

**MARGINALIZATION DYNAMICS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON
NATIONAL COHESION IN KENYA: CASE OF MOMBASA COUNTY**

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been previously submitted for the award of another degree in any other University.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work posthumously to my late Father, Oyombra Wanyando, who out of love for education had his oxen plough grounded after he sold all the bulls to finance my high school education, and to the people of Mombasa that they may live to consider themselves as part of Kenya.

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ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS

| | | |
|---------|---|---|
| ACK | – | Anglican Church of Kenya. |
| BBI | – | Building Bridges Initiative |
| CAJ | – | Commission on Administrative Justice. |
| CLO | – | Crown Land Ordinance |
| CMS | – | Church Missionary Society |
| CPF | – | Coast People’s Forum |
| CRA | – | Commission on Revenue Allocation |
| CRPD | – | Centre for Research and Development |
| DRC | – | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| GOK | – | Government of Kenya |
| KII | – | Key Informant Interview |
| KPA | – | Kenya Ports Authority |
| LTO | – | Land Title Ordinance |
| MCA | – | Member of County Assembly |
| MICOSEA | – | Mijikenda Council of Elders Association |
| MOU | – | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MP | – | Member of Parliament |

- MRC – Mombasa Republican Council
- NACOSTI – National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
- NCIC – National Cohesion and Integration Commission
- UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

OPERATIONAL DEFINATION OF TERMS

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Achinatsi: | Mijikenda word for those who claim indigenous status (sons of the soil) |
| Autochthons: | Those who claim the indigenous status by virtue of the fact that they occupied a given territory as first inhabitants |
| Culture: | A set of shared values, attitudes, goals and practices that characterize a group of people |
| Elite Pacts: | Agreements between political leaders from across political divides |
| Ethnic Group: | A community of people sharing a common identity and common fate based on issues related to origin, kinship ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness, and shared history |
| Ethnicity: | Outlooks and practices that distinguish a group of people based on common ancestral, social, cultural or national experiences |
| Hegemonial Exchange: | The act of including politicians from different ethnic communities in government |
| Marginalization: | A situation whereby certain segments or regions in the society are confined to a lower or peripheral edge by being denied access to socio-economic, cultural or political benefits of the society |

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| National Cohesion: | The degree of social integration among communities and society at large and the extent to which mutual solidarity is expressed among individuals and communities |
| Political Elites: | Those individuals who hold disproportionate amount of wealth, privilege and political power and capable of mobilizing their communities or regions for a given course |
| Political Participation: | The extent to which individuals in society are able to form political organizations, freely articulate their political concerns and secure appointments to senior positions in government such as cabinet secretaries, principal secretaries and parastatal heads in process of allocating socio-economic and political benefits of the state |
| Politics: | Those activities geared towards the attainment of governmental power and the allocation of resources and values in a country |
| Religion: | A set of beliefs, dogmas, feelings and practices which define the relationship between human beings and the super natural |
| Wanyika: | Mijikenda word for people from the bush |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-------------|
| DECLARATION..... | ii |
| DEDICATION..... | iii |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENT | iv |
| ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS | vi |
| OPERATIONAL DEFINATION OF TERMS | viii |
| LIST OF FIGURES | xiii |
| LIST OF TABLES | xiv |
| ABSTRACT..... | xv |
| CHAPTER ONE | 1 |
| INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| 1.1 Background to the study..... | 1 |
| 1.2 Statement of problem | 14 |
| 1.3 Objective of the study | 16 |
| 1.3.1 Specific objectives | 16 |
| 1.4 Research Questions. | 16 |
| 1.5 Significance of the study | 17 |
| 1.6 Scope of the study | 18 |
| 1.7 Limitation and Delimitation of the Study | 19 |
| CHAPTER TWO | 21 |
| LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 21 |
| 2.1 Introduction | 21 |
| 2.2 Literature Review | 21 |
| 2.2.1 Conceptualization of Marginalization | 21 |
| 2.2.2 Socio-economic Marginalization and National Cohesion | 25 |
| 2.2.3 Cultural Marginalization and National Cohesion | 42 |
| 2.2.4 Political Marginalization and National Cohesion..... | 59 |
| 2.3 Theoretical Framework | 65 |
| 2.3.1 Relative Deprivation Theory | 66 |
| 2.3.2 Framing Theory | 68 |
| 2.4 Conceptual framework | 71 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| CHAPTER THREE | 73 |
| RESEARCH METHODOLOGY | 73 |
| 3.1 Introduction | 73 |
| 3.2 Research Design | 73 |
| 3.3 Study Site | 74 |
| 3.4 Target Population | 75 |
| 3.5 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size | 76 |
| 3.6 Data Collection Instruments | 79 |
| 3.7 Trustworthiness | 80 |
| 3.7.1 Credibility | 81 |
| 3.7.2 Dependability | 81 |
| 3.8 Data collection Techniques | 82 |
| 3.8.1 In-depth Interviews | 83 |
| 3.8.2 Focus Group Discussions | 84 |
| 3.8.3. Key Informant Interviews (KII) | 85 |
| 3.9 Data Collection Procedure | 86 |
| 3.10 Data Analysis and Presentation | 87 |
| 3.11 Ethical Considerations | 88 |
| CHAPTER FOUR..... | 90 |
| PRESENTATION OF STUDY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION | 90 |
| 4.1 Introduction | 90 |
| 4.2 Marginalization as conceptualized by residents of Mombasa County | 91 |
| 4.3 Socio-economic Marginalization and National Cohesion..... | 106 |
| 4.3.1 The Land Question | 107 |
| 4.3.2 Provision of Education | 128 |
| 4.3.3 Economic Development and Employment Opportunities | 144 |
| 4.4 Cultural Marginalization and National Cohesion..... | 161 |
| 4.4.1 Religious Marginalization and National Cohesion..... | 162 |
| 4.4.2 Ethnic Marginalization and National Cohesion..... | 170 |
| 4.5 Political Marginalization and National cohesion | 176 |
| CHAPTER FIVE | 186 |
| SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 186 |
| 5.1 Introduction | 186 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| 5.2 Summary | 186 |
| 5.2.1 Conceptualization of Marginalization | 187 |
| 5.2.2 Socio-economic marginalization and National Cohesion | 188 |
| 5.2.3 Cultural Marginalization and National cohesion..... | 190 |
| 5.2.4 Political Marginalization and National Cohesion..... | 191 |
| 5.3 Conclusion..... | 192 |
| 5.4 Recommendations | 193 |
| 5.4.1 Recommendations on Research Findings..... | 193 |
| 5.4.2 Recommendations for Further Research | 195 |
| REFERENCES..... | 196 |
| APPENDICES | 209 |
| Appendix I: Informed consent form for respondents | 209 |
| Appendix II: Interview/Focus Group Discussion Guide | 211 |
| Appendix III: KII Guide | 214 |
| Appendix IV: Research Authorization Permit from Kenyatta University Graduate School..... | 216 |
| Appendix V: Research Permit from NACOSTI..... | 217 |
| Appendix VI: Research Authorization Letter | 218 |
| Appendix VII: Research Authorization Letter (Nyali Sub-County) | 219 |
| Appendix VIII: Research Authorization Letter (Kisauni Sub-County)..... | 220 |
| Appendix IX: Research Authorization Letter (Mvita Sub-County)..... | 221 |
| Appendix X: Research Authorization Letter (Jomvu Sub-County) | 222 |
| Appendix XI: Research Authorization Letter (Changamwe Sub-County) | 223 |
| Appendix XII: Research Authorization Letter (Likoni Sub-County) | 224 |
| Appendix XIII: Map of Mombasa County | 225 |
| Appendix XIV: Budgetary Estimates | 226 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|--|----|
| Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework | 72 |
|--|----|

LIST OF TABLES

| | | |
|------------|--|-----|
| Table 3.1: | Population Census 2019..... | 75 |
| Table 3.2: | Sample Distribution of Interviewees | 76 |
| Table 3.3: | Targeted sample distribution by categories of residents..... | 77 |
| Table 3.4: | Actual sample distribution by categories of those finally interviewed...77 | |
| Table 3.5: | Targeted distribution for Focus Group Discussion participants | 78 |
| Table 3.6: | Actual distribution for those who finally took part in Focus Group Discussion | 78 |
| Table 3.7: | Distribution for Key Informant Participants | 79 |
| Table 4.1: | Number of Primary and Secondary Schools in Selected Counties Kenya | 132 |
| Table 4.2: | 2019 Basic Educational Enrolment in selected Counties in Kenya | 132 |
| Table 4.3: | Ethnic distribution of Kenya Ports Authority Limited staff | 150 |
| Table 4.4: | Ethnic Representation among senior staff at KPA | 151 |

ABSTRACT

Peaceful co-existences among various groups in the society is paramount for wellbeing and development. Regional, ethnic and religious inequalities and imbalances have increasingly become sources of tensions and social conflicts in many parts of the world. Marginalization, real or perceived, of certain groups and regions based on their ethnic background, place of origin, religious creed or any other distinctions, breeds hatred, erodes trust, undermines national development and may ultimately escalate into open hostilities thereby undermining national cohesion. The main objective of this study was, thus, to examine the marginalization dynamics and implications on national cohesion in Kenya with a focus on Mombasa County. The specific objectives of the study were to assess how the various communities in Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization; examine the socio-economic indicators of marginalization and their implications on national cohesion; analyse the cultural indicators of marginalization and how they are likely to impede on national cohesion; and to evaluate the implications of political marginalization on national cohesion. The study was carried out in Mombasa County, Kenya. Two theories guided the study: the Relative Deprivation Theory and the Framing Theory. While the Relative Deprivation Theory explains how inequalities among groups and regions are likely to cause conflict and undermine national cohesion in the society, the Framing Theory explains how the societal elites and/or media outlets construct frames around which a narrative is created for group mobilization to violence. The study adopted phenomenological research design using qualitative approach. Non-probability sampling techniques particularly purposive, stratified purposive and snowball techniques were used to obtain study participants from the six sub-counties that form Mombasa County. A total of 65 interviews, 19 Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and 7 Key Informants (KII) were conducted. Both primary and secondary sources of data were used in the study. The data collection instruments were semi-structured interview guides and F G D guides. Data collection techniques included interviews, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Data was analysed through critical discourse analysis and presented using narratives and verbatim quotations. The study revealed that marginalization of Mombasa County was both a reality and a perception. This could explain the tensions and restlessness that sometimes characterize the relationship between the locals and upcountry immigrants in Mombasa County. Further, the study revealed that even though marginalization was a key concern for Mombasa residents, resentments and tensions that threaten national cohesion are also as a result of relative privilege and reference to some treaties signed during colonial period. The study recommends, among others, equitable sharing of state resources, more decentralization of authority and resources, and enhanced hegemonial exchange in political leadership.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets the contextual framework of the study. It includes the background to the study, the statement problem, objectives of the study, research questions, justification and significance of the study, scope of the study, and limitations and delimitations of the study.

1.1 Background to the study

The ability to maintain a socially cohesive society is one of the main challenges facing many countries of the world, including Kenya. The various interests, such as those related to socio-economic, cultural and political benefits from the state against the backdrop of scarce resources sometimes create animosity among the different interest groups within the state.

National cohesion, as defined by Larsen (2011), is the process of constructing awareness or a sense of belonging among members of different groups in a polity through the regulation and reconciliation of differences as well as competing interests and demands. As a concept, national cohesion constantly reminds citizens of the need to be collectively attentive to and be aware of any kind of discrimination, inequality, marginality and exclusion. Jenson (2010) further posits that national cohesion is the capacity of the society to ensure the welfare of all its members by minimizing disparities and avoiding polarization. In the context of the foregoing, a cohesive society is one in which diversities such as those based on cultural, regional, religious or ethnic affiliations are managed in such a way that they become a source of mutual amelioration rather than a factor of division and conflict. Shola (2015) points out that national

cohesion is that act of all inhabitants of a given territory being able to peacefully co-exist within the territory of the state irrespective of their tribal or religious background, or other identities. Hence, according to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012), a cohesive society is one that works towards the wellbeing of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalization, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust and offers members opportunity for upward mobility.

Social cohesion as a concept has a long tradition in academic inquiry particularly in the fields of sociology, philosophy, history and economics (Caryn, 2016; Dragolov *et al.*, 2016; Vasta, 2010). The earliest reference to social cohesion can be traced to a 14th century political theorist, Thomas Hobbes, in his work the “Leviathan” in which he argued that to promote social cohesion in the society, members must subscribe to the authority of an absolute sovereign in the form of a monster who commands obedience from all in the society.

The concept social cohesion was further expounded by Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist, in his work “Division of Labour in the Society”. Durkheim observed that in any society, social cohesion is always maintained on the basis of two forms of solidarity – mechanical and organic solidarities (Dragolov *et al.*, 2016). According to Durkheim, mechanical solidarity characterized the life in traditional and primitive societies where social cohesion was maintained by homogeneity. Organic solidarity on the other hand is found in modern industrial societies in which social cohesion is based on the interdependence of individuals as a result of division of labour. Since Mombasa County is a home to people from diverse ethnic background and cultural outlooks, cohesion can only be maintained through interdependence and equity.

Although concerns of what keeps societies and communities glued together and what motivates individuals to co-operate are traceable to the centuries of old, social cohesion as an area of empirical research only gained more prominence from the 1990s with the end of cold war (Vasta, 2010). During cold war, the international system was bipolar whereby the two main protagonists – the United States of America (USA) and United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and their allies engaged in ideological conflict. This was also characterised by lesser intra state conflicts mainly because authoritative regimes particularly in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe were able to get protection and financial support by playing one super power against the other.

The end of the cold war, however, marked a paradigm shift. This is because, the end of cold war created a unipolar international system in which the USA became the sole super power. Consequently, the former authoritative regimes that previously had little regard for human rights, the rule of law, and the need to respect ethnic and religious diversities eventually lost the cold war card they played out to balance the superpower equation by playing one super power against the other (Vasta, 2010).

During the entire period of cold war, the real threat to peace and stability among nations was interstate conflicts. The end of cold war, however, witnessed an increase in intrastate conflicts of unprecedented nature (Yilmaz, 2007). Several ethnic, religious and linguistic groups that had for a long time considered themselves to be marginalized under the dictatorial regimes in places such as Yugoslavia, Romania, Indonesia, Sudan, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo, among others, engaged in new forms of nationalism to demand for their socio-economic, cultural and political rights thereby posing a serious threat to national cohesion (Caryn, 2016). This has therefore invited fundamental questions on how national cohesion could be maintained in multi-ethnic

societies. In this regard, Fonseca, Lukosch and Brazier (2019) adopts the Council of Europe's definition of social cohesion as the capacity of a society to ensure the wellbeing of all its members by reducing disparities and eradicating marginalization in order to minimise differences and divisions as a means of ensuring welfare for all. This perspective implies that inequalities and marginalization threaten social cohesion.

Marginalization refers to a situation whereby a region or a group of people are confined to a lower or peripheral edge of the society by being denied access to social-economic, cultural or political opportunities of the wider society (UNDP, 2015).

According to Marxist perspective, marginalization can be equated to alienation from means of production, mainly through oppression and unequitable distribution of opportunities (Richie, 1993). What this means is that, marginalization creates cores and peripheries as well as social power and privilege. Magnus (2020) further observes that, capitalism generates economic marginalization. Apart from marginalizing the owners of labour, those regions that enjoy capitalist penetration also experience higher levels of infrastructural development and other opportunities as compared to those regions that do not.

According to Etefa (2019), marginalization refers to the process of relegating, downgrading or excluding people from the benefits of the state. In this context, marginalization could be based upon persistent historical or cultural reasons or on social, economic and political choices made by those in control of the local, national or global system (Etefa, 2019).

According to Joan (2016), marginalization is in most cases a very subjective concept and may therefore be conceived differently by individuals in the society depending on who is defining it. As noted by Messiou (2006), individuals will define themselves as marginalised or not depending on their lived experiences. From the point of view of those who have not been able to access state resources and values such as schools, health facilities, roads, employment opportunities, and appointments to senior positions in government relative to other segments of the society, marginalization could be seen to be real. However, for those regions and groups that have enjoyed access to public resources and other state benefits, claims of marginalization may just be a perception. As observed by Debal (2010), marginalization in some cases is just a perception and has been used in many debates as a smokescreen behind which several ideological, ethnic, regional or religious battles are fought.

Sen (2000) relates marginalization to capacity deprivation whereby individuals, groups or regions are not empowered to be able to extract benefits from the society. From a sociological view point, marginalization is understood, in societal contexts, in terms of non-participation, non-integration and also in reference to exclusion of groups or sections of population from several key activities of society (Debal, 2010).

According to Billson (2005), marginalization has three manifestations: cultural marginalization which implies dilemmas of cross-cultural identities and assimilation; social role marginalization which refers to the tensions which occur if an individual is restricted from belonging to a positive reference group; and structural marginalization which refers to the social, economic and political powerlessness and disadvantage.

Longman (2018) observes that marginalization may sometimes be self-inflicted, by certain individuals, groups or regions. A group of people or regions may, for instance, fail to adjust to or embrace social change and emerging value systems, which eventually would negatively affect their future capabilities and development. In this regard, a region or a group of people may, for instance, because of their earlier decision to reject new technology, formal education, or embrace new religion, not be able to effectively compete with other regions or ethnic communities in the job market in future. This may, in the long run, leave them underdeveloped compared to those regions or communities that embraced social change or new value systems.

As pointed out by Ndzovu (2014), for instance, education in Kenya favoured those regions and communities that benefitted from Christian missionaries' penetration. The Muslims of Mombasa ended up being marginalized in the provision of education because of boycotting missionary schools, which they thought would corrupt their culture and religion. This original boycott of missionary schools and education system had long-term effect in terms of levels of education generally in the coast and particularly in Mombasa. The cumulative effect has been that, those regions that embraced missionary education, for instance, have continued to develop and advance as compared to those that did not.

The implication, nevertheless, is that, marginalization dehumanizes certain groups by denying them access to socio-economic and political opportunities, infrastructural development, respect for their culture and other basic needs that uphold human dignity (Idowu & Azeez, 2017). This could eventually breed hatred, erodes trust, undermines national development and may ultimately escalate into open hostilities thereby undermining national cohesion. The ethnic communities, religious groups and regions

that perceive themselves to be marginalized may mobilize to conflict thereby subverting national cohesion.

The issue of marginalization and how it is likely to undermine national cohesion has elicited substantial debate among conflict and peace scholars, economists, human rights advocates and political scientists across the globe. Internal conflicts around the world produce human tragedies on a colossal scale, create humanitarian crisis and destabilize countries and regions (Lessmann, 2015). Internal conflicts are also a major reason for underdevelopment, at least, due to destruction of parts of capital stock because of clashes. Lessmann (2015) further observes that, even the threat of conflict alone has a negative effect since it increases uncertainty and reduces the expected return on investment.

Throughout the world, there are several cases to demonstrate how marginalization, real or perceived, has contributed to the escalation of conflicts with devastating consequences in societies. The conflict in and the eventual disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, for instance, reveal that perceptions of marginalization of certain regions in terms of socio-economic, cultural and political benefits of the state served to fuel the armed struggle in a significant way (Agneza 2005). Pavlos (2014) observes that perceptions of marginalization of other regions such as Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Macedonia in terms of infrastructural development, employment opportunities, provision of social services, infringement on the right to religion and inequitable appointment to senior positions in government were exploited by the various federations to mobilize to violence leading to eventual disintegration of the former territory of Yugoslavia. As observed by Koos (2018), when individuals feel that they are not considered as valuable human beings with equal opportunities to economic,

social, political and cultural resources, they are likely to find it difficult to coexist with others.

Conflicts in Indonesia's pitting the Aceh region and the Jakarta regime which began in the 1950s and only partially ended in 2000 was mainly prompted by the Aceh region feeling marginalized in relation to other parts of the country (Cederman & Wucherpfenning, 2017). Members of the Aceh community felt that the enormous wealth from their region which significantly contributed to the nation's economy was not ploughed back to improve the region in terms of socio-economic and infrastructural development.

Africa, particularly the post-colonial Africa, has been plagued by internal conflicts and tensions. The conflicts have caused serious human suffering, ranging from the loss of millions of lives, displacement of populations, destruction of property, slow economic development and, in some cases, total disintegration and creation of new states such as South Sudan from the larger Sudan and Eretria from Ethiopia.

Scholars observe that the challenge to national cohesion in Africa may be traced to Berlin Conference of 1884-85 which divided Africa among the various colonial powers (Keller, 2014; Koos 2018; Oyugi, 1997; Thomson, 2004; Troco, 2018). The arbitrary drawing of boundaries lumped together various ethnic communities in total disregard of the previous cultural, economic, religious and political peculiarities. In some cases, an ethnic community such as the Somali, found itself divided among Kenya, Ethiopia and Somaliland (Thomson, 2004). Further, since the colonial economy was mainly extractive in nature, too much premium was placed on high potential regions at the

expense of areas considered to add little or no value at all to the overall colonial enterprise (Oyugi, 1997).

While writing on the tensions and perennial conflicts in the Nigeria, scholars have noted that political marginalization of certain groups or regions particularly those endowed with oil resources has served to provide a basis for group mobilization to engage in violent conflict which has consequently undermined national cohesion for decades in Nigeria (Asal *et al.*, 2015; Courson, 2011). These studies, however, only pay attention to political marginalization and how it has contributed to conflicts in the Niger Delta but do not elucidate how other dimensions of marginalization such as cultural and socio-economic have been responsible in the escalation of conflict. The present study intends to fill this gap by looking at other dimensions of marginalization and how they could affect national cohesion and stability

Scholars who have examined the conflict in Sudan such as (Abusharaf, 2013; Deng, 2001; 2012; Heather, 2005; Madibbo, 2012) all point to the nexus between marginalization and the onset of tensions and conflict in the society. The Sudan conflict that lasted for decades leading to subsequent secession of the South in 2011 was partly preceded by decades of marginalization and exclusion of the South and non-Muslims from the affairs of the state by the Arab North (Laku, 2017; Ylonen, 2008). As explicated by Troco (2018), unaddressed grievances related to marginalization motivate people to develop nationalist ideologies and formation of secessionist organizations. On his part, Vhumbunu (2018) argues that most movements that advocate for regional autonomy in Africa seem to converge on the grievances of marginalization, regional imbalance, underrepresentation and suppression based on various identities.

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 that led to the massacre of close to one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu in just three months was according to (Keller, 2014) largely because of marginalization. Similar sentiments are also expressed by Stewart, (2016) when he points out that, marginalization of the Hutu during colonial period and Tutsi in the post-colonial Rwanda, had significant bearing in the trajectory of the tensions and subsequent genocide. Further, Kavivya et al (2021) note that, the hatred and marginalization, for instance through ethnic quotas unfavourable to the Tutsi in a significant way contributed to the genocide that seriously undermined national cohesion.

Conflicts in Northern Uganda pitting the Lord's Resistant Army (LRA) against the government of President Museveni since mid-1980s undermining national cohesion have been partly linked to marginalization of the North by the government. Wasonga (2008) attributes the emergence of protracted conflicts to fundamental political and socio-economic cleavages premised on ethnic affiliation characterized by marginalization of some groups from power and the deliberate creation of structural economic differences across ethnic communities and regions. The LRA combatants have always perpetuated the narrative of marginalization of the Acholi in government, lack of development of the north and the failure to integrate the Acholi into the national identity of Uganda as some of the grounds for war with the government. According to Omona (2015), the ethnic and regional segregation that was set up by the colonists was perpetuated by the post-colonial regimes created a north-south divide making national cohesion in Uganda difficult.

Kenya generally has been characterized by tensions and restlessness among the various ethnic, religious and regional groupings which have threatened to impede national

cohesion especially since early 1990 with the re-introduction of the multi-party democracy (Oyugi, 2000). Conflicts and tensions have, for instance, been witnessed between pastoralists and agriculturists as has been the case between the Maasai and their Kikuyu neighbours in Ewaso Kedong area in Mai Mahiu (Nying'uro 2005); between Pokomo who are mainly farmers that embrace individual land ownership; and the Ormo pastoralists who subscribe to communal land ownership in Tana Delta (GOK, 2019.). Other intrastate conflicts have been premised on contestation for grazing land and pasture between pastoral communities for instance between Marakwet and the Pokot in Rift Valley.

Some of the tensions and conflicts have also revolved around competitive politics every election cycle since the introduction of multi-party politics as was the case in 1992, 1997, 2007 and 2017. The common denominator is that conflicts irrespective of their cause, lead to loss of lives and destruction to property, create mistrust, slow down economic development, and undermine national cohesion.

The conflicts, tensions and their eventual impediment to national cohesion in Kenya, like in many African countries, may be traced to colonialism. As earlier noted, the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 disregarded ethnic, geo-political, cultural and socioeconomic realities during the partitioning Africa into colonies and protectorates (Oyugi, 1994). Further, the colonists disproportionately developed their colonies concentrating infrastructure in areas with economic viability or potential. Accordingly, Wanyande (2016) observes that the policies that promoted ethno-regional inequalities and marginalization in Kenya can be traced to the colonial period. The implication of these colonial policies was that certain regions and ethnic groups benefited in terms of

socio-economic development and political inclusion while others continued to be marginalized thereby leading to identity formation of “in-groups” and “out-groups”.

Ogot (2000) posits that the weak and fragile structures created by the colonial regime heightened the ethnicization of the state, making ethnic, religious and regional considerations in the sharing of state resources useful than creating socially cohesive nations. The colonial legacy of skewed development pattern has been perpetuated by subsequent political regimes which have not done much to ameliorate the situation as those regions that enjoyed earlier benefits of the colonial enterprise have continued to enjoy comparative advantage over the others in terms of development and political inclusion (Muhula, 2009).

Despite the widely held view that marginalization of ethnic communities, religious groupings or regions may lead to group mobilization to violence thereby undermining national cohesion, other studies have found results that are at variance with this perception. Raleigh (2010), for instance, argues that there is little evidence that the most marginalized groups create or sustain conflicts and tensions that undermine national cohesion. According to Raleigh, most governments are worried about large groups that are politically coherent and capable of mobilizing their constituents to violence than the already marginalized groups. Similar sentiments are expressed by Stewart (2002) and Huber and Mayoral (2019) who argue that the marginalized are already poor and may not have the resources required to wage or sustain a conflict.

Other scholars argue that it is not only marginalization that may undermine national cohesion but sometimes endowment with natural or strategic resources (Asal *et al.*, 2015; Cederman, Weidmann & Bormann, 2015; Stewart, 2016). Regions rich in natural

or strategic resources may feel that they are disproportionately contributing to the national budget hence get involved in secessionist conflicts as was the case in former Yugoslavia, the Basques region of Spain, the Niger Delta in Nigeria or the Southern Sudan in the former Sudan.

The thrust of this thesis is that even though there are several other factors that may undermine national cohesion in Kenya, marginalization, real or perceived, stands out to be of great significance. Throughout the years in the pre- and post-colonial Kenya, the narrative of marginalization has dominated the political debate. The argument has been that certain ethnic communities, religious groupings and regions have been able to make considerable strides in development using the national resources as others continue to lag behind. This has often led to ethnic conflicts and regional outbursts in many parts of Kenya, including Mombasa County.

Interestingly, the coastal region and Mombasa in particular has not witnessed conflicts that have threatened national cohesion in the range of those witnessed for instance in Rift Valley, Nairobi and Nyanza regions. However, the tensions in coastal Kenya and Mombasa specifically are unique in that unlike other conflicts which have mainly pitted ethnic communities against each other, conflicts in Mombasa even though sometimes have displayed ethnic expressions are also directed at the national government coupled with the demands for secession.

A number of scholars have documented marginalization of Mombasa County. Mutinda, Kipruto and Maluki (2018), for instance, focused on socio-economic marginalization, and how it has contributed to recruitment of the youth to Al-Shabaab in Mombasa. Botha (2014) also did a study and found out that marginalization of the Muslim culture

and religion is the main cause of the youth joining Al-Shabaab. Ndzovu (2018) looked at how feeling of marginalization has led to religious indoctrination and Muslim-Christian discourse in Mombasa. Deacon, Gona, Mwakimako and Willis (2017) studied how the Muslim-Christian divide undermined cohesion in Mombasa. Chome (2013) focused on how marginalization of the coastal Members of Parliament (MPs) at the national level has led to the emergence of alternative voices such as Mombasa Republican Council among others to champion the coastal interest.

Despite this understanding, relatively little empirical research has been conducted in Kenya to analyse how marginalization is likely to undermine national cohesion. Further, most studies on marginalization and national cohesion have been done outside Kenya. A question therefore remains whether or not real or perceived marginalization of Mombasa indigenous communities could threaten national cohesion in Kenya.

1.2 Statement of problem

When Kenya attained political independence in 1963, the dream of the nation was, as envisioned by her founding fathers, a nation that is prosperous, socially cohesive, and devoid of conflict, tensions, inequality and exclusivity. These aspirations were partly captured in the national anthem thus: May we dwell in unity, peace and liberty, plenty be found within our borders.

To realize this dream, the different post-colonial regimes have come up with policies and interventions to reverse the colonial legacy which led to entrenched marginalization of certain communities and regions. Some of the efforts thus far include the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, Vision 2030, the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission as a way of promoting national cohesion and

diffusing ethno-regional tensions fueled by marginalization. The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 in its article 10 (2) (b), for instance, identifies marginalization as a serious threat to national cohesion and provides that *“the constitution shall endeavour to promote human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalized”*.

The most recent effort in addressing ethnic and regional disparities that cause animosity thereby undermining national cohesion is the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 2020, famously known as the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) which was passed by the two houses of Kenyan parliament as at the time of writing this thesis. In its section six (6), the act identifies marginalization in socio-economic, political and cultural spheres of life as a major hindrance to national cohesion in Kenya.

Even though the various legislations and policy interventions have been adopted by the post-colonial political regimes with the aim of promoting fairness, justice, respect for diversity, and equitable sharing of resources across regions, the results have notably been contrary. Mombasa County has for instance, continued to witness ethnic and religious tensions and outbursts based on narratives of marginalization.

The national predicament, therefore, resides in the fact that despite the various legislative frameworks, policy interventions and public statements to minimize marginalization in Kenya, ethnic, religious and regional narrative framing around marginalization continue to manifest.

This study therefore seeks to answer the question that despite efforts towards inclusivity and equity within the Kenyan society, marginalization continues to be used as a frame

around which to mobilize residents of Mombasa County against the government and those considered to be “foreigners”.

This study therefore focuses on marginalization dynamics and its implications on national cohesion. By this, the study intends to get into the world of a people who claim to be marginalized and to analyse what they mean by being marginalized as a way of informing national cohesion.

1.3 Objective of the study

The main objective of this study was to examine the dynamics marginalization and implications on national cohesion in Kenya.

1.3.1 Specific objectives

The study was guided by the following specific objectives:

- i. To assess how the various communities in Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization.
- ii. To examine the indicators socio-economic aspects of marginalization and how they could affect national cohesion.
- iii. To analyse the nexus between cultural marginalization and national cohesion.
- iv. To evaluate the implications of political marginalization on national cohesion.

1.4 Research Questions.

- i. How do the various communities in Mombasa County conceptualize marginalization?
- ii. What are the implications of socio-economic indicators of marginalization on national cohesion?

- iii. To what extent does cultural marginalization affect national cohesion?
- iv. In what ways does political marginalization impede national cohesion?

1.5 Significance of the study

Peaceful co-existence among communities, religious groupings and regions is paramount for the development, stability and growth of any society. The desire for Kenyan society to live together as one harmonious nation has, however, been under serious threat from time to time due to some sections of the society feeling marginalized. The tensions and restlessness in Mombasa County sometimes coupled with the demand for secession by a section of the political class and the members of the Mombasa Republican Council with their clarion call “*Pwani sio Kenya*” (Coastal region is not part of Kenya) should worry the government and those who envision a socially cohesive Kenyan society. Mombasa County was significant in this study not because it is the most marginalized but because the marginalization narrative in Mombasa has also been coupled with the demands for secession.

The importance of this study was therefore premised on the fact that it sought to examine the implications of perceptions of marginalization among residents of Mombasa County on national cohesion. The study envisaged that such an examination was necessary to provide a better understanding of how real or perceived marginalization of communities, religious groupings and regions can hamper national cohesion.

Considering that the perceptive element as well plays in the mind of the people, and given that people’s actions are in some cases driven by what they perceive, this study will add to the body of knowledge of scholars in peace and conflict studies, governance,

economists, political scientists and human rights advocates among others on how to come up with initiatives that do not only focus on real marginalization but the perceptive element as well.

The findings of this study could be applied to enrich the efforts of institutions such as the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) and other relevant agencies in terms developing and implementing policies aimed at reducing levels of marginalization and promoting national cohesion in Kenya. Future researchers interested in peace and conflict studies, governance, and human rights among others may also interrogate the findings of this study in their endeavour to carry out further investigation on how national cohesion may be maintained in multi-ethnic societies.

The society, in general, will benefit in that the study findings may influence policy and address issues of marginalization. This will greatly reduce the motivation by various segments of the society to mobilize to violence. This study has demonstrated that for sustainable peace and national cohesion to be realized, the government needs to put certain measures in place. These measures should be those that aim at creating a Kenyan identity, economic empowerment, socio-economic inclusion, infrastructural development, political inclusion and cultural tolerance among others.

1.6 Scope of the study

This study sought to investigate the dynamics of marginalization and implications on national cohesion in Kenya. Conducted in Mombasa County Kenya, the study covered all the six sub-counties namely Mvita, Nyali, Changamwe, Kisauni, Likoni and Jomvu. The study focused on indicators of marginalization and specifically on variables such as socio-economic, cultural and political marginalization. The study assessed the

implications of these variables on national cohesion in Kenya. While appreciating that some parts of the country and more specifically the coastal region have been restless and marred by perennial conflict, the study was, however, geographically limited to Mombasa County. The study adopted a purely qualitative approach using phenomenological research design.

1.7 Limitation and Delimitation of the Study

In the process of undertaking this study, the researcher experienced some challenges.

First and foremost, some respondents realizing that this research was for completion of a Ph.D. programme in the School of Security, Diplomacy and Peace Studies were reluctant to participate in the study fearing that the information they provide could end up being shared by the state security agencies and used to victimize them. However, the researcher overcame this by producing the various authorization documents and assuring the respondents that the study was purely for academic purposes and not meant to victimize them in any way. Further, the researcher and the research assistants assured the respondents that confidentiality would be maintained and where the respondents so wished, their identities would be kept secret and would not feature in the report.

Secondly, given the diversity of respondents in terms of their ethnic, religious and racial outlooks, the study was affected by attribution whereby some respondents expressed biases by, for instance, attributing the positive events to themselves and blamed those events or outcomes that were negative on others. The researcher addressed this by making reference to secondary sources of information to corroborate the information received from respondents.

Thirdly, since the study focused on people's lived experiences, some respondents particularly the elderly exhibited selective memory by not being able to provide accurate accounts of certain events. The researcher addressed this through focus group discussions (FGDs) and further consultation of secondary sources of information.

Language barrier also became a challenge particularly among the elderly who could not comprehend the language in which the research tools were developed and the researcher who had a problem with some words used by the respondents. This problem was, however, addressed through the assistance of one of the research assistants from Mombasa who also doubled as an interpreter.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the related literature and academic discourses about marginalization and national cohesion, and the theoretical framework. The literature reviewed is based on the specific objectives of the study. It discusses the socio-economic, cultural and political marginalization and how they may impede on national cohesion. The rationale for the review of literature is to theoretically contextualize the present study and identify inconsistencies and gaps in relation to marginalization and national cohesion.

2.2 Literature Review

This section presents discussion on how the study variables interact with each other. The variables, as per the objectives of the study, are national cohesion – as the dependent variable and, marginalization manifested in socio-economic, cultural and political horizontal inequality – as independent variables.

2.2.1 Conceptualization of Marginalization

Marginalization can be conceptualized in various ways depending on factors such as region of origin, ethnic affiliation, religious creed and racial background among others. Marginalization manifests itself in different forms and levels and may form part of people's lived experiences if internalized (Messiou, 2006). Longman (2018) posits that marginalization is sometimes a very idiosyncratic concept such that even those belonging to the same community, race, and religion or occupying the same territorial space may have different conceptualizations of marginalization. Within a community,

for instance, the minority of individuals who, because of their personal efforts in education, have been able to secure salaried jobs may not conceive of themselves as marginalized in relation to other members of the same society as far as employment opportunities are concerned. Such individuals who have made personal efforts, for instance, in education and ended up being successful may therefore view marginalization just as a perception.

According to Joan (2016), individuals in any society conceptualize marginalization differently depending on their lived experiences such that certain individuals may consider themselves to be marginalized but, in the eyes of others, they are not. In this context, for instance, the indigenous residents of Mombasa County may perceive themselves to be marginalized but in the eyes of those from upcountry they are not. Longman (2018) further notes that individuals will consider themselves as marginalized or not depending on their ability to access benefits that accrue from the state such as appointment to senior positions in government, being granted permission to practice their culture, and infrastructural development among others.

As observed by Messiou (2006), marginalization can sometimes be self-inflicted. What this means is that some regions or communities may, for instance, based on their religious or cultural orientation fail to adjust to prevailing behavior patterns or societal norms hence end up marginalizing themselves. For instance, people who fail to embrace the prevailing value system or social change such as formal education due to cultural or religious factors, may, in future, not be able to enjoy comparative advantage over others in the job market due to lack of requisite academic qualifications hence perceive themselves as marginalized.

In this regard, residents of Mombasa County over time have not had a consensus on what constitutes marginalization. Mombasa County is home to various ethnic, religious and racial groupings. These various identities in essence create competing fault lines on how to conceptualize marginalization. As pointed out by Willis and Chome (2014), the shared sense of marginalization has not been, in itself, enough to create a political community of *Wapwani* (the coastal people) because the potential community is divided as to how exactly to understand their marginalization. They further note that different conceptualizations of marginalization divide the community into smaller identities such as Arabs, Mijikenda, upcountry immigrants, Swahili, Muslims and Christians among others. Accordingly, Chimerah (2013) notes that the coastal residents do not trust or respect one another but at best hate one another. This has, as pointed out by Ndzovu (2014), increased tensions among the presumed Mombasa residents.

The local communities such as the Mijikenda, for instance, view marginalization in relation to the loss of their ancestral land to the Arabs, Swahili, Europeans and upcountry communities (Chome, 2013). Further, the Mijikenda conceive marginalization in terms of lack of employment opportunities, low levels of political participation, and inadequate infrastructural development such as roads, educational institutions and health facilities among others.

Arabs, on the hand, conceive marginalization in terms of loss privilege acquired during colonialism and domination of Islam by Christianity. Further, the encroachment on their private land and being referred as foreigners by section of the local population constitute marginalization. As pointed out by the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) (2012), the coastal residents of Arab descent have complained of being

marginalized in the issuance of identification documents, particularly after the rise of international terrorism.

Conceptualization of marginalization in Mombasa also takes a religious dimension particularly between the two major religious groupings: Christians and Muslims. Muslims, for instance, consider themselves to be marginalized by the government, which they view to have been largely composed of upcountry Christians since independence (Deacon *et al.*, 2017). This marginalization is manifested in areas such as education, employment opportunities, infrastructural development and being unfairly targeted by law enforcement officials for arrest on suspicion of belonging to terrorist organizations such as Al Shabaab (Mghanga, 2010).

However, majority of the Christians in Mombasa have a completely divergent view of marginalization from that of their Muslim counterparts. According to Ndzovu (2017), Christians in Mombasa believe that marginalization has not spared any religion and therefore it is not accurate for the Muslims to claim that they are the most marginalized. Marginalization narrative advanced by Muslims is therefore only used as a smokescreen to perpetuate jihadist ideology targeted at Christians (Ndzovu, 2017).

On the political front, marginalization has been conceived by residents of Mombasa from the point of view of low status of the coastal politicians in national politics and the low socio-economic levels of those who consider themselves as indigenous coastal communities (Chome, 2013). The coastal politicians have been seen to be marginalized and less influential at the national level. Consequently, they have not been able to articulate coastal issues and share in the spoils of the state such as development projects or high-level appointments in government (Deacon *et al.*, 2017).

From the foregoing, there is no convergence in the studies on the conceptualization of marginalization. External studies present inconsistencies in the manner in which individuals or groups conceptualize marginalization; for instance, as an idiosyncratic phenomenon (Longman, 2018) or one that could even be self-inflicted (Messiou, 2006). While the current study reasonably hinges on these constructs, it proceeds to investigate ramifications of marginalization on national cohesion.

Similarly, local studies provide insight on the subject of marginalization from largely singular perspectives: political (Willis & Chome, 2014), religious (Chimerah, 2013; Ndzovu, 2014; Deacon *et al.*, 2017), ancestry or descent (Chome, 2013; CRA, 2012) and socio-economic (Mghanga, 2010). No single study was found to address the phenomenon of marginalization in a broad and multiple perspective, something the present study embarked on as conceived in its first, second, third and fourth objectives. The first object interrogates marginalization from the point of view of communities (ancestry or descent), the second objective consider the socio-economic domain (such education, employment and infrastructural development), the third objective assess the cultural aspect (religious and ethnicity), while the fourth objective focuses on the political dimension of marginalization. It is envisioned that such an eclectic approach would generate diverse and robust data which the scholars and other stakeholders would find useful in shaping the discourses on marginalization and national cohesion.

2.2.2 Socio-economic Marginalization and National Cohesion

Socio-economic marginalization refers to the various forms of disadvantages to which some segments of the population or regions are subjected in terms of the socio-economic benefits that accrue from the state (Langer & Stewart, 2013). Socio-economic marginalization in some cases is brought about by different factors such as ecological

and climatological differences, the distributions of natural and other strategic resources, and historical circumstances such as colonial policies which favoured certain groups and regions over others leading to those ethnic communities or regions having undue advantage over others in distribution and sharing of state resources (Østby, 2013; Raleigh, 2010; Wanyande, 2016).

According to Stewart (2012), socio-economic marginalization does not just happen overnight but is a cumulative process, sometimes lasting for decades before its impacts become visible. Initial position of privilege could lead to a long-term cumulative advantage. This eventually leads to a situation whereby certain ethnic communities and regions enjoy opportunities such as access to infrastructural facilities such as roads, factories, educational institutions, and health facilities while others lag behind (Wanyande, 2016). The unequitable socio-economic development opportunities consequently create the “in group” and “out group” distinctions as those who miss out on development initiatives of the state begin to feel relatively deprived.

Socio-economic marginalization has long been recognized to contribute to conflict and social disorder within states or regions (Gurr, 1970; Østby, 2013; Richmond 2014; Stewart, 2016). As observed by Stewart (2016), socio-economic marginalization provides incentives for individuals, particularly those who are relatively poorer than the country average, to conflict. Related to ideas by Stewart (2016), is the argument by Troco (2018) and Langer (2005) that intergroup socio-economic marginalization increases intergroup hostility, which can escalate to conflict thereby undermining national cohesion. Particularly, large segments of unemployed males reduce the cost and provide incentives for the political entrepreneurs to engage in grievance formation and group mobilization (Koos, 2018). The risk of grievance formation and group

mobilization to violence is heightened where individuals believe that their socio-economic conditions are a deliberate effort by the government to marginalize them (Stewart, 2016).

Large disparities in wealth distribution intensify feelings of relative deprivation and marginalization that can lead to violent mobilization along the lines of communal, ethnic, religious or regional identities (Fjeide & Østby, 2014). Borrowing from framing thesis, socio-economic marginalization is viewed to catalyse antagonism between groups and regions and a possible basis upon which elites could create a frame for group mobilization. Collective socio-economic grievance framing and frustrated aspiration often stem from intergroup comparisons, which could be based on ethnic, religious, regional and racial distinctions therefore enhancing in-group out-group identities (Langer, 2005; Stewart, 2016).

Unequitable access to state resources and services such as education, employment opportunities, physical infrastructure and land across groups breeds tensions and hostility between groups or regions that are considered to be enjoying comparative advantage and those that are not (Fjeide & Østby, 2014). The hostility is normally directed against groups seen to have a greater access to state resources (Langer & Brown, 2016). Even though the unequal access in the distribution of spoils from the state could be brought about by deliberate government policy decisions, ironically, the aggrieved groups, in most cases, do not direct their violence at the state but instead at the other ethnic, racial or religious groups that are perceived to be connected to the political regime in power (Østby, 2010). This mostly happens because it is easier and less risky to direct anger and frustration at another group than attack the state installations.

Alcorta, Swedlund and Smits (2020) for instance, find a connection between marginalization in the provision of education and the emergence of conflict. Education is a public social good that most citizens in a country should procure regardless of their social or economic status. Education can reduce the chances of conflict by promoting economic growth, reducing the size of the recruitment pool for militant organizations and increasing opportunity cost for young people to be mobilized to violence (Alcorta, Swedlund & Smits, 2020). Groups that are marginalized in the provision of education have a higher tendency to engage in violent conflicts. Low levels of education reduce chances of getting employment opportunities and increase the pool from which ethnic, religious or regional elites can mobilize to violence.

In a study on the conflict in East Jerusalem, Pressmann (2020) and Kimhi (2010) argue that there is a nexus between conflicts that have plagued the city of Jerusalem in Israel and socio-economic marginalization. Socio-economic development in terms of roads, healthcare facilities, and educational infrastructure, among others, are skewed in favour of West Jerusalem, which is predominantly occupied by the Jews, whereas East Jerusalem, which is inhabited by the Palestinians, is largely marginalized in the provision of socio-economic infrastructure (Pressmann, 2020).

These feelings of marginalization have served to crystalize the in-group and out-group dichotomies between Jews and Palestinians leading to perennial conflicts in Israel. Borrowing from the framing theory, the media outlets sympathetic to Palestinians have, for example, used the low levels of socio-economic development as a frame for narrative creation. This has led to sporadic attacks on Jewish institutions and critical infrastructures by suspected suicide bombers as a protest against marginalization of the Eastern Jerusalem, significantly jeopardising national cohesion in the state of Israel.

Interestingly, the findings of the studies by Pressmann (2020) and Kimhi, (2010) are contrary to those of other scholars (Cederman, Weidmann & Bormann, 2015; Langer, 2005; Stewart, 2002: 2016) who posit that marginalization will lead to group mobilization to conflict mostly when socio-economic and political marginalization are in the same direction. However, in the case of East Jerusalem, Pressmann (2020) found that the elite do not play any significant role in narrative formation and group mobilization. The attackers were found to be sole individuals without any elite mobilization or coordination.

Even though the present study could draw some significant lessons from the Jerusalem situation since Mombasa County has as well experienced attacks carried out by just a few individuals, the study by Pressman only brings out how maintaining social cohesion has been difficult in the city of Jerusalem. The present study however looks at how the marginalization of Mombasa County could have implications on national cohesion in Kenya generally.

Closer home, in Africa, perennial conflicts in the Niger Delta in Nigeria have been motivated by the feeling among the local communities that the Nigerian state has demonstrated high levels of economic marginalization of the region (Courson, 2011; Shola, 2015). The contention among the local communities has been that even though the region contributes approximately 80% of the Nigeria's national budget, it has continued to lag behind in socio-economic development with close to 90% of the population living below poverty line. Further, the region has little infrastructural development (Kaur, 2020). Langer and Stewart (2015), note that the Boko Haram Islamic fundamentalists who agitate for the creation of an autonomous Islamic state in northern Nigeria have been motivated by the marginalization of the north in terms of

socio-economic development. Many male unemployed youths have easily become candidates for recruitment to the Boko Haram militant group. Although the above scholars' views are not directly related to the current study area, they bring to the fore fundamental questions for this study. For instance, they provide an insight on how the presence of a large population of unemployed youth could provide a pool from which to recruit rebels.

In East Africa, scholars such as (Madibbo, 2012; Troco, 2018; Vhumbunu, 2018) concur that the rebellion of Southern Sudan that culminated in the secession of the south in 2011 was largely fuelled by real or perceived marginalization of the Southern Sudan in terms of socio-economic development by the North's dominated political regimes. Troco's study even though providing some rich insight on the role of marginalization of the south in the conflicts is not only limited to marginalization but looks at some other determinants of the secession as well. For instance, the study focuses on the role of external factors as well. Vhumbunu's study interrogated the causes of Sudan secession and the lessons the African states could learn from it. The study, purely based on secondary sources of data, found that centuries of marginalization of the Southern Sudan in terms of socio-economic development was critical in the conflict that finally led to the secession of the south. This study was however limited, in that, it, apart from only relying on secondary sources of information, placed more emphasis on the lessons the African states could learn from it. The current study, however, sought to interrogate the Kenyan scenario by interrogating both primary and secondary sources of information.

Similarly, the conflicts that have plagued northern Uganda for decades causing thousands of deaths displacements and suffering among the local communities have

been partly attributed to the neglect of the northern Uganda in terms of socio-economic development; first, by the British colonialists, then, by the post-independent political regimes (Omona, 2015; Wasonga, 2008). In a Ph.D. study examining the contradiction between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and local peace initiatives in northern Uganda, Wasonga argues that a significant size of the population blamed the conflict on marginalization of the northern Uganda in terms of socio-economic development. The regional imbalance created by the colonial government and perpetuated by the post-colonial state has seriously undermined national cohesion (Wasonga, 2008). Although the current study draws some parallels with this study, the study under review focused on the contradiction between the pursuits of justice and peace through the ICC and the local Acholi initiatives. The main question in the current study, however, is how marginalization of a certain region in a country would likely undermine national cohesion.

In Kenya, socio-economic marginalization has been and remains one of the single most determinants of political contest, sometimes fuelling the kind of post-elections violence witnessed in 2007/2008 (Muhula, 2009). According to Wanyande (2016) and Stewart (2010), regional marginalization in Kenya is traceable to the colonial regime which favoured the development of certain regions while neglecting others on the basis of economic viability.

Socio-economic marginalization in Kenya mostly manifests itself in unequal access to land, skewed development of physical infrastructure, and disproportionate provision of social services such as education and health facilities among others. This has led to disunity, tensions and sometimes open hostilities among communities and regions. The Rift Valley region has, for instance, experienced conflicts particularly since the advent

of multi-party politics. The conflicts which have largely occurred every election circle have been attributed to marginalization in the access, use and allocation of land (Boone, 2017; Klaus, 2020; Morten & Dunn, 2013; Oyugi, 2000).

Boone (2017) points out that the state's appropriation and allocation of land in the Rift Valley from colonial era was largely skewed in favour of certain regions (hence, communities) while marginalizing others. The first post-colonial regime perpetuated the irregular allocation of land by favouring the president's community while marginalizing those who claimed the autochthonous status like the Kalenjin and the Maasai communities (Onguny & Gillies, 2019). The political violence that occurred in Rift valley in 1992, 1997, 2007/2008 could therefore be associated with marginalization in access to land. Land is a critical economic resource for the wellbeing of communities particularly in agrarian societies such as Kenya. People depend on land for their socio-economic wellbeing. The allocation, access and use of land therefore become very political, emotive and competitive because it directly affects people's livelihood.

Mombasa and, by extension, the entire coastal region have from time to time claimed that they are socio-economically marginalized. Socio-economic conceptions of marginalization of Mombasa have centred around access to land, infrastructural development, employment, and provision of social services such as education and health care among others (Mazrui, 2011; Mghanga, 2010; Ndzovu, 2014; Willis & Chome, 2014)

Marginalization in terms of land allocation, use and access has been very emotive in Mombasa and coastal region generally (CRA. 2012; Kanyinga, 2016). As observed by Kanyinga (2016), marginalization in terms of land ownership among the Mijikenda

dates back to pre-colonial period during the Arab occupation. The land ownership issues were however exacerbated during the British colonialism when a series of legislation such as Crown Land Ordinance (CLO), 1902 and Land Title Ordinance (LTO), 1908 were promulgated leading to the loss of Mijikenda land mainly to the Arabs and Swahili (Okoth, 2000; Syagga, 2012; Kanyinga, 2016; Chimerah, 2013). The CLO provided that any land not occupied becomes government land while LTO required that individuals who had legitimate claim to land be issued with title deeds for the land they owned.

The LTO, 1908 complicated the Mijikenda land question leading to their further marginalization in land ownership. As pointed out by Okoth (1991), according to the Mijikenda customs and traditions, land was considered to be a deity and could not therefore be owned individually but collectively. The implication of this was that, as the Arab and Swahili were laying claim to large tracks of land and acquiring titles for them, the Mijikenda were left landless on the basis of their culture that prohibited individual land ownership.

The post-colonial political regimes did not take any serious steps to correct marginalization in land allocation of the Mijikenda. Instead, it did not only preserve the land rights of the Arabs and Swahili but also engaged in further appropriation of the Mijikenda land (Kanyinga, 2016). Accordingly, CRA (2012) and Syagga (2012) point out that the land question is a problem that has bedevilled the Mijikenda community for centuries. Since colonialism, the Mijikenda have been marginalized in land allocation. For instance, during President Jomo Kenyatta's regime, the Land Act Cap 280 laws of Kenya gave the president all the powers to among other things allocate and lease land. This Act was, for example, applied to allocate land including the prime beach plots to

political cronies, senior government officials and their close relatives (Syagga, 2012; Kenya Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung'u Land Report), 2004; Kanyinga, 2016). The effect has been that there are large tracks of land owned by Arabs, Swahili and upcountry immigrants while the indigenous Mijikenda community live as squatters (Mghanga, 2010).

Land is a critical socio-economic resource whose access, allocation and ownership are emotive because, to a large extent, they determine the economic wellbeing of individuals. As noted by Klaus (2020) land is not just a primordial inheritance but also a means of production and wealth creation. Among other things, farming can be a very profitable economic undertaking that can be used to create wealth while land title can be used as a security to get credit from financial institutions for personal development. As noted by Warah (2017) and Mghanga (2010), land is an economic resource and where people do not own the land they occupy, their prospects for development are diminished making land related issues very emotive and political. According to Mghanga (2010), much of the Mombasa Island and mainland including Kisauni, Changamwe, Likoni and Mtongwe are owned by absentee landlords of Arab and Swahili origin who continue to collect land rent through their agents from Mombasa while the indigenous community continues to stay there as squatters. Lack of title deeds therefore means that the majority of the Mijikenda cannot for instance embark in long term development plans for the land they occupy or access credit facilities from financial institutions for personal development.

As noted by Klaus (2020), the illegitimacy or marginalization in land allocation can foment grievances and lead to the formation and perpetuation of narratives that incite

or mobilize people to violence. This is particularly the case where autochthons perceive themselves to have been marginalized at the expense of the outsiders.

Socio-economic marginalization in Kenya has also been conceived from inadequate provision of educational services. According to Stiftung (2012), the way in which different regions and communities had access to education is important for understanding the perpetuation of marginalization in Kenya since independence. Education is universally regarded as the basis for material advancement, and increasing individuals' chances for employment and status mobility (Stiftung, 2012). The implication is that those regions and ethnic communities that had the privilege of getting education were advantaged over the others. Consequently, access to education helped entrench marginalization instead of reducing socio-economic structures inherited during colonialism.

According to CRA (2012), regions and ethnic communities that missed the opportunity to engage with Christian missionaries in the past were marginalized in the provision of education. They, thus, were deprived of the invaluable returns associated with modern education such as reduction of poverty and improvement of quality of life.

Mombasa County and by extension the entire coastal region has as well historically considered itself marginalized in the provision of education (CRA, 2012). As observed by Eisemon, (2000) although the Mombasa people were the first to be exposed to modern education, their attainment rate remains one of the poorest in Kenya. In fact, Mazrui (2011) while referring to delayed creation of a public university in coastal Kenya was more forthright by observing that "the people of Mombasa were the first to be literate but the last to graduate". Unlike other coastal communities in Africa such the

Yoruba and Ibo of Nigeria, the levels of education of coastal communities in Kenya have remained relatively low. (Eisemon, 2000) notes that marginalization of Mombasa in terms of provision of education can be traced to colonial period. During colonialism, schools were built for the Arabs and Asians but not Africans and Swahili communities. Ironically, even though a vast majority of the Digo and almost the entire Swahili community professed the Muslim faith, they were never admitted into the schools meant for the Arabs and Asians. This marginalization as pointed out by Chimerah (2013) was a part from being based on racial distinctions was also premised on the belief that the Swahili and Africans had not contributed anything much to human civilization and were therefore not entitled to reap the benefits of human civilization. Consequently, for the entire colonial period, the British did not build a single secondary school for Africans in the entire coastal region (Chimerah, 2013).

Even though the post-colonial political regimes particularly beginning with the Kibaki government of 2003 which made primary education free and compulsory, the levels of achievement of education in Mombasa County is still far from satisfactory. For instance, the entire Kisauni Sub-County with a population of more than 300,000 had, according to CRA (2012), only fifteen primary public and four government secondary schools. The implication of this is that the vast majority of uneducated and unemployed youth provide a pool from which elites can easily recruit and mobilize to violence that can eventually undermine national cohesion.

Despite the widely held view that Mombasa has been marginalized in the provision of education, other scholars argue that the low levels of education in Mombasa is not entirely because of state marginalization but was also self-inflicted by the residents themselves (Ndzovu, 2014; Eisemon, 2000; Willis & Chome, 2014). According to

Ndzovu (2014), the coastal communities' refusal to conform to or embrace social change and the prevailing value system is partly to blame for their socio-economic and political underdevelopment. The argument here is that the residents of Mombasa, in a way, contributed to their own marginalization in the provision of education. Ndzovu (2014) posits that even though the Muslims of Mombasa were incorporated in the colonial administration of indirect rule, they failed to seize the opportunity to acquire formal education. The Muslim community, in most cases, deliberately ignored missionary education claiming that it was likely to corrupt the Islam faith. This initial boycott of formal education had cumulative negative effect since it significantly narrowed the scope of their participation in other spheres of life.

According to Eisemon (2000) and Mazrui (2011), Mombasa had a head start in the attainment of education since the first formal education institution in Kenya was built at Rabai in Mombasa by the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in 1846. The local communities particularly the Mijikenda and the Swahili, however, either ignored or expressed open hostilities to the missionary education. For instance, according to Mambo, (1980) cited in Eisemon (2000) an African missionary sent to a missionary station in south Mombasa was sacrificed in a Mijikenda ritual. The Swahili on the other hand expressed disdain for missionary education because the missionaries provided refuge to the freed slaves.

In retrospect, both the external and local studies concur on threefold socio-economic aspects of marginalization. They include unequitable distribution of infrastructural facilities such as roads, factories, and health facilities; unequal access to education; and comparative deprivation to land access and ownership. These aspects are incorporated in the current study as components of socio-economic marginalization. The reviewed

literature, however, does not give preeminence to the question of unemployment. Most of the studies consider it as a consequence of lack of education (Stiftung, 2012; CRA, 2012) while others view the unemployed youth as a base for mobilization to conflict (Alcorta, Swedlund & Smits, 2020). Though Fjeide and Østby (2014) clearly identify unemployment as one of the aspects of socio-economic marginalization, they counter argue that these factors in themselves cannot trigger conflict nor undermine national cohesion. The current study, therefore, treated unemployment as an independent component of socio-economic marginalization and investigated its bearing on national cohesion in the Kenyan context.

On the flipside, some studies are at odds with the view that socio-economic marginalization may hamper national cohesion (Muhula, 2009; Stewart, 2002; Fjeide & Østby, 2014). For instance, Fjeide and Østby (2014) observe that socio-economic marginalization in itself may not cause conflicts that can undermine national cohesion. Socio-economic marginalization and its degeneration to conflict is in most cases moderated by the ethnic or regional elites. Real or perceived socio-economic inequality will only escalate to the level that it degenerates into conflict or open hostilities if the elites are involved in collective action framing aimed at reinventing the group narrative (Stewart, 2016; Fjeide & Østby, 2014). According to the framing theory, the elites must be involved in narrative formulation and group mobilization. Socio-economic marginalization and conflict are therefore conditioned on the status of elite interactions (Langer, 2005; Hillesund *et al.*, 2018).

Langer (2005) argues that the emergence of conflict or group mobilization in many societies therefore, to a large extent, depends on how the regional or ethnic elites interact. Despite glaring socio economic marginalization, it will require that the elites

initiate the process of grievance formation by framing a narrative around which to mobilize their constituents to violence. This is because the political elites are pre-occupied with the acquisition and maintenance of political power while the ordinary citizens are concerned with daily basic needs (Muhula, 2009; Stewart, 2016). Where there is an elite pact or political settlements that are mutually beneficial to inter-regional or ethnic elites, the incentive to instigate group mobilization to violence that can undermine national cohesion is significantly reduced.

It is however worth noting that elite pacts are sometimes just used as a stopgap measure as the regime tries to address the grievances that threaten national cohesion. If the elites ignore the concerns of their constituents for far too long, there is the likelihood of the ethnic elites losing support among their constituents. Under such circumstances, a new set of elites may surface from the sub elites to pursue the issues at hand (Langer, 2005).

Whether or not socio-economic marginalization eventually degenerates into violence also depends on the level of cohesiveness among the members that occupy a given territorial space. The presence of smaller groups that not only differ in their cultural traditions, religious creed, histories and myths of origin but also have been in conflict with one another may prevent the development of a strong regional identity or consciousness that can be mobilized to violence (Langer, 2005). This theoretical paradigm may, for example, be used to explain why sometimes mobilizing the residents of Mombasa around the secessionist agenda because of socio-economic marginalization may not be a possibility because the various communities living in Mombasa have for decades had differences based on racial, religious and ethnic distinctions (Willis, & Chome, 2014; Ndzovu, 2014). These differences act as fault lines making it difficult to rally the different communities around marginalization rhetoric.

Other studies have also found that it is not only socio-economic marginalization that motivate individuals to conflicts that can cause instability but relative privilege as well (Deiwiks, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2012; Stewart, 2010; 2012; 2016; Mancini, 2016; Hillesund, 2018). For instance, Mancini (2016) and Zulfan *et al.* (2020) argue that the conflicts that undermined national cohesion in Indonesia for decades was partly because of relative privilege and not just relative deprivation. The wealthier regions such as Aceh, Papua, East Kalimantan and Riau which are endowed with oil and gas resources mobilized to violence to protest the government's redistributive policy which favoured sharing of revenue from the rich regions to subsidize the poorer regions.

Post-cold war breakups of the former Yugoslavia can also be attributed to relative privilege. The rich regions such as Slovenia and Croatia felt short-changed in the redistributive policies of government (Deiwiks, Weidmann & Bormann, 2015). Slovenia for example was not happy that it was giving too much to the federal fund to support the under-developed regions.

Conflicts in the Niger Delta in Nigeria, and in the former Sudan which led to eventual secession of the Southern Sudan in 2011 can also be conceived to be related to relative privilege. Even though these two regions were significantly underdeveloped socio-economically, they were endowed with strategic resources. Potential or real wealth may therefore provide a fulcrum around which framers create a narrative to mobilize citizens to violent conflict including demand for secession. Following this line of argument, it can be inferred that the indigenous communities living in Mombasa could be using a marginalization narrative to push for secession because of the strategic opportunities such as the port of Mombasa and the tourism and hotel industries which accord them relative privilege. The thinking of the local community could therefore be that, if they

became an independent state, all the revenue generated from the region will not have to be shared with the rest of the country but remain in the region.

Yet other scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearson and Laitin (2003) do not find any significant relationship between socio-economic marginalization and conflicts that can undermine national cohesion. Using econometric model, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) posit that rebellion and conflict that have continued to undermine national cohesion in many countries across the globe are motivated by circumstances that generate profitable outcomes. In this context, rebellion or group mobilization to violence is seen as a business enterprise that generates profit. For instance, the rebels could be motivated because they know that, having control of a region endowed with natural or strategic resources such as minerals, timber, and oil among others provides them opportunity to enrich themselves. The motivation can also come from the support the rebels get from the dispersion, friendlier foreign government, as was the case during cold war or from what Collier refers to as private motivation thesis, where conflict provides the unemployed youth with the opportunity to be recruited as soldiers.

Despite all these debates, the role of socio-economic marginalization on group mobilization to conflicts that can impede on national cohesion cannot be overemphasized. Socio-economic disadvantage makes it easy for the masses to buy into the narratives framed by societal elites.

The counterarguments against the role of socio-economic marginalization in fomenting conflicts that threaten national cohesion further shaped the current study. These arguments put three propositions at the centre of conflict escalation: the role of ethnic/regional elites in narrative framing and group mobilization, the dimension of

relative privilege, and the privately-motivated rebellion whereby rebels engage in conflict as an economic enterprise, or to get support from foreign countries or dispersion. The plausibility of these impetuses to conflict has not been empirically tested in Kenya since all of the relevant studies on these themes are external. Though the current study does not directly focus on these hypotheses, the elites and the media feature as the intervening variables of the study (see Figure 2.1).

2.2.3 Cultural Marginalization and National Cohesion

Cultural status marginalization is the perceived or actual differences in the treatment, public recognition or status of different group's cultural norms (Langer & Brown 2008). Cultural marginalization occurs when, for instance, the culture of a group including its language, religion, ethnic background, traditional customs and lifestyles are denigrated or suppressed by the state (Langer & Brown, 2016). Cultural marginalization is, in most cases, connected to socio-economic and political dimensions of marginalization.

In multi-cultural societies, the perceived or real acts of discrimination based on cultural attributes such as religion, language, customs, and cultural artefacts is, in most cases, viewed by members as a form of cultural marginalization (Stewart & Langer, 2007). As observed by Satya (2015), of all the cultural attributes, individuals always have very strong attachment to their religion and ethnic identity and, as such, will enthusiastically sacrifice, fight, die and live for it. As pointed out by Langer and Brown (2016), culture plays an important role in framing socio-economic and political marginalization narratives. In this case, the cultural elites use their culture as a frame for group mobilization and point of call.

When individuals, for instance, attribute their lack of socio-economic resources such as education, health facilities and employment opportunities to their culture, they easily become vulnerable to group mobilization to violence which may negatively impact on social cohesion (Langer, 2005; Stewart, 2012).

Cultural expression and the narratives associated with them communicate a worldview that ranges from highly exclusive to highly inclusive (Roos, 2007). Cultural identities therefore act as a barrier to and opportunity for undermining national cohesion. As noted by Thomson (2004), ethnic or religious mobilization can be found at the heart of political contest and fault lines in societies are normally drawn along ethnic and religious identities. Similar sentiments are expressed by Muhula (2009) who points out that cultural factors are important for group mobilization and these combine with existing geographic and economic conditions in society to provide the potential for construction of group identity as a source of group mobilization.

Stewart (2016) posits that whereas socio-economic inequality may persist for decades without necessarily becoming conflictual, feelings of cultural marginalization such as those based on religion, language and ethnic background can easily degenerate into conflict since they are easily linked to group identity.

It is, however, important to note that cultural differences in themselves may not cause conflicts that can undermine national cohesion. What causes conflict is when the cultural differences become the lens through which causes of conflict are refracted through instrumentalization of cultural differences (Satya, 2015). It is against this background that the current study particularized ethnicity and religion as cultural indicators of marginalization that could be weaponised for conflict.

2.2.3.1 Ethnic Marginalization and National Cohesion

Members of an ethnic group share a sense of belonging based on common historical memories, shared values, norms and expectations (Chazan, 1999). Since the end of cold war in the 1990s, ideology and class-based conflicts have significantly reduced while identity-based conflicts have significantly been on the rise (Østby, 2011). The idea that ideology-based conflict would significantly reduce was first alluded to by Huntington (1993) in his famous book *The Clash of Civilization* in which he predicted that in post-cold war era, conflicts will not necessarily be based on ideology but more on ethnicity and religion and that they will be violent and bloody. As noted by Schulze (2017) and Chandra (2004), ethnic narrative framing can significantly shape the trajectory of conflict. What this means is that, when an ethnic community feels relatively deprived, it becomes very easy for political entrepreneurs to instrumentalize ethnicity and use marginalization narrative as a pole around which to mobilize their support base to fight for something that could sometimes be purely personal.

Alesina *et al.* (2012) cited in Nyaura (2018) observe that marginalization in access to state resources and services on the basis of ethnicity is likely to exacerbate the salience of group identity, hinder social cohesion among the ethnic groups and lead to conflict. Oyugi (2000) and Thomson (2004) concur and go as far as to suggest that ethnic marginalization creates in-group out-group distinctions whereby those left out in the distribution of state resources and values strive to break the barrier to access state resources while the in-group struggle to maintain status quo.

According to Nyaura (2018), negative ethnicity brings about marginalization and distrust, and heightens ethnic tensions eventually leading to conflict in society. Under such conditions, ethnic elites or intermediaries from the marginalized communities or

those threatened with marginalization instrumentalize ethnicity by invoking historical memories, myths and symbols, which they use to frame and perpetuate a narrative that is used to mobilize people to violence (Brass, 2003; Stewart, 2002: 2016; Oyugi, 2000; Klaus, 2020). According to Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010), political elites, in most cases, are inclined towards favouring co-ethnics while marginalizing those from other ethnic communities when it comes to distributing public goods and services.

Freide and Østby (2014) posit that where the political regime is thought to be marginalizing other ethnic communities while favouring their own ethnic communities, for instance, in employment, land allocation, and award of government tenders and contracts, frustrated aspirations are likely to be directed at the members of the advantaged groups. In line with the relative deprivation thesis, what this means is that inter-group comparison is key in framing a narrative for group mobilization. Members of an ethnic group need to look at their condition vis-a-vis that of the other ethnic group/s and be convinced that the other ethnic group is being relatively privileged as compared to them (Hillesund *et al.*, 2018). Consequently, using the framing theory premises, the ethnic elites use the ethnic favouritism as a frame around which to develop and propagate a narrative for group mobilization. This eventually leads to inter-ethnic group antagonism, which may escalate to open hostilities thereby undermining national cohesion.

The conflicts that tore the former Yugoslavia apart in the 1990s have been, according to Sekulic, Massey and Randy (2006), attributed to historical ethnic distinctions and hatred. As observed by Dusko (1993), conflict in Yugoslavia was supposedly an artificial creation plagued by atavistic and irrational hatred among the various identities that were only muted during President Tito's regime. In the absence of Tito's

charismatic leadership and unifying presence following his death in 1980, the various ethnicities were bound to clash. These studies on the Balkan wars offer useful insights for the present study by bringing out how ethnic identity distinctions could be invoked to cause conflict.

The ethnic perspective of marginalization in Africa is well documented by Wanyande (2016), Keller (2014), Thomson (2004) and Chazan (1999) who hold that ethnic distinctions, real or perceived, are important for understanding conflicts that have continued to undermine national cohesion in many African states. Though ethnic antagonisms and conflicts that have plagued Africa may be traced to colonialism, it must not be misconstrued that prior to colonial occupation there were no conflicts in Africa.

According to several scholars of ethnic conflicts in Africa, most ethnic communities as we know them today have their origin in colonialism (Chazan, 1999; Oyugi, 2000). Prior to colonial occupation, there rarely existed what could be purely classified as ethnic communities (Thomson, 2004; Pat, 2007). In the pre-colonial Africa, identities were fluid with people having multiple, sometimes overlapping identities and no ethnic community dominated the other (Mitchell, 2018). Kinship and lineage group/s were more important and were never consolidated into tribes. In Kenya, for instance, what we today recognize as the Luhya, Mijikenda or Kalenjin ethnic communities were prior to colonialism small groups having distinct structures of leadership, economic undertakings and systems of governance (Chazan, 1999; Thomson, 2004).

As pointed out by Chazan (1999), the process of ethnic identity formation was set in motion, on the one hand, by the colonists for administrative convenience and, on the

other, by tribal intermediaries to capitalize on the resources made available by the new colonial administrative structure. Since the state preferred to deal with ethnic communities, the African tribal leaders and intermediaries found themselves on the rush to consolidate into larger ethnic communities because the bigger an ethnic community was the larger the share they got from the state (Thomson, 2004). Once created, the ethnic communities occupied a given territorial space and the ethnic elites invented myths, symbols and collective memories through which groups could be glued together and mobilized (Chazan, 1999).

The colonial administration further brought together the various ethnicities that had hitherto had different political, economic, social and cultural outlooks under one political authority in the name of a state. What this meant was that the various ethnicities created by the colonists and, in some cases, by the ethnic elites found themselves in competition for political power and access to state resources. Further, since colonial enterprise was primarily extractive in nature, it placed more attention on those regions that added much value to the colonial economy (Wanyande, 2016). Because ethnic communities occupied given geographical territories, those regions and ethnic communities that benefitted from colonial penetration experienced development in terms political power and socio-economic infrastructural development while those ethnic communities and regions that were considered unproductive ended up being marginalized. This skewed development and inequitable access to state resources and values is what has partly contributed to perennial ethnic tensions and conflicts that continue to impede on national cohesion, more so, in Africa.

The Rwanda genocide of 1994 that led to the massacre of close to 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus and the displacement of millions in just three months, even though

attributed to ancient hatreds between the Hutu and the Tutsi (Desforbes,1999; Keller, 2014), could largely be gleaned from the point of view of marginalization. The Hutu did not butcher the Tutsi because of atavistic or primordial ethnic hatreds. The genocide, according to Lemarchand (2004) and Stewart (2016), was caused by perceived and real marginalization first of the Hutu in colonial Rwanda and then the Tutsi in the post-colonial period. During colonialism, the German and Belgium colonial occupiers considered the Tutsi as a superior ethnic group and consequently favoured them in the provision of socio-economic services and political participation while marginalizing the Hutu. As African countries began to agitate for internal self-rule, the colonists shifted allegiance from the Tutsi who were pressing for internal self-rule to the Hutu leading to the latter taking mantle of leadership at independence. With the Hutu in political leadership following independence, they engaged in a form of revenge mission that saw the systematic marginalization and oppression of the Tutsi. Perceptions of marginalization between the Tutsi and the Hutu were eventually instrumentalized by the political elites of the two ethnic communities to mobilize to violence. The Hutu elites, for example, invoked historical collective memories, myths and symbols to mobilize violence with catastrophic outcomes (Desforbes, 1999).

Similarly, the conflicts that lasted for decades in Sudan culminating in the secession of the south in the year 2011 were partly brought about the ethnic divide of Africanism and Arabism (Abusharaf, 2013; Madibbo, 2012). During the colonial administration, there were policies that were deliberately formulated to favour the Arabs while marginalizing the Africans (Laku, 2017). Troco (2018) further argues that concentration of development projects in the Arab north while African south continued to be marginalized weaponized ethnic identities to violence. The post-independent

regimes instead of correcting the wrongs created by colonial administration perpetuated the Arab-African dichotomies. This served to crystalize in-group versus out-group tensions, eroded trust and transformed into conflict that led to the disintegration of Sudan (Vhumbunu, 2018).

In Kenya, real or perceived marginalization of certain ethnic communities has led to tensions and conflicts especially every election cycle, the worst being the Post-Election Violence (PEV) in 2007/2008 (Muhula, 2009). The political elites from those communities that feel marginalized have instrumentalized ethnicity using the marginalization narrative to mobilize to conflicts, which have sometimes threatened national cohesion.

As pointed out by Wanyande (2016) cited in Nyaura (2018), the distribution of state resources based on ethnic affiliation has contributed to the marginalization of certain communities hampering national unity. In Kenya, like in many countries, particularly in Africa, political contest is a zero-sum game, which ends up creating losers and winners. Those who lose in the political competition, in most cases, become partially shut out from accessing the spoils of the state. This creates a situation in which certain ethnic communities are made to feel left out from benefiting from state resources. Political elites then create an ethnic narrative by, for example, making reference to skewed distribution of state resources and senior public jobs as a way of mobilizing the constituents to their cause sometimes for their own benefit. In this whole narrative, the masses are made to believe that the reason they are marginalized from accessing state resources is because of their belonging to a particular ethnic group.

Mombasa County and the entire coastal region have witnessed ethno-nationalist sentiments and outbursts mainly directed at the government and upcountry immigrants. The relationship between indigenous Mijikenda community and that of the upcountry immigrants mainly the Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba and Luhya has been characterized by tensions sometimes turning conflictual as was the case in Likoni Sub-County in the eve of 1997 general elections (Oyugi, 2000). As observed by Mghanga (2010) and Ndzovu (2014) sentiments of the indigenous Mijikenda community against the upcountry immigrants in Mombasa could, for example, be conceived from the point of view of the feelings among the Mijikenda that the upcountry communities have been favoured in land allocation, infrastructural development and employment opportunities by the post-independent political regimes while the Mijikenda continue to be marginalized. This domination and ethnic favouritism has marginalized the Mijikenda of coastal Kenya in general and Mombasa in particular, who, according to Mghanga (2010), has continued to languish in poverty in the middle of opulence. The emergence of MRC and their demand for an autonomous coastal state may be viewed from this perspective.

On the contrary, despite the widely held view that ethnicity causes conflict, some scholars (Østby, 2008; Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Oyugi, 2000) do not entirely believe that ethnicity, in itself, can cause conflicts that can undermine national cohesion. As argued by Fearon and Laitin (1996) cited in Stewart (2016), there are many societies that have multiple ethnic communities but have never had serious conflict. Tanzania, for instance, has around one hundred and forty-two (142) ethnic communities but has never experienced serious ethnic conflicts. Rwanda with only three ethnic communities sharing the same language and culture experienced one of the worst ethnic conflicts in the 21st century leading to the genocide against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu in which

close to a million people were killed and several thousand displaced. Similarly, Somalia inhabited by only one ethnic community with the same religion, but different clans has had conflicts for decades (Wasonga, 2008).

From the above observations, it can be inferred that what causes conflict in most cases is the instrumentalization of ethnicity whereby political elites from an ethnic community or groups of ethnic communities that perceive themselves to be marginalized in the sharing of state resources and values draw on welfare differences to mobilize to conflict mainly for their own political or economic interests (Østby, 2011).

Stewart (2002) notes that, sometimes, inter-ethnic marginalization may not necessarily translate to conflict, particularly where there is glaring intra-ethnic inequalities. This is the case because it becomes extremely difficult to mobilize the entire community using the marginalization rhetoric in situations where there are some people from the same community claiming to be marginalized benefiting from state resources. Further, elites from vertically unequal communities will identify more with elites from other regions thereby neutralizing the likelihood of conflict (Muhula, 2009)

It is clear from literature cited above that ethnicity plays a pivotal role in framing narratives about marginalization and constructing perceptions of relative deprivation. It is also emergent that geo-ethnic marginalization was incidental in the colonial Africa – driven by the extractive philosophy of the colonialism, and deliberately exacerbated by the post-colonial regimes – which favoured regions from which the ruling class originated. The common thread in all the examples: Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sudan and Kenya (during the PEV and the emergence of MRC) – is the weaponization/instrumentalization of ethnicity by the political elite, ostensibly, towards

realization of parochial political pursuits. This overarching view led the present study to divorce cultural from political concerns of marginalization so as to ascertain if, for example, marginalization on the basis of ethnicity could be extant devoid of political machinations. To this end, the study's third objective delineated cultural marginalization from socio-economic (the second objective) and political (the fourth objective) marginalization.

2.2.3.2 Religious Marginalization and National Cohesion

Religious differences make the occurrence of conflict more likely and, in most cases, more intense (Rummel 1997 cited in Abdulmajid 2018). In countries where religious variances are key distinguishing indicators within the society and where religious dialogue controls politics, issues of inclusion-exclusion and participation-marginalization occur between majority and minority groups (Abdulmajid, 2018). As pointed out by Thomson (2004), religion has long been established as a social cleavage generating political competition within and between societies. According to Basedau, Pfeiffer and Vullers (2016), religious identity structures offer opportunities for mobilization while grievances of marginalization provide motive for the aggrieved parties to take up arms.

Religion may play a role as an identity marker, a fulcrum around which to mobilize, a basis for rationalizing violent behaviour, or a source of values on which to base peace building and reconciliation (Best & Rakodi, cited in Silvestri & Mayall, 2015). As observed by Stewart (2012), religion fosters stronger loyalty and commitment than any other identity giving it the highest propensity towards violence.

Marginalized religious groups are potential recruitment pools for individuals with strong group ties. Subjective marginalization of religious groups represents a powerful motivation for rank and file which, coupled with the mobilizing of organizational resources of religious groups, can be capitalized on by religious and political entrepreneurs (Toft, 2007 & De Juan, 2009 cited in Basedau, Pfeiffer & Vullers 2016). Borrowing from the relative deprivation thesis, when members of a given religious organization compare their status with that of others and realizes that they have comparative disadvantage in relation to that other group, there is likelihood of frustration setting which may lead to violence (Basedau & Kehnert, 2019).

State restrictions on religious education or difficulties to find a job because of one's personal religious identity can be a strong motive for participating in organized violence as a way to combat such injustices (Basedau & Kehnert, 2019; Osborne, 2014; Jackson, 2007; Devine, Brown & Deneulin, 2015). The risk of armed conflict increases when religious distinctions are reinforced by other distinctions such as ethnicity and socio-economic status (Stewart, 2010). Political and religious elites can capitalize on the grievances leading to escalation of violence.

It is not only the feeling of being marginalized based on religious outlook that can cause violence. Sometimes conflicts that display religious character are related to a given theological interpretation or sacred religious sites or symbols (Basedau, Pfeiffer & Vullers, 2016). Degrading a given sacred religious symbol/s may, for example, be a justification for violence. Religious ideology and especially where a particular religion claims a universal and an exclusive validity may also generate conflict as was the Christian crusades of the 16th century and Islam jihads (Basedau, Pfeiffer & Vullers, 2016). Violent acts may also be motivated by the belief in reward in the after world.

For instance, the belief in the seventy-two virgins by jihadists may motivate some adherents to violence.

According to Silvestri and Mayall (2015), religious identities can erect potent boundaries and provoke fierce confrontation within a group when there is excessive emphasis on claims by some that they belong and adhere to or are protecting a set of absolute truths. These conflicts can be between members of different religious groupings or those professing the same faith but belonging to different denominations or sects as has been the case in Ireland, Syria or Iraq.

In Ireland, marginalization on the basis of religious denomination has led to protracted conflicts between the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland for decades (Basedau, Pfeiffer & Vullers, 2016). The Catholics perceive themselves marginalized in the provision of employment opportunities and other social services such as health care services and housing because of their religion.

The political behaviour of many countries in the Middle East is remarkably influenced by the differences between the religious sects leading to constant violent conflicts and unrests (Abdulmajid, 2018). Even though predominantly Islam, religious distinctions of Sunni-Shiite dichotomies have been linked to conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Iran. The Syrian war has, over the time, developed religious overtones (Basedau, Pfeiffer & Vullers, 2016). The Alawite minority ascribed to the Shiite sect and who have been in power since 1971 have engaged in marginalization of the Sunni majority in socio-economic development and political participation (Abdulmajid, 2018). In Iraq, for instance, the Shiite Muslims were for decades marginalized and suppressed by the Saddam Hussein regime because of their presumed loyalty to their

Shiite brothers in Iran, which was Saddam's greatest enemy in the region (Menon, 2005 cited in Abdulmajid, 2018).

In Israel, the violent conflicts between East and West Jerusalem that continue to undermine national cohesion has been partly blamed on the marginalization of the East which is predominantly occupied by Palestine Muslims (Pressmann, 2020). The East Jerusalem has always complained that the Israel government has for years shown open favouritism in the distribution of public resources and services in favour of West Jerusalem predominantly occupied by Jews.

In Africa, conflicts with religious overtones have been experienced in countries such as Nigeria, Sudan and Kenya, among others. In Nigeria, for example, the Boko Haram militants have engaged the Nigerian government in conflict in the north to push for the introduction of the Islamic state (Basedau, Pfeiffer & Vullers 2016). The militants cite marginalization and neglect by the state because of their religious orientation. The northern region is underdeveloped in terms of social amenities such as hospitals and schools among others. The Boko Haram militants have interpreted this as discrimination and marginalization based on religion. Marginalization based on Islam-Christian divide in metro-polis, the head quarter of Plateau state in north-central Nigeria between the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom who are largely Christians, on the one hand, and Hausa and Fulani who are predominantly Muslims, on the other, has, as well, contributed to conflicts that undermine social cohesion in Nigeria (Nnabuihe, 2019). Since colonial times, the Hausa and Fulani Christians have enjoyed comparative advantage over the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere in terms of access to state resources and political power. Religion has therefore been invoked to mobilize citizens to violence.

In the long history of tribal confrontations affecting the Sudan, religion is often said to play a central role (Silvestri & Mayall, 2015). Entrenched conflicts between Muslim-Arab northern Sudan and the Christian/Animist African south which culminated in the eventual secession of the south was escalated by the overlap between religion and other cleavages. The south suffered socio-economic and political marginalization on the basis of religious distinctions (Abusharaf, 2013; Madibbo, 2012).

The relationship between marginalization and conflict is not new to Kenya. According to Ndzovu (2017), perceptions of marginalization have nurtured a favourable environment for dissemination of jihadi ideas among sections of the Muslim community living in Mombasa. According to Ndzovu (2014), poor education, economic underdevelopment and political powerlessness are some of the reasons why frustrated Muslims have resorted to politicizing Islam to agitate for their rights. Ndzovu (2017) observes that economic marginalization and skewed distribution of resources arouse discontent and dissatisfaction among Muslims which vulnerably expose them to the Muslims' emancipation call.

Real or perceived marginalization of the Muslims provides a fertile ground for the mobilization of domestic Jihadi groups such as al-Hijra, Jaysh Aymen and al-Muhajiroun to perpetuate criminal acts and violence especially on non-Muslims (Ndzovu, 2018). According to Mwangi (2012) cited in Silvestri and Mayall (2015), radical Islam is the most powerful as a mobilizing agent in situations where Muslim populations feel threatened by secular Christian state.

As pointed out by Hansen (2016) cited in Ndzovu (2017), the relative success of Christians increases Muslim's resentments thereby escalating ethno-religious

animosity hence making violence more attractive to the destitute Muslims. Deacon *et al.* (2017) posit that there are perceptions among the Muslims that Christians are favoured in access to state resources at the expense of Muslims. In Mombasa specifically, there is a growing disquiet within the Muslim fraternity that the upcountry immigrants who are largely Christian have benefitted more in terms of socio-economic development, political power and other benefits that accrue from the state as compared to the Muslims. Further, the Muslims claim that they have been unfairly targeted for prosecution and execution for alleged involvement in terror related activities by a government that is largely composed of upcountry Christians (Willis & Gona, 2012). These feelings have sometimes degenerated into open hostilities where churches have been deliberately targeted for revenge attacks (Ndzovu, 2017). For example, when the radical Muslim cleric, Aboud Rogo was murdered by suspected state security apparatus on 28th August 2012, there were retaliatory attacks in which a Salvation Army church, Jesus Celebration Centre, Pentecostal Assemblies of God church and Neno Evangelism church were either burned or destroyed (Ndzovu, 2018).

The foregoing view that it is marginalization based on religious grounds that is likely to degenerate to conflicts that can undermine national cohesion has, however, been criticized by several scholars. According to Thomson (2004), there are different religions that have lived side by side for a long time without engaging in conflicts that can undermine national cohesion. Conflicts around religion are not, in most cases, because of spiritual issues but have socio-economic and political underpinnings which make group mobilization in the name of religion likely. Nnabuihe (2019) expressing similar sentiments argue that religious differences alone may not cause conflict unless, of course, placed on pedestals of socio-economic imperatives.

According to Christian's clerics living in Mombasa, it is not accurate to argue that it is only Muslims that are marginalized. Marginalization according to them does not have religious boundaries. Even the Christians who live in Mombasa County suffer the same fate as their Muslim counterparts. To allege that Muslims engage in violent conflicts because they are marginalized is therefore to misrepresent facts (Deacon *et al.* 2017; Ndzovu, 2017). Christian clerics believe that it is not the marginalization that leads to violence but indoctrination and radicalization due to the brand of Islam propagated by certain section of the Muslim clergy. This brand of Islam mainly preached by clerics trained from Saudi Arabia rejects co-existence not only with non-Muslims but also with those Muslims who do not sympathetic to their course (Gatho, 2015 quoted in Ndzovu, 2017).

Mutua (2015) concurs that marginalization on religious grounds will not necessarily lead violence by arguing that not all those who are recruited or drawn to jihadist conflicts are from the low class or the marginalized. Some of those involved in violent conflict are drawn from affluent families. For instance, the suspected mastermind of the Garissa university attack that left 148 people dead and 79 with injuries was a trained lawyer, from affluent family who had secured a good job as a legal officer to a local bank (Mutua, 2015). Karega (2015), on his part, goes on to argue that even though marginalization of the Muslim may create a conducive environment for recruitment to violent groups, there is a vast majority of Muslims who live in the same environment and experience the same conditions and frustration but have instead chosen to be non-violent.

Even though these counterarguments could have some relevance, the fact that majority of the extremists are drawn from the underclass and the unemployed Muslim community attest to the fact that at the heart of these violent mobilization are religious as well as other socio-economic and political undercurrents. As victims of marginalization, Muslims readily find solace in religion and turn to it as a way of advancing their course, which could sometimes not be purely religious. It is this position that informed the inclusion, in the current study, of religion as a cultural sub-variable of cultural marginalization.

The study conceives that marginalization on the basis of religious identities or cleavages irrespective of extraneous extremist, socio-economic or political underpinnings may significantly undermine national cohesion. This consideration has not been subjected to study especially in the context of Mombasa County, thus, the current research was constructed to bridge this gap.

2.2.4 Political Marginalization and National Cohesion.

Political marginalization implies exclusion of other groups from major political offices notably the presidency, cabinet appointments, especially most influential cabinet slots, and senior government positions such as police and military chiefs (Stewart, 2010). When ethnic or regional elites perceive themselves to be politically excluded or threatened with exclusion, they are likely to invoke ethnic or regional ideologies as a way of mobilizing the masses for what could be personal or elite interest (Stewart, 2010).

Langer and Stewart (2015) have pointed out that political marginalization gives leaders a strong incentive to mobilize supporters. This is because political inequality entrenches other forms of marginalization as those groups or regions that dominate the government have the tendency to accord preferential treatment to their regions in the allocation of state resources and services (Wanyande, 2016; Stewart, 2016).

The distribution of public goods such as physical and social infrastructure are also dictated by the amount of political power a given region or ethnic community wields (Muhula, 2009). From this point of view, those controlling political power also have a say on which resources are to be spent on which projects. The implication of this, basically, is that the political power an ethnic community or region controls will, in most, cases translate to how much share of resources they get from the state coffers.

Marginalization from central state power as well as regional institutions are closely associated with secessionist conflicts (Deiwiks, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2012). Political marginalization tends to exacerbate ethno-nationalist grievances since the political entrepreneurs from the regions or ethnic communities that perceive themselves to be relatively deprived can easily draw on welfare differences, create a common enemy and identify a frame for narrative formation and mobilize the masses to violence (Deiwiks, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2012).

Asal *et al.* (2015) argue that groups or regions subjected to political marginalization are more likely to engage in conflicts that can undermine national cohesion particularly if the region is endowed with resources. In circumstances where the political elites from the marginalized regions are not included in government and in the decision on how resources are shared, the chances are high that the region may begin to demand for

autonomy. The perennial conflicts in the Niger Delta according to Asal *et al.* (2015) is premised on the assumption that despite the region being rich in oil and gas resources, the political elites from the region are politically marginalized. Their marginalization therefore means that they cannot participate, for example, in deciding how the oil revenue is redistributed across the state. This, therefore, creates a fertile ground for the politicians to engage in narrative framing and group mobilization to violence. Conversely, inclusion of leaders from those regions in government makes the emergence of tensions and conflict less likely. Stewart and Langer (2007) concur by adding that political marginalization often leads to bias in the distribution of government resources including access to socio-economic services, government employment and contracts.

According to Fjeide and Østby (2014), in most countries of the world, state policies in the allocation and deliverance of public goods are rarely neutral but skewed towards political ethnicities that wield more power. Political elite in government often gain more legitimacy by favouring co-ethnics in the distribution of state resources, patronage and provision of collective goods (Fjeide & Østby, 2014).

Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) argue that adequate representation in government offers advantages such as access to government jobs and services. From this argument, it can be inferred that the proportion of resources and services allocated to regions, in most cases, depends on how influential the political elites are and the amount of political support they can provide in the competition for political power.

According to Cederman, Gleditsch and Baung (2014), political power provides groups with a channel through which to express interests and address their grievances. If a

group is properly represented at the national level, it gives them an opportunity to defend their rights as well as influence the distribution of public goods and resources. Conversely, if a group is politically marginalized, their chances of benefitting from state resources are severely limited. Gurr (1993) observes that ethnic group's grievances are likely to be strongest when groups face active and intentional political marginalization by the state.

Conflicts and tensions that sometimes escalate to violent conflict have plagued many countries in of the world particularly in Africa. According to Stewart (2012) and Langer (2005) the civil war that plagued Ivory Coast following the death of President Boigny in 1993, was partly blamed on political marginalization of the political elites from the northern part of the country. During Boigny's tenure, there was relative peace in the country because he was able to engage in hegemonial exchange in which political elites from both the north and south of the country were incorporated in government. This inclusion of political elites from both north and south brought some psychological satisfaction to the political elites and the masses that they owned government. After his death, however, the regime that followed engaged in a systematic marginalization of elites from the north leading to a civil war that led to the death and displacement of thousands of the population (Langer, 2007).

The civil war in Sudan that lasted for decades and only ended with secession of the south in 2011 has been, according to some scholars, linked to political marginalization (Madibbo, 2012; Troco, 2018). The concentration of political power on the Arab north formed the basis on which a narrative was created to mobilize the southern region to conflict. As pointed out by Vhumbunu, (2018) and Abusharaf (2013), the conflict in Sudan was partly caused by the marginalization of political elites from the southern

Sudan. The Arab north dominated government engaged in systematic exclusion of elites from the southern Sudan in government. As argued by Madibbo (2012), key positions in government were allocated to the people of Arab descent from the north. African elites from the south were rarely appointed to government and, where it did happen, were given less influential positions (Ylonen, 2008).

In Kenya, the resulting inter-regional variations in access to political and socio-economic power have in turn sustained deep-seated grievances sometimes causing the kind of conflict witnessed in 2007/2008. Stiftung (2010) and Wanyande (2016) argue that the distribution of state resources in Kenya has always been skewed in a manner that favours elites from those regions or ethnic communities that control the state. As observed by Kanyinga (2016), the various political regimes that have been at the helm since independence have deliberately favoured certain regions in key appointments in government while ignoring others. The exclusion from government has created fault lines whereby leaders from certain communities and regions end up being appointed to strategic positions in government while others remain in the periphery. The zero-sum game nature of Kenyan politics has generated tensions between communities and regions sometimes degenerating into open hostilities every election cycle. As at the time of writing this thesis, the Kenyan parliaments (Senate and the National Assembly) had passed the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) or the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2020. The BBI is a product of the task force appointed following the famous 14th March, 2018 handshake between President Uhuru Kenyatta and the former Prime Minister Raila Odinga after the contentious presidential election of 2017. After collecting and collating views from the Kenyan public, the BBI task force found that one of the problems that bedevil Kenya as a country is the zero-sum game nature of its

politics. The elections in Kenya over time create losers and winners. This leads to the marginalization of certain ethnic communities and regions from government. The bill aims at constitutional amendments to the constitution of Kenya, 2010. Agenda Six of the BBI identifies political marginalization of some communities and regions as one of the causes to perennial conflicts after every general election.

According to Willis and Gona (2012) and Willis and Chome (2014), Mombasa County has suffered political marginalization since the colonial time. This marginalization has sometimes according to Chome (2013), manifested itself in the lack of political clout by Members of Parliament (MPs) from the coastal region as compared to their counterparts from upcountry communities. In Kenya, like in many countries in Africa, the political worth of a MP is sometimes measured in terms of his/her ability to influence decision and allocation of resources in favour of their constituents. What this means is that when a MP is marginalized at the national stage, the constituents, by extension, also end up feeling marginalized. Accordingly, Willis and Chome (2014) suggest that the resentment of residents of Mombasa against people from upcountry is partly because of the feelings that the upcountry immigrants want to dominate them the way politicians from upcountry have dominated the politicians from the region at the national level.

It is however important to note that political marginalization in itself may not necessarily cause the kind of conflicts that can undermine national cohesion (Muhula, 2009; Stewart, 2010, 2016; Langer and Brown, 2016; Cederman, Weidmann and Bormann, 2015). For it to generate conflict, political marginalization must be in the same direction with socio-economic marginalization. As pointed out by Muhula (2009) and Stewart (2010) the ordinary citizens are, in most cases, preoccupied with how to

get their daily bread while the political elites want to acquire and retain power. Where the masses experience acute socio-economic marginalization and the political elites are excluded, it becomes easy for the politicians to mobilize along the marginalization rhetoric for their own benefit.

The current study appreciated the interface between socio-economic deprivation and political mobilization to violence. However, the previous studies present a back-and-forth argument that insert political motive in any perception of marginalization using the concept of instrumentalization or weaponization. On the one hand, the political hand is seen to be at the heart of shaping perceptions of marginalization from the socio-economic and cultural viewpoints to create dissension among the marginalized groups and disrupt national cohesion efforts. On the other hand, political instigations to violence are seen mostly to be defined by socio-economic and cultural undertones. To offer, a paradigm shift, the current study, therefore, delinked the three indicators (socio-economic, cultural and political) so as to assess the magnitude of each in relation to national cohesion. The data and insights generated through this approach are envisioned to be instrumental to scholars and other stakeholders in crafting multipronged interventions towards achieving a unified and cohesive society locally and globally.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

The study used Relative Deprivation and Framing theories. Relative Deprivation Theory was relevant given its tenets on how inequalities in human societies may be a recipe for restlessness, chaos and violence which may eventually undermine social cohesion. Relative Deprivation Theory, even though appropriate, was deficient in that it does not accurately explain the process of narrative formulation and group mobilization. Consequently, Framing Theory which explains how, for example, the

elites and media outlets become framers of a narrative that can be used to mobilize citizens to violence was used to address that weakness.

2.3.1 Relative Deprivation Theory

The theory of relative deprivation has its roots in ancient Greece. According to Aristotle, as quoted in Besancon (2005), social cohesion in any society is in most cases undermined by the struggle between the oligarchs who desire to consolidate more economic and political power and the masses who demand for economic and political equality. The relative deprivation theory in its current form can however be credited to the work of Samuel Stouffer (1900-1960).

The relative deprivation theory was further developed by Gurr (1970) and his colleagues who argued that economic and other types of inequality increase the risk of revolt due to frustrated expectation. This theory postulates that while absolute poverty may lead to apathy and inactivity, comparisons with those in the same society who do better may inspire radical action and even violence (Pettigrew, 2015).

Relative deprivation may manifest itself in socio-economic, cultural or political spheres of life. Relative economic deprivation, for instance, occurs when a group of people are reminded of their poverty by looking at other communities who are doing better economically. Political relative deprivation takes place when groups or individuals are not given equal opportunities to participate in the political process for instance, through appointment to senior positions in government or non-recognition of political elites from a given community or region. Cultural relative deprivation occurs when people perceive themselves as being discriminated against on the basis of cultural attributes such as language, ethnic or religious backgrounds.

According to this theory, group mobilization to violence requires that individuals compare their status with that of the other groups, perceive the situation to be unjust and assign blame to the other group or government (Stewart, 2002). As pointed out by Koktsidis (2014), comparison with other groups solidifies the feelings about a group's entitled rights that are being denied and social justice.

According to this theory, therefore, conflicts like revolutions and collective violence are primary responses to an intolerable gap between the normative value expectation and actual achievement created by cumulative experience of hardships (Koktsidis, 2014). According to Gurr (1970), if a section of the society feels that there is glaring discrepancy between what they get and what they could potentially get vis-a-vis what other groups get group mobilization becomes easy.

In this study, the theory was useful in that it helped to investigate how the real or perceived marginalization of Mombasa County has been constructed from the feeling of being relatively deprived on comparing their situation with that of the other parts of the country. Majority of the residents of Mombasa have, over time, felt that there is a mismatch between the value expectations and value capabilities in terms of, for instance, access to land, education, employment opportunities and infrastructural development among others. By comparing their condition by that of the upcountry communities, they conceptualize the situation to be unfair, unjust and discriminative.

This theory was therefore applied to help understand how narratives of marginalization in terms of socio-economic, cultural and political resources of Mombasa County in particular have been the cause of tensions and conflicts which have threatened to undermine national cohesion.

The theory of relative deprivation is, however, criticized in that it is not only the relatively deprived that can mobilize to violence. Hillesund *et al.*, (2018) for instance observes that sometimes it is the relatively privileged groups that may mobilize to violence as a result of what they believe to be unfair distribution. Relatively privileged regions (Østby, 2013; Stewart, 2002) may also engage in conflicts that may undermine national cohesion as was the case in Biafra in Nigeria, Croatia in the former Yugoslavia, Southern Sudan in the former Sudan and Basques in Spain among others. In this study, it emerged that conflicts and tensions in Mombasa are partly because of its strategic resources such as the port and tourism industry, which generate a lot of revenue to the national economy. Consequently, a second theory, that is, Framing Theory, was used to complement the deficiencies of Relative Deprivation Theory.

2.3.2 Framing Theory

The concept of framing was first advanced by Bateson (1972). Framing refers to the process through which individuals develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007). According to Gamson and Modigliani (1989) cited in Chong and Druckman (2007), a frame refers to, for instance, the words, images, expressions and presentation style a religious leader, media outlet or politician uses when relaying information about an issue or an event to the audience.

The underlying assumption of Framing Theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations. As pointed out by Entman, Matthes and Pellicano (2009), framing can have significant effects on how individuals conceptualize and express an opinion in regard to a particular issue

According to this theory, the significance of framing can be conceived at either individual or societal level. At individual level, it may lead to transformation in attitudes, about an issue based on exposure to certain frames. At societal level, frames may contribute to shaping social level processes such as decision-making, political socialization and collective action (Vreese, 2005). As observed by Desrosiers (2015), framing theory postulates that when effective, frames allow framers and their publics to interpret circumstances as opportunities which are then used as springboard for group mobilization.

Framing is understood as strategic communication where frames are purposive tools to present to people or circumstances in a specific light to achieve a specific goal such as obtaining support or mobilizing a target public. The theory acknowledges that pre-existing social structures, beliefs and identities influence framing process. When applied to this study, marginalization of Mombasa Country could be used as a frame around which a narrative is created and perpetuated for group mobilization.

Framing consists of two identical processes: alignment and resonance. Alignment implies the essential efforts deployed by framers to bring into line their views and goals to meet the target public's beliefs and perceptions. As argued by Feste (2011), frame articulation involves the connection and alignment of events and experiences so that they hang together in comparatively unified and compelling fashion. The concept of resonance, on the other hand emphasizes that for frames to have an impact, they must echo what a public already believes and experiences since experimental knowledge and pre-existing social beliefs are powerful filters.

The success of frames, in most cases, depends on how much they fit with existing cause, values, beliefs and cultural elements that matter to people, peoples lived experiences or prevailing circumstances (Desrosiers, 2015; Feste, 2011). Acknowledging the value of resonance and alignment for the success of frames, using for example, religious or ethnocentric rhetoric can be considered a valid strategy. It is, however, important to note that where the views of framers and those of the public do not resonate or are not aligned enough, frames may fail to influence how people respond to a certain issue.

In most cases even though the masses may be the point of reference (Chong & Drunkman, 2007; Desrosiers, 2015) the frame around which an issue is articulated may sometimes not be intended to benefit the masses but the framers. Human beings being actors driven by self-gratification, religious, cultural, ethnic, or political elites may sometimes construct a frame to gain or maintain power or some position of privilege. In this context, the constructors of a given frame may apply it strategically to gain some personal advantage. It is upon this assumption within framing theory that this study sought to evaluate how the various manifestations of marginalization can be invoked by the elites to engage in rhetoric that can undermine national cohesion.

In some instances, adversarial frames are used, which interpret or reinforce interpretations of others as opponents responsible for the group's predicament (Desrosiers, 2015). In identity-based conflicts, adversarial framing emphasizes the righteousness of a group while projecting others as immoral, oppressors or wrongdoers.

As observed by Feste (2011), the rhetoric power of a frame comes from its function to heighten the saliency of some aspects of reality over others. In this process, portions of observed, experienced and/or recorded reality are brought together, collated and

packaged. Frames are composed of key concepts, metaphors, images and symbols to structure transmission of meaning.

2.4 Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework in figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between marginalization and the absence of national cohesion. The key variables for this study were categorized as independent variables and dependent variables. The independent variable was marginalization while the dependent variable was national cohesion. The independent variable, which was marginalization, had three measurable variables namely socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions. The socio-economic variables included; issues of land ownership, low levels of educational infrastructure and fewer employment opportunities. Cultural variables were ethnicity and religion. Political variables included inadequate representation in government, low political status of politicians from the region and fewer senior positions in government.

The dependent variable which was absence of national cohesion was measured through, inequality, intolerance of differences exclusion and tensions and conflict. The study was also influenced elites, the media and government policies as intervening variables.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

Source: The Researcher, 2021

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes how the study was conducted and outlines the research design, study area, target population, sampling technique, sample size, data collection instruments, credibility and dependability, data collection techniques, data analysis, and ethical considerations.

3.2 Research Design

The study adopted a phenomenological research design using qualitative approach. The qualitative approach was preferred because the researcher wanted to have an in-depth understanding of the phenomena under investigation. In this case, it helped to determine meaning and underlying relationship between marginalization dynamics and national cohesion. Statistical generalization, according to the researcher was not capable of bringing out the various issues about marginalization and its implication on national cohesion.

Phenomenological design is normally guided by the Husserlian slogan, “return to the things themselves”. This design was preferred because it views individuals as conscious agents whose experience should be studied from a first-person perspective. The phenomenological design was therefore of more benefit in bringing out meaning of abstracts, ideas and imagination. The main concern of this study was a deeper understanding of the phenomena but not how much.

The phenomenological design, therefore, allowed the researcher to enter into the social world of the people of Mombasa County. It therefore accorded the researcher an opportunity to see issues from the conscious and lived experiences of the residents of Mombasa County. Further, it enabled the researcher to engage in an intellectual interpretation of what it means when the people of Mombasa County claim they are marginalized in terms of socio-economic, cultural and political resources and the implications this is likely to have on national cohesion in Kenya. Through the phenomenological approach, the researcher entered to the perceptive world of the people to see things through their lenses.

3.3 Study Site

The study was carried out in Mombasa County. The county is located along the shores of the Indian Ocean. It covers an area of 11.94 km² making it the smallest county in Kenya in terms of geographical space (GOK, 2019). Administratively it is divided into seven divisions, eighteen locations and thirty sub-locations. It borders Kwale to the South and Kilifi to the North. According to the 2019 population and housing census, Mombasa County had a total population of 1,208,333. The county is the economic hub of the coastal region and by extension the whole country and the main link between Kenya and other countries in the region. The port of Mombasa is the largest in East Africa and receives imported and exported goods to and from other countries in the region, including Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Southern Sudan among others.

The county has six sub-counties namely Changamwe, Mvita, Nyali, Likoni, Jomvu and Kisauni (GOK, 2011). Mombasa is largely cosmopolitan comprising mainly the indigenous Mijikenda communities, Arabs, Swahili and the upcountry immigrant communities such as Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya among others. The main

economic activity is tourism, agriculture, manufacturing and services at the port of Mombasa.

The study site was selected purposively because it was ideal for generating the information required to answer research questions. Mombasa County is chosen because it is the most cosmopolitan and economically vibrant county in the entire coastal region. The choice was also informed by the fact that despite being one of the most economically viable counties in Kenya and the economic powerhouse of coastal Kenya, as observed by Mghanga (2010), the residents have from time to time as expressed feelings of being marginalized to the extent, at times, of calling for secession from the larger Kenya.

3.4 Target Population

The target population for this study was all adult residents of Mombasa County of age 18 years and above. According to the 2019 National Population and Housing Census, Mombasa County had approximately 700,000 persons above 18 years. Children below the age of eighteen years were deliberately excluded from the study because of ethical considerations.

Table 3.1: Population Census 2019

| Constituency | Population |
|---------------------|-------------------|
| Changamwe | 131,882 |
| Jomvu | 163,415 |
| Kisauni | 291,930 |
| Nyali | 216,577 |
| Likoni | 250,358 |
| Mvita | 154,171 |
| Total | 1,208,333 |

Source: 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census Volume II

3.5 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

The study adopted non-probability sampling techniques, mainly purposive, stratified purposive and snowball sampling techniques. Purposive sampling enabled the researcher to select individuals by virtue of their appropriateness in sharing information related to the problem under investigation. The seven participants for the Key Informant Interviews were selected using this technique. Stratified purposive sampling technique targeted the various categories of residents of Mombasa County such as members of the indigenous community, Arabs, Swahili, immigrants from other parts of the country and the two dominant religious groups (Christians and Muslims), that live in Mombasa County to enable each category to have an opportunity of sharing their lived experiences of marginalization and its implication on national cohesion. Snowball sampling technique was employed to identify difficult-to-reach participants such as members of the MRC. The sample distribution for the participants for interviews was determined guided by the 2019 Population and Housing Census Volume II.

Table 3.2: Sample Distribution of Interviewees

| Sub-County | Sample |
|-------------------|---------------|
| Changamwe | 10 |
| Jomvu | 10 |
| Kisauni | 14 |
| Nyali | 12 |
| Likoni | 15 |
| Mvita | 13 |
| Total | 74 |

Table 3.3: Targeted sample distribution by categories of residents

| SUB-COUNTY | CATEGORIES | | | | Total |
|--------------|------------|----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Mijikenda | Upcountry immigrants | Arabs | Swahili | |
| Changamwe | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 10 |
| Jomvu | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 10 |
| Kisauni | 6 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 14 |
| Nyali | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 12 |
| Likoni | 5 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 15 |
| Mvita | 3 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 13 |
| Total | 25 | 19 | 13 | 17 | 74 |

Table 3.4: Actual sample distribution by categories of those finally interviewed.

| SUB-COUNTY | CATEGORIES | | | | Total |
|--------------|------------|----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Mijikenda | Upcountry immigrants | Arabs | Swahili | |
| Changamwe | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 09 |
| Jomvu | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 09 |
| Kisauni | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 12 |
| Nyali | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 11 |
| Likoni | 4 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 13 |
| Mvita | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 11 |
| Total | 22 | 18 | 12 | 13 | 65 |

Table 3.5: Targeted distribution for Focus Group Discussion participants

| Category | No. | Total |
|----------------------|------------|--------------|
| Mijikenda | 3 | |
| Upcountry immigrants | 2 | |
| Arabs | 1 | |
| Swahili | 2 | |
| Christians | 2 | |
| Muslims | 2 | |
| Total | 12 | 12 |

Table 3.6: Actual distribution for those who finally took part in Focus Group Discussion

| Category | No. | Total |
|----------------------|------------|--------------|
| Mijikenda | 6 | |
| Upcountry immigrants | 4 | |
| Arabs | 2 | |
| Swahili | 3 | |
| Christians | 2 | |
| Muslims | 2 | |
| Total | 19 | 19 |

Table 3.7: Distribution for Key Informant Participants

| Category | No. | Total |
|-------------------|------------|--------------|
| Religious Leaders | 3 | |
| Political Leaders | 2 | |
| Community Leaders | 2 | |
| Total | 7 | 7 |

In terms of sample size, the researcher targeted a total of seventy-four (74) individuals representing various identities in the six sub-counties. In reality however, the researcher ended up interviewing 65 participants (see Table, 3.4). According to the researcher, participation rate was still sufficient borrowing from scholars such as (Creswell, 2014; Bryman, Teevan & Bell, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) who recommend that in a study that is qualitative in nature, a sample size of between ten and thirty is adequate to generate the required data. The researcher was also guided by the principle of saturation whereby data was collected to a point that no new information was coming forth or whatever new information that was coming forth was negligible.

3.6 Data Collection Instruments

For the purpose of this study, the instruments of data collection included interview guide, KII guides and FGD guide. The interview guide was used to get information from the 74 individuals from various categories who participated in the study. KII guide was used for individuals chosen to participate in the study by virtue of their positions in the society such religious and political leaders. FGD guide on the other hand was

used for group interviews. The instruments were properly organized and structured to avoid confusion and collection of irrelevant information.

In the organization and structuring of instruments, the researcher employed some key measures. First, data collection instruments were structured in such a way to capture the aim of the research as presented in the research objectives and questions. Secondly, the researcher also certified that the language used in developing the instruments was appropriate for the different categories of the participants. This was made possible by use of interview guide which comprised of a list of questions that were structured into sub-topics. The structure of the interview guide made it possible for questions to be posed directly. Further, instruments of data recording comprised of tools that were used to keep records of the data gathered from the field. This included field notebook and a recorder.

Thirdly, during interviews and focus group discussions, the researcher ensured that the necessary instruments such as pens, pencils, paper and tape recorders were available. Where photographs and voice recording were deemed vital, participants' consent was sought before proceeding with such activities.

3.7 Trustworthiness

Based on the fact that this study was purely qualitative, it borrowed from Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) criteria for assessing and establishing quality of qualitative research comparable to reliability and validity in a quantitative study. Guba and Lincoln developed the concept of trustworthiness as a way of ensuring quality in a qualitative study. Trustworthiness mainly has to do with credibility which can be equated to validity and dependability which is the alternative of reliability.

3.7.1 Credibility

To ensure credibility of the study findings, the researcher first and foremost engaged in triangulation of data from various sources such as interviews, focus group discussion, key informants and secondary sources. Secondly, the researcher was able to present negative and contradictory information that run counter to the general perspective of themes. Thirdly, credibility of the data was also guaranteed by the duration the researcher took in the field to collect data. The investigator took a total of five (5) months in the field. This prolonged stay in the field accorded the investigator an opportunity to gain in-depth conceptualization of the study problem. Fourthly, the researcher engaged in thick description to express the study findings. This was meant to provide future researchers with the opportunity with what Guba and Lincoln (1994) refer to as a database from which to make judgment about the possibility of transferability of the data to other settings. Finally, the researcher ensured credibility through what scholars such as (Marshall & Rossman 2011; Creswell, 2013: 2014) refer to as member checks or participants' validation. The researcher took the study findings to the participants and conducted a follow-up interview to give them the opportunity to confirm that the indeed the findings are a reflection of their points of view. As pointed out by Trochim and Donnelly (2007), validity in qualitative research is judged by the respondents' concordance with the research findings. Therefore, the higher the agreement with the research findings the higher the credibility.

3.7.2 Dependability

In a qualitative study, dependability is basically concerned with the possibility of obtaining the same outcome if the phenomenon is observed twice. Due to high degree of flexibility and freedom advocated by qualitative research, dependability was

guaranteed by the investigator sharing the findings with an external auditor to give an independent and objective evaluation of the final report. Secondly, the researcher kept complete records of all the phases of the research from problem identification and formulation all the way to data analysis. Further, dependability was ensured by the researcher ensuring that his idiosyncratic persuasion did not overtly sway the conduct of the study.

3.8 Data collection Techniques

Data collection involves gathering information required to address a research problem. The journey towards data collection began by attaining approval from the Graduate School, Kenyatta University and the National Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). Since commencement of data collection required formal notifications and approvals, the researcher contacted the relevant government offices upon arrival in the area of the field study.

The researcher, therefore, reported to the Ministry of Education and the County Commissioner's offices before the commencement of the fieldwork. Having acquired the relevant documents, the researcher organized for face-to-face interactions with the respondents. In the field, the researcher used note-taking, recording and memoirs, in data collection. The researcher sought voluntary informed consent of the participants before commencing interviews and focus group discussions. In some cases, audio recording of the information was conducted to enable the researcher have an opportunity to listen to the participants' view in future.

3.8.1 In-depth Interviews

The researcher was able to interview interviewees from various ethnic communities, religious backgrounds as well as political persuasions using semi-structured interview guide, to assess their views on marginalization and its implication on national cohesion. In-depth interviews took place mainly in religious institutions, homesteads, open spaces, personal office spaces and restaurants, among others. Although most of the participants were selected purposively, the researcher also relied on snowballing to identify further participants. In the process of conducting interviews, the researcher in most cases, began by engaging the respondents in informal conversations on matters related to current affairs, politics, economy, and sports among others. This was important for ice breaking and establishment of rapport between the researchers and the respondents in a relaxed environment.

When it came to semi-structured in-depth interviews, the researcher used the interview guide to collect information and probe the participants beginning with general to more specific questions. These involved asking questions on issues such as land allocation and access, economic opportunities, levels of provision of education, employment opportunities, infrastructural development and political representation among others. Further, the researcher-maintained eye contacts during interviews in order to pick any non-verbal expressions that may have importance to the study. Information generated during the interviews was recorded in the field notebooks. Due to time constraints, and to avoid loss and misrepresentation of facts, interviews, in some cases, were audio-recorded and later transcribed. This was done with the consent of the participants. Interviews ended with debriefing and appreciating the participants for finding time to take part in the study.

3.8.2 Focus Group Discussions

The study used FGDs as a way of gaining better understanding of the research problem in a group context. The participants to FGDs were set up mainly with the assistance of the research assistants, local administrators such as the area chief, village elders, and religious leaders.

Focus groups comprised of members of the various communities living in Mombasa County such as the indigenous Mijikenda community, upcountry immigrants, Arabs and the Swahili. Further, it comprised of Muslim and Christian faithful's. The rationale was to get the views of the various identities living in Mombasa County in a group context. Initially, the researcher had targeted 12 FGDs but ended up conducting a total of nineteen (19) FGDs (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6). The high number of FGDs was attributed to the good will of one of the research assistants from the Mijikenda community, who was able to get more people wanting to participate in the study. The FGDs helped establish varying views from the participants. This was important for clarifying some issues and triangulating data from interviews, Key Informant Interviews and secondary sources. FGDs also assisted in getting clarity of questions through dialogue. This ensured that the researcher did not integrate his idiosyncratic meanings of circumstances, undertakings, events and people. Clarification also increased the credibility of the data.

The process of conducting FGDs was set in motion with an introduction from the researcher and the research assistants. The researcher also introduced the purpose of the study to the respondents by assuring them that it was purely for academic purposes. This was then followed by setting of the ground rules to guide the discussion. Some of the rules included permitting one participant to speak at a time, respecting opinions of

others, non-disruption and staying throughout the discussion process. During FGDs, research assistants accompanied the researcher and, in some cases, when need arose, explained the research questions in the local language.

In the actual discussions, the researcher introduced the research question and allowed the members to share their views on all the issues raised. During discussions, the researcher ensured members complied with the ground rules and the required ethical considerations. The participants were accorded the opportunity to continue with their contribution to the discussion without interference with the researcher only occasionally interjecting to shed light on certain ideas and arguments. In the documentation of the discussions, the researcher and the assistants took notes and recorded the proceedings. This was paramount just in case one failed to accurately capture some issues during the discussion.

As the discussion progressed, the researcher paid attention to facial expressions, change of tone and moods. Outright retreat into local (ethnic language) especially on sensitive matters such as the pursuit of secession were monitored and noted. In some of these cases, the researcher requested further discussions with identified participants to help discern the projected body language appropriately. The follow-up discussions to get clarity on the body language added to the quality of the collected data.

3.8.3. Key Informant Interviews (KII)

Key informant interviews were also used to generate data for the study. A few individuals believed to have firsthand information about the phenomenon under investigation and capable of giving candid opinions were purposively selected to

participate in the study. Those identified as key informants included religious, political and community leaders.

Religious leaders were included because the researcher wanted to have in-depth information on the genesis of religious tensions in Mombasa County. They were therefore better placed to provide detailed information on matters religion. Political leaders were as well selected to participate because politicians are opinion shapers and key in narrative framing and group mobilization. Community leaders were on the other hand valuable for this study because their position enabled them to clearly articulate socio-economic, cultural and political issues affecting members of their communities.

3.9 Data Collection Procedure

This is the process through which information is gathered to prove some facts. Since the study was purely qualitative in nature, two research assistants who were holders of master's degree were used to assist in data collection. They were trained using a training manual that was developed by the researcher. They were then issued with the interview guide and the key informant guide to administer to the participants to provide their views on dynamics of marginalization and their implications on national cohesion.

Qualitative data was collected from a group of between 10-15 participants in 19 FGDs, 7 key informants and 65 interviews. To qualify to take part in data collection, the participant had to prove that they are aged 18 years and above. The researcher and the research assistants moderated the discussion using the various tools of data collection.

During FGDs, the researcher, research assistants and the participants sat in a circular manner to avoid feelings of intimidation. Each participant was given a chance to express their views in regard to the marginalization dynamics and their implications on national

cohesion in Kenya. During interviews, the researcher and the interviewee sat facing each other to enable to ensure eye contact and building of trust. The responses were recorded either verbatim or using note books.

To supplement data from FGDs and interviews, the researcher also reviewed secondary sources such as books, journals, theses and other relevant documents. Thus the study triangulated data from various sources to benefit from each approach.

3.10 Data Analysis and Presentation

Studies that are qualitative in nature sometimes require that data analysis goes hand in hand with data collection. The process began with transcription, coding and digitizing of the recorded interviews. Since qualitative studies generate a lot of raw data, the researcher winnowed the data to pick that which accurately addressed the research objectives. Phenomenological studies endeavor to provide in depth analytical description of phenomenon being studied with the aim of revealing the lived experiences of those being studied. Consequently, the analysis of study findings was presented as quoted narratives and comprehensive paragraphs bringing out the meaning of the experiences, and the essence of the phenomenon.

Initial analysis began during data collection with the writing of the notes. Memos encompassed the researcher's insights, impressions and intuitions that stood out in the process of data collection. During the analysis, memos became part of conceptual, theoretical and personal reflections. The notes provided an excellent avenue to identify potential frequent themes, statements, ideas, and phrases. The memos enabled the researcher to formulate patterns that appeared from most or majority of the respondents. Preliminary analysis continued during transcription of recorded interviews.

Transcription accorded the researcher an opportunity to acquaint himself with the materials and identify emergent themes from the data.

At the preliminary stage of data analysis, all the data was edited, cleaned, transcribed and organized according to the emerging themes. To single out the themes, the researcher repetitively read and reread the field notebooks to establish patterns. After the readings, the investigator developed some matrices from the pre-determined groups and themes. That is, marginalization and its implication on national cohesion. This helped the researcher to single out historical, socio-economic, cultural and political emerging issues relevant to the problem under investigation.

The researcher frequently listened to audio interviews and then transcribed the data. The research assistant helped transcribe data in cases where the local dialect was used. In the process of transcription, common and divergent views were isolated and then grouped together as a way of creating a composite whole of the data. The transcription process was done in privacy so as to ensure confidentiality of the interviewees. The transcriptions were labeled numerically according to the location and order in which they were conducted.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

The researcher sought permission from Kenyatta University Graduate School and the National Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). The authority of various institutions of government such as Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government through the office of County Commissioner, Mombasa County and the Ministry of Education through the office of the County Education office were also sought. The researcher clarified to all the respondents that the purpose of the study

was purely academic and that whatever information they volunteered for the purpose of this study was to be treated with utmost confidentiality. Further, the participants were informed that their participation in this study was voluntary and purely out of informed consent. To increase their confidence to take part in the study, the participants were asked not to put any information that could disclose their identities in the research instruments.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF STUDY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presented findings of the study together with the discussions emanating from the collected data. The presentation of study findings was done as per the specific objectives of the study. Since this study was purely qualitative, data was collected mainly through Focus Group Discussions and interviews. This chapter is divided into four sections, each addressing itself to a specific research question. Where necessary, and for purposes of deeper analysis, some of the questions were further subdivided into sub-themes while presenting and discussing the findings.

The first section sought to answer the first research question which aimed at assessing how the various communities and religious groupings living in Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization. The second question, addressed in the section, sought to examine how the socio-economic marginalization of Mombasa County is likely to have implications on national cohesion. Question three, as presented in the third section, aimed at analyzing the nexus between cultural marginalization and national cohesion in Kenya, while the final section deals with the fourth question that sought to evaluate the relationship between political marginalization and national cohesion.

The information presented and discussed in this chapter was based on selected demographic features of respondents such as gender, ethnic and religious background among others. The main aim of the study was to investigate the dynamics of marginalization of Mombasa County and implications on national cohesion in Kenya. The study targeted a total of seventy-four (74) interviews, seven (7) Key Informant

Interviews and twelve (12) Focus Group Discussions. The researcher: however, finally conducted sixty-five (65) interviews which translated to 87.83% response rate. The researcher was, nevertheless, satisfied since the main arguments started to recur in the responses indicating saturation point. Further, the Key Informant Interviews and the higher number of Focus Group Discussions compensated for the deficit in the number of interviews because, out of the targeted twelve (12) FGDs, the researcher ended up conducting a total of nineteen (19) FGDs comprising between 8-12 participants. The findings are examined in the subsequent sections.

4.2 Marginalization as conceptualized by residents of Mombasa County

The first objective of the study was to assess how the various residents of Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization. As noted by Joan (2016), marginalization is, in most cases, a very subjective concept and, hence, may be conceptualized differently by individuals in a given society depending on various persuasions and identities. What this means is that individuals occupying the same territorial space at a given period in time could conceive marginalization differently depending on a number of factors such as gender, ethnic affiliation, race, religious background, political orientation and cultural outlooks among others. Messiou (2006) opines that individuals will define themselves as marginalised or not depending on their lived experiences.

Mombasa County where this study was conducted is highly cosmopolitan. It is mainly inhabited by the indigenous Mijikenda community, Arabs, Swahili and upcountry immigrants. Further, Mombasa is religiously diverse having almost an equal number of Muslims and Christians. Given this diverse nature of the residents of Mombasa in terms of their ethnic, religious, socio-economic, political and historical background, it is only typical that they are likely to have divergent views on marginalization. Consequently,

the researcher sought to obtain an in-depth understanding of how the various diversities influenced the participant's conception of marginalization. To do this, the researcher conducted interviews and organized FGDs with participants from the divergent backgrounds to have an insight on how they understood marginalization. The findings on the conceptions of marginalization are discussed below.

The qualitative data collected using field interviews and FGDs, revealed that marginalization was conceived differently by the various groupings in Mombasa County depending mainly on their ethnic and/or religious affiliations. In Kenya, like in many countries of the world, allocation of state resources and services is, in most cases, skewed in favor of certain ethnic, religious, class or political identities (Wanyande, 2016). This creates a situation where some segments of the same society enjoy state benefits while others are left out hence entrenching feelings of marginalization. The different lived experiences: therefore, make people conceive marginalization differently.

From the study, it emerged that gender did not influence how people of Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization. There were no differences between men and women living in Mombasa County as to how they conceptualized marginalization. Both the interviews and Focus Group Discussions with men and women painted a picture of a people who did not display any clear-cut distinctions on how they conceived marginalization based on their different genders. According to a female interviewee at Likoni Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK) Pastoral Centre, marginalization affected both men and women equally and did not know any gender distinctions. She remarked:

All of us, men and women, suffer marginalization. It does not know a man or a woman because what affects our men affects us and vice versa. If we sleep

hungry, they (men) also sleep hungry and if they fail to get employment or get money to pay school fees, it also directly affects us women (Interviewee 6/04/2019).

Similar sentiments were expressed during a FGD comprising both men and women at Makadara Sub-location, Mvita Sub-County. A male participant observed:

You (referring to me) know both men and women live side by side and encounter the same experiences. There is no way we can conceive marginalization differently because our experiences with what the government does is the same (Participant, FGD, 5 April, 2019)

From the above observations, it emerges that there were no gender distinctions as to how residents of Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization. Gender differentials did not therefore, in any way have any implications on the conceptualization of marginalization. Both men and women believed that they suffered the same fate and therefore being male or female had no significance on how they conceptualized aspects of marginalization.

The other variable that the researcher used to assess the conceptualization of marginalization was the ethnic background. The study revealed that ethnic affiliation had a strong bearing on how the residents of Mombasa County understood marginalization. The various ethnic groupings living in Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization differently depending on which ethnic group one belonged to.

According to majority of members of the Mijikenda community for instance, marginalization was considered mainly from the point of view of denial of land rights such as those related to access and ownership; low levels of education; low levels of socio-economic development; and fewer employment opportunities both at the lower and higher levels of government and key parastatals, among others. During a FGD with

a group of middle-aged men from the Mijikenda community at ACK Pastoral Centre in Likoni, one of the participants observed:

The Mijikenda are the original inhabitants of Mombasa but we have nothing much to show for it. Foreigners (referring to Arabs, Swahili, Asians, Europeans and upcountry immigrants) came here, took away our land, got titles for it and here we are squatting on our own land without title deeds to prove ownership. It really pains us to see these people enjoy the benefits of our land (Participant, FGD, 28 March, 2019).

This statement from one of the participants in a FGD is an indication that majority of members of the Mijikenda community feel that they have been illegally disposed of their land by outsiders whom they commonly refer to as foreigners. Land is a critical socio-economic and a symbolic resource whose ownership significantly affects peoples' lives. According to the Kenyan law, individuals can either own land individually or communally. Individually, people lay claim to ownership of land if they possess a title deed for it. Traditionally, the Mijikenda owned land as a collectivity and used land for grazing their livestock, food production and performing religious rituals among others.

When a people do not own documents to confirm ownership of land, it means they cannot fully enjoy some of the benefits that accrue from land ownership. Since majority of the Mijikenda live as squatters, they do not have any documents to prove land ownership. Their occupation of land is therefore temporary and unpredictable thereby making it difficult to either have long-term investment plans in land or use the land to acquire loans for development from financial institutions.

Comparing themselves to those from other parts of the country such as central Kenya, Rift Valley, Nyanza and western regions who have been able to use their land titles to get loans from banks and other financial institutions for personal development, the

feeling of marginalization is entrenched among the Mijikenda. The above quote resonates with Warah (2017), with the observation that if people do not own the land they occupy, their economic prospects are seriously diminished.

Besides conceptualizing marginalization from the point of view of denial of land rights particularly those related to ownership, the study also revealed that among the Mijikenda, marginalization also implied lack of or inadequate provision of amenities such as education, health care services and employment opportunities among others. In a FGD with residents of Kadongo village in Kisauni Sub-County, it came out that they feel that Mombasa County has been shortchanged by the national government in the provision of physical and social infrastructure such as roads, educational institutions, and health facilities, among others, as compared to other parts of the country which have benefitted more from the provision of such services. A participant from Kadongo village Kisauni Sub-County noted:

“The government has for a very long time neglected us, the people of Kisauni and Mombasa, generally in terms of the provision of social and physical infrastructure such as education, health care and roads among other amenities. Kisauni has very few government schools in the interior, and these do not attract good students and teachers due to inaccessibility and lack of other facilities necessary for effective learning (Participant, FGD, 6 April, 2019).

Similar sentiments were expressed by an interviewee from Mikindani Sub-Location in Jomvu Sub- County who remarked:

“As far as I am concerned, marginalization implies having sub-standard educational institutions, road network and other physical infrastructure as compared to other parts of the country. I have personally lived and worked in Kisumu for 5yrs. They have better and well-equipped schools than we. Mombasa is really endowed but, unfortunately, our wealth is benefiting other parts of the country as we languish in poverty (Interviewee, 3 April, 2019).

From the above remarks, it can be deduced that most residents of Mombasa particularly those of the Mijikenda origin conceive marginalization in terms of inequitable

distribution of socio-economic resources. Comparing themselves with those from other parts of the country that enjoy better services, the feeling of being relatively deprived is entrenched. These feelings are compounded by the fact that Mombasa County contributes significantly to the national budget through the port of Mombasa and through tourism and hotel industries yet the revenue generated from these investments could be benefitting other parts of the country more.

The above claim resonates with CRA (2012) which observes that Mombasa County has been underdeveloped in the provision of educational institutions and other key infrastructure despite being a major contributor to the economy. According to CRA (2012), Kisauni Sub-County with a population of approximately 300,000 has only sixteen (16) government primary and four (4) government secondary schools. Further, the road network is pathetic making access to those schools a nightmare.

Apart from the Mijikenda as an ethnic identity, the study also sought the opinion of Arabs on how they conceptualized marginalization. From the study, it emerged that Mombasa residents of Arab descent conceived marginalization mainly from the point of view of being profiled and viewed as foreigners and therefore not fully integrated into the Kenyan community. During an interview with a male interviewee from Arab community at Tononoka sub-location in Mvita Sub-County, he remarked that:

The Arabs have lived in Mombasa for centuries, but we are still considered foreigners. People who pretend to be squatters invade our lands claiming that it belonged to their ancestors, and nothing is done to them. Sometimes we are not considered in the discussions on issues touching on coastal people and Kenya generally. For instance, those who call for coastal secession do not consider us as locals but foreigners who belong to somewhere else (Interviewee 03 April, 2019).

During a FGD with a group of Arabs at Mwembe Tayari location, Mvita Sub-County, a male participant remarked:

We Arabs have never been fully considered as Kenyans. In most cases we are treated as aliens in this country. Sometimes, even getting a government job is not easy. Sometimes, you go to look for a job, for example, to be employed as a police or military officer, then you hear people shouting that you go to be employed in Saudi Arabia (Participant, FGD, 10 April, 2019).

The above remarks from the FGD and interview present a people who feel that they have not been fully integrated into the Kenyan society. When a people, for example, have difficulty being recruited for employment in certain sectors of the economy based on their racial or ethnic identity, it entrenches feelings of in-group versus out-groups. Those who are discriminated from securing employment opportunities based on their racial or ethnic identities therefore feel isolated and find it difficult to co-exist with other ethnic or racial groupings.

These views from the interview and FGD seem to resonate with Willis and Chome (2014) who argue that Arabs feel that they have not been fully integrated in the Kenyan society and do not get equal treatment mainly in employment opportunities as compared to other citizens from different ethnic backgrounds. This is premised on the belief that Arabs trace their origin from Middle East and should not therefore claim indigenous status.

The argument favoured by Arabs on marginalization is however refuted by the Africans particularly the Mijikenda who argue that Arabs are foreigners and should not consider themselves as locals. According to a male interviewee from the Mijikenda community (Interview, 07/04/2010), Arabs cannot claim indigenous status when it is obvious that their ancestors came from Middle East countries such as Oman and Persia.

Another female interviewee while refuting Arabs claim of marginalization was very categorical, by remarking:

The Arabs came here at the invitation of the Swahili to help them overthrow the Portuguese. After defeating the Portuguese, they decided to make Mombasa an extension of the Oman Empire. The kind of suffering Africans went through at the hands of these slave traders cannot allow us to consider them as our brothers and sisters. These people are beasts; they came here, sold our ancestors and took away all our land. Much of the land in Mombasa is owned by absentee landlords who live in Yemen, Oman and Saudi Arabia. How can they claim native status now when they were part and parcel of colonialism? (Interviewee, 10 April, 2019).

From the above quote, it is evident that the indigenous Mijikenda community has never considered Arabs as locals of Mombasa. This is despite the fact that Kenyan Arabs are legally considered as one of the ethnic communities in Kenya. According to them, Arabs came mainly from Yemen, Persia and Oman at the invitation of Swahili to help them overthrow the Portuguese. The assertion by the above participant seems to be corroborated by available historical accounts such as (Mwaruvue, 2011) who observe that in 1729, a Swahili delegation was sent to the Sultan of Oman to request for military support to help rid Mombasa of Portuguese rule. After a series of battles, the Portuguese were eventually defeated in 1798. Consequently, the sultan migrated its headquarters from Muscat to Zanzibar, marking the beginning of Arab rule at the East African coast. The Arabs claim for native status has therefore partly been complicated by this history and the fact that they engaged in slave trade and slavery before British colonial occupation of Kenya and did not accept the native status during colonialism.

The perennial tensions between Arabs and locals on the native status is corroborated by Ndhovu (2014) who, for instance, observes that during colonialism, the Arabs deliberately rejected the native status and preferred to be regarded as aliens so as enjoy the privileges that came with the alien status. The fact that the Arabs ruled over the Mijikenda before colonialism and refused to accept indigenous status during colonialism makes it difficult to integrate into the Kenyan nation.

The Swahili, on their part, conceptualized marginalization in terms of not being recognized as locals; discrimination in employment opportunities; and failure by the government to wholly consider Swahili culture as part of the African culture. According to a male interviewee of Swahili descent (Interview, 10/04/2019), the Swahili were the first to occupy Mombasa before any other ethnic community, but they are still considered as foreigners. He pointed out:

The Mijikenda (Wanyika) only came to coastal Kenya including Mombasa around 16th century from Shingwaya in Somalia long after the Swahili had settled in Mombasa. How comes that they are considered more indigenous than us? (Interviewee, 10 May, 2019).

In line with these sentiments, a female participant in a FGD at Tononoka Sub-location, Mvita Sub-County remarked:

We, members of the Swahili community, have never been fully accommodated as Africans. Mombasa County where we live is a leading tourist destination, but our culture has rarely been used to market tourism. We see for example the Maasai, Mijikenda and Kikuyu cultures being used to market Kenya as a tourist destination, but the Swahili culture is rarely used. This, to us, is cultural marginalization (Participant, FGD 14 July, 2019)

It can be observed from the quotes that that the failure, particularly by the Mijikenda, to fully recognize the Swahili as legitimate citizens with equal rights makes them feel discriminated and marginalized. The failure by the government to recognize their culture as an African culture and incorporate it among the cultures that are used to market tourism that thrives more in Mombasa County which has a significant population of the Swahili means that they feel excluded from enjoying some of the benefits that may accrue from tourism such as branding rights. When the Swahili see the Maasai and other African cultures from across the country being elevated to market tourism higher than their own, it creates a feeling of cultural marginalization.

The views portrayed by the respondents of Swahili origin that they were the first to occupy Mombasa is however at variance with certain historical accounts. According to some historical accounts, the Swahili as an ethnic community, is a product of intermarriage between Arab traders and local Bantu women. The fact that there were Bantu women willing to marry the Arab men means that Bantus were already living along the Indian Ocean coast. Therefore, for the Swahili to claim that they were the first people to settle in Mombasa before the Mijikenda may not be accurate.

Further, as observed by Pat (2007), the hybrid nature of the Swahili has complicated matters for them since colonialism making it difficult for them to be fully considered as locals. The colonists for instance, classified people as Europeans, Arabs, Asians and Africans leaving the Swahili without a distinct identity. Since most African societies are patriarchal in nature, a child's identity is mainly traced through the father's lineage. The fact that the Swahili were believed to be products of Arab fathers and African mothers has meant that their lineage is more associated with Arabs than Africans.

The view that there were communities living in Mombasa before the Swahili was supported by a group of Mijikenda elders. During a FGD with a group of male and female elders from Mijikenda community at Junda Sub-location in Likoni Sub-county, a participant pointed out:

Our ancestors discovered this land before any other community and lived here as fishermen and farmers. However, when these foreigners (Arabs and Swahili) came, they moved to the interior to escape slavery only for them to return and take away our land (Participant, FGD 10 May, 2019).

From the above quote, it is evident that the Mijikenda have all along not considered the Swahili to be locals. This has always been complicated by their hybrid status. When a people are not fully considered to belong, the feelings of marginalization are entrenched

making it difficult to co-exist as a society. These assertions from the participants are corroborated by scholars such as Mwaruvue (2011), Park (2015), Spear (1982: 2014) and Willis (2018) who allude to the fact that the Mijikenda were indeed the original inhabitants of Mombasa. According to Mwaruvue (2011), the periplus of the Erythrean Sea written around 100 A.D by anonymous writer mention the inhabitants of the region as men who were black and of great stature ruled by chiefs. These communities engaged in iron making, farming, hunting and gathering and fishing (Mwaruvue, 2011).

According to some respondents of the Mijikenda origin, the Swahili should blame themselves for their marginalization and failure to be fully integrated in the Kenyan society. Shaban (Interview, 08/04/2019), for instance, observed that during colonialism, the Swahili never accepted the native status considering themselves to be superior to Africans and instead preferred to be associated with the Arabs who were seen to be a superior race.

In terms of religion and how it influences people's conceptualization of marginalization, the study revealed that religion, in a significant way, shaped peoples' understanding of marginalization in Mombasa County. Mombasa County is mainly inhabited by people who profess Christianity and Islam. It is not exactly obvious which religion has the largest following in the region even though Ndzovu (2017) puts the Christian population to be slightly higher than that of Muslims. Christianity is largely practised by majority of the indigenous Mijikenda community and upcountry immigrants while Islam is mainly the religion of the Swahili, Arabs, and a few members of the Mijikenda and upcountry communities. It is, however, important to note that Mombasa is historically considered an Islam territory since the presence of Islam predates that of Christianity.

From interviews and FGDs with members of the Christian and Muslim communities, it emerged that whichever religion one belonged to had a bearing on how they conceptualized marginalization. During a Key Informant Interview with a Muslim cleric from Mijikenda community, from Centi Kumi village, Likoni Sub-County, he pointed out:

“We, Muslims, are seriously being marginalized by governments that have been controlled by Christians from upcountry. This region has been deliberately neglected because of our faith. Christians from upcountry have better schools and infrastructure in their regions while here we have very few. As if that is not enough, they come here and get employed in the port and hotel industry as we watch (KII, 8 April, 2019)

Related views came up during a FGD with a group of male youths from Kwa Hola Sub-location, Chagamwe, Sub- County. A participant remarked:

Our marginalization cannot be viewed separately from our religion. We, Muslims, have been viewed as enemies of the state. Further, all the four post-independent political regimes have been held by Christians from upcountry. We, Muslims, are therefore deliberately ignored in the provision of key opportunities and services (Participant, FGD, 10 April, 2019).

From the above quotes, it appears that religion has a significant bearing on how individuals conceive marginalization. Religion is always at the core of our humanity and will therefore significantly shape an individual’s perceptions. According to the Muslims respondents, they are simply victims of marginalization because of their faith. Their marginalization is apparently blamed on the government which according to them has, since independence, been controlled by upcountry Christians. Religion, in this context, has become an identity marker of in-group and out-group distinctions.

Several authors on religion and group mobilization underscore the value of religion in shaping peoples’ opinions. According to Ndzovu (2017), religious identity and loyalty to faith are powerful tools for influencing how individuals or groups perceive certain

issues. Mitchel (2013) posits that religion can be a dominant boundary marker and the basis of widespread social segregation. What this means is that religion provides a variety of resources for creating a “we-versus-them” dichotomies, which may serve to undermine national cohesion. Religion as a system of belief and practice relating to the supernatural and bringing together its adherents in a community, according to Orellana (2016), has a powerful hold on how people think, act and express their interests. Further, De Soysa and Nordas (2007) as cited in Karakaya (2015) argue that ideas, political beliefs and political actions are in most cases largely shaped by religion.

The views of the above respondents on religion and marginalization resonate with those of a number of scholars such as (Akwiri, 2014; Botha, 2014; Deacon *et al.*, 2017; Ndzovu, 2017), that indeed the coastal Muslims have over time suffered marginalization. According to Deacon et al. (2017: 155), there are perceptions that Christians have been favoured at the expense of Muslims in the allocation of state resources. Botha (2014), on his part, notes that majority of Muslims in those territories dominated by Muslims such as northeastern and coastal Kenya have over time felt increasingly marginalized by the government in the allocation of resources in comparison to their Christian counterparts from other parts of the country. Akwiri, (2014) further observes that Muslims of coastal Kenya have always complained of lack of access to land and fewer employment opportunities compared to upcountry Christians.

Borrowing from Tedd Gurr’s (1970) relative deprivation thesis, it can be argued that members of the Muslim faith in Mombasa County compare their situation with that of their Christian counterparts from upcountry and find their situation wanting. The seemingly relative success of the upcountry Christians heightens a sense of resentment

thereby escalating tensions between Muslims and Christians. As pointed out by Basedau and Kehnert (2019), feeling marginalized based on religion creates frustration and the resulting aggression may lead to violence that may undermine national cohesion.

Respondents who professed Christian faith had a different conception of marginalization. During a FGD with respondents who were purely Christians and from upcountry communities at ACK Pastoral Centre in Likoni Sub- County pointed out that the view that Muslims are marginalized as compared to their Christian counterparts is not accurate. One female interviewee remarked:

There is no such a thing that the Muslims have been marginalized while Christians have been favoured. We live in the same environment and our children attend the same schools and get treated from the same hospitals. In essence, if there is marginalization, it affects us in the same way. Interestingly these Muslims keep on telling us that we have sat on them for such a long time, and it is time to give them some space. The problem with our Muslim brothers and by extension people from this region is that they talk too much and work very little. Most of us survive on manual work which these people cannot manage (Participant, FGD, 3 April, 2019).

Similar sentiments were expressed by a christian interviewee from Mkomani Sub- location Nyali, Sub- County by remarking:

The marginalization narrative has been unfairly used to target those of us who are Christians from upcountry. These people think that we have largely benefited from the political leadership since independence. Sometimes you hear them say that their wealth has been used to develop our regions and that they are tired of being ruled by Christians. The fact that all the four post-independent political regimes have been led by people who are Christians and more so from upcountry does not imply that everybody has benefitted (Interviewee, 5 May, 2019).

The sentiments expressed by these participants, paint a picture completely different from that projected by some Muslim faithfuls. Marginalization, according to these

participants, is just a perception that has been ingrained in the minds of some segments of the society. Accordingly, these participants argue that Muslims are not the only ones marginalized even though Christians have been unfairly victimized and blamed for marginalization of Muslims. Their only problem is that they are from upcountry and are Christian. Since the government that is accused of marginalizing Muslims while favouring Christians has all along since independence been dominated by upcountry Christians, then they share the blame.

According to a Catholic priest from a parish in Likoni, the marginalization narrative is used as a smokescreen to propagate a larger agenda. It is not marginalization per se that generates tension between the locals and the upcountry immigrants who are largely Christian. The agitation by the Muslims using marginalization rhetoric, according to this priest, is mainly due to radicalization and indoctrination by some radical Muslim elites (KII, 08/04/2019). The calls for secession by the MRC and other radical clerics can partly be gleaned from the global Islam emancipation call guided mainly by the concept of Ummah. The Ummah concept do not approve of Muslims paying allegiance to a secular state but to a larger Muslim community. Being governed by a secular dispensation like in the Kenyan context is therefore according to radical Islam unacceptable.

Interestingly, even though religion seemed to shape how residents of Mombasa Country conceptualized marginalization, from the study, it came out that, in some cases, religion had minimum influence in individuals' perception of marginalization. For instance, even though they professed the same faith, Christians from the local Mijikenda community and those from upcountry expressed divergent views on marginalization despite professing the same faith. Whereas majority of Christians from upcountry did

not buy into the marginalization narrative of Mombasa County, those from indigenous Mijikenda community seemed to side with their Muslim counterparts by agreeing that they are marginalized as a region. The same case was for Muslims from upcountry communities who sided with their Christian counterparts from upcountry to argue that marginalization was not only peculiar to coastal Kenya and Muslims in particular but affected different parts of the country.

From the above discussions, the study therefore revealed that there was no consensus on how the residents of Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization. Their conceptualization of marginalization was largely based on their various underlying identities such as religion, race and ethnicity.

The implication of this kind of conceptualization on national cohesion is that when citizens of a given state fall back to their ethnic, racial, religious or political enclaves to conceptualize a given issue, it is likely to entrench antagonistic relationships. Maintaining national cohesion in such an environment becomes a challenge. This is because people look at issues not in terms of social reality but from the lenses of their competing identities. Borrowing from the framing theory, these multiple identities can easily form the basis upon which a narrative is framed and perpetuated for group mobilization that could undermine national cohesion.

4.3 Socio-economic Marginalization and National Cohesion

This section sought to answer the second question of the study which was to examine how socio-economic marginalization of Mombasa County was likely to undermine national cohesion in Kenya. This section of the study focused on various dimensions of

socio-economic marginalization such as the land question, provision of education, availability of employment opportunities and infrastructural development.

4.3.1 The Land Question

Land is a critical socio-economic resource whose ownership, access and use significantly shape people's economic wellbeing. Land in Kenya, as in many other parts of the world, is therefore key in sustaining livelihoods by providing means for earning incomes, improving living standards of people and enhancing food security (Syagga, 2012). As observed by Onguny and Gillies (2019), where formal employment prospects and resources are limited, land provides alternative sense of security to those who own it. Further, in many societies across the world, land and related resources continue to have major spiritual, historical and cultural significance to individuals.

As pointed out by Kanyinga (2016), inequalities in land ownership have been one of the most important dimensions to the growing socio-economic inequalities in Kenya. This is because the issues related to land ownership, use and access have, over time, favoured some communities at the expense of others. This has led to Onguny and Gillies (2019) to comment that land rights related to allocation, access and use in Kenya are complex, multi-layered and politicized.

According to an interviewee, 6 April, 2019, a better understanding of the land question in Mombasa County dates back to the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial circumstances that have informed the structure of land and how the elites have constructed and influenced the narratives on land access and ownership (Interviewee, 6 April, 2019).

According to another interviewee, 6 April, 2019, beginning with the Arab-Swahili rule, colonial administration, all the way to post-colonial political regimes, the Mijikenda people in Mombasa have helplessly watched their land taken over as they are reduced to squatters.

During an interview with an elderly man from Kadongo village in Kisauni, Sub-County, who pointed out:

Our land problems did not begin yesterday. From the time of Arab rule, we lost our land in Mombasa and other parts of the region as our ancestors fled to the interior to escape being captured and sold to foreign lands as slaves or made to work in Arab plantations here in Mombasa as slaves. Unfortunately, as they escaped to the interior, the others occupied our land and converted it into their own. We are simply claiming what was originally our ancestral land (Interviewee 09 May, 2019).

The above quote demonstrates that the Mijikenda land question is historical. There is a feeling among majority of the members of the Mijikenda community that the Arab and Swahili dispossessed them of their ancestral land and converted it to commercial agricultural land to their own benefit. Further, not only was their land illegally taken away, they were also forced to work as slaves in the plantations. The implication here is that lack of land ownership significantly impacted on the socio-economic, spiritual, political and cultural wellbeing of the Mijikenda by making it difficult for them to benefit from land and related resources.

The views of the respondents resonate with that of Kanyinga (2016) who argues that in the pre-colonial period, the Arabs and Swahili consolidated slave trade and slavery during which time, large tracks of land belonging to the Mijikenda were forcefully taken away and converted into plantations. Similar views are expressed by Okoth (1991) who point out that abundance of slave labour and free access to land facilitated the Arabs

and their Swahili counterparts to establish large plantations around the coast and on land whose ownership was not a subject of dispute since the Mijikenda inhabitants, out of fear of being captured and forced to work as slaves in the plantations, fled into the interior.

The Mijikenda's account of how they lost land is however disputed by respondents of Arab and Swahili origin. During an interview at Makadara Sub-location, Mvita Sub-County, a male elderly interviewee from Swahili community had this to say:

Nobody marginalized these people (referring to Mijikenda) in the acquisition of land. The truth of the matter is that the land we own did not belong to any body. It was open land when our ancestors acquired it. Secondly, some of the land we own were sold to us by the Mijikenda elders in exchange with alcohol. Therefore, to claim that they are marginalized in land ownership is to misrepresent facts (Interviewee, 30 March, 2019).

Similar sentiments emerged during a FGD with a group of men at Mwembe Tayari Sub-location in Mvita Sub- County. A participant commented:

This whole idea that the Arabs and Swahili illegally took away land belonging to the Mijikenda is a hoax. Most of the land our ancestors took was largely open land roamed by wild animals. Further, these people (referring to Mijikenda) lived far in the interior and not Mombasa. It was only when they realised the economic potential of Mombasa that they began to claim land here (Participant, FGD, 10 April, 2019).

From the above quotes, it emerges that the Arab and Swahili have a different account of the land question in Mombasa from that held by the Mijikenda community. According to them, they were either the first occupiers of the land they own and therefore established the rights by virtue of settling in the land first or, in some cases, bought the land they occupy from Mijikenda elders. It is worth noting from the above quote that the members of the Mijikenda community were in some instances cheated out of their land. To claim that in some cases they gave out their land in exchange of alcohol is a clear indication that the Mijikenda land was taken unfairly. To allege that

the community could accept alcohol in exchange of land is demeaning and being disrespectful to the community.

Even though it was not within the scope of this study to verify authenticity of historical accounts regarding who settled in Mombasa before the other, the issue of which community settled in Mombasa before the other has been a subject of debate by historians. According to some historical accounts, the Mijikenda occupation of Mombasa predates that of the Arabs and Swahili. Park (2015), for instance argues that the Mijikenda were the first to occupy Mombasa. According to his account, Mombasa Island was an ownerless land and only discovered by a Mijikenda hunter who traced a wounded elephant and found it at the present site of Fort Jesus. Thereafter the hunter and his people decided to settle in the Island. Walsh (1992) expresses similar views by pointing out that the Mijikenda developed in the territories they occupy today and did not migrate from Shingwaya as depicted in some oral traditions.

According to historians such as (Spear, 1982), the Mijikenda only migrated to their present territories from the coastal Somali in the 16th century to escape their hostile Galla neighbours. From Spear's account, it seems that the Arabs and Swahili settled in Mombasa before the arrival of the Mijikenda. Despite the counter narratives, the truth of the matter is, however, that vast tracks of land in Mombasa are owned mainly by absentee Arab and Swahili landlords while the Mijikenda live there as squatters.

The study further revealed that the British colonial occupation also in away contributed to the entrenchment of marginalization of the Mijikenda in terms of access to and ownership of land in Mombasa County and, by extension, the entire coastal region.

According to Charo (Interview, 9/04/2019), the arrival of British colonists indeed exacerbated the Mijikenda land problem through various treaties and legislations.

During an interview at Birikani Sub-location, Jomvu Sub- County, a male interviewee from the Mijikenda community commented that:

The British colonists significantly contributed to the loss of our land. They came up with treaties and legislations that recognized and allowed Arabs and Swahili to claim and get titles for our ancestral land while completely refusing to recognize our land tenure system. It really pains to be considered as a squatter in land that you know belonged to your forefathers (Interviewee, 2 April, 2019)

Similar sentiments came out during a FGD with a group of men and women at Mwembe Legeza Sub-location, Kisauni Sub-county. A female participant remarked:

As much as we had problems of land ownership during the Arab and Swahili period, the British colonists made the issue worse by introducing land titles. People were required to acquire and hold titles for the land they occupied. This worked to our disadvantage since our culture did not recognize individual land ownership (Participant FGD, 5 April, 2019).

From the above quotes, it can be inferred that the British colonists played a critical role in entrenching marginalization of the Mijikenda in terms of land ownership. The fact that the land tenure system introduced by the British colonists was at variance with the Mijikenda customs and traditions in relation to land ownership, access and use meant that it became increasingly difficult for them to acquire individual land titles. These views resonate with those of Kameri-Mbote (2009) who observed that the colonialists alienated the African customary land system by introducing individual land ownership resulting in mass disinheritance of communities of their land.

These views are further corroborated by different scholars on the coastal land question. Syagga (2012) posits that since the period when Kenya was under colonial rule, land issues along the coastal Kenya and other parts of the country have been emotive,

contentious and an obstacle to social cohesion and economic growth. According to Willis and Gona (2012), the marginalization of the Mijikenda in terms of allocation and access to land in Mombasa during colonialism can be traced to the Anglo-German agreement between the British and Germans in 1886. This agreement resulted in placing the East African hinterland under the influence of the two colonial powers and the recognition of ten-mile coastal strip (*Mwambao*), running from Kipipini in the northern part of Kenya to river Ruvuma in the southern Tanzania and stretching from the point of high-water mark to the interior as the territory under the Sultanate of Zanzibar (Mwaruvue, 2011).

Each colonizing power subsequently undertook to enter into agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar on the management of the ten-mile coastal strip under his domains of influence. The British, as a way recognizing the nominal sovereignty of the sultan and the treaties already signed between the sultan and other nations such as the United States of America, France and Germany, undertook to uphold pre-existing property rights of the sultan subjects (Mwaruvue, 2011). This, in effect, allowed the Arabs, Swahili and Asians who had bought land from the Arabs to own freehold land along the coastal strip but discriminated against the Mijikenda since they were not considered to be sultan's subjects (Willis & Gona, 2012).

Apart from the 1886 agreement, the British colonists enacted a series of other legislations that entrenched the marginalization of the Mijikenda from their land. In 1902, for instance, the British introduced the Crown Land Ordinance (CLO). The ordinance required that all unoccupied land within the protectorate becomes crown land; that is, land in which the colonial governors had authority on behalf of the Queen

of England. This facilitated the acquisition of unoccupied land owned by the Mijikenda under the customary tenure in Mombasa and other parts of the coastal region.

Another legislation that further contributed to marginalization of the Mijikenda from their ancestral land was the 1908 Land Titles Ordinance (LTO). Through this ordinance, the British colonists wanted to ascertain the extent of private land ownership before they would alienate the remainder as crown land. According to Syagga (2012) and Okoth (2000), the 1908 Land Titles Ordinance complicated matters further for the Mijikenda. The ordinance required any claimants of land on the coast to make claims with documentary or real evidence to the land registration courts within six months for them to be issued with title deeds (Kanyinga, 2016). Proof of land ownership in Mombasa by the Mijikenda became very complicated. As pointed out by participants in a FGD in ACK pastoral center, the Mijikenda customs and tradition did not allow private land ownership. One participant observed:

We, the Mijikenda people, considered land to be a spirit and therefore something that could not be owned by an individual. What we had were rights to use of land and land related resources. Therefore, there is no way we could apply for individual titles. This is how our prime land along the coastal strip was taken away (Participant, FGD, 28 March, 2019).

In concurrence, a female interviewee at Mjambere Sub-location, Kisauni Sub-county expressed similar views by remarking:

Land among the traditional Mijikenda was not subject to individual ownership. How could we compete for land ownership with our gods? Since people feared the consequences of trying to claim land ownership as individuals, the Arabs and Swahili took advantage to appropriate our land (Interviewee, 5 April, 2019).

Those quotes from the FGDs and interviews indicate that customs and traditions significantly contributed to the marginalization of the Mijikenda in terms of land ownership. According to Mijikenda customs and traditions, land was owned

collectively but not individually. This, in essence, implied that it was extremely difficult for the Mijikenda to provide any documentary or real evidence of land ownership individually for them to be issued with title deeds as demanded by the Land Titles Ordinance. The Arabs, Swahili and Asians consequently took advantage of the prevailing situation to lay claim to large tracks of land including those belonging to the Mijikenda since their culture and religion allowed for private property ownership.

This view seems to be in tandem with Okoth (2000), who posits that according to the Mijikenda culture, land was considered to belong to a cultural deity and could not be owned by an individual. Being considered as a spirit meant that land was held in high regard and no individual would dare claim ownership lest they attract the wrath of the spirits.

This cultural dimension to land therefore, in a significant way, contributed to the Mijikenda's claim to ancestral land ownership not being recognized during land registration and, hence, their land subsequently ended up in the hands of the Arabs and Swahili or being converted to crown land. On the other hand, since the Arab and Swahili culture recognized private property ownership, they were able to successfully, sometimes producing ex-slaves who settled on their farms as witnesses to their claims to have large tracks of land registered in their name (CRA, 2012; Kanyinga, 2016; Willis & Gona, 2012).

Kanyinga (2016) also suggests that the 1908 Lands Title Ordinance in essence closed all the avenues for the Mijikenda and ex-slaves to lay claim to land. Since they could not provide proof of ownership, large tracks of land were left available for expropriation by the settlers. Further, matters were complicated for the Mijikenda because the process

of laying claim and registering land was controlled by the Arab administrators appointed by the colonists and announcement of outcomes done in mosques where there were no Mijikenda.

Morten and Dunn (2013) go on to argue that the introduction of title deeds created new rules about land access and provided security of ownership despite the considerable injustices that occurred through the expulsion and dispossession legitimized by the process. Okoth (2000), in concurrence, observed that the land titles ordinance of 1908 complicated matters for the Mijikenda in that the new form of ownership through titles deeds masked all the other forms of ownership that existed before even though the absence of title did not imply that the Mijikenda did not have any land regime at all.

The rising nationalism and agitation for political independence in the 1950s and 1960s, was to reactivate the land related grievances in coast generally and Mombasa in particular (Kanyinga, 2016). When the rest of Kenya became a colony in 1920, the ten-mile coastal strip remained a protectorate under the control of the Sultan of Zanzibar (Willis & Gona, 2012). During the negotiation for independence, the status of the ten-mile coastal strip that had remained as a protectorate became a very contentious issue between the indigenous Mijikenda community on the one hand and the Arabs and Swahili on the other. Fearing losing their privileged status and land rights, the Arabs and the Swahili advocated to secede and become an independent state or be joined to Zanzibar (Mwaruvue, 2011). The Africans representatives, on the other, hand felt that the strip should be joined to the larger Kenyan colony.

To address the issue of the coastal strip, a commission known as the Robertson Commission was formed to collect and collate views from the Arabs, Swahili and

Africans on the issue of the ten-mile coastal strip. The appointment of the commission coincided with the Lancaster conferences for independence. As noted by Willis and Gona (2012), during the second Lancaster Conference, the position of the ten-mile coastal strip became a subject of intense debate pitting the African delegation, on one side, and the Arabs and Swahili delegations on the other. African delegation consisting of Jomo Kenyatta, Oginga Odinga, Ronald Ngala, and Tom Mboya among others insisted that the ten-mile strip was part of Kenyan territory and could not be surrendered at whatever cost. The Arabs and Swahili delegation, on the other hand, felt that the strip should be granted autonomy as a sovereign state because it was never part of the Kenyan colony but remained as a protectorate in 1920 when the rest of Kenya became a colony.

After receiving several petitions from the Africans, Swahili and the Arabs, the commission recommended that the coastal strip should be part of the independent Kenya (Mwaruvue, 2011; Willis & Gona, 2012). Further, it recommended that the existing land rights should be acknowledged and guaranteed.

Since the discussion on the status of *Mwambao* (coastline) was seen to be derailing the process of granting of self-rule to Kenya, the incoming Prime Minister, Jomo Kenyatta ceded some ground on the status of the ten-mile coastal strip by committing to protect certain rights of the sultanate subjects (Willis & Gona, 2012). Consequently, on 5th October, 1963, an agreement was signed in London between Jomo Kenyatta and the prime minister of Zanzibar.

One of the undertakings in the agreement was that the freehold titles in the coast region that were already registered would at all times be respected, and that steps would be

taken to ensure continuation of the procedure for registration of new freehold titles and rights of freeholders would, at all times, be respected unless otherwise land is taken for purposes of public utilities, in which case prompt compensation will be awarded (Willis & Gona, 2012). Three days later, on 8th October, 1963, another agreement was signed, this time among the Prime Ministers of Kenya and Zanzibar, the Sultan of Zanzibar and the secretary of state for colonies revoking the 1890 and 1895 agreements regarding the state of the protectorate.

Apart from marginalization dating back to the pre-colonial and colonial regimes, the study as well revealed that marginalization in terms of land ownership in Mombasa and coast generally continued even in the post-colonial Kenya. When Kenya attained independence in 1963, the expectation of the indigenous Mijikenda community living along the coastal strip was very high.

During an interview in Kwa Hola Sub-location, Changamwe Sub-county, a middle-aged female interviewee remarked:

When we got independence from the British colonists in 1963, we thought that the land question will be solved once and for all. It never occurred to us that a government led by fellow Africans will preside over land grabbing just like the Arabs and British colonizers. It really pains that we continue to live as squatters more than six decades after gaining internal self-rule when foreigners have title deeds for land that originally belonged to our ancestors (Interviewee, 9 July, 2019)

From the above remark, it appears that the attainment of internal self-rule brought with it a lot of hopes and enthusiasm. It was expected that the transfer of power from the British colonists to the local elites would fundamentally change the land question. This did not, however, materialize as the post-colonial era witnessed increased elite capture of the land rights and simply retained the colonial land laws and pursued the same land reform objectives without any major alterations (Onguny & Gillies, 2019). As observed

by Kanyinga (2016) both the negotiation and agreement between Kenyatta, the sultan of Zanzibar and the outgoing colonial government over independence, in essence, concluded the process of creating the squatter phenomenon in coastal Kenya. The Mijikenda found themselves as squatters, or tenants of Arabs and Swahili landlords in Mombasa and the entire coastal region.

The first post-colonial regime, from the onset, undertook to uphold the land rights in Mombasa irrespective of how they were acquired. The colonial 1915 Crown Land Ordinance was not repealed but instead became the Land Act (Cap 280) laws of Kenya. The Land Act invested all the powers on the president in terms of leasing, granting and disposition of the public land (Syagga, 2012). It is this act that the post-colonial political regimes invoked to further dispossess the Mijikenda of Mombasa and the entire coastal region of their land and arbitrarily allocate it to their political cronies, friends, families, and other senior government officers and heads of parastatals (Mghanga, 2010; Syagga, 2012).

The issue of arbitrary land allocation also came out during a FGD with a group of men in Mtaa Mbuzi Sub-location in Likoni Sub-County. A participant remarked:

We, the Mijikenda of Mombasa, unfairly lost our land to Arabs, Swahili and people from upcountry. They own large tracks of land here including the lucrative beach plots when we have nothing. How did, Waitiki, for instance acquire nine hundred (900) acres of land here when no single Mijikenda has ten (10) acres of land anywhere? When you ask, you are told he has a title. This is not fair (Participant, FGD, 28 March, 2019).

The above quote illustrates how the local community feels cheated in distribution of land. The fact that one individual whom according to them is a “foreigner” can own 900 acres of land in their midst when the locals have very little or none at all entrenches feeling of marginalization and animosity against outsiders.

These views that the Mijikenda have been marginalized in terms of land ownership are supported by scholars such as Mghanga (2010) and Warah (2017) who note that much of Mombasa Island including Changanwe, Likoni, Kisauni, and Mtongwe are owned by absentee land lords mainly of Arab, upcountry and Swahili origins owning titles which were acquired centuries ago but who continue to collect ground rents from squatters of the Mijikenda community.

Poor and unequal distribution of land along the coastal strip was rampant particularly during the first two post-colonial political regimes. For instance seven years after gaining independence, Syagga (2012), points out that President Jomo Kenyatta's government oversaw the allocation of the premier beach plots in the coastal strip to political cronies and relatives in what came to be known as second row plots. In this arrangement, it was only the then powerful coastal provincial commissioner, Eliud Mahihu, who was tasked to identify and recommend those qualified to be issued with the prime beach plots. Ordinarily those interested in the beach plots would submit their written requests to the registrar of titles in Mombasa who would then forward them to the commissioner of lands for possible consideration (Syagga, 2012).

Interestingly, Mahihu bypassed this procedure by directly writing to the commissioner of lands recommending who were to be allocated the prime beach plots. The effect was that those who ended benefitting from the prime beach plots were people from outside Mombasa – mainly political elites, senior government officers, military chiefs and heads of parastatals among others (CRA, 2012). The indigenous Mijikenda community missed out on the allocation of prime beach plots since they lacked the political networks or some of their own in the relevant offices (Syagga, 2012; Mghanga, 2010; CRA, 2012).

As captured in the Ndung'u Land Report (2004), post-colonial land tenure regimes have been manipulated by various national elites to irregularly allocate public land for personal or political gains and, as pointed out by Onama (2010), to stifle the operation of land institutions. This has led scholars such as Keller (2014) to argue that the Kenya's independence of 1963 only marked the end of formal colonialism since the post-colonial political regimes have engaged in the same land related injustices as the colonial regime. The post-colonial state has therefore aggravated the situation by giving grants to land even in areas already occupied by the indigenous Mijikenda ethnic community thereby escalating landlessness and the squatter problem (Kanyinga, 2016).

From the above historical accounts beginning with Arab and Swahili period, the colonial period and the post-colonial political dispensation, it is evident that several factors have coalesced to marginalize the Mijikenda of Mombasa in terms of the rights to land use and ownership.

During the fieldwork, it emerged that the Mijikenda base their claim to marginalization on land on the fact that they are the "sons of the soil" (autochthons) or "*wanaati*" in the local dialect. According to Morten and Dunn (2013), autochthony implies one has the right to belong because of ancestral claims to territory, that is, "this is ours because we were here first". In this context therefore, the Mijikenda perceive themselves as having indisputable historical claim to Mombasa.

During oral interviews, those from the Mijikenda community used the 'sons of the soil' narrative to show how much they have been marginalized and denied the right to land despite the fact that they are the true autochthons of Mombasa. An elderly male interviewee from Centi Kumi Sub-location, Likoni Sub-county pointed out:

We are upset that we do not have land we call our own despite being the indigenous inhabitants of Mombasa. All these other people came from somewhere else. The Arabs, for instance, came from Oman, these whites from Europe, the Swahili I don't know from where and our African brothers from other parts of this country. We have never heard that, as they were coming here, they carried soil with them and poured in Mombasa for them to claim ownership of land here. Unfortunately, they took advantage of our hospitable nature and took away all our land (Interviewee, 28 March, 2019)

Similar sentiments came out during a FGD with a group of elders in Kadongo village Kisauni sub-county. One of the participants while emphasizing on the sons of the soil narrative observed that:

The Mijikenda were the indigenous inhabitants of Mombasa before people from all over came and took away our land. (Pointing at his homestead, he lamented that), I have lived here for the last sixty years but still I've no title for it. In our culture, when a child is born, a palm tree is planted at the site where the placenta is buried and when an old man dies a mango tree is planted at the grave site. That mango tree there is planted at my grandfather's grave and that other one is my father's grave, the palm tree over there, I was told, is where my placenta was buried and that other one (pointing at another palm tree), is my eldest brother's. But still, we are told this land is not ours and constantly threatened with eviction simply because we do not have papers (Participant, FGD, 6 April, 2019).

These statements project a people lamenting of unfair marginalization in the allocation of land. Lack of land one calls their own implies diminished development prospects. It is, for instance, very difficult to plan to initiate long-term investments on land whose ownership is in dispute and uncertain. Since land in Kenya is a critical economic resource, whose ownership significantly shapes economic prospects of individuals, lack of land could therefore undermine a peoples' economic, social and cultural development. It is, however, important to point out that ownership of land does not automatically translate to economic development. There are communities or individuals who own large tracks of land but still languish in poverty. Conversely, there are people

without land they call their own but have been able to realize substantial economic development.

Even though the Mijikenda claim that they are the autochthons and should enjoy unlimited land rights, in Kenya, proof of land ownership is through land title deeds. In the absence of the relevant documentations, claim to land ownership may prove futile irrespective of how long someone has lived on a given piece of land.

The issue of absentee landlords has sometimes led to squatters forcefully occupying unoccupied parcels of land which, according to them, is their ancestral land. At the time of writing this thesis, there is a protracted battle between Hussein Dairy and Bandari Sacco on one side and more than 3000 squatters who invaded a 460-acre piece of land in Nguu Tatu area of Kisauni Constituency since 2011 (Nation on Sunday, 18/03/2016; KTN, Prime Time News, 28/05/2020; Citizen TV, Lunch Time News 14/09/2020). Even though the court has ruled in favour of Bandari Sacco and ordered that the squatters should vacate, they have stayed put insisting that they actually invaded the land because it belonged to their ancestors.

This view of the Mijikenda being the indigenous community of Mombasa seems to get support from among scholars. Okoth (2000) and Park (2015), for example, argue that although historians of Arab and Swahili origin sometimes argue that these ethnic groups were the first to arrive in the coast and therefore established tenure rights by virtue of being the first settlers, the correct position is that the Mijikenda, Taita and Pokomo presence precedes that of any other ethnic group in the area.

Kanyinga (2016), on his part, notes that initial land rights were established by first occupation and the continued investment of labour and bush clearing. This land

eventually became the common property of descendants of the first occupants and passed on to the next generations. From this point of view, it can be argued that since the Mijikenda, for instance, believe that their ancestors were the original inhabitants of Mombasa, their rights of access to and use of land was therefore passed on to them by their forefathers and that their right to land cannot simply be denied due to lack of title deeds.

Onguny and Gillies (2019) further argue that the Mijikenda's claim of autochthonous status gives them a form of identity linked to lines of ancestry. As observed by Morten and Dunn (2013), autochthonous claims provide individuals with the trajectory of memories that are invoked to construct a narrative around which to mobilize for conflict. Supporting this line of argument, Mitchell (2018), for instance, observe that the claims of "sons of the soil" bring with it emotional context entrenched within the ancient significance of land as conceived by individuals born within a given community. Morten and Dunn, (2013) further notes that when "the sons of the soil status" is challenged, for instance, through land grabbing or political takeover, it is met with popular outrage. This partly explains why the land issue in Mombasa and the coast generally has been emotive and political with the Mijikenda feeling that the political systems over time have marginalized them in land allocation.

It can therefore be argued that the feelings of being short-changed in land allocation and ownership has, as argued by Morten and Dunn (2013), given the Mijikenda an opportunity to re-activate narratives of belonging (sons of the soil) to distinguish themselves from the intruders. This consequently degenerates into political contests creating in-groups and out-group distinctions where the "sons of the soil" narrative is seen as an opportunity to correct historical injustices committed by aliens or strangers,

in this case, mainly the Arabs, Swahili and upcountry immigrants. During FGD with former members of the MRC, at ACK Pastoral Centre in Likoni, a participant observed:

When we were active as MRC, one of our concerns was the land question. How can you feel that people from all over have titles here including the prime beach plots which they did not pay for when we have none ourselves despite being the indigenous inhabitants? That is why we feel that we should be a country of our own so that these colonists (referring to the non-locals) can go away (Participant, FGD, 29 March, 2019).

The above remarks are illustrative of a people who are bitter that “foreigners” who live amongst them have titles for lands that they consider their ancestral land when they (the local community) have none. What pains them most is that the so-called foreigners continue to benefit from their land and related resources while the local community languish in poverty. This entrenches feelings of marginalization to the extent of wanting to secede and become a country on its own. The assumption is that becoming a country on its own will accord them the opportunity to get back their land and improve their economic status.

The “sons of the soil” narrative has therefore been invoked by ethnic or regional elites as a political strategy to mobilize for support. The constituents find the “sons of the soil” narrative appealing to them. In this respect, ascending to political leadership or becoming a country on its own gives the people of Mombasa hope of correcting the historical injustices related to land.

Since politics in Africa revolve around ethnic or regional elites, politicians are able to frame these narratives effectively to mobilize for support. As argued by Morten and Dunn (2013), the tales of belonging sometimes end up provoking dramatic expressions of violence that can undermine social cohesion.

This partly explains why the Mombasa County, in particular, and coastal Kenya, in general, has, over time, had disquiet against upcountry immigrants whom they accuse of irregularly taking their land including the prime beach plots. This, according to Oyugi (2000), has sometimes led to open hostilities and conflicts like the one experienced in Likoni in 1997 targeting upcountry immigrants in which thirteen (13) people including six (6) police officers lost their lives.

The view that the Mijikenda are the true autochthons of Mombasa and by extension the entire coastal Kenya, has however been contested by other communities living in Mombasa. During an interview with a female respondent from the Swahili community, he remarked:

I have never understood where this whole idea of the Mijikenda being the autochthons of Mombasa came from. Read your history and get the facts correct (referring to the researcher). By 7th century, the Swahili were already living and doing business with people from China, Persia and Asia along several coastal towns including Mombasa. According to historical records, these Mijikenda people came here almost ten centuries later from Nyika (the bush). How can they begin to claim to be the original inhabitants of Mombasa? (Interviewee, 3 April, 2019).

From the above remarks, it emerges that the Swahili feel that they have lived in Mombasa for centuries and must not therefore be regarded as foreigners. Fourteen centuries are such a long time to live in a given territory and still be regarded as foreigners.

Despite the widely held view that the Mijikenda have been marginalized in terms of land rights, particularly those related to access and ownership, from the study, it also came out that there are those who did not entirely agree that the Mijikenda as an ethnic community have been marginalized in the allocation of land. An interviewee of Arab descent from Makadara Sub-location Mvita Sub-county observed:

Nobody marginalized these people (referring to the Mijikenda) in the acquisition of land. The truth of the matter is that the land we own did not belong to anybody. It was open land when our ancestors acquired it. Secondly, some of the land we own were sold to us by the Mijikenda. In some cases, the elders would even dish out land in exchange of alcohol. Therefore, to claim that they are marginalized in land ownership is to misrepresent facts (Interviewee 09 July, 2019).

Another participant from one of the upcountry communities during a FGD at Centi Kumi village Timbuani Sub-location remarked:

These people sold land to us only to turn and claim that we grabbed their land after misusing the money. Even as we speak, some of those who were issued with titles at Waitiki Farm by the president recently have already sold it. To prove it, I can take you there now to buy a plot if you so wish. They are selling at three hundred thousand shillings. Thereafter they will go to squat in another land and begin claiming that it was their ancestor's land. I'm telling you there are people from the NGOs and local communities who have all along been benefitting from this land issue in Mombasa and coast generally (Participant, FGD 8 July, 2019).

The above remarks from interview and FGD paint a different picture altogether from that presented by the Mijikenda. As observed by the interviewee, the land they occupied was either open unoccupied land or given to their ancestors by the Mijikenda elders in some cases in exchange of alcohol. Since the Mijikenda did not traditionally own land individually, the elders could have apportioned land to the Arabs and Swahili just for their use to produce crops out of their generosity. It never occurred to them that the Arabs will at some point in time privatize land ownership and that a time would come that land would be a critical resource in determining people's livelihoods. Further, the observation of the participants in the FGD paint a picture of a people who are opportunists and want to use the NGOs and community leaders to project an image of a people that are marginalized in land allocation when it is sometimes obvious that these people sometimes sell their land to willing buyers and then take advantage to squat in other people's lands after squandering the proceeds from such sales.

Despite these counter narratives from members of other ethnic communities, particularly Arabs, Swahili and upcountry immigrants, it cannot be entirely denied that the Mijikenda community has historically suffered in terms of land access and ownership as shown by the number of those who live as squatters in Mombasa County and the coastal region generally. Indeed, the Ndung'u Land Commission appointed by his Excellency President Mwai Kibaki in 2004 to investigate the land problem in Kenya confirmed that the Mijikenda have historically suffered marginalization in land allocation and access from colonial period (Ndung'u Land Report, 2004). The report, among other things, recommended that several titles held by absentee landlords in Mombasa and other coastal regions be revoked. Further, the report recommended that the local communities need to be issued with title deeds for their lands.

The marginalization on land allocation, access and use could have serious ramifications on national cohesion. Land and related resources have significant implications on the socio-economic and cultural wellbeing of a people. Land can be used as a source of wealth creation by those who own it. For instance, land could be used to produce crops for sustaining livelihoods or for economic purposes. Further, people can use title deeds to secure loans for development from financial institutions.

In situations where some segments of the society cannot freely enjoy land use or benefit from related resources while others continue to prosper because of land ownership, feelings of relative deprivation begin to be entrenched. Consequently, the community or regional elites could use land access as a frame for group mobilization that can have serious implications on national cohesion as was the case in Likoni in 1997 when people from upcountry were deliberately targeted for attack leading to the death of thirteen people including six police officers (Oyugi, 2000)

4.3.2 Provision of Education

Socio-economic marginalization among the residents of Mombasa was also analysed in the provision of education. Education is a critical service that all citizens should have an opportunity to access. Education provides skills and knowledge necessary to navigate through life. Without good levels of education, an individual's life chances are significantly curtailed because it, for instance, becomes difficult to secure employment opportunities (Stiftung, 2012).

In recognition of the role of education in improving peoples' quality of life, the Kenyan government has enacted various domestic statutes and ratified several international conventions related to education. For instance, the Constitution of Kenya 2010 in articles 43 (f) and 53 (b) provides for the right of every person to education and the right to free and compulsory basic education respectively. Also, according to the Children's Act of Kenya 2001 revised in 2010 part II (7), "*every child shall be entitled to education – the provision of which shall be the responsibility of the government and the parents.*" The United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child 1989 to which Kenya is a signatory in article 28 (a) and (b), in part, requires that "*state parties ensure free and compulsory primary education and encourage the development of secondary education and vocational training institutes and make them available and accessible to every child.*" It is against this background that this sub-theme sought to analyse how the status of provision of education in Mombasa County is likely to create conditions that make the residents vulnerable and easy to mobilize to violence that can undermine national cohesion.

From the field interviews and Focus Group Discussions in the six Sub-Counties of Mombasa, it emerged that majority of the respondents felt that from the time of British

colonists, Mombasa County and the entire coastal region has been marginalised in the provision of education compared to other regions of the country. Mombasa being the second largest city in Kenya after Nairobi according to (Interviewee 7/04/2019) ought to have some of the best educational institutions but this is not the case.

During an interview with a middle-aged woman at Kadongo village, Mjambere ward in Kisauni Sub-county, one participant remarked:

“We have really been side-lined in the provision of education. We have very few government schools here and due to the remoteness and inaccessibility of this area, no teacher wants to be posted here. This makes it difficult to get qualified teachers from the Teachers Service Commission. The schools therefore rely mainly on untrained teachers contracted by the Boards of Management but not those employed by government through Teachers Service Commission” (Interviewee 30 March, 2019).

This statement is an indication that residents of Kadongo village in Kisauni Sub-county feel that their children are not getting access to quality education. It is the duty of the government to provide quality education to its entire citizenry without undue discrimination. The observation that the area is remote and does not benefit from trained teachers employed by the Teachers Service Commission is a pointer to the fact that quality of education in the region is likely to be compromised. When a section of the population is marginalized in the provision of a critical service like education, it is likely to have negative impacts on their life chances. Lack of quality education, in essence, would deny the residents of Kisauni Sub-county the requisite skills to navigate through life or to effectively compete in the job market with their counterparts from other regions that enjoy access to quality education.

During a FGD with a group of locals from Ratna Square village in Kongowea Sub-Location, Nyali Sub-county, the participants concurred with the views from interviews

that Mombasa has for a very long time been marginalized in the provision of education.

A participant observed:

“We, the people of Mombasa, have suffered neglect in the provision of educational infrastructure. Despite being the second largest city, we have for a very long time had only one national school - Shimo La Tewa – whereas other places have several. There has been a deliberate move by the government to marginalize us as a people even in institutions of higher learning. For instance, what is the justification of accrediting Kiambu Institute of Technology to offer a course in blue economy yet there is no water body near Kiambu yet we have no such institution here in Mombasa yet we are surrounded by the ocean all over (Participant, FGD, 28 March, 2019).

The quotation depicts a people who feel that the government has over time deliberately marginalized them in the provision of education and development of educational institutions. Accreditation of Kiambu Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) to offer a course in blue economy despite its location in the former white highlands far away from any water body may be construed to mean that since the current head of state is from Kiambu County, this is a deliberate move to benefit his own people at the expense of people of Mombasa County. Ideally, a course in blue economy could have been offered in learning institutions in places like coast region or along the Lake Victoria basin. The thinking that some segments of the society are enjoying favouritism or comparative advantage over others in the provision of education is likely to entrench feelings of marginalization.

These views that Mombasa County and, by extension, the entire coastal region has been marginalized in terms of education have been corroborated by the works of scholars from the region such as Mazrui (2011) and Ndhovu (2014). While addressing a conference in Pwani University in 2011, Mazrui pointed out that coastal Kenya and Mombasa in particular has suffered neglect in the provision of education for years. He remarked “*the coastal people were the first to be literate but the last to graduate*”. This

remark was apparently in reference to the fact that the first formal education institution was built by missionaries at Rabai in Mombasa County in 1846 but over the years, Mombasa and the entire coastal region did not have a university until 2011 when the former the Mombasa Polytechnic became a fully-fledged university. Ndhovu, on his part, posits that the coastal region was deliberately left behind because educational system privileged ethnic groups and regions that favoured missionary penetration. Unlike other parts of the country, Mombasa was largely Islamic and did not embrace Christianity hence missing out in (or from) development of educational infrastructure which was church sponsored. Consequently, fewer educational institutions were put up in Mombasa County and the entire coastal region that had large Muslim following.

According to the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA, 2012), Mombasa County is significantly underdeveloped in the provision of education. In its working paper of 2012, the commission noted that “Kisauni Sub-County, for instance, with a population of over 300,000 people had only sixteen government primary and four government secondary schools. With only a few government schools, chances are that a significant number of school-going age may miss out on the opportunity to enroll for education in government schools or that the quality significantly compromised because of overstretched facilities.

In trying to get an in-depth understanding of the education situation in Mombasa County, and whether there could be any indications of marginalization, the study tried to look at the number of basic education institutions in the county as compared to other counties.

Table 4.1 below shows the number of Primary and Secondary schools in selected counties in Kenya against the total population as provided in the 2019 Population and Housing Census Report Volume II while Table 4.2 shows the status of basic education enrollment in selected counties against the population of the school going age of twenty-four years and below.

Table 4.1: Number of Primary and Secondary Schools in Selected Counties Kenya

| | Primary | | Secondary | | Total Population |
|--------------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|------------------|
| | Public | Private | Public | Private | |
| Mombasa | 97 | 362 | 48 | 101 | 1,208,333 |
| Kisumu | 615 | 206 | 226 | 26 | 1,155,574 |
| Siaya | 653 | 198 | 243 | 3 | 993,183 |
| Baringo | 729 | 112 | 175 | 8 | 666,763 |
| Machakos | 852 | 350 | 361 | 99 | 1,421,932 |
| Uashin gishu | 487 | 358 | 192 | 56 | 1,163,186 |
| Nyeri | 390 | 162 | 221 | 21 | 759,164 |
| Kisii | 704 | 403 | 355 | 13 | 1,266,860 |
| Murang'a | 511 | 170 | 310 | 38 | 1,056,640 |
| Nakuru | 727 | 409 | 347 | 185 | 2,162,202 |
| Kakamega | 908 | 212 | 420 | 23 | 1,867,599 |

Source 1: 2019 GOK Basic Educational Statistical Booklet

Source 2: 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Volume II

Table 4.2: 2019 Basic Educational Enrolment in selected Counties in Kenya

| | PRE-PRIMARY | | PRIMARY | | SECONDARY | | Total | Population 0-24 yrs | % Of School Enrollment |
|--------------|-------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|--------|---------------------|------------------------|
| | Public | Private | Public | Private | Public | Private | | | |
| Mombasa | 8900 | 18000 | 75100 | 80,270 | 23200 | 13300 | 195570 | 615779 | 31.7 |
| Kisumu | 49000 | 28800 | 254000 | 33,150 | 90100 | 3200 | 458250 | 701002 | 65.3 |
| Siaya | 65200 | 34600 | 253500 | 16030 | 92000 | 200 | 461530 | 607673 | 75.9 |
| Baringo | 51300 | 7900 | 143600 | 18,300 | 44700 | 2100 | 267900 | 438971 | 61 |
| Machakos | 32100 | 50000 | 238600 | 45830 | 104,400 | 13800 | 484730 | 741944 | 65.3 |
| Uashin gishu | 34700 | 22300 | 173900 | 57280 | 61300 | 8400 | 357880 | 687181 | 52 |
| Nyeri | 14400 | 8700 | 101400 | 23470 | 74000 | 3100 | 225070 | 357395 | 62.9 |
| Kisii | 57700 | 29800 | 255,600 | 56400 | 131300 | 1800 | 532600 | 763536 | 69.7 |
| Murang'a | 38200 | 10200 | 176500 | 29910 | 115800 | 6300 | 376910 | 523416 | 72 |
| Nakuru | 53300 | 57300 | 376,700 | 101,320 | 141300 | 30400 | 760320 | 1263029 | 60 |
| Kakamega | 119,100 | 28,500 | 519,900 | 35,160 | 161700 | 3600 | 867960 | 1174936 | 73.8 |

Source 1: 2019 GOK Basic Educational Statistical Booklet

Source 2: 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Volume II

Even though it was not within the scope of this study to undertake a comparative analysis, the researcher was of the view that making reference to some statistical data would help augment some of the findings from the field. Using the 2019 Population and Housing Census and the information from the Basic Education Statistics 2019, the researcher was able to do some comparison between Mombasa County and a few selected counties, particularly those counties with more or less the same population as Mombasa County.

From Table 4.1 above, it can be noted that Mombasa County has extremely fewer public schools as compared to other counties with almost the same population or even far much less. For instance, a county like Kisii with a population of 1.2 million people like Mombasa has 707 public primary schools and 355 public secondary schools compared to Mombasa's 97 and 48 public primary and secondary schools respectively. Murang'a with a population of approximately 1 million people has 511 and 310 public primary and secondary schools respectively while Kisumu with a population of approximately 1.1 has 615 public primary and 206 public secondary schools.

Ideally, one of the reasons governments the world over conduct national census, is to assist in fiscal planning and distribution of resources and services equitable. One of the key factors to consider in the development of infrastructure and provision of other services should be population density. Under the circumstances therefore, Mombasa County, given the population size, should have government basic educational institutions commensurate with the population size. Interestingly, the available basic educational institutions are far below compared to other counties. Consequently, in line with the relative deprivation thesis, comparing themselves to other counties, with

similar or even less population, feelings of relative deprivation are likely to be entrenched.

Table 4.2 compares basic enrollment status in both public and private schools against those in the population aged twenty-four years and below in selected counties in Kenya. According to GOK (2019), the upper limit for school going children is provided at twenty-two (22) years. However according to 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census Volume II, the population categories are given using an interval of four (4) beginning from age zero (0), and therefore age twenty-two years (22) is covered within the category of 20-24 years. It is, therefore, for this reason that the researcher considered the age of up to and including 24 years to determine the enrollment status in selected counties.

From this report on basic education statistics of 2019, it is evident that the enrollment status of people in this age bracket from Mombasa County is far below compared to other counties. From the selected counties, Mombasa is lowest at 31.7% followed by Uasin Gishu at 52% and Nakuru at 60%. On the other hand, Siaya County has the highest enrollment at 75.9%, followed by Kakamega at 73.8% and Murang'a at 72%. This low enrollment in basic education is worrying given that Mombasa County, according to national population and housing census, 2019 has 615,779 people who fall in the age bracket of 24 years and below. A fundamental question that emerges from this data is that, if only 31.7% of those who are supposed to be in school in Mombasa County are enrolled, where are the remaining 69.3% and what are doing?

This inadequate enrolment and provision of educational facilities according to (Kajembe, Interview 5 May, 2019) has had a long-term impact on the people of

Mombasa County, for instance, on their ability to effectively compete in the job market with their counterparts from other parts of the country. As a result, there is a large population of youth who are less educated and jobless in Mombasa County. Without good education and stable employment, the youth are likely to be demotivated, hopeless and become readily available for mobilization to conflict and violence that can undermine national cohesion. During a Focus Group Discussion with former members of the MRC in Likoni, Sub-County. One participant remarked:

“Our joining MRC was partly because of hopelessness. Without education, you cannot get a job and without a job, you will not be able to survive. Some of us did not go to school because the schools were very far away or because our parents did not have money to pay for our education. The same government that denied us the opportunity to get education is the same government that brought people to settle in our land (Participant, FGD, 29 March, 2019).

The above quote depicts a people who seem to have lost hope in life. The fact that schools were far away and that their parents could not afford the cost of education meant that majority of the youth missed out on education. Lack of (or lower levels) of education have made it difficult to secure meaningful employment hence marginalizing them from the job market. Lack of gainful employment or other means for survival could partly be responsible for recruitment of the youth to MRC. As pointed out by Sen (2000), when education is not accessible to a certain segment of the society, it minimizes their life chances.

The lack of or lower levels of education could have long-term effects in enabling the residents of Mombasa County to enjoy the benefits that accrue from education. Stiftung, (2012) argues that access to education is important in understanding the inequalities in Kenya since independence. Education has been universally accepted as the basis for material advancement and for enhancing individual’s prospects for employment, job

advancement, salary and even status. Alcorta *et al.* (2020) note that education is a public good that most citizens in a country should have regardless of their background.

Higher levels of education decrease the chances of conflict by reducing grievances and stimulating economic growth, reducing the size of the recruitment pool and increasing the opportunity cost of young people to join rebellion (Alcorta *et al.*, 2020). From this argument, it could be inferred that groups that are marginalized in the provision of educational infrastructure are more likely to engage in conflicts that can cause instability thereby undermining national cohesion than those who are not.

Lack of education thus can be equated to capacity deprivation of groups and regions to extract benefits of the society (Sen, 2000). In line with Sen's argument, by being marginalized in the provision of education, the residents of Mombasa are by extension deprived of the capacity to effectively compete for the available benefits that accrue from education.

According to UNDP (2015), marginalization in education limits the scope people have for influencing decisions that affect their lives. People lacking literacy and numeracy skills face a heightened risk of poverty, insecure employment and ill health. Marginalization in education is an important factor of entrenching socio-economic marginalization (UNDP, 2015). By looking at other regions of the country, Mombasa residents consider themselves to be comparatively disadvantaged in the provision of education. According to Juma (Interview, 10/04/2019), the feelings of marginalization are escalated by the fact that Mombasa County contributes immensely to the national budget yet no resources are brought back to build schools and other institutions of learning.

A female participant in an interview at Fort Reitz Sub-location in Changamwe Sub-county commented:

“At this time and age, we should not be complaining of inadequate schools and other institutions of learning in Mombasa County. (*Pointing at the direction of Kilindini port she asked the researcher*), how much revenue is generated from this port? And how much is brought back to support education? Very little, if not nothing. What we need as people of Changamwe are good schools, not handouts. Only then would our children become anything they want in this world (interviewee 5 April, 2019).

From this comment, the residents feel that the region is contributing a lot to the national economy but getting very little in return. If only part of the revenue that was generated through the port could be ploughed back to develop educational infrastructure, children in the county would get the best education. The thought that revenue generated under their own eyes is used to develop other regions as they languish in poverty intensifies feelings of being relatively deprived and generates anger normally directed at their perceived oppressors, in this case government led by upcountry communities.

This participant’s view resonates with Nelson Mandela’s in his famous book the *Long Walk to Freedom* where he refers to education as an equalizer in life. He observes: “Education is the greatest engine of personal development. It is through education that the daughter of a peasant can become a doctor and the child of a farm worker become president of a great nation” (Mandela, 1994: 144).

Thus, in light of the discussion above, to some extent, it could be justified to argue that Mombasa County has over time experienced some form of marginalization in the provision of education and development of educational infrastructure generally. Despite this, however, some respondents did not entirely blame low levels of education in Mombasa County on the government. According to Mwanahamisi (interview,

14/04/2019), the low levels of education in Mombasa County could also be blamed on the residents themselves.

A male resident of Ratna square village, Nyali Sub-county corroborates this position thus:

“The issue of refusing to go to school or lack of adequate educational infrastructure in Mombasa and coastal region generally is historical. This formal education was introduced in this region by the Christian Missionaries. Majority of the people here were, however, Muslims. Religious politics therefore significantly contributed to the current state of affairs. Since a good number of our people were Muslims, they saw Christian Missionary Schools as likely to interfere with their religiosity and therefore deliberately refused to either take their children to school or support in the putting up of the educational infrastructure (Interviewee, 28 March 2019).

What emerges from this quote is that, even though some participants would want to blame the government for low levels of education, from the initial stages, some residents of Mombasa County deliberately boycotted formal education due to religious politics. As mentioned earlier, the first educational institution in Kenya was built at Rabai and Jomvu both in Mombasa County. Ordinarily, Mombasa County would have had some of the best educational infrastructure if only the residents embraced the education provided by missionaries.

This point of view is echoed by scholars such as (Ndhovu; 2014; Willis & Chome, 2014). Ndhovu (2014) observed that despite the integration of some Muslims into the colonial administration system, Muslims in the coastal region did not capitalize on the privileged position to acquire education. He adds that Muslims did not only fail to capitalize on the educational opportunities offered through the mission schools, in some cases, they deliberately ignored them. This initial Muslim boycott of missionary schools was to have serious negative impact on the uptake of education in Mombasa County.

Low levels of education significantly limited Muslim's chances of getting employment opportunities.

This implies that although the coastal people were the first to be exposed to western education, their participation is still the poorest in Kenya since the Muslim community resisted colonial system of education and the expansion of wage economy. According to Willis & Gona (2012), Muslims refused to enrol for Christian missionary education out of fear that it demonized Arabs as slave traders whom Europeans had removed from power.

Willis and Chome (2014), on their part, observe that groups may be marginalized because they fail to conform to the value expectation of the larger society. From this standpoint, it can be argued that by refusing to embrace formal education during colonial period, the residents of Mombasa by extension marginalized themselves because educational qualification was later to become the yardstick to be used for employment opportunities. In fact, academic qualification opened doors for further opportunities.

During a FGD with participants in Makadara Sub-location, Mvita Sub-county, one participant concurred with the view that the reason a place like Mombasa lagged behind in education is not purely because of government's deliberate efforts to marginalize them but partly because their parents and grandparents refused to go to school. The participant remarked that:

This issue of not going to school did not begin with our generation. What we are going through began with our fathers or may be our forefathers when they refused to go to missionary schools due to Islam which saw Christianity as corrupting the Muslim faith. Those communities and regions which accommodated missionaries and went to their schools are now enjoying the fruits of education as we watch (Participant, FGD, 10 May, 2019).

This observation is illustrative of the fact that low levels of education and inadequate educational institutions could be gleaned from a historical perspective. What this means is that the low levels of education in Mombasa County could be traced to the pre-colonial period when majority of locals deliberately boycotted education. The earlier boycott of missionary education had cumulative effects on the education status of Mombasa County passing through generations. This view resonates with the findings of Brown and Langer (2010) who observe that marginalization tend to reproduce over time sometimes lasting for decades. An initial advantage or disadvantage often leads to long-term cumulative effects. As applied in the context of this study, those who embraced the missionary education, used the opportunity to acquire knowledge, skills, networks and opportunities to enable them navigate through life. Conversely, those who resisted formal education continued to lag behind due to lack of skills, knowledge and the necessary networks to navigate in life.

During an oral interview in Mwaweche village, Shika Adabu location, Likoni Sub-county, an interviewee revealed that even though there is substantial progress in pursuing formal education, a majority of the residents of Likoni has not fully embraced education. This, he attributed to two main things: Islam which is the main religion among the Digo people who are the majority of the residents of Likoni County and the belief in witchcraft. Islam for a very long time has preferred madrasas to formal education condemning the latter of corrupting the Muslim faith.

The Digo, according to (Interviewee, 09/04/2019) believe so much in witchcraft and sorcery. Quite a number of people still fear taking their children to school for fear of being bewitched. This lack of support for education, according to a respondent, seems to be very popular to the point that Honourable Shakombo, a former MP for Likoni,

lost a parliamentary seat for forcing children in his constituency to go school (Interview, 10/04/2019).

In support of the view that education is still not considered seriously in this region, an interviewee at Mtaa Mbuji village Maji Safi sub-location Likoni Sub-county remarked:

Here, as long as a child has gone to school up to class eight, that is good enough. We just take them to school to know how to write their names. Of what benefit is it to me to take my son to school then he ends up being bewitched or get a good job in Nairobi, get confused with upcountry girls and disappear there forever? In this village, (he went on) *wasomi* (the educated) either ended up running mad due to sorcery or went to Nairobi or outside the country never to be seen here again. I would rather have him here even if he is a drunkard and palm wine tapper but at least I see him around than lose him to mental sickness or forever to Nairobi after getting employment (Interviewee, 4 April, 2019).

Expressing similar views, a local administrator from Mvita Sub-County also pointed out that low levels of education in Mombasa and the coastal region generally cannot be entirely blamed on government but, is, in a way, self-inflicted. During an oral interview, he remarked:

Do not be cheated that it is the government that is entirely to blame for poor education infrastructure and/or low levels of education in this region. The people here from colonial times did not see the need to go to school partly because of Islam and too much belief in witchcraft. Mombasa had the first opportunity to get education before any part of this country. (Addressing the researcher) Are you aware that the first educational institutions in the country were at Jomvu and Rabai both in Mombasa but people did not seize the opportunity to acquire education? (Interviewee, 5 April, 2019).

From the above quotes, it can be deduced that the marginalization of Mombasa County and the coastal region generally in the provision of education services cannot entirely be blamed on the government. When people refuse to take their children to school for fear of witchcraft, the implication is that majority of the residents will not acquire levels of education necessary to enable them fairly compete in the job market with those who have higher levels of education. Secondly, if the few who have got relatively higher

levels of education get “bewitched” or disappear in towns or overseas after getting employment as alleged by the respondent then, the locals may lack the motivation to take their children to school or the youth do not have the role models to look up to for motivation to go to school.

These views resonate with the observation made by Chome (2013), that the educated sons and daughters of coastal natives are accused of forsaking their uneducated kin in their flight to the capital, Nairobi or into the Diaspora. In the African context, taking a child to school is not only seen as an opportunity to enable them acquire knowledge and skills to help them navigate through life; education is, in most cases, an investment by parents in their children. Ideally, parents expect their educated children to take care of them in their sunset days. If those who have acquired higher levels of education disappear in towns or end up losing their mind, then the parents will lack the motivation to educate their children.

It is however worth noting that even though education considerably contributes to enhancing an individual’s life chances and can be an equalizer as pointed out by Nelson Mandela, its contribution is not always so obvious. There are so many individuals with relatively good academic qualifications but still struggle in life. Conversely, there are people with no or lower levels of education but doing far much better than the well-educated in life. This notwithstanding, there is consensus that those with good education have better chances of navigating through life than those with low levels or no education at all.

From the above discussion, even though there is some evidence that Mombasa County has relatively low levels of school enrolment and fewer government schools both at

primary and secondary levels as compared to other counties, the current state of affairs cannot be entirely blamed on the government. What emerged from the fieldwork revealed that, to a considerable extent, the people of Mombasa also contributed to their own marginalization in several ways. The refusal to allow missionary penetration, the religious politics of Islam and Christianity, and the traditional belief in sorcery and witchcraft all coalesce to stifle education levels of Mombasa County and coastal Kenya generally.

This argument notwithstanding, having a large number of youths with low levels on no formal education could have serious implications on national cohesion. Scholars have pointed out that education decreases the chances of group mobilization to violence by reducing the recruitment pool for militant organizations and promoting economic growth (Alcorta, Swedlund & Smits; 2020; Marchais et al. 2021). Groups that are or perceive themselves to be marginalized in the provision of education are more likely to be recruited to engage in violent conflicts than those with reasonable levels of education. As pointed out by Alcorta, Swedlund and Smith (2021), low levels of decreases the chances of securing employment opportunities and increases the pool from which to recruit.

In the context of this study, large numbers of uneducated youths in Mombasa County could have serious implications on national cohesion. Since majority of the youths blame their lack of education on government that has been accused of favouring other regions in the provision of education, a feeling of relative deprivation begins to creep in. Further, the significant population of uneducated youths can form a pool from which political, religious or ethnic elites could draw the youth for mobilization to violence that may undermine national cohesion.

4.3.3 Economic Development and Employment Opportunities

Economic development can play a major role in peace and stability within and between states. The ability of people to develop economically implies that they are able to meet their daily needs and improve on their quality of life. Even though it is not always definite that economic development will translate to peace, economic underdevelopment may degenerate into hopelessness and resentments that can undermine peace and stability of states. It is with this in mind that the study sought to examine how lack of economic development and employment opportunities in Mombasa County had implications on national cohesion.

From the study, it emerged that a substantial number of residents of Mombasa County harboured feelings that the region has been underdeveloped economically despite Mombasa being the second largest city in Kenya. Interestingly, of all the other manifestations of socio-economic marginalization, there seemed to be consensus across respondents from various religious and ethnic identities that Mombasa County has largely been marginalized economically and in the provision of employment opportunities.

During interviews and FGDs with residents of the various sub-counties in Mombasa County, a large majority expressed the view that the level of economic development of the county is not commensurate with its economic contribution to the country. During an interview in Miritini, Jomvu Sub-County, an interviewee remarked:

Here, we do not know which Kenya we really belong to. Look at the infrastructure around here and tell me whether this is how a city should look like. We suffer from serious neglect by the government. The infrastructure here is dilapidated, the youths here do not have jobs but if you go to the port, it is full of people from upcountry. How would you feel if “foreigners” are given preference in the job opportunities as the locals watch? I’m not sure but I think

our problems will only end when we become a country on our own (Interviewee, 6/05/2019).

Underlying this sentiment is the view that the people of this region have suffered neglect over the years. The port of Mombasa is a critical infrastructure that generates billions of shillings in revenue to the ex-chequer. The thinking that non-locals get preferential treatment in employment opportunities and that no significant revenue generated from the port is ploughed back to develop the region invoke feelings of being marginalized. This leads to drawing boundaries of us (locals) versus them (upcountry immigrants) hence creating tensions that can undermine national cohesion.

The argument that coastal Kenya has suffered neglect over the years has been documented by various scholars. According to Etefa (2019: 29), “the amalgamation of coastal Kenya to British Kenya was not followed with effective government administration because the region was considered as a different category from the centre. Consequently, the coastal Kenya ended up being isolated, abandoned and marginalized.” Mazrui (2011) concurs by observing that Mombasa in Kenya was short-changed by history. In most countries of the world, the city on the ocean grows to become the biggest, most developed and often the most economically vibrant. Examples include London, New York, Beijing, Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Accra, Cape Town and Dakar among others. Mombasa started off as the most important city in Kenya and was, at independence, almost 1000 years older than Nairobi. However, due to factors such as geographic location and Islamic penetration, Nairobi gained more prominence than Mombasa.

According to (Interviewee, 11/04/2019) marginalization of Mombasa and coastal region in terms of economic development and employment opportunities has persisted

over time and is responsible for the disquiet expressed against the government and upcountry immigrants. During a FGD with some former members of the MRC in Bamburi Sub-location in Kisauni Sub-County, the participants were categorical that Mombasa and, by extension, the entire coastal region has suffered neglect in economic development for decades. One participant remarked:

Mombasa has been deliberately neglected in economic development for years despite being the country's economic hub and the link between Kenya and the rest of the world. It all began during colonialism when the capital city was transferred to Nairobi. With the transfer of the capital city to Nairobi, all attention was diverted there. This is why MRC think that coastal Kenya should become a country on its own to save us from this skewed development and domination by foreigners. If anything, Mombasa was never colonized (Participant, FGD, 4 April, 2019).

The above assertion indicates that the residents of Mombasa feel short-changed in economic development and employment opportunities over the years. This according to Athman (Interview, 06/04/2019), has led to a vicious circle of underdevelopment and poverty.

The above view is explained by the assertion of scholars such as Stewart and Langer (2007) and Stewart (2016) who postulate that marginalization among groups or regions may sometimes persist over long periods trapping generations after generations in a situation of poverty. A region or group that has been historically marginalized in economic development or employment opportunities will have a lower surplus and thus be less able to accumulate financial and human assets hence likely to be poorer in subsequent years. The continued underdevelopment of Mombasa and calls for coastal autonomy by political elites from the coast and/or members of the MRC could be interpreted from this perspective.

The concerns of the majority of the respondents on the question of economic marginalization concur with those of Mghanga (2010) who pointed out that Mombasa contributes substantially to the national budget particularly through the port and hotel and tourism industries yet continues to be underdeveloped.

According to KPA financial report of 2019, the port of Mombasa recorded a profit of Kshs.13.886 billion in the year 2019. Further, the Economic Survey Annual Report by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) indicated that out of the 9160 hotel bookings, 3904 were in the coastal region translating to 42.6%. Further, the Economic Survey Report indicates that the government generated a total of Kshs.163.6 billion from tourism. From these figures, it is evident that the port of Mombasa and the tourism industry generate substantial revenue to the ex-chequer. Interestingly, according to the County Government Revenue Allocation Bill of 2020, Mombasa County was allocated Kshs. 7,057,950,000 (GOK, 2020). Interestingly counties such as Mandera, Turkana and Kitui among others that do not generate much revenue to the exchequer got more allocations than Mombasa. For instance, Mandera and Turkana got Kshs. 1000,000,000 each, while Kitui got Kshs. 8000,000,000. Looking at the revenue generated from the port and tourism industry vis-a-vis what is given back from the national government, it is evident that the region receives very little compared to what it generates. Using the framing theory, it can be argued that this disproportionate allocation of resources gives the societal elite a basis for framing a narrative that can be used to mobilize Mombasa residents to violence that may undermine national cohesion.

During an interview at Viemani sub-location, Likoni sub-county an interviewee remarked:

Our problem as people of Mombasa and the coast generally is that we have been ignored in development and employment opportunities as compared to other parts of this country despite being endowed with a lot of resources and opportunities (Interviewee, 11 May, 2019).

The underdevelopment of Mombasa has led to sentiments of disquiet among the indigenous communities. The contention has been that the resources from Mombasa do not directly benefit the locals but are instead used to develop other regions as locals languish in poverty. This has served to undermine the creation of a Kenyan identity and cohesive society as members from those communities that are presumed to be doing much better are often targeted for violence.

The nexus between low levels of economic development and/or lack of employment opportunities and its likelihood to undermine national cohesion has been well documented in other studies such as (Langer & Stewart, 2015; Lessmann, 2015; Stewart, Brown & Mancini, 2010). The scholars argue that economic marginalization heightens resentment against the government and other communities that are considered to be favoured in economic empowerment. Lessmann (2015), for instance, argues that uneven regional development can be a breeding ground for separatist movements and greed revolutions. Langer and Stewart (2015) while writing about Nigeria, demonstrate that marginalization of northern Nigeria in terms of economic development and other social amenities made it a fertile ground for the emergence of Boko Haram followers. Brown and Langer (2010) observe that, the risk of violent group marginalization is likely to increase especially when people are convinced that their economic deprivation and lack of development are as a result of deliberate marginalization against their ethnic community or region by the state.

Despite the widely held view that low levels of economic development or lack of employment opportunities will act as a fodder for group mobilization to violence, sometimes groups could be mobilized to violence due to what Asal *et al.*, (2015) refer to as relative privilege. Those regions that are endowed with strategic or valuable resources, in most cases, feel that they are disproportionately contributing to the national budget. Under such circumstances, the regional elites may use the relative privilege status as a frame around which to mobilize citizens to violence in protest of revenue sharing.

Even though this study was purely qualitative, the researcher felt that some information that came from interviews and FGDs, required cross checking with some statistical data to ascertain their authenticity or otherwise. One of the issues that required further interrogation was the claim that the residents of Mombasa, particularly those from the Mijikenda, Arab and Swahili communities have been marginalized in terms of employment opportunities especially in state corporations domiciled in Mombasa County such as Kenya Ports Authority.

The researcher therefore interrogated the NCIC Ethnic Audit of Parastatals report of 2016 to get a better picture of ethnic representation in state corporations in the country. Generally, the report revealed that six ethnic communities (Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, Kamba and Kisii) form 79.9% of parastatal employment in the country (NCIC, 2016: 24). Only 20.1 % employment opportunities were occupied by the other 36 communities. The report also revealed that other communities such as the Embu, Mijikenda, Swahili and Borana were also overrepresented in parastatal employment across the country. From the report, it also emerged that most state corporations drew a good percentage of their employees from the local community.

The Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below for instance provide the status of employment at KPA.

Table 4.3: Ethnic distribution of Kenya Ports Authority Limited staff

| Ethnic Group | Total Number | % |
|---------------------|---------------------|------------|
| Mijikenda | 2721 | 41.6 |
| Luo | 791 | 12.1 |
| Kamba | 581 | 8.9 |
| Luhya | 548 | 8.4 |
| Taita | 459 | 7.0 |
| Kikuyu | 392 | 6.0 |
| Swahili | 279 | 4.3 |
| Kalenjin | 244 | 3.7 |
| Gabbra | 123 | 1.9 |
| Kenyan Arabs | 99 | 1.5 |
| Samburu | 71 | 1.1 |
| Kenya Somali | 53 | 0.8 |
| Taveta | 52 | 0.8 |
| Borana | 35 | 0.5 |
| Maasai | 35 | 0.5 |
| Orma | 19 | 0.3 |
| Teso | 10 | 0.2 |
| Nubi | 9 | 0.1 |
| Foreigners | 9 | 0.1 |
| Suba | 4 | 0.1 |
| Kenyan Asians | 4 | 0.1 |
| Kuria | 3 | 0.05 |
| Waat | 1 | 0.02 |
| Kisii | 1 | 0.02 |
| TOTAL | 6543 | 100 |

Source: NCIC 2016

Table 4.3 above reveals that out of the 6543 employees at KPA, 2721 representing 41.6% were members of the Mijikenda community. The Luo came second with 791 (12.1%); Kamba was third with 581 (8.9). Swahili and Kenyan Arabs were at 279 (4.3%) and 99 (1.5%) respectively.

Table 4.4: Ethnic Representation among senior staff at KPA

| Ethnic Group | Total Number | % |
|---------------------|---------------------|------------|
| Mijikenda | 18 | 25.4 |
| Luo | 12 | 16.9 |
| Luhya | 8 | 11.3 |
| Kamba | 7 | 9.9 |
| Kikuyu | 7 | 9.9 |
| Kalenjin | 5 | 7.0 |
| Others | 14 | 19.6 |
| TOTAL | 71 | 100 |

Source: NCIC 2016

In terms of representation among senior positions as shown in table 4.4 above, the report revealed that Mijikenda were the majority at 18 (25.4%), the Luo came second with 12 (16.9%), Luhya was third at 8 (11.3%). Interestingly, six ethnic communities (Mijikenda, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, Kikuyu and Kalenjin) had 80.4% of employment opportunities at the port leaving only 19.6% to other ethnic communities.

Table 4.5 The Variance between representation in parastatal employment and national population of selected ethnic communities.

| Ethnic Group | % of national population | % employed in state corporations | Variance |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|---|-----------------|
| Luo | 10.8 | 13.89 | 3.09 |
| Kikuyu | 17.7 | 20.62 | 2.92 |
| Mijikenda | 5.2 | 5.25 | 0.05 |
| Arabs | 0.1 | 0.14 | 0.04 |
| Swahili | 0.3 | 0.52 | 0.22 |
| Meru | 4.4 | 3.84 | -0.56 |
| Kamba | 10.4 | 9.17 | -1.23 |
| Kenyan Somali | 6.4 | 1.54 | -4.86 |

Source: NCIC 2016

The researcher further examined the national picture in terms of ethnic representation in state corporation's vis-a-vis the percentage of national population. From Table 4.5

above, it emerged that the Luo were highly represented in state corporations at 13.89% against the national population of 10.8%. This gives a variance of 3.09%. Kikuyu came second at 20.62% against a population of 17.7% giving a variance of 2.92%. The least represented were the Kenyan Somali at 1.54% against a population size of 6.4%, with a variance of -4.86. Interestingly, from the table, the three ethnic communities that claim indigenous status of Mombasa County (Mijikenda, Arab and Swahili) had a positive variance in terms of employment in state corporations.

Looking at the employment status at the port of Mombasa and other state corporations in the county generally contradicts the views of majority of participants that employment especially at the port has been skewed in favour of people from other regions. What this means is that the narrative that upcountry immigrants have taken over employment at the expense of the local communities is just a mere perception and not a reality. The danger here is that perceptions are very strong in influencing people's behaviour. What people choose to believe in is key in determining their course of action. In Mombasa for instance, since people perceive that upcountry immigrant have taken a bigger chunk of employment opportunities, it may become a pole around which a narrative is framed to mobilize unemployed youth to violence that can impede on national cohesion.

From the study, it also emerged that part of the reason Mombasa County and coastal Kenya, even though not the only or most marginalized, think they should secede is informed by the belief that they disproportionately contribute to the national budget but has nothing to show for it in terms of economic development. As pointed out by (Interviewee, 04 April, 2019), Mombasa County is the economic hub of Kenya but neglected by the government in terms of economic development.

During a FGD in Kadongo village, Kisauni Sub-County, participants noted that Mombasa generates a lot of revenue that do not necessarily benefit them as locals but end up benefitting other regions. One participant observed:

Look at the amount of revenue that we generate as a county and the level of development here. Can you compare? What is the need of contributing all this to the national budget yet remain underdeveloped? It is annoying that the money generated from Mombasa through the port and tourism industry among others does not benefit us directly. I wish coastal region was a country so that the money generated here remains here (Participant, FGD, 6 April, 2019).

These sentiments were echoed by a youth interviewee from Mwaweche village in Likoni Sub-county by remarking:

We are one of the most strategic counties yet underdeveloped. The government has ignored us for far too long. We do not benefit from the port and other strategic resources around. This port, for example, generates millions, which do not benefit us but is taken to Nairobi to develop other regions. Even majority of those who are employed in the port are foreigners who eventually use the money they get to develop their regions. I know you people (referring to the researcher) say we have not gone to school and cannot be considered for employment opportunities, but what level of education does one require to sweep, or prepare tea? (Interviewee, 7 April, 2019).

The above remarks reveal bitterness from people who feel that a critical facility like the port does not benefit them but instead ends up benefitting other regions and “foreigners”. The term “foreigners” in this context is mainly used to refer to upcountry immigrants. Referring to upcountry immigrants as foreigners could imply that they are considered not to belong but only interested in expropriating coastal resources to benefit their regions. The concerns of those who agitate for secession, according to above remarks, are premised on the belief that if coastal region seceded and the resources generated from the port and other strategic facilities remained in the region, they would be better off.

Scholars such as (Asal et. al, 2015; Cederman, Weidmann & Bormann, 2015; Shola, 2015; Stewart, 2002) have argued that sometimes the tensions and conflicts that have

undermined national cohesion in many parts of the world are not necessarily because of marginalization but, in some cases, the result of some regions feeling that they are disproportionately contributing to the central budget yet getting very little in return. Shola (2015), for instance, argues that perennial conflicts in Niger Delta have been motivated by feelings among the local communities that the central government has deliberately demonstrated high levels of economic marginalization of the Niger Delta despite the region contributing approximately 80% of the national revenue.

Consequently, the narratives of autonomy resonate with the masses who see secession as an opportunity to take charge of their resources. Part of the reason Mombasa and the coastal region generally continue to demand for secession could be construed from this perspective. For instance, Mghanga, (2010) argues that despite being the most historically cosmopolitan and having attracted many immigrants from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, Mombasa was relegated to a secondary position in terms of economic development, both during the colonial and post-colonial era. There is widespread perception that most valuable resources of the coast province such as land, tourism, and the port of Mombasa among others are controlled by non-locals mainly foreigners and upcountry immigrants. Despite the billions of shillings that are earned from tourism that blossoms at the coast, hardly any of the returns are invested back to develop the local community which remain poor and underdeveloped in the middle of opulence (Mghanga, 2010). The scholar further opines that very few locals are employed in managerial positions in the institutions arguably for lack of education.

Out of fear of losing the relative privilege status, the intended transfer of some of the port services to dry port in Naivasha continues to generate tension between the locals and the government and the upcountry immigrants whose kins are perceived to be the potential beneficiaries of this arrangement. The port is an economic hub of Mombasa and, by extension, the entire nation. A participant in a FGD with members of the Mijikenda community in Jomvu Sub-county observed:

When will the government consider us as citizens of this country with equal rights to economic development? This government of yours (referring to those of us from upcountry) does not want *Wapwani* (coastal communities) to own anything. *Sasa mumeamua kuhamisha bandari mupeleke uko Naivasha* (Now you have decided to migrate the port to Naivasha) and you still tell us that Kenya is one (Participant, FGD, 10 July, 2019).

The local communities consider the transfer of some of the port services as a deliberate attempt by the government to further marginalize them economically. Transferring part of the port services to Naivasha, according to majority of the residents of Mombasa County, will have serious effects on the economy of Mombasa. According to (Juma, Interview, 12/07/2019) the migration of the port services is an attempt to benefit the Kikuyu at the expense of local residents because they (Kikuyu) own the presidency. This kind of reasoning is likely to generate tensions directed at a particular ethnic community which is assumed to benefit because of political connections. Since the port is one of the lifelines of the residents of Mombasa, moving some of the services will lead to what Armin Langer (2005) refers to as economic shock among the local communities. This may create conditions that make it easy to mobilize groups to violence. According to Langer (2005), changes and institutional shocks within a country's institutional and economic environment such as sharp economic decline may act as a source of violent group mobilization. In this context, since Mombasa residents

largely rely on the port, creation of a dry port in Naivasha will lead to economic shock and significantly affect the economic wellbeing of Mombasa. Coupled with the dwindling tourism and hotel industries, the sharp decline or lower than expected economic progress is likely to create a large bulge of unemployed youth that can be readily mobilized to violence that can undermine national cohesion.

Some participants however disputed the view that Mombasa County has been deliberately economically underdeveloped by the government. According to (Interviewee, 13 April, 2019), economic development to a large extent depends on how industrious and hardworking citizens are. Echoing those sentiments, an interviewee at Mtongwe sub-location in Likoni sub-county observed that:

These people (referring indigenous coastal communities) have a problem. *Wana ngoja maembe uanguke kutoka kwa mtu wale* (They wait for a mango fruit to fall from the tree so that they can eat). They do not want to work hard but complain so much about poverty and underdevelopment. If you go to the port, you will realise so many people from upcountry employed to do manual work because the locals cannot do it, for example, carrying luggage. That is why majority of the people at the port are from upcountry but the locals continue complaining that their jobs have been taken (Interviewee 8 May, 2019),

From this observation, what emerges is that economic underdevelopment and failure to secure employment opportunities is partly because of local communities' attitude towards work. If people do not want to work or choose which work to do, their economic prospects are diminished. Work contributes to wealth and general economic development of regions. Where employers are reluctant to employ people from a certain ethnic community or region because of their attitude towards work, it has serious ramification on their economic development.

Interestingly some respondents, while agreeing that Mombasa County is economically marginalized, doubted if the marginalization narrative could be used to mobilize residents to violence that could undermine national cohesion. During an interview with an interviewee from Bamburi location, Kisauni sub-county, he questioned if the residents of Mombasa could engage in violent acts that could undermine national cohesion. He commented as follows:

Majority of residents of Mombasa are too poor and vulnerable to wage a war against the government. Further, there are many identities with divergent political, ethnic and religious affiliation living in Mombasa making it difficult to rally them using marginalization narrative (Interviewee, 03 April, 2019).

According to the remark above, even though there is a widespread view of marginalization in Mombasa County, some respondents doubt the possibility of using marginalization narrative to mobilize the residents to violence. The various identities and ideological orientations make it difficult to employ marginalization rhetoric as a pole around which to mobilize the masses to violence that could undermine national cohesion.

Expressing similar views Raleigh (2010), argues that the most marginalized segments of the society may not have the capacity to initiate or sustain rebel campaigns due to lack of resources. In this case, the government may decide to ignore the already marginalized and negotiate with the larger groups which pose a serious threat to national cohesion. Huber and Mayoral (2019) concur by arguing that the poor might find it particularly difficult to engage in conflict due to lack of resources to sustain revolt. This could partly explain why despite undertones of marginalization over the years, Mombasa County may not pose a serious threat to the government since those

who agitate for coastal secession are impoverished and do not have the resources to sustain conflict.

Further, apart from lack of financial and other resources, Mombasa County does not constitute a strong political constituency that can pose a serious threat to the government due to multiple identities. The multiple identities of religion, race and ethnicity make it difficult to bring people together using marginalization rhetoric. It is however important to note that this should not be used to ignore the various concerns of residents of Mombasa County because identities are fluid and may change from time to time. A time may come when the residents of Mombasa County embrace a common identity around which to mobilize.

Even though it emerged from the study that socio-economic marginalization may lead to conflict, the study also revealed that whether or not the perceived socio-economic marginalization undermines national cohesion will also depend on whether the political elites are involved in grievance formation and group mobilization. During a FGD in Mwembe Legeza location, Kisauni sub-county, participants reported that political elites played a critical role in group mobilization. One participant observed:

All these problems are brought by politicians. If they agree at their level, we do not have a problem but if they do not, we are told how bad other people are. They come here and remind us how we are the only people who do not have titles for our land and how critical resources such as the port and tourism industry are controlled by people from upcountry. But the moment they become friends with fellow politicians from other regions, things cool down (Participant, FGD, 5 April, 2019).

The remark by this participant imply that socio-economic marginalization by itself may not be enough to mobilize societies to conflicts that may undermine national cohesion. There needs to be political motivation to mobilize citizens to violence. This implies that

politicians will only mobilize their constituents to violence if their interests are not adequately taken care of. In such cases, the socio-economic conditions of the masses will be used as a pole around which to mobilize for support.

An interviewee at Junda sub-location in Kisauni sub-county supported the view that political settlements or elite pacts can significantly moderate tensions and conflicts related to socio-economic marginalization. She explained:

Let me tell you, as long as our governor or *Mweshimiwa* (Member of Parliament) is ok, we may not do much even if there are glaring levels socio-economic marginalization. You know we elected them to lead us and give us direction. If they tell us this government is bad, we take them for their word. Look at the likes of governors Joho and Kingi. In the first term of Uhuru's presidency, they made a lot of noise telling us how we are marginalized and should become a country on its own. After the famous handshake between President Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga in March, 2018 things changed and nobody talks about secession. Do you think that it is because things got better? No. It is because they have become friends with government and are now comfortable (Interviewee, 6 April, 2019).

The two quotes above illustrate how socio-economic marginalization by itself may not translate into conflict that may disrupt peace and stability of the state. For it to impede national cohesion, socio-economic marginalization needs to go hand in hand with political discontent among the political elites. During president Uhuru's first term as president, the Mombasa County governor Ali Hassan Joho for example, kept on criticizing his government and boycotting any presidential functions in Mombasa, and sometimes calling for coastal secession. Interestingly, after the famous handshake between the president and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) leader, Raila Odinga, in March, 2018, the governor, who is also the deputy party leader of ODM, no longer talks of marginalization and coastal secession. This is not because the government has addressed the issues affecting Mombasa but because of elite

settlements. The political elites therefore play a very significant role in moderating the occurrence of conflict and tensions.

These views are corroborated by scholars (Fearson and Laitin, 2000; Langer, 2005; Muhula, 2009; Stewart, 2010;). Muhula (2009), for instance, posits that socio-economic marginalization, in most cases, will get to the level that it generates tensions or conflict if the political elites are involved in the process of grievance formation and group mobilization. Ordinarily, the masses are more preoccupied with survival needs, that is, how to get basic needs such as food, shelter, healthcare services and clothing among others while the political elites are concerned with things like power and recognition. In circumstances where the political elites are well taken care of in the allocation of economic resources and power, the elites from regions that are perceived to be marginalized lack the motivation to draw on the welfare needs to mobilize their constituents to violence. Stewart (2010) argues that when ethnic elites feel politically marginalized, they invoke ethnic or regional ideologies as a way of mobilizing the masses to fight for what is purely personal or elite interest.

Langer (2005) observes that the emergence of group mobilization to violence in multi-ethnic societies experiencing marginalization will, to a large extent, depend on the inter-ethnic or inter-regional elite interaction. The co-option of elites from those regions that feel marginalized significantly reduces group mobilization even if there is glaring socio-economic marginalization. Elite settlements in this case are used as a circuit breaker for conflict and a platform for state building.

4.4 Cultural Marginalization and National Cohesion

The third question that this study sought to answer was whether cultural marginalization had implication on national cohesion in Kenya. As observed by Stewart (2016) cultural expressions can act as points of call or identity markers for group mobilization to violence that may undermine national cohesion. To address this question, the researcher focused on, as variables for investigation, two main cultural attributes that people normally have strong attachments to: religion and ethnicity. Mombasa County has a large segment of population that are either Christians or Muslims. Further, Mombasa has been home to various ethnicities including the indigenous Mijikenda community, Arabs, Swahili and upcountry immigrants among others. This religious and ethnic trajectory may therefore provide a good basis for identity formation and group mobilization. Even though there are other cultural expressions such as language, artefacts and symbols among others, religion and ethnicity in many societies across the world have always stood out to be key in grievance formation and group mobilization. As pointed out by Thomson (2004), ethnic or religious identity provide a basis around which groups can be mobilized. Fault lines in societies are normally drawn along ethnic or religious identities. According to Stewart (2012), religion and ethnicity can be used to prosecute war but, in most cases, this happens only when it is combined with other forms of marginalization. The idea that religion and other cultural expressions can act as a fulcrum for group mobilization to conflict was aptly captured by Huntington (1993) in his work *The Clash of Civilizations*. Huntington observed that religious and other cultural identities will be the main drivers of conflicts in the new world order, following the end of cold war.

4.4.1 Religious Marginalization and National Cohesion

Throughout human history, religion has been used to draw boundaries among groups and as a tool for mobilization to violence. The Egyptian-Jewish conflict, the Jewish-Palestine conflict, the middle age crusades aimed at ridding off infidels from the holy land and the Christians-Muslims conflict in Nigeria are just but a few examples. Sometimes these conflicts do not have to be inter-religious; they could be intra-religious as well as has been the case between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. It is however important to note that most world religions advocate peaceful co-existence among communities and do not therefore necessarily support violence.

Mombasa County is home to two main dominant religious groups, namely, Christianity and Islam. Islam, as a religion has been practised in Mombasa for centuries. For a very long time, Islam dominated the coastal town mainly practised by the Arabs and the Swahili (Ndzovu, 2017). Christianity was first introduced by Portuguese in the 15th century. It however remained relatively dormant until the 19th with the coming of the missionaries during colonialism. The arrival of Christian missionaries saw more and more people particularly the freed slaves and the local Mijikenda community converting to Christianity. Later, the migration of largely upcountry communities to Mombasa Country following the construction of Kenya-Uganda Railways significantly changed the religious equation of the coastal town.

From the study, it emerged that religion contributed significantly in causing tensions and conflicts that were sometimes witnessed in Mombasa County. The divergent views did not only manifest between Islam and Christianity but there were also intra-faith divisions as to whether religion formed the basis of their marginalization or not. For, instance, within the Muslims faithfuls, there were those who strongly subscribed

to the marginalization narrative and those who felt that marginalization was not serious enough to warrant group mobilization and conflict. Christians were also divided mainly along denominational lines with some denominations arguing that marginalization rhetoric is just a smokescreen for perpetuation of jihadist ideology while others suggesting that the narrative of marginalization should not be wished away completely without serious conversations and interrogation.

According to (Interviewee, 5/04/2019), Muslims have been unfairly targeted for marginalization and persecution by the state. Muslim youth from Mombasa cannot get employment because Christians from upcountry have taken over everything. Further, Muslim religious leaders are persecuted by a government dominated and run by Christians from upcountry for preaching and standing with the marginalized Muslims.

During an interview with a Muslim cleric from Likoni sub-county, he remarked:

This region was dominantly Islam for centuries before the invasion by Christian Missionaries and people from upcountry. Unfortunately, the different political regimes controlled by Christians from upcountry have over time deliberately marginalized this region because it is largely considered a Muslim territory. We have been largely left out in employment opportunities and the provision of other amenities. Can you imagine that we, for example, rely on water from Kwale which is not reliable when the ocean is just next door? (KII (1), 2 April, 2019).

A FGD with a group of Muslims from Mshomoroni in Nyali sub-ounty generated views that resonated with those of the Imam. One participant remarked:

We Muslims have suffered serious marginalization because of our faith. These kafiri (infidels) from upcountry have come here in their numbers and now want to impose their religion after taking over employment opportunities and our land. How can you get employment here when *wakubwa* (bosses) are Christians from upcountry? (Participant, FGD, 3 April, 2019).

From these interviews and FGDs, it emerges that there are those who strongly believe that they have suffered marginalization because of their religion. This narrative of being

marginalized because of religion has served as a basis for identity distinctions of “we” versus “them”- in this case, Muslim victims versus Christian upcountry oppressors. According to Gurr’s relative deprivation thesis, when people compare their situation with that of others and find their situation wanting, the desire to coalesce around an identity is heightened. In this context, the presumed lack of employment opportunities and other key services on the basis of religion lead to the use of religion as an identity marker and creation of group boundaries.

These views are corroborated by scholars who argue that religion as a system of beliefs and practices relating to the sacred and uniting its adherents in a community has an influential hold on how people think, act and explain their situations and interest (Jakelic, 2016; Orellana, 2016; Ndzovu, 2017; Smart, 2009; Thomson, 2004). According to Ndzovu (2017), for instance, marginalization of Muslims by a government perceived by local Muslims to be composed largely by Christians from upcountry has served to sever the relationship between Muslims and Christians thereby derailing the desire for a cohesive Kenyan society.

In this context, borrowing from the framing theory, it can be argued that some sections of Muslims of Mombasa have framed a narrative of marginalization, which is blamed on government and upcountry people viewed to be largely Christian. Religious doctrines, beliefs, sacred texts and other symbols have in this case been invoked to incite hatred and portray the upcountry people and Christians as the enemies from within. The upcountry immigrants are therefore likely to be targeted for violence because they are seen to have increased the Christian population in Mombasa, thereby significantly changing the local religious balance.

Ndzovu (2017) and Deacon *et al.* (2017) posit that there is a feeling that people from upcountry and, by extension, Christians, have dominated power since independence and have therefore favoured the development of their regions while continuing to neglect Muslim regions such as Mombasa.

Borrowing from the relative deprivation theory, by comparing their conditions to those of their compatriots from upcountry who are largely Christians, the Muslims of Mombasa feel relatively deprived. Consequently, radical Muslim clerics have been able to win more converts particularly the disenfranchised youth by preaching a message that draws parallels between local conditions and what is perceived as the global oppression of Islam by its enemies (Ndzovu, 2017). These feelings breed resentment thereby fuelling religious and regional animosities likely to undermine national cohesion.

The marginalization narrative also explains why the jihadist ideologues find it easy to recruit the youths to their course. As narrated by a female Muslim interviewee, (Interview, 29/03/2019), majority of the youth of school-going age have left their homes and joined the Al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups to fight the enemies of Islam, in this case, government and upcountry Christians.

The Muslims further claim that they have been unfairly targeted for extra-judicial execution and enforced disappearance. The killings of radical Muslim clerics and enforced disappearances of a number of the youth in Mombasa have served to entrench feelings of marginalization (Ndzovu, 2017). All these are blamed on the government seen to be largely composed of upcountry Christians.

In 2014 alone, several radical Muslim clerics were killed in Mombasa and its surroundings under unclear circumstances. These deaths attracted retaliatory attacks and riots targeted at churches associated with upcountry people. When unknown attackers murdered Aboud Rogo, a radical Muslim cleric, on 27 August, 2012, rioters blamed this on government and decided to retaliate by burning down the Salvation Army Church in Mombasa Island (Deacon *et al* 2017; Ndzovu, 2017).

Since Rogo's murder was suspected to have been carried out by government security forces, the deliberate attack on churches was seen as retaliation against the government. This could give credence to the earlier argument that a section of the Muslim community in Mombasa County felt that there was no clear boundary between the church and the government.

Propagating a narrative of a people that are destitute, disposed, and disenfranchised has served to crystalize Islam identity and jihadist ideology. There is an attempt by local religious ideologues to domesticate the global narrative of Muslim persecution by drawing parallels between local Muslim grievances with those of the Muslims elsewhere (Chome, 2020; Deacon *et al*, 2017). As pointed out by Ndzovu, (2017), the religious elite and ideologues frame a narrative using the various strands of socio-economic and political conditions leading to religious polarization and emergence of in-group-out-group distinctions. These categorizations enhance group identity and create a pool from which to recruit people to the jihadist emancipation call. As observed by Stewart (2012) and Schliesser, Orellana and Kollontai (2020), religion fosters stronger loyalty than any other identity leading to propensity towards violence. According to Ylonen (2008), when religion, race or ethnicity determines who gets what in the society, maintaining national cohesion becomes extremely difficult.

A closer analysis of the tensions in Mombasa however reveals that even though they project a religious dimension, they have been subsumed in some causal factors such as unemployment, under-provision of social amenities and political exclusion. As argued by Orellana (2016), when people feel that they have been let down by false promises of social or economic development, religion offers an attractive alternative. Similar views are expressed by Thomson (2004) by observing that religious differences in themselves are not likely to generate tensions or cause violence in the absence marginalization based on socio-economic, cultural or political imperatives.

The view that marginalization leads to engagement in the jihadist ideology is however debatable. There are several cases of individuals engaged in jihadist undertakings without necessarily coming from a destitute background. The suspected ringleader of Garissa University attack, for instance, was a trained lawyer from affluent family and employed as a legal advisor to a bank (Deacon *et al.* 2017). The fact that a trained lawyer and, by extension, a bank employee can get involved in a jihadist violence raises questions on the relationship between poverty and joining of jihadist organizations. The involvement of the affluent in Jihadist undertakings could be seen as motivated by the need to identify with the problem of fellow Muslims who are poor and marginalized as taught in the Quran. Furthermore, there are very many poor and marginalized Muslims who do not necessarily engage in religious-based conflicts and tensions that threaten to undermine national cohesion in the society.

Despite a widely held view among certain segments of the Muslim population that they have suffered marginalization for decades, majority of Christians in Mombasa County did not entirely subscribe to the idea that Muslims have been marginalized. According to some Christian clerics, the jihadist attacks perpetuated by Muslims on Christians is

not because of marginalization but part of the larger scheme of radical clerics who have been involved in indoctrination and radicalization of the youth.

Participants in a FGD at Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK) Pastoral Centre in Likoni, sub-county did not find any relationship between religion and marginalization. A participant observed:

It is not only Muslims who are marginalized here in Mombasa County. We are Christians but we suffer the same way our Muslim brothers do: no good schools, no employment opportunities and loss of our land among others. How come we do not join Al Shabaab and get involved in violence? (Participant, FGD, 4 April, 2019).

These views from the FGD were corroborated by a catholic priest from a parish in Jomvu sub-county who remarked:

Perception of marginalization in this region is strong particularly among our Muslim brothers. The truth of the matter however is that it is not only Muslims who have been marginalized. My Christian parishioners are not doing any better. The problem is that Christianity is in most cases associated with upcountry immigrants and government whom they blame for their conditions. The difference however is that unlike Christianity which does not provide any incentive to its followers to engage in violence, Islam jihadists draw adherents to their cause through the promise of both material and spiritual incentives. Jihadists are, for example, apart from getting financial rewards here on earth are promised that if they die for a religious cause, will get more rewards in heaven, for example, the promise of seventy-two virgins when they get to paradise (KII, 9 April, 2019).

The above remarks from the FGD and KII bring to the fore the different perspectives of religion in interpreting marginalization. Whereas Muslims blame their religion for their marginalization, Christians, on the other hand, believe that marginalization does not know any religious boundary. According to Christians, therefore, the tensions and violent tendencies perpetuated by a section of Muslims are because of jihadist ideology that provides incentives for violence.

The views resonate with those of Johnson and Cox (2003) quoted in Silvestri and Mayall (2015) who argued that religion offers more persuasive reasons, than do realpolitik and economic advantage for people to put their lives on the line as it provides a vision of reality that transcends temporal and terrestrial life and thus inspires people to make the ultimate sacrifice. In this context, the radicalised jihadists look at life beyond this world and do not fear death because the life after is more rewarding and promising.

The views are also affirmed by Ndzovu (2014) who noted that Christians, on their part, do not support the narrative that marginalization of Muslims is to blame for the tensions in Mombasa that are likely to undermine national cohesion. They point to the indoctrination and radical teaching brought about by preachers with influence from Saudi Arabia who have taken over certain mosques and madrassas in Mombasa. These preachers have introduced the Wahabi-Safi form of Islam which portray Islam as the only true religion. They do not approve the co-existence among various religions and perceive other religious organizations as non-believers, oppressors and corrupting the Islam faith. This brand of Islam, according to Christians, has served as an identity marker between the presumed oppressed Muslims, on one side, and the Christian upcountry oppressors, on the other. Interestingly, even those Muslims perceived to be moderate and therefore sympathetic to the Christians are not spared by the jihadists. For instance, on 10th June, 2014, moderate clergy Mohamed Idris was shot dead in Likoni Sub-Country for not supporting the Jihadists (KTN prime time news, 19/06/2014).

Despite the belief among Christians, that marginalization of Muslims is not to blame for the conflicts and tension in Mombasa County; it is a fact that a vast majority of those

who join the jihadist organizations are often from the poor, disposed and the destitute segments of the society (Deacon *et al.* 2017). The victims of perceived marginalization therefore readily find consolation in religion and turn to it to seek justification for their revolutionary ideas.

From the above discussions, it emerges that religion can be used as an identity marker and a tool for group mobilization to violence. Real or perceived marginalization can have serious implications on national cohesion. The feeling that people can suffer marginalization because of their religious creed can breed resentment thereby fuelling animosity. As observed by Mayall (2015), religion offers more persuasive reasons for people to put their lives online since it projects a vision of reality that transcends temporal and terrestrial life.

4.4.2 Ethnic Marginalization and National Cohesion

Ethnicity as a form of cultural expression has been used as a pole for identity formation and group mobilization particularly in Africa (Thomson, 2004; Chazan, 1999). In most multi-ethnic societies, individuals not only know who their co-ethnics are, they can also tell which ethnic group the others belong to. According to Nyaura (2018) negative ethnicity brings about marginalization, distrust and heightens ethnic tensions that may lead to conflict.

Mombasa County is home to people of diverse ethnic backgrounds. It is mainly inhabited by the indigenous Mijikenda community, Arabs, Swahili and upcountry immigrants. It is for this reason that the researcher sought to establish the implication of perceived ethnicity among the residents of Mombasa County on national cohesion.

The study revealed that Mombasa has been characterized by ethnic tensions particularly pitting the indigenous Mijikenda community against the upcountry immigrants. The tensions have generally revolved around issues such as land ownership, employment opportunities and development of infrastructure among others. The indigenous Mijikenda community has, in most cases, accused the Arabs, Swahili and upcountry immigrants of dispossessing them of their land.

According to Gambo (Interview, 10/04/2019), some of the upcountry communities have, since independence, used their proximity to political power to benefit from the resources and opportunities in Mombasa County at the expense of the local communities. The immigration of other ethnic groups to Mombasa changed the demographic balance leading to the marginalization of the indigenous communities and escalation of ethnic tensions. With the increased number of immigrants from upcountry, there is a growing feeling among the Mijikenda that they are losing out. Ethnic narrative framing has had implications in the trajectory of tensions and conflict in Mombasa particularly between the indigenous Mijikenda community and the upcountry immigrants.

During a FGD with a group of men in Centi Kumi Sub-Location, Likoni Sub-County, the general feeling among the participants was that the indigenous Mijikenda have been marginalized by the government particularly in land allocation, infrastructural development and employment opportunities among others. One participant remarked:

Here in Likoni, there are all ethnic communities from Kenya. But what annoys us most as Mijikenda is that others are favoured by the government in employment opportunities and land allocation. If you go to the port and the big hotels in Mombasa, they are the majority. Some of them own very big parcels of land here including the prime beach plots, not because they bought from anybody but because of political connections. Waitiki, for example, got

thousands of acres here when Jomo Kenyatta was president because he was a Kikuyu. (Participant, FGD, 8 July, 2019).

Another added:

We are going through all these because none of our sons or daughters has ever occupied a very senior position in the government, more so, the presidency. How can people come from Kisumu, Kiambu, Kakamega and everywhere else then take over everything? When we complain we are told that anybody can live and work anywhere they wish. How many Mijikenda do you know who own land in Murang'a, Siaya or Kakamega? (Mwakiroho, FGD, 8 July, 2019).

From the interviews and FGDs, the common theme is that ethnicity significantly determines who gets what. The majority of the Mijikenda perceive themselves to be marginalized in the sharing of public resources as compared to their counterparts from the upcountry. The genesis of marginalization can partly be linked to colonial penetration that originally favoured the upcountry communities at the expense of coastal communities. The occupation of the white highlands and other areas that the colonists had interest in meant that infrastructural development and provision of other services such as education and health care were also concentrated in those regions and, by extension, ethnic communities. The cumulative effect of these infrastructures was that those regions and ethnic communities continued to develop while other regions and ethnic communities lagged behind.

This reality has served to solidify the identity of the Mijikenda as an ethnic community by drawing on their primordial instincts. Primordialism thinking reactivates parochial allegiances demonstrated in primitive unrestrained fashion (Chandra, 2004; Sekulic Massey & Randy, 2006; Thomson, 2004). In this context, the narrative of being marginalized has led the Mijikenda of Mombasa to activate their history and memories as a people. In their historical account, they, for example, make reference to their being autochthons of Mombasa.

This claim to autochthony is used to demand the right to enjoy the resources and benefits from Mombasa County. The thinking that those from upcountry can come to Mombasa and, for instance, get employment opportunities or acquire land at their expense, therefore, heightens the feelings of marginalization. The memories of being marginalized as an ethnic community is consequently directed at the perceived source of their frustration – in this case, the government and upcountry immigrants.

This primordial perspective is however deficient in explaining why ethnic communities may antagonize each other or engage in conflict that can undermine national cohesion. There are several societies that are more ethnically diverse but have never had any serious ethnic conflicts or those with only one ethnic community but have had worse conflicts. Tanzania is such an example of a society that is ethnically diverse with more than one hundred and twenty ethnic communities but has not had a serious conflict. This is partly because the state has successfully created a national identity with which every citizen identifies. Citizens think of themselves as Tanzanians first before falling back to their ethnic enclaves. Conversely, Somalia has only one ethnic community and several clans but it is one of the countries that has had the worst conflicts in Africa. What this means is that people cannot hate each other and engage in conflict simply because of different ethnic backgrounds. The various ethnicities living in Mombasa cannot have tensions and conflict simply because they share different myths, physical characteristics, culture, symbols and history of origin among others.

The conflicts and tensions in Mombasa County that threaten national cohesion may therefore be viewed from the fact that ethnicity has been weaponized by the political elites. In this case, ethnicity is often applied as an instrument for strategic political schemes and acquisition of power. As pointed out by Tomchak (2017), political elites

will use structural issues and grievances harboured against other group/s based on historical memories. Even though ethnicity in itself may not constitute a condition for violence, instrumentalists can manipulate ethnic diversity by portraying their ethnic communities as having suffered marginalization thereby setting the stage for conflict.

During a FGD with a group of youths from Viemani Sub-location in Likoni Sub-County, it emerged that the politicians play a critical role in ethnic narrative formation and group mobilization that could result in tensions or conflict.

One participant remarked:

Politicians keep on telling us how other ethnic communities are doing better than us and how we need to rise up if we are to realize any meaningful change. They tell us how our land has been taken by upcountry immigrants and how the port and the tourism industry only benefit other communities. They remind us that unless we mobilize, the government will not listen to us (Participant, FGD, 8 May, 2019)

Similar views were expressed by a former Member of County Assembly (MCA) who noted:

We, as the Mijikenda leaders, have been accused of inciting our people against other communities here in Mombasa. What we are doing is not incitement or hate speech but telling the truth. As a community we have been neglected in appointment to senior positions in government and development opportunities. What is worrying is that they now want to take the port to Naivasha. What we are doing is trying to sensitize our people on the need to mobilize as a community to guard against marginalization and claim our fair share of the national resources and opportunities. For how long shall we standby as other communities benefit from the resources from Mombasa? (KII, 6 May, 2019).

These sentiments are illustrative of a people who feel that they have been marginalized because of their ethnic identity. If a people think that their ethnicity is responsible for missing out in the sharing of spoils from the state, they begin to erect boundaries against the others whom they perceive to be enjoying state favouritism in the allocation of state resources and opportunities.

The above claims are in tandem with the observations by Chandra (2004) and Brass (2003) that it is the ethnic elites who perpetuate ethnic narrative for their own selfish political or economic interests. Chandra (2004), for instance, argues that national cohesion is undermined because leaders strategically manipulate ethnicity for the sake of political power or for extracting resources from the state. Brass (2003) also observes that political entrepreneurs can easily insert local – often trivial incidents, events and rumours into the master narrative creating inflammable situations and instigating violence. In this context, the political elites from Mombasa, particularly from the Mijikenda, may activate historical cleavages such as those related to loss of land, inadequate employment opportunities and economic development to mobilize to violence.

By comparing themselves to those from other parts of the country, a narrative is created and disseminated whereby blame is apportioned to the government and other ethnic communities for the prevailing conditions of the locals. As noted by Cederman and Wucherpfenning (2017), ethnic marginalization may turn conflictual through intergroup comparison, evaluation of injustice, and then blaming and targeting ethnic groups in power.

Where members of an ethnic group are systematically underprivileged, organizations striving to alter these conditions are likely to have an easier time recruiting. The radicalization and indoctrination of the Muslim youth and the emergence of MRC that threaten to undermine national cohesion may be seen from this context. As pointed out by Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010), under the conditions of pervasive ethnic favouritism, political elites and their constituents are driven by the strategic motive to avoid or even overturn dominance by ethnic others.

4.5 Political Marginalization and National cohesion

The fourth objective of the study sought to evaluate the implications of political marginalization on national cohesion in Kenya. According to Alcorta *et al.* (2020), political marginalization leads to collective grievances formation which can eventually degenerate into violence. Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2014) posit that inter-ethnic group political differentials in access to state resources can form the basis of group mobilization to violence. In this context, as argued by Langer (2005), political marginalization provides the leaders with the motivation to mobilize their followers to violence. Alcorta *et al.* (2020), however, observes that political marginalization by itself is not sufficient to generate tensions or mobilize communities or regions to conflict that can undermine national cohesion. In this context, political marginalization becomes an issue when it goes hand in hand with other forms of marginalization. This enables political or religious elites to frame a narrative around which to mobilize.

From the study, it emerged that majority of the residents of Mombasa, particularly those who claim indigenous status like the Mijikenda, expressed the view that Mombasa and the entire coastal region has been historically marginalized politically since colonialism.

During a FGD with participants from Kwa Hola Sub-location Changamwe Sub-county, it emerged that the majority of the residents felt that one reason Mombasa has not developed socio-economically was because they are politically marginalized. According to (Interviewee, 7/4/2019), Mombasa County has very few of their own occupying strategic positions in government and other key parastatals. An interviewee at Fort Reitz Sub-location in Changamwe remarked that:

“We, the people of Mombasa County, have not been considered for development because our sons and daughters do not occupy positions from where they can influence decisions and the allocation of resources. When people sit around the table in Nairobi to divide the national cake, we are either absent or not effectively represented; so, what do you expect? (Interviewee, 7 April, 2019).

This view was corroborated by an interviewee in Freetown Sub-location in Nyali Sub-county who remarked:

In Mombasa and the entire coastal Kenya, it is as if we never gave birth to real men and women that qualify to be appointed to key positions such as the cabinet. Other regions have people in strategic positions to push their agenda but here we have very few. This makes it easy for the government to ignore us altogether (Interviewee, 10 April, 2019).

These remarks are an indication that being able to politically influence decisions at the national level will, to a great extent, dictate how far a region or community is able to access state resources and services. Conversely, the inability to articulate and win the support of the national government implies minimal or lack of access to state resources and values. As noted by Francois, Rainer and Tebbi (2015) cited in Alcorta *et al.* (2020), political power provides groups with a channel to address their grievances.

Expressing similar sentiments, a number of scholars argue that where groups are represented at the national level, they have the ability to influence the distribution of public goods and services (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2014; Deiwiks, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2012; Muhula 2009; Stewart & Langer, 2007). Muhula (2009), for instance, observes that, in Kenya, history reveals that the region that controls political power also controls the distribution and sharing of state resources. Access to political power, thus, largely dictates how socio-economic and political benefits are distributed in Kenya.

If an ethnic community or coalitions of ethnic communities do not have one of their own occupying top political leaderships, more so, the presidency, their chances of getting strategic political appointments and, by extension, a share of state benefits are very limited. The resulting inter-regional or inter-ethnic marginalization in access to political power sometimes makes it easier to mobilize groups using marginalization rhetoric, which could cause the kind of violence witnessed in Kenya in 2007/2008 following the general election.

Similar views are expressed by Stewart and Langer (2007) and Stewart (2010) who note that political marginalization often leads to exclusion in the distribution of government resources including access to social and economic services, government employment and contracts among others. This creates a situation whereby people, looking at the other ethnic communities or regions, feel relatively disadvantaged hence entrenching the feeling of “we versus them”. In any society where a section of the population looks at their disadvantaged condition and blame it on others, maintaining national cohesion becomes a challenge (Gurr, 1993).

During a FGD with some former members of MRC at ACK Pastoral Centre in Likoni Sub-county, participants argued that part of the reason for the emergence of MRC and their push for secession was because they felt that politicians from Mombasa and the entire coast region were marginalized and could not effectively articulate their issues such as those related to the land question and socio-economic marginalization. One participant observed:

Our problem as people of Mombasa is lack of effective political leadership to push our cause. The politicians we rely on are weak and cannot effectively push for our agenda. Those regions or communities that have strong leadership like the Luo, Kikuyu and Kalenjin have always pushed their agenda because they

have strong and reliable leadership. Here, we are watching as foreigners take way our land and reap millions from the tourism industry and the port (Participant, FGD, 29 March, 2019).

The issue of weak political leadership also came out during interview with a senior politician at Mwembe Tayari location in Mvita constituency. According to the politician, it is unfortunate that Mombasa County contributes substantially to the national budget through the port and tourism, yet it continues to be politically marginalized. This over-domination by the politicians from upcountry makes them feel that they should become a country of our own to manage our resources without exploitation by “foreigners”. He observed:

We, politicians from coast, are not as aggressive as our colleagues from upcountry when it comes to demanding for our share of the national cake. Mombasa remains impoverished yet it has so many resources that could be used to develop the entire region. Majority of us politicians are weak to the point that we cannot, for instance, push for a substantial share of the resources from the port and tourism to remain here. Politicians from here are marginalized to the point the port services are now being transferred to Naivasha as they watch. I’m telling you, if this port was in Kisumu, Eldoret or Nyeri, the story would be different (KII, 7 May, 2019).

The above quotes bring to the fore the feeling among residents of Mombasa that they lack effective political leadership to champion their course. The absence of effective political leadership in essence implies that they cannot agitate for the issues that affect the residents. Inability to negotiate at the state level, therefore, means that they will continue to lose out in the sharing of resources and other opportunities. Residents believe that Mombasa County is endowed with resources and opportunities, the only thing that is lacking is political leadership. Those who advocate for secession of coastal Kenya such as MRC think that Mombasa County is endowed with resources and opportunities which instead of benefiting the locals end up developing other regions.

These views are supported by scholars such as (Asal *et al.*, 2015; Chome 2013) who argue that political exclusion or marginalization of regions endowed by strategic resources can form the basis for group mobilization to violence. Political elites from those regions or their associates may draw on the political marginalization narrative to whip up the emotions of their political base/s and cause conflict. Asal *et al.*, (2015), on their study of political marginalization of the Niger Delta region and perennial conflicts that continue to undermine national cohesion in Nigeria, argue that ethnic groups or regions subjected to political marginalization and whose regions are rich in resources are more likely to engage in conflicts than regions experiencing marginalization alone. Exclusion from political system is a strong motivator for armed conflict, particularly if the region experiencing exclusion is endowed with strategic resources (Cederman, Weidmann & Bormann, 2015).

The push for secession by members of the MRC could therefore be gleaned from the point of view of political marginalization of the Mombasa and coastal Kenya generally and the abundance of resources. There is a general feeling among the residents of Mombasa and the entire coastal region that the politicians from the region are marginalized in national politics despite the region contributing immensely to the national economy. As pointed out by Chome (2015), those advocating for the secession of the coast such as MRC and Mijikenda Council of Elders have a feeling that the elected members of parliament from the region are themselves marginalized at the national stage to the point that they cannot address the marginalization of the coast.

Ordinarily, a member of parliament would be expected, apart from legislation, representation and oversight, to exploit their political networks to benefit their constituents through appointments in government and initiation of development projects such as education facilities, health care infrastructure, water supply and other physical infrastructure. Since the coastal politicians seem to be marginalized nationally, they lack the capacity to effectively push for the benefit of their constituents (Chome, 2013; Willis & Gona, 2012)

According to (Interviewee, 6 May, 2019), the politicians from coastal Kenya are so marginalized to the point that President Kibaki at some point completely ignored the entire region in appointment in cabinet. Komora remarked that:

Can you imagine during the second term of Kibaki's presidency he ignored the entire coastal region during cabinet appointment? We had to petition the president and even send him Curriculum Vitae and names of those from this region that qualified to be appointed in cabinet or senior positions in government (Interviewee, 6 April, 2019).

From the above quote, it can be argued that there is a feeling among a section of residents of Mombasa that their lack of appointment in government is not because they lack the requisite qualifications but because of deliberate efforts by the government to ignore them.

The study revealed that not all residents of Mombasa blamed political marginalization of Mombasa on the government. Other respondents were of the view that marginalization of the coastal politicians cannot be entirely blamed on the government but on the politicians themselves and the coastal people generally. According to (KII, 7 April, 2019), the coastal politicians are marginalized at the national stage because of disunity among themselves. The interviewee observed:

In Mombasa, people identify with multiple identities. In many cases, the ethnic, religious and racial identities among the various communities that live in Mombasa play out in the national stage making it difficult for politicians from Mombasa to push for the same agenda. For instance, distinctions are drawn on the basis of being Arab, Swahili, Mijikenda, Christians, Muslims, and upcountry immigrants among others. This makes it easy for the government to marginalize them because they do not form a formidable political constituency to pose any serious threat to the government (KII, 7 April, 2019).

This statement is an indication of the fact that multiple identities of residents of Mombasa County play a critical role in their political marginalization. These multiple identities make it difficult for the politicians to mobilize their various constituents using the marginalization narrative. This, therefore, makes it easy for the national government to ignore politicians from the region.

These findings resonate with those of some coastal scholars (Chome, 2013; Willis & Chome, 2014; Mazrui, 2000; Ndhovu, 2010). According to Chome (2013), the marginalization and lack of influence of coastal leaders at the national stage is due to their disunity based on various identities. Willis and Chome (2014) concur that the disunity of the people of Mombasa undermines their ability to articulate coastal issues at the national stage hence marginalizing them. In this perspective, the shared sense of marginalization has not been itself enough to create a real political community of *Wapwani* (people of the coast) since the political community is deeply divided as to how to conceptualize marginalization (Willis & Chome, 2014). Mazrui (2000) cited in Chome (2013: 4) observes that “the coastal region is the least national in terms of power, influence and orientation.” This has, for instance, been evident in the secessionist campaign by the MRC who have considered only the Mijikenda to be the true coastal indigenes ignoring the Arabs, Swahili and the upcountry immigrants. This has, in effect, made the push for coastal secession by MRC less attractive to other communities.

It is evident from the study that the multiple identities make it difficult for the residents to push the secession agenda because people have more attachment to their other identities than the common coastal identity. It is, however, worth noting that identities are fluid and with time may change due to prevailing socio-economic, cultural or political circumstances. As pointed out by Hillesund *et al* (2018), identities are fluid and open to reinterpretation. Consequently, political elites can redefine or emphasize particular aspects of identity in ways that increase group cohesion and facilitate mobilization that may eventually undermine national cohesion. In support of this perspective, Koos (2018) posits that even the most cherished identities such as ethnicity and religion are subject to change. New religions can be born acquiring millions of followers and sometimes losing them along the way as was the case during reformation and counter-reformation. From this point of view, it may be argued that even though the residents of Mombasa County currently pull in different directions because of multiple identities that residents pay allegiance to, a time may come when political or religious elites may find a common identity around which to mobilize the residents based on the marginalization narrative. The government should not ignore the concerns of the residents of Mombasa County simply because of lack of cohesiveness due to multiple identities.

The study further revealed that there were those residents who felt that Mombasa and the entire coastal region is not politically marginalized. Some respondents pointed out that they have had a fair share of the national cake only that those who have been entrusted with positions in government have let the region down. During a FGD with a group of Mijikenda elders in Jomvu Kuu Sub location Jomvu Sub-County, one participant remarked:

As much as we always blame the government for our backwardness, the problem also lies with our own people. Look at the land issue for instance, this region was privileged to have the first chairperson of the national land commission in the new constitutional dispensation who is still in office yet our land issues still persist. How do you blame the government for marginalizing us? Coastal people are their own enemies (Participant, FGD, 8 April, 2019).

Similar views were given by an interviewee from Ganjoni Sub-location, Mvita Sub-County by remarking:

This region has had its fair share of high-profile appointments. The current Chief Executive Officer of Kenya Ports Authority, the chairman of National Lands Commission and the Chief of Defense Forces are also sons of the coast; how can someone claim that we do not get senior appointments in government? The problem is that once appointed, they only think about themselves not about the rest of us (Interviewee, 10 April, 2019).

From the above remarks, it emerges that not all participants agree that Mombasa County and, by extension the coastal region, has been marginalized politically. There have been senior appointments in government from the region. Nevertheless, being a senior political appointee does not necessarily imply that one will influence serious decisions that can bring change to their community because real power may reside somewhere else. Since these are political appointees, they may be reluctant to push the appointing authority to address issues affecting their regions for fear of losing their privileged positions.

According to (Interviewee, 9 April, 2019), “even though the coastal region has had high profile appointments, they do not have much influence in the national scene.” Similar views were expressed by (Interviewee, 10 April, 2019) who remarked that the appointments are just meant to make the coastal communities feel psychologically satisfied that they have one of their own occupying those positions but they cannot make serious decisions. That is why, despite the fact that the chairperson of National

Lands Commission, Chief of Defense Forces and the managing director of Kenya Ports Authority are among the senior officers in government from this region, there is very little they can do bring meaningful change. The land issue still persists and the revenue from the port rarely benefits the people of Mombasa (Interviewee, 10 April, 2019).

From the discussions above, the nexus between political marginalization and national cohesion cannot be overemphasized. In multi-ethnic societies such as Kenya, every ethnic community would expect to have some of their own occupying senior positions in government. Even though from this study it may not be entirely true that Mombasa and Coastal Kenya generally has been politically marginalized, political marginalization of regions or ethnic communities may have serious implications on national cohesion. Ignoring political elites from a given ethnic community or region may provide the leaders with the motivation to form a frame around which a narrative is created to mobilize people to violence.

Sometimes it is not what the leaders will extract from the state to benefit their community or region. People will still feel psychologically contented if they have one of their own occupying senior positions in government even if they do not benefit directly as a community.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study was to examine marginalization dynamics and their implications on national cohesion in Kenya. Specifically, the study sought to answer four research questions. The first question was how the residents of Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization. The second question was to examine if socio-economic marginalization had implications on national cohesion. The third question sought to analyse the relationship between cultural marginalization and national cohesion. The fourth question was to evaluate the nexus between political marginalization and national cohesion. This chapter provides summary and conclusions as per each of the four objectives of the study and recommendations for action and further research based on the study findings.

5.2 Summary

According to the study findings, marginalization, real or perceived, can act as a pole around which a narrative can be framed for group mobilization that can eventually lead to conflict thereby undermining national cohesion. This study also revealed that apart from marginalization, resentments and restlessness in Mombasa County are also because of some treaties signed during colonial period and the relative privilege of Mombasa County in terms of strategic economic infrastructures such as the port and tourism and hotel industries.

5.2.1 Conceptualization of Marginalization

The first question of the study was to assess how the various residents of Mombasa County conceptualized marginalization. From the study, it emerged that the residents of Mombasa did not have a common conception of marginalization. Their conceptualization of marginalization was tilted in favour of various distinctions such as those related to race, ethnic affiliation and religion. Since Mombasa County is cosmopolitan, having people from various ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds who migrated there at different historical epochs, their lived experiences have been shaped differently.

According to the study findings, gender did not influence how people conceptualized marginalization in Mombasa County. Both men and women felt that marginalization, in disregard of gender boundaries, affected both men and women in more or less the same way.

According to study findings, respondents from the indigenous Mijikenda community believed that they suffered marginalization more than the other communities living in Mombasa County. Their marginalization was conceptualized from the point of view of being side-lined in land allocation, access and use, provision of social amenities such as educational facilities and low levels of economic empowerment through employment opportunities and infrastructural development. The upcountry immigrants, on their part, conceptualized marginalization from the point of view of being discriminated against in government recruitments for example the police and military and other public service jobs because they are considered to be non-locals.

From the study, it emerged that religion, also, in a very significant way shaped individuals' conceptualization of marginalization. Being a Muslim or Christian had a bearing on how marginalization was conceptualized by the adherents. Muslims conceived marginalization in terms of low levels of education, discrimination in employment opportunities and being unfairly targeted by law enforcement officers for prosecution because of being suspected of belonging to or being sympathetic to terrorist organizations. Christians, particularly those from upcountry communities, felt that marginalization did not recognize any religious boundaries but affected individuals equally. Interestingly, ethnicity turned out to be a stronger parameter for conceiving marginalization than religion. For instance, Christians and Muslims from upcountry and indigenous communities conceived marginalization differently depending on their religion.

5.2.2 Socio-economic marginalization and National Cohesion

The second question of the study examined how socio-economic indicators of marginalization had implication on national cohesion. The study revealed that majority of the residents of Mombasa County felt that the region has been historically marginalized in socio-economic development. Of serious concern for the residents mainly from the Mijikenda community, was the land question. Lack of land titles significantly impacted on their socio-economic wellbeing. The absence of land that someone could call theirs meant that people could not, for example, have long term investment plans in the land they occupied or use the land to acquire credit facilities for personal development from the financial institutions. Comparing themselves to people from upcountry communities who had title deeds for the land they owned in the county

and had used the same for personal advancement, the indigenous residents of Mombasa felt relatively deprived.

Apart from the land question, the residents of Mombasa also felt marginalized in the provision of socio-economic resources such as in education and infrastructural development. Low levels of education, for example, meant that residents had a challenge securing stable and well-paying jobs which significantly impacted on their economic development. The feelings of marginalization were exacerbated by the fact that Mombasa County is endowed by strategic resources such as the port of Mombasa and the tourism and hotel industries. However, according to the majority of the residents the proceeds from the resources were benefiting other regions at the expense of the people of Mombasa.

The study further revealed that even though socio-economic marginalization was critical for narrative framing, it, in itself, was not sufficient to mobilize citizens to conflict unless it went hand in hand with political marginalization. What this means is that where the political elites from communities or regions that are socio-economically marginalized are incorporated in government through hegemonial exchange or elite pacts, the motivation to frame a narrative for group mobilization to violence is significantly reduced even if socio-economic marginalization is very glaring.

From the study, it also, emerged that relative privilege of Mombasa County, but not necessarily marginalization, was partly responsible for restlessness and demand for secession by politicians and members of the Mombasa Republican Council. The feelings of majority of the residents of Mombasa County were that the county was significantly contributing to the national budget through the port and tourism and hotel

industries but getting very little ploughed back to develop the county. Those who advocate for secession of the coastal region – such as MRC – believe that resources from the port and hospitality industry, if retained in Mombasa, are enough for socio-economic development of the region.

Even though there is a general feeling that Mombasa is socio-economically marginalized, from the study, it also emerged that the government should not solely shoulder the blame for socio-economic marginalization of Mombasa. According to study findings, the people of Mombasa have significantly contributed to their socio-economic marginalization. For example, through the boycott of formal education offered by the missionaries during colonialism, the Mijikenda and Swahili set in motion their own marginalization. Education was later to open more opportunities and networks. Those with low level of education could not compete in the job market.

5.2.3 Cultural Marginalization and National cohesion

The study findings largely supported the view that cultural marginalization whether real or just a perception had implications on national cohesion. Individuals' have strong attachments to cultural expressions particularly those related to ethnicity and religion and therefore readily available to die for them should they be under threat.

From the study, it emerged that religion as a cultural marker has been key in framing the marginalization narrative in Mombasa County. Particularly, majority of Muslims considered themselves to have suffered marginalization which they blamed on government they believe is dominated by upcountry Christians. The reasoning has been that the upcountry Christians have taken advantage of their proxy to political power to marginalize the coastal communities based on their religion.

The study also deduced that tensions and restlessness that have characterised relations in Mombasa County and coastal region generally are partly because the indigenous ethnic communities especially the Mijikenda feel that the various political regimes have, over the time, favoured upcountry communities particularly those that have had the presidency at the expense of the locals.

Even though cultural expressions of ethnicity and religion are key in grievance formation, the study found out that these, in themselves, are not sufficient to form the basis for group mobilization. Under very rare circumstances will citizens engage in conflict simply because of religion or ethnic distinctions. What threatens national cohesion is the instrumentalization of religious and /or religious peculiarities by the religious or ethnic elites to mobilize their followers to violence. Perceived marginalization of on the basis of ethnic or religious identities can therefore act as a focal point for group mobilization to violence by the elites, sometimes for their own benefit.

5.2.4 Political Marginalization and National Cohesion

The fourth objective of this study sought evaluate the nexus between political marginalization and national cohesion. From the study findings, it is evident that the nature of political engagement plays a very important role in social stability of the state. Marginalization of political elites from a given community or region is likely to motivate the leaders to engage in narrative framing and group mobilization that can impede national cohesion. From this study, even though a good number of residents of Mombasa County particularly those from the Mijikenda community attributed their low levels of socio-economic development to the lack of clout by their political leadership in national level and appointments to senior positions in government, this may not be

true. There is evidence that coastal Kenya generally has had some high-profile appointments in government. For instance, at the time of doing this research, the chairman National Land Commission, the Chief of Defence Forces and the minister for tourism were all from the region.

5.3 Conclusion

The study made important findings in relation to the Dynamics of Marginalization and implications on national cohesion in Kenya. Study findings revealed that the residents of Mombasa had varied conceptualizations of marginalization depending on who was defining it. This was informed by the fact that the various ethnic, racial and religious groupings living in Mombasa and who migrated there during different historical epochs have had different experiences; consequently, they did not have consensus on what constituted marginalization.

As far as socio-economic marginalization is concerned, the study concluded that wide disparities in socio-economic wellbeing entrenched feelings of relative deprivation and provided an opportunity for narrative framing and group mobilization by the societal elites and media outlets. This is particularly the case where the excluded region or group is endowed with strategic resources. It was however noted that socio-economic marginalization by itself was not sufficient to mobilize citizens to violence. This study concluded that, even though there was some evidence that Mombasa County had been marginalized in the provision of some social services such as education and infrastructural development, there is sufficient evidence that those ethnicities that occupy Mombasa County such as the Mijikenda, Arabs and Swahili have not been marginalized in employment opportunities. In fact, the NCIC report on ethnic audit of employment in state corporations of 2016 reveals that the three ethnic communities are

overrepresented in state corporation. The idea of missing out in employment opportunities is therefore more of a perception than a reality.

The study, also, concluded that culture was very important in shaping people's behaviour. The feeling of being marginalized based on cultural attributes such as ethnicity and/or religion could be emotive and conflictual. From this study, it emerged that culture, specifically in terms of religion and ethnicity has played a key role in violence, tensions and outbursts that have been witnessed in Mombasa targeted at either specific ethnic or religious groups.

In relation to political marginalization and its implication on national cohesion, the study found out that marginalizing political elites from a given region or ethnic community/ies in Kenya (by extension) implies marginalizing their communities from socio-economic and other benefits that accrue from the state. Consequently, this provides the fodder for group mobilization to violence since political exclusion gives the politicians the motivation to whip up ethnic, religious or regional emotions to violence.

5.4 Recommendations

5.4.1 Recommendations on Research Findings

Marginalization is a global phenomenon that affects various communities and regions across the world. Marginalization breeds hatred provides frames around which groups are mobilized and eventually undermines national cohesion.

There is need to ensure equity in terms of different ethnic communities, religious groupings benefiting from government expenditure. This will make people look at issues as Kenyans and not based on their parochial identities.

From objective two, the study recommends that the government may not only provide social and economic services but could also ensure equitable access to them among different groups and regions within the society. To improve on educational enrolment, for instance, the government needs to construct such number of government primary and secondary schools in Mombasa County commensurate with the population. The issue of land has been and continues to be very emotive in the Mombasa County. This could be a time bomb if not properly addressed. The government needs to identify genuine squatters and allocate them land and title deeds. Individuals' land must not however be taken by force from legitimate owners. The government may consider coming up with appropriate compensation plan for those who own large tracks of idle land in Mombasa County and allocate it to squatters. From the study, it emerged that the majority of the participants feel that Mombasa County is disproportionately contributing to the national budget particularly through the port and tourism and hotel industries. To address the disquiet, the government may design a policy framework on how a given percentage of the revenue from strategic infrastructures or key investments such as the port or tourism industry is retained within the regions where they are domiciled to improve socio-economic development of the region.

Thirdly, there is need to for equal opportunities among the various ethnic and religious groupings to reduce unnecessary tensions and conflicts.

To address political marginalization, there is need to adapt proportional representation as opposed to the winner-take-all model. Hegemonial exchange helps to defuse tensions among political elites. Further, it creates a psychological satisfaction among the masses that they have a share in the government.

5.4.2 Recommendations for Further Research

The following areas should be considered for further research:

- Identity politics and its implication on social cohesion in Mombasa County Kenya
- The relationship between relative privilege and national cohesion: A Case of Mombasa County.
- Colonial treaties and their implications on land conflicts in Mombasa County

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Informed consent form for respondents

My name is George Ochieng' Oyombra. I am a student from Kenyatta University undertaking a Ph.D. study in Peace and Conflict Management. For the award of this degree, am required to conduct field study leading to a thesis. The fieldwork am undertaking is on the "*Dynamics of Marginalization and Implications on National Cohesion in Kenya: A case of Mombasa County*". To achieve this, the researcher will engage the respondents in interviews and Focus Group Discussions by asking questions and recording their responses.

This is therefore to invite you to participate in this research and share your views about the issues under study. Your responses will be written down and where necessary tape recorded and transcribed.

The information you share will be treated with utmost confidentiality and anonymity upheld in both written and oral reports. Nobody a part from the researcher, the research assistants and the supervisors will have access to the information you share. The researcher will ensure safe custody of the information by keeping it in a locked place. The information generated from this study will be retained to assist in data analysis and the writing of thesis. After the submission of the final Thesis, the information will be destroyed and electronically wiped out.

The researcher does not anticipate any risk. You will only be asked about your views and/or experiences in regard to perceived marginalization and national cohesion. In case of any issues or concerns, kindly feel free to seek clarification from the interviewer.

Your participation in this exercise is voluntary and you may refuse to respond to any question or participate in any activity. If you feel uncomfortable participating in this exercise, you may withdraw at any time without penalty. If you agree to participate in this project, please sign and tear the consent slip below and return it to the interviewer before you start.

I have read and understood the above information and all questions pertaining to this project have been answered to my satisfaction. I also understand that by signing and returning the consent form, I have agreed to participate in this study voluntarily.

Name: Sign:

Date:

Thank you for freely participating in this interview

Appendix II: Interview/Focus Group Discussion Guide

We are interested in gaining better understanding on the implications of perceived marginalization on national cohesion. Kindly spare a few minutes and share with us your views and experiences marginalization and national cohesion in this county.

PART I: Background Information

Date.....

1. Interviewee number
2. Constituency
3. Location
4. Sub-Location
5. Village
6. Sex..... Male/Female
7. Ethnic Background
8. Religious Affiliation.....

PART II: Conceptualization of marginalization by residents of Mombasa County

1. In your own understanding what is marginalization.
2. What are some of the manifestations of marginalization?
3. Kindly explain how any of the following influences your understanding of marginalization
 - i. Gender
 - ii. Ethnic Background
 - iii. Religious Affiliation

PART III: The implications of socio-economic marginalization on national cohesion

1. Please explain the levels of availability and/or accessibility of the following in Mombasa County
 - i. Land

- ii. Educational infrastructure
 - iii. Employment opportunities
 - iv. Infrastructural Development
2. What reasons if any make it difficult or easy for you to access the services in number one above?
 3. What feelings come to your mind because of either ability or inability to access any of the services in one above.
 4. a) Do you think this region is disadvantaged or favoured in the to the services in one above?
b) Kindly explain your answer
 5. What are some of the steps that should be undertaken to address socio-economic marginalization of Mombasa County?

PART III: Implications of cultural marginalization on national cohesion

1. For how long have you lived in this area?
2. How did you get here?
3. Briefly explain your relationship with people from other ethnic or religious groupings.
4. a) Is there a way in which your religious or ethnic background affects your opportunity to get any government services or opportunities?
b) Please elaborate.
5. If your answer is yes in two above, what do you think should be done to minimize marginalization based on ethnic affiliation and/or religion?

PART IV: Implications of political marginalization on national cohesion

1. Do you belong to any political grouping or organization?
a) Kindly explain your answer
2. How have you as a region or ethnic community benefitted or failed to benefit for supporting or not supporting a given political party or grouping?
3. a) Are there any of your ethnic community members employed in senior positions in government?
i) If yes which position do they hold?

- ii) If no, what do you think is the explanation?
4. What is your view in terms of appointment of people from this region to senior positions in government?
 5. What is the senior most position that has been occupied in government by someone from your community?
 6. a) Do you think the political leadership or those holding senior positions in government from this region have done enough to uplift this region?

b) Please elaborate on your response
 7. What do you think the government should do to address perceived political marginalization?

Thank you for volunteering to take part in this study

Appendix III: KII Guide

PART I: Background Information

Date.....

1. Interviewee number
2. Sex..... Male/Female
3. Designation.....

PART II: The implications of socio-economic marginalization on national cohesion

1. What is your take on the levels of availability and/or accessibility of the following in Mombasa County
 - v. Land
 - vi. Educational infrastructure
 - vii. Employment opportunities
 - viii. Infrastructural Development
2. a) Do you think this region is disadvantaged or favoured in the provision of the services above?
 - b) Kindly explain your answer
3. What steps need to be taken to address issues that arise from one above?

PART III: Implications of cultural marginalization on national cohesion

1. Please comment on the inter-religious relationship in Mombasa County
2. How do you conceive inter-ethnic relations in Mombasa County?
3. What are some of the issues that promote or hamper peaceful co-existence of communities or religious groupings in this county.
4. What do you think should be done to address the issues that create tensions among the various cultural identities?

PART IV: Implications of political marginalization on national cohesion

1. Which political party do you belong to?
2. How have you as a region or ethnic community benefitted or failed to benefit for supporting or not supporting a given political party or grouping?
3. Are there any of your ethnic community members employed in senior positions in government?
 - i) If yes which position do they hold?
 - ii) If no, what do you think is the explanation?
4. As a political leader from this region what has been your contribution in improving the welfare of your people?
5. What do you think the government should do to address issues affecting this region?

**Appendix IV: Research Authorization Permit from Kenyatta University
Graduate School**



KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke

Website: www.ku.ac.ke

OUR REF: C82/32015/15

The National Commission for
Science, Technology & Innovation
P.O. BOX 30623-00100
NAIROBI

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 8710901 Ext. 57530

Date: 6th March, 2019

Dear Sir/Madam,


RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FOR MR. OCHIENG G. OYOMBRA REG. NO. C82/32015/15

I write to introduce **Mr. Oyombra** who is a Postgraduate Student of this University. He is registered for Ph.D. Degree programme in the Department of Security & Correction Science in the School of Security, Diplomacy & Peace Studies

Mr. Oyombra intends to conduct research for a Ph.D. thesis entitled, "Implications of Perceived Marginalization on National Cohesion in Kenya: Case of Mombasa County".

Any assistance given will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,


PROF. ELISHIBA KIMANI
DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

RM/cao

Appendix V: Research Permit from NACOSTI

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. GEORGE OCHIENG OYOMBRA
of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 43844-100
Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct
research in Mombasa County

on the topic: IMPLICATIONS OF
PERCEIVED MARGINALIZATION ON
NATIONAL COHESION IN KENYA: CASE
OF MOMBASA COUNTY

for the period ending:
12th March, 2020

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/19/44169/28773
Date Of Issue : 12th March, 2019
Fee Received :Ksh 2000



Applicant's Signature _____
Director General
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation

Appendix VI: Research Authorization Letter



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,
2241349, 3310571, 2219420
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

NACOSTI, Upper Kabete
Off Waiyaki Way
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/19/44169/28773**

Date: **12th March, 2019**

George Ochieng Oyombra
Kenyatta University
P.O. Box 43844-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*Implications of perceived marginalization on national cohesion in Kenya: Case of Mombasa County*" I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Mombasa County** for the period ending **12th March, 2020**.

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Mombasa County** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit a **copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.


GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Mombasa County.

The County Director of Education
Mombasa County.

Appendix VII: Research Authorization Letter (Nyali Sub-County)



THE PRESIDENCY

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Telephone: Mombasa 2311201
Tel. 0715 040444

COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
P.O. BOX 90424-80100
MOMBASA

Email: msacountycommissioner@yahoo.com
When Replying please quote:

Ref. no. MCC/ADM.25 VOL.I/ (78) 27TH MARCH, 2019

Deputy County Commissioners,
MOMBASA COUNTY - NYALI

RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – GEORGE OCHIENG OYOMBRA
PERMIT NO. NACOSTI/P/19/44169/28773

This is to authorize the above named student from Kenyatta University, Nairobi to carry out on *“Implications of perceived marginalization on national cohesion in Kenya: Case of Mombasa County”* for the period ending 12th March, 2020.

Please accord him the necessary support.

ESTHER I. TSUMA
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
MOMBASA COUNTY

C.C.

County Director of Education,
MOMBASA

Appendix VIII: Research Authorization Letter (Kisauni Sub-County)



THE PRESIDENCY
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Deputy County Commissioners,
MOMBASA COUNTY *Kisauni*

RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – GEORGE OCHIENG OYOMBRA
PERMIT NO, NACOSTI/P/19/44169/28773

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Please accord him the necessary support.


ESTHER I. TSUMA
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
MOMBASA COUNTY

C.C.

County Director of Education,
MOMBASA

Appendix IX: Research Authorization Letter (Mvita Sub-County)



THE PRESIDENCY

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

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Email: msacountycommissioner@yahoo.com
When Replying please quote:


Ref. no. **MCC/ADM.25 VOL.1/ (78) 27TH MARCH, 2019**

Deputy County Commissioners,
MOMBASA COUNTY *Mvita*

RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – GEORGE OCHIENG OYOMBRA
PERMIT NO. NACOSTI/P/19/44169/28773

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Please accord him the necessary support.


ESTHER I. TSUMA
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
MOMBASA COUNTY

C.C.

County Director of Education,
MOMBASA

Appendix X: Research Authorization Letter (Jomvu Sub-County)



THE PRESIDENCY
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

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Tel. 0715 040444

COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
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MOMBASA

Email: msacountycommissioner@yahoo.com
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Ref. no. **MCC/ADM.25 VOL.I/ (78)** **27TH MARCH, 2019**

Deputy County Commissioners,
MOMBASA COUNTY *- Jomvu*

RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – GEORGE OCHIENG OYOMBRA
PERMIT NO. NACOSTI/P/19/44169/28773

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Please accord him the necessary support.


ESTHER I. TSUMA
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
MOMBASA COUNTY

C.C.

County Director of Education,
MOMBASA

Appendix XI: Research Authorization Letter (Changamwe Sub-County)



THE PRESIDENCY

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Telephone: Mombasa 2311201
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COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
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Email: msacountycommissioner@yahoo.com
When Replying please quote:


Ref. no. **MCC/ADM.25 VOL.1/ (78) 27TH MARCH, 2019**

Deputy County Commissioners,
MOMBASA COUNTY *Changamwe*

RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – GEORGE OCHIENG OYOMBRA
PERMIT NO. NACOSTI/P/19/44169/28773

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Please accord him the necessary support.


ESTHER I. TSUMA
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
MOMBASA COUNTY

C.C.

County Director of Education,
MOMBASA

Appendix XII: Research Authorization Letter (Likoni Sub-County)



THE PRESIDENCY
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Ref. no. MCC/ADM.25 VOL.I/ (78) 27TH MARCH, 2019

Deputy County Commissioners,
MOMBASA COUNTY - LIKONI

RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – GEORGE OCHIENG OYOMBRA
PERMIT NO. NACOSTI/P/19/44169/28773

This is to authorize the above named student from Kenyatta University, Nairobi to carry out on *“Implications of perceived marginalization on national cohesion in Kenya: Case of Mombasa County”* for the period ending **12th March, 2020.**


Please accord him the necessary support.


ESTHER I. TSUMA
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
MOMBASA COUNTY

C.C.

County Director of Education,
MOMBASA

Appendix XIII: Map of Mombasa County



Source: Survey of Kenya

Appendix XIV: Budgetary Estimates

| Budget Items | Cost (Kshs.) |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| Typing and editing services | 40,000.00 |
| Stationery | 10,000.00 |
| Hospitality | 30,000.00 |
| Communication | 10,000.00 |
| Printing and Binding | 20,000.00 |
| Transport | 20,000.00 |
| Accommodation and meals | 90,000.00 |
| Data Analysis | 30,000.00 |
| Field work | 53,000.00 |
| Grand Total | <u>293,000.00</u> |