

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Contesting the Subaltern Narrative: The Trickster Trope in the Kenyan Political Autobiography

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ABSTRACT

This article is a critique of the idea of subalternity[1] as it is used in the Kenyan political autobiographies of leaders who have reigned but never ruled.[2] The study is largely located within postcolonial theory, with particular emphasis on the strand that interrogates the interest that inhabits the production of knowledges about the self. The biographical method was used to analyse Jaramogi Odinga's *Not Yet Uhuru*, Bildad Kaggia's *The Roots of Freedom*, Raila Odinga's *The Flame of Freedom* and Joseph Murumbi's *The Path Not Taken*. Interrogating the dangers of a single story, the paper argues that the Kenyan political autobiography is heavily loaded with rhetorical performances determined by the need to tell an effective story. Using trickery, and hiding behind the hackneyed utopian concept of speaking truth to power, the leaders examined here project selves that are fearless, bold and revolutionaries aiming to forcefully and strategically mythologise themselves. This process is made possible in the contexts of historical (re)writing. Thus, Jaramogi, Kaggia, Raila and Murumbi's portrayal of themselves as victims and subalterns in their autobiographies are for disguise, deception, and indirection while maintaining an outward impression, in power-laden situations, of willing, even enthusiastic consent.

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1. Introduction: Autobiography as a Hidden Transcript[3]

Jungah Kim in "Ethical Complexities in Reading and Writing Autobiography: Thinking the Humanity of Others in *The Instant of My Death*" (2012, 97) argued that although autobiographical works "demand 'truth' and 'trustworthiness', some writers prefer to explore and even exploit the tensions between historical verifiability and the limits of memory", hence stretching the boundaries of an autobiography. By bending the rules of 'memoir', Kim argues, the writer "explores an aesthetic dimension of a provocative 'deformation' of the genre of auto/biography that calls into question notions of 'truth' and 'self' a questioning in which memoir writing always already engages" (98). This bending of the ethics of an

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autobiography is crucially personified in the Kenyan political autobiography through scripting of a cunning protagonist whose use of the genre is to advance political interests through manipulating history and past events. As I am going to contend in this paper, Kenyan politicians do not only make the genre of autobiography questionable, but also make it a fiction of convenience. Through selfishness, deceit and Machiavellianism, these leaders use their autobiographies to refashion the Kenyan history, writing themselves into the favourable side of history, the one that is concomitant with the Kenyan subaltern. Writing as if no one has travelled on the paths they travel on, the leaders moot for particular "lessons" through their narratives as the magic solutions to the problems that dog the nation.

Identifying themselves with the masses, the political leader is not himself but a part of the subaltern: He is no longer merely "myself" but he is part of an "us" (Leech 2015, 115). Olney posits that all African autobiographies partake of the same generic and "narratival" elements. To wit, the "African community of existence" accounts for the "typicality and archetypicality" of African stories and tales (Olney 1973, 76). The African subject, immersed in this community, metonymically recapitulates his or her social formation. Although this is the nature of African sensibilities, I note that the Kenyan politicians use this Africanness to stretch the truth unethically in an autobiography. An interrogation of what they write about is not only significant but also urgent, especially because of our (Kenyan) several socioeconomic and political false starts, defeats and setbacks. Wading through the debates that try to give a plausible explanation to these socioeconomic and political failures, this paper interrogates the autobiographies of those leaders who steered Kenya's nationalist project but served subordinate roles in the New Kenya. Their autobiographies are key in this interrogation, especially because these autobiographies express their writers' inner realm of existence. To be able to enter into their inner world, this paper took a historical perspective in its interpretation; how these writers wrote themselves into history; how they rewrote the known history, cunningly (mis)using the past not only to recover the historical agency of subaltern actors, but also to overcome a certain set of representations that has reduced them to undeserving subjects of history (Dirks, Eley, and Ortner 1994).

Subalternity in Kenya has been an ongoing practice since independence. The Kenyan poor has incessantly resisted and endured difficult conditions in everyday life. They have, as a rule, negotiated power relations from the margins or from what Thompson calls "history from below," towards an emancipatory direction (Chandra 2015). In the recent past, postcolonial historiography has sought to write the history of subordinate groups (Moore 1998). Within this grid, Kenyan subalterns have attempted to (re)write the "lost" narratives of the marginal, oppressed groups. In this rewriting, Scott (1992) argues that subaltern actors wrestle with an audience of power holders, who author deceptive public performances. The subaltern, in this formulation, resides not simply in a space of

autonomy, but also in a fixed site, "outside" "lines of mobility" presumably traversed by other social actors. Subalternity here dwells in another place, a site of radical difference disarticulation (Moore 1998).

To wit, in an interview by Leon de Kock, Spivak has told us:

> Subaltern is not just a classy word for 'oppressed', for [the] Other, for somebody who's not getting a piece of the pie … In post-colonial terms, everything that has limited or no access to the cultural imperialism is subaltern — a space of difference. Now, who would say that's just the oppressed? The working class is oppressed. It's not subaltern … Many people want to claim [the condition of] subalternity. They are the least interesting and the most dangerous. I mean, just by being a discriminated-against minority on the university campus; they don't need the word 'subaltern' … They should see what the mechanics of the discrimination are. They're within the hegemonic discourse, wanting a piece of the pie, and not being allowed, so let them speak, use the hegemonic discourse. They should not call themselves subaltern. (De Kock 1992, 29–47)

According to Spivak there is a risk of speaking for or on behalf of disempowered subaltern groups by educated, metropolitan-based intellectuals. This is because in this representation they will overlook or marginalise the crucial differences between subaltern groups and individuals. For Spivak, any model of political consciousness will paradoxically work to objectify the subaltern or "control her through knowledge." Indeed, the idea of speaking for disempowered people is a central concern for Spivak. Spivak attempts to argue that postcolonial critics who attempt to give silenced people a voice might repeat the very silencing that they are writing against. Therefore, the Kenyan politician can only use treachery to wedge themselves in the discourses of subalternity. They are incapable of speaking for or on behalf of the Kenyan subaltern. With their penchant to question and critique government policies, pointing out failures of the leaders who rule(d), their autobiographies are cunningly meant to become a postcolonial historiography that seeks to write the history of subordinate groups (Vezzadini and Guidi 2013, v).

Seen through this lens, the leaders who reigned but never ruled (de)construct, re-order, and rewrite Kenyan history in their autobiographies. In the rewritten history, they are subalterns who are victimised by the system together with the Kenyan masses; the poor and the marginalised. They do this within the confines of the trickster narrative trope. A trickster tale, in oral traditions worldwide, is a story featuring a protagonist (often an anthropomorphised animal) who has magical powers and who is characterised as a compendium of opposites. This protagonist is a selfish, callous and cunning character who doesn't follow rules and tricks other people to get what he or she wants. Although the trickster's actions and personality may seem ridiculous or extreme, Babcock-Abrahams (1975) has noted that he or she serves an important purpose in traditional and contemporary narratives. For example, the trickster may work as a kind of outlet for strong emotions or actions in which humans cannot indulge. These actions are at the margins of social morality and normal behaviour, so humans

can express and feel things through the trickster that would be unsafe to express or experience outside of stories. In this sense, the trickster is a kind of "escape valve" for a society. As I am going to argue, and show, what the writers of the four autobiographies want is power, either for themselves or for the people whom they support (specific dynasties), and they use their trickery to clothe themselves in subalternising demeanour.

To be able to underscore properly this trope that underpins the Kenyan political autobiography, Scott's (1992) understanding of how hidden transcript function is handy. Scott's central innovation in his work is the distinction between public transcripts[4] (2) and hidden transcripts (4). Scott observes that there is a sharp divide between the behaviour, language, and customs that dominated groups assume in public, and the language, jokes, and criticisms that structure their lives within their group experiences where they are located.

In Kenya, public transcripts can be said to be the official history, mostly endorsed by the state. This official history has been perpetrated by the ruling class who use the politics of marginalisation such as intimation and political parties to weed out leaders with different political views, police harassment, and political assassinations. Wearing a cloak of subalternity, the leaders examined here cunningly present themselves as subalterns and use their autobiographies to construct a subaltern narrative that seemingly contests the official historical narrative. Theirs, as they would like their various audiences to imagine, is a hidden transcript. It is in this construction that this paper reads nuances of the trickster trope in the Kenyan political autobiography. Known as a complex mythological character, the trickster comprises contradictory traits, from cunningness to intransigence. A trickster is not only a mythological figure but also a religious one. In the Kenyan political landscape, the leaders use the genre of autobiography as a spiritual guide to the masses; a religious undertaking led by the belief that the genre of autobiography is an honest representation of the self and history.

It is in this vein that this paper contests the cloak of subalternity created in Jaramogi Odinga's *Not Yet Uhuru* (hereafter *Uhuru*), Bildad Kaggia's *Roots of Freedom* (hereafter *Roots*), Raila Odinga's *Flame of Freedom* (hereafter *Freedom*) and Joseph Murumbi's *Path Not Taken* (hereafter *Path*). Intending to be seen as subalterns, these writers construct identities that portray them as the representatives of the oppressed and disseminate counterhegemonic knowledges that resist the everyday politics of power. Resistance here denotes a subtle form of contesting the public transcript by making use of a particular political language that resists the abuse of power – including character assassination, gossip, metaphors, and ideographs (Mutie and Kamau 2018). Problematising the nature of autobiography as a true account of one's life, the Kenyan political leader's autobiography uses doublespeak, trickery, flattery and self-flagellation to achieve personal interests.

Seen from the perspective of the autobiographies of the leaders who reigned but never ruled cunningly being inserted in the locale of the hidden transcript. In this new space, *Uhuru*, *Roots*, *Freedom* and *Path* contest the official history

advanced by the auto/biographies of leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki, and their supporters. These presidents control the sources, agents, and contents of information using the Althusserian state apparatuses like the police, educational institutions, and the church.

To some extent, *Uhuru*, *Roots*, *Freedom* and *Path* contain information that gives voice to the dominated. In these autobiographies, particular memories like the Mau Mau and Sessional Paper No. 10 are revisited to form the political rhetoric that the authors of these autobiographies envisage institutionalising once they ascend to power. Clashes over what constitutes Kenya's history, for example, the history of the Mau Mau, events of national importance, and even how political and media discourses are framed, are best understood through power relations and the ability of the dominant group to impose its interpretation of reality as the universal norm or the collective common sense.

In their autobiographies, Jaramogi, Kaggia, Raila and Murumbi contest official Kenyan history, partially through collective forgetting, especially of events that do not help them advance their interests. It is noteworthy that the Kenyan ruling elite uses agents like the media and archives which means that through manipulation, distortion, and silencing, certain memories can be made subordinate to others. The autobiographies of the leaders who reigned but never ruled endeavour to penetrate the domain of official history to subvert it and rewrite their imagined, correct history of Kenya.

2. Dynasties and Histories[5] of Continuity through Autobiographies of Leaders

Despite claiming to authorise an authentic account of self and nation, the Kenyan political autobiography is partial. It is riven with its contradictions that derive from mediations of memory, and ideological and cultural biases that tend to promote the agenda of the individual subject. Thus, life narratives from different individuals, even if they claim to represent the marginalised, the Kenyan subaltern, will apprehend and interpret experience differently. Jaramogi, Kaggia, Raila, and Murumbi authorise different versions of self and nation, often seeking to exclude competing narratives on the self as perceived by others. Such partiality, this paper contends, does not only exclude perceived political rivals, but also ordinary people whose subjective experience is not rendered into the autobiographical narrative. Although Jaramogi, Kaggia, Raila, and Murumbi claim to represent the Kenyan subaltern, there is an elitist tone in the writing of their autobiographies, which makes the understanding of what is 'political' in these narratives narrow and self-serving. It fails to anticipate that both the self and the nation that they seek to represent as cohesive are always shifting, fractured and that this is a condition of possibility for creating new identities.

This paper notes that what gives Jaramogi, Kaggia, Raila, and Murumbi endeavour to involve themselves in historical rewriting is the supposition that the

history of the Kenyan subaltern is misrepresented in the official history. According to the marginalised (of which the four leaders are not), the official Kenyan history is a false narrative that advances postcolonial elite domination in Kenya. This paper interrogates the possibility of the Kenyan political autobiography's capability of serving at the altar of historical narratives that define the nation. Of interest is the way the autobiographical genre can be used by those who claim to represent the subalterns to rewrite historical narratives, "to talk out, talkback, talk otherwise" (Heddon 2008, 3). Thiong'o in *Decolonising the Mind* rightly observes that "[w]riters are surgeons of the heart and souls of a community, but official Kenya declines the operation, retaining the old Kenyan history" (ix). It is noteworthy that in the 1960s Kenya witnessed a brand of historians who often produced misrepresentations of Kenya's past and present. An idea concomitant to Cooper's (1997) idea of "African bashing", this misrepresentation helped build up a different strand of history that paid lip service to the Kenyan masses and mythologised leaders who were favoured by the colonial mentors and their attendant disciples.

According to Thiong'o (1981), history is a propaganda instrument in the service of a chosen ideology, and thus this paper interrogates the way Jaramogi, Kaggia, Raila, and Murumbi's autobiographies engage in historical (re)configuring, revision, and (re)writing. The question is: why do they rewrite the Kenyan history? This paper contends that they do this intending to establish and prop dynastic rule in Kenya. The cloak of subalternity is to dupe the oppressed. They are, as Ochieng' (1985) calls them, a bunch of discontented revisionists who are at war with the world. For instance, Kaggia, in *Roots*, argues that the bane of the Kenyan people, which the Mau Mau succeeded in dismantling, was elitism. In chapter six of his autobiography titled "How could I liberate their minds?" Kaggia concludes: "the fate of the African bourgeoisie is that they want to assist the master to colonise fellow Africans" (54). This liberation could be achieved within the contexts of the Mau Mau discourse (55). Therefore, according to Kaggia, the Mau Mau, which was composed of ordinary oppressed people, brought independence.

Throughout *Roots* the impression created is that Kaggia belonged to the radical wing of KAU, that he believed in violence, if necessary, to gain *Uhuru* for the Africans. He was impatient with reactionaries like Jomo Kenyatta, J.D. Otiende, Tom Mbotela, and Joseph Katithi, who preferred constitutionalism and sweet reasonableness to violence. To Kaggia it was clear that the colonial government would not give way without a struggle, and that is why the militants resorted to Mau Mau. The impression we get from Kaggia is that although Jomo Kenyatta was later charged with masterminding and organising the Mau Mau, he was quite ignorant of its origins and activities. And when late in 1952 Kenyatta agreed to go along with the colonial government request to denounce the Mau Mau, he was summoned to meet the Mau Mau Central Committee: "He was surprised to see Kubai and me there. And he noticed to his further surprise that other leaders, whom he did not know, were running the meeting" (113).

By recounting these details about who managed the Mau Mau, Kaggia aims to rewrite Kenyan history, which has placed the onus of liberation on Jomo Kenyatta. By arguing that Kenyatta knew little about the Mau Mau, Kaggia deconstructs Kenyatta's centrality in Kenya's independence and, by extension, aims to destroy Kenyatta's budding dynastic leadership. An autobiography affords Kaggia an opportunity to magnify the Mau Mau movement, in which Jomo Kenyatta played a subordinate role, to the extent of arguing that it solely brought *Uhuru* because an autobiography is not a mere disinterested recording of events but, as Weintraub (1975) points out, it involves the autobiographer's choice of certain events or subjects and the omission of others. It is Kaggia who chooses what to amplify and what to conveniently forget. Kaggia is autonomous and fully responsible in selecting the period, the events, and the ways the self and others are presented (See also Weintraub 1975; Gusdorf 1980; Mason 1980).

The question of how dynastic leadership was established, and its flagellation and maintenance in Kenya is central to this paper. Of interest is how literature, especially the autobiographical genre, plays part in this dynasty formation and maintenance. This paper notes that dynastic leadership in Kenya was orchestrated by the fall out between Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga in the 1960s. This is especially true concerning the camps that were formed in support or against these families. This paper notes too that the four autobiographies interrogated here could be located within these camps. Kaggia's *Roots* aims to dissociate Jomo Kenyatta's from a group which many people hail as the champions of *Uhuru*, Mau Mau. In doing this, Jomo Kenyatta is portrayed as an oligarchic opportunist. To Kaggia, Jomo Kenyatta was not only non-Messianic but also did not possess the pedigree of leadership, and that is the reason they [Mau Mau] were using him "to throw more dust in the eyes of the authorities […] the Mau Mau central committee did not like it very much, but since it was Kenyatta we did not discuss it with him" (Kaggia 1975, 113). In belabouring this point of the subservient role that Kenyatta presumably played, Kaggia advances his interests as the black Messiah, and since he worshipped at the altar of Odinga's radicalism, Kenyatta's deflation here strengthens the Odinga dynasty.

This is what Kaggia tries to do in his autobiography; narrating the history and the role of the Mau Mau veterans to place himself amongst the subalterns, the real leaders who could have led Kenya to all-round development. However, as already argued, an interrogation of Kaggia's desire leads one to notice the ways of a trickster. Just like the leaders he vilifies, the autobiography portrays him as a self-seeking leader. In rewriting the official Kenyan history, Jaramogi Odinga explains the origin of the term "Harambee." The official history attributes its origin to Jomo Kenyatta. However, by way of demythologising Kenyatta and rewriting Kenya's official history, in his autobiography Jaramogi explains that it was not Jomo Kenyatta who invented this philosophically loaded slogan but Omolo Ongiro of Nyakach location in Central Nyanza. The desire to correct this, or seemingly attempting to correct it, is situated within historical revisionism:

> Harambee became our national cry from this time on but I remember it had first been used by Omolo Ongiro (who came to be known as Omolo Harambee) of Nyakach location in central Nyanza. At every meeting he shouted 'Harambe-eeeh, Harambe- eeeh' and added 'let us all go to Lodwar to pull Kenyatta from prison, pull together for independence' Harambee became Kenya's slogan for national unity, for cooperation in the building of a new country. (Odinga 1967, 238)

This serves to discredit Jomo Kenyatta who is seen here as an opportunist.

According to Tunai (2017) Jaramogi's *Not Yet Uhuru* delves into the author's past, narrating the history of his lineage and family, beginning with his great-grandfather (Odinga 1967, 4–6). Many other autobiographies begin at the birth of the protagonist, but Jaramogi begins in the manner he does because he intends to invoke a sense of community in his self; in other words, as he shows throughout his book his life is not only an individual's life but an embodiment of the life of community and nation.

In rewriting Kenya's official history, Jaramogi endeavours to capture the timelines of Kenya's political key events as closely as possible. And as the story moves nearer to the time of writing, that is, the 1950s and 1960s, ascribing dates to events becomes even more meticulous involving giving us not only the years of events but also the days and months when events occurred, for instance, the formation of the Kenya African Union (KANU) party in May 1960 (193), the first Lancaster Constitutional Conference began 12 February 1962 (228), and the KANU Limuru Conference of March 1966 (299). In tracing the political development in Kenya, *Not Yet Uhuru* gives dates to events thus vouching for the truth of these events. As in most political autobiographies, history then occupies a significant place in *Not Yet Uhuru* and, as Muchiri (2014) has observed, "autobiography is intertwined with history and sometimes people read autobiographies as historical documents or evidence for the analysis of historical movements, events or persons" (84).

However, although Jaramogi's autobiography is presented as narrating the true history of the Kenyan subaltern, it is important to note that a few questions always crop up when interrogating Jaramogi's representation of Kenya's history. It would seem that shortly before independence Jaramogi was using Jomo Kenyatta to silence Tom Mboya whom he believed "British and United States strategy seemed to converge on grooming … for leadership in the place of Kenyatta" (Odinga 1967, 200). To me, Odinga's praise of Kenyatta seems to be a matter of one dynasty bolstering and protecting the other. Jaramogi, sensing defeat by the then young T.J. Mboya, might have decided to fix his main opponent politically by demanding the release of the forgotten Jomo Kenyatta. That decision set in motion a chain of events that handed over the Presidency to Kenyatta on a silver platter (Branch 2011; Hornsby 2012).

The same kind of revisionism can be seen through Jaramogi's magnification of what he supposedly did for Jomo Kenyatta, especially as regards his release from

detention and eventual accession to power. In defence of Jomo Kenyatta's release from detention, he writes:

> 'These people,' I told the council, 'before they were arrested were the political leaders of the Africans in the country, and the Africans respected them as their political leaders, and even at this moment, in the heart of hearts of the Africans, they are still the political leaders' […] my enemies in Nyanza said I represented not Central Nyanza but also the Mau Mau […] that same weekend Kiano told a Baraza at Fort Hall that he disagreed with my statement that Kenyatta and the others were still *our real political leaders*. He said that the statement had been made in a fit of anger, and the only leaders of the African people were 'those of us whom you elected and the chiefs' (Odinga 1967, 156–58)

This defence of Kenyatta could either be interpreted to mean that Jaramogi wanted to show Jomo Kenyatta that he (Jaramogi) was not the enemy, or it could be a pacification which accompanies hidden transcripts. Jaramogi's presentation of how he defended Jomo Kenyatta resists the official history which portrayed him as not only Jomo Kenyatta's enemy but also a saboteur ready to overthrow the *Uhuru* government with the help of communists.

By choosing to raise his voice above the political cacophony of the time, and preferring to talk about how he assisted Jomo Kenyatta to be released from detention is telling. This paper contends that this was a calculated enterprise to elbow out the "overly ambitious Tom Mboya" (Murumbi 2015, 232). It is also not lost to this paper that after the statement "These people, before they were arrested, were political leaders in this country" (Odinga 1967, 156), Jaramogi received so much condemnation – even from fellow African members of the LEGCO – for "embracing detainees whom the government considered to be dangerous criminals" (Odinga, 157) and this statement hardened the feelings of the Europeans in the LEGCO and outside, who began calling Jaramogi a communist sympathiser, a call that, ironically, Jomo Kenyatta used after independence to muzzle him politically. By narrating this sacrifice in his autobiography, Jaramogi aims to reconfigure the Kenyan political narrative.

Jaramogi's autobiography is a construction. In it the protagonist narrates the story with a slant. The writing of *Uhuru* becomes a careful process of selecting events that are considered worth knowing, or assigning reported speech or examples to illustrate a point and piecing them together to convey the appearance of coherence (Stanley 1992, 128). Therefore, according to Stanley an autobiography is "not and cannot be referential of a life". The idea of construction brings into attention what is included and excluded, which is ultimately an ideological decision. By treating *Uhuru* as a construction, the past can be questioned and interpreted.

The same trope continues in Raila Odinga's autobiography, *Freedom*, in which he decries his father's betrayal by the Kenyan ruling elite, after having sacrificed much for the nation. He captures this point on dynasty fighting quite succinctly:

> It was the second time Jaramogi had stood back for the good of the country. The first had been shortly before Kenyatta's release, when Renison, desperate to work with anyone but

> Kenyatta, had summoned Jaramogi to his office and offered him the post of prime minister. Jaramogi selflessly turned down the chance of guiding Kenya into independence advising Renison instead to release Kenyatta from restriction […] 'Kenyatta is around, just here in Lodwar. Release him and allow him to lead us; he is already our choice.' (Raila 2013, 38)

This offer was turned down by Jaramogi at a defining moment more than 50 years ago. Raila revisits what he thinks were sacrifices his father Jaramogi made for the Kenyan people in order to cunningly mythologise his father and at the same time demythologise Jomo Kenyatta. It is his father Jaramogi who sacrificed a lot for the Kenyan people, and not Kenyatta. However, a keen look into Raila Odinga's sacrifice can also expose his gullibility and myopia.

These discourses on Jaramogi's role in the release of and the subsequent accession to power by Jomo Kenyatta show the benevolence of the former, not only to Jomo Kenyatta himself, but also to the people of Kenya. Within the context of the politics of betrayal, it can be rightly argued that the isolation of Jaramogi from the seat of power was a calculated enterprise to establish Jomo Kenyatta's family as a dynasty. Any efforts, including writing *Not Yet Uhuru*, in trying to turn political luck towards the Jaramogi dynasty has always been futile.

It is this war of dynasties that led Raila Odinga, by a twist of destiny, to repeat the same infamous mantra "Kibaki Tosha" in the run-up to the 2002 general elections in Kenya:

> Eventually, the moment came and I posed the question: 'Hata tukisema ati ni Mzee Kibaki ndiye anatosha, si mtakubali? Si Kibaki Tosha?' ('Even if we say it is Kibaki, would you approve? Doesn't Kibaki fit the bill?') and they responded, 'Ndiyo Tosha' ('Yes, he does'). I asked the crowd again 'Si Kibaki Tosha?' (Kibaki can fit the bill?'), and the response was unanimous 'Kibaki Tosha' (Kibaki it is!'). The deed was done. (Raila 2013, 272)

Although Raila Odinga might have hoped to use Kibaki as a weapon against what he perceived as the re-emergence of a scion of Jomo Kenyatta's dynasty, this perceived benevolence, like that of his father half a century before then, works against him. The same forces that he helps foster are the ones that aim to dim his family's dynasty.

The framework of this game of thrones gave birth to what this paper dubs "compromise candidates" or "custodian candidates." To date, every single man who has ended up as president of Kenya has done so, not out of genuine service to the people, but as a compromise candidate. According to Odinga (2013), Mwai Kibaki, just like Jomo Kenyatta in 1963, was a compromise candidate. In the recent past, the compromise has gravitated towards tribal affiliations. However, when one interrogates these affiliations, dynastic undertones always emerge.

Although in *Uhuru* Jaramogi aims to use this text as a hidden transcript, exposing the sacrifices that he made for the country, the subaltern and Jomo Kenyatta, one wonders what might have happened to the Odinga dynasty? To answer this

question the paper interrogated what seems to be inconsistencies in Jaramogi's autobiography, and this pertains to the last, and arguably best chapter in the autobiography, "Obstacles to *Uhuru*" (253–315). This paper notes that the last chapter of Jaramogi's *Not Yet Uhuru* is an addendum and was not originally part of the book. It is noteworthy that, on a sad note, without this last chapter the book would have treated the reader to a sterile discussion on the crusade to release Kenyatta, internal intrigues in KANU and the struggle between KANU and KADU. This paper, thus, agrees with John Okumu that "Odinga's book is, in part, a lament of his failure, while he had the chance to shape the development of African nationalism, to create a *modus operandi* for this synchronic and diachronic transformation of our society" (Ochieng' 1985, 94). One does not see the evolution in Odinga's mind of the kind of society he wished to create at independence. This is indeed an consistency in Jaramogi's autobiography, the one that shows his unpreparedness and, to some extent, his political myopia, a Peter Pan[6] demeanour, aligning with what Fanon (1968) calls the "intellectual laziness" of the vanguard, the middle class.

The fascination with the idea of heroism on the part of the Kenyan postcolonial leader lays its head herein. While Jaramogi, Kaggia, and Raila owe it to Kenyans to write their life stories, it is noteworthy indeed that the biggest enemy confronting their writing is the trickster trope, a creation of a mythologised Okonkwo. The creation of this Okonkwo-like trickster exposes the dangers associated with single stories as conceptualized by Adichie (2016). Riding on their zeal to build or prop up a dynasty, the autobiographers revise history as they knowingly construct Peter Pan and Okonkwo personae from their lives. These creations assist them and/or their relatives to fan the dying embers of their dynastic rule.

This paper takes cognisance of the affinity the Kenyan bourgeoise or political class has for using the autobiographical genre to salvage an endangered self. For them, thus, an autobiography becomes a self-mythologising event. Through refashioning and reinventing history, the autobiographers tell stories about themselves, stories which form part of a calculated narrative whose aim is political survival. This political theatre can best be dramatised within the context of literature. It is in literature, especially in the autobiographical genre, where the political actors dramatise the act of reinventing themselves. It is in this self-fashioning where Jaramogi imagines himself as the Biblical Moses, Kaggia crafts for himself the image of a black Messiah, Raila Odinga, Joshua, and Murumbi dons prophetic stature.

A critical interrogation of the four autobiographies shows that political activism and success can be gained through antagonism. Just like the Greek mythologies create larger than life characters through the suffering of their protagonists, these autobiographers create a suffering protagonist to mythologise these personae, portraying them as more endowed to lead than any other person in the country. This suffering appeals mainly to the Kenyan subaltern who is suffering out of lack and the dark forces of poverty, disease and bad governance. The

four leaders aim to use their political travails to gain sympathy from the reader. It, therefore, follows that in the crafting of a political autobiography, the story can only be as intellectually fascinating and emotionally compelling as the forces of antagonism make them. Jomo Kenyatta's leadership used this suffering of the patriarch to establish a dynasty that has persisted from independence to date. Through writing, too, Jaramogi and Raila aim to fan to life the embers of their diminishing dynasties.

Joseph Murumbi's *A Path Not Taken*, like the other three autobiographies, adds voice to reframing Kenyan historical narrative through unearthing hidden transcripts. Standing in the middle of both Kenyatta's and Odinga's dynasty wars, *A Path Not Taken* revives the ideological differences that rocked Kenya at its inception and the consequent casualties. One major casualty to the numerous ideological wars was Pio Gama Pinto.[7] Although he may now appear as a footnote in Kenya's revised historical narrative, the context within which he died remains problematic.

Murumbi describes Mboya as an "overly ambitious man" (Murumbi 2015, 232), Oginga Odinga as "an honest man" (233), while Pio Pinto "wasn't a man ambitious for power or anything, he was genuinely interested in Kenya" (358). Here, Murumbi revises the Kenyan historical strand that demonises those on the political left wing like Oginga Odinga and Pio Pinto, simultaneously demonstrating that Tom Mboya was not a nationalist, as Goldsworthy in his biography, *Tom Mboya, The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget* (1982), would want readers to believe.[8] By describing him as an overly ambitious man, Murumbi refashions this history and demythologises him. He does this to construct a narrative that fronts the Odinga dynasty.

Murumbi's autobiography revisits the relationship between Odinga and Kenyatta. In *Path*, Murumbi recounts the suspicion between the president, Jomo Kenyatta and his vice president, Oginga Odinga. Using autobiographical autonomy, and with the benefit of writing from the present, with its advantages of hindsight, he writes:

> There must have been false rumours of this kind because the Old Man should have realized that of all people who were honest with him, nobody more than Odinga. When the old man was in prison he had the courage and the guts whilst the British were here to say in parliament that he was the old man's true friend […] whenever he (Odinga) had some money he used to come to the old man and say, 'I've got this money, take a few thousand pounds for yourself.' And I think it was the wrong judgment on the part of the old man to have suspected Odinga. (2015, 233)

Murumbi here aims to defend Jaramogi's character. According to this defence, Jaramogi was an honest man whom Jomo Kenyatta should have trusted. Murumbi's assertions play a big role in situating the image of Jaramogi against that of his rival, Mboya: while Jaramogi was a sincere and honest man, Mboya was an ambitious man who could do anything to ascend to power. By presenting Jaramogi as such, dynastic politics come into play.

Riding on the same conceptualisation, Murumbi continues to correct what he terms the misrepresentation of Jaramogi. In doing this, Murumbi's autobiography joins largely revisionist texts. He aims to revisit official Kenyan history to rewrite it:

> The arms were taken from the airport and to keep them in a safe place, it was done with the knowledge of the President. These arms were taken and put in a strong room in Odinga's office … there was never any intention that Odinga would be using these arms against the Old man. The whole thing was discussed in cabinet, we knew the arms were there … it was misinterpreted that Odinga had these arms there and was going to use them against the old man. (2015, 234)

This quotation shows Murumbi's aim to correct what he considers a historical misconception. This is the rewriting of a public transcript to serve his own interests. The problem with this rewriting is that in itself is still the need to construct yet another public transcript. Murumbi, however, imagines his autobiography as a hidden transcript, a transcript of the marginalised.

What Murumbi is doing in his autobiography is revising Kenya's history. In his revision, he places himself and his friends at a vantage point. They are the only ones who were concerned about the subalterns. This, I argue, is the way of the trickster. What Murumbi's autobiography shows us is that history is a construction (see Anderson 2001, 86–7; Stanley 1992, 128). The concept of history as construction and process are important insights for papering the way resistance can be understood in autobiographies. By stating that an autobiography constructs, invents, and reframes history, the possibility for multiple readings and interpretations of the texts under study are kept open.

Even as the writers-cum-leaders engage primarily in the politics of self-definition, they use their narratives to "move the centre," portraying the ability of a Kenyan leader ready to tell the Kenyan story, of course, with a slant. Thus, the Kenyan narrative has been an interesting one: one that inspires and repels at the same time. The Kenyatta and Odinga dynasties alongside family interests have dominated every political discourse and provided what is largely consumed as the Kenyan narrative. The two dynasties have influenced Kenyan socioeconomic, geopolitical, and intellectual life. They have held the country back by their incessant feuds that protect their interests. The literature on dynasties in Kenya leads us in the direction of hero-worship, chiefdoms, and hereditary politics

In *Uhuru*, *Roots*, *Freedom*, and *Path* the writers present the plight of the Kenyan subaltern intertwined with their own. This portrayal, however, is skewed because, as this paper has noted thus far, Jaramogi, Kaggia, Raila, and Murumbi were Kenyan leaders who held elevated political positions in the Kenyan government.

Situating the discussion of the Kenyan political autobiography within the frameworks of Simatei's (2001) contention, *Uhuru*, *Roots*, *Freedom*, and *Path* are narratives which, while creating alternative voices that challenge, unearth the

inadequacy of official history to address and provide a full account of reality, are creations which serve the interests of their writers. They hoodwink the masses and are populist tools for bolstering and propping dynastic rule in Kenya. This is made possible through the use of the trickster trope in these autobiographies.

3. Storying Subalternity in the Kenyan Political Autobiography

The Kenyan political autobiographies in this study are written by leaders who reigned but never ruled recount the history of subalternity in Kenya. As already argued in this paper, they do this to dupe the oppressed into thinking that they are the right leaders who would have been able to steer the nation back to the developmental path. By not electing them, therefore, Kenya becomes a case of "a path not taken". The four autobiographies reveal the social and economic realities of the people on the periphery of society; political betrayal, landlessness, political assassinations, marginalisation and poverty with the aim of storying subalternity in Kenya, and immersing themselves therein.

As the paper has already argued, earlier Jaramogi pays tribute to the Mau Mau Movement about which he comments on at the end of chapter six of his autobiography, *Uhuru*. He names successful battles and their Mau Mau leaders (120) and after mentioning the propaganda of the colonial government that called Mau Mau a savage atavistic movement, Odinga argues that this movement was not only of the past but is also of the present since "only now in Kenya is it becoming possible to present a truer version of the events of this time" (121). This truer version, according to Jaramogi, was being presented by life-story writers and historians, including in his autobiography *Uhuru*. It is noteworthy that by presenting Gama Pinto and the Mau Mau in his narration, Jaramogi argues their case and represents them. He is, in essence, storying their subalternity. *Uhuru*, therefore, is a text that not only recounts the Kenyan truer version of history but also a text that details the Kenyans' suffering and resilience.

However, in storying subalternity, in the guise of presenting the truer version of history, this paper argues that Kenya's history is refashioned. *Uhuru* could be understood as a text that aims to portray Jaramogi as the leader whom Kenya should endeavour to have. Seen from this perspective, therefore, Jaramogi's *Uhuru* constructs yet another strand of a historical narrative whose purpose is to narrate the subalternity of the self and others. According to this paper, *Uhuru* does not only story the Kenyan subalternity but also iconises Jaramogi.

Therefore, even when Jaramogi narrates his isolation and eventual resignation from the first government, he constructs a narrative that augurs well with the subalterns: that he is politically isolated because of fighting against neocolonialism and for advocating the solving of the problem of landlessness in Kenya as a way of fighting poverty. In *Uhuru*, therefore, the autobiographical subject's core beliefs are tested and Jaramogi harnesses all means possible to explain his stand on issues affecting Kenya at its birth as a nation.

According to him, Jomo Kenyatta did not represent the subaltern. Therefore, here Jaramogi aims to be understood as the true leader who remembers the subaltern. His autobiography, thus, should be read as an effort to narrate the fate of the subaltern (253–254). These assertions are an effort to demythologise Jomo Kenyatta and his dynasty. By demythologising Jomo Kenyatta, Jaramogi lionises himself, advancing the Mosaic stature interrogated and contested by Mutie and Kamau (2018).

The issue of landlessness and the failure to recognise the benefits of the peasantry insurgency in Kenya is the central theme in Kaggia's autobiography. In the early 1950s, Kenyan workers, peasants and other progressive forces led by the Mau Mau and its armed wing, Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA), took up arms against British colonialism and its internal agents. The armed struggle eventually forced British colonialism to retreat. Kenya became independent in 1963 under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party with Jomo Kenyatta as its president. An independent government could be expected to glorify the role that the Mau Mau played in the achievement of independence. But the opposite was, in fact, the case.

Among the Kikuyu, it is, therefore, a fact that the land tenure system was assaulted on two fronts: land lost to white settlement, and that lost to the newly landed gentry with access to a cash economy. In his autobiography, Kaggia castigates this latter lot for what he calls their "caution and gradualism" approach to African nationalism. Kaggia, like most of the Mau Mau stalwarts, came from a penurious background as was evidenced by the family's absolute landlessness. He avers that among the Kikuyu, as indeed in other agrarian societies in Kenya, no worse fate could befall a man than that of landlessness, the fate that had befallen his father for he was "a poor man who lived all his life outside his district."

Kaggia notes that he suffered many injustices in the army where racial discrimination was the order of the day. This is even though " … we are all human beings equal in the sight of God" (Kaggia 1975, 13). As seen in his autobiography, to narrate subalternity and arouse nationalism among the peasant, Kaggia launched *Inooro ria Gikuyu* and *Afrika Mpya* newspapers. By narrating how he founded these newspapers and became their editor, Kaggia's story exemplifies patriotism at two levels: the first is at the ethnic level, in his case, the taking up an active political position as owner and editor of the two newspapers, and wilfully taking and administering the Mau Mau oath. The second lay in his belief that the ideals of the Mau Mau, as espoused in the demand for "land and freedom," were nationalistic in intention, albeit clad in an ethnic cloak. To him, especially among the *Dini ya Kaggia* adherents, there was no contradiction between the two positions as much as there was no contradiction between one being a good Christian and a true nationalist, a good Christian and an African proud of his culture at the same time. These multiple stands by one of the most iconic churchmen in

Kenya today summarises the parallel, and complementary, strands that form the tapestry that is faith and nationalism.

As such, it may not be far-fetched to suggest that in such Christians, the Mau Mau found a kindred spirit. However, according to Gachihi (2014), the adherents of Independent Churches and Schools seem to have related to the Mau Mau oaths differently. The attachment of the members of the Mau Mau to these institutions had inevitably coloured their nationalist outlook. Although the linkages between these institutions and the Mau Mau remain contentious, a few observations concerning the oaths about the Christians affiliated to these churches is pertinent. It has been suggested by some scholars that the founding of Gikuyu Independent Schools and Churches was as much religious as cultural-political. Furthermore, as noted by Branch, "the whole issue underlying the movement was one of colonial enslavement, hence their ethos of African right of self-determination in politics, culture, and religion" (2011, 145). As such, it is difficult to divorce the aspirations of the adherents of these institutions from the struggle for justice and ultimately political liberation. As for the Mau Mau oaths, there is evidence to suggest that an inordinately large number of independent church and school affiliates not only took the Mau Mau oath(s) but that some of the leaders of these institutions allowed their churches and schools to be used as centres for "subversion" and for oath ceremonies.

While Kaggia appears, in his remarks, to want to justify his joining the ranks of the Mau Mau, his predicament poignantly captures yet another set of Christians with the certain awareness that they were saddled with a faith that was, in many ways, directly linked to the injustices of colonialism. His beliefs in *Dini ya Kaggia* also highlights the cultural disconnect arising from association with a faith that had inculcated in him the unworthiness of his customs and traditions, while teaching him the superiority of those of his Christian master.

Murumbi's autobiography, *A Path Not Taken*, presents political betrayal as occurring in Kenya through two perspectives. On a horizontal plane, there was betrayal among the elite which occurred in the form of political assassinations, and on the vertical plane, the ruling elite betrayed the masses:

> Sometimes you see, but what influenced me mainly as a vice president, and even when I was foreign minister, was to see the change in people's minds, that was taking place at that time. I realized that as their minds were changed, all the original intentions, good intentions we had of how to run the country, and how to look after the people who were poor or people who had no land, had no jobs these things were being forgotten. It was the personal interest of people which was paramount. And I didn't want to be associated with a government which was going to let down the people. Our struggle was with the people's struggle. (Murumbi 2015, 359)

Murumbi's autobiography suggests that with the achievement of independence in Kenya the transfer of power from the coloniser to a small African political elite groomed by the coloniser ensured the continued domination of the ordinary public. The autobiography asserts that independence did not benefit the Kenyan

subaltern. In a sense, thus, Murumbi's autobiography is a tool exposing and asserting a different version of history in Kenya. One of the narratives that his autobiography aims to reconstruct is that which had portrayed Jaramogi Odinga as the villain of the 1963 independence:

> But as far as I know, Odinga is not a communist. Odinga has one virtue, it never fails, that if you've helped Odinga, if you ever found him a good turn, he will never forget it and he will forever be grateful to you and always be your friend […] Odinga generally helped people in need, Mboya used people's needs to serve his own needs. As I've said before I've heard him say to a man 'why are you coming to me I paid you for it and that's the end of it.' (Murumbi 2015, 231)

For Murumbi, Jaramogi was a nationalist who was concerned about the welfare of the masses. He was not concerned with his selfish interests like Mboya whom Murumbi dismisses as "an overly ambitious man" (232). Arguably, Murumbi imagines himself as a representative of the subaltern. In this excerpt, he aims to represent the interests of Jaramogi who is silenced by the narratives that misrepresent him. Murumbi's portrayal of Jaramogi as generous and and as a mistake for the Old Man [Kenyatta] to have suspected him (233) serves the purpose of defending a threatened self. In defending Jaramogi's self, he has to narrate his subalternity before powers that threaten his life history.

However, Murumbi's autobiography, in a bid to portray Jaramogi's subalternity, unwittingly portrays another aspect of his would-be leadership. Murumbi argues that although he respected Jaramogi immensely, he had some reservations: " … and if Odinga came into power, I'm sure there would be people who would influence him in the wrong direction for their motives, with communist influence, that would not be in the interest of Kenya" (233). This portrayal presents Jaramogi not as a nationalist but a gullible leader.

Another instance where this inconsistency clouds Murumbi's portrayal of Jaramogi is when he narrates the rivalry between Jaramogi and Mboya: "It was, it was this rivalry between the two, not only for the leadership of the Luo but to be in second place after Kenyatta. And the whole object of the Limuru conference was to put Mboya in second place" (3). This observation portrays Jaramogi as a power-hungry leader and, although Murumbi writes subalternity into Jaramogi's persona, the appellation does not stick.

Thus, although the argument advanced in this paper regards subalternity as a driving force in the writing of the autobiographies of these leaders who reigned but never ruled in Kenya, these slippages may be pointers as to their real character traits. The autobiographies have a trickster trope that portrays these leaders as tricksters ready to dupe the Kenyan subaltern. The leaders are not what they say they are, and the way the other is presented in the point of narration depends on the political interests that the author or the protagonist wants to advance.

The titles of three autobiographies rely heavily on the ideographs of resistance. *Not Yet Uhuru*, *Roots of Freedom*, and *The Flame of Freedom* denote a movement

from a land of oppression to a free land. The narrative created here is that the journey to freedom has not borne fruits for the subaltern because the path that the country took was the wrong one. In *The Flame of Freedom*, and especially in his 2007 manifesto launch, Raila reiterates:

> 'All Kenyans of goodwill' I heard Ian say, 'recognize his contribution to democracy, peaceful development, and the fight for human rights and dignity. He is at home with all Kenyans: poor and rich, men and women, young and old, from north to south, and from east to west. Today he welcomes all who believe in the potential of this country and the dignity of all Kenyans, to join him on his journey. Ladies and gentlemen, I give you – Raila Odinga.' […] It was a moment in a lifetime and a very emotional one for me. I raised my hands in salute, utterly humbled by the outpouring of love and hope from Kenyans – so oppressed, for so long. (2013, 3)

Raila uses this passage to launch his presentation of his understanding of the burden of the Kenyan official history on the already oppressed masses. According to him, this history mutes the voices from the subaltern class. The oppressed group can only be saved by one of their own. Raila grabs the opportunity to present himself as a comrade in suffering from the subaltern. By doing this, he mythologises himself as the titan Prometheus[9] who suffers in the Caucus for the sake of the humans. Just like Prometheus, Raila uses his autobiography to catalogue his contributions to the Kenyan subaltern.

In storying his suffering for the sake of Kenyans, Raila aims to mythologise himself, making himself a titan in Kenyan politics. He is burdened by the weight of oppression of the Kenyan subaltern:

> 'Kenyans!' I appealed. 'If today you feel the same passion I feel for our country; if you want the same things I want, the same things I have fought for all my life; if you share my dream, if you share my will, if you share my determination; if you want us, as a nation, to grow into what our forefathers dreamed of; if you love your families and want the best for them; if you have a dream of being the best you can be – WE CAN WIN!' (2013, 4)

The subaltern political autobiography is audacious in presenting those aspects of Kenyan past that the official history has muted. Much of this history portrays the bourgeoisie's leadership in a bad light. For instance, Raila graphically illustrates what in the Kenyan opposition discourse has come to be largely regarded as the Kisumu massacre:

> There were bodies and loud wails everywhere. We sent Jaramogi back to Lakeside, and then I started counting until I could count no more. The official report said 59 had died but I know there were many more and countless others lay wounded. The shooting had been completely indiscriminate […] eight-year-old son, had been inside the house, some 30 meters from the road, watching the presidential motorcade from a window. One of the bullets went straight through and killed the boy […] on his way to Nairobi, Kenyatta passed Jubilee Market, in the Centre of Kisumu. His security detail shot dead two people in the street before the motorcade sped off to Ahero, some 20

> kilometers distant. There, two more people were killed, and shortly afterward another two died at Awasi Market. (Raila 2013, 50)

Here, Raila shows how the subaltern relates to the affluent in Kenya: the subaltern's life does not matter. The tone that Raila uses to represent how the indiscriminate killing was shows that the suffering of the masses does not in any way affect the ruling class. The subaltern is the wretched of the earth and, as such, any number can be sacrificed as long as the ruling class make a political point.

However, this paper notes that the purpose of the Kenyan subaltern political autobiography is not to expunge the ghost within Kenyan history, the one that thrives on sucking the blood of the subaltern, but aims to advance their interests. The history that has been consumed only serves particular interests of the political elite. In these autobiographies, the concept of ethnicity and poverty are constructed and commodified to be used to serve the interests of the leader, the protagonist in the autobiography, the trickster. This can be said with respect to the presentation of the theme of suffering in the four autobiographies. This theme is a construction that feeds on the narrative of subalternity that the Kenyan autobiographers aim to construct.

4. Conclusion

This paper has illuminated several points that help contest the idea of subalternity as advanced in Jaramogi, Kaggia, Raila and Murumbi's autobiographies. The paper has shown that these writers aim to reframe official Kenyan history by cunningly hiding in the hidden transcript of Kenya's history which they selectively unearth. By offering a different reading of the history of the country, the four autobiographers seemingly suggest that the problem with the nation comes from its inability to reimagine and reconfigure its narrative from the margins, the space in which, as seen in their autobiographies, they are located. The paper found out that the leaders who reigned but never ruled use(d) their autobiographies to front an image that portrays them as victims of the system while, at the same time, benefiting from the same system they seem to fight. Underscoring the dangers of a single story, the paper argues that the Kenyan political autobiography is imbued with rhetorical performances determined by the need to tell an effective story. Hiding behind the utopian concept of speaking truth to power, the leaders examined here project selves that are fearless, bold and revolutionaries aiming to mythologise themselves. This process is made possible in the contexts of historical (re)writing. Thus, Jaramogi, Kaggia, Raila and Murumbi's claim of victimhood and subalternity in their autobiographies are for disguise, deception, and misdirection while maintaining an outward impression, in power-laden situations, of willing, even enthusiastic consent. Situating the study along these lines requires an understanding of how the public transcript is constructed, how it is maintained, and the purposes it serves.

Notes

1. The term was introduced by Gramsci as a reference to a social group that is always subjected to the activity of the ruling groups (Gramsci 1971, 52). In this paper, the term subalternity is used to refer to the position or the condition of being a subaltern.
2. These are Kenyan leaders who, during a specific political epoch, became very popular and, although they commanded a huge following at specific periods in the nation's growth, they never ruled as elected presidents. These nationalist leaders question(ed) the excesses of the post-independence new states and thus played a crucial role in moulding the nation's character.
3. The meaning of this word is derived from Scott's (1992) influential book *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*. According to Scott "Hidden transcripts" is a concept often used in discussions of power and resistance, and it refers to forms of resistance and dissent that are kept out of sight of those in power. "Hidden transcripts": ideas and visions carefully kept below the radar by dissenting groups and individuals as a way of remaining safe in the face of power.
4. According to Scott (1992) public transcript is "the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate" (2). The public transcript is a conventional pattern of speech for the dominated, a stylised public performance through which they adopt the forms of deference and respect for the powerful that are needed to avoid conflict with the powerful.
5. Refers both to the public transcript and the hidden transcript.
6. According to Okola (1967), Peter Pans were African leaders who were unable to come to terms with the challenge of leadership and the onerous responsibilities which independence brings. These Peter Pans hoped to learn and think on the job, and this has been very costly for Africa.
7. The first Kenyan political martyr of the Indian ascent. He was assassinated for fighting for the subaltern.
8. In this biography, Goldsworthy argues that no nationalist, dynamic, intelligent and patriotic leader could be compared to Thomas Joseph Mboya in Eastern Africa. He did so much for Kenya during his short life on the earth, from work with trade unions to fighting for Kenya's independence from British colonial rule.
9. The mythological titan Prometheus as captured by Shelley (1842) contributed much humans who had to understand this fact when he listed his contributions to humanity's progress. Prometheus suffered much from the pain inflicted by the god Jupiter who repeatedly pierced his bleeding heart. According to Prometheus, humans needed shelter and guidance, drugs to stave off illness.

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