

**KENYA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT
MISSIONS: CASE OF AMISOM**

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to Kenya Defence Forces personnel who pursue the enemy within and without our borders. It's by their courage and loyalty Kenya remains secure.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am eternally grateful to the almighty God for granting me good health and resilience during the course of my study. I am also appreciative of my employer for sponsoring my studies and especially Major General Peter Muteti who believed I deserved the opportunity.

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Ultimately the completion of this study would have been an exercise in futility was it not for the effort of my research participants.

ABSTRACT

According to recent trends, rallying together nations with specific national security interests is favoured as an intervention in combating insurgency. The ongoing turmoil in Somalia, and the continuous Al-Shabaab's threat to bordering nations, is concerning. Despite many regional and international organisations' actions, the situation continues to be fragile. The main objective of this study was to critically analyse the role of national interests in peace enforcement missions with the Republic of Kenya and AMISOM as the case study. The specific objectives of the study were to assess the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM, to examine how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya and to evaluate ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM. A qualitative descriptive research design was utilized. The study used a sample of 116 participants. The study established that Kenya joined AMISOM so as to strongly and fervently protect its national interests which at that time, were under threats from Al Shabaab. These interests were strategic interests, national security interests, social interests, economic interests and political interests. The study established that Kenya's national security interests were affected positively, economic interests were affected positively, social interests were affected positively, political interests were affected positively, and strategic interests were affected positively. The study established that strategies that Kenya can use in securing her national interests include formation of and seeking the interventions of a regional security organization with its neighbours, having a strong military force and pre-emptively act on any threats towards its national interests, using diplomatic interventions such as soft power and developing a foreign policy and defence policy anchored on strong partnership with allied nations. The study recommends that Kenya should seek for and work towards greater engagement in regional formations that are focused on not only economic and social cooperation but also security cooperation so as to benefit from security operations, missions and cooperation that are pegged on regional organisations and institutions.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|---|
| AMIB | African Union Mission in Burundi |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| AQIM | Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb |
| ASF | African Standby Force |
| AU | African Union |
| AUDA | Africa Union Development Agency |
| AUPSC | African Union Peace and Security Architecture |
| DoD | Department of Defence |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| ECCAS | Economic Community of Central African States |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| FIB | Forced Intervention Brigade |
| ICISS | International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| IGASOM | Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia |
| KDF | Kenya Defence Forces |
| MINUSMA | Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali |
| MoD | Ministry of Defence |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NACOSTI | National Council for Science, Technology and Innovation |
| NEPAD | New Partnership for Africa's Development |
| OAU | Organisation of African Unity |
| REC | Regional Economic Communities |
| RM | Regional Mechanisms |
| RSCT | Regional Security Complex Theory |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SNA | Somali National Army |
| TCC | Troop Contributing Countries |
| TFG | Transitional Federal Government |
| UN | United Nations |
| UN DPKO | United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations |
| UNAMID | United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur |
| UNEF | United Nations Economic Front |
| UNON | United Nations Office in Nairobi |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |

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OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

National interest – these are in strategic, economic, political, social, security and ideological desires and preserves of a nation which are considered key motivations of decisions to take part in peace keeping and peace enforcement missions

Officer - a commissioned individual within Kenya Defence Forces in order of seniority from 2nd Lieutenant to General. As such they are categorized into three, general officers comprising of Major general, Lieutenant general and General. Senior officers are from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel and Brigadier. Junior officers include 2nd lieutenant, Lieutenant, Captain and Major

Peace enforcement – the use of force by the military to restore and maintain peace as sanctioned by the United Nations and regional organisations. The use of force has been claimed to be effective methods of persuasion rather than just a last resort.

Peacekeeping – specialised methods aimed at preventing breaches of peace while restoring and nurturing peace. These processes are often sanctioned and carried out with the agreement of the United Nations and other international and regional organisations.

Troop Contributing Countries – these are nations that advance their military personnel to take part in peace keeping and peace enforcement missions.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The section provided a contextual introduction as well as a global, regional, and local overview of peacekeeping missions and the pursuit of national interests in the twenty-first century. It also detailed the problem statement, overall objective and specific objectives, research questions, justification, significance and the scope.

1.1 Background to the Study

The universe has changed dramatically since the United Nations (UN) was established and in terms of global peace and security, the use of coercion has shifted from traditional interstate wars to intrastate conflicts, global extremism, and abuse of fundamental rights, as well as civil unrest. Intractable conflicts and rational development of the resolution and strategies for preserving global peace and security have dramatically transformed fears and complexities. However, intellectuals do not agree on the motivation of peace operations and their function in the national and international interests (Lotze, 2013).

Peace enforcement according to the United Nations (2021), entails utilization of a variety of offensive mechanisms like deployment of military troops, as a way of restoring peace and security. Such deployment happens in circumstances where the UN Security Council (UNSC) decides to act in response to a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression. Such activities require the UNSC's formal approval. Under its power and in conformity with the UN Charter, the Council may use regional organizations and agencies to take enforcement measures when appropriate. While peace keeping is bound under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter on nonviolent resolution of conflicts, Chapter VII provides for peace enforcement (Karlsrud, 2015). The Charter is closely linked to enforcement since it establishes the legal foundations for distinguishing peacekeeping from peace enforcement.

National interests which include strategic, economic, political and ideological interests are traditionally perceived to be primary drivers in intervention choices by realist thinkers (Morgenthau, 1967; Wight, 1978). Amongst the core national interest is the sovereignty of states which determines its survival. Hence, states ought to safeguard their physical, political and cultural identities against other countries (Williams, 2005). The threats of terrorism have brought

countries together to collaborate and fight terrorists to prevent spill over effects and ensure their own national security. This is a clear manifestation that when states are threatened, they can go to any extent to protect their interest either individually or as part of an alliance (Renwick, 2015).

Much has been documented on how national interests have led to nations taking part in peace enforcement missions. For example, Renwick (2015) explained how India emphasised that its nations' manpower commitment to UN peacekeeping missions is motivated by its aspirations to become permanent members of the Security Council, a move that was considered a strategic interest. Furthermore, in conventional senses, national interests are the single most significant reason in the United States of America's (USA) decision to use force in Iraq. The Bush Administration saw Iraq as a danger to its strategic and economic interests (Ninshaba, 2009), and utilised "all necessary means" to carry through its strategy. The choice of collaborating with UN as part of the peacekeeping effort aided the United States' success.

In West Africa for instance, at the onset of The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), one common understanding amongst the financiers as well as Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) in the region was that realisation of calmness in Mali would lead to cessation of spill over of instability to bordering states. Nevertheless, difference in national political interest, operational doctrine and mistrust amongst troop contributing countries further proves a barrier in efficient cooperation between TCCs within MINUSMA. This similar conflict of interest also plays out in AMISOM (Renwick, 2017). In the Eastern Africa region, Burundi troops gained substantial field experience in her engagement in Somalia under AMISOM which has also boosted the cohesion of her forces and collaboration with other armed forces of the TCCs (Kebede and Dawit, 2017). Since Ethiopia shares a border with Somalia, any prospect of conflict in Somalia would see influx of displaced persons across the border into Ethiopia. Any such influx has the potential to upset the ethnic imbalance which in liaison with Ogaden region could be a breeding ground for terrorism (Moe, 2017). These fears drove Ethiopia in July 2006, to unilaterally deploy to Somalia and pursue the Islamic Court Union.

In Somalia several armed opposition groups such as Al-Shabaab and al-Islamiyah opposed the deployment of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM). Those who opposed this deployment argued that since some frontline states

were contributing troops, there was possibility of these states pursuing their own interests in the mission (Ninshaba, 2019). In a blatant effort of self-preservation, Eritrea opposed the deployment of IGASOM because it would have protected the Transitional Government of Somalia (TFG), which it deemed Ethiopian friends in Somalia (Ninshaba, 2019).

Kenya's engagement in Somalia arose out of its strong commitment to make a contribution to regional and global peace and security (Republic of Kenya, 2012). At the beginning of its entrance to Somalia, Kenya argued for the right of a state to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter which, following an armed attack against a UN member, explicitly identified the inherent right of individual or collaborative self-defence (Miyandazi, 2012). The adoption of this article as legal basis for Kenya's participation generated a number of issues as to whether such steps were necessary for an invasion of this size. In addition, it was also alleged that Kenya did not follow the appropriate procedure necessary in pursuit of self-defense, since the nation did not inform the United Nations Security Council of its planned activity (Williams and Harshi, 2016). As described by its late Minister of Internal security, Kenya ventured into Somalia in order to 'preserve its territorial integrity against external invasion' (Miyandazi, 2012).

National interests have had mixed effects and results on peace enforcement missions. It is perceived that Kenya's claim that insistent kidnappings and killings by al-Shabaab were the primary motivation for its engagement in Somalia may have served as a convenient pretext to pursue deeper national interests. These include allegations that Kenya's involvement in Somalia was to pave way for oil exploration, for political elites to garner voter support in the elections that were due in 2013 as well as allegations of violation of human rights, civilian casualties and charcoal trading by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) (Miyandazi, 2012). The local situation in Kenya turned more precarious, since its national security was jeopardised by the Somali onslaught. By engaging in Somalia, Kenya gave al-Shabaab sufficient reasons to finally actualise its threats by constantly attacking Kenya at the Coast, in Nairobi and in the North-eastern.

The action is liable to add insults in existing tensions with Kenya's Somali ethnic group. The Kenyan administration launched a parallel campaign days before this invasion to hunt out sympathisers with Al-Shabaab in the nation (Republic of Kenya, 2012). These kind of profiling of the local Somalis and Somali refugees definitely risk alienating them. This might lead to al-Shabaab seeing Kenya as an even more appealing recruiting base. Civilian casualties were being

reported. Even though KDF could have succeeded in obtaining the backing of the Kenyan citizenry in support of the invasion at the onset, if civilian casualties continue, increased condemnation from citizens in both Kenya, Somalia and the international community will be witnessed.

AMISOM was deployed in an endeavour to restore normalcy and restore Somali state. In January 2007, AMISOM was born after an AUPSC agreed to take over IGAD's control and obligation for a peace mission in Africa. It has been necessary to move the command from IGAD to the AU because more militant African involvement is needed. Kenya has not been spared from terrorist attack patterns, much like other AMISOM contributing countries. Counter-terrorism actions have been enhanced and the Government of Kenya has developed anti-terrorism measures through strong military action, enhanced intelligence-sharing, strict border control and counter-radicalization programmes. However, this has had a detrimental effect on Kenyan ties with Somalia and has weighted down the grounds for justifiable military involvement and the possible repercussions.

In October 2011, Kenya unilaterally deployed its troops (Kenya Defense Forces) to Somalia. This was a reaction to numerous Al-Shabaab attacks in Nairobi, Lamu and North Eastern where security personnel were attacked, civilians lost lives and others wounded. The unilateral deployment “dubbed Operation Linda Nchi”, was in response to Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan territory (and the group's suspected participation in foreigner kidnappings). The intervention reflected the dynamic Kenyan politics and national interests. The KDF deployment was the peak of several failed efforts by AU to make use of political means through negotiation, to bring peace to Somalia. Kenya joined AMISOM following strides made in the liberation of majority of Somali towns from the Al Shabaab during its unilateral incursion in Somalia. This was motivated by the desire to stop the territorial aggressions and attacks on the Kenyan citizens and foreign tourists in Kenya by the terrorist group; all which amounted to the compromise of the state security interests of the Republic of Kenya.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

AMISOM was first deployed for six months in 2007 to aid federal transitional institutions improve conditions in the nation. It was also designed to promote dialogue and compromise, to encourage humanitarian assistance and to create an environment for long-term changes and

progress in Somalia. Despite the fact that the KDF is now part of AMISOM, there was some confusion over the mandate parameters under which the soldiers were acting. AMISOM's mission was to undertake peacekeeping activities to stabilise the situation and allow deployment of humanitarian aid and a rapid UN takeover. The KDF's goals were not covered by this mandate. Despite the deployment of AMISOM in Somalia, Al-Shabaab has continued to threaten and attack the Somali people as well as the people of neighbouring countries. This has continued to undermine the chance of peace in Somalia, while also generating security concerns among the TCCs, who were helping AMISOM while protecting their own national interests.

Kenya argued for the right of the country to self-defense at the beginning of its intervention into Somalia. The operation by Kenya has been undertaken in order 'to prevent external assault against its territorial integrity.' KDF joining AMISOM was largely driven by the need to stop the territorial aggressions and attacks on the Kenyan citizens and foreign tourists in Kenya by the terrorist group; all which amounted to the compromise of the state security interests of the Republic of Kenya. Kenya is impacted by the crisis in Somalia. Impacts of activities of insurgents in Somalia resulted in many internally displaced persons who end up as refugees in Kenya, the proliferation of small guns and light weapons into Kenya and psychological trauma resulting from terror acts on Kenyans. Kenya Joining AMISOM was largely driven by the need to stop the territorial aggressions and attacks on the Kenyan citizens and foreign tourists in Kenya by the terrorist group; all which amounted to the compromise of the national interests (security, political, social and economic) of the Republic of Kenya. This study was therefore important to find out how specific national interests of Kenya played a role leading to its participation in the peace enforcement mission by joining AMISOM instead of continuing with the unilateral intervention previously pursued yet, the unilateral mission was considered successful.

1.3 General Objective

To critically analyse the role of national interests in peace enforcement missions with the Republic of Kenya and AMISOM as the case study.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

- 1) To assess the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM
- 2) To examine how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya.
- 3) To evaluate ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM

1.4 Research Questions

- 1) What are the national interests that led Kenya to participate in AMISOM?
- 2) How did the participation in AMISOM affect national interests of the Republic of Kenya?
- 3) What are the ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM?

1.5 Justification of the Study

AU's position in Africa is influencing our view of global peace and security frameworks. When Africa decided to invest in AMISOM, among other things, it embarked on a massive political undertaking. Because of this vision, as well as help from like-minded organisations, the AU's and sub-regional organisations' capacity to dispatch peacekeeping operations has significantly increased.

The study's timing was justified by the fact that Africa is commonly considered as the most conflict-prone continent in the world where most peacekeeping missions are deployed (Conflict Barometer (2015)). These wars aggravate a continent already afflicted by endemic poverty, health difficulties and environmental calamities caused by people and nature. Understanding the driving forces behind African countries and specifically the Republic of Kenya, to be part of peace enforcement missions remains important.

The academic rationale was informed by inadequate current literature and definitive empirical findings on national interests as a factor in peacekeeping. The outcomes of this study will add to the existing body of knowledge and making updated information available for future investigations.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The findings shall be useful to policymakers and implementers dealing with peace support operations in African countries in restructuring existing security policies and writing new security policies. Such new regulations are intended to provide successful and efficient peacekeeping missions that are free of harmful national interests. As a result, this research will aid in the development of knowledge and practise in policy development and execution, as well as the different theoretical views that lead and shape peace and security. Furthermore, considering the UN's focus and significance put on bilateral collaboration with the AU, TCCS to AMISOM, and other African states in the future, the study has high stakes for future practise and policy in peace operations in Africa.

Understanding the driving forces behind African countries and specifically the Republic of Kenya, to be part of peace enforcement missions remains important. The findings and recommendations of this study will open our eyes to the national motivations that led Kenyan to join AMISOM as well as shape the future national interests that might result in Kenya joining future peace enforcement missions.

The outcomes of this study are significant in terms of compounding to the existing body of knowledge and making updated information available for future investigations. Researchers and academics will utilize findings from this study as a basis for other investigations.

1.7 Scope of the Study

This study was limited to the role of national interests in peace enforcement missions, Kenya and AMISOM being the case studies. The objectives were to assess the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM, to examine how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya and to evaluate ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM. The study focused on the period 2011-2019 because Kenya first set out into Somalia through Operation Linda Nchi in 2011 and later joined AMISOM in 2012. The period 2011 to 2019 was considered as this is the period that Kenya has been actively and continuously involved in the peace and security mission in Somalia. While the study will be focusing on Kenya's participation in the peace enforcement mission in Somalia, the study participants will be based in Kenya. Therefore, the unit of analysis is Kenya.

1.8 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

The peace support mission being undertaken by AMISOM in Somalia was an active mission where security personnel from Kenya were actively involved. As a result, getting some of the mission's essential yet classified reports and records was a challenge. To solve this issue, the researcher obtained appropriate permission from relevant institutions to access such reports and records while maintaining the confidentiality of the material and using it for the study's academic goals.

Additionally, some of the targeted participants exhibited reluctance to partake in the interviews as well as provide factual and verifiable details due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing AMISOM mission. This was a challenge that would affect not only validity and reliability of the data but also the verifiability and triangulation of findings. To address this limitation, the researcher affirmed her assurance that the information provided would only be used for the academic purposes of this study. The researcher further assured the participants that their personal information or that of their hosts would not be recorded in the final report and that this information would be held in confidence.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presented a review of literature that is related to the study topic. The chapter discussed the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM, how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya and ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM, theoretical review, the conceptual framework of analysis and a summary of the literature review and research gaps.

2.1 National Interests Leading to Kenya's Participation in AMISOM

Past AU operations have indicated that majority of those who readily put their troops on the line to undertake peace enforcement are those whose interests have been threatened. An example is Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya in Somalia. This practice might not be in the best interest of the mission itself as such countries might pursue national interest rather than strive to achieve the mandate (Moe, 2017).

Djibouti is endangered by the Somalia issue because it shares a border with Somalia, which allows illicit weaponry and refugees to flow freely (Peter, 2015). Despite not sharing a border with Somalia, Uganda and Sudan are apprehensive about the possibility of terrorist strikes from Somalia (Moe, 2017; Karlsrud, 2018). Furthermore, Uganda is AMISOM's key soldier contributor. Sudan has no border with Somalia and is not involved in Somalia's affairs. It's possible that this is due to internal issues. Sudan, on the other hand, has a religious link to Somalia, thus it feels obligated to be concerned about the Somalis' destiny.

Eritrea's role in the Somali affair was viewed from historical perspective and this entails its hostile relationship with Ethiopia (Segui, 2013). This hostile relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia led them to conflict over part of the territory of Badme along the common border leading to destruction of property and death and displacement of civilian population (Segui, 2013). This conflict prompted the United Nation to intervene. Therefore, instead of direct confrontation, it is my analysis that they decided to engage indirectly through proxies. Ethiopia was alleged to have opted supporting Transition Federal Government (TGF) while Eritrea was alleged to have supported Union of the Islamic court (UIC) (Segui, 2013). It can however be deduced that not much connected Eritrea to UIC, in terms of core national interest.

Burundi troops are deployed in sector 5 towards the north of Mogadishu. However, the troops do not have much reach and influence beyond their base at Jowhar (Karlsrud, 2018). Burundi contribution of troops to AMISOM should actually be viewed as a sacrifice considering that Burundi itself has been unstable for a long time and still struggles to pacify the ethnic undertones that have been the cause of her internal troubles. During a visit by National Defence College to Burundi recently, the briefing by the ministry of foreign affairs gave a critical role played by her troops in AMISOM, in pursuit of regional security and as a way of appreciating effort made by the region towards Burundi's peace and security. However, Burundi troops gained substantial field experience in her engagement with Alshabaab which has also boosted the cohesion of her forces (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019).

Ethiopia is a neighbour to Somalia and one of the countries linked to Somalia by History. These two neighbours have gone to war against each other previously in the 1970s. The study established that in 1978 for example, the two neighbours went to war over the Ogaden issue in Somalia (Segui, 2013). Just like in Kenya, Ethiopia has a region with a good number of ethnic Somalis bordering Somalia. Coupled with this is the historical irredentism by Somalia which has never been renounced. Ethiopia therefore would be at peace with a friendly regime in Somalia which does not have linkage with Ogaden region or harbour grave threats to its national security.

Ethiopia being land locked has had to use port of Kenya and Djibouti to move goods and services from and to Ethiopia. A peaceful Somalia with her long coastline and many ports would provide alternative for Ethiopia to exploit (Albrecht and Haenlien, 2016). Some of these ports could provide a better alternative considering distance and cost of services. Because Ethiopia shares a border with Somalia, any prospect of conflict in Somalia would see influx of displaced persons across the border into Ethiopia. Any such influx has the potential to upset the ethnic imbalance which in liaison with Ogaden region could be a breeding ground for terrorism. These fears drove Ethiopia in July 2006, to unilaterally deploy to Somalia and pursue the Islamic Court Union (Karlsrud, 2018).

Uganda was the first country to deploy under AMISOM in 2007 (AMISOM, 2012). The country deployed to support a weak Federal government of Somalia with an initial mandate of six months. Aside from contributing troops, Uganda has commanded the force through appointment of Uganda generals to the post of Force Commanders. The entry of Kenya and later Ethiopia has

denied Uganda that monopoly over the command of troops (Segui, 2013). One reason for the entry of Uganda into AMISOM, particularly at a time that Alshabaab had a strong hold on of territories across Somalia, is thought to be reputational. Uganda having fought wars of liberation during her many coups, have always touted that experience as setting her apart from other regional militaries which she dismissed as only professional without experience and indeed capacity to wage and win wars. She therefore had a point to prove by deploying her troops and leading the way for others (Ninshaba, 2019).

Indeed, Uganda's entry into Mogadishu unilaterally at a time when other efforts have failed and withdrawn is a milestone and taking of leadership role to inspire others at a difficult time. Just as it happened with Kenya, Al-Shabaab attacked Uganda on two occasions attempting to weaken Uganda's resolve and force a withdrawal (Albrecht and Haenlien, 2016). Far from being intimidated, Uganda responded by deploying more troops. Despite not sharing a border with Somalia, Uganda and Sudan are apprehensive about the possibility of terrorist strikes from Somalia. Uganda is also the largest contributor of troops to AMISOM. Sudan has no border with Somalia and is not involved in Somalia's affairs. It's possible that this is due to internal issues. Sudan, on the other hand, has a religious relationship with Somalis, thus it feels obligated to be concerned about their fate. Uganda contribution of troops to AMISOM is therefore largely reputational to project her image as hegemony within the horn of Africa region.

Kenya staged a unilateral military operation in Somalia in self defence in October 2011, in response to Al Shabaab incursion into Kenya territory. Kenya later on in 2012 merged its efforts and joined AMISOM to continue pursuing its diverse national interests. These included national security interests, economic interests, social interests, political interests and strategic interests (Amadi, 2014). For instance, Kenya, which has a Somali border, is endangered in Somalia by the conflict, as ethnic Somalis live in the North-eastern portion of the nation. Kenya, like Ethiopia, is subjected to terrorist assaults by the Somali organisations. Additionally, terrorists from Somalia staging attacks on Kenyan soil was considered an act of breach of territorial sovereignty- a prized political possession (Albrecht and Haenlien, 2016).

One of the reasons for Kenya's entry into Somalia as established by the various studies was to protect the citizens and their property (Ninshaba, 2019; Miyandazi, 2012; Kebede and Dawit, 2017; Williams, 2019). This was necessitated by Al-Shabaab crossing over into Kenya and

harassing Kenyans, looting and even kidnaping both Kenyans and foreigners. Tying this to the economic front, Al-Shabaab had on several occasions kidnapped tourist from along the border as well as in the coastal town of Lamu. Unfortunately, some of those kidnapped have never been traced to date. Those kidnapped were tourists and other foreign nationals who were in Kenya for various reasons. The kidnapping affected tourism negatively (Williams, 2019). Tourism is the second highest foreign exchange earner for Kenya and therefore its decline would have a serious negative impact for Kenya's economy and overall development.

Additionally, the long and porous border as well as the lack of government in Somalia has enabled Al-Shabaab to exploit the surveillance gap to control areas along the common border with Somalia. They conducted trade into Kenya, particularly trading in sugar. This cheap sugar soon flooded the Kenyan market. This led to the government losing revenue because the trade was being conducted through illegal crossing points to evade taxation (Ninshaba, 2019). Illegal importation of sugar across the border and flooding of market led to unfair competition with Kenya's local industries. Most sugar producing companies were knocked out of business which in turn led to job losses and in some instances closing down the factories.

The Kenya-Somali border is a long and porous one. In the horn of Africa region, a lot of small arms and light weapon are in the wrong hands. With no semblance of government in Somalia, Kenya had to secure the border and check the spread of insecurity along the border by surveillance and preventing the inflow of small arms while at the same time checking against Al-Shabaab operations (Albrecht and Haenlien, 2016).

The presence of refugees in parts of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti presents negative effects on security, economic and environmental sectors within Eastern Africa. Kenya hosts Somalia refugees at Dadaab, which is about 70kms from the common border with Somalia. The indigenous community is also of Somali origin. The close proximity to the border and the similar ethnic belonging is an impediment for Kenya when monitoring activities of refugees as well as controlling movement across the border (Albrecht and Haenlien, 2016). At times clashes between the refugees and the community itself has been witnessed. This has been over scarce resources of water, firewood and manual jobs by UN agencies. The environment has also been affected as the more than 500,000 additional burden on firewood use have seen complete destruction of environment.

I'm intrigued by the fact that none of the motives examined in this paper compel a TCC to take risks with people it sends to peacekeeping missions. Given the possibility for domestic political reaction if national personnel are compromised, the more democratic the state, the less likely it is to take such a risk. I further noted that wealthy states avoid contributing troops due to the uncertainty of the dangers that may arise; hence majority of their support to peace enforcement missions comes in form of money. Most countries take the chance to acquire the field experience alongside service to humanity as part of peacekeeping and peace enforcement mission. International deployment as part of United Nation mission also comes with some sense of reputation, which in certain regions is viewed as a projection of force.

2.2 How the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of Kenya

October 2011 saw a significant event which was to have a far-reaching impact in the history of AMISOM. Kenya which had experienced attacks by Al Shabaab decided in self-defence, to pursue Al Shabaab into Somalia in operation code named *Linda nchi* (protect the nation) (Albrecht and Haenlien, 2016). Kenyan troops registered a remarkable success in repulsing the threat and restored normalcy and security along the border with Somalia. In early 2012 after engagement by IGAD and the regional heads of states, Kenya joined AMISOM and deployed to sector two in the federal state of Jubaland (Karlsrud, 2018). Kenyan troops, have operational responsibility for reducing Al Shabaab capacity and creating conditions for operation by humanitarian agencies (Williams, 2018). The deployment covered west of Juba River down to Kismayu and westwards to Ras Kamboni and then runs north along the international border to Burahache town.

Within few months, Kenya troops registered a huge success by liberating from Alshabaab many towns and cities, among them a strategic port City of Kismayu which was the main revenue generator for Alshabaab at the time. Later, encouraged by this achievement, Ethiopia joined AMISOM and deployed to Sector 3 with her headquarter in Baidoa (Segui, 2013). Any state's core interest is its survival. The essence of states survival is its sovereignty. States will therefore endeavour to defend their territorial integrity by all means necessary. That explains why Kenya initially launched operation *linda nchi* even before it joined AMISOM (Williams, 2016).

In the east African arena, Kenya has long been viewed to be a haven of peace and stability. However, after it joined AMISOM in 2012, it has been attacked severally by the terrorist group

Al Shabaab, indicating their protest against Kenya's role in AMISOM and attempting to force its withdrawal. Kenya continues to receive a huge number of Somali refugees some of whom are believed to be coordinating terrorist activities from their refugee camps in Daadab. Kenya continues to play a substantial position in AMISOM as well as strengthening its defence mechanism internally against terror attacks (Amadi, 2014).

The Kenya-Somali border is a long and porous one. In the horn of Africa region, a lot of small arms and light weapon are in the wrong hands (Danish Institute of International Studies, 2017). With no semblance of government in Somalia, Kenya has had the opportunity to secure the border and check the spread of insecurity along the border by surveillance and preventing the inflow of small arms while at the same time checking against Al-Shabaab operations. This has seen the construction of a boarder wall along the Kenya Somalia boarder, boosting security of the nation and controlling movement and surveillance (de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud, (2016). Tourism is the second highest foreign exchange earner for Kenya and therefore its decline has had a serious negative impact for Kenya's economy and overall development. This is due to the numerous travel advisories issued by different nations to their citizens against travelling to Kenya in view of increased retaliatory attacks by Al Shabaab on Kenya (Cold-Ravnkilde, 2017).

The presence of refugees in parts of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti presents negative consequences on the security, economy and environment. Kenya hosts Somalia refugees at Dadaab, which is about 70kms from the common border with Somalia. The indigenous community is also of Somali origin. The close proximity to the border and the similar ethnic belonging has hampers Kenya's role in monitoring flow and activities of refugees (Albrecht and Haenlien, 2016). With a relatively peaceful environment returning to Somalia and with the provision of security to citizens in Somalia, Daadab and Kakuma refugee camps have seen reduced inflow of refugees from Somalia. Further, Kenya has seen an increased number of refugees voluntarily repatriating back to Somalia (Lotze and Williams, 2016). This has been a benefit and a step in the right direction by Kenya to reduce its refugee burden.

Kenyan military staged security operation into Somali in self-defence in October 2011 (Amadi, 2014). This was after the Al Shabaab made incursion into Kenya particularly along the coast to raid some facilities and abduct tourists. As much as the act was an affront to Kenya's territorial integrity it was also to have a serious impact on Kenya's economy as tourism is Kenya's major

foreign exchange earner. The attack by Al-Shabaab on the Westgate mall in Nairobi in 2013, Garissa University College in 2015 and Dusit D2 Hotel in 2019 indicates that even with KDF deployment in Somalia under AMISOM, terror threat against Kenya still persists (Ninshaba, 2019). Concerted effort to compliment effort by AMISOM needs to be put in place to prevent such attacks in future. The strengthening of internal security mechanism, including capacity building for intelligence and joint planning of operations and coordinated execution is in the interest of Kenya.

In conclusion, Somalia has never renounced her pursuit of irredentism ideology, which then forms the notion in the mind of her immediate neighbours, as to what a strong Somali government would portend for them in terms of their security and interests. In an attempt to secure its own territorial integrity and sovereignty, Kenya focused so much on the immediate and proximal border areas and by extension closer ties and cooperation with the federal states in control of these areas. The Federal Government Somalia albeit, has been suspicious of this close ties between her federal states on one hand and Kenya on the other. This has led to diplomatic rows between Kenya and Somalia to the extent of Kenya cutting diplomatic ties with Somalia. While other troop contributing countries have never had formal discussions and frameworks on whether to withdraw from AMISOM, in Kenya there has been public sentiments especially from the opposition parties, for Kenya to withdraw from AMISOM and focus on protecting own borders.

2.3 Ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interests in its participation in AMISOM

National interests are diverse and change throughout time. They aren't always internally consistent, as a desire to respond to specific issues in one arena may conflict with other desires. Thus, balancing priority interests arises, in which the state's many parties negotiate between competing interests (Bellamy, 2011). However, dependent and fragmented actions may also involve concurrently pursuit of conflicting goals. A variation in the motive of the donors to peace operations are the difficulty of the blurred boundary between war and peacekeeping. The bulk of peacekeeping soldiers is provided by small nations while most of the financing is done by bigger countries. In the name of a peace keeping mission, an even smaller fraction of the bigger nations could be ready to expose their troops.

Kenya's architects of the unilateral mission in Somalia and the joining of AMISOM thereafter should have been prepared to offer unambiguous and positive accounts of the goals and the achievement of the operation (Peter, 2015). In this context, defined strategic targets and benchmarks for determining their success should have been established. During the first several years, the failure to define appropriate standards led to the idea that the goal did not have a realistic road to success (Cold-Ravnkilde, 2017), thus, had difficulties in securing the interests of the country. It is also vital that all partners have clear comprehension of the nature of the mission in operations such as AMISOM which involve several players.

Kenya's inability to create crucial enablers proved nearly difficult defeating Al-Shabab's fighting troops and threats in time. Despite this, foreign and local players have expressed dissatisfaction with AMISOM's failure to eradicate Al-Shabab. Aviation was one of the most noticeable gaps: despite the authorisation of a 12-military-helicopter aviation component in February 2012, AMISOM only got it in December 2016 (AMISOM, 2016a), when Kenya deployed three helicopters. It can thus be noted that an earlier deployment of these helicopters would have given Kenya an edge during the earlier days of the mission and this would have led to timely achievement of objectives.

The benefits and difficulties of these contributions should be weighed by missions strongly reliant on neighbouring country military forces and prepared to prevent possible negative repercussions (Renwick, 2015). Kenya, as a close Somalia neighbour, had critical interests at stake and was ready to invest enormous resources or even suffer significant defeats like fatalities. Simultaneously, AMISOM suffered political and military implications as a result of its politicised objectives (Williams and Dersso, 2015). Notably, Kenya's alleged involvement in local governance—including backing its chosen candidates and financial concerns like as illegal trading—is a source of concern and may complicate AMISOM's and Kenya's exit strategy (Ninshaba, 2019). There is thus an urgent need for Kenya to work on such negative perceptions and bring them to rest as they may paint a bad picture on Kenya's interests in AMISOM.

Kenya must quickly persuade local political leaders to make specific decisions in order to create the groundwork for the security sector reforms that will see a restoration of law and order in Somalia. Evidence from past decades suggests that Somali national politics significantly impedes modernisations of Somalia's security sector (Peter, 2015). Kenya thus has the best chances of

using its association with AMISOM to push for such reforms which will ultimately lead to law and order, thus reducing security risks facing Kenya. In the same vein, Kenya should not have had unrealistic expectations about how long it would take to achieve progress on the AMISOM mission and eliminate terror threats. Considering that the AMISOM operation was faced with a very large area to cover in terms of the size of Somalia that was under Al Shabaab control, patience was key (Williams, 2018a). While Kenya anticipated to realise results in a very short time by under-estimating the potential of the enemy (Segui, 2013), the national interests of territorial sovereignty and national security require time and patience. This was not evident in the AMISOM and Kenyan scenario.

In the case of AMISOM, the partners had inadequate liaison channels and were rarely sufficiently collocated to execute fully cooperative operations progressively. As one Somali government official put it in February 2016 (Williams, 2018b), “What signal does it send to the locals when they see the SNA and AMISOM still not working very closely together and using two separate bases? It signals that AMISOM are really like an occupying force not working with the SNA.” As Kenya carried out combined operations with AMISOM and the SNA, soldiers withdrew for transition to take place, but without comparable Somali forces replacing them. This ran the risk of Al Shabaab re-grouping. There was need to work on a framework of installing SNA in the liberated regions to maintain the peace and security that had been achieved by Kenya in the sector it was operating in. For effective exit, Kenya needs to leverage on collaborations and processes besides its own. Kenya and AMISOM should learn that exiting ought to be conceptualized as a political process whose objective is to reduce chances of re-emergence of insurgents (Williams, 2019). The key lesson is that a peace operation without an efficient strategic communication effort is a big mistake (Williams, 2018a). To prevent this from happening again, Kenya requires a permanently established structure of strategic communication to define policies and strategies, to maintain consistency and to promote communication in all its peace activities.

2.4 Summary of Literature and Research Gaps

All legally engaged neighbouring and regional countries in a crisis scenario contribute large proportions of the workforce for peacekeeping missions hence, are routinely concerned to ensure that the country concerned stays intact and solid just as its neighbours and the area as a whole.

This offers an additional blend of political, financial and security concerns for those involved in deploying peacekeeping operations. AMISOM engaged substantial partners on possible resolutions for the Somalia situation.

Kebede and Dawit (2017) conducted a study that concentrated purely on literature review and analysis. It did not interrogate issues to do with the national interests of Kenya. While Durch and England (2009) focused on understanding the purposes of peace operations, the study did fail to elaborate on how national interests were embodied in the purposes of peace operations. Viggo (1999) conducted a study that, despite interrogating issues within national interests, the study does not provide findings that relate to AMISOM. The findings have further been overtaken by time. Assefaw (2008) conducted a study on transformations and determinants of United Nations peace missions in Africa. Although the study was conducted partly in the period of this current study, Assefaw failed to include any aspect on AMISOM, yet AMISOM was already in force at the time.

A study by the Danish Institute of International Studies (2017) focused on Regional Interests in African Peace Operations. The study however, left a gap, as it did not focus on individual country interests. Having identified these and other gaps, the current study endeavours to address this gap by critically analysing the role of national interests in peace enforcement missions with the Republic of Kenya and AMISOM as the case study. Unlike the previous studies, the current study will focus on AMISOM as the case study while Kenya will be the units of analysis.

2.5 Theoretical review

This study will be informed by the Realism Theory of International Relations and the Regional Security Complex Theory.

2.5.1 Realism Theory of International Relations

This theory is credited to the works of Niccolò Machiavelli in 1532 (Antunes and Isabella, 2018). The theory is based on four main propositions. First, the idea holds that nations, instead of leaders or international organizations, are the primary players in international politics. Second, according to the theory, the global political system is chaotic since there is no supranational authority to enforce regulations. Third, the theory proposes that within global community, nations act in their rational self-interest. Finally, the idea claims that governments want power in order to assure their own survival.

In an international emergency, the often-used analogy of 'nobody to call' helps to emphasize that which the realists put forward. We usually have the police, military, tribunals and other institutions within our own states (Viggo, 1996). In the event of an emergency, these institutions are expected to "do something" in response. Internationally nobody or anything 'doing' is clearly expected to do because of absence of a hierarchy. So, states can only depend on themselves at the end of the day. Realists think that our egoism, our willingness to do so and our lack of confidence in others lead to predictable results. This may be why, during recorded history, war was so common (Steele, 2008). Since people are organised into states, the impact of human nature on state behaviour. Niccolò Machiavelli has therefore concentrated on the extent to which fundamental human qualities influence state security (Machiavelli, 1532).

In *The Prince* (1532), according to Machiavelli, the first aim of a leader is to enhance national security. To properly perform this role, the leader should be aware and capable of dealing efficiently with both internal and external challenges to their reign. Finally, governments must rely on self-help to maintain their own security. In this setting, realists have two basic techniques for coping with insecurity: power balance and deterrence. The threat (or use) of major force is used to deter, but strategic, flexible alliances are used to balance power. Both are evidence in this case.

The fundamental point in understanding realism is the idea that unsavoury actions such as war are essential tools of statehood in a world that is not perfect, and leaders must use them when in the interests of the nation. In a world in which State survival is paramount, this is entirely rational. After all, if a state ceases to exist due to attack or internal collapse, all other policy objectives are no longer very relevant in practise. In other words, when deciding where and when to use military might, a leader should be extremely cautious.

This theory will be applied in understanding the motivations behind Kenya's initial incursion into Somalia (which was considered a war against an enemy) and later on, joining AMISOM. This level of understanding at present is incomplete and inconsistent. It therefore has the potential of providing a better understanding of the position of the Republic of Kenya in terms of engaging in peace enforcement through AMISOM.

This theory has received a fair share of criticisms. The theory is imprecise and has ambiguities in its application of notions like as power, national interests, and balance of power (Antunes and

Isabel, 2018). While realists regard the balance of power as a reasonable method for managing an unsafe world, detractors see it as a tool to justify war and aggression. In the same vein, proponents of this theory evade the analysis of the process by which national interests are formulated. They focus more on protecting national interests and less on analysing their nature and scope. Having noted the above criticisms and the gaps the theory might leave, the study adopted a second theory to complement this theory and fill in the gaps left.

2.5.2 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver developed this theory of international relations in 2003. Buzan and Wæver may be best known as the main figures of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, where security is a social structure (Gupta, 2010). Regional security complexes are geographically composed of neighbours and are isolated by natural barriers, such as oceans, deserts and mountains. Buzan and Wæver (2003) describe their work as an extension, "incorporating" and filling up perceived theoretical gaps for the monolithic neorealist school of international relations.

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) asserts that international security should be viewed from a regional perspective, and that state-to-state (and other actor-to-state) relations follow predictable, geographically clustered patterns. Buzan and Wæver created the term "regional security complex" to characterize such arrangements. The actions and motivations of actors in the field of international security in RSCT are heavily regional in nature. This implies that an actor's security worries stem largely from their local surroundings (Gupta, 2010). Each actor in a region's security interacts with the other players' safety. Most security worries do not spread very far, and risks are thus most probably most strongly felt in an actor's close neighborhood. The adjacency generally means that there is significant interdependence between security inside a regional security complex, but there are far less interactions with externals (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).

Critics of securitization contend that by extending the meaning of security, they have actually undermined it, to the point that everything may be securitized and so influence state security. (Lupovici, 2014). What the States do to operate security then is disregarded. The proponents of this idea claim that three measures incorporate their views on securitization, so that everything does not become a security concern. However, the difficulty is that not all dangers are existential

for all States, and so States differ in their perception of threats which require distinct emergency measures and various reactions from the public and commercial sectors alike.

The theory is complicated by existence of actors with security interests and force projection capabilities. This forms the basis of the application of this theory in the current study whereby, the national security of interest of Kenya will be looked at in relation to the security of the actors within AMISOM and within the Eastern Africa Region. Security interests, according to Buzan & Wæver (2003), are generally geographical in character. This is in contrast to the concept that security politics is mostly a reflection of global great power interests, which was prevalent during the Cold War.

2.6 Conceptual framework of analysis

The primary analytical framework of this study was the idea that peacekeeping is an important element of broader conflict management and resolution techniques. The framework is influenced by the organised and concentrated approach of comparison by Alexander George that enables generalisations to be derived from a limited number of examples. The technique requires that the study of each case be organised around a number of 'standardised general questions' and that the features of each instance that are relevant to the research topic should be judiciously addressed. The study therefore selectively focused on decision-making to undertake enforcement operations and structured its case studies through three key issues derived from the intervention literature and current discussion. These issues related to the function of the national interest. National strategically, economically, and ideologically determined interests have traditionally been seen as the main drivers of intervening and participating in peacekeeping missions.

The basic analytical foundation of this study was the idea that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are important parts of larger conflict management and resolution methods. The unit of analysis was the AMISOM deployment in Somalia. The conceptual framework depicts the interrelationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable. The dependent variable was peace enforcement missions. The independent variable was national interests. The intervening variables included country legislation and policies and previous experience in enforcement missions. The figure 2.1 illustrates this interrelationship.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework

The national interests that the study investigated were measured using several indicators. The study focused on political interests, security interests and strategic interests as the national interests of the Republic of Kenya. The security interests included security of the citizens of Kenya, security of the borders of the Republic of Kenya, proliferation of arms and security of foreigners in Kenya who include tourists, medical services providers and humanitarian services providers. The socio-economic interests included sustaining of tourism and tourist activities along the Kenyan coast, continuation of education in the North Eastern part of Kenya, reduction of influx of refugees into Kenya and lifting of travel bans by foreign nations. The political interests included Kenya's strategic position in East Africa as a leader and Kenya's foreign policy affirmation.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presented the methodology that the study adopted. It discussed research design, study population and sampling, data sources and instrument of data collection, data collection procedures, data analysis and ethical considerations.

3.1 Research design

Qualitative descriptive research design was utilized due to the nature of the population under study; that is individuals who have knowledge or experience with a sensitive phenomenon. This research design was adopted since it does not essentially need random sampling. This made it most suitable for this study. The research design further allows more flexibility while conducting an investigation on a sensitive topic. The primary strength of qualitative research designs is their strong internal validity. They are able to isolate, control, and intensively interrogate a few variables (Long and Johnson 2000).

The fact that the study sought to explain national interests and the role they play in peace enforcement missions, an analytical research approach was used. This approach allowed the researcher to leverage on the concept of data triangulation, therefore improving the quality of results (Creswell and Clark, 2011).

3.2 Study area

The study focused on Kenya's participation in the AMISOM mission in Somalia. Having experienced episodes of internal conflicts with diverse origins, AMISOM was formed as a means to enforce peace in Somalia and safeguard human life. The Republic of Kenya launched a unilateral incursion into Somalia to pursue Al Shabaab and ostensibly protect its national interests. Since this study is at a strategic level and considering that it is a case study on Kenya, actual field data was collected in Kenya. Therefore, there was no need of traveling to Somalia to collect data.

3.3 Target Population

The study population was infinite. It included scholars and academic experts in international relations and security studies in Kenyan and KDF officers currently and previously directly involved in the different activities within AMISOM and Operation Linda Nchi. The population

also included senior officials from the DoD, MoD and MoFA. The inclusion of this scope of population was based on the fact that members of this population possess not only experience in but are knowledgeable on matters foreign policy, peace enforcement and security studies, beside some of them having been part of the security operation in Somalia.

The target population further included officials from IGAD office in Kenya, AMISOM office in Somalia, UNON and AU office in Kenya (AUDA-NEPAD). Inclusion of IGAD, UN and AU in the study population is supported by the reason that these organisations sanctioned AMISOM's mandate.

According to Mintzberg (1990) top level management involved in policy and decision making as well as the execution in organization is composed of between 4 to 9 individuals. This informed the 5 participants purposively targeted for AU, AMISOM, UN, IGAD, MoFA, MoD and Department of Defence. For KDF officers involved in AMISOM the study took cognizance of various top-level officers of the main formations in the three services Kenya Army, Airforce and Navy bringing the total number of participants to 100. As for the scholars and academic experts they were drawn from the 5 main Universities in Kenya that facilitate security and international relations studies as well as those involved in facilitation of security studies in top Security services institutions at National Defence College, Joint Command and Staff College, Kenya Military Academy, International Peace and Support and Training Centre and Defence Intelligence Academy as shown in table 3.1

Table 3.1: Target Population

| Target | Description | Target population |
|----------------------------------|---|--------------------------|
| African Union Office in Nairobi | Top Level Management | 5 |
| AMISOM Office in Nairobi | Top Level Management | 5 |
| United Nations Office in Nairobi | Top Level Management | 5 |
| IGAD Office in Nairobi | Top Level Management | 5 |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Top Level Management Diplomats involved in Kenya-Somalia relations | 5 5 |
| Ministry of Defence | Top Level Management | 10 |
| Department of Defence | General officers | 5 |
| | Senior staff officers | 5 |
| KDF Officers in Amisom | Senior officers | 50 |
| | Junior Officers | 50 |
| Scholars and Academic experts | Universities | 50 |
| | Scholars and academic experts in KDF affiliated institutions | 50 |
| TOTAL | | 250 |

3.4 Sampling Technique

The study made use of multistage sampling technique by employing stratified sampling and purposive sampling. The study made use of stratified sampling to obtain initial potential samples. According to Kombo & Tromp (2006) stratified random sampling involves dividing the population into homogeneous subgroups and taking samples from the subgroups. First, the targeted participants were placed in strata that were based on management level within the institutions and organisations. The strata created were top level management, mid-level management and low-level management. Each stratum was formed based on shared attributes or characteristics. Stratified random sampling was adopted for this study due to the need to evaluate data from different subgroups within the target population. It allowed the researcher efficiently obtain a sample that best represented the entire population being studied.

Purposive sampling was thereafter employed to obtain respondents from the respective strata. Being an analytical study, the use of purposive sampling was hinged on the fact that the data that was being sought was held by experts and participants in peace enforcement missions. As such, other methods of sampling would not yield a sample size that was rich in the information being sought by the study.

3.5 Sample Size

A total of 116 participants formed the sample size which was calculated using the formula that was proposed by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003). Furthermore, the sample size used in the study was arrived at based on the propositions of Dworkin (2012) who recommends that in qualitative studies, 25–130 participants are adequate to attain saturation and redundancy as well as satisfactory for publications in journals as well as for academic purposes.

$$n = \frac{z^2 pq}{d^2}$$

Where:

n = the minimum sample size

z = the table value for standard normal deviate corresponding to 95% significance level (=1.96)

p = the proportion in the target population estimated to have characteristics being measured (7%)

q = 1-p

d = margin error set at +/- 0.05

Therefore,

$$n = \frac{(1.96)^2 (.07)(.93)}{(.05)^2}$$

$$= 100$$

$$100 + 16 \text{ allowance for non-response} = 116 \text{ participants}$$

The study sample size was therefore 116 participants

Table 3.2: Study Sample Size

| Target | Description | Target population |
|----------------------------------|--|--------------------------|
| African Union Office in Nairobi | Top Level Management | 5 |
| AMISOM Office in Nairobi | Top Level Management | 5 |
| United Nations Office in Nairobi | Top Level Management | 5 |
| IGAD Office in Nairobi | Top Level Management | 5 |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Top Level Management | 5 |
| | Diplomats involved in Kenya-Somalia relations | 5 |
| Ministry of Defence | Top Level Management | 10 |
| Department of Defence | General officers | 5 |
| | Senior staff officers | 5 |
| KDF Officers in Amisom | Senior officers | 17 |
| | Junior Officers | 17 |
| Scholars and Academic experts | Universities | 16 |
| | Scholars and academic experts in KDF affiliated institutions | 16 |
| TOTAL | | 116 |

3.6 Instruments of data collection

In collecting data from respondents targeted in the study, the researcher used a semi-structured questionnaire. These types of questionnaires contain closed-ended and open-ended questions and are frequently designed to have a closed-ended question being followed by an open-ended question to elicit more information on reasons as to why a participant chose a particular response to the previous question. A semi structured questionnaire has the advantages of consistency of replies and the ability to ask follow-up questions if necessary.

These questionnaires were open-ended enough to allow the key informants to explore ideas and issues relating to policy while consulting with colleagues and resources within their respective institutions as far as providing accurate and credible information was concerned.

The questionnaire was divided into four sections. Section one captured the background information of the respondents. Section two enquired on the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM. The third section captured data on how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya. The fourth section enquired on ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM.

The questionnaire used in the study collected information from scholars and academic experts in international relations and security studies in Kenyan and KDF officers currently and previously directly involved in the different activities within AMISOM and Operation Linda Nchi. Structured interviews were administered on officials from the DoD, MoD, MoFA, UNON, AU office in Kenya, IGAD office in Kenya and AMISOM office in Somalia.

3.7 Pilot Testing of Research Instruments

The study conducted a pilot study on KDF officers at the Lanet Military Barracks. This is because within the entire study sample, KDF officers were factored in as respondents and as such, having them as part of the pilot study enabled the researcher to have a feel of what to expect in the actual data collection. Findings from the pilot study were excluded from the final report. The responses obtained from the exercise helped identify some of the likely shortcomings that would have been experienced during the actual data collection exercise. This aided in restructuring the instruments where necessary depending on the shortcomings realized.

3.8 Validity and reliability

Content validity and construct validity were utilized by the research. These were assessed by judgmental discretion and panel assessments. To establish the validity of the questionnaire and interview guide, a draft copy was availed to a panel of experts for reviewing. The views, opinions and recommendations from the supervisors were factored into the refining of the questionnaire where necessary. Furthermore, a field test was done among KDF officers at the Lanet Military Barracks. Thereafter, necessary amendments were made taking into consideration field test results and recommendations from the panel.

Reliability of the data collection tools being based on their internal consistency, was established using Cronbach's alpha, aiming at a minimum index of 0.7 (Santos, 1999). The recommended value of Cronbach's alpha (α) is 0.7 and was used as a cut-off reliability. Examples of where the Cronbach's alpha has been used include Okeyo et al, (2014); Hughes & Morgan (2007); Ferreira, Azevedo, & Fernandez (2011).

Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed criteria to be used in assessing rigour in qualitative studies. They include truth-value, consistency, neutrality, and applicability. In addressing truth-value, the researcher considered subjective experiences and views which could result in bias. Results were

presented solely relied on the data collected from the targeted samples to clearly and accurately present participants’ perspectives. Peer debriefing assisted in uncovering taken-for-granted biases and assumptions.

Table 3.3: Case Processing Summary of Reliability Test

| | Number | Percentage (%) |
|--------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Valid | 13 | 100.00 |
| Excluded | 0 | 0.00 |
| Total | 13 | 100.00 |

Reliability Statistics

| Cronbach’s Alpha | | Number of Items |
|-------------------------|--|------------------------|
| 0.812 | | 13 |

Table 3.3 reports reliability of the research instruments. For the study to be reliable, the Cronbach Alpha value has to be above 0.7000. Since the above scale is 0.812, this means the research instruments were reliable and the data collected and subsequent findings could be used for decision making with a reasonable degree of reliability.

3.9 Data Collection Techniques

A semi-structured, self-administered questionnaire was utilized. Taking into account the prevailing Covid-19 pandemic and the containment measures that were in place at that time, the researcher was biased to using mailed questionnaires aided by google forms. The researcher also made use telephonic structured interviews to collect data from respondents who were not readily available to respond to the questionnaires. This made sure that the researcher is compliant to the containment regulations, avoid predisposing himself to risk of contracting the virus as well as fit into the new world order of social distancing. Non-response was anticipated and it arises with this data collection technique. Telephone contact was initiated with respondents so that calls are made prior to dropping or mailing the questionnaires as well as prior to collection.

Secondary sources were utilized to obtain secondary data. Indeed, the role of national interests in peace enforcement missions with a key focus on Kenya and AMISOM, necessarily entails adopting an organizational level approach. Therefore, key AMISOM, UN, IGAD, OAU and AU documents as well as other official sources were critically reviewed. Secondary sources consisted official reports on peace enforcement missions in Africa, academic journal articles, publications and books containing commentaries on and analyses of study topic.

3.10 Data Analysis and Presentation

Data from questionnaires underwent cleaning and sorting. Thereafter, it was coded and entered into the SPSS program for analysis. Descriptive analysis and thematic analysis were conducted. Keen interest was placed on observation of relationships, trends, variations and differences present in the data, which were used in informing the findings of the research. Content analysis was conducted on secondary data to be able to understand what is known about national interests in peace enforcement missions. The researcher used a systematic approach in conducting this review. The process of data analysis involved finding out relationships and trends by cross-referencing results from content analysis, thematic analysis and descriptive analysis. This enabled the researcher to understand what stands out across the study samples, the differing responses and thus, facilitate the drawing of conclusions. The results were presented in narrative form as well as use of verbatim where necessary.

3.11 Ethical considerations

Authority to conduct research was sought from all relevant authorities and institutions before commencing the study. These institutions included but not limited to Kenyatta University, Ministry of Education and the National Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). All participants were adequately informed of the study and its intentions through relevant introductory letters. Consent was sought from all participants prior to their participation. Confidentiality and anonymity of all respondents was highly observed. In light of the fact that questionnaires can be intrusive and stressful for participants, the researcher proved their credibility and gained the trust of the participants by showing a proficient understanding of the topic. The researcher also provided the participants with relevant information before administering the questionnaires so as to give the participants the opportunity to prepare themselves.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents results of the data collected by the study. The chapter entails the return rate, demographic information of the study participants, the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM, how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya and the ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM.

4.1 Return Rate

The study realized a 91% return rate with a total of 105 questionnaires out of 116 being duly filled and returned. The researcher found the information in 105 questionnaires valid and as such, used the information to inform the study as Mugenda and Mugenda (2008) noted that a return rate above 75% is ample enough to inform a study and the findings can be used to generalize characteristics of a population

4.2 Demographic Information

The study sought to understand the background characteristics of the study population by enquiring on the gender, age and marital status, highest level of education and duration of service. Demographic information provides data regarding research participants and was necessary in determining whether the individuals in the study were a representative sample of the target population for generalization purposes. Capturing demographic information enabled the researcher to actually determine whether the information that was being sought by the study was from the right sources.

4.2.1 Gender

The study first sought to understand the distribution of the participants according to their gender. The study established that there were more males as compared to females within the study sample. The study noted that males constituted 88% of the valid sample size while females constituted 12% of the valid sample size. Thus, the findings of this study were that males constituted the highest percentage of the study sample size.

4.2.2 Age

The study also sought to understand the distribution of participants according to their age. The study established that most of the participants were aged between 30 and 35 years. This was noted among 63.8%. Those who were aged between 24 and 29 years were 22.9%, those who were aged between 36 and 40 years were 9.5% while 3.8% were aged between 41 years and 45 years.

4.2.3 Marital Status

The study sought to understand the distribution of the study participants according to their marital status. The study established that most of the participants were married. This was observed among 69.5% of the study participants. Those who were single were 14.3%, those who were divorced were 11.4% and those who were separated were 1% while 3.8% were widowed.

4.2.4 Highest Level of Education

The study also sought to understand the highest level of education that the participants had attained. The study established that 83% of the participants had attained university level of education while 17% had attained college level of education. Therefore, the findings of this study were that most of the participants had attained university level of education and that all the participants were literate.

4.2.5 Duration of Service

Finally, the study sought to establish the duration that the participants had been in service within the organisations they were working in. The study established that most of the participants had been in service for a period of between 11 and 20 years. This was noted among 69.5% of the participants. Those who had been in service for 6 to 10 years were 27.6% while 2.9% had been in service for a period of 21 years and more.

4.3 National interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM

One of the main objectives of this study was to establish the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM. Here, the study sought to establish the reasons why Kenya deployed to Somalia and whether the deployment was necessary, reasons why Kenya joined AMISOM and whether there were any national interests that Kenya sought to protect by joining AMISOM.

4.3.1 Reasons why Kenya deployed its troops to Somalia

The study begun by enquiring on whether the participants were aware of the reasons why Kenya deployed its troops to Somalia. The study established that 99% of the participants were aware of the reasons why Kenya deployed its troops to Somalia while 1% were not aware. Thus, the findings of this study indicated that most of the participants were aware of the reasons why Kenya deployed its troops to Somalia.

Additionally, the study enquired from the participants the specific reasons why Kenya deployed its troops to Somalia. As noted by most of the participants, Kenya deployed its troops into Somalia to track down Al-Shabaab militants who had over several months carried out attacks on Kenyan soil, killing people, destroying property, abducting people and propagating insecurity.

Some of the reasons pointed out by the participants include:

To preserve territorial integrity of Kenya against Al Shabaab attacks (Participant A94)

To safeguard Kenya's national interests and create a buffer zone to deter external aggression (Participant A16)

To protect the territorial integrity of our borders which were being infiltrated by a growing Shabaab population in Lower Juba Somalia. Cases of abductions along the Kenyan side of KenSom border had increased (Participant A24).

From the findings of this study and as suggested by the above narrations by the participants, the themes that emanate from the reasons provided by the participants include safeguarding of national interests, safeguarding territorial integrity, protecting citizens and ensuring their security and working towards elimination of the threat of Al Shabaab both in Kenya and in Somalia.

4.3.2 Necessity for a foreign military intervention in Somalia

The study further sought to establish whether the military incursion into Somalia by Kenyan troops was necessitated at that time. The findings of this study indicated that most of the participants were in agreement that Kenya's military deployment in Somalia was necessary. This was noted among 84% of the participants with 16% noting that the deployment was not necessary.

The study went ahead to enquire from the participants on the justification for their responses above and the following were some of the prominent responses.

There was real and perceived threat to our nation which needed military intervention as the sole solution. (Participant A53)

Without the intervention of foreign militaries, the situation in Somalia would have deteriorated with the influence of Alshaabab spreading across the region. This is because the country's (Somalia) was overwhelmed by insecurity perpetuated by Alshaabab (Participant A101)

Foreign military intervention was necessary as the militants had taken control of the Somalia and the government of that time was inadequately prepared in many facets to deal with the menace. (Participant A6)

Somali security forces were and are still unable to counter the alshabaab threat on their own. In a country that is characterized by terror groups, a combination of both hard and soft approaches remains key in resolving conflicts. (Participant A78)

As evidenced by the above sentiments as well as review of the data collected, the study noted that the military incursion into Somalia was necessitated by the fact that the security apparatus in Somalia were not capacitated to deal with Al Shabaab at that time and as such, the military deployment was seen as a reinforcement. Further, it was observed that the threats posed by Al Shabaab had a spill-over effect to neighbouring countries and as such, Kenya as one of the neighbours, could not just sit on the fence and observe its national interests (security, safety, territorial integrity) being threatened. The findings also show that without the intervention of Kenya's military, the situation in Somalia and in the neighbouring countries would have deteriorated as a result of the threats posed by Al Shabaab. This is because as indicated in the findings of the study, the terror group would have continued its attack on the countries neighbouring Somalia just as they have continued to date (albeit at very reduced intensity and magnitude). The study thus finds that the military deployment into Somalia was necessary.

However, participants who noted that the military deployment was not necessary noted that Kenya would have safeguarded her borders without necessarily having troops inside Somalia. Others noted that Kenya would have stuck to safeguarding its porous borders so as to deter any militants from crossing over, and this would have still served the same purpose of safeguarding its national interests. For instance, one participant noted;

Kenya would have as well achieved her interests of protecting her territories by simply firming up her borderline and defending against attackers crossing over. There was no need for KDF to cross over into Somalia at the start. (Participant A81)

One other participant noted;

It was not necessary, if it was, then why are we all insisting on soft power. Kenya has a strong army and she could even have used mechanisms such as deterrence. (Participant A67)

4.3.3 Awareness of AMISOM and its roles

The study further sought to understand whether participants were aware of AMISOM and whether they understood the roles of AMISOM. From the findings of this study, all the participants were aware of AMISOM. For instance, participants noted;

Restoration of peace and security in the Republic of Somalia. Thereafter, it will facilitate the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces (Participant A04)

AMISOM mandate is to help the Somalia back to her feet through degradation of Al shabaab and supporting Somalia to put in place political structures to enable her to govern itself (Participant A22)

To incapacitate Al Shabaab and ensure the Somali Security Forces are fully capable to perform operations against the militants on their own and perform other military duties in protection of their country. (Participant A99)

The study that noted that AMISOM has several roles to play. AMISOM has a role to play in stabilizing Somalia and ensuring peace, security and stability are realized sustainably. In doing so, AMISOM has a role to play in eliminating Al Shabaab and all its threats. Additionally, AMISOM has a role to play in building the capacity of the security forces in Somalia; the military and the federal police. This will go a long way in ensuring that the peace and stability achieved by AMISOM is maintained and in a sustainable manner. AMISOM has a role to play in supporting Somalia to put in place political structures to enable her to govern herself and provide security to her people. This also include supporting her in post-reconstruction of her security and social fronts.

At the end of its mandate in Somalia, AMISOM will have the transition role of handing over the control of regions it was securing back to the Somalia security organs. Thus, from these findings, the study observed that all the participants were not only aware of the existence of AMISOM but also aptly aware of its roles in terms of stabilizing Somalia and ensuring peace and security returns to Somalia.

4.3.4 Parties in the Somalia conflict consenting to AMISOM's deployment

The study went ahead to enquire whether all the parties in the Somalia conflict gave their consent prior to the deployment of AMISOM. The study established that most of the participants were of the opinion that warring parties in the Somalia conflict did not consent to the deployment of AMISOM. This was noted among 47.6 % with 9.5% noting that the parties consented while those who did not know were 42.9%. These findings are an indication that the deployment of AMISOM, despite the fact that not all parties gave their consent to its deployment, was a necessary tool to restore peace and stability.

4.3.5 Reasons why Kenya officially joined AMISOM

In further understanding the dynamics behind Kenya's decision to join AMISOM after the unilateral deployment into Somalia earlier on, the study enquired from participants the period when Kenya officially joined AMISOM and the reasons why Kenya formally joined AMISOM. The study established that 99% of the participants knew the period when Kenya officially joined AMISOM while 1% did not know the period when Kenya joined AMISOM.

Furthermore, the study sought to establish whether participants were aware of the reasons why Kenyan officially joined AMISOM after deploying into Somalia unilaterally earlier on. The study established that 98% of the participants were aware of the reasons why Kenya officially joined AMISOM while 2% were not aware of the reasons why Kenya officially joined AMISOM. For instance, from the data collected, the following prominent reasons were cited;

To help Somalia build its own force security forces so as to be able to fight Alshaabab and safeguard Kenya's national interest (Participant A84)

There was need for a concerted effort by East African countries towards realization of lasting peace in Somalia. If Somalia is unstable then it's neighbours will be unstable as well. (Participant A16)

To legitimize its military operation in Somalia. Also, there were chances that Kenya would benefit for instance financially, through training and military hardware (Participant A103)

This was to be in solidarity with other members of the IGAD and EAC in fighting a common enemy and bringing peace to Somalia and the region (Participant A72)

The findings thus indicate that Kenya joined AMISOM so as to work in unison with other states for purposes of bringing sanity to the security situation that was spilling over from Somalia, almost ravaging the entire region in Eastern Africa. The findings also indicate that Kenya joined AMISOM so as to make its entry and military operation into Somalia legitimate. Kenya also joined AMISOM so as to reap the benefits of working with a continental peace enforcement mission and these benefits included financial benefits to sustain the military deployment, military hardware and training. Kenya joined AMISOM so as to strongly and fervently protect its national interests which at that time, were under threats from Al Shabaab even after the unitary deployment. Above all, Kenya joined AMISOM so as to work together in bringing the much elusive peace and stability back to Somalia.

4.3.6 Interests that Kenya wanted to protect by joining AMISOM

Having understood the background of Kenya's deployment to Somalia and subsequently joining AMISOM, the study sought to understand the interests that Kenya wanted to protect by joining AMISOM. The study established that strategic interests were the most prominent interests that Kenya wanted to protect by joining AMISOM. This was cited in 21.7 percent of the cases. Other interests were national security interests (21.2 percent), social interests (20.1 percent), economic interests (19.2 percent) and political interests (17.9 percent). Thus, Kenya sought to protect its valued national interests by officially joining AMISOM.

4.3.7 National interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM

Finally, the study sought participants opinions regarding the different national interests and how they related to Kenya's decision to officially join AMISOM.

From the data collected, a cumulative 6.7 percent of the participants disagreed that Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its national territorial integrity with 12.4 percent being neutral and a cumulative 80.9 percent being in agreement that Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its national territorial integrity. A cumulative 3.9 percent of the participants were in disagreement that Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its citizens against terrorism acts with 11.3 percent being neutral and a cumulative 84.8 percent agreeing that Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its citizens against terrorism acts.

A cumulative 2.9 percent of the participants disagreed that Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its visitors (tourists, foreign aid workers) against terrorism acts with 5.7 percent being neutral and a cumulative 91.4 percent were in agreement that Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its visitors (tourists, foreign aid workers) against terrorism acts. A cumulative 6.7 percent were in disagreement that Kenya joined AMISOM to help restore and stabilize peace in Somalia with 8.6 percent being neutral and a cumulative 84.7 percent agreeing that Kenya joined AMISOM to help restore and stabilize peace in Somalia.

A cumulative 4.8% of the participants were in disagreement that Kenya joined AMISOM to reduce illicit flow of migrants into Kenya with 9.5 percent being neutral and a cumulative 85.7 percent agreeing that Kenya joined AMISOM to reduce illicit flow of migrants into Kenya. A cumulative 1 percent were in agreement that Kenya joined AMISOM because other nations joined (solidarity) with 6.7 percent being neutral and a cumulative 92.3 percent agreeing that Kenya joined AMISOM because other nations joined (solidarity).

A cumulative 4.8 percent were in agreement that Kenya joined AMISOM so as to promote its national image and pride with 15.2 percent being neutral and a cumulative 80 percent agreeing that Kenya joined AMISOM so as to promote its national image and pride. A cumulative 2.9 percent were in agreement that Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its markets from influx of unregulated products from Somalia with 7.6 percent being neutral and a cumulative 89.5 percent agreeing that Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its markets from influx of unregulated products from Somalia.

Therefore, from the findings above, the study established that Kenyan officially joined AMISOM with the most compelling reason being Kenya joined AMISOM because other nations joined (solidarity) (92.3 percent). Other reasons included the need to protect its visitors (tourists, foreign aid workers etc) against terrorism acts (91.4 percent), to protect its markets from influx of unregulated products from Somalia (89.5 percent), to reduce illicit flow of migrants into Kenya (85.7 percent), to protect its citizens against terrorism acts (84.8 percent), help restore and stabilize peace in Somalia (84.7 percent), to protect its national territorial integrity (80.9 percent) and to promote its national image and pride (80 percent). All these factors constitute the national interests of Kenya that led to Kenya joining and participating in AMISOM.

The findings herein are supported by a report (Republic of Kenya, 2012) which indicated that Kenya's engagement in Somalia arose out of its strong commitment to make a contribution to

regional and global peace and security (Republic of Kenya, 2012). These findings are further supported by the affirmation of Miyandazi (2012) that at the beginning of its entrance to Somalia, Kenya argued for the right of a state to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter which, following an armed attack against a UN member, explicitly identified the inherent right of individual or collaborative self-defence.

Additionally, the findings of this study agree with the findings of Amadi (2014) who noted that after the unilateral entry into Somalia in 2011, Kenya, in 2012 merged its efforts and joined AMISOM to continue pursuing its diverse national interests. These included national security interests, economic interests, social interests, political interests and strategic interests. Therefore, the findings of this study refute the allegations (Miyandazi, 2012) that Kenya's involvement in Somalia was to pave way for oil exploration, for political elites to garner voter support in the elections that were due in 2013.

4.4 How the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya

The second specific objective of the study was to identify how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya. Here, the study sought to establish the benefits that accrued to Kenya as a result of joining and taking part in AMISOM, how specific national interests were affected as a result of Kenya joining AMISOM and the overall effect on the national interests of Kenya after officially joining AMISOM.

4.4.1 Kenya's active participation in the AMISOM peace keeping activities and the benefits accrued

The study first sought to establish whether Kenya had actively participated in the AMISOM activities since it officially joined the mission. From the data collected, 99 percent of the participants agreed that Kenya had actively participated in the activities of AMISOM with 1% noting that Kenya had not actively participated in AMISOM activities. Thus, the study established that Kenya participated actively in AMISOM.

The study went ahead to enquire how Kenya had benefited from its participation in AMISOM. The study established that the most prominent benefits Kenya has realized by actively participating in AMISOM were the joint trainings and joint missions which have improved the skill-sets of Kenyan troops (23.7 percent) and Kenya having made a name for itself as a strong

trooped nation (23.7 percent). Other benefits included receiving financial gains as part of being in the mission (22.9 percent), receiving training, knowledge and capacity building (18.2 percent) and benefiting from tools, weapons and equipment (11.4 percent). Therefore, the study established that by joining and participating actively in AMISOM, Kenyan troops improved their skills through the joint training while at the same time, Kenya made a name for itself as a strong trooped nation.

4.4.2 Effect of Kenya's participation in AMISOM on Kenya's national interests

The study further sought to understand how the participation of Kenya in AMISOM affected its national interests. It was established that national security interests were affected positively (84 percent), economic interests were affected positively (71 percent), social interests were affected positively (56 percent), political interests were affected positively (64 percent), and strategic interests were affected positively (75 percent). Therefore, the study established that the national security interests were the most positively affected national interests due to Kenya's active participation in AMISOM.

In the same vein, the study sought further opinion of participants in relation to how the national interests of Kenya have been affected as a result of its participation in AMISOM. From the data collected, a cumulative 63.8 percent of the participants disagreed that Kenya's national interests have not changed even after joining AMISOM with 30.5 percent being neutral and 5.7 percent being in agreement. A cumulative 2.9 percent of the participants disagreed that by Kenya joining AMISOM, Kenya still faces threats on its national security with 6.7 percent being neutral and a cumulative 88.6 percent agreeing that by Kenya joining AMISOM, Kenya still faces threats on its national security.

A cumulative 45.7 percent were in disagreement that Kenya's national image was soiled as a result of civilian casualties with 35.2 percent being neutral and a cumulative 12 percent agreeing that Kenya's national image was soiled as a result of civilian casualties. A cumulative 35.2 percent disagreed that Kenya's national image was soiled as a result of allegations of illicit trades with 28.6 percent being neutral and a cumulative 36.2 percent agreeing that Kenya's national image was soiled as a result of allegations of illicit trades. A cumulative 5.7 percent were in disagreement that By joining AMISOM, Kenya achieved more of its deployment objectives in view of national interests with 5.7 percent being neutral and a cumulative 88.5 percent agreeing

that By joining AMISOM, Kenya achieved more of its deployment objectives in view of national interests.

From the results obtained in the study, Kenya's national interests were affected positively after officially joining AMISOM and participating actively in its activities. Further, the study established that by joining AMISOM, Kenya achieved more of its deployment objectives in view of national interests.

The findings of this study are in tandem with the findings of Albrecht and Haenlien (2016) who noted that as a result of Kenya's participation in AMISOM, a relatively peaceful environment was returning to Somalia coupled with the provision of security to citizens. As such, the researchers noted that Daadab and Kakuma refugee camps had begun to witness reduced inflow of refugees from Somalia. Further, Kenya has seen an increased number of refugees voluntarily repatriating back to Somalia. This has been a benefit and a step in the right direction by Kenya to reduce its refugee burden and the social and economic pressure that the refugee burden comes with.

Additionally, as noted by Amadi (2014), the strengthening of internal security mechanism, including capacity building for intelligence and joint planning of operations and coordinated execution have seen the national security interests of Kenya receive a positive transformation through among others, community policing.

4.5 Ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM

The final objective of this study was to identify ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM. Here, the study enquired on the need for Kenya and AMISOM to address the root cause of the conflict and violence in Somalia, the best strategy a nation can secure its national interests in view of conflicts and the best way that Kenya can use to secure its national interests going into the future.

4.5.1 The need to address the causes of conflict to provide sustainable peace

The study first sought to understand whether there was need for Kenya and AMISOM to address the causes of conflict to provide sustainable peace in Somalia. The findings of this study were that 80 percent of the participants agreed that Kenya needs to address the causes of conflict in Somalia for sustainable peace with 20 percent saying no. On the other hand, 90 percent of the

participants agreed that AMISOM needs to address the causes of conflict in Somalia for sustainable peace. Therefore, the study established that Kenya and AMISOM need. to address the causes of conflict in Somalia for sustainable peace.

4.5.2 Kenya's approach in securing its national interests

The study also sought to interrogate whether Kenya's initial approach in securing its national interests was the best approach. The study established that 84 percent of the participants were in agreement that Kenya's initial approach to securing its national interests was the best with 16 percent noting that this was not the best approach. The study further sought to find out whether joining AMISOM was the best approach that could ensure Kenya's national interests were secured. It was established that 64 percent of the participants were in agreement that joining AMISOM was Kenya's best approach to securing its national interests with 36 percent noting that this was not the best approach.

4.5.3 Best strategy a nation can secure its national interests in the face of conflicts

In forming part of the study recommendations, it was important for the researcher to enquire on the best strategy that a nation can use to secure its national interests in the face of conflicts. The study established that seeking interventions of a regional organization was the most prominent strategy a nation could use to secure its national interests. This was noted by 62.9 percent of the participants. Unilateral deployment of troops was cited by 5.7 percent, joining a peace keeping mission was cited by 19 percent and joining a peace enforcement mission was cited by 12.4 percent. From these findings, it was established that the use of regional organizations was the best strategy a nation can secure its national interests in the face of conflict.

4.5.4 Best way that Kenya can use to secure its national interests going into the future

Finally, the study sought to find out the best way that Kenyan can use to secure its national interests with the Somalia case and going into the future. The prominent mechanism and strategies cited include:

Soft power approach. By having a dialogue as it's options in dealing with foreign policy.
(Participant A48)

Seeking interventions of both regional and international organizations as we as formation of regional security blocks with allied neighbours. (Participant A92)

Pulling out her forces from Somalia and AMISOM then secure her territory integrity from Kenya side. Kenya should review its priorities and engage more with the stakeholders to come up with a more current and working strategy (Participant A60)

Using both military intervention as well as political intervention when dealing with a stable government to secure its interests. (Participant A70)

From the findings of this study, it was established that strategies that Kenya can use in securing her national interests include formation of and seeking the interventions of a regional security organization with its neighbours, having a strong military force and pre-emptively actin on any threats towards its national interests, using diplomatic interventions such as soft power, developing a foreign policy and defence policy anchored on strong partnership with allied nations, fighting from within its borders and preventing any infiltration and keeping its operations under AMISOM and ensuring the boarders are well secured.

The findings of this study agree with Williams (2019) who noted that Kenya needs to leverage on collaborations and processes besides its own. These collaborations could be local, state-to-state and even regional in nature. The findings thus find footing in the Regional Security Complex Theory which asserts that international security should be viewed from a regional perspective, and that state-to-state (and other actor-to-state) relations follow predictable, geographically clustered patterns. Thus, national security of interest of Kenya ought to be looked at in relation to the security of the actors within AMISOM and within the Eastern Africa Region.

Additionally, the findings of this study are in tandem with the suggestions by Peter (2015) who strongly rooted for the use of soft power in the sense that Kenya has the best chances of using its association with AMISOM to push for policy reforms which will ultimately lead to law and order, thus reducing security risks facing Kenya

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter entailed a presentation and interpretation of the results obtained from the process of analysis of the data collected by the study. Kenya joined AMISOM so as to strongly and fervently protect its national interests which at that time, were under threats from Al Shabaab even after the unitary deployment. Kenya's national interests were affected positively in addition to Kenya reaping many benefits from joining and working with AMISOM. Both Kenya and AMISOM need to address the causes of conflict in Somalia for sustainable peace to prevail.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents a discussion of the findings of the study. The chapter entails a brief introduction of the study, the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM, how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya and ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM. The chapter further presents conclusions arising from the findings, recommendations and suggestions for future studies.

5.1 Introduction

The main objective of this study was to critically analyze the role of national interests in peace enforcement missions with the Republic of Kenya and AMISOM as the case study. The specific objectives of the study were to assess the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM, to examine how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya and to evaluate ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM. A descriptive cross-sectional survey research design was utilized. Data was collected from a targeted sample of 116 respondents with analysis being conducted on data obtained from 105 participants.

5.2 Summary of findings

5.2.1 National interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM

The study established that Kenya deployed its troops into Somalia to track down Al-Shabaab militants who had over several months carried out attacks on Kenyan soil, killing people, destroying property, abducting people and propagating insecurity. In launching the unilateral incursion into Somalia, Kenya was aiming to safeguard its national interests, safeguard territorial integrity, protect citizens and ensure their security as well as work towards elimination of the threat of Al Shabaab both in Kenya and in Somalia.

Most of the participants were in agreement that Kenya's military deployment in Somalia was necessary. The findings of this study indicated that the military incursion into Somalia was necessitated by the fact that the security apparatus in Somalia were not capacitated to deal with Al Shabaab at that time and as such, the military deployment was necessary. The study

established that threats posed by Al Shabaab had a spill-over effect to neighbouring countries and as such, Kenya as one of the neighbours, could not just sit on the fence and observe its national interests (security, safety, territorial integrity) being threatened. Additionally, without the intervention of Kenya's military, the situation in Somalia and in the neighbouring countries would have deteriorated as a result of the threats posed by Al Shabaab.

However, the study established that most of the participants felt that the warring parties in the Somalia conflict did not consent to the deployment of AMISOM, a security mission that begun its operation in Somalia several months after Kenya's unilateral incursion. The study established that Kenya officially joined AMISOM so as to work in unison with other states for purposes of bringing sanity to the security situation that was spilling over from Somalia, almost ravaging the entire region in Eastern Africa.

The findings also indicate that Kenya joined AMISOM so as to make its entry and military operation into Somalia legitimate. Kenya joined AMISOM so as to reap the benefits of working with a continental peace enforcement mission and these benefits included financial benefits to sustain the military deployment, military hardware and training. The findings additionally, showed that Kenya joined AMISOM so as to work together in bringing the much elusive peace and stability back to Somalia.

Kenya joined AMISOM so as to strongly and fervently protect its national interests which at that time, were under threats from Al Shabaab even after the unitary deployment. In this breadth, the study established that strategic interests were the most prominent interests that Kenya wanted to protect by joining AMISOM. Other interests that Kenya wanted to protect by joining AMISOM were national security interests, social interests, economic interests and political interests.

Further findings from this study showed that Kenya joined AMISOM because other nations joined (solidarity). These findings thus affirm earlier findings of the study which indicated that Kenya officially joined AMISOM so as to work in unison with other states for purposes of bringing sanity to the security situation that was spilling over from Somalia, almost ravaging the entire region in Eastern Africa. Other reasons that led to Kenya joining AMISOM relate to the need to protect its visitors (tourists, foreign aid workers) against terrorism acts, to protect its markets from influx of unregulated products from Somalia, to reduce illicit flow of migrants into Kenya, to protect its citizens against terrorism acts, help restore and stabilize peace in Somalia, to protect its national territorial integrity and to promote its national image and pride. All these

factors constitute the national interests of Kenya that led to Kenya joining and participating in AMISOM.

5.2.2 How the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya

As established by the study, Kenya had actively participated in the activities of AMISOM. This participation, as established by the study, had come along with various benefits to Kenya. The most prominent benefits Kenya has realized by actively participating in AMISOM were the joint trainings and joint missions which have improved the skill-sets of Kenyan troops and Kenya having made a name for itself as a strong trooped nation.

The study further established that other benefits included receiving financial gains as part of being in the mission, receiving training, knowledge and capacity building and benefiting from tools, weapons and equipment. Therefore, the study established that by joining and participating actively in AMISOM, Kenyan troops improved their skills through the joint training while at the same time, Kenya made a name for itself as a strong trooped nation.

The findings of this study showed that Kenya's national security interests were affected positively, economic interests were affected positively, social interests were affected positively, political interests were affected positively, and strategic interests were affected positively. Therefore, the study established that the national security interests were the most positively affected national interests due to Kenya's active participation in AMISOM. The study further established that Kenya achieved more of its deployment objectives in view of national interests.

5.2.3 Ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM

It was established that Kenya's initial approach to securing its national interests was the best and to a commendable extend, joining AMISOM was Kenya's best approach to securing its national interests. The study further established that seeking interventions of a regional organization was the most prominent strategy a nation could use to secure its national interests. Other strategies as noted in the study include unilateral deployment of troops, joining a peace keeping mission was and joining a peace enforcement mission.

In the context of Kenya, the study established that strategies that Kenya can use in securing her national interests include formation of and seeking the interventions of a regional security organization with its neighbours, having a strong military force and pre-emptively actin on any

threats towards its national interests, using diplomatic interventions such as soft power, developing a foreign policy and defence policy anchored on strong partnership with allied nations, fighting from within its borders and preventing any infiltration and keeping its operations under AMISOM and ensuring the borders are well secured. From these findings, it was established that the use of regional organizations was the best strategy a nation can secure its national interests in the face of conflict.

The study established that both Kenya and AMISOM need to address the causes of conflict in Somalia for sustainable peace. In this regard, Kenya must quickly persuade local political leaders to make specific decisions in order to create the groundwork for the security sector reforms that will see a restoration of law and order in Somalia. Diplomatic strategies could play a key tool to achieve this as established in this study.

5.3 Conclusions

The study concluded that Kenya joined AMISOM so as to strongly and fervently protect its national interests which at that time, were under threats from Al Shabaab even after the unitary deployment. These interests were strategic interests, national security interests, social interests, economic interests and political interests. Other reasons that led to Kenya joining AMISOM relate to the need to protect its visitors (tourists, foreign aid workers) against terrorism acts, to protect its markets from influx of unregulated products from Somalia, to reduce illicit flow of migrants into Kenya, to protect its citizens against terrorism acts, help restore and stabilize peace in Somalia, to protect its national territorial integrity and to promote its national image and pride.

The study concluded that Kenya's national security interests were affected positively, economic interests were affected positively, social interests were affected positively, political interests were affected positively, and strategic interests were affected positively. This is in addition to Kenya reaping from benefits such as joint trainings and joint missions which have improved the skill-sets of Kenyan troops, Kenya having made a name for itself as a strong trooped nation, receiving financial gains as part of being in the mission, receiving training, knowledge and capacity building and benefiting from tools, weapons and equipment.

The study concluded that strategies that Kenya can use in securing her national interests include formation of and seeking the interventions of a regional security organization with its neighbours, having a strong military force and pre-emptively act on any threats towards its

national interests, using diplomatic interventions such as soft power, developing a foreign policy and defence policy anchored on strong partnership with allied nations, fighting from within its borders and preventing any infiltration and keeping its operations under AMISOM and ensuring the borders are well secured.

The study concluded that both Kenya and AMISOM need to address the causes of conflict in Somalia for sustainable peace

5.4 Recommendations

The following recommendations arose from the findings of the study:

- a. Kenya should seek for and work towards greater engagement in regional formations that are focused on not only economic and social cooperation but also security cooperation. This will enable Kenya to benefit from security operations, missions and cooperation that are pegged on regional organisations and institutions which are more beneficial unlike solitary security operations. The ministry of East African Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can spearhead policy and collaboration negotiations to this end.
- b. There is need for Kenya's defence forces to relook at their mission readiness and pre-deployment planning and organisation. This will enable them to be much more prepared and have a clear understanding of the enemy, terrain and logistical requirements so as to avoid early setbacks and deployment ambushes. The Ministry of Defence and the Department of Defence should work synergistically on all aspects of mission readiness and pre-deployment by consulting far and wide in terms of not only national frameworks but also international frameworks and foreign policy.
- c. There is need for Kenya to put in adequate and sustainable measures so as to ensure that all that has been secured remains intact while at the same time, seek to secure more national interests for its own development as well as the contribution to the development of its neighbours.
- d. Kenya Defence Forces should invest more in security cooperation with members of other regional organisation so as not only to benefit from financial resources but also gain field experience in the use of both military software and military hardware. Such cooperation

can be in form of training, joint military drills and exchange programs as spearheaded and negotiated by the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

5.5 Suggestions for future studies

Further research should be conducted on the involvement of non-military personnel (civilians such as envoys, diplomats, civilian observers and advisors) in AMISOM and how their involvement contributed to the achievement of Kenya's national interests by joining AMISOM.

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APPENDIX I: INTRODUCTION LETTER

Ms Mukami Gicovi

Reg. No. S202/OL/CTY/27610/2019

Kenyatta University

Department of International Relations, Conflict and Strategic Studies

P.O Box 43844-00100

NAIROBI.

To whom it may concern,

Dear Madam/Sir,

RE: PERMISSION TO UNDERTAKE RESEARCH

I am requesting for permission to undertake academic research in your institution. I intend to gather data towards developing my masters research project. I am a masters student at the Kenyatta University, International Relations, Conflict and Strategic Studies. My study topic is, “The Role Of National Interests In Peace Enforcement Missions: A Case Of The Republic Of Kenya And AMISOM”

The findings of this study will be useful to policymakers and implementers dealing with peace support operations in Kenya, the African Union, and other African countries in restructuring existing security policies and writing new security policies. Such new regulations are intended to provide successful and efficient peacekeeping missions that are free of harmful national interests. As a result, this research will aid in the development of knowledge and practise in policy development and execution, as well as the different theoretical views that lead and shape peace and security. Furthermore, considering the UN's focus and significance put on bilateral collaboration with the AU, TCCS to AMISOM, and other African states in the future, this study has high stakes for future practise and policy in peace operations in Africa. Attached, please, find a copy of the instrument for your perusal.

I look forward to your positive response at our earliest convenience.

Thanking you in advance.

Yours faithfully,

Mukami Gicovi

Researcher

APPENDIX II: CONSENT FORM

Project name: The Role of National Interests in Peace Enforcement Missions: A Case Of The Republic Of Kenya And AMISOM

Name of researcher: Gicovi Winfred Mukami

My name is **Gicovi Winfred Mukami**, a Masters student at Kenyatta University carrying out research on the subject: **The Role of National Interests in Peace Enforcement Missions: A Case of The Republic of Kenya and AMISOM**. As a key stakeholder within an organization that has in the past and continues to provide support and oversight to peace mission in Somalia, you have been selected to participate in this academic study. This form has important information about the reason for doing this study, what we will ask you to do if you decide to be in this study, and the way we would like to use information you provide if you choose to be in the study.

The main objective of this study is to critically analyse the role of national interests in peace enforcement missions with the Republic of Kenya and AMISOM as the case study. The study seeks to establish the national interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM, to identify how the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya and to identify ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM

The study is positioned to take place between December 2020 and January 2021 and at the end of the study, a report of the findings will be produced. The study is purely academic and no part of the information you give shall be used for any other purposes other than for the academic purposes of the study.

The findings will be useful to policymakers and implementers dealing with peace support activities in Kenya, the AU, and other African countries in restructuring existing security policies and writing new security policies. Such new regulations are intended to provide successful and efficient peacekeeping missions that are free of harmful national interests. As a result, this research will aid in the development of knowledge and practise in policy development and execution, as well as the different theoretical views that lead and shape peace and security.

There shall be no any form of payment for taking part in this study. However, the researcher shall ensure you have a good and ample environment that facilitates you to comfortably respond

to the questions. All information, which you provide will be kept strictly confidential and used for academic purposes only. Your identity shall not be revealed to anyone.

PARTICIPANT

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactory
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time by informing the researcher and without my rights being affected.

Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study.

Your Signature _____ Date _____

Your Name (printed) _____

Printed name of person obtaining consent _____

Date _____

This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of the study.

APPENDIX III: QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Gicovi Winfred Mukami, a Masters student at Kenyatta University carrying out research on the subject: The Role of National Interests in Peace Enforcement Missions: A Case Of The Republic Of Kenya And AMISOM. As a key stakeholder within an organization that has in the past and continues to provide support and oversight to peace mission in Somalia, you have been selected to participate in the study by responding to this interview. All information, which you provide will be kept strictly confidential and used for academic purposes only. Please, respond to the questions as honestly as possible

Section A: Demographic information

- 1. What is your gender? Male () Female ()
- 2. How old are you? 18-23 () 24-29 () 30-35 () 36-40 () 41-45 () 46 and above ()
- 3. What is your marital status? Single () Married () Divorced () Separated () Widowed ()
- 4. What is your highest level of education? None () Primary () Secondary () College () University ()
- 4. How many years have you worked in this organisation? Less than 1 year () 1-5 () 6-10 () 11-20 () 21 and over
- 5. What is your current position/role in this organisation?
.....

Section B: National interests leading to Kenya's participation in AMISOM

- 6. Are you aware of the reasons why Kenya deployed its troops to Somalia? Yes () No ()
- 6b. If Yes, what do you think are the reasons for the deployment of Kenyan troops to Somalia?
.....
.....
.....
- 7. Was it necessary for a foreign military intervention in the precarious situation in Somalia?
Yes () No ()
- 7b. Kindly elaborate your answer above
.....
.....
- 8. Are you aware of AMISOM? Yes () No ()

9. What would you say is the concern or role of AMISOM?

.....

.....

10. Did all warring parties’ consent to AMISOM’s deployment?

Yes () No () Don’t know ()

11. Do you know when Kenya officially joined AMISOM? Yes () No ()

12. Do you know the reasons why Kenya officially joined AMISOM? Yes () No ()

13. Which of the following would you say were the interests that Kenya wanted to protect by joining AMISOM? national security interests () economic interests () social interests () political interests () strategic interests ()

Others.....

14. Kindly rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements

SA=strongly agree A=agree N=neutral D=disagree SD=strongly disagree

| Statement | SD | D | N | A | SA |
|--|----|---|---|---|----|
| Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its national territorial integrity | | | | | |
| Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its citizens against terrorism acts | | | | | |
| Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its visitors (tourists, foreign aid workers etc) against terrorism acts | | | | | |
| Kenya joined AMISOM to help restore and stabilize peace in Somalia | | | | | |
| Kenya joined AMISOM to reduce illicit flow of migrants into Kenya | | | | | |
| Kenya joined AMISOM because other nations joined (solidarity) | | | | | |
| Kenya joined AMISOM so as to promote its national image and pride | | | | | |
| Kenya joined AMISOM to protect its markets from influx of unregulated products from Somalia | | | | | |

Section C: How the participation in AMISOM has affected the national interests of the republic of Kenya.

15. Would you say Kenya has participated actively in the AMISOM peace keeping activities?

Yes () No ()

16. How has Kenya benefited from its participation in AMISOM?

Received financial gains as part of being in the mission ()

Received training, knowledge and capacity building ()

Benefited from tools, weapons and equipment ()

Joint trainings and joint missions have improved the skill-sets of Kenyan troops ()

Kenya has made a name for itself as a strong trooped nation ()

17. How have the following national interests been affected by Kenya's participation in AMISOM?

| National interest | Positively affected | Negatively affected |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| National security interests | | |
| Economic interests | | |
| Social interests | | |
| Political interests | | |
| Strategic interests | | |

18. Kindly rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements
 SA=strongly agree A=agree N=neutral D=disagree SD=strongly disagree

| Statement | SD | D | N | A | SA |
|---|----|---|---|---|----|
| Kenya's national interests have not changed even after joining AMISOM | | | | | |
| By Kenya joining AMISOM, Kenya still faces threats on its national security | | | | | |
| Kenya did actually achieve strategic interests of having a strong regional peace keeping force | | | | | |
| Kenya's national image was soiled as a result of civilian casualties | | | | | |
| Kenya's national image was soiled as a result of allegations of illicit trades | | | | | |
| By joining AMISOM, Kenya achieved more of its deployment objectives in view of national interests | | | | | |

Section D: Ways in which Kenya could have secured its national interest in its participation in AMISOM

19. Does Kenya need to address the causes of conflict to provide sustainable peace?

Yes () No ()

20. Does AMISOM need to address the causes of conflict to provide sustainable peace?

Yes () No ()

21. Would you say Kenya initially used the best approach to secure its national interests by deploying unilaterally? Yes () No ()

22. Would you say that by joining AMISOM, Kenya had the best chances of securing its interests more as opposed to going unilateral? Yes () No ()

23. What is the best strategy a nation can secure its national interests in view of conflicts?

Unilateral deployment of troops ()

Seeking interventions of a regional organisation ()

Joining a peace keeping mission ()

Joining a peace enforcement mission ()

24. What is the best way that Kenya can use to secure its national interests going into the future?

.....
.....
.....

APPENDIX IV: WORKPLAN

| | MARCH 2021 | APRIL- JUNE 2021 | JULY -DEC 2021 | JAN 2022 | FEB 2022 | MARCH- SEPTEMBER 2022 | OCTOBER 2022 | NOVEMBER 2022 |
|---|---------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Identification of topic and concept paper development | | | | | | | | |
| Proposal writing | | | | | | | | |
| Presentation of research proposal and Defence at the department | | | | | | | | |
| Graduate school review of the proposal | | | | | | | | |
| Data Collection | | | | | | | | |
| Data organization and analysis | | | | | | | | |
| Presentation of findings | | | | | | | | |
| Submission of refined project to graduate school | | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX V: BUDGET

| ITEM | QUANTITY | UNIT COST (Kshs.) | TOTAL COST (Kshs.) |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Typing and printing | 1 booklet | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| Printing | 3 booklets | 700 | 2,100 |
| Binding | 4 booklets | 300 | 1,200 |
| Stationery | Assorted | | 3,000 |
| Internet subscription | 5 months package | 3,000 | 15,000 |
| Researchers | | | |
| Transport and allowance | 1X14 days | 500 | 7,000 |
| Thesis for defence | | | |
| Typing and printing | 4 booklets | 2,000 | 8,000 |
| Binding | 4 booklets | 300 | 1,200 |
| Final thesis | | | |
| Typing and printing | 4 booklets | 2,000 | 8,000 |
| Binding | 4 booklets | 300 | 1,200 |
| SUB-TOTAL | | | 47,500 |
| Contingencies | 10% of sub-total | | 4,750 |
| TOTAL | | | 52,250 |

APPENDIX VI: RESEARCH APPROVAL



KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke

Website: www.ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 810901 Ext. 4150

Internal Memo

FROM: Dean, Graduate School

DATE: 17th March, 2022

TO: Gicovi Winfred Mukami
C/o Inter. Rel. Conf. & Strg. Studies Dept

REF: S202/CTY/27610/2019

SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF RESEARCH PROJECT PROPOSAL

This is to inform you that Graduate School Board at its meeting of 2nd March, 2022 approved your Research Project Proposal for the M.A Degree Entitled, "The Role of National Interests in Peace Enforcement Missions: A Case of the Republic of Kenya and AMISOM."

You may now proceed with your Data Collection, Subject to Clearance with Director General, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation.

As you embark on your data collection, please note that you will be required to submit to Graduate School completed Supervision Tracking and Progress Report Forms per semester. The Forms are available at the University's Website under Graduate School webpage downloads.

Thank you

JACKSON MUVUSI
FOR: DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

d.c. Chairman, Inter. Rel. Conf. & Strg. Studies Department

Supervisors:

1. Dr. Francis Mulu
Department of Int. Rel. Conf. & Strg. Studies
Kenyatta University

JL/mo

APPENDIX VII: RESEARCH PERMIT



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **592519**

Date of Issue: **04/May/2022**

RESEARCH LICENSE



This is to Certify that Ms., WINFRED MUKAMI GICOVI of Kenyatta University, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS: A CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA AND AMISOM for the period ending : 04/May/2023.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/22/17179**

592519

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

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