

THE AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY

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This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for publication in any other university. BY

CAREY FRANCIS ONYANGO

2014/12/27

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY.

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*The agnostic implication  
of Jean-Paul Sartre's*

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PROF. ROBERT M. MURUGI

## ACI DECLARATION I

I would like to thank the following persons and institution.

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university. Philosophy

I also thank Prof. Robert Murungi for patient advice and insights from the time of formulation of the problem to completion of the thesis. I also thank Prof. K. Masbari and other members of the Department of Philosophy, Kenyatta University, for advice, encouragement, and other help. Of significance was the advice and material help from Fr. I. Klinger of the Benedictine Mission.

Finally I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Mr. Simon S. Obeyia, for the sleepless nights at the keyboards.

  
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**CAREY FRANCIS ONYANGO**

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

  
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**PROF. ROBERT W. MURUNGI**

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INTRODUCTION

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First, **Kenyatta University** for offering me a scholarship to study for a **Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy**

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## CHAPTER THREE

The first agnostic implication of gnoseological-immanentism manifest in Sartre's ontology especially in *Being and Nothingness*.

## ABSTRACT

## CHAPTER ONE

The methodological and epistemological features of Sartre's "reduction of the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it" (BN,xxi) and an implicit phenomenological reduction of philosophy are not consistent with his atheism. Heidegger (1978) meanings, make Sartre's phenomenological ontology inadequate when alluded to this when rejecting Sartre's reference to him as an dealing with the transphenomenal (Lafarge, 1970:32).

atheist. As Heidegger says, the existential analysis of human beings neither affirms nor denies the existence of God.

## CHAPTER FOUR

Existentialism defends a position which is "closed", leading to gnoseological-immanentism in taking concrete and immediate some form of agnosticism (Dondeyne, 1962). The roots of experience as supreme, coupled with a shunning of inference, lead existentialist atheism can be traced to the Cartesian "principle of Sartre's philosophy into metaphysical naivete. Hence, the position immanentism" (Fabro, 1964). The principle is defective and any is a closed one and should lead to agnosticism and not atheism. atheism arrived at via it must be refuted (*Ibid*). There are two

agnostic implications from gnoseological-immanentism" in Sartre's

## CHAPTER FIVE

philosophy and one from phenomenology.

Even though Sartre followed Heidegger out of purely descriptive phenomenology to the deciphering of concealed meanings, he had no

## CHAPTER TWO

intention to abandon the most basic tenet of phenomenology that A historical explication of gnoseological-immanentism from the source and final test of knowledge is the intuition of Descartes to Sartre reveals the agnostic implications inherent in phenomena. This is the case at least until the rationalism, British empiricism, Kantian thought, and in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. However, *Search for a Method* which phenomenology due to the epistemological deficiencies of that was originally written as a preface to the former is a primer in principle.

existential/phenomenological methodology.

**CHAPTER THREE**

The first agnostic implication is the gnoseological—immanentism manifest in Sartre's ontology especially in Being and Nothingness.

The "reduction of the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it" (BN;xxi) and an implicit phenomenological reduction of meanings, make Sartre's phenomenological ontology inadequate when dealing with the transphenomenal (Lafarge, 1970;32).

**CHAPTER FOUR**

Gnoseological-immanentism in taking concrete and immediate experience as supreme, coupled with a shunning of inference, lead Sartre's philosophy into metaphysical naivete. Hence, the position is a closed one and should lead to agnosticism and not atheism.

**CHAPTER FIVE**

Even though Sartre followed Heidegger out of purely descriptive phenomenology to the deciphering of concealed meanings, he had no intention to abandon the most basic tenet of phenomenology; that the source and final test of knowledge is the intuition of phenomena. This is the case at least until the Critique of Dialectical Reason. However, Search For a Method which was originally written as a preface to the former is a primer in existential/phenomenological methodology.

Metaphysical questions are "system strange" (Farber, 1943;566) because phenomenology contains a naivete in relation to methods that function indirectly, i.e. inference. The existence of God, therefore, can neither be affirmed nor denied within a phenomenological scope. It was erroneous in procedure for Sartre to have taken an atheist stand within his "phenomenological ontology" and used it as a premise for a similar stand in his existential/phenomenological hermeneutics.

## CHAPTER SIX

Gnoseological-immanentism commits the cartesian error of trying to proceed from a sole principle and fact, i.e., subjective consciousness. It falls into the "illusion of immanence" (Dondeyne, 1962;103) by conceiving the immediate objects of knowledge as immanent in the mind. Percepts and concepts are not taken as medium quo or "instruments" within and at the service of which cognitive intention bears out towards reality (Ibid).

In relation to phenomenology, a philosophical problem should be tackled appropriately, and every method has its appropriate or "proper questions" and there are "system strange" questions with respect to it. The co-operation of various philosophical methods is therefore vital in the quest for knowledge.

## INTRODUCTION

Jean-Paul Sartre was born in 1905 in Paris. His father was a ranchman and his mother was a German. He lost his father when he was two years old and was taken to Alsace where he grew up in the home of his maternal grandparent, Charles Schweitzer, a cousin of Albert Schweitzer.

## CHAPTER ONE

His formal education was basically French but classed by study in Germany. After attending the Lycee Henry IV in Paris, he went to the Ecole Normale Supérieure, where he received his masters degree in philosophy. He taught philosophy in Lycées in Havre, Leon and then Paris. From 1933 upto 1935, he was a research student first in Berlin and then at the University of Freiburg, after which he taught in the Lycée Condorcet at Paris. It was at Freiburg and Berlin that he first read Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, the two thinkers who were to greatly influence his thinking. There were other influences as well: Rene Descartes, Blaise Pascal, Immanuel Kant, George Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, and Soren Kierkegaard.

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In 1939 Sartre joined the French army and was captured in 1940. Released in 1941, he returned to teaching Philosophy and was also an active participant in the resistant movement. He died in April, 1980. Jean-Paul Sartre belongs to the existentialist movement of philosophers. This includes philosophers such as Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Gabriel Marcel, among others.

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"existence precedes essence". L'pour-soi means "the for-itself" or "the for-oneself". This is human self consciousness. L'en-soi or "the in-itself" is a derivation from Immanuel Kant's "Ding-an-sich", i.e. the "thing-in-itself".

Although different existentialist philosophers have different outlooks on religion, politics, as well as philosophy, they share certain general themes. They contrast the sort of being that applies to man with that which applies to things. They share the view that human beings are active and creative while things are not. For existentialists, things are simply what they are, but human beings are not determined in the way that things are. For the existentialists, men must choose even the principles on which they choose. "Existence precedes essence" for them. Human beings make their essences as they go along. Human beings are free. The reality and nature of freedom is a major concern for the existentialists.

Since self-consciousness is for Sartre not "self-identical", Sartre distinguishes between two kinds of existentialists (EH; 26). He mentions on the one hand, Christian existentialists among whom are Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel. On the other hand he talks about atheist existentialists among who are Martin Heidegger, the French existentialists, and even Sartre himself.

The second proof is in the existentialist doctrine that "exists". It is such a context that Sartre attempted "...to draw in the full conclusions from a consistent atheist position" (EH, in P.56). as to the abstract, especially as it manifests itself in concepts. Take the example of the following concept about man; "man

Sartre tries to prove the non-existence of God in two ways: first, through his interrelated concepts of "L'pour-soi" and "L'en-soi"; and second from the existentialist doctrine that

"existence precedes essence". L'pour-soi means "the for-itself" or "the for-oneself". This is human self consciousness. L'en-soi or "the in-itself" is a derivation from Immanuel Kant's "Ding-an-Sich", i.e. the "thing-in-itself". are quite special and particular to individual men in concrete situations.

For Sartre there is no self-consciousness without objects, it is universal. In contrast the existentialist and Sartre's in this case phenomena or objects as they appear to our senses. Man concept of "existence" is in terms of the particular, aiming at all experiences his ego, i.e., self, in what he is doing, in his those details that are excluded by the abstract concept, and psychic states that go together that, and in his experiences and therefore concrete. The related concept of essence usually influences of any kind. For Sartre, consciousness is correlative to expresses the understanding that human beings, and other beings objects, actions etc, though not reducible to them. Therefore self- too, have a definite nature that does not change for the entire consciousness, being correlative to objects, actions, etc, is not period of their existence. However, Sartre does not conceive of self-identical.

essence in the way defined above. For Sartre, men exist and then create. Since self-consciousness is for Sartre not self-identical, the notion of a personal and transcendent, i.e., a self-identical consciousness, is contradictory. This is because a personal being is a self-conscious being. The supposed notion of God implies that such a self-conscious being is at the same time a self-identical being. So to Sartre the notion of God is contradictory. who creates such an essence which is always in the making, men must also create

The second proof is in the existentialist doctrine that their own values. Sartre says, "man is damned to be free" (en, "existence precedes essence." "Existence" is here conceived of in terms of the concrete. The concrete can be understood here in contrast to the abstract, especially as it manifests itself in concepts. Take the example of the following concept about man; "man

is a rational animal". The above concept is abstract because, even though it expresses something we have understood of man, it does not contain all those details that are quite special and particular to individual men in concrete situations.

It is universal. In contrast the existentialist and Sartre's concept of "existence" is in terms of the particular, aiming at all those details that are excluded by the abstract concept, and therefore concrete. The related concept of essence usually expresses the understanding that human beings, and other beings too, have a definite nature that does not change for the entire period of their existence. However, Sartre does not conceive of essence in the way defined above. For Sartre, men exist and then create their essences, essences are always in the making and there is no fixed essence for a human being. It is in the same way that men also create their own values. Sartre is opposed (EH) to the view that men have to choose values which arise from and must conform to a given and unchanging nature or essence. Since for him there is not such a given and fixed essence, it is men who create such an essence which is always in the making, men must also create their own values. Sartre says, "man is damned to be free" (EH, Passim).

At the same time this is man's possibility, he has the chance to affirm nor denies the existence of God. Heidegger, who in that project his existence freely. These notions of man's ethical freedom, creating his own essence, values his "World", and of man's ethical freedom which is equally unrestricted and creative, leave no room for a transcendent or even a natural law.

The transcendent in this respect refers to laws and values emanating from a transcendent or supreme being, i.e. God. Natural law is that emanating from an essence or nature of human beings that would in the case of Sartre be conceived of as being prior to existence contrary to the existentialist views. Therefore, the existence of man as conceived by Sartre leads him to the conclusion that God and man cannot co-exist.

Despite Sartre's commitment to atheism, his philosophy can be said to have agnostic implications. The issue of agnostic implications was brought up by Martin Heidegger (1978). He pointed it out partly in a reply to Sartre's attempt to create a direct filiation between their philosophies by calling them atheistic.

The agnostic implications can be seen to stem from the epistemological and methodological assumptions on which Sartre's philosophy is based, and from the background of which he draws his atheist conclusions. First, the epistemological foundation of Sartre's philosophy. This is his philosophy, whether explicit or

He says that the existential analysis of human beings neither affirms nor denies the existence of God. Heidegger, who in that discussion was concerned with giving his conception of humanism, does not give reason why existential analysis of human beings neither affirms nor denies the existence of God.

Fredrick Copleston (1972) also raises questions about Sartre's atheism. He mentions Heidegger's rejection of the affiliation but his angle of criticism differs. He is not concerned so much with the question whether Sartre's philosophy has the epistemological and methodological orientation to take such a stance on the problem of the existence of God. His concern is with a contradiction in Sartre's first argument against the existence of God. The position has two basic tenets. First, it accepts the Cartesian tradition that the self-

consciousness (1962) considers existentialism as defending a position which is at least a "closed" one leading to some form of "agnosticism" or even "atheism". Dondeyne's concern, however, is with the exposition of contemporary thought and the implications of existentialism are only secondary.

The agnostic implications can be seen to stem from the epistemological and methodological assumptions on which Sartre's philosophy is based, and from the background of which he draws his atheist conclusions. First, the epistemological foundation of existence; man's existence as the being through whom Sartre's philosophy. This is his philosophy, whether explicit or

The second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism is that the implicit, concerning the meaning and scope of knowledge and indeed of what being is. The epistemological foundation of Sartre's philosophy is a position manifesting gnoseological-immanentism. Gnoseological-immanentism basically means that the immediate object of knowledge, either explicitly or implicitly, is something in the mind. Apart from the largely epistemological factor of gnoseological-immanentism, agnostic implication also arises from the largely methodological factor of phenomenology which is essential to Sartre's philosophy.

Gnoseological-immanentism was brought to prominence by Rene Descartes whose philosophy stresses the role of the subject as the ultimate basis of knowledge. The position has two basic tenets. First, it accepts the Cartesian tradition that the self-consciousness of the subject other than being is the ultimate foundation of intelligibility, truth, meaning, and value. According to this tradition, man's freedom expresses his autonomy in the face of truth in as much as man is responsible for truth (Descartes, 1952 a and b), i.e., "it accepts nothing as true that does not present itself to consciousness as clear and distinct". "I must actualise truth for it to exist" (Fabro; 1964, 943). It is within the scope of that first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism that Sartre draws the conclusion of his second argument against God's existence; man's existence as the being through whom intelligibility, truth, meaning and value comes to being, is

incompatible with the existence of a transcendent or natural law. being (1952). Edmund Husserl (1969 and 1970), follows with his idealism. The second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism is that the immediate object of human knowledge is something immanent "remaining in", i.e., something in the mind. Here we have Descartes' (1952, a and b) innate clear and distinct ideas i.e. ideas that since they are inborn or intuited by the mind by its own faculties and not derived from any other source as sensation, are clearly and distinctly perceived by the mind so that they cannot be doubted. So is the representationalism of John Locke (1952) that all know are sense data (what is perceived by the senses of touch, sight, smell, hearing and taste), and that these represent objects to us. Likewise is the empiricism of David Hume (1952) that all we know are our sense "impressions" (data or impressions imprinted on our senses by objects), and their faint copies which he calls "images". Before Hume, Berkeley comes in with his idealism saying "to be is to be perceived" (1952). In other words the essence of objects is to be perceived. He argues that objects are no more but clusters of "ideas" or sense data and that "ideas" or sense data cannot be perceived apart from a mind perceiving them. Kant follows in that tradition with his phenomenalism, i.e., we can only know objects in so far as they appear to us, and his idealism that objects get their intelligible form when the mind imprints the categories (quality, quantity, relation, and modality) on them. For Kant the categories are ways of understanding and not modes of respect against what they see as reductionism of

being (1952). Edmund Husserl (1969 and 1970), follows with his idealism that the object, the correlate of intentional consciousness (consciousness which has an object and is directed towards it), is constituted by the intending consciousness. Most recent is the position of Sartre that intelligible structure and determination come to being from human consciousness (BN) That is how Sartre's philosophy embraces the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism to deny God's existence in his second argument.

Secondly, the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism seems to be necessitated in Sartre's philosophy by his second special interest as an existentialist. The first special interest is with man as a free consciousness, and this leads to the embracing of the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism. The second interest is an existentialist concern signified by the term "existence" in the phrase "the existential conditions of man". "Existence" signifies that man is a concrete being or existent in a situation.

In that regard, Sartre asserts with Soren Kierkegaard, the precursor of existentialism, the following:

- (I) "The irreducibility and specificity of what is lived" (SFM; 10-12). Human existence is to be studied in its particular, specific, and concrete situations. Existentialism is in this respect against what they see as reductionism of

abstract conceptual knowledge that would reduce the "existential" to a dry concept-ridden domain. Existentialism is a reaction of Hegelian and related types of idealism which reduce subjective existence to an instance of some absolute. Thus the existentialists resort to literal forms and concrete life stories of fictitious characters as vehicles for expressions of their ideas.

Agnostic implication also arises in Sartre's philosophy

(II) It is by virtue of the above that existentialism asserts; because phenomenology is essential to Sartre's philosophy and not "the primacy of the specifically real over thought" (SFM; simply a method to be used when convenient. It is within his 10-12).

phenomenological ontology (BN) that Sartre gives his first argument

against the existence of God. It is also the phenomenological

Existentialism is interested in the concrete data of ontology that lays ground for the second argument against God's experience, especially of the human situation of what Sartre calls existence.

facticity, and in describing this data as far as possible. Sartre's philosophy thus claims to be a philosophy of the concrete (SFM). He

is not merely urging us to return to experience, but also stressing

that experience in the widest sense of the term is the only way of

getting to reality. Existentialism for Sartre, has its fundamental

affirmation, even as its name suggests, in "the primacy of

existence over consciousness" (SFM; 31-32). Therefore "only

conceptual and discursive thought that goes back immediately to men

and things in the world is acceptable" (Ibid). In other words the

criterion of knowledge is that it refers immediately to things of

Sartre called himself an atheist and, in fact he was for he

experience. The second tenet of gnoseological immanentism is

that psychological disposition, he believed that no such being

reached because knowledge is only of things which can be

experienced, which means that outside experience there can be no knowledge or even being. Ultimately, things as conceived, cannot exist outside and beyond experience, and must exist only in relation to being experienced. Therefore things are immanent in consciousness and ultimately cannot be considered to exist independently of it.

Agnostic implication also arises in Sartre's philosophy because phenomenology is essential to Sartre's philosophy and not simply a method to be used when convenient. It is within his phenomenological ontology (BN) that Sartre gives his first argument against the existence of God. It is also the phenomenological ontology that lays ground for the second argument against God's existence.

However, even without taking phenomenology as the essence of philosophy, it would still be a problem to raise the problem of God's existence within phenomenology regarded simply as a method. Heidegger (1976) alludes to this in his repudiation of Sartre's attempt to filiation. The existential analysis of which he talks is a part of the phenomenological approach.

## 1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Sartre called himself an atheist and, in fact he was for he had that psychological disposition, he believed that no such being

as God exists. However, questions can be raised as to whether his philosophy really has the basis to raise the problem of God's existence and even take the stance of atheism. The objective of the study is thus, contrary to Sartre's proclamations to show that his philosophy has agnostic implications and therefore no basis to proclaim atheism.

### 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

From the above described epistemological and methodological principles of Sartre's philosophy, this study aims at showing three agnostic implications. Those principles are gnoseological-immanentism (under which phenomenology can be subsumed if considered to be the essence of philosophy), and phenomenology which can also be considered as only a method of philosophy.

The three agnostic implications are as that the study intends to show are as follows:-

- 1) The first agnostic implication is to be shown as coming explicitly, not from, especially, the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism as manifest is Sartre's ontology where objects derived their essence, form, or structure from consciousness. Consequently there is no ontologically-objective basis for ascertaining the characteristics of being in such an ontology, and no justification to assert or deny the existence of a being.

- 2) The second agnostic implication is to be drawn from the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism necessitated by in this section, the aim is to show what premises entail the existentialist concern for the concrete, and reflecting conclusions which constitute agnostic implications of Sartre's philosophy. The study intends to show three agnostic implications and test of knowledge. Consequently, we cannot within such that have been stated in the objectives of the study. For each an epistemological framework assert the existence or non-implication there is a set of premises as follows:
- existence of a being that cannot fall within the range of immediate experience. Moreover, there is the same problem of agnosticism of ontologically-objective existence because reality seems to be conceived of in terms of immediate experience and it is difficult to see how that immediate "B" I and II.
- For the third agnostic implication, there is the set "C".
- 3) The third implication is to be drawn from phenomenology which is not merely a method to Sartre's philosophy but an integral part of it. Phenomenology can be subsumed under in Sartre's philosophy, objects have a determinate gnoseological-immanentism, as in the philosophy of Sartre, structures, form, or essence bestowed on them, not by virtue but it will here be studied as such because it is an error of their being, but by human-subjective consciousness. in procedure to raise metaphysical problems within its scope there is by implication, no ontologically-objective basis whether or not it is regarded as simply a method. The aim is for the affirmation of the characteristics of being to show that one cannot assert the existence or non-existence of a God within a framework whose basic tenet is the intuiting of phenomena.

#### 1.4 PREMISES OF THE STUDY

In this section, the aim is to show what premises entail the conclusions which constitute agnostic implications of Sartre's philosophy. The study intends to show three agnostic implications that have been stated in the objectives of the study. For each implication there is a set of premises as follows:

A) For the first agnostic implication, there is the set of premises "A".

B) For the second agnostic implication is the set of premises "B" I and II.

C) For the third agnostic implication, there is the set "C".

#### A) SET OF PREMISES FOR FIRST AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION

1. In Sartre's philosophy, objects have a determinate structure, form, or essence bestowed on them, not by virtue of their being, but by human subjective consciousness. There is by implication, no ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of the characteristics of being.

2. Without an ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of the characteristics of being, then there is no way of ascertaining whether supposed characteristics of being are ontologically-objective or just projections of subjective consciousness.

3. Since there is no way of ascertaining the characteristics of being, then there is no justification to deny or affirm the existence of a being.

B) SET OF PREMISES FOR SECOND AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION

I First sub-set.

1. Being goes beyond the confines of immediate experience, and human knowledge is able by conceptual means, by inference, to go beyond the limits of immediate experience. If that were not so, then we would not be able to account for the fact that the earth rotates round its axis in 24 hours and it goes round the sun on its orbit in 365 days.

The existence or non-existence of God is not given to immediate experience. Hence, the problem cannot be raised within any epistemological framework, as Moore's, that restricts itself to the criterion of reference to immediate experience.

Second sub-set.

- 2) Reference to immediate experience, therefore, is not the only way to knowledge of being. Other forms of knowledge, conceptual or inferential can be used to grasp being beyond the confines of immediate experience. Since reference to immediate experience is the criterion of knowledge, being is thus conceived of only in terms of what the proposition, "all men are vegetative and sensitive beings". The truth of such a proposition can never be grasped on the basis of reference to immediate experience. It can only exist in relation to an experiencing subject.
- 3) Sartre's philosophy restricts itself to the criterion of Being is, by implication, existent only in relation to a reference to immediate experience as the source and test of knowledge (SFM). As objects would then exist only in relation to an
- 4) If an object is not given to immediate experience, then truth about its existence or non-existence cannot be asserted solely on the basis of reference to immediate experience. Consequently, there is no basis nor justification to assert the existence or non existence of a being.
- 5) The existence or non-existence of God is not given to immediate experience. Hence, the problem cannot be raised within any epistemological framework, as Sartre's, that restricts itself to the criterion of reference to immediate experience.

- II) **Second sub-set.** of the phenomenological method is that the source and final test of knowledge is the intuition of
- 1) Sartre's philosophy stresses reference to immediate experience as the source and test of knowledge.
  - 3) Since reference to immediate experience is the criterion of knowledge, being is thus conceived of only in terms of what can be immediately experienced.
  - 4) An instance of immediate experience or concrete experience can only exist in relation to an experiencing subject.
  - 5) Being is, by implication, existent only in relation to a mind or consciousness.
  - 6) As objects would then exist only in relation to an experiencing subject, there is no ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of the characteristics of being.
  - 7) Consequently, there is no basis nor justification to assert the existence or non existence of a being.
- SET OF PREMISES FOR THE THIRD AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION**
- 1) The phenomenological method is an essential and exclusive component of Sartre's philosophy.

2) The basic tenet of the phenomenological method is that the source and final test of knowledge is the intuition of phenomena. The logical positivist criterion is limited because being and human knowledge surpass the limits of experience, as was demonstrated by the examples of some aspects of the solar system in premise 1 of sub-set 1 of B set of premises for the second agnostic implication.

3) In the problem of God's existence, the object is more than phenomenal and cannot therefore be simply intuited from phenomena. The problem of God's existence is meaningful also especially in the light of the following facts:

4) The problem of God's existence, cannot therefore be raised within the scope of Sartre's philosophy.

The premises of this study should be bolstered by others that give the problem of God's existence meaning. This is especially so in the face of the assertions of the logical positivists in the earlier part of this century. For the logical positivists, all metaphysical, religious, and ethical statements are meaningless and hence questions about truth cannot be raised about them.

That is by virtue of their principle of verification according to which a statement is meaningful if and only if it can be verified by appeal to experience. It is only when it is verifiable by experience that questions of truth or falsehood can be raised. Otherwise a statement is meaningless and questions of truth cannot be raised. The answer is negative. From the above facts and assumptions, meaningful questions can be raised concerning truth

Meaningfulness, contrary to the logical positivists, is here conceived of in the sense that questions of truth of the existence or non-existence of God can be raised. The logical positivist

The above facts and assumptions are necessary in focussing criterion is limited because being and human knowledge surpass the limits of experience, as was demonstrated by the examples of some aspects of the solar system in premise 1 of sub-set I of B set of hypothesis and premises justify the assumption so that the study premises for the second agnostic implication.

The problem of God's existence in this study is meaningful also especially in the light of the following facts:

- 1) There are some human beings and other beings existing.
- 2) These beings have come into existence as a result of the causality of others.
- 3) None of these existents is the cause of its existence, i.e. all are contingent beings.

From those facts, one can posit the following assumption that is analogous to St. Thomas Aquinas' cosmological argument for the existence of God; if all existing beings are contingent, could that fact explain their existence even if they formed an infinite series? The answer is negative. From the above facts and assumptions, meaningful questions can be raised concerning truth

about the existence or non-existence of a being regarded as the ultimate cause or explanation of the universe, i.e. God.

The above facts and assumptions are necessary in focussing the agnostic implications. The study is conducted on the basis that the problem of God's existence or non-existence can be raised. The hypothesis and premises justify the assumption so that the study avoids the fallacy of begging the question.

### 1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The study is not propaganda or a crusade against atheism. The concern is really with the proper epistemological and methodological orientation for the raising of philosophical issues and problems. The study has thus picked on a typical representative, Jean-Paul Sartre, with whom it is the objective to show that his epistemological and methodological orientations are not suited to the raising of the problem of God's existence.

Sartre called himself an atheist and, infact, he was, for he had that psychological disposition, he believed that no such being as God exists. However, questions can be asked as to whether his philosophy really has the basis to raise the problem of God's existence and even take the stance of atheism. The objective of the study is thus, contrary to Sartre's proclamations, to show that his philosophy has no such basis and infact has agnostic implications.

Heidegger (1978), and Copleston (1972), have questioned Sartre's claim to atheism. Heidegger did this partly in a reaction to Sartre's attempt to make direct filiation between their philosophies by calling them atheist. Heidegger says that, in the existential analysis of man, nothing is decided about the existence or non-existence of God. Heidegger, who was more concerned with an exposition of his conception of humanism, did not expound further on his statement. The study, therefore, aims at showing why in the existential analysis, a part of the phenomenological method, nothing can be decided about God's existence or non-existence. The study also aims at giving other reasons, i.e. gnoseological-immanentism. Copleston (1972) also mentions Heidegger's rejection of the filiation but points to a contradiction in Sartre's argument against God's existence. His angle of criticism is therefore different.

By showing the agnostic implications in Sartre's philosophy in a detailed manner, especially expounding on the areas that these authors have not concerned themselves with, the study hopes to contribute to an accurate understanding of Sartre's position. Apparently, Sartre says one thing, logically his philosophy implies something else. The above point can be expressed differently as follows; in order to understand a philosophy in itself or in relation to a particular issue, more often than not, it is inadequate to simply give that philosophy a label. For example

2) Being and human knowledge transcend the limits that example calling it "atheistic" or "theist", without examining whether it has the appropriate epistemological or methodological orientation to be without contradiction such as we may label it.

The study also aims at stressing the Socratic adage that philosophical assertions should have proper justification, otherwise they are not worth asserting. If one wants to assert atheism, then this atheism should be founded on sound premises. The same applies for one who wants to assert theism. It is crucial, in the quest for knowledge, that our claims should be justified and the principles or criteria for such justification be evident. That maxim applies not only to philosophical analysis, but to other branches of knowledge as well.

#### 1.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

It is asserted that Sartre's philosophy has agnostic implications under the following presuppositions:

- 1) That the problem of God's existence is meaningful, i.e. questions about truth of existence or non-existence can be raised about it. This meaningfulness is not based upon the logical positivist's criterion but upon the premises and the kind of hypothesis made in St. Thomas Aquinas' cosmological argument for the existence of God.

2) Being and human knowledge transcend the limits that Sartre's philosophy has in terms of epistemology and methodology. These restrict it to things immanent in the mind and to that which can be intuited from phenomena.

These presuppositions are made on the basis of a conceptual framework which bases itself on the fact that being and human knowledge go beyond the limits of Sartre's philosophy. Such a framework also provides the premises which show that the problem of God's existence is meaningful.

The conceptual framework in this study is gnoseological-realism. Realism is the doctrine that things have objective existence. Gnoseological-realism means a trust based on the fact that our knowledge is able to transcend the gnoseological-immanentist limit to things immanent in the mind and to grasp being itself, at least in some way. Indeed our knowledge is very imperfect and limited, yet man is able to transcend the immanentist limit.

Proof for the presuppositions of gnoseological-realism are the objective existence of some qualities of things, and the intelligibility of some proportion of being.

Evidence for objective existence can be adduced from qualities of things which, beyond the scope of reasonable doubt, seem not in any way to depend upon their being perceived. Such

qualities of things which beyond the scope of reasonable doubt, seem not in any way depend upon their being perceived. Such qualities are extension, solidity, motion, and rest.

To use a close analogy to Russell's "appearance and reality" puzzle, we may not be very certain about the shape of a "table X", its colour, its sound when tapped, its hardness, softness, smoothness, or roughness. Such qualities seem to be tied considerably to the status of the perceiver. However, it will be immediately affirmable that "table X" is at least one object, is extended, is solid, is in motion, or is in rest. The reason is that these qualities have objective existence, their perception is not affected by the status of whoever perceives.

One could perhaps challenge that thesis with the Berkeleyan negation of matter, or "esse est percipi", according to which only minds and their "ideas" do exist. However a sufficient reason for the "ideas" does require more than the Berkeleyan minds and their "ideas". The insufficiency of the Berkeleyan position has been pointed out clearly by Strawson (1959). Assertions on being, made within such a philosophy, would only lead to the fallacy of circular reasoning. We cannot explain which sense data make up the object except by referring to them as sense data of the object. We have to refer to the object in order to explain which sense data it

Scepticism that it is not possible to know being itself is already an affirmation of the characteristics of being itself. Such

consists of. That cannot be because objects are clusters of "ideas" that do not exist apart from a perceiver. The circularity is in a statement can only be based on some understanding, however identifying objects solely on the basis of "ideas" or sense data which are the constituents of objects. The problem manifests a depreciation of objective datum that is typical of gnoseological-immanentism. Realism, in its metaphysical sense that is directly relevant to this study, has two major components:

We may not be in agreement as to the colour of "table X", its odour, its shape, its hardness, smoothness, softness, roughness, or the sound it emits when tapped. These qualities may be relative to the status of the percipient. However it can be objectively affirmed that "table X", at least, does have some colour, shape, odour, a sound when tapped, and etc. It may be impossible to objectively verify the type of these qualities, but at least it will be possible to affirm their objective existence as such. Colours, sounds, smells, tastes, and sensations of the touch, why there is being other than nothingness?" It also looks at such problems as that of "being and becoming", and the problem of "one over

On the other hand, in as much as some portion of reality has become intelligible to man, there is still a lot that defies his understanding. However the intelligible portion, and man's ability to manipulate some of its sectors are proof that man is able to know being itself. If man was not able to go beyond subjective consciousness, then being as a whole would still be radically unintelligible. Metaphysics itself derives from the title that was posthumously given to a treatise that Aristotle wrote after his Physics. The word metaphysics then came to be used as a label for

Scepticism that it is not possible to know being itself is already an affirmation of the characteristics of being itself. Such

a statement can only be based on some understanding, however minimal, of some characteristics of being itself. It is already an affirmation that certain qualities of being have been cognised, as exhibited in experience.

Gnoseological-realism, in its metaphysical sense that is directly relevant to this study, has two major components: that are normally considered branches of metaphysics are:

- i) The method of ontology, and
- ii) Presuppositions of the validity of ontological inference made by the method of ontology.

cosmology, a branch of metaphysics which treats of the origin and structure of the universe; and,

i) The method of ontology

Ontology is a part of metaphysics that dedicates itself to the study of being as such. It tries to answer such questions as, "why there is being other than nothingness?" It also looks at such problems as that of "being and becoming", and the problem of "one over many". For Aristotle ontology was "First Philosophy", the science of being or of the essence of things. The term ontology was however introduced into philosophy by Christian Wolff (1679-1754).

However, it does not limit its inquiries to the facts of experience but draws inferences in the attempt to grasp

"Metaphysics" itself derives from the title that was posthumously given to a treatise that Aristotle wrote after his 'Physics'. The word metaphysics then came to be used as a label for the sort of topics dealt with in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'.

Metaphysics has as one of its main concerns, the ontological status of objects, i.e., their being or essence. It focusses on the generic (characteristic or genus or class, not specific) features exhibited in experience.

Apart from ontology, other areas that are normally considered branches of metaphysics are:

a) rational psychology, a speculative treatment of the soul and its faculties in contrast to a descriptive empirical psychology;

b) cosmology, a branch of metaphysics which treats of the origin and structure of the universe ; and,

c) natural theology, in general, a term used to distinguish any theology based upon the fundamental premise of the ability of man to construct his theory of God and of the world out of the framework of his own reason and of reasonable probability from the "revealed theology".

These beings are contingent, none is the cause of its own

Metaphysics starts its inquiries with experience and statement of facts. However, it does not limit its inquiries to the

facts of experience but draws inferences in the attempt to grasp

being, then by means of the logical examination of concepts. It is

this kind of inferences that are referred to here as the method of

ontology.

contingent, i.e., it is not the cause of its own existence,

then not even an infinite number of such beings could explain

The method of ontology given the background of gnoseological-  
~~their own existence.~~

realism consists first in grasping the notion of being, i.e., whatever is in so far as it is, and first principles such as the principle of contradiction in its ontological formulation; nothing can exist and not exist at the same time and in the same respect. It then studies each single problem by starting with experience and statement of its facts. It then makes an ontological inference from these facts by applying one of the first principles, e.g. the principle of causality; something real and actual cannot come into existence other than through the causality of another that is real and actual. In this way it aims to reach valid conclusions and it may continue to derive any further implications out of its conclusions.

Consider the following example:

- 1) There are human persons and other beings existing.

In contrast, the phenomenological approach, to whose basic

- 2) These beings are contingent, none is the cause of its own existence but has come into existence as a result of the causality of other beings.

- 3) If none of these beings is the cause of its own existence, could they explain their own existence even if they were arranged to infinity? The answer is negative. If a being is contingent, i.e., it is not the cause of its own existence,

then not even an infinite number of such beings could explain their own existence.

From such facts of experience as existence and contingency we can at least raise questions about the truth of the existence or non-existence of being that is the cause of its own existence and the ultimate cause of the universe.

The emphasis here is not so much on the above problem. The significance of the example is to demonstrate how far beyond the data of experience, by using gnoseological-realism as a basis, we are able to go in our quest for being. It is gnoseological-realism which provides the basis on which we are able to grasp being, beyond the merely immanent or that which cannot be taken to exist independently of human consciousness. It is only on the basis of such a framework that we should raise questions about the existence of beings and even that of God's.

In contrast, the phenomenological approach, to whose basic tenets Sartre adheres, is as per the etymology a *logos* or study of phenomena. Phenomena are objects as they appear to us in occasions of experience. The proper function of phenomenology then is to intuit, analyse, and describe that which is given in experience. It then tries to apprehend and investigate the ideal or essential in various phenomena, and such essences are in phenomenology also phenomenal. After grasping the ideal content of phenomena, it then

tries to investigate relationships between phenomenal essences. Throughout the period of phenomenological investigation all theoretical knowledge, hypotheses, inferences and proofs derived from other sources are excluded so that only the 'given' will be admitted (J.M. Bochenski: 1968, 16). Even at the level of phenomenological hermeneutics, that is, the science of interpreting obscure meanings especially in human activity, it is, at least in principle, supposed "to exclude all indirect acquisition of knowledge from their enquiries" (Ibid, 28).

a) Value of concepts.

As Spiegelberg (1976, Vol.II, 695) says, for phenomenological hermeneutics to defend its phenomenological right, one would have to maintain that hermeneutic interpretation is a matter not of mere constructive inference but of an unveiling of hidden meanings, or at most of an intuitive verification of anticipations about the less accessible layers of phenomena, layers which can be uncovered, although they are not immediately manifest. Though hermeneutics in this case interpretes concealed meanings, intuition is the source and final test of knowledge. Hence, phenomenology in any form remains essentially the study of phenomena and lacks the capacity to investigate beyond the phenomenal, especially the metaphysical which includes the problem of God's existence.

## ii) Presuppositions of ontological inference

Presuppositions of ontological inference are assumptions that are the conditions for the validity of ontological inferences made by the method of ontology. These consist of the following:

- a) Value of concepts.
- b) Knowledge as an intentional act.
- c) The immediate object of knowledge as reality itself.

a) Value of concepts.

Our concrete case of ontological inference (the example given under the method of ontology) starts with a statement of facts; "There are some human persons and other beings really and actually existing". This is a meaningful statement, if the terms or concepts involved, i.e. "human persons", "other beings", "actually existing", "really existing", etc., signify something of reality itself. Indeed, they are far from signifying reality in all its richness. Rather they do signify something of reality by way of something of reality itself and true in so far as there is existence.

There are other ontological terms such as "essential identity" (the definite nature that a being has throughout the period of its existence and that which distinguishes it from other beings), "numerical identity" (that an individual being has an identity that it possess throughout the period of its existence),

"nature or essence", "contigent being", "self-existent being" etc.

These terms and concepts are not as exact as mathematical definitions or the scientific formulation of the laws of nature.

This does not mean, however, that they are meaningless, and the question of truth cannot even be raised concerning them as the

logical positivists would have us believe. For the logical positivists, before the question of truth of a statement can be

raised, the more crucial question is whether or not it is

meaningful. Only then can the question of truth value be raised. A

statement is meaningful if its truth value can be verified by

appeal to experience either in practice or in principle. Since

metaphysical, religious, and ethical assertions cannot be verified

in that way, the logical positivists regard them as meaningless

and, hence, say the question of truth cannot be raised about them.

(A.J. Ayer; 1936).

Man is part of the physical world because of his body.

These terms and statements do signify something of reality

itself. Indeed, they are far from signifying reality in all its

richness. Rather they do signify something of reality by way of

demarcation of knowledge and without them there can be no objects

help us to unify the various objects that we experience and provide

Sartre's philosophy on the other hand does not have the

value for these concepts by virtue of its stress that only thought

referring to immediate experience is admissible. His philosophy does the following: (i) it asserts "the primacy of existence over consciousness", (ii) "the irreducibility and specificity of what is lived", (iii) "the primacy of the specifically real over thought", (iv) "the incommensurability of the real and knowledge". Sartre's philosophy considers experience in the widest sense of the term the only way of getting to reality (SFM; 10-12, and 31-32).

However, these concepts are valuable components for ontological inference, because after starting with experience, truths are supposed to be established on the grounds of reason (logical examination of concepts). These concepts provide a basis for gnoseological-realism.

b) Knowledge as an intentional act.

Man is part of the physical world because of his body. Therefore, physical factors, for example, the stimulus rays of light, sound waves, physical process, chemical process, and atomical process will be part of man's knowledge. However, knowledge is not a physical process, but a psychic act. As Aristotle had already known, the physical factors are not knowledge

itself but are only the "bridge" connecting the subject with the object, a condition of sensation, indeed, a necessary condition of actual perception. "Indeed, the sense perceptions as well as the concepts are not what are known in the sense of being entirely what is known, representations or copies of reality, and even entities in themselves" (Dondeyne; 1962, 103) as gnoseological-immanentism takes it. "They are rather the medium and at the service of which cognitive intention bears towards reality" (Ibid)

c) The immediate object of human knowledge as an intentional act is therefore reality itself and not something immanent in the mind as the gnoseological-immanentists take it to be. The innate clear and distinct ideas, representative ideas, impressions and images, and collections of ideas are only but the "bridges" through which reality itself is known.

## 1.7 METHODOLOGY

The study was carried out through the consultation of written sources, especially library sources.

The primary sources are the philosophical and other relevant works of Jean-Paul Sartre. In their chronological and conceptual order, they are the following: TE (1936), translated into English (1957) by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick; NAU (1938), translated by Lloyd Alexander (1949); STE (1939), translated into English (1961) by Phillip Mairett; IPC (1940), translated into English (1962) by Forrest Williams; TF (1943) translated into English (1965) by R.D. Cumming; BN (1943), translated into English by Hazel E. Barnes (1958); EH (1946), translated into English by George J. Becker (1948); TDGL (1951), translated into English by Kitty Black (1960); SFM (1957), translated into English by Hazel E. Barnes; SOT (1967), edited by Michael Rybalka, and translated into English by Frank Jellinek; WD (1984), translated into English by Quentin Hoare.

The secondary sources include literature on existentialism, Phenomenology, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and epistemology.

The study integrates three methods: descriptive, analytic, and critical.

### Descriptive Method

The objective of the study is to show the agnostic implications in Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy. The study therefore uses the descriptive method to lay the foundation. The method is expository and sets forth the facts.

### Analytic Method

The term "analytic" is conceived of not in the sense of "analytic truth" or statement whose truth is established by merely examining its component parts. "Analytic" is conceived here as a method that aids in the examination of philosophical material. (Wittgenstein, 1971; 4:112).

As a method of examination it is divisible into two segments.

i) In the first segment, the method was brought to the fore in which is however only the concern here by virtue of the philosophy by Rene Descartes as the second step of his methodological aspect. The broad philosophical concern of (1952,a). It consists of the analysis of ideas, concepts, propositions, and entire systems of argumentation breaking them down into their simple constitutive elements.

ii) In the second segment, analysis is an approach prominent with the philosophy of linguistic analysis. This has its roots in the approach of some of the logical positivists. The logical positivists were also interested in language apart from their interest in the nature of logical, mathematical, and scientific statements. (A.J. Ayer, 1936). In their discussions they were

thinking of a common language for all sciences, i.e. the scientific language. Such language should exclude once and for ever all textual criticism which is concerned with establishing confusion, so they thought. Although not a member of the Vienna Circle (the school of logical positivism founded in Vienna in 1922 by Moritz Schlick and composed of Otto Neurath, and Rudolf Carnap among others), Ludwig Wittgenstein was in close contact with its member. His first work, the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus (1971) was supposed to be a "critique of language". Philosophy, according to the Tractatus, is nothing but the "logical clarification of thoughts. "The result of philosophy is not a number of philosophical propositions, but to make our propositions clear" (Wittgenstein, 1971; 4:112).

## 1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

That is the foundation of the philosophy of linguistic analysis which is however only the concern here by virtue of the methodological aspect. The broad philosophical concern of linguistic analysis is the philosophical study of the use and meaning of language. Abandoning the idea that the objective method of doubt involves the suspension of belief in the truth of a philosophy is to make propositions or even systems, the proposition until it is perceived by a subjective consciousness to be so. Descartes' application of this method in Discourse on Method (1952, a, first published 1637) has been the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism which is that by minutely examining their constitution, and it is this analytic aspect that the study employs. This also involves the clarification and ascertaining of the relevant propositions in Sartre's philosophy.

Close to the analytic approach, the study also employs the concept of textual criticism which is concerned with establishing authentic texts and the or intention of the author.

### Critical Method

The critical method here should be distinguished from the textual criticism mentioned above. Critical is conceived primarily in terms of judging of merit. It judges merit because it aims at showing the limitations of gnoseological-immanentism, and the phenomenological approach to philosophy and indeed of Sartre's philosophy in so far as the problem of God's existence is concerned.

### 1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW

In Discourse on Method (1952, a, first published 1637) Descartes applied the method of doubt to establish subjective consciousness as the first certainty and the final source of all certainties. The method of doubt involves the suspension of belief in the truth of a proposition until it is perceived by a subjective consciousness to be so. Descartes' application of this method in Discourse on Method embraced the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism which is that the subject other than being is the foundation of truth. This is mostly the basis on which the first agnostic implication of this study is to be demonstrated.

Moreover, in the Meditations

is the theory that knowledge consists of clear and distinct innate ideas which are not derived from experience and being but from the deficiencies of the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism, that conceptual and discursive thought of man's reasoning faculties. This study intends to demonstrate the second agnostic implication of that spells the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism, according to which the immediate object of knowledge is something immanent in human consciousness, and from which the second agnostic implication of this study is to be demonstrated.

In History of Philosophy (1985), by Walsh, is an accurate account of the analysis that philosophers as diverse as Nicolas de Malebranche, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume shared Descartes' view of the problem faced by such a position is how to account for the existence of the objects when not being perceived or even for all of them understood the immediate object of knowledge to be something immanent in the mind. That is the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism which is the basis on which the second agnostic implication of this study is to be demonstrated.

In An Enquiry of Human Understanding (1952), first published in 1791, by David Hume, the objects of knowledge are restricted to the contents of the mind which are conceived of as perceptions or sense data. What has in contemporary philosophy come to be known as sense data. Perceptions are either "impressions" and "ideas". The "impressions" are vivid original perceptions while "ideas" are less lively versions and reflections of the original impressions. We have no knowledge of things, or of the world, as distinct from immediate object of knowledge, the idea, is something in the mind, and since it is all we know, there arises the problem of determining which of our "ideas" represent which objects and how far they go in their representation. It is by such epistemological

rejecting the notion altogether. Hume substitutes the principle of causal analogy for the rejected notion of causal connection or relation. The enquiry, in so doing, rejects all kinds of knowledge deficiencies of the second tenet gnoseological-immanentism that this study intends to demonstrate the second agnostic implication in Sartre's philosophy.

In The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), first published 1710), by George Berkeley, the objects of knowledge are taken to be collections of "ideas" or sense data which cannot be conceived apart from a mind perceiving them. That is the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism.

The problem faced by such a position is how to account for the existence of the objects when not being perceived or even for aspects of being that are not given to perception. This study intends to demonstrate its second agnostic implication on the basis of such epistemological weakness.

In An Enquiry of Human Understanding (1751), first published 1751, by David Hume, the objects of knowledge are restricted to the contents of the mind which are conceived of as perceptions or sense data. Perceptions are either "impressions" and "ideas". "Impressions" are vivid original perceptions while "ideas" are less lively versions and reflections of the original impressions. We have no knowledge of things, or of the world, as distinct from impressions of them, and the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism is reached. In that enquiry, and on the basis of the same conception of knowledge, a significant analysis of the notion of casual connection or relation is made with the result of

itself. Sartre bases his second argument against the existence of rejecting the notion altogether. Hume substitutes the principle of God on that concept.

causal analogy for the rejected notion of causal connection or relation. The enquiry, in so doing, rejects all kinds of knowledge based on inference of causal relation, including arguments for the existence of God. The root of Hume's atheism is his conception of knowledge in the enquiry, and it is the aim of this study to refute atheism arrived at via the second tenet of gnoseological-immanence in Sartre's philosophy.

In the The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant deeply influenced by Hume, restricted the objects of knowledge to phenomena or sense data. He distinguishes the phenomena from the noumena or things-in-themselves which, though they are the origin of the phenomena, remain hidden.

In the same treatise, Kant again embraces the second tenet of gnoseological-immanence by his conception of the categories. He regards the categories (quality, quantity, relation, and modality), not as modes of being, but as ways of the understanding intuited by the mind itself. The phenomena by themselves are unintelligible until the mind imprints an intelligible form or category on them. The immediate object of knowledge is thus something immanent in the mind. The Kantian notion of the categories bears a close resemblance to the Sartrean conception of being-in-itself as undifferentiated and meaningless void which is only illumined by its appearance to consciousness or being-for-

itself. Sartre bases his second argument against the existence of God on that concept.

In Contemporary Thought and Christian Faith (1962), Dondeyne

discusses the epistemological and methodological limitations of

Edmund Husserl, in Logical Investigations (1970) and Ideas

(1969), attempted to overcome the empiricist approach in

gnoseological immanentism. He aims to go back to the original

cartesian approach which saw the objects of knowledge as

originating, not from experience, but from the immanent sphere of

transcendental subjectivity or consciousness. Husserl was a great

influence on Sartre when the latter studied in Germany. Sartre

attributes to consciousness the function of constituting the world

of our experience, at least as far as its meanings are concerned.

That spells the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism. In "New

Fabro in God in Exile: Modern Atheism (1964), traces the roots of

modern atheism. He does not use the term gnoseological-immanentism,

but talks of the "principle of immanentism" from Descartes and then

to what he calls the "patent atheism of French existentialism". For

him, that atheism derives from the "principle of immanentism" which

coincides with the radical assertion of atheism, in as much as the

very definition of an immanentist stand on being can only involve a

denial of that transcendence in the epistemological direction in

which consists the first step of theism rightly and radically

understood. Fabro (1964) is concerned with the correlation between

atheism and the "principle of immanentism" in the Western

existentialism, as is evident in the case of Sartre, is not merely

philosophy, but he also states that the principle is defective and

preaching our return to experience, in the widest sense of the

that atheism arrived at by such a principle must be refuted.

In Contemporary Thought and Christian Faith (1962), Dondeyne discusses the epistemological and methodological limitations of existentialism and phenomenology, especially, in relation to the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism. He considers Sartre's existentialism to be defending a position which is at least a "closed" one leading to some form of "metaphysical agnosticism" or even atheism. He sees the existentialist disdain for conceptual knowledge, in preference for the concrete, as leading it into the "illusion of immanence". On that basis, Sartre and other existentialists have accepted the radical empiricism of Kierkegaard and are in that respect not interested in what they would consider artificial problems or theoretical constructions. In "New Empiricism" (1962; pp. 136-141), Wild mentions the existentialists' interest in the concrete data of immediate experience, and in describing these data as they are given. It seems to be true, as MacIntyre has stated in "Existentialism" (1967), that the empiricist protest against rationalism was being reformulated, and that the existentialists were doing even much more. Therefore, there is justification in calling existentialism "the new empiricism", different no doubt from the old but still empiricism.

In that regard, existentialism is not just exposing itself to the danger of a new empirism as Dondeyne has stated (1962). Existentialism, as is evident in the case of Sartre, is not merely preaching our return to experience, in the widest sense of the word. It also discusses Sartre's phenomenological existentialism when he writes with the main theme that there is nothing but a human

term, but it also argues that this experience is the only way of getting to know reality. Therefore, conceptual and discursive knowledge, at the level of which metaphysics arises, is excluded.

Spiegelberg (1976) also discusses the essentials of the

The existentialist interest in the concrete and in describing the data of concrete experience as exactly as possible is what brings them into a very close affinity with phenomenology. Macquarrie has made that observation in Existentialism (1973). He notes their hesitation, like Husserl, to infer some Kantian thing-in-itself which is hidden by phenomena. Like Husserl, the existentialists content themselves with the description of phenomena as they show themselves. However, they seem to be unwilling to follow certain idealist tendencies that manifest themselves in Husserl.

In History of the Phenomenological Movement (1976),

Spiegelberg traces the development of the phenomenological movement as well as Sartre's philosophical development in the movement. Starting with Sartre's theme of subjective freedom, he traces Sartre's attempt to reconcile subjective freedom and objective being. He starts with Sartre's pre-phenomenological period through to his phenomenological psychology when Sartre wrote *NAU*, *STE*, and *IPC*. He then moves on to phenomenological ontology, when BN tries to reconcile subjective and free consciousness to objective being. He also discusses Sartre's phenomenological existentialism when EH was written with the main theme that there is nothing but a human

universe which results from man's self-transcending projects and is constituted by human subjectivity.

Spiegelberg (1976) also discusses the essentials of the Phenomenological method and includes the existential hermeneutics and phenomenological hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger and Sartre. Though a deviation from Husserl's intentions phenomenological hermeneutics still adheres to intuition of phenomena as the source and final test of knowledge.

In Methods of Contemporary Thought (1968), Bochenski also gives an insight into the basics of the phenomenological method. He points out the significant fact that even though Heidegger and Sartre have gone into the phenomenology of existence, i.e., existential hermeneutics, they still deal with what is given, with the phenomenon, and wish at least in principle to exclude all indirect acquisition of knowledge from their inquiries. He also discusses other methods of contemporary thought, such as linguistic analysis or semiotic methods, axiomatic methods, and reductive analysis. The phenomenological method is just one amongst many methods and where it proves unsuitable other methods should be applied.

On that note Dondeyne (1962) points to the inadequacies of the categories of phenomenology. Even though they have rendered a service to philosophy, they are not adequate even for a philosophy gets obscure when the opponents of existential phenomenology fail

of man. Those categories, as Dondeyne says, do not go beyond the order of living experience, that is to say, of being as "being-for-me". The existentialist affirmation of the primacy of experience leads to the phenomenon but not to its transphenomenal foundation, and certainly not to metaphysics.

In Jean-Paul Sartre (1970), Lafarge see the same kind of phenomenological framework of the intuiting of phenomena can limitation in Sartre's philosophy. Ontology takes on a new meaning, accommodate. Metaphysics must always proceed from inference of the facts of experience. Even if one admits Luijpen's distinction of a describe and not to explain, it is phenomenological. But when first and second stage of metaphysics, the problem is that the dealing with the transphenomenal being of the phenomenon, ontology existentialists, especially Marcel, Jaspers, and Sartre either soon becomes inadequate. This ontology is phenomenological and not affirm or deny the absolute within what is clearly a metaphysical, we speak of being but it is the being of the phenomenological framework. phenomenon and the in-itself has become the transphenomenal being of the phenomena.

Heidegger (1978) seems to have had the limitations of existential phenomenology in mind when he rejected Sartre's Luijpen, in Phenomenology and Humanism (1965), raises the depiction of his thought as atheist. He thought that the question question whether existential phenomenology does necessarily exclude of God's existence could not be decided within the framework of metaphysics. He mentions the reproach by opponents of existential analysis. Rather, he saw the study of essence of phenomenology that this way of thinking is not a metaphysics. He existential conditions of human beings as a preliminary to raising says that the reproach is clear when it says that phenomenology is the metaphysical issues about being (1967). not a metaphysics, if metaphysics is conceived of in what he refers to as its second phase. That, he says, is the stage in which man's thinking arrives at the affirmation of an explanatory ground that itself does not need any explanation. For Luijpen, the reproach gets obscure when the opponents of existential phenomenology fail

to explicitly distinguish between the first and the second phase of metaphysics. Metaphysics in the second phase referred to here is supposed to affirm the absolute. Luijpen argues that without the differentiation of the stages of metaphysics, the reproach that phenomenology is not a metaphysics is unqualified. It is difficult to conceive of the kind of metaphysics, as Luijpen does, that the phenomenological framework of the intuiting of phenomena can accommodate. Metaphysics must always proceed from inference of the facts of experience. Even if one admits Luijpen's distinction of a first and second stage of metaphysics, the problem is that the existentialists, especially Marcel, Jaspers, and Sartre either affirm or deny the absolute within what is clearly a phenomenological framework.

Martin Heidegger (1978) seems to have had the limitations of existential phenomenology in mind when he rejected Sartre's depiction of his thought as atheist. He thought that the question of God's existence could not be decided within the framework of existential analysis. Rather, he saw the study of Dasein or existential conditions of human beings as a preliminary to raising the metaphysical issues about being (1967).

## 2.1 INTRODUCTION

### CHAPTER TWO

This chapter complements the definition of gnoseological-immanentism in chapter one with a historical outline of its progression from continental rationalism to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. It also points out the epistemological and methodological deficiencies, in gnoseological-immanentism, that lead to agnostic implications. The aim is to show that gnoseological-immanentism is not a philosophy of being because it lacks the appropriate epistemological and methodological orientation to grasp ontologically-objective being. Hence, gnoseological-immanentism has no basis to assert the existence or non-existence of being.

#### RATIONALISM TO PHENOMENOLOGY

Because gnoseological-immanentism is only a stipulative term, there is need to explicate it further by pointing to some latent manifestations in the works of other gnoseological-immanentists, in addition to Sartre. Such philosophers include, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Husserl. Thomas Reid commented that philosophers as diverse as Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, Berkeley and Hume could all be included in the Cartesian system (Walsh, 1985; 259). All these philosophers understood, in the gnoseological-immanentist sense, that the immediate object of knowledge was something immanent in the mind. Husserl tried to overcome, the empiricist approach by resorting to the original Cartesian concept, i.e., knowledge comes from the

## 2.1 INTRODUCTION

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## 2.2 GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM IN CONTINENTAL RATIONALISM:

### RENE DESCARTES

#### 2.2.1) FIRST TENET OF GNOSEOLOGICAL IMMANENTISM

As noted in chapter one, gnoseological-immanentism was

brought to prominence in Western philosophy by Descartes. The first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism has the self-consciousness of the subject other than being as the foundation of knowledge. Descartes' philosophy stresses the role of the subject as the ultimate foundation of knowledge due to a desire for a mathematical kind of certainty in philosophical matters. Descartes' philosophy is gnoseological-immanentist because it seeks a system of knowledge where the basis of certainty lies, not in being as such, but solely in the conceptual-discursive thought of the subject's reasoning faculties (1952, a; part 1, 43).

In his quest for certainty, Descartes seeks an indubitable basis for the deduction of knowledge. His philosophy is immanentist because he arrives, not at being as the basis for the deduction of knowledge, but at subjective intellectual consciousness, i.e., "cogito ergo sum" or "I think, therefore I exist". Intellectual consciousness, other than being, is to be the sole foundation of and basis for the affirmation of knowledge.

Descartes' philosophy arrives at gnoseological-immanentist through methodic doubt. This is a "...peculiar attitude induced by

a sort of deliberate doubt meant to turn the eye of meditation upon a subjective being as the first certainty and final source of certainties" (Fulton, 1969; 68). Methodic doubt leads to gnoseological-immanentism by casting doubt on and suspending the existence of being, intellectual subjective consciousness is left as the only certainty. Consequently, intellectual subjective consciousness, other than being, is the foundation of knowledge because the existence of the latter has been suspended. Methodic doubt is immanentist because it is aimed to arrive, not at being, but at "... the immanent sphere of consciousness as the source of all certainty" (Ibid; 69). It was "... to lead the subject as the ground of truth, meaning, and value" (Ibid). The process of methodic doubt involves a sweeping away of existence and all opinions of the "natural attitude" which is conceived as the world of common sense, science, natural beings, social and cultural forms and institutions. Coupled with the extolling of the virtues of individual achievements, Descartes aims to arrive at a "foundation which is entirely his own" (1952, a; part II, 45).

Methodic doubt is likewise the way to an equally immanentist criterion of truth i.e., experience. Knowledge for Descartes must proceed from the conceptual and discursive thought of man's reasoning ... to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognise to be so: that is to say ... to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it. (Ibid).

For a proposition to be true, according to Descartes, the only necessity was that, it not be so of being, but a subject perceive it as clear and distinct. Hence, the subject and not being is the final arbitrator in matters of truth.

### 2.2.2 THE SECOND TENET OF GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM

The second tenet takes the immediate object of knowledge as something immanent. In all instances the conception is such that the object, either explicitly or by implication, cannot be conceived apart from a subject.

In Descartes' philosophy there is immanentism in that sense because he conceives of knowledge as innate ideas, which, of course, cannot be conceived apart from a mind. The immanentism was immanentist "proofs" in the above sense because it is based on through innatism comes after his famed illustration with the piece of wax. He says that "... even bodies are not known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding only..." (1952, b; part II, 81).

The immanentism is due to quest for certainty and a heavy distrust of sensory experience. Knowledge for Descartes must proceed from the conceptual and discursive thought of man's reasoning faculty and not from extraneous factors, for man other than being is the foundation of knowledge. Therefore, Descartes' existence of God is, for Descartes, necessitated by the thought immanentism in the form of his theory of innate ideas complements that the idea of the perfect cannot proceed from the imperfect. In

the same way the subject could not be aware of imperfection if the his immanentism of conceiving subjective consciousness as the loss of the perfect were not being, and as its source as well as foundation of knowledge. It is intellectual subjective priority cannot be the imperfect we are led back to God as well as consciousness that is the basis for deductions of the world. It is its priority. from the mind that all knowledge is to be deduced apriori, i.e. innate ideas. Truth, for Descartes depends not on being, but on the will of subjective consciousness. The perfect as epistemologically prior to that of the imperfect. The "perfect" notion should be

### 2.2.3) THE GNOSEOLOGICAL IMMANENTIST "PROOF" FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

we are aware of imperfection which brings to consciousness a notion Descartes made two arguments for God's existence and both of "what ought to be" or the perfect. However, Descartes conceives were based on gnoseological-immanentist "proofs". The first the idea of the perfect as not deriving from experience, but as argument was on the basis of the second tenet of gnoseological-found, innate in the subject's consciousness having been implanted immanentism, i.e., where the immediate object of knowledge is there by God. Since the innate idea of the perfect, which is conceived as immanent or as something in the mind. The argument something immanent in subjective consciousness, is the basis of uses immanentist "proofs" in the above sense because it is based on Descartes' argument, the proof in this argument is gnoseological. Descartes conception of knowledge as innate ideas.

immanentist. It is immanentist "proof" because an innate idea, being Descartes' argument is based on the conception of the epistemological priority of the notion of the perfect over the imperfect and of consciousness of the latter due to the priority of the former. The attempt, as in other instances of gnoseological-immanentism, lacks objective data on the basis of which we can give God as the imperfect cannot logically be its source. The argument proof of a being existing on an ontologically-objective status. is that since the imperfect cannot be the source of the perfect, such lack of objective data arises because an innate idea is and as the latter is logically prior, then God exists. The something immanent in the mind. consciousness is not "...of reality existence of God is, for Descartes, necessitated by the thought but consciousness of ideas ..." (Walsh, 1985, 226) that are that the idea of the perfect cannot proceed from the imperfect. In

the same way the subject could not be aware of imperfection if the idea of the perfect were not prior, and as its source as well as priority cannot be the imperfect we are led back to God as well as its priority.

since the foundation of knowledge is the subject other than being, there is no ontologically-objective basis to verify

The argument is based on immanentism because of the innatism whether these ideas represent more than just ideas. Consequently, in the conception of the idea of the perfect as epistemologically there is no basis to assert or deny the existence of any being.

prior to that of the imperfect. The "perfect" being should be ontologically prior to the "imperfect being", but epistemologically

we are aware of imperfection which brings to consciousness a notion of "what ought to be" or the perfect. However, Descartes conceives

the idea of the perfect as not deriving from experience but as found innate in the subject's consciousness having been implanted

there by God. Since the innate idea of the perfect, which is something immanent in subjective consciousness, is the basis of

Descartes' argument, the proof in this argument is gnoseological immanentist. It is immanentist "proof" because an innate idea,

being immanent especially in a subjective consciousness cannot be proof for objective existence.

is of the perfect being. What is understood clearly and distinctly to belong to the true immutable nature of anything can only be affirmed of it. That we clearly and

immanentism, lacks objective data on the basis of which we can give distinctly understand that to exist belongs to God. Therefore God proof of a being existing on an ontologically-objective status.

exists. To Descartes, it is clear and distinct to think of a supremely perfect being devoid of imperfection. This is the pivot of his argument is a criterion of truth, i.e. clear and distinct

but consciousness of 'ideas'...." (Walsh, 1985; 226) that are perception by the subject. That criterion is gnoseological-

immanentist because the subject, other than being is the final

arbitrator in truth. For a proposition to be true, it needs not be immanent. As the idea is innate, with knowledge conceived as innate so of being but that the subject perceive it as clear and distinct. ideas, and since the foundation of knowledge is the subject other than being, there is no ontologically-objective basis to verify whether those ideas represent more than just ideas. Consequently, there is no basis to assert or deny the existence of any being.

Descartes' second argument for God's existence is based on the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism, i.e. the subject other than being as the foundation of knowledge. That is because the argument is based on Descartes' criterion of truth, according to which for a proposition to be true or false, the test is not against being, but that the subject perceive it as clear and distinct. In other words the subject, and not being, is the final arbitrator in matters of truth. The argument is an adoption of St. Anselm's ontological argument for God's existence (Descartes, 1952, b; part V, 93-96). Descartes says that we perceive clearly and distinctly that the idea of God is of the perfect being. What is understood clearly and distinctly to belong to the true immutable nature of anything can only be affirmed of it. That we clearly and distinctly understand that to exist belongs to God. Therefore God exists. To Descartes, it is out of our power to think of a supremely perfect being devoid of supreme perfection. The pivot of his argument is a criterion of truth, i.e. clear and distinct perception by the subject. That criterion is gnoseological-immanentist because the subject, other than being is the final

arbitrator in truth. For a proposition to be true, it needs not be so of being but that the subject perceive it as clear and distinct. Truth is to be "...actualised by the subject..." (Fabro, 1964; 943) as it is conceived to depend on the will and not to factors extraneous to it, i.e. being.

That criterion of truth according to which the subject needs only perceive clearly and distinctly, leads to a lack of objective datum. Truth is made dependent on the will and there is no reference to factors extraneous of the will, i.e., being. Subjective consciousness is the only ground. Besides, the existence of being has been suspended so it has to be affirmed on the ground of subjective consciousness, the only thing to withstand the methodic doubt. Hence, being is inconsequential in the affirmation of truth, the final authority lying with subjective consciousness. There is no ontologically-objective basis and justification to assert the existence or non-existence of a being. Pierre Gassendi, a contemporary of Descartes, pointed out the weakness inherent in the latter's criterion of truth, and indeed of gnosological-  
 (224-225). Had he developed his insight along the line that being immanentism, of making the subject other than being the primary authority in matters of knowledge and of truth. Gassendi maintained that people often think that they clearly and distinctly perceive something and then discover that they were wrong. Clarity and distinctness alone are not enough and need to be based on a further criterion of knowledge (Walsh, 1985; 226). In other words, the authority of being needs be realised when it comes to truth.

focussing his interest merely on the clarity and distinctness and certainty of his foundational ideas.... Consciousness is consciousness of ideas (Ibid)

It is in the above described way that continental rationalism through the works of Descartes and even others like Malebranche and Leibnitz, is an example of gnoseological-immanentism. With his criterion of truth and methodic doubt, Descartes placed all in doubt except "cogito ergo sum" or intellective consciousness which became the prime authority and foundation of knowledge. On that sole basis, Descartes attempted to derive all certain knowledge. The existence of being and its authority in knowledge is not presupposed as a fact from the onset. A philosophy will necessarily be locked up in gnoseological-immanentism if the reality and truth of being, other than intellective subjective consciousness, is not presupposed as a fact. There is then no ontologically-objective basis for the ascertaining of the characteristics of being, and consequently no justification to assert the existence or non-existence of a being.

Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" implies that being conscious is not "...necessarily a consciousness of being or of beings" (Ibid; 224-225). Had he developed his insight along the line that being conscious is also consciousness of being then his philosophy would have avoided gnoseological-immanentism because the primary authority of being in relation to knowledge would have been recognised.

Instead, Descartes developed his insight in a rationalist and idealist direction through

focussing his interest merely on the clarity and distinctness and certainty of his foundational ideas.... Consciousness is consciousness of ideas (Ibid).

The situation is aggravated by an "... excessive distrust of sensory experience and a depreciation of objective datum" (Ibid; 231). "Descartes' philosophy"... is not one of being but of representationalist indirect realism ..."(Ibid) a form of gnoseological-immanentism, because;

... what we are aware of are certain ideas in the mind... it presupposes that consciousness is for the main part closed consciousness and objective datum is largely inaccessible. All certain knowledge is deduced from principles which are evident a priori, independently of the data of sensory experience (Ibid).

### 2.3 GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM IN BRITISH EMPIRICISM: LOCKE, BERKELEY, AND HUME.

It has been stated that Thomas Reid commented about philosophers as diverse as Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, Berkeley, and Hume being in the Cartesian system (Ibid; 259). Though there are obvious differences between rationalism and empiricism, all these philosophers understood that the immediate object of knowledge is something immanent in the mind, i.e., what has been referred to as the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism. In that form of immanentism, though it may not be stated explicitly, the conception of knowledge is such what we are aware of are not representations" (Walsh, 1985; 259). There is a depreciation of objective datum, common to gnoseological-immanentism. It is a

result of failure to see that the percept and objects themselves but certain ideas in the mind. In this case it is the sense data. The mistake seems to lie in the conception of percepts and concepts not as medium quos at the service of which cognitive intention bears towards being, but as all that we are aware of. (Dancy, 1962; 103).

In Locke's representative realism, the immediate object of knowledge is immanent because knowledge is restricted to ideas or sense data in our minds. The ideas are supposed to be caused by qualities of objects which are purported to exist independently, but of which we know nothing (Locke, 1952; Book II, Chap. 1., 121 and Book II, Chap. VIII, 134). Our ideas of perceptions do not extend beyond the actual experience of the sense data or ideas which we have. Ideas are in our minds and the qualities from which they derive are in objects. Hence, ideas are purported to represent objects to us (*Ibid*). The immediate objects are thus ideas in our minds produced by qualities of objects which we do not know. The immediate object of knowledge is therefore immanent.

extension, number, motion, and rest are purported to inhere in the object. The secondary qualities, i.e., odours, tastes, colours, sounds are purported to have no exact counterparts in the objects. Locke failed whole. The problem of Locke is lack of an ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of which ideas or how they represent objects. The immediate object of knowledge is immanent, "...our knowledge is confined to ideas which are no more than mental representations" (Walsh, 1985; 259). There is a depreciation of objective datum, common to gnoseological-immanentism. It is a

The criticism usually directed at Locke's representative realism manifests a deficiency of gnoseological-immanentism as a purported to have no exact counterparts in the objects. Locke failed whole. The problem of Locke is lack of an ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of which ideas or how they represent objects. The immediate object of knowledge is immanent, "...our knowledge is confined to ideas which are no more than mental representations" (Walsh, 1985; 259). There is a depreciation of objective datum, common to gnoseological-immanentism. It is a

to see that the distinction is "... groundless if one maintains result of failure to see that the percept and immediate object of thought" (Walsh, 1985; 259). There can be no valid distinction of

.... concept are, as the mediavals put it, a medium quo, and intentio, that is to say an instrument within and at the service of which cognitive intention bears us towards reality in all its concreteness. Far from separating us from being, it helps us to come to grips with it, to bring us closer to it (Dondeyne, 1962; 103). Assertions made, such as Locke's, "Feeling has immediate justification."

Objects are not collections of ideas nor are the latter what are entirely known nor representations. The ideas are rather the "bridges" through which cognitive intention bears towards reality.

If they are taken as representation, then the result isgnoseological-immanentism because ideas do not carry within themselves a certificate of authenticity signifying that they represent the qualities of objects. is a close resemblance here to

Descartes and practitioners of the phenomenological reduction as Locke's, and indeedgnoseological-immanentism's, lack of an suspension of existence. Descartes' methodic doubt annihilated the ontologically-objective basis to make assertions on being is world and left only the thinking substance as the basis for manifest in his distinction of secondary or virtual qualities of affirmation of the former.

objects and primary ones. The latter, i.e. solidity, extension, number, motion, and rest are purported to inhere in the object. The secondary qualities, i.e., odours, tastes, colours, sounds are purported to have no exact counterparts in the objects. Locke failed

when applied to things. That leads to his famous "esse est percipi" or "to be is to be perceived" which can be interpreted to mean that "the immediate object of knowledge is immanent". For Berkeley,

to see that the distinction is "... groundless if one maintains that it is only the idea itself that is the immediate object of thought" (Walsh, 1985; 259). There can be no valid distinction of this kind, not only in a representative theory of perception, but also in the entirety of gnoseological-immanentism. There is no ontologically-objective basis from which to make assertions on being, and any assertions made, such as Locke's, have no justification.

On the other hand, Berkeley's idealism becomes gnoseological-immanentism by the reduction of objects to clusters of sense data. These, he explicitly stated, could not be conceived apart from a mind. Since in Berkeley objects are clusters of ideas, hence eliminating their independent existence, the only other existents are perceivers. There is a close resemblance here to Descartes and practitioners of the phenomenological reduction as *Chapt. I passim*). We cannot explain which sense data make-up the world and left only the thinking substance as the basis for affirmation of the former.

For Berkeley human knowledge is of ideas, sensations which however blended cannot exist other than in a mind perceiving them (Berkeley, 1952; 413). That for Berkeley is the meaning of "exists" when applied to things. That leads to his famous "esse est percipi" or "to be is to be perceived" which can be interpreted to mean that "the immediate object of knowledge is immanent". For Berkeley,

...their (sensible objects) esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds of thinking things which perceive them...for, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that anyone of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived... (Ibid; 413-414).

Realising his immanentist predicament, Berkeley appealed to the veracity of God as guarantor of the existence of objects when unperceived. The subject, as the objects are immanent and cannot exist apart from a mind perceiving them, is the sole basis for the affirmation of knowledge. There is no ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of being.

Assertions on being, made within such a philosophy, would only lead to the fallacy of circular reasoning (Strawson, 1959; Chapt. I passim). We cannot explain which sense data make-up the object except by referring to them as sense data of the object. We have to refer to the object in order to explain which sense data it consists of. That cannot be because objects are clusters of 'ideas' that do not exist apart from a perceiver. The circularity is in identifying objects solely on the basis of ideas or sense data which are the constituents of objects. The problem is of the depreciation of objective datum, typical of gnosological-immanentism.

Likewise for Hume the immediate objects of knowledge are restricted to contents of the mind. For him perceptions of the senses are not produced by external objects resembling them, there is no representationalism. The mind has to itself only perceptions, i.e., sense impressions and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. For Hume, therefore, knowledge is confined to the contents of the mind, perceptions or sense data. These are either "impressions" or their less lively versions or ideas (Hume, 1952; 455-458). We can have no ideas of things different from our perceptions of them, and the mind cannot reach any possible connection of perceptions with objects (*Ibid.*, 505). The immediate object of knowledge is immanent as it is conceived as a content of the mind, and moreover we cannot perceive the connection between it and objects.

As a result, the most we can have is belief in the existence of bodies apart from us. That is not only the manifestation of the deficiency of a radical scepticism arising from an equally radical empiricism, but also of gnosological-immanentism which conceives the immediate object of knowledge as confined to contents of the mind. All we are supposed to be aware of are perceptions which are not conceived as mediums at service of which cognitive intention bears towards being. As it is also asserted that there can be no perception of any connection between them and objects, there is no ontologically-objective basis for the ascertaining the objects of knowledge. As the object of knowledge

is immanent, there is no way of telling which phenomena come from  
 affirmation of being. That is the reason why Hume advocates a  
 radical scepticism of mere belief in the existence of objects  
 beyond our impressions.

#### 2.4 GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM IN KANT'S PHENOMENALISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM.

There is gnoseological-immanentism in Kant's analysis of the  
 nature of sensation, i.e., phenomenalism and in his study of man's  
 capacity for understanding, i.e. transcendental idealism. In the  
 former, the immediate object of knowledge is immanent because of  
 his famous antimony of phenomena, and noumena, i.e., thing-in-  
 itself (*ding-an-sich*). It is purposed that the noumena, or objects  
 of the physical world, act on our senses and that phenomena are the  
 sensible data derived from the affection. Immanentism arises  
 because the noumena themselves are not supposed to be the objects  
 of knowledge despite their affective activity on our senses. The  
 objects of knowledge are said to be the phenomena or things in so  
 far as they appear to us. We cannot know the world beyond our  
 experience or apart from our sensibility, i.e. phenomena (Kant,  
 1952 a; 23). The immediate object of knowledge is immanent because  
 all we know are phenomena or things in so far as they appear to us.

As in all instances of gnoseological-immanentism there  
 arises the problem of lack of an ontologically-objective basis for  
 ascertaining the objects of knowledge. As the object of knowledge

is immanent, there is no way of telling which phenomena come from which noumena. That is more so because the noumena are themselves not known.

The immediate object of knowledge is likewise immanent, i.e. a content of the mind, in Kant's analysis of man's capacity of judgement or to understand the data of sense perception. That analysis is usually called Kantian transcendental idealism, and that already says a lot because in idealism, an instance of gnoseological-immanentism, objects are regarded as existing only in relation to an experiencing subject. That arises because Kant understood the phenomena to be yet only the unintelligible and undetermined raw material of knowledge (Ibid; 53). The phenomena only become intelligible when a form or category is imprinted on them a priori by the mind (Ibid) or a transcendental consciousness. The immediate object of knowledge is immanent because the object does not have an intelligible form in itself, but rather such a form is imprinted on it a priori by the mind. Hence the object of knowledge does not exist apart from an experiencing of the subject that intuits a priori the intelligible form. Kant draws the wrong conclusion that the categories or forms are not modes of being but ways of the understanding. As is typical of gnoseological-immanentism, the primary epistemological authority is not being but the subject. Kant is wrong because in the process of knowledge the mind is capable of recognising distinctions which already exist in the object of knowledge. It is conceived, not as having structure in

itself, but as structured by the mind. By implication, it is the mind that regulates being in the process of knowledge, and as is being. It is not that the mind introduces distinctions into what is typical of the first level of gnoseological immanentism, it is the subject other than being that is the foundation of knowledge. To

Aristotle was the first to categorise, comprehensively and intelligibly, the modes of being. He distinguished ten categories but conceived of them appropriately as modes of being. Kant added more comprehension by distinguishing two other categories, so that the number rose to twelve. The categories as conceived by Kant were divided into four groups of three each:

- 1) Quantity of judgements; universal, particular, and singular. Note that he does not refer to them as quantity of being but as "quantity of judgements". The emphasis is clearly not on being but on consciousness.
- 2) Quality of judgements; affirmative, negative, and infinite.
- 3) Relation of judgements: Categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive.
- 4) Modality of judgements; problematic, assertoric, and apodictic (Ibid; 39).

Though Kant adds more comprehension to the categories, he in the sense of gnoseological-immanentism, conceives of them as ways of the understanding that consciousness imprints on objects. The object of knowledge is conceived, not as having structure in knowledge to phenomena, and his idea of intentionality. Likewise

itself, but as structured by the mind. By implication, it is the mind that regulates being in the process of knowledge, and as is typical of the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism, it is the subject other than being that is the foundation of knowledge. To stress his argument, from which one can discern his commitment to gnoseological-immanentism, Kant says it would be difficult to conceive how the laws of phenomena of nature could exist in phenomena themselves, i.e., objects. "Laws do not exist except in relation to the subject in which phenomena inhere" (Ibid; 58). If it is the mind endowing being with intelligible structure, then as in other instances of gnoseological-immanentism, there is no ontologically-objective basis for ascertaining the characteristics of being. If the categories are imprinted on objects by consciousness, other than being modes of being, then objects are as in the case of Husserl the "Leistung" or achievements of intentional consciousness.

## 2.5 GNOSEOLOGICAL IMMANENTISM IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, was a gnoseological-immanentist who tried to beat the empirist approach which stressed that knowledge originates in sensation. His aim was to recapture the original cartesian approach in which the objects of knowledge had their origin in some transcendental ego. Immanentism, in the form of the immediate object of knowledge being immanent in the mind, i.e., second tenet, is as a result of his reduction of knowledge to phenomena, and his idea of intentionality. Likewise

231). If the phenomena is the supreme transcendental, then there is gnoseological-immanentism in his philosophy in the subject of knowledge is immanent and cannot be conceived apart from conception of the subject other than being as the primary authority perceiver. Besides, "...there is ... a unique emphasis upon the in knowledge, i.e., first tenet. The first tenet is as a result of concrete experience of the subject and an epistemology closely his idea of intentionality, the phenomenological reduction, and his linked to the philosophy of perception ... and the final point is transcendental idealism. Husserl's conception of phenomenology as placed upon immediacy" (Ihde, 1971; 3-4 and 17). The limitation of the essence of philosophising continues the gnoseological-knowledge to immediate and concrete experience renders objects immanentist tradition by giving primacy to questions of the inconceivable without perceiving subjects. Besides they are thinking subject which "...runs at least from Descartes through supposed to be directly intuited and such mediate experience does Kant and Hegel" (Ihde, 1971; 3). Husserl can therefore be not exist apart from a perceiving subject, categorised as a philosopher of the cartesian system (Walsh, 1985; 231). The idea of intentionality likewise leads to immanentism by

rendering the object of knowledge a content of the mind that does His conception of phenomenology as the essence of not exist apart from a subject. The idea of intentionality means philosophising is significant in his adoption of gnoseological-immanentism because it leads to his reduction of knowledge to something other than itself and the directedness of consciousness phenomena or things as they appear to a consciousness. Husserl's to objects (Husserl, 1969; 19-123). Acts thus directed, are called catchword was "back to the things themselves", i.e., phenomena, intentions" and objects as intended are referred to as with the aim of deepening the range of immediate experience "intentional objects". (Ibid). Immanentism arises when Husserl (Husserl, 1969; 92-93). Knowledge is confined to phenomena, and ascribes to the intentions the function of constituting the that which cannot be intuited as phenomena can be, i.e., intentional object (Ibid; 232). The object is referred to as the theoretical constructs, inferences, symbolisms, etc, are to be achievement, "Leistung", of the intentional acts. The intentional discarded in favour of the unadulterated phenomena (Bochenski, 1968; 20-21). For a phenomenologist like Husserl, and indeed for a intending acts refer, as already given, but as something which gnoseological-immanentist, the phenomenon is not just a foundation originates in the intending act. The object of knowledge is of cognition but the "...supreme transcendental" (Dondeyne, 1962;

112). If the phenomena is the supreme transcendental, then the object of knowledge is immanent and cannot be conceived apart from a perceiver. Besides, "...there is ...a unique emphasis upon the concrete experience of the subject and an epistemology closely linked to the philosophy of perception ...and the final weight is placed upon immediacy" (*Ibid*, 1971; 3-4 and 17). The limitation of knowledge to immediate and concrete experience renders objects inconceivable without perceiving subjects. Besides they are supposed to be directly intuited and such mediate experience does not exist apart from a perceiving subject.

The idea of intentionality likewise leads to immanentism by rendering the object of knowledge a content of the mind that does not exist apart from a subject. The idea of intentionality means, for Husserl, the property of consciousness as consciousness of something other than itself and the directedness of consciousness to objects (Husserl, 1969; 119-123). Acts thus directed, are called "intentions" and objects so intended are referred to as "intentional objects", (*Ibid*). Immanentism arises when Husserl ascribes to the intentions the function of constituting the intentional object (*Ibid*; 232). The object is referred to as the achievement, "Leistung", of the intentional acts. The intentional object is no longer the pre-existent referent to which the intending acts refer as already given, but as something which originates in the intending act. The object of knowledge is subjectivity is characterised by its proper

explicitly conceived as incapable of being thought of without the intending acts of consciousness, and Husserl is already in his transcendental idealism. He says;

In accordance with the phenomenological method, everything that can have the validity of being must be viewed as constituted in my ego, and hence everything existent appears to be a mere factor of what is called my 'transcendental being'....the world and all its realities as a universe of constituted transcendences'... is as constituted in experiences and powers of my ego which...precedes this constituted world as the final constitutive subjectivity (Ibid; 96).

Apart from the immediate object of knowledge being immanent, Husserl saw Descartes as the forerunner of his phenomenology and the primary authority is explicitly not being but subjective consciousness. Intentionality as an aspect of consciousness is meant to establish subjective consciousness as that form which the suspended, including belief in an objective world, common sense, meaning of objects flow. It is aimed at negating the so called science, natural beings, and socio-cultural forms and institutions. "natural attitude" conceived as a stand point of natural experience phenomenological reduction aims at disclosing the existence of (Ibid; 105) with its thesis of the independent existence of things and implying that they have a meaning independent of the accomplishment of the subject as the foundation of certainties intentional consciousness. The idea of intentionality is meant to state the primacy of the subject, in an immanentist sense, over being. That, Husserl felt that it was in the methodic doubt that

Cartesian thought most significantly anticipated phenomenology. Starting with...consciousness of...is not any form of (Husserl, 1965; v), has world might be mirrored. Consciousness or subjectivity is characterised by its proper

activity ...giving meaning to its objects. That activity is lost sight of, if consciousness is taken as a thing: it is replaced by the idea of a passive reproduction within consciousness. Consciousness is ...nothing more than the activity of giving meaning ...intentionality ...something always outside itself, absorbed in the objects to which it is giving meaning (Pettit, 1970; 9). (Husserl, 1969; 69-70).

The immanence of the conception of the subject other than being as the primary authority is taken up in the phenomenological reduction. It is similar to the methodic doubt which Descartes had used to suspend or put in doubt the existence of being so that subjective consciousness was left as the foundation of knowledge. Husserl saw Descartes as the forerunner of his phenomenology and the phenomenological reduction, just as the methodic doubt, is an act by which the general thesis of belief in factual existence is suspended, including belief in an objective world, common sense, science, natural beings, and socio-cultural forms and institutions. Phenomenological reduction aims at disclosing the existence of the subject as the primary certainty. It is aimed at the accomplishment of the subject as the foundation of certainties (Husserl, 1969; 171-184).

Husserl felt that it was in the methodic doubt that cartesian thought most significantly anticipated phenomenology. Starting with an expression of indebtedness to Descartes (Husserl, 1965; v), he sees phenomenology as the historical completion of the

subjective movement inaugurated by Descartes' Meditations (Descartes, 1952; b.). The central idea of Descartes, for Husserl, was the return to the self, or to the stream of experiences, by means of doubt, a peculiar attitude which turns the eye of meditation upon a subjective being as the first certainty and final source of all certainties (Fulton 1969; 69-70).

FIRST AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION IN  
SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY: ONTOLOGICAL -  
IMMANENTISM IN HIS ONTOLOGY

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

## CHAPTER THREE

### FIRST AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION IN SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY: GNOSEOLOGICAL - IMMANENTISM IN HIS ONTOLOGY

On that basis, Sartre makes certain observations about man in EH. Since it is from the subject that meaning comes to being, which otherwise is simply what it is, man's freedom and autonomy are conceived in absolute terms. The subject is free to choose even the principles on which choices are made. The individual is neither subject to transcendental law, as would emanate from a transcendent being, i.e., God, nor subject to natural law that would emanate from the nature of man. On that basis, the co-existence of man and God is deemed incompatible. As the existence of the former can be intuited, whereas of the latter cannot, then the latter does not exist.

Despite his supposed atheism, this chapter seeks to point to an agnostic implication in Sartre's philosophy as a result of

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In his second argument against God's existence (EH; 56), Sartre says that existentialism is nothing but the attempt to draw the full conclusions from a consistently atheist position. The conclusion of his supposed atheism is made on the premise of his phenomenological ontology as outlined in BN.

In Sartre's ontology (BN), being is devoid of any meaning and intelligible structure in itself. It is simply "what it is". Therefore, all intelligible structure and meaning are conceived as endowed on being by the intentionality of subjective consciousness. Consequently, there is gnoseological-immanentism, i.e., the subject other than being is the primary foundation of knowledge.

### 3.2 GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM IN SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY

On that basis, Sartre makes certain observations about man in EH. Since it is from the subject that meaning comes to being, which otherwise is simply what it is, man's freedom and autonomy are conceived in absolute terms. The subject is free to choose even the principles on which choices are made. The individual is neither subject to transcendental law, as would emanate from a transcendent being, i.e., God, nor subject to natural law that would emanate from the nature of man. On that basis, the co-existence of man and God is deemed incompatible. As the existence of the former can be intuited, whereas of the latter cannot, then the latter does not exist.

Despite his supposed atheism, this chapter seeks to point to an agnostic implication in Sartre's philosophy as a result of

foundation of meaning, intelligibility, and truth. Sartre's gnoseological-immanentism in his ontology. First, it will be necessary to delineate the gnoseological-immanentism in Sartre's ontology. In summary Sartre's ontology makes the subject, other than being, the primary foundation of intelligibility, meaning and truth. The intelligible structures of objects are conceived as bestowed on them by subjective consciousness, and as a result the immediate object of knowledge is immanent. Consequently, there is no ontologically-objective basis for ascertaining the characteristics of being in such an ontology, nor is there justification to assert or deny the existence of a being.

### 3.2 GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM IN SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY

The immanentism in Sartre's ontology results from his existentialist concern for the freedom of the subject when confronted with being. The conception of the subject's autonomy in the face of being or in encounter with being, compels Sartre to say of the latter that it is simply "what it is", so that it is from the subject that being acquires meaning and intelligible structure.

#### 3.2.1) THE FIRST TENET OF GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM

The express aim when Sartre states his ontology (BN) seems to be affirmation of the subject, other than being, as the primary

foundation of meaning, intelligibility, and truth. Sartre's ontology consists of two major components, i.e., "le-pour-soi" or subjective consciousness and "l'en-soi" or being-in-itself. To make the former the primary foundation, leading to the adoption of gnoseological-immanentism, Sartre does an implicit phenomenological reduction.

The phenomenological reduction that has been seen in Husserl, in chapter two, is similar to Descartes' methodic doubt. It is likewise aimed to arrive at the immanent sphere of consciousness as the primary foundation of intelligibility and meaning in being. In Sartre's case it is stripping off being-in-itself of all meaning and intelligible structure with the aim of making the subject's consciousness the primary intelligibility meaning, and truth. The phenomenological reduction, resulting in gnoseological-immanentism in Sartre's ontology, is conducted in three stages.

- 1) Limiting of being to the phenomenon.
- 2) The analysis of being-in-itself.
- 3) The analysis of the being of consciousness as the "problem of nothingness" and as "being-for-itself".

phenomena and thing-in-itself or "ding-an-sich" (ibid:xxii)

### 1) THE LIMITING OF BEING TO THE PHENOMENON

The limiting of being to the phenomenon opens the way to gnoseological-immanentism, i.e., the subject other than being as the foundation of intelligibility, meaning, and truth, because it renders being-in-itself meaningless. That gives credence to the view that being is only meaningful in so far as it appears to consciousness, i.e., phenomena. Hence, being is only meaningful in so far as it shows itself to consciousness whose intentionality bestows it with such meaning.

The reduction of being to the phenomenon (BN;xxvi) is an attempt by Sartre, to describe the world and consciousness as they appear. He says:

The subject becomes the primary meaning and basis of intelligibility... modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it. It aims at overcoming a certain number of dualisms which have embarrassed philosophy and to replace them by a monism of the phenomenon... the appearances which manifest the existent are neither interior nor exterior; they are all equal... (BN;xxi-xxii).

In as much as Sartre is anxious to reject the Kantian dualism of phenomena and thing-in-itself or "ding-an-sich" (Ibid;xxii) authority in being becomes the subject.

If ... the phenomenon (or "being in so far as it appears to human consciousness") is to be

separated by an impassable gulf, the identification of being with the succession of its finished appearances has important consequences in Sartre's ontology in terms of the adoption of gnoseological-immanentism: (34).

2) It leads to the conception of en-soi (being-in-itself) as an absolute plenum with no potency, and indeed no relations of anything beyond. In itself the appearance is complete. It is supplemented only by other appearances... The way is prepared for a view of being-in-itself (en-soi) as a finished continuum fully in act, and lacking all power and potency... (Wild, 1962;143).

Being is stripped of meaning and intelligibility. These are to be projected on it from the intentions of subjective consciousness. The subject becomes the primary meaning and basis of intelligibility in being. In as much as Sartre wants to avoid the Berkeleyan "to be is to be perceived", the phenomenon, or "being-for-us" is set up as the supreme transcendental, which is an implicit acceptance of the interpretation of things... that "to-be-for-man" is the only meaning that the word being can have for us (Dondyne, 1962;118). Therefore, the transphenomenal being of which he talks becomes meaningless, as he admits, and the primary authority in being becomes the subject.

If ... the phenomenon (or "being in so far as it appears to human consciousness") is to be

considered as the supreme transcendental, the absolute measure of all meaning...the transphenomenal being of the phenomenon is stripped of all meaning. It is what it is, and that is just about all one can say of it, since it is through man that things acquire meaning (BN;30-34).

## 2) THE ANALYSIS OF BEING-IN-ITSELF (L'EN-SOI)

The analysis of being-in-itself, l'en-soi, the other major component of Sartre's ontology, is the second part of the phenomenological reduction that leads to gnoseological-immanentism. That is because the analysis, which appears in the form of three formulae, rather than giving a clear meaning of being, leaves it as dense as close that we have to consider it "undifferentiated and unstructured" (Hartmann, 1964;34-35). As a result subjective finite difference. All distinctions have to be referred to the consciousness becomes the primary authority as differentiation and pour-soi or consciousness which "...literally makes the world" structure are intended on being by subjective consciousness or (Wild, 1977; 143). There is immanentism in Sartre's thesis because le pour-soi. The formula sums up being-in-itself as: the subject, other than being, is again affirmed as the primary foundation of intelligibility, meaning, and value in being. The first formula leads to immanentism because being-in-itself is described as not, all that is forbidden on principle. It is what it is...it can encompass no negation. It is full positivity. It knows no...neither passivity nor activity... both are human and designate human conduct or the instruments of human conduct...In a word, man (BN;xiii).

is active and the means which he employs are called passive... These concepts put absolutely, lose all meaning. In particular, being is not active...it cannot be passive. The self-consistency of being is beyond the active as it is beyond the passive (BN; xl-xli).

The formula achieves the function of rendering being-in-itself superfluous by creating the impression that being is simply itself, or "being is itself" (*Ibid*). The second formula, i.e., "being is what is", functions to achieve gnoseological-immanentism by portraying being as simply what it is. That is because the formula interpretes the synthesis of the in-itself (*Ibid*;xlii) as "undifferentiated nebulous background" (Copleston, 1977; 145), an absolute plenum with no potency and indeed no relations to anything unstructured" (Hartmann, 1966;34-35). As a result subjective consciousness becomes the primary authority as differentiation and structure are intended on being by subjective consciousness or le pour-soi. The formula sums up being-in-itself as:

...isolated...does not enter into any connection ...Transition, becoming, anything which permits us to say being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it is not, all that is forbidden on principle. It is what it is...it can encompass no negation. It is full positivity. It knows no otherness...it is not subject to temporality. It is and when it gives way, one cannot even say that it no longer is (BN;xlii).

definite form by consciousness. In itself, it is mere matter capable of being organized under any one number of forms (Pettit, 1970). The third formula, i.e., "being-in-itself is" (*Ibid*), achieves gnoseological-immanentism by implying that being-in-itself is meaningless (*Ibid*). If being is meaningless, then it is subjective consciousness that has primary authority in terms of intelligibility, meaning, and truth. Being, at best, may have only a secondary authority.

The three formulas strip off being-in-itself of all being of consciousness. The other major component of Sartre's determinacy by itself or on an ontologically-objective status. ontology, the phenomenological reduction enters the third phase. Being-in-itself is rendered "opaque", "massive", "superfluous", "undifferentiated nebulous background" (Copleston, 1977; 145), an absolute plenum with no potency and indeed no relations to anything than being, the primary authority, beyond" (Wild, 1962; 143), and "which by itself remains non-referential" (Hartman, 1966; 144). The denial of essential independence goes with the need to underscore that it is intentional of subjective consciousness that brings meaning and intelligible structure to being.

"The problem of Nothingness". The key to the adoption of gnoseological-immanentism is the rejection of the idea of consciousness "in-itself" (or that it becomes inconsequential)...of an object having a meaning ready made...other than that which it assumes for some consciousness. An object has meaning, according to the doctrine of being in intentionality, only because it is given a confrontation with it. Consciousness, by virtue of its freedom, is capable of wrenching itself from being and putting a psychic

definite form by consciousness. In itself, it is mere matter capable of being organised under any one number of forms (Pettit, 1970; 10).

### 3) THE ANALYSIS OF THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (LE POUR-SOI)

In the foregoing analysis, gnoseological-immanentism has been adopted, i.e., the subject other than being becoming the primary authority in terms of meaning, intelligibility, and truth, by rendering being-in-itself superfluous. In the analysis of the being of consciousness, the other major component of Sartre's ontology, the phenomenological reduction enters the third phase. This has the function of adopting gnoseological-immanentism by describing the characteristics of consciousness that make it, other than being, the primary authority.

The analysis is in two segments; immanentist position as follows:

- a) "the problem of nothingness", and
- b) "being-for-itself", *le-pour-soi* or consciousness.

a) "The problem of Nothingness". The key to the adoption of gnoseological-immanentism is in this instance the conception of consciousness as "nothingness". That means consciousness is the negation and recoil from the "fullness" of being. By negation is meant the ability of consciousness to stand out from being in confrontation with it. Consciousness, by virtue of its freedom, is capable of wrenching itself from being and putting a psychic

cleavage or nothing between itself and being (BN; 632). Negation is conceived as the ability of the subject to question the World. The significance of the concept of nothingness, in terms of adoption of gnoseological-immanentism, is the conception that it is only after nothingness has come to being from subjective consciousness, and questioned it in a systematic and sceptical doubt, that the absolute plenum of being-in-itself is illuminated, given intelligible structure, and meaning (Ibid; 24-25).

iii) transcendence.

The psychic cleavage, nothingness, is conceived as cutting a "clearing through" the absolute plenum or "dense foliage" of being-in-itself" encase(s) it with a shell of a non-being (i.e. nothingness)" (Ibid; 632) in order to render it intelligible. Once more the subject, other than being, is affirmed as the primary authority in being. Sartre explicitly states the gnoseological-immanentist position as follows:

...for.....being to order itself round us  
 ...for it to parcel itself into  
 differentiated complexes....it is necessary  
 that negation rise up not as a thing among  
 other things but as a rubric of a category  
 which presides over the arrangement and  
 redistribution of great masses of being in  
 things. Thus the rise of man in the midst of  
 being, which "invents" him, causes a world to  
 be discovered. But the essential and  
 primordial moment of this rise is the  
 negation (Ibid; 24).

## (b) "Being-For-Itself"

Under that analysis, gnoseological-immanentism is adopted by

examination of the characteristics of consciousness in contrast to those of being-in-itself. The analysis falls into three elements, i.e.

- i) the immediate structures of the "for-itself",
- ii) temporal dimension, and
- iii) transcendence.

(i) The immediate structures of the "for-itself":

Gnoseological-immanentism is explicitly reiterated when consciousness is clearly earmarked as that by which foundation appears in being. In contrast, "...being is and can only be" (Ibid; B1), whereas the for-itself founds itself by ability to distance itself from being, question it, interrogate it, and negate it. On the other hand, the in-itself can neither provide the foundation for consciousness nor anything, it is simply what it is. Sartre says:

If it (the in-itself) founds itself, it does so by giving itself the modification of the for-itself. It is already no longer in-itself, and we encounter here again the origin of every foundation of itself in so far as it is already no longer in-itself. If being-in-itself, can be neither its own foundation nor that of other beings, the whole foundation comes into

the world through the for-itself. It is not only that the for-itself as a nihilated in-itself is itself given a foundation, but with it foundation appears for the first time (Ibid; 82).

Hence, subjective consciousness other than being is declared the foundation of all foundations. Sartre uses a term, the "circuit of selfness", that sums up well his explicit adoption of gnoseological-immanentism. The term refers to the relation of the for-itself with the possible which it is, and "world" for the totality in so far as it is traversed by the "circuit of selfness" that acquires unit and meaning as the world (Ibid; 104).

ii) Temporal dimension; Under the analysis of ontology in temporal dimension, the in-itself which is simply what it is, cannot conversely be present to something (Ibid; 121). That there cannot be simultaneity between one in-itself and another in-itself except from the point of view of a being which would have in it the power of presence. The present, therefore, can be only the presence of the for-itself to being-in-itself (Ibid; 121-122). The significance of that, in terms of the affirmation of gnoseological-immanentism, is well summed up by Sartre as follows:

...the presence of the for-itself is what makes being-in-itself exist as a totality... (Ibid) but Beings are revealed as co-present in a world where the for-itself unites them with its own. The blood by the total ecstatic sacrifice of the

for-itself is the negation of the in-itself as an absolute meaningless self which is called presence. "Before" the sacrifice of the for-itself it would have been impossible to say that beings existed either separated or together. (Ibid).

The immanentist conception is quite explicit in that quote.

iii) Transcendence; The for-itself is referred to as a "transcendence" in line with conception of its intentional quality, i.e., it is always a consciousness of something other than itself, of objects transcendent to or outside consciousness. Transcendence,

here, concerns a relation between the for-itself and being-in-itself out of which a gnoseological-immanentist conviction is explicitly stated.

Sartre says that "...knowledge and finally the knower himself are nothing except the fact that ...being-in-itself gives itself and raises itself in relief on the ground of this nothing (being-for-itself)" (Ibid; 179). The for-itself is conceived to be

the foundation of knowledge by negating the continuity of being-in-itself or "cutting a clearing through it" so as to introduce ontological determination on the basis of which there can be any positive characterisation. Such positive characterisation is

conceived as not due to an inner determination of being (Ibid) but to the negativity of subjective consciousness or for-itself. The

for-itself is the negation of the in-itself as an absolute meaningless plenum that simply is. not being, i.e., there must be

being-for-itself (Ibid). The same goes for quantity. The relation It is continuously asserted, in the immanentist manner, that of quantity it is said, is not one in-itself, but a purely the subject other than being is the primary authority in matters of negative and external relation of the nothingness cast on being by knowledge. Determination is conceived not as an internal or being-for-itself (Ibid; 191).

ontologically-objective structure of the thing, but as summoned by the for-itself across a system of "internal negations" (Ibid; 180).

That human reality causes a nothing outside of being through which being is revealed. (Ibid; 181): from the happening of consciousness

to being" (Ibid). Subjective consciousness is then, in

...nothingness introduces quasi-multiplicity in the heart of being. This quasi-multiplicity over gnoseological is the foundation of all intra-multiplicity over being. Every mundane multiplicities, for a multiplicity subjective supposes an original unity at the heart of consciousness which the multiplicity is outlined...The in-

itself is not diversity; it is not multiplicity; and in order for it to receive multiplicity...a being must arise which is There simultaneously present to each in-itself reduction, isolated in its own identity. It is through immanentist, human reality that multiplicity comes into the world; it is the quasi-multiplicity at the heart of being-for-itself which causes the primary number to be revealed in the world (Ibid; primary 187).

foundation of intelligibility, of meaning, and of truth.

To give subjective consciousness even more authority over being, it

However, in order that this study avoids naive realism, a is also asserted that a quality is not an external aspect of few issues need to be clarified at this juncture. That is

specifically in relation of the conception of subjective

consciousness as projecting any meaning or intelligibility on

being. The study is not of the opinion as of naive realism that

being. That in order for quality to be, there must be being for a nothingness which by nature is not being, i.e., there must be being-for-itself (Ibid). The same goes for quantity. The relation of quantity, it is said, is not one in-itself, but a purely negative and external relation of the nothingness cast on being by being-for-itself (Ibid; 191).

If quality and quantity are projected on being by being-for-itself, then it can be said that the "world" "...with all its distinctions of things arises from the happening of consciousness to being" (Ibid). Subjective consciousness is then, in gnoseological-immanentist tradition, the primary authority over being. Everything has to be affirmed on the basis of subjective consciousness, it becomes the absolute point of reference.

Therefore, through a protracted implicit phenomenological reduction, Sartre has adopted the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism, i.e. the subjective consciousness other than being is the primary authority in matters of knowledge. It is the primary foundation of intelligibility, of meaning, and of truth.

However, in order that this study avoids naive realism, a few issues need to be clarified at this juncture. That is specifically in relation of the conception of subjective consciousness as projecting any meaning or intelligibility on being. The study is not of the opinion as of naive realism that

all perceptions are intrinsic property of objects. Naive realism takes all perceptions as literally characteristics of the object and that none is subjective to percipients. All qualities are regarded as external to the subject, independent of perception, and persisting in exactly the same way when not perceived. can also mention various social-cultural worlds which cannot be conceived apart from the people who make them up.

Naive realism is easily contradicted by arguments from illusion, it cannot accomodate delusory experiences or hallucinatory experiences like mirages which delude us to think that there is a pond of water or an oasis when these are actually absent. It must be conceded that there are subjective and relative epistemological dimensions. This is more so in the realm of instrumentality, utility, and aesthetics. Copleston (1977; 144-147) has made that observation in relation to Sartre's BN. He gives the example of a table which stands out from other things as not being something other than a table, suitable for one purpose and not another because human beings give it a certain meaning, an instrument for the fulfilment of certain purposes. It can be a place for dinner, a battering ram, or anything else in relation to a consciousness. However, as Copleston appropriately observes, "... it does not follow however that consciousness creates the object. It indubitably is or exists. And it is what it is. But it acquires an instrumentalist meaning ... only in relation to consciousness" (Ibid; 144).

## 3.2.2) SECOND TENET OF GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM

This tenet of gnosological immanentism takes the

In the above example the essence of truth can be man's

immediate object of knowledge to be immanent in the mind. This

capacity for attaching meaning to things by means of free projects

tenet is in Sartre's ontology due to what can be referred to

as existentialists would say. The "... explanation would suffice

as an "idealism of meaning" (Dondeyne, 1962) or essence. In

when we are dealing with the world of utility values, of things

such an idealism, being-in-itself is conceived as

constructed by man, whose 'truth is man made' "(Dondeyne, 1962;

meaningless, superfluous void, unstructured and

62). One can also mention various social-cultural worlds which

undifferentiated. The determinate structure of objects are

cannot be conceived apart from the people who make them up.

conceived not to belong to objects themselves, but rather, to

consciousness.

On the other hand, there is also the "natural world", or a

world whose truth depends on being as such. Such a world, however,

should not be conceived of as divorced from man. Man is fastened to

the world and there are also ways in which the world is fastened to

man. Man in a way, as Heidegger put it, is "the shepherd of being",

for he is the being capable of understanding the inner value of

each being, to compare them altogether with their respective

values, and to make them a "valuational choice". So, in a way, man

idealism of Kant which is also an idealism of meaning or

illuminates being and grasps its intelligible structure. However,

essence. In Kant, the phenomena, or raw material of knowledge

that should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is by

as he conceives them, become intelligible only after the mind

virtue of the projections of man's consciousness that being

has imprinted on them intelligible forms or categories, which

acquires intelligible structure. Rather, man is the being who, even

if intuits a priori. Likewise, in Sartre's ontology, an object

though the truth of the "natural world" depends on being as such,

has meaning only because it is given a definite form by

consciousness. Being is conceived as parcelling itself into

differentiated complexes by the negation of consciousness

which is conceived to rise as a rubric of category presiding

over the world.

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over the world.

### 3.2.2) SECOND TENET OF GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM

This tenet of gnoseological-immanentism takes the immediate object of knowledge to be immanent in the mind. This tenet is in Sartre's ontology due to what can be referred to as an "idealism of meaning" (Dondeyne, 1962) or essence. In such an idealism, being-in-itself is conceived as meaningless, superfluous void, unstructured and undifferentiated. The determinate structure of objects are

conceived not to belong to objects themselves, but rather, to consciousness or *le\_pour-soi*. Consequently, the determinate structure of objects, their form meaning or essence, exist only in relation to a consciousness. The emphasis as in all instances of idealism, is consciousness and objects are either explicitly or implicitly conceived as existing only in relation to consciousness.

There is a close similarity to the transcendental idealism of Kant which is also an idealism of meaning or essence. In Kant, the phenomena, or raw material of knowledge as he conceives them, become intelligible only after the mind has imprinted on them intelligible forms or categories, which it intuits a priori. Likewise, in Sartre's ontology, an object has meaning only because it is given a definite form by consciousness. Being is conceived as parcelling itself into differentiated complexes by the negation of consciousness which is conceived to rise as a rubric of category presiding

over. All meaning and intelligible forms are from subjective consciousness. The immediate object of knowledge is immanent in the mind and cannot be conceived apart from it. The emphasis is on consciousness and not on being.

and intelligibility" (Bondaynes, 1962, 60). Being is simply over the arrangement and redistribution of great masses of conceived as a sort of facticity which man, "...because of the being in things (BN; 24). Any characterisation in being is not due to an inner determination (Ibid; 179), but to the transcendence his power of comprehension affords him, for it constitutes the world" (Ibid). negativity of the for-itself.

The shift of emphasis from the primacy of being to the

### 3.3 FIRST AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION

subject or epistemological-immanentism, is at the root of agnostic implication in Sartre's philosophy. The shift denies Sartre's

The gnoseological-immanentism in Sartre's ontology is the reason for an agnostic implication in his philosophy, contrary to his assertions of atheism. This immanentism makes the subjective consciousness, other than being, the primary foundation of knowledge, intelligibility, meaning and truth. That results from phenomenological reduction which renders being-in-itself superfluous so that all meaning and intelligible forms are from subjective consciousness, the immediate object of knowledge is immanent in the mind and cannot be conceived apart from it. The emphasis is on consciousness and not on being.

Consciousness is the basis for the affirmation of truth. The epistemological and ontological emphasis has shifted to the point where all and every aspect of being is either explicitly or implicitly conceived as being regulated by man's consciousness. "Human subjectivity becomes the only measure of being, the source as well as the norm, of all value

and intelligibility" (Dondeyne; 1962, 60). Being is simply conceived as a sort of facticity which man, "...because of the transcendence his power of comprehension affords him, forms and constitutes the world" (Ibid).

The shift of emphasis from the primacy of being to the subject, or gnoseological-immanentism, is at the root of agnostic implication in Sartre's philosophy. The shift denies Sartre's philosophy the appropriate ontological and methodological orientation to become a philosophy of being. Sartre's philosophy suffers from an ontological or metaphysical agnosticism due to the lack of an ontologically-objective status to apprehend and affirm the characteristics of being. Being is conceived not to possess intelligible structure in itself or in an ontologically-objective way. Rather, these are projected on it by subjective consciousness. Hence, determinate structure in being cannot be conceived apart from a consciousness, and there is no way of affirming whether the supposed characteristics of being or any assertions about being are ontologically-objective or are the mere projections or subjective consciousness. The ontological agnosticism denies to Sartre's philosophy the justification either to assert or deny the existence of God. Assertions about the existence or non-existence of God, i.e., necessary being have to be made on the basis of the cognisance, apprehension,

(28\_294C\_502) which is consciousness derivative of human existence.

and affirmation of the characteristics of being as a totality.

Asserting or denying the existence of God has certain implications on being, and the epistemological and ontological assumptions on the basis of which such conclusions are reached must be able to accommodate those implications. For example, if one says that God does not exist, the implication is that being itself is necessary and infinite or eternal. On the other hand, asserting the existence of God implies that being is contingent and finite. If one's argument against God's existence is of the moral type, i.e., the argument that existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of God as supremely good, then the implication is of self-cognisance of being as including that which is evil and malignant.

4) Since it is from subjective consciousness that determinacy in being comes, the former is the primary foundation of knowledge and everything is to be affirmed only on its basis.

Minimally, any argument about God, i.e., necessary being, must at least take cognisance of some aspects of being. Sartre's philosophy should not be atheistic because it lacks an ontologically-objective status for cognisance and affirmation of the characteristics of being.

Sartre's philosophy should not be atheistic because it lacks an ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of the characteristics of being, then

The agnostic implication can be explicated as follows:—supposed

- 1) In Sartre's ontology there are two entities, objective or just projections of subjective being-in-itself (l'en-soi), and being-for-itself consciousness.

(le\_pour\_soi) which is consciousness denotive of human existence.

- 2) Being-in-itself is conceived as an absolute plenum, or superfluous, inconsequential, meaningless void that lacks any determinate structure.
- 3) All the intelligible forms that give being determinate structure are conceived as projected on it by subjective consciousness.
- 4) Since it is from subjective consciousness that determinacy in being comes, the former is the primary foundation of knowledge and everything is to be affirmed only on its basis.
- 5) If being lacks determinacy in itself and knowledge is to be affirmed only on the basis of subjective consciousness, then there is no ontologically-objective basis for cognition and affirmation of the characteristics of being.
- 6) Without an ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of the characteristics of being, then there is no way of ascertaining whether supposed characteristics of being are ontologically-objective or just projections of subjective consciousness.

- 7) Since there is no way of ascertaining the characteristics of being, then there is no justification to affirm or deny the existence of God.

THE SECOND AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION  
FROM GNOSEOLOGICAL - IMMANENTISM IN BARTRE'S  
PHILOSOPHY

## INTRODUCTION

## CHAPTER FOUR

The agnostic implication explicated in this chapter comes from Sartre's existentialist concern for man as a free and concrete individual existent. That concern leads him to a criterion of knowledge, i.e., reference to immediate experience, which is an instance of the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism. It is that immanentism, arising from Sartre's concern for concrete existence or living experience, that is the basis of the agnostic implication pointed out in this chapter.

Sartre's THE SECOND AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION OF EXISTENTIALISM CONCERNING GOD FROM GNOSEOLOGICAL - IMMANENTISM IN SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY

either does he argue directly his criterion of knowledge, i.e., reference to immediate experience, to the non-existence of God. However, that concern and his criterion of knowledge are major aspects of his philosophy and they certainly have implications on his ontology and epistemology. They are inconsistent with his endeavour to address the metaphysical question of God's existence or non-existence.

The chapter bases itself on the premise that if the criterion of knowledge is reference to immediate experience, then it must exclude all metaphysics from the scope of our investigations. Such a framework gives us no justification to make assertions beyond immediate experience, and theism as well as atheism certainly have implications beyond such a scope. The

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

The agnostic implication explicated in this chapter comes from Sartre's existentialist concern for man as a free and concrete individual existent. That concern leads him to a criterion of knowledge, i.e., reference to immediate experience, which is an instance of the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism. It is that immanentism, arising from Sartre's concern for concrete existence or living experience, that is the basis of the agnostic implication pointed out in this chapter.

Sartre does not directly argue from his existentialist concern for concrete experience to the non-existence of God. Neither does he argue directly from his criterion of knowledge i.e., reference to immediate experience, to the non-existence of God. However, that concern and his criterion of knowledge are major aspects of his philosophy and they certainly have implications on being, and indeed of knowledge. However, the existentialist his ontology and epistemology. They are inconsistent with his reverence for the concrete leads, especially in Sartre's case, to endeavour to address the metaphysical question of God's existence as an instance of the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism on or non-existence.

The chapter bases itself on the premise that if the criterion of knowledge is reference to immediate experience, then we must exclude all metaphysics from the scope of our investigations. Such a framework gives us no justification to make assertions beyond immediate experience, and theism as well as atheism certainly have implications beyond such a scope. The

chapter also bases itself on the premise that being exceeds the bounds of immediate experience, and that human knowledge, taking with capability to be so experienced. The implication then, is that cognisance of especially gnoseological-realism, is able to know without being so experienced, they have no being or existence, that being beyond the bounds of immediate experience. This premise gives goes with a disdain for inferential, conceptual, abstractive, the study the justification to back the claims about the speculative, and theoretical knowledge which seem to be erroneously limitations of Sartre's criterion of knowledge, and of necessarily identified with the absolute rationalism and extreme gnoseological-immanentism in general, that imply agnosticism.

The chapter first looks at the gnoseological-immanentism, i.e., second tenet, necessitated by Sartre's concern for concrete existential experience, and then points to the agnosticism implied.

These types of knowledge provide a significant basis of approach to

#### 4.2 GNOSEOLOGICAL-IMMANENTISM IN SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY:

##### IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE AS CRITERION OF KNOWLEDGE.

The stress of immediate experience as a criterion of knowledge. Concrete existential experience is certainly an element of being, and indeed of knowledge. However, the existentialist reverence for the concrete leads, especially in Sartre's case, to an instance of the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism on which the second agnostic implication in his philosophy is based. In that tenet, the immediate object of knowledge is immanent in the mind, consciousness, or perceiver. It is the non-reducible residue

confronting the subject, indeed even comprising the existence of If knowledge is conceived as referring only to immediate experience, then the being or esse of objects seems to be equated

with capability to be so experienced. The implication then, is that without being so experienced, they have no being or existence. That goes with a disdain for inferential, conceptual, abstractive, speculative, and theoretical knowledge which seem to be erroneously identified with the absolute rationalism and extreme "concrete", or "existence" which since due to its "non-reducible" ideaism of Hegelian and like types of metaphysics. The mistake is to extend the criticism and rejection of Hegelian type philosophies to inferential, conceptual, abstractive, speculative, and theoretical knowledge as such.

Those types of knowledge provide a significant basis of approach to existence and existence is not revealed to consciousness through conceptual knowledge but through pre-reflective immediate experience. The stress of immediate experience as a criterion of knowledge, an instance of the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism, manifests itself both explicitly and implicitly in Sartre's philosophy. The theme is taken up in Sartre's philosophical novel, *NAU*, where he introduces existentialist reverence for the concrete. *NAU* is Sartre's discovery of "facticity" or the concrete situation in which consciousness finds itself and to which it is bound. It is the non-reducible residue confronting the subject, indeed even comprising the existence of

The concern with the concrete and the conviction that being can only be grasped by concrete, particular, immediate living experience continues in Sartre's outline of his phenomenological ontology in *BN*. The subject. Significantly, it is stated that existence is not an abstraction but "...the very paste of things" (NAU, 127).

The significance of this, in terms of the adoption of gnoseological-immanentism, is that NAU is an introduction to the "concrete", or "existence" which since due to its "non-reducible" (Catalano, 1974; 27-29) characteristics, must be revealed to us. Our access to it is not in conceptual knowledge but in immediate confrontation with reality, or immediate experience. Therefore any access we have to being is non-conceptual (*Ibid*; 28). Reality is existence and existence is not revealed to consciousness through conceptual knowledge but through pre-reflective immediate experience. The argument in NAU is that our access to existence is fundamentally different from its objectification in consciousness (*Ibid*; 29). Also "...if being were revealed to us in knowledge, Sartre would claim that we would be faced with the problem of being, or existence, of that knowledge" (*Ibid*). So it seems that the only access to being is immediate pre-reflective experience, inference is excluded.

It is not enough in that argument, merely to state that bad faith occurs, nor even to list in a general way the kind of situations in which we might be satisfied by description of bad faith. It is an essential part of Sartre's method, by virtue of his conception of

The concern with the concrete and the conviction that being can only be grasped by concrete, particular, immediate living experience continues in Sartre's outline of his phenomenological ontology in BN. BN "... shows itself to be central to the existentialist tradition by its insistence upon the presentation of the concrete fact not merely by way of example, but as an integral part of its arguments" (BN; xiii). In line with the conception of knowledge as reference to immediate experience, the treatment of the concrete and particular in BN is not simply a matter of method but arises out of the special interest of Sartre and other existentialists.

The conviction that knowledge of being is only by concrete, particular, and immediate experience leads to presentation, in BN, by "... extremely detailed description or anecdote, not merely for illustrative purposes, but as an essential element in the argument" (Ibid; x). There are quite some instances in BN testifying to that. A sufficient example is the treatment of "bad faith" (Ibid; 47-70). Sartre argues from the fact that people are capable of bad faith, and by detailed description of instances of bad faith (Ibid; 55-59), to the most general characteristic of consciousness, namely; its ability to separate itself from the world of things by a psychic cleavage or "nothingness" as making bad faith possible.

It is not enough in that argument, merely to state that bad faith occurs, nor even to list in a general way the kind of situations in which we might be satisfied by description of bad faith. It is an essential part of Sartre's method, by virtue of his conception of knowledge. Then, in Sartre, Marxism was the dominant philosophy of the twentieth century, and existentialism was only an ideology which could contribute to, but could neither contradict nor supersede it. However, in Sartre's view, Marxism had an essential flaw: it had forgotten the concrete and particular, and had fallen into idealism (SFN; xiii).

In SFM Sartre gives three statements in relation to his conception of knowledge as reference to immediate experience:

"Irreducibility and specificity of what is lived" (Ibid; 101).

knowledge, that we should, as nearly as possible, be presented with the living fact of bad faith (Ibid;x). Where as one would think it would bad faith and to define it, Sartre devotes a whole chapter of BN to a detailed description and illustration of the fact of bad faith.

The significance of those descriptions is not merely illustrative, they are an intergral part of Sartre's arguments as to the nature of being. Access to being is conceived as through immediate experience. It is rather that we should understand the nature of the phenomenon by accepting the truthfulness of the story, in a way be completely convinced of the truth of the representation of life in a film or a novel, the existentialist way (Ibid; xi).

In SFM, Sartre is more explicit in his statement of his conception of knowledge. SFM is an epistemological and methodological critique of Marxism for having abandoned reference to concrete and particular experience as the yardstick for knowledge. Then, for Sartre, Marxism was the dominant philosophy of the twentieth century, and existentialism was only an ideology which could contribute to, but could neither contradict nor supersede Marxism itself. However, in Sartre's view, Marxism had at the time "...become dead or fossilized" (BN; xv). The reason, says Sartre, is because Marxist theory of knowledge had forgotten the concrete and particular, and had fallen into idealism (SFM; xiii).

In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre gives three statements in relation to his conception of knowledge as reference to immediate experience:

The most blunt statement of Sartre's criterion of knowledge

- i) "Irreducibility and specificity of what is lived" (*Ibid*; 10).
- ii) "The primacy of the specifically real over thought, that the real cannot be reduced to thought" (*Ibid*).
- iii) "The incommensurability of the real and knowledge" (*Ibid*; 12).

theory of knowledge which can be valid is one which is founded on

The statements are actually an echoing of an earlier truth of microphysics: the experimenter is part of the Kierkegaardian criticism of Hegelian idealism and rationalism. It can be experimental system (*Ibid*). Significant is the assertion that the said of Sartre that he is

only admissible refutation is that which leads us back immediately

to experience and accepting the radical empiricism of Kierkegaard. They

(existentialists) are not just interested rather in the concrete

It is a fact that ideas originate from experience. However,

data of immediate experience, but also in describing this data so

sensation and sense knowledge alone are not all of knowledge. To

far as possible and exactly as they are (Wild, 1962; 136-141).

insist that knowledge must derive from sensation alone, more so

Not only is the empiricist protest against rationalism being

reformulated, but Sartre and other existentialists are doing much more

(MacIntyre, 1967; 136-141). Since they follow the "radical empiricism of

Kierkegaard" (Wild, 1962; 136-141), there is justification in calling

existentialism "... the new empiricism" (*Ibid*), different, no doubt from

classical empiricism, but still empiricism (*Ibid*) stressing immediate

concrete experience. That is in harmony with the adoption of

phenomenology, where the basic tenet is intuition of phenomena as the

source and test of knowledge. Significantly the subtitle of Sartre's *BN*

is "An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology".

of knowledge stressing immediate experience.

The most blunt statement of Sartre's criterion of knowledge comes in SFM. He says that the existentialist's reflection is not reduced to the simple immanence of idealist subjectivism; it is, for them, a point of departure only if throws us back "immediately" among things and men in the world (SFM; 32). For Sartre (Ibid), the theory of knowledge which can be valid is one which is founded on the truth of microphysics; the experimenter is part of the experimental system (Ibid). Significant is the assertion that the only admissible reflection is that which leads us back immediately to men and things in the World. a concrete situation. However, it

must also be taken into consideration that the nature of human

It is a fact that ideas originate from experience. However, understanding is necessarily selective and abstractive because we sensation and sense knowledge alone are not all of knowledge. To insist that knowledge must derive from sensation alone, more so are unable to know of and to understand all those many details and properties at the same time. It therefore tries to focus on immediate experience, is to restrict knowledge unnecessarily. If qualities that are rather essential.

knowledge were such, then there would be no explanation for the very principles on which such radical empiricist conceptions of knowledge are based. Such principles are inexplicable solely on the grounds of appeal to experience, they are universal principles. For example, the principle that "experience alone guarantees true knowledge" (Walsh, 1985), is the very basis of empiricist criteria of knowledge and yet it is not verifiable solely by appeal to experience. The difficulty is aggravated by a criterion

leads his philosophy into the second tenet of gnoseological immanentism and agnostic implication.

of knowledge stressing immediate experience.

### 4.3 THE SECOND AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION

It must be conceded that our ideas originate in experience. It must also be recognised that concepts are concretised in existing individual substances and do not exist in themselves as completely separated from and different from those substances as conceived in platonic terms. It must also be conceded that concepts are certainly limited in so far as their grasp of being is concerned. By its nature the concept, or what we understand of percepts, is abstractive. It never contains all those details that are special and particular to existents in a concrete situation. However, it must also be taken into consideration that the nature of human understanding is necessarily selective and abstractive because we are unable to think of and to understand all those many details and properties at the same time. It therefore tries to focus on qualities that are rather essential.

Being goes beyond the confines of immediate experience, and Conceptual knowledge, therefore, is not a preserve of human knowledge is safe, by inferential or conceptual means, of immediate experience. If that is the case, we would not be able to account for the fact that we are able to understand the sun in 24 hours and that it cycles around the sun on its orbit in 365 days. Therefore, reference to immediate experience as the criterion of knowledge. That insistence leads his philosophy into the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism and agnostic implication.

The object of knowledge is being. All knowledge ultimately aims at understanding being or whatever exists.

#### 4.3 THE SECOND AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION.

To Sartre knowledge refers to the object of knowledge and the second insistence that the only knowledge admissible is that which throws us back to men and things, i.e., immediate experience (SFM; 32) is the instance of the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism in Sartre's philosophy that bears a second agnostic implication. As has been stated, Sartre does not directly argue from that gnoseological-immanentism to God's non-existence. However, it is the contention of this study that the problem of God's existence cannot be addressed within such an epistemological framework. Sartre's criterion of knowledge has obvious implication on his ontology.

The agnostic implication is explicated in the following argument:

- 1) Being goes beyond the confines of immediate experience, and human knowledge is able, by inferential or conceptual means, to go beyond the limits of immediate experience. If that were so, then we would not be able to account for the fact that the earth rotates around its axis in 24 hours and that it goes around the sun on its orbit in 365 days.
- 2) Therefore, reference to immediate experience is not the only way to knowledge of being.
- 3) The object of knowledge is being. All knowledge ultimately aims at understanding being or whatever exists.

- 4) To Sartre knowledge refers to the object of knowledge and Sartre conceives of knowledge as referring to immediate experience, the being or esse of objects is equated with being so perceived.
- 6) Without being so perceived, i.e., immediately, the objects can be said not to be or exist.
- 7) Consequently, as the esse or being of objects is implicitly equated perceived immediately, then the objects cannot exist without relation to percipients, subjects, consciousness, or mind (The second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism).
- 8) If objects cannot have an existence independently of their being equated with being perceived immediately, independently of consciousness, subjects, percipient or mind, then there is no ontologically-objective basis in being for the affirmation of the characteristics of being as not merely projections of subjective consciousness.
- 9) To say "God does not exist" or "God exists", implies an understanding of being as either necessary, or contingent respectively. If God does not exist then being is the own case for its existence, but if God does exist then being is contingent.
- both the theist and the atheist do make statements that cannot be verified solely by reference to experience. An analogy of one of

their arguments, by John Wisdom, can further illustrate the argument. The position of the logical positivists was taken for a different reason, to eject all metaphysical knowledge from what was

regarded as meaningful. However it very well serves the purpose of

10) But if there is no ontologically-objective basis for the illustrating that both atheists and theists do not make statements affirming of the characteristics of being then there is no that can be verified solely on the grounds of appeal to experience. justification to assert either the existence of non-Therefore, if one has a criterion of knowledge stressing reference existence of God.

to immediate experience, then atheism or theism cannot be part of

11) Consequently Sartre's philosophy implies agnosticism.

The stressing of immediate experience at the expense of conceptual and inferential knowledge affects the capacity of Sartre's philosophy to address itself to metaphysical problems. There can be no inference beyond the confines of immediate experience. However, both the theist and atheist make propositions that cannot be accounted for solely on the basis of reference to immediate experience. Both positions imply cognisance of characteristics of being far beyond the confines of immediate experience. To say "God does not exist" implies cognisance of the eternity and necessity of the entirety of being. Such cognisance cannot be given in immediate experience. Also to assert that God exists implies cognisance as well as other characteristics of being cannot be given in immediate experience.

They examine the garden carefully, sometimes coming onto new things

The logical positivists, despite their objectionable principle of verification, were able to recognise the fact that both the theist and the atheist do make statements that cannot be verified solely by reference to experience. An analogy of one of

their arguments, by John Wisdom, can further illustrate the argument. The position of the logical positivists was taken for a different reason, to eject all metaphysical knowledge from what was regarded as meaningful. However it very well serves the purpose of illustrating that both atheists and theists do not make statements that can be verified solely on the grounds of appeal to experience. Therefore, if one has a criterion of knowledge stressing reference to immediate experience, then atheism or theism cannot be part of that conceptual framework.

John Wisdom expressed that in his parable of the gardener (1953; pp. 154-155). The story is about two people returning to their neglected garden to find among the weeds a few old plants surprisingly vigorous. One says to the other "it must be that a gardener has been coming and doing something about these plants". Inquiring, they find that no neighbour has seen anyone tending the garden. The first man says to the other, "He must have worked while the people slept". The other says, "No, someone would have heard him and besides, anybody who cared about the plants would have kept them down, these weeds". The first man says, "look at the way these are arranged. There is purpose and sense of beauty here. I believe that someone invisible to mortal eye comes. I believe that we shall find confirmation of this if we look more carefully." They examine the garden carefully, sometimes coming onto new things

suggesting a gardener and sometimes they find things suggesting the contrary.

They also study gardens that are unattended, and each learns all the other does about this and that when after all, one says "I still believe that a gardener comes" while the other says "I don't", their different words, says Wisdom, now reflects no further and no difference about how fast unattended gardens deteriorate. At this stage, says Wisdom, the gardener hypothesis has ceased to be experimental, the difference of one who accepts and one who rejects is only a matter of one expecting something that the other does not expect.

Wisdom stresses significantly that there is no disagreement about the experienceable facts, the settlement of which could determine whether the theist or atheist is right. Neither the theist's position nor the atheist's can even in principle be verifiable by appeal to experience (Hick, 1973; 87).

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The third agnostic implication in Sartre's philosophy is the adoption of the basic tenets of phenomenology, at least implicitly, as the

**CHAPTER FIVE**

Both of Sartre's arguments against the existence of God are made on the basis of phenomenological framework. The first is based on Sartre's conception of being-for-itself or consciousness (EN). Consciousness, for Sartre, is not self-identic. A "consciousness of consciousness" only arises on the basis of what he calls a non-positional or consciousness which is already a consciousness of something other than itself. For consciousness to exist as self-identic implies, for Sartre, existence in the mode of being-in-itself which is the negation of consciousness, and to which the

**THE THIRD AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION****IN SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY: HIS PHENOMENOLOGY**

of a rigid, fixed, inert, and deterministic that contradicts the freedom, autonomy, and sporadic nature of consciousness. The concept of a self-identic consciousness is, therefore, to Sartre, a contradiction of consciousness as a being-for-itself. The concept of God as an absolute and necessary being implies that consciousness is not absolute because it is prior to all being and, therefore God exists in the mode of being-in-itself. At the same time God is also conceived as a personal being, implying what Sartre calls being-for-itself or consciousness. For Sartre, no being can exist but in the mode of being-in-itself and being-for-

## 5.1 INTRODUCTION

The third agnostic implication in Sartre's philosophy is the adoption of the basic tenets of phenomenology, at least implicitly, as the essence of philosophising.

Both of Sartre's arguments against the existence of God are made on the basis of phenomenological framework. The first is based on Sartre's conception of being-for-itself or consciousness (BN). Consciousness, for Sartre, is not self-identical. A "consciousness of consciousness" only arises on the basis of what he calls a non-positional or consciousness which is already a consciousness of something other than itself. For consciousness to exist as self-identical implies, for Sartre, existence in the mode of being-in-itself which is the negation of consciousness, and to which the latter, though correlated, is strictly not reducible. The concept of a self-identical consciousness seems to imply for Sartre, a rigidity, fixedness, inertness, and determinism that contradicts the freedom, autonomy, and sporadic nature of consciousness. The concept of a self-identical consciousness is, therefore, to Sartre, a contradiction of consciousness as a being-for-itself. The concept of God as an infinite and necessary being implies that consciousness is self-identical because it is prior to all being and, therefore God exists in the mode of being-in-itself. At the same time God is also conceived as a personal being, implying what Sartre calls being-for-itself or consciousness. For Sartre, no being can exist both in the mode of being-in-itself and being-for-

itself simultaneously. The two modes are to him mutually contradictory and irreducible to each other. He therefore rejects the notion of God as self contradictory.

The argument is made within the so called phenomenological ontology of BN. It is as if Sartre would like one to have a phenomenological intuition that it is not possible for consciousness to exist as being-for-itself (free, autonomous, versatile, spontaneous, and dynamic) and at the same time be being-in-itself (inert and simply what it is).

The second argument against God's existence (EH) is made on the basis of an implicit phenomenological reduction conducted in the phenomenological ontology of BN. The argument is made in the framework of phenomenological/existential hermeneutics or phenomenology that studies the concrete existential conditions and experiences of human beings and tries to decipher their meanings. Sartre's phenomenological reduction (BN) strips being-in-itself of all meaning or intelligible structure in itself. All intelligible form comes to being from the intentional projections of being-for-itself. Hence, subjective consciousness rather than being becomes the primary authority. For Sartre, therefore, the human existent is not free to create their own essence, values, and even the principles on which choices are based (EH). On the basis of that Sartre concludes that the existence of man is incompatible with both a natural law and a transcendent law that would emanate from a

inclusion of metaphysics. Metaphysics, for the most part, deals almost entirely with inference and concepts. Though it starts its investigations from the data of experience, it does not limit itself to the data of experience. It deals with the question of transcendent being as God. Since we can intuit man's existence as an absolutely free being, so argues Sartre, the notion of God is contradictory and therefore false. That man's absolute freedom is incompatible with the existence of God. That each mode of existence is a negation of the other. To Sartre the former is abundantly evident, so God does not exist.

The contention of this study is that it is erroneous in methodological procedure to raise metaphysical problems, as of God's existence, within an exclusively phenomenological framework. Whatever the perception of phenomenology, it has epistemological and methodological limitations in a relation to the raising of metaphysical questions. is the test and source of knowledge. Franz

Brentano, the major precursor of phenomenology, felt that philosophy starts from phenomena, but he felt positivism had understood phenomena unilaterally as physical phenomena and yet nothing in the exclusive use of phenomenological procedure to there is psychic phenomena. Carl Stumpf pushed Brentano's ideas justify more than agnosticism. Even though Sartre and other phenomenologists departed from the orthodoxy of Husserl, of a there can and should be a study of the ideal content of phenomena purely descriptive phenomenology, to the unveiling of hidden or essence of the phenomena, i.e., "eidology". The study was also meanings, i.e., phenomenological/existential hermeneutics, they did not have the desire to depart from the conception of the basic tenets of phenomenology as essence of philosophy. The intuition of phenomena still remains the test and source of all knowledge, and only a departure from that principle could have justified the

Edmund Husserl developed phenomenology systematically. He emphasized the description of human consciousness as directed onto almost entirely with inference and concepts. Though it starts its investigations from the data of experience, it does not limit itself to that because it investigates the totality of being, a subject matter lying well beyond the confines of the data of experience or intuition of phenomena. An investigation of the general principles of being, including the question of the supposed existence of a necessary being, involve inferences that transcend intuition of phenomena.

## 5.2.1) THE OBJECT OF PHENOMENOLOGY: THE PHENOMENON

### 5.2 PHENOMENOLOGY-WHAT IS IT?

The object of phenomenological observation and analysis is Phenomenology is the systematic study of phenomena, or exclusively the phenomenon. Therefore, if phenomenology is taken as objects as they appear to consciousness. However, to a the essence of philosophy, i.e., the intuition of phenomena is the phenomenologist, it is the very essence of philosophising, so that intuition of phenomena is the test and source of knowledge. Franz Brentano, the major precursor of phenomenology, felt that principles of being, including that of the existence of a necessary philosophy starts from phenomena, but he felt positivism had understood phenomena unilaterally as physical phenomena and yet phenomenological framework. there is psychic phenomena. Carl Stumpf pushed Brentano's ideas ahead, and besides the study of particular phenomena, he said, there can and should be a study of the ideal content of phenomena or essence of the phenomena, i.e., "eidology". The study was also to consider the relationship of various phenomena. whether what is given is "real" or "only apparent" plays no part in the

Edmund Husserl developed phenomenology systematically. He emphasized the description of human consciousness as directed onto phenomena and description of phenomena themselves. He understood philosophy to be necessarily locked up in the phenomenal world. Heidegger, Sartre and other phenomenologists turned to studying the phenomena of the concrete living conditions of human beings and interpreting their meanings. However, such endeavours were not supposed to include inference, at least not to the level that it would facilitate an approach to metaphysical questions.

### 5.2.1) THE OBJECT OF PHENOMENOLOGY: THE PHENOMENON

The object of phenomenological observation and analysis is exclusively the phenomenon. Therefore, if phenomenology is taken as the essence of philosophy, i.e., the intuition of phenomena is the source and test of knowledge, then knowledge is necessarily confined to the phenomenal realm. Questions of the general principles of being, including that of the existence of a necessary being, certainly cannot be raised in an exclusively phenomenological framework.

However, the word phenomenon has other distinct meanings apart from its phenomenological conception. First, the phenomenon is often contrasted with reality, it is taken to be an appearance. That differs from its phenomenological sense, where whether what is given is "real" or "only apparent" plays no part in the

phenomenologists' considerations. For the phenomenologist, the important thing is to deal with the plainly given. Further, the phenomenon as appearance is often contrasted with the thing-in-itself lying behind them as in Kant. That, also, is not what the phenomenologists have in mind, that thing-in-itself lying behind phenomena is of no interest. They want to observe only the phenomenon itself, i.e., the given.

In the natural sciences, "phenomenon" indicates processes permitting direct sense observation. The meaning is narrower than the phenomenological conception, because it is, to the phenomenologists, unnecessary to be able to observe phenomena through the senses, nor should it be a process. While phenomenologists investigate processes too, they deal above all with structures.

The sense of "phenomenon", phenomenologically, is in Heidegger's words; the thing showing itself as itself, that which is itself and truly shows itself to be what lies before us (Bochenski, 1968; 16-17). However, there are also differences in the way various phenomenologists conceive of the phenomena. Husserl at first, and to a great extent, ascribed to Brentano's sense of phenomena, i.e., items for scientific exploration; physical and psychological phenomena (Spiegelberg; 1976; Vol. I, 39). Later he started abandoning it (Husserl, 1970; Vol. III. and 1969; 41-47). The phenomenon becomes the "pure phenomenon" which

had been subjected to the phenomenological reduction and purified from the reality attributed to it by the so called "naive consciousness" of the "natural attitude" or belief in the independent existence of objects (Husserl, 1969; 44). Consequently their ontological status was deliberately left undecided at the start, while the final word was that they owed their being to consciousness (Spielberg, 1979, Vol. I; 35; and Husserl, 1969; 44).

However, other phenomenologists depart from Husserl's conception of phenomena. Heidegger (1976), from whom Sartre borrowed a lot, started his departure from an analysis of "phenomenology" in which the two components, "phenomenon" and "logos" are distinguished and interpreted separately at first. The result vastly differs from Husserl's interpretations, "phenomenon" is "what shows itself in person" and it is not the distillate of special reductive operations (Spielberg, 1976, Vol. I; 320-321).

From that, Heidegger distinguished the "phenomenological concept of phenomenon" as that which "first and foremost" does not show itself but remains hidden as meaning (sign) or ground (grund) of what shows itself. The significance of that is the laying of ground for phenomenological/existential hermeneutics that is first the investigation of the existential conditions of human existents together with their not so apparent meanings. Though it is certainly a deviation from the purely descriptive phenomenology into the interpretation of concealed meanings of phenomena, one at first

...enlarging and deepening of the range of our immediate experience" (Spiegelberg, 1976; Vol. 11; 636). Since Husserl's manifesto, "...philosophy as a rigorous science...", He thinks that some leeway has been given to inference that would facilitate any metaphysics. However, that is not the case, the intention, at least, is still that source and test of knowledge is intuition of phenomena.

For Sartre too, the phenomenon is being as it appears (BN; xxi-xxvi). He uses the word in its usual phenomenological sense. However, he adds his own concept, the transphenomenal being of the phenomenon, while rejecting the Kantian dualism of noumena and phenomenon. The transphenomenal being is being-in-itself which all the same does not facilitate or give any foundational framework for metaphysics. The reason is that Sartre's ontology is not able to say what being-in-itself is except that it is "...simply what it is" (BN). Consequently, as in the Kantian and Husserlian way, philosophy must remain locked up in the phenomenal world, for being is only meaningful in so far as it appears to consciousness.

### 5.2.2) BASIC TENETS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

The examination of the basic tenets of phenomenology equally reveals nothing that would provide a framework for raising metaphysical questions, as of God's existence, if phenomenology is adopted exclusively.

The phenomenological approach is largely a protest against reductionism. The aim of the approach is supposed to be

"...enlarging and deepening of the range of our immediate experience" (Spiegelberg, 1976, Vol. 11; 656). Since Husserl's manifesto, "...philosophy as a rigorous science...", The watchword "to the things themselves" (Zu den sachen) has been the guardian of phenomenological research. In other words:

On its side phenomenology as a theory is a series of methods and concepts which take as their central value the primacy of the concrete... the final weight is placed upon immediacy. The Husserlian theory of evidence in which the aim is "to the things themselves" always finds verification only when that which is under investigation is "bodily" present (Ihde, 1971; 17).

Such a theory of evidence, it is obvious, does not favour any metaphysical question. In the phenomenal rule of "back to the things themselves", with "things" is meant just the given. The intuition of the given, phenomena, is the necessary foundation and test of all cognition. In the terminology of Husserl, "the primordial dator consciousness is the only legitimate source of knowledge" (Bochenski, 1968; 20-21).

By basing itself on the intuition of phenomena, phenomenology has certain negative implications. It is meant of be cathartic, a departure from crystallized beliefs and theories, handed down from tradition, which often perpetuates preconceptions and pre-judgements (Spiegelberg, 1976, Vol. II; 656). There is

nothing necessarily wrong with such a cathartic, however, the rule of "back to the things themselves" requires the purging of not only all subjective feelings but also of everything which is not directly given in the object under observation or examination. Therefore, and significantly, what is to be excluded includes everything that we know from indirect sources or by inference. Metaphysics cannot be raised within a programme requiring that indirect sources of knowledge, theories, deductions, hypotheses etc be excluded.

#### Phenomenological/existential hermeneutics.

It is imperative, for the phenomenologists, to see everything that is given, as far as possible. Further, phenomenological observation must be descriptive, i.e., the object must be taken apart, and its elements then described and analysed.

If phenomenology does not dismiss the indirect acquisition of knowledge altogether, then at least the use of indirect methods in the course of phenomenological investigations cannot be permitted.

"eyes", "keep them open" and "not get blinded", "looking and listening" etc (ibid; p.660). The attempt to grasp the unique nature of specific phenomena can be aided by comparison to related phenomena.

#### 5.2.3) PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

Equally an examination of phenomenological method reveals nothing that would justify the inclusion of metaphysical questions,

such as of God's existence, in an exclusively phenomenological framework. One of the characteristic cores of phenomenology is its method. There is little disagreement about this point (Spiegelberg, 1976, Vol. 11; 656).

Therefore, significantly phenomenological analysis does not permit inference or any indirect methods of knowledge acquisition.

The stages of the phenomenological method are the following:

- 1) Investigation of particular phenomena.
- 2) Investigation of general essences.
- 3) Apprehending essential relations among essences.
- 4) Watching modes of appearance.
- 5) Watching the constitution of phenomena in consciousness.
- 6) Suspending belief in the existence of phenomena.
- 7) Interpreting the meaning of phenomena (Ibid), i.e.,

Phenomenological/existential hermeneutics.

- c) Phenomenological "describing-phenomenological description";

#### 1) INVESTIGATING PARTICULAR PHENOMENA

It determines the location of phenomena in a framework of

In the investigation of particular phenomena, there are class names or a system of classes. It does not involve inference

three intimately related operations:

as in the case of what can be termed "descriptive metaphysics" or

ontology) wh The intuitive grasp of phenomena; in one has to "open his

eyes", or "keep them open" and "not get blinded", "looking and

listening" etc (Ibid; p.660). The attempt to grasp the unique

nature of specific phenomena can be aided by comparison to related

phenomena.

In ontology, general essences are arrived at by inference.

However b) that Phenomenological in analyzing-"Phenomenological

analysis"; at The watchword of phenomenology is "back to the things

themselves" and is based on the direct apprehension of phenomena.

Therefore, significantly phenomenological analysis does not permit

inference nor than any indirect methods of knowledge acquisition.

Likewise it is different from the largely linguistic analysis, of the analytic philosophers which attempts to rewrite in some way more appropriate terms those words they found philosophically puzzling. Phenomenological analysis does not concern itself with inference or with linguistic expressions. It aims to trace the elements and structure of phenomena obtained by intuiting. It is simply the distinction of what makes up the phenomena and of their relations.

- c) Phenomenological "describing-phenomenological description";

It determines the location of phenomena in a framework of class names or a system of classes. It does not involve inference as in the case of what can be termed "descriptive metaphysics" or ontology which locates various aspects of being in categories or a framework of class names.

## 2) INVESTIGATING GENERAL ESSENCES (EIDETIC INTUITING)

In ontology, general essences are arrived at by inference. However, that is not the case in phenomenology. Essences are arrived at, in phenomenology by simultaneous intuiting of exemplifying particulars. Such particulars may be given either in perception or in imagination or in combination of both. In order to apprehend the general essence, the particulars have to be looked

consciousness. The purpose is to determine the "typical structure" at as instances which stand for the general essence. The general of a constitution in consciousness by means of an analysis of the essences are phenomenologically conceived as phenomena even though essential sequence of its steps" (ibid: 686). they differ from particulars.

### 3) APPREHENDING ESSENTIAL RELATIONS

A phenomenological study of essences also includes the discovery of certain essential relationships or connections pertaining to such essences. The essential relationships are of two types: a) Those within a single essence. b) Relationships between several essences. The "natural attitude" is inhibited, as belief in things having a form, meaning or essence

### 4) WATCHING MODES OF APPEARANCE

Phenomenology is the systematic exploration of phenomena, reduction as suspension of existence. The phenomenological not only in the sense of what appears, but also of the way in which they appear. What is involved in this stage is the way in which an object which is by no means beyond our range of knowledge presents itself to us. These ways of appearing are usually overlooked in preoccupation with what appears.

This endeavour, i.e., phenomenological/existential hermeneutics was pioneered by Heidegger and was taken up by Sartre,

### 5) EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTION OF PHENOMENA IN CONSCIOUSNESS

Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others. Hermeneutics attempts to interpret Constitutional exploration consists of determining the ways in which phenomena establish themselves and take shape in our

consciousness. The purpose is to determine the "typical structure of a constitution in consciousness by means of an analysis of the essential sequence of its steps" (Ibid; 688).

#### 6) SUSPENDING BELIEF IN EXISTENCE

The suspension of belief in existence is an aspect of the phenomenological reduction, i.e., act by which the general thesis of belief in factual existence, seen by phenomenologists to characterise what they refer to as the "natural attitude" is inhibited, suspended or "bracketed". The phenomenological reduction is also conceived as purging consciousness of the "natural attitude" as belief in things having a form, meaning or essence other than that bestowed on them by consciousness. Such is the case of Sartre and other phenomenologists who do not ascribe to the reduction as suspension of existence. The phenomenological reduction serves to focus attention on the phenomena and nothing else.

#### 7) INTERPRETING CONCEALED MEANINGS

This endeavour, i.e., phenomenological/existential hermeneutics was pioneered by Heidegger and was taken up by Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others. Hermeneutics attempts to interpret the "sense", meaning of certain phenomena. The goal is to discover meanings of phenomena, meanings that are not

immediately manifest to intuiting, analysis, and describing. Hence, the interpreter has to go beyond what is directly given, the object of study is still the phenomena, and the requirement is that they be capable of direct intuition even when not so apparent.

(Spiegelberg, 1970, Vol. 11; 489). He sums it up in the following

### 5.3 SARTRE AS A PHENOMENOLOGIST

Sartre's adoption of phenomenology gives no justification for trying to raise metaphysical questions, as of God's existence. It only amounts to a phenomenological ontology. A philosophy based exclusively on phenomenological method must imply agnosticism. Sartre has no hesitation to admit that phenomena are all there is. Aspects of phenomenological method, i.e., description, analysis, and phenomenological reduction, are key features of his philosophy. Even though he followed Heidegger out of the realm of purely descriptive phenomenology, to the deciphering or interpretation of concealed meanings, he had no intention to abandon the most basic tenet of phenomenology; that the source and final test of knowledge is the intuition of phenomena.

#### 5.3.1) PHENOMENA AS CONCEIVED BY SARTRE

Sartre has no hesitation to admit that phenomena are all there is, and he insists that "...modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of

appearances which manifest it..." (BN; xxi). Like other being-in-itself, is not appropriately developed. The three forefathers phenomenologists he will, however, not accept the Kantian dualism of phenomena and noumena. "Like any British phenomenalist, he is ready to define objects in terms of series of phenomena" (Spiegelberg, 1976, Vol. 11; 489). He sums it up in the following manner:

The essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent, it is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series... To be sure phenomenology is anything but a nominalism. But essence, as the principle of the series, is definitely only the concatenation of appearances, that is itself an appearance. This explains how it is possible to have an intuition of essences, (the Wesenchau of Husserl, for example). The phenomenal being manifests itself; it manifests its essence as well as its existence, and it is nothing but the well connected series of metaphysical manifestation (BN; xxii).

It is evident that with such a conception of being, Sartre's phenomenological ontology cannot even be remotely metaphysical. If being is conceived as merely phenomenal, then knowledge too must be phenomenal. It is inevitable then that any metaphysics must be excluded.

5.3.2) SARTRE AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

The adoption of phenomenological method by Sartre does not give his philosophy any justification to raise the question of to be autonomous in its being and is not merely constituted by God's existence. The examination of two of those aspects as adopted by Sartre reveals that. These are:

being-in-itself, is not appropriately developed. The three formulas meant to describe what being-in-itself or transphenomenal being (BN) is, merely end up rendering superfluous, inconsequential and "simply what it is". In other words Sartre's ontology is inadequate in the sense that it is unable to say what being really is, instead it is undifferentiated, undetermined, and structureless nebulous background. Consequently, what are meaningful are the phenomena or being in so far as it has appeared to consciousness or *le pour-soi* whose intentional projections endow phenomena with intelligible structure.

Had Sartre developed his idea of "transphenomenal" being or intention that the truth of the argument not be inferred but be "being-in-itself" in an appropriate direction, then his ontology would have been able to be more than just phenomenological and be immediately felt and apprehended. There is no allowance for inference and indirect methods of knowledge that provide a metaphysical. Then there would be justification to rise ultimately methodological basis for the approach to metaphysical questions. metaphysical questions. However, the "phenomenological" being (BN) remains simply what it is and knowledge remains necessarily locked up in the phenomenal realm.

factor in his exclusive adoption of phenomenological method. There is a reaction against reductionism

### 5.3.2) SARTRE AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD intuition of phenomena

while shunning inferences, theory construction and explanatory hypotheses. The adoption of phenomenological method by Sartre does not give his philosophy any justification to raise the question of reducible characteristics of existence, referred to as "brute God's existence. The examination of two of those aspects as adopted reality" (Ibid), the revelation of being is not by Sartre reveals that. These are:

1) Intuition, analysis, and description of phenomena.

2) Phenomenological/ existential hermeneutics.

### 1) INTUITION, ANALYSIS, AND DESCRIPTION OF PHENOMENA

The above are basic methodological procedures in Sartre's

philosophy. Intuition is, as Spiegelberg says (1976; Vol. 11; 478),

It is at that juncture that phenomenological intuition functions more or less explicitly invoked as the final test of all claims.

This is displayed in Sartre's insistence on the presentation of arguments, significantly in BN, which is his main philosophical

work, through anecdote or description. Such anecdote is not merely for illustrative purpose but central to argumentation. It is the

intention that the truth of the argument not be inferred but be immediately felt and apprehended. There is no allowance for

inference and indirect methods of knowledge that provide a

methodological basis for the approach to metaphysical questions.

The same theme is taken up in BN which is appropriately subtitled "An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology". BN is marked out

as a model not only of existentialist thought, but also of phenomenological method. There is a reaction against reductionism

in an attempt to base all knowledge on the intuition of phenomena

while shunning inferences, theory construction and explanatory

hypotheses. Due to what Sartre conceives (NAU; 127) as the non-

reducible characteristics of existence, referred to as "brute

reality" (Ibid), the revelation of being is not

intuiting it, by accepting the

truthfulness of the described world, in a way that we may be

completely convinced by the truth of the presentation of life in a film or a novel.

(Ibid). Therefore any access we have must be non-conceptual, i.e., intuition (Catalano, 1974; 28). Reality is existence and is not revealed to consciousness through conceptual knowledge but through pre-reflective awareness.

conscious individual human existents, or being-for-others (BN; 221-430), fundamental to our experience of

the world. It is at that juncture that phenomenological intuition fuses with Sartre's philosophy, not as a mere method to be disposed where by picking on the concrete section of shame (Ibid; 221-222). It cannot be used, but as springing directly from the subject matter of his philosophy and as an essential element in his argumentation. If the revelation of brute existence is not in the significance of being-for-others as fundamental to our experience, conceptual knowledge but in immediate confrontation with reality, we might simply have been asked to agree, on the basis of the inference, that, if anyone experiences shame, then that person at best way to deal with that brute existence is to incorporate it in least must believe that other people exist. That, however, would not have been a phenomenological way of presentation. As it is, we

are askThe same theme is taken up in BN which is appropriately

subtitled "An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology". BN is marked out

as a model, not only of existentialist thought, but also of

phenomenological thought. It is a model because the key is not

Under that impact, the question arises as to whether we inference or the making of hypotheses, but the intuition of what is presented, i.e., the phenomena. These approach manifests itself in

mode of existence. Therefore, anecdote is used (Ibid; 359), of an extremely detailed descriptions or anecdotes that are integral to

espieddropper entirely absorbed in getting an ear to the keyhole, Sartre's arguments. It is rather that one should understand the conscious of himself only in the minimal way in which he barely nature of the phenomenon, intuiting it, by accepting the distinguishes himself from his surroundings.

truthfulness of the described aspect, in a way that we may be

But suddenly, while he is so engaged, he hears a footstep in the hall, and becomes aware that there's someone behind him and he is completely convinced by the truth of the presentation of life in a film or a novel. Immediately, he begins to exist in a different way, he experiences himself and the other person in a feeling of shame.

Such an example is Sartre's bid to prove that apart from single individual existence of conscious beings, being-for-itself, there are also other conscious individual human existents, or being-for-others (BN; 221-430), fundamental to our experience of the world. This is presented existentially and phenomenologically by picking on the concrete emotion of shame (Ibid; 221-222). It would have been possible to present an argument, for being-for-others, which would have led in the same direction of proving the significance of being-for-others as fundamental to our experience. We might simply have been asked to agree, on the basis of inference, that, if anyone experiences shame, then that person at least must believe that other people exist. That, however, would not have been a phenomenological way of presentation. As it is, we are asked not "...to agree to a proposition but to experience in imagination a familiar emotion ..." (Ibid; xi), to have an intuition through detailed description.

## 2) PHENOMENOLOGICAL/EXISTENTIAL HERMENEUTICS

Under that impact, the question arises as to whether we could believe that other people exist, and that they determine our mode of existence. Therefore, anecdote is used (Ibid; 359), of an eavesdropper entirely absorbed in getting an ear to the keyhole, conscious of himself only in the minimal way in which he barely distinguishes himself from his surroundings.

But suddenly, while he is so engaged, he hears a footstep in the hall, and becomes aware that there's someone behind him and he is under observation. Immediately, he begins to exist in a different way, he experiences himself and the other person in a feeling of shame. To accept the anecdote and to reject the general conclusion, as to the existence of others and that they determine our mode of existence would be to assert a contradiction. Here then, is an example of a phenomenological way of argument. The key is that intuition is the source and test of whatever is presented. Hence, to "meet that" condition, the argument turns essentially on presentation by detailed description. Such presentation is not meant to include inference or the making of hypotheses, and it is not just at interpreting meanings, but also at concealed meanings in the realm of human existence. Even pre-hermeneutic or conditions of human beings. It is also the method that is "descriptive" phenomenology is not unconcerned about meanings. exclusively used to examine other aspects of being. Sartre therefore hermeneutic phenomenology aims at something a bit different. Its goal is the discovery of meanings which are not framework of his phenomenological ontology which does not immediately manifest to intuiting, analyzing, and describing. One would on the onset think that the interpretation of concealed to an ultimate metaphysical question.

meanings involves inference to the level where the metaphysics of the question of God's existence could be feasible. That, however,

## 2) PHENOMENOLOGICAL/EXISTENTIAL HERMENEUTICS

Hermeneutics, as such, predates phenomenology. The term is derived from the Greek verb *hermeneuein* meaning to interpret. The Husserl who conceived phenomenology as purely descriptive. Though term refers to the intellectual discipline concerned with the nature and presentations of the interpretation of human him from assimilating the basics of Heidegger's philosophy. He expressions. Having origins also in biblical exegesis and the

interpretation of historical documents, it assumes a different form in its phenomenological setting.

Phenomenological hermeneutics was pioneered by Martin Heidegger, who uses the term, not to refer to documents or symbolic expressions, but to "symbolic of the real world, to human being or Dasein" (Spiegelberg, 1976; Vol. 1; 47). It is the interpretation of this particular type of being for which Heidegger reserves the term "hermeneutic".

Phenomenological hermeneutics is also distinct because it aims, not just at interpreting meanings, but also at concealed meanings in the realm of human existence. Even pre-hermeneutic or "descriptive" phenomenology is not unconcerned about meanings. Therefore hermeneutic phenomenology aims at something a bit different. Its goal is the discovery of meanings which are not immediately manifest to intuiting, analyzing, and describing. One would on the onset think that the interpretation of concealed meanings involves inference to the level where the metaphysics of the question of God's existence could be feasible. That, however, is certainly not the case.

Phenomenological hermeneutics was never encouraged by Husserl who conceived phenomenology as purely descriptive. Though Sartre was considerably influenced by Husserl, that did not prevent him from assimilating the basics of Heidegger's philosophy. He

espouses Heidegger's hermeneutics as a legitimate enterprise, and shares his criticism of Husserl's enterprise (Ibid, 1976, Vol. 11; 478). Despite the criticism, Sartre's hermeneutics remains strictly phenomenological, hence dashing away any hopes for inclusion of inference of indirect methods within the framework.

Sartre's departure from Husserl towards phenomenological hermeneutics can already be seen in his TE. He negates the latter's conception of the ego as the original structure of consciousness. For Sartre, the original structure of consciousness, is that, it is first of all a consciousness of something other than itself. The significance of Sartre's rejection of Husserl's "transcendental ego" is to mark the transition from Husserlian phenomenology, concerned with a description of "transcendental consciousness" and its objects, into the level of human existence. Sartre's phenomenology drops out of the transcendental dimension into the humanisation or "mundanisation" of consciousness. It becomes a phenomenology of human existence in the context of concrete human existence. His philosophy, in that sense, coincides to a great extent with the philosophy of existence in Heidegger's sense, and it has already become phenomenological hermeneutics.

The task of the method is to decipher the not so apparent meanings of concrete human existence that have now become the object. The deciphering of the meaning of the concrete experience and existence of individuals is what is also called existential

At this point, hermeneutics seems to hold the promise of hermeneutics. In that connection Sartre pioneered what he referred to as "existential psychoanalysis" (BN; 557-575).

The deciphering of not so apparent phenomena seems, at first, to be very radical departure from the purely descriptive basic tenets of phenomenological approach, and it will not contain inference or any explanatory hypothesis. It deals with what is like psychoanalysis would really have led to major methodological adjustments in his philosophy. It is true that the objects of indirect acquisition of knowledge from its enquiries. The object of existential hermeneutics are not directly given or they are not so apparent, hence the need for much more than just a merely described and interpreted in a genuinely phenomenological sense, descriptive method. The objects sought are man's motivations and his reflections, his loves and aversions, his likes and dislikes. The hermeneutic enterprise does not and is not intended to contain explanatory hypotheses and inference which is descriptive

Sartre's ambition is to penetrate and to elucidate such opaquer aspects of man. Infact, he even finds himself agreeing with Freudians and other psychologists, users of inference and explanatory hypotheses, in their objective of penetration below the surface of our manifest behaviour and our first superficial self-interpretations. For Sartre, at that level:

it is not enough infact to draw up a list of behaviour patterns, of drives and inclinations, it is necessary also to decipher them; This research can be conducted only according to the rules of ...existential psychoanalysis ....The goal of psychoanalysis is to decipher the empirical behaviour patterns of man; that is to bring out in the open the revelations which each of them contains and fix them conceptually.... the essential task is an hermeneutic; that is a deciphering, a determination, and conceptualization (Ibid; 568-569).

At this point, hermeneutics seems to hold the promise of being able to accommodate inference. However, Sartre is still concerned with the concrete and the appropriate ways for its presentation. Even with the significant reversal of Husserl's procedures, phenomenological hermeneutics still remains true to the basic tenets of phenomenological approach, and it will not contain inference or any explanatory hypothesis. It deals with what is given, with the phenomenon and wishes in principle to exclude all indirect acquisition of knowledge from its enquiries. The object of enquiry, the concrete human experiences and existence, is to be described and interpreted in a genuinely phenomenological sense.

Now in the first place such a psychoanalysis. The hermeneutic enterprise does not and is not intended to contain individual fact is produced by the explanatory hypotheses of and inference which descriptive to be explained ... is resolved into a phenomenology set out to abolish. That would have implied a complete abandonment of basic phenomenological principles. So one would say: the intersection of universal schemata (BN; 558).

In order to defend its phenomenological analysis right, one would have to maintain that hermeneutic interpretation is a matter not of mere constructive inference but of unveiling of hidden meanings, or at most of intuitive verification of anticipations about the less accessible layers of the phenomenon, layers which can be uncovered, although they are not immediately manifest (Spiegelberg, 1976, Vol. 11; 695).

...it is obvious that this so called explanatory classification has no more interest or value than the classifications in ancient. Therefore, while Sartre agrees with the Freudian and other types of psychoanalysis, in the objective of penetrating below the

surface of our manifest behaviour, the objects to conceptions which cannot be directly intuited, because they are opaque and impenetrable to consciousness. He is also opposed to the introduction of theory construction and the elaboration of explanatory hypotheses. He insists that the interpretative hypotheses of psychoanalysis can and must be verified directly rather than indirectly. Therefore, Sartre is somewhat critical of Freudian and other psychoanalysts who use inference, explanatory hypotheses, and conceptions which cannot be intuited as in the "opaque" and impenetrable to intuitive verification by phenomenological sense. He says:

Such, for example are; psychoanalytic constructions as "Id" or repression. Now in the first place such a psychoanalysis proceeds from the postulate that an individual fact is produced by the intersection of abstract universal. The fact to be explained ... is resolved into a combination of typical, abstract desires such as we meet in "the average adolescent". What is concrete here is only an organisation of abstract qualities, the individual is only the intersection of universal schemata (BN; 558).

ical psychoanalysis in fact is based on the existence of an unconscious psyche, which on principle escapes the intuition of the consciousness. ... At this point the similarity of phenomena as the source and test of knowledge. Sartre sums up his distaste for the above psychoanalysis, and affirms his commitment to the basic tenet of phenomenology by saying that, (BN; 570-571).

"...it is obvious that this so called explanatory classification has no more interest or value than the classifications in ancient In contrast to that empirical psychoanalysis, Sartre would rather account for the same phenomena by factors that can at least

in principle be reached by consciousness. First, among these, is the concept of fundamental choice which is supposed to explain our botany; like the latter it amounts to assuming priority of the abstract over the concrete" (Ibid; 562). He is reaffirming that "... the interpretative hypotheses of psychoanalysis can and must be verified directly rather than indirectly" (Spiegelberg; 1976, Vol. 11: 494). There has to be an intuitive verification of anticipations about the less accessible phenomena of human experience.

Sartre objects to conceptions of psychoanalysis that are "opaque" and impenetrable to intuitive verification by consciousness. Such, for example are; psychoanalytic constructions as "Id" and "super ego" and such subconscious mechanisms as repression and sublimation. He differentiates between empirical psychology, using inference and reduction, and his existential psychoanalysis based on the intuition of phenomena:

Empirical psychoanalysis in fact is based on the existence of an unconscious psyche, which on principle escapes the intuition of the subject. Existential psychoanalysis rejects the hypothesis of the unconscious; it makes the psychic act co-extensive with consciousness....At this point the similarity between the two kinds of psychoanalysis ceases. They differ fundamentally in that empirical psychoanalysis has decided upon its own irreducible instead of allowing this to make itself known in a self evident intuition (BN; 570-571).

In contrast to that empirical psychoanalysis, Sartre would rather account for the same phenomena by factors that can at least

in principle be reached by consciousness. First, among these, is the concept of fundamental choice which is supposed to explain our theoretical, practical and emotional surface behaviour (Spiegelberg, 1976, Vol. 11, and BN; 557-573). He insists that:

In our research we will be guided by this principle: to stop only in the presence of evident irreducibility; that is, never to believe that we have reached the initial project until the project end appears as the very being of the subject under consideration... that we can advance no further but we have reached the project of the being; ... fundamentally, man is the desire to be and the existence of this desire is not to be established by an empirical induction; it is the result of an apriori description of the being of the for-itself (Ibid; 564-565).

It is clear then that even Sartre's move from purely descriptive phenomenology to a deciphering of hidden meanings does not warrant any methodological transformation to include indirect ways of knowing, of inference, to a level that would justify a raising of the metaphysical question of God's existence in his philosophy. The method is still to operate on the basis of an apriori description of an intuitive grasp, analysis, and description of the phenomena of the fundamental choices, of individual existents, that are not distinct from the being of the for-itself or consciousness. Phenomenology's attempt to reach back to what can be termed the "simplest elements" of experience is very crucial (Farber, 1943; 562). Significantly, phenomenology also aims at

#### 5.4 CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGY WITH SPECIAL APPLICATION TO SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY

Phenomenology should not be criticised simply because it is not metaphysical, it does not have to be. There is no doubt that phenomenology is valid philosophical method in its own right. However, the problem is the exclusive application of phenomenology even to philosophical questions to which it is inadequate. Phenomenological method must be seen as one amongst several philosophical methods such as linguistic/ logical analysis, the axiomatic methods of logic and mathematics, and the reductive methods of the natural sciences, the philosophy of nature and even metaphysics.

An important aspect is also the study of the essential

Phenomenology, there is no doubt, has a valid field of investigation. The phenomena are an aspect of being and hence an

Such an illustration can be the experience of getting oriented to a appropriate method for them. One should not unnecessarily doubt that phenomenology is a major breakthrough in that area, and that

it has rendered invaluable service to philosophy and knowledge in general. The intuition, analysis, and description of the experience

of individual objects, as they are bound to appear on the part of a single knower are an important ingredient of the critique of

knowledge. Phenomenology's attempt to reach back to what can be termed the "simplest elements" of experience is very crucial

(Farber, 1943; 562). Significantly, phenomenology also aims at

analysis which gives an account of the part played by the mind (or even subjectivity) in its relation to what is "given" in experience.

A major contribution of phenomenology is the fourth stage of its methodological steps (set out in section 5.2, 5.2.3 of this chapter). Phenomenology is also concerned with the way phenomena appear and not just what appears. The former aspect, i.e., watching modes of appearance, is normally overlooked in the concentration of attention on what appears. What is involved is the way an object within the range of our knowledge presents itself to us.

An important aspect is also the study of the essential sequence in which phenomena constitute themselves in consciousness. Such an illustration can be the experience of getting oriented to a new neighbourhood or city.

The phenomenological reduction is also a significant element, especially in so far as it is an intellectual cathartic of beliefs and assumptions held uncritically, and to point out presuppositions bearing on a subject matter. However, it is erroneous to suspend belief in the existence of being so as to affirm it on the basis of so called "purified" subjective consciousness.

To conceive the function of philosophy as an analysis of concealed, the requirement is still that intuition be the source phenomena is to restrict philosophy unnecessarily. Likewise, and test of knowledge. Metaphysics, on the other hand, as a quest

...to conceive of the function of philosophy as a logical method in the restricted sense of giving rules for the formation and transformation of sentences (in the sense of logical/ linguistic analysis) is to miss much of method itself. The formal-logical method, as an extra method, is of value in its own account, for it leads to a science of pure forms. The emptiness, relativism, or nihilism into which it eventuates if used exclusively, merely indicates its essential limitations in philosophy (Ibid; 569).

In relation to phenomenology, one can say the following:

... when used strictly in accordance with its proper function, it will not be adversely criticised because it fails to achieve what is accomplished by means of the deductive method, or by means of naturalistic, inductive philosophy of change which generalizes on the basis of the special sciences (Ibid; 572).

Phenomenology limits its investigations to phenomena, and Phenomenology is especially limited when it comes to questions of inference, especially beyond the directly given, as it is the case in metaphysics of God's existence. Phenomenology, even of the hermeneutic kind, as Sartre's philosophy shows, remains essentially a study of phenomena, and whether apparent or

lay the foundations of an experiential philosophy. Kant was right

when he restricted the sphere of the possible knowledge to concealed, the requirement is still that intuition be the source and test of knowledge. Metaphysics, on the other hand, as a quest for understanding the ultimate principles of being, including the generic features exhibited in experience has to transcend the merely phenomenal. Metaphysics, no doubt, starts its inquiries with experience and a statement of facts, but it cannot limit itself to that. To grasp the ultimate principles of being, including whether God exists, and the generic features exhibited in experience, metaphysics has to make inferences transcending the phenomenal order. If the universe is contingent, then it has an ultimate cause, and if it does not have an ultimate cause, then it is itself necessary. Such cognisances and conclusions on being cannot be accommodated in a framework of the intuition of phenomena. Likewise questions concerning change in being, i.e., the problem of "being and becoming" or why being seems to be changing and yet remaining the same in certain aspects, can also not be dealt with in an exclusively phenomenological framework.

Phenomenology limits its investigations to phenomena, and Sartre says "modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it" (BN; xxi). Sartre's statement has been interpreted in a significant way by Roger Verneaux (Lafarge, 1970; 27) to mean the following; Hume was right to eliminate metaphysical entities and to lay the foundations of an experimental philosophy. Kant was right

when he restricted the sphere of the possible knowledge to phenomena. Comte was right in proclaiming the advent of the positivistic era and the abolition of the metaphysical era. Renouvier was right to adopt "the point of view of knowledge". Lachelier, Brunschvicg, Hamelin were all right to reject Kant's "thing-in-itself". And Husserl, above all was right to accept only the pure phenomenon apodictic and unquestionable, and so was Heidegger when he refused to make a distinction between phenomenon and being.

Therefore, the exclusive use of phenomenological method for "system strange" questions (Farber, 1943; 566) such as metaphysical problems, must be discouraged. It is also

"... The significance of Verneaux's interpretation is that phenomenology conceived simply as a method or as the essence of philosophy, whereby the existent is reduced to a series of appearances, must by its very nature exclude all metaphysics. Metaphysics, in Verneaux's interpretation, has already been excluded by philosophers who can in some ways be considered to be phenomenologists while some are precursors of phenomenology. The exclusion of metaphysics from a "phenomenological" framework is only natural. However, such an exclusion should not necessarily be linked to a conception of metaphysics as invalid. Being surpasses the phenomenological/existential hermeneutics is a significant innovation by the phenomenologists in the investigation of the

concrete. However, the exclusion of metaphysics from such "phenomenological" framework should reiterate the difficulty of raising metaphysical questions in them. That is because "phenomenology itself contains a naivete in relation to methods

which function indirectly and which find their justification precisely in given types of indirectness" (Ihde, 1971; 18). The naivete is of inference on which metaphysics must be based. That must be the reason why Sartre's phenomenological ontology (BN) "... soon becomes inadequate when dealing with the transphenomenal" (Lafarge, 1970; 32) which it simply calls "something that is" (BN).

Therefore, the exclusive use of phenomenological method even for "system strange" questions (Farber, 1943; 566) such as metaphysical problems, must be discouraged. It is also "...questionable whether phenomenology is an adequate tool for a complete philosophical study of embodiment" (Dondeyne, 1962; 114). Phenomenology cannot attain such a level and must not pretend to be a framework for a complete philosophical scrutiny for man who is also a being with metaphysical qualities. Philosophers like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty claim to work out a philosophy of man (*Ibid*; 115-116). Man's unity cannot be described in terms of physics nor even of pure phenomenology (*Ibid*). Wider categories than those of phenomenology are needed for even an adequate philosophy of man.

Phenomenological/existential hermeneutics is a significant innovation by the phenomenologists in the investigation of the concrete living experience and behaviour of human beings. In that respect, phenomenological/existential hermeneutics has rendered a valuable service to philosophy by reaching back to the "simplest elements" of living experience which can be reduced no further.

## 5.5 AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION IN Sartre's PHILOSOPHY THROUGH

Phenomenological hermeneutics has drawn;

...attention to the irreducible and primitive character of human existence as an embodied being, and by providing us with the appropriate method for clarifying the living experience of the body and as my body (Dondeyne, 1962; 114).

Despite the legitimacy of phenomenology and its contributions, it is inadequate as a philosophical method in several aspects. Therefore, it is imperative it be realised that the co-operation of various philosophical methods is necessary. A given method may be inadequate or unsuitable to investigate certain aspects of being, and in such an instance other methods should take over. Every philosophical question or problem must be tackled appropriately with suitable methodological orientation. Every philosophical method has its "...proper questions" (Farber, 1943; 566), and there are "...system strange" (Ibid) questions with respect to it (Ibid). In other words:

...the approach to philosophy is conditioned by different motives (problems). As Russel has pointed out, "every philosophy has been invented to solve some one problem, and it is incapable of dealing with many others" ...But it is also an error to hold that one "method" must be used exclusively, with a resolute disregard of the problems and aims that may be set up (Ibid; 569).

## 5.5 AGNOSTIC IMPLICATION IN SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY THROUGH PHENOMENOLOGY

The chapter aimed to show an agnostic implication in Sartre's philosophy by virtue of phenomenology. The argument is that metaphysical problems, including that of God's existence are "system strange" to phenomenology, regardless of how it is conceived. In Sartre's case there is a tendency, at least implicitly, to use the phenomenological method exclusively. His first argument against God's existence (BN) is made within the framework of phenomenological ontology. Likewise, his second argument (EH) is made on the basis of the phenomenological ontology of BN and within the context of what is the existential phenomenology of EH.

Metaphysical problems are "system strange" to phenomenology because the latter is exclusively a study of phenomena and its basic tenet is the intuition of phenomena as the source and final test of knowledge. Within the course of phenomenological study, inference, explanatory hypotheses, and theory construction are excluded. Phenomena must be intuited or immediately apprehended. However, there can be no intuition of phenomena as to the existence or non-existence of God, such a conclusion should only be reached on the basis of inference from the data of experience. The question of God's existence must take cognisance of factors in being that

Quite significantly, on the onset, Sartre has no hesitation to admit that phenomena are all there is, and insists that "nothing

thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it. (BN; xvii). He fails to surpass the phenomenal realm. If one concludes that God does not exist, then the implication is that being itself must be necessary and eternal. However, there is no intuition of phenomena as to the necessity and eternity of the entirety of being. The same applies to the position asserting God's existence. The implication is that the entirety of being must be contingent. There is no intuition of phenomena of the contingency of the entirety of being.

The chapter has examined phenomenology, its basic tenets, and its method in order to reveal its nature. Within the course of that examination it has been stated that phenomenology is a *logos* of phenomena. With that background, the chapter went on to show the significance of phenomenology in Sartre's philosophy as prelude to pointing the agnostic implication. The intention is to point out that Sartre's use of phenomenological method, even though quite different from the orthodoxy of Husserl and other pure phenomenologists, is a central part of his philosophy. It is not just a method of illustration but an essential element in the argument and it springs directly from the subject of Sartre's philosophy. It is the method that Sartre intends to exclusively use in investigating the entirety of being, i.e., his phenomenological ontology (BN) and his raising of the problem of God's existence within the same framework.

Quite significantly, on the onset, Sartre has no hesitation to admit that phenomena are all there is, and insists that "modern

thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it "(BN; xxi). He talks of a transphenomenal being of the phenomenon, being-in-itself, but that has been rendered inconsequential by the reduction of existence to the phenomenal. Moreover being-in-itself remains essentially indeterminate except when it appears to consciousness, and in that case phenomenal.

Sartre adheres to the most basic tenets of phenomenology. That manifests itself in his use of extremely detailed anecdote, not just for illustration, but as essential to argumentation. The anecdote is not a method to be abandoned under unsuitable circumstances or when handling what can be called "system strange" or "method strange" problems, but is an essential approach to most problems. Even when Sartre goes into phenomenological/ existential hermeneutics, the method is, at least in principle, not abandoned. Despite the fact that the aim now is to decipher the meaning of not so apparent phenomena of concrete human existence, the intuition of phenomena is sacrosanct. It does not involve the drawing of inferences or constructing hypotheses or theories, but of intuiting the anticipations of the not so accessible layers of phenomena.

It is within such a phenomenological scope that Sartre puts forward two arguments for God's existence. The argument of this chapter is that it is erroneous in procedure to argue for or against the existence of God within an exclusively phenomenological framework. To argue for or against the existence of God is to take

## INTRODUCTION

The aim of the study was to point out three agnostic indications in Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy contrary to his position of atheism. Sartre distinguished between two kinds of existentialists (EH: 26). On the one hand, christian existentialists among whom are Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel. On the other hand, he talks about atheistic existentialists among whom Heidegger, the French existentialists and Sartre himself.

## CHAPTER SIX

It is in such context that Sartre drew "...the full implications from a consistent atheistic position" (EH, 56). He gave arguments against God's existence. First, through his related concepts of le-pour-soi and l'en-soi and, second from the existentialists doctrine that "existence precedes essence". The arguments are outlined in the introductory part of chapter one of the study.

## GENERAL CONCLUSION

Despite Sartre's personal commitment to atheism, his philosophy implies, not atheism, but agnosticism. Hints at such indications had already been given by Heidegger (1978), Copieleton (1972), Dondeyne (1962), and Fabro (1964). These are linked to the methodological and epistemological assumptions of Sartre's philosophy, i.e., gnoseological-ismantism and phenomenology. Heidegger felt that existential analysis of human beings can neither affirm nor deny the existence of God. Dondeyne considered existentialism to be defending a position which he saw as, at best, a "closed" one leading to some form of "agnosticism" or even

## 6.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of the study was to point out three agnostic implications in Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy contrary to his assertions of atheism. Sartre distinguished between two kinds of existentialists (EH; 26). He mentioned, on the one hand, christian existentialists among whom are Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel. On the other hand, he talks about atheistic existentialists among who are Heidegger, the French existentialists and Sartre himself.

It is in such context that Sartre drew "...the full conclusions from a consistent atheistic position" (EH, 56). He gave two arguments against God's existence. First, through his related concepts of le-pour-soi and l'en-soi and, second from the existentialists doctrine that "existence precedes essence". The arguments are outlined in the introductory part of chapter one of this study.

Despite Sartre's personal commitment to atheism, his philosophy implies, not atheism, but agnosticism. Hints at such implications had already been given by Heidegger (1978), Copleston (1972), Dondeyne (1962), and Fabro (1964). These are linked to the methodological and epistemological assumptions of Sartre's philosophy, i.e., gnoseological-immanentism and phenomenology. Heidegger felt that existential analysis of human beings can neither affirm nor deny the existence of God. Dondeyne considered existentialism to be defending a position which he saw as, at least, a "closed" one leading to some form of "agnosticism" or even "atheism".

## 6.2 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY: THREE AGNOSTIC IMPLICATIONS

1) The problem of God's existence is meaningful i.e., questions about truth of existence or non-existence can be asked of Sartre's epistemological and methodological assumptions. This meaningfulness is not conceived in terms of the philosophical positivist sense of capacity to be verified by sense-experiences, while phenomenology constitutes the methodological one.

2) Being and human knowledge transcend the limits that Sartre's epistemology and methodology restrict it to mind-dependent entities, immediate experiences, and whatever can be intuited from phenomena.

The three agnostic implications pointed out are:

1) The first agnostic implication namely, the gnoseological-immmanentism in Sartre's ontology.

2) The second agnostic implication from gnoseological-immmanentism as a conceptual framework. Gnoseological-immmanentism, contrary to gnoseological-immmanentism, is a basic trust

3) The the third agnostic implication, i.e., Sartre's phenomenology

The concern was that proper epistemological and methodological orientation be assumed in bringing up philosophical existence by taking the existence of being as a fact from the onset so that being does not have to be affirmed later on the basis of subjective consciousness as gnoseological-immmanentism does.

The study was based on the following presuppositions:

As gnoseological-immmanentism is a stipulative term but referring to a significant feature of especially Western philosophy, the chapter two of this study aimed at complementing the definition with a historical outline from Descartes to Husserl. The purpose was to highlight the epistemological and methodological

1) The problem of God's existence is meaningful i.e., questions about truth of existence or non-existence can be asked of it. This meaningfulness is not conceived in terms of the philosophical positivist sense of capacity to be verified by sense experience.

2) Being and human knowledge transcend the limits that Sartre's philosophy has in terms of its epistemology and methodology. These restrict it to mind-dependent entities, immediate experience, and whatever can be intuited from phenomena.

The presuppositions were made on the basis of gnoseological-realism as a conceptual framework. Gnoseological-

realism, contrary to gnoseological-immanentism, is a basic trust that human knowledge is able to grasp being, at least in some way, and that human knowledge can transcend the limits of gnoseological-

immanentism, i.e., objects immanent in the mind. Gnoseological-realism tries to avoid the "agnosticism of objectively-ontological" existence by taking the existence of being as a fact from the onset so that being does not have to be affirmed later on the basis of subjective consciousness as gnoseological-immanentism does.

As gnoseological-immanentism is a stipulative term but referring to a significant feature of especially Western philosophy, the chapter two of this study aimed at complementing the definition with a historical outline from Descartes to Husserl. The purpose was to highlight the epistemological and methodological

limitations in gnoseological-immanentism and that it is not a philosophy of being. It suffers fundamental deficiencies as far as the epistemological and methodological orientation to grasp being are concerned. It does not take existence of being as a fact from the outset. Likewise it does not take sensory knowledge and experience as bridges at the service of which cognitive intention presupposed and accepted as a fact alongside that of the bears towards being. Besides, Sartre borrowed significantly from some of the gnoseological-immanentists discussed in this chapter.

### 6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study has come up with four recommendations about the following:

- 1) The first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism.
- 2) The second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism.
- 3) The use of methods in philosophy.
- 4) The classification of philosophies.

#### 1) THE FIRST TENET OF GNOSEOLOGICAL IMMANENTISM

If a philosophy wants to address itself to the problem of God's existence, then it must be a philosophy of being. The problem of God's existence is the problem of the entirety of being, and a philosophy should not be an instance of the first tenet of gnoseological-immanentism.

That is because, by that tenet, gnoseological-immanentism makes subjective being the primary certainty or authority in matters of knowledge. In principle, each philosophical approach will not have an ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of the characteristics of being, if the authority of being is not presupposed and accepted as a fact alongside that of the subjective.

Therefore, a philosophical approach which wishes to be a philosophy of being, (i.e., a philosophy that has access to ontologically-objective basis for affirmation of the characteristics of being), must presuppose and accept the reality and authority of being in terms of knowledge. Only in that way can there be an ontologically-objective basis for understanding being, and hence justification to assert or deny the existence of a being. The conception of the subject other than being as the basis of all certainties must be avoided. Hence, to be avoided are attempts by such philosophers as Descartes who proceed from a sole principle and fact, i.e., *cogito ergo sum* or subjective intellectual consciousness. Likewise is the so called Kantian "copernican revolution" that conceives of being as structured and regulated by the mind in the process of knowledge. So is Edmund Husserl's Cartesian affirmation of the immanent sphere of the subjective consciousness as primary certainty.

2) RECOMMENDATION ON THE SECOND TENET OF GNOSEOLOGICAL-  
IMMANENTISM

If a philosophy is to have an ontologically-objective basis for the affirmation of the characteristics of being, then the conception of the immediate objects of knowledge as immanent in the mind (i.e., second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism) should be avoided.

A philosophy should avoid falling into the "illusion of immanence" (Dondeyne, 1962; 103) as adherents to the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism do by conceiving of percepts and concepts as the "...entities themselves" (Ibid) or all there is to know. The percept and concept should be conceived as the "...mediavals put it, a medium-quo, and intentio, that is to say an instrument within and at the service of which cognitive intention bears us towards reality in all its concreteness" (Ibid). Far from separating us from being, it helps us to come to grips with it, to bring us closer to it (Ibid). Percepts and concepts should be understood in the way that philosophers like Aristotle and Aquinas did. These two gnoseological-realists understood them not as knowledge itself but "bridges" connecting the subject with the object. That should not be construed to mean that the subject's mind comes into actual contact with the object, but that through the percepts and concepts the subject knows being in-itself to some extent.

The erroneous conception of the immediate object of knowledge as immanent has been widespread in philosophy. Thomas Reid, the Scottish realist, had already noted it earlier. Even though he did not refer to it as the second tenet of gnoseological-immanentism, he clearly elaborated its essence (Walsh, 1985; 257ff). Noting that it was inspired by Descartes, he said that philosophers as diverse as Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume could all be included in the cartesian set. In the cartesian sense, they understood the immediate object of knowledge to be something immanent, either "innate ideas" or "ideas" of sensation. In the case of Locke, we only know ideas which are purported to represent to us objects of which we know nothing. The problem arises of an ontologically-objective basis to determine which of our ideas represent which objects and how far they go in representation. In Berkeley, objects are but clusters of ideas which cannot exist but in a mind perceiving them. The esse of objects is to be perceived. There is a problem of accounting for the existence of objects when unperceived.

In Hume knowledge is confined to the contents of mind, which are "sense impressions" and their "less lively versions" or "ideas". A true proposition, to Hume, must be based on a sense impression, and we must therefore be sceptical of anything beyond the bounds of what cannot be directly experienced.

3) RECOMMENDATION ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS

This recommendation is in relation to the exclusive use, by philosophical methods are vital in the quest for knowledge. Sartre, of the phenomenological method, even for obviously single philosophical method may not be appropriate in investigating metaphysical problems to which it is unsuitable. The certain aspects of being, and in such an instance other methods phenomenological method should be used in accordance with its should suffice. Every philosophical problem should be tackled proper function. If that is done, then it will not be adversely criticised because it fails to achieve what is accomplished by questions" (Farber, 1943; 565), and there are "systemic strang means of the deductive method, or by any other philosophical method (ibid) questions with respect to it. (Farber, 1943; 572).

What should be avoided, for example, are the sorts of The function of philosophy should not be conceived simply as declarations made by the logical positivists. They were so deeply an analysis of phenomena, that is to restrict philosophy impressed by the progress of the natural sciences, that they only unnecessarily. Phenomenological/existential hermeneutics, of acknowledged the methodology of the natural sciences. On that basis Sartre and Heidegger, is certainly an appropriate method for a the logical positivists declared all metaphysical, ethical, and study of the concrete living situations of human beings. However, religious statements as not being worthy of investigation because it should be realized that phenomenology is not an adequate tool they cannot be verified by appeal to sense experience. They were for a complete philosophical study of embodiment (Dondeyne, 1962; purported to have merely sectional value. 114).

Logical positivism is just but an example of numerous There are numerous philosophical methods, i.e., linguistic attempts in the twentieth century to pursue philosophy within the or logical analysis, the axiomatic methods of mathematics and exclusive frameworks of single methodologies. There is the example logic, reductive methods of the natural sciences, and even the of conceiving philosophy in terms of pure linguistic analysis. That method of ontology within metaphysics. Each method should be duly approach got its inspiration from the logical positivist concern recognised and no philosophical method should proclaim itself the sole or genuine method.

Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, philosophy is no more than the clarification of thoughts expressed in language.

However, to conceive philosophy as a logical method in the

### 3) RECOMMENDATION ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS

philosophical methods are vital in the quest for knowledge. A single philosophical method may not be appropriate in investigating certain aspects of being, and in such an instance other methods should suffice. Every philosophical problem should be tackled appropriately and every method has its appropriate or "proper questions" (Farber, 1943; 566), and there are "system strange" (Ibid) questions with respect to it.

What should be avoided, for example, are the sorts of declarations made by the logical positivists. They were so deeply impressed by the progress of the natural sciences, that they only acknowledged the methodology of the natural sciences. On that basis the logical positivists declared all metaphysical, ethical, and religious statements as not being worthy of investigation because they cannot be verified by appeal to sense experience. They were purported to have merely emotional value.

Logical positivism is just but an example of numerous attempts in the twentieth century to pursue philosophy within the exclusive frameworks of single methodologies. There is the example of conceiving philosophy in terms of pure linguistic analysis. That approach got its inspiration from the logical positivist concern with the meaning of scientific statements. According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, philosophy is no more than the clarification of thoughts expressed in language. However, "...to conceive philosophy as a logical method in the

restricted sense of giving rules for the formation and transformation of sentences, is to miss much of method itself" (Farber, 1943; 569).

Likewise the axiomatic method, or formal-logical method, as an exact method, is of value in its own account. However, "... the emptiness, relativism, or nihilism into which it eventuates if used exclusively, merely indicates its essential limitations in philosophy" ("Ibid). In the same way, in as much as the metaphysical method of ontology is an appropriate tool for the study of being as such, it cannot be expected to be appropriate for the study of concrete existential conditions of human persons. If philosophy is to progress then the interdependence of methods must be recognised.

#### 4) RECOMMENDATION ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHIES

In order to understand a philosophy in itself or in relation to a particular issue, more often than not, it is inadequate to simply label it, for example as "atheistic", etc. An examination must first be carried out, thoroughly, to find out if the characterisation is coherent with all aspects of that philosophy. Apparently, Sartre says one thing, logically his philosophy implies something else.

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS**Agnosticism:**

Etymologically, the word comes from the Greek word gnosis, meaning knowledge. With the addition of a a to make it agnosis, the term comes to signify "not-knowism". This is a lack of knowledge, and specifically it is the doctrine which admits that it is impossible to know whether God exists or not. Likewise it admits that one can neither prove nor disprove the existence of God, and if we embrace some position, we must do so on the basis of faith alone. The word "God" refers, in general to the being regarded as the ultimate cause of the universe.

**Atheism:**

Etymologically, the word comes from the Greek word "atheos" which contradicts "theos". The latter means of God or of gods. Hence the word theism means a position which is for god or which affirms the existence of God. From "atheos" the

It might not have existed at all  
 atheism is derived. It means a  
 position which is not for God or a  
 position which denies the existence  
 of God. In that case, nothing could  
 ever have come to exist, for there  
 would have been no causal agency.

Being:

Being is the entirety of existence.

Categories:

These are classes or order of being.  
 The categories as conceived, by  
 Kant, are twelve. However, whereas  
 Kant conceived of them as modes of  
 understanding, they are here  
 conceived of in the Aristotelian  
 way as modes of being. Aristotle had  
 distinguished ten categories, and  
 Kant added more comprehension by  
 naming twelve categories: quantity,  
 quality, relation, and modality.

Cosmological argument:

This is one of the five proofs for  
 the existence of God by Thomas  
 Aquinas. It was his third argument,  
 and is also known as the argument  
 from contingency. The argument runs  
 as follows; Everything in the world  
 about us is contingent i.e. each

## Essence:

item might not have existed at all or might have existed differently. If everything were contingent, there must have been a time when nothing existed. In that case, nothing could ever have come to exist, for there would have been no causal agency.

## Existentialism:

Since there are things in existence, there must be something that is not contingent, and this we call God.

## Empiricism:

Empiricism is the philosophical doctrine which holds, not only that, human knowledge originates from experience, but that it must also refer to experience.

## Epistemology:

Etymologically it derives from the Greek words "episteme" or knowledge, and "logos" which means discourse or study of. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy which studies knowledge as such. It asks questions such as: what is knowledge? how do we acquire knowledge?

**Essence:**

Essence means an individual being's possession of the same nature throughout the time of its existence. Nature refers to qualities, characteristics, sort, or class which distinguish a being or beings from others.

**Existentialism:**

The term, which was coined by Jean-Paul Sartre, refers to the movement of philosophers including Martin

Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, and Sartre among others.

Soren Kierkegaard is usually considered the precursor of existentialism.

Immanentism comes from immanence. The interest of this group of philosophers is in man as the ek-sistent or creature who because of his freedom and creativity is able to and should stand out of the rest of being. For the existentialists, man's freedom is a unique attribute and absolute. Men must choose even

Descartes. The position has two the principles on which they basic tenets: First, it is the choose. Human life is conceived as attempt led by Descartes, to accept "choice without excuse".

the self-consciousness of the Secondly, the major concern of subject other than being as the existentialism is the concrete ultimate foundation of truth, existence of individual human meaning, and value. The second tenet beings. The existentialists are is that the immediate object of interested in describing the data human knowledge is something of this existence exactly as immanent in the mind. In the text, possible.

gnoseological-immanentism is also philosophies which all in some way or another regard reality as immanent.gnoseological is a derivation from gnoseology which means the study of or discourse about knowledge.

Gnoseological-Realism: Gnoseological-realism is also a Immanentism comes from immanence stipulative term. Realism is the which is etymologically derived from position that things have existence the Latin term "immanere", meaning in themselves independently of human to "inhabit" or "in dwelling".

consciousness. Gnoseological-realism Gnoseological-immanentism, though a is opposed, therefore, to stipulative term, expresses a gnoseological-immanentism. Being, position brought to prominence in rather than human consciousness, is modern and contemporary Western the foundation of truth, meaning and philosophy starting with Rene value. Rather than conceiving of

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Descartes. The position has two basic tenets: First, it is the attempt led by Descartes, to accept the self-consciousness of the subject other than being as the ultimate foundation of truth, meaning, and value. The second tenet is that the immediate object of human knowledge is something immanent in the mind. In the text, it refers to a variety of gnoseological-immanentism is also philosophies which all in one way or referred to as immanentism, and another regard objects as existing gnoseological-immanentist only in relation to an experiencing philosopher as an immanentist. subject, so that reality is

#### Gnoseological-Realism:

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Intentionality:

the objects of human knowledge as it means that consciousness is things immanent, gnoseological-always of objects or always directed realism signifies a basic trust in at objects. It is the property of our knowledge. It is not just a being about some object beyond blind trust, but trust based on the itself, as was originally conceived fact that by our knowledge we are by Franz Brentano.

L'En-soi:

is some way, at least, and to some extent. It is used by Sartre to

Idealism:

denote being in so far as it is. It refers to a variety of devoid of human consciousness and philosophies which all in one way or its meaning and value and owing another regard objects as existing characteristics, its freedom, and only in relation to an experiencing its creativity.

Le Pour-Soi:

subject, so that reality is conceived in terms of mind or experience. The emphasis in idealism is always the mind, objects are conceived as existing only in relation to a mind, as of human consciousness as conceived by Sartre. consciousness as conceived by Sartre.

Logical Positivism:

The name of "logical positivism" was chosen by some members of the "Vienna

Intentionality:

It means that consciousness is always of objects or always directed at objects. It is the property of being about some object beyond itself, as was originally conceived by Franz Brentano. Sartre exhibits the

L'en-soi:

Is a French term meaning being-in-itself. It is used by Sartre to denote being in so far as it is devoid of human consciousness and its meaning and value and owing characteristics, its freedom, and its creativity. Sartre gives to a treatise

Phenomenology:

Metaphysics:

Le Pour-Soi:

that Aristotle wrote after his "physics" or study of physical nature. 'Metaphysics' came to be associated with the topics dealt with in Aristotle's treatise. It is the French term chosen by Sartre to denote human consciousness. Le pour-soi refers to being-for-itself, a term chosen to signify the dynamism of human consciousness as conceived by Sartre. Le pour-soi is concerned with the ontological status or being of objects. It is also focusses on the generic characteristics, genus, or class of being that are exhibited in experience.

Logical Positivism:

The name of "logical positivism" was chosen by some members of the "Vienna

"Ontologically-objective":

Circle" in 1931. This was a group of philosophers who were inspired by the ideas of the physicist Ernst Mach. The group included Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, and Rudolf Carnap. The very name exhibits the

Ontology:

group as a continuation of Metaphysics as the study of being as positivism. It is again the such and of its generic insistence on the "positive data" or characteristics. empirical phenomena that is typical

Phenomena:

of that approach. to that which

Metaphysics:

appears or that which is apparent in 'Metaphysics' derives from the title experience.

post humorously given to a treatise

Phenomenalises:

that Aristotle wrote after his "physics" or study of physical

nature. 'Metaphysics' came to be

Phenomenology:

Etymologically, it derives from phenomena and logos. It is thus a with in Aristotle's treatise.

study of phenomena. The basic tenet

Metaphysics is concerned with the

of phenomenology, is that, the

ontological status or being of

intuition of phenomena or their

objects. It is also focusses on the

immediate apprehension is both the

generic characteristics, genus, or

source and final end of all

class of being that are exhibited in

experience. Phenomenology can be

taken to be the essence of

- "Ontologically-objective": The term is borrowed from Klaus Hartmann (1966). It signifies that an object has existence and certain qualities by virtue of its being and not by virtue of its relation to a consciousness. Heidegger, Sartre, and other phenomenologists
- Ontology: Metaphysics as the study of being as turned to what can be referred to as such and of its generic "hermeneutic phenomenology" or "phenomenological hermeneutics".
- Phenomena: Phenomena refers to that which appears or that which is apparent in experience. sought to interpret the phenomena of what Heidegger
- Phenomenalism: The doctrine that the only objects of knowledge are phenomena. Sometimes it passes into
- Phenomenology: Etymologically, it derives from phenomena and logos. It is thus a study of phenomena. The basic tenet of phenomenology, is that, the intuition of phenomena or their immediate apprehension is both the source and final test of all
- "Phenomenological-ontology": Term coined by Sartre as Subtitle of his Being and Nothingness (1958). It taken to be the essence of

philosophy, as the phenomenologists do, or as just a method. Edmund Husserl emphasized the description of human consciousness as directed onto phenomena and a description of the phenomena themselves. Heidegger, the doctrine which emphasizes the faculty of conceptual and discursive thought, other than experience, as turned to what can be referred to as the source and test of knowledge. "hermeneutic phenomenology" or "phenomenological hermeneutics". Hermeneutics is the science of interpretation, and that phenomenology sought to interpret the phenomena of what Heidegger called *Dasein* or human reality. Sometimes it passes into 'existential hermeneutics' or 'existential analysis', i.e., exploring the existential conditions of the human person, together with its meanings on the basis of certain choices.

"Phenomenological-ontology": Term coined by Sartre as Subtitle of his Being and Nothingness (1958). It

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refers to a phenomenological scrutiny, of being in so far as it appears to consciousness which gives it meaning. Translated into English (1937) as *The Transcendence of the ego* by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. Noonday.

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The doctrine which emphasizes the

faculty of conceptual and discursive thought, other than experience, as the source and test of knowledge. Translated (1938) as *La Nausée* by Lloyd Alexander as *Nausea*. Penguin.

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