

**THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
INTERVENTION IN DARFUR CONFLICT (2004-2021)**

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DECLARATION

Student: This project report is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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S205/38849/2017

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DEDICATION

The project report is dedicated to my dad, Mr. Benard Langat, and my mum, Elizabeth Langat for their unwavering support throughout my master's studies.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CA	Constitutive Act
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CPAWD	Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division
EU	European Union
JEM	Justice Equity Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PRC	Permanent Representative Committee
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RECS	Regional Economics Communities
SLM	Sudan Liberation Movement
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries

TEU Treaty on European Union

UN United Nations

UNAMID United Nations Mission in Darfur

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

- Conflict:** Conflict is a violent disagreement between a state and one or more organized non-state actors within the state's territory. The misunderstanding can arise due to economic pressure, political alienation, and resource scarcity leading to the struggle.
- Darfur:** The western part where armed conflict has been occurring in Sudan since the year 2003. The geographic scope of the research, therefore, covered the Darfur region.
- Efficacy:** Refers to the ability to achieve its goals well, to achieve set goals. In this case, these organizations need the timely mobilization of the resources and eventual utilization of the resources mobilized to achieve set goals and mandates.
- Janjaweed:** Refers to the militia group that arose during the Darfur conflict; it carried out violent attacks on the Darfur locals. The Janjaweed was the proxy militia of the Khartoum regime of Al Bashir.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the research study was to establish the efficacy of the African Union's Peace and Security Council intervention (PSC) efforts in the Darfur conflict. The mandate of the African Union PSC is to promote peace and security, anticipation and prevention of conflicts thus ensuring political, economic, and social stability in Africa. The study's core objectives were to examine 1564 of the 2004 Peace and Security Council mandate in the Darfur conflict meant to end the violence in Darfur and the protection of civilians. Secondly, the research was to assess the mobilization of the resources by the Peace and Security for resolving the Darfur conflict. Lastly, the study analyzed the Peace and Security Council's intervention efforts in ending the Darfur conflict. The research utilized the institutional liberal theory as it was the most suitable theory for explaining the efficacy of the PSC of the African Union (AU). The liberalist thoughts allowed for an elaborate critique of the mobilization strategy of the PSC, the utilization of the resources, and the mandate of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peacekeepers in Darfur. The study utilized the descriptive research design. The descriptive research design was suitable for the study as it allowed the collection of data that was qualitative. The study's data collection methods used both primary sources of data and secondary sources of data. The primary data gathering instruments for the study adopted the use of interviews while the secondary data was derived through desktop review. The purposive sampling proved suitable for acquiring the key informants for the study. The data obtained from the interview was transcribed and coded for data to be in meaningful and organized forms. Inductive analyses were used to discover themes and patterns of the research problem. Further, the research utilized deductive analysis which proved essential in ensuring that the data generated was in line with the conceptual framework of the study. Corroboration of data was essential in enhancing the validity of the data acquired. The study demonstrated that the PSC arrived at the resolution to intervene in Darfur through consensus. The formulation of a restrictive mandate meant to address the Darfur conflict constrained the AMIS peacekeeper's efficiency. The African Union Commission exhibited more powers and influence beyond its legal framework in influencing the decisions on the Darfur intervention. The slow operationalization of the key organs meant to assist the PSC in delivering its mandate led to the administrative running of the Darfur intervention in a disjointed manner. The PSC relied on external donors for funds and military equipment, moreover, there was slow compliance from the AU member states in availing AMIS troops and they failed to raise the minimum required number. The monitoring of PSC resource utilization in the Darfur intervention was poor thus resulting in high administrative costs than operational costs. The Darfur intervention failed to bring peace in Darfur due to the lack of a robust mandate and timely adequate resources availing from the AU member states. All these essential elements require good political will and commitment from the AU member states which were solely missed in the Darfur intervention thus the mission failed to restore peace in Darfur.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND

1.0 Introduction

This Chapter delves into the concept of efficacy of the Peace and Security Council of African Union intervention efforts in the Darfur Conflict-Sudan. The study is organized into the following subtopics: background of the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, premises of the study, justification and significance of the study, the scope of the study, and its limitations.

1.1 Background of the Study

International organizations are organizations that are established by a treaty or any other instrument governed by international law with a legal personality (International Law Commission, 2011). The end of World War II paved way for the emergence of the US and the Former Soviet Union as superpowers. The war had ravaged economies and many lives. The victors of the war called for the establishment of a strong international organization to maintain world peace and security (Clavin, 2015).

The US spearheaded the idea of forming an international organization which became a success with the Moscow Declaration of 1943 that led to the inception of the United Nations in 1945. The need for cooperation at the regional level spurred the formation of regional organizations. According to the UN Charter, Article 53, the Charter of the United Nations Chapter VIII recognizes the existence of regional organizations as legal and has the mandate of maintenance of international peace and security by settling disputes peacefully in a subordinate capacity to the UN Security Council. Additionally, the Security Council has the authority to use regional agencies for enforcement.

The enormous role placed on international organizations (IOS) requires them to be effective in delivering their mandate. The IOS law should give it authority in its mandate and constrain its actions to enhance its accountability (Peters 2016). Additionally, IOS requires legitimacy, that is the ability to enjoy acceptance from the member states and receive adequate resources to carry out its mandate (Such man and Bundy 2017). The Peace and Security Council (PSC) enjoys legitimacy as it has been entrusted to promote peace, security, and stability in Africa (AU Constitutive Act; Vines 2013).

Conflict is a violent disagreement that can occur between a state and a non-state organized actor which can be one or more within the state's territory (Smith 2017). Conflict, therefore, is an international problem that various international organizations have been struggling to mitigate through peacekeeping intervention. The United Nations have been dealing with several conflicts since the end of World War II. The case of the Liberia civil war saw the intervention by the UN peacekeepers (SC/RES/1270/1999). The mission became a success due to a clear mandate, and adequate funding thus implementing the Lome Peace Agreement (Adibe, 1997) and (Sesay, 2008). On the contrary, the UN peacekeepers in Bosnia were unable to give protection to the civilians in Eastern Srebrenica, thus the Bosnian forces executed several Muslims. The failings can be attributed to the dispatching of small under-equipped peacekeepers to give protection to the civilians (Ahmad, 1998). The two scenarios of Liberia and Bosnia whereby the UN peacekeepers achieved mixed results is a clear indication that the concept of efficacy ought to be researched so that factors of timely resource mobilization and its utilization are factored in so that the mission mandate is achieved.

At the regional level of Europe and North America, the conflict problem exists. Regional organizations have the comparative advantage of a rich understanding of the underlying factors causing conflict on a regional basis (An Agenda for Peace, 1992). Moreover, there has been optimism about the regional organizations sharing responsibility with the UN regionally in fostering peace. This debate was convened by the Security Council inviting the dignitaries of the European Union (EU), the AU, NATO, and the ASEAN. The panel called for more predictable means of financing regional organizations including the possibility of using the UN-assessed contributions, trust funds, and access to expertise and material support from the UN (SC/RES/1631/2005). Nevertheless, there has been a divide in working cooperation between the UN and various regional organizations in terms of the UN providing technical assistance for the peacekeeping missions carried out by the regional organizations (Barnett, 1995). The lack of adequate funds dedicated to regional organizations has compromised their efficacy in containing regional conflicts.

The efficacy of both the international organizations and regional organizations is measured in terms of their ability to achieve their goal effectively (OECD, 2012), to achieve set goals these organizations need both human and financial resources. The case of the Rwanda intervention by the UN peacekeepers (SC/RC/872, 1993) failed due to a lack of adequate peacekeepers and poor funding thus being unable to contain the Rwandan civil war. On the other hand, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in the year (2003-2004) was considered a success by the African Union. This mission was the first test by the African Union to authorize armed peace operations to restore order in Burundi. The mission restored peace in Burundi courtesy of leadership from South Africa and timely funding from the EU and the UN (Williams, 2014).

The Darfur conflict is a culmination of the historical problems of marginalization of the Darfurians dating back to the colonial era and then the post-colonial regimes, that peaked during the president Bashir era (Vines, 2013). The dictatorial regime during the Bashir era did not respect the democratic practices and various human rights principles, this has put the AU and ICC in turbulent relations (Nyawo, 2021).

Darfur is the region in Sudan where conflict erupted in 2003. This region is multi-ethnic comprising the Furs who make up 40% of the population in Darfur and practice crop farming while their Arab counterparts Mahariya and Irayaat are nomads (Temple, 2009). The root cause of the crisis in Darfur is the neglect from the center of power in Khartoum, a legacy that dates back to before independence. Additionally, the Darfurians felt left out of the country's development agenda and political participation (High-Level Panel Report on Darfur, 2009). The rebellion peaked in 2004 whereby there was a gross violation of human rights, deaths of many people, and mass displacement of up to 2 million people and 250,000 refugees (Davidson, 2018). The Peace and Security Council of the African Union had to intervene in the Darfur conflict as it is mandated by the Peace and Security Council protocol to oversee security matters in Africa as a central decision-making organ in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It is therefore worth investigating the efficacy of the African Union Peace and Security Council intervention efforts to contain the Darfur conflict.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The African Union through its Peace and Security Council authorized intervention in the Darfur region of Sudan in the year 2004. The peacekeeper's mandate was to restore peace, security, and stability in the region by ending the civil war. Despite the African

Union's Peace and Security Council's continuous intervention efforts in the Darfur conflict, the peacekeepers realized little progress in their efforts to restore peace in the Darfur region. The available studies on the Darfur conflict indicated that the civil conflict has destroyed the social fabric in Darfur, leading to the loss of human lives and the influx of refugees to neighboring countries which in turn has hurt the regional economy. Nevertheless, little has been done to assess the efficacy of the PSC intervention efforts in Darfur which has the potential of determining the PSC mandate in Darfur, the timeliness of the PSC intervention in Darfur, and the utilization of the mobilized resources for the achievement of PSC mandate in Darfur which are essential in determining success or lack of in peacekeeping intervention efforts.

1.3 Research Objectives

General Objective

The research's main objective was to establish the efficacy of the African Union Peace and Security Council intervention efforts in the Darfur conflict. The study had the following specific objectives.

- i. To evaluate the Peace and Security Council mandate in the Darfur conflict.
- ii. To assess the mobilization of the resources by the Peace and Security Council for resolving the Darfur conflict.
- iii. To analyze the Peace and Security Council intervention efforts to end the Darfur conflict.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. How has the Peace and Security Council's mandate been implemented in the Darfur conflict?

- ii. What has been the Peace and Security Council's mobilization of the resources for resolving the Darfur conflict?
- iii. What has been the analysis of the Peace and Security Council's intervention efforts to end the Darfur conflict?

1.5 Research Premises

- i. The Security Council's decisions and resolutions have been implemented in practice.
- ii. The Peace and Security Council has been mobilizing resources for the Darfur Conflict resolution.
- iii. The Peace and Security Council intervention effort in the Darfur conflict has analysis.

1.6 Justification and Significance of the Study

Since 2003, Darfur has been a scene of civil conflict. According to Huth & Valentino (2020), it is estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 people have died while over two million have been displaced from their homes ending up being refugees (Flint and De Waal, 2008). Additionally, the Darfur conflict has brought tragedy to people living there and becoming a part of a regional security challenge to Sudan, Eastern parts of Chad, Northern parts of Uganda, Libya, Eritrea, Central African Republic, and Egypt as Huth & Valentino opine. All these insecurity implications of the Darfur conflict are sufficient reasons to investigate this conflict.

Increased intervention by regional organizations in the conflict in many parts of the world has been on the rise with varied success levels in mitigating those conflicts. The concept of efficacy was meant to establish whether the PSC of the African Union has been able to

realize its mandate of bringing peace to the Darfur region or not. Moreover, the study critiqued the mobilization strategy of resources for the mission. It is worth noting that, peacekeeping interventions were essential in averting wars and conflict spill-over effects which have been the case in most parts of the world. It was, therefore, important to find out the extent to which PSC had mitigated the Darfur conflict taking into account its expertise, sources of funds, mobilization strategy, distribution, and the impact it had on the peacekeeping missions supervised in Africa. The time factor was essential in decision-making as it had a direct impact on the course of the conflict. The concept of efficacy, therefore, was justifiable to be researched.

The study's findings were significant to various stakeholders. First, the regional organizations benefitted to have detailed information on the value of having a robust and equipped decision-making organ. This research having placed the PSC of the African Union as the basis of the research, added to the knowledge gaps that efficacy is essential to the success of any peacekeeping intervention efforts. The lessons and experience of the AMIS intervention in the Darfur conflict demonstrated that decision-making organs require timely adequate resource support from the stakeholders and effective monitoring of resource utilization to ensure that set goals are achieved which is the lesson to the PSC experts in its future decisions, AU administrators, RECS experts, and government policy makers. The loss of lives and damages inflicted by the Darfur conflict is a lesson to the Sudan government. The study's focus on efficacy was essential to academicians' curiosity by establishing that efficacy determines the success or lack of peacekeeping intervention as demonstrated by the case of Darfur.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The research study focused on establishing the efficacy of the PSC of African Union intervention efforts in the Darfur conflict. Moreover, The PSC approved the sending of the peacekeeping force; the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The study's geographical scope is the Darfur region of Sudan. This is the region where civil conflict has been going on for a long period leading to the destruction of property and losing of about 400,000 lives in the region which makes it suitable for the study. The period (2004-2019) is essential since it is the time that the African Union intervened by sending its peacekeeping force (the AMIS). Additionally, the year 2004 represents the onset of the PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict, thus this period going forward up to the year 2019 gave accurate data on PSC intervention.

1.8 Limitations of the Study

Upon the commencement of the data collection, the researcher visited the Information desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for official inquiries on key informants' contact information. This led to the eventual refer to the Africa and African Union Directorate, at first there was little progress as the researcher was given several postponements. Reaching the key informants through email proved vital to breaking barriers to information accessibility.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The literature review section focused on several themes that are relevant to the study of the efficacy of the PSC intervention in the Darfur Conflict. The first theme is on the regional organization's intervention in conflicts and its efficacy, followed by the evolving mandate of the PSC of the African Union in conflicts. It is from these themes that the research gaps were identified and used in the formulation of the research objectives.

2.1 The International Organizations and Regional Organizations Interventions in Conflicts and Efficacy

The United Nations (UN) is essential to the realization of international peace and security. The Security Council which is the powerful organ of the UN has powers to oversee security matters (the UN Charter). In terms of its composition, this organ has eleven members, of which five are permanent members with veto powers. The remaining six are non-permanent members which are elected for a two-year term based on the regional distribution and ability of the country to contribute funds and troops for the realization of international peace. In terms of peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, the Security Council must approve through a resolution without an objection from the five veto power member states (the UN Charter). In terms of the intervention by the UN peacekeepers, there has been both success and failures in some operations (Howard, 2007). The case of the East Timor intervention by the UN peacekeepers represents a success as it restored peace and security in the region through the

International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and later, the UN managed to establish and restore the administration in East Timor (S/2000/115).

The UN on some occasions has failed to achieve its mandate through its peacekeeping operations. The several cases include; the UN intervention in Somalia, Rwanda, and Angola. In the case of the Rwanda intervention, the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed to achieve its mandate of establishing peace in Rwanda, thus the violence culminated into genocide (S/1257/1999). Several scholarly works on the UN peacekeeping operations have cited both success and failure in that operation, the factors identified include the interest of the veto power states that have permanent representation at the Security Council and the ambiguous mandate (Foley, 2017). The study found that the available studies have rarely examined how efficacy determines the success or failure of peacekeeping interventions conducted by both international organizations and regional organizations. The research on the efficacy of the PSC of the African Union aimed to address in depth the mobilization of resources for peacekeeping missions and how it affects the mission's mandate.

The European Union (EU) is both a political and an economic union that was established under the Maastricht Treaty which came into force in 1993. The EU has 28 member states that enjoy a single market free from tariffs and unrestricted movement of people, goods, and services. The use of the euro currency has enhanced efficient economic integration in the EU member states. The establishment of the EU was primarily to be a European trading bloc, but there have been developments that have enabled it to have the additional role of intervening in conflicts outside Europe (Naert, 1999). The EU developed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in the year 1999. The

Policy on defense spelled out the legal framework of how the EU will conduct itself when intervening in a conflict outside Europe (Treaty on European Union (TEU)).

To establish the efficacy of the EU in conflict intervention, the starting point is to question the composition of the decision-making organ, how the decisions are made and implemented, then the last part is to analyze the results achieved in a given peacekeeping operation intervened by the European Union. In Article 42(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the CSDP is supposed to provide the EU with operational capacity that is composed of civilian personnel and military personnel to provide the Union with the expert skills that will be key in making decisions relating to peacekeeping efforts and prevention of global conflict. The decision to intervene in a conflict is made by the Council Ministers (Article 42(4) of the Treaty on European Union). In the case of funding the peacekeeping mission, the Union is open to the use of both the national resources of its member states and the Union's resources (TEU, article 42).

The European Union's preparations for the intervention in the conflict that was going on in Chad and the border of the Central Africa Republic (CAR) started with lobbying which was led by France. The France representative brought before the EU Council of Ministers a proposal calling for immediate intervention in the ongoing conflict in Chad, citing abuse of human rights in the ongoing conflict both by the rebel and the government forces of Chad to the refugees fleeing conflict in the Darfur region, the use of child soldiers and the need to contain the ongoing conflict (Tigner, 2007). The proposals by the France government constituted the mandate of the EU when it finally launched the military operation in January 2008 in eastern parts of Chad and its border with the Central Africa Republic for an intended period of one year (Disktra, 2010).

In terms of establishing the efficacy of the European Union intervention in Chad and the CAR, the peacekeepers fared well in terms of giving protection to the refugee civilians in the camps. On the other hand, the peacekeepers were unable to establish peace in the region because the France government was seen as being partial by the rebels, thus the presence of its peacekeepers was seen by rebels to be siding with the government forces. In terms of funding the peacekeepers, the France government complained of shouldering the responsibility of funding the operation alone while the UK and Germany were seen to have sabotaged the mission through their lack of providing funds for the mission.

The protest by France created political tensions between the three EU member states. The critique of the EU efficacy in its intervention in Chad and the CAR raises curiosity about the PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict with little known in terms of the mission mobilization of the resources, its utilization of the resources, and whether the mission achieved its mandate. Additionally, as portrayed by the EU intervention in Chad that France shouldered funding this peacekeeping mission which portrays fault in the EU funds mobilization strategy, the same question will be posed for the PSC mobilization of the resources as it affects the realization of the mission goals. The gaps raised are what the research sought to address.

The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. It is a political and economic union of 15 countries located in West Africa. The main goal of the ECOWAS during its establishment was to foster economic integration in the region through increased inter-trading between member states with the removal of trade barriers (Treaty of Lagos). The ECOWAS has evolved from being a trading bloc to enhancing itself to respond to

security threats within its member states. This move started with the ECOWAS heads of states agreement in their summit to incorporate a collective security provision, this eventually led to the signing of the Protocol on Mutual Defense in 1981. The ECOWAS soon intervened in Liberia's civil war following the incursion into Liberia by the rebel forces led by Charles Taylor into Liberia and then engaging with the forces of President Samuel Doe, the fighting led to violence and eventually civil war in the whole of Liberia. The ECOWAS initially intervened by sending a mediation team, but when there was no progress in the civil war stopping, it intervened by sending the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group also known as ECOMOG.

The ECOMOG mandate was to restore law and order, maintain peace and ensure that there is a ceasefire (Suntharalingam, 2007). On arrival at Monrovia, Liberia the ECOMOG force of 3000 found itself engaged in a gunfire battle with the rebel faction led by Charles Taylor, the mission objective changed to peace enforcement. Although this mission eventually achieved to end the civil war with the successful conduct of elections in Liberia with Charles Taylor becoming the president, this mission was marked with serious flaws which compromised its effectiveness (Tuck, 2000). In terms of the decision-making by the Standing Mediation Committee, this organ was dominated by the Nigerians which assumed hegemonic status with its ability to contribute more than half of the ECOMOG peacekeepers and contribution of funds to sustain this operation. The problem then arose in the mission as Nigeria favored President Samuel Doe while Burkina Faso funded and supported the Taylor rebel group, thus the lack of impartiality by Nigeria compromised the mandate of the mission. On the part of the organizational structure, the ECOMOG lacked a well-defined mandate on the mission this was

contributed by the lack of a well-defined organizational structure and the over-reliance on decision-making on an ad-hoc basis. Although the available literature on the ECOMOG focuses on the intent shown by the peacekeeping force, in terms of efficacy the mission was highly flawed. The flaws in the ECOMOG intervention raised curiosity about the PSC intervention in Darfur that available studies have done little to establish its efficacy.

The North Atlantic Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 as a collective self-defense organization (Washington Treaty). It has 29 member states coming from Europe and North America. The primary goal of this organization was to protect member states' territory in case of an attack.

NATO has evolved from being a self-defense mechanism to including peacekeeping activities. This can be seen through the Oslo Declaration in which member states agreed to enlarge their mandate to include crisis management by availing the alliance resources and expertise. The NATO decisions are arrived at through consensus. The North Atlantic Council in which all member states are represented is chaired by the Secretary-General whose decisions are binding (Steinke, 2015). NATO decided to conduct an offensive strike in the former Yugoslavia in 1998 after failed negotiations with Yugoslavia's president, Slobodan Milosevic to end the massacre of civilians especially the Kosovar Albanians (Steinke, 2015).

NATO conducted air strikes with the mandate of ending the violence and suffering of the Kosovar Albanians. Though the mission did not receive UN approval and was heavily criticized to have defied international law, this mission became a success as it managed to end the violence and extermination of the Kosovar-Albanians by the Serbs Army (Suntharalingam, 2007). In terms of efficacy, which is key to the success or failure of

regional organizations, NATO funding comes from its members who have stable economies thus the issue of mobilizing for human and financial resources is well established. Additionally, NATO has a budget allocation for military intervention and an investment program meant to raise funds and necessary resources including the military hardware that is essential in any peacekeeping intervention efforts.

The well-defined source of funding made the NATO airstrike mission of 11 weeks in former Yugoslavia a success by ending the violence in the region. In terms of the mandate, NATO through the North Atlantic Council is a decision-making organ that approves any peacekeeping mission. The critique of the NATO source of funding and defining its mandate very well raises the gap for research of whether the PSC of the African Union has a clear mobilization strategy of the resources for its intervention in the Darfur conflict and whether it has achieved its goals in its intervention and if not, what are the factors making this mandated security organ fail.

2.2 The Evolving Mandate of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in Conflict Intervention

The evolution from the OAU to African Union in the year 2002 spelled several reforms to the organs that were formed. The inception of the PSC was a result of various reforms to the OAU security system which had proved to be unresponsive to the ever-rising security challenges in the continent (Kahombo, 2018). The security threats included the increase of coups d'état which reached 26 in number between 1980-1990 and increased armed conflict which caused the deaths of 7 million people, 3 million refugees, and 20 million internally displaced persons. This increased cases of insecurity can be attributed to the fact that the OAU lacked enforcing mechanism in its organs and the call for non-

interference in the domestic affairs of the member states (the OAU Charter article III (2) saw an increase in civil conflicts in several member states

In 1993 there was a proposal for the creation of an organ that will be responsible for addressing security matters. This led to the Cairo Declaration of 1993 which facilitated the establishment of the Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution organ. This organ vested more powers in the Secretary-General as it anticipated dealing with the conflict through the use of preventive diplomacy; however, it failed miserably (Rodd, 2014). Given the inability of the OAU to mitigate the contemporary African security needs, the African Heads of state convened in Libya to discuss the way forward for the continent taking into account the increased security challenges (Sirte Declaration, 1999). The Sirte Declaration marked the beginning of the journey whereby in July 2001 in Lusaka, the African leaders agreed to repeal the security organ including having a well-spelled mandate for it to be able to tackle the security problems in Africa.

The African Union was founded in the year 2002 through its Constitutive Act. This was a milestone achievement by the African leaders since they thought that the AU will be well-placed to deal with the African security challenges (Levitt. 2003). The PSC protocol was adopted in 2002. This operationalized the Peace and Security Council to oversee security matters in Africa. The assessment of the origins of the Peace and Security Council was important as it sheds light on some of the motivating reasons for the change that included the establishment of an organ that is robust and commanding to deal with African security demands ranging from the unconstitutional change of governments, combating terrorism and mitigating conflicts that arise. The Peace and Security Council was officially inaugurated in May 2004. The African leaders hailed the importance of

this organ claiming that it was a step forward in Africa towards Africa resolving its conflict without relying on external intervention which had been the case in the earlier years(AU 2004: par1).

The scholars soon focused on researching the PSC. Levitt (2003) lauds the authority given to the PSC to manage conflict through military intervention since the use of preventive diplomacy proved to have lost relevance in tackling insecurity matters in Africa. Additionally, he notes that the PSC will operationalize key provisions in the Constitutive Act, that is article 3(f) that call for the provision of peace in Africa, article 4(h) authorize the African Union to intervene in member states are facing security crisis, article (4J) that allow the AU member states to request for an intervention from the AU.

The assessment by Levitt is important since the research deals with efficacy, it will be important to see which article was used by the PSC to authorize a peacekeeping mission in Darfur. He further analyzes the overall structures of the PSC, he notes that there are legal stumbling blocks that need to be addressed, that is article 16 which commits the PSC's responsibility of securing Africa, and Article 17 which commits the PSC to cooperate and seek consent from the Security Council. Levitt's work contributed to the anticipated challenges that the PSC was to face in delivering its mandate. Nevertheless, the study by Levitt is not enough considering that it fails to touch on how the PSC was to raise the needed resources, the mobilization strategy it was going to adopt, and its utilization of the resources and timely allocation of the resources which are essential to success or lack of in peacekeeping intervention.

Williams (2009), contributes a lot through his analyses of the embryonic structures of the PSC, he examines the membership of the PSC between 2004-2010 and notes that there

was a serious violation of the law on the eligibility criteria since some members who were in conflicts such as Ethiopia and Sudan became members of the PSC despite being parties to the conflict. Since the Darfur conflict in Sudan is the focal point of this research it will be interesting to discover how their membership in the PSC affected the decision-making on the Darfur conflict. Acharya and Johnstone (2007) question the relevance of the PSC politically that is whether the member states support the PSC by committing their funds and qualified personnel to the organ to ensure its success.

Williams (2009), notes that since the year 2006, 75% of the AU budget was paid by the five countries in Africa with the largest economies that include Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa. Although these studies touch on the importance of adequate funding for the AU to run smoothly, they do not provide adequate information on it, the research, therefore, seeks to fill these gaps of knowledge. Vines (2013) notes that the PSC is coping well with the security challenges, he illustrated it using the cases whereby Cote D'Ivoire, Madagascar, and Niger were sanctioned by the AU for the unconstitutional change of governments. However, he notes that finance and human resource deployment are not able to match the workloads that the PSC has.

The research on efficacy therefore proved necessary since the scholarly works available have demonstrated inadequate information on it. Additionally, by focusing on the PSC intervention efforts in the Darfur conflict, the research sought to demonstrate with concrete facts whether the PSC of the African Union was able to meet its mandate. Additionally, the research sought to critique the efficacy of the PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict with a bid of illustrating what this robust organ needed to adjust to realizing its overall goal of establishing peace and security in Africa.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

Different theories explain the importance of international organizations in the realization of peace, security, and stability (Kate & Pease, 2003). The constructivist theory argues that international organizations lead states to cooperate even when their power is compromised and the goal to maximize their interest is not achieved, neo-realist is pessimist of international organizations and they dupe it as a vehicle by which states use to achieve their interest. On the other hand neo- liberalist believes that international organizations are essential to making world peace and cooperation possible. This shows that there is no single theory that explains a lone about both international organizations and regional organizations exhaustively. Nevertheless, the liberal institutional theory is the best fit to explain the PSC's role in the Darfur conflict.

2.4 The Liberal Institutional Theory

According to Goldstein & Pevehouse (2007), the development of the Liberal Institutionalism theory has its origin in Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace Theory, 200 years ago. This theory explained how peace and cooperation could be achieved in the international system. According to Kant, states could develop organizations and rules of engagement to govern their interaction in a bid of establishing cooperation. Moreover, Kant called for the formation of a World Federation which can be likened to today's United Nations. This was the cornerstone of the foundation of today's international organizations (IOS). Secondly, he urged that peace depends on the internal character of the government thus he used the example of a monarch whereby the legislature should practice checks and balances so that peace can be realized. Moreover, he stressed that

trade could promote wealth and cooperation among states thus reducing conflicts and wars.

The liberal institutional theory tenets argue that states are rational actors who pursue their interests through the international organizations they establish and by doing this they foster long-term well-being and cooperation among states. Additionally, this theory concedes that both the state and the non-state actors have an important role to play in the international system. This assumption gives scholars a chance of examining the role that these actors play in world politics. Moreover, for the neo-liberalist, the nature of the international system is made up of both conflict and cooperation, but the presence of conflict does not lead to war as this is overcome by the reciprocity principle whereby states want to foster long-term beneficial relations with one another (Barnett & Finn more, 2014). This aspect of states cooperating to overcome conflict was important to the research on the Darfur conflict since the study could examine how the African states devoted their resources to the PSC for its intervention in the missions.

The neo-liberalists view the state as not being a unitary actor. This is because the state is driven by individuals, governments' ministries, the judiciary, and the legislature which are involved in the decision makings. Lastly, for neo liberalist several issues dominate the international agenda, this includes security, economic, social, and environmental issues. This gives a comprehensive view of the international system. The research on the Darfur conflict falls under the security agenda. The research, therefore, sought to establish the efficacy of PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict utilizing the neoliberalist assumptions appropriately.

The liberal institutionalism theory is in agreement with a few aspects of realism, game theory, and liberal functionalism which qualify it to be a robust theory (Kate & Pease, 2003). Liberalist believes that states cooperation in a bid to realize joint interests is possible (Richardson, 2012). Additionally, Keohane (1948) demonstrated optimism that international organizations can help states overcome the greed and selfish nature associated with it. Moreover, the neo-liberalist concedes with the realist perspective take that anarchy exists in the international system thus giving rise to the importance of military capabilities necessary for state protection. The neo-liberalists see the risk of the arms race being overcome by the essential need for cooperation instilled by international organizations (Burchill 2005).

The neo-liberal agreement with some of the realist arguments have led to realist proponents terming neo-liberalist theory as being a "modified realism" (Mearsheimer, 1995). Nonetheless, the institutional liberalist disputes realist negative assumptions of the international system by stating that IOS is essential in the realization of peace and security regionally. This tenet gave the research podium to establish and critique the level of cooperation among the African States on its ability to mobilize funds and troops timely for its intervention in Darfur. The institutional liberalist assumptions, therefore, remain the most suitable theory in explaining the efficacy of the Peace and Security Council's intervention in the Darfur conflict.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

The essence of the conceptual framework used in the research study was the generation of the study's variables. The variables are the difference in the attributes measured in the study. Every study topic has both independent variables and dependent variables.

Independent variables are the predictors or factors identified by the researcher who thinks that it explains the variation in the dependent variable (Kombo and Tromp, (2011). The dependent variable is the outcome variable in the study. The study had three independent variables. These include; the PSC mandate formulation that has an impact on its mission intervention, resource mobilization by the PSC affects its mission intervention and efficacy determines success or lack of in PSC intervention. The dependent variable of the study was Peace and Security Council intervention. See figure 2.1 below for an illustration.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework for PSC Intervention in Darfur conflict

Source: Author (2021)

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This Chapter explains the framework of how the research was conducted. It has the research design, research location, target population, sampling technique, sample size, instruments of data collection, validity and reliability, and ethical considerations.

3.1 Research Design

The research study employed a descriptive research design. Kothari (2006) stated that the research design allows the researcher to have an overall strategy of how to integrate the different components of the research in a logical manner ensuring that the research problem is addressed. Therefore descriptive research design was appropriate in examining the mobilization of resources by the PSC of the African Union in its intervention in the Darfur conflict. Additionally, the descriptive design proved essential in establishing narratives about the mandate of the PSC in the Darfur conflict intervention. Moreover, the descriptive research design was essential in ensuring that the narrative identified was in line with the theoretical framework of the research.

3.2 Study Area

The research study was carried out in Nairobi City County. The Nairobi City County proved suitable for this research because it hosts several embassies and officials from the African Union regional agencies offices in Westlands Area. The researcher visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Kenya to acquire official contacts and addresses of the officials which represented Kenya in the PSC of the African Union since the year 2004 when the Darfur conflict started. The MFA represented the starting point of

conducting the research. See Appendix IX for the map showing the location of the MFA. Additionally, of interest to the research was the African Union Agency office in Kenya, the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) located at Ngong which the researcher visited in the process of data collection.

3.3 Target Population

Aken & Berends (2018) stated that a target population is a group of individuals from where the sample size is derived. The research study targeted population was the personnel experts who worked in the Peace and Security Council from the year 2004 as this period is significant since it was the onset of the Darfur conflict. Additionally, experts from Kenya who have worked in different capacities at the African Union were conducted to inform the study. The target population of the study was twenty-one experts who were from the following departments: The Peace and Security Council which has fifteen member states. The AU member states that had membership representation in the PSC included; Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Gabon, Algeria, Congo, Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Lesotho, Libya, and Mozambique. Additionally, two senior members from the Africa Union Commission, two members from the Permanent Representative Committee, one member from the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division, and one member from the African Union Leadership Academy were included. The sourcing of the experts from the stated strata was significant in informing the research problem with in-depth information.

3.4 Sampling and Sampling Technique

Sampling is the process that shows how the participants are selected for a research study (Sedgwick, 2015). Once all the potential key informants were identified, the researcher

selected the representative sample from the target population. The research study employed an on-probability type of sampling technique, whereby the purposive sampling technique was useful in selecting key informants. Teddlie & Yu (2007) agree that the purposive sampling technique is useful for qualitative studies. Additionally, the use of purposive sampling was appropriate since the research was targeting experts that were conversant with the working of the PSC and the decisions that informed the sending of the AMIS peacekeepers to the Darfur region. The criteria used for considering whether a person participate as a key informant or got disqualified was purely based on expertise and knowledge of the working of the PSC during the intervention in the Darfur conflict and the last criterion was checking whether the participants were willing to participate in the research study.

3.5 Sample Size

Sample size refers to the small part of the population which has the characteristic of the whole population (Kothari, 2009). The sample size of thirteen experts has the desired characteristic as it has a representative from each department of the African Union which took part in the decision-making to deploy the AMIS peacekeepers to the Darfur region. The participants that were selected were experts knowledgeable about the Darfur intervention who were willing to contribute to the research study. Almeda & Sarte (2010) proposed the use of hyper geometric distribution formula as appropriate in deriving sample size when the target population is small. The formula for calculating the sample is illustrated.

$$n = \left\{ \frac{N(Z^*a/2)}{Z^*a} \right\}^2 + 4N^*e$$

n- Sample size, N is Target population=21, Z represents the score value, e is the margin of error=0.16 $n=21(1.96*1.96) / (1.96*1.96) + 4*21*(0.16*0.16) =13$.

Table 1.1 below illustrated how the various strata of the sample size were derived from the various AU organs.

Table 3.1: Sample Size of Experts That Informed the Study

Field	Target Population	Sample Size
Peace and Security Council	15	7
African Union Commission	2	2
African Union Leadership Academy	1	1
Permanent Representatives Committee	2	2
Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division	1	1
Total	21	13

Source: AU structure and Organs in AU Handbook, (2017)

3.6 Instruments of Data Collection

The study used open-ended questions which were set according to the research objectives. The interview guide was structured to be simple and direct to the point. This was meant to ensure that there was no ambiguity and that the research problem of the study was answered. The instruments of data collection were tools that were used in data collection. The choice of a data collection instrument was informed by the research design of the study and the research questions of the study (Bui, 2009). Therefore, the research study being qualitative research, the use of an interview guide was appropriate for the study. See Appendix II for the sample of the interview guide to the study.

3.7 Validity and Reliability

Validity is the extent to which an instrument measures the intended result or objective of the study (Bui, 2009). It is important to have a valid instrument used when carrying out a research study to ensure that the goal of the research is achieved and to enhance the interpretation of the results in a meaningful way. Considering that the research undertaken was qualitative, the corroboration of data was essential to enhance its validity. Further corroboration of data allowed the establishment of patterns of convergence and the development of an overall interpretation. The weakness of one method, therefore, was overcome by the strength of another. Waithaka (2018) stated that reliability is the ability of the instrument to consistently bring out the same result. The research conducted contributed to the gaps of knowledge by ensuring that the findings realized were generalizable beyond the Darfur conflict.

3.8 Data Collection Technique and Procedures

The study generated primary data through the use of in-depth interviews and a review of secondary materials. The interviews were conducted orally with key informants who were available and willing to inform the study. The research conducted an extensive search of existing relevant information about the Peace and Security Council decision-making process, mobilization strategy of the resources, the intervention in the Darfur conflict by the PSC, how the PSC derived mandate for the AMIS peacekeepers, and how efficacy influence the success or lack of in peacekeeping intervention. The search involved the use of electronic search whereby the computer internet was key in sourcing detailed information through the authorized authentic websites provided by Kenyatta University. Additionally requesting vital documents from the key informants proved to

work as some informants recommended their authored books and journals which proved essential to the study. In total a collection of approximately fifteen documents that included published books, evaluation reports, and reports of the AU Chairperson of the Commission on Darfur, journals, communiqués of the PSC, and resolutions of the Security Council on the Darfur conflict and deliberations of the AU Assembly were reviewed.

3.9 Data Analysis

The data collected from the interview sessions were transcribed and the data were categorized according to the research questions. Considering that data that was obtained from the interview sessions were in form of narratives, the coding method was used to organize interview data into themes and issues of the research questions. The data generated from both interviews and reviewed secondary materials were corroborated to enhance their validity. The inductive analysis was used to discover themes and patterns of the research problem. Moreover, deductive analysis was essential in ensuring that the data generated was in line with the conceptual framework of the research. The data obtained from secondary sources of data in form of numerical were illustrated using tables where necessary.

3.10 Ethical Consideration

The researcher obtained a research letter from the Graduate School of Kenyatta University which was used for introduction at the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI). Once the research permit was acquired the researcher used it while requesting appointments with the key informants. Additionally, the NACOSTI permit was used for the introduction at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

International Trade and the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) regional office in Nairobi. Upon acquiring a research appointment, the researcher assured the respondents of their confidentiality and informed them that the information acquired was to be utilized for academic purposes.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction

The research study investigated the efficacy of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council intervention in the Darfur conflict by examining the Peace and Security Council mandate in the Darfur conflict, assessing the mobilization of the resources by the Peace and Security Council for resolving the Darfur conflict and critiquing the efficacy of the Peace and Security Council intervention in the Darfur conflict. The researcher discussed the results and findings of the study thematically. The research study drew key informants from various African Union organs that participated in decision-making concerning the Peace and Security Council-authorized intervention in the Darfur conflict. It is vital to illustrate the demographic data of the respondents to the research study as shown below in table 4.1.


Table 4.1: Demographic Data of the Respondents and General Information

Variables	Category	Frequency
Gender	Male	10
	Female	3
Interview Method	Oral Interview	13
Categories of AU Departments	PSC	7
	AU Commission	2
	AU Leadership Academy	1
	Conflict Prevention & Early Warning	1
	Permanent Representative Committee	2

Source: Researcher, (2021)

The study's key informants' gender distribution was 75% male and 25% female. This was an indication that more men are working in the African Union than women, and this calls for the AU to involve more women in the decision-making of the Peace and Security Council. The research study was conducted through oral interviews. This method proved vital as the study was focused on reaching key informants face to face to exhaust their rich knowledge of the PSC Darfur intervention.

The highest level of education and working experience with the African Union of key informants to the study was probed. The study interviewed thirteen informants of whom eight key informants had a master's level of education, three had a degree level and two had a Ph.D. level. This illustrated that the Peace and Security Council of the African Union has highly skilled human resource personnel. See Figure 4.2 below for an illustration.



Source: Researcher 2021

4.1 The Peace and Security Council mandate in the Darfur conflict

The researcher examined the Peace and Security Council mandate in the Darfur conflict. The identified sub-themes included the process of arriving at a resolution to intervene in Darfur by the PSC. The role of other African Union organs in the Darfur resolution, the African Union member states reaction to the Darfur intervention, the resolutions on the Darfur conflict, and the outside Africa support to the PSC intervention in Darfur.

4.1.1 Process of arriving at Resolution to intervene in the Darfur Conflict by the PSC of the African Union

The African Union through the Peace and Security Council is mandated to authorize intervention to a peacekeeping intervention by the Constitutive Act. The study interviewed thirteen key informants through oral interviews. The key informants to the study informed that the PSC arrived at the resolution to intervene in the Darfur conflict through the consensus approach. Below are some of the key quotations from the informants.

The PSC has always preferred to make its decisions through consensus. Before consensus is reached there are a lot of persuasions between the PSC members being led by the chair of the month to ensure that there is a common position and eventual consensus, this was the case in arriving at the Darfur resolution. (Key Informant C1: Senior official that served at the African Union Commission 28/12/2020).

This clearly shows that the use of consensus is the official stand of arriving at the decisions in the PSC thus the persuasion in a bid to have consensus can be time-consuming and can delay the decision-making process. Aning (2017) argued that the use of consensus to pass resolutions has become the norm of the PSC.

Subsequently, when the researcher probed the informants on the possibility of adopting resolutions through the voting system in the future, all thirteen informants stated that the

use of the voting system could bring division among PSC members. Below are some of the key quotations from the informants.

The use of a voting system will divide the PSC members in arriving at decisions on Security matters which is not good for Africa which still experiences conflicts at any time. (Key Informant C3: Senior Official at the Border Institute 5/12/2020).

This shows that the reason that the PSC prefers consensus over voting is to avoid division it can bring to the decision-making system, however, other avenues such as mediation, fact-finding missions, sanctions, military intervention, and collaboration with other regional organizations get utilized. Williams (2015) stated that the use of consensus in arriving at decisions in the PSC is preferred due to its ability to guard the AU image by not portraying political vault lines among the members serving in the PSC. Although the use of voting in the PSC is unpopular due to it being termed as divisive its use can establish the position of states serving in the PSC on security issues thus giving a clear view of the timeliness of the response and the resource adequacy that states devote to resolutions they support which is essential while examining efficacy.

The fifteen members of the PSC as of 2004 when the resolution to intervene in the Darfur Conflict was Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Togo, Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Gabon, Mozambique, Lesotho, Libya Congo, and Cameroon (The AU Handbook, 2017). Notably, Sudan which was in civil conflict managed to become a member of the PSC thus violating the Constitutive Act principles.

The key informants to the study spoke of Sudan gaining membership to the PSC as a clear show of the weak legal structures of the AU. Below are some of the key quotations from the key informants.

Sudan gaining membership to the PSC portrayed weak legal structures of the AU in ensuring that states elected to the PSC conform with the laid down

rules in the CA. (Key Informant C1: Senior AU Official at the African Union Commission 28/12/2020).

Sudan's membership to the PSC while being part of the conflict clearly shows that the AU has weak legal structures that are meant to interpret and determine the suitability of the state's candidature to the PSC. Okumu (2017) opined that the African Union leaders do not pay great attention to the legal structures put in place. Further, Williams (2015) stated that the elections to the PSC are purely aspirational as long as states meet their membership financial obligation.

All the key informant's comments indicated that despite the AU having legal structures in place that interpret the suitability of a member state that is eligible to contest membership to the PSC, it is clear that the AU member states used the political decision to allow Sudan contest and eventually got voted to the PSC due to its important funding to the AU and geo-political influence that the Bashir regime enjoyed in Africa among the member states. Sudan's influence on the AU to the point of breaking the organization's rules and becoming a PSC member justify the liberal institutional theory tenet that states are rational actors that pursue their interest through the IOS they establish, however, this tenet is not enough as the proponents did not state the extent that states go in the quest to pursue its interest.

The signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, and the JEM who were the main fighting factions paved way for the intervention in Darfur. Below are some of the key quotations from the key informants.

The signing of the HCA in N'djamena Chad gave the platform for the PSC to authorize intervention in Darfur. (Key Informant C8: PSC Expert and Officer at Political Diplomatic Affairs Directorate 28/12/2020).

The Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA) was the turning point for intervention in the Darfur conflict as it stated the conditions that were to be observed by the fighting factions in Darfur. The content of the HCA formed the PSC mandate for the Darfur intervention though it compromised a lot by putting several reservations in it (PSC/AHG Comm, 2004). Moreover, Okumu (2016) & Murithi (2017) opined that the failure of the PSC to come up with a substantive mandate shows its weak leadership. In conclusion, the PSC arrived at its resolution to intervene in the Darfur conflict through consensus which is the favored way of making decisions in the PSC.

4.1.2 Role of other AU Organs in Darfur Resolution

The Peace and Security Council is the overall decision-making organ meant to oversee the maintenance of security and Peace in Africa. Since its inauguration in the year 2004, the PSC was met with the ‘boiling’ conflict in Darfur which necessitated its intervention. The PSC does not work as Pariah, thus it needs support from other organs of the African Union to deliver its mandate. The Assembly, the African Union Commission (AUC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force, the military committee, the Panel of the Wise, and the Peace Fund together form the Peace and Security Architecture except for the first two organs (Sansculotte, 2017).

The CEWS tasked with gathering intelligence information and ringing alarm to the PSC of possible conflicts was only endorsed in January 2007. According to Williams (2014), the Panel of the Wise members was named in January 2007 and inaugurated in December on the other hand; the Africa Standby Force remains a work in progress.

The slow process of operationalizing the key organs of the Peace and Security Architecture meant that the PSC was going to work under pressure in delivering its stated

mandate of bringing peace to the Darfur region. The African Union Commission through its chairperson serves as the chief executive officer tasked with the execution of the decisions made by the PSC and it can provide it with relevant advice (African Union Handbook, 2017).

The key informants to the study informed that the African Union Commission was utilized to do the drafting of the PSC mandate in Darfur. Below are some of the quotations from the key informants.

The African Union Commission played a central role in drafting the PSC minutes and communique as the PSC did not have a working Secretariat yet, this increased the workload on the Commission. (Key Informant C1: Senior African Union Commission Officer 28/12/2020).

The African Union Commission (AUC) drafting the communique meant that the AUC could be overwhelmed with more workload as it was playing this role on an ad-hoc basis. Aning (2017) noted that the lack of operationalized PSC Secretariat led to the PSC relying on the AUC for drafting minutes and communique. The study observed that the drafting of the minutes and communique was not time bound, this in turn delayed the decision-making process on Darfur resolutions.

Nonetheless, four key informants to the study noted that the AUC took advantage of its working offices to influence the decisions of the PSC on the Darfur intervention. Below are some of the key quotations from the informants to the study.

The African Union Commission took advantage of its operative organs to influence the content of the PSC mandate in Darfur, yet its role is pure execution of the PSC decisions. (Key Informant C9: PSC Expert & Officer at Political Diplomatic Affairs Directorate Africa at MFA 8/12/2020).

The African Union Commission assuming more powers than those vested in the Constitutive Act compromised the PSC's role of coming up with the mandate on its own. Aning (2017) opined that in the paper the PSC is a supreme organ in conflict

intervention, but the AUC has assumed powers till it can influence the agenda of the PSC through the PSC secretariat contrary to the requirement that the chair of the month determining the PSC agenda. In terms of efficacy, clear working lines are essential to coming up with a clear mandate which is essential to successful intervention which was missed during the Darfur intervention.

Key informants had different views on the impact that the presence of the CEWS would have brought on the Darfur conflict. Notably, the CEWS was operationalized in the year 2007 which was three years later after the Darfur conflict had erupted (High-Level Panel report on Darfur, 2009). Some felt that the CEWS would have brought the Darfur conflict to the PSC agenda on a timely basis. Below are some of the key quotations from the key informants.

The presence of the CEWS would have been essential in bringing the Darfur Conflict to the PSC's attention and advising the PSC on preemptive measures.
(Key Informant C7: PSC Expert Officer 11/12/2020).

The absence of the CEWS when the Darfur conflict erupted in the Year 2003 was greatly felt with the PSC having to set up a reconnaissance team to assess the Darfur conflict and prepare the deployment of Ceasefire Commission (PSC/PR/Comm. (V), 2004). The mobilization of the reconnaissance team took more than three weeks to be dispatched to the Darfur region thus failing to provide timely preemptive advice to the PSC as the CEWS would have done. This resulted in the slow deployment of the Ceasefire Monitoring Commission which was meant to lay the working framework for the AMIS peacekeepers.

Some key informants to the study felt that the Continental Early Warning System would have not made difference to the Darfur conflict as the Sudan government would have

treated the early warning signs as an internal matter which does not require the PSC's attention. Below are some of the key quotations.

The Continental Early Warning System does good work in gathering intelligent information on developing conflicts, it relays the information to the PSC but most of the time states treat early warning signs from the CEWS as internal matters and the Darfur conflict would not have received positive attention from Bashir government. (Key Informant C2: Senior IGAD Mediator on Sudan Peace Talks 28/12/2020).

The treatment of the CEWS warning of developing conflicts by states as internal matters clearly shows that the PSC needs to do more by showing leadership to states that are experiencing early signs of conflicts. Further, regime types determine the action that would be taken, for the case of the Darfur conflict, the Bashir regime which was dictatorial proved to be a stumbling block to the PSC intervention efforts. Williams (2014) and Behabtu (2017) argued that the slow operationalization of the CEWS and the challenges it faces working with the states experiencing conflicts need to be addressed for this organ to realize its role of being a preemptive organ. This means that the AU should invest more financial resources and more human personnel experts for it to be an effective organ capable of being utilized on a timely basis by the PSC to avert future conflicts.

In conclusion, the lack of timely operationalization of the APSA organs (the PSC Secretariat and the Continental Early Warning System) proved costly in bringing the Darfur conflict to the PSC agenda on a timely basis and formulation of the Darfur mandate on time. The assuming of more powers from the AUC to the extent of influencing the content of the Darfur mandate is contrary to the Constitutive Act and the PSC protocol that envisions the independent Peace and Security Council as capable of making decisions on conflict intervention without interference. With the liberal

institutional theory, it is worth noting that for states to be able to pursue their interest through the IOS efficiently for long-term well-being there should be timely operationalization of the decision-making organs which was solely missed during the formulation PSC mandate in Darfur.

4.1.3 The AU Member States Reaction to Darfur Resolution

The African Union member states reaction to the Darfur resolution can be traced to the signing of the Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement (HCA) on 8 April 2004 which eventually led to the authorization and deployment of the AMIS peacekeepers. It is good to note that before the deployment, the AU commissioner had sent a reconnaissance mission to Darfur to assess the magnitude of the conflict on May 7-13. The reconnaissance mission suggested an urgent intervention and cited massive human rights violations and the killing of civilians (PSC/MIN/2(XII), 2004). The study established that the Darfur conflict began in February 2003 and evolved into one of the world's most severe crises. It is only on the 13th of April of 2004, which is a year later since the conflict erupted that the PSC of the African Union began putting the Darfur matter on the agenda.

The African head of state did not back its declaration to support the Darfur intervention with timely availing of the human resource to the PSC for deployment. Below are some of the key quotations from the key informants

African head of state declared their commitment to intervention in Darfur, only for a handful number of states to offer their troops that were not adequate for a region as big as Darfur. (Key Informant C4: PSC Expert 28/12/2020).

The African head of state tends to make the declaration to support the PSC resolutions only to end up with few states showing that commitment. It is worth noting that PSC

intervention in Darfur received military observers and protectors from two states, Rwanda and Nigeria who were the first to arrive in Darfur (Okumu, 2016). After the PSC had resolved to intervene in the Darfur conflict, the Chairperson of the Commission embarked on efforts of appealing to external donors to support the Darfur intervention with funding(PSC/PR/2(XVII), 2004). This indicated that the African States leaders did not follow their declaration to intervene in Darfur by availing funds to support the mission. Further, it took more than three weeks for the first contingents of military observers to be deployed in Darfur.

There were a few PSC member states that honored their obligation to avail their troops for deployment in the Darfur conflict; however, they did not meet the pledged number and time set for deployment. Below are some of the key quotations from the key informants.

It is worrying that only five out of fifteen PSC member states were willing to offer their troops, including Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, and South Africa. The countries that promised troops only managed to offer half the number they promised on most occasions. Rwanda which was not a member of the PSC showed leadership and dedication in availing its military troops. (Key Informant C6: PSC Expert 3/11/2020).

There was poor leadership from the PSC members authorizing the Darfur intervention considering that only a third of the total membership offered their troops. Moreover, countries that offered their troops availed half the number of troops they had promised (PSC/PR/2(XVII), 2004). Peters (2016) stated that for an institution to be successful it must enjoy support from the member states in terms of financial and human resources. In the Darfur case, there was slow availing of military troops and the mobilized troops were few and not on a timely basis which compromised its efficiency in the Darfur conflict.

The observer mission mandate was to monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA) signed by the government of Sudan and rebels, contribute to the confidence-building efforts, record cases of human rights violations, and secure Darfur for safe delivery of humanitarian relief and the eventual return of the displaced people. The AMIS observer mission had protection troops from two countries; Rwanda and Nigeria that were the first ones to arrive three weeks later after the intervention had been authorized (Kalu, 2018). This was a clear indicator that shows a lack of preparedness from the AU member state countries on its obligation to contribute its troops to restore peace in Darfur on a timely basis and a lack of political will. Further, the failure of AU member states to avail its troops on time for deployment clearly shows that the neo-liberal thinker's assumption that cooperation can be achieved when states work through IOS overlooked the issue of time as it did not state the length of time it takes states to cooperate and fulfill its obligation which is a key aspect when assessing efficacy.

The 17th report of the chairperson of 20th October 2004 stated clearly the operationalization of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) its components and the eventual expansion of the AMIS mandate and its capacity which transformed the observer mission into a full peacekeeping force with the expanded mandate (PSC/PR/2(XVII)). The new mandate included the monitoring of the HCA, assistance in confidence building, protection of civilians under imminent threat, and the facilitation of safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The transformation of the observer mission into a peacekeeping force saw an increase in the number of AU member state countries availing their military troops for deployment in the Darfur intervention. Below are some of the comments from the key informants.

There was an increase in the number of the AU member states that availed their troops for deployment in Darfur for peacekeeping intervention efforts which was good news for the AU. (Key Informant c6: Expert in PSC 3/112020.

The transformation of the observer mission into a full peacekeeping force saw an increase in the number of AU member states countries that contributed troops. This included; Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Namibia, Senegal, and Ghana which joined Rwanda and Nigeria in contributing troops. This saw the deployment of 450 military observers, 815 civilian police, and 2341 military protection personnel (Murithi, 2017). This was an improvement from the observer mission that had few military troops, yet it was not enough for a region as large as Darfur with 493,180 square kilometers (Okumu, 2016). On the commitment by the PSC member states, it was notable that there were only five out of fifteen member state countries serving in the PSC that contributed their troops. This included Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Senegal, and Ghana. This shows that states once they secure the seats in the PSC do not necessarily mean that they will support its authorized intervention if its interest is not at stake which contradicts the provisions of the Peace and Security Protocol that bestow responsibility on the PSC elected members to support its mandate fully (Peace and Security Protocol, Article 5).

The presence of a fully operationalized East Africa Standby Force would have solved the issue of timely and adequate military troops needed for the intervention in the Darfur conflict, although a lot need to be done for it to realize its potential. Key informants to the study informed that.

The presence of ASF will have injected the needed timely deployment, but looking at it currently, the case of EASF struggling with the political supremacy battles between Kenya and Ethiopia shows that states forming the various Standby Force Brigades need to shelve political battles and operationalize fully the ASF for it to become an efficient responsive organ. (Key Informant C5: African Capacity Building Foundation and PSC Expert16/11/2020).

The slow response from the AU member states and eventual availing of inadequate troops compromised the ability of the PSC to achieve its mandate in the Darfur intervention. Williams (2014) & Okumu (2016) stated that due to the tendency of the AU PSC to act as a fire extinguisher rather than building a firewall to a possible conflict, the AU should put its effort into operationalizing and supporting its Africa Standby Forces by providing adequate funds and human resource needed for it to provide timely intervention. In the case of the Darfur conflict, the lack of timely resolution, allowed the conflict to evolve and become the largest humanitarian crisis.

The AU states did not provide the needed military hardware thus the AMIS military troops had to rely on donors to facilitate the needed military equipment (Okumu, 2016). The study observed that it took time before the donors availed the needed military equipment; in turn, the AMIS peacekeepers faced shortages which compromised their efficiency in Darfur. Moreover, there was a lack of adequate staffing in the eight subsectors of the Darfur headquarters (Badmun, 2015). This meant that the troops had to work without adequate expert guidance on how to achieve their mandate.

In conclusion, the African Union member states availed inadequate troops for the PSC intervention in Darfur. The availing of the military troops was not on a timely basis which allowed the Darfur conflict to evolve into one of the largest humanitarian crises. Further, there were few PSC member states that availed military troops for deployment in Darfur which portrayed poor leadership. The promise of timely intervention by the Africa Standby Forces demands resource devotion from the AU member states and political will. Therefore, the institutional liberal theory envisioned states fostering cooperation by

working through the IOS overlooked resource backing from the member states and its timeliness which determines the achievement of the set goals.

4.1.4 The Resolutions on Darfur Conflict.

There were several resolutions to the Darfur conflict which were passed by the PSC of the African Union. The first resolution which authorized the intervention in Darfur spelled a limited mandate to the AMIS military troops of being an observer mission to oversee the monitoring of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and recording of human rights violations in Darfur (PSC/AHG/COMM. (X), 2004). The serious violations of human rights in the Darfur region prompted the PSC to pass the 12th resolution on the situation in Darfur. The resolution called for the establishment of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) which was to comprise expertise to provide direct support to the AMIS troops. The 17th report of the AU commissioner provided a clear composition of the CFC members. It indicated that the military observers contributed by the AU member states failed to reach the minimum number required despite pledging a higher number (PSC/PR/2(XVII), 2004).

Several resolutions passed by the PSC indicated slow compliance and inadequate military troops availed by the African Union member states. Below are some of the quotations from the key informants on several resolutions passed on Darfur.

The several resolutions from the PSC show poor compliance from the AU member states, although there is no empty seat in PSC when decisions are made, AU member states and even member states countries that get elected to PSC did not give adequate support to the resolutions of the PSC on Darfur intervention. (Key Informant C3: The Border Institute& PSC Expert 5/12/2020).

The study established that the several PSC resolutions on the Darfur conflict signified slow compliance from the AU member states. The few African states that offered their

troops for deployment in the Darfur conflict were availed on different timelines after the PSC had given authorization (PSC/PR/2(XVII), 2004). Further, the fact that five out of the fifteen PSC member states that were serving in the PSC offered their troops is a clear indication of poor leadership from the PSC members as they are supposed to be at the forefront in backing the decisions of the PSC. See Appendix VI for a table giving the illustration of the number of African countries that contributed troops, the number of troops it contributed and the time it availed troops for deployment. Notably, African states did not stick to the timeline of availing troops thus compromising their ability to end the Darfur conflict.

The revision of the PSC mandate in Darfur signified the failure of the initial mandate bestowed on the observer mission as it failed to end the Darfur conflict. Aning and Murithi (2017) argued that the few military troops availed for the Darfur intervention were poorly coordinated thus a reflection of the African military capabilities that lag in many aspects making it unprepared to react to conflicts that arise in the continent. Okumu (2016) opined that the lack of political will from most African states to support their peacekeeping intervention efforts has contributed to failed conflict intervention.

In conclusion, the several resolutions by the PSC indicated slow compliance from the AU member states. Further, the military troops availed for the deployment in the Darfur conflict were inadequate and did not reach the pledged number from the AU member states. Moreover, several resolutions indicated weak mandates that needed subsequent resolutions to address and poor implementations of the PSC resolutions. In terms of efficacy, the lack of time-bound in availing adequate troops affected the ability of the AMIS peacekeepers to end the Darfur conflict. Moreover, a third of the PSC member

states contributing to their troops was a reflection of a lack of leadership and commitment from all the members of the PSC.

4.1.5 External Support to the PSC Intervention in Darfur

The chairperson of the AU Commission clearly stated in his speech that he expected support from the donors so that the AU could be able to sustain its intervention efforts in Darfur (PSC/MIN/2. (XII),2004). The key informants to the study spoke of the outside African support as essential to implementing the PSC mandate in the Darfur conflict. Below are some of the key quotations from the experts.

The chair of the Commission did well in organizing pledge conferences to mobilize funds for the Darfur intervention as he knew the African States' behavior when it comes to mobilizing resources. (Key Informant C6: PSC Expert 3/11/2020).

The PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict relied on external sources of technical assistance for it to implement the Darfur intervention. Williams, (2014) noted that the PSC has been able to carry out its peacekeeping intervention efforts through funds facilitation from European countries. This shows that this organ has gained importance outside Africa as a vehicle for restoring peace in various parts of Africa.

The observer mission in the Darfur conflict had few European funders while the transformation of the observer mission into a full peacekeeping mission led to an increase in the number of donors. Below are some of the key quotations.

The initial AMIS observer mission attracted a small number of countries that supported intervention; we had the UK, the US, and the EU. The improvement of the AMIS mandate on October 2004 which included the protection of civilians led to an increase in the number of Western countries that supported the Darfur mission. (Key Informants C10: PSC Expert 9/12/2020).

The PSC member states drafted the Darfur intervention mandate in a vague manner which was a cautious approach to the Darfur conflict. This in turn did not attract many

donor states willing to commit their funds to the mission. The revision of the Darfur mandate on 20th October 2004 saw an increase in the number of donors willing to fund the intervention (PSC/PR/2(XVII), 2004). Further, the supremacy battles in the UN Security Council and division among the top diplomats of the Western Countries towards the Darfur conflict was contributing factor to the few Western countries availing their funds to support the initial observer mission in Darfur (Traub, 2007).

A look at the Security Council meant to provide a leadership role when it comes to conflict intervention revealed division among the veto members on how to approach the Darfur conflict. The Chinese permanent representation was not willing to allow any resolution that could affect its 40% percent investment in the oil sector in Sudan. On his part the Secretary-General, Koffi Annan stated that although he received heavy criticism for watching 'genocide in the making' unfold in Darfur, he noted that there was no nation from the members of the Security Council willing to offer its troops to be deployed in Darfur (Traub, 2007). The admission by the UN Secretary-General clearly shows that major powers only react when its interest is at stake.

The Security Council finally took strict measures on Khartoum by pressurizing it to open all areas for access to the humanitarian organizations working in the area (S/RES/1556(2004)). During October 2004, the Darfur conflict gained interest in the Western countries through the media thus the public opinion of the citizens from the Western countries pressured their governments to do something in Darfur Traub (2007) and Allison (2014). This gave a major boost to the AU Chair in his efforts to mobilize resources for AMIS peacekeepers. This saw an increase in the number of Western countries that supported the intervention in Darfur by availing of their financial support.

In conclusion, the PSC intervention in Darfur relied on external donors for the intervention in the Darfur conflict. The initial observer mission in Darfur had few donors, while the revision of the mandate that saw the AMIS observer mission transformed into a full peacekeeping force that saw an increase in the number of donors availing funds to support PSC mandate implementation in Darfur. In assessing efficacy, it is notable that the over-reliance on the Western countries to facilitate mandate implementation by providing funds was a poor strategy considering that the AU could not dictate the timeline of when the funds could be availed and the exact amount of funds. Further, sticking to set timelines and adequate resources are essential elements when examining efficacy which in turn determines the success or failure of a peacekeeping intervention.

4.2 The Mobilization of the resources by the Peace and Security Council for resolving the Darfur conflict

The study discussed objective two of the study by assessing the mobilization of the resources by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union for resolving the Darfur conflict. The study discussed this objective through identified sub-themes that included the mobilization strategy of the PSC for the Darfur intervention, the main financial contributors for the Darfur mission, and the monitoring of the PSC resource utilization in the Darfur conflict. Under this objective, all thirteen key informants were interviewed orally to provide insightful narratives.

4.2.1 The PSC Mobilization Strategy for the Darfur Intervention

Resource mobilization by the African Union has been its biggest problem since its inception Lulie (2011) and Murithi (2017). This could be partly explained by the poor economic policies being pursued by its member states which in turn have led them to a

debt trap. The annual budget of the African Union from 2004 onwards was \$130 million (African Union Handbook, 2017). This amount of money was supposed to be derived from member states with a contribution formula whereby the five states with bigger economies; Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, and South Africa to contribute 75% of the total budget while the remaining states contribute the remaining part. African Union has not been able to fund its budget fully since its inception. It has always operated under a budget deficit. It has been able to raise only \$270 million out of the approved \$ 470 million (Okumu, 2016).

The key informants spoke of the mobilization strategy adopted by the PSC in mobilizing funds for the Darfur intervention and stated that the PSC relied on Western countries to mobilize funds for the Darfur intervention. Below are the comments by the key informants of the study.

The Commission saw that the viable option was to mobilize the Western states to fund the intervention. (Key Informant C1: Former AU Deputy African Union Commission 28/12/2020).

The African Union member states opted to rely on Western countries to fund the Darfur intervention. The reliance on the external source of funds was the cheapest option for the African Union leaders (Williams, 2014). Moreover, considering that the Peace Fund was not yet equipped reliance on the external source of funds was the viable option. The key informants to the study indicated that the PSC member states did not show leadership in shouldering the financial needs of the Darfur intervention mission. Below are some of the key quotations.

No PSC member state showed a willingness to shoulder financial responsibilities in the Darfur intervention; going for donor support was the realistic way. (Key Informant C5: ACBF & PSC Expert 16/11/2020).

The lack of PSC member state willing to shoulder the financial needs of the Darfur intervention shows that states have not devoted fully their resources to the PSC. The lack of reliable funding from the member states led to the adoption of the mobilization of funds using external sources. The external sources of funds for the Darfur intervention included the EU, UK, USA, France, Germany, Canada, Sweden, and Netherlands (PSC/PR/2(XVII), 2004). The Mobilization strategy of the PSC did not meet the budget estimates for the Darfur mission. The PSC intervention efforts in Darfur had budget estimates of \$250 million (Okumu, 2016). The financial breakdown indicated that the African Union observer mission in Darfur had budget estimates of \$ 27 million. The sourcing of this financial amount was to be raised through the pledges made by external donors.

In conclusion, the PSC relied on the strategy of mobilizing funds through external sources of funds. This strategy arose because no PSC member state was willing to shoulder the financial responsibilities of funding the Darfur intervention. Further, the Peace Fund which is meant to provide funds for the peacekeeping intervention as provided for in the Peace and Security Council Protocol was yet to be operationalized. In terms of efficacy, the external source of funds facilitated the Darfur intervention, but the funds were not availed on a timely basis thus delaying the AMIS Peacekeepers' deployment.

Moreover, the Western countries did not meet the budget estimates of the PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict which affected the ability of the peacekeepers to establish peace in Darfur. The problem of inadequate funding calls for the AU member states to devote more financial resources to the PSC by equipping Peace Fund fully. The

assessment of the mobilization strategy adopted by the PSC in its intervention efforts in Darfur indicated that the theoretical perspective of the institutional liberal theory that IOS is important to the realization of peace and security regionally is not complete without IOS having an efficient mobilization strategy of the resources which in turn translates to the achievement of peacekeeping goals.

4.2.2 The Main Financial Contributors to the Darfur Mission

The initial AMIS observer mission was authorized on 25th May 2004 to 19th October 2004. The mandate of the mission was formulated vaguely with a limited mandate of overseeing the humanitarian ceasefire agreement and tabulating cases of violation of the humanitarian rights committed on the Darfur inhabitants by the rebel groups and the government-sponsored militia, Janjaweed. The transformation of the AMIS observer mission into a full peacekeeping force started on 20th October 2004 to 30th September 2006 when its mandate was going to expire with the ushering in of an UN-led mission, the UNAMID which was going to take over from the AMIS.

The key informants to the study stated that the initial observer mission in Darfur had a few external financial funders. Below are some of the quotations from the key informants of the study.

The AMIS observer mission had the EU, UK, and US funded the intervention, and the AMIS peacekeeping force witnessed an increase in the number of countries that joined in funding the mission. (Key Informant C5: ACBF & PSC Expert 16/11/2020).

The AMIS observer mission had a few external donors that availed their funds for the intervention. The UK, USA, and the EU were the only donors that showed interest to fund the peacekeepers. The African Union had budget estimates of 250 million of which \$ 27 million was meant to facilitate the AMIS observer mission (Okumu, 2016). The UK

pledged \$3.4 million which was fulfilled after one month, while the EU pledged 12 million Euros of which it managed to donate 11 (representing 80% of the pledged amount) million through the Peace Facility Fund. On its part, the USA operationalized the AMIS headquarters site in El Fashir with an estimated cost of 7 million while the Netherlands joined during October 2004 when the observer mission was transitioned into a full peacekeeping force and it managed to donate 2 million (PSC/PR/2(XVII)). These countries were the top financial funder for the Darfur intervention.

The low turnout of donors willing to fund the Darfur intervention by the AU was a big blow. First, it was a hard-learned lesson by the AU that it needed to take its authorized mission seriously by ensuring that the member states contributed to the mission effectively so that it could sustain its peacekeepers. Additionally, the lack of adequate funds mobilized showed the need of operationalizing the Peace Fund which was created to facilitate the AU peacekeeping missions but African member states were not equipping it with funds as obligated by the Peace and Security Council protocol. The shortfalls in funds mobilization by the AU exposed the poor strategy of over-reliance on Western donors to facilitate funds for peacekeeping intervention. Additionally, the division among the P5 members of the Security Council led several Western Countries to turn a blind eye to the Darfur crisis (Traub, 2007). Although, the AU member states realized that most Western donor states were not willing to commit themselves to fund the Darfur intervention, there was no single African state that showed the urgency of stepping in to fill the gap in funding the mission. This trend indicated a lack of political will from the AU member states to bring peace to the Darfur region.

The key informants to the study informed that there was an increase in the number of external donors that joined the funding of the Darfur intervention towards the start of the year 2005. Below are some of the quotations from the key informants.

There was an increase in the number of states that joined the funding of the AMIS peacekeeping intervention in the Darfur conflict towards the start of the year 2005 up to its takeover by UNAMID. (Key Informant C9: Officer at Political Diplomatic Affairs Directorate Africa 4/12/2020).

The transformation of the AMIS observer mission into a full peacekeeping force from 20th October 2004 to 30th September 2006 saw the revision of its mandate to include the protection of civilians. (PSC/MIN/2 (XII), 2004). In the Western world, there was a change in the donors' view on the Darfur conflict. Moreover, the pressure from the media and the use of good office by the Secretary-General, Koffi Anan saw an increase in the number of donor states from three to eleven. The countries that availed funds included; Canada, Denmark, EU, Germany, Greece, League of Arab States, Netherlands, UK, USA, South Korea, and Japan (PSC/PR/2(XVII), 2004). See Appendix VII for a table illustrating the donor states, the amount they availed for the Darfur intervention, and the time they fulfilled the pledge for the year 2004. The funds from external donors increased significantly from the year 2005 onwards. See Appendix VIII for the donor countries and the funds they contributed.

In conclusion, the major financial contributors to the Darfur intervention were the Western countries. Further, the funding for the Darfur intervention improved significantly from the start of the year 2005 till the end of the year 2007 when the UNAMID took over the peacekeeping mission in the Darfur conflict. The availing of funds was on a timely basis. This indicated that the PSC intervention effort in the Darfur conflict was enjoying political relevance from the Western state countries.

4.2.3 Monitoring of PSC Resource Utilization in Darfur Conflict

Resource utilization is an essential aspect while assessing the efficacy of a peacekeeping intervention. The monitoring of resource utilization is important as spells out the resource allocation to the various contingents of the peacekeeping mission. The key informants to the study stated that the PSC relied on the ad-hoc process in monitoring resource utilization in the Darfur conflict. Below are some quotations from the key informants.

The PSC relied on several ad-hoc processes thus it did not have an established structure meant to evaluate the spending of its finances. (Key Informant C10: Expert on PSC 14/12/2020).

The reliance on the ad-hoc process to monitor the utilization of the mobilized resources portrayed a weakness in the implementation of the Darfur intervention. Aning (2017) argued that the African Union Commission which is tasked with the execution of the PSC decisions should be accountable for the implementation of any authorized intervention by the PSC. Further, the AUC failed in setting up a competent monitoring commission as the Darfur Integrated Taskforce proved to be a failure (Okumu, 2016).

The lack of a reliable monitoring structure for the utilization of the mobilized resources in the Darfur intervention resulted in several gaps in the implementation process that resulted in funds misappropriation. Moreover, the financial figures indicated that more resources were channeled towards administration costs as compared to the AMIS peacekeepers that had many military troops and civilian police (PSC/AHG/4(XXIII, 2005). This was a show of weak leadership from the African Union Commission and the PSC.

In conclusion, the monitoring of the resource utilization in Darfur relied on an ad-hoc process that portrayed gaps in the utilization of the mobilized funds for the intervention. The weak leadership in the AUC saw funds misappropriation whereby the administrative

cost was higher than the operational cost. Efficacy calls for efficient utilization of resources which in turn translates into greater output. In the case of PSC intervention in Darfur, the element of efficient resource utilization was missing.

4.3 Analysis of the Peace and Security Council's Intervention Efforts to End the Darfur Conflict

The study analyzed the PSC intervention efforts in the Darfur conflict which was the third objective of the research. The research study came up with various themes that included; an evaluation of the PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict, the impact of the chairperson's office, and lessons learned from the PSC intervention in Darfur. Through these themes, the research was able to establish efficacy or lack of in the PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict thus determining its success and its shortfalls.

4.3.1 Evaluation of the PSC Intervention in the Darfur Conflict

Evaluating the intervention in the Darfur conflict required an assessment of the PSC mandate. The starting point was the decision-making process of the PSC. It is worth noting that the PSC authorized the intervention of the AMIS in July 2004 when the conflict in Darfur had erupted one year earlier during February 2003. The key informants to the study stated that the PSC intervention in Darfur failed to achieve its mandate of bringing peace to the Darfur conflict. Below are some of the quotations.

We evaluate the intervention in Darfur by looking at the achievements of the AMIS peacekeepers and for the Darfur case there was nothing much to show for it. (Key Informant C12: PSC Expert 19/12/2020).

The African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS) peacekeepers failed in its overall mandate of bringing peace to the Darfur conflict. Okumu (2016) argued that the deployment of nearly six thousand troops to the Darfur region which is as big as the size of France strained the peacekeepers thus leaving most parts of Darfur unaccounted for in the face of

atrocities hence not much was there to be shown. Williams, (2014) goes on to brand the PSC as partial peace brokers in Darfur due to the way they ran the intervention in a disjointed manner. The gaps in the implementation of the Darfur intervention underscored the importance of efficacy for a peacekeeping intervention to realize its goals.

The PSC mandate for Darfur conflict intervention was formulated with several reservations. The reservations meant that it could limit the peacekeeper's areas of engagement. Below are some of the key quotations from the respondent to the study.

The PSC mandate for Darfur was poorly drafted and could not match the Darfur complexities. (Key Informant C3: Senior Official at the Border Institute and PSC Expert 5/12/2020).

The formulation of a robust mandate is essential to achieving peacekeeping goals. Aning & Murithi (2017) opined that the first weakness portrayed by the PSC was the formulation of a mandate with several reservations which was meant to befit the Sudan government of the time. The failure of the AMIS peacekeepers in its bid to end the Darfur conflict was a reflection of poor input from the PSC in terms of bestowing a weak mandate that could not address the complexities of the Darfur conflict.

Resource utilization is essential when evaluating the success or lack of the Darfur intervention. Notably, the PSC relied on Western countries to fund the intervention efforts. This was a clear reflection that the AU member states have not devoted their funds to its peacekeeping intervention. Considering that there was high administrative cost than the operational cost depicted poor resource utilization. Okumu (2016) opined that the AMIS peacekeepers had to share communication devices and the payment of the peacekeepers always experienced delays. This was an indication of a disjointed implementation process. On a positive note, Aning (2017) observed that the increase in

funding from donors led to the introduction of civilian police into the refugee camps that often experience attacks and the camps realized peace and order. This denotes that if the PSC would have acted with efficacy in its action the Darfur region would have realized peace.

In conclusion, the formulation of a weak mandate by the PSC meant to address the Darfur conflict was a reflection of the weak leadership. The implementation process for the intervention in Darfur was poor considering that the utilization of the funds mobilized saw a high administrative cost than the operational cost. This in turn resulted in shortages in procuring military equipment and peacekeepers facilities. This failed to achieve the mandate goals.

4.3.2 Impact of the Chairperson on the Commission's Good Office

The chairperson of the commission, Mr. Omar Konare placed faith in donors to fund the AMIS intervention. In 2004, after the AMIS had been authorized to intervene, Konare facilitated a donor's conference in Addis Ababa for the donors to make their pledges (PSC/AHG/Comm. (X), 2004). The success of Burundi's intervention denotes the use of good office by the head of the mission, Mamadou (Badmus, 2017). The key informants to the study noted that the chairperson of the Commission relied on the Western countries for funding without putting efforts to woo African member states to make their contributions. Below are some of the quotations from informants.

The chairperson's turn of his attention to mobilizing funds from the donors was a clear indication of weak leadership from the chair. (Key Informant C13: PSC Expert 19/12/2020).

The reliance on donor funds is a clear indication that the African member states did not devote funds for the peacekeeping intervention efforts in Darfur. On the chairperson's part, which is a political figure with the ability to woo African states to support the

mission with funding was a show of weak leadership. Nonetheless, Williams (2014) concedes that the reliance on external donors is a cheap option for the PSC in conducting peacekeeping intervention efforts, though he questions the political will and the domestic agendas of the AU member states. On 28th February 2005, Konare met with the UN Secretary-General, Koffi Annan. The two discussed ways to strengthen AMIS including the possibility of having a UN peacekeeping force replace AMIS. On his part, Konare was adamant that AMIS was capable and that it needed only proper financial support (PSC/PR/2(XLIII), 2005) and Traub (2007). The action of the AU chairperson was a clear indication of true Pan-Africanism. This led to the abandonment of the idea of bringing an UN-led peacekeeping mission at the time.

In conclusion, the chairperson of the commission did not do enough to woo the African states to devote funds for the intervention efforts in Darfur. This was a show of weak leadership. In terms of coordinating the administrative duties, the AUC showed weak leadership as it failed to run AMIS intervention in a timely coordinated manner. The weak administrative running by AUC led to the misappropriation of funds thus the AMIS peacekeepers experienced logistical challenges and a lack of timely equipment that limited their performance in enforcing the mandate.

4.3.3 Lessons Learned from PSC Intervention in Darfur

The authorization of the peacekeeping mission in the Darfur conflict was the first step in the right direction. The African states demonstrated intent in providing a solution to the Darfur conflict. The AU however failed to equip the PSC with the required support. This included the lack of timely operationalization of the essential organs that include the CEWS, the ASF, and the Peace Fund (the AU Handbook, 2017). The presence of an

efficient Peace Fund would have solved the issue of funds mobilization and eliminate over-reliance on donor funding. Additionally, to ensure proper utilization of the mobilized resources the PSC should have clear monitoring of its resources to ensure efficient utilization of the funds generated by its member states which in turn would have translated to efficient output in the Darfur intervention. Moreover, efficient monitoring and evaluation of the mobilized resources would have eliminated the issue of high administrative costs than the operational cost in the Darfur intervention.

The issue of inadequate mobilization of peacekeeping troops by the AU member states clearly shows that most African states are unwilling to commit themselves fully to supporting PSC intervention. Additionally, this calls for the quick equipping of the African Standby Force as this would have eliminated the issue of appealing to member states to avail their troops for a peacekeeping intervention. Moreover, the issue of time which is the key aspect when examining efficacy would be greatly solved thus leading to timely intervention and the establishment of peace. Even though, the African Standby Force establishment entered into force in December 2003 with a clear framework of creating five brigades based on the five groupings stated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The process of operationalizing and equipping these five brigades has been hit with a lack of political will (Aning, 2017). The East Africa Standby Force (EASF) which should have provided a robust rapid reaction to the Darfur conflict has been marred with political supremacy battles between Kenya and Ethiopia whereby it has led to having its headquarters in Ethiopia while the logistics and planning offices are in Kenya. This political battle has slowed its operationalization. This is a clear indicator that

the African Union and its member states have not learned the importance of having peace and stability in Africa.

The AU's lack of institutional capacity led to several ad hoc processes and pressure in the decision-making process. As witnessed during the AMIS intervention, the PSC members did not have a secretariat that should be responsible for drafting and coordinating the meeting and providing advice to the members. In turn, the PSC had to rely on the AUC secretaries to draft meeting agendas and communique which put them under immense pressure. The operationalization of the PSC Secretariat in the year 2005 did not show an immediate impact on the Darfur intervention efforts by the PSC. The absence of the Continental Early Warning System, which was not yet operationalized, proved costly. First, the CEWS would have played its role of alerting the PSC of the development of the Darfur conflict for an early preemptive action or an adequate response. The problem of overlapping roles and the unclear authority which compromised the efficacy of the Darfur intervention will have been adequately solved if every organ of the Peace and Security Architecture would have been operationalized.

The Darfur intervention exposed the AU's lack of efficient administration which was evident in its lack of proper coordination from the AU headquarters to the El Fashir headquarters. This proved costly as it led to the slow deployment of troops and military equipment necessary for the protection of the civilians, observing the HCA, and confidence building in the Darfur conflict. Additionally, there was a divide between the political unit mission and the military unit mission. All these factors compromised the AMIS peacekeeper's ability to end the Darfur conflict.

In conclusion, the failure of the Darfur intervention exposed the AU and the Peace and Security Council in that it did not put into account the lessons of Burundi whereby it enjoyed the success of restoring peace and stability. Further, the lack of timely operationalization of the APSA organs proved costly and resulted in the formulation of a weak mandate. The weak mandate saw several follow-up resolutions and a weak implementation process. The reliance on external donors to fund peacekeeping intervention in Darfur proved inadequate and lacked time-bound. Efficacy, therefore, remains to be essential if the PSC is to realize success in its future conflict intervention efforts in Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The research study assessed the efficacy of the Peace and Security intervention efforts in the Darfur conflict. The study sought to address the research problem through the identified objectives that included, the examination of the Peace and Security mandate in the Darfur Conflict, the assessment of the mobilization of the resources by the Peace and Security Council for resolving the Darfur conflict, and the critiquing of the efficacy of the Peace and Security Council intervention in the Darfur conflict. The study established that the PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict had a weak mandate which was formulated vaguely.

The PSC's slow decision-making process during the Darfur intervention was contributed by the incapacity of the AU and the slow operationalization of the key organs meant to support PSC decision-making. The study further, found the PSC mobilization strategy to be a poor one due to its overreliance on donor contributions. The AU member states do not support PSC intervention efforts with the required resources on time. Additionally, the PSC lacked a monitoring agency on the utilization of its resources in Darfur and there was misappropriation of the resources. The critique of the PSC's efficacy in the Darfur intervention established that most African states did not avail their military personnel to the PSC for deployment in the Darfur conflict intervention due to a lack of political will from the AU member states.

5.1 Summary

1. The slow process in the PSC decision-making process, the lack of timely operationalization of the key organs of the security architecture, and the geopolitical influence of Sudan in the AU led to the slow classification of the Darfur conflict in the PSC agenda. The formulation of a weak mandate by the PSC spelled its failure in its quest to bring peace to the Darfur region. The weak mandate arose due to the failure of the AU to enforce its rules and principles which resulted in Sudan, a party to the Darfur conflict gaining membership in the PSC. The results included the formulation of a weak mandate full of reservations meant to address the Darfur conflict which was full of human rights violations, mass killings, and displacement. The weak mandate resulted in several follow-up resolutions that did not bring a major impact on resolving the conflict.
2. The lack of capacity in the PSC meant that it had to rely on several ad-hoc processes. The research established that the PSC Secretariat was not yet operationalized, in turn, the PSC had to rely on the AUC staff for the drafting, advice, and processing of its communique which proved to be time-consuming and thus compromising its ability to come up with the decisions on a timely basis which is a key aspect when assessing efficacy. The African Union member states did not back its declaration to support the Darfur intervention with timely expertise and military personnel thus the mission experienced delays.
3. The PSC adopted a poor mobilization strategy. The PSC resorted to the mobilization of funds from external sources which were dominated by the European countries. The reliance on external funding to operationalize the Darfur intervention was a clear

indication of the AU member states lack of political will to shoulder resource mobilization on its authorized intervention. The reliance on the donors' pledges had its shortfalls as the mission did not receive timely and adequate funding as demonstrated by the AMIS observer mission. Additionally, the misappropriation of the funds resulted in high administrative costs as compared to the operational cost allocated to the AMIS peacekeepers. This was a result of the lack of a reliable monitoring structure to oversee the utilization of the mobilized resources. The main financial funders for Darfur were the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

4. The research study critiqued the PSC intervention efforts in the Darfur conflict and found that the PSC did not achieve its goal of establishing peace in Darfur due to a vague mandate full of reservations bestowed on it. The implementation of the Darfur intervention saw the overlapping portfolios and running of the AMIS intervention in a disjointed manner. The use of good office by the Chairperson of the Commission was only felt in mobilizing external donors to fund the mission, but on the administrative duties the office failed to provide leadership in coordinating the Darfur intervention like the case of the Burundi peace intervention efforts by the OAU.
5. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peacekeepers' achievement of bringing security to the refugee camps identified to be under imminent attack, was a clear indication that if the mission had received timely adequate resources, a clear robust mandate, and resources utilized well in the running of the mission, the peacekeepers would have achieved its goals.

5.2 Conclusions

1. The PSC decision-making process formulated a weak mandate for the Darfur intervention. This was a clear indication that Sudan's geo-political influence was felt in the PSC as the principles determining the state's qualification to contest for the PSC seat was overlooked thus Sudan becoming a PSC member although it was a state experiencing conflict in the Darfur region. The slow decision-making process that led to the delay in authorizing the Darfur intervention was a result of a lack of capacity in several APSA organs that are meant to aid the PSC in the execution of its mandate of restoring peace in Darfur. Further, several PSC member states and the AU Assembly did not back their declaration to support the intervention efforts in Sudan with the promised resources. Therefore, the lack of time-bound in making the Darfur resolution, and the formulation of the weak mandate that failed to address the conflict shows that AU member states preferred a cautious approach to avoid offending the Bashir regime that was committing atrocities on the Darfur people through the proxy approach of funding and arming the Janjaweed militia. In conclusion, the PSC decision-making system lacked efficacy which resulted in the formulation of a weak mandate, lack of a time-bound decision-making system, and poor coordination of the administrative duties which are essential in a successful peace intervention mission.
2. The PSC's reliance on external funds to operationalize the Darfur intervention was a clear indication of a poor mobilization strategy and lack of political will to operationalize the Peace Fund. The AMIS observer mission had a few donors that included US, UK, and EU. The transformation of the observer mission into a full

peacekeeping mission saw an increase in the number of external donors that funded the Darfur intervention. This was motivated by the improvement of the mandate that included the protection of civilians and the shift in the domestic politics in Europe whereby public opinion and Europe's top diplomats' view of Darfur as essential necessitated support to curb it from spreading. Although external funds sustained the PSC intervention mission in Darfur, it was not adequate and did not meet agreed timelines thus delaying the deployment of military equipment, military components, and expert personnel. Further, the incapacity of most APSA organs resulted in a lack of a clear monitoring structure that could oversee the proper financial allocation and spending of the mobilized funds. As a result, there was financial misappropriation and eventual shortages.

3. The analysis of the PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict revealed a robust PSC decision-making system on paper, while in reality there are gaps in the decision-making system, enforcing of its rules and principles, and incapacity in some organs that have led to several ad-hoc processes. Further, there was poor implementation of the PSC intervention in Darfur thus delays in the deployment of the peacekeepers. The poor administrative running of the Darfur intervention demonstrated that the chairperson's office did not do enough. On the lessons learned from the Darfur intervention, the study found that lessons from past peacekeeping interventions are not taken into account. The whole decision-making of the PSC; its implementation process had gaps and thus lacked efficacy. This resulted in failed intervention in the Darfur conflict.

5.3 Recommendations

1. The researcher has conducted a study on the African Union Peace and Security Council intervention and proposes some recommendations that sought to improve the performance of the PSC in discharging the mandate of maintaining and restoring peace and security in Africa.
2. The study recommends that PSC member states show leadership in peacekeeping intervention efforts by formulating a clear robust mandate for the peacekeepers on a timely basis to ensure the realization of the peacekeeping goals. Further, the PSC should equip APSA organs with adequate resources as they aid the execution of the PSC mandate.
3. The study recommends the AU member states shoulder the financial funding of the PSC-authorized intervention by equipping the Peace Fund. This will ensure that the PSC has a reliable source of funds and will solve on time factor which is essential to success in achieving peacekeeping goals.
4. The study recommends various government policymakers embrace efficacy in their decision-making organs. This will lead to coming up with clear mandates and goals for various government agencies on a timely basis. Further, the mobilized funds and other resources will be utilized for the right functions.

5.4 Areas for Further Research

1. There is a need for further studies to be carried out to establish the underlying factors that have curtailed the realization of the five brigades of the African Standby Forces as they are important to efficient PSC.

2. The relationship between the African Union Commission and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.
3. The African Union member states regime politics, its influence in the Assembly, and the implication to the PSC decision-making system.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Introduction Letter

Evans Kibet,
P.O Box 595,
Litein, Kenya

Evanskibet1@students.ku.ac.ke

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH DATA ACCESS

Greetings and hope you are doing well. My name is Evans Kibet, a postgraduate student at Kenyatta University pursuing a master's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy in the Department of International Relations, Conflict, and Strategic Studies.

Currently, I am conducting a research project titled Efficacy of the African Union Peace and Security Council Intervention in Darfur Conflict (2004-2021). I am writing this letter to request permission at your institution to interview the identified experts from your institution to inform the research study. The main objectives of the research study are as stated below;

To examine the Peace and Security Council mandate in the Darfur conflict

To assess the mobilization of resources by the PSC for resolving the Darfur conflict

To analyze the Peace and Security Council intervention efforts to end the Darfur conflict

Any assistance accorded will be highly appreciated by the researcher in his efforts of contributing to the role of international organizations in conflict mitigation.

Here are my contact details, email: evanskibet1@students.ku.ac.ke, alternatively my mobile phone number is 0723042638.

Thank you for your time and assistance

Kind regards,

Evans Kibet.

Appendix II: The Research Instrument

Interview Guide

Efficacy of the African Union's Peace and Security Council Intervention in the Darfur Conflict (2004-2021)

To examine the PSC mandate in the Darfur conflict

1. Describe how the resolution to intervene in the Darfur conflict by the PSC reached
2. What role did other AU organs play in resolving to intervene in the Darfur conflict?
 - a) The African Union Commission
 - b) The Assembly
 - c) The Military Security Committee
 - d) PSC Secretariat
3. Do you think the decision to intervene in the Darfur conflict was timely reached from the time the conflict erupted?
4. How did the AU member states respond to the resolution to intervene in the Darfur conflict?
5. Were there subsequent resolutions on the Darfur intervention and were states complying with the promise made?
6. How did the PSC follow up on its resolution on the Darfur intervention (PSC/AHG/COMM.X)
 - a) Was the resolution implemented fully?

- b) Who supported the Darfur resolution outside Africa?
 - c) Were there any gaps in the implementation process?
7. How were the identified needs by the PSC for its intervention in the Darfur conflict met and by whom?
- a) The civilian expertise
 - b) Technical support
 - c) Peacekeepers
 - d) The police contingents

To assess the mobilization of the resources by the PSC towards achieving its mandate in the Darfur conflict

1. What was the projected cost of the PSC/AMIS intervention in the Darfur conflict?
 - a) How much did the PSC get for the intervention
2. What was the PSC budget allocation for the:
 - a) The AMIS peacekeepers
 - b) Civilian expertise
 - c) Police contingents
 - d) Technical support and training
3. Who were the main financial contributors to the Darfur mission during these periods:-
 - i. 2004-2005
 - ii. 2005-2006
 - iii. 2006-2007

4. How did the PSC monitor the utilization of its resources in the Darfur conflict?
 - i. The AMIS peacekeepers
 - ii. The expertise
 - iii. The technical support equipment
5. How do you assess the monitoring of the PSC resources in the Darfur conflict?

To critique the efficacy of the PSC intervention in the Darfur conflict

1. How do you evaluate the intervention in the Darfur conflict?
2. What could be done differently to enhance the efficacy of the PSC in situations like Darfur
3. How were voting and decision-making affected by Sudan's membership in the PSC at the time of the Darfur crises?
4. What lessons can be learned from the PSC peacekeeping intervention in the Darfur conflict
5. What was the impact of the chairperson's good office in restoring peace in Darfur?

Appendix III: Key Informants to the Study

Name	Expertise	Date
C1	Senior Official at African Union Commission & ACBF	28/12/2019
C2	Senior IGAD Official on the Sudan Peace Talks at Machakos	17/11/2020
C3	PSC Expert & The Border Institute Executive	5/12/2020
C4	An official at The African Union Leadership Academy and Institute for Justice and Reconciliation	10/12/2020
C5	PSC Expert & Africa Capacity Building Foundation Official	16/11/2020
C6	PSC Expert	3/11/2020
C7	An official at Conflict Prevention & Early Warning Department	11/12/2020
C8	PSC Expert & Political Diplomatic Affairs Directorate- Africa.	3/12/2020
C9	PSC Expert & Political & Diplomatic Affairs Directorate -Africa	4/12/2020
C10	PSC Expert	14/12/2020
C11	PSC Expert	20/11/2020
C12	PSC Expert	19/11/2020
C13	PSC Expert	19/12/2020

Appendix IV: Approval Letter from the Graduate School



KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke

Website: www.ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 810901 Ext. 4150

Internal Memo

FROM: Dean, Graduate School

DATE: 9th June, 2020

TO: Evans Kibet Cheruiyot
C/o Inter. Rel. Conf. & Strg. Studies Dept

REF: S205/38849/2017

SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF RESEARCH PROJECT PROPOSAL

This is to inform you that Graduate School Board at its meeting of 20th June, 2020 approved your Research Project Proposal for the M.A Degree Entitled, "Efficacy of the African Union's Peace and Security Council Intervention in Darfur Conflict (2004-2019)".

You may now proceed with your Data Collection, Subject to Clearance with Director General, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation.

As you embark on your data collection, please note that you will be required to submit to Graduate School completed Supervision Tracking and Progress Report Forms per semester. The Forms are available at the University's Website under Graduate School webpage downloads.

Thank you.

JACKSON LUVUSI
FOR: DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

c.c. Chairman, Inter. Rel. Conf. & Strg. Studies Department

Supervisors:

1. Dr. James Nyawo
Department of Int. Rel. Conf. & Strg. Studies
Kenyatta University

Appendix VI: Annex 1

African States support PSC intervention efforts in Darfur

Countries contributions	MILOBS	Projected Time	Arrival	Military protection Troops	Projected Time	Arrival
Nigeria	9	June 4 th	June 28 th	155	4 th July	15 th Aug
Rwanda	-	-	-	155	4 th July	30 th Aug
Namibia	4	4 th July	20 th Oct	-	-	-
Ghana	1	4 th July	20 th Oct	-	-	-
Kenya	5	4 th July	20 th Oct	-	-	-
Mozambique	5	4 th July	20 th Oct.	-	-	-
Algeria	3	4 th July	20 th Oct	-	-	-
Congo	10	4 th July	20 th Oct.	-	-	-
Egypt	4	4 th July	20 th Oct.	-	-	-
Ghana	10	4 th July	20 th Oct	-	-	-
Mauritania	10	4 th July	20 th Oct	-	-	-
Gambia	7	4 th July	20 th Oct	196	4 th July	20 th Oct
Senegal	9	4 th July	20 th Oct.	196	4 th July	
South Africa	9	4 th July	20 th Oct	-	-	

Source: the number of troops contributed by AU states adapted from the 23rd report of the PSC on Darfur (PSC/AHG/4(XXIII), 2005).

Appendix VII: Annex 2

Illustration of the Donor pledges and realized amount for AMIS Peacekeepers intervention in the Year 2004

Donors	Pledged Amount	Amount realized	Time fulfilled
Canada	\$1,503,759	\$1,503,759	On-time
Denmark	\$736,664	\$736,664	On-time
EU	\$12,000,000	11,000,000	On-time
Germany	\$1,165,120	\$1,165,120	On-time
Greece	\$120,000	\$100,000	After 1 month
Arab States	\$100,000	\$100,000	After 1 month
Netherlands	\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000	On-time
South Korea	\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000	After 1 month
Sweden	\$134,066	\$134,066	On-time
UK	\$3,676,000	\$3,676,00	On-time
USA	\$6,800,000	\$6,800,000	On-time

Source: Financial figures adapted from PSC's 17th report of the PSC on Darfur.

(PSC/PR/2(XVII), 2004)

Appendix VIII: Annex 3

Illustration of the Donor pledges and realized amount for AMIS Peacekeepers


intervention in the year 2005

Donors	Pledged Amount	Amount realized	Time fulfilled
Canada	\$15,037,598	\$1,503,759	On-time
Denmark	\$750,000,000	\$736,664	On-time
EU	\$101,676,794	11,000,000	On-time
Germany	\$1,311,700	\$1,165,120	On-time
Netherlands	\$6,506,959	\$2,000,000	On-time
Sweden	\$625,000	\$134,066	On-time
UK	\$18,404,000	\$3,676,00	On-time
USA	\$40,383,485	\$6,800,000	On-time
Total	190,580,182	190,580,182	

Source: Financial figures adapted from 43rd report of the PSC on Darfur

(PSC/PR/2(XLII), 2005)

Appendix IX: Map Showing Location of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Source: Google Maps, 2022