

**RADICALIZATION OF PRISONERS ON PRISON SECURITY
MANAGEMENT IN MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON FACILITIES IN KENYA**

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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university or for any award.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my late parents Mr. & Mrs. Lukas, my wife Ednah, children (Rono, Jepchirchir, Jelagat, Jebet) and my niece Jepkosgei for everything not forgetting Counter Terrorism champions in Kenya and globally.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ATPU	Anti Terror Police Unit
CPCT	Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DOHS	Digitized Offender Integrated Information System
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICSRPV	International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
MCAC	Multi-Cultural Advisory Councils
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NPS	National Police Service
NSCVE	National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism
OAU	Organization of African Union
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PSC	Permanent Security Councils
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMRTP	United Nations Standard Minimum Rules on Treatment of Prisoners
USA	United States of America
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
VE	Violent Extremism
VEOs	Violent Extremist offenders

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Caliphate	Refers to as a territory occupied or claimed by a violent extremist prisoners within the prisons to imitate the rule of caliph in Muslim religion.
De-radicalization	This refers to assisting prisoners to change their radical beliefs or ideologies through various strategies.
Disengagement	This implies cutting the links between violent extremist offender and fellow VEOs or external contacts associations.
Extremism	These are strong beliefs held by a prisoner that resist commonly held societal belief systems in the prisons facility.
Extremist	This is a prisoner who tends to strongly deviate from commonly held believes.
Ideology	Refers to belief system held by a group of prisoners in prisons facility.
Maximum Security Prison	Refers to a prison facility that is meant for offenders that are perceived to be dangerous for example murder, robbery, robbery with violence and terrorism. It is characterized by high security layers.
Prisons Security Management	In this context it is used to mean the entire arrangement of prisons security in terms of buildings, officers, visitors and all prisoners.
Prisoner	It refers to a person lawfully held in a prison as a remand or convict on terror related offences.

Prisoner Radicalization	It means a prisoner exposure to extreme views the may be based on politics, religion, or ideologies.
Radicalization	This means changing prisoner’s beliefs to extreme positions or views on political, religious, social issues r ideologies.
Religious conversion	A change in prisoner’s religion, belief or identity from one religion to another.
Terrorist prisoner	A prisoner held in prisons facility for terror related offences
Violent extremist	Refers to a prisoner who promotes or supports violence as a means through which to achieve ideological, religious, or political revolutions.
Violent Extremism	Encouraging, justifying, and supporting use of violent acts to achieve ideological, religious, social or economic objectives by violent extremists in prisons.

ABSTRACT

Radicalization is emerging as a big security threat and concern in all nations more so when it takes place in prison facilities. This raises serious concerns on the prison security management. This study therefore examined radicalization of prisoners on prison security management in Maximum Prison facilities in Kenya. The Specific objectives of the study were to establish causes of prisoners' radicalization in prisons facilities, explore how radicalization is propagated in prisons facilities, examine the effects of prisoners' radicalization on prison security management and determine the challenges associated with mitigating prisoners' radicalization in prison security management in prison facilities in Kenya. The study was anchored on uncertainty-identity theory, deterrence theory, and rehabilitation theory of punishment. The study employed descriptive survey and exploratory research designs. The study was carried out in Shimo la Tewa, Kamiti and Lang'ata Women Prisons which were selected because of their high security level to hold high and very high risk prisoners as a result of their offences. The target population was 7400 comprising of 6000 prisoners and 1400 prison officers from the three facilities were selected using both secondary data, purposive and snowball sampling techniques. Questionnaires and interview schedules were used to collect quantitative and qualitative data respectively. Quantitative data were analyzed statistically while thematic content analysis technique was applied to analyze qualitative data and presented appropriately using different methods. Key findings of this study revealed that radicalization occurred in prison facilities due to diverse factors including religious ideology, inadequate information sharing among key security agencies, social-economic factors, and laxity among the officers which pose serious threat to the prison security. Among the challenges encountered when mitigating radicalization were; lack of adequate inadequate information sharing, congestion, insufficient resources and ill-training of prison officers on handling radicalization of prisoners. The study recommends formulation of policy framework on multi-agency digitized information sharing system, improvement of infrastructure in prison facilities, improvement in general welfare of prison staff and enhanced vetting of staff to curb radicalization and enhance prison and national security management to address the various concerns raised in the study.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the background to the study, problem statement, objectives, research questions, and justification of the study. Additionally, the chapter highlights significance, scope, limitations and delimitations of the study.

1.1 Background to the Study

Radicalization in prisons is being reported in many parts of the world. A study by Luders, Jonas, Fritsche and Agroskin (2016) on a theoretical perspective of radicalization in different parts of the world established that the concept of radicalization entails developing extremist beliefs, emotions and behaviours that may be in contradiction with the fundamental and commonly agreeable values of the society and existing laws. According to Onapajo and Ozden, (2020) “radicalization involves the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”

Radicalization has been associated with individuals or groups outside or inside prisons. According to Hickey (2016), prison radicalization is a process through which some prisoners overtly or covertly adopt extremist views based on religious, political and economic causes. However, Botha (2010) argues that prison radicalization is mainly driven by a political, social, religious, revenge objective and by terrorist sympathizers using fear to gain attention of the public. Irrespective of the reasons for prison

radicalization, it is apparent that it poses serious security threats not only to the prison security management, but also to national security. The threat may emanate from both internal and external sources, but mainly driven by extremist groups such as al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab, and ISIS, among other known radicalized entities spread across different parts of the world. These groups are infamous for causing insecurity and safety concerns through their covert and clandestine networks.

Prison security management refers to government mechanisms for ensuring maximum security in prison facilities. This is a critical global prison administration phenomenon, and it entails putting in place effective systems and structures for guaranteeing security to the entire prison population, including inmates (prisoners) and prison staff. The threats of radicalization of prisoners and other institutional management dynamics pose various challenges to prison facilities in many parts of the world. According to Mulcahy, Shannon and Bell (2013), some of these dynamics include lack of or weak central information gathering units for some prisons which makes it impossible for the prison management to receive accurate and timely information that can help in improving prison security protocols and reign on prison radicalization and other lawless activities within prison facilities. There are also cases of low financial motivation for the staff, inadequate education and specialized training of staff on how to deal with behaviour change for both staff and the prisoners.

Effective monitoring of radicalization attempts in prisons requires reliable systems for individualized attention such as observing, documenting, and dealing with any suspicious behaviour of violent extremist prisoners (Azarva, 2009). This process further

requires collaborative sharing of intelligence through a comprehensive approach to identify potential radicalization activities. Yet, studies indicate that many prison facilities globally do not have the capacity to enforce such strict security rules, thus leaving them vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist elements (Hickey, 2016). This scenario is no exception among prisons facilities in SSA in general and Kenya in particular, such that compromised security measures and low morale among prisons staffs sometimes create security gaps where sympathizers of extremist ideologies can easily infiltrate prison security systems.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), prisons play a significant role in triggering radicalization of the inmates (UNODC, 2016). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has recognized the terrorist threat posed by radicalized prisoners and the need to address this threat. The United Nations resolution 2396 (2017), for instance, views prisons as potential recruitment grounds for terrorists (Wright, 2019). Hence, the resolution underscores the role of the government and civil society organizations (CSOs) in all the UNSC Member States in addressing radicalization of prisoners through rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives (UNDP (2017).

In the United States of America (USA), more than 354,000 inmates self-identify as Muslims (Khalil, Horgan & Zeuthen, 2019). Furthermore, studies indicate that of the American prisoners who change faith while still in prisons, more than 80% of them join Islam (David, Cotet, Matu, Mogoase and Stefan, 2017). This trend implies that radicalization in prisons is real; at least by virtue of the fact that radicalization is widely,

rightly or erroneously, traced to the Muslim faith (Wright, 2019). Moreover, despite the spirited fight against radicalization and fundamentalism by the US throughout the world, it is evident that the country is also facing unprecedented security threat of the phenomenon of radicalization into violent extremism. Bora et al (2018a) states that the causes of radicalization remain varied across countries and social institutions, such as prison facilities. According to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), in the US, like in many parts of the world, radicalization is a highly complex phenomenon, with no clear explanations why some individuals choose to engage in the vice. While the origin of extremist groups has largely been traced to the Islamic religion, there is no clear justification that the religion plays a direct role in radicalization in the USA, or elsewhere in the world (Trip et al, 2019).

In Germany, de-radicalization programs carried out in prison facilities require a lot of resources and specialized personnel, which sometimes prove too expensive for the prison authorities to manage (Council of Europe, 2015). Similarly, according to Schmid (2013), disengagement programs run in Swedish prisons for terror-related convicts have not been very successful due to lack of sufficient budgetary allocations to establish systems that are effective for executing such security programs. In the United Kingdom, frontline workers in prisoner rehabilitation programs in prisons, such as prison staff and social workers, find it difficult to deal with violent extremist offenders hence making prison security management very difficult (Bjorgo, 2005). Similar hurdles are experienced in African countries, including Morocco and Asian jurisdictions such as India. For instance, studies indicate that in Morocco and other Arab countries there is a tendency of corruption and nepotism in prisons which often make it very difficult for

the prison security management to effectively address prison security matters and prison radicalization in general (Silke, 2014).

In Australia, prisons are not considered as entirely the safest places to send terrorists. Recent empirical evidence has shown that, through intimidation, coercion and violence, radicals were using penitentiaries to recruit new converts (Milmo, 2010). Such happenings continue sparking fears that newly converted extremists posed a grave danger when released into the community with a treacherous new mind-set and schema (Travis, 2010). The new trend of radicalization in prisons has forced Australia to come up with policy guidelines classifying all terrorist criminals as high risk, hence separating them from other inmates to reduce chances of more radicalization in prisons (UNDP, 2016).

In Africa, prison radicalization still remains on the rise, with various cases of organized criminal gangs having been reported in many countries on the continent. According to the Organization of African Union (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (CPCT), Member States in Africa should criminalize terrorist acts as a way of discouraging radicalization on the continent (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). In spite of the OAU's stand on radicalization and terrorism in Africa, studies indicate that there is growing threat of terrorism in many parts of Africa, where this is linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crimes, and money laundering among other serious crimes (Marsden, 2016).

In July 2010, Boko Haram insurgents invaded a prison in Bauchi State of Nigeria and released over seven hundred prisoners (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). Such incidences are a

testimony to the complexity of radicalization and prisons security management since there are widespread networks involved. In Egypt, concerns have been raised by world organizations such as the UN about the country's weak policies to combat terrorism where huge numbers of detention and indiscriminate arrests are common thus fueling radicalization in prisons (Kariuki, 2019). Similar sentiments have been expressed regarding Libya where such cases are also rampant. According to the Human Rights Watch (2011), in both countries de-radicalization and counter-terrorism efforts have not borne lasting solutions almost a decade since these processes were begun.

In Morocco, the terrorist group ISIS has been accused of radicalizing and recruiting prisoners to violent extremism with the lie that it will help them with bails or assist their families financially (Schmid, 2014). Poor prison conditions characterized by overcrowding and lack of access to adequate healthcare services as well as long stay in pre-trial detention are some of the factors that have been linked to favourable environment for radicalization in prisons, with these factors cutting across many countries' detention facilities (Marsden, 2016). For instance, in Nigeria congested courts are said to make a prisoner stay in pre-trial detention for five to ten years hence a catalyst for radicalization in prisons (Sodipo, 2013). According to Sodipo (2013), this is what has greatly been linked to Boko Haram radicalizing and recruiting members through prisons thus raising prisons security management concerns.

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), radicalized and extremist groups are increasingly infiltrating Kenyan prisons where the most vulnerable prisoners are the main target (ICG, 2014). Prisons often tend to become favourable grounds for

radicalization, especially given that some individuals are radicalized following the frustrations they encounter once they are arrested (Kariuki, 2019). Despite these revelations, there is scarcity of clear-cut findings indicating how radicalization occurs and its implication in Kenya's prison security management. Hence, the current study was important in bridging this gap.

Kenya has experienced a number of terrorist attacks, including the August 7th 1998 al-Qaeda twin attacks to the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam which left more than 220 people dead and more than 300 injured. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the country include the 21st September, 2013 Westgate Mall attack where 67 people were killed and more than 100 wounded by terrorist associated with al Shabaab, the April 2nd 2015 Garissa University incident where close to 150 people died, and the January 16th 2019 Nairobi DusitD2 Hotel attack where about 26 persons lost their lives (Muindi, 2020). In some of these occurrences, perpetrators or suspects could be arrested thus ending up in prisons hence posing danger of radicalization of other prisoners and a threat to the prisons security management. However, exploring the implication of radicalization of prisoners on prisons put into better context the challenges posed by radicalization to the whole question of prisons security management.

Prisons in Kenya such as Shimo La Tewa, Kamiti and Lang'ata among other prisons usually end up holding some of the most treacherous and dangerous radicalized terrorists from within and outside the country. For instance, the violent extremist offender (VEO) Jermaine Grant, an associate of well-known Samantha Lewthwaite (The White Widow), has served a two-year jail term in Shimo La Tewa prison after being found guilty to

terrorism activities in Kenya (Sahgal and Zeuthen, 2020). Empirical evidence also shows that Grant was radicalized in prison by British terrorist Richard Reid, and is suspected to have been involved in radicalizing prisoners in Shimo La Tewa.

Although the so-called VEOs and dangerous criminals are held in different blocks of the prison facilities, this move does not guarantee complete restricted interactions among radicalized prisoners and the rest of the prison population because they may just require a very little contact with their target for radicalization. Soft targets for indoctrination are usually vulnerable young and first-time offenders as they may easily be influenced because of their state of minds and emotions. Given the immense influence some of the suspects wield, they are alleged to bribe and intimidate officers handling them and the prison administration so as to have their way (Kariuki, 2019). In this sense, this study is important in highlighting the implications of radicalization in Kenya's Prisons on prisons security management.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Prison facilities are ideally mandated and intended to provide safe and humane custody, administration of justice, rehabilitation or reformation and facilitation of reintegration of all prisoners under their care. However, prisons facilities in Kenya have over time continued to experience increased number of prisoners associated with radicalization and terrorism-related offences. At the time of this study, according to the prisoners returns book, the prison population was about 55,000 in Kenya with about 177 violent extremist offenders (VEOs) across different stations, hence raising security management concerns associated with terrorism that have remained unaddressed. Since

2001, prison facilities have experienced an increase in the number of prisoners associated with radicalization and terrorism-related offences. This is despite close monitoring of maximum security prison facilities to ensure adequate security and prevention of further radicalization to violent extremism. This raises serious concerns about the security management in Kenya's prisons. It is not clear yet on issues regarding to why to it occurs, who are responsible, how it takes place in prison facilities, the main challenges prison facilities encounter when handling radicalized prisoners and the implications of such radicalization on prison facilities security management. From these concerns there is an urgent need to find strategies to address this present emerging security challenge of radicalization in prison. It is against this backdrop that this study sought to examine the causes, effects and challenges of radicalization of prisoners on the prisons security management in selected maximum security facilities in Kenya.

1.3 General Objective of the Study

The general objective of this study was to examine the implications of radicalization of prisoners in maximum prison facilities on the prisons security management in Kenya.

1.4 Specific Objectives of the Study

The study was guided by the following specific objectives:

- i. To establish the causes of prisoners' radicalization in maximum security prison facilities in Kenya.

- ii. To explore how radicalization is propagated in maximum security prisons facilities in Kenya.
- iii. To examine the effects of prisoners' radicalization on maximum security prison facilities management in Kenya.
- iv. To determine the security management challenges associated with mitigating radicalization of prisoners in maximum security prison facilities in Kenya.

1.5 Research Questions

The study sought to answer the following research questions:

- i. Why is radicalization happening among prisoners in maximum security prison facilities in Kenya?
- ii. How is prisoners' radicalization being propagated in maximum security prison facilities in Kenya?
- iii. What are the effects of prisoners' radicalization on security management in maximum security prison facilities in Kenya?
- iv. What are the challenges associated with mitigating prisoners' radicalization on prisons security management in maximum security prison facilities in Kenya?

1.6 Justification to the study

Globally, issues of radicalization are believed to be taking place in different environments in the society and communities. Kenya at the moment is facing numerous challenges of radicalization among its youth in different environments hence the rise in number of those arrested for violent extremism and terror related offences are sent to

prisons facilities as remands or convicted prisoners posing a threat of radicalization to other prisoners in those facilities. This makes prisons facilities fertile breeding grounds for radicalization of prisoners thus posing threat to the prisons security management. With these indicators, there was an urgent need to carry out this study to establish the causes, the effects and challenges associated with mitigation of radicalization of prisoners on prisons security management thus the justification of this study at this particular point in time that violent extremism and terrorism due to radicalization is emerging as a serious global concern.

1.7 Significance to the Study

This study is intended to benefit prisoners, prison officers, the Prisons department and other government players in law enforcement and criminal justice system in addressing radicalization and challenges in security management in prison facilities. It provides critical information to the prison population, prison officers, and prison management regarding the causes, effects, and challenges associated with radicalization of prisoners on the prisons security management. Besides, the study made significant recommendations towards reduction of radicalization by the prisoners and good security management practices through standard operating procedures (SOPs), curriculum and modules for training on prevention of radicalization and countering violent extremism through certification of staff.

The findings are important in informing policy makers and security practitioners on how to initiate standard counter radicalization and narrative policy guidelines for prison facilities. Good policies by effective prison security management would prohibit

prisoners from possessing literature that preaches, proposes or instigates radicalization, violence and hatred which are some of the precursors to violent extremism and terrorism. This study was also important in understanding the social, economic, religious and political backgrounds leading to radicalization of prisoners in prisons facilities and the general society. Interested researchers in the area of radicalization and violent extremism in prisons will benefit from the use of this study as a reference point for similar future studies.

1.8 Scope of the Study

This study aimed at examining radicalization of prisoners and its implication on prison security management in prisons facilities in Kenya. The study was carried out in three (3) maximum security prisons which included Shimo la Tewa, Kamiti and Lang'ata Women Prison. It focused on the causes of prisoners' radicalization in prisons in Kenya, how radicalization of prisoners happens, the effects of prisoners' radicalization, and the challenges associated with mitigating prisoners' radicalization on the prisons security management in prisons facilities in Kenya. Participants of the study included violent extremist offenders and members of prisons staff, but excluded other players in the criminal justice system like the police, judiciary etc.

1.9 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

Given the sensitivity of the information needed on the ideological, political, religious orientations, criminal history and personal records of prisoners, some participants were reluctant to divulge the right information for the study. Reluctance of the respondents to

share the right information was informed by their fear that their shared data was likely to be used against them in one way or the other. In order to address these challenges, assurance of confidentiality and anonymity was communicated to the respondents. Also, proper explanations were done regarding the intention of the study before commencing collection of data from the identified respondents.

Both the prison management and prisoners were closely engaged in order for them to understand that the information being sought was for academic purposes only. This approach helped the researcher to earn their trust. The study was delimited to maximum prisons in Kenya, with the focus on radicalization and its implications on security management in maximum security facilities. Three prisons facilities spread across Nairobi and Mombasa counties provided the platform for examining the subject of the research, with the possibility of generalizing the findings of the research to other similar populations in a number of prison facilities in other parts of the country. Another delimitation was in terms of the research objectives, questions, target population and sample size used, when and how to carry out as the researcher had control over the research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviewed related and relevant literature to the study on radicalization of prisoners and its implication on the prisons security management based on the specific objectives. These included causes of radicalization and how it happens among prisoners, effects and challenges associated with mitigating radicalization of prisoners in prisons facilities security management as well as exploring theoretical and conceptual frameworks.

2.1.1 Causes of Radicalization of Prisoners in Prisons

Radicalization remains a complex phenomenon throughout the world. Studies have shown that prison facilities are increasingly becoming fertile grounds for radicalization where other prisoners are influenced by hardcore convicts who have a history of violent extremism (VE) or terror-related criminal records (Porges, 2014; Kruglanski et al, 2014). In a study by Trip, Bora, Marian, Halmajan and Drugas (2019) in the United States of America (USA) to establish the main causes of radicalization in prison facilities and its effects on the prisons security management and global governance order, the findings revealed that radicalization directly or indirectly affects governments' order of security and peace operations. More specifically, radicalization in prison facilities was clearly burdensome on security management in prisons in terms of extra budgetary allocations needed to facilitate safety and security of individuals and

their property. Despite the evidence by Trip et al (2019), the study focused on a global perspective hence posing a contextual gap.

In the US, the Richard Reid debacle has remained one of the most outstanding cases of prison radicalization in contemporary times, thus signifying how correctional institutions often tend to become breeding grounds for terrorists (Brandon, 2009a). Studies show that, as a petty criminal, Reid kept on moving in and out of jail in the 1990s before he was finally convicted. Eventually, in 1995 he ended up converting into Islam while in jail (Abdul, 2015). A few years later, he joined the Finsbury Park Mosque popularly known for its anti-American and anti-western radical views. Richard Reid would later, on 22nd December 2001 got associated with an aborted terror attack of an American airline; thus leading to his life imprisonment (Keme, 2002).

In terms of the presence and spread of radicalization globally, no country has been spared of the vice. Over the years, prison radicalization in the Western European countries has remained a major concern in the prisons security management. In the UK, recent cases of prison radicalization include Mohammad al-Figari, Muktar Said Ibrahim, Richard Reid and Martin Mubanga (Nesser, 2008). Overall, it is estimated that by 2019 there were more than 2,220 terrorist prisoners in the UK (Silke & Morrison, 2020). In Spain, more than 175 inmates were imprisoned on jihad-related offences, while in France statistics showed that close to 300 inmates were in prison due to terrorist-related charges. Despite the variations in the number of prisoners imprisoned due to terrorist charges in different western countries, it is evident that the figure keeps on rising (Silke & Veldhuis, 2017).

Sahgal and Zeuthen (2020) further argue that the harsh prison environment forces prisoners to easily get involved in any activities that appear to be promising them a better alternative. Hence, such a move would seem like giving such prisoners solace in radicalization networks due to the financial rewards that sometimes come with involvement in these vices. Furthermore, the need for imprisoned violent extremists to aspire to spread their activities through fresh recruitments within and outside prisons is buttressed by the uncertainties presented by the generally inhumane living conditions of most of the prison facilities (Hogg and Wagoner, 2017).

There is empirical evidence that a number of high-profile terror-related criminals were first radicalized while in prison. According to Brandon (2009a), some of these high-status cases include those of Levar Washington, Kevin James, Richard Reid, and Jose Padilla, where the offenders were allegedly converted into Islamic radicals while behind bars. Such cases have provided grounds for attempts by some countries including Australia and the USA to advocate for isolation and segregation of terror criminals in jails (UNDP, 2016). According to Neumann (2010), this approach was informed by the fact that prisons are potential incubators for terrorism as they are usually home for vulnerable prisoners.

In a study by Mastroe (2016) to understand the effect of radicalization on prisoners in Africa, conditions such as overcrowded, understaffed and poorly-run prisons make it easy for extremist operatives to easily convince and radicalize new recruits into their folds. In this sense, mobilization is usually centered on economic, political and religious ideologies. Ultimately, the very vulnerable individuals within the prison population and

groups in society end up being more exposed to the dangers of the process of radicalization (Wright, 2019). The views by Mastroe (2016) about the central role of prisons in radicalization is reinforced by the philosophical stand by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSRPV) which emphasizes the role of prison facilities in radicalization of individuals and groups in the world today (Silke & Veldhuis, 2017).

A study by Luders, Jonas, Fritsche and Agroskin (2016) on a theoretical perspective of radicalization in different parts of the world established that the concept of radicalization entails developing extremist beliefs, emotions and behaviours that are in contradiction with the fundamental and commonly agreeable values of the society and existing laws. In this sense, extremist beliefs and activities also tend to go against the universal human rights while advancing hegemony of a certain group or groups based on racial, religious, political, economic, or social inclinations among other stratifications. These findings were corroborated by a subsequent study by Trip et al (2019) which further observed that subjective religious and dogmatic beliefs were some of the factors behind radicalization of certain individuals or groups. However, the study by Luders et al (2016) and Trip et al (2019) presented general views about the beliefs underlying the existence of radicalization instead of the prisons set up.

A study by Schmid (2013) on radicalization and de-radicalization in the Hague, Netherlands noted that radicalization often involve individuals or groups that are generally intolerant of existing political, social, or administrative systems where they resort to applying various forms of pressure, including violent tendencies so that they

can push for their agenda. These sentiments were reinforced by Trip et al (2019) by noting that extremism entails anti-democracy political ideologies where disgruntled groups are motivated by selfish political agenda. In this sense, extremist political philosophies tend to contradict the common societal values and principles of human rights by promoting narrow individual or group interests based on religious, racial, political, social, or economic supremacy (Klein and Kruglanski, 2013).

Schmid (2014) carried out a study on violent and non-violent extremism debate in Netherlands and established that Islamic extremism was at the center of radicalization in liberal democracies. The study further noted that although there is no clear-cut definition of the concept of 'violent extremism', what is clear is the fact that violent extremism tends to undermine governments' collective efforts to maintain peace and foster national security. Furthermore, violent extremism is viewed as a philosophy that encourages, condones and justifies commission of or involvement in violent acts to achieve political, religious, ideological or social objectives (Hodwitz, 2019). The emphasis about violent extremism seems to lie in the fact that extremist propagators must be driven by a philosophical standpoint through radicalization.

The disruptive nature of radicalization in prison facilities has serious negative implications on the prisons facilities security management (Trip et al, 2019). The increasingly fluid and amorphous causes of radicalization in modern times where it is not confined to hierarchical structures or systems has increased its threats to security management in and outside prison facilities. A study by Bjorgo and Horgan (2009) to understand the effect of terrorism across the world today established that radicalized

groups are progressively infiltrating many smaller groups, prison facilities and lone actors (individuals) in all sectors of life. The fact that radicalized organizations are progressively becoming less constrained and unpredictable in their activities makes it hard for relevant national and international security agencies to decisively address the vice. Moreover, these new dynamics make prevention of radicalization even more difficult. These sentiments were echoed by Hodwitz (2019) by noting that the situation could be more complicated in social and security institutions such as prisons where financial and structural resources might be constrained.

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2016), the broader concepts of radicalization can be traced to the social and political reforms agenda of the 19th century in the US and France. Bora, Roseanu and Trip (2018b) further argue that radicalization basically simply connotes the idea of a fundamental shift from commonly held belief systems hence introducing and entrenching new doctrines by individuals or groups. Ideally, radicalized individuals or groups are viewed as dissenters who challenge the status quo and advocate for fundamental systems and societal changes. Yet, there is no clear evidence that all radicalized individuals must be dissenting or challenging the status quo because they are disgruntled. This view therefore may not clearly link radicalization in prisons to the question of prisons security management.

Radicalization is often viewed from the lens of violent extremism where the effect is usually a negative one, hence upsetting the normal operations of the government, including national security endeavours (McGregor, 2013). Studies have further shown that while inside prisons, violent extremist offenders sometimes tend to self-segregate

themselves and isolate from the rest of the prison population thereby creating security concerns to the prisons administrations (Bora et al, 2018a). At the same time, there are reported cases of recruitment of new members into radicalized and violent extremist groups which further pose security concerns not only to the prison administration, but also to the general government security systems outside the prison facilities (Bora et al, 2018b).

In Northern Ireland, lack of clear programs for addressing radicalization in prisons has kind of politicized the fight against this vice in the country. According to Veldhuis (2016), radicalization in Northern Ireland's prisons is on the increase thereby significantly affecting the prisons security. Unlimited social interaction among radicalized prisoners in prisons exacerbated the situation, with a number of them freely influencing and recruiting new ones into their fold. However, it is evident that despite the presence of radicalization and violent extremism in many countries globally, each operates in a different social and political environment which could make the challenges different from country to country. Therefore, the current study greatly contributes to a clear understanding of the different dynamics relating to radicalization in Kenya's prisons facilities.

Although it is not very easy at any particular time to give a definite number of violent extremist prisoners around the world given most countries' discreet prison systems in dealing with radicalized prisoners (Patterson, 2015; Acheson, 2016; Rogan, 2018), the role of prisons is evident when it comes to tackling violent extremism. Schmid (2014) postulates that the presence of the al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda terror groups has

significantly been felt in Kenyan prisons, spreading the influence even to those imprisoned for different crimes. The widespread sophisticated use of the social media has also eased communication where ideologically laced messages are easily disseminated to incite violence. In prisons, technology is enhancing the ease with which information travels from perpetrators of radicalization and violent extremism to the intended targets (European Parliament, 2014).

Botha (2013) carried out a study on vulnerability of the youth in Kenya to radicalization and extremism and noted that the menace can largely be traced to schools of Islamic inclinations such as the Shia, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi. Furthermore, the vice had spread to prison facilities owing to high levels of vulnerability of prisoners in those institutions. Furthermore, the study by Botha (2013) did not specifically focus on prisons facilities in Kenya, but generally highlighted how the youth were affected. Hence, the current study is critical in helping to understand the general dynamics of radicalization in prison facilities in Kenya and how these impact on the management of prisons security.

2.1.2 Radicalization in Prison Facilities

Studies have indicated that radicalization occurs in prisons in many parts of the world. Research shows that Islam in prison appeals to some different reasons and the prisoners often become involved in religious groups' benign reasons, rather than conversion for violent purposes. Reasons can include enhancing a sense of belonging, coping with difficult prisons conditions for protection, or join status among inmate population. There are a number of different factors contributing to radicalization of prisoners in

prison facilities. Religious conversion is one of the ways through which individuals embrace radicalized views (Ammar, Weaver & Saxon, 2004, Clear et al, 1992, Merola & Vovak 2012). There are also those who identify with Islam (or other religions) while in prisons as a form of repentance for having committed shameful or disgraceful criminal act (ibid). Ammar, Weaver & Saxon, (2004) found the difference between those who converted before and those who converted during incarceration and suggested that those with stronger Muslim connections outside Muslim communities had the potential for greater social control over violent behavior and therefore a better chance at non-offending on release. They concluded that religion can be an important factor in the process of offender rehabilitation. According to Baran (2005) religion has over time served as a means through which individuals adapt to prison life, hence likely to mislead some people into blindly embracing certain religious ideals that can potentially turn harmful to them (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). There are also arguments that consider religious conversions as often happening through new friendships where already radicalized individuals or groups have to use persuasion in order to convince new converts.

Research has also revealed that there are cases where incentives have to be used to hoodwink potential converts (Berg, 2005). Despite these revelations, all prison facilities may not exhibit similar social environments, hence the need for this study focusing in maximum prisons in Kenya. Beutel (2007) further argues that radicalized groups have sometimes been associated with religious rituals that are intended to thrust new converts into new social lives by joining such groupings. In spite of this view, “religious

involvement among prisoners remains a complex phenomenon which is driven by a number of social and psychological factors.”

According to Branch (2006), there are different types of converting prisoners that can be summarized as protection-seeking convert, the crisis convert, the searching convert, and the free-world recruited convert. Regarding the crisis convert, psychologists argue that some prisoners embrace certain religious doctrines in order to deal with their own crises. Granted, virtually all prisoners may be facing one crisis or the other, hence the likelihood of being desperate in their situations. Under the circumstances they may be forced to use any available strategy to address their problems, including joining radicalized groups with the hope of getting solutions.

The protection-seeking convert is motivated to join a religious group by their need for protection against physical assault or any other form of aggression by their real or imagined enemies. Hagedorn (2006) revealed that establishing a strong cultural identity within the prison population tended to reassure some prisoners of their physical and spiritual security. At the same time, studies have indicated that there are prisoners who join prison when they do not already have any religious inclinations. Lack of religious background leave such prisoners easily hostage to any radicalized groups coming with promises that could potentially change their lives. There are also instances of prisoners turning to religion for manipulative purposes; such that they can access certain privileges, including special diets, growing beards, wearing certain religious attires, and access to reading materials among others (Ammar et al, 2004).

Some prisoners are also said to have joined certain faith groups due to the influence of free-world religious leaders whose recruitment processes involve frequent visits to prison facilities (Thomas & Zaitzow, 2004). Extensive distribution of religious materials to prisoners such as newsletters, and promises of jobs and other material benefits easily hoodwink the prisoners into joining groups that may later turn to be associated with radicalization and terror-related activities. From the foregoing, it is evident that religion is playing a central role in radicalization of prisoners in prisons. Yet, it is also evident that some prisoners are deceived to join certain religions without knowing the real intention. Because of such dynamics, the current study was important in putting into perspective the manner in which radicalization takes place in prisons.

Collusion of prison staff and external radicalized groups has also been blamed as channel through which prisoners are radicalized in prisons. According to Borum (2014), access of radicalized literature and other messages by prisoners cannot be possible without the help of prison officers. In this sense, bribery and corruption of prison officers are blamed for radicalization in prison facilities. Closely associated with corruption and bribery in prisons is unprofessional behaviour by some prison officers, such as discrimination, harassment, and victimization of prisoners that sometimes tend to provoke prisoners into joining radicalized groups for self-identity and boosting of their self-esteem (Corner & Gill, 2015).

Hasisi, Carmel, Weisburd and Wolfowicz (2019) further argue that violent extremist prisoners have also attempted to undermine the authority of prison officers through various means as they pursue further recruitment agenda. Some of the approaches

applied include manipulation of staff by some hardcore prisoners, such as using bribes to access communication channels and gadgets for relaying messages to external terror networks. Khalil, Horgan and Zeuthen (2019) further argues that radicalized prisoners use face-face interactions, phones, internet, and preachers' and disguised sermons in order to pass their communication to their intended audience. Through conditioning, some violent extremist prisoners can also attempt to get things to work to their advantage.

Lloyd and Dean (2015) posit that there are instances where violent extremist offenders may tend to impose their will on vulnerable staff, which may eventually draw in more staff especially if prison authority is part of this kind of arrangement. For instance, using various strategies to identify potential weaker or vulnerable staff to involve in illegal smuggling of cell phones and other methods of communication with the external terror network, violent extremist offenders use money and other forms of enticement to lure many associates or converts into their game. There is also the question of intimidation and extortion of some staff by violent extremist prisoners so that the latter can get leeway in their dealings.

In the center of such scenarios is the aspect of huge monies, but which cannot penetrate the prisons environment without involving several different actors. According to Khalil et al (2019), some prison staff in key prison management positions are sometimes compromised to retreat into passive roles where certain rules are deliberately ignored as the prisoners are left to run their illegal activities with little restraints.

These ways in which radicalization takes place in prisons among prisoners have implication on the prisons security management hence the importance of this study. The literature reviewed this has not revealed how these ways of radicalization can be mitigated in the prisons instead have only pointed out the causes. With all indications that prison radicalization is on the increase globally, this implies that many prisoners propagating terrorist ideologies continue to pose serious threats to prison authorities in a number of states (Pressman & Flockton, 2012). The possibility of terror convicts or suspects serving long years in prisons and remands respectively also presents several administrative challenges to the prison security management in terms of resources needed for the prisoners' general upkeep, security and other essential services. Studies have also indicated that majority of the terrorists or terror suspects arrested are generally relatively young, hence likely to be a big threat to the prison authorities due to their dynamic nature and the propensity to recruit other prisoners with the hope of resuming their terror-related activities even after their prison sentence (Silke, 2014).

Different policies for holding in prisons radicalized and extremist offenders across different developed countries have also played a big role in determination of the level of this phenomenon in prison facilities and the rate at which new radicalized inmates are being initiated. For instance, according to Acheson (2016), some western countries, such as the Netherlands, Australia and USA use concentration policies where radicalized and extremist offenders are kept in common closely guarded prison facilities with the hope of the government authorities keeping a closer eye on them. Empirical evidence further indicates that the intricate nature of terror networks allows radicalized inmates to continue influencing prisons security management from within and outside

prison facilities (Sahgal and Zeuthen, 2020). According to Mueller (2016), terror groups use their networks to mobilize resources and reach out to individuals even in the most unlikely places, including prison facilities hence posing prisons security threat.

2.1.3 Effects of Prisoners' Radicalization on Security Management of Prisons facilities

Over the years, radicalization has evolved into different forms and capacities such as violent extremism such that extremist groups now occupy large territories across borders. When radicalization leads to violence, radical thinking becomes a threat to prisons and national security management (Santropete and Xu, 2018). Furthermore, many violent extremist groups are increasingly seizing and generating considerable amount of resources, including through grabbing of oil fields, kidnappings, and other forms of illicit trade (Neumann, 2012).

Radicalization may lead to indoctrination and violent extremism that is often rooted in ideological foundations, hence making it easier to spread across different geographical locations and to various target groups (Cronin, 2009). Trip et al (2019) established that violent extremists are using technology such as use of phones and internet to innovatively interact with their new target, especially the disillusioned youth and other most disadvantaged social groups such as prisoners. The end result is socially corrupted vulnerable people in the society who are likely to seize such opportunities to indulge in any activities that would guarantee them an income. The effects of radicalization on prisons security management are as varied as there are motivations for individuals or groups getting involved in these vices. In a study by Kundnani (2012) in the United

States of America to understand the effect of radicalization on societal wellbeing, the findings revealed that radicalization presents itself in many guises, hence making it hard for the prison management to easily root it out.

According to Hodwitz (2019), radicalization in prison facilities complicates more the responsibilities and roles played by prison management systems in order to maintain prison population, inculcate a sense of discipline while at the same time minimizing inappropriate influence from external sources. A study conducted by Van der Heide and Schuurman (2018) to understand the influence of prison radicalization on prison security management in the Netherlands further noted that lack of general discipline among the prisoners is always a recipe for prison breaks, escapes and general deterioration of prison environment. The scenario can also lead to poor interaction among prison staff and the prison population, thereby often causing anxiety within the prison facilities. These complexities make it easy for further spread of radicalized ideologies without being identified by government authorities due to communication breakdown in its key security institutions, such as prisons.

Studies have further indicated that prison radicalization also provides leeway to the prisoners in general to access to extremist literature and unauthorized materials through contacts with radicalized individuals, hence posing a greater danger of compromising prisons and national security (Trip et al, 2019). According to a study in Europe and USA, Kundnani (2012), some individuals coming to visit prisoners have tended to disguise themselves as preachers while their actual intention is to sneak in controversial literatures and radical materials in order to lure new recruits into radical movements.

Such acts also tend to create mistrust among prison officers, since some of the officers have been found to facilitate such visits through their actions or inactions. Despite the findings by Kundnani (2012), there are temporal (period or duration) and contextual gaps since the study was carried out more than eight years ago in a totally different social environment from Kenya's prisons' environment. The current study therefore focused on Kenya's Maximum Prisons.

Online video channels such as YouTube, social networking sites, and radical chat rooms have also provided a fertile ground for radicalized groups within and outside prisons to widely, quickly and more effectively advance their messages intended to incite violence (Jones, 2014). According to Cronin (2014), there are different motivations and effects of prison radicalization, which can be viewed from ideological, issue-based, and ethno-nationalist or separatist dimensions. In an ideological sense, there are political, religious or dogmatic principles which often lead individuals to be associated with radicalization. These dimensions can further have far-reaching effects on the social institutions where the converts belong, including prisons for those involved while in prison facilities. For instance, Hodwitz (2019) argues that radicalized prisoners tend to cause heightened anxiety among the prison population by virtue of likely defiance to prison authority.

Further studies indicate that the means, patterns and trends of radicalization are slowly broadening, enabling violent extremists to draw inspiration from a wide range of ideologies. Acheson (2014) observes that the dangers of prison radicalization raise two fundamental concerns. First, prisons provide an avenue for the terrorists to come into contact with ordinary criminals, thus likely influencing the latter with radical and

violent extremist ideals. In this sense, prisons act as a conveyor belt when it comes to fanning terrorism activities through new initiates rather than providing a forum for discouraging the risk of terrorist activities. Yet, Acheson (2014) was short of providing an alternative for prison security managements on how to isolate the two sets of prisoners in a bid to forestall further spread of radicalization and subsequent extremist violence. This study have revealed that most of the studies on radicalization in prisons have been done in developed countries where facilities and resources are adequate as compared to Kenya's facilities. This raises a resource gap hence the focus is on how resource inadequacy could contribute to radicalization in prisons.

Due to high level of susceptibility in prisons where individuals are more likely to be socially influenced to eventually fall into the trap of radicalization and violent extremism even long after release from prison, prison management often have a hard time in controlling the situation every time there are indications of radicalization in prison (Van der Heide & Schuurman, 2018). Studies have further revealed that cases for most radicalized offenders tend to take too long to resolve, and this implies that the prisoners spend longer time in prison (Rogan, 2018). According to Neumann (2012), this further implies that long-time imprisoned offenders continue to cost prison management for a long time in terms of basic needs and their security while still in prison. By extension, incarcerated radical offenders remain a serious security threat to the prison management for as long as their lives are spent in prison. Furthermore, the more radicalized prisoners remain in prison the more they are likely to influence others into joining their groups.

Like the rest of the organs or agents of national security outlined in Kenya's constitution, prisons play a central role in public safety and security. According to Terrill (2009), prison facilities further ensure safe custody of those individuals that have lawfully been imprisoned with the hope of facilitating rehabilitation of the offenders for later reintegration into the community. However, in the context of prison radicalization, prison facilities sometimes become fertile ground for insecurity. Despite clear constitutional provisions about prison management's role in the preservation and maintenance of national security in the country, such a scenario contravenes these provisions. Besides the implication of radicalization of prisoners on prison security management, Smith (2010) observes that there are other direct or indirect transnational and cross-border security threats that Kenya commonly faces as a result of radicalization in prisons. These include terrorism, proliferation of light weapons and small arms, drug and human trafficking, as well as corruption among others.

Studies have further indicated that globalization and widespread use of technology have led to easy communication among radicalized groups as they propagate cybercrimes and terrorist activities, thus posing monumental threats to prison and national security (Omondi, 2014). Decisive fighting of corruption in government institutions, such as prisons, and enhanced security interagency cooperation, studies indicate that still there is some level of infiltration of radicalization in prison facilities (Rogan, 2018). Lack of sufficient resources, ineffective policy guidelines, and lack of political goodwill among different government security agencies have been blamed for this scenario (Kariuki, 2019). Nevertheless, prison facilities holding radicalized and violent extremist offenders naturally remain points of interests to prison and national security agencies

and apparatus. This is particularly with respect to resources allocation for surveillance and monitoring of the offenders (Carleton, 2016). This raises a contextual gap as Kenya is faced with the challenge of adequate funds and resources to install and deploy sophisticated technology across all prisons in the country unlike in other developed countries where this is very possible in their prisons.

Kariuki (2019) carried out research on challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya, where specific focus was on radicalization among the youth. The study used a mixed method approach where both quantitative and qualitative data was used. The findings revealed that violent extremist groups significantly contribute to the cycle of insecurity, where all critical security and criminal justice system institutions are negatively affected. For the prison facilities, the more widely spread radicalization is in the general society, the more cases of radicalized prisoners are expected to end up in prisons, hence further potentially threatening peace and order in those facilities (UNGA, 2015). However, the study by Kariuki (2019) generally focused on the impact of radicalization on the youth in the general Kenyan society whereas the current study specifically focused on radicalization of prisoners and its implications on the prisons security management.

2.1.4 Challenges of Prisons Security Management when Mitigating Prisoners' Radicalization

Dealing with radicalization in prisons is often a tough task for the prisons management and other stakeholders in ensuring safety and security of the prisoners and staff. Studies indicate that there are various challenges that tend to slow or affect the fight against

radicalization in prison facilities which is associated with both the prison population and prison staff. For instance, a study by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 2015) on how to prevent radicalization in prisons indicated that unregulated early exposure to extremist ideologies in a family set up or through networks of friends and/or family members played a significant role in radicalization of individuals who may later end up in prison facing jail terms. This argument implies that social background of individuals early in life may turn out to be an impediment to addressing radicalization and violent extremism not only within the prison facilities, but also within the societal level. However, this line of thought can be analyzed further in the current study where Kenya's prison facilities form the basis of this empirical inquiry.

Past criminal tendency of violence has also often been blamed for current behaviours of some prisoners, which may be problematic to the prisons authority when it comes to handling prisoners. A study by Subedi (2017) on the early warning and response for preventing radicalization and violent extremism in Africa, it emerged that prisoners who might have been into contacts with extremist ideologies, even if they were not directly involved, tend to easily get radicalized inside the prisons immediately they have an opportunity to interact with those sympathetic to extremist ideologies. This is mainly because the tough prison environment forces some prisoners to look for anything to cling to or on even if such a move acts as an escapist strategy. Eventually this behaviour causes a lot of problems to the prisons security management. Furthermore, some prisoners have tended to engage in developing of violent extremist materials as a way of hitting back at the authorities and showing open hostility and anger in order to communicate their defiance.

The findings by Subedi (2017) applied in a wider African context, hence the need to conduct the current study in a more confined and specific study environment in Kenya's prison facilities. There are also prisoners who are driven by perceived glorifications of violence or religious extremism, opportunism, overexcitement, and adventure, among other weird thoughts which in turn give prisons authorities a hard time in terms of prison management in general. Although some studies have argued that the best way to deal with prisoners with terror-related criminal history is by identifying them so that they can be closely monitored or isolated (UNGA, 2015). Furthermore, this approach often proves untenable especially given the secretive nature of radicalization in general (Subedi, 2017). This secretive nature of radicalization is manifested by the way the prisoners involved operate in clandestine manner away from the view of the prisons authorities. This study thus looks also into how radicalization takes place in an environment that is deemed secure or under close monitoring and supervision with a high or maximum level of security.

Re-enacting or reinterpretation of ideologies has also been revealed as sometimes tending to render some prisoners too rigid to reasonably listen to the prisons authority or the rest of the prison population. Hence, deliberate use of extremist ideologies to reject or violate prison rules ultimately end up making it difficult for the management of prisons in general (Lauren and Calder, 2016). While some researches have recommended that such offenders motivated by ideologies to act violently should be identified and other more stringent means used to tame them (Subedi, 2017), this approach remains complex since most of such inmates tend to act discretely. Despite such complexities, the current study anticipated to provide recommendations on how to

chart a clearer roadmap on how to address radicalization in Kenyan prisons and generally address the broader question of security management in prison.

Further studies indicate that beliefs and attitudes of prisoners is a critical element in management of prisoners in Africa, and indeed elsewhere in the world (Akresh and Walque, 2008). The herd mentality has tended to influence some prisoners to give prison authorities hard times where radicalized ideologies play a central role in influencing the behaviours of inmates. Some also use such an opportunity to play victim of personal or group injustice by the prisons systems hence justifying their use of violence as means for expressing their grievances with the aim of receiving justice. However, since there are rules in every prison facility guiding on how such cases should be dealt with, the current study is suffice in helping to understand the extent to which such a strategy can work in favour of radicalized prisoners hence giving hard times to prison authorities.

Croissant (2007) carried out a study on Muslim insurgency, political violence and democracy in Thailand and noted that prisoners with a history of terror-related criminal records often harbored feelings of hate, frustration and alienation which often pushed some of them to show open hostility to prison authorities as a way of collective solidarity for seeking sympathy for those they feel their rights have been violated by the prison management. This generally presented a serious challenge to prison management in addressing the whole problem of radicalization and violent extremism in prisons. Radicalized beliefs and philosophies continue to give some prison authorities a hard time when it comes to management of the prison facilities. Hence, this sometimes

forces prison managements in many parts of the world to use unconventional means to contain prisoners, including isolating them in different blocks from the rest of the prison authorities. Despite the efforts by prison management to contain and control such prisoners, it is generally not easy to completely dissuade ideologically ‘indoctrinated’ prisoners from influencing others (UNDP, 2017).

Radicalized offenders are usually categorized as a delicate group of inmates who need clear institutional policy framework and properly trained staff to handle. In a study by Ogada (2017) to understand how to counter terrorism in Kenya revealed that in cases where a prison facility is keeping violent extremist offenders in isolation from the rest of the prison population, the right staffs are required to manage this category of inmates as this is a more daunting task. Consequently, prison staffs tasked with the responsibility of working with violent extremist offenders need to have proper training in order to effectively handle their responsibilities. Yet, a number of prison facilities, especially in Kenya, lack enough financial resources and effective infrastructure to consistently have well-trained staffs to manage violent extremist offenders within their care.

The prison society is commonly complex, where high skilled and more dynamic personnel are required for effective service delivery. However, often the constrained prisons environment makes it difficult to appreciate and motivate workers who dedicate their lives handling isolated radicalized inmates (Ogada, 2017). This failure often exacerbated by lack of clear policy guidelines, inadequate resources, poor managerial skills, and absence of goodwill from the government to improve the general prison

conditions (Williams, 2016) The situation is usually direr in most African countries, including Kenya, where the government does not always allocate enough finances for management of prison facilities due to constrained budgets.

In order to prevent radicalization in prison facilities, there is need for the authorities to focus on staff skills and competencies, especially given the complex nature of radicalization and extremist ideologies. Building of good prison staff also requires a clear understanding of dynamic cultural and religious norms and values that can help in effectively defining staff-offender relationship and creating mutual trust and respect. However, findings by UNDP (2016) indicate that prejudices and fear of prison staffs can sometimes lead to biased and negative interactions between prison personnel and the inmates; and this can undermine de-radicalization efforts.

Performance of every institution relies heavily on the capacity and training of its personnel. The whole process of preparing staff begins at the recruitment stage, with high likelihood that recruiting the right people will make it easy to give them the right job skills. Yet, according to Lauren and Calder (2016), a number of prison facilities face financial limitations to hire the right workforce with the capacity to effectively manage violent extremist. Studies further indicate that failure of majority of prison facilities to have specialized trained prison officers to identify and effectively handle radicalized offenders in prison usually set the wrong precedence in as far as effective management of violent extremist offenders is concerned (UNGA, 2015). The situation of lack of the right and more dedicated prison staff in most African jurisdictions is sometimes

worsened by corruption which sometimes features right from the time of recruitment of prison staff (Burke, Gelb and Horowitz, 2007).

The prison environment requires comprehensive and intense training of staffs for effective management of prisoners. From the onset the new prison recruits must be devoid of any criminal history; least of not have any link to violent extremist groups or organized criminal organizations a daunting task to achieve because of inadequate screening mechanism. Yet, due to lack of strict safeguards, some prison facilities are said to have been infiltrated by violent extremist sympathisers during recruitment, ultimately creating a difficult environment for the authorities to effectively and progressively deal with de-radicalization and counterterrorism in prisons (Zeiger and Aly, 2015). However, prison environments in different institutions or countries are not all the same. Moreover, the contexts of the previous studies were different from the current study, thus presenting both contextual and conceptual gaps. Hence, there was need to carry out the current study to understand the whole question of radicalization of prisoners and its implication to prisons security management in Kenya's prison facilities and how to bridge these gaps.

According to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, also known as the Nelson Mandela Rules, both prison staff and prisoners must be treated with dignity if prisons have to achieve their objectives as correctional facilities (UNGA, 2015). For the prison staff, they are expected to receive competitive remunerations, accorded human respect, and allowed to work in good general working conditions. It is anticipated that prison staff working under generally conducive environment would naturally be inspired to

carry out their duties in a more diligent manner, hence helping to effectively deal with the problem of radicalization in prisons. However, in many countries such as Kenya, prison facilities are replete with challenges, such as general poor working conditions and unsatisfactory pay for the prison officers (UNODC, 2016).

The problem of radicalization in prisons is a big threat to the prisons security. Often, a lot of resources otherwise intended for other general security matters are diverted to reinforce safety of individuals and property once there is suspected to be heightened terror-related incidences (UNDP, 2017). Furthermore, reinforcement of secure housing for prison staff and their families, enhancing of search equipment for vehicles entering prison compounds, and installation of effective alarm systems for the prison officers as well as for the entire prison system are some of the extra costs related to radicalization within and outside prison facilities. The findings by UNDP (2017) did not factor in the element of radicalization and the management of prisons security; which the current study focuses on.

According to Cole (2012), in low-resource countries, the biggest challenge would be overcrowded prisons where prisoners stand the risk of being deprived in many ways. Such situations may not only imply a violation of the prisoners' basic rights but also a contravention of the international standards for human existence. What is more, failure to meet the basic needs of inmates by prison management can turn to be exploited by violent extremist groups. For instance, when extremist groups provide food and protection to prisoners, loyalty can easily shift. Yet, these findings may not be generalized to all prison situations across different jurisdictions. The situation therefore

calls for the current study to determine the effect of radicalization of prisoners and its implication on the prisons security management in Kenya.

Vidino (2013) examined the influence of prison environment on radicalization and the European strategies against Jihadist radicalization in prison facilities. The study revealed that overcrowded and untidy prison environment makes it difficult for prison management to effectively monitor activities within prisons, hence unable to detect unusual happenings on time. Additionally, insecure and unruly prison atmosphere aggravates vulnerability of prisoners thereby making it easy for a revolt through radicalization and extremism philosophies. The study by Vidino (2013) was however carried out in Europe more than 8 years ago, hence presenting temporal and contextual gaps for the current study to address.

Denying negative religious space to extremists is another important strategy for combating radicalization in prisons. A study by Schmid (2012) indicated that this can only happen through proper vetting of Imams or Maalims preaching in prison facilities and keen scrutiny of their teachings which should guarantee passing of the right religious messages to the inmates. This would further curtail the possibility of infiltration of prisons by criminal elements with ulterior motives. Yet, this approach may be hampered by the fact that those who propagate radicalization keep on upgrading their strategies hence often staying ahead of the authorities. Thus, carrying out of this current study is important in addressing any contextual or conceptual gap, especially given that Schmid (2012) carried out the study almost 10 years ago in a European context.

Throughout literature review, different past empirical studies were critically examined based on thematic areas that emanated from specific objectives of the study. Despite very insightful findings under each of these themes, there were temporal (period), conceptual, contextual or methodological gaps that the current study strives to address. For instance, while trying to address the causes of radicalization in prisons, Botha (2013) carried out a study which focused on vulnerability of the youth in Kenya and how this lead them to engage in radicalized activities. The findings indicated that radicalization and extremism can largely be traced to schools of Islamic faiths, such as the Shia, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi.

Furthermore, the study noted that the vice had spread to prison facilities owing to high levels of susceptibility of prisoners in such institutions. Despite these findings, the study did not provide recommendations on how to address radicalization in prisons in Kenya. Furthermore, the study by Botha (2013) did not specifically focus on prisons in Kenya, but generally highlighted how the youth are affected by radicalization and violent extremism. Thus, the current study is critical in helping to understand radicalization of prisoners on the management of prisons security.

In another study by Acheson (2014), it was observed that the danger of prison radicalization raises two fundamental concerns. First, prisons provide an avenue for the extremists and terrorists to come into contact with ordinary criminals, thus likely influencing the latter with radical ideals. In this sense, prisons act as a conveyor belt when it comes to fanning radicalization, extremism and terrorist activities through new initiates rather than providing a forum for discouraging the risk of terrorist activities.

Yet, Acheson (2014) did not provide an alternative for prison security managements on how to isolate the two sets of prisoners in an effort to prevent further spread of radicalization and subsequent violent extremism. Similarly, the study by Acheson (2014) was carried out more than seven years ago, hence presenting a contextual limitation that the current study sought to address.

Neumann (2012) did a study on the al-Qaeda militant group's recruitment in Europe and how this impacted prisons security management in prison facilities. The study noted that imprisoned offenders isolated from their familiar and close associates to live within unfamiliar territories were haunted by their past and driven by the desire to rediscover themselves in new and habitually unfriendly surroundings. Such new realities could jeopardize the prisoners' faiths hence causing them to embrace radical and extremist tendencies as a matter of survival. Similarly, the context (Europe) of this study was different; hence the need for the current research which studies the selected Kenya prisons maximum facilities.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The study was anchored on Uncertainty-Identity Theory by Michael Hogg (2007), Deterrence Theory by Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century and became more popular since 1960s when it was associated with George Kennan and Rehabilitation theory of punishment by American sociologist Robert Martinson in 1974. Each of these theories helped to fill the gaps left by any of the other two theories in this research based on specific themes of focus for the study. The three theories were important in cementing the arguments fronted by the study around the whole subject of

radicalization of prisoners and its implication on the prisons security management. The use of three theories was informed by the inadequate nature of any single one of them to sufficiently cover all the four specific objectives of the study.

2.2.1 Uncertainty-Identity Theory

Uncertainty-identity theory stemmed from social identity perspective as propagated by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Turner (1985). Through this model, Hogg (2007) explains what motivates certain individuals to resort to self-categorization and subsequent identification with certain groups. The theory further postulates that individuals are usually motivated to reduce aversive uncertainty whenever they find themselves in such states, so that they can try to get rid of such negative drive state. According to Hogg and Adelman (2013), although there may be many ways of dealing with uncertainty, self-categorization or joining a group has been identified as one of the most effective strategies a number of individuals adopt.

The new group provides the new convert with an ideal environment that prescribes how to behave, feel and think. Ultimately, such scenario offers the individual a shared collective identity where the group members give each other hope through their common worldviews and perception of the self, thus reducing uncertainty. Uncertainty-identity theory has been variously used to explain why desperate individuals choose to join radicalized groups. For instance, although different theories explain the reason behind radicalization among individuals or groups, uncertainty-identity theory argues that individuals or groups are driven to engage in radicalization as a mechanism to

reduce their self-uncertainty, uncertain future, perceived failures or their unpleasant situations by engaging in group identification (Hogg and Wagoner, 2017).

Uncertainty-identity theory helps to address objectives one and two, which are about the causes of prisoners' radicalization in prisons facilities, and how radicalization is propagated in prisons facilities in Kenya. This may explain why some prisoners are attracted to associate with radicalized prison population for self-identity. This view tends to reinforce the argument by social identity theory that individuals usually use groups that they belong to in order to define their self-concept (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). By focusing on Kenya's prison facilities, the findings could be better focused to address this objective. According to Kruglanski et al. (2017), radicalization or extremism is deliberate deviation from the norm(s) of conduct in a given context. Extremist groups are therefore viewed as historically highly persuasive groups that have managed over time to lure people into joining them and/or supporting their ideology (Hogg, 2014).

McGregor, Prentice and Nash (2013) observed that extremist religious beliefs are defined by personal uncertainty emanating from the inability by certain individuals or groups to achieve an important life goal. Some individuals or groups therefore decide to adopt extreme convictions and idealistic approaches to their problems once they realize that their active goal is threatened. For instance, insecure forms of high self-esteem are often associated with defensive compensatory convictions, hence the reason for some prisoners joining radicalized groups as a perceived channel for achieving what they have failed to achieve through normative and legal means. This view is reinforced by

Doosje, Loseman and Van den Bos (2013) by observing that realistic threats activated by both individual and collective deprivation sometimes push individuals to develop distant relationships toward legally established systems and eventually culminate into violent attitude hence threatening the prisons security management.

Uncertainty-identity theory addresses the perspective that some of the extremist offenders are driven to commit crimes due to the pessimistic situations they find themselves. This includes low self-esteem which pushes the affected individuals to involve in crime as a way of compensating for their weaknesses. However, uncertainty-identity theory falls short of addressing the strategies to be applied in intervening on radicalization in prisons facilities. Hence, deterrence theory was included in order to help the researcher address the remedy or prevention measures to deny radicalized prisoners an opportunity to further their radical ideals or endanger the security of other prisoners, staff or the general prisons facility.

2.2.2 Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory became more popular in the 1960s when it was associated with George Kennan and commonly applied in research to help in explaining social phenomena based on individuals' perceived reward or punishment. The theory's application in the criminal justice field has been evident, especially in explaining why people avoid certain choices related to committing of crime. There are three main features of deterrence theory, namely the probability of arrest, the likelihood of conviction, and the harshness of penalty to the offender (Sitren and Applegate, 2012).

This study examined radicalization of prisoners and its implications in Kenyan Prison facilities on the prisons security management. Based on deterrence theory, it would imply that prisoners intending to get involved in radicalization would first have to weigh the likely consequences of their actions to them as individuals and how these would affect the prisons security management. From the perspective of the prison management and security agents, it would be imperative to deter radicalization among prisoners rather than wait to deal with the aftermath; which might be more expensive than prevention of further criminal acts (Paternoster, 2010). On the prisons security management front, deterrence of further radicalization could be achieved through strengthening of security systems in prisons and enhancing on interagency coordination where different stakeholders in the security effectively handle their respective roles.

According to Tittle, Botchkovar and Antonaccio (2011), one of the principles of deterrence theory relating to criminality entails the idea that the more severe the threat of punishment to the offenders, the more possibility that they will shun crime. Conversely, the higher the potential rewards, the higher affinity to criminal acts prospective offenders would have. "There are two types of deterrence which include specific and general in nature, while specific deterrence applies to individual criminals who when punished they are likely to avoid crimes in future because of stiffer punishment, general deterrence applies to the general public," (Paternoster, 2010). In either case, the threat of retaliation or punishment by the government is expected to deny the criminals an opportunity get involved in criminality again in future. There is also the aspect of absolute deterrence which seeks to apply punishment to deter unknown amount of crime from occurring (Tittle et al, 2011).

Considering the objectives of this study which included establishing the causes of radicalization of prisoners in prisons in Kenya, how radicalization occurs in prisons despite the tight security arrangements, the effects of radicalization on the prisons security management in Kenya, and determining the challenges associated in mitigating radicalization of prisoners in Kenya's prisons, the deterrence theory was very relevant in helping to put the study objectives into clear perspectives on the strategies on how to address radicalization of prisoners in prisons. The state security agencies and prison management have the onus to come up with laws and strategies on how to deter radicalization in prison facilities. Yet, these vices remain present within the prison population and elsewhere in the country. Using deterrence theory therefore, more stringent measures may be necessary to make the crime of radicalization less attractive and common in all spheres of society.

Since the study also focused on the challenges associated with mitigating prisoners' radicalization in security management in prisons facilities in Kenya, both uncertainty-identity theory and deterrence theory did not adequately help in addressing this specific objective, hence the need to introduce a third theory, the rehabilitation theory of punishment. The theory helps to emphasize the need for extremist offenders should receive rehabilitative services in order to help them to reform and change their behaviours or ideologies and also stabilize psychologically.

2.2.3 Rehabilitation Theory of Punishment

Rehabilitation theory of punishment was founded in 1974 by American sociologist, Robert Martinson. The theory postulates that punishment of offenders should be viewed

as a form of treatment and training so that they can be prepared for eventual reintegration into the society. This implies that offenders who have gone through this kind of ‘training’ should be in a better position to live within the confines of law whenever they complete their prison terms. According to Martinson (1974), rehabilitation is a humane alternative to retribution or deterrence. For the most part, the concept of rehabilitation would presume sending of the offender on probation under some strict conditions. Depending on circumstances, an offender may be forced to spend longer time in prison in order to undergo treatment and training.

Indeterminate prison sentence was also applied as a strategy in rehabilitation of prisoners such that at the end of the long period in prison they would be reluctant to go back to their criminal lives (Martinson, 1972). With respect to this study, a number of prisoners serving terror-related prison sentences often spend long periods in prison, hence giving some of them an opportunity to reform on the principle of change. Further studies on the applicability of rehabilitation theory on prisoners reform revealed that careful implementation of rehabilitation programs was most likely to reduce chances of reoffending hence having positive implication on the prisons security management .

Despite general acceptance of rehabilitation theory in reforming offenders, critics argue that it would be wrong to leave the entire sentencing and reform of prisoners to the discretion of prison administrators. The theory advocates for a situation where prisons management should be left to make judgment on when to release an offender based on his/her satisfactory assessment report. However, critics also argue that some prison administrators could easily become subjective in their assessments, thus ending up

arbitrarily detaining some prisoners longer than necessary. At the same time, there were cases of abuse of authority by prison administrators on the pretext of detaining offenders for long enough for them to reform. Longer detention of prisoners accused of minor offences were sometimes reported, especially under circumstances where such offenders were not ready and willing to be subservient to prison officers in authority for the former to gain favours (Butterfield, 2001). This theory informed the study on how radicalization of prisoners and its implications on the prisons security management can be mitigated to lessen insecurities, radicalization or extremism in prisons through rehabilitation, reformation and theory of change strategies.

The three theories were used to help address the different objectives of the study. For instance the Uncertainty-identity theory stemmed from social identity perspective as propagated by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Turner (1985) explains what motivates certain individuals to resort to self-categorization and subsequent identification with certain groups. This theory helped to address objectives one and two about the causes of prisoners' radicalization and propagation in prisons facilities in Kenya. It why some prisoners are attracted to associate with radicalized prison population for self-identity. Deterrence theory by Beccaria and Bentham (1960s) as associated with George Kennan and commonly applied in research helped in explaining social phenomena based on individuals' perceived reward or punishment. The theory helped to emphasize the need for extremist offenders to be deterred in order to prevent them from committing and engaging in other vices. Rehabilitation theory of punishment, 1974 by American sociologist, Robert Martinson helped to suggest strategies in form of treatment and training so that offenders can be prepared for eventual reintegration into the society.

These theories informed the study on how radicalization of prisoners and its implications on the prisons security management can be mitigated to lessen insecurities, radicalization or extremism in prisons through understanding and applying them in prison facilities.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

This section looked at how the variables were interrelated in the study based on the specific objectives of the study. The study focused on four independent variables which were; causes of radicalization, how it is propagated, effects of radicalization and associated mitigation challenges in radicalization of prisoners and their implications on the prisons security management whose relationship with the dependent variable (prisons security management) is illustrated in figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework

Source (Researcher, 2019)

According to Kuada (2012), a conceptual framework demonstrates a theoretical link between independent variables and the dependent variable of a study. A conceptual framework further illustrates how the variables being studied influence the outcome of the study, also known as the dependent variable. Kothari (2013) further argues that a conceptual framework provides an idea of how predictor variables determine the study outcome. This study focused on four independent/predictor variables, namely causes of radicalization, how it happens in prisons, effects and challenges encountered in addressing radicalization of prisoners in Kenya's maximum prisons. The four independent or predictor variables are presumed to influence the prisons security management.

As demonstrated in figure 2.1, each of the independent variables were further measured using various relevant sub-variables which helped to clearly define the relationship between the independent and the dependent variables. In between the independent and dependent variables is the intervening variables which help in explaining the causal links between the two variables. Hence, the conceptual framework provides a theoretical link between the factors being studied and the likely outcome of the study. The conceptual framework also acts as a snapshot of the foundation of the study being undertaken.

In this study, the conceptual framework depicts the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. From the foregoing on objective on about the causes of radicalization in prisons facilities, religious belief systems, ideological beliefs, poverty, and peer pressure are seen as critical factors that can influence prisoners to get

attracted to radical ideas while still in prison. Due to radical religious ideals and ideological beliefs, some individuals tend to develop weird convictions where it is not easy to convince them otherwise once they have taken certain decisions. This also applies to radicalization where most of the individuals associated with this phenomenon are viewed as very hard to change their hardcore behaviours and indoctrinated minds. At the same time, poverty and peer pressure can be seen as push factors for the inmates to get involved in radicalization.

How radicalization is being propagated in prisons can be considered include through contact/interaction, radical literature/material, internet/online or social media, radical preachers, and use of mobile phones. Constant interaction or contact with radicalized prisoners posed imminent danger to other prisoners in terms of possible converting to radicalization. Other risk factors included access to radical literature/materials, access to and increased use of the internet for communication, and access to mobile phones by prisoners. All these factors are potential contributors to accessing external influencers with the intent to corrupt the minds of prisoners facing different petty crimes so that they can embrace radicalism.

The effects of radicalization were viewed in terms of further radicalization, extremism, threat to prisons security, costs of imprisonment, and prison breaks and escapes. All the aforementioned sub-variables can determine the effects of radicalization on prisoners in prisons facilities in Kenya. The challenges associated with radicalization include; insufficient funds/capacity, overcrowding in prisons, inadequately trained prison officers, poor conditions of service and beliefs & attitudes. These four factors are

considered as independent variables while the prisons security management is considered as a dependent variable or the outcome of the study. A questionnaire and interview guide were used as research tools for collection of data and measuring of these variables.

There are indicators under each of the four broad independent variables. There is also what would be termed as intervening variables; in this case considered to be the existing government policy and regulations, strategies, training of officers, structural designs on how to deal with radicalization and other social controls. The interplay among all these factors at different levels would likely lead to radicalization of prisoners in prisons, which in turn would have a bearing on the prisons security management and vice versa. The dependent include enhanced prisons security, reduced radicalization, reduced extremism, less staff verses prisoner conflicts, observance of human rights, reduced costs of prisons maintenance, less prison breaks and reduced prison escapes.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology used in carrying out the study on radicalization of prisoners and its implication on the prisons security management. This is broken down as follows: research design, units of analysis, target population, sampling technique and sample size. In addition, the chapter highlights the research instruments, touching on their validity and reliability as well as pilot testing in order to guarantee credible data. Besides, data collection procedures, data analysis procedures, data management and ethical considerations are addressed. In summary, the chapter focuses on how the study was conducted, while providing the justification for the methods and techniques employed.

3.1 Study Design

The study employed both descriptive survey research design and exploratory research design. Descriptive survey research design was suitable in describing the phenomena the way they were (Saunders et al, 2013), and this was complemented by exploratory research design to get into the in-depth questioning on the causes and how radicalization of prisoners happens in prisons, effects and associated challenges in mitigating it. “Exploratory research design in addition presented an opportunity for the researcher to use facts or information already available and to analyze these to make a critical evaluation of the material,” (Kothari, 2013).

3.2 Research Sites

The study was conducted in Shimo La Tewa, Kamiti Maximum and Lang'ata Women's prisons. The three study sites were important for this study because of their security levels, contexts and other social dynamics such as gender (male and female) of the respondents.

Shimo La Tewa Maximum security Prison is located in Mombasa County and holds male prisoners. It has an estimated population capacity of 2400 prisoners and about 500 prisons officers. There is also more than 2000 civilians in the institution, either as families and relatives of the staff.

Kamiti Maximum Prison is located in Nairobi, it holds male prisoners. Although initially built for about 1400 prisoners, prison records indicate that Kamiti Maximum Prison now houses about 2800 prisoners, 500 officers besides more 2000 civilians who could either be families and relatives of the staff.

Lang'ata Women's Prison is located in Nairobi it holds female prisoners. It has approximately 800 prisoners, 400 officers and more than 1500 civilian populations who are mostly family members and relatives of the staff.

The three prison facilities were chosen for the study given that they their different geographical locations, same security level and stature, holding dangerous or high risk categories of prisoners such as terror offenders, robbery with violence, rape, murder, robbery among other serious criminal offenses. Furthermore, using the approach of involving three different male and women prison facilities provided an opportunity for

comparison of male and female prisoners' involvement in radicalization hence obtaining rich data for this research.

3.3 Target Population

The target population for the study were prisoners and prison officers in the three prison facilities namely Shimo la Tewa, Kamiti and Lang'ata Women Prison. Available statistics from prison records show that Shimo La Tewa Prison has an estimated population of 2400 inmates and about 500 prison officers. Lang'ata Prison has 800 inmates and 400 officers while Kamiti Prison has 2800 inmates and 500 staff. The total target population was therefore 7400 individuals, which formed the sampling frame for the study. These included prisoners and prisons officers.

Table 3.1 Target Population

Prison facility	Category		Total
	Prisoners	Officers	
Shimo la Tewa	2400	500	2900
Lang'ata	800	400	1200
Kamiti	2800	500	3300
Grand Total	6000	1400	7400

Source: Prisons Records 2018

It was important to involve both the inmates and prison officers so as to get varied viewpoints regarding the subject of the study. Prisoners and prison officers were interviewed for quantitative and qualitative data for in-depth understanding of the

subject of radicalization of prisoners in prisons. Several criteria were used to determine interviewees. In all cases, the minimum age category for the respondents was 18 years. Furthermore, at the time of the interview, the respondents, both the inmates and prison officers, must have served or stayed in the prisons for not less than one month. This was considered an ideal time period for the respondents to have had some reasonable experience in their respective prison facilities to be able to provide credible information for the study.

3.4 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

Given the main focus of the study as radicalization of prisoners in prisons and its implications on the prisons security management, purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to arrive at the suitable sample size of the respondents. The sample size for the study was representative as it effectively addressed the research questions. The number of terror related offenders at the time of study was totaling to 75 in all the three facilities (identified purposively and supported by the secondary data (Prison records) and through snowballing for those not known but among the rest of the prisoners' population) were interviewed. Primary and secondary data were used in the study in order to provide the current situation in prisons facilities regarding radicalization and security management of the maximum security facilities.

Snowballing was also used to identify respondents who could be among other prisoners but not known by the prisons but only through some signs and behaviours manifested and seen by the officers or even other prisoners that pointed at radicalization. On the other hand, 30 prison officers from the three prison facilities (10 each) who were

directly involved with handling of the terror related convicts or violent extremist (VEOs) offenders at their respective stations were purposively sampled to provide additional in-depth information regarding the subject of the study. The categories of the respondents included the chaplaincy, prisons junior and senior officers. Key informants were also involved from senior prison officers from the three stations where they were interviewed to inform on the study. Tables 3 .2, 3.3 and 3.4 present summary of the sample size.

Table 3.2 Sample Size for Quantitative Data (prisoners)

Prison facility	Frequency	Tool used	Methodology
Shimo la Tewa	32	Structured and Unstructured Questionnaires	Guided administration of the questionnaires
Lang'ata	4	„	„
Kamiti	39	„	„
Total	75		

Table 3.3 Sample Size for Qualitative Data (Prison Officers)

Prison facility	Frequency	Tool Used	Methodology
Shimo la Tewa	10	Interview guide	Oral interview
Lang'ata	10	„	„
Kamiti	10	„	„
Total	30		

Source: Researcher, 2018

3.5 Data Collection Instruments

The study adopted mixed method approach, using both quantitative and qualitative data for triangulation. This approach was appropriate to give cross-sectional and in-depth perspectives to the study. A structured questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data while interview schedules were used to collect qualitative data. A questionnaire was preferred for quantitative data due to its several advantages. According to Orodho (2005), questionnaires are more cost-effective, practical in terms of scalability or measurability and generating of quick results and convenient to code for data analysis.

Furthermore, questionnaires were easy to understand by both the interviewers and the respondents. Key informant interviews, which involved prison officer, were appropriate for key individuals in the prison facilities to give in-depth information regarding radicalization in prisons. The questionnaire was used for interviewing prisoners while the key informant interview guide was used to obtain detailed information from prison officers. All interviews were conducted by the researcher and research assistants, and were carried out within the prison facilities. However, the prison authorities restricted the use of electronic gadgets for audio-visual recording thus making tangible evidence of real time recording inaccessible.

3.6 Pilot Study

The pilot study was conducted at Naivasha Maximum Security Prison. The facility was suitable for the pilot based on its Security level, the prisoners held in the prisons facility including violent extremist offenders, standard operating procedures and similar living

environment as the study sites. The pilot study was conducted by the researcher and it involved five (5) terror related offenders for quantitative interviews and five (5) prison officers for the qualitative interviews. This was done in October 2018 two weeks prior to commencement of the actual study. The pilot study helped in correcting any ambiguities and inconsistencies in the research instruments for collection of the relevant information during the actual study. Furthermore, the pilot study ensured that the questionnaires and key informant interview guide were properly phrased for ease of understanding by the respondents.

3.6.1 Validity of Research Instruments

According to Orodho (2010), “validity is the degree to which a research instrument measures what it intends to measure and performs as it is designed to perform.” In order to guarantee validity, the researcher discussed the questionnaires with his academic supervisors to ensure that there was a match between test questions and objectives of the subject area of the study. Only inferences related to the specific objectives under discussions were considered during the match between test questions and content of the subject area. Pretesting of the research instruments was done to ensure flow and acceptability of the research questions in the study.

3.6.2 Reliability of Research Instruments

According to Orodho (2010), “reliability is a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results or data after repeated trials.” Reliability contributes to standardization of research instruments which in turn enables the results of a study to

be generalizable to the larger population though the topic under discussion can yield results on case by case basis. This is because radicalization of every individual varies despite the common denominator being radicalization in prisons.

A pilot study was done to understand where the questionnaire needed to be adjusted. In addition, reliability analysis was subsequently done using Cronbach's Alpha. Alpha coefficient ranges in value from 0 to 1 and was used to describe the reliability of factors extracted from dichotomous (that is, questions with two possible answers) and/or multi-point formatted questionnaires or scales (i.e., rating scale: 1 = poor, 5 = excellent). The higher the score, the more reliable the generated scale would be; therefore 0.7 was used as an acceptable reliability coefficient. The findings from the pilot helped to determine how to adjust the questionnaire based on the Cronbach's 0.7 theory.

3.7 Data Collection Procedure

After an approval of this study by Kenyatta University, NACOSTI and other relevant institutions including the prison facilities, the first step was the recruitment of two research assistants and training them on the research instruments. At the same time, a briefing on the study objectives and data collection processes was conducted for the research assistants. The two research assistants and the researcher worked in all the study facilities throughout collection of the data. An introduction letter with proper explanation of the nature of the research was attached to every questionnaire.

Confidentiality was assured to the respondents so as to gain their confidence and increase the response rate. The study involved either face-to-face or self-administered

questionnaires with close guidance and assistance during actual data collection. After fieldwork, an assessment of the filled questionnaires was done through serialization and coding in preparation for data entry. Data analysis, presentation and discussion then followed before conclusions and recommendations were finally made.

3.8 Data Analysis Methods

This study utilized both quantitative and qualitative data analysis methods. Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics, which included frequencies and percentages. Analyzed data was then presented using tables and figures such as bar graphs and tables for easy interpretation of the findings. Qualitative data on the other hand was analyzed based on emerging themes and patterns using thematic content analysis technique. They were presented in narrative and verbatim forms. Based on the study objectives, analyzed data were summarized and presented using tables, figures, and narratives. For purposes of easier reference to specific respondents involved in qualitative data collection where in-depth information was sought from them, they were assigned specific reference numbers, such as resp1, resp2, etc. The anonymized reference was necessary to protect the respondents' privacy and uphold the principles of anonymity and confidentiality in social research.

3.9 Data Management and Ethical Considerations

Orodho (2005) posits that, "every scientific study must conform to the ethical principles of research, where ethical considerations entail informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity during the research process." During data collection, participants were

informed of any possible harm if they were to participate in the research so that they can make an informed decision before agreeing to participate. According to Kothari (2013), “confidentiality involves treating participant’s information with discretion and trust where information given is not leaked to a third party and is only used for the purposes of the research; anonymity on the other hand entails using the information without revealing participant’s identities.” Generally, research ethics demand that all due protocol is observed, and that the participants are not in any way harmed following their involvement in the research.

During fieldwork, the researcher strictly adhered to all principles of ethical research. Before commencing actual fieldwork, all relevant authorizations from Kenyatta University, National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) and Kenya Prisons Service were duly obtained. During fieldwork, an introduction letter was used, explaining the intention of the study and outlining its main objective. Furthermore, the inmates were always interviewed with the blessings of the prison authorities. Before commencing any interview, introduction was done by the researcher or his research assistants where the respondents were informed of their role in the study. They were clearly informed that their participation was voluntary, and that the information they shared was only meant for the study. They were further informed that they had the freedom to disqualify themselves from participation if they felt any reason to do so, without any indictment. This assurance gave the research participants confidence enough to participate in the study and provide the right information for answering the research questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.0 Introduction

This study examined radicalization of prisoners and its implication on the prisons security management: a study of maximum security prisons in Kenya, with specific reference to Shimo La Tewa, Kamiti, and Lang'ata Women prisons. The study was guided by the following objectives: to establish the causes of radicalization in prison facilities, in Kenya to explore how radicalization is propagated in prison facilities, to examine the effects of prisoners' radicalization on the prisons security management, and to determine the challenges associated with mitigating prisoners' radicalization in management of prison facilities in Kenya.

4.1 Questionnaire Return Rate

It was imperative for the researcher to interrogate the number and percentage of the respondents who managed to successfully participate and provide credible information for addressing the research questions. This process was one of the many steps applied to assess the validity of data used in the study. Table 4.1 below summarizes the number of respondents that were anticipated to participate in the study, and those that managed to actually participate.

Table 4.1 Response Rate of prisoners

Prison Facilities	Sample Size		Response Rate	
	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Shimo La Tewa	32	43	22	69
Kamiti	39	52	28	72
Lang'ata	4	5	4	100
Total	75	100	54	72

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

Based on available official statistics, at the time of the interviews there were a total of 75 terror related offenders in the three prison facilities. These were spread as follows: Shimo la Tewa - 32, Kamiti -39, and Lang'ata Women prison - 4 prisoners. However, 54 out of 75 of them voluntarily accepted to be interviewed for the study which accounted for 72% response rate. On the contrary, 21 of them which accounted for 28% of the sample size refused or were reluctant to be interviewed as some said they were not interested and saw no need to participate in it since it was a waste of time to them. Despite their refusal, 72% was an impressive outcome of the response rate for an objective analysis. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), a response rate of 70% and above is excellent in terms of adequate data for helping to satisfactorily address the research questions. Summary of the response rate is presented in table 4.1 above.

To reinforce the quantitative data, thirty (30) selected prison officers and senior prisons management officials from the three (3) facilities were accessed and interviewed for


detailed information regarding radicalization of prisoners and its implication on prisons security management.

4.2 Demographic Information of the Respondents

The respondents' demographic background information was obtained based on their sex, age, marital status, religion, levels of education, and length of stay in prison. This information was critical in helping to determine the extent to which any of those aspects contributed in making choices with respect to getting involved in radicalization.

4.2.1 Distribution of Sex of the Respondents

The respondents were asked about their respective sex to help in determining if and to what extent sex dynamics influenced their decisions regarding their involvement in radicalization. Figure 4.1 below shows sex distribution of radicalization of offenders



interviewed for this study.

Figure 4.1 Respondents' Gender Distribution

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

Statistics in figure 4.1 shows that 50 (93%) of the respondents were males while 4 (7%) of them were females. The results were reflective of the situation on the ground where two male prison facilities were targeted against one for the women. Furthermore, out of the 75 sampled respondents (violent extremist offenders), only 4 happened to have been female who were in Lang'ata women's prison. All of the female VEOs were interviewed as presented in figure 4.1 above.

Studies have indicated that there may be a gender disparity when it comes to the number of terrorist suspects (Hodwitz, 2019), hence the need to disaggregate data based on the sex of the respondents (offenders). From the distribution of the respondents (VEOs) based on sex, it can be deduced that more male than female individuals get involved in violent extremism and terror activities. This was further demonstrated by the fact that at the sampling stage where the VEOs were purposively identified in the three prison facilities of Kamiti, Shimo la Tewa and Lang'ata Women prisons, only 4 inmates in the latter facility were identified as linked to radicalization and violent extremist groups while there were tens of them in the two male prisons. This was also linked to the causes of radicalization, such as religious, economic, political and other ideological factors which seemed not much attractive to the female as opposed to their male violent extremist offenders (Lloyd & Dean, 2015).

Studies have also indicated that, due to immense societal pressures placed on male on heavy family responsibilities, many of them are ready to take higher risks as opposed to

women (Kariuki, 2019). This explains why more male seemed to have a high attraction to violent extremist activities as compared to their female counterparts due to the needs that they wanted to achieve in life, such as monetary rewards.

4.2.2 Age Distribution of the Respondents

The respondents were asked about their ages as a possible determinant of the critical decisions individuals make in their social circumstances, such as associating and participating in radicalization. Figure 4.2 below provides a summary of the distribution of age categories of the respondents VEOs.




Figure 4.2 Respondents' Age Distribution

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

Based on the findings in figure 4.2, 24 respondents were aged 26-35 years accounting for 44% of the total interviewed. This category was followed by 12 of the respondents

aged 36-45 which accounting for 22%, and 10 of them aged 18-25 years accounting for 19% of the total number of respondents interviewed. 8 of respondents aged 56 years and accounted for 15% of the total respondents reached. None was aged between 45-55 years. From these statistics, it can be deduced that generally a greater majority of the respondents (violent extremist offenders) aged between 18-45 years old which together accounted for 46 (85%) of the respondents interviewed.

This distribution is a further confirmation that radicalization attracts fairly young people due to the high risk factors associated with this age category. Previous studies indicate that the risk of unemployment, illiteracy, drug abuse, and religious or ideological influences tend to affect young people negatively to a greater extent when compared to the older generation (Botha, 2013; Anzalone, 2012; Bruzzone, 2014). While it is true that social and economic pressures affect everyone in society regardless of their age, gender, religion/ideology or any other social dynamics, Cronin (2014) noted that relatively younger people tend to fall victim to radicalization than older ones. In the current study, the 26-35 years age category of VEOs accounted for the majority (44%) of the respondents. According to Kundnani (2012) & Wright (2012), this is the category of age that ideally has young and dependent families to raise.

Studies have also suggested that a number of young people between their teen and young adult ages tend to engage in radicalization and other criminal activities (Silke & Morrison, 2020). Some of the factors that contributed to this state of affairs included the youth's relatively high level of gullibility, low level of resilience, and low level of education, peer pressure, identity crisis, low self-esteem, and general desperation due to

unemployment, among others. These reasons resonate well with the uncertainty-identity theory stemming from social identity perspective as propagated by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Turner (1985). Through this model, Hogg (2007) explains that age factor motivates certain individuals to resort to self-categorization and subsequent identification with certain groups.

Uncertainty-identity further postulates that individuals are usually motivated to reduce aversive uncertainty whenever they find themselves in such states, so that they can try to get rid of such negative drive state. The stronger that kind of feeling is in an individual, the more such an individual strives to get rid of the negative feeling in order to feel confident about who he or she is. The new group provides the new convert with an ideal environment that prescribes how to behave, feel and think. Ultimately, such scenario offers the individual a shared collective identity where the group members give each other hope through their common worldviews and perception of the self, thus reducing uncertainty.

Although different theories explain the reason behind radicalization and extremism among individuals or groups, uncertainty-identity theory argues that individuals or groups are driven to engage in radicalization as a mechanism to reduce their self-uncertainty, uncertain future, perceived failures or their unpleasant situations by engaging in group identification (Hogg and Wagoner, 2017). This can explain why some prisoners are attracted to or find it more convenient to associate with radicalized prison population for self-identity. This view tends to reinforce the argument by social

identity theory that individuals usually use groups (sometimes based on age categories) that they belong to in order to define their self-concept (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

4.2.3 Marital Status of the Respondents

The respondents were asked about their marital status to understand whether marital pressures and responsibilities in any way influence their decisions to engage in radicalization activities.

Figure 4.3 below summarizes marital status of the respondents (VEOs).




Figure 4.3 Respondents' Marital Status

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

From the findings in figure 4.3 above, 29 respondents accounting for 54% of the respondents were married while only 1 respondent accounting for 2% was divorced. At

the same time, 18 respondents accounting for 33% of the respondents were single, 4 of the respondents accounting for 7% were widowed, and 2 of the respondents accounting for 4% were separated. This explains why those married and other categories could have fallen into the trap of promises of the material gains (monetary and other promises) and good lives for them and their families. According to Silke & Veldhuis (2017), married people were more likely to be pushed into radicalization and possible extremist activities with the hope of receiving monetary gains for taking care of pressing family responsibilities, such as educating their children.

Since marital status of an individual can influence the decisions they make in life, especially due to the responsibilities that come with married life, it was imperative for the study to consider marital status of the offenders. Analyzed alongside sex differentiation of the respondents (VEOs) where 93% of them were male, this lend further credence to the argument that family pressures and responsibilities are playing a significant role in people's involvement in radicalization and extremist activities. Furthermore, these findings corroborate the revelations by Botha (2013), Cronin (2014) and Kundnani (2012) in their studies of radicalization, where marital status was a critical element in individual's decision making regarding their involvement in radicalization.

4.2.4 Religion of the Respondents

The respondents were asked about their religion to find out if in the actual sense there is any connection between religion and involvement in radical activities by different individuals. Figure 4.4 illustrates distribution of the respondents' religious affiliations.

Also, by and large, radicalization has in one way or the other often been associated with religion (Luders et al, 2016); hence it was crucial to get this information about the respondents.




Figure 4.4 Respondents' Religion

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

From the statistics in figure 4.4, 41 respondents accounting for 76% of the respondents were professing Islam, 11 of the respondents accounting for 20% Christianity while 2 of the respondents accounting for 4% practiced other religions. 'Other' religion included all other religious affiliations except Islam or Christianity. These included no religion, Buddhism, Hinduism, and traditional African religion, among others. Distribution of these findings indicated that a greater majority of the radicalized individuals were affiliated to the Islamic religion or those who have just converted from other religions. Although there is no direct link of radicalization to Islam, some studies have tended to suggest that most of the extremist ideals associated with radicalization originally stem from misinterpretation of the Quran and eventual perpetration of extremist views and activities (Luders et al, 2016; Acheson, 2016; Abdul, 2015).

4.2.5 Level of Education of the Respondents

The respondents were asked about their level of education as an important factor that is widely believed to influence individuals' critical decisions about their social, spiritual, ideological, political or economic lives or circumstances. Distribution of these responses is presented in figure 4.5 below.




Fig. 4.5 Respondents' Level of Education

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

On the level of education of the respondents, 20 respondents accounting for 37% of them had attained primary, 16 respondents accounting for 30% had acquired other education status which included madrassa and no formal education, 11 respondents accounting for 20% had reached high school while 7 of the respondents accounting for 13% had gone up to middle level colleges and none had university degree.

From the above findings, it can be inferred that most radicalized offenders had minimal formal education. This can mean that they were not in position to critically analyze what they were being told by those who radicalized and recruited them (Wright, 2019). In this sense, most of them were ignorant and gullible. Cumulatively, 47 respondents

accounting for 87% of the respondents had obtained between primary, high school and other forms of education which in this case meant informal school such as madrassa or no education at all. The remaining 7 respondents accounting to 13% who had college education indicated that it was not only the uneducated that can be manipulated into radicalization and recruitment into a VE group but also those who are educated depending on other risk factors such as ideological narratives, economic factors among others in the society or even prisons facility.

From the findings in figure 4.5, it is evident that just a minority 13% of the respondents had middle level college education, which was the highest. Studies by Wright (2019) and Khalil et al (2019) noted that majority of radicalized individuals in society had primary or no education at all. The less educated were mostly associated with lack of formal employment or stable business, hence most vulnerable when it came to being enticed to join illegal groups with the hope of receiving monetary rewards in return. The argument by Wright (2019) and Khalil et al (2019) were replicated in this study where, by virtue of their inferior education achievement, the VEOs in this study were likely to have poor formal employment history; a fact that can easily render certain individuals vulnerable and hence prone to manipulation. Muindi (2020) also noted that equally important in critical decision-making processes is an individual's level of education as this can also have a direct influence on the kind of decisions they make and worldviews. As demonstrated in this study, majority of the VEOs had low education qualifications which can be linked to their low employability or income levels; factors that are likely to play a central role when deciding to involve in radicalization or terror-related activities. In my view, though all those interviewed did not have University education,

there is no concrete empirical evidence that only those with low level of education were directly associated with radicalization in prisons.

4.2.6 Length of Sentence/Stay in Prison

The length of sentence or stay in prison was important for helping to understand the nature and extent of exposure of the extremist offenders to the prison environment. This information would further be instrumental in determining factors that influence prisoners to be lured or lure other prisoners into radicalization and extremist activities.

Figure 4.6 presents a summary of the respondents' period of stay or service in prisons.




Figure 4.6 Respondents' Period Served in Jail (in Years)

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

Regarding the period the respondents have served or stayed in prison since their remand or conviction, there were 27 respondents that account for 50% of the total respondents whose cases had not been heard (remands). On the other hand, for those already convicted, 12 of the respondents accounting 22% of them have been in prisons for over 10 years, 8 of the respondents accounting for 15% have served for 1 month-3 years

while 7 of the respondents that accounted for 13% had been in prison for 4-6 years. Based on these findings, it is noted that most extremist offenders spend a very long time in remand awaiting their cases to be heard and determined. Studies by UNDP (2017) and Marsden (2016) noted that the longer periods of stay in prisons or remands provided prisoners with an ample time to identify their targets from among the pool of other prisoners in the facilities to lure them into radicalization and extremism. Those in remands expressed their pessimism regarding how long it was likely to take before their cases were heard and determined, thus affecting them psychologically and socially. The findings also supports the uncertainty-Identity theory that places self-identification of individuals at the centre of some of the causes of radicalization in prisons. The long imprisonment and stay in remand could have negative implication with the prisons security management as it requires that good security arrangements, structures and well trained personnel are deployed thus stretching the resources available.

4.3 Radicalization of Prisoners and Prisons Security Management

The study examined the radicalization of prisoners and its implication on prisons security management in selected maximum prisons in Kenya. Specific focus included establishing the causes of prisoners' radicalization in prisons, how radicalization happens in prisons, effect of prisoners' radicalization on prisons security management, and challenges associated with mitigating prisoners' radicalization in the prisons security management in Kenya.

4.3.1 Causes of Prisoner's Radicalization in Prisons facilities

The first objective of the study was to establish the causes of radicalization of prisoners in Kenya. Asked to whether the respondents were aware of any prisoner being involved in radicalization, majority 32 of the respondents accounting for 59% of the 54 respondents among the VEOs said that there was nothing like that going on in prisons whereas 22 of the respondents accounting for 41% of them were of a contrary opinion, stating that radicalization of prisoners in prisons facilities was actually happening. Despite the contradictory opinions, it was evident that the vice was being witnessed in Kenyan prisons. Besides the prisoners who provided much of the data, the key informants interviewed for in-depth information also corroborated the former by acknowledging that there were cases of radicalization in prison facilities. A few cases had, for instance, been reported of prisoners converting to Islam through influence by those related to terror offenses – a religion which was largely associated with radicalization. Although discreetly and covertly undertaken, the influence into converting was allegedly driven by monetary gains. To the prison authorities, these activities posed a serious challenge to prisons security management.

Similar sentiments regarding existing radicalization in prisons were expressed by key informants from senior prisons management, with the common sentiments revolving around the fact that radicalization of prisoners was not a strange phenomenon in prison facilities. However, due to the general unfriendly conditions in most prisons in the country, some inmates were forced by circumstances to covertly involve in radicalization. The intricacy of the phenomenon of radicalization poses serious security

challenges not only to the facilities and the prison officers, but also a big threat to other security organs in the country. As respondent 5 (prisons senior officer) said,

I see radicalization is real in our prisons and the general society today, including a number of government institutions. A number of prisoners often exhibit funny behaviours, which the prison management sometimes suspects to be associated with radicalization. For instance, recently we experienced instances of withdrawn behaviour among 5 inmates, which we were forced to investigate further. Although we are yet to conclude the matter, but these are serious indicators of radicalization. We have also heard in various parts of the country of teenage boys disappearing without a trace. These incidences are worrisome to security apparatus because you can imagine what would happen in the security sector if it turns out that for sure these children are joining terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab.

Furthermore, using a 5-point Likert scale, the respondents were interviewed about the frequency of certain signs among fellow prisoners, which were associated with radicalization of prisoners in prisons. Table 4.2 illustrates a summary of some of the common signs that were related to radicalization of prisoners.

Table 4.2 Signs of Radicalization of Prisoners

Radicalization signs	<i>1= not at all</i>	<i>2= rarely</i>	<i>3= moderately</i>	<i>4= frequently</i>	<i>5= most frequently</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>
Sudden change of behavior over a very short period of time (appearances, religion, beliefs etc.)	10 (19)	21 (39)	1 (2)	11 (20)	11 (20)	54 (100)
Seeking, reading, listening to and watching certain radical materials	12 (22)	17 (31)	8 (15)	9 (17)	8 (15)	54 (100)
Actively displaying aggression against other prisoners not in the same group or religion	5 (9)	7 (13)	5 (9)	21 (39)	16 (30)	54 (100)
Converting to a new religion or interest in the religion	14 (26)	18 (33)	7 (13)	8 (15)	7 (13)	54 (100)
Vulnerable/easily impressionable and susceptible to peer pressure	6 (11)	6 (11)	5 (9)	18 (33)	19 (35)	54 (100)
Reject authority or establishment	5 (9)	7 (13)	9 (17)	19 (35)	14 (26)	54 (100)
Using dehumanizing or derogative language against prisoners from certain religion or background	8 (15)	13 (24)	11 (20)	11 (20)	11 (20)	54 (100)
Intolerance to other prisoner's views on belief or religious matters	4 (7)	7 (13)	9 (17)	17 (31)	17 (31)	54 (100)
Celebration when a terrorist attack occurs	3 (5)	5 (9)	25 (46)	11 (20)	10 (19)	54 (100)
Voluntary preaching to inmates or Self-imposed preachers	2 (4)	5 (9)	9 (17)	21 (39)	17 (31)	54 (100)

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

Regarding whether there were observations of sudden change of behaviour over a very short period of time, such as appearances, religion, beliefs etc., 19% of the respondents indicated that it never happened at all, 39% said it rarely happened, 2% moderately, 20% frequently and most frequently in equal measure. On whether there were signs of suspicion such as seeking, reading, listening to and watching certain radical materials, 22% said it did not exist at all, 31% rarely, 15% moderately, 17% frequently, while 15% indicated that these signs were witnessed most frequently. At the same time, there were strong indications that some prisoners frequently (39%) and most frequently (30%) actively displayed aggression against other prisoners not in the same group or religion. However, 33% of the respondents indicated that converting to a new religion or interest in the religion was rarely experienced while only 15% and 13% indicated that this frequently and most frequently happened respectively.

Concerning whether there was any sign of prisoners being vulnerable or easily impressionable and susceptible to peer pressure, 35% of the respondents indicated that this happened most frequently while 33% said that it occurred frequently. At the same time, 11% of the respondents had the opinion that this did not happen at all or rarely occurred. There were also indications that cases of prisoners rejecting to heed the authority or establishment in prisons happened frequently (35%), with only 9% suggesting that this did not happen at all. However, on whether there were cases of prisoners using dehumanizing or derogative language against fellow prisoners from certain religion or background, the reactions were divided on almost an even scale, frequently (20%), most frequently (20%), moderately (20%), rarely (24%) and not all (15%).

There were also cases of some prisoners expressing signs of intolerance to other prisoners' views on belief or religious matters where 31% of the respondents indicated that this happened frequently and most frequently in equal measure. At the same time, 17% of them opined that this happened moderately, 13% rarely, while 7% suggested that this did not happen at all. On whether there were any signs of celebration when a terrorist attack occurs, 46% of the respondents indicated that this happened moderately, 20% frequently, 19% most frequently, 9% rarely while 5% said this did not occur at all. However, it appeared that voluntary preaching to inmates or self-imposed preachers was a common occurrence, with 39% of the respondents saying it happened frequently while 31% indicating that this occurred most frequently.

From the foregoing findings, it was evident that there were certain common signs that were related to radicalization of prisoners. These findings also showed that single sign or indicator should not be conclusively used to mean that radicalization is taking place. Hence, it was important that all other set of early warning signs are taken into account. Moreover, a 5-point Likert scale was used to examine the extent to which radicalization of prisoners exists in prisons and how the phenomenon impacts prisons security management.

Table 4.3 Radicalization

Stem	<i>1= no extent at all</i>	<i>2= to a small extent</i>	<i>3= to some extent</i>	<i>4= to a large extent</i>	<i>5= to a very large extent</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>	<i>n(%)</i>
To what extent do you think radicalization of prisoners exists in this prison?	0 (0)	19 (35)	27 (50)	8 (15)	0 (0)	54 (100)

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

As indicated in table 4.3 above, whereas none of the respondents said that the problem existed to a very large extent or that it did not exist at all, 27 of the respondents accounting for 50% of them expressed the opinion that radicalization existed in prisons to some extent, 19 of the respondents accounting for 35% said it existed to a small extent, and 8 of the respondents accounting for 15% opined that the issue existed to a large extent. Overall, based on this statistical distribution, it was evident that there was radicalization being propagated in prisons. These findings corroborated the views by a number of previous studies which established that despite prisons being places for rehabilitation of offenders, ironically they provided fertile ground for furtherance of terrorist networks (Omar (2009; Shaykhutdinov and Achilov, 2012; Schmid, 2014; Botha, 2013; Anzalone, 2012; Bruzzone, 2014).

On whether radicalization poses any security threats on the management of prisons security, the findings indicated there were various threats in the sense that the terror networks involved individuals and entities from within and outside the facilities. The key informants further explained that given the covert operational manner of terrorist groups and their associates, the more there was infiltration of the outlawed groups into prisons and other government institutions, the more complicated it became for the security agencies to deal with the phenomenon. On this account, more resources and more sophisticated strategies were required for uprooting the problem from the prison facilities and associated illegal networks. On the other hand, there were concerns from

the key informants about the general threat that radicalization and violent extremism posed to national security.

Some of the common warning signs exhibited by those who later turned to be recruits to radicalization and terror-related networks included violent or hate rhetoric, sudden change in religious practice, cultural or religious isolation and defiance to the law enforcement agencies. There were also cases of withdrawal, change in daily routine, solitude and high level of privacy, extreme opinions and change of associates among other indicators in the prisons facility.

Besides the dynamics of radicalization of prisoners in prison facilities, it also turned out that the most vulnerable prisoners were majorly the target of terrorist groups which for instance capitalized on desperate individual prisoners to lure them into terrorist activities. For instance, the findings revealed that individuals were promised huge sums of money for their families if they complied to participate in radicalization or terror-related activities. Apart from the individuals who get excited about the material things and money, those with low levels of education also commonly fell victims due their limited opportunities since even when they were released they did not have much prospects in terms of job opportunities. Furthermore, most of the petty offenders who may be released soon (whether remanded or already convicted) were very much willing to join the radical groups. This mostly happened when the prisoners were about to be released, with promises of a lot of favours to them and/or their families upon release. Respondent 6 (a senior prisons management officer) had the following to say in relation to enticement:

'Many prisoners who felt vulnerable were likely to be converts who were not well versed with Islamic religion. Based on the promises they were given that they would be provided with lawyers to handle their cases. Some were promised cash inducements for themselves or their families. It is evident that some of these converts have been bonded or released, and we hear that some of them sometimes tend to cross the Somali border once they get the opportunity for example Salim Rashid Mohamed skipped court and escaped with a bond of Kenya shillings 1.5 million.'

Furthermore, the findings noted that Muslim prisoners who were serving relatively short terms were prone to embrace radicalization with the hope of getting rewarded upon release. Similarly, those who converted from Christianity were easily duped into joining radical and extremist groups where a lot of promises were given to them upon joining. On the other hand, prisoners serving long sentences were targeted based on their frustrations of imprisonment in prison. They were promised lawyers to handle their cases. These sentiments were captured well by respondent 3 (a prison officer) who said the following:

'Extremist groups usually target the prisoners serving long sentences or those who have already been condemned to hang. Given their long suffering and seemingly bleak future for themselves and their families, they readily accept to join these groups with the hope of getting some help, especially financial assistance.'

It also emerged that some of the new converts were influenced by their peers who may have received in one way or the other some assistance from the radicalized or terrorist groups.

Regarding who actually radicalized the prisoners, it emerged that other violent extremist offenders were in the forefront in radicalization of their fellow prisoners. Also, misinterpretation of the Quran writings led semi-illiterate prisoners to easily embrace radicalized ideals, especially as coined by some dishonest spiritual leaders or preachers

to serve their selfish interests, and those of their radicalized groups at large. There were also opinions by some respondents that radicalized ideas did not only emanate from prisoners but also from some prison staff. According to respondent 8 (a prison officer),

'Radicalization did not happen only through fellow prisoners. Some prison staffs such as the officers were conduits of radicalization groups. Although this was propagated in a very discreet manner, it was common for some prison officers to influence prisoners to convert into extremists with the promise that they would be secured release or their families would be given some financial assistance including school fees for their children and food for their suffering families back at home. Such promises were even readily taken to be serious especially coming from officers who symbolized authority within the prison precincts. Of course it was not easy to verify such pronouncements, but that is common.'

Concerning how exactly radicalization took place in prisons, it came out that this was mostly done through verbal communication especially during madrasa lessons. Also, though there were also some cases of sneaked in mobile phones to target certain individuals for propagating radicalized ideals in prisons. This took place mostly during evening prayer hours when some prisoners would be meeting alleged Quran preachers who sometimes turned out to be having different agenda of radicalization to vulnerable prisoners. Looking at both the quantitative and qualitative data by the respondents and their interpretation, it can be deduced that there is radicalization of prisoners in prisons despite the mechanisms put in place by the prisons regime to prevent it. This is mainly because the risk assessment tools and methodology may not be adequate to discover all the character aspects in all inmates. Nevertheless, there were indications that radicalization existed in prisons. Figure 4.7 below provides a summary of frequency of terror-related cases in prisons.




Figure 4.7 Frequency of Terror-related Cases in Prisons

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

Regarding how frequent or rampant radicalization manifests itself in prisons, the respondents expressed mixed responses, as analyzed based on a 5-point Likert scale where 1=never 2=least frequent, 3=less frequent, 4=frequent, and 5=very frequent. On frequency of custody of prisoners suspected of terror-related activities, statistics indicated that majority 39 of the respondents accounting for 72% of the respondents expressed that this happened less frequently. On the other hand, 11 of the respondents accounting for 20% of the respondents said that they did not think that this happened at all. 4 of the respondents of the respondents accounting for 7% said that it was least frequent. There was no responses for frequent and very frequent from the data collected and analysed. From this analysis, it can be deduced that although there were cases of radicalization in prisons, the trend was not very worrying. This could further imply that the covert operational manner of terror groups made it difficult to easily identify individuals associated with the phenomenon.

The findings on the causes of radicalization of prisoners generally indicated that this phenomenon is real in Kenya prisons though undertaken covertly. Although not happening overtly, this phenomenon was particularly related to the vulnerable prisoners who were lured into joining radicalization and terrorist related networks through some of their fellow prisoners who propagated radical tendencies. From qualitative data, it was found that, a number of prisoners were believed to be hoodwinked to join radical groups with promises that either they or their families were going to be given monetary rewards. The continued trend posed complex challenges not only to the prison authorities charged with the day-to-day running of security and safety affairs of the prison population, but also to the other security agencies owing to the revelations that radicalization activities inside prison facilities involved networks of individuals and groups. By extension, this scenario presented a significant threat to national security.

The findings of this study on the number of cases of terror related prisoners brought to prisons have significant links to previous studies on radicalization and extremism inside and outside prison facilities. Contrary to what Shaykhutdinov and Achilov (2012) allege that little is mentioned about how radicalization takes place in prisons, this study revealed that a lot is happening albeit often in a covert or secret manner. In agreement with the findings of this study, Anzalone (2012) noted that most prisoners of Islamic following who were serving short jail terms were likely to embrace the ideals of radicalization and extremism with the hope of being rewarded upon completion of their jail terms. And so was the case with the new Muslim converts, who were eager to join radicalized groups in anticipation for money and other enticements promised. Schmid (2014) reiterated this point by arguing that the presence of the al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda

terror groups has significantly been felt in Kenyan prisons, spreading the influence even to those imprisoned for different crimes.

The United Nations and the international community in general recognize the primary role of prisons holding violent extremist prisoners in contributing to public safety (UNDP, 2016). In this regard, prison facilities are expected to ensure that the prisoners remained in lawful custody while at the same time the prisons security management tactfully engaging to deter them from spreading radicalized ideals within and outside the prisons. However, past studies have indicated that the complexity of radicalization and the general administrative inefficiencies in a number of prison facilities across the world make it difficult to decisively address radicalization in prisons (Doosje, 2013; Kariuki, 2019).

As noted by respondent 13 (a senior prisons officer) about whether radicalization of prisoners has effects on the prisons security management like prison breaks or escapes, this phenomenon has the potential to affect the entire national security system.

'The intricacy of radicalization where many things happen in a covert manner makes it difficult to root it out in prison facilities, and other institutions in general. It turns out that at times the web extends even to include prisons security management where some prison officers are involved. It is therefore not lost on us that radicalization in prisons ever remains a matter of serious concern to the prison management and other security agencies in the country'.

The intricate process through which known terrorist networks in the Kenyan cross-border neighbourhoods operate definitely presents serious security concerns, not only to the prison security and authorities, but also to other national security agencies. For instance, the al-Shabaab terror group whose origin is linked to the neighbouring

Somalia has on several occasions been linked to disappearance of young people, especially in coastal areas and the northern frontiers of Kenya, such as Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir among other areas. The report that some of the weapons and military architecture allegedly used by the al-Shabaab were linked or traced to other countries meant that security of the Kenyan borders was in jeopardy. However, study revealed that prisons management tries their best to deal with radicalization of prisoners in Prisons facilities in Kenya.

Regarding the mode of spread of radicalization in prisons, it emerged that among other means, peer pressure played a critical role in getting prisoners to be enjoined in radicalized and extremist groups. Other violent extremist offenders were also in the forefront in radicalization of their fellow prisoners. Also, misinterpretation of the Quran writings led semi-illiterate prisoners to easily embrace radicalized ideals. There were also indications that radical ideas did not only emanate from prisoners but also from some prison staff. These sentiments were however in contradiction with the findings by Anzalone (2012) which indicated that the government was largely to blame for not withdrawing its security forces from Somalia hence encouraging widespread radicalization not only in the prisons but also in a general society.

Further, contrary to the findings of this study, Botha (2013) had a different view on this subject, with the study tracing radicalization and extremism in Kenyan prisons to various schools of Islamic inclinations such as the Shia, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi. For Bruzzone (2014), the presence of radicalization in Kenyan prisons can be traced to rampant joblessness among young people in the country who were easily lured

into the trap with the hope of getting money and other material rewards or affluent lives for their families while in prison and upon release. The findings of the current study corroborated the revelations by Bruzzone (2014) on the account that involvement in terrorist and violent extremist activities by many unemployed youth was a time bomb in as far as security both in prisons and nationally was concerned. The more a number of young people are lured to join terror-related groups such al-Shabaab and al-Qaida in the region, the more the scenario put the rest of the country at risk of attacks from external insurgencies (Kariuki, 2019).

By the findings linked the spread of radicalization to some prison officers means that the problem could be bigger than imagined. Some prison officers were abdicating their role of preventing this crime and abetting it instead by smuggling in communication gadgets like mobile phones and some uncensored literature materials in exchange of money as reported by both prisoners and some senior officers in Kamiti, Shimo la Tewa and Lang'ata Prisons thus threatening the prisons security. Some key senior officers responded that they had realized that other avenues for spreading terrorist and extremist crime were during madrassa lessons or sermons by radicalized preachers who come in while disguised as genuine ones. The link of preachers to terrorist activities also posed serious security concerns, especially given the very young minds involved in madrassa where poisoning of their value system, beliefs and activities could easily be influenced and eroded through brainwashing. The scenario risks prisons security even further, especially on the account that terrorist beliefs and activities thus having some security risk implications among the prisoners and staff. A key senior security officer (28) at Shimo la Tewa Maximum Security Prison had the following to state.

‘Most of these prisoners especially those charged for terror related offences are hostile to the prisons establishment. They reject the officers taking care of them. They don’t want the prison Maalims to take them through madrassa classes or other religious teachings and preaching. They prefer to be administered to by external Maalims instead of the government appointed thus raising more questions and answers as to why they prefer so. There have also been some cases of sneaked contrabands by visitors or external preachers who disguises themselves as genuine despite the prison vetting process.’

Regarding causes of radicalization in prison facilities, the findings indicated that some of the factors that commonly featured included religious belief systems, political inclinations, and peer pressure which is associated with perceived monetary benefits to the new converts. There was also the case of high levels of poverty and/or unemployment which left a number of potential converts to be easily lured into joining terrorist group networks. Furthermore, on a scale of a 5-point Likert, the study noted mixed reactions from the respondents regarding some of the possible contributory factors to radicalization in prison facilities in Kenya.

Table 4.4 Factors Contributing to Prisoners’ Radicalization

Factors Contributing to Radicalization/Extremism	1=never	2=very rarely	3=rarely	4=frequently	5=very frequently	Total
	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)
Religious belief systems	13(24)	4(7)	6(11)	24(44)	7(13)	54(100)
Political inclinations	21(39)	3(6)	22(41)	8(15)	0(0)	54(100)
Others (Peer pressure, illiteracy, economic, or personal pleasures)	35(65)	5(9)	7(13)	6(11)	1(2)	54(100)

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

Based on the statistics in table 4.3, religious beliefs took the lead, with 57% of the respondents agreeing that this factor contributed to individuals embracing radical ideals. On the contrary, ‘other’ factors did not play a very significant role, with 74% of the respondents expressing this view. In this case, ‘other’ factors included peer pressure, illiteracy, economic pressures and personal pleasures or desires that drove individuals to indulge in radicalized activities. At the same time, 41% of the respondents had the opinion that political influence contributed to radicalization of prisoners in prisons.

Those who rooted for religious beliefs as the main contributory factor to radicalization activities linked this to the purported defense of the Muslim religion by the outlawed groups, such as the al-Shabaab insurgencies. One of the VEOs had the following to say:

‘A number of radicalized groups have been linked to radicalization in prisons, with al-Shabaab and al-Qaida featuring a lot. However, I can’t say that these groups’ activities can easily be detected in prisons’ radicalization activities’.

On whether they considered themselves as radicalized, the VEOs interviewed indicated that they were being prosecuted by those opposed to what the former believed to be justified under their religion. These sentiments were corroborated by some of the key informants who claimed that some of the VEOs seemed to justify their actions by what they termed their intention to achieve ‘caliphate’.

In my view, the denial of political involvement by those high risk extremist offenders could point out to a tactical and strategic approach by the leaders, radicalizers and recruiters to hide their real Intentions or goals from the prospecting recruits while brainwashing them with radical ideological messages. Some of these logically twisted messages included the insinuations that their religion (Islam) is being targeted, its

followers oppressed, marginalized, killed and their lands or states being taken away by the non-believers. Respondent 47 (one of the VEOs in Lang'ata women prison) had the following to state:

'We are killed, our children do not attend Madrassa, our religion is being targeted by infidels, our states or lands are targeted to be taken away..... (Paused) look at what is happening in Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Somali among other Islamic and Arab States..... is it not enough reason for us to fight for our brothers?' (She asked).

The general sentiments expressed in the current study agreed with the views by a number of previous studies (Cronin, 2014; Kundnani, 2012; Wright, 2012; Jones, 2014; Mark, 2014; Neumann, 2012; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Hegghammer, 2013). Based on the general findings by these authors, some of the many causes of radicalization included religious ideologies, political factors, material or monetary influences, marginalization of individuals and groups among others. For instance, according to Hegghammer (2013), political and ideological factors were commonly behind radicalization in many countries, including in prison facilities.

These revelations were not very different from what other literatures on this subject have. For instance, although Cronin (2014) did not provide specific details regarding factors influencing radicalization and violent extremism in prisons, the study indicated that the drivers for this menace could generally be grouped into ideological, issue-based, and ethno-nationalist or separatist violence. Ideological violence encompassed political ideologies, extreme versions of religious principles and viewpoints advocating use of violence, or violent left-wing, anarchist and right-wing ideologies. Indeed, this is a common phenomenon in the world today where people are enticed into some radicalized groups based on distorted beliefs and ideologies.

In this study, religious and political ideologies played a more significant role in influencing people to radicalization in prisons. However, these were not the only factors that were behind the existence of radicalization in Kenyan prisons. In agreement with the revelations by Kundnani (2012), the study established that radicalization presented itself in many facades, attributed to internal and external dynamics related to jail life. For instance, some of the most common external factors contributing to this phenomenon in prisons included extremist literature, videos and web links accessed by inmates through clandestine means. Similar influence was noted through sympathizers and supporters of radicalization who came in during visiting days disguised as visitors, preachers or relatives yet they were conduits with ulterior motives of spreading extremist ideologies amongst prisoners.

Contrary to Kundnani (2012) who did not show how exactly the inmates accessed extremist literature, it was noted in this study that sometimes there was collusion between the prison authorities and agents of extremist ideologies for these materials to be sneaked in and accessed by the target individuals. The presence of contraband goods such as smartphones made communication even easier; as also discovered by Hegghammer (2013). These revelations were in line with the findings by Wright (2012), who had reported that there were cases of some radical imams having access to prisons and spreading their radical ideals to prisoners. In this sense therefore, this study generally agreed with the views of Omar (2009), Cronin (2014), Kundnani (2012) and Wright (2012), on radicalization in prisons and how the same takes place. It is on the same basis that Jones (2014) said that extremism has evolved to new forms and capabilities, hence the need for sophisticated means of addressing it.

As Mark (2014) found, prisons provided an avenue for terrorists to come into contact with ordinary criminals, thus presenting a possibility for influencing them with radical and extremist ideals. Indeed, it also emerged that technology made the violent extremists' intentions even more easily tenable through easy communications by the violent extremist offenders inside and outside the prisons. Furthermore, as Neumann (2012) pointed out, this study noted that imprisoned individuals were prone to embracing radical and extremist ideologies following the frustrations such as limited liberty they face in prison. On a similar note, Nesser (2008) had established that gangs and extremist groups in prison easily took advantage of the prisoner's meaningless life and tried to fill this void by wielding their radicalized ideals as an exchange reward. These frustrations resonate with the uncertainty – identity theory by Hogg 2009 which states that individuals are influenced by the challenges they face in life. These challenges may make them to seek for solutions or assistance through self-identification with another individual or group which may offer assistance especially when the individual or group is receptive and welcoming. This means that if they fall into radicalizers, then the chances of being radicalized could high.

4.3.2 How Radicalization is propagated in Prisons

The study noted that radicalization of prisoners in prisons was real despite being done mostly in secrecy. There were various ways through which radicalization is believed to be propagated within prison facilities. These included compromising of vulnerable prison officers in order to allow certain otherwise outlawed behaviours of the violent extremist prisoners to exist without being strictly put under check and curtailed. For

instance, access of cell phones by the prisoners would be allowed after exchange of money between the prisoners or their agents and some prison officers. This enabled them to freely receive messages from external sources of terror networks for the purposes of further planning and spreading of their messages even to the new or potential recruits and also prison breaks or escape.

At the same time, some of the radicalized groups' conduits would be allowed disguised as preachers while their actual intention is to exchange literature and other radical messages with their intended target. Access to internet was not allowed to the violent extremist prisoners but they could use covert means to access smart phones with internet to communicate with their link groups or individuals about the situation in prisons and how best to strategize in their recruitment quest. There were also instances of face-to-face interactions between compromised prison staff and extremist offenders where money changed hands to facilitate such behaviours. According to one of the senior prison officers:

'Although most of these things don't happen in the open, but there are instances where we have received allegations of corruption and bribery between extremist offenders and some of our officers so that contraband stuff could be sneaked into prison precincts. We are trying our best to ensure that such behaviours don't escalate, but we cannot completely rule them out.'

Regarding how often specific methods were used in the spread of radicalization of prisoners in prison, table 4.5 provides summary of the responses.

Table 4.5 How Radicalization Happens in Prisons

Mode of Radicalization	1= not at all	2= rarely	3= moderately	4= frequently	5= most frequently	Total
	<i>n</i> (%)	<i>n</i> (%)	<i>n</i> (%)	<i>n</i> (%)	<i>n</i> (%)	<i>n</i> (%)
Cell phones	22 (41)	19 (35)	5 (9)	5 (9)	3 (6)	54 (100)
Internet	24 (44)	14 (26)	11 (20)	3 (6)	2 (4)	54 (100)
Face-to-face	1 (2)	2 (4)	4 (7)	23 (43)	24 (44)	54 (100)
Preaching	19 (35)	25 (46)	4 (7)	4 (7)	2 (4)	54 (100)
Others (specify)	54 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	54 (100)

(Researcher, 2019)

Table 4.5 indicates that 22 of the respondents accounting for 41% of the respondents thought cellphones were not at all involved, 19 the respondents being 35% rarely, 5 the respondents making 9% moderately, 5 the respondents being 9% frequently, and 3 the respondents standing for 6% most frequently used in radicalization of prisoners in maximum prisons in Kenya. This could be attributed to the reasons that prisoners are not allowed to own or access phones. However, those who indicated the use of mobile phones indicated that some phones get smuggled into the prisons as contrabands. At the same time, 24 the respondents translating to 44%, 14 the respondents being 26%, 11 the respondents accounting for 20%, 3 the respondents attributing to 6%, and 2 the respondents translating to 4% of the respondents respectively opined that internet was used in radicalization of prisoners in prisons. This is also informed by the inaccessibility of gadgets such as smart phones or computers that can be used by the prisoners. Those that indicated that internet was being used in radicalization of prisoners based their

responses also on the contraband mobile phones as prisoners were not allowed to own mobile phones while inside the prisons. Regarding face-to-face interactions, 24 the respondents being 44%, 23 the respondents translating to 43%, 4 the respondents making 7%, 2 the respondents attributing to 4%, and 1 the respondents being 2% of the respondents thought that face-to-face was most frequently, frequently, moderately, rarely and not at all and respectively used in advancing radicalization in prisons. This was because in most cases prisoners find themselves interacting in different parts of the prisons during different activities hence they get time to pass on a message to a target prisoner of radicalization. There were also opinions that preachers' sermons were used in radicalization of prisoners, with 19 (35%), 25 (46%), 4 (7%), 4 (7%), and 2 (4%) respectively arguing that this mode was not all, rarely, moderately, frequently, and most frequently applied. This could be because most of the preachers are the ones employed by the prisons. The cases where radicalization could be as a result of sermons by preachers could be attributed to some prisoners who assume the role of preachers to preach to the other prisoners so that they can pass their radical message.

These findings largely concur with a number of previous studies. For instance, Borum (2014) noted that a number of prisoners accessed some radical literature and other messages through compromised and bribed prison officers holding key prison administration positions. Hence, bribery and corruption of prison officers significantly contributed to radicalization in prison facilities. Similarly, Hasisi et al (2019) established that extremist prisoners sometimes tend undermine the authority of prison officers through manipulation and conditioning so that the former can be allowed access

to communication gadgets and channels for relaying messages to external terror networks.

Khalil et al (2019) also revealed that radicalized prisoners use face-face interactions, phones, internet, and preachers' disguised sermons so that they can communicate with their intended audience. Through conditioning, some violent extremist prisoners have also attempted to get things to work the way they want, hence spreading radical messages to other unsuspecting prisoners. Similar sentiments were expressed by Lloyd and Dean (2015) by noting that extremist offenders may tend to impose their will on vulnerable staff so that they can be allowed to pursue their covert extremist agenda in prisons. Various strategies have been applied to identify potential weaker or vulnerable staff who involve in illegal smuggling of cell phones and other methods of communication with the external terror network. There is also the question of intimidation and extortion of staff by violent extremist prisoners so that the latter could get leeway in their dealings. In all these ways, radicalization of prisoners in prisons in one way or another, implicitly or explicitly, have far reaching implication in the prisons security management and operations. They largely undermine both monetary and human resources to run the prisons.

4.3.3 Effect of Prisoners' Radicalization on Management of Prisons Security

Radicalization in prison has a number of repercussions on the prisons security management at large. Some of the sentiments expressed in the study seemed to blame the prisons facilities for not doing enough to root out this problem. In this sense, the prisons was viewed by some of the respondents as contributing in one way or the other

to radicalization in prisons either by commissions or omissions, intended or unintended.

Figure 4.8 captures summary of these responses.




Figure 4.8 Government’s Role in Radicalization in prisons

Source: (Field research, 2019)

Based on the statistics in figure 4.8 above, 46% of the respondents did not think that the government directly or indirectly contributes to radicalization in prisons. On the contrary, 35% of them agreed while 19% said they did not know. Regarding the effect on the prison population, ordinary prisoners were exposed to hard life whereas extremist offenders were treated relatively well and given more privileges, hence ironically encouraging conversion by other prisoners with the hope of also becoming beneficiaries by also being treated well.

There was also a feeling that there were biases when it came to handing sentences or convictions to violent extremist offenders and other criminals. Despite this (sentencing)

being a judicial issue, the view by some of the respondent's points out to discontent bearing the serious effects of terrorism to human life and property. Respondent 27 (one of the prison officers in Kamiti maximum prison) said the following regarding what was viewed as a bias by government agencies in the legal and justice system:

'Even the Kenyan courts contribute to radicalization in the sense that if one is arrested of a case like defilement even without much evidence, he or she is sentenced for life but those with VEOs cases are not given hard sentence or jail terms even with convincing evidence like in possession of grenades. There is also oppression of people by the government through arbitrary arrests, torture and marginalization which pushes people to join radical groups as a way of seeking revenge. Also, through stigmatization by officers where for instance instead of calling them by their names, they call the suspects and other prisoners who are not even terror related in reference to the terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab, al Qaeda, ISIS, MRC etc. This pushes them even more to act and revenge or those who had not joined to want to join. Mishandling and separation of terror suspects or convicts with no proper counselling increases stress in them hence making the fight of radicalization and extremism even more challenging.'

With the foregoing argument, it was evident that in one way or the other radicalization in prisons posed a serious challenge to the government in terms of skewed perceptions by the public and prisoners. Further threats of radicalization and extremism in prisons came in form of unpredictable terror attacks planned by violent extremist offenders, causing fear, destabilizing government national planning and important programs, destabilizing the economy, causing of deaths and suffering to the victims. The conditions in prisons also played some role in contributing to radicalization and extremism of prisoners, thus cascading the negative impact of this phenomenon. Responses by the respondents are presented in figure 4.9 below.




Figure 4.9 Prison Conditions and Radicalization of prisoners

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

Fifty percent (50%) of the respondents agreed that prison conditions contributed to further radicalization of prison population which in turn translated to intensified security threats to safety and security. There were also revelations by the study that prison tended to embody a sense of hopelessness, hard life, and limited freedom among other inhumane conditions. This made it difficult for the violent extremist and other offenders to reconcile with the realities of life hence pushing them to be defiant.

This study also established that further defiance by VEOs meant that they would easily recruit other inmates into their fold at any slightest opportunity. Furthermore, as indicated by the prisons management (through key informants), there were no practical programs meant for reforming or keeping radicalized prisoners busy as a way of dissuading them from spreading their radical ideals. There were further revelations that lack of life skills engagement and rehabilitation programs rendered VEOs idle during

most of the time, hence heightening the possibility of influencing many more. This meant that a number of prisoners were bound to be preoccupied with more evil thoughts such as recruiting more converts. At the same time, the study noted that overcrowding of prisons also posed a big prisons security management challenge not only to the radicalized and extremist offenders but also to the entire prison population. This is because of stretching the resources available such as food, sleeping space, beddings and other personal needs beyond the limit hence making the prisoners seeking for alternative means to compensate this gap. Similarly, isolation of violent extremist offenders led to their suffering from psychological trauma hence making it difficult to approach them with counter narrative messages, inspiring hope or behaviour change.

Respondent 11 (a VEO in Shimo la Tewa prison) had the following to say:

'Most of us are isolated not only from our fellow prisoners but literally we are locked from the outside world where we do not know what is happening out there. It is like we are in the dark as far as the normal human life is concerned. This makes it almost impossible to approach me with any positive message because already I feel like my mind is tortured. I wish things were different. You know, an idle mind is an evil mind. I need to be engaged closely so that I can be understood better and be helped to change.'

Regarding how politics influenced radicalization in prisons, the findings showed that due to their selfish political interests, politicians sometimes used vulnerable individuals to achieve their ends. This included giving money to hapless youth as incentives to drive partisan political agenda; including taking extreme stands such as radicalization and extremism. This in the long run will ultimately lead them to join radical groups, hence posing even bigger security challenges to the country at large leading some of the youth getting themselves into prison where they can drive their political agenda. Political, religious and general leadership struggles often bordered on splitting camps

based on extreme stands since extremism is believed to be politically motivated globally. It is due to political agenda that sometimes Sharia law is applied by terrorist or extremist groups in the guise of going to the original ways of Islam as a religion. These views were vividly captured by respondent 15 (a prison officer based in Kamiti prison) who had the following to say:

'It was common for the youth to be incited by politicians thus ending up taking extreme stands including joining terror groups. You must have heard of so many groups emanating from mostly idle young people who are lured into these gangs with promises of all kinds. Even across borders we know of extreme groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria which are driven by political agenda. Many other countries such as Sudan, Syria and Somalia among others have suffered the problem of radicalization and violent extremism courtesy of political competition where opposing camps create their own 'armies' to defend their interests. Negative political competition even here in Kenya is also known to have led politicians to recruit young people into radical groups to defend them. These gangs are very common in the coastal region for example the outlawed 'Mombasa Republican Council' (MRC), 'Wakali wao', 'Wajukuu wa bibi' among others which may transform to extremist groups if not checked. Even in prisons sometimes you find that prisoners are divided alongside certain gang groups and political and religious ideologies which could easily lead them to belong in radical and extremist groups.'

Among the VEOs, further radicalization takes place overtly as they embolden their beliefs since they are accommodated in one isolated area together in the prisons where they mingle and interact freely amongst themselves. This could imply that even those VEOs whose level of radicalization and extremism is still low could run into the danger of graduating to a higher level of extremism instead of being assisted to reverse the trend through deliberate de-radicalization strategies. The covert radicalization is believed to happen in the prison wards or cells of the general population of other prisoners by radical prisoners who may be in the general prisoners' population but not yet identified. These groups of radical and extremist prisoners are dangerous as they can engage in smooth operation of radicalization without being noticed. They use

clandestine approaches to identify, approach, radicalize and recruit vulnerable prisoners through various ways like enticements among other methods. This was spread and aided by radicalized prisoners, some members of staff or even visitors who visited prison precincts with ulterior motives.

4.3.4 Challenges Associated with Mitigating Radicalization in Prisons facilities

There were a number of challenges faced by the prisons in mitigating radicalization in prisons. In terms of why prison was encountering these challenges, it emerged that there were a number of challenges associated with mitigating radicalization in prisons facilities as put by the officer in charge Shimo la Tewa Prisons who was a key informant that;

'Radicalization of prisoners in prisons is a new phenomenon in Kenya, we hold prisoners from different backgrounds and offences like terror related ones. For those that we have their records we isolate and hold them together in different cells or accommodation. However, since we don't have enough space, we crowd other categories of prisoners together which could be dangerous to their health among other challenges that accompany overcrowding. As I mentioned earlier, since terrorism and radicalization is a new phenomenon in our prisons, most of our prison officers have insufficient training in handling prisoners with terror related cases. They also don't have the capacity to identify the early warning signs of radicalization among prisoners because they don't know what those signs could be and how radicalization happens in the prisons. We also have challenge in resources or finances, there is also language barrier between the staff and some prisoners who mostly use Arabic and coded language thus hampering them from detecting newly radicalized prisoners as early as possible.'

The above narrative by the officer in charge of Shimo la Tewa was in agreement with the findings by Romaniuk (2012), prison authorities had been infiltrated by terror groups hence proving quite a challenge for the prisons to fight the menace. Many of these challenges included financial inadequacy which makes it difficult to finance

prisons projects, programs and operations in ensuring prison security management, language barrier as many of the extremist offenders use Arabic language that is only understood by a few prison officers, inadequate sharing of vital information between or among security agencies since there is no elaborate policy and handover notes by other players in the criminal justice system on the character of certain suspects and prisoners other than what the prisoner is charged for. This may make prisoners who may have been involved in extremist activities in the community mix with the general prisoner population thus having a conducive environment to radicalize other prisoners.

The officer in charge of Kamiti Maximum Prisons who was also a key informant echoed the sentiments by the officer in charge Shimo la Tewa. He said,

'there were serious challenges, such as inadequate allocation of resources to counter terrorism and countering violent extremism in prisons, and lapse in bringing all the agencies under one integrated system to enable sharing of information and working on cases appropriately.' He also said that, *standard operating procedures (SOPs) are rarely fully adhered to, with some prisons officers being accused of corruption and were being investigated.'*

These challenges hamper the war on radicalization, extremism and terrorism. In this sense, there was a general recognition that in the fight of the problem of radicalization in prisons, government agencies were trying their best to urge all those preaching different faiths to espouse peace all the time.

Another critical question was whether prison facilities can actually control or eradicate radicalization in prisons. Most of the key respondents interviewed agreed that it was actually possible to minimize radicalization if various strategies in place such as isolation of VEOs and searches being carried out on prisoners and their cells.

There was also need to understand how the question of radicalization in prisons could be mitigated. The respondents (Prison officers) were asked their opinion on different possible strategies or initiatives that prison facilities can employ in addressing the problem of radicalization in prisons. Majority of the key prison officers responded suggested that the institution could come up with counter violent extremism in prisons, rehabilitation programs targeting violent extremist offenders, vetting of religious leaders, literature and visitors getting into prisons.

Furthermore, the key informants were asked their general opinions on what they thought the prison facilities and other security stakeholders would do to address radicalization in prisons. Some of the general strategies included thorough investigation of all cases suspected to be related to radicalization in prison so as to get to their roots. Besides, there was need for all security agencies to share information in a better coordinated way in order to reduce new cases. In addition, prisons management needed to be closer to all prisoners and religious leaders in prisons so as to seal any possible loopholes for further influence that would lead to new cases of radicalization in prisons. These sentiments were aptly summed up by key informant 23 (a senior prisons officer at Shimo la Tewa prison), who had the following to say:

'Being a very delicate area, radicalization among prisoners needs high level coordination from all security stakeholders in order to root it out. Furthermore, prisons management must come up with good policies that are more practical in dealing with this matter. For instance, all prisoners must be treated equally and fairly to erase the feeling that violent extremist offenders were being favoured hence making it attractive for petty criminals in prison to convert. This would resonate well with President Uhuru Kenyatta's suggestion during a prison officers passing out parade in 2016 that violent extremist offenders should not be given special treatment while in prison. Enhancing security checks and surveillance would ensure that prisoners do not access radical preachers, the likes of the late Aboud Rogo who was

one of the fiery prisoners in this prison. This means that even the computers in the learning centers must be monitored closely so that prisoners do not access radical literature and videos.'

These sentiments were corroborated with similar views given by a respondent 17 (a security officer) in Kamiti Maximum prison who opined thus:

'In order for this battle to be won, dealing with radicalization needs a multipronged approach from all stakeholders in the security sector. For instance, it would be prudent to come up with rehabilitation programs for violent extremist prisoners and institute policies where violent extremist offenders are isolated into their own blocks to avoid 'contaminating' the rest of the inmates. Also, proper vetting of chaplaincy must always be done to avoid allowing rogue preachers whose intention is to radicalize prisoners. Fast-tracking of cases was also important so as to avoid scenarios where suspected violent extremist offenders stay in remand for years and end up influencing others due to frustrations they may be facing in remand.'

Related to some of the aforementioned sentiments, one of the VEOs indicated that he regretted to have joined the group since those who had enlisted him had deserted him. This had left the burden to his family members who nonetheless were too poor to even hire competent lawyers for him. As revealed further by this study, that kind of frustration of the violent extremist offenders was turning counterproductive for the government as this ended up hardening the criminals even more. Suggestions by key informants in the study who basically constituted part of the prisons management insinuated that training and creating more awareness to the staffs and the inmates was critical for showing the prisoners the right paths to follow while in prison. Propagating equality and equity inside and outside prisons was also important for the government to eradicate a feeling of marginalization of certain groups, a situation that can then lead to embracing of radical ideologies in order to champion their perceived restricted rights. A good example was given as MRC and other similar outlawed groups in the coast region.

There have been spirited efforts by the prisons to mitigate radicalization and violent extremism in prisons. Despite the looming challenges, the government was, for example, advocating for the separation of radicalized offenders into different blocks so as to reduce their influence on other prisoners who were facing lesser charges but were likely to be co-opted due to their vulnerability. Furthermore, there were expressions that prison officers had heightened their vigilance hence significantly minimizing contacts of violent extremist offenders with the rest of the prison population. In addition, there were remarkable improvements by the prisons in terms of instituting some rehabilitation programs and ensuring that there were very minimal cases of conflicts in prisons among prisoners belonging to different groups.

Similarly, it was important to have positive education and development programs for prisoners and staff to enlighten them on how to avoid being victims of this vice. There was also need for strong sensitization, guidance and counseling programs for prisoners to help them deal with trauma. However, despite these findings, it was still not a straight forward case implementing all the desired strategies to yield tangible results. Furthermore, besides weaker policy for dealing with radicalization in prisons, there was lack of enough money to institute working counter-terrorism programs and strategies for addressing this problem. Effective policy guidelines for instance, would prevent prisoners from accessing hate-propagating literature meant to encourage radicalization among prisoners. The issue of weak policy came out strongly, with key informants opining that the prisons needs to do more on initiating policies capable of reducing radicalization in prisons. Weak prevention and counter terrorism law was particularly a big drawback of mitigating radicalization not only in cells but in the general society.

Similarly, specialized training for prison officers would equip them better to handle violent extremists in a more professional manner.

This was expressed by officer in Charge Shimo la Tewa Maximum who said,

As a prison, we lack enough funds from the government to enforce some of the required policy guidelines or even train our officers on counter terrorism and countering violent extremism in prison.'

The study also revealed that overcrowding and lack of enough space in prison facilities made it difficult to separate suspected violent extremist offenders from the rest of the common prisoners in order to forestall any further influence. From records and statistics available, the population of the prisoners in the three facilities were as follows; Shimo la Tewa 2400, Kamiti 2800 and Lang'ata Women Prisons 800. This is against the recommended capacity for 1200, 1500 and 500 prisoners respectively for the three prison facilities (Shimo la Tewa, Kamiti and Lang'ata Women Prison facilities). These findings were in line with the findings by Kyai and Holland (2013) which indicated that harsh prison conditions emboldened prisoners, leading to some of them to adopting radical ideologies. Kyai & Holland (2013) further stated that program-rich prison environments provided hope for the prisoners hence making radicalization options less attractive and lucrative.

Poverty among most individuals inside and outside prison also came out as one of the biggest challenges encountered in its efforts to address radicalization in prisons. Perceived vulnerable prisoners and those with poor background were easily taken advantage of by terror networks in the name of being promised money and competent lawyers to handle their cases if they agreed to join radicalized groups.

Tied to the issue of poverty was the question of high unemployment rate, especially among the youth. Randall (2010) revealed that addressing poverty and other socio-economic deprivations, human rights issues and governance in all communities may become a significant departure from youth disempowerment hence ultimately addressing radicalization in institutions such as prisons because the number of VEOs brought to prisons may decrease. Mixing unknown or unidentified radicalized prisoners with other common or ordinary prisoners may increase the chances of the ordinary ones being radicalized. This is because such prisoners may have a conducive environment to radicalize other prisoners as they may not be known by the prisons authorities. Similarly, exposing ordinary prisoners to hard life whereas extremist offenders were treated relatively well and given more privileges would likely serve as a motivation for the ordinary ones to embrace radical ideals so that they could also be treated well. Same was said about the issue of not engaging violent extremist offenders in prisons rehabilitation programs and activities just like the rest of the convicts, which may be a double loss to the government as they are not bringing any returns to the exchequer.

The tough conditions in prisons could also play some role in contributing to radicalization of prisoners. The sense of hopelessness, hard life, and limited freedom among other inhumane conditions embodied in jail made it difficult for the violent extremist offenders and other prisoners to reconcile with the realities of life hence pushing them to be more defiant. This defiance meant that they would easily recruit other prisoners into their fold at any slightest opportunity. Furthermore, there were no practical programs meant for reforming or keeping radicalized prisoners busy as a way of dissuading them from spreading their radical ideologies.

Overcrowding of prisons also posed a big challenge not only to the radicalized and violent extremist offenders but to the entire prison population. At the time of this study, the prisoners' population was about 55,000 two times more than the recommended capacity of 25,000 according to the prison records in Kenya. There was also about 177 violent extremist offenders (VEOs) across different stations, hence raising security management concerns associated with terrorism that have remained unaddressed. Additionally, as Vidino (2011) had established, insecure and unruly prison atmosphere aggravated vulnerability of prisoners thereby making it possible for a revolt through radicalization. Similarly, isolation of extremist offenders could lead to their psychological trauma hence making it difficult to approach them with messages of change. Indeed, Bal et al (2011) had established that treating violent extremist offenders decently and respecting their human rights was likely to soften their radical stand hence making it easier for the government to address this problem. This study found out that, violent extremist offenders were being handled and treated fairly well by the prisons authorities leading to misconceptions by other prisoners on special treatment of VEOs which could motivate some vulnerable prisoners towards radicalization so that they can be accorded the preferential treatment like VEOs.

Acting as a basis, the study may likely stimulate new interests among scholars hence encouraging further and broader researches on radicalization and violent extremism of prisoners thus leading to further understanding on this area. The findings will also inform on policy formulation and adoption of the best practices in addressing radicalization in prisons facilities in Kenya. Additionally, the study anticipates informing the Kenyan national government security agencies regarding the concepts of

radicalization and terrorism as it affects all sectors of security systems. Finally, the study is crucial to researchers and the academia that acts as a reference material for future studies on the whole topic of radicalization of prisoners. Acting as a basis, the study may likely stimulate new interests among scholars hence encouraging further and broader researches on radicalization and violent extremism of prisoners thus leading to further understanding on this area.

Despite the treatment by the prisons regime, the VEOs seem not to appreciate as most of them are reported to be uncooperative with the prisons authorities in their day to day activities which leaves the administration with many questions of how the VEOs would want to be handled despite the fair treatment by the authorities. To some extent, the VEOs also have access to the outside world for example watching news through the televisions mounted at their resting yard. This was seen at Kamiti Maximum prisons. However, in Shimo la Tewa, the VEOs did not have television because it was reported by the authorities that they misused the privilege given to them by engaging in disobedience of some of the rules set out by the prison. Politics and political machinations were also serious drawbacks for the government in fighting radicalization in prisons as some of the VEOs manifested affiliations to certain political groups. This political inclination pointed out radicalization as having a political agenda even in the prison set up. Selfish political interests often used vulnerable individuals to achieve their political ends, and in the long-run these individuals could join radical groups and become extremists. The same picture was painted about religion and general leadership struggles which often bordered on splitting camps based on extreme stands for example

the Muslim faithful in prisons also split into Shias and Sunnis that is a replica of what is happening in the entire Muslim world.

Despite the challenges, the prisons was also advocating for the separation of radicalized and extremist offenders into different blocks so as to reduce their influence on other prisoners who were facing lesser charges or conviction. Furthermore, there were sentiments that prison officers had heightened their vigilance hence significantly minimizing contacts of extremist offenders with the rest of the prison population. In addition, there were remarkable improvements by the prisons in terms of instituting rehabilitation programs and ensuring that there were very minimal cases of conflicts in prisons among prisoners belonging to different groups. There were also attempts to create awareness among prisoners and enhancing warnings about the dangers of joining radical groups. These views were summed up by respondent 19 (an officer in Shimo la Tewa prison) by saying the following:

'As government agents, we are doing a lot in creating awareness among prisoners of the repercussions of joining radical and extremist groups. The sensitization also features the need for the rest of the prisoners to minimizing contacts with extremist offenders lest they may also be brainwashed, especially the seemingly vulnerable ones. We have also enhanced searches to detect any prohibited materials such as misguiding literature. Being a very delicate endeavour where those who ascribe to it almost take it as a religion, terrorist movements keep on reinventing themselves hence manifesting in different forms. This calls for extra vigilance through heightened patrols, searches and installation of CCTV cameras for 24/7 surveillance among other strategies. Bringing awareness programs and counselling services to staff and prisoners is also imperative if we have to win or rather fight this war. Despite the various hurdles, the prisons is making remarkable progress.'

Furthermore, respondent 27 (a senior prisons officer) had the following sentiments:

'In order to effectively address radicalization as a threat to prisons security management, one of the ways of doing so is coming with better ideas as it has been said that with guns we kill terrorists but with better ideas we kill terrorism. We need

to kill the will to kill instead of the skill to kill as the skill to kill cannot be unlearned.'

From the various responses, analysis and interpretation, it is evident that radicalization in prisons directly or indirectly affect prisons security management. The actions or inactions by some prisoners in the prisons despite being locked up can jeopardize the management of prisons security by themselves or through proxies.

The study applied the uncertainty-identity and deterrence theories to bring out the relationship between radicalization of prisoners and prisons security management in selected prisons in Kenya. For instance, the uncertainty-identity theory postulates that some individuals are motivated to join certain groups for identification purposes. From the study, religious beliefs accounted for 57% as a factor that contributed to individuals embracing radical ideals. Other factors did not play a very significant role, with 74% of the respondents expressing this view. In this case, 'other' factors included peer pressure, illiteracy, economic pressures or frustrations and personal pleasures or desires that drove individuals to indulge in radicalized activities. At the same time, 41% of the respondents had the opinion that political influence contributed to radicalization of prisoners in prisons. Furthermore, Hogg and Adelman (2013) averred that self-categorization or joining a group is one of the most effective strategies a number of individuals adopt in order to justify their actions. In establishing the cause of radicalization, it emerged that vulnerable prisoners were the main target for radicalization where they were easily persuaded due to their low self-esteem. In joining radicalized groups therefore, the new 'recruits' were motivated by the drive to be

identified with some perceived known or outstanding groups. Hence, the uncertainty-identity theory was seen at play here.

Hogg and Wagoner (2017) further argue that through self-identity, an individual feels a sense of a shared collective identity, with the group members expected to give hope to one another through their common worldviews and perception of the self, thus reducing uncertainty. As demonstrated in this study, uncertainty-identity theory was used to help in explaining why desperate individuals choose to join radicalized movements. The study noted that a number of prisoners were pushed into radicalization due to their bleak future in and outside prisons. In this sense, they were lured into the vices with the promise of getting financial rewards from the radicalized networks which could either go to the families of the 'recruits' or to them personally upon release from prisons. These findings of the study were in sync with the tenets of uncertainty-identity theory which argues that individuals and groups get driven to engage in radicalization as a mechanism to reduce their self-uncertainty, uncertain future, perceived failures or their unpleasant situations by engaging in group identification (Hogg and Wagoner, 2017).

In line with revelations of this study, Hogg (2014) further posits that extremist groups are viewed as historically highly persuasive groups that have over time managed to lure people into joining them and/or supporting their ideology. As respondent 6 (a senior prison officer) noted 'many prisoners who felt vulnerable were likely to be converted based on the promises they were given that they would be provided with lawyers to handle their cases. Some were promised cash inducements for themselves or their families. This view was reinforced by the argument by Tenold (2019) that some

individuals or groups decide to adopt extreme convictions and idealistic approaches to their problems once they realize that their active goal is threatened. This included the fact that insecure forms of high self-esteem are often associated with defensive compensatory convictions, hence the reason for some prisoners joining radical and extremist groups as a perceived channel for achieving what they have failed to achieve through normative and legal means.

The findings further established that a number of prisoners were lured into radicalized activities due to what they anticipated to benefit from their actions. In order to bring out these views more forcefully, deterrence theory was actively applied in the study, especially in addressing the second and third objectives. These included the effect of radicalization on prisons security management in Kenya and determining the challenges in mitigating radicalization in Kenya's prisons. The theory was used by George Kennan for explaining social phenomena based on individuals' perceived reward or punishment they were likely to receive if they committed those actions. From a deterrence point of view, many years of imprisonment of terror suspects or heavy fines imposed on them can be viewed as some of the deterrence measures to those intending to get involved in radicalization and extremism.

Sitren and Applegate (2012) noted that many people avoid certain choices related to committing of crime based on three main assumptions, which happen also to be features of deterrence theory. These included the probability of arrest, the likelihood of conviction, and the harshness of penalty to the offender. As noted in this study, threats of radicalization on the security of prisons came in form of unpredictable escapes or

planning of prison breaks, fear, destabilizing prisons planning and programs and massive channeling of resources towards the management of VEOs, thus alienating other essential components of the prisons security. From the point of view of deterrence theory, this would call for the prisons to institute preventive measures to crime rather than waiting to address offences after they occurred. The latter approach could be too expensive to manage.

From the prisoners' perspective, using the principle of proactive prevention of radicalization, it implies that offenders intending to get involved in radicalization would first have to weigh the likely consequences of their actions to them as individuals and to the prisons security before actually getting involved. From the perspective of the prison management and applying the argument by deterrence theory, it would be imperative to deter radicalization among prisoners rather than wait to deal with the aftermath (Paternoster, 2010). Deterrence of further radicalization can be achieved through strengthening of security systems and enhancing on interagency coordination where different stakeholders in the security docket effectively handle their respective roles. This means that proper information sharing can be communicated hence assist prisons to design on how to handle different prisoners in relation to their risk factors.

Based on the objectives of this study which included establishing the cause of radicalization of prisoners in Kenya's prisons, how radicalization happens, the effect of radicalization on prisons security management in Kenya, and determining the challenges in mitigating radicalization in Kenya's prisons, overall the deterrence theory was very relevant in helping to put the findings into clear perspectives in relation to the

measures to address radicalization of prisoners in prisons. The parliament, state security agencies and prison management have the responsibility to enact laws, policies and systems for deterring radicalization in prisons as one of the important measures for guaranteeing and safeguarding prison and in extension the national security.

Both uncertainty-identity theory and deterrence theory were sufficiently used to ground the study, as seen from the perspectives of potentially radicalized prisoners on one hand, and prison security management on the other. While potentially radicalized prisoners were likely to be driven by their own socio-economic insecurities and low self-esteem (based on uncertainty-identity theory), the prison security management needed to put in place strategies for mitigating (deterrence theory) radicalization on one hand, and preventing any major challenges that were bound to hamper the prisons security management efforts. Using deterrence theory therefore, more stringent measures may be necessary to make the crime of radicalization less attractive and common in all spheres of society.

It was found from the key respondents that there was inadequate manual and information sharing among the key players in the criminal justice system. Senior prison managers in the three stations stated that they do not get enough information to inform them on how to place prisoners. Without any vital information to guide on the risk factors of each prisoner brought into prisons, the prisoners will only be distributed and mixed in the various blocks, wards or cells within the prisons. The study also found that there was no Digitized Offender Integrated Information System (DOIIS) where all the profiles, special characteristics and identities such as biometrics of offenders within the

criminal justice system could be accessed within a record time anywhere in the country. This impedes how each prisoner is properly assessed, categorized, isolated and rehabilitated so that the dangers of mixing radicalized and non-radicalized inmates are minimized. The study also revealed that there was no collaborative approaches in involving all stakeholders and communities in preventing radicalization and extremism in the country. This non-involvement minimizes trust and understanding among the multi-agency teams to initiate, model and remodel any existing strategies and policies in place to resonate to the needs and dynamics of radicalization and extremism in prisons and communities.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The study sought to examine radicalization of prisoners and its implication on the prisons security management of selected Maximum prison facilities in Kenya, with specific reference to Shimo La Tewa, Kamiti, and Lang'ata Women prisons. Based on the findings of the study, this chapter focuses on the summary, conclusions and recommendations as well as suggestions for further studies. The summary, conclusions and recommendations are based on themes according to the specific objectives of the study.

5.1 Summary of Findings

The study focused on four specific objectives which included: to establish the causes of prisoners' radicalization in Kenya's Prisons, find out how radicalization is propagated in prisons, examine the effects of prisoners' radicalization on management of prisons, and determine the challenges associated with mitigating prisoners' radicalization in the prisons security management in Kenya.

5.1.1 Causes of Radicalization of Prisoners

Objective 1 of the study was to identify the causes of radicalization of prisoners in Kenyan Prisons. This was by finding out why there was radicalization amongst prisoners in prisons despite the tight security in maximum security facilities. The study

revealed that vulnerable prisoners were taken advantage of by the radicalization networks or their fellow prisoners who propagated radicalization tendencies aided by inadequate information gathering and sharing strategies in the prisons facilities and other agencies. A number of prisoners were also hoodwinked to join radical religious groups with promises that either they or their families were going to be given monetary materials. The findings further indicated that radicalization in prisons is happening albeit sometimes in a covert manner. For instance, it was noted that most prisoners of Islamic religion or following who were serving short jail terms were likely to embrace the ideals of radicalization with the hope of being rewarded upon completion of their jail terms. And so was the case with the new Muslim converts, who were eager to join radicalized groups in anticipation for money.

Regarding the mode of spread of radicalization of prisoners in prisons, this study revealed that among other means, peer pressure played a critical role in getting prisoners to be enjoined in radical groups. Other violent extremist offenders were in the forefront in radicalization of their fellow prisoners. Also, misinterpretation of the Quran writings led semi-illiterate prisoners to easily embrace radical ideologies. There were also feelings that radical ideas did not only emanate from some prisoners but also from some prison staff. The study further linked the presence of radicalization in Kenyan prisons to rampant joblessness among young people in the country who were easily lured into the trap with the hope of getting money and other material rewards or affluent lives for their families thus ending up in prisons after arrest by the law enforcement officers. In prisons, they may take advantage to radicalize their fellow prisoners hence making prisons a fertile ground of radicalization. The fact that this study linked the

spread of radicalization with some prison officers means the problem was bigger than imagined. Despite this being propagated in a very discreet manner, it was scary that some prison authorities were abdicating their role of preventing this crime and abetting it instead. Other avenues for spreading this crime was during madrassa lessons or sermons by radicalized preachers who came in while disguised as genuine ones.

5.1.2 How Radicalization is propagated in Prisons

Some of the common modes of radicalization of prisoners in prisons included mobile phones, internet, face-to-face interactions, and preachers' sermons. Compromised vulnerable prison staff sometimes condoned bad behaviours of extremist offenders. These included allowing extremist prisoners to have contacts with other prisoners in the larger population, to access to radicalized literature and interact with external extremist networks for furtherance of radical ideals within prisons facilities. Corruption and bribery of key prisons administration staff allowed some of the illegal things to be committed in prisons while disguised preachers were sometimes allowed to spread their radicalized ideas to the prison population.

Some of the common drivers of radicalization of prisoners in prisons propagated through the various ways as face to face interaction, extremist literature or radical preachers were religious and political ideologies. For instance, change of belief systems in the process of radicalization significantly depended on the vulnerability situations of prisoners such as poverty, illiteracy, peer pressure, and personal pleasures or desires. Ideological violence encompassed political ideologies, extreme versions of religious principles and viewpoints advocating use of violence ideologies. The ideological

underpinnings propagated by the extremist prisoners and other prisoners operating covertly made it challenging for the prison security management and other security apparatus to effectively deal with the issue of radicalization not only within the prisons, but also in other areas outside prison facilities.

5.1.3 Effects of Radicalization of Prisoners on Prisons Security Management

Radicalization prisoners in prisons tended to overstretch capacity of the prisons management in terms of safeguarding of security and safety of the prison population and property in general. Radicalization presented itself in many facades, and was attributed to internal and external dynamics related to prison life. For instance, inmates' accesses to extremist literature, videos and web links through clandestine means were some of the common aggravating factors to this problem in prison facilities. Similarly, covert influence was noted through sympathizers of radicalization who came in disguised as normal visitors, preachers or relatives yet they were conduits hell-bent on spreading extremist ideologies amongst prisoners. Where this happened, the target individuals ended up being psychologically influenced to adopt radicalized ideals.

Sometimes there was collusion between the prison authorities and agents of radical and extremist ideologies for clandestine materials to be sneaked in and accessed by the target individuals. The presence of contraband goods such as smartphones made communication even easier, thus spreading radicalized messages even more easily. Prisons provided an avenue for terrorists or extremists to come into contact with ordinary criminals, thus presenting a possibility for influencing them with radical and extremist ideals and thus ultimately creating a huge prisons security challenge.

Technology played a lead role in making the radical and extremists' intentions even more easily tenable through easy intercommunications. It was also noted that some prisoners were prone to embracing radical ideologies following the frustrations they are facing in prison. In a general sense, radicalization posed serious prisons security issues not only to the entire prison population and prisons management, but also to other security agents outside prison facilities as manifested by radicalized prisoners' threat while in prison and upon release.

5.1.4 Challenges Associated with Mitigating Radicalization of Prisoners in Prisons Facilities

There were a number of challenges faced by prison officers and authorities in mitigating radicalization in prisons. In terms of why prisons were encountering these challenges, insufficient training of prison officers came to the fore as the main hurdle hampering them from detecting newly radicalized prisoners so that they can be discouraged and dissuaded from their new thinking. Furthermore, besides weaker policy framework for gathering, analyzing, sharing and disseminating information dealing with radicalization of prisoners in prisons and other stakeholders, prisons rarely receive enough budgetary allocation for instituting working counter-terrorism programs and strategies for addressing this problem in a progressive and decisive manner.

Effective policy guidelines for instance, would prevent prisoners from accessing hate-propagating literature meant to encourage radicalization among prisoners. The issue of lack of policy framework came out strongly, with strong indications that there were unclear counter terrorism laws guiding how to handle VEOs in prisons as particularly a

big drawback in mitigating radicalization not only in prisons but in a general society. Similarly, inadequate specialized training for prison officers to equip them with better knowledge, skills and to handle extremists in a more professional manner came out as one of the major challenges impeding mitigation of radicalization in Prisons.

The study also revealed that overcrowding and lack of enough space in prison facilities made it difficult to separate suspected extremist offenders from the rest of the common inmates in order to forestall any further influence. Poverty among most individuals inside and outside prison also came out as one of the biggest challenges encountered by the government in its efforts to address radicalization in prisons, whereby 50% of the respondents had indicated this as a big challenge. Perceived vulnerable prisoners and those with poor family background were easily taken advantage of by terror and extremist networks where they were promised money and competent lawyers to handle their cases if they agreed to join radical and extremist groups. Tied to the issue of poverty was the question of high unemployment rate, especially among the youth caused by diminishing opportunities to access income and property thus making some of them seek for alternative ways hence ending up into radical and extremist groups.

The tough conditions in prisons also played some role in contributing to radicalization and extremist of inmates. The sense of hopelessness, hard life, and limited freedom among other inhumane conditions embodied in jail made it difficult for the extremist offenders to reconcile with the realities of life hence pushing them to be more defiant. This defiance meant that they would easily recruit other inmates into their fold at any slightest opportunity. Overcrowding of prisons also posed a big challenge not only to

the radicalized and extremist offenders but to the entire prison population. Bad politics and political machinations were also serious drawbacks for the government in fighting radicalization and extremism in prisons. Selfish political interests often made some politicians to use vulnerable individuals to achieve their political ends, and in the long-run these individuals joined radicalized groups and became extremists. The same picture was painted about religious and general leadership struggles which often bordered on splitting camps based on extreme stands. These challenges have negative implication to the prisons security management in prisons thus exposing the prisons to dangers and handling of prisoners difficult.

Despite the challenges, prison facilities are however trying the best to deal with, prevent or mitigate radicalization among prisoners in prisons. Some of the strategies used included preaching different faiths to espouse peace all the time, despite inadequate space, advocating for the separation of radicalized and extremist offenders into different blocks in prison so as to reduce their influence on other prisoners who were facing lesser charges. Heightened vigilance in prisons was also significantly minimizing contacts of extremist offenders with the rest of the prison population for possible further influence. Some customized rehabilitation programs were also instituted to mitigate further spread of radical ideologies. Awareness campaigns by the various partners and stakeholders were also in top gears to dissuade prisoners from joining radical and extremist groups and engaging in terror-related activities.

5.2 Conclusions

Based on the study findings, it is clear that radicalization of prisoners is a serious concern in prison facilities in Kenya. Regarding the causes of radicalization of prisoners in Kenya, the study concluded that some of the causes of radicalization included religious, economic and political factors or ideologies which present themselves as the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.

Concerning how radicalization is propagated in prisons, the study concluded that prisons radicalization is being propagated in prisons both overtly and covertly depending on the target and the parts of the prisons that the radicalization is taking place. Prisons administration was also to blame for some of the illegal behaviours by extremist prisoners, such as sneaking in mobile phones, and accessing radicalized literature through dubious individuals and internet sources.

Regarding challenges encountered by prisons in mitigating radicalization in prisons, the study concluded that the prisons was facing a number of hurdles in fighting radicalization, such as lack of enough specialized training of security personnel to address terror-related security issues. There were also policy framework issues in gathering, analysing, sharing or dissemination information among the stakeholders in the security sector concerning VEOs, high poverty levels, inadequate prisons structures or facilities to accommodate the large prisoner population in prisons.

5.3 Recommendations

Since the study concluded that there were some cases of radicalization of prisoners in Kenyan prison facilities which have implication on prisons security management, the following recommendations were made:

1. The prisons facilities should adopt or adapt a holistic approach to counter terrorism and counter radicalization into violent extremism through information sharing with other players in the Criminal Justice System.

To do this, prisons and other stakeholders in the security sector should address the problem of radicalization in Kenyan prisons, in a holistic approach that focuses on the VEOs, the Prison officers (staff) and the prisons facility. The players in the security sector and criminal justice system should come up with a seamless information sharing procedures to ensure that there is an adequate or necessary flow of information of every inmate right from the arrests, investigation, prosecution, probation, courts and prisons. This can be actualized through the establishment of Digitized Offender Integrated Information System (DOIIS).

2. Prisons administration should stem out corruption and bribery among staff and prisoners that compromise security of the prisons.

Corruption and bribery among prisons staff and extremist groups or other prisoners should be addressed, discouraged and stemmed out in order to prevent condoning of illegal behaviours and vices by the prisons population, which gives room for furtherance of radicalization and extremist ideals in prisons. More strict rules in prisons

will ensure that wayward preachers do not easily get a chance to sell distorted ideas and narratives to potential converts to radicalization.

3. The prison facilities should establish of high resolution Close Circuit Televisions (CCTVs) to improve the surveillance in the prisons.

The CCTVs system among other surveillance and access control technologies like x-ray and body scanners in all prisons. This will minimize chances of contraband materials such as smart phones that may aid in radicalization of prisoners and extremism, escape of terror related prisoners from prisons and breach of prisons security.

4. The prisons department should ensure standards and professionalism through proper selection, recruitment, training, deployment and development of all prison staff.

The VEOs should be handled with professionalism and adherence to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules on Treatment of prisoners (UNSMRTP) otherwise known as Mandela Rules that give guidelines on how prisoners should be handled (admission, accommodation, food, clothing, health, and contact with outside world among others). This can well be informed by the government coming up with good risk assessment and decision making tools and proper case management system in the prisons regime.

For staff, it should include selection and recruitment, training and development of prison staff who understand their work well. Their conditions of service should also be improved to encourage them in observing professional standards and ethics. Contributions of specialist staff such as Imams preachers among others must also be

vetted well to avoid infiltration of prisons by radicalized individuals and materials such as radical literature.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Studies

The study recommends the following as possible further research:

1. Women and radicalization in maximum prison facilities in Kenya.
2. Successes and failures of strategies used by the government to address radicalization and extremism in Kenyan prisons.

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Appendices

Appendix i: Introduction Letter

Cheboi Peter Komen

P. O Box 409- 00232 Ruiru

Date.....

Dear Respondent,

RE: Participation in Research

I am a student pursuing Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) studies in Kenyatta University (KU). As a requirement for this course, I am undertaking a study on **Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya**. I would therefore kindly ask you to participate in this study by helping me fill this questionnaire. Please answer all questions freely and in honesty. Your actual name will not be revealed to anyone and the data you provide will only be used for academic purposes.

Your participation is very important for the success of this project and I would highly appreciate your contribution.

Thanking you most sincerely in advance.

Yours

Faithfully,

Sign...

Cheboi Peter

(MA)

Appendix ii: Questionnaire for Prisoners

Cheboi Peter Komen

P. O Box 409- 00232 Ruiru

Date.....

Dear Respondent,

RE: Participation in Research

I am a student pursuing Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) studies in Kenyatta University (KU). As a requirement for this course, I am undertaking a study on **Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya**. I would therefore kindly ask you to participate in this study by helping me fill this questionnaire. Please answer all questions freely and in honesty. Your actual name will not be revealed to anyone and the data you provide will only be used for academic purposes. Your participation is very important for the success of this project and I would highly appreciate your contribution.

Thanking you most sincerely in advance.

Yours

Faithfully,

Sign.....

Cheboi Peter

Komen (MA)

Please tick the boxes or fill in the blank spaces provided as may be appropriate.

Section A: Respondents' Social and Demographic Information

1. Gender of the respondent (male=1, female=2)

Male ()

Female ()

2. Age (in years) of the respondent

18-25 years ()

26-35 years ()

36-45 years ()

46-55 years ()

56 & above ()

3. Marital status of the respondent

Single ()

Married ()

Separated ()

Divorced ()

Widowed ()

4. What is your religion?

Christianity ()

Islam ()

Other (Specify)..... ()

5. Highest level of education of the respondent

Primary ()

High school ()

Middle college ()

University ()

Other...specify ()

6. Length of service in prison (**in years**)

0-3 years ()

4-6 years ()

7-9 years ()

10 & above years ()

Remand/trial ()

Section B: Causes of Radicalization of Prisoners in Prisons Facilities

7. Are you aware of any prisoner being involved in radicalization? Yes () No ()

8. Please explain your answer above

.....

9. On a scale of 1-5 where *1= not at all, 2= rarely, 3= moderately, 4= frequently, 5= most frequently*, how frequent do you observe any of the following signs among your fellow prisoners?

i. Sudden change of behavior over a very short period of time (appearances, religion, beliefs etc.)

ii. Seeking, reading, listening to and watching certain radical materials

iii. Actively displaying aggression against other prisoners not in the same group or religion

- iv. Converting to a new religion or interest in the religion?
- v. Vulnerable/easily impressionable and susceptible to peer pressure?
- vi. Reject authority or establishment?
- vii. Using dehumanizing or derogative language against prisoners from certain religion
- viii. Intolerance to other prisoner's views on belief or religious matters?
- ix. Celebration when a terrorist attack occurs
- x. Voluntary preaching to inmates or Self-imposed preachers
- 10. In your opinion, does radicalization pose any threat to prison security? Yes ()
No ()

Explain

- 11. Who is being radicalized in the prisons? Tick the option (s) Prisoners ()
Staff/officers () spiritual leaders () or Their families () None ()
- 12. Who radicalize them? Tick the option (s) Prisoners () Staff/officers () spiritual
leaders/preachers () or Their families () None ()
- 13. What time does it mostly take place? Kindly tick one or more brackets.
(a) Day (), (b) Night (), (c) During activities e.g. games, prayers etc. () (d) Anytime ()
- 14. How does radicalization take place in this prison? Tick the option(s); face to
face () Literature materials () sports () internet/online () Visitors () Preaching ()
- 15. Why is radicalization happening in this prison? Tick the option(s); Religious()
Political() Economic (Poverty)() Peer pressure() Prisons Condition () Status()
Adventure()
- 16. Is there any relationship between the following and radicalization in this prison?

i. Religious belief systems; Yes () No ()

Please explain

.....

ii. High levels of poverty; Yes () No ()

Please explain

.....

.....

iii. Unemployment; Yes () No ()

Please explain

.....

.....

iv. Peer pressure; Yes () No ()

Please explain

.....

.....

v. Level of education; Yes () No ()

Explain

.....

Section C: How Radicalization propagated in Prisons Facilities

17. How does radicalization takes place in prisons

.....

18. On a scale of 1-5 where *1= not at all, 2= rarely, 3= moderately, 4= frequently, 5= most frequently*, how frequent do you think the following are used in radicalization of prisoners in prison? (i) cell phones, (ii) internet, (iii) face-to-face interactions, (iv) preachers' sermons,

(v) Others

(specify).....

Section D: Effects of Radicalization of Prisoners on Management of Security in Prisons Facilities in Kenya

19. Does radicalization have any effect(s) on prisons security management in this prison?

Yes () No ()

If yes, explain

.....
.....

20. What is your opinion on the following effects of radicalization on prisons security management in Kenya?

i. Threat to prisons security management

.....

ii. Threat to political stability

.....

iii. Can lead to political factions hence threatening national security.

.....

iv. Economic instability.

.....

Section E: Challenges Associated with Mitigating Radicalization of Prisoners in Prisons Facilities

21. Is this prison facility doing enough to address or mitigate radicalization of prisoners?

Yes () No ()

Please explain.

.....

22. Are there challenges associated with addressing radicalization in this prisons?

Yes () No ()

List them if

any.....

23. As a prisoner do you think the following are challenges in mitigating prisoners' radicalization in the prisons security management?

i. Overcrowding of the prison facility, Yes () No ()

Please explain

.....

ii. Poorly trained prison staff, Yes (), No ()

Please explain

.....

iii. Beliefs & attitudes of the prisoners, Yes () No ()

Please explain

.....

Any other challenges; please explain.

.....

24. Please give any other general comments regarding the following.

i. Causes of radicalization prisoners in prisons in Kenya's maximum prisons.

.....

ii. How radicalization happens.

.....

iii. Effects of radicalization of prisoners on prisons security management in Kenya.

.....

iv. Challenges associated with mitigating radicalization of prisoners on the prisons security management of in Prisons facilities in Kenya.

.....

.....END.....

Appendix iii: Key Informant Interview Guide for Prisons Management

Cheboi Peter Komen (MA)

P. O Box 409- 00232 Ruiru

Date.....

Dear Respondent,

RE: Participation in Research

I am a student pursuing Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) studies in Kenyatta University (KU). As a requirement for this course, I am undertaking a study **Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya**. I would therefore kindly ask you to participate in this study by helping me fill this questionnaire. Please answer all questions freely and in honesty. Your actual name will not be revealed to anyone and the data you provide will only be used for academic purposes. Your participation is very important for the success of this project and I would highly appreciate your contribution.

Thanking you most sincerely in advance.

Yours Faithfully,

Sign.....

Cheboi Peter Komen (MA)

Section A: Background Information

1. Please introduce yourself and briefly explain your role in this prison facility
2. How long have served as a prison officer?

Section B: Causes of Radicalization in Maximum Prisons

3. Do you know or understand what radicalization means?
4. Are there some cases of radicalization in this prison? Please narrate.
5. From your experience, what are the causes of radicalization of prisoners in this prisons?
6. What are some of the early warning signs of radicalization of prisoners in this prisons?
7. Who is being radicalized, and by who?

Section C: How radicalization is propagated prisons facilities

8. If there are cases of radicalization of prisoners in this facility in 4 above, how do they happen?
9. Is there any relationship between the following and radicalization and violent extremism in this prison? Please explain.

Section D: Effects of Radicalization of prisoners on Prison Management in Prisons facilities

10. Does radicalization affect the management of prison security in Kenya? Please explain.

Section E: Challenges in Mitigating Radicalization of Prisoners in Prisons facilities

11. Is this prison facility doing enough to address or mitigate radicalization of prisoners?

Please explain.....

If there are any challenges by the government or the prison facility, what are these challenges? Please explain

.....
12. What is your opinion on the following as possible challenges associated with mitigation radicalization in prisons?

- i. Insufficient funds or capacity by the prison facility
- ii. Overcrowding of the prison facility
- iii. Inadequately trained prison staff
- iv. Poor conditions of service for the prison staff
- v. Beliefs & attitudes of the prison population
- vi. Any other challenges

13. Generally explain the influence of radicalization of prisoners on the prison security management in Kenya. Please consider the following in your explanation.

- i. The causes of radicalization of prisoners in Kenya's maximum prisons.
- ii. Effects of radicalization of prisoners in Kenya's maximum security prisons.
- iii. Challenges encountered in addressing radicalization of prisoners in Kenya's maximum prisons.

.....**End**.....

Appendix iv: Data Collection Procedure Table

Method used	Respondents	Data collector	Where to collect data	When to collect data	Why to collect data
Quantitative (Questionnaire)	Radicalized prisoners or VEOs	Researcher and Research assistants	Shimo La Tewa, and Lang'ata Kamiti prison	2018 - 2020 (during fieldwork)	For general information to address the research questions
Qualitative (Interview guide)	Prison officers	Researcher and Research assistants	Shimo La Tewa, and Lang'ata Kamiti prison	2018 - 2020 (during fieldwork)	For in-depth information to address the research questions.

Appendix v: Work Plan/Time Lines

Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.


Activity	The year 2017 - 2023 (Months)				
	2017 - 2018	2018 -2020	2020 - 2021	2021 - 2022	2022 - 2023
Proposal Writing, Review by Supervisors & approval					
Proposal Writing, Defence & approval					
Fieldwork and Data collection					
Data collation Analysis & interpretation					
Thesis report, defence, corrections and submission of Final & Conferment of the PhD.					

Appendix vi: Budget

Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.


Item	Amount in Kshs (Estimates)
Transport/Accommodation	50,000.00 (Airborne & Road)
Field Work & 2 Research Assistants	70,000.00
Stationery	20,000.00
Typesetting and Printing	30,000.00
Binding	10,000.00
Miscellaneous	20,000.00
Total (Approximate.)	200,000.00

Appendix vii: Map for the Areas of Study: Kamiti Maximum Prison and Lang'ata Women Prison (Nairobi County) and Shimo La Tewa (Mombasa County).




Appendix viii: Lang'ata Women Prison; Nairobi County

Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.




Source: Google Map (November, 2018)

Appendix ix: Kamiti Maximum Security Prison; Nairobi County: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya



Source: Google Map (November, 2018)

**Appendix x: Shimo La Tewa Maximum Security Prison, Mombasa County:
Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security
Prison Facilities in Kenya.**



Source: Google Map (November, 2018)

Appendix xi: Substantive Registration (PhD) from Kenyatta University.

Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.



**KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR (ACADEMIC)
P.O. BOX 43844 – 00100 NAIROBI
TEL: 8703222/23
Email: admissions-pg@ku.ac.ke**

=====

Our Ref: C82/CTY/38457/2016

Date: 28th September, 2018

Cheboi Peter Komen
P.O BOX 409 - 00232
RUIRU

TEL: 0720 261 049

Dear Mr. Cheboi

RE: SUBSTANTIVE REGISTRATION (Ph.D)

Following the recommendation by the Dean, Graduate School, you are hereby granted substantive Ph.D. registration.

Please note that your registration number and all rules and regulations remain the same as per your admission letter.

Thank you.

**MR JOSEPH LIKAM
FOR: REGISTRAR (ACADEMIC)**

CC Dean, Security, Diplomacy and Peace Studies
Dean, Graduate School
Chairman, Dept of Security and Correction Sc.

JL/cm

Appendix xii: Approval for Research Proposal (PhD) from Kenyatta University

Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.



KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke

Website: www.ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 810901 Ext. 4150

Internal Memo

FROM: Dean, Graduate School

DATE: 27th September, 2018,

TO: Cheboi Peter Komen
C/o Security & Correction Science Dept.
Kenyatta University

REF: C82/CTY/38457/16

SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF RESEARCH PH.D PROPOSAL

We acknowledge receipt of your revised Proposal as per our recommendations raised by the Graduate School Board at its meeting of 22nd August, 2018, Entitled, "Implications of Radicalization and Violent Extremism of Prisoners on National Security: A Case of Shimo la Tewa ,Kamiti and Lang'ata Women Prisons - Kenya".

You may now proceed with your Data Collection, Subject to Clearance with Director General, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation.

As you embark on your data collection, please note that you will be required to submit to Graduate School completed Supervision Tracking Forms per semester. The form has been developed to replace the Progress Report Forms. The Supervision Tracking Forms are available at the University's Website under Graduate School webpage downloads.

By copy of this letter, the Registrar (Academic) is hereby requested to grant you substantive registration for your Ph.D. studies.

Thank you.


REUBEN MURIUKI
FOR: DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

C.c. Chairman, Department of Security & Correction Science
Registrar (Academic) Att. Mr. Likam

Supervisors:

1. Dr. Stephen Handa
National Defence College (NDC) Karen
C/o Department of security & Correction Science
Kenyatta University
2. Dr. Casper Masiga
C/o Department of Gender & Development Studies
Kenyatta University

Appendix xiii: Research Authorization (PhD) from Kenyatta University.

Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.



**KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL**

E-mail: dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke

Website: www.ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 8710901 Ext. 57530

Our Ref: C82/CTY/38457/2016

DATE: 27th September, 2018

Director General,
National Commission for Science, Technology
and Innovation
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FOR CHEBOI PETER KOMEN – REG. NO.
C82/CTY/38457/16

I write to introduce Mr. Cheboi Peter Komen who is a Postgraduate Student of this University. He is registered for Ph.D degree programme in the Department of Security & Correction Science School of Humanities & Social Sciences.

Mr. Cheboi intends to conduct research for a Ph.D Research Proposal entitled, "Implications of Radicalization and Violent Extremism of Prisoners on National Security: A Case of Shimo la Tewa, Kamiti and Lang'ata Women Prisons".

Any assistance given will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P. Okemo'.

**PROF. PAUL OKEMO
DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL**

KAM/000

**Appendix xiv: Research Authorization (PhD) National Commission for Science
and Technology (NACOSTI).**

**Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum
Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.**



**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,
2241349,3310571,2219420
Fax: +254-20-318245,318249
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website : www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

NACOSTI, Upper Kabete
Off' Waiyaki Way
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/18/6034/26333**

Date: **31st October, 2018**

Peter Komen Cheboi
Kenyatta University
P.O. Box 43844-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“Implications Of radicalization and violent extremism of prisoners on National Security: A case of Shimo La Tewa, Kamiti And Lang’ata Women Prisons - Kenya,”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Kiambu, Mombasa and Nairobi Counties** for the period ending **30th October, 2019.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education, Kiambu, Mombasa and Nairobi Counties** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit **a copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

**GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:




The County Commissioner
Kiambu County.

The County Director of Education
Kiambu County.

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation is ISO9001:2008 Certified

Appendix xv: Permission for (PhD) Research by NACOSTI

Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT: **Permit No : NACOSTI/P/18/6034/26333**
MR. PETER KOMEN CHEBOI **Date Of Issue : 31st October,2018**
of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 0-232 **Fee Received :Ksh 2000**
RUIRU,has been permitted to conduct
research in Kiambu , Mombasa ,
Nairobi Counties
on the topic: IMPLICATIONS OF
RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT
EXTREMISM OF PRISONERS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE OF SHIMO
LA TEWA, KAMITI AND LANG'ATA
WOMEN PRISONS - KENYA
for the period ending:
30th October,2019

Applicant's Signature


Director General
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation

Appendix xvi: Research License by NACOSTI

Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.

THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT, 2013


The Grant of Research Licenses is guided by the Science, Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing) Regulations, 2014.

CONDITIONS

1. The License is valid for the proposed research, location and specified period.
2. The License and any rights thereunder are non-transferable.
3. The Licensee shall inform the County Governor before commencement of the research.
4. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further necessary clearance from relevant Government Agencies.
5. The License does not give authority to transfer research materials.
6. NACOSTI may monitor and evaluate the licensed research project.
7. The Licensee shall submit one hard copy and upload a soft copy of their final report within one year of completion of the research.
8. NACOSTI reserves the right to modify the conditions of the License including cancellation without prior notice.

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
P.O. Box 30623 - 00100, Nairobi, Kenya
TEL: 020 400 7000, 0713 788787, 0735 404245
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke, registry@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke

REPUBLIC OF KENYA



National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation

RESEARCH LICENSE

Serial No.A 21535

CONDITIONS: see back page

Appendix xvii: PhD. Research Approval by Kenya Prisons Service

Title: Radicalization of Prisoners on Prison Security Management in Maximum Security Prison Facilities in Kenya.

**OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
KENYA PRISONS SERVICE**

Telegrams: "COMPRISONS", Nairobi
Telephone: +254022722900-6.
Email: Comprisons@yahoo.com
When replying please quote



PRISONS HEADQUARTERS
P.O. BOX 30175-00100
NAIROBI

REF: PRIS 1/21 /VOL V/54

31 October 2018

Peter Komen Cheboi
P.O. Box 409
RUIRU

REF: APPLICATION TO CONDUCT ACADEMIC RESEARCH.

We acknowledge receipt of your letter requesting for approval to conduct an academic research titled "*Implication of Radicalization and Violent Extremism of Prisoners on National Security: A case of Shimo La Tewa Main, Kamiti Main, and Langata Women Prisons*".

This is to inform you that your request has been approved for the period between 1 November 2018 to 31 January 2019.

You are expected to adhere to the Prison rules and regulations during your research period. You are also required to provide the Prisons headquarters with a copy of your research findings at the end of your research.

By a copy of this letter, the Officers in Charge: Shimo La Tewa Main, Kamiti Main, and Langata Women Prisons are requested to accord you the necessary assistance during your research period.


B.O. NJOGA, EBS, ndc (K) DCGP
FOR: COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF PRISONS

Cc.
Officers in Charge
1. Shimo La Tewa Main
2. Kamiti Main
3. Langata Women Prisons