

**KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ETHIOPIA**

**FROM 1963 TO 2020**

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**DECLARATION**

This project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university or for any other award.

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## **DEDICATION**

This research paper is dedicated to my family. My loving husband Chrispinus Barasa who has been extremely supportive during my entire studies. My daughters Ellah Lucy Barasa and Elsie Dorcas Barasa for enduring long hours without seeing mum. My mother Dorcas Isiaho Mutsotso for encouraging me to enroll and focus on finishing my studies and for her ardent prayers. Rest in peace dear mum, I will forever treasure you.

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## ABSTRACT

Kenya and Ethiopia are two African states that vary in physical size, political capabilities, and economic stability. The two are sovereign states and members of the African Union and United Nations. They are separated by a mutual boundary; they face the same threats and they have mutual prospects. The two countries have been enjoying close bilateral relations since 1963 when Kenya attained independence. The general objective of the study was to analyze Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020. This study had three objectives: To explore the nature of diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020; to examine the factors behind Kenya and Ethiopia diplomatic relations from 1963 to 2020; and to analyze the extent to which fair and equitable bilateral trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been promoted from 1963 to 2020. A comparison was made to analyze Kenya-Ethiopia diplomatic relations since 1963 to 2020 as determined by different presidents, and the influence that President Jomo Kenyatta's era had to the diplomatic relations between 1963 and 1978 that impacted on the other regimes' relations with Ethiopia. The study adopted the Realism Theory together with Allison's Theory of Decision-making in international relations. This enabled the conceptualization of foreign policy as a meaningful perspective to guide state relations in the modern world. This study adopted an exploratory research design and purposive, snowball and stratified random sampling techniques were employed. Interview schedules research instruments were used to obtain data. A thematic approach was used in analyzing qualitative data and the statistical package for social sciences was employed in the analysis of quantitative data. This enabled a contemporary analysis of the available academic material and interstate reports to determine Kenya's strategic advances towards Ethiopia. The findings showed that Kenya and Ethiopia have had cordial diplomatic relations over time though with some traces of tension. The cordial relations can be seen in the series of combined activities that the two states have engaged in such as joint cross border security enhancement initiatives, cross border trade, sending their troops to AMISOM with a view of stabilizing Somalia as well as spearheading peace talks in Sudan. Secondly, it was also found that the two states' ties have been built on joint security, economic and economic factors. Lastly, it was also found that there were traces of tension as manifested by unfavorable investment policies especially by Ethiopia. In conclusion, it was recommended that the two states' diplomatic ties can be enhanced further through continued trade and security engagements and that there was need for Kenya and Ethiopia to harmonize their investment policies as a roadmap to free and fair-trade relations.

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## OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Bilateral Relations-** Relations between two sovereign states for the mutual benefit of both of them.

**Capitalism-** A system where trade and industries of a state are controlled by private owners for profit, and not the state itself.

**Cold War-** Political animosity between states characterized by intimidations, propaganda, as well as other actions apart from open war.

**Communism-** A theory or system of social organization in which all property is owned by the community and each person contributes and receives according to their ability and needs.

**Democracy-** A form of government in which freedom and equality is strongly encouraged and the people have the authority to deliberate and decide legislation, or to choose governing officials to do so.

**Diplomacy-** The technique of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence.

**Foreign Policy-** A strategy employed by sovereign states with a view of informing how they relate with other states.

**Geopolitics-** This term is used in the study to refer to politics of a given country as influenced by the natural resources available in the country which can affect its relations with other countries.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

AMISOM	-	African Mission in Somalia
AU	-	African Union
CPA	-	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EAC	-	East African Community
EPC	-	Export Promotion Council
EPRDF	-	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
ICC	-	International Criminal Court
IGAD	-	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	-	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
ICT	-	Information and Communications Technology
JMC	-	Joint Ministerial Committee
KDF	-	Kenya Defense Forces
MOU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
NACOSTI	-	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NFD	-	Northern Frontier District
NGOs	-	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	-	Organization of Africa Union
OLF	-	Oromo Liberation Front
SPLM	-	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
TFG	-	Transitional Federal Government
TNA	-	The National Alliance
UK	-	United Kingdom
UN	-	United Nations
URP	-	United Republican Party
US	-	United States
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background to the Study

The strength of a nation's international relations is dependent on a number of factors. Security and economic development are among the most common of these factors. States are rational actors who seek to preserve themselves; hence, they are influenced by their security and economic survival. In achieving security and economic development, states use both bilateral and multilateral forums. Since decolonization, African states have worked to limit the influence of colonial legacies on their ties, such as instability induced by porous borders. According to The Daily Nation (24<sup>th</sup> November 2020), Kenya and Ethiopia are neighboring sovereign states at the Horn of Africa that share a common border, which is approximately 779KM, similar challenges, and arguably, joint opportunities. Schlee (2003) acknowledged that the common challenges faced by both Kenya and Ethiopia include: security challenges caused by the smuggling of small guns and an inflow of refugees from nearby volatile nations like Somalia and South Sudan, as well as cross-border disputes over natural resources, livestock rustling, and contraband trade. This led to various concerns from members of parliament in Kenya and Non-Governmental Organizations risking the good ties Kenya enjoys with Ethiopia.

Kenya has had diplomatic relations with other states both globally and regionally. China-Kenya relations were shaped mainly by the prevailing global trends such as Cold War, the collapse of communism and the New Cold War where capitalists and communists are fighting for developing countries. Kenya has enjoyed bilateral relations with China since 1963 but the relations began turning sour when President Jomo Kenyatta began alienating

the left wing for fear that their leader, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga would introduce socialist ideologies into the country (Morton, 1999). When President Moi who was pro-West took over leadership then the Western countries started pushing for democracy, he started warming up towards countries in the eastern bloc and this move resulted into signing of numerous agreements on economic and technological cooperation (Barkan, 1994). President Kibaki's government embraced the 'look East' policy since his government was being driven by the desire to resuscitate the economy and accusations of graft by Britain and US only catalyzed the move (The Guardian Newspaper, 2008).

Kenya's diplomatic efforts with France and Russia have been driven mostly by a desire for trade and investment. Kenya has always had cordial connections with France, with the former offering the latter the largest investment market (La France au Kenya, 2019). Russia on the other hand has had cordial relations with Kenya since 1963 but the economic activity between Kenya and Russia has been limited (RWR Advisory Group, 2016). However, Valentina Matviyenko, Russia's Senate Speaker said that Russia saw Kenya as a strategic partner in Africa and was determined to foster trade relations between the two states (Citizen News, 2015). Obala (2013) contends that President Uhuru's foreign policy has not departed from the old since it laid emphasis on presenting Kenya as a regional leader while asserting sovereignty and alienating the Western powers. He further states that Kenya's foreign policy during president Uhuru's regime was more afro-centric though ironically, the Jubilee Coalition manifesto still endeavored to engage the traditional economic partners such as the US and UK among other European countries.

Kenya's compromised position over South Africa's apartheid policy played a major role in shaping Kenya-South Africa relations. Mbogo (2014) opines that mistrust exists between

Kenya and South Africa and efforts to resolve the poor trade relations have often been thwarted by Kenyan policy makers who seem uneasy about the volume of trade imbalance in favor of South Africa. According to Gichangi (2012) regional bodies such as EAC, IGAD, COMESA and AU play a pivotal role in advancing Kenya's foreign policy towards its neighbors.

Gichangi (2012) asserts that the treaty signed by Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda Tanzania and Burundi in an effort to revive the EAC in 1999 facilitated trade and interaction among the member countries. According to Kabukuru (2015), Ethiopia supported Kenya's Mau Mau liberation struggle against British colonial rule. On the other hand, Ethiopia battled the Italian occupation forces through Kenyan territory and secured medical support and military aid. Kabukuru (2015) further states that the principle of reciprocity between the two states has never wavered sixty years later. The problems between Kenya and Ethiopia mostly were resource- based conflicts between border communities such as the Daasanach (Merille) of Ethiopia, the Turkana of Kenya, the Nyangatom of South Sudan and Ethiopia, the Gabra and the Borana of both Kenya and Ethiopia, which begun in the 1990s and escalated in 2010 (OCHA, 2011).

According to a biographer Jeremy Murray, Kenya's former president Jomo Kenyatta was a close ally of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie (Murray, 1982). As a result, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta went on to name one of the only three critical avenues in Nairobi after the Emperor in 1972- Haile Selassie Avenue (Gebremedhin, 2015). The same good friendship among Kenyan and Ethiopian leaders as constituted in the constitution of Kenya saw President Mwai Kibaki develop good relations with his counterpart the late Ethiopian Premier Meles Zenawi (1955-2012). Economic diplomacy has continued to dominate

Kenya's relations towards Ethiopia (Makinda, 1987). Despite the transformation of governance in Kenya and Ethiopia and the point that the two states had diverse colonial experiences, economic prowess continued to characterize their co-operation and foreign relations (Onyango, 1995).

Little research has been done on Kenya-Ethiopia relations. Therefore, in order to understand Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia, it is essential to establish the factors behind Kenya and Ethiopia diplomatic relations exploring the nature of Kenya and Ethiopia diplomatic relations. This study analyzed the challenge faced by Kenya in the implementation of its foreign policy towards Ethiopia. It explored explicitly the nature of diplomatic relations as well as factors that determine the relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020. This study also sought to analyze the extent to which fair and equitable bilateral trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been promoted from 1963 to 2020.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

Since Kenya's independence in 1963 and despite having had four different presidents with different economic preferences -Jomo Kenyatta (1963 to 1978); Daniel Arap Moi (1978 to 2002); Mwai Kibaki (2002 to 2013) and Uhuru Kenyatta (2013 to 2020), the sound relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been seeded and added value to both Kenya and Ethiopia in numerous ways that generated enhanced relations, connections, and collaboration between them. Nonetheless, given that both Kenya and Ethiopia are confronted by similar security related challenges stemming from cross-border conflict, lack of security, terrorism, and volatility makes an investigation of their foreign policy an essential topic to examine (Blanchard, 2013).

For instance, in 1964, both Kenya and Ethiopia found themselves having a common enemy in Somalia. At Africa's independence, the then OAU called its members to respect the colonial boundaries under *Uti possidetis* the principle of International Law (OAU, 1987). Kenya and Ethiopia signed a Defense Pact after being faced by a familiar foe, Somalia. This pact has since remained intact to this day (Maina, 2005). Although some scholars opine that this was proof of dependency, where Kenya through its heads of state can depend on other states when in need and as well offer support to her neighbors, it reveals a very realistic scenario that the two states have co-existed well (Onyango, 1995).

As Abebe (2010) notes, after 1991 Kenya's relations with Ethiopia experienced some problems due to cross-boundary conflicts between the border communities forcing the Kenyan government to enter into a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In 1997 Kenya pushed for the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which identified 18 fields of cooperation on different spheres; border security, immigration, refugee matters, legal matters, information and broadcasting rights, among others. At the same time, the relations of these two states have been tested by the movement of the Ethiopian opposition group, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The involvement of these groups did not have an impact on the relations of the two states. This has made local officials from the two states along with local communities living along the border to organize consultative meetings on the growth, strength, and threat level of the armed opposition group.

Although Kenya was a colony of the British and Ethiopia resisted colonialism, Kenya's relations with Ethiopia seem to be instituted on comparable socio-political and economic prospects existing in both of them. The states experience similar national security challenges posed by neighboring states. Conflicts in Somalia as well as South Sudan posed

unique challenges to Kenya and Ethiopia stemming from refugees, illegal immigrants, importation of firearms, to extremism together with other security threats. Occasions have existed for both Kenya and Ethiopia to grow their relations, particularly on economic growth, power supply, and accessibility to broader markets. Despite the foregoing, little research has been done to examine the two countries' general diplomatic ties and how much they've responded to sub-regional events such as economic competition. This study analyzed the challenge faced by Kenya in the implementation of its foreign policy towards Ethiopia. It explored explicitly the nature of diplomatic relations as well as factors that determine the relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The general objective was to:

Analyze Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020.

#### **Specific Objectives**

- i. To explore the nature of diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020.
- ii. To examine factors behind Kenya and Ethiopia diplomatic relations from 1963 to 2020.
- iii. To analyze the extent to which fair and equitable bilateral trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been promoted from 1963 to 2020.

#### **1.4 Assumptions**

- i. Diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been cordial from 1963 to 2020.
- ii. Security and economic development are the main factors behind Kenya and Ethiopia diplomatic relations from 1963 to 2020.
- iii. Bilateral trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been fair and equitable from 1963 to 2020.

#### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

The study on Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia has both political and academic justifications. Foreign policy refers to a government's tactic in relating to other states. This shows that the instruments and approach used by a state in its foreign policy are the determinants of how a state can foster good relations with other states. Kenya is bordered by five states, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania and South Sudan, all of which were colonized except Ethiopia.

On the other hand, Kenya has received threats from some of these states at different levels since its independence. For instance, Somalia claimed the North Eastern District of Kenya. Uganda, on the other hand, claimed the western district while Sudan (South Sudan) claimed Lake Turkana (Waithaka, 2016). As these cross-border tensions continue, Kenya has had border conflicts with its Ethiopian counterpart, which begun in the 1990s and escalated in the year 2010, but the relations between the two states continue to be strong. There are substantial research materials written on Kenya – Ethiopia relations, but very little literature can be found on Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020. From 1963 through 2020, this study looked into the nature of Kenyan-Ethiopian foreign

ties. It focused at the elements that influenced Kenya-Ethiopia diplomatic ties from 1963 until 2020. This study also analyzed the extent to which fair and equitable bilateral trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been promoted from 1963 to 2020.

The study generated evidence that could be considered useful by policy makers to add to the growth of Kenya's foreign policy towards other states and also established whether the nature of Kenya-Ethiopia diplomatic relations would help researchers to understand the Realism Theory and the Allison's Theory of Decision-making in international relations.

### **1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

This study takes into account primarily the nature of diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia and attempts to examine the critical determinants behind Kenya-Ethiopia diplomatic relations as well as the order in which they shaped Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia since independence (1963) up to 2020. The study aimed at examining Kenya's conduct towards Ethiopia through the lens of four different regimes thus, the period 1963 to 2020 was selected because it provides a comprehensive evaluation of the diplomatic relations between the two states from independence under four different leaders. 1963 was particularly chosen because both Kenya and Ethiopia had different ideology inclinations at the time with Kenya being pro-West and Ethiopia being pro-East whereas 2020 was chosen because it is the period when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia was pushing for a foreign policy that would lead to liberalization of the Ethiopian market, a move that is crucial to Kenya's economic development. Considering that both Kenya and Ethiopia face common threats emanating from clashes, lack of security and volatility makes their foreign policy a vital subject to research on. Kenya's foreign policy is of significant interest in this study since it dictates the actions that Kenya takes about other nations as

well as actors in the global arena. The factors to be investigated include; economic, security, and geopolitical factors.

Suitable informants such as diplomats and Foreign Service officials to be interviewed were a challenge to the study; since the study focused on people with expert knowledge and experience on Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia. These individuals were not readily available and most of those that were interviewed were too busy to fill questionnaires thereby forcing the researcher to resort to both face to face interviews and telephone interviews. The focus of the study was also sensitive, especially with the view of security matters related to the two states thus making it difficult to get detailed information especially from the Ethiopian Embassy and the security personnel.

Restricting the informants to the timeframe of 1963 to 2020 was yet another challenge to the study since most of the Ethiopian informants had little or no knowledge about Kenya – Ethiopia relations in the 60s, 70s and 80s. On the other hand, they had substantial information on Kenya-Ethiopia relations during President Uhuru Kenyatta's regime since that is the period when the two states made major milestones in terms of security and economic development. Therefore, in the study, the LAPPSET Project and the Al'Shabaab threats to both Kenya and Ethiopia came out. However, due to the restricted availability of data, the analysis had little impact on the endeavor to achieve the study's overall objectives. To overcome the limitations, the study focused on the use of diplomats and Foreign Service officers that were available and willing to take part in the study. Secondly, sensitive topics of concern, which were security related, were also avoided and anonymity of the respondents preserved to improve their ability to provide the required information.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter analyses the broad literature on Kenya's foreign policy towards a number of countries. It discusses the nature of diplomatic relations that Kenya has been having with other states such as China, Russia, United States of America, United Kingdoms, France, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia. The nature of Kenya's diplomatic relations is clearly discussed in the light of the different presidents that were holding office at the specified time i.e. President Jomo Kenyatta (1964 to 1978), President Daniel Arap Moi (1978 to 2002), President Emilio Mwai Kibaki (2002 to 2013) and President Uhuru Kenyatta (2013 to 2020). In this chapter, the factors that determine Kenya's foreign policy with the mentioned states are also discussed explicitly.

#### **2.1 The Nature of Diplomatic Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020**

A number of foreign countries view Kenya as a strategically placed country that facilitates their penetration into the African market. Kenya has been having diplomatic relations with a number of countries globally some of them include: China, Russia, Britain, United States of America, France, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia among others. The relations have been of both cooperation and conflicts depending on the prevailing circumstances.

The diplomatic relations between Kenya and China date back to December 14<sup>th</sup> 1963 when China opened its Embassy in Nairobi and appointed Wang Yutien as its first ambassador. China was one of the first countries to acknowledge Kenya's independence, and its embassy

in Nairobi is Africa's largest, as well as being located in a relatively secure neighborhood near Kenya's army headquarters. According to Chege (2008), in May 1964, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga who was the Minister for Home Affairs then led a team to China and in July 1964, China's ambassador paid a visit to the Minister of Finance, James Gichuru. This resulted into a dispatch of 15 Chinese experts to Kenya with a view of cementing their negotiations on technical and economic cooperation. However, the China-Kenya relations begun turning sour when the pro-Western President Jomo Kenyatta who stuck by the principle of "Non-Interference" begun viewing Oginga Odinga as a threat that needed to be neutralized for fear that he might make Kenya a socialist-friendly country (Morton, 1999). This led to an expulsion of the Third Secretary in the Chinese Embassy in 1966 and a protest by the Chinese outside the Kenyan embassy in Beijing and thus an 11 years diplomatic break in 1967 (Chege, 2008).

When President Moi came to power in 1978, he followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta, in terms of foreign policy (Mwega, 2009). As at 1983, Kenya was a great ally of the Western Bloc. However, President Moi who had just amended the constitution to support one party rule was forced to start warming up towards the Eastern Bloc when the West started pushing for democracy and multi-partyism (Barkan, 1994). This brought the 11 years diplomatic break between Kenya and China to an end as agreements on economic and technological cooperation were signed (Alden & Oiveira, 2008). During President Kibaki's regime, there was an exchange between Former British Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Edward Clay and Cabinet Ministers in Kenya over allegations of graft thereby leading to a diplomatic row between Kenya and her allies from the West (Britain and US) (Oluoch, 2006).

According to Kiberenge (2012), the exchange was not accidental since at the time, the bilateral relations between Kenya and China were flourishing. Since President Kibaki's motive was to revive the economy, he paid state visits to Beijing, New Delhi and Tokyo then paid similar visits to Washington and London and this led to an outcry from western diplomats, investors and financiers, but the President Kibaki government seemed unshaken (New York Times, 24<sup>th</sup> January, 2008). President Kibaki's state visit to China gave birth to a series of agreements aimed at developmental assistance (Gadzala, 2009). A travel ban to US and UK was then issued to Dr. Chris Murungaru who was the Transport Minister then over allegations of corruption and the move was interpreted as a way of hitting back at President Kibaki since the western allies were not amused by the government's decision to allow competition from the East that made them lose lucrative contracts (The Guardian Newspaper, February 19<sup>th</sup>, 2008).

Kenya-Britain diplomatic relations date back to the 19th century before Kenya attained its independence. When Kenya attained independence and President Jomo Kenyatta took over leadership, Britain still endeavored to continue relating with its colonies. President Jomo Kenyatta being a conservative leader, upheld ideologies that were in tandem with Britain's quest such that four years into independence over 1,700 Britons were still holding government positions inclusive of senior strategic and military positions (Ogot, 1995). When President Moi took over power from 1978 to 2002, the Kenya- Britain relations continued being warmer since he adopted the 'Nyayo' motto that evidently declared that he would continue fostering policies laid down by his predecessor. President Moi continued using foreign policy as a technique to attract vital resources for economic development just like President Jomo Kenyatta. However, the relations started being strained when the West

begun advocating for democracy and multi-partyism. During President Kibaki's regime the Kenya-Britain diplomatic relations were further strained due to the 'look-east' policy which resulted from allegations of massive graft by senior officials in the Kenyan government. This made Kenya to start engaging alternative non-traditional partners as allies in infrastructural development, affordable technology trade and manufacturing with a view of increasing Foreign Domestic Investments and flows. In spite of the little misunderstandings that were popping up between Kenya and Britain and Kenya and US, their diplomatic relations still continued to grow since the relations are mutually beneficial with Kenya enjoying military support, trade, investment, employment opportunities and foreign aid whereas the US and Britain benefit from trade and highly profitable foreign direct investment opportunities.

France has consistently enjoyed cordial bilateral relations with Kenya thanks to the cooperation in education, peace promotion and development (La France au Kenya, 2019). Kenya provides the largest market in East Africa for French investors. The French firms include: Total, BIC through HACO, KLM-Air France, Afribon, Bayer East Africa and Decathlon among others (French Chamber of Commerce Kenya, 2019). Russia on the other hand has had cordial relations with Kenya since 1963 but the economic activity between Kenya and Russia has been limited (RWR Advisory Group, 2016). However, Russia expressed interest in strengthening the economic ties thereby resulting into formation of the Russian-African Forum in 2015 with an aim of enhancing trade relations between Kenya and Russia (RWR Advisory Group, 2016). According to Citizen News (2015), Valentina Matviyenko, Russia's Senate Speaker said that Russia saw Kenya as a

strategic partner in Africa and was determined to foster trade relations between the two states.

Mabuda (2014) opines that during the apartheid era Kenya seemed to disguise its relations with South Africa. However, when President Moi took over leadership, in the 1990s, FW de Klerk who was South Africa's president then paid Kenya a visit and President Moi also paid South Africa a visit, a move that was interpreted as a failure by Kenya to support the Pan-African movement in its war against the apartheid state. Trade relations between Kenya and South Africa have not been very good due to mistrust between Kenyan and South African Companies in the 1990s and 2000s (Mbogo, 2014). Mbogo (2014) further explains that the establishment of common forums with a view of improving trade relations has often hit a dead end since Kenyan policy makers often seem uncomfortable with the volume of trade imbalance in favor of South Africa.

Obala (2013) contends that President Uhuru's foreign policy is not a departure from the old since it laid emphasis on presenting Kenya as a regional leader while asserting sovereignty and alienating the Western powers. He further states that ironically, regardless of the rhetoric against the Western powers, the Jubilee Coalition manifesto still endeavored to engage the traditional economic partners such as the US and UK among other European countries while upholding relations with the Eastern countries in pursuit for economic development. President Uhuru's regime has played a major role in pushing towards the stability of Somalia and South Sudan as well as Congo. In a digital article written by Abdur Rahman in 2019, leaders of both Kenya and Ethiopia met in Addis Ababa with a view of discussing on how to enhance relations between the two countries. Rahman states that the Kenyan delegation comprised of a team of investors who wanted to explore investment

opportunities and that during the forum, Prime Minister Abiy emphasized on opening up the Ethiopian market and the economic reforms that will take Ethio-Kenya relations to greater heights.

According to Gichangi (2012), regional bodies such as EAC, IGAD, COMESA and AU play a pivotal role in advancing Kenya's foreign policy towards its neighbors. Gichangi (2012) asserts that the treaty signed by Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda Tanzania and Burundi in an effort to revive the EAC in 1999 facilitated trade and interaction among the member countries. The member countries have benefitted from common custom procedures, common external tariffs and duty-free trade across borders but on the other hand, Tanzania and Uganda had fears that Kenya is likely to be the greatest beneficiary in the region (World Bank, 2012). Kenya has witnessed a number of cross-border disputes with her neighbors in the EAC, a fact that has often interfered with trade (Sunday, 2019). Examples are cases where trucks from Kenya were held in Uganda for a number of weeks and the scramble for Migingo Island. Kenya's economic dominance led Tanzania to close its borders for Kenya in 1977. The same suspicions made Uganda to reroute a pipeline that was meant to transport oil through Kenya such that it passed through Tanzania instead thus sparking a diplomatic row between Kenya and Uganda. Ironically, trade relations had to be revived between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and the signing of a tripartite agreement increased the trade volumes significantly.

The implementation of Kenya's foreign policy is informed by various sources which entail official documents and declarations such as bills (Ahmed, 2016). The parliament also plays an important role in foreign policy formulation. Oloo (1995) opines that during President Jomo Kenyatta's regime, 22 parliamentary motions relating to foreign affairs were brought

before the National Assembly and 14 were approved while eight were rejected. During President Moi's tenure, that is 1978 to 1993, only two motions relating to Foreign Affairs were debated in parliament, and both were approved. During President Moi's regime, most issues relating to foreign affairs were handled by bureaucrats under the direction of the president (Oloo, 1995). Both Kenya and Ethiopia have had different presidents but still maintained cordial diplomatic relations unlike other nations that have seen a break in these relations with new leadership in place. Hughes (2012) asserts that Kenya's foreign policy is clearly seen under various leaders since independence in 1963, i.e. President Jomo Kenyatta's era, President Moi's era, and President Kibaki's era.

### **2.1.1 Kenya's Foreign Policy under President Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978)**

Kenya embraced the principles of capitalism for her economic goals, and her quest for opportunities led her to neighboring nations such as Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Tanzania, among others. On November 30, 1999, the East African Community was formed as a result of this. Kenya was invaluable in helping the EAC's expansion. The political foundations that affected geopolitics and capitalist-communism warring throughout the Cold War were the dilemma with this unification. The economic disparity between the three member states, i.e. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania as well as Idi Amin's erratic policies caused havoc in the East African Cooperation, thus contributing to its collapse. This forced Kenya to close its borders in 1977. Other causes for the collapse of EAC as mentioned by other scholars include: the perception of unequal gains, the rise of fiscal autonomy as well as the effect of external power (Ojo, 1985).

According to Merhatsidk (2011), Ethio-Kenya diplomatic relations begun way back when Ethiopia opened a consulate office in Kenya. He further opines that although Ethiopia had smooth relations with the British colonial administration, it gave massive support to Kenya's Mau Mau movement that fought the British colonial rule. As soon as Kenya attained independence, the relations intensified as marked by Kenya opening its consulate in Addis Ababa and Emperor Haile Selassie paying a state visit to Kenya. Merhatsidk (2011) further lists the useful milestones made by Kenya and Ethiopia in their relations at the time as: getting rid of the visa system, demarcation of their shared boundary as well as signing of a military pact in 1964. Kenya and Ethiopia also established a trans boundary committee and had a number of meetings which made them arrive at a middle ground on how to utilize the shared resources. It is at this juncture that Kenya was allowed to use Omo River by Ethiopia.

Belete (2005) contends that bilateral relations between Kenya and Ethiopia during the Haile Selassie era were based on cooperation. According to Whittaker (2008), the aspiration of the Kenya-Somalis to embrace the Somalia state was the most significant factor influencing Kenya's foreign politics prior to 1963. If Kenya did not defend its territorial integrity, different ethnic groups in the country would also strive to secede. This would have impacted not only Kenya but also Ethiopia and French Djibouti, as the Somalia government had ambitions of combining her lost territories into one Greater Somalialah, (Kabukuru, 2015). As such, Kenya and Ethiopia signed a Defense Pact in 1964 due to former's assertiveness in agreeing to the Organization of African Union (OAU) on territorial integrity. The former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah (1960-66) third Chairman of the OAU, once said:

“This fatal relic of colonialism [boundaries] will drive us to war against one another. Unless we proceed in arresting the danger through mutual understanding on fundamental issues and through African Unity, which will render existing boundaries obsolete and superfluous, we shall have fought for independence in vain. Only African Unity can heal this sort of boundary disputes between our various states”. (Nkrumah, 1997).

It is upon this basis that the OAU Charter was formed based on the following principles: Sovereign equality of member states, non-interference in internal affairs of states and respect of borders inherited from colonialism. The Defense Pact enabled Kenya’s government to utilize the Ethiopia’s military to contain Somalia’s territorial ambitions and prevent secession of the Northern Kenya. The significant reliance on Ethiopia's military force was however, Kenya's principal concern, as the former would exert control over the latter's foreign policy, and interferences in her domestic politics.

In 1974, Ethiopia’s leadership was taken over by a military junta known as Derg who had close relations with the Eastern socialist bloc. This seemed to threaten Ethio-Kenya relations since Kenya was pro-West. However, the Derg proceeded with the amicable relations such that Ethiopia enjoyed much support from Kenya during the Somali invasion in 1977/78 (Nigussay, 1977). The visit of Colonnal Mengistu the Derg leader to Kenya before he fled to Zimbabwe is an important indicator of the nature of relations between the two states especially during tough moments (Okumu, 1977).

### **2.1.2 Kenya’s Foreign Policy under President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi (1978 to 2002)**

During President Moi’s reign (1978-2002), the main factors that influenced Kenya’s foreign policy were the downfall of the Somalia administration under the leadership of Siad Barre in 1991, multi-party-political system, and the bombing of the United States embassy

in 1998. Several African countries had totalitarian regimes supported by Western superpowers before to 1990. The regimes were unconcerned about full democracy and civil liberties. The two main hegemonies, the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR), did not consider the political systems of their allies as a valuable component in conducting diplomatic cooperation. The number of governments that supported their geopolitical philosophies was their top priority. Many western countries, however, began to campaign for democracy after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This was seen as a step in the direction of economic liberalization.

Kenya, just like other African nations at that time, was a single-party state, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) serving as the only political vehicle. However, diplomatic pressure from western governments compelled the regime to embrace multi-party system. This led to the removal of Section 2A of the Constitution, ending the one-party political structure. Kenya made this decision because it did not want to compromise its diplomatic ties with the western countries, which were the main donors. As a result, it became a role model for East African governments, in terms of democratic rule of governance. At the time when Kenya was accepting democracy, other neighboring states like Somalia were being affected by the collapse of governance. For instance, the downfall of the Siad Barre government in 1991, which made the state ungovernable (Gumbi, 2015). The influx of Somali refugees in Kenya from the time when Mohammed Siad Barre was dethroned in 1991 made democracy to be a relevant system of governance to the Kenyan Foreign policy. Kenya became a signatory of the OAU and Geneva Conventions on Refugees and as such, established a refugee camp in Dadaab as a kind gesture and in fulfillment of her international commitments. The nation opened her borders for refugees

of about 200000, who had left the volatile Somalia because of security concerns (IFRC, 2006). Internally, the North Eastern province is generally marginalized and lacks sufficient social amenities to support decent livelihood standards, for both residents and refugees. The governance void generated in Somalia promoted the establishment of terrorist factions such as Al-Ittihad and Al-Islam, something that became a security concerns for Kenya (Abasa, 2015).

The new ideological battle post the Cold War was the terrorism issue, which resulted as a result of Kenya dealing with the refugee difficulties in Somalia. The Al Qaeda terrorist organization main goal of disrupting the US interests around the world, while also establishing an Islamic caliphate, caught up with Kenya, since it had cordial relations with the US. As such, the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, was bombed on August 7, 1998. Kenya was entangled in a war she was not a party to, and was forced to tackle terrorist groups by allying with the US and other Western powers.

Terrorist attacks faced by both Kenya and Ethiopia also enhanced their cooperation. In an effort to mitigate terrorism, Kenya cushioned Ethiopia by closing its borders with Somalia so that the defeated Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) can lack a place to hide (Ploch, 2010). According to USIP Special Report (2014), Ethiopia has also experienced terrorist activities such as mines planted on roads, bombing of public buildings, kidnappings, plane hijackings and assassination attempts from groups such as Al Ittihad al Islamiya (AIAI), Oromo Liberation Front and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia. Somalia on the hand serves as a safe haven for the terrorist groups as occasioned by a number of factors such as: lawlessness that results from Somalia being a collapsed state, active existence of the largest Islamist radical group Al Ittihad al Islamiya (AIAI) as well as high levels of

insecurity that has minimized western presence in the region thus weakening the intelligence (USIP Special Report, 2014). Based on the USIP Special Report (2014), the terrorist groups from Somalia have always found Kenya to be a soft target due to corruption in the immigration system that led to foreigners acquiring citizenship and going as far as setting up businesses as well as NGOs thereby forcing Ethiopia as a close ally to Kenya to support the fight against terrorism with the help of the United States of America. Annual border commission meetings comprising of officials from the Kenya and Ethiopia, local community leaders and IGAD officials are held with a view of highlighting common challenges and how they can be mitigated (IGAD, 2009). When the EPRDF government took over power in 1991, it also opened a window for cooperation with neighboring countries. In 1991 a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that identified 18 areas of cooperation was signed between Kenya and Ethiopia (Abebe, 2010).

### **2.1.3 Kenya's Foreign Policy under President Emilio Mwai Kibaki (2002 to 2013)**

The desire to resuscitate the economy based on underperformance in the previous Moi regime can describe Kibaki's reign (2002 to 2013). Kenya's inflation rate was high, thus the government had to reform her foreign relations and establish relationships with other development partners in order achieve her economic goals. During President Kibaki's tenure, Kenya was not only hit by the commodity price hike and the financial crisis, but also post-election violence in 2008. As a result, the GDP growth dropped from 7% in 2007 to below 1.5%, while inflation increased to over 30% (World Bank, 2012). The 'look east' policy, which allowed Kenya to develop close ties with China on development issues, was one of the most powerful factors that influenced the country's economic and diplomatic initiatives. This move deviated from the traditional norm, given that the west had remained

the country's major development and donor power. Kenya needed to increase its market and commercial prospects in order to thrive economically.

As Kenya moved East, its international strategy focused on establishing a better market in the region, which was most likely among the six member states of the East African Community (EAC): Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and South Sudan. Kenya had also the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) made of seven member states in the Horn of Africa namely: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia. Increased intraregional trade gains from expanding enterprises was one of Kenya's most notable EAC achievements. Kenya needed to grow economically and become one of the most developed countries in Eastern Africa and play key roles in the regional economic issues. The discovery of oil in the northern region allowed her to utilize economic diplomacy to persuade Ethiopia and South Sudan of her importance, particularly the Mombasa port for oil exports. This was significant because they could use liberal philosophy to ensure that countries worked together to thrive economically.

Kenya also featured prominently in guaranteeing that President Omar al-Bashir's Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached a political settlement under the Kibaki administration (Oloo, 2006). After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Southern Sudanese would vote on whether to stay in Sudan or become a sovereign country in a referendum. Kenya needed this since Kakuma and Dadaab were home to 269,000 refugees. As a result, maintaining peace in South Sudan was critical to limiting the number of refugees entering the country.

According to Rice (2011), the Al Shabab attack on Lamu in 2011 was by far the most pivotal event of Kibaki's presidency, and hence Kenya's participation in Somalia was driven by self-defense and the necessity to safeguard Kenya's sovereignty. As ships were hijacked, Al Shabab and the piracy threat off the coast of Somalia were impacting Kenya's economic interest zones. As Al-Shabab launched terrorist assaults in Kenya, the number of visitors visiting the nation decreased. Kenya's participation in Somalia as part of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) gave Kenya a voice in Somalia. According to Maclean (2013), the Kenyan government chastised Eritrea for helping Al Shabab. Kenya was exerting its role as a peacemaker by making this declaration.

An indication of the exit from its old foreign policy stand, KDF attacked Somalia in October 2011, while hunting Al Shabab, after citing Article 51 of the United Nation's Agreement on the right to Self-protection (Africa Report, 2012). Regardless of the fact that Kenya's act seems to have the implicit backing of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the armed incursion of Somalia by KDF and the zealous diplomatic undertakings to earn domestic and global backing for her behavior point to a noteworthy progress in the foreign policy of Kenya. Ethiopia sent its troops across the Somali border end of 2006 to help the weak Transitional government rout out the Islamic Courts Union who had controlled the capital, Mogadishu for six months. Ever since, Ethiopian troops have been either an independent force or as part of AMISOM peacekeeping force. According to Abdirashid Ahmed, a Somali Political Analyst Ethiopia's boots on the ground are at least 10,000, and only 2000 serve under AMISOM's Green Beret as of 2010.

According to Merhatsikdk (2011), Ethio-Kenya diplomatic relations were amicable since Ethiopia gave massive support to Kenya's Mau Mau movement that fought the British colonial rule. Belete (2011) opines that bilateral relations between Kenya and Ethiopia during the Haile Selassie era were based on cooperation, an indicator that they were cordial relations. Okumu (1977) contends that the visit of Colonel Mengistu the Derg leader to Kenya before he fled to Zimbabwe is an important indicator of the friendly nature of relations between the two states especially during tough moments. Onyango (1995) opines that trade played a pivotal role in enhancing cordial diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. The literature reviewed so far indicates that the diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia are cordial. However, there is no much literature indicating the frosty nature of the relations between Kenya and Ethiopia thus necessitating the need to investigate the silent diplomatic tag of war between Kenya and Ethiopia.

#### **2.1.4 Kenya's Foreign Policy under President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (2013 to 2020)**

Obala (2013) opines that Uhuru Kenyatta took over the leadership of Kenya in 2013 under the flag of Jubilee Coalition and he was not expected to make major foreign policy changes given that he had to follow the footsteps of his predecessors. Both the head of state and his deputy Dr. William Samoei Ruto took over power at a time when they were facing trials at ICC on crimes against humanity and that impacted on their foreign policy towards other states. Obala (2013) further states that President Uhuru and his deputy made a point of visiting a number of countries in East Africa before being elected with an intention of changing the negative narrative about them and the move eventually yielded fruits as demonstrated by them getting into power. The appointment of Amina Mohammed who had served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for nearly 2 decades as a Cabinet Secretary at the

same ministry is a pure indication of President Uhuru's desire of not wanting to alter the foreign policy pursued by President Kibaki and President Moi. In the same vein, President Uhuru's regime was expected to use the umbrella of regional bodies such as IGAD, AU and EAC to check the behavior of the West especially on the ICC issue just like the previous leaderships did.

According to Obala (2013), President Uhuru's foreign policy is founded on sub-regionalism and Pan-Africanism as informed by the following pillars which were also captured in the Jubilee manifesto: regional security, free movement of goods and people, strengthening of regional bodies and the equality of nations. Obala (2013) contends that President Uhuru's foreign policy is not a departure from the old since it laid emphasis on presenting Kenya as a regional leader while asserting sovereignty and alienating the Western powers. He further states that ironically, regardless of the rhetoric against the Western powers, the Jubilee Coalition manifesto still endeavored to engage the traditional economic partners such as the US and UK among other European countries.

In a different digital article which was a presentation by Ambassador Monica Juma to diplomats on 26<sup>th</sup> February 2018, President Uhuru is quoted to have often reiterated the centrality of Africa in Kenya's foreign policy in Ambassador Juma's effort to reaffirm Kenya's Afro-centric foreign policy. On regional peace and Security, Ambassador Juma mentioned that Kenya was the Chair of the AU Peace and Security Council and as such was committed to supporting the Somali, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo governments to ensure their political stability and socio-economic development. On regional integration Ambassador Juma stated that in President Uhuru's second inaugural speech he declared that citizens from EAC member states who have national identity cards

are at liberty to transact business in Kenya or even invest in Kenya. On matters of peace building Ambassador Juma opines that President Uhuru has been playing a key role in South Sudan's peace process and that he pushed for the return of 5 detainees to South Sudan so that they can talk to President Salva Kiir, a move that was taken as a major milestone.

Mosley (2020) in his article entitled Ethiopia's Transition: Implications for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea Region contends that President Uhuru's Ethiopian counterpart that is Prime Minister Abiy intends to reduce on investment restrictions in major sectors such as banking and telecommunications although he is faced with resistance to full-scale liberalization as well as lacking the development of full details of the new policies. Kenya's private sector seems to be looking forward to Ethiopia's market liberalization since it presents opportunities especially in telecommunications where Safaricom Kenya can compete, banking with KCB group hoping to enter the Ethiopian market since it has branches in other EAC countries already and Brookside Dairy for supply of milk products. The move is bound to reaffirm Kenya's administration of its solid relations with Ethiopia. According to Mosley (2020), Ethiopia's infrastructural development such as its road and rail network program seems to be dovetailing with Kenya's LAPSSSET Project and both are aimed at facilitating trade between the two countries.

## **2.2 Factors behind Kenya and Ethiopia Diplomatic Relations from 1963 to 2020**

There exists a detailed body of literature on foreign policy formulation in general. Modelski (1962) defines foreign policy as "The structure of communal undertakings developed with a view of transforming the behavior of other nations and for regulating their actions in the global arena." Modelski accentuated mainly the features of policy which purpose to alter

the present behavior of states as the principle goal of foreign policy. Foreign policy entails change in the present behavior and furtherance of the behavior at diverse periods. It entails both transformation and the current situation as long as they work for the domestic welfare.

In exploring the relevance foreign policy in international relations, studies have found that it is influenced by two main determinants. These include international or external and domestic or internal. These are perceived as factors that help in shaping and molding foreign policy. However, the link between international and domestic determinants has long been debated in international relations and foreign policy. Whereas other people maintain that internal politics and foreign policy are autonomous issues, others perceive foreign policy and internal politics as symbiotic issues that could be intertwined. The level of influence of each of the factors tends to be different for each state. In some cases, international factors play a key role while in others; domestic determinants play a major role. The main external factors that determine the foreign policy of a state are but not limited to: the international system or power structure, international law, international organizations, alliances, and military strength or arms race. Rizwan (2009) opines that on the other hand, the domestic determinants of foreign policy include culture and history, geography, size and population, economic development and natural resources, military capabilities, political system, leadership, political parties and the press and public opinion.

According to Muller (1997), the aim of a state in its interactions with other states depends on its inner social structure and the formation of political authority within it. Precisely, the class that exerts state control outlines foreign policy by its interests although this may be interpreted as the interests of the whole nation. Rana (2010) notes that in the modern era of increased struggle by superpower countries to be more influential, even matters that

would be confined to a specific region usually take on an international outlook thanks to the involvement of superpower countries. This has altered the topography of power across Africa and thus the contexts in which foreign policy decisions are formed. In most research, the state of the economy of African states, internal political pressures, colonial heritage, external environment, geographical location, the existence of colonialism and white supremacist regimes, and the cold war environment, are identified as the key determinants that affect the trends adopted in the formulation of foreign policy. The desire to promote a transparent financial policy, the need for foreign investment flows, political system (coalition government), national integrity and sovereignty and regional integration (EAC) have influenced Kenya's approach to foreign policy (GoK, 2009).

Ideally, and as Schraeder (1994) opines, foreign policy decisions ought to be guided by the interest of the nation and founded on intermediate as well as sustainable planned and essential domestic interests. Howell (1969) highlights sub-regional, regional, and national political interests, which are local interests but deeply influence how Kenya behaves globally. According to Omolo (2009), Kenya's foreign policy is founded on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and preservation of national security. He further states that the strategic physical location of Kenya and the security concerns of Kenya and other states provide a vast opportunity for trade, tourism and arbitration between states and global institutions.

The goals of a nation in international relations are accomplished via diverse means such as cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, environmental diplomacy, diaspora diplomacy, and peace diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Kenya is a state party to several multilateral treaties. These include International Convention on Maritime Search and

Rescue, 1979 (SAR), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) among others. The most significant international affiliations are with the East African Community, the African Union, and the Commonwealth of Nations. Treaties facilitate the fundamental need of states to regulate by consent matters of mutual interest, thereby bringing forth stability into their mutual relations. Treaties are one of the most important elements of international peace and security (Dorr & Schmalenbach, 2017). Despite these affiliations, Kenya's relations with her neighbors to the north i.e., Somalia and Sudan have been less harmonious for decades except for Ethiopia.

Castagno (1964) contends that the North Eastern region of Kenya has often been a cradle of clashes, which stem mainly from the Somali's self-determination. He further explains that the Somali people felt that they had a right to self-determination in order to join their kin in the Somali Republic because the British administration had at first stated that all regions where the Somali people had occupied should be united. The British colonial administration then later handed the North Eastern region to Kenyan nationalists regardless of the irresistible yearning by the Somali people in the region to be united with the Somali Republic (Castagno, 1964). However, the urge to form a greater Somalia has now given rise to a number of terrorist activities as an effort to fight historical injustices brought about by the British colonial administration. President Jomo Kenyatta on the other hand, as a Kenyan nationalist, consistently said, "Not an inch" when confronted with a question aimed at allowing the Northern Frontier District to be part of Somali Republic (Hansard, 1965).

According to Maina (2014), Somalia has traditionally made claims over the North-Eastern territory with the large ethnic Somali population leading to instability in the region. Kenya's foreign policy comprises interactions and actions that the government takes in order to promote, protect, and preserve its national interests as well as its image on the international arena. Keohane (2010) notes that state's strategic tactic of wait and see has become obsolete thanks to external influences. For many years, Kenya has not been able to wait for its key competitors to grab its markets before reacting and thus it is forced to preserve the speed of asserting itself to expand its existence in foreign states. Kenya, thus, has to achieve this by enhancing and aligning its economic diplomacy structures.

Ahmed (2016) opines that the guiding standards of Kenya's foreign policy are: Peaceful relations with other states, solving of contentions peacefully, respect for territorial integrity, respect for international law, obedience to the regulation of non-alignment as well as fairness in the behavior of global relations. Kenya's relations with the Western and Eastern countries were mainly hinged on economic development and enhancing national security. Since independence, Kenya has maintained amicable relations with the United Kingdom, which has remained its key trading partner, primary supplier of economic and military help, and major source of private investment (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998).

According to Mwegu (2009), by 1983 Kenya was the major partner to the Western countries in East Africa as evidenced by the many security/military agreements and defense pacts signed with Britain, US and Israel. The French embassy on the other hand listed the areas of cooperation between Kenya and France which include: education, promotion of peace and development (La France au Kenya, 2019). Chege (2008) opines that diplomatic

visits made by senior government official from Kenya to China and from China to Kenya were meant to negotiate and seal economic and technical deals. Kenya's foreign policy with its neighbors is built on the concept of good neighborliness which is a principle in international law that compels states to harmonize their interests with those of their neighbors. In particular, it has been found that Kenya has close relations with its many neighbors. This is influenced by the fact that a majority of the neighbors share close ties with the state in terms of culture, politics and trade. As a way of maintaining good neighborliness, Kenya has been part and parcel of supporting the war on terrorism in Somalia (Makinda, 2008). It has also been critical in supporting refugees in one of the largest refugee camps in the world (UNHCR, 2016).

According to Mitei (2005), Kenya has also participated in solving political unrest in states such as Sudan among others (Jan, 2012). According to Blanchard (2013), the degree to which Kenya can attain its set foreign policy goals and influence the behavior of Ethiopia or any other international body largely relies on how active the state is in pursuing such policies. Domestic factors such as the physical position and size of the states, their resources (both mortal and material), their military, level of advancement in technology are all crucial to the type of foreign policy the state adopts. James and Zhang (2005) contend that policy makers often settle for strategies that are satisfactory to the masses regardless of whether they find the strategies to be less ideal. For a number of administrators, the capability to consistently earn support from the masses for their decisions is a crucial element that choices must comply with.

Breunning (2007) argues that a state's citizenry is the principal determinant of its foreign policy. A state's citizenry takes several diverse forms, though the key ones can be categorized into three groups which are interest groups, mass media, and views from the masses. The degree to which state citizenry influences foreign policy is measured by taking into account how policy makers are controlled by the pressure from the citizenry. Secondly it is also influenced by the strategies employed by policy makers in seeking to fix their plans and forming the opinion of the citizenry. James, Zhang, and Breuning (2007) in their work observe that domestic constituencies and leaders play a pivotal role in shaping foreign policy thus ignoring the fact that external pressure from neighboring states is bound to influence the foreign policy of a state.

Howell (1968) asserts that globally, Kenya's foreign policy is characterized by a strong sense of idealism, a philosophy that is fundamentally peace oriented and is shaped by values and beliefs of the nation. Almost every major Kenyan foreign policy pronouncement such as those on security and international relations points to the inequalities the present global order and the desire to attain a nonviolent and unbiased global community founded on rule-based inter-state relations. According to The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2013/14 – 2017/18, Kenya's foreign policy is founded on principles such as a resilient activism for a global structure founded on rules, environmental sustainability and unbiased advancement as well as a safe world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Regionally, the foreign policy of Kenya is directed by a more traditional philosophy, particularly where a drastic retreat from normalcy is not considered. Clearly where foreign policy matters directly affect essential interests of Kenya such as internal security and development, the

fanaticism of Kenya's extensive foreign strategy, mainly demonstrated in UN conferences, subjected to substantial control.

According to Gebremariam (2004), from 1965 to 1967, Somalis prepared rebel groups which made distressing invasions into Kenya as well as Ethiopia, regardless of the efforts made by Sudanese President Ibrahim Aboud who had arbitrated at the start with a view of calming the aggressions. This impelled both countries to approve a preventive foreign policy by closing the boundaries as a way of hindering the Somali pastoralists from intruding their regions. The move enhanced closer collaboration between Kenya and Ethiopia on Somalia, particularly on matters of security.

In another study by The Institute of Public Administration (1999), it emerges that the Somali issue seems like it is entirely restricted to the Somali people and their state. This is owing to the fact that it is a conflict that presents features of an in-house conflict with in-house implications; nevertheless, upon close analysis, it turns out to be a regional issue that has become global since it spills over to neighboring countries. To confront the threat of Pan-Somalism which is the Somalis' vision of unifying all areas populated by Somalis to form a Greater Somalia, the governments of both Ethiopia and Kenya opted to collaborate in case of any threats from Somalia under self-defense Article 51 of the UN charter – collective self-defense. For a number of years, foreign policy decisions by Ethiopia as well as Kenya have demonstrated stability by collaborating in the event that the integrity of their territories is being compromised by Somalia. It is useful that both states ensure that that they have troops in Somalia to counter the challenge emanating from the Somali crisis, and especially the challenge posed by Al-Shabab. Additionally, as cooperation is required from the states it also helps them accomplish their individual interests.

According to Alemneh (2017), Ethiopia's import from Kenya increased by 49% from 2004 to 2013 with the highest trade volumes being recorded in 2006. The major imported commodities from Kenya were stationery, creams for footwear, household articles, and powdered milk. Ethiopia's export to Kenya rose by 800% which was a dramatic change with the largest increase being marked in 2013 and the lowest revenue 2004. On the other hand, Alemneh (2017) argues that the government of Ethiopia has a lot of untapped potential in the private sector yet it has chosen not to open doors to Kenya and COMESA countries as it abides by the principle of economic nationalism as a way of protecting its local industries from competition. Therefore, economic development is among the key factors that are aimed at enhancing bilateral relations between Kenya and Ethiopia and there is proof that trade is going on between the two countries.

Omolo (2009) opines that foreign policy starts where national policy stops, and both of them are aimed at maintaining national security, which is a valuable national concern. Citizens of a given state are at the heart of its interest, and their security is the nation's core interest. Omolo (2009) argues that Kenya's foreign policy is based on: respect for the integrity of other nations as well as maintaining of national security. The strategic location of Kenya and the relatively protected concerns of Kenya with other states provide a huge opportunity for business.

According to the Kenyan Government Sessional Paper Number 10(1965), Kenya asserted that African Socialism in the state must not rest its success on a satellite relationship with any other state or group of states. Kenya therefore, made agreements with major world powers and received economic and military assistance from them. This is seen for instance in the military support that the state gets from developed nations such as the UK and US in

training its military. Since 1963 Kenya has been embracing capitalism while benefitting from the East for developmental projects in order to maintain the state's political independence while gaining economic mileage. The literature available just gives a general outlook of the main factors that determine Kenya's foreign policy with Ethiopia as security, economic development and geopolitics. However, there seems to be an imbalance in the trade policies of Kenya and Ethiopia which is an integral aspect of economic development; a fact that makes factors that determine Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia an interesting area that requires further exploration.

### **2.3 Bilateral Trade Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020**

According to The Kenya Association of Manufacturers Report (2021), Flora Mutahi, the Vice Chairperson of the Association opines that Ethiopia is known for its agro-based industries in leather, coffee, bamboo products, natural gum and flowers though it has a young manufacturing sector whereas Kenya has a more stable and wider manufacturing sector. According to Mutahi, Ethiopia has cheaper energy supply thereby making its manufacturers to pay 6 times less for electricity than their Kenyan counterparts. Mutahi goes ahead to state that Kenya and Ethiopia have had a number of exchange programs in technical expertise and that Ethiopia imports livestock from Kenya with a view of getting raw materials for manufacturing leather products. However, Ethiopia often has a shortage of milk thereby presenting a great opportunity for Kenya's dairy sector. Mutahi points out the fact that there are numerous opportunities for Kenya to invest in Ethiopia especially in the food, beverage and financial domain though seemingly, Ethiopia often buys beverages from South Africa. Notably, Ethiopia can do business with Kenya in the mobile sector but Ethiopia's ICT sector has not been liberalized since Ethiopia still relies only on the services

provided by Ethio Telekom, a state-owned company. Mutahi concludes by stating that a number of challenges exist in the implementation of free trading and exchange of expertise between Kenya and Ethiopia.

According to the Moyale Cross-Border Market Profile Report (2011), food products and livestock are the main commodities that Kenya imports from Ethiopia and non-food products such as detergents, plastic and construction materials are the main items that Kenya exports to Ethiopia. The report further enumerates the main constraints of cross-border trade as: Poor infrastructure, civil conflict, market dominance by brokers, high taxes, export bans and the negative impact of food aid.

Alemneh (2017) points out the trade imbalance that exists between Kenya and Ethiopia and states that it can only be mitigated if Ethiopia improves on its agricultural commodities before exporting them and if Kenya and Ethiopia solve the impediment that promotes trade imbalance. According to Alemneh (2017), the Ethiopian government locks out the private sector in the running of projects and in the process investors from Kenya fail to be included. Alemneh further explains that trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have seemingly improved gradually but still remain low in comparison to other EAC countries.

A lot of research has been done on Kenya's foreign policy in general; however, little analysis has been done on the key factors that influence Kenya's diplomatic relations with Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020 in the order of their significance. Makinda (1987) talked about Kenya- Ethiopia relations while he was attempting to trace Kenya's foreign policy from 1963 but his main focus was on the role that Kenya played in the Somali-Ethiopia dispute. Adar (1986) also discussed Kenya- Ethiopia relations briefly. However, his thesis was only

concerned with the importance of “territorial integrity” as the main factor that determines Kenya-Ethiopia relations. Mesfin (1964), on the other hand, talked about Kenya-Ethiopia relations while analyzing the background of Ethiopia-Somalia disputes. Abebe (2014) also discussed Kenya-Ethiopia relations but he focused more on the socio-economic and environmental implications of Gibe III Dam system in Ethiopia’s Omo Valley. Similarly, Merhatsidk (2011) discussed diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia but his main aim was to bring out the challenges and prospects of the security factors that affect relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. Alemneh (2017) mentioned Kenya-Ethiopia’s relations but he focused on the regional economic integration of East African countries. Onyango (1995) on the other hand discussed how security, geopolitical and trade factors contributed to cooperative relations between Kenya and Ethiopia but he never brought out the conflictual nature of their relations. Kenya’s diplomatic relations with Ethiopia is usually mentioned in passing by different scholars.

#### **2.4 Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Framework**

Despite the many theories that exist in international relations, this research was hinged on two theories only which are: the Realism theory and the Allison’s theory of Decision-making. The central assumption behind this study is that states are rational actors. That is, they make decisions based on the reality that they face. Kenya is faced by challenges and continues to face challenges ranging from threats to its national security to economic survival. As such, this exploratory study on Kenya’s diplomatic relations with Ethiopia employs the Realism theory and Allison’s theory of Decision-making in international relations since the two theories are more suitable to give an explanation on the relations. The study established whether the nature of the relations help us to understand theoretical

frameworks in international relations. The key assumptions and critics of the two theoretical frameworks are discussed below:

#### **2.4.1 Realism Theory**

A number of approaches which explain international relations are encompassed in the realist theory whose other name is political realism. It differs with idealism or liberalism since liberalism or idealism puts emphasize on cooperative relations. Carr and Morgenthau who are the main proponents of this theory explain international relations through human nature. They assert that human beings are naturally egocentric, self-interest-oriented and aggressive and so is the state (Brown, 2005: 30). That states are so power-hungry that at times they apply aggressive techniques to ensure that they subdue other states. According to realism the state is the main actor in the international arena. The state is a central actor in the pursuit of matters of security, national interest and power struggle (Buzan, 1997: 53).

Hans Morgenthau (1978) is the key proponent of the realism theory. He opines that power is central in explaining the behavior of states in the international arena. According to Morgenthau, there is no central governing authority in the international arena thus making each of the states to adopt techniques of improving their military capability. All realists uphold the doctrine that security issues of a state come top on the hierarchy of their agenda on sustaining the state's existence. In other words, they regard security as primary in international politics whereas other issues like commerce are considered secondary. States take the leading role in the global system and thus engaging in relations that are aimed at propagating, safe-guarding their individual interest and maximizing their power which in turn affects their relations with other states.


Morgenthau among other realists doubts the existence of morality in the international arena. He contends that in case morality is employed then probably it is used as an instrument to justify a given state's behavior. Morgenthau argues that the guiding principle of foreign policy formulation is to enhance national stability and survival. It is against this background that many states strive to protect their political integrity and physical territories from interference by other states that may have bad motives. The theory is relevant in this study since it explains the motive behind Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020. Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia is mainly pegged on enhancing mutual security and economic development. However, this theory prioritizes security over economic development, which makes it insufficient in explaining Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia. However, the limitation of the realism theory will be covered by Allison's theory of foreign policy decision making.

#### **2.4.2 Allison's theory of foreign policy decision making**

The study also used Allison's theory of foreign policy decision making. In his book, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (1971), Allison argues that the three models of the rational actor, organizational process, and national politics are useful in strategic foreign policy implementation processes by states. In the rational actor model, Allison says that human beings act in rationality with certain policy concepts. These concepts identify phenomena as actions performed by purposeful agents. Rational choice consists of selecting that alternative whose consequences ranks highest in the decision makers' pay off. The organizational behavior model explains how an organization behaves and makes decisions and how these decisions are implemented. Organizations have standard procedures which do not change significantly over time. The government politics

model views the actions of government as political resultants. Allison outlines that the emergence of those resultants is from the foreign policy feature of a competitive game, where multiple players with different policy preferences struggle, compete, and bargain over the substance and conduct of policy. These approaches contend to the fact that governments are unified, rational entities seeking to achieve well defined foreign policy goals in the international system. A careful examination of Kenya's trade relations with Ethiopia will best be explained within this theoretical framework since Kenya's foreign policy is based on rational decisions by policy makers that are aimed at benefitting Kenya as a country.

## 2.5 Conceptual Framework



**Figure 1: Conceptual Framework**

Kenya's foreign policy is determined by various factors (Independent variables). These factors include: security and economic development. Kenya's foreign policy is pegged on whether Kenya stands to gain by preserving its territorial integrity, enjoying protection against terrorist attacks as well as limiting conflicts among border communities. On the other hand, Kenya seeks to enhance trade relations and investments with other countries and also improve on its infrastructure. However, on many occasions extraneous variables such as manipulation from colonial masters together with the leadership in place at a given time often come into play thus influencing foreign policy decisions.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This section describes the research process in terms of the design, the targeted population, study sample, sampling technique, sampling frame, data type, data collection techniques and data analysis and ethical considerations.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

In this study exploratory research design was used. Exploratory research is aimed at gaining new insights, discovering unfamiliar concepts and improving understanding of a phenomenon. This research was exploratory since it explored Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia, an area that has not received much academic attention. Substantial research has been done on Kenya's foreign policy in general but not much research has been done on the foreign policy of Kenya towards Ethiopia, the nature of their diplomatic relations as well as the critical determinants of Kenya's diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.

#### **3.2 Study Area**

Primary data was mainly collected from employees at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya. A number of the informants were interviewed in Nairobi town, the capital city of Kenya and its outskirts since Nairobi is the hub of most of the major ministries such as The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The Ministry of Defense. However, a few other informants were interviewed on phone especially those who were in Ethiopia and those who were too busy to schedule a physical meeting.

### 3.3 Target Population

<b>Category</b>	<b>Target Population</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Diplomats	20	19.6
Foreign Service Officers	20	19.6
Security Personnel	8	7.8
Other key informants	54	52.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>100</b>

The target population of the study comprised of 102 adults; male and female from Kenya and Ethiopia. They included: Diplomats, Foreign Service officers, Security Personnel, and other key informants such as Ethiopians living in Kenya and Kenyans living in Ethiopia.

### 3.4 Sampling Techniques

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999), purposive sampling technique allows a researcher to use cases that have the required information concerning the objectives of his or her study. Cases of subjects are therefore handpicked because they are informative or they possess the required characteristics. In this study, the informants were purposively selected based on ease of acquiring information and minimum expenditure as well as their knowledge about Kenya- Ethiopia relations and their availability for the interview. The study also used snowball sampling technique to get new contacts or links to other respondents since being referred by a former informant to another one earned the researcher more credibility which facilitated the process of collecting data. Stratified random sampling technique was also employed to ensure that all categories of the target population had an equal opportunity of being included in the sample.

### 3.5 Sample Size

Category	Frequency	Sample ratio	Sample size
Diplomats	20	0.3	6
Foreign Service Officers	20	0.3	6
Security Personnel	8	0.3	2
Other key informants	54	0.3	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>		<b>30</b>

Given that it is impossible to collect data from the entire population, the researcher had to select a sample to represent the entire population. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) contend that 30% of the target population is enough to represent the target population. Therefore, out of a target population of 102 people, 30 respondents were enough to provide relevant data for the study at hand. Additionally, the researcher ensured that accuracy as well as representativeness was taken into account while calculating the sample size. This was done by using the stratified random sampling technique that ensured that all categories of the target population got an equivalent opportunity of being part of the sample. A sample of 30 individuals with expert knowledge on Kenya- Ethiopia's diplomatic relations was sampled purposively and 18 of them were male while 12 were female. These included 6 diplomats and 6 Foreign Service officers some who are still in service and others who had already retired from service. Among the informants there were 2 members of the security personnel one being a retired Brigadier from the military and another who is a serving Colonel in the Kenya Defense Headquarters at Hurlingham. Other key informants included 8 Kenyans and 8 Ethiopians who were also interviewed to gain their general outlook on Kenya- Ethiopia relations. The design in this study is aimed at covering the

target population adequately, while considering the inadequate funds and the distance between the two states.

### **3.6 Instruments of Data Collection**

The researcher employed interview schedules comprising of close-ended and open-ended questions to generate data. This facilitated the process of the researcher acquiring data which is essential in meeting the objectives of the study. An interview schedule which is semi-structured was used as the participatory tool, and the respondents were engaged in a conversation through a series of guided questions. It is flexible and also allows open-ended discussion with the government officials and people with expert knowledge of Kenya-Ethiopia relations and foreign policy analysis. The semi-structured interview schedules were designed with questions that varied to some extent from one respondent to another basing on the required data. Telephone interviews were also conducted in situations where a face-to-face interview was impossible. Secondary data was also sought to inform the study.

### **3.7 Pre-testing of Research Instruments**

The researcher conducted a pre-test of the data collection instruments by sending out 20 questionnaires to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but only 10 were responded to. Among the 10 questionnaires some had many blank spaces, which made the researcher to opt for interview schedules as data collection instruments. This was due to the nature of the informants' jobs. These individuals were not readily available and most of those that were interviewed were too busy to fill questionnaires thereby forcing the researcher to resort to both face to face interviews and telephone interviews.

### **3.8 Validity and Reliability**

This research employed construct validity since it is a measure of the degree to which data obtained accurately and meaningfully represents a theoretical concept. The concepts being tested in this research were theoretical concepts relating to Kenya-Ethiopia relations; thus, construct validity was perceived as the best technique for this study. Data collected from primary sources was also triangulated with data collected through secondary sources with a view of ensuring that the findings from the empirical data collection process are credible. The data collection instruments were also pre-tested and adjusted accordingly in effort to improve validity.

Reliability on the other hand entails the degree to which data collection instruments give consistent results. Reliability was taken care of through a piloting exercise conducted among a small percentage of the target population at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### **3.9 Data Collection Techniques and Procedures**

The primary sources of data in this study were face to face and telephone interviews with key informants such as Kenyan government officials namely: diplomats, high ranking security officers, Foreign Service officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya as well as Kenyans with interests in Ethiopia and Ethiopians living in Kenya. Their ranks include: Ambassadors, Deputy Foreign Service Academy, Director General Foreign Service Academy, Third Secretary, Foreign Service officers, Brigadier, Colonel, scholars and Kenyan and Ethiopian nationals. A total of 30 informants took part in the study, 22 of them were Kenyans and 8 were Ethiopians. Open-ended questions with key informants and interviews were the data collection techniques that were employed in this study. A semi-structured interview schedule was used as the participatory tool, and the respondents

were engaged in a discussion directed by a sequence of questions. The interview schedule permitted unrestricted discussion with all the respondents with adept understanding on the analysis of foreign policy.

The secondary sources of data consisted of the general literature on foreign policy and Kenya's relations with other states the main focus being Ethiopia in particular. It also consisted of Kenya- Ethiopia export and import volumes aimed at explaining the trade trends between Kenya and Ethiopia. The secondary sources of data include: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Reports, UNHCR Reports, UNOCHA Reports, books such as Kenya Foreign Policy Behavior Towards Somalia by Adar G.K., Postgraduate thesis such as The Hydro-politics of Omo-Turkana Basin by Abebe, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, The Modern Journal of African Studies, archival records such as letters, itinerary and photos, Hansard Parliamentary Debates among others. Internet sources such as online journals and YouTube were also relied on for current information. Statistics on the magnitude of trade was obtained from the International Trade Centre Database, compiled by EPC.

### **3.10 Data Analysis**

Data was analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques. In particular, thematic analysis was used to conduct the qualitative analysis. In this type of analysis, interview data is grouped into key themes and patterns before being analyzed. In the context of this study, a portion of the qualitative data was categorized into related sets after which the groups were coded and compared to identify key themes from the data.

The key themes identified for objective 1 explored the nature of diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020 were: pragmatic, cordial and frosty whereas the key themes identified for objective 2 identified the factors behind Kenya and Ethiopia diplomatic relations from 1963 to 2020 were: regional and sub-regional integration, peace and security, economic prosperity and political organization. The sub-themes identified for objective 2 included: sovereignty and territorial integrity, national interests, friendship between leaders, international organizations as well as treaties and pacts.

Objective 3 analyzed the extent to which fair and equitable bilateral trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been promoted from 1963 to 2020. The main theme identified for objective 3 was: unfavorable investment policies. Quantitative data collected from secondary sources was used by the researcher to justify the qualitative data collected from primary sources. Simple statistics in form of percentages, histograms and pie charts from excel program was employed in coding, tabulating and analyzing of the data collected. Descriptive statistical tools which include frequencies and percentages were used to analyze and interpret the quantitative data. The data was then presented in form of pie charts and tables.

### **3.11 Ethical Considerations**

The researcher observed the principle of voluntary participation such that respondents were not coerced to give information. The researcher also respected cultural sensitivity since the respondents were from diverse cultural backgrounds that is Kenya and Ethiopia. The researcher also observed anonymity of the informants as requested given the sensitivity of the study and the fact that most of the informants were holding senior government positions

and they had to preserve their jobs. The information gathered was kept confidential, and research permits and authorization were obtained from the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI) as well as the Kenyatta University Ethics Review Committee.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

Chapter four consists of the analysis and interpretation of data that was obtained by the researcher from information founded on objectives of the research through formal interviews that were guided by interview schedules. This section also explores findings of the study and compares them with those from previous studies in order to understand the contribution of this study to literature on international relations and diplomacy.

The researcher conducted a pre-test of the data collection instruments by sending out 20 questionnaires to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but only 10 were responded to. Among the 10 questionnaires some had many blank spaces, which made the researcher to opt for interview schedules as data collection instruments. The researcher drew a sample of 30 informants from a target population of 102 informants with knowledge on Kenya-Ethiopia relations and managed to interview all of them. The sample size was adequate given the complexity of the topic since only a limited number of the entire population had in-depth knowledge on Kenya's relations with Ethiopia.

#### **4.1 Demographic Information**

Demographic information such as age, gender and working period in a government institution is vital in this study since it is an indicator that all the relevant categories of the population are well represented in the sample. The tables below give a comprehensive summary of the general characteristics of the 30 participants who participated in the study.

#### 4.1.1 Gender of the Informants

**Table 1: Gender of the Informants**

<b>Gender</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Male	18	60%
Female	12	40%
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100%</b>

There was a total of 30 people who took part in the study, 22 of them were Kenyans and 8 were Ethiopians. Among those who volunteered to take part in the study, 60% were male, while 40% were female. Thus, there were more men than women in the study sample, an element that could have skewed the study outcomes.

#### 4.1.2 Age of Informants

**Table 2: Age of the Informants**

<b>Age Group</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Below 21	0	0%
21-30	2	6.7%
31-40	12	40%
41-50	10	33.3%
51-60	4	13.3%
Above 60	2	6.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100</b>

The above table indicates the age group of the participants. From the findings, majority of those who responded were aged 31-40 years, which comprised 40% of the sample. 33.3% were aged between 41 and 50 years, and 6.7% were aged 21 and 30 years of age. 13.3% were aged 51-60 years and 6.7% were above 60 years old.

### 4.1.3 The Working Period in the Government Institution

**Table 3: The Working Period in the Government Institution**

<b>Period</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Below three years	0	0%
3-7 years	2	6.7%
8-10 years	10	33.3%
Above ten years	4	13.3%
Not applicable	14	46.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100</b>

The table above shows that 6.7% of the participants had worked as government officials for a period ranging between 3 and 7 years, 33.3% for 8 to 10 years and those who had worked for more than ten years were 13.3%. 46.7% of the participants could not be placed in either of the Foreign Service professional categories since majority were Kenyan and Ethiopian nationals who gave their general views about Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

## 4.2 The Key Findings


### 4.2.1 The Nature of the Diplomatic Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia between 1963-2020

The first specific objective of this study was to explore the nature of diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020. In the analysis of the nature of diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia three main themes arose. Some respondents indicated that the diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been cordial; others found the relations to be pragmatic whereas others found the relations to be frosty. The diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia can be described as cordial, and according to the findings this has been in existence since independence. These relations

can be traced in a letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1964 in which Emperor Haile Selassie writes to Sir Malcolm MacDonald, who was the Governor General of the Kenya Colony of his intentions to visit Kenya after independence. The letter was written during the transition period after Kenya got its independence. Therefore, Kenya was still under the stewardship of Sir MacDonald who was the Governor General of the Kenyan Protectorate and Jomo Kenyatta was the Prime Minister then. In this letter, Emperor Haile Selassie says that he is pleased to learn that His Excellency Sir Malcolm MacDonald will be able to visit Ethiopia (Jubilee Palace, 1964). He confirms that 12<sup>th</sup> December 1964 is a very convenient date and that they will be very happy to welcome him and Mrs. MacDonald (Sir Mac Donald's wife) as of that date (See Appendix 4).

In a different letter H.W. Russell, the British Ambassador at the time also acknowledges Emperor Haile Selassie's visit to Kenya indicating the feeling of the people in Kenya in having both governments work together to improve mutual interdependence between the two states. In this letter, Ambassador Russell writes that, it was a great honor and pleasure to have The Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie as a guest at the State House in Kenya and that both the exalted and the humble people continued talking about the emperor's visit, an indication that he had left an abiding impression (State House Nairobi, 1964). He further stated that the government and the people of Kenya felt warmer towards Ethiopia than before. (See Appendix 4). These visits seem to have cemented the relations between the two states an element that resulted in the laying of the foundation stone for the Ethiopian embassy near state house Nairobi on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1964 as indicated on Emperor Haile Selassie's invitation card from Ethiopia's Ambassador to Kenya (See Appendix 4).

**Figure 2: Respondents' Views on the Nature of Diplomatic Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia**



In response to the question of how the informants rated the nature of relations between Kenya and Ethiopia, 50% of the 30 informants interviewed felt that the relations between Kenya and Ethiopia were cordial whereas 43% felt that Kenya-Ethiopia relations were pragmatic. They pointed out the economic and security factors that were of benefit to both states. On the other hand, 7% of the informants expressed that the relations between Kenya and Ethiopia were frosty. The latter went to an extent of giving examples of incidents that made them feel that the Kenya-Ethiopia diplomatic relations were frosty. It was found that indeed, the relations have been cordial as noted by one of the ambassadors who was the UN Special Envoy to Somalia who said that:

“The relations between the two states are cordial, and this can be explained by the fact that the Ethiopian embassy is situated near State House and also in Ethiopia, the Kenyan Embassy is situated strategically in the city of Addis Ababa, showing the relations that exist between the two nations” (KY3, telephone interview, 6/02/2019)

The Ethiopian embassy is only 240 meters away from state house in Nairobi whereas the other embassies that seem closer to the state house such as the Embassy of Spain, the Embassy of Tanzania and the British High Commission are 2 kilometers away from state house. In diplomatic context, such subtle elements such as the location of the embassies among other factors can be an essential starting point in understanding relations between two nations, an aspect that emerges clearly from the relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. Informant KY3 agrees with Merhatsidk (2011) who contends that: As soon as Kenya attained independence, the relations intensified as marked by Kenya opening its consulate in Addis Ababa and Emperor Haile Selassie paying a state visit to Kenya.

In the same vein, informant KY3 echoes the sentiments of Nigussay (1977) who opines that the Ethiopian military junta known as the Derg proceeded with the amicable with Kenya at a time when it seemed that the relations were going to be dampened by the different ideological stands of leaders of the two states. Ideally most nations tend to have cordial relations with nations that share a similar ideology with them. The ascension of the Derg who was pro-East to power seemed to be a threat to Kenya-Ethiopia relations since Kenya was pro-West. The fact that Kenya-Ethiopia relations still stood firm during the Derg's era is a clear indicator of how cordial the relations are. In addition, Okumu (1977) states that the visit of Colonnal Mengistu the Derg leader to Kenya before he fled to Zimbabwe is a vital indicator of the cordial nature of relations between the two states especially during tough times.

Secondly, the relations have also been termed by respondents as pragmatic as evidenced by the collaborations in which both states have benefited from each other, enhancing the stability of both states. Ideally, it is only practical for a state to establish strong bilateral

relations with a state which does not have a common interest and the bilateral ties will often lead to collaborations that eventually will be of mutual benefit to both states. This is in line with Allison in his theory of decision-making who contends to the fact that governments are unified, rational entities seeking to achieve well defined foreign policy goals in the international system. From the findings, collaborations began way back before independence. Informant KY4 who was Kenya's ambassador to Ethiopia opines that:

“Kenya's relations with Ethiopia begun during pre-independence time. Early diplomats in both Kenya and Ethiopia, for example, were concerned with the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and especially Somalia” (KY4, Westlands, 19/02/2019).

Informant KY4 tends to validate Whittaker (2008) in his study on The Stigma of Shifta War during the 'shifta war' in Kenya 1963-1968 where he argues that before 1963, the biggest concern that would influence Kenya's foreign relations was the desire by the Somalis in the Northern Frontier District to join the Somalia government. In the post-colonial era, from the late 1950s to the present, the Horn of Africa has witnessed a number of major wars between two different states and among communities within the states. The wars include: the Ethiopian-Somali wars (1964, 1977-78, 2006-9), the Kenyan-Somali war (1963), the Ugandan-Tanzanian war (1978-79) and the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war (1998-2000). Cross-border conflicts among different communities have also occurred due to environmental destruction as well as porous boundaries which are not appreciated by the communities that practice pastoralism especially those divided by the national borders (Ngeiywa, 2008).

Belete (2005) contends that bilateral relations between Kenya and Ethiopia during Haile Selassie era were based on cooperation for mutual security benefit. His argument supports Informant KY4 who mentioned that conflict in the Horn of Africa made Kenya and Ethiopia to cooperate since that was the only pragmatic solution. Abebe (2010) further supports Informant KY4 by highlighting that in 1991 Kenya and Ethiopia signed a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that identified 18 areas of cooperation.

According to the Realism Theory, countries come up with foreign policy decisions that will often favor the protection of their territorial integrity and this entails forming bilateral relations with the view of safeguarding their security. The many cross border conflicts and the desire to mitigate the common threats from Somalia clearly defines the nature of relations between Kenya and Ethiopia as that which is pragmatic in the sense that both countries had a desire to collaborate so that they can be able to fight the challenges facing them as one strong unit. The wars in the Horn of Africa are intertwined and related in the sense that they adopt sub-regional as well as regional forms. For decades almost all the states in the Horn of Africa have suffered a number of conflicts of diverse degrees and magnitude. However, no state in the Horn of Africa region has succeeded in averting the increase of intra-state and inter-state violence and none has ever succeeded in mitigating the hostile impact of the conflicts in a way that is sustainable.

In addition, the results indicated that regional bodies such as IGAD, AU and EAC have been vital in determining Kenya's relations with her neighbors such as Ethiopia which is in concurrence with findings of Gichangi (2012) who did a study on The Effects of East African Common Market on Cross Border Business for Kenya Association of Manufacturers' Members. IGADD which is an instrument that helped at the beginning to

mitigate the drought situation at the horn of Africa had to take up the mandate of promoting peace and security in the region. As the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia and Northern and Southern Sudan continued to escalate in this part of Africa, IGAD grew as an essential instrument that helped to negotiate for peace in the border between Kenya and Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Somalia as well as Sudan. Indeed EAC, AU and IGAD have often given Kenya and Ethiopia a platform where they can work together to ensure that there is peace and economic development in the East African region. Kenya and Ethiopia form the economic powerhouse in the East African region so they have a bigger say in running the operations of the regional organizations. Due to their economic position, Kenya and Ethiopia are often entrusted with the role of negotiating peace among member states and even influencing economic policies in the region. Both Kenya and Ethiopia for example played a major role in South Sudan peace talks as well as enhancing stability in Somalia. Therefore, this form of collaboration under the umbrella of IGAD has been cited by informant KY5 who is one of the former ambassadors of Kenya to Canada as very essential. He said:

“IGAD is an essential element that has had a positive effect on the diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. The role of regional players through IGAD, mainly Ethiopia and Kenya, in curbing the spillover effect of the interstate and intra state wars on the Horn of Africa has had a great impact” (KY5, Foreign Service Academy, 14/02/2019).

According to Informant KY6 an ambassador:

“Ethiopia and Kenya play an active role in the seven-member IGAD, which attempts to resolve regional conflicts and promote regional economic integration. Both Ethiopia and Kenya did their best to assist the Sudan government and the South Sudan people’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to reach an agreement in 2005, a signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and it finally led to a referendum that was conducted in Southern Sudan in 2011” (KY6, telephone interview 22/01/2019).

Somalia is always claiming the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and northern territories of Kenya, and this violates the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia and Kenya. The convergence of the two states' national interests against Somalia's claim has been a substantial issue in regards to their cooperation since the 1960s.

According to KY5 the Deputy Foreign Service Academy:

“Attacks from terrorists made Kenya and Ethiopia to be closer since they have a major mutual concern which is enhancing security thus resulting into the two states sending their troops to AMISOM to fight against terrorists. It is this concern that drove the Ethiopian Prime Minister Haile Mariam Dessalegn and the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta to renew the six decades old military pact in 2015”

(KY5, interview at Foreign Service Academy 14/01/2019)

KY5 highlighted the transformation of the Somali problem into the Al-Shabaab crisis when the Al-Shabaab decided to hit back at Kenya in support of the Somalis of North Eastern part of Kenya who resented because they felt that their region was less developed compared to other parts of Kenya. Terrorists began to destabilize Kenya by launching a number of attacks. In 1980, the Jewish-owned Norfolk hotel was attacked. In 1998, the US embassy in Nairobi was bombed, as was the Israeli-owned Paradise hotel in 2002.

Informant KY5 echoes the sentiments of Ploch (2010) who contends that terrorist attacks faced by both Kenya and Ethiopia also enhanced their cooperation. According to Ploch (2010) in his study on Countering Terrorism in East Africa, Kenya cushioned Ethiopia by closing its borders with Somalia so that the defeated Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) can lack a place to hide as an effort to mitigate terrorism. Abasa (2015) also concurs with Informant KY5 by noting that the vacuum created in Somalia due to lack of a proper

government enabled terrorists to camp in Somalia, which therefore posed security challenges to both Kenya and Ethiopia thus fostering their cooperation.

Still, on pragmatic collaborations, KY1 noted that:

“Under the rule of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Selassie, both states developed and maintained close working relations. A vital element of these relations can be seen in the negotiation of the boundary adjustments between the two states that were done to the satisfaction of both parties leading to the signing of a treaty on 9<sup>th</sup> of June 1970 at Mombasa” (KY1, Foreign Service Academy, 14/01/2019).

The treaty entailed clear demarcation of the boundary line between Kenya and Ethiopia as well as a guideline on how common water points and grazing land will be shared among border communities (UN Treaty Series, 1989). Although Kenya and Ethiopia seem to have co-existed well as neighbors, there have been episodes of tension arising from border communities due to shared resources and they were catalyzed by the porous borders. In order to solve the cross-border conflicts, authorities from both Kenya and Ethiopia had to be involved as a way of offering a pragmatic solution. During this period, both states welcomed diplomatic missions that were geared towards increasing trade between the states, improvement in security, educational, science and technical cooperation as well as the coordination of policies at meetings of international organizations.

The findings also indicate that cordial relations between the two states seem to have developed as a result of the defense pact signed between Kenya and Ethiopia in 1964. This is in concurrence with findings of Merhatsidk (2011) who did a study on Security factors affecting Ethiopia-Kenya relations: (Post 1991) Challenges and Prospects. Pacts and treaties are used as binding tools that are geared towards enhancing bilateral relations

between countries. Kenya and Ethiopia signed the defense pact that bound them together so that they can assist each other in case they faced threats from an external aggressor and to date they have been abiding by the defense pact as a way of countering security threats from Somalia. One of the former ambassadors of Kenya to Ethiopia KY4, states that:

“The development of positive relations between the two states seems to have been significantly influenced by the defense pact, an aspect that positively helped foster the relations between the two states” (KY4, Westlands, 19/02/2019).

Other aspects that also indicate good relations between the two states that were also identified from the findings include the fact that the leaders of both states were friends and especially Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Selassie. An informant KY8 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opines that Emperor Haile Selassie and President Jomo Kenyatta were such great friends that:

“The emperor took good care of President Jomo Kenyatta’s family while he was imprisoned in the 1950s” (Informant KY8, interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14/03/2019)

The sentiments of informant KY8 are in agreement with those of biographer Jeremy Murray and Gebremedhin who opined that Kenya’s former president Jomo Kenyatta was a close ally of Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie (Murray, 1982). As a result, other than keeping the Ethiopian flag in his room, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta went on to name one of the only three critical avenues in Nairobi after the Emperor in 1972- Haile Selassie Avenue (Gebremedhin, 2015). This friendship has been a critical force in driving positive engagements across different aspects of strategic relations. One of the diplomats interviewed KY5, who is former Kenya’s ambassador to Canada observed that:

“The support given in both directions as a result of this friendship has been vital in building a positive diplomatic environment as well as engagement” (Informant KY5, interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14/02/2019).

Nonetheless, one of the respondents, a former ambassador of Kenya to Ethiopia KY4 cited incidents of competition between Kenya and Ethiopia. He particularly opined that:

“Kenya seems to have opened its doors wider to Ethiopia than Ethiopia has opened to Kenya. It is much easier for an Ethiopian to set up a business in Kenya than it is for a Kenyan to set up a business in Ethiopia. In fact, bilateral trade between Kenya and Tanzania and Kenya and Uganda is much better than Kenya and Ethiopia. Trade between Kenya and Ethiopia is quite low and this results from the silent competition between the two states for regional economic leadership” (KY4, Westlands, 19/02/2019).

This was confirmed by another female respondent KY13 who is a Kenyan living in Ethiopia who said that:

“It is rare to find an African who is not an Ethiopian running a business in Ethiopia. In fact, most of the businesses are owned by Asians and Ethiopians. Most of the Kenyans in Ethiopia are employees of multinational corporations” (KY13, telephone interview, 1/03/2019).

The sentiments of KY4 and KY13 are in tandem with those of the Foreign Affairs Chief Administrative Secretary Ababu Namwamba during the celebration to mark 55 years of strategic partnership between Kenya and Ethiopia. He said that:

“Despite all these very impressive agreements and JMC, regrettably the bilateral trade between our two countries remains quite low” (Mr. Ababu Namwamba, Chief Administrative Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

However, during the same celebrations of 55 years of strategic partnership between Kenya and Ethiopia, Ethiopian Ambassador to Kenya Meles Alem said:

“Ethiopia and Kenya complement each other. As we celebrate 55 years of strategic partnership, this is the beginning of more to come. We are not rivals. Maybe the only thing we compete each other on is athletics. Commemoration of the 55-year

relationship is not only about reflections but reaffirming our commitment to further deepen the relations we have. These two states have excellent diplomatic relations which is a vehicle for a strong economic bond. The economic dividends between Kenyans and Ethiopians are insignificant but commemoration of 55 years is an affirmation of the commitment to further deepen our traditional ties and above all make our economic and business ties stronger” (Meles Alem, Ethiopian Ambassador to Kenya).

In spite of the over 30 agreements and MoUs as well as the formation of the Joint Ministerial Commission aimed at driving the bilateral ties, conducting robust trade between Kenya and Ethiopia seems to be a struggle. The struggle according to Mr. Ababu Namwamba is as a result of non-tariff barriers such as long bureaucratic procedures, bans and sanctions as well as a strict foreign currency regulatory regime (Business Daily, 2019).

Despite the different fronts of collaboration between Kenya and Ethiopia, Kenya-Ethiopia relations have not been entirely free from tension. Informant KY10 a Foreign Service Officer said that:

“Ethiopia’s Gilgel Gibe III Dam on River Omo has been a source of tension between Kenya and Ethiopia” (Informant KY10, interview at the Ministry of Foreign affairs on 14/01/2019).

When the dam was still being constructed, Richard Leakey a Kenyan palaeanthropologist once said:

“The dam will produce a broad range of negative effects some of which would be catastrophic to both the environment and half a million indigenous Ethiopian and Kenyan communities living downstream.”

80% of the water in Lake Turkana comes from River Omo and by January 2015, the water levels of Lake Turkana had dropped by approximately 1.5 meters according to data from United States Department of Agriculture. According to Human Rights Watch, the shoreline of Lake Turkana had receded as much as 1.7 kilometers since 2014 thus affecting the

breeding area of fish which is a source of livelihood for the Turkana people. There were fears that the reduced water levels will heighten competition for water thus resulting into increased clashes. Felix Horne, a Human Rights Researcher asserts that:

“The Ethiopian government in its haste to develop its resources has not bothered to come up with strategies that will downsize the impact on those living downstream” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

When confronted with the question on describing the nature of relations between Kenya and Ethiopia, informant KY12 a Colonel in Kenya Army responded that:

Kenya and Ethiopia have issues that cannot be classified as major. The issues arising between them mostly revolve around outdated cultural practices such as cattle rustling and some are resource-based. Such issues are often fixed by regional administrations” (KY12, Kikuyu, 14/3/2019).

The sentiments of informant KY12 are in tandem with those documented in the UNOCHA report of 2011 that states that: The relations have not been entirely free of problems but the problems were not significant. The problems between Kenya and Ethiopia mostly were resource- based conflicts between border communities such as the Daasanach (Merille) of Ethiopia, the Turkana of Kenya, the Nyangatom of South Sudan and Ethiopia, the Gabra and the Borana of both Kenya and Ethiopia, which begun in the 1990s and escalated in 2010 (UNOCHA, 2011).

Lastly, the findings also indicated that both states realized that there was mutual benefit in them working together and the need to build good relations. Precisely, the benefits far outweighed any antagonistic relations in helping to deal with the problem of food security, drought, locust invasion, and conflicts that emerged in the regions of Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea (Alemneh, 2017). It was also found that there was a need to work together

cooperatively to help stabilize the volatile region through IGAD. Both Kenya and Ethiopia are very active members of regional organizations such as IGAD. Therefore, they play a major role in resolving the regional conflicts thereby contributing immensely to improving regional stability. Most of the scholars perceived this form of collaboration as a perfect example of the cordial and pragmatic relations between the two states.

The relations between Kenya and Ethiopia can be termed as cordial since at no time in history have the two countries declared enmity between them or even staged a war against each other. Kenya and Ethiopia have been facing similar challenges such as cross border conflicts, security threats from Somalia, an influx of refugees from neighboring countries but they have chosen to focus on the common opportunities at their disposal while solving the issues amicably. The regular visits by the heads of state of Kenya and Ethiopia regardless of changes in the leadership as well as collaborations in fixing their economic and security challenges are a clear indication of how cordial and pragmatic their relations are. Kenya and Ethiopia seem to be inseparable as evidenced by the regular renewal of their treaties since several decades ago with an aim of further deepening their relations. However, it is evident that there is a spec of mistrust between Kenya and Ethiopia as demonstrated by their trade relations. Ethiopia seems to fear competition from Kenya since both of them are striving to be regional economic giants. According to the findings, the same fear has driven Ethiopia into developing stringent measures that restrict foreign investors (Kenyans included) from accessing the Ethiopian market easily whereas Kenya has opened its doors wider to foreign investors (Ethiopians included).

Overall, it can be concluded that Kenya and Ethiopia continue to enjoy cordial and pragmatic relations that have helped both states to make many achievements from trade,

security, and stability, among others. A number of the responses that were received from the participants showed that between 1963 and 2020, they would rank the relations between the two states as amicable. However, some of the respondents mentioned that there were some frosty relations between the two states due to resource-based cross-border tension as well as trade imbalance, a fact that cannot be ignored.

#### **4.2.2 Factors behind Kenya and Ethiopia Diplomatic Relations from 1963- 2020**

In this study, the first objective found out that the strategic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been amiable and that both states enjoy cordial relations but with some traces of imbalance between the ways in which the two countries handle each other on matters of trade. Several key factors have contributed to these relations, which are explained below. It was, however, established that different respondents had different perceptions of these factors and pointed out some of them as essential determinants of these relations.

First, the study established that the good relations between the two states were influenced by mutual security concerns such as security threats from Somalia. One of the former ambassadors KY5 said that:

“Kenya and Ethiopia have related well since independence. We have collaborated in fighting terrorism and developing transport infrastructure in the region as well as negotiations for peace in the region through the bilateral relations and IGAD” (KY5, Foreign Service Academy, 14/01/2019).

Informant KY5 agrees with Makinda (2008) who contends that as a way of maintaining good neighborliness, Kenya has been part and parcel of supporting the war on terrorism in Somalia. This statement thus indicates the key mutual problems that Kenya and Ethiopia have, which meant that they needed to put measures in place that would help them address the problems they were facing. Maina (2012) contends with the fact that security is one of

the main factors that determine Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia by stating that: Kenya and Ethiopia signed a Defense Pact after being faced by a familiar foe, Somalia and the pact has since remained intact to this day. The second factor tied to security which is one of the determinants mentioned by KY5 that have influenced these relations includes the cross-border conflicts between Kenya and Ethiopia.

Findings of this study indicate that the key factor that dictates Kenya's relations with Ethiopia is protection from attacks from Somalia. According to KY3, the UNHCR Special envoy for the Horn of Africa and former IGAD's Special envoy to Somalia, the issue of conflicts and security threats from Somalia is a key factor that necessitated the development of positive diplomatic engagements between Kenya and Ethiopia.

“Kenya and Ethiopia became great collaborators as a result of The Shifta War (1963-1967) which was a secessionist conflict where ethnic Somalis in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya attempted to secede from Kenya to join the greater Somalia. Both states engage in positive relations because they are very keen on the stability of Somalia and hence both have troops in AMISOM for this purpose” (KY3, telephone interview, 6/02/2019).

Informant KY3 tends to agree with the opinion of Whittaker (2008) who argues that before 1963, the biggest concern that would influence Kenya's foreign relations was the desire by the Somalis in the Northern Frontier District to join the Somalia government. Between 1963 and 1968 the newly independent Kenyan state was faced by a secessionist insurgency of ethnic Somalis living within Kenya who wanted to be identified with the “greater Somalia” ideal. Ethiopia on the other hand had its Ogaden region being claimed by Somalia. As early as 1954, Somalia and Ethiopia were already hostile neighbors engaged in territorial skirmishes. The result was the need for the establishment of a common

approach to deal with the external aggression from the Somali states and Somalia nationalism that also became violent towards both Kenya and Ethiopia.

The core of the Kenya-Ethiopia Defense Pact, which has been renewed consistently over the years, is significantly based on either country coming to the aid of the other in case of an attack from a third party thus resulting into a united response should Somalia attack either of them. In the same spirit, today both Kenyan and Ethiopian troops are in Somalia to contain the Al-Shabaab militant group. Therefore, the need for stability in the region, especially from security threats, is a factor that has been at the heart of the relations between the two states, driving positive engagements between them.

The findings established that the second factor which is tied to security is cross border conflicts. According to KY9 who is a Foreign Service Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya:

“The cross-border conflicts mostly emerging from the cattle rustling communities living near the border as well as the Lake Turkana region also enhanced the relations” (Informant KY9, interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14/01/2019).

According to KY12, a Colonel in the Kenya Defense Forces:

“Poor infrastructure, low literacy level of the natives, and a high poverty index are the main characteristics of these cross-border regions thereby encouraging conflicts. The locals are mostly nomadic pastoralists and since they are not confined to one particular state, they often cross over to Ethiopia and vice versa” (KY12, a Colonel in the Kenya Defense Forces, 18/01/2019).

Informant KY12 tends to agree with Abebe (2010) who opines that after 1991 Kenya’s relations with Ethiopia experienced some problems due to cross-boundary conflicts between the border communities. According to Abebe (2010), on many occasions, these

movements often result into resource-based conflicts as they look for water and pasture for their animals. The conflict prevention mechanism of the locals is very weak since the locals rely on traditional methods of conflict resolution other than state intervention.

Merhatsidk (2011) notes that the existence of peace committees which are groups formed between warring communities with a view of enhancing peace seems not to bear much fruit due to poor communication as well as poor linkages with the local authorities. Positive relations between the two states, Kenya and Ethiopia were desired because of the need to stop these conflicts. Respondent KY2 opines that:

“In particular, the Kenyan government has been involved significantly in programs aimed at stopping the issue of cattle rustling, disease control and controlling the Oromo Liberation movement along the Kenya-Ethiopia border. In turn, Ethiopia has allowed Kenya to benefit from the free cross-border trade and the joint security initiatives, which has created a win-win situation for the two states” (Respondent KY2, interview at Kikuyu, 1/02/2019).

However, we cannot ignore the fact that both Kenya and Ethiopia have been making efforts to mitigate the cross-border conflicts. KY8 who is a Foreign Service Cadet in the department of Africa notes that:

“The 2006 agreement signed by Kenya and Ethiopia played a key role in minimizing cross-border conflicts” (KY8, interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14/02/2019).

According to a report by UNOCHA (2006), in the year 2006 Kenya and Ethiopia signed an agreement to work jointly to create situations of free movement of citizens of both states in the common border area. The agreement was signed at Adama town of South Ethiopia’s Oromia State after a two-day meeting of Ethio-Kenya Joint Administration Commission. The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation, to maintain peace and security and to halt

anti-peace forces in the border areas. They observed that tribal conflicts had been minimized due to strengthening the cross-border committees. KY8 further explained that:

“The cross-border initiative launched by Kenya and Ethiopia with the help of UN, EU, AU and IGAD has also improved the situation at the Kenya-Ethiopia border. This initiative is aimed at fostering peace and sustainable development around Marsabit County in Kenya and Borana/Dawa Zones of Ethiopia by improving the socio-economic status of the locals around the boundary area” (KY8, interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14/02/2019).

Kenya and Ethiopia have a common border that stretches to a length of up to approximately 779 kilometers thereby cutting across four counties on the Kenyan side namely: Mandera, Marsabit, Wajir and Turkana and Dawa and Borana regions on the Ethiopian side. The Kenya-Ethiopia border region is an area that experiences a lot of conflicts due to the fact that there exists no binding legal framework that regulates the use of the available resources by the communities living in the area. The area is known for sporadic conflicts stemming from shared resources such as water and pasture given that most of the inhabitants at the border area practice nomadic pastoralism as a source of their livelihood. The proximity of the border area to the respective capital cities of Kenya and Ethiopia seems to have contributed immensely to the low development in the area which in turn has led to poor education as well as increased poverty levels. Poor development of a region often goes hand in hand with sticking to cultural practices that often infringe on other people’s rights such as cattle rustling. Since the cross border conflicts affect both Kenya and Ethiopia, it was imperative that the two countries join hands in fighting this vice that has often resulted into massive killings and loss of property.

The study holds that another factor that determines the positive relations between Kenya and Ethiopia is the need to foster positive economic development and trade between the two states. Both Kenya's foreign policy and Ethiopia's foreign policy share regional integration and Pan –Africanism as one of their key guiding principles that is aimed at unifying people of African descent while at the same time boosting them economically. In this regard, Kenya and Ethiopia opted to strengthen their economic ties through improving on the road and rail network to facilitate movement of commodities and people from one country to another as well as encouraging trade and investment across borders. Informant KY7 asserts that:

“One of the critical issues is the fact that Ethiopia is a landlocked state, and hence, there was a need for collaboration. Ethiopia has a population of 100 million people, and hence, the need to access the coastline to facilitate the movement of goods was critical. Kenya on the other hand needed the market of the 100 million Ethiopians to be able to grow economically. Kenya was also interested in benefitting from the lower tariffs and lower energy cost provided by Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam, an aspect that is critical for industrialization” (KY7, Kikuyu, 1/02/2019).

Makinda (1985) and Onyango (1995) agree with Informant KY2 since they opine that trade played a pivotal role in enhancing cordial diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. They further explain that Kenya and Ethiopia discovered the need to work closely in order to reap maximum benefits of intra-African trade. Kenya seems to be more grounded in the manufacturing sector as compared to Ethiopia. Ethiopia on the other hand is in a position to supply the entire region with affordable energy which Kenya is in dire need of since it is aspiring to boost its industries. Kenya also benefits more from exporting its goods to Ethiopia since it has a ready market of about 100 million people. Clearly, Kenya and Ethiopia needed to establish strong economic ties that would strengthen their

economic standing in the East African region and beyond. Informant KY4 who was Kenya's ambassador to Ethiopia states that:

“It is for the sake of enhancing trade and economic development that the LAPPSET project which is a regional flagship project aimed at providing seamless connectivity between Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan was launched since it was going to ease the delivery of goods from Mombasa to Ethiopia and I had the honour to initiate the project before leaving the office” (Informant KY4, Westlands, 19/02/2019).

Informant KY4 seems to validate the sentiments of Alemneh (2017) who in his study on Economic Integration in East Africa argues that poor Kenya-Ethiopia trade relations was occasioned by poor infrastructure and different economic policies thereby leading to an increase in contraband trade which results into loss of revenue for both Kenya and Ethiopia. Apparently, findings indicate that the trade between Kenya and Ethiopia was highest across the Moyale border. Kenyans visiting Ethiopia do not need to have a visa and vice versa, which has been done to support trade between the two nations. Informant KY11, a Retired Brigadier in the Kenya Armed Forces confirmed this by saying:

“The border in Moyale is porous; therefore, civilians from either Kenya or Ethiopia walk freely across the border without any restrictions. I think that is aimed at enhancing cross- border trade. In fact, Moyale is divided into two; there is Moyale Ethiopia and Moyale Kenya and leather items such as shoes and jackets in Moyale Ethiopia are usually much cheaper. Therefore, Kenyans usually cross over to Moyale Ethiopia to buy them” (Informant KY11, telephone interview, 6/3/2019).

Due to the realization of the fact that both states can benefit from trade across borders, Kenya and Ethiopia have made a deliberate effort to foster positive relations with a view of enhancing trade. However, unfavorable trade policies and lack of transparency especially on the Ethiopia's side has proved to be a hindrance to the effort to promote robust trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. Traders who do business across the

border also face challenges due to lack of a proper formal trade agreement between Kenya and Ethiopia. The challenges include: Poor infrastructure, civil conflicts, market dominance by brokers, high taxes by Ethiopia on food products being exported to Kenya and occasional export bans on food products by the Ethiopian government.

A close analysis of the findings demonstrates that friendship between leaders of both Kenya and Ethiopia is also a factor that has facilitated the process of enhancing Kenya's bilateral relations with Ethiopia. Informant KY1 contends that:

“Emperor Haile Selassie was a great friend of President Jomo Kenyatta as evidenced by their visits and support for each other during times of crisis. Their friendship is what became the foundation of bilateral relations between Kenya and Ethiopia because the rest of the leaders had no choice but to follow the footsteps of their predecessors” (KY1, Foreign Service Academy, 14/01/2019).

The sentiments of Informant KY1 are in tandem with Muller (1997) who observes that the aim of a state in its interactions with other states depends on its inner social structure and the formation of political authority within it. Precisely, the class that exerts state control outlines foreign policy by its interests although this may be interpreted as the interests of the whole nation. Yuri Van Hoef (2017) in his paper on Friendship and Foreign Policy asserts that the practices that demonstrate friendship among leaders of states include: Providing privileged or specialized access as well as solidarity and support in times of need. Celebrating and appreciating each other together with exchanging gifts are also strong pillars of friendship. According to Jeremy Murray-Brown, a biographer, as a way of celebrating Emperor Haile Selassie's victory President Jomo Kenyatta kept the Ethiopian flag in his room at London's Quaker College where he was studying after Haile Selassie was declared the emperor having resisted colonization of Ethiopia by Italy. Kenya's


founding father President Jomo Kenyatta valued Emperor Haile Selassie so much that he invited him as the first dignitary in the Jamhuri day celebrations in 1964 during which he instructed that President William Tubman of Liberia stays under ship arrest until the emperor was done with his state visit.

On the other hand, the emperor handed a white dog to President Jomo Kenyatta who hated pets as a gift but due to their solid friendship, President Jomo Kenyatta loved the dog so much that he bought it a Mercedes 280s where it sat on the back left while being chauffeured by its own driver, as revealed by Lee Njiru who was an officer at the State House. President Jomo Kenyatta had very few friends and he made two foreign trips only during his tenure. The first trip was to Britain where he was manhandled on the streets by John Tyndall, the former Secretary of the British National Socialist Party in July 1964 and the second trip was when he went to Ethiopia where fighter jets displayed his name 'JOMO' in the sky in 1969. Emperor Haile Selassie also supported President Jomo Kenyatta's family so much when he was imprisoned, a clear indication of their solid friendship. The solid friendship between President Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Selassie, who are termed as the founding fathers of Kenya and Ethiopia respectively, formed a strong foundation upon which Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia was built. It is on the same basis that their successors had to consider Kenya and Ethiopia as brothers and work towards fostering their bilateral relations in the area of security and economic development.

In conclusion, the need to solve mutual problems such as cross-border conflicts resulting from environmental concerns around Lake Turkana and along the Kenya-Ethiopia border as well as the effort to eliminate militant groups in Somalia such as Al-Shabaab coupled

with the need to improve trade and economic development between the two states as well as leadership, stood out as the key factors that have helped to build positive relations between Ethiopia and Kenya. Having understood the value of these relations, the diplomatic missions sought out to ensure that there was a positive diplomatic environment that was important in helping improve the social and economic conditions of both states.

**4.2.2.1 Ranking the Determinants of Kenya’s Foreign Policy towards Ethiopia in Terms of Significance from 1963-2020**



**Figure 3: Ranking of the Determinants of Kenya-Ethiopia Relations in the Order of Significance**

In this study, it was established that the main determinants of Kenya-Ethiopia relations were security, economic development and leadership. 50% of the 30 informants interviewed strongly agreed that security was a common major concern between Kenya

and Ethiopia which led to their cordial relations. The sentiments of the 15 informants echo Omolo (2009) who contends that Kenya's foreign policy is based on: respect for the integrity of other nations as well as maintaining of national security. On the same note, Ahmed (2016) opines that the guiding standards of Kenya's foreign policy are: Peaceful relations with other states, solving of contentions peacefully, respect for territorial integrity.

Economic development came second at 40% as one of the key factors that enhanced the relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. The sentiments of 12 of the 30 informants resonate with those of Onyango (1995) who states that despite the change of leadership in both Kenya and Ethiopia between 1963 and 2020, economic prowess continued to characterize their co-operation and foreign relations.

5% of the informants which is 1 of the 30 informants felt that political organization (leadership) must have also contributed to the cordial relations between the two states by specifically highlighting the friendship between President Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Selassie. The one informant concurs with Belete (2005) who contends that bilateral relations between Kenya and Ethiopia during the Haile Selassie era were based on friendly cooperation.

As indicated in the previous discussion, the need to solve mutual problems, conflicts and security issues as well as the need to foster economic development between the two nations were identified as critical determinants of the relations between the two states. However, while all the issues were necessary for the two states, it is possible to rank them in order of importance.

In 50% of the responses received, the issue of solving the conflicts and security threats emerged as a core issue that shaped Ethiopia-Kenya Foreign policy relations. In particular, conflicts caused by Somalia's aggression, cross-border conflicts between the communities staying at the Kenya-Ethiopia border driven by cattle rustling as well as water and pasture scarcity have all been mentioned as very important. Thus, these issues needed to be addressed through a joint approach between the two states, and hence, they needed to come together to improve the stability of both states. The issue of Somalia in particular, and South Sudan proved a critical rallying point for both states to find ways to work together to improve their wellbeing. As two frontier states to both Somalia and South Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia tend to shoulder most of the burden of refugees as well as external aggression from Somalia.

According to the UNHCR Population Statistics Reference Database, by the year 2010, Kenya was hosting approximately 337,000 refugees from Somalia while Ethiopia was hosting about 240,000 refugees from Somalia. In order to contain the situation, Kenya and Ethiopia signed a Defense Pact where they promised to support each other to fight a common enemy who is Somalia. In the same vein, both states sent their troops to Somalia under the umbrella of AMISOM to fight the Alshabaab. Both Kenya and Ethiopia played a key role in the peace processes both in Somalia and South Sudan. Ethiopian leaders went to Somalia in 2006 and Kenyan leaders went in 2011 to prevent the state from collapsing and to try and establish regional peace and a framework that can allow a lot more peaceful engagements in the region.

Secondly, having tried to solve the issues of conflict and security, another issue of importance in terms of rank has been the issue of trade and economic development of both states. Both states place importance on trade given that Ethiopia, for instance, needs goods to be delivered to the state through the Kenyan coast because of the state being landlocked. Therefore, of crucial importance has been the need for both governments to support trade and hence the establishment of free cross-border trade between Kenya and Ethiopia through the signing of an agreement in 2014. The agreement was aimed at creating opportunities for communities at the borders of the two states in order to create stability and security. Additionally, the LAPPSET project, the Railway from Kenya to Ethiopia and the pipeline infrastructure projects have been perceived as avenues to foster cross border trade that is important for the two states.

Overall, from the study findings, it seems that security and economic factors have been given significant priority by Kenya and Ethiopia as aspects that calls for the development of mutually cooperative relations in order to enhance success. While others, such as political organization (leadership), International/Regional Organizations and history have also been considered, they have not been given much priority in comparison to these two issues. Security came top on the list of priority since it also dictates the economic development of an area. Where there is insecurity economic development which entails trade is likely not to take place smoothly. Security and economic development are important as demonstrated by the over 30 bilateral agreements, foreign policy documents, and pacts that have been developed in support of these issues.

### 4.2.3 Bilateral Trade Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020

This sub-section presents findings with regard to the extent to which the principle of reciprocity has been upheld in the trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020. The findings reveal an imbalance in the trade relations as occasioned by a number of factors such as high tariffs and a number of restrictions by the Ethiopian government which prevent foreign countries from investing whereas Kenya does not have many restrictions thereby allowing all investors and especially those from East Africa to invest as much as they would like.


#### 4.2.3.1 Bilateral Trade Figures between Kenya and Ethiopia

**Table 4: Kenya Exports to Ethiopia and Imports from Ethiopia from 2001 to 2010**

**(Values in USD)**

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Kenya exports to Ethiopia	25,734	11,786	35,980	26,002	33,575	50,902	51,027	63,915	55,882	55,310
Kenya imports from Ethiopia	911	256	293	0	848	1,681	2,165	2,908	3,081	964

*Source: International Trade Centre Database*



*Source: International Trade Centre Database*

**Figure 4: Kenya Exports to Ethiopia and Kenya Imports from Ethiopia from 2001 to 2010**

Table 4 and Figure 3 clearly demonstrate that there is a significant improvement on the exports from Kenya to Ethiopia with the lowest being commodities worth 11,786 USD in the year 2002 and the highest being 55,882 USD in 2009. However, the value of commodities that Kenya imports from Ethiopia has considerably remained low with the highest in a span of nine years being 3,081 USD in the year 2009 and the lowest being 0 in 2004. This is an indication that Kenya seems to be the greatest beneficiary of the trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. Indeed, Kenya gets a large market from the about 100 million Ethiopians. However, that is not an indicator of excellent trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia given that Kenya exercises an open-door policy that allows Ethiopians to set up businesses in Kenya easily whereas Ethiopia imposes many restrictions that prioritize the locals over Kenyans while setting up businesses. The tables below give a summary of the goods that Kenya imports from Ethiopia and those that Kenya exports to Ethiopia.


**Table 1: Kenya’s Imports from and Exports to Ethiopia**

	<b>Imports</b>	<b>Exports</b>
1	Maize/corn	Insecticides
2	Cane	Medicine
3	Vegetables	Stationary
4	Textile	Petroleum oils
5	Beverages	Detergents
6	Woven fabrics	Rubber products
7	Aircraft parts	Shoe polish and wax
8	Alcohol	Plastic items
9	Live plants	Household items
10	Cement	Beauty products
11	Clothing accessories	Animal/vegetable oils
12		Live animals

**Source: International Trade Centre Database 2018, Compiled by EPC**

#### **4.2.3.2 Perspectives from Ethiopians Residing in Kenya about Kenya-Ethiopia Relations**

In order to understand Kenya- Ethiopian relations better, the study gathered sentiments from Ethiopian nationals residing in Kenya. The Ethiopian informants interviewed have lived in Kenya for varying period of years and are found in diverse sectors such as business and employment. This was aimed at understanding their experience and their opinion about Kenya.



**Figure 5: Ethiopian Informants’ Response to the Question about their Experience in Kenya**


Data was collected through face-to-face interviews of a total of 8 Ethiopian informants who were interviewed with the guideline of a set of questions about their experience in Kenya from the time they migrated into Kenya. From the findings, 75% of the informants indicated that their experience in Kenya was “very good” and “very comfortable.” This is because they were able to transact any form of business without many restrictions. 12% of the informants said that they had a good experience in Kenya whereas the other 13% evaded the question. All the 8 informants had stayed in Kenya for 2 to 18 years, indicating a long history of stay in Kenya. An informant aged 32 who is a freelance Amharic translator particularly mentioned that he found Kenya “welcoming and a nice place to stay” while a 40-year-old Ethiopian businessman in Eastleigh mentioned that it was “quite an interesting and affordable place to stay.” On the contrary, another informant aged 27 stated that “So

far my experience in Kenya has been good apart from the high cost of living”. Another respondent was non-committal on his experience in Kenya raising suspicions that probably he could be an illegal immigrant since an informant who is a retired Brigadier from the Kenya Defense Forces had mentioned that Kenya has a number of Ethiopian illegal immigrants who tend to use Kenya as a transit route to countries such as South Africa.

“Most of the Ethiopian refugees in Kenya presently are usually illegal immigrants who are on transit to a third country which is mostly South Africa with an aim of getting greener pastures” (KY11, telephone interview).


Informant KY11 confirms findings of Merhatsidk (2011) who observed that Ethiopian illegal immigrants find it easier to use the route of Kenya-Tanzania-Mozambique-South Africa than Somali-Yemen-Saudi Arabia or Sudan- Libya- Italy-South Africa because of the security threats on the way.

Overall, the majority of the participants indicated that they had positive experiences in Kenya. Most of them indicated having a comfortable stay free from all manner of discrimination or victimization, which is an indication that they really had a positive attitude towards Kenya because they were being treated fairly by both Kenyan citizens and the Kenyan authorities. The fact that they were given equal rights with Kenyan citizens made them feel at home and thus appreciate the cordial relations between Kenya and Ethiopia.



**Figure 6: Source of Livelihood for Ethiopians Living in Kenya**


Informants were asked whether they had any business in Kenya and from the findings, it was established that about 4 of the informants which makes 50% of those surveyed indicated that they owned one form of business or the other which entailed selling of goods and services in Nairobi town. In particular, they owned businesses such as electronic shops, boutiques especially in Eastleigh, cosmetic shops, restaurants such as Habesha, Abyssinia, and Awash Restaurants among others. Among those interviewed 1 which makes up for 12% of the 8 informants that were interviewed was selling his services as a freelance translator of Amharic language. Other 2 informants i.e., 25% were employees of various multinational companies and NGOs in Kenya and 1 i.e., 13% was not willing to disclose his source of livelihood. From this perspective, it can be argued that the friendly relations between the two states provide an essential environment that supports Ethiopians to reside and work in Kenya.



**Figure 7: Feedback on Kenyan-owned Businesses in Ethiopia**

The 8 Ethiopian informants were asked a question on whether there were businesses owned by Kenyans in Ethiopia. In response to that question, 75% which are 6 informants said they have never come across a business owned by a Kenyan in Ethiopia. Among the 75% some in fact chose not to elaborate their response to that question probably because it exposed the inequality between how Kenyan entrepreneurs are handled in Ethiopia and how Ethiopian entrepreneurs are handled in Kenya. 25% which are only 2 of the informants said that Kenyans own businesses in Ethiopia, a fact that seems to be disputed by most of the Kenyan entrepreneurs.

#### 4.2.3.2 Kenyans' Experience in Ethiopia



**Figure 8: Kenyans' Experience in Ethiopia**

Data on the experience of Kenyans in Ethiopia was collected through face-to-face interviews. 8 Kenyans were interviewed on their opinion about their stay in Ethiopia. 75% which are 6 of them said their stay was very good whereas 25% which are 2 of them said that their stay in Ethiopia was just good. None of them mentioned having had a bad experience in their stay in Ethiopia. Informant KY14 aged 45 who works for a multinational company based in Ethiopia said:

“I have really enjoyed my stay in Ethiopia. I have never experienced any form of discrimination as an individual since I came to Ethiopia 8 years ago” (KY14, telephone interview on 23/05/2019).

Another Kenyan informant KY15 aged 30 who is a teacher in Ethiopia had the following to say:

“Ethiopia is a good country to stay in. I am very comfortable. Tension in Ethiopia only comes up due to politics but the Ethiopians are generally good people” (KY15, telephone interview on 23/05/2019).

On the other hand, all the 8 Kenyans interviewed were employed and they complained about the complexity of setting up a business in Ethiopia. All of them had gone to Ethiopia as expatriates in different sectors that include: Engineering, Teaching, Diplomacy, Information Technology as well as International and Regional Organizations. Informant KY16, a 35-year-old Kenyan entrepreneur particularly said,

“I have been trying to set up an IT related business in Ethiopia for the last two and a half years with no success” (KY16, telephone interview on 23/05/2019).

He particularly cited the repatriation of funds, the cost of setting up a business as well as a lot of bureaucracy as some of the reasons that either slow down or eventually hinder the entire process. Another 45-year-old Kenyan informant KY17 who is an entrepreneur living in Ethiopia and working there as an engineer opines that:

“In order to succeed in starting a business in Ethiopia, one needs to do it in partnership with the natives or else, as an individual from Kenya it’s impossible” (KY17, telephone interview on 23/05/2019).

According to Giustini et al. (2020), Ethiopian House of the People’s representatives adopted a new investment law on 30<sup>th</sup> January 2020 that entailed a rule that demands that any investor from a foreign country should apportion at least a capital of USD 200,000 for one investment project. In case the foreign investor has a partnership business with a local investor, the minimum capital required reduces to USD 150,000; and if the investment is

in the line of architecture or engineering or in relation to technical consultancy services or publishing works, the capital needed reduces to USD 100,000 or to USD 50,000, respectively, depending on if the foreign investor is planning to run the business alone or in partnership with a local investor.

A different Kenyan informant KY18 aged 40 also raised similar sentiments and went to an extent of giving an example of the Safaricom deal of venturing into the Ethiopian market that backfired. On asking him on whether Kenya Commercial Bank and Equity Bank have succeeded in establishing branches in Ethiopia, this is what he had to say:

“They only have representative offices. All the full-fledged banks are owned by Ethiopians” (KY18, telephone interview on 23/05/2019).

In an interview with a different informant KY19 aged 47, an entrepreneur who has stayed in Ethiopia for about seven years highlighted the issue of capital as well as some unfavorable policies that barred foreigners including Kenyans from investing in Ethiopia.

“You need minimum capital of 60,000USD to be able to start a partnership business with a local investor. Not all business ventures are open to foreigners; some are a reserve for the locals” (KY19, telephone interview on 23/05/2019).

He also mentioned the fact that once a foreigner invests in Ethiopia, it becomes very difficult to wire money back to his country. The views from Kenyans definitely cast a shadow on whether the principle of reciprocity is being upheld faithfully by both parties.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The chapter reviews the key findings based on the three objectives set out at the start of the study and gives a conclusion of the findings as well as recommendations that will be useful in policy making and further research.

#### **5.1 Summary of Findings**

##### **5.1.1 Nature of the Diplomatic Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia between 1963-2020**

The findings established that Kenya and Ethiopia diplomatic relations could be described as cordial and this is built on the close relations that the two states have enjoyed and the support that they have given each other. While there were some frosty relations between Kenya and Ethiopia resulting from cross border conflicts, this did not stop the two states from working together on matters related to security and their economic development. Instead, it further improved the diplomatic ties between them.

Previous studies indicate that inter-state relations and diplomatic ties have the sole purpose of promoting interests of the states across all spheres, be it economic, cultural, and environmental or security. From the perspective of international relations, matters are often viewed in a different light, taking into consideration the issue of reciprocity. Thus, while Ethiopia and Kenya have strived to build stronger diplomatic ties over a long period, the same has not been easy as both states have had to defend their own interests although they are expected to be granting an advantage to each other. In short, the good relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been driven in part by the ability of both states to move from self-

interest to the furtherance of mutually advantageous relations. This has been seen from the joint activities that the two states have engaged in that have been at the heart of their diplomatic ties such as helping to ensure security in the region as well as collaborating to improve infrastructure with a view of enhancing the economic development of both states. However, incidences were cited where the principle of reciprocity seemed not to have been adhered to especially on matters of trade.

### **5.1.2 Factors behind Kenya and Ethiopia Diplomatic Relations from 1963- 2020**

The findings of the study indicate that economic development and the need to solve mutual problems such as security threats from neighboring countries like Somalia and cross-border conflicts as well as leadership are the key factors that have helped to build positive relations between Ethiopia and Kenya. Having understood the value of these relations, the diplomatic missions sought to ensure that there was a positive diplomatic environment that was important in helping improve the social and economic conditions of both states.

Security stood out as the most significant factor followed by economic development. The foreign policy of a state is usually informed by the values, ethics and interest of the state. The state is guided by the goals and objectives of development at both national and global level. These goals and objectives of national and global development can never be achieved without security measures being put in place since once security has been taken care of then economic development is bound to set in. There are a number of studies that have explored international relations and the issue of security. However, it should be noted that in the context of Kenya and Ethiopia, the need to solve mutual problems such as cross-border conflicts resulting from environmental concerns around Lake Turkana and along the Kenya-Ethiopia border as well as the effort to eliminate militant groups in Somalia such

as Al-Shabaab coupled with the need to improve trade and economic development between the two states, stood out as the key factors that have helped to build positive relations between Ethiopia and Kenya. While there was no threat of interstate conflict and war, there were resource-based security challenges arising from the pastoralist communities staying at the border between the two states. The conflicts have continuously posed a threat to local peace building efforts and in some situations affected diplomatic relations between the two states. However, it is these conflicts that have helped the two states to build stronger ties with the aim of solving this problem occurring across their border for the peace and wellbeing of their citizenry.

Secondly, the issue of international trade and economic development has been explored in many studies as a key determinant of positive diplomatic relations. Studies have found that diplomatic relations often refer to the nature and effectiveness of the interstate relations and hence not the formal exchange of ambassadors. Studies have examined the relationship between interstate diplomacy and bilateral trade flows and have found that the more friendly two states are, the greater their levels of economic exchange. Studies have also indicated that hostile and diplomatic relations between two states tend to weaken economic ties and also depress the levels of trade and commerce between the states. Thus, from previous studies, when a given state is faced by a decision to establish a trade partnership with another state with whom it has amicable diplomatic relations or with another with whom it has unstable ties, the first state tends to be a more attractive and less risky business partner.

This study established that Kenya and Ethiopia needed to have strong bilateral relations since Ethiopia has approximately 100 million inhabitants yet it is landlocked and Ethiopia also constructed The Great Renaissance Dam which was geared towards the supply of electricity to Ethiopia as well as its neighbors. Kenya on the other hand discovered that it stands to benefit from the supply of affordable power from Ethiopia and the ready market of its goods in Ethiopia. It is in the same spirit of economic development that the LAPPSET Project was initiated so as to improve connectivity and thus mobility of goods between Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan.

Lastly, previous studies have also indicated that states need to understand that relations cannot just be built between two states without the individuals or public figures taking part. In particular, improving relations between states is viewed as a means of protecting their interests. This takes place through exchange of official visits at all levels, from ministers and heads of states and governments to top civil servants. Leadership came up as the third factor in fostering bilateral relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. In the Kenya and Ethiopia context, it has been observed that the friendship between the heads of the two states and their visits have played a pivotal role in cementing the relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. President Jomo Kenyatta was a close ally of Emperor Haile Selassie to an extent of him naming one of the main avenues in Nairobi after him. The same good friendship among Kenyan and Ethiopian leaders saw President Mwai Kibaki develop good relations with his counterpart the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, a friendship that resulted in the construction of the LAPSSET Project. Therefore, improving bilateral relations between the two states has been possible through public figures that make up public opinion, helping to support the growth of diplomatic ties between the states.

### **5.1.3 Bilateral Trade Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020**

The findings of this study revealed some loopholes in the trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. The trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia were interfered with to some extent by some unfavorable trade policies especially on the side of Ethiopia. These policies are particularly aimed at protecting Ethiopia's local industries but they are often interpreted by Kenya as lack of transparency in their dealings. Kenya abides by the spirit of Pan-Africanism as demonstrated by opening doors wider to regional economic partners. However, Ethiopia who is Kenya's key economic partner in the East African region imposes many restrictions on investment that often discourage Kenyans from investing in Ethiopia. Therefore, contraband trade across the borders seemed to be at an advanced level thereby resulting into loss of revenue for both Kenya and Ethiopia. Kenya and Ethiopia have made economic gains in the line of infrastructural development and export and imports, however, when it comes to Kenyans investing in Ethiopia, they are often hindered by unfriendly trade policies.

## **5. 2 Conclusion**

Opportunities have occurred for both Kenya and Ethiopia to improve relations, particularly on economic growth, power supply, together with accessibility of broader markets. Despite the above, not many studies have been conducted on Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020. This study explored the nature and factors that determine Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020. This study also sought to analyze the extent to which fair and equitable bilateral trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been promoted from 1963 to 2020.

The first objective of this study was to explore the nature of diplomatic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1963 to 2020. The study concludes that the two states' diplomatic relations could be described as cordial and this is built on the close relations that Kenya and Ethiopia have enjoyed and the support that they have given each other. While there were some frosty relations between Kenya and Ethiopia, this did not stop them from working together on matters related to security and their economic development which further improved their diplomatic ties.

The second objective was to examine factors behind Kenya and Ethiopia diplomatic relations from 1963 to 2020. This study concludes that the issue of trade and economic development, the need to solve mutual problems such as security at the border of the two states as well as leadership have been among factors that have helped to build positive relations between Ethiopia and Kenya. In the third objective the study was to analyze the extent to which fair and equitable bilateral trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been promoted from 1963 to 2020. The findings of this study conclude that at the heart of interstate relations there are interests of each state that have to be given priority and at times these interests can be influenced by the relationship between the respective leaders. From the perspective of international relations, matters are often viewed in different light, taking into consideration the issue of reciprocity.

The different investment policies upheld by Kenya and Ethiopia are a clear indication of how each state prioritizes its interests. Thus, while Kenya and Ethiopia have strived to build stronger diplomatic ties over a long period, the same has not been easy as both states have had to defend their own interests although they are expected to be granting an advantage to each other. In short, the good relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have

been driven in part by the ability of both states to move from self-interest to the furtherance of mutually advantageous relations.

The findings of the discussion have established support for the growing importance of diplomatic relations and how they can be built. Additionally, factors such as the issue of security and the need for economic development are at the heart of diplomatic ties. From the findings of this study, the growing positive relations between Kenya and Ethiopia is rooted in academic discourse and hence this study is important because of the contribution it makes in enhancing the understanding of diplomatic relations and how such ties can be built.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

From these research findings, Kenya and Ethiopia seemed to have cordial relations. However, a few indicators of frosty relations between Kenya and Ethiopia came up especially on trade between the two states. Kenya is hinged on an open-door policy that encourages foreigners including Ethiopians to invest in Kenya without many restrictions. However Kenyan entrepreneurs find it difficult to invest in Ethiopia due to non-tariff barriers. This is interpreted by a number of scholars as an imbalance that could be as a result of fear for competition although in real sense Ethiopia is doing so to protect its local industries. Ethiopia will definitely reap more from the private sector if it opens its doors to regional investors like Kenya. Furthermore, Kenya and Ethiopia ought to consider harmonizing their trade policies as a roadmap to free and fair trade between them. Kenya's foreign policy is based on maintaining amicable relations with neighboring states, a principle which at times may not necessarily lead to mutually beneficial relations. Kenya with the help of regional bodies such as EAC, AU and IGAD needs to adopt a more

dynamic foreign policy that will accommodate the evolving regional events in order to foster bilateral trade relations with other states such as Ethiopia.

### **5.5 Recommendation for Further Research**

There is need for further research on whether the principle of reciprocity is being upheld in equal measure by both Kenya and Ethiopia. A detailed study on Ethiopia's investment policies and how they impact on its relations with neighboring states in the region is also required since it will serve to inform foreign policy decisions by both Kenya and Ethiopia as well as their neighbors.

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## APPENDICES

### A 1 : Questionnaire Cover Letter

Dear Sir/Madam,

**RE: Research on Kenya's foreign policy towards Ethiopia, 1963-2020**

This is to let you know that I am a postgraduate student at Kenyatta University, undertaking a Master of Arts in International Relations. I wish to research Kenya's diplomatic relations with Ethiopia, 1963-2020.

There is a list of questions attached which will assist me in analyzing the study. Kindly respond to the questions by putting a tick or giving an elaborate explanation where applicable to the best of your understanding and be certain that any information given is purely for scholarly work and will be handled with the highest confidentiality. No report from this study will reveal individual names or any information which is likely to show your identity.

Your co-operation will be highly appreciated,

Yours faithfully,

Wamalwa Winrose Nafula

## A 2: Data Collection Instruments

### Semi-Structured Interview Schedule for Government Officials

#### INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Kindly respond to all questions
2. The interview schedule consists of 7 sections.
3. Mark with an “X” where relevant

NB: All information gathered will be kept confidential.

#### SECTION 1: BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

1. Please indicate your Gender. Male [  ] Female [  ]
2. Please tick the age bracket in which you fall.  
Below 21 years (  )                      31-40 years (  )  
21-30 years (  )                              41-50 years (  )  
51-60 years (  )                              Above 60 years (  )
3. Position held in the organization \_\_\_\_\_
4. How long have you worked with the organization?  
Below 3 years (  )      3-7 years (  )  
7-10 years (  ) above 10 years (  )
5. How long have you worked with the Ministry or Government?  
Below 3 years (  )      3-7 years (  )  
7-10 years (  ) above 10 years (  )

**SECTION 2: NATURE OF KENYA-ETHIOPIA RELATIONS**

1. What would you say was the nature of Kenya’s diplomatic relations with Ethiopia between 1963 and 2020?

(Tick the appropriate answer)

<b>Regime</b>	<b>Cordial</b>	<b>Pragmatic</b>	<b>Frosty</b>
1. President Jomo Kenyatta Era(1963-1978)			
2. President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi Era(1978-2002)			
3. President Emilio Mwai Kibaki Era(2003-2010)			
4. President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta Era(2013-2020)			

**SECTION 3: DETERMINANTS OF KENYA-ETHIOPIA RELATIONS**

1. What would you describe as the main factors that condition Kenya’s diplomatic relations with Ethiopia?

.....  
 .....

2. On a scale of 1-5, tick on the main objectives of Kenya’s diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in order of significance.

<b>Objectives of Kenya’s diplomatic relations</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
To protect Kenya’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.					
To promote sub-regional and regional integration and cooperation.					
To enhance regional peace and security.					
To advance the economic prosperity of Kenya and her people.					
To promote and protect the interests of Kenyans abroad.					

3. What roles have Kenya and Ethiopia played in IGAD and AMISOM with a view of promoting regional peace and economic prosperity?

.....

.....

.....

.....

4. What peace initiatives have been put in place by Kenya and Ethiopia in order to solve cross border conflicts?

.....

.....

.....

**SECTION 4: ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
IN FOSTERING KENYA-ETHIOPIA RELATIONS**

1. Kindly name the non-state actors and international organizations’ representatives who have played a role in resolving Kenya- Ethiopia cross border conflicts.

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

2. What role did the above named non-state actors and international organizations’ representatives play in fostering Kenya’s diplomatic relations with Ethiopia?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

- 3 What has been the role of regional bodies in fostering economic relations between Kenya and Ethiopia? (Kindly name the specific regional organizations)

.....  
.....  
.....

**SECTION 5: ROLE OF SOMALIA AND SOUTH SUDAN IN ENHANCING KENYA- ETHIOPIA RELATIONS**

1. What was the role of Somalia and Southern Sudan in fostering Kenya –Ethiopia relations?

.....

.....

.....

**SECTION 6: TREATIES AND PACTS SIGNED BY KENYA AND ETHIOPIA**

1. Which treaties were signed by Kenya and Ethiopia as an initiative to boost their relations?

.....

.....

.....

**SECTION 7: CHALLENGES FACED BY KENYA AND ETHIOPIA IN THEIR RELATIONS**

1. Are there any challenges in Kenya-Ethiopia relations? If so, please mention them.

.....

.....

.....

**Thank you for your cooperation**

**Semi-Structured Interview Schedule for Kenyans in Ethiopia**

1. For how long have you lived in Ethiopia?.....
  
2. What is your occupation?.....
  
3. Do you have any kind of business in Ethiopia? (If the answer is YES please mention the kind of business).....
  
4. How do you find your stay in Ethiopia?.....
  
5. Are there Kenyans running businesses in Ethiopia? YES/NO (If the answer is yes please mention the kind of businesses) .....
  
6. If the answer for questions 5 and 6 is NO then explain what could be the reason.  
.....  
.....  
.....
  
7. Are there Non-Kenyan nationals owning businesses in Ethiopia? ( If the answer is YES please mention their country of origin as well as the kind of businesses they own).  
.....  
.....  
.....

**Thank you for your cooperation**

**Semi-Structured Interview Schedule for Ethiopians in Kenya**

1. For how long have you lived in Kenya?.....
2. What is your occupation?.....
3. Do you have any kind of business in Kenya?(If the answer is YES please mention the kind of business).....
4. How do you find your stay in Kenya?.....
5. Are there Kenyans running businesses in Ethiopia? YES/NO (If the answer is yes please mention the kind of businesses).....
6. If the answer for questions 5 and 6 is NO then explain what could be the reason.  
.....  
.....
7. Are there Non- Ethiopian nationals owning businesses in Kenya? (If the answer is YES please mention their country of origin as well as the kind of businesses they own).  
.....  
.....  
.....

**Thank you for your cooperation**

### **A3: Verbatim Reference**

KY1- Oral interview at the Foreign Service Academy on 14/01/2019

KY2- Oral interview at Kikuyu on 1/02/2019

KY3-Telephone interview on 6/02/2019

KY4-Oral interview at Westlands on 19/02/2019

KY5-Oral interview at the Foreign Service Academy on 14/02/2019

KY6-Telephone interview on 22/01/2019

KY7-Oral interview at Kikuyu on 1/02/2019

KY8-Oral interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14/03/2019

KY9-Oral interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14/01/2019

KY10-Oral interview at the Ministry of Foreign affairs on 14/01/2019

KY11-Telephone interview on 6/3/2019

KY12-Oral interview at Kikuyu on 14/3/2019

KY13-Telephone interview on 1/03/2019

KY14-Telephone interview on 23/05/2019

KY15-Telephone interview on 23/05/2019

KY16-Telephone interview on 23/05/2019

KY17-Telephone interview on 23/05/2019

KY18-Telephone interview on 23/05/2019

KY19-Telephone interview on 23/05/2019

## A4: Approval of Research Proposal Letter



**KENYATTA UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL**

E-mail: [dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke](mailto:dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke)

Website: [www.ku.ac.ke](http://www.ku.ac.ke)

P.O. Box 43844, 00100  
NAIROBI, KENYA  
Tel. 810901 Ext. 4150

**Internal Memo**

**FROM:** Dean, Graduate School

**DATE:** 12<sup>th</sup> March, 2021

**TO:** Wamalwa Winrose Nafula  
C/o Inter. Rel. Conf. & Strg. Studies Dept.

**REF:** C50/CE/23370/2010

**SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF RESEARCH PROPOSAL**

We acknowledge receipt of your revised Research Proposal as per our recommendations raised by the Graduate School Board of 22<sup>nd</sup> August, 2018 entitled "Kenya-Ethiopia Diplomatic Relations 1963-2010".

You may now proceed with your Data Collection, Subject to Clearance with Director General, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation.

As you embark on your data collection, please note that you will be required to submit to Graduate School completed Supervision Tracking Forms per semester. The form has been developed to replace the Progress Report Forms. The Supervision Tracking Forms are available at the University's Website under Graduate School webpage downloads.

Thank you.

**HARRIET ISABOKE**  
**FOR: DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL**

C.c. Chairman, Department of Inter. Rel. Conf. & Strg. Studies

Supervisors:

1. Dr. Boniface Muoka  
C/o Department of Inter. Rel. Conf. & Strg. Studies  
**Kenyatta University**

///

## A5: Research License

**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:**  
**MS. WINROSE NAFULA WAMALWA**  
**of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 7-902**  
**KIKUYU, has been permitted to conduct**  
**research in Nairobi County**

**Permit No : NACOSTI/P/18/20831/26096**  
**Date Of Issue : 8th October,2018**  
**Fee Recieved :Ksh 1000**

**on the topic: KENYA-ETHIOPIA**  
**DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,1963-2010**

**for the period ending:**  
**8th October,2019**



  
.....  
**Applicant's**  
**Signature**

  
.....  
**Director General**  
**National Commission for Science,**  
**Technology & Innovation**

### **THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND** **INNOVATION ACT, 2013**

The Grant of Research Licenses is guided by the Science,  
Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing) Regulations, 2014.

#### **CONDITIONS**

- 1. The License is valid for the proposed research, location and specified period.**
- 2. The License and any rights thereunder are non-transferable.**
- 3. The Licensee shall inform the County Governor before commencement of the research.**
- 4. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further necessary clearance from relevant Government Agencies.**
- 5. The License does not give authority to transfer research materials.**
- 6. NACOSTI may monitor and evaluate the licensed research project.**
- 7. The Licensee shall submit one hard copy and upload a soft copy of their final report within one year of completion of the research.**
- 8. NACOSTI reserves the right to modify the conditions of the License including cancellation without prior notice.**

**National Commission for Science, Technology and innovation**  
**P.O. Box 30623 - 00100, Nairobi, Kenya**

**TEL: 020 400 7000, 0713 788787, 0735 404245**

**Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke, registry@nacosti.go.ke**

**Website: www.nacosti.go.ke**



**REPUBLIC OF KENYA**



**National Commission for Science,**  
**Technology and Innovation**

**RESEARCH LICENSE**

**Serial No.A 20957**

**CONDITIONS: see back page**

## A6: Research Authorization Letter



### NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,  
2241349, 23310571, 2219420  
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249  
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke  
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke  
When replying please quote

NACOSTI, Upper Kabata  
Off Nairobi Way  
P.O. Box 30825-00100  
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No: **NACOSTI/P/18/20831/26096**

Date: **8<sup>th</sup> October, 2018**

Winrose Nafula Wamalwa  
Kenyatta University,  
P. O. Box 43844-00100  
**NAIROBI.**

#### **RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*Kenya-Ethiopia Diplomatic Relations, 1963-2010*" I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for the period ending **8<sup>th</sup> October, 2019.**

You are advised to report to **the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit a **copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

  
**BONIFACE WANYAMA**  
**FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

The Principal Secretary  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The County Commissioner  
Nairobi County.

## A7: Program and Letter from Ethiopia

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS BRANCH

STATE VISIT TO KENYA OF  
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY HAILE SELASSIE I  
EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA.

5th to 12th JUNE 1964.

### PROGRAMME

FRIDAY 5th JUNE - PUBLIC HOLIDAY

#### ARRIVAL NAIROBI AIRPORT

- 10.30 a.m. All guests to have arrived (including Ministers)
- 10.45 a.m. Official Welcoming Party arrive  
His Excellency The Governor-General  
The Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald, P.C.  
  
The Prime Minister of Kenya,  
The Hon. Jomo Kenyatta  
  
H.E. The Ambassador for Ethiopia  
Ato Getachew Mekasha.
- 11.00 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY'S plane lands  
Official welcoming party proceed to aircraft  
accompanied by Equerry and A.D.C.  
  
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY disembarks and is met by  
H.E. The Governor-General  
The Prime Minister  
H.E. The Ambassador for Ethiopia.  
  
His Excellency The Governor-General presents to  
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY the Commander, Kenya Army,  
Major-General I.H. Freeland.  
  
The Party proceeds to Saluting Base,  
National Anthems to be played.  
Inspect Guard of Honour  
National Anthems to be played  
  
21-Gun Salute fired by 3rd Light Regiment.  
  
The Party proceeds to where H.W. the Mayor of Nairobi,  
Alderman C. Rubia will be waiting to present the  
KEY of Nairobi City to HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY  
  
H.W. The Mayor is presented to HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY  
  
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY is presented with the KEY OF CITY  
OF NAIROBI by H.W. The Mayor of Nairobi  
  
H.E. The Governor-General takes leave of HIS IMPERIAL  
MAJESTY and leaves for State House in order to be  
ready to receive HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND PARTY.  
  
H.W. The Mayor leaves for State Lounge.  
  
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND PRIME MINISTER proceed to the  
Presentation Line where the Prime Minister will  
present Ministers and the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps  
presents members of the Diplomatic Corps.

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND PRIME MINISTER will board a ceremonial Land Rover and proceed to the group of waiting dancers (on edge of tarmac). The rest of the arty watch the dancing from where they are.

As the dancing ceremony ends, the Party enter the State Lounge. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND PRIME MINISTER will then return to the Buildings and enter the State Lounge.

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY presents the members of his Party to The PRIME MINISTER.

PRIME MINISTER presents the Commandant and Senior Staff of the Nairobi Airport to HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY.

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY is invited to sign the AIRPORT BOOK.

Refreshments are served.

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party are ushered to their cars and the CAVALCADE leaves the Airport for State House

#### LUNCHEON

- 1.00 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY is guest to a Luncheon given by H.E. The Governor-General at State House.

#### OFFICIAL TALKS

- 3.30 p.m. The Ministerial party consisting of The Minister for Home Affairs The Hon. A.O. Odinga,  
The Minister of State, The Hon. J. Murumbi, and  
The Minister of State for Pan-African Affairs The Hon. M. Koinange, call at State House.  
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves for Prime Minister's Office.
- 3.51 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at Prime Minister's Office, Met by the PRIME MINISTER and Ministers.
- 3.55 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY signs Visitors Book below portraits of His Imperial Majesty and Prime Minister.
- 4.00 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY is conducted to the Cabinet Room and the Talks begin.
- 6.00 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves Prime Minister's Office for State House.

} N.B. These  
} Ministers are  
} referred to  
} elsewhere in  
} this program  
} as "The  
} Ministerial  
} Party".

#### STATE DINNER

- 8.00 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY attends a State Dinner given by His Excellency the Governor-General of Kenya

SATURDAY 6th JUNE

VISIT TO CITY COUNCIL

- 9.15 a.m. The Ministerial Party calls at State House
- 9.25 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party drive to City Hall.
- 9.30 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at The City Hall, Nairobi  
Met by H. W. The Mayor of Nairobi, Alderman Charles Rubia.  
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY signs the Visitors' Book.
- 10.00 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves for Kenyatta National Hospital.
- 10.10 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at the Kenyatta National Hospital  
Met by Minister of Health and Housing, The Hon. Dr. Mungai,  
and Medical Superintendent, Dr. T.C.H. Mathews.
- 10.45 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY proceeds to State House.

LAYING OF THE FOUNDATION STONE  
FOR THE ETHIOPIAN EMBASSY.

- 11.15 a.m. The Ministerial Party calls at State House.
- 11.25 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves State House for Anderson Road,  
site of the new Ethiopian Embassy.
- 11.30 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at Site for the Ceremony of  
Laying of Foundation Stone, met by H.E. The Ambassador  
for Ethiopia Ato Getachew Mekasha.
- 1.00 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY returns to State House for a private  
luncheon.

GARDEN PARTY

&

DISPLAY OF TRADITIONAL DANCING

- 4.00 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY attends Garden Party given by . . .  
H.E. The Governor-General at State House.  
Watches Display of Traditional Dancing.
- 6.00 p.m. The Band plays The Retreat and flags are lowered.
- 8.00 p.m. Private Dinner.

SUNDAY 7th JUNE

VISIT TO NYERI - TREE TOPS

- 9.45 a.m. The Ministerial Party calls at State House.
- 10.00 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves State House for Nyeri, accompanied by the Minister of State for Pan-African Affairs, The Hon. M. Koinange; The Minister for Natural Resources, The Hon. L.G. Sagini; The Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's Office, Mr. D. Ndegwa and The Permanent Secretary, External Affairs, Mr. R. J. Ouko.
- 12.15 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at The Outspan Hotel and is met by the President Central Region, Mr. Lukas K. Ngureti; Civil Secretary, Mr. D. Owino who in turn present the Owner of Tree Tops and Outspan Hotels, Captain Malin Sorsbie and the Manager of the Outspan Hotel to HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY.
- 12.45 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY lunches.
- 2.00 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party will leave for TREE TOPS accompanied by The Minister for Natural Resources, The Hon. L. G. Sagini; The Minister for Pan-African Affairs, The Hon. M. Koinange; The Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, The Hon. R. Achieng-Onoko.
- The rest of the party will remain at the Outspan Hotel, Nyeri.
- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY will spend the rest of the afternoon and night at Tree Tops, returning to the Outspan Hotel the following morning.

MONDAY 8th JUNE

- 8.00 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND PARTY returns to The Outspan Hotel for breakfast.
- 9.30 a.m. President and the Civil Secretary of the Central Region will call on HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY, drive through Nyeri and continue to Thika via Fort Hall.

VISIT TO THIKA

- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at Thika is met by Regional Agent.
- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY visits the Salvation Army School for the Blind and Joy Town for Cripple Children.
- 11.45 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves for Gatundu.  
The rest of the party return to Nairobi for lunch at State House.

VISIT TO GATUNDU

- 12.30 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at Gatundu  
Met by Prime Minister.
- Lunch  
Watch display of Dancing.  
Return to Nairobi.
- RECEPTION
- 8.00 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at the New Stanley Hotel.  
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY is host to a DINNER in Tate Room at the New Stanley Hotel followed by a
- 10.00 p.m. RECEPTION in the Restaurant.

TUESDAY 9th JUNE

VISIT TO NAIROBI GAME PARK.

- 6.30 a.m. Ministerial Party calls at State House.
- 6.35 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND PARTY leaves for Game Park.
- 6.45 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at The Park.  
Met by The Minister for Information, Broadcasting  
and Tourism, The Hon. R. Achieng-Onyko.
- 9.30 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY returns to State House.  
approx.

VISIT TO PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS

Ceremonial Meeting of HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY with  
Honourable Members of the National Assembly of Kenya

- 11.00 a.m. Guard of Honour provided by the 5th and 1st  
Battalions' The Kenya Rifles drawn up outside  
Parliament Buildings.
- 11.05 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY'S entourage arrive at the  
Members' entrance.
- 11.12 a.m. The Prime Minister arrives at the Main Entrance.  
He is met by the Speakers of both houses and  
by The Commander, The Kenya Army.
- 11.15 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY, accompanied by H.E. The  
Governor-General will arrive at the main entrance  
to Parliament Buildings. They will be received  
by the Speakers and by the Prime Minister and  
together with the Prime Minister will be escorted  
to the Saluting Base by The Commander, The Kenya  
Army.
- 11.30 a.m. Ceremonial procession to the Chamber of the House  
of Representatives.
- H.E. The Governor-General delivers speech of  
welcome.
- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY delivers an address.
- The Prime Minister delivers an address of thanks.
- 12.15 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party leave Chamber in  
(approx.) procession and return to C.P.A. room.  
Members and Guests take refreshments in Garden  
where HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party then join  
them.

LUNCH AT PARLIAMENT BUILDING

- 12.45 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and retinue entertained to  
luncheon by Speakers at Parliament Buildings  
(without wives).

PARLIAMENT SITS

- 2.30 p.m. Both Houses sit as usual.
- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and retinue and invited  
guests to witness proceedings of House of  
Representatives from Speaker's Gallery.
- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves Parliament for  
State House.

MOMBASA/TAVETA VISIT

- 4.00 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party leave State House for Nairobi Airport to travel to Mombasa in Friendship plane, arriving 4.25 p.m.
- Accompanied by the Minister for Home Affairs, The Hon. A. O. Odinga; Minister of State for Pan-African Affairs, The Hon. M. Koinange; Minister for Education, The Hon. J. D. Otiende; Minister for Works, Communications and Power, The Hon. D. Mwanjumba; Minister for Lands and Settlement, The Hon. J. H. Angaine; Three Press and Two Officers from External Affairs.
- 5.30 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at Port Reitz Aerodrome, Mombasa. Met by His Worship the Mayor of Mombasa; President of the Regional Assembly and Civil Secretary.
- 6.30 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY attends a Reception given by the Government to of Kenya at The Oceanic Hotel.
- 8.30 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY has private dinner at the Oceanic Hotel, where he also spends the night.

WEDNESDAY 10th JUNE

MOMBASA/VOI/TAVETA

- 7.00 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves by
- a) Air to Voi (2 planes with 3 passengers)
    - Emperor's Party                    5
    - The Hon. A. O. Odinga            )
    - The Hon. D. Mwanjumba         )
    - Security Officer                 ) 3
  - b) Leave Voi in four (4) cars for Taveta.  
Packed lunch
  - c) Return to Voi by car
  - d) Return to Mombasa from Voi by Air
  - e) Rejoin rest of party at Port Reitz
- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party leave for Nairobi in Friendship.
- 8.00 p.m. Members of the Diplomatic Corps to be introduced to HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY.

THURSDAY 11th JUNE

OFFICIAL TALKS

- 9.30 a.m. The Ministerial Party calls at State House.  
9.41 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves State House for Prime Minister's Office.  
9.45 a.m. TALKS WITH CABINET.  
to  
11.45 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves Prime Minister's Office for State House.

CIVIC LUNCH

- 12.35 p.m. The Ministerial Party calls at State House.  
12.46 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party leaves State House for City Hall.  
12.50 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at City Hall.  
Met by His Worship the Mayor, Alderman C. Rubia.  
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY is Guest of Honour at a Civic Lunch.  
12.15 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves the City Hall, returns to State House.

FOOTBALL MATCH

- 3.20 p.m. The Ministerial Party calls at State House  
3.30 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party leave State House for Doonholm Road Stadium to watch a Football Match organised by Nairobi Football Association.  
3.50 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY inspects the Teams.  
4.00 p.m. Kick-off  
6.15 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY returns to State House.

STATE BANQUET

- 8.05 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY with H.E. The Governor-General attends STATE BANQUET given in his honour by Government of Kenya, met by PRIME MINISTER.

FRIDAY 12th JUNE

VISIT TO NAKURU

DEPARTURE

- 8.10 a.m. Ministerial Party calls at State House.
- 8.20 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves State House for Nairobi Airport.
- 8.45 a.m. The Party take off in 2 D.C.3's, Charter for Nakuru (Lanet Airfield).
- 9.30 a.m. The Party arrive at Lanet Airfield,  
Met by H.W. The Mayor of Nakuru; President of Rift Valley Region,  
Hon. D.T. Arap Moi; Ag. Civil Secretary, Mr. G.S.K. Boit and  
Commander, The Kenya Army, Major-General I.H. Freeland.
- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY leaves for the Military Training School  
(East Africa) at Lanet, one mile away, travelling in G.O.C.'s  
Staff Car.
- 9.40 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at Military Training School Barracks.  
Met by Brigadier A.J. Hardy, Commander 1st Infantry Brigade, and  
Major A. Unwin, Officer Commanding Military Training School.
- 10.15 a.m. Arrive 5th Battalion the Kenya Rifles Barracks,  
Met by the Commanding Officer, Lt.Col. J. Ndolo.
- 10.45 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY and Party leaves Barracks for Nakuru Town.
- 11.00 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY stops at Town Hall.  
Signs the Mayor's Book,  
continues drive round town and proceeds to Show Ground.
- 11.15 a.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives at R.A.S.K., Nakuru Show Ground.  
Met by President of R.A.S.K. - Mr. R. D. Mason, and  
Chairman of the Show Committee, Dr. R. V. Bowles.
- Drive round the Show in a Land Rover.
- 12.30 p.m. Lunch at Show Ground. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY meets Members.
- 1.45 p.m. 1st plane load leaves Show Ground for Lanet and takes off at 1.55 p.m.  
arriving Nairobi Airport at 2.40 p.m.
- 2.00 p.m. 2nd plane load leave Show Ground and take off from Lanet at 2.10 p.m.  
arriving Nairobi Airport at 2.55 p.m.

ARRIVAL IN NAIROBI

- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives by D.C.3  
Met by H.E. The Governor-General and Prime Minister
- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY inspects the Guard of Honour and proceeds  
to State Lounge.
- HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY takes his leave and proceeds to D.C.6.
- 3.15 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY takes off for Dar es Salaam.
- 5.30 p.m. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY arrives in Dar es Salaam.



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JUBILEE PALACE  
ADDIS ABABA

2nd December, 1964

Your Excellency,

We are very pleased to have learnt from Your Excellency's letter of August 22nd, 1964 that you will be able to visit Us very soon in Ethiopia. We wish to inform Your Excellency that December 12, 1964 is a convenient date for Us and that We will be very happy to welcome you and Mrs. Mac Donald as Our guests as of that date.

We have given instructions to Our Minister of the Imperial Court to finalize all the necessary details concerning your forthcoming visit to Our country.

Best wishes for your continued health and happiness.

HAILE SELASSIE I,  
EMPEROR

His Excellency  
The Governor General,  
The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Mac Donald, P.C.,  
State House,  
Nairobi, Kenya.

1st July, 1964.

I was very touched by the kind and gracious message which Your Imperial Majesty sent me from your aeroplane as you flew away from Kenya to Tanganyika on June 12th.

It was not only a great honour, but also a great pleasure to have you as a guest at State House during your historic visit to Kenya. I can assure you that the visit was an unqualified success. Exalted and humble people alike here have continued to speak about it ever since; and you have left an abiding impression. Your charm and wisdom, energy and friendliness, generosity and dedication to Ethiopia and to Africa, captured all hearts in Kenya. The Government and people here feel even more warmly towards Ethiopia as a good neighbour than they did before.

I hope that the rest of your journeys were equally interesting and enjoyable; and that you were not too tired when you returned to Addis Ababa. Your travels were truly effective in creating a greater sense of mutual inter-dependence between the East African countries themselves, as well as with Ethiopia; and I believe their results will continue to bear excellent fruit.

With most profound respects and highest regards,  
I beg to remain Your Imperial Majesty's  
obedient, humble servant

His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I.



The Ambassador of Ethiopia

has the honour to invite

*His Excellency The Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald and Mrs MacDonald*

to a Ceremony where

*His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie First*

will lay the Foundation Stone of the New Imperial Ethiopian Embassy Building

Anderson Road, at 11.15 a.m. on Saturday the 6th of June 1964

and to a Reception at the site immediately afterwards

R.S.V.P.  
The Imperial Ethiopian Embassy  
P.O. Box 5198, Nairobi

Dress: Gentlemen—Lounge Suit  
Ladies—Afternoon Dress.  
Hat and Gloves


**A8: Photographs of Kenyan and Ethiopian leaders from 1963 to 2020**



**Old friends Embrace. A friendly embrace between President Jomo Kenyatta who was Prime Minister then and His Majesty Haile Selassie I, after the latter had presented Mr. Kenyatta with the distinguished Order of the Queen of Sheba in recognition of his services in the struggle for freedom in Africa.**



**The Emperor poses with President Jomo Kenyatta who was the Prime Minister, the Governor General Macdonald and the speakers of the senate of the house of representatives Mr. Muigai Chokwe and Mr. Humphrey Slade.**



### **Treetops Hotel**

**His Majesty Haile Selassie I and President Jomo Kenyatta who was the Prime Minister at the time in a group with some of the guests at the foot of the hotel. Right to left Dr. Njoroge Mungai, Jomo Kenyatta, Lawrence Sagini, Haile Selassie, Achieng' Aneko among others.**



**The Emperor of Ethiopia with the Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta and the Governor General Mr. M. MacDonald at the New Stanley Hotel where the Emperor was hosted for a state dinner.**



**Applause for the Dancers**

**The Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, Emperor Haile Selassie and Macdonald  
at the Garden Party.**



**President Kibaki receives Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi at the JKIA for a State Visit on 1<sup>st</sup> March 2012, with him is the former Vice President Stephen Kalonzo and the Retired Honorable Prime Minister Raila Odinga.**



**President Uhuru Kenyatta congratulating Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed for receiving the 2019 Nobel Prize Award.**



**A photo of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed during his two-day visit after The Tigray Crisis. The Prime Minister jetted into Kenya to participate in the unveiling of a Border Point in Moyale that had been under construction for two years.**

**-END-**