Oyugi, 1997; Holmquist & Ford, 1998:235; Throup & Hornsby, 1998:284; Horowitz, 1999; Horowitz, 2001; Njogu, 2001:381; Ajulu, 2002; Chandra, 2005; Posner, 2005; Orvis, 2006:106; Chandra, 2007; Cheeseman, 2008; Wallace, Abduk-Khaliq et al., 2008; Holmquist & Githinji, 2009; Yieke, 2010; Bratton, Bhavnani et al., 2011:1). It should be noted that for councillors and members of parliament outside Nairobi, the primary influence is clan while within Nairobi, because of its cosmopolitan nature, the influence is ethnicity.

Primordial attachments are highly embedded in day-to-day engagements, but heightened during election period (Woodhouse & Tobias, 1966; Khalaf, 1968; Hefner, 1987; Baèová, 1998; Evera, 2001). Horowitz (1993:22) argues that in a divided polity like Kenya where social classes are yet to solidify, ethnicity matters more than any other socio-economic variable to the politics of inclusion and exclusion as evidenced by the Kalenjin's privilege under Moi regime and earlier on the Kikuyu's privileged largesse under Mzee Jomo Kenyatta (Sandbrook, 1988:248; Özbudun, 1989:241; Adar,1998; Decalo,

1998:177). This probably explains, why election related violence is often ethnic or clan-based in Kenya. This state of affairs obtaining in Kenya today can be traced back to the colonial period. During the colonial period, it benefitted the colonial administration to balkanise the country ethnically so as to rule successfully. The division was done along ethnic lines whereby eight provinces were demarcated to at least represent one majority ethnic group in each province. The same trend was adopted as small administrative units were subdivided into district and/or constituencies throughout the republic. Again, the colonial rulers made sure at least one major clan dominated the administrative unit (Yieke, 2010:9). This process resulted in the balkanization of the country into ethnic and/or clan territories where others are seen as outsiders (Hornsby, 1989:284; Yieke, 2010). This scenario persists until today as ethnicity and/or clan structures voting behaviour in Kenya.

Evidence contained in Table 4.3p tends to corroborate the above claim that ethnicity and/or clan is an important variable in politics. Responses from over 65 per cent of sampled informants indicated that ethnicity and/or clan influenced their voting behaviour across all the three elective offices. Chi-square tests obtained were statistically significant across all the elective positions ($p \leq 0.001$). This means that ethnic or clan influence on voting behaviour is real and not sporadic. This finding is in common with Heinz (2010:96) revelation on Ghanaian political divide between Nkruma's NDC and the Ewe voters pitted against Busia-Danquah's NPP's Ashanti voters.

This kind of ascriptive and immutable attachment is not conducive to liberal democracy since it leverages domination over coexistence. Unfortunately, if ethnic affiliation will continue to be the driving force behind voting behaviour in Kenya, as observed from Table 4.3p, then we expect that this social bond will remain a significant obstacle in the development of liberal democracy in Kenya. This scenario is captured vividly in the focus group discussions where ethnicity or clan politics featured prominently as defining features of voting behaviour. In one discussion group, a participant retorted that, "blood votes are over" meaning ethnic or clan are no longer structuring features of voting behaviour. But a colleague disagreed vehemently stating that, "you cannot leave your brother". Meaning you cannot vote a foe candidate from another ethnic or clan when a candidate from your ethnic or clan is on the ballot paper.

Table 4.3p: Influence of Candidate's Ethnic/Clan Background on the Three Elective Positions

	Councillor		**Member of Parliament**		**President**	
Degree of ethnic/clan influence	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**	**No. of Respondents**	**%**
Much influence	283	47.10	308	51.30	283	47.20
some influence	127	21.20	136	22.70	155	28.80
No influence	190	31.70	156	26.00	162	27.00
Total	600	100.00	600	100.00	600	100.00
	X^2=61.59;df=2;p=0.001		**X^2=88.48;df=2;p=0.001**		**X^2=51.79;df=2;p=0.001**	

So far, the preceding presentation has focused on the influence of each socio-demographic bond on voting behaviour in respect to the three elective positions, without introducing the influence of confounding factors or the interaction between the variables so far interrogated in this study. The intervening factors that were considered relevant in shaping voting behaviour in this study were region, ethnicity/clan, gender, age, and religion, level of education, occupation, income and marital status. The next section is devoted to analysis of the influence of these intervening factors on the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour.

4.10 Mediating Factors Between Social Bonds and Voting Behaviour

In this section, we control for variables to observe the interactive value of each intervening variable on the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour. The structural factors considered are region, ethnicity/clan, gender, age, religion, level of education, occupation, income and marital status.

4.10.1 The Influence of Region

Evidence from available literature (Walraven & Thiriot, 2002:71) reveals that the process of democratization in Africa many times leads to the process of territorialism. Where, some regions of the republic are parcelled out as belonging to certain groups or spheres of influence of certain politicians. This happens anywhere especially where identity and ethnicity are played out in the national body politik to the extent that certain geographical spaces are claimed to belong to certain groups along ethnic or other primordial criteria. This is

what Baker (2009) found in Mexico. As indicated earlier in this chapter, Kenya was balkanised by the colonialist into ethno-regional blocks. Politicians especially those who hail from majority ethnic and/or clan in those claimed territories usually instrumentalise this historical fact by claiming ownership of particular blocks through such slogans as *hatutaki madoadoa* (meaning we do not want foreigners), *hatutaki wabara* (we do not want people from the hinterland), *Mundu wa Nyumba ya Mumbi* (People from Mumbi's house), *Shienyu ni shienyu* (do not forsake your own) among others as happened in the 2007 general elections with debilitating consequences to the development of liberal democracy in Kenya. Consequently, it was thought necessary to examine the confounding influence of region on the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour. In this vein, it was prudent to include province and constituency as variables, because in Kenya, region connotes province and constituency. We present province first.

A (i) Province

Research results carried in Table 4.4a show that voters in Nyanza Province had the highest mean score for social bonds for the three elective positions. Western Province and NEP followed in that order for the positions of councillor and MP; but interchanged for the position of president where NEP (31.55) scored more than Western (31.26).

Table 4.4a: Voter Behaviour Mean Scores for President, MP and Councillor

Province	N	Councilor		MP		President	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation
Western	100	31.91	5.26	32.19	5.40	31.26	5.80
Nyanza	200	39.43	7.46	38.31	6.81	37.85	7.56
Nairobi	200	36.10	8.34	35.59	9.29	35.42	9.37
NEP	100	30.14	7.89	28.01	7.66	31.55	8.26
Total	600	35.52	8.29	34.66	8.47	34.89	

The predominance of the social bond factors in Nyanza perhaps explains why the region has consistently voted as a block since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. This overarching influence of social bonds in shaping voting behaviour in Luo Nyanza is partly explained by the existence of single leadership as a rallying node of attachment in the form of the Odinga dynasty. The observed trends in Nairobi can be attributed to the ethnic pattern of politics in the major towns of Kenya, where we have *Kisumu ndogo, Mogadishu* etc. This means that the nature of settlements in major towns tends to take on ethnic dimensions, such that people from one ethnic group live in one section of the town. People of Luo origin or Somali origin live together, hence the naming of those sections of the town after specific tribal town headquarters (MacDonald & MacDonald 1962; Bascom, 1963:169; Lobo,2003; Pieterse, 2005). Ethnicity remains a cohesive factor under such circumstances as re-tribalization takes root.

ANOVA tests were conducted to establish whether or not region had a significant intervening influence on the way social bonds structure voting behaviour. ANOVA test is a statistical technique for determining whether data from the different groups have a common mean or the existence of differences between means of the groups on some variable are significant. That is the amount of variability between the means of the group compared to the amount of variability among the individual score of each group on the measured characteristic. The two means are compared using F-test and conclusions are drawn using the value of F.

The ANOVA tests are reported in Table 4.4b. The tests showed that the provincial residence of the voters significantly affected the way social bonds influenced voting behaviour for the positions of councillor (F= 43.01; P=0.001 df=3), MP (F=44.50; p=0.001; df= 3) and president (F=21.61; p=0.001; df=3). In other words, the point to be reiterated is that the combined influence of all the social bonds considered in this study was strongest in studied constituencies in Nyanza, followed by Nairobi, Western and North Eastern regions for all the three elective positions.

4.4b: Voter Behaviour Score for the three elective Positions (ANOVA)

	Councillor				MP				President			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between Groups	7321.39	3	2440.46	43.01	7860.66	3	2620.22	44.50	4234.78	3	1411.60	21.61
Within Groups	33816.45	596	56.74		35101.33	596	58.90		38932.74	596		
Total	41137.83	599			42961.99	599			43167.52	599		

One weakness of ANOVA is that it is general and not specific to the extent that it does not show which pairs of means are or are not significantly different. This weakness is usually addressed by undertaking a paired difference of means test for various groups, in these case regions. In this study, therefore, the t-test of differences between means was conducted to determine significant mean differences in the way social bonds shape voting behaviour for councillor, MP and president between any pair of the four provinces. The respective results of the t-test are presented in Table 4.4c.

4.4c: Tests of Differences Between Means in Voter Choices for the Three Elective Positions by Province.

Provinces compared	Councillor		MP		President	
	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values
Western and Nyanza	-7.52	*	-6.16	*	-6.59	*
Western and Nairobi	-4.19	*	-3.40	*	-4.16	*
Western and NEP	1.77		4.18	*	-0.29	
Nyanza and Nairobi	3.34	*	2.72	*	2.43	*
Nyanza and NEP	9.29	*	10.30	*	6.30	*
Nairobi and NEP	5.96	*	-7.58	*	-3.87	*

Key: *=p≤ 0.001

The results contained in Table 4.4c show that the influence of social bonds are significantly different between voters in the respective regions for all elective positions with two exceptions; these two are Western and NEP for both councillor and president in reference to which there are no significant differences in voting behaviour. Indeed, the lack of differences between voting behaviour for councillors and the presidency is affirmed by the very small differences of means in the two provinces. It was also hypothesized in this study that apart from provincial unit differences, constituencies will also

have a bearing on voting behaviour. The next section is dedicated to analyzing the confounding effect of constituency on the influence of social bonds in shaping voting behaviour.

A (ii) Constituency

Information contained in Table 4.5d indicates that voters in Ugenya constituency had the highest mean score for social bonds for the election of councillor, MP and president respectively followed by Starehe, Mbita and Langata . Note that Table 4.5d only highlights constituencies that posted significant trends. To this effect, Matungu and Dujis are left out.

Table 4.5d: Voter Mean Scores for Councillor, MP and President by Constituency

Constituency	**N**	**Councillor**		**MP**		**President**	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std Deviation
Ugenya		43.79	3.98	41.54	3.52	40.99	3.42
Mbita		35.07	7.60	35.07	7.73	34.70	9.12
Langata		34.84	4.27	33.94	4.63	33.24	4.69
Starehe		37.35	10.88	37.23	12.10	37.59	12.05
Total		37.76	6.68	36.95	7.00	36.63	7.33

There is greater voter consensus regarding voting behaviour in the choices of councillors, member of parliament and president in both Ugenya and Langata constituencies as attested to by the relatively small standard deviations. The

opposite is true of Mbita and Starehe constituencies where standard deviations are comparatively larger. There is greater cultural homogeneity in both constituencies, one being predominantly Jo-Ugenya (descendants of Ugenya); and the other being predominantly settled by Nilotic Luo and their Nubian kins. Interestingly, many Nubians in Langata are Dholuo speakers.

ANOVA tests were next conducted to find out whether or not constituency had a significant intervening influence on the way social bonds shape voting behaviour. The results presented in Table 4.5b indicate that constituencies of the sampled voters significantly influenced the way social bonds structure voting behaviour for all the three elective positions (all F-ratios are significant at 0.001 levels). This means that variations between constituencies are real and not spurious.

Table 4.5b: ANOVA Tests for Constituency and Voter Choices for the Three Elective Positions

	Councillor				**MP**				**President**			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between groups	11438.31	5	2287.66	45.75*	10494.91	5	2098	38.40*	7159.11	5	1431.82	23.62*
Within groups	29699.52	594	50.00		32467.08	594	54.66		36008.41	594	60.62	
Total	41137.83	599			42961.99	599			43167.52	599		

*$p \leq 0.001$

As was done in testing for differences between provinces, paired differences of means tests (t-tests) between the constituencies were performed to determine significant differences between any paired constituencies. The results of the t-tests are shown in Table 4.5c.

Table 4.5c: Tests of Differences between Means in Voter Behaviour for the Three Elective Positions by Constituency

Provinces compared	Councillor		MP		President	
	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values
Ugenya and Mbita	**8.72**	**	**6.47**	**	**6.29**	**
Ugenya and Lang'ata	**8.95**	**	**7.60**	**	**7.75**	**
Ugenya and Starehe	**6.44**	**	**4.31**	**	**3.40**	**
Mbita and Lang'ata	**0.23**	**N.S**	**1.13**	**N.S**	**1.46**	**N.S**
Mbita and Starehe	**-2.28**	*	**-2.16**	*	**-2.89**	*
Lang,ata and Starehe	**-2.51**	*	**-3.29**	*	**-4.35**	*

Key: *p≤ 0.05, ** p≤ 0.001

Social bonds exacted significant differences on voting behaviour regarding the three elective positions between all the constituencies except for Mbita and Starehe. But it must be remembered as averred to earlier in this study that these regions were delineated so as to attain some ethnic and/or clan homogeneity. Therefore, social bonds operating with such a social milieu might have a significant effect, especially in provinces like Luo Nyanza where there is near total language and cultural congruency among the inhabitants-*jokanyanam* (descendants of Nyanam).

The predominance of the social bond factors in Luo Nyanza perhaps explains why the region has consistently voted as a block since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. The observed trends in Nairobi can be

attributed to the retribalized pattern of politics in major towns which in turn reflect regions in Kenya (Richards, 1966). The next variable thought to have an intervening effect on the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour is ethnicity on which we turn to.

4.10.2 The Influence of Ethnicity /Clan

Apart from regionalism, ethnicity and/or clan, influence was expected to have a bearing on how the social bonds shape voting behaviour. This is because reviewed literature revealed that ethnicity or clanism is one of the most enduring and entrenched characteristics of Kenyan politics since independence in 1963 (Okumu, 1975:182; Oyugi, 1992:14; Muigai, 1995:161&387; Fish, 1997:2333; Oyugi, 1997; Ake, 2000:179; van Walraven & Thiriot 2002:70; Elischer, 2008:179). It was, therefore, hypothesized that while ethnicity will matter on presidential choices across the board and also on parliamentary positions in urban constituencies, clan was going to matter in rural constituencies.

Results in Table 4.6a indicate that voters' ethnicity or clan affiliations did not affect the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour for the election of councillor but did influence choice for MP and president. The mean responses for the intervening effect of ethnicity/clan and those that this factor did not intervene were virtually the same for the position of councillor but were markedly different for MP and president, most likely because these are the most crucial positions in the country's political profile. This partly

explains the ethnic base of parliamentary and presidential elections in Kenya especially in terms of party alignments (Chelang'a, Ndege et al., 2009).

Table 4.6a: Voter Behaviour Mean Scores for President, MP and Councillor

Influence of clan/ethnic group	N	Councillor		MP		President	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation
Yes No	226 374	35.50 35.53	8.90 7.91	35.14 34.38	9.04 8.11	35.77 34.36	8.77 8.28
Total	600	35.52	8.29	34.66	8.47	34.89	8.49

4.6b: Voter Behaviour Score for the Three Elective Positions (ANOVA)

	MP				President			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between groups	81.40	1	81.40	1.14	281.78	1	281.78	3.93*
Within groups	42880.59	598	71.70		42885.74	598	71.72	
Total	42961.99	599			43167.52	599		

*≤0.05

What remains to be explained is whether the differences between the two responses for member of parliament and president are significant.

Accordingly, ANOVA tests were carried out to determine whether or not one's ethnicity or clan had a significant intervening influence on relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour for positions of member of parliament and president. The ANOVA tests are reported in Table 4.6b. Ethnicity/clan significantly affected the influence of social bonds on voting behaviour for presidential candidates ($F=3.93;P=0.05;df=1$). This is in sync with findings of Chelang'a, Ndege et al., 2009 that revealed the extent of ethnic leverage in presidential elections between 1992 and (2002).

In 1992, President Moi was elected by 40 per cent vote and managed to get the mandatory 25 per cent votes in five provinces out of the eight provinces. But of importance to the current study is the fact that President Moi garnered 71 percent of the total votes cast in his home province of Rift Valley. The same scenario was repeated in 1997 when he got 69 per cent votes in Rift Valley while winning the national presidency with 42 per cent. It is also crucial to note that in 1992, the opposition big wigs led by Kenneth Matiba of FORD Asili and Oginga Odinga of FORD-Kenya just like Moi scored their highest per centage votes from their home provinces (where their own ethnic groups predominate). In 1997, President Kibaki got 89 per cent of votes cast in his home turf of Central Province, while the other presidential candidates in the race Michael Wamalwa, Raila Odinga, Charity Ngilu suffered the same fate. It is, therefore, prudent to agree with Oyugi's (1997) contention that ethnicity is a major intervening force in the process of structuring voting behaviour in

Kenya. The next demographic variable hypothesized to confound the influence of social bonds on voting behaviour was gender, which is our next attention.

4.10.3 Gender

Another demographic factor that reviewed literature indicates is of great influence in Kenya's politics is gender. In other words, the forces that shape the way females and males vote may be quite different but crucial in understanding Kenyan politics especially the way social bonds shape voting behaviour. Hence, this study sought to determine the mediating influence of gender on the link between social bonds and voting behaviour. Information carried in Table 4.7a shows that males and female voters had almost the same mean score for social bonds for the election of councillor and member of parliament. In other words, gender does not make an intervening difference in the way social bonds structure voting behaviour for the election of these two elective positions.

Table 4.7a: Voter Behaviour Mean Scores for President, MP and Councillor

Gender of Respondents	N	Councillor		MP		President	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation
Male	316	35.27	7.89	34.44	8.19	34.18	8.38
Female	284	35.79	8.70	34.90	8.78	35.68	8.55
Total	600	35.52	8.27	34.66	8.47	34.89	8.49

Mean scores for females and males in respect to the position of president show a marked difference (1.50). ANOVA tests conducted to determine whether or not gender significantly intervened in the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour revealed that the differences were significant for all the three elective positions at 0.05 level of significance; councillor (F-058,P=0.45,df=1) , MP (F=0.44;P=0.50 df=1) and president (F =4.67 P=.03 df=1). Interestingly, women scored slightly higher than men.

Table 4.7b: Voter Behaviour Score for the Three Elective Positions (ANOVA)

	Councillor				**MP**				**President**			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between Groups	39.91	1	39.91	0.58	31.48	1	31.48	0.44	334.60	1	334.60	4.67
Within Groups	41097.92	598	68.73		42930.52	598	71.80		42832.92	598	71.63	
Total	41137.83	599			42961.99	599			43167.52	599		

The ANOVA result confirms that gender makes a significant intervening difference in the way social bonds influence voters' voting behaviour for the election of president. It is important to note that women scored slightly higher than men, meaning that social bonds have a stronger influence on women's voting behaviour than on men. In essence, women seem to be more mobilized voters in the sense that they are more susceptible to the influence of culture and the social structure dictates that eventually define social bonds. Apart

from gender, age was thought to be an important factor in shaping voting behaviour and was consequently included for analysis. This is the subject of the next section.

4.10.4 Age

It was hypothesized that age has a mediating influence in the way voting behaviour is structured. Research results contained in Table 4.8a show that age had a stranglehold on the Kenyan voter across generations. The information in the table indicates that voters within the birth cohort (1962 or earlier) had the highest score for the way social bonds structured voting behaviour for the election of the councillor and president while for the position of MP, it is birth cohort 1983 or after (34.88) followed by birth cohort 1963 -1982. Thus, birth cohorts show generational differences in voting behaviour, perhaps because of experiencing different historical events that shape their political perceptions along different lines. The older generation political socialization may be more inward and community-oriented, given the nature of colonial and immediate post-colonial society that were less cosmopolitan thus also affecting political socialisation. While the younger Kenyan generation may have experienced more of cosmopolitan life and may also have a broader view of life because of their higher levels of educational attainment.

Table 4.8a: Voter Behaviour Mean Scores for President, MP and Councillor

Birth cohorts	N	Councillor		MP		President	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation
1962-or earlier	126	36.30	7.82	34.39	7.65	35.89	7.38
1963-1982	336	35.66	8.11	34.68	8.47	34.75	8.69
1983- & After	138	34.46	9.04	34.88	9.21	34.31	8.93
Total	600	35.52	8.29	34.66	8.47	34.89	8.49

Next, it was appropriate to conduct ANOVA tests to find out whether or not birth cohorts had a significant mediating influence on the interaction between social bonds and voting behaviour for the three elective positions. The results of ANOVA tests shown in Table 4.8b reveal that birth cohorts did not significantly mediate the interface between social bonds and voting behaviour.

Table 4.8b: ANOVA for Birth Cohorts and Voter Behaviour Score for the Three Elective Positions

	Councillor				MP				President			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between groups	0.10	1	0.10	0.001	81.40	1	81.40	1.14	281.78	1	281.78	3.93
Within groups	41137.73	598	68.79		42880.59	598	71.70		42885.74	598	71.72	
Total	41137.83	599			42961.99	599			43167.52	599		

Next, a paired difference of means test (t-test) between the birth cohorts was performed to determine whether there existed any significant differences in the way this variable modifies the influence of social bonds on voting behaviour. The study findings shown in Table 4.8c reveal that birth cohorts do not significantly modify the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour. This finding is in tandem with earlier findings in this study which revealed that voter behaviour in Kenya is more often than not structured by immutable primordial factors. That means age might not manage to significantly intervene (Kagwanja, 2006).

Table 4.8c: Tests of Differences Between Means in Voter Choices for the Three Elective Positions by Age

Age cohorts compared	**Councillor**		**MP**		**President**	
	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values
1962 or Earlier & 1963-82	**0.64**		**0.27**		**1.15**	
1962 or Earlier &1983 or Later	**1.85**		**0.50**		**1.59**	
1963-82 & 1983 or Later	**1.20**		**0.21**		**0.44**	

The other variable whose intervention was considered in this study is religion and the next section is dedicated to its analysis.

4.10.5 Religion

The founding father of the republic of Kenya, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta once assigned the Church a crucial political duty by declaring that the Church is the conscience of society (Sabar-Friedman, 1995:429). That means that the

political leader of the country had realized the mobilizing capacity that the Church wielded and that if utilised might have an impact on the politics of Kenya. This impact is likely to be along the lines of constructing and structuring social identities and therefore, creating formidable interventions on the way social bonds within Kenyan society shape voting behaviour (La O, 2008:442). This sort of scenario is perfected in Senegal by the Parti Socialiste, which mobilizes votes along religious lines (Ake, 2000:170), Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, National Islamic Front in Sudan, Christian Democratic Party of South Africa and the banned Islamic Party of Kenya (Salih, 2009:33). It is within this logic that this research hypothesized that religion is a potential mediator between social bonds and voting behaviour.

Results in Table 4.9a reveal that Protestant voters had the highest mean score for the way social bonds structured voting behaviour for the three elective positions. Catholic voters closely followed. In contrast, Muslim respondents had relatively lower mean scores for all the three elective positions. Hence respondents of Christian faith exhibited a higher influence of social bonds in shaping voting behaviour during general elections. This is probably due to the fact that Christianity is not as cohesive as Islam in minimizing the influence of various social bonds. Essentially, this lack of cohesiveness among Christians can be attributed to the central tenets of Christianity especially the New Testament which emphasizes individuality in consonant with the liberal democracy central ideals of individual autonomy.

Table 4.9a: Voter Behaviour Mean Scores for President, MP and Councillor

Religion	N	Councillor		MP		President	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation
Protestant	379	37.03	8.27	36.46	8.38	36.18	8.83
Catholic	73	36.14	6.57	35.67	5.81	34.60	6.49
Muslim	148	31.34	7.68	29.55	7.76	31.71	7.62
Total	600	35.52	8.29	34.66	8.47	34.89	8.49

Following the above observations, ANOVA test was conducted to determine whether or not affiliation to Christianity or Islam significantly alters the influence of social bonds on voting behaviour. The results of ANOVA test shown in Table 4.9b indicate that religious affiliation of voters significantly modifies the link between social bonds and voting behaviour for all the three elective positions.

Table 4.9b: Voter Behaviour Score for the Three Elective Positions (ANOVA)

	Councillor				**MP**				**President**			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between groups	0.10	1	0.10	27.48*	81.40	1	81.40	40.81*	281.78	1	281.78	15.56*
Within groups	41137.73	598	68.79		42880.59	598	71.70		42885.74	598	71.72	
Total	41137.83	599			42961.99	599			43167.52	599		

* P< 0.001

To find out whether or not there is significant variations in the way different religious affiliations modified the link between social bonds and voting behaviour, paired difference of means test (t-test) was performed and the results are carried in Table 4.9c. The results reveal a significant variation. That is to say that religious affiliation is a very strong intervener on the way social bonds structure voting behaviour especially among Christians.

Table 4.9c: Tests of Differences Between Means in Voter Choices for the Three Elective Positions by Religious Organization

Religious organizations compared	**Councillor**		**MP**		**President**	
	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values
Protestant and Catholics	**0.89**		**0.79**		**1.58**	
Protestant and Muslims	**5.68**	**	**6.91**	**	**4.48**	**
Catholic and Muslims	**4.79**	**	**6.12**	**	**2.89**	*

*P<0.05; ** p< 0.001

The other variable whose intervention was considered in this study is Education and the next section is dedicated to its analysis.

4.10.6 Level of Education

Given that education's major mission is to emancipate its beneficiaries and place them on a rational plane of thinking, it has been claimed to help citizens absorb civic virtues such as tolerance and stable political identities more (Almond & Verba, 1965; Osei-Kwame & Achola, 1981; Achola, 1984; Osei-Kwame & Taylor, 1984; Dahl, 1992:48; Wanyande, 1998; Emler & Frazer, 1999:262-268; Wanyande, 2002). It is on the basis of this logic that this study sought to investigate whether respondents' educational attainment have a mediating role in the way social bonds influence voting behaviour for

the three elective positions in Kenya's general elections. Information carried in Table 4.10a indicates that respondents with university education had markedly higher mean scores in respect to the link between social bonds and voter behaviour for all the three elective positions. In contrast, respondents with no formal education posted the lowest intervening mean scores for the elective positions of councillor and Member of Parliament.

It would seem that education exerts little influence on the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour among those who least have it and the highest influence among those well-endowed with it. Ironically, primary level education more strongly modifies the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour than does secondary education. This finding is in agreement with Osi Kwame and Achola (1981:601) who found that the interconnectedness of social relations in the indigenes has also permeated the modern sectors so much that higher education is not enough intervention to modify social bonds influence on voting behaviour. But this is in contrast to Dahl's assertion that increasing formal education will automatically increase one's capacity to comprehend political issues (Dahl, 1992:50). But the finding also concurs with revelations elsewhere in this study that voting behaviour in Kenya like elsewhere in Africa is shaped by immutable primordial social bonds that education hardly alters in any significant way.

Table 4.10a: Voter Behaviour Mean Scores for President, MP and Councillor

Level of Education	N	Councillor		MP		President	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation
No Education	82	33.84	8.56	32.10	8.28	35.00	7.59
Primary Ed	201	36.31	7.08	35.00	7.24	35.14	6.96
Secondary Ed	299	35.35	8.81	34.50	9.07	34.39	9.44
University	18	37.06	9.87	37.33	9.73	39.83	10.09
Total	600	35.52	8.29	34.66	8.47	34.89	8.49

Given the distribution of the means of the various levels of educational categories carried in Table 4.10a, it was considered relevant to find out whether or not different educational levels significantly alter the influence of social bonds on voting behaviour. The results of ANOVA test, shown in Table 4.10b, revealed that the level of education of sampled voters does not significantly modify the link between social bonds and voting behaviour except for the elective position of MP. In essence, this means that the observed differences in voting behaviour between voters with different levels of education are minimal except for the position of MP.

4.10b: Voter Behaviour Score for the Three Elective Positions (ANOVA)

	Councillor				MP				President			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between groups	408.87	3	136.29	2.00	801.32	3	267.12	3.78*	529.21	3	176.40	2.45
Within groups	40728.96	596	68.34		42160.67	596	70.74		42638.31	596	71.54	
Total	41137.83	599			42961.99	599			43167.52	599		

*p<0.01

To establish whether or not variation in the level of education significantly modifies the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour for MP, a paired difference of means test (t-test) was conducted and the results are displayed in Table 4.10c. The results indicate that the way levels of education modify the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour differs significantly between those with no formal education and the rest of the informants with formal education.

Table 4.10c: Test of Differences Between Means in Voter Choices for the Three Elective Positions by Education

Educational levels compared	MP	
	Mean Differences	t-Values
No Education and Primary Education	-3.38	*
No Education and Secondary Education	-2.54	*
No Education and University	-5.22	*
Primary and Secondary Education	0.85	
Primary Education and University	-1.84	
Secondary Education and University	-2.69	

*p<0.05

The other factor hypothesized to modify the relationship between social bonds and voter behaviour was occupation. This variable is discussed in the next section**.**

4.10.7 Occupation

It is reasonable to expect types of occupations engaged in by respondents to differentially shape their voting behaviour. Claude Ake (2000) contends that peasant societies are predominantly communal, isolated, and mobilized during

election time by the elites for their own benefits as they compete for power. Thus, confirming that occupations affect voting behaviour. Therefore, it was decided in this study, to examine how occupations of respondents mediate the influence of social bonds and voting behaviours. Results contained in Table 4.11a indicate that respondents who were peasant farmers or pastoralists had markedly the highest mediating mean score for the way social bonds shaped voting behaviour for the three elective positions. Respondents in small and medium-size enterprises, those permanently employed and casuals cum housewives and students followed with little difference between them. It seems that peasant farmers and pastoralists are strongly influenced by social bonds in structuring their voting behaviour. This is probably due to the fact that their contextual experiences are specific and limited subjecting them to a high influence of the same social bonds.

Table 4.11a: Voter Behaviour Mean Scores

Occupation	N	Councillor		MP		President	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation
Peasant farming/ /pastoralism	231	36.93	8.01	36.19	7.40	35.84	7.62
SMEs	183	34.55	8.57	33.28	9.72	34.69	9.64
Permanently employment	116	34.62	8.86	33.91	8.93	33.66	9.25
Casual/ house wife/student	70	34.86	6.85	34.50	6.66	34.33	6.22
Total	600	35.52	8.29	34.86	8.47	34.89	8.49

From the distribution of the means of the various occupations shown in Table 4.11a, it was deemed appropriate to find out whether or not occupational variations significantly modified the manner in which social bonds structure voting behaviour for the three elective positions during general elections. The results of ANOVA test, shown in Table 4.11b, revealed that respondents' occupational variations significantly modify the link between social bonds and voting behaviour except for the election of president. This is to say that the observed differences in voting between various types of occupations are real and not a chance occurrence for both councillor and member of parliament.

4.11b: Voter Behaviour Score for the Three Elective Positions (ANOVA)

	Councillor				**MP**				**President**			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between groups	760.57	3	253.52	3.74*	952.32	3	317.44	4.50*	412.87	3	137.63	1.92
Within groups	40377.26	596	67.75		42009.68	596	70.49		42754.65	596	71.74	
Total	41137.83	599			42961.99	599			43167.52	599		

*p<0.05

From the observed results shown above, a paired difference of means test (t-test) was conducted to establish which occupational groups differ significantly in mediating the link between social bonds and behaviour. The results are carried in Table 4.11c and indicate that for positions of councillor and member

of parliament the mediating role of occupation differs significantly between peasant farming/pastoralist and SMEs on one hand and peasant farming/pastoralist and those in permanent employment on the other hand. Furthermore, peasant farmers/pastoralists and those in permanent employment differ significantly in their mediating role regarding the link between social bonds and voting behaviour for the election of president. Apart from the localized occupations of peasant farming and pastoralism being important anchors of social bonds shaping voting behaviour, the other occupations shown in the table play a far less discriminating role. Further analysis confirmed that respondents who were peasant farmers or pastoralists had lower levels of formal education than the other occupational groups. In this respect, the interactive impact of low levels of education and peasant farming or pastoralism renders those in their catchments strongly attached to social bonds as a shaper of voting behaviour.

Table 4.11c: Tests of Differences Between Means in Voter Choices for the Three Elective Positions by Occupation

Occupations compared	Councillor		MP		President	
	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values
Peasant farming /Pastoralism and SMEs	2.39	**	2.90	**	1.15	
Peasant farming /Pastoralism and Permanently employed	2.31	*	2.29	*	2.18	*
Peasant farming /Pastoralism and Casual worker/student/house wife	2.08		1.69		1.51	
SMEs and Permanently employed	0-.07		-62		1.03	
SMEs and Casual worker/student/house wife	0-.31		-1.22		0.36	
Permanently employed and Casual worker/student/house wife	0-.24		0-.60		0-67	

*<0.05, **<0.01

The next variable hypothesized to modify the relationship between social bonds and voter behaviour was income. We now turn to this variable in the next section.

4.10.8 Income

Income is a variable that influences people to behave differently depending on the level. In this respect, it was logical to find out the intervening role of income on the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour for the three elective positions investigated in this study. As with previous variables, the first step was to find out the mean intervening scores for different levels of income specified in this study. Evidence presented in Table 4.12a shows the obtained intervening means for the different income levels. Voters who earned less than Kshs.5, 000 per month had the highest mean intervening score for the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour for all the three elective positions shown in the table.

The next prominent intervening mean score was registered among respondents within Kshss.5001 -10000 monthly income bracket. Above the Kshss.10, 000 monthly incomes, the influence of social bonds weakens noticeably. It is interesting to note that for the position of all the three elective positions in this study, the influence of social bonds decreases with increase in income. In other words, the more the monthly income, the more independent voting behaviour is of the influence of social bonds. This is probably due to the fact that voters in higher income brackets have internalized the rational ethos inherent in the practice of liberal democracy.

Table 4. 12a: Voter Behaviour Mean Scores for President, MP and Councillor

Income in Kshs per months	N	Councillor		MP		President	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation
Below 5000	312	37.27	7.81	36.40	7.65	36.27	7.72
5001-10000	109	34.90	8.06	34.64	8.50	33.67	8.93
10,001-20,000	121	33.34	8.59	32.03	8.87	33.15	9.30
20,001-30,000	38	31.71	9.01	32.21	10.44	33.42	9.91
30,001 and above	20	32.00	6.94	28.20	5.97	33.25	6.29
Total	600	35.52	8.29	34.66	8.47	34.89	8.49

Given the above distribution of the intervening means associated with different levels of income, it was considered relevant to determine whether or not income differences of respondents significantly altered the link between social bonds and voting behaviour. The results of ANOVA test conducted to establish whether different income levels significantly modify social bonds-voting behaviour nexus are shown in Table 4.12b. The results confirmed that income differences of the voters significantly modify the link between social bonds and voting behaviour for all the three elective positions.

4.12b: Voter Behaviour Score for the Three Elective Positions (ANOVA)

	Councillor				MP				President			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between groups	2368.10	4	592.03	9.09*	2846.45	4	711.61	10.56*	1261.23	4	315.31	4.48
Within groups	38769.73	595	65.16		40115.55	595	67.42		41906.29	595	70.43	
Total	41137.83	599			42962.00	599			43167.52	599		

*p<0.001

To establish whether or not income variation categories differ significantly in the manner they modify the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour, a paired difference of means test (t-test) was conducted and the results are contained in Table 4.12c. The evidence confirmed that there is a significant difference for all the three elective positions at 0.05 level of significance. This result is in consonant with Claude Ake's assertion that poverty is the bane of democratization process in Africa (Ake, 1996) and also De La O (2008) assertion that income affects electoral politics.

Table 4.12c: Tests of Differences Between Means in Voter Choices for the Three Elective Positions by Income

Income Levels compared	Councillor		MP		President	
	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values
Below 5000 and 5001-10000	2.37		1.76		2.60	
Below 5000 and 10001-20000	3.93		4.37		3.12	
Below 5000 and 20001-30000	5.56		4.19		2.85	
Below 5000 and 30000+	5.27		8.20		3.02	
5001-10000 and 10001-20000	1.56		2.61		0.52	
5001-10000 and 20001-30000	3.91		2.43		0.25	
5001-10000 and 30000+	2.90		6.44		0.42	
10001-20000 and 20001-30000	1.63		-0.18		-0.27	
10001-20000 and 30000+	1.34		3.83		-0.10	
20001-30000 and 30000+	-0.29		4.01		0.17	

The last structural factor thought to modify the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour was marital status. This variable is discussed in the next section**.**

4.10.9 Marital Status

It was averred that marital status of voters has a bearing on their voting behaviour. Accordingly, this study sought to investigate the mediating role of marital status on the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour for all the three elective positions of councillor, member of parliament and president. Results contained in Table 4.13a indicate that married voters had the highest intervening mean score between social bonds and voting behaviour for of all the three elective positions. This can be explained by the fact that this

category of respondents is more settled in their respective communities and as such are more susceptible to the influence of social bonds in structuring their voting behaviour.

Table 4.13a: Voter Behaviour Mean Scores for President, MP and Councillor

Marital Status	N	Councillor		MP		President	
		Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation	Mean	Std deviation
Single	147	34.12	10.38	34.03	10.83	34.22	10.68
Married	429	36.08	7.58	34.95	7.65	35.28	7.73
Divorced	24	34.00	3.83	33.38	5.52	32.04	5.09
Total	600	35.52	8.29	34.66	8.47	34.89	8.49

Given the distribution of the means of the different marital statuses carried in Table 4.13a, it was deemed necessary to find out whether or not marital status significantly altered the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour. The results of ANOVA test shown in Table 4.13b reveal that marital status of the voters significantly modified the link between social bonds and voting behaviour for all the three elective positions. In essence, this means that the institution of marriage is a very strong social bond in

determining voter electoral calculus, especially among the married respondents.

Table 4.13b: Voter Behaviour Score for the Three Elective Positions (ANOVA)

	Councillor				**MP**				**President**			
	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F
Between groups	480.66	2	240.33	3.53*	133.57	2	66.78	0.93	323.43	2	161.71	2.25
Within groups	40657.18	597	68.10		42828.43	597	71.74		42844.09	597	71.77	
Total	41137.83	599			42961.99	599			43167.52	599		

*p<0.05

Given that marital status significantly modifies the link between social bonds and voting behaviour for the position of councillor, a paired difference of means test (t-test) was conducted to determine which types of marital status significantly modified the link between social bonds and voting behaviour. The results carried in Table 4.13c confirm that the influence of social bonds on voting behaviour significantly differs between single and married respondents regarding voting for a councillor. In other words, social bonds exert less influence on single respondents relative to married respondents in shaping their voting behaviour for the position of councillors. This can be explained from the perspective that single respondents have less attachment to social

bonds due largely to their younger age or probably that they live outside family circles.

Table 4.13c: Tests of Differences Between Means in Voter Choices for the Three Elective Positions by Marital Status

Marital Status Compared	Councillor		MP		President	
	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values	Mean Differences	t-Values
Single and married	-1.97	*	-0.92		-1.05	
Single and divorced	0.12		0.66		2.18	
Married and divorced	2.08		1.58		3.23	

*p<0.05

In the next section, we present regression analysis performed on those variables that appeared significant. The essence of this exercise was to identify the best predictor variables for voting behaviour.

4.11: Critical Predictors of Voting Behaviour

What may be of great interest to scholars of voting behaviour in Africa and Kenya in particular is the relative contribution of each variable to predicting voting behaviour. Such information can inform advocates of democracy to pay close attention to contexts or variables that facilitate or hinder the development of liberal political democracy in a polity like Kenya**.** In other words, civic education programmes meant to inculcate liberal democratic ethos among citizens should be in a position to incorporate into the content of

civic education curriculum factors that highlight hindrances and/or facilitators of a liberal democratic culture**.**

Based on the above rationale of highlighting factors that promote and also those that undermine civic competencies, an effort was made in this study to establish the relative importance of a number of the social bonds in predicting voting behaviour with respect to the three elective positions discussed by this study. A first step in this process involved the selection of those social bonds that were significantly related to voting behaviour in respect of each elective position. The social bonds that met this criterion were subjected to Multiple Linear Regression analysis using SPSS software. Multiple Linear Regression analysis is a robust statistical technique employed to understand the functional relationship between the interaction of dependant and independent variables so as to authoritatively predict or estimate the behaviour of the dependent variable in this case voting behaviour.

Table 4.14 carries the results of linear multiple regression analysis involving the identified significant variables structuring voting behaviour for councillor, member of parliament and president. A number of interesting patterns emerge from the results. To begin with, the home region of a candidate is the leading predictor of voting behaviour in the choice of councillor, member of parliament and president. This result confirms the Kenyan voters' strong attachment to the notion of "home district". For positions of councillor and member of parliament, homeland or territorial bonds play out in the form of province and constituency. This is in common with the arguments of (Rutten,

Mazrui et al., and 2001:11) that socio-economic differentiations in colonial and post-colonial Kenya are regional and ethnic in character. This kind of scenario is detrimental to the development of a liberal democratic political culture and it is the cost Kenya has had to pay for basing representation to these two positions on primordial ties rather than on cross-cutting concerns and interests. As for the position of presidency, the strong predictive function of province is in fact a surrogate for ethnicity. It is common knowledge that many of Kenya's provinces coincide with specific hegemonic ethnic groups. These hegemonic ethnic groups have historically been exploited in establishment of political parties and distribution of strategic national resources. The loud result has heightened ethnic identity at the expense of national consciousness.

Furthermore, the results in Table 4.14 reveal that religion is the third most important predictor of voting behaviour after both province and constituency. Indeed, it is a significant predictor for all the three elective positions shown in the table. What these results suggest is pervasive influence of religion in shaping voting behaviour largely along the two dominant religious denominations in Kenya, namely; Christianity and Islam. There is *prima facie* evidence that where either of these religions is dominant, a candidate professing the alternative religion has potentially minimal chances to be elected. Essentially, therefore, political representation at the level of councillor, member of parliament and president will follow dominant religious patterns in the various electoral boundaries. Within this context, election of

Kenya's president will for the foreseeable future favour a Christian candidate. Given that Kenya's population is dominantly Christian with a Muslim population standing at 11.21 per cent (KNBS, 2010:396).

Indeed, the results pertaining to religion point to a serious conundrum, namely; how to subordinate entrenched religious values and beliefs to liberal democratic tenets of tolerance and accommodation. There is, therefore, a challenge to overcome these apparent polarising religious dogmas in order to facilitate adoption of shared democratic values.

Table 4.14: Standardized Regression Coefficients of Selected Predictor Variables for the Three Elective Positions

Predictor Variable	Councillor	MP	President
	Beta	Beta	Beta
Province	0.82***	0.52*	0.45**
Constituency	-0.72***	-0.47**	-0.33
Religion	-0.33***	-0.31***	0.28*
Occupation	-0.04	-0.04	-
Income	-0.15**	-0.18***	-0.11
Marital Status	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
Ethnicity/Clan	-	-0.06	-0.07
Level of Education	-	0.11	-
Gender	-	-	-0.07***
Multiple R	0.39	0.41	0.31
Multiple R^2	0.15	0.16	0.09

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Results in Table 4.14 also revealed that income is an important predictor of voting behaviour for the election of councillor and member of parliament. The result seems to reiterate the fact that one's financial circumstance is a crucial variable in shaping voting behaviour. This is in sync with Kenya's electoral history since independence where money plays a pivotal role in outcomes of general elections. Therefore, these results point to the fact that political representation for these two elective positions are leveraged by the financial vulnerability of most of the voters.

This scenario whereby voters' financial circumstances influence their voting behaviour does not promote the development and consolidation of a liberal democratic culture in Kenya. Liberal democratic political culture rests on choice of leaders for political office largely on the basis of their positive character and the issues they espouse. Therefore, scholars and activists involved in the development of liberal democracy in Kenya should try to engage the citizens in values and virtues that privilege liberal democratic ideals against short-term financial gains that are not sustainable.

Finally, the evidence in Table 4.14 showed that among the sampled respondents, ethnicity or clan, education, occupation, marital status and gender were not important predictors of voting behaviour. This means that any civic education programme should pay more attention to the more significant predictors revealed above by this study.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This study examined the influence of various social bonds, and socio-demographic characteristics regarded as relevant in structuring voting behaviour during general elections in Kenya and the implications of such influence on the development and consolidation of liberal political democracy in the country. In the sections that follow, we highlight the major findings, draw conclusions and implications and end up with recommendations for policy, practice and further research.

5.1 Summary of Key Findings Related to Social Bonds

The results of this study were presented in chapter four. In section three of that chapter, it was established that the key **purposive social bonds** influencing voter behaviour for the three elective positions during general elections were; the political party of the candidate, mass media (radio, television, internet and mobile phone) candidate's religion and provincial administration institution.

In addition, the study examined the influence of **primordial bonds,** namely; wider family, ethnicity and clan on voting behaviour. All the three specified primordial bonds had a significant association with voting behaviour in respect to the elective positions of councillor, member of parliament and president.

Furthermore, the study examined the influence of candidate- specific socio-demographic characteristics on voting behaviour. These characteristics were candidate's age, family profile, wealth, associates, level of education, gender, clan or ethnicity and issues platform. All these characteristics were found to be significantly associated with voting behaviour for the three elective positions considered in this study.

The twelve social bonds and the extent of their influence on voting behaviour were converted into an aggregate variable for each of the three elective positions. As mentioned in the methodology, the 5-point Likert scale was converted into an interval level of measurement with the maximum score being 60 and minimum score being 5 in respect to each of the three elective positions. This therefore, gave an aggregate measure of association. It was, therefore, necessary to undertake ANOVA and test of difference between group means (t-test) to find out whether significant differences existed between groups belonging to different categories of the independent variable and which specific groups were significantly different, respectively.

5.2 Intervening Structural Factors Between Social Bonds and Voter Behaviour

Section four of Chapter Four addressed the structural factors confounding the influence of social bonds in structuring voting behaviour for all the three elective positions. The study sought to examine the intervening variables between social bonds and voter behaviour for the three elective positions of councillor, member of parliament and president. The variables considered

were both demographic and socio-economic, namely; region, ethnicity or clan, gender, age, religion, education, occupation, income and marital status. Findings of this study revealed that these variables differ in the extent to which they intervene on the structuring effect of social bonds on voting behaviour.

Though most of the factors included in the study did contribute to the explanation of the influence of social bonds in shaping voting behaviour, not all were significant. More so, certain variables that were found to be significant using ANOVA turned out to be insignificant in the linear regression analysis. The explanation for this is that relationships initially confirmed to be significant using ANOVA were most likely spurious in the sense that rigorous application of linear regression analysis invalidated their significance.

Linear regression analysis confirmed that three demographic factors that are the best predictors of voting behaviour in general elections for all the three elective positions are voters' province, constituency and religion in that descending order. Only income, among the socio-economic factors, was found to be a significant predictor of voter behaviour in reference to the elective positions of councillor and member of parliament.

5.3 Conclusions

The major conclusions of this study are presented by examining the outcome of each hypothesis in the order they were stated in Chapter One. The first hypothesis averred that:

The stronger one's loyalty to a purposive corporate actor, the more one would vote for the candidates it supports

The findings of this study confirmed that purposive corporate actors are relevant in attracting voters. Religion is a very salient factor shaping voting behaviour across the elective positions in general elections. Unfortunately, religion is a structural variable that is not easily amenable to policy input.

The second hypothesis stated that:

There is a strong congruence in voting for candidates among members of the wider family (kinship)

The study results revealed that voters' primordial ties shape their voting behaviours fundamentally. In a context such as Kenya where many citizens are excluded from membership of cross-cutting civic and professional associations, voter's wider family networks fill this vacuum. Hence, any study of voting behaviour in emerging democracies such as Kenya needs to pay special attention to voters' wider family solidarities and networks.

The third hypothesis stipulated that:

Candidates who originate from traditional leadership lineages are more likely to be elected than their colleagues from non-leadership lineages

The results in respect to this hypothesis showed that candidates' attributes such as inherited heritage (ascriptive status) are of central concern to voters. Therefore, sponsored and ascribed statuses of a candidate are of cardinal importance in shaping voting behaviour. Surprisingly, many contemporary Kenyan voters remain loyal to traditional notions of ascriptive leadership. Voters still strongly believe in patriarch-based ascription reminiscent of the Botswana BDP's democracy (Charlton, 1993: 332).

The fourth hypothesis proposed that:

Voters with high socio-economic profiles are more influenced by issue voting than those with low socio-economic profiles

Voters' socio-economic profiles, namely; education, occupation, income and marital status were hypothesized to intervene and influence voting behaviour. Of the four socio-economic factors considered in this study, education turned out to be unimportant as an intervening variable on the influence of social bonds in shaping voter behaviour. The implication is that differential educational attainment does not markedly undercut familial and other primary bonds among Kenyan voters. In other words, primary bonds remain strongly embedded among Kenyan voters with different levels of education.

It needs to note that while ANOVA and t-tests indicated that occupation, income and marital status were significant mediators between social bonds and voting behaviour, linear regression analysis revealed that income was the only socio-economic attribute that significantly predicted voting behaviour. Stated simply, people in different income levels, differentiate the types of candidates they vote for in Kenyan general elections. This lends credence to the popular notion that Kenya is slowly evolving into a class society. If this process is correct, it should facilitate Kenya's transition and consolidation into a mature liberal democracy.

This analysis revealed that the confounding significant predictors of voting behaviour were essentially demographic, namely; voters' region (province and constituency) and religious affiliation. Among the socio-economic factors considered in this study was only income that turned out to be a significant predictor of voting behaviour. It is persuasive to conclude that attachments to places of birth which reproduce kinship loyalties remain the most important predictors of voting behaviour in Kenya. Religious affiliation is also largely a locality specific attribute in the sense that there is geo-religious homogeneity among Kenya's populations. The implication is that a candidate professing an esoteric religion in a given region will face an uphill task in competing for an elective office.

5.4 Recommendations

This study, endeavourerd to examine voting behaviour in general elections in Kenya and its implications on the development of liberal political democracy.

Recommendations made here are derived from the key findings of this research. The impact of social bonds among other variables in shaping voting behaviour was given central consideration as evidenced by the preceding results, summaries, conclusions and implications. In light of the foregoing conclusions and implications, a number of recommendations suffice in order to social engineer the obtaining voting behaviour approximate to the demands of liberal democratic ideals. Accordingly, three sets of recommendations namely, those touching on policy, practice and those on indentified gaps on research are made in the sections that follow.

5.4.1 Policy Recommendations

Given that the Kenyan voter is strongly attached to purposive corporate social bonds such as political parties, instruments of mass media, government through provincial state operatives and religious affiliations of the candidate, it is recommended that:

i. A comprehensive legal framework for the operation of the Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission (IEBC), National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) and civil society organizations involved in civic education is put in place by the state. Enactment of such a legal framework will give these bodies statutory responsibilities to promote inter-ethnic accommodation, religious understanding and tolerance, distributive justice touching on resource allocation and re-allocation.

ii. The state through IEBC and KIE should develop a curriculum guide for voter education to help promote civic consciousness that privilege social diversity in the interest of national cohesion. This curriculum should be used by purposive social actors identified in this study as exacting influence on voting behaviour.

iii. Parliament should initiate a constitutional amendment in the electoral law to usher in proportional electoral system based on party lists with strict regulations as to the ethnic, gender, religious, geographical and other relevant composition of the party list.

5.4.2 Programmatic Recommendation

One of the key findings of this study is that the Kenyan voter is still fundamentally attached to primordial solidarities and networks. This is partly due to the dearth of strong civic associations. Accordingly, it is recommended that:

i. State organs such as IEBC and NCIC should make a deliberate and definite move to weaken the pervasive effects of kinship solidarities and networks through civic education using the educational system aimed at empowering Kenyan civic competencies and sense of civic consciousness. The content of such civic education should stress appreciation for group differences, social cohesion, national unity and consciousness.

ii. The finding that the Kenyan voter is very much loyal to ascriptive notions of power and leadership leads to the recommendation:

Governance and leadership content that stress merit and performance be incorporated into the formal education curriculum from an earlier stage of schooling. Religious institutions should also inculcate in the youth the importance of merit as the essence of leadership.

5.5 Further Research

Drawing from the findings of this study, a number of issues are recommended for further research. The pursuit of these issues may facilitate better and more effective intervention strategies in social engineering of voting behaviour for the development of liberal political democracy.

i. To build on the existing works, it is suggested that more studies be conducted on the implications of voting behaviour on the development of liberal political democracy, especially those incorporating other variables such as membership in voluntary associations, party membership recruitment procedures, political campaigns and exit polls.

ii. There is need to expand the sample to cover more counties of Kenya to find out the relationship between social bonds and voting behaviour.

iii. There is need to carry out further studies after the next five years to assess whether trends are changing with regard to political, social and legal environment in the context of the new Kenyan Constitution. This will be very handy in continuously updating our sociological understanding of the changing trends in the nature of voting behaviour. Such studies would also enable monitoring and identification of the direction in the development of liberal political democracy and provide insights for improvement.

iv. There is need for more investigations to document patterns of voter behaviour and their implications for the development of political liberal democracy in different countries of Africa. Studies of a comparative nature are highly recommended in this respect.

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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE

PART I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Date_____

1. Respondent number_____
2. Province_____
3. District_____
4. Constituency_____
5. Sex _____ Male/Female
6. Date of birth_____
7. Education :Standard/form _____
8. What is your main occupation (main source of livelihood)?
9. Marital status _____
10. Income per month in Kenya Shillings:

    Below 2000

    2,001 - 5,000

    5,001 - 10,000

    10,001 - 15,000

    15,000 - 20,000

    20,001 - 30,000

    30,000 - 50,000

    More Than 50,000

11. What is your religious denomination?
12. Which Kenyan language is your mother tongue?

PART II: Social Bonds

12a. Which is your clan; is it the dominant clan? If not which is the dominant clan?

13a Has any of your clan member been a candidate for a political office in a General

Election? Yes/No

13b If yes, which of the following offices did He/She ran for?

	1992	1997	2002	2007
President	-----	-----	----	------
Parliamentary	--------	------	------	------
Councillor	----------	------	-------	-------

13c Was she/he elected? Yes/ No

If yes indicate the offices for which he/she was elected?

	1992	1997	2002	2007
President	-----	-----	--------	---------
Parliamentary	--------	--------	----------	----------
Councillor	----------	----------	----------	----------

14a. Indicate the extent to which the factors listed usually influence your choice of councillorship candidate.

	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very little	Never
The candidates clan					
The family of the candidate C. Gender					
C: Issues					
C. Age					
C. Education					
C. Associates/friends					
Your own association/friends					
Your family members					
Party					
Money					
Intimidation					
Others (specify)					

14b. Indicate the extent to which the factors listed usually influence your choice of parliamentary candidate

	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very little	Never
The candidates clan					
The family of the candidate C. Gender					
C. Issues					
C. Age					
C. Education					
C. Associates/friends					
Your own association/friends					
Your family members					

Party					
Money					
intimidation					
Others (specify)					

14d Indicate the extent to which the factors listed usually influence your choice of President candidate

	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very little	Never
The candidates ethnicity					
The family of the candidate C. Gender					
C. Issues					
C. Age					
C. Education					
C. Associates/Friends					
Your own association/friends					
Your family members					
Party					
Money					
intimidation					
Others (specify)					

Part III: Purposive Corporate Actors

15a. Do you or your family own the following items.

(a) Radio - Yes/No

(b) T.V. - Yes/No

(c) Mobile. phone - Yes/No

(d) Internet services - Yes/No

(e) Newspapers -Yes/No

15b. How frequent do you use the above gadgets for political Information?

Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely

15C Indicate the extent to which Radio has influenced your vote for the candidates listed

Candidate	Very Much	Much	A little	Very little	Never
President					
Parliament					
Councillor					

15d Indicate the extent to which television has influenced your voting for the candidates listed.

Candidate	Very Much	Much	A little	Very little	Never
President					
Parliament					
Councillor					

15e Indicate the extent to which mobile phones have influenced your voting for the candidates listed.

Candidate	Very Much	Much	A little	Very little	Never
President					
Parliament					
Councillor					

15f Indicate the extent to which Internet has influenced your voting for the candidates listed.

Candidate	Very Much	Much	A little	Very little	Never
President					
Parliament					
Councillor					

16a Which was your political party in the following election:

Name of Political Party

1992 ----------

1997 ----------

2002 ----------

2007 ----------

16b If you did not belong to a political party, explain why?

16c(i) Apart from your political party, do you think other political parties are necessary? Yes---------- No----------

16C(ii) Please explain your answer to the above question.

17a To what extent did your local Chief or local administration influence your voting in the following elections.

Candidate	Very Much	Much	A little	Very little	Never
President					
Parliament					
Councillor					

18. Did your religious leader influence the way you voted in the elections? If so, indicate the extent:

Candidate	Very Much	Much	A little	Very little	Never
President					
Parliament					
Councillor					

APPENDIX 2: FOCUS GROUP DICUSSION INTERVIEW GUIDE

- How many of you have ever participated in general elections?
- How many participated in the 1992, 1997, 2002 or 2007?
- You participated in what capacity? Voter, candidate, campaigner or IEBC official
- As a voter, what are the factors that you think influenced the way you voted for Councillor, MP or President?
- How did the following influence your voting behaviour:
    - Political parties
    - Religious affiliation
    - Media(radio, TV, Mobile Phone, internet)
    - Gender of the candidate
    - Age of the candidate
    - Family of the candidate
    - Family of the voter
    - Associates of the candidate
    - Voters Associates
    - Candidates Agenda
    - Candidates wealth
    - Candidates education
    - Ethnicity and/or clanism
    - Etc

APPENDIX 3: SPSS OUTPUT

Oneway

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	WESTERN	100	31.9100	5.26105	.52611
	NYANZA	200	39.4300	7.46416	.52780
	NAIROBI	200	36.0950	8.33688	.58951
	NEP	100	30.1400	7.88685	.78869
	Total	600	35.5167	8.28719	.33832
Voter behaviour scores for MP	WESTERN	100	32.1900	5.40238	.54024
	NYANZA	200	38.3050	6.81279	.48174
	NAIROBI	200	35.5850	9.28785	.65675
	NEP	100	28.0100	7.66007	.76601
	Total	600	34.6633	8.46894	.34574
Voter behaviour score for president	WESTERN	100	31.2600	5.80077	.58008
	NYANZA	200	37.8450	7.55821	.53445
	NAIROBI	200	35.4150	9.37401	.66284
	NEP	100	31.5500	8.25524	.82552
	Total	600	34.8883	8.48917	.34657

Descriptives

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	WESTERN	30.8661	32.9539	19.00	44.00
	NYANZA	38.3892	40.4708	16.00	57.00
	NAIROBI	34.9325	37.2575	15.00	60.00
	NEP	28.5751	31.7049	12.00	49.00
	Total	34.8522	36.1811	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		Sum of Square
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	7321.
	Within Groups	33816.
	Total	41137.
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	7860.
	Within Groups	35101.
	Total	42961.
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	4234.
	Within Groups	38932.
	Total	43167.

Voter behaviour scores for MP	WESTERN	31.1180	33.2620	19.00	43.00
	NYANZA	37.3550	39.2550	20.00	55.00
	NAIROBI	34.2899	36.8801	12.00	60.00
	NEP	26.4901	29.5299	12.00	46.00
	Total	33.9843	35.3423	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour score for president	WESTERN	30.1090	32.4110	20.00	51.00
	NYANZA	36.7911	38.8989	15.00	56.00
	NAIROBI	34.1079	36.7221	12.00	60.00
	NEP	29.9120	33.1880	12.00	49.00
	Total	34.2077	35.5690	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	43.012	.000
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	44.490	.000
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	21.609	.000

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) PROVINCE	(J) PROVINCE	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	WESTERN	NYANZA	-7.52000*	.92254	.000
		NAIROBI	-4.18500*	.92254	.000
		NEP	1.77000	1.06526	.097
	NYANZA	WESTERN	7.52000*	.92254	.000
		NAIROBI	3.33500*	.75325	.000
		NEP	9.29000*	.92254	.000
	NAIROBI	WESTERN	4.18500*	.92254	.000
		NYANZA	-3.33500*	.75325	.000
		NEP	5.95500*	.92254	.000
	NEP	WESTERN	-1.77000	1.06526	.097
		NYANZA	-9.29000*	.92254	.000
		NAIROBI	-5.95500*	.92254	.000
Voter behaviour scores for MP	WESTERN	NYANZA	-6.11500*	.93991	.000
		NAIROBI	-3.39500*	.93991	.000

		NEP	4.18000*	1.08531	.000
	NYANZA	WESTERN	6.11500*	.93991	.000
		NAIROBI	2.72000*	.76743	.000
		NEP	10.29500*	.93991	.000
	NAIROBI	WESTERN	3.39500*	.93991	.000
		NYANZA	-2.72000*	.76743	.000
		NEP	7.57500*	.93991	.000
	NEP	WESTERN	-4.18000*	1.08531	.000
		NYANZA	-10.29500*	.93991	.000
		NAIROBI	-7.57500*	.93991	.000
Voter behaviour score for president	WESTERN	NYANZA	-6.58500*	.98987	.000
		NAIROBI	-4.15500*	.98987	.000
		NEP	-.29000	1.14301	.800
	NYANZA	WESTERN	6.58500*	.98987	.000
		NAIROBI	2.43000*	.80823	.003
		NEP	6.29500*	.98987	.000
	NAIROBI	WESTERN	4.15500*	.98987	.000
		NYANZA	-2.43000*	.80823	.003
		NEP	3.86500*	.98987	.000
	NEP	WESTERN	.29000	1.14301	.800
		NYANZA	-6.29500*	.98987	.000
		NAIROBI	-3.86500*	.98987	.000

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

			95% Confidence Interval	
Dependent Variable	(I) PROVINCE	(J) PROVINCE	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	WESTERN	NYANZA	-9.3318	-5.7082
		NAIROBI	-5.9968	-2.3732
		NEP	-.3221	3.8621
	NYANZA	WESTERN	5.7082	9.3318
		NAIROBI	1.8556	4.8144
		NEP	7.4782	11.1018
	NAIROBI	WESTERN	2.3732	5.9968
		NYANZA	-4.8144	-1.8556
		NEP	4.1432	7.7668
	NEP	WESTERN	-3.8621	.3221
		NYANZA	-11.1018	-7.4782
		NAIROBI	-7.7668	-4.1432
Voter behaviour scores for MP	WESTERN	NYANZA	-7.9609	-4.2691
		NAIROBI	-5.2409	-1.5491
		NEP	2.0485	6.3115
	NYANZA	WESTERN	4.2691	7.9609
		NAIROBI	1.2128	4.2272
		NEP	8.4491	12.1409

	NAIROBI	WESTERN	1.5491	5.2409
		NYANZA	-4.2272	-1.2128
		NEP	5.7291	9.4209
	NEP	WESTERN	-6.3115	-2.0485
		NYANZA	-12.1409	-8.4491
		NAIROBI	-9.4209	-5.7291
Voter behaviour score for president	WESTERN	NYANZA	-8.5291	-4.6409
		NAIROBI	-6.0991	-2.2109
		NEP	-2.5348	1.9548
	NYANZA	WESTERN	4.6409	8.5291
		NAIROBI	.8427	4.0173
		NEP	4.3509	8.2391
	NAIROBI	WESTERN	2.2109	6.0991
		NYANZA	-4.0173	-.8427
		NEP	1.9209	5.8091
	NEP	WESTERN	-1.9548	2.5348
		NYANZA	-8.2391	-4.3509
		NAIROBI	-5.8091	-1.9209

Oneway

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	MATUNGU	100	31.9100	5.26105	.52611
	UGENYA	100	43.7900	3.97033	.39703
	MBITA	100	35.0700	7.60417	.76042
	LANGATA	100	34.8400	4.26809	.42681
	STAREHE	100	37.3500	10.87707	1.08771
	DUJIS	100	30.1400	7.88685	.78869
	Total	600	35.5167	8.28719	.33832
Voter behaviour scores for MP	MATUNGU	100	32.1900	5.40238	.54024
	UGENYA	100	41.5400	3.51740	.35174
	MBITA	100	35.0700	7.73194	.77319
	LANGATA	100	33.9400	4.63151	.46315
	STAREHE	100	37.2300	12.10297	1.21030
	DUJIS	100	28.0100	7.66007	.76601
	Total	600	34.6633	8.46894	.34574
Voter behaviour score for president	MATUNGU	100	31.2600	5.80077	.58008
	UGENYA	100	40.9900	3.42154	.34215
	MBITA	100	34.7000	9.11819	.91182
	LANGATA	100	33.2400	4.68852	.46885
	STAREHE	100	37.5900	12.04545	1.20454
	DUJIS	100	31.5500	8.25524	.82552
	Total	600	34.8883	8.48917	.34657

Descriptives

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	MATUNGU	30.8661	32.9539	19.00	44.00
	UGENYA	43.0022	44.5778	28.00	56.00
	MBITA	33.5612	36.5788	16.00	57.00
	LANGATA	33.9931	35.6869	24.00	44.00
	STAREHE	35.1918	39.5082	15.00	60.00
	DUJIS	28.5751	31.7049	12.00	49.00
	Total	34.8522	36.1811	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour scores for MP	MATUNGU	31.1180	33.2620	19.00	43.00
	UGENYA	40.8421	42.2379	31.00	51.00
	MBITA	33.5358	36.6042	20.00	55.00
	LANGATA	33.0210	34.8590	17.00	42.00
	STAREHE	34.8285	39.6315	12.00	60.00
	DUJIS	26.4901	29.5299	12.00	46.00
	Total	33.9843	35.3423	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour score for president	MATUNGU	30.1090	32.4110	20.00	51.00
	UGENYA	40.3111	41.6689	29.00	50.00
	MBITA	32.8908	36.5092	15.00	56.00
	LANGATA	32.3097	34.1703	21.00	46.00
	STAREHE	35.1999	39.9801	12.00	60.00
	DUJIS	29.9120	33.1880	12.00	49.00
	Total	34.2077	35.5690	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	11438.313	5	2287.663
	Within Groups	29699.520	594	49.999
	Total	41137.833	599	
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	10494.913	5	2098.983
	Within Groups	32467.080	594	54.658
	Total	42961.993	599	
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	7159.108	5	1431.822
	Within Groups	36008.410	594	60.620
	Total	43167.518	599	

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	45.754	.000
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	38.402	.000
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	23.620	.000

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) CONSTITUENCY	(J) CONSTITUENCY	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound	95% Confidence Interval Upper Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	MATUNGU	UGENYA	-11.88000*	.99999	.000	-13.8439	-9.9161
		MBITA	-3.16000*	.99999	.002	-5.1239	-1.1961
		LANGATA	-2.93000*	.99999	.004	-4.8939	-.9661
		STAREHE	-5.44000*	.99999	.000	-7.4039	-3.4761
		DUJIS	1.77000	.99999	.077	-.1939	3.7339
	UGENYA	MATUNGU	11.88000*	.99999	.000	9.9161	13.8439
		MBITA	8.72000*	.99999	.000	6.7561	10.6839
		LANGATA	8.95000*	.99999	.000	6.9861	10.9139
		STAREHE	6.44000*	.99999	.000	4.4761	8.4039
		DUJIS	13.65000*	.99999	.000	11.6861	15.6139
	MBITA	MATUNGU	3.16000*	.99999	.002	1.1961	5.1239
		UGENYA	-8.72000*	.99999	.000	-10.6839	-6.7561
		LANGATA	.23000	.99999	.818	-1.7339	2.1939
		STAREHE	-2.28000*	.99999	.023	-4.2439	-.3161
		DUJIS	4.93000*	.99999	.000	2.9661	6.8939
	LANGATA	MATUNGU	2.93000*	.99999	.004	.9661	4.8939
		UGENYA	-8.95000*	.99999	.000	-10.9139	-6.9861
		MBITA	-.23000	.99999	.818	-2.1939	1.7339
		STAREHE	-2.51000*	.99999	.012	-4.4739	-.5461
		DUJIS	4.70000*	.99999	.000	2.7361	6.6639
	STAREHE	MATUNGU	5.44000*	.99999	.000	3.4761	7.4039
		UGENYA	-6.44000*	.99999	.000	-8.4039	-4.4761
		MBITA	2.28000*	.99999	.023	.3161	4.2439
		LANGATA	2.51000*	.99999	.012	.5461	4.4739
		DUJIS	7.21000*	.99999	.000	5.2461	9.1739
	DUJIS	MATUNGU	-1.77000	.99999	.077	-3.7339	.1939
		UGENYA	-13.65000*	.99999	.000	-15.6139	-11.6861
		MBITA	-4.93000*	.99999	.000	-6.8939	-2.9661
		LANGATA	-4.70000*	.99999	.000	-6.6639	-2.7361
		STAREHE	-7.21000*	.99999	.000	-9.1739	-5.2461
Voter behaviour scores for MP	MATUNGU	UGENYA	-9.35000*	1.04555	.000	-11.4034	-7.2966
		MBITA	-2.88000*	1.04555	.006	-4.9334	-.8266
		LANGATA	-1.75000	1.04555	.095	-3.8034	.3034
		STAREHE	-5.04000*	1.04555	.000	-7.0934	-2.9866
		DUJIS	4.18000*	1.04555	.000	2.1266	6.2334
	UGENYA	MATUNGU	9.35000*	1.04555	.000	7.2966	11.4034
		MBITA	6.47000*	1.04555	.000	4.4166	8.5234
		LANGATA	7.60000*	1.04555	.000	5.5466	9.6534
		STAREHE	4.31000*	1.04555	.000	2.2566	6.3634

		DUJIS	13.53000*	1.04555	.000	11.4766	15.5834
	MBITA	MATUNGU	2.88000*	1.04555	.006	.8266	4.9334
		UGENYA	-6.47000*	1.04555	.000	-8.5234	-4.4166
		LANGATA	1.13000	1.04555	.280	-.9234	3.1834
		STAREHE	-2.16000*	1.04555	.039	-4.2134	-.1066
		DUJIS	7.06000*	1.04555	.000	5.0066	9.1134
	LANGATA	MATUNGU	1.75000	1.04555	.095	-.3034	3.8034
		UGENYA	-7.60000*	1.04555	.000	-9.6534	-5.5466
		MBITA	-1.13000	1.04555	.280	-3.1834	.9234
		STAREHE	-3.29000*	1.04555	.002	-5.3434	-1.2366
		DUJIS	5.93000*	1.04555	.000	3.8766	7.9834
	STAREHE	MATUNGU	5.04000*	1.04555	.000	2.9866	7.0934
		UGENYA	-4.31000*	1.04555	.000	-6.3634	-2.2566
		MBITA	2.16000*	1.04555	.039	.1066	4.2134
		LANGATA	3.29000*	1.04555	.002	1.2366	5.3434
		DUJIS	9.22000*	1.04555	.000	7.1666	11.2734
	DUJIS	MATUNGU	-4.18000*	1.04555	.000	-6.2334	-2.1266
		UGENYA	-13.53000*	1.04555	.000	-15.5834	-11.4766
		MBITA	-7.06000*	1.04555	.000	-9.1134	-5.0066
		LANGATA	-5.93000*	1.04555	.000	-7.9834	-3.8766
		STAREHE	-9.22000*	1.04555	.000	-11.2734	-7.1666
Voter behaviour score for president	MATUNGU	UGENYA	-9.73000*	1.10109	.000	-11.8925	-7.5675
		MBITA	-3.44000*	1.10109	.002	-5.6025	-1.2775
		LANGATA	-1.98000	1.10109	.073	-4.1425	.1825
		STAREHE	-6.33000*	1.10109	.000	-8.4925	-4.1675
		DUJIS	-.29000	1.10109	.792	-2.4525	1.8725
	UGENYA	MATUNGU	9.73000*	1.10109	.000	7.5675	11.8925
		MBITA	6.29000*	1.10109	.000	4.1275	8.4525
		LANGATA	7.75000*	1.10109	.000	5.5875	9.9125
		STAREHE	3.40000*	1.10109	.002	1.2375	5.5625
		DUJIS	9.44000*	1.10109	.000	7.2775	11.6025
	MBITA	MATUNGU	3.44000*	1.10109	.002	1.2775	5.6025
		UGENYA	-6.29000*	1.10109	.000	-8.4525	-4.1275
		LANGATA	1.46000	1.10109	.185	-.7025	3.6225
		STAREHE	-2.89000*	1.10109	.009	-5.0525	-.7275
		DUJIS	3.15000*	1.10109	.004	.9875	5.3125
	LANGATA	MATUNGU	1.98000	1.10109	.073	-.1825	4.1425
		UGENYA	-7.75000*	1.10109	.000	-9.9125	-5.5875
		MBITA	-1.46000	1.10109	.185	-3.6225	.7025
		STAREHE	-4.35000*	1.10109	.000	-6.5125	-2.1875
		DUJIS	1.69000	1.10109	.125	-.4725	3.8525
	STAREHE	MATUNGU	6.33000*	1.10109	.000	4.1675	8.4925
		UGENYA	-3.40000*	1.10109	.002	-5.5625	-1.2375
		MBITA	2.89000*	1.10109	.009	.7275	5.0525
		LANGATA	4.35000*	1.10109	.000	2.1875	6.5125
		DUJIS	6.04000*	1.10109	.000	3.8775	8.2025
	DUJIS	MATUNGU	.29000	1.10109	.792	-1.8725	2.4525
		UGENYA	-9.44000*	1.10109	.000	-11.6025	-7.2775
		MBITA	-3.15000*	1.10109	.004	-5.3125	-.9875

	LANGATA	-1.69000	1.10109	.125	-3.8525	.4725
	STAREHE	-6.04000*	1.10109	.000	-8.2025	-3.8775

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Oneway

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	YES	226	35.5000	8.89856	.59192
	NO	374	35.5267	7.90717	.40887
	Total	600	35.5167	8.28719	.33832
Voter behaviour scores for MP	YES	226	35.1372	9.03739	.60116
	NO	374	34.3770	8.10518	.41911
	Total	600	34.6633	8.46894	.34574
Voter behaviour score for president	YES	226	35.7699	8.77117	.58345
	NO	374	34.3556	8.28055	.42818
	Total	600	34.8883	8.48917	.34657

Descriptives

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	YES	34.3336	36.6664	12.00	60.00
	NO	34.7228	36.3307	15.00	60.00
	Total	34.8522	36.1811	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour scores for MP	YES	33.9525	36.3218	12.00	60.00
	NO	33.5529	35.2011	12.00	60.00
	Total	33.9843	35.3423	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour score for president	YES	34.6202	36.9196	12.00	60.00
	NO	33.5137	35.1976	12.00	60.00
	Total	34.2077	35.5690	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	.101	1	.101
	Within Groups	41137.733	598	68.792
	Total	41137.833	599	
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	81.403	1	81.403
	Within Groups	42880.590	598	71.707
	Total	42961.993	599	
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	281.780	1	281.780
	Within Groups	42885.739	598	71.715
	Total	43167.518	599	

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	.001	.969
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	1.135	.287
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	3.929	.048

Oneway

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	MALE	316	35.2722	7.89547	.44415
	FEMALE	284	35.7887	8.70833	.51674
	Total	600	35.5167	8.28719	.33832
Voter behaviour scores for MP	MALE	316	34.4462	8.18634	.46052
	FEMALE	284	34.9049	8.78089	.52105
	Total	600	34.6633	8.46894	.34574
Voter behaviour score for president	MALE	316	34.1804	8.38114	.47148
	FEMALE	284	35.6761	8.55376	.50757
	Total	600	34.8883	8.48917	.34657

Descriptives

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	MALE	34.3983	36.1460	12.00	60.00
	FEMALE	34.7716	36.8059	14.00	60.00
	Total	34.8522	36.1811	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour scores for MP	MALE	33.5401	35.3523	12.00	60.00
	FEMALE	33.8793	35.9306	12.00	60.00
	Total	33.9843	35.3423	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour score for president	MALE	33.2527	35.1080	12.00	60.00
	FEMALE	34.6770	36.6752	14.00	60.00
	Total	34.2077	35.5690	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	39.914	1	39.914
	Within Groups	41097.919	598	68.726
	Total	41137.833	599	
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	31.475	1	31.475
	Within Groups	42930.519	598	71.790
	Total	42961.993	599	
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	334.603	1	334.603
	Within Groups	42832.916	598	71.627
	Total	43167.518	599	

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	.581	.446
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	.438	.508
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	4.671	.031

Oneway

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	1962 or earlier	126	36.3016	7.82230	.69687
	1963-1982	336	35.6577	8.11588	.44276
	1983 or later	138	34.4565	9.03531	.76914
	Total	600	35.5167	8.28719	.33832
Voter behaviour scores for MP	1962 or earlier	126	34.3889	7.64510	.68108
	1963-1982	336	34.6756	8.46655	.46189
	1983 or later	138	34.8841	9.21208	.78418
	Total	600	34.6633	8.46894	.34574
Voter behaviour score for president	1962 or earlier	126	35.8968	7.37654	.65715
	1963-1982	336	34.7470	8.68512	.47381
	1983 or later	138	34.3116	8.92614	.75984
	Total	600	34.8883	8.48917	.34657

Descriptives

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	1962 or earlier	34.9224	37.6808	12.00	52.00
	1963-1982	34.7868	36.5287	14.00	56.00
	1983 or later	32.9356	35.9774	15.00	60.00
	Total	34.8522	36.1811	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour scores for MP	1962 or earlier	33.0409	35.7368	12.00	55.00
	1963-1982	33.7670	35.5842	12.00	56.00
	1983 or later	33.3334	36.4347	15.00	60.00
	Total	33.9843	35.3423	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour score for president	1962 or earlier	34.5962	37.1974	12.00	56.00
	1963-1982	33.8150	35.6790	12.00	59.00
	1983 or later	32.8091	35.8141	16.00	60.00
	Total	34.2077	35.5690	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	239.415	2	119.707
	Within Groups	40898.419	597	68.507
	Total	41137.833	599	
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	16.264	2	8.132
	Within Groups	42945.729	597	71.936
	Total	42961.993	599	
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	180.761	2	90.381
	Within Groups	42986.757	597	72.005
	Total	43167.518	599	

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	1.747	.175

Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	.113	.893
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	1.255	.286

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Year of Birth Recoded	(J) Year of Birth Recoded	Mean Difference (I-J)
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	.64385
		1983 or later	1.84507
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	-.64385
		1983 or later	1.20122
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	-1.84507
		1963-1982	-1.20122
Voter behaviour scores for MP	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	-.28671
		1983 or later	-.49517
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	.28671
		1983 or later	-.20846
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	.49517
		1963-1982	.20846
Voter behaviour score for president	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	1.14980
		1983 or later	1.58523
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	-1.14980
		1983 or later	.43543
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	-1.58523
		1963-1982	-.43543

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Year of Birth Recoded	(J) Year of Birth Recoded	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	.86463
		1983 or later	1.01987
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	.86463
		1983 or later	.83685
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	1.01987
		1963-1982	.83685
Voter behaviour scores for MP	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	.88601
		1983 or later	1.04508
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	.88601
		1983 or later	.85754
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	1.04508
		1963-1982	.85754
Voter behaviour score for president	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	.88643
		1983 or later	1.04558
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	.88643

		1983 or later	.85795
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	1.04558
		1963-1982	.85795

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Year of Birth Recoded	(J) Year of Birth Recoded	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	.457
		1983 or later	.071
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	.457
		1983 or later	.152
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	.071
		1963-1982	.152
Voter behaviour scores for MP	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	.746
		1983 or later	.636
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	.746
		1983 or later	.808
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	.636
		1963-1982	.808
Voter behaviour score for president	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	.195
		1983 or later	.130
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	.195
		1983 or later	.612
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	.130
		1963-1982	.612

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Year of Birth Recoded	(J) Year of Birth Recoded	95% Confidence Interval
			Lower Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	-1.0542
		1983 or later	-.1579
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	-2.3419
		1983 or later	-.4423
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	-3.8480
		1963-1982	-2.8447
Voter behaviour scores for MP	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	-2.0268
		1983 or later	-2.5477
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	-1.4534
		1983 or later	-1.8926
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	-1.5573
		1963-1982	-1.4757
Voter behaviour score for president	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	-.5911
		1983 or later	-.4682
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	-2.8907
		1983 or later	-1.2495
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	-3.6387

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Year of Birth Recoded	(J) Year of Birth Recoded	95% Confidence Interval
			Lower Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	-1.0542
		1983 or later	-.1579
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	-2.3419
		1983 or later	-.4423
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	-3.8480
		1963-1982	-2.8447
Voter behaviour scores for MP	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	-2.0268
		1983 or later	-2.5477
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	-1.4534
		1983 or later	-1.8926
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	-1.5573
		1963-1982	-1.4757
Voter behaviour score for president	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	-.5911
		1983 or later	-.4682
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	-2.8907
		1983 or later	-1.2495
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	-3.6387
		1963-1982	-2.1204

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Year of Birth Recoded	(J) Year of Birth Recoded	95% Confidence Interval
			Upper Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	2.3419
		1983 or later	3.8480
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	1.0542
		1983 or later	2.8447
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	.1579
		1963-1982	.4423
Voter behaviour scores for MP	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	1.4534
		1983 or later	1.5573
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	2.0268
		1983 or later	1.4757
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	2.5477
		1963-1982	1.8926
Voter behaviour score for president	1962 or earlier	1963-1982	2.8907
		1983 or later	3.6387
	1963-1982	1962 or earlier	.5911
		1983 or later	2.1204
	1983 or later	1962 or earlier	.4682
		1963-1982	1.2495

Oneway

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	PROTESTANT	379	37.0264	8.27499	.42506
	CATHOLIC	73	36.1370	6.57080	.76905
	MUSLIM	148	31.3446	7.68311	.63155
	Total	600	35.5167	8.28719	.33832
Voter behaviour scores for MP	PROTESTANT	379	36.4644	8.37675	.43029
	CATHOLIC	73	35.6712	5.80721	.67968
	MUSLIM	148	29.5541	7.75587	.63753
	Total	600	34.6633	8.46894	.34574
Voter behaviour score for president	PROTESTANT	379	36.1847	8.82863	.45350
	CATHOLIC	73	34.6027	6.48661	.75920
	MUSLIM	148	31.7095	7.62046	.62640
	Total	600	34.8883	8.48917	.34657

Descriptives

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	PROTESTANT	36.1906	37.8622	17.00	60.00
	CATHOLIC	34.6039	37.6701	16.00	48.00
	MUSLIM	30.0965	32.5927	12.00	49.00
	Total	34.8522	36.1811	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour scores for MP	PROTESTANT	35.6183	37.3104	12.00	60.00
	CATHOLIC	34.3163	37.0262	20.00	48.00
	MUSLIM	28.2941	30.8140	12.00	48.00
	Total	33.9843	35.3423	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour score for president	PROTESTANT	35.2930	37.0764	12.00	60.00
	CATHOLIC	33.0893	36.1162	15.00	50.00
	MUSLIM	30.4716	32.9474	12.00	50.00
	Total	34.2077	35.5690	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	3468.041	2	1734.021
	Within Groups	37669.792	597	63.098
	Total	41137.833	599	
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	5167.047	2	2583.524
	Within Groups	37794.946	597	63.308
	Total	42961.993	599	
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	2138.461	2	1069.230
	Within Groups	41029.057	597	68.725
	Total	43167.518	599	

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	27.481	.000

Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	40.809	.000
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	15.558	.000

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) RELIGION	(J) RELIGION	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	PROTESTANT	CATHOLIC	.88940	1.01531	.381
		MUSLIM	5.68179*	.76995	.000
	CATHOLIC	PROTESTANT	-.88940	1.01531	.381
		MUSLIM	4.79239*	1.13609	.000
	MUSLIM	PROTESTANT	-5.68179*	.76995	.000
		CATHOLIC	-4.79239*	1.13609	.000
Voter behaviour scores for MP	PROTESTANT	CATHOLIC	.79315	1.01699	.436
		MUSLIM	6.91033*	.77123	.000
	CATHOLIC	PROTESTANT	-.79315	1.01699	.436
		MUSLIM	6.11718*	1.13798	.000
	MUSLIM	PROTESTANT	-6.91033*	.77123	.000
		CATHOLIC	-6.11718*	1.13798	.000
Voter behaviour score for president	PROTESTANT	CATHOLIC	1.58196	1.05961	.136
		MUSLIM	4.47524*	.80355	.000
	CATHOLIC	PROTESTANT	-1.58196	1.05961	.136
		MUSLIM	2.89328*	1.18567	.015
	MUSLIM	PROTESTANT	-4.47524*	.80355	.000
		CATHOLIC	-2.89328*	1.18567	.015

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

			95% Confidence Interval	
Dependent Variable	(I) RELIGION	(J) RELIGION	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	PROTESTANT	CATHOLIC	-1.1046	2.8834
		MUSLIM	4.1696	7.1939
	CATHOLIC	PROTESTANT	-2.8834	1.1046
		MUSLIM	2.5612	7.0236
	MUSLIM	PROTESTANT	-7.1939	-4.1696
		CATHOLIC	-7.0236	-2.5612
Voter behaviour scores for MP	PROTESTANT	CATHOLIC	-1.2042	2.7905
		MUSLIM	5.3957	8.4250
	CATHOLIC	PROTESTANT	-2.7905	1.2042
		MUSLIM	3.8823	8.3521
	MUSLIM	PROTESTANT	-8.4250	-5.3957
		CATHOLIC	-8.3521	-3.8823
Voter behaviour score for president	PROTESTANT	CATHOLIC	-.4991	3.6630
		MUSLIM	2.8971	6.0534
	CATHOLIC	PROTESTANT	-3.6630	.4991

		MUSLIM	.5647	5.2219
	MUSLIM	PROTESTANT	-6.0534	-2.8971
		CATHOLIC	-5.2219	-.5647

Oneway

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	NO EDUCATION	82	33.8415	8.55840
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	201	36.3134	7.07999
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	299	35.3478	8.80700
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	18	37.0556	9.87255
	Total	600	35.5167	8.28719
Voter behaviour scores for MP	NO EDUCATION	82	32.1098	8.28058
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	201	35.4925	7.23956
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	299	34.6455	9.06990
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	18	37.3333	9.73169
	Total	600	34.6633	8.46894
Voter behaviour score for president	NO EDUCATION	82	35.0000	7.59142
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	201	35.1443	6.95659
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	299	34.3880	9.44091
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	18	39.8333	10.08931
	Total	600	34.8883	8.48917

Descriptives

			95% Confidence Interval for Mean	
		Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	NO EDUCATION	.94512	31.9610	35.7219
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	.49938	35.3287	37.2982
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	.50932	34.3455	36.3501
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	2.32698	32.1461	41.9651
	Total	.33832	34.8522	36.1811
Voter behaviour scores for MP	NO EDUCATION	.91444	30.2903	33.9292
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	.51064	34.4856	36.4995
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	.52453	33.6132	35.6777
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	2.29378	32.4939	42.1728
	Total	.34574	33.9843	35.3423
Voter behaviour score for president	NO EDUCATION	.83833	33.3320	36.6680
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	.49068	34.1767	36.1118
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	.54598	33.3135	35.4624
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	2.37807	34.8160	44.8506
	Total	.34657	34.2077	35.5690

Descriptives

		Minimum	Maximum
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	NO EDUCATION	12.00	49.00
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	15.00	52.00
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	15.00	60.00
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	19.00	55.00
	Total	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour scores for MP	NO EDUCATION	12.00	49.00
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	14.00	55.00
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	12.00	60.00
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	25.00	60.00
	Total	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour score for president	NO EDUCATION	12.00	48.00
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	14.00	56.00
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	12.00	60.00
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	22.00	60.00
	Total	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	408.870	3	136.290
	Within Groups	40728.963	596	68.337
	Total	41137.833	599	
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	801.321	3	267.107
	Within Groups	42160.672	596	70.739
	Total	42961.993	599	
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	529.206	3	176.402
	Within Groups	42638.313	596	71.541
	Total	43167.518	599	

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	1.994	.114
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	3.776	.011
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	2.466	.061

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) LEVEL OF	(J) LEVEL OF	

	EDUCATION	EDUCATION	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	NO EDUCATION	PRIMARY EDUCATION	-2.47197*	1.08322
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	-1.50636	1.03050
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-3.21409	2.15172
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	2.47197*	1.08322
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.96561	.75401
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-.74212	2.03384
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	1.50636	1.03050
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	-.96561	.75401
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-1.70773	2.00626
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	3.21409	2.15172
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.74212	2.03384
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	1.70773	2.00626
Voter behaviour scores for MP	NO EDUCATION	PRIMARY EDUCATION	-3.38278*	1.10209
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	-2.53573*	1.04846
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-5.22358*	2.18921
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	3.38278*	1.10209
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.84705	.76715
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-1.84080	2.06928
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	2.53573*	1.04846
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	-.84705	.76715
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-2.68785	2.04121
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	5.22358*	2.18921
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	1.84080	2.06928
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	2.68785	2.04121
Voter behaviour score for president	NO EDUCATION	PRIMARY EDUCATION	-.14428	1.10832
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.61204	1.05438
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-4.83333*	2.20158
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.14428	1.10832
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.75632	.77149
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-4.68905*	2.08096
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	-.61204	1.05438
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	-.75632	.77149
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-5.44537*	2.05274
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	4.83333*	2.20158
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	4.68905*	2.08096

		SECONDARY EDUCATION	5.44537*	2.05274

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) LEVEL OF EDUCATION	(J) LEVEL OF EDUCATION	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	NO EDUCATION	PRIMARY EDUCATION	.023	-4.5994
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.144	-3.5302
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	.136	-7.4400
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.023	.3446
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.201	-.5152
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	.715	-4.7365
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.144	-.5175
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.201	-2.4465
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	.395	-5.6479
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.136	-1.0118
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.715	-3.2522
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.395	-2.2325
Voter behaviour scores for MP	NO EDUCATION	PRIMARY EDUCATION	.002	-5.5472
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.016	-4.5948
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	.017	-9.5231
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.002	1.2183
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.270	-.6596
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	.374	-5.9048
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.016	.4766
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.270	-2.3537
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	.188	-6.6967
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.017	.9241
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.374	-2.2232
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.188	-1.3210
Voter behaviour score for president	NO EDUCATION	PRIMARY EDUCATION	.896	-2.3210
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.562	-1.4587
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	.029	-9.1571
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.896	-2.0324
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.327	-.7588

		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	.025	-8.7760
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.562	-2.6828
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.327	-2.2715
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	.008	-9.4769
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	.029	.5095
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.025	.6021
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.008	1.4139

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) LEVEL OF EDUCATION	(J) LEVEL OF EDUCATION	95% Confidence Interval
			Upper Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	NO EDUCATION	PRIMARY EDUCATION	-.3446
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	.5175
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	1.0118
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	4.5994
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	2.4465
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	3.2522
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	3.5302
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.5152
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	2.2325
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	7.4400
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	4.7365
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	5.6479
Voter behaviour scores for MP	NO EDUCATION	PRIMARY EDUCATION	-1.2183
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	-.4766
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-.9241
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	5.5472
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	2.3537
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	2.2232
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	4.5948
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.6596
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	1.3210
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	9.5231
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	5.9048

		SECONDARY EDUCATION	6.6967
Voter behaviour score for president	NO EDUCATION	PRIMARY EDUCATION	2.0324
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	2.6828
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-.5095
	PRIMARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	2.3210
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	2.2715
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-.6021
	SECONDARY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	1.4587
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	.7588
		UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	-1.4139
	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION	NO EDUCATION	9.1571
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	8.7760
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	9.4769

Oneway

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	SMALL SCALE FARMER	228	37.0658	7.92142
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	165	34.5333	8.61404
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	18	34.6667	8.36660
	PASTORALIST	3	27.0000	10.44031
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	116	34.6207	8.85600
	CASUAL WORKER	41	34.5122	5.08489
	STUDENT	11	35.0000	13.34166
	HOUSEWIFE	18	35.5556	4.90165
	Total	600	35.5167	8.28719
Voter behaviour scores for MP	SMALL SCALE FARMER	228	36.3640	7.24669
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	165	33.0424	9.97152
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	18	35.5000	6.76714
	PASTORALIST	3	22.6667	8.02081
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	116	33.9052	8.92673
	CASUAL WORKER	41	33.8537	4.53630
	STUDENT	11	36.9091	12.76287
	HOUSEWIFE	18	34.5000	5.55454
	Total	600	34.6633	8.46894
Voter behaviour score for president	SMALL SCALE FARMER	228	36.0307	7.45878
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	165	34.4909	9.81202
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	18	36.5000	7.84594
	PASTORALIST	3	21.0000	4.58258
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	116	33.6552	9.25024
	CASUAL WORKER	41	33.1951	5.56875
	STUDENT	11	38.2727	9.17705

	HOUSEWIFE	18	34.5000	4.64315
	Total	600	34.8883	8.48917

Descriptives

			95% Confidence Interval for Mean	
		Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	SMALL SCALE FARMER	.52461	36.0321	38.0995
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	.67060	33.2092	35.8575
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	1.97203	30.5061	38.8273
	PASTORALIST	6.02771	1.0648	52.9352
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	.82226	32.9920	36.2494
	CASUAL WORKER	.79413	32.9072	36.1172
	STUDENT	4.02266	26.0369	43.9631
	HOUSEWIFE	1.15533	33.1180	37.9931
	Total	.33832	34.8522	36.1811
Voter behaviour scores for MP	SMALL SCALE FARMER	.47992	35.4184	37.3097
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	.77628	31.5096	34.5752
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	1.59503	32.1348	38.8652
	PASTORALIST	4.63081	2.7419	42.5915
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	.82883	32.2634	35.5469
	CASUAL WORKER	.70845	32.4218	35.2855
	STUDENT	3.84815	28.3349	45.4833
	HOUSEWIFE	1.30922	31.7378	37.2622
	Total	.34574	33.9843	35.3423
Voter behaviour score for president	SMALL SCALE FARMER	.49397	35.0573	37.0041
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	.76387	32.9826	35.9992
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	1.84931	32.5983	40.4017
	PASTORALIST	2.64575	9.6163	32.3837
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	.85886	31.9539	35.3564
	CASUAL WORKER	.86969	31.4374	34.9528
	STUDENT	2.76698	32.1075	44.4380
	HOUSEWIFE	1.09440	32.1910	36.8090
	Total	.34657	34.2077	35.5690

Descriptives

		Minimum	Maximum
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	SMALL SCALE FARMER	12.00	57.00
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	14.00	60.00
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	16.00	44.00
	PASTORALIST	15.00	34.00
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	15.00	60.00
	CASUAL WORKER	21.00	44.00
	STUDENT	19.00	60.00
	HOUSEWIFE	28.00	43.00

	Total	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour scores for MP	SMALL SCALE FARMER	12.00	55.00
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	12.00	60.00
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	25.00	48.00
	PASTORALIST	15.00	31.00
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	14.00	60.00
	CASUAL WORKER	23.00	42.00
	STUDENT	19.00	60.00
	HOUSEWIFE	22.00	42.00
	Total	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour score for president	SMALL SCALE FARMER	12.00	56.00
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	12.00	60.00
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	24.00	52.00
	PASTORALIST	16.00	25.00
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	17.00	60.00
	CASUAL WORKER	21.00	46.00
	STUDENT	27.00	60.00
	HOUSEWIFE	29.00	45.00
	Total	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	1074.755	7	153.536
	Within Groups	40063.079	592	67.674
	Total	41137.833	599	
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	1686.851	7	240.979
	Within Groups	41275.143	592	69.722
	Total	42961.993	599	
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	1371.669	7	195.953
	Within Groups	41795.849	592	70.601
	Total	43167.518	599	

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) OCCUPATION	(J) OCCUPATION	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	SMALL SCALE FARMER	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	2.53246*	.84081	.003	.8811	4.1838
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	2.39912	2.01407	.234	-1.5565	6.3547
		PASTORALIST	10.06579*	4.78068	.036	.6766	19.4549
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	2.44510*	.93820	.009	.6025	4.2877
		CASUAL WORKER	2.55359	1.39549	.068	-.1871	5.2943
		STUDENT	2.06579	2.53949	.416	-2.9217	7.0533
		HOUSEWIFE	1.51023	2.01407	.454	-2.4454	5.4658
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-2.53246*	.84081	.003	-4.1838	-.8811
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-.13333	2.04201	.948	-4.1438	3.8771
		PASTORALIST	7.53333	4.79251	.117	-1.8791	16.9457
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	-.08736	.99677	.930	-2.0450	1.8703
		CASUAL WORKER	.02114	1.43553	.988	-2.7982	2.8405
		STUDENT	-.46667	2.56171	.856	-5.4978	4.5645
		HOUSEWIFE	-1.02222	2.04201	.617	-5.0327	2.9883
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-2.39912	2.01407	.234	-6.3547	1.5565
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	.13333	2.04201	.948	-3.8771	4.1438
		PASTORALIST	7.66667	5.13008	.136	-2.4087	17.7420
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	.04598	2.08400	.982	-4.0470	4.1389
		CASUAL WORKER	.15447	2.32600	.947	-4.4137	4.7227
		STUDENT	-.33333	3.14831	.916	-6.5166	5.8499
		HOUSEWIFE	-.88889	2.74214	.746	-6.2744	4.4966
	PASTORALIST	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-10.06579*	4.78068	.036	-19.4549	-.6766
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	-7.53333	4.79251	.117	-16.9457	1.8791
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-7.66667	5.13008	.136	-17.7420	2.4087
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	-7.62069	4.81055	.114	-17.0685	1.8271
		CASUAL WORKER	-7.51220	4.92023	.127	-17.1754	2.1510
		STUDENT	-8.00000	5.35819	.136	-18.5234	2.5234
		HOUSEWIFE	-8.55556	5.13008	.096	-18.6309	1.5198
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-2.44510*	.93820	.009	-4.2877	-.6025
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	.08736	.99677	.930	-1.8703	2.0450

		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-.04598	2.08400	.982	-4.1389	4.0470
		PASTORALIST	7.62069	4.81055	.114	-1.8271	17.0685
		CASUAL WORKER	.10849	1.49465	.942	-2.8270	3.0440
		STUDENT	-.37931	2.59530	.884	-5.4764	4.7178
		HOUSEWIFE	-.93487	2.08400	.654	-5.0278	3.1581
	CASUAL WORKER	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-2.55359	1.39549	.068	-5.2943	.1871
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	-.02114	1.43553	.988	-2.8405	2.7982
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-.15447	2.32600	.947	-4.7227	4.4137
		PASTORALIST	7.51220	4.92023	.127	-2.1510	17.1754
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	-.10849	1.49465	.942	-3.0440	2.8270
		STUDENT	-.48780	2.79335	.861	-5.9739	4.9983
		HOUSEWIFE	-1.04336	2.32600	.654	-5.6116	3.5248
	STUDENT	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-2.06579	2.53949	.416	-7.0533	2.9217
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	.46667	2.56171	.856	-4.5645	5.4978
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	.33333	3.14831	.916	-5.8499	6.5166
		PASTORALIST	8.00000	5.35819	.136	-2.5234	18.5234
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	.37931	2.59530	.884	-4.7178	5.4764
		CASUAL WORKER	.48780	2.79335	.861	-4.9983	5.9739
		HOUSEWIFE	-.55556	3.14831	.860	-6.7388	5.6277
	HOUSEWIFE	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-1.51023	2.01407	.454	-5.4658	2.4454
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	1.02222	2.04201	.617	-2.9883	5.0327
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	.88889	2.74214	.746	-4.4966	6.2744
		PASTORALIST	8.55556	5.13008	.096	-1.5198	18.6309
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	.93487	2.08400	.654	-3.1581	5.0278
		CASUAL WORKER	1.04336	2.32600	.654	-3.5248	5.6116
		STUDENT	.55556	3.14831	.860	-5.6277	6.7388
Voter behaviour scores for MP	SMALL SCALE FARMER	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	3.32161*	.85343	.000	1.6455	4.9977
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	.86404	2.04431	.673	-3.1510	4.8790
		PASTORALIST	13.69737*	4.85245	.005	4.1673	23.2275
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	2.45886*	.95228	.010	.5886	4.3291
		CASUAL WORKER	2.51038	1.41645	.077	-.2715	5.2922
		STUDENT	-.54506	2.57762	.833	-5.6074	4.5173
		HOUSEWIFE	1.86404	2.04431	.362	-2.1510	5.8790
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-3.32161*	.85343	.000	-4.9977	-1.6455
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-2.45758	2.07267	.236	-6.5283	1.6131
		PASTORALIST	10.37576*	4.86447	.033	.8220	19.9295
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	-.86275	1.01173	.394	-2.8498	1.1243
		CASUAL WORKER	-.81123	1.45708	.578	-3.6729	2.0504
		STUDENT	-3.86667	2.60017	.138	-8.9733	1.2400

		HOUSEWIFE	-1.45758	2.07267	.482	-5.5283	2.6131
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-.86404	2.04431	.673	-4.8790	3.1510
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	2.45758	2.07267	.236	-1.6131	6.5283
		PASTORALIST	12.83333*	5.20710	.014	2.6067	23.0600
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	1.59483	2.11529	.451	-2.5596	5.7492
		CASUAL WORKER	1.64634	2.36092	.486	-2.9905	6.2831
		STUDENT	-1.40909	3.19558	.659	-7.6851	4.8670
		HOUSEWIFE	1.00000	2.78331	.720	-4.4664	6.4664
	PASTORALIST	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-13.69737*	4.85245	.005	-23.2275	-4.1673
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	-10.37576*	4.86447	.033	-19.9295	-.8220
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-12.83333*	5.20710	.014	-23.0600	-2.6067
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	-11.23851*	4.88278	.022	-20.8282	-1.6488
		CASUAL WORKER	-11.18699*	4.99410	.025	-20.9953	-1.3787
		STUDENT	-14.24242*	5.43864	.009	-24.9238	-3.5610
		HOUSEWIFE	-11.83333*	5.20710	.023	-22.0600	-1.6067
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-2.45886*	.95228	.010	-4.3291	-.5886
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	.86275	1.01173	.394	-1.1243	2.8498
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-1.59483	2.11529	.451	-5.7492	2.5596
		PASTORALIST	11.23851*	4.88278	.022	1.6488	20.8282
		CASUAL WORKER	.05151	1.51709	.973	-2.9280	3.0311
		STUDENT	-3.00392	2.63427	.255	-8.1776	2.1697
		HOUSEWIFE	-.59483	2.11529	.779	-4.7492	3.5596
	CASUAL WORKER	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-2.51038	1.41645	.077	-5.2922	.2715
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	.81123	1.45708	.578	-2.0504	3.6729
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-1.64634	2.36092	.486	-6.2831	2.9905
		PASTORALIST	11.18699*	4.99410	.025	1.3787	20.9953
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	-.05151	1.51709	.973	-3.0311	2.9280
		STUDENT	-3.05543	2.83529	.282	-8.6239	2.5130
		HOUSEWIFE	-.64634	2.36092	.784	-5.2831	3.9905
	STUDENT	SMALL SCALE FARMER	.54506	2.57762	.833	-4.5173	5.6074
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	3.86667	2.60017	.138	-1.2400	8.9733
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	1.40909	3.19558	.659	-4.8670	7.6851
		PASTORALIST	14.24242*	5.43864	.009	3.5610	24.9238
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	3.00392	2.63427	.255	-2.1697	8.1776
		CASUAL WORKER	3.05543	2.83529	.282	-2.5130	8.6239
		HOUSEWIFE	2.40909	3.19558	.451	-3.8670	8.6851

	HOUSEWIFE	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-1.86404	2.04431	.362	-5.8790	2.1510
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	1.45758	2.07267	.482	-2.6131	5.5283
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-1.00000	2.78331	.720	-6.4664	4.4664
		PASTORALIST	11.83333*	5.20710	.023	1.6067	22.0600
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	.59483	2.11529	.779	-3.5596	4.7492
		CASUAL WORKER	.64634	2.36092	.784	-3.9905	5.2831
		STUDENT	-2.40909	3.19558	.451	-8.6851	3.8670
Voter behaviour score for president	SMALL SCALE FARMER	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	1.53979	.85880	.073	-.1469	3.2265
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-.46930	2.05717	.820	-4.5095	3.5709
		PASTORALIST	15.03070*	4.88297	.002	5.4407	24.6207
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	2.37553*	.95827	.013	.4935	4.2576
		CASUAL WORKER	2.83558*	1.42535	.047	.0362	5.6349
		STUDENT	-2.24203	2.59383	.388	-7.3362	2.8522
		HOUSEWIFE	1.53070	2.05717	.457	-2.5095	5.5709
	SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-1.53979	.85880	.073	-3.2265	.1469
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-2.00909	2.08571	.336	-6.1054	2.0872
		PASTORALIST	13.49091*	4.89506	.006	3.8771	23.1047
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	.83574	1.01809	.412	-1.1638	2.8353
		CASUAL WORKER	1.29579	1.46624	.377	-1.5839	4.1755
		STUDENT	-3.78182	2.61652	.149	-8.9206	1.3570
		HOUSEWIFE	-.00909	2.08571	.997	-4.1054	4.0872
	FISHERMAN/WOMAN	SMALL SCALE FARMER	.46930	2.05717	.820	-3.5709	4.5095
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	2.00909	2.08571	.336	-2.0872	6.1054
		PASTORALIST	15.50000*	5.23985	.003	5.2091	25.7909
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	2.84483	2.12859	.182	-1.3357	7.0253
		CASUAL WORKER	3.30488	2.37577	.165	-1.3611	7.9708
		STUDENT	-1.77273	3.21567	.582	-8.0882	4.5428
		HOUSEWIFE	2.00000	2.80082	.475	-3.5007	7.5007
	PASTORALIST	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-15.03070*	4.88297	.002	-24.6207	-5.4407
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	-13.49091*	4.89506	.006	-23.1047	-3.8771
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-15.50000*	5.23985	.003	-25.7909	-5.2091
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	-12.65517*	4.91348	.010	-22.3052	-3.0052
		CASUAL WORKER	-12.19512*	5.02550	.016	-22.0651	-2.3251
		STUDENT	-17.27273*	5.47284	.002	-28.0213	-6.5242
		HOUSEWIFE	-13.50000*	5.23985	.010	-23.7909	-3.2091
	PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-2.37553*	.95827	.013	-4.2576	-.4935

		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	-.83574	1.01809	.412	-2.8353	1.1638
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-2.84483	2.12859	.182	-7.0253	1.3357
		PASTORALIST	12.65517*	4.91348	.010	3.0052	22.3052
		CASUAL WORKER	.46005	1.52663	.763	-2.5382	3.4583
		STUDENT	-4.61755	2.65083	.082	-9.8237	.5886
		HOUSEWIFE	-.84483	2.12859	.692	-5.0253	3.3357
	CASUAL WORKER	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-2.83558*	1.42535	.047	-5.6349	-.0362
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	-1.29579	1.46624	.377	-4.1755	1.5839
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-3.30488	2.37577	.165	-7.9708	1.3611
		PASTORALIST	12.19512*	5.02550	.016	2.3251	22.0651
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	-.46005	1.52663	.763	-3.4583	2.5382
		STUDENT	-5.07761	2.85311	.076	-10.6811	.5259
		HOUSEWIFE	-1.30488	2.37577	.583	-5.9708	3.3611
	STUDENT	SMALL SCALE FARMER	2.24203	2.59383	.388	-2.8522	7.3362
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	3.78182	2.61652	.149	-1.3570	8.9206
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	1.77273	3.21567	.582	-4.5428	8.0882
		PASTORALIST	17.27273*	5.47284	.002	6.5242	28.0213
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	4.61755	2.65083	.082	-.5886	9.8237
		CASUAL WORKER	5.07761	2.85311	.076	-.5259	10.6811
		HOUSEWIFE	3.77273	3.21567	.241	-2.5428	10.0882
	HOUSEWIFE	SMALL SCALE FARMER	-1.53070	2.05717	.457	-5.5709	2.5095
		SMALL SCALE BUSINESSPERSON	.00909	2.08571	.997	-4.0872	4.1054
		FISHERMAN/WOMAN	-2.00000	2.80082	.475	-7.5007	3.5007
		PASTORALIST	13.50000*	5.23985	.010	3.2091	23.7909
		PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED	.84483	2.12859	.692	-3.3357	5.0253
		CASUAL WORKER	1.30488	2.37577	.583	-3.3611	5.9708
		STUDENT	-3.77273	3.21567	.241	-10.0882	2.5428

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	2.269	.028
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	3.456	.001
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	2.775	.008

Post Hoc Tests

Oneway

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	SINGLE	147	34.1156	10.38012	.85614
	MARRIED	429	36.0816	7.57951	.36594
	DIVORCED	24	34.0000	3.83349	.78251
	Total	600	35.5167	8.28719	.33832
Voter behaviour scores for MP	SINGLE	147	34.0340	10.82515	.89284
	MARRIED	429	34.9510	7.64547	.36913
	DIVORCED	24	33.3750	5.52317	1.12741
	Total	600	34.6633	8.46894	.34574
Voter behaviour score for president	SINGLE	147	34.2245	10.68336	.88115
	MARRIED	429	35.2751	7.73171	.37329
	DIVORCED	24	32.0417	5.08604	1.03818
	Total	600	34.8883	8.48917	.34657

Descriptives

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	SINGLE	32.4236	35.8077	14.00	60.00
	MARRIED	35.3623	36.8009	12.00	56.00
	DIVORCED	32.3813	35.6187	24.00	41.00
	Total	34.8522	36.1811	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour scores for MP	SINGLE	32.2694	35.7986	15.00	60.00
	MARRIED	34.2255	35.6766	12.00	55.00
	DIVORCED	31.0428	35.7072	23.00	42.00
	Total	33.9843	35.3423	12.00	60.00
Voter behaviour score for president	SINGLE	32.4830	35.9659	12.00	60.00
	MARRIED	34.5413	36.0088	12.00	56.00
	DIVORCED	29.8940	34.1893	21.00	41.00
	Total	34.2077	35.5690	12.00	60.00

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	480.655	2	240.327
	Within Groups	40657.179	597	68.102
	Total	41137.833	599	
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	133.566	2	66.783
	Within Groups	42828.427	597	71.739
	Total	42961.993	599	
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	323.425	2	161.713
	Within Groups	42844.093	597	71.766
	Total	43167.518	599	

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	Between Groups	3.529	.030
Voter behaviour scores for MP	Between Groups	.931	.395
Voter behaviour score for president	Between Groups	2.253	.106

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) MARITAL STATUS	(J) MARITAL STATUS	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	SINGLE	MARRIED	-1.96594*	.78869
		DIVORCED	.11565	1.81683
	MARRIED	SINGLE	1.96594*	.78869
		DIVORCED	2.08159	1.73100
	DIVORCED	SINGLE	-.11565	1.81683
		MARRIED	-2.08159	1.73100
Voter behaviour scores for MP	SINGLE	MARRIED	-.91704	.80947
		DIVORCED	.65901	1.86472
	MARRIED	SINGLE	.91704	.80947
		DIVORCED	1.57605	1.77662
	DIVORCED	SINGLE	-.65901	1.86472
		MARRIED	-1.57605	1.77662
Voter behaviour score for president	SINGLE	MARRIED	-1.05057	.80962
		DIVORCED	2.18282	1.86506
	MARRIED	SINGLE	1.05057	.80962
		DIVORCED	3.23339	1.77694
	DIVORCED	SINGLE	-2.18282	1.86506
		MARRIED	-3.23339	1.77694

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) MARITAL STATUS	(J) MARITAL STATUS	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	SINGLE	MARRIED	.013	-3.5149
		DIVORCED	.949	-3.4525
	MARRIED	SINGLE	.013	.4170
		DIVORCED	.230	-1.3180
	DIVORCED	SINGLE	.949	-3.6838
		MARRIED	.230	-5.4812
Voter behaviour scores for MP	SINGLE	MARRIED	.258	-2.5068
		DIVORCED	.724	-3.0032
	MARRIED	SINGLE	.258	-.6727
		DIVORCED	.375	-1.9131
	DIVORCED	SINGLE	.724	-4.3212

		MARRIED	.375	-5.0652
Voter behaviour score for president	SINGLE	MARRIED	.195	-2.6406
		DIVORCED	.242	-1.4800
	MARRIED	SINGLE	.195	-.5395
		DIVORCED	.069	-.2564
	DIVORCED	SINGLE	.242	-5.8457
		MARRIED	.069	-6.7232

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) MARITAL STATUS	(J) MARITAL STATUS	95% Confidence Interval
			Upper Bound
Voter Behaviour score for councillor	SINGLE	MARRIED	-.4170
		DIVORCED	3.6838
	MARRIED	SINGLE	3.5149
		DIVORCED	5.4812
	DIVORCED	SINGLE	3.4525
		MARRIED	1.3180
Voter behaviour scores for MP	SINGLE	MARRIED	.6727
		DIVORCED	4.3212
	MARRIED	SINGLE	2.5068
		DIVORCED	5.0652
	DIVORCED	SINGLE	3.0032
		MARRIED	1.9131
Voter behaviour score for president	SINGLE	MARRIED	.5395
		DIVORCED	5.8457
	MARRIED	SINGLE	2.6406
		DIVORCED	6.7232
	DIVORCED	SINGLE	1.4800
		MARRIED	.2564

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Predictor Variable	Councillor	MP	President
	Beta	Beta	Beta
Province	0.82***	0.52*	0.45**
Constituency	-0.72***	-0.47**	-0.33
Religion	-0.33***	-0.31***	0.28*
Occupation	-0.04	-0.04	-
Income	-0.15**	-0.18***	-0.11
Marital Status	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
Ethnicity/Clan	-	-0.06	-0.07
Level of Education	-	0.11	-
Gender	-	-	-0.07***
Multiple R	0.39	0.41	0.31
Multiple R^2	0.15	0.16	0.09