ANGLICAN AND ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ANGLICAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN KAMPALA DURING THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ADMINISTRATION (1986-2016)

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DECLARATION AND RECOMMENDATION

I, **Samuel Opol,** declare that this thesis is my original work and has never been presented for any academic award in any Institution or University. All sources used in this study have been rightfully acknowledged.

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DEDICATION

To the Opol family, whose future was the main motivation for this effort.

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ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

ACK	:	Anglican Church of Kenya
ANT	:	Alliance for National Transformation
IBEACO	:	Imperial British East African Company
IEAD	:	Islam in East Africa Project
BASR	:	Imperial British Association for the Study of Religion
CBOs	:	Community-Based Organizations
CID	:	Criminal Investigation Department
CMS	:	Church Missionary Society
CODERSIA	:	Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
CoU	:	Church of Uganda
CP	:	Conservative Party
CSOs	:	Civil Society Organizations
DP	:	Democratic Party
EAEP	:	East Africa Educational Publishers
FBO	:	Faith-Based Organization
FGD	:	Focus Group Discussions
FDC	:	Forum for Democratic Change
IEAP	:	Islam in East Africa Project
JEEMA	:	The Justice Forum Party, an acronym formed out of the five cardinal principal goals: Justice for all Education for all, Economic revitalization, Morality, and African Unity
IAHR	:	International Association of the History of religions
IBEAC	:	Imperial British East African Company
IDB	:	Islamic Development Bank
IRCU	:	Inter-religious Council of Uganda
IUIU	:	Islamic University in Uganda
NAC	:	Native Anglican Church
n.d	:	Not Dated
NUP	:	National Unity Platform
MP	:	Member of Parliament

NAAM	:	National Association for the Advancement of Muslims
NBS	:	National Broadcasting Service
NCCK	:	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NRM/NRA	:	National Resistance Movement/National Resistance Army
NDP	:	Nile Dialogue Platform
NGOs	:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NTV	:	National Television
OI	:	Oral Interview
OIC	:	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
RC	:	Roman Catholic
RGS	:	Royal Geographical Society
SDA	:	Seventh Day Adventist Church
UBC	:	Uganda Broadcasting Corporation
UBOS	:	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UCU	:	Uganda Christian University
UAE	:	United Arab Emirates
UJCC	:	Uganda Joint Christian Council
UNC	:	Uganda National Congress
UPC	:	Uganda People's Congress
UPM	:	Uganda Patriotic Movement
UMSC	:	Uganda Muslim Supreme Council
UMSRS	:	Uganda Muslim Social Reform Society
UNLA/UNLM	:	Uganda National Liberation Army/Uganda National Liberation Movement
WF	:	White Fathers

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

Anglican Political Hegemony: The ascendency and dominance of Anglicans in Ugandan politics in the Pre and Post-independence periods.

Buganda Element: The important place of Buganda Kingdom as the location upon which the nation of Uganda was founded, and whose central position gives it incomparable influence in the socio-political and economic activities in Uganda.

Evangelical Revival: Also called the Great Awakening, it is the wave of spiritual awakening experienced in Britain and its colonies between the 1730s and 1740s.

Evangelical Spirituality: Is the form of spirituality resulting from the Evangelical Revival. Characteristically, its emphasis was on the renewal of Christian faith.

Islamic Fundamentalism: An effort to radicalize the Islamic consciousness through individual and public means. In Uganda radicalization of Islam is expressed through activities such as political activism and the quest for the establishment of *kadhi* courts.

Neo-religious: the new expression of the religious groups—Anglican, Roman Catholic, Islam, and Traditional Religion following the clamping down of religiopolitical activity at the onset of the National Resistance Movement administration in 1986.

Political ethos: Political philosophy, nature or character. Here it is used to refer to the emergent political practices and the underlying ideas of the Anglican and Islamic religious communities. Hence, Anglican and Muslim political ethos.

Political Theology: Religious ideas regarding politics; or framework through which a religious group/people understand systems of national governance.

Religiopolitical cleavages: are the political power alignment in Buganda preceding the inter-religious wars in Buganda (1888-1892). These groups were aligned religiously as Roman Catholics, Anglican, Muslims and Traditionalist.

Ten-Point Programme: NRM Bush War ideological framework. Formulated by the founders of the National Resistence Movement during the war, it stipulated the ten proposals for political action. It would later became the guiding ideology of the Movement Administration.

GLOSSARY

Al-Zuhuri	(localized *Zukuli*) Mid-day prayer in Islam
Bukoto Nateete Juma	A sect of Muslims in Uganda that did not have extre mid-day prayers following the Juma prayers on Friday. They were based in Bukoto and Nateete suburbs in Kampala.
Dīn	Religion
Dawa	Islamic Mission
Dawla.	State
Etandikwa	Seed money for business venture
Gomesi	Traditional woman's dress in Buganda adopted from the English boarding
Jihad	Striving for the cause of Allah
Juma	Congregational pryars for Muslims.
Juma ne Zukuli	Mid-day prayer following the *Juma* prayers. Also referes to a break-away faction of Uganda Muslims that insisted on having Mid-day prayers following the main Juma prayers of Friday
Kabaka	King of Buganda
Kabaka Yekka	King Only, reference to the political party formed by the royalist, often called *Kabaka Yekka* (KY)
Kafir	Infidel, Non-Muslim
Kaizer	Is derived from Parsian, and means king or ruler
Katikiro	Prime Minister in the Kingdom of Buganda
Kauta	Royal slaughterer
Khadhi Courts	Islamic courts presided over by the Islamic religious law teacher.
Khaliffa	Successor/Deputy, reference here is to the successor of Prophet Muhammad
Madrasah	Islamic School
Mchaka mchaka	Political sensitisation of masses
Mutaka (pl. *Bataka*)	Patriarchal clan head appointed by the king
Mutongole (pl. *Batongole*)	Appointed chiefs in Buganda
Namasole	Queen Mother

Patronato	Church/state relations characterised by the independence of the Church as the state religion but patronised by the state
Prado	Euphemism for a presidential gift to a newly consecrated bishop, usually in form of a Sports Utility Vehicle.
Sharia	Islamic Law
Sharia banking	Financial activities based on the principles of the Islamic law
Shii (also called Shi'ites)	A breakaway group from within Islam deriving its tradition from Ali and his family. It is found mainly in Iran, Yemen, Oman and East Africa
Ssabataka	Overlord, head of clans in Buganda
Suni	One of the main sects in Islam consisting of 90% of Muslim Population
Tabliq (Tabligh)	A Muslim missionary and revival movement
Taliban	Fundamentalist ans nationalist militant movement in Afganistan.
Wazei	Old men or women

ABSTRACT

This study examined the Anglican and Islamic political theologies and their attendant influence on Anglican-Muslim relations in Kampala during the administration of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) between 1986 and 2016. In 1986 the NRM Administration implemented the Ten-Point Programme, its bush war governance blueprint. Central to it was realisation of national unity by eliminating religiously "sectarian" politics. In pursuit of it, the Administration abolished the religiopolitical parties, and in the National Constitution in 2005 secularised politics. In spite of this, religiously partisan politics passisted as evidenced by religiously partisan political activities. The problem investigated, thus, constituted the irony of the persistence of Anglican and Muslim political interest, and how this influenced the relations of the two religious groups between 1986 and 2016. The study sought to: Examine the NRM Administration's ideology on religious groups' involvement in national politics, Evaluate the influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies in national politics, and, Assess the influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Anglican–Muslim relations. The literature reviewed comprised works of both Christian/Anglican and Muslim scholars. It highlighted that religion was not unique and socio-historically autonomous; instead, it was inextricably bound to culture and society. This was in sync with the theoretical framework of the study drawn from Hans Kung's view of religion as an encompassing reality (Kung, 1996). In light of this, the study sought to understand political theologies and their causal influence on activities and relations between Anglicans and Muslims. The study employed a qualitative methodology using a phenomenological approach. Data was collected through documentary analysis, review of archival materials; second, key informant interviews; and self-administered questionnaires. Findings of the study included that the Administration's stance, influenced by the Ten-Point Programme, fostered religious inclusivity in the bid to eliminate all forms of sectarianism. However, this enabled groups to redefine their political participation. The Anglican Church's political involvement was driven less by a common theological position than its episcopal-based ecclesiology, where the local bishops set the political tone. Muslims, though not articulating their theological motivation, were more politically active. However, they suffered internal fractures as well as political influences from diverse global Muslim communities. As a result, they remained too weak to have a united political voice. The study concluded that political participation and relation between the two groups resulted less from articulated political theologies than from historical factors. The religiopolitical nexus following the religious wars (1988-1892) overtime remained a major defining factor in political participation by religious groups in Ugandan politics. In light of the above, for the State, the study recommends a cautious effort in opening religiopolitical space and in implementing religio-cultural elements that would easily breed religiopolitical tensions among religious groups; and that both the Anglican Church and the Muslim community develop programmes for political guidance in order to enlighten the "faithful" of their civic responsibility.

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter sets the background to the nexus of religion and politics, in the context of Uganda against which the research problem is to be understood. The chapter also outlines the statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, research objectives, research questions, the scope of the study, the significance of the study, and the justification of the study.

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Religion defines the individual and his/her world. Scholars have argued for its comprehensive nature beyond the individual believer to a global scope (Kung, 1996, p. xvii; McLean, 2005, p. 9; Huntington, 2011). Other scholars have similarly argued that religion is not unique and socio-historically autonomous; instead, it is inextricably bound to culture and society (Beek & Blackley, 1994, p. 1; McCutcheon, 1997, 2001). Both Christianity and Islam exemplify this comprehensive influence. Right from antiquity, both Christian and Islamic political theologies have been exerted strongly in the world political order (Southern, 1970, pp. 15-16; Burnett, 1990; Huntington, 1996; Kirk, 2011; Nasr, 2003, p. xi).

Christian political theology has developed over a long period. By the fourth century AD, the Church's influence was more overtly political following the policy of Constantine to unite the Church to the secular state (Livingstone, 1977). This was expressed through the complex integration of Christian religious thoughts and practice in the Byzantium (MacMullen, 1984; Southern, 1970). The Dark Ages (from the fifth century to the end of the eleventh century) saw the fall of Rome in 410, and subsequently the rise of Islam in the seventh century and the ensuing political destabilisation and structural changes following its spread throughout the Mediterranean region. With this, came the near demise of the long history of the Church's political influence. By the Middle Ages (1100 to the end of fifteenth century), Europe realized some stability, and in the place of the old Roman Empire emerged two Christian power centres—the Byzantium and Western Europe (McGrath, 1994). The Byzantium was the Christian Eastern Roman Empire centred in Constantinople, and from Western Europe emerged France, Germany and Italy. During Reformation - the birth of nation-states in Western European centres of Wittenburg in Northern Germany, Zurich and Geneva, dealt with far

beyond doctrinal issues which highlighted the complex integration of theological ideas into social, political, and economic life reforms (McGrath, 1994). However, the rise of secularism in the Modern period saw the weakening and final decline of Christian political influence in parts of Europe. Ironically, Christianity's residual influence in the public square is considerably strong in former European colonies of the Global South—Africa, Asia, and Latin America—now its "centre of gravity" (Jenkins, 2002: pp. 1ff., 83; Cox, 1993, p. 410).

Christian political theologies are broadly differentiated. This is demonstrated by thinkers such as St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Richard Hooker (Troeltsch, 1992; O'Donovan & O'Donovan, 1999; Sheldon, 1990; Gustafson and Moen, 1992). Contemporary thinkers are no less so. For instance, liberal political theologians uphold high regard for politics, seeing it as "something that matters to God, therefore, to the people of God" (Stackhouse, 1951, p.1). Contextual theologies, which, since the 1950 and the 60s are expressions of dialogue between church and society, tend to assume the liberal stance. These include Latin American liberation theology advanced by scholas such Gauthier, 1965; Alves, 1968; Gutiérrez, 1978; 1983; Hennelly, 1995; North American black theology by Cone, 1969; 1975; 1993; and, South African liberation theology by Boesak, 1987; Tutu, 1984; de Gruchy, 1986. The conservatives, mostly evangelicals, see the necessary distinction between the Church and the state (Fowler, 1982). Yet, some Protestant churches including the largest ones, both mainline and evangelical have maintained a conservative stance towards politics. Others, such as the evangelical churches in the US, have remained politically active, but maybe less so in the United Kingdom and Germany. The Roman Catholic Church has had a strong political influence in several nations today such as in Italy, Ireland, France, Spain, Poland, United State of America, Philippines, and in the Latin American nations, such as in Brazil and Argentina.

The Islamic political theology in general posits a religiopolitical nexus. Historically, this was defined by the combined religious and secular leadership role in the person of Prophet Muhammad, as well as in the emergence of the caliphate and sultanate. Seyyed argues that Islam has never separated religion from politics, rather, it upholds the principle of the rulership of Allah over the Islamic community through nomocracy - rule of the divine law (2003, p.110). Esposito (1990) similarly argues about the comprehensive nature of Islam, showing it as "relevant to and integral to politics, law, education, social life, and economics. These institutions or areas of life are not

viewed as secular but religious (Islamic), based on the belief that Islam is a *way of life*, thus, religion and society are interrelated" (1998, p. 159). However, Islam also exemplifies historical differentiation according to the main groups—Sunni and Shi'ites. While the former recognized the role of the jurist with the *caliph* as the symbol of unity and the rule of *Sharia* the latter rejected the caliphate and upheld the monarchy.

In Africa, both Christinity and Islma have had a formative influence. Islam gave rise to the ancient West African states - Songai, Mali, Timbuktu. Today, parts of West Africa (such as Nigeria and Senegal), Central Africa, Horn of Africa (Somalia and Djibouti), have remained its mainstay (Hanwick, 1997, p. 42ff; Davidson, 1994, p. 274). Sub-Saharan Africa today is also home to 30% of the world's Muslim population (Hanwick, cited in Englebert & Dun, 2013, p. 92ff, 92ff). Also, East African regional studies point to increasing influence of both Christianity and Islam (Thoroup, 1995 p. 143ff).

In Uganda, since 1892, religion and politics have been inextricably bound and both the Anglican Church and Islam have identified closely with state politics at different times (Low, 1967; Mudoola, 1996; Gifford, 1999; Wandira, 1978; Mutibwa, 1978, 2008, 2016; Karugire, 2010). Roots of this historically lie in the milieu of religious plurality in Buganda, in which Islam and Anglican faiths were introduced in the early 1840s and late 1870s, respectively. From the onset, the nexus of religion and politics impacted the relations between Muslims and Anglicans. The relations were xenophobic and hostile, flaring up in 1888-92 into wars for the control of Buganda.

The wars had a long-term impact on the religiopolitical climate in Buganda and in the Protectorate. Firstly, the wars distinguished religiopolitical cleavages, namely, Traditionalist, Muslims, Anglicans and Roman Catholics (Tuma/Mutibwa, 1978; Pirouette, 1968, 1978; Hansen, 1986 and Gifford, 1999). Secondly, the wars marked the onset of the Anglican hegemony and shift of the power base from the *Kabaka* to the Anglican oligarchy in Buganda, and later in the rest of Uganda (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p.10). Thirdly, the dominance of Anglicans in politics following the victory of the Anglican cleavage over the Traditionalists, Muslim and Catholic forces limited the Muslims' political involvement, consequently worsening the already poor relations between the two groups (Mutibwa, 2016, p.17).

Anglican political theology in Uganda has taken different shades, varying between the liberal during the Protectorate era and conservative in the later era. During the Protectorate era, the liberal Anglican political theology was articulated by Bishop

Alfred Tucker. Tucker was the first bishop of Equatorial Africa, later the first bishop of the Diocese of Uganda in 1897. His political ideas followed the general evangelical theology of political involvement, which gave the justification of missionary involvement in local politics (Griffith, 1998, p125). However, the roots of it lie in Richard Hooker's political theology of the Christian Church being both a 'politic society - a temporal, politically ordered society, and a 'society supernatural.' This theology justified the English Reformation political tradition of Church and state fusion (O'Donovan and O'Donovan, 1999, p. 744). It further legitimized the Church of England's status as the official state religion. In the nascent Anglican Church in Uganda in the 1890s, it took the form of Bishop Tucker's evangelical tradition of political involvement. Proclaimed originally by Henry Venn, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) Secretary, Tucker popularized it in Buganda. By it he made a case for the connection between church and state given the situation in Buganda following the religious wars: "The history of the mission work of the Church of England is inseparably bound up with the political history of the protectorate of Uganda as a development of the colonial policy of Great Britain. *This close connection has been due to peculiar circumstances of the case*" (Tucker, 1910 [cited in Griffith, 1998, p. 123. Emphasis mine]).

The words above capture the justification of the Church's involvement in the Protectorate of Uganda. From these is derived Tuckers implementation of the Evangelical tradition of political involvement. By this theology, he envisioned Buganda's status as British Protectorate and the continued involvement of the Church in political activities in the Kingdom of Buganda following the end of the wars (Griffith, 1998, p. 123). In the subsequent years it gave the justification of the recognition of Anglican Church as the quasi-national church at the exclusion of other religious groups. It was by this theology that the Anglican Church was spurred into political action, practically thereby entrenching the decades-long Anglican political hegemony in Uganda.

In recent years this liberal political theology seems to have been overtaken by the attitude of political withdrawal. Influenced by the conservative evangelical tradition of East Africa Revival and the history of political turbulence, the political stance of the Anglican Church seems to have shifted significantly from liberal to conservative. Niringiye's (2016) historical - ecclesiological study of the Church of Uganda in the post-independence era points to the varying levels of political involvement between 1962 and

1992. Lack of a clearly articulated political stance agreeable throughout the Church of Uganda, as Niringiye observes, seems to have had a cumulative effect of minimal involvement in politics. This is in complete contrast to the Muslims.

Islam has been part of the evolving political culture in Uganda. As suggested above, Islamic theology does not regard religion as separate domain of the supernatural but rather, is part of life. Although Muslims in the ancient Buganda never articulated it, features of Islamic political theology were manifested in the early Islamic community of 1840s. Muslims in Uganda today look to this period as 'the golden age of Islam in Buganda,' paralleled in Buganda's history by the eight-year rule of Idi Amin (Kanyeihamba, 1998). At the time, Islam was the religion of the Kingdom with the royal patronage of *Kabaka* Suuna, and later *Kabaka* Mutesa I (Kanyeihamba, 1998: p. 7). Following the loss of privileged political status to Anglicans, Muslims' participation in politics became a matter of expediency rather than of principle. In this way Muslims' participation was a matter of survival amidst religiopolitical domination.

However, their increased participation in politics came in the mid 1960s in allegiance with the Anglican-based Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC) (Mudoola, 1996, p.47ff.) and later in 1971 at the coming of the Muslim-led administration of President Idi Amin, who was seen as the Constantine of Islam (Rubongoya, 2007, p. 47ff; Niringiye, 2016, p. 194). Under President Amin Islam's political woes were reversed. He declared Islam a state religion (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p.13). His effort towards the formation of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) in 1972 helped expose the Muslim community to the international community. In 1974, Uganda was made a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) which enabled it (Uganda) to secure assistance from Saudi Arabia, the OIC and the Islamic Development Bank. This, in addition to Amin's personal effort, rejuvenated the Muslim community.

The resurgence of Islam during the era of President Amin redefined the nature of Christian-Muslim relations. Both Pirouette (1980) and Niringiye (2016) have examined the state of the Anglican Church at the time. In the new trends, Niringiye observed that "…the new regime not only deposed the church from its quasi-established position but also groomed Islam to take over (p. 194). This was only briefly as the 1979 overthrow of President Amin mitigated Islam's political influence. Although Islam's status did not approach that of the pre-Amin era, until the onset of the NRM administration in January 1986, it remained overshadowed by the Anglican-based UPC Administration.

The above scenario depicts the long-defining effect of religion in politics and on the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims. The formation of religiopolitical parties in the 1950s and 60s as well as the dominance of the Anglican exclusivist political theology illustrated the deep-rooted religiopolitical consciousness. It further points to the extent to which the nation was fractured along religious lines. The abiding influence of religion in politics lingered until the onset of the NRM administration in January 1986 (Carbon, 2000, p. 517; Museveni, 2000, p. 16).

Against this backdrop the NRM administration sought to eliminate religiously "sectarian" political cleavages by championing the policy of national unity. To this end, all political parties were suspended (Aseka, 2005, p. 367). The rhetoric of 'Fundamental Change' championed a radical departure from religious and ethnic sectarianism (Museveni, 2000, p. 6). Guided by the Ten-Point Programme - the administration's political philosophy - it sought to consolidate national unity and eliminate of all forms of sectarianism (Ondoga ori Amanza, 1998). Subsequently, the 2005 National Constitution, recognizing "religious diversity," stipulated non-adoption of state religion and guaranteed religious freedom to every citizen (Constitution III: I; Chapter 2:7 and 37:1c). The implications of these were two-fold: it would mean that no religious group would assume exclusive political hegemony, also, that Uganda would be a secular state.

By secularizing politics, the Administration initially stemmed the divisive effect of religion in politics. Yet, ironically, in so doing, it opened political space to the hitherto relegated political parties. Over time it seems to have lent religious groups to further political involvement, thereby casting anew the traditional political power-brokers - Catholics, Anglicans, Traditionalist, and Muslims. In particular, these developments have tended to strengthen the Muslim political position by enabling their increased participation in elective politics. This has cast Muslims in a favourable light compared to other political power-brokers. Consequently, there has been a resurgence of theologically inspired Islamic activity, such as the quest for *kadhi* courts and *Sharia* banking, and increased participation in elective politics (Oloka-Onyango, 2004). In contrast to the pre and immediate post-independence Islamic community, and they have demonstrate the growing influence of Islamic political participation vigorously challenging the historical Anglican political hegemony. This seems to be redefining the Anglican-Muslim relations.

It is the reason that the study examined the Anglican and Islamic political theologies. By studying the Anglican and Islamic political theologies, the study sought to

examine their attendant influence on Anglican-Muslim relations during the NRM administration in Kampala between 1986 and 2016.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

While the NRM Administration's regulations and the National Constitution sought to stem the religious groups' involvement by secularising Ugandan politics, it did so to a less significant extent. Instead, it seems to have opened up space to the resurgence of religious-based political interests. This glaringly indicates that in spite of the efforts at secularisation, religion continued to be an important part of political discourse. Specifically, the Anglicans and Muslims seem to have repackaged themselves politically. Influenced by their political theologies, they have demonstrated varying levels of political involvement. On the one hand, Anglicans inspired by the conservative evangelical theology are politically less proactive; yet their numerical superiority and a stronger history of education compared to Muslims, continued to entrench them into the socio-political systems. Muslims on the other hand, coming from a position of political relegation, have proactively exerted a considerable lobbying force in national politics, and sought to use politics as a rallying point for gaining socio-political, economic, and cultural influence. This renewed claim in national politics by the Anglicans and Muslims, although in varying ways, points to a realignment of religiopolitical forces in Ugandan politics, whereby both religious groups are able to claim political space. By this, the relationship between the Anglicans and Muslims seems to have entered a new defining era. Based on this, the key questions for the study are: How has the NRM administration's policy on religious groups' involvement in politics influenced Anglican and Islamic political theologies? How have the Anglican and Islamic political theologies impacted the participation of the religious groups in politics? How have the Anglican and Islamic theologies impacted the Anglican-Muslim relations during the NRM administration?

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this study were, to:

- Examine the NRM Administration's policy on religious group's involvement in national politics between 1986 and 2016.

- Evaluate the influence of Anglican political theology in national politics during the NRM administration between 1986 and 2016.
- Evaluate the influence of Islamic political theology in national politics during the NRM administration betwee1986 and 2016.
- Assess the effects of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Anglican–Muslim relations between 1986 and 2016.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions guided the attainment of the above objectives:

- What was the NRM Administration's policy on religious groups' involvement in national politics between 1986 and 2016?
- How did the Anglican political theology influence national politics between 1986 and 2016?
- How did the Islamic political theology influence national politics between 1986 and 2016?
- In what ways did Anglican and Islamic political theologies influence the Anglican–Muslim relations in Uganda between 1986 and 2016?

1.5 RESEARCH PREMISES

This study is premised on the assumptions that:

- While the NRM administration policy on none-religious involvement in politics was meant to stem the influence of religiously sectarian politics, this is not sufficiently realised. Rather, between 1986 and 2016 there has been a heightened religious groups' political involvement in Ugandan politics, although at varying levels.
- Involvement of Anglicans and Muslims in Ugandan politics is grounded on the foundation of their respective political theologies.
- Anglican and Islamic political theologies have a causal effect on the Anglican – Muslim relations. By each levarging their political theologies, there has been heightened political activity, thereby breeding tension betwee the two groups.

1.6 JUSTIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Globally, religion drives political activity. Berger et al. (1999), Tibenderana (2006), and Sookhdeo (2009), for example, have examined the resurgent religion and world politics. Huntington (2011) I particular shows the causal influence of religion on relationship of world's civilization. Specifically, Jomier (1989), Lewis (2002) and Gelvin (2005) show the relations between Western and Islamic civilization in the Middle East. While the global scope of these writings raises important thematic issues on the nexus between religion and politics, there is still need for a microcosmic and contextual examination of the causal impact of religion in politics and the attendant Christian-Muslim relations. In Uganda, there have been studies on religion and politics (Low, 1967; Mudoola, 1996; Gifford, 1999; Wandira, 1978 and Mutibwa, 1978). Save for passing references to the attendant complicity of religious groups in partisan politics, there is litle study focused examination of the Anglican and Islamic political theologies and their influence on Anglican-Muslim relations. In highlighting the Anglican and Islamic political theologies in Ugandan politics, this study has hopefully addressed this lacuna.

The study examined the theological framework for understanding Anglican and Muslim political involvement and relations. It was anchored on the Anglican and Islamic theologies in order to show their influence on Anglican-Muslim relations. In this respect, it was hoped that this study would be of enormous value. For both the Department of Religious Studies of Kenyatta University, and the Bishop Tucker School of Divinity and Theology of Uganda Christian University, it was hoped that the study would guide students of research in similar areas in understanding the theological foundation for religiopolitical relationships in Uganda. Uganda is a highly religious nation. Alava H and J. S Sentongo (2017, p. 678) have described "the highly religious public culture in Uganda." Reference is here made to the 'religious culture' in relation to the role of religion in elections. This is drawn from the historical influence of religion in public life, especially in national politics since 1892. While religion has invariably remained the reality of the Ugandan landscape, students of theology are always faced with the need to understand the Church's political theology. The lack of clarity of an Anglican political theology despite its long history of political involvement, points to the urgency with which the Church needs to articulate it.

While this study does not necessarily explicate a political theology, it hoped to provide seminal ideas based upon which theological students can begin to wrestle with the Church political theology. In addition, it will provide a framework for thinking about

mission to Anglican-Muslims relations. There is a growing interest in the Anglican Church to reach out to Muslims. Such efforts are driven by the Church's missiological interests. To this extent, theological colleges have programmes on Islam for Mission, which basically teach Islam from a missiological point of view. Emphasis has been on Muslim evangelization, Muslim apologetics, and Christian-Muslim relationship. While these are important, there is a need to understand the potency of political theology in impacting Christian-Muslim relationships. Based on this understanding, it is possible then, to draw some themes for further missiological exploration. It is in this respect that this study gains its value. It is hoped, therefore, that it will offer insights into the ongoing studies on the Christian mission to Muslims in theological colleges in order to further the Church's mission in the world.

Second, to advocates of interfaith relations this study will provide an alternative beginning point for exploring Anglican-Muslim relations. The Anglican Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Muslim community in Uganda have invested a lot of effort on ecumenical and inter-faith relations. The birth of Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) and Interreligious Council of Uganda (IRCU) point to this. A newly discovered niche area is the establishment of connector projects. These are activities that can be undertaken jointly by both Christians and Muslims. They have also ventured into areas that call for common efforts, such as peace, HIV/AID, development, and gender issues. The inter-religious programmes of greater significance was the recent Presidential Debate. Yet, to the extent that both the Anglican Church and Islam are heavily political, their relationship is strongly felt more in the political realm. There is a need, therefore, to understand their political theologies in order to be able to understand their attendant influence on the relation between the two. It is hoped, therefore that the study will inform the formulation of policy on inter-religious relations at the national level. Specifically, it is hoped that it will inform the formulation of the National Peace Policy, a document drawn from a multi-sectoral contribution aimed at addressing the impact of historical divisions along religiopolitical lines in Uganda.

Third, it will feed into the Sustainable Development Goals. Two of these will particularly be addressed. The first is Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. This expresses that: "We cannot hope for sustainable development without peace, stability, human rights and effective governance, based on the rule of law." It acknowledges the "increasingly divided" world where "some regions enjoy peace, security and prosperity, while others fall into seemingly endless cycles of conflict and

violence." This condition accordingly is not inevitable and must be addressed. Uganda's religiopolitical polarization, especially involving the Anglican-dominated Protectorate Administration and the post-independence eras of Obote and Amin, has demonstrated the extent to which religion has defined relations between Anglicans and Muslims. While there has not been outright violence, there have been cold relations, where Muslims have withdrawn into a passive war in quest for self-determination against the Anglican-dominated Administrations. Such a condition has fomented antipathies in the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims. Yet, such cannot be ignored as it has for decades bedeviled the nation (Carbon, 2000, p. 517; Museveni, 2000, p. 16).

By highlighting the NRM Administration's quest for national unity by eliminating religiously sectarian political cleavages (Ondongo ori Amanza, 1998), this work feeds into Goal 16. Specifically, it highlights the extent to which political theologies hdefined the nature of relation between the Anglicans and Muslim. In the short term, it will bring to the fore aspects of political theologies that have the potency for generating poor relation. In the long term, it will help both the Anglicans and Muslims to understand and work towards addressing issues that threaten relations between the two religious groups in political involvement. In that way, it will address the SDGs aim to "significantly reduce all forms of violence, and work with governments and communities to end conflict and insecurity." This is by ensuring inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels, as well as promoting and enforcing non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development.

Furthermore, it will address Goal 17: Partnerships for the Goals. Attainment of the peaceful relations between the two religious groups will come with deliberate effort. Such would include fostering corporation between the two religious groups in mutual goals through connector activities. In Uganda, this has been achieved through inter-religious efforts. Such efforts demonstrate the extent to which religious groups that have for decades been in conflict can be drawn towards partnerships for goals that are common to both groups. This is by highlighting the groups' political interest, and fostering mutual respect for each other's political interests and space while working towards mutually beneficial interests.

1.7 Scope and Limitations

The study was limited to the examination of the Anglican and Muslim political theologies and their implication on Anglican-Muslim relations during the NRM

Administration between 1986 and 2016. Accordingly, the focus was on the four thematic areas that constituted the objectives of the study.

The study was limited to two religious groups: Anglicans and Muslims. Uganda has several religious groups, among which are Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindu, Bahai and the Traditionalists. Uganda's population is estimated at 42.2 million (National Population Census Report, 2014). The religious demographic breakdown by the Uganda International Religious Freedom Report (2019, p.2) showed that 82 percent of the population is Christian. Next to Christianity is Islam. Its total population is highly contestable. Imam Kasozi (OI, 19/10/2021) puts it anywhere between 16-20 percent. Other sources, however, have a conservative figure of 14 percent (Uganda International Religious Freedom Report, 2019 , p.2).

Several variables have been left out that would otherwise have provided useful venues for consideration for this study. The first of these is the broad range of religious groups in Uganda as indicated above, all of which have somewhat been the historical players in Ugandan politics. For instance, the Roman Catholic Church gave birth to the Catholic-based Democratic Party (DP). It has since then posed a formidable force against the long-term ruling UPC. The Pentecostal Churches, though not espousing a political theology, they have leveraged the liberal conditions offered by the NRM Administration policy to make political in-roads.

Another possible variable was the ethnicity. Uganda today has at least four linguistic groups, under which fall the 54 tribes of Uganda. These ethnic groups consist of the Bantu, Atekerin, Luo and the Sudanic groups (Nzita and Mbaga, 1998, p. 1). Prior to the estblishement of the Brtish Protectorate Administration, conflicts existed between tribal groups exercerbated by the policy of indirect rule (Refugee Law Project, 2014, p. 15). In a similar way, the North-South divide (North being mostly Luo, Sudanic and Atekerin, and South mostly Bantu) and the subsequent discriminatory policy on education and employment by Protectorate policy left decades-long tension between the North and South. These divisions have been persistent (Refugee Law Report, 2014, p19), and tensions and concflicts have resurfaced in form of revenge and counter-revenge over the post-independece era and in different regimes, and have indeed become political.

Leaving out the above dimensions, the study focused on religion in politics. Specifically, it examined the Anglican Church and Muslims. These groups were used to illustrate the influence of political theology on inter-religious relationships during the

NRM administration. The Anglican Church with its long tradition as the quasi-national church, and its birth of UPC Anglican-dominated political party, demonstrated interesting variation in political participation. This Cn be seen from the Bishop Tucker's liberal stance influenced by the Evangelical tradition of political participation, to the more conservative Evangelic tradition of non-participation. During the Protectorate period, its status as the quasi-establishment Church defined its relationship with other religious groups, including Muslims.

Muslims on the other, following the loss of position of prominence in the Buganda kingdom in 1870s, and the humiliating defeat at the religious wars between 1888 and 1892, withdraw from explicit political involvement during the protectorate era. While recovering from this state at the end of the colonial era, and getting more politically active, Muslims were mostly under the UPC Anglican-based Party (Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021). However, over history, the Muslim community has taken important strides towards political recovery, and claiming their political space, first during the Amin era, and later during the NRM Administration's under National Policy on Religious Involvement in Politics. The variations in political involvement by the two religious groups provided an interesting history that in the past shaped their relationship. By focusing on Anglican and Islamic political theologies, this study, therefore, examined the defining effect of the NRM Administration's policy on religious groups' involvement in politics, the Anglican and Islamic political theologies, and the influence of political theologies of the two groups on their relationship during the NRM Administration.

In this chapter we set the background to the nexus of religion and politics in the context of Uganda against which the research problem is to be understood. We then outlined the statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, research objectives, research questions, the scope of the study, the significance of the study, and the justification of the study. In the next chapter, related literature is examine and conceptual framework and model for the study are highed.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter set out the background against which to understand the problem of the study. In this chapter we examine the related literature and conceptual framework. The goal of the literature review was to underscore the methodological and thematic relevance of various works to the study in as far as they highlighted variances and similarities, based upon which the current study was justifiable. The goal of the theoretical framework was to show the philosophical framework upon which the study was conducted. The approach taken was thematic, where the works reviewed were categorised into themes in order to highlight methodological emphasis. They focused on four-fold thematic areas defined by the objectives. These are:

- National Policy on Religious Involvement in Politics
- Anglican political theology
- Islamic political theology
- Influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Christian-Muslim Relationship.

2.1. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1.1 National Policy on Religious involvement in Politics

Various historical and political realities have spawned different forms of relationships that define state policy on religious involvement in politics. This is illustrated, for instance, by Gustafson and Moen (1992, p. 7) in their examination of the relationship of religion and politics. They argue that its differentiated nature depends on "the nature of the regime and the impediments that it erected for the faithful." They identify three forms of relationships: first, the state co-opting religion; second, the state limiting the political role of religion by demarcating spheres of influence and authority; third, the state extirpates religion. Although they are without a focus on different national contexts, these approaches explicated globally, provided models of religiopolitical relationship. However, to the extent that religion has always been restricted to church and related activities as a consequence of the secularisation of politics, of the three approaches, the second seems to resonate with the Ugandan pattern of religion and politics. In this

respect, this study built on it to draw the theological explanation for the persistence of religion in national governance. Considering the persistence of religion in politics, it was fitting to examine how political theologies continue to be expressed in national politics.

Other models elsewhere illustrate different forms of relations. For example, contextually focused studies drawn from both Christian and Islamic national experiences show competing power structures in church-state relations. Gustafson's (1992) examination of the church and state in Argentina shows how, from the colonial period to the present, the institution of church-state relation is defined by policy of *patronato* - the state patronage of the Roman Catholic Church, the dominant faith in these countries (p. 20). It is characterized by the independence of the church from the state religion but under the patronhood of the state. In the *patronato* policy, church and state have influenced each other, seeking to ensure that "religion and the church would support the state's existence, power and action" (p. 20). This article underscores the national policy that defines the relationship between the church and state. Its value to the study is in highlighting local examples of national policy on the church by explicating Argentinian policy on the state. Furthermore, it shows the struggle of the church under military dictatorship in Argentina. In so doing, it paints a background context of Latin America against which to understand liberation theology's quest for political liberation.

A different model of church-state relations exists in Mexico, where the corporatist relationship demonstrates the national policy of church and state. In his article, Metz (1992) examines the church and state relations in Mexico, arguing that historically there have been close church-state corporatist relations. In the corporatist relations, state legislations "determine and restrain church autonomy and its activity" (Metz, 1992, p. 112). He shows how, due to structural weakness in the church hierarchy in the 1970s and for its survival, the church had to adapt to the government policies. At the same time, the state maintains good relations with the church in recognition of the role it plays in social cohesion and as a stabilizing force. The value of Metz's article is highlighting the corporatist dimension of church-state relations, a model closer to the NRM's in nature.

Other contextual studies of the United States illustrate how national policies limit the political role of religion by demarcating its spheres of influence. Wallis (2005) explores the issues of faith and politics. He argues that: "Too often politics and religion have been separated, polarized and even put into competition with one another" (Wallis, 2005, p. xxii). Based on this observation of faith and politics in America, he observes the

polarization on the question of religion and politics. It is time, therefore, to reclaim and reassert the gospel faith in public life. Written from an activist point of view, it dwells more on the contemporary situation without doing a critical analysis of Christian political thought.

In Uganda, there are several studies on church-state relations. However, save for the extensive studies on Church-state institutional relations, none has delineated the state policy on religion as a few examples illustrate. Among the earliest is that by Hansen (1984). Hansen shows how the early colonial period played a formative role for both the church and state in establishing themselves, and it is the context within which to understand the emergent church-state relationship.

Later works, such as Karugire's (1980, 2003) similarly show the identification of religion and politics from the pre-colonial time. In the first volume (1980), he sheds light on the establishment of the eighty-year long Anglican hegemony in Uganda against the backdrop of the religious wars in Buganda. In his other volume (Karugire, 2003), the liberal nature of the Anglican political theology is demonstrated by the easy marriage of religion to politics following the religious wars. Both volumes analyse the extent of the Church proximity to state, but show the Church's liberal spirit in political involvement. In a similar way to most of the books written of Church and politics in Uganda, Karugire's works are historical, and are only useful for situating Church-state historical relation. And for this very purpose, this study has made use of his works to show the long history of religion-political nexus in Uganda, beginning with the British imperial interest.

Similarly, Mudoola (1996) built on Karugire's works to develop the motif interest groups. He examined the dynamic interaction of Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and the formal political structures, and shows the identification of national institutions with particular socio-political forces. This work is of historical value in providing the background for the institutional church-state relation. Besides its historical value, it provides this work with conceptual framework for reflecting on the Muslims and Anglicans as religious interest groups. However, the interest groups are seen more as sociological units. In this respects, the work falls short of providing the theological underpinning of group formation, and how this affects relations between Anglicans and Muslims.

Ward (1995) made a deliberate effort to examine the interplay between the Church and politics in Uganda. He shows the Anglican Church's experience as the quasi-

established church since the colonial period, arguing that the "Church of Uganda has reflected –or rather embodied—the retention and conflict operating within the state and society." In the circumstance, "unity of both the church and state, have been fragile to the extreme" (Ward, 1995, p. 73). Ward here highlights the contextually defined nature of the church-state relationship and the influence of the Church on governance. At the same time he reveals the failures of the Church of Uganda in managing the religious-based sectarianism resulting from the church-state relationship, and the stigma that religion in Uganda has continued to bear as a result of its alignment with politics. For the current study, Ward's work provides the backdrop against which to understand NRM Administration's anti-sectarian critique of religion.

Pirouette (1980) also examines institutional relationship between religious groups and the state. She focuses on the challenges faced by the religious communities in responding to the harassment and threats to civil liberties during Amin's regime. Tracing it to historical factors of the interreligious hostilities and factionalism within religions, especially the Anglican Church, Pirouette shows how "churches found themselves dragged, against their will, into becoming foci of opposition, until eventually they became feared by those in power" (Pirouette, 1980, p.13). The contribution of this work to the discourse on religion and politics in Uganda is in highlighting the challenge especially posed by the dictatorial Muslim-led government, to both Christians and Muslims. This study helps to highlight th fortunes of Islam in politics during the era of a Muslim-led government. It therefore provided a thematic shift from the familiar history of domination to the reversal of Muslim fortunes in politics.

2.1.2 Anglican Political Theology

The discourse on Christian political theology goes as far back as antiquity through to the Middle Ages, Reformation and Modern periods. Out of these periods have been identified different forms of relationship of Church and state. This discourse was brought to focus more at the Reformation. Callaway (2018) argues, "While the topic of establishment has receded in importance at present, it has been central to political thought in the West since at least the days of Constantine. In the wake of the Protestant Reformation, European societies wrestled with determining exactly what roles the church and state should play in each other's sphere, and so the topic of establishment became especially pressing in the early modern era, although there was also substantial discussion in the Middle Ages (Dante, 1995). By using the term "establishment," he

refers to any of several possible arrangements for a religion in a society's political life. Among which are the following: a religious body may be a "state" church in the sense that it has an exclusive right to practice its faith; a church may be supported through taxes and subject to the direction of the government; particular ecclesiastical officials may have, in virtue of their office, an established role in political institutions; a church may simply have a privileged role in certain public, political ceremonies (for example, inaugurations, opening of parliament, etc.); or, a state could simply enshrine a particular creed or belief system as its official religion, much like the "official bird" or "official flower. These models help us see some of the Church's historical establishment that have defined the variant expressions of the Church political theologies.

Some political theologies illustrate the Church's struggle with the contemporary culture. Chadwick (1967), for example, shows the Church's struggle to cope with the challenges of the contemporary culture during the early period. Citing early theologians like Cyprian of Carthage, he illustrates the Church's response to the hostile relationship with the state. He also shows how the ascension to the throne by Constantine opened a new chapter in the church-state relationship in Rome and Europe (Chadwick, 1967, p. 125). However, while the Church did not explicate formal political theology, Constantine's political considerations formed the foundation of institutional relationship. It provided the early model institutional relationship of the Early Church and state based upon which an assessment will be made of the influence of religion in politics.

A different pattern of political involvement is observed during the Middle Ages, one in which the Church is more engaged. Southern (1970), for example, highlights the identification of the Church with the whole organized society as the distinguishing feature of Christendom in Europe. According to him, the greatest achievement of the time for Christendom was the impression of "a universal human society as an integral part of a divinely ordered universe in time and in eternity, in nature and supernatural, in practical politics and in the world of spiritual essence" (Southern, 1970, p. 22). Although the church's political theology is less explicit, Southern's work provides a general background against which to understand the emergence of national sovereignties and their localized political theologies. For the current, study its value is in providing a paradigm for understanding the formative influence in local socio-cultural setting.

Bradstock, also writing on Reformation within the context of the political theology, shows the import of the Reformation to the birth of political theology. He says: Luther's rediscovery of the doctrine of justification through faith may well be understood

as a “spiritual experience,” yet any appreciation of its impact will be at best partial if it takes no account of its political and ecclesiological repercussions (p. 67). This statement underscores the possible relationship of Christian doctrine and politics, which he then outlines in his examination of various Reformation figures: Martin Luther. Luther shows how his discovery of God’s grace also led him to “challenge the power, structures, wealth, and influence of the church: for to affirm that the individual is able to relate directly to God is not only to undermine the role of the church as mediator of salvation but to challenge its authority – if not the very concept of authority itself.” Citing Müntzer, a little know fellow of the time with a profound articulation of political theology from a spiritual, yet political dimension, Bradstock shows how, “in certain circumstances rebellion against the authorities can be warranted from scripture,” especially in order to derive “purgation from the soul of all that hinders the work of God” (p. 71). Thus, Müntze provides theological legitimacy to political resistance. He then cites the Anabaptists and their passion for social justice and for a wholesale transformation of the church, providing another model of Reformation political theology. Bradstock finally mentions a well-known figure, John Calvin, who “set out to construct a new model of relations between the church and the civil authorities. The three models broaden the scope of understanding of the possible church-state relationship, which in themselves enrich the perspective in this work by providing the various models for church-state engagement.

The emergence of national sovereignties and the more explicit expressions of Christian political theologies are observable as outgrowth of the Reformation. Chadwick (1972) suggests that the weakness of Christendom under the Pope finally gave way to the emergence of national sovereignties as the political parallels. Thus, by advancing royal state power throughout Europe, local sovereignties supplied state authorities in nations which hitherto were the domains of the Pope. For this, it is possible to identify the emergent sovereignties and their local theologies, such as in Germany, England, Geneva, and France. In England, as well as in the afore-mentioned nations, the Reformation had spiritual as well as political underpinnings (McGrath, 1995, p. 58). However, while the political thoughts of the reformers are not examined, the political dimension of the English Reformation furnishes this study with the English institutional church model from which the Protectorate Anglican Church in Uganda derived its political ethos—political philosophy, nature or character.

A combination of these different strains of political thought help highlight the formative influence of the Reformation thinkers, who from a spiritual point of view, impacted the political thought. The variety of contexts out of which these thoughts are articulated underscore the plural form of Christian political thought. This is vividly brought out by Troeltsch (1992) who shows the plural forms of Christian political theology. For example, he has compiled the Protestant Christian social teachings. Beginning with Luther's sociological understanding of the church, he adumbrates the sociological effect of Luther's and Calvin's social teaching. While not explicitly addressing political theology, the work provides a framework for understanding Protestant social teachings. Therefore, it provides the framework for reflecting on the ramification on the church-state nexus.

Contemporary expressions of Christian political theologies are equally varied. Hennelly (1995) shows how the liberation methodology has had a strong influence on both the Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians, who find in the praxis-based methodology a greater affinity with the ideals of the gospel. Similarly, de Gruchy (1986; p. 52), shows the Church's struggle during the Apartheid era, and seeks to provide a contextually defined solution in South Africa. The strength of contextual theologies in general is to demonstrate Christian political engagement in specific contexts. Yet, they are more prescriptive, and their approaches are to generalized to fit the the Ugandan context.

In general, the discourse on Christian political theology is categorized into two: liberal and conservative. Stackhouse (1951) explicates the liberal stance, pointing out the argument that politics matter to God, and therefore it should matter to the people. The reasons for this are: the state has become the most comprehensive institution of society, embracing almost the whole of life; also, to help in resisting political powers being used to impose evil on the world and to help the good. Stackhouse here provides principles for appraising Christian political activity, by showing the Spirit's manifestation in political power and the need for Christians to retain sufficient power to fulfil the divine vocation of the state, while guiding them in the use of power and on the issues of church and state. The challenge is that a liberal attitude can lead to indiscriminate political activity.

A further expression of a liberal stance is in social Christianity. According to Clark (1963), social Christianity emphasizes human welfare and fulfilment in life, here and now, and the positive role of the secular state. Clark examined the relationship of the established church with the state in England during the Prime Minister Thatcher era and

the Church's struggle for economic justice. He shows the efforts made by the Church of England (Anglican) to carry out faithful and effective social witness on issues of social justice. Though outlining the Church of England's thought, the work contributes to the understanding of the intricate church-state relationship patterns in Uganda.

In contrast, the conservative stance, especially by the evangelicals, has tended to withdraw from politics and society. Fowler (1982) illustrates this stance. Using the Protestant American context of discourse, Fowler provides a useful survey of the various Protestant intellectual perspectives that provide the form, substance and history of evangelical political thought. Its goal is to highlight the evangelical political stance. Clearly, it shows how more conservative Protestant intellectuals see the necessary distinction of Church and state, and politics as the sphere of evil. The challenge of such a perspective is in promoting a dualistic worldview that sees the necessary distinction between the sphere of 'good' and that of 'evil', the Church and religion. It also drives a wedge between church and society, and takes little consideration of the fact that, religion is socially operative and that there is an overlap between church and state.

In Africa the discourse on Christian political theology is not well delved into. However, there are growing voices articulating a broad range of issues in Africa, from Church-state relationship, liberation and black theologies, and socio-economic and political transformation. A contrast of two political voices - John Henry Okullu and Emmanuel Katongole - illustrates the variation in the agenda for the ongoing engagement.

Okullu, writing in the immediate post-colonial Africa wrestles with the issues of Church and politics in East Africa (1974) and Church and State in Nation Building and Human Development (1984). These two books, at the time and even now, are perhaps some of the strongest voices on the subject. By looking at the Church and politics in East Africa he highlights pertinent issues, such as Church and state, Church and development, as well as such endemic social challenge as corruption, tribalism and democracy. He decries the Church's slow response "in giving the guidance which African nation have needed in working out their national aspirations as independent nations." This is due to the fact there are clearly defined lines between church and state, which is the cross-cutting challenge to the Church ministry in the contemporary world. One of them is in the area of development. He highlights that economic and political justice and development are inseparable (p.24). The Christian in development, according to him, is

"partly to provide his fellow men with bread, work, health and education, and so to achieve better living condition" (p. 26).

The Church's engaged presence in the world constitute his conviction about its role in challenging issues endemic in the world, such as development, corruption, tribalism, etc., as well as the Church's quest for democracy and education. In his other book (1984), he pursues some of the thematic issues in the earlier work, such as justice, nation building, Church state relationship, human development and human rights. He believes that justice, "is today the centre of the aspirations of people in their struggle all over the world" (p. 4.) and that "the concern for a just society is shared by all people of different faiths…as well as secular humanist and Marxist (p. 5). Similarly, nation-building is an activity "[e]very individual, institution, the university, commerce and industry, the trade union and, of course, the Church, are summoned to participate in it" (p. 28). Such thematic issues set the tone to his discourse on the Church and its civic responsibility. It might as well be said, even though he does not, that these two books articulate his political theology. It is one in which the Church is seen as a key player in issues of politics and nation-building. These books, though written years back, and are not pitched to the contemporary discourse, leave his readers with no doubt as to the nature of his political theology.

A more contemporary writer, Katongole (2011), brings in a fresh expression of discourse in political theology. In his article, *Political Theologies of Africa,* Katongole raises a number of pressing questions: What is the relation between the distressing political and economic realities of Africa and its dynamic Christian expression? What difference does Christianity make in Africa's political history? Can Christianity be a positive force of social transformation, and if so, in what way? These are raised against the contradictions in Africa today: "While the economic and political story of Africa is distressing, things seem bright on the religious front" (p. 347). Katongole confronts the apparent contradiction of what he calls "the two Africans" – an Africa of political and economic disaster on the one hand, and an Africa that is religiously flourishing, on the other. The goal is to highlight the possibilities as well as the limits of the church as an agent for political transformation. He argues that it is through the reinvention paradigm that Christians can more explicitly engage the much-needed task of social reimagination (p. 348). The primary goal of Christian mission, accordingly, is the formation of a spiritual identity; advocacy for justice, democracy, and human rights within the political sphere and "development" and the provision of "social services." He champions the

cause of reinventing Africa's political modernity through holistic transformation, prophetic critique, incarnational advocacy, and theological social innovativeness (p. 354).

Okullu and Katongole differ in approaches, perhaps illustrating the different times and geographical context informing the agenda of discourse. Whereas on the one hand, Bishop Okullu wrote to address issues in the immediate post-colonial East Africa, on the other Katongole is broadly focused, and has the benefit of the contemporary post-modern frame of thinking to inform his political theology. The two books are invaluable in their own rights as eye-openers to the various dimensions of the Church's political theology.

Another attempt by a contemporary thinker on issues of Church and politics is Enyinnaya (2006). Writing on *A Theological Approach to Political Transformation in* Africa, he argues for a theological approach to political transformation. To build his case he has examined the African political landscape, highlighting the challenges faced by nation in finding a model that is appropriate. Based on this, he makes a case for a theological approach that enables Christian theology to be relevant to the social political life of African nations. He departs from the emerging political, although artificial culture of political secularity—the separation of religion from politics and its devastating effect in Africa (p. 81). For African that are thoroughly religious, he argues, this is "a great disservice" (p. 81), and that religion and politics are "related to each another and should be understood and practices as such."

Enyinnaya renders the use of the term 'secularity' inappropriate and Western in origin (p. 82). Rather than adopting political models of former colonial master, he highlights the need for African nations to look inward into their worldview and peculiar context in order to give birth to political systems that will suit their unique situations" (p. 84). In the same vain, he argues that Africans must seek their own solution, and for this African theologian have a role to play, and goes on to suggests guidelines for developing a political system (p. 85). In addition to this, he proposes that African theologians must bring a theological perspective to the discourse (p.86), and that Christians be equipped to act politically (p. 88). Eyinnaya here makes a very important contribution to the discourse on religion and politics. Specifically, the need for the Africans to integrate their worldview and circumstances in the peculiar context to the discourse stands out strongly (Enyinnaya, 2006).

Prevalence of works in the market on Church and state, however, seems to point to the fact that there is more discourse on Church and politics in the East African region on Kenya than in any other nation. All of which wrestle with the issues of Church-state relations. Three of the works illustrate this. In the case of Kenya, for example, Throup (1995) examined the politics of church-state conflict in Kenya between 1978 and 1990, showing how the identification of the main denominational church—the Anglican Church of Kenya—with the colonial establishment elicited differentiated approaches to politics. The cold attitude of the denominational church towards the nationalist anti-Christian ideology of the Mau Mau, is contrasted with the liberal National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), which illustrates the awakening of member churches towards their social and political responsibility. The book highlights the conflict between the state and the Protestant churches in NCCK, and illustrates the challenges of the churches' political activism and of the failed church-state relations. For the current study it is useful for comparative analysis of the varying nature of institutional relations of churches with state.

A variant Church-state theology articulated by Njoya (2012) represents an adversarial relation between Church and state. Spawn out of a prophetic tradition, it is one that champions "people's God-bestowed humanity, sovereignty, freedom and dignity." Njoya is writing from a Kenyan context where religion, politics and ethnicity are interwoven. For that matter, he finds the legitimacy for his theological position in light of the Kenyan Lancaster constitution and the One-party state. By this, he sees religion and politics as the Kenyan elite self-reward systems to the neglect of the masses. He also sharply criticizes the Kenyan ecclesiastical leadership for their complicity in the "unholy unity of the Church-State identities." Njoya's political theology is drawn from the paradigms of the biblical prophets, such as Elijah, Isaiah, Habakkuk, Micah and Hosea, and from them sees the Church-state relationship as "mutually exclusive and diametrically incompatible, just as light and darkness or Jesus and Satan." Njoya's political theology is ideal for prophetic ministry, especially in cases of perceived or real injustice. The challenge is that it represents a one-man's crusade than a broader Church's perspective. Also, it creates cognitive tension for those in the Church who see good in the state. Ultimately, what he calls "undivinely recognized marriage" between Church and state delegalizes the state. For this study, however, it serves to underscore yet another paradigm through which religion revolutionized state.

A similar tone is echoed by Okello (2012), who stated that, “the pulpit should be kept separate from the political platform…” and that, “the pastor does his members a very big favour by refusing to jump onto any political bandwagon, and by staying focused on and remaining committed to the ministerial call God placed upon him. This position is taken with the hindsight of the 2007/08 Kenyan national election that saw the unprecedented numbers of the members of the clergy join elective politics. His main argument is that “failure of Kenya’s Evangelical Christianity to draw demarcations between the sacred and the secular reflects a move on the part of the church to open the door for the secularization of the church. Church and politics must of necessity then, be kept separate. The three-fold reasons for this are: to pursue the occupation of a given parliamentary seat, confuses the electorate who strongly feel that the pulpit is sacred ground and must, of necessity, be distinguished from the political podium; such is often driven by some form of greed for power and materialism, third, Kenya’s multiparty system of politics has strong ethnic loyalties that puts the pastor at odds with members of the congregation for other ethnic groups. Ultimately, the boundary between politics and the prophetic voice gets significantly blurred, at least for the masses depending on their pastors for spiritual leadership. The perspectives of both men are very contextual. Okello particularly argues from a less theological but more pragmatic point of view.

In Uganda the foundation of the Anglican political theology is traced to 1892 when religion and politics became inextricably bound. The ground-breaking work of Hansen (1984) demonstrates this. He explores the church-state problem of colonial society, showing how the period played a formative role for both the Church and state in establishing themselves. This work is seminal to several others on the subject, and remains an invaluable piece for the current study. The comparative framework assumed is informative of the comparative study design assumed in this work. Also, it forms the context from which to understand the emergent church-state relationship. However, the institutional level of enquiry lends it more political considerations, from which the current study departs to focus on political theologies.

Later works with a similar methodological approach, such as by Mudoola (1996), further illustrate the Church’s political experience. Drawing on insights from seminal scholarship on religion and politics, Mudoola examined the dynamic interaction of Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and political structures. He points out that these religious groups were more or less a replay of the power struggle during the 1880s and early 1890s that saw the rise of Protestant hegemony and the marginalization of other religious

groups. He further picks up the motif of the negative influence of religiopolitical cleavages in the Ugandan politics, that is, the identification of national institutions with particular socio-political forces. These insights notwithstanding, political rather than religious bias of the work predetermines its methodology, structure and goals. And, although religion plays a central role in the development of political structure, he has not examined political theology.

Karugire's works (1980, 2003) highlight the experience of religion and politics in Uganda. The first volume offers an overview of the political history of the nation from the pre-colonial time, shedding light on the importance of the religious wars in Buganda for Uganda, first, in marking the birth of the protectorate era in Buganda (Uganda), and second, in ensuring the establishment of the eighty-year long Anglican hegemony in Uganda. The chronology of events from the onset of the protectorate era to 1971sets a background against which to understand the birth of the religiopolitical cleavages and, later in 1950, the birth of the religion-based political parties.

Motifs in the above work resonate in Karugire's other work (2003) in which he examines the intricate history of the birth of the protectorate era, putting the British imperialistic interest against the backdrop of the religious tension in Buganda. He shows how religious pluralism and the wars for control of power in Buganda by Christian chiefs and the subsequent marriage of religion to politics, ensured the alignment of religious faiths along political lines. From this is derived the book's central motif: religion as a divisive factor, and along with ethnic nationalism, they furnish the long roots of instability in Uganda. Like the first volume, the methodology predisposes this work to historical conclusion. However, the value of the works remains historical, and furnishes this study with the historical linchpins for understanding the divisive role of religiopolitical cleavages in Ugandan politics.

Other works further examine the interplay of religion and the state. Two works in particular examine the interplay of religion and state. Ward (1995) shows the Anglican Church's experience as the quasi-established church since the colonial period, arguing that the "Church of Uganda has reflected –or rather embodied—the retention and conflict operating within the state and society." In the circumstance, "unity of both the church and state, have been fragile on the extreme (1995, p. 73). Ward here highlights the contextually defined nature of church-state relationship and the influence of the church on governance. At the same time, he reveals the failures of the Church of Uganda in managing the religious-based sectarianism resulting from the church-state relationship,

the stigma that religion in Uganda has continued to bear. For the current study, Ward's works provides the backdrop against which to understand the Movement's anti-sectarian critique of religion in Uganda.

Niringiye (2016) also examined the relationship between the Church and the State. This work is a historical-ecclesiological study of the Church of Uganda. It depicts the Church in the wider socio-political context of the post-independence Uganda. The task of the work is two-fold: historically, to show "how the Church of Uganda adopted, accommodated, confronted, resisted, reformed, interacted with, survived and acted as a faith community;" and, theologically, to show what "authenticated it as a church in the historical cultural-socio-political." While not delineating the Church's political theology, its value indeed is in defining the context of the church-state engagement.

Griffiths (1998) examined the Anglican evangelical political theology during the protectorate era. His focus was on the missionary work of Bishop Tucker during the immediate pre and post-protectorate era. It shows how, in the turbulent period in Buganda and the increasing missionary involvement in Buganda, Tucker's "evangelical tradition of political involvement" influenced the establishment of the protectorate administration in Buganda (Griffiths, 1998, p. 123ff). The peculiar circumstance of war and civil unrest that obtained in Buganda at the time, call for contextual examination, and missionary involvement in the war can only be taken as an exception rather than the norm. However, the work is certainly instructive of how the liberal mission interests, woven into the imperialistic agenda, resulted into the Anglican political ethos, with the long-term results of instituting the Anglican political hegemony in Uganda. This study will build on it to explicate the influence of the Anglican political theology.

All the above literature variably demonstrates the extent of the influence of the Christian political thought. With the exception of literature on contextual theologies, much of the literature demonstrates a historical focus, and for this study it highlights the challenge of the Church in the contemporary political context. Additionally, the Christian political theology shows varied expressions. These variations are informed by different shades of Christian theological thinkers along the conservative to liberal continuum. In general, there is less effort to examine the ideological frameworks that influence Christian involvement in politics. This will constitute the major task of this study.

2.1.3 Islamic Political Theology

Islamic scholarship attests to the historical influence of Islamic theology in governance. For instance, Schirrmacher (2011) shows how the Islamic polity was defined from the beginning, and how Islam was not just a religion, but a combination of religious and secular leadership in the person of Prophet Muhammad. It is this that defined the Islamic polity. By highlighting the binding influence of the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* among Muslims, the work shows Islam as a comprehensively lived reality covering all concerns of life, religious and otherwise, private and public. For the current study, it provides the foundation for understanding the Islamic polity in national governance.

Riddle and Cotterell (2003) also examine the history of the Islamic empire, showing the interaction between Islam and the rest of the world, the ebb and flow of the Islamic empire, and the interaction of Islam within the socio-political and cultural context. By so doing, they provide a rich context from which to understand Islam in the past and present. Similarly, Lewis (2002) examines Islam within its socio-cultural and political context, underscoring the dynamics of its relationship with Western civilization. In it he highlights the Islamic political thought and shows the endemic tension between the religious concerns and political needs that characterized the Islamic states. The work cautions against delineation of religion and politics in Islam, as the two are one. It is important for the current study in underscoring the thematic issue of the nexux of religion and politics that arises from the Islamic polity.

On the underpinning ideology of the influence of Islamic political theology, Voll (1991) argues that while both religion and politics are strongly linked, "certain institutions within Muslim society perform functions that can be called religious, and other structures can be called states" and that none of the two—political and religious dimensions - is independent (p. 209). It is in this respect that Islam is reckoned as "a total way of life" (p. 211). He also observes that in spite of the political plurality based on the modern states, Muslims have a "unified polity." However, the state is a subordinate instrument of God, not a sovereign, independent institution. By far Voll's article identifies the critical issues in religion and state institutional relationship. For this study it provides a beginning point for a reflection on the Islamic political thought.

The influence of Islamic political theology is explicitly demonstrated by the Islamicist movement. In the African context, for instance, attempts by Islamicists to realign the faith with the *Sharia* are reflected in Lesch's (1992, p. 182) examination of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Accordingly, right from the birth of the Brotherhood,

it was associated with the socio-economic programmes in line with the *Sharia*. The struggle of the Brotherhood through the three successive regimes of Abdel Nasser, Anwar Saddat and Hosni Mubarak, shows its tenacity in realizing its ideals in Egypt. Among these ideals are: representation in government, state reforms according to the *Sharia*, and a comprehensive programme concerning education, social structure, legislation, and the realization of the dream of a Muslim alliance to counter the three-fold enemy of capitalism, communism and Zionism. Lesch's work shows the enduring nature of the religious ideas of the Brotherhood, some of which are core to Islam.

The current study provides a case on which to understand the influence of Islam in its social and political setting. An examination of Islamic political theology is one that cannot be done in isolation. The reason is that Islam, rather than being a separate domain of the supernatural, is part of life. Seyyed (2003, p. 110), for example, says: "Islam has never separated religion from politics…the Prophet himself was both a religious and the political leader of the first Islamic community." Accordingly, Islam upholds the principle of the rulership of Allah over the Islamic community, not as a theocracy, but as a nomocracy—a rule of the Divine law. Also, Esposito (1998, p. 159) shows how religion and governance are related, arguing that Islam is a total way of life: "Islam is believed to be relevant to and integral to politics, law, education, social life and economics. These institutions or areas of life are not viewed as secular but religious (Islamic), based on the belief that Islam is a *way of life*, and thus religion and society are interrelated." Both Seyyed and Esposito have not tackled the question of how Islam remains influential worldwide as a religious as well as political force. However, through their works one is able to glean the nature of Islamic political theology. In this way it benefits the current study by showing religion as a way of life rather than a separate domain.

It is Gelvin (2005) and Jomier (1989) who have explained why Islam remains influential worldwide. Gelvin (2005, p.15), has looked at it from a historical/political perspective. Surveying the history of Islam from the late antiquities to the dawn of a new age, the work gives a foundational understanding of how Islamic involvement in national governance has historically played out. It shows how, right from the birth of the religion, it has identified itself as a political as well as a religious movement. Muhammad and the *caliphs* after him ruled the emergent Islamic community under the *Sharia* with aegis of the *Ulama*. Yet, little effort is invested in giving a religious framework from which to understand the relationship between religion and governance. This work reinforces the

widely held position of the inherent nexus of religion and politics in Islam by giving the historical roots from within the Ugandan context.

Caner and Caner (2002) provide an explanation for the inextricable link between religion and politics, by showing how politics is as an integral part of the religious duty of a Muslim. Accordingly, Islam is based on salvation by personal righteousness - duty and reward- and political power is a result of faithfulness, and authority is given to Muslims "in order that they may maintain Allah's Law." While this is seen as the basis for coercion of the conquered people to Islam, it is also a means of securing religious freedom by assuming power. Thus, the key to prosperity is "integrating politics and religion" and extending Allah's kingdom politically as an integral aspect of Islamic religious duty (Caner and Caner: 2002, p. 35). By showing religion as an integral aspect of life, the book grounds the political ethos on the theology of salvation by personal righteousness—duty and reward, and to the extent that political power is a result of faithfulness, it is understandable why politics is central to the Islamic ethical pattern.

Despite the general practice of integration of Islamic theology, there is a minority apolitical section in Middle East. These, according to Fattaz (2013), champion ritualistic apolitical agenda in the Middle East. He says: "This agenda is adopted by five different discourses that emanate from formations that are highly critical of each other" who "limit Islam to the personal domain, depriving it, thereby, of any role as far as legislation and political action is concerned" (2013, p. 290). He adds that such a model of Islam is confined to mosques, and is "limited to matters of faith, ethics, and rituals. The five groups are: secular Muslims; non-Muslims; a group of modern preachers who do not want to get involved in political affairs; Sufis; and, apolitical Salafis. These, according to Fattaz, "advocate for secularism and total separation between religion and states and preach full citizenship after the liberal secular models of the United States and Canada, where there is no official, religion of the state, or the British and Spanish models, where the official religion has only minimal symbolic relevance" (2013, p. 290). Included among these are most Egyptian Copts, Israeli Arabs, Lebanese Christians, Moroccan Jews, Saudi Shi`a, and Iranian Sunnis. The presence of these in Middle East, the mainstay of Islam, is illustrative of the diversity in the Islamic political theology. Thus, rather than perceiving Islam as monolithic in political conviction on religion and state/politics, for this study, it helps provide alternative perspectives the Islamic political theology.

Smith (2009) shows the utilitarian relationship between Islam as a religion and politics. Adopting the term ‘political religiosity’ - coined by Haynes (1999: p. 245—as cited in Smith, 2009, p. 44). Smith shows the utilization of religion to help pursue secular goals. He argues that religious manifestation or growth in Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, Asia and Latin America, aims “to fill an ideological vacuum” (p. 44). The political religiosity thesis sounds plausible in light of the resurgence of politically oriented Islamist movements worldwide and Africa in particular. However, political religiosity requires critical examination, especially in reference to the Ugandan context, where the religion and politics nexus is hardly explainable only by political theory.

Although Islam has played a role in Uganda’s politics, it is not very broadly examined. This is partly because of the predominance of Christian scholarship on religion and politics in Uganda. However, some scholarship has tried to highlight Islam’s role in Uganda’s politics. For example, Kasozi (1986) has helped to popularize Islam in a predominantly Christian nation. His work chronicles the penetration of Islam into Uganda since 1844, and highlights its political importance. Two other issues stand out in this work. First, the sources: he “neglected sources” of Muslim origin, especially first-hand or more reliable oral accounts (Kasozi, 1986, p. 9). In this way, his work helps to evade the challenge of history written by the victor - Missionary, Colonial or Christian-based sources. Second, he highlights the history of Islam during the years of the birth of religious-based political parties in Uganda, and how it was exploited for political expedience, thereby showing its political importance in the 1950s (p. 109). On these two aspects the study benefits from its understanding of Islam, especially from the perspective of Islamic scholarship.

Although written as a biography, Kasozi (1996) provides another window to the Islamic community in Uganda. Through the life of one Prince Badru Kakungulu, a Muslim leader, Kasozi shows the struggles of the Muslim community in the post-colonial era as it emerges from the embers of domination by Christians following the religious wars in Buganda. The book underscores the struggle of Islam as a minority religion in a religious pluralistic milieu and its efforts to modernize its population in a progressive post-colonial community and to curve a niche in national politics. It provides this study with an understanding of the Islamic quest for political space in Uganda.

Of similar importance in appreciating the history of Islam in Uganda, is Oded (1990). The work examines the history of the two-year reign of the only Muslim Muganda king, Kalema (from October 1888 - January 1890). Set within the formative

era of the religiopolitical cleavages, the book is particularly helpful in underscoring the struggles of the Muslim community during the upheavals and turbulence that characterized the wars of religion in Buganda. It is an illustration of the audacity of the Islamic political spirit in its fight against the superior Anglican and Roman Catholic parties. Also important is the analysis of the history of Buganda politics "on the basis of Muslim Baganda sources and interviews" which are authenticated by his use of Christian sources, missionary reports and official correspondence of the British Consul in Zanzibar. However, the work leans on the political dynamics of the kingdom, and little is left to show the ideological influence of Islamic political theology in national governance. Nevertheless, its value is in providing the foundational understanding of the interface of Islam and the Christian religious groups at the formative stages of the religious cleavages.

Similarly, Kanyeihamba (1998) highlights the challenge of Muslim leadership focusing on issues of leadership in the highly pluralistic Muslim community. In it, Kanyeihamba has contributed insightfully, in not only tracing the spread of Islam, but also in underscoring the challenge of the leadership of the Muslim community in a highly politically charged and Christian-dominated milieu. However, it falls short of showing the relationship of the Islamic political ideology to trends in the growth of Islam and participation of Muslims in governance. Also, to the extent that the work is more narrowly focused of Muslim leadership, the scope of the work precludes issues that are central to this study—Christian-Muslim relations

Foundations of Islamic involvement in politics in Uganda are brought out first in Oded (1990). Focus is made on the short reign of Kalema, the only Muslim king of Buganda. Apart from putting the Islamic political history of Buganda into perspective, a special feature of this work is on the source. Oded has used Muslim sources, which though scanty and lacking dates, compared to Christian sources, authenticate his account. Thus it is valuable in situating the Islamic political foundation in Ugandan history.

A short, but, fairly detailed account of the Muslim political experience in Uganda is by Kiyimba (1990). It provides a snapshot of the Muslim community in Uganda through 140 years of minority status. During this time, Islam "has been present in the private lives of several Ugandans, has led to the evolution of a Muslim community, and has left indelible marks on aspects of the Ugandan public life in general" (p. 86). The detailed historical account of the birth of Islam is invaluably informative for this study.

And, while not attempting to put Islamic experience in a theological perspective, he has showed the struggles of the Muslim community in their bid for political participation.

The above literature has highlighted the aspect of the foundation of Islamic political theology and its influence on politics. As has been examined above, much of the literature is written from a historical and political framework. Based on this, its value is mainly to show the historical development of political theology.

2.1.4 Influence of Anglican and Islamic Political Theologies on Christian-Muslim Relations

In a multi-religious global context, the impact of political theology cannot be overemphasized. The extent to which religion is inextricably bound to culture and society makes it a force to reckon with, especially with boundaries collapsed by globalizing factors. Huntington's thesis (2011) on religion and the remaking of the world order explicates this. By positing culture as a defining ideology with a global scope, Huntington shows the global realignment of countries: "in the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural." The cultural here refers to the socio-political grouping that he calls civilizations or power blocks. He argues that "people use politics not just to advance their interest but also to define identity" (p. 29). These are grouped into the world's seven to eight major civilizations—Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese. While not using religion as an identity marker for the emerging civilization, its revitalization throughout the world today "is reinforcing the cultural differences" (p. 28). Huntington's theory has been challenged, and its weaknesses demonstrated. However, Huntington's examination of the clash gives a general background of socio-political groupings—civilizations or power blocks. Against this framework, it is possible to understand the Anglican-Muslim relations in general global scale. This realignment can as well be observed on a more local scale such as in Uganda, where, in relation to the broader Islamic community, Muslims appear to reconstitute themselves as a socio-political force.

Historical studies show the challenge posed by the persistence of Christian and Islamic political theology on Christian-Muslim relations. Gelvin's (2005) sketch of the history of Islam from the nascent community to its growth and expansion, points how Islamic dynasties have lived side-by-side with other empires, such as the Christian Byzantine Empire. Wars of expansion by the Sasanid Empire against the Byzantium in

the seventh century, illustrate the nature of Christian-Muslim relations. While the goal of the sketch is to outline the history of the Middle East, Gelvin shows the relationship between Islamic empires and their neighbours. The value of this work is in providing paradigms that illustrate the relationship between Islamic empires and their Christian political neighbours. Lacking, however, is demonstration of the influence of political theology on Christian-Muslim relations, which this study highlights.

Lewis (2002) has explored the religiously-based attitudes that defined the relations between Muslims and their neighbours. Examining the impact of the growth of Western civilization in Europe and the Middle East, Lewis shows the corresponding impact of the loss by Islam of the forefront position in human civilization to Christian Europe during the Middle Ages. Although written from a political point of view to show the relationship between the last Muslim-based Ottoman Empire and the European Christendom, the book shows less explicitly religious ideas behind the relations. However, the work sets the foundation for exploring themes on Christian-Muslim relations. It, therefore, highlights the impact of political theology on Christian-Muslim relations for comparative studies with trends in Uganda.

Jomier (1989) examined the history, teachings and practices with a special focus on Islam in the modern world. He identified Islam as both a political and religious movement and highlighted the glories of the former Islamic civilization by maintaining the authentic Muslim character and religious values, showing the ultimate issue in the quest of Islamic resistance to Westernization—preserving Islamic identity while embracing modernity and development. By looking at Islam through the perspective of reformist Islamic movements, he associates it with political and economic activity. In a way, the work portrays an alignment of Islamic and Western religious and political forces in the modern world. By looking at Islam as both a political and religious movement, this work provides for this study thematic issues that are central to Christian-Muslim relations. The key one is struggle to preserving Islamic identity within the context of religious and political ideologies in Uganda.

Political theology remains the driving factor in contemporary Christian and Muslim communities. By examining the idea of the human good in Christian and Islamic political theologies, Park (2017) constructs a framework for the Christian-Muslim relationship. Using as an illustration, the oldest religious conflict in recorded history in Mindanao, Philippines, the book is aimed at examining various ways of constructing a framework of public civility, especially among Christian and Muslim communities. He

then uses Aristotle's notion of the human good, to construct a universal framework of what he calls a 'public civility.' The aim is to show how the Aristotelian notion of the human good serves as a promising basis for constructing public civility in liberal democratic societies among two of the largest faith communities in our world today. "Reframed in terms of the human good rather than the common good," he argues, "Catholic and Islamic political theologies can contribute positively and invaluably to the construction of public civility." The book provides an excellent example of the use of political theologies for dealing with interreligious relations. While dealing with Christian political theology, however, its focus is on Catholic political theology. Yet, it is an excellent resource for reflecting on the influence of political theology of Christian-Muslim relations.

In Africa, both religions have lived side-by-side. This environment has elicited unique patterns of relations between Muslims and their neighbours. This uniqueness is noted by Azuma (2008): "We have multi-ethnic families, clans, ethnic groups, and nations." At each level of relations, he shows how African Muslims and Christians have a lot of things that bind them together, including kinship ties, shared languages and citizenship. The work aims at explaining Islam to Christians, which highlights its usefulness for this work. It underscores the stereotypes that characterize the Christian-Muslim relations, and the challenges posed to Christianity by Islam. Of relevance to this study is the political challenge posed by Islam: it "makes no separation between private and public, spiritual and temporal, religion and politics" (Azuma, 2008, p. 12). By so doing, it highlights an important thematic issue in this study. At the same time, it is instructive for this study in as far as it contrasts the approaches to politics by both Anglicans and Muslims.

More focused East African regional studies on religion and politics (Hansen and Twaddle, 1995) point to the growing influence of, not only Islam, but also other religious communities in the region. And although the East African region has been home to Christianity and Islam in all their shades, there is increased quest for political expressions, often leading to conflicts (Twaddle, 1995, p. 1). It invaluably lays the ground for the on-going exploration of thematic issues in Church and politics/state. Based upon these thematic issues, one then proceeds to examine the relations between Christians and Muslims in their political engagement.

There are scanty works on the subject of inter-religious encounter in Uganda. One work by Pirouette (1980) examines institutional relationship between religious

groups and the state. She focuses on the challenges faced by the religious communities in responding to the harassment and threats to civil liberties during Amin's Administration (Pirouette, 1980). Tracing it to historical factors of the interreligious hostilities and factionalism within religions, especially the Anglican Church, Pirouette shows how "churches found themselves dragged, against their will, into becoming foci of opposition, until eventually they became feared by those in power" (Pirouette, 1980, p.13). Here Pirouette highlights the challenge especially posed by the dictatorial Muslim-led government, to both Christians and Muslims. In an invaluable way, this work highlights the institutional relations, and in particular, how national policy defined the relations between the Church and state.

Omona (2015) identifies religion as one of the defining factors and an identity marker through which conflict gets expressed. Through the use of a local experience, he illustrates this by the way the Western beliefs interfered with the African belief systems, resulting into fragmentation of communities according to religious identities. Cases of the Buganda wars (1888-92) and the subsequent religionization of politics are used to further illustrate this. Omona's thesis is instructive of the impact of foreign religions on traditional society. The danger, however, is in overblowing the divisive effect of foreign religions on conflict in African societies' that pre-dated foreign religions. However, it remains a foundational document in understanding the defining role of religion in the politics of Uganda. For this study, therefore, it puts to perspective the role religion played historically in the formation of the religiopolitical cleavages. Against this background, it is thus possible to understand the NRM policy on national unity, and the need to secularise Ugandan politics between 1986 and 2016.

Differing from the current approaches to the subject explored above, this study represents a new dimension to the study of the contribution of religions in Ugandan politics. Viewed from a comparative-historical light, the study ultimately examines the religious ideas in national politics. The focus is specifically on highlighting the religious groups' political ideas, herein described as political theologies and their attendant influence on inter-religious relations. The uniqueness of this research will be to underscore the primacy of the religious underpinnings of Christian and Muslim involvement in politics. It is based on this that it will be possible to appreciate the influence of this in inter-religious relations.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the bid to expolre the Anglican and Islamic political theologies and their attendant influence on Anglican-Muslim relations this study considered some of the available frameworks. Among which, were Ninian Smart's taxonomy of religion, the Critical Theory, and Hanns Kung's understanding of religion as an encompassing reality. These were reviewed for their relevance to the study.

2.2.1 Ninian Smart's taxonomy of religion

Smart offers a scheme of ideas that he has categorize it into what he called 'dimensions." These dimensions include the practical and ritual; experiential and emotional, narrative or mythic; doctrinal and philosophical, ethical and legal, social and institutional, and material dimensions (Smart, 1998: 11-25). This scheme helps to identify the various dimensions of religion. Related to the study are the doctrinal and philosophical dimension. In the study these are identified as the political theologies of the two religious groups. They are seen to be influencing the explication of political activities—the practical and ritual activities as well as the political ethos. The importance of this taxonomy to the study is that it helps avoid generalization among the various religious groups under study by identifying the peculiarities of their religio-political though. Furthermore, it helps portray a picture of religion broadly, and thereby enables one to appreciate the breadth religion and the essential political ideas. In a context of religious pluralism such as Uganda, requires identifying the religion by its essential aspects that give it its final form, and to castes a vision of religion not as a standalone. However, it was limited in explaining the profound nature of the experience of religion and it characteristic persistence of religion in Ugandan politics.

2.2.2 The Critical Theory

The Critical theory was considered in this study to illuminate the idea that persistence of religious groups' political involvement as an explication of a theoretical position, or for the matter their political theology. The idea of critical theory is often discussed in relation to other schools of thought—post-structuralism and post-modernity. Agger argues that "all three theoretical perspectives…reject presuppositionless representation, arguing explicitly that such representation is both politically undesirable and philosophically impossible (Agger, 1991:105-131). Critical theorists question the certainty of knowledge, arguing for the "social and political nature" of ideas

(Kloppenborg, 1996, p. 279-289, Agger, 1991, p. 105-131). It grew as a reaction to positivism (Carette, 2005:28). The positivism, according to Agger (1991:109) held that "one can perceive the world without making assumptions about the nature of the phenomena under investigation." It was embedded in the understanding that "knowledge reflects the world" (p. 109), which is association of reality and rationality.

By postulating a causal influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies, the critical theory provided for this study a framework for understanding their political assumptions. This was so considering that religion could not be understood in isolation of the socio-cultural realities. It is important in this study to highlight the presuppositions a they imping on political involvement by religious groups in question. While it helps understand Ugandan politics as a broader manifestation of both Anglican and Islamic political traditions, it does not explain its persistence inspite of the efforts by the Administration to delineate religion and politics. For this matter, the study examined Hans Kung view of religion as an encompasing reality.

2.2.3 Hans Kung's view of religion as an encompassing reality

Hans Kung (1996, p. xvii) defined religion as: "…*a social and individual relationship, vitally realized in a tradition and community* (through doctrine, ethos, and generally ritual…), *with something that transcends or encompasses man and his world*." (Emphasis original). This definition underscores an experiential encounter between the individual or community on the one hand, and on the other with a transcendent being. By building on the formative thoughts of Otto F. Heiler, M Eliade, and G. Mensching, he shows how the experiential encounter is core to a religion (1996, p. xvii). The two characteristic aspects of it are worth mentioning. First, it depicts religion as a lived experience, written in the hearts of adherents. Second, it is an extremely contemporary reality, and forms the core of their very existence. The implication of these two aspects is that it forms part of people's day-to-day life. It provides for adherents a mechanism for understanding and interpreting the world in which they live so that events and circumstances are understood from a religious point of view. More than give the basic nature, this definition broadens the scope of religion, seeing it as a reality that transcend people's spiritual life and encompasses all of human life. Consequently, people's political, social and economic lives often have a religious value, and the environment in itself ceases to be simply natural; rather it is the arena in which God, gods or the supernatural is at work. Religion is simply an all-pervasive reality in people's lives.

Kung's definition of religion, while not necessarily addressing the issues of politics, he makes a very important contribution to the understanding of religion and politics. This is by taking it to a level that helps a student of religion to appreciate the depth and the profound impact of religion in the life of the believers. It is on the dimension of the profound impact of religion in the life of believers that this study builds to show the inextricable impact of religion. It is in respects of this inextricable nature of religion in the life of believers that this study seeks to explicate Kung's ideas of all-pervasive nature of religion for understanding the historical and inextricable nature of religion in Uganda politics.

This is important for this study as it helps highlight the contemporary nature of religion, that is to say, the way in which it is a lived experience. In that respect, it provides ground for understanding how religion and politics potentially interface. He argues that religion is not an issue of the past. Rather, it is a contemporary experience: religion "…is a *lived life*, inscribed in the heart of men and women, hence for all religious persons something that is extremely contemporary, pulsating through every fibre of their everyday experience." (1996, p. xvii). He describes the various ways in which it can be lived: "traditionally, superficially, passively, or in a profoundly sensitive, committed, dynamic way." (1996, p. xvii).

By aruguing as above, about religion as an all-embracing reality, Kung implied that religion influences every aspect of life of the adherents. He would further say:

> Religion is a *believing view of life, an approach to life, a way of life*, and therefore a fundamental pattern embracing the individual and society, man and the world, through which a person (though only partially conscious of this), sees and experiences, thinks and feels, acts and suffers, everything. It is transcendentally grounded and immanently operative system of coordinates by which man orients himself intellectually, emotionally and existentially. (1996, p. 17).

By so saying, he shows that religion is a lived experience, written in the hearts of adherents, and that it is extremely contemporary, and forms the core of their very existence. Further, he argued that religion brings meaning to life, creating value and norms, and giving birth to a spiritual community and home to its adherents. One way to try to appreciate the depth and profoundness of Kung's understanding of religion is to say that it provides the second pair of eyes through which one sees the world.

Although Kung does not explicate a theory of religion, his definition thereof is of importance to the study. By looking at religion as a comprehensive reality, Kung's

understanding provided a basis for understanding the inextricable nature of religion in socio-cultural realities. By being so intricately woven into the socio-cultural reality religion and politics necessarily become part and parcel of each other. By seeing it as a lived experience, he demonstrates how, from a religious point of view one might perceive of political issues, and influenced thereby, one might then be able to participate from a religiously-informed point of view. Based on his understanding of how religion brings meaning to life, creates value and norms, and gives birth to a spiritual community and home to its adherents, we understand how religious people's perspective, values, norms and understanding of space or home, can be defined religiously.

Kung's understanding of religion as a comprehensive reality highlighted the influence of religious thought beyond politics, to the Anglican-Muslim relations in Uganda. The inextricable relationship between religion and politics in Uganda attested to this reality. The religionisation of politics, right from the religious wars (1888-92), through the Protectorate (from 1894-1962), and from independence (1962) to the present, simply demonstrates religion as a defining experience of Ugandan politics. It is not surprising, therefore, Uganda's public culture is described as "highly religious" (by Alava and Sentongo, 2017, p. 678). The highly religious culture in observable historically through the easy weaving together of religion and politics in Buganda. The result of this weaving was formation of religiopolitical cleavages in the 1880s and 1890s, out of which emerged religiopolitical parties. Mudoola (1996) has also described the emergence of interest groups 1960s, and identified the three historic religions as Catholics, Protestant and Muslims. Thus, by default, mention of a political groups in Uganda is a mention of a religious group.

While the pervasive nature of religion is true of Uganda political groups, by default, it is also true of the relationship of the various religious communities in general, and specifically for the Anglicans and Muslims which serve as cases to illustrate this phenomenon. Based on this, therefore, the study sought to examine the associated relations among members of various religiopolitical parties, and to demonstrate the extent to which religious ideas strongly defined political identity and relationships. Thus, the use of Hans Kung's theory of religion as "all defining reality" highlighted the comprehensive nature of religion by the way it defined political participation and relations between Anglicans and Muslim. Its inextricable relationship with politics in Uganda was attested right from the religious wars (1888-92), through the Protectorate (from 1894-1962), independence (1962) and to the present through attendant religious

political fragmentation. And, even though the NRM Administration's policy of National Unity brought this to a close, its ambivalence in the treatment of religious groups with hostility and yet with balanced tolerance, simply demonstrates religion could not easily be delineated from politics. Rather, it was an intrinsic experience of national politics.

From that defining experience of religion advanced by Kung this study sought to show the framework out of which Anglican and Muslim political participation was understood. This was to demonstrate that religion as a comprehensive reality cannot be understood in isolation of the sociocultural realities. Based on this, the study went beyond the empirical manifestations of religion to examine political theologies. The goal of this was two-fold, to understand their presuppositions in as far as they imping on political involvement by religious groups in question. Second, to show how these presuppositions defined the relationship of the Anglicans and Muslims. Persistence of religion in Ugandan politics was thus understood as a broader manifestation of both Anglican and Islamic political traditions, and by default, influencing their relations

From Kung's understanding of religion, it is possible to notice the overlap between politics and religion. The two spheres of human function thus demonstrate that they are part of nearly every aspect of life, and that it is difficult to effectively define either one in isolation of the people. By taking politics out of the confines of formal exercise of authority within the machinery of government, to its broader conception as 'public life' or 'public affairs,' the political theorists above underscore the all-pervasive nature of both politics and religion postulated by key scholars of religion. Their all-pervasive nature seems to cause an interface of the two, and giving rise to a political theology which is a framework for thinking about politics from a religious point of view.

2.3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Based on the above theoretical framework, a conceptual model was developed that sought to demonstrate that political theologies are not *sui generis*—in isolation of, but rather the driving factor in political participation and in inter-religious relations. Using historical studies, this was demonstrated in Buganda and in the rest of the country in the subsequent colonial and post-colonial eras. The focus on the NRM Administration between 1986 to2016 further demonstrated this.

The conceptual model shows how political theologies, as the independent variable in this study, remained the driving factor behind the socio-cultural realities of the two religious communities. This by default influenced their political involvement,

and ultimately, the nature of relations, seen as the dependent variable. For Muslims whose religion is strongly political (Esposito, 1990; Seyyed, 2003), their political ethos is demonstrated right from the 1870s when Mutesa I made it the religion of the kingdom. Furthermore, the attempt by Muslim converts to usurp political control of the kingdom to establish an Islamic dominance further illustrates the religiopolitical ethos of Islam. Similarly, for the Anglican community, their politics was defined by the nature of the Anglican Church as the national Church of England, Uganda's colonial master. This was given further impetus by Bishop Alfred Tucker's evangelical tradition of political involvement (Griffith, 1998, Byaruhanga, 1999).

The birth of religiopolitical cleavages that fought the religious wars, with the attendant historical developments following the religious wars of control for the Buganda kingdom, galvanised the religious influence in the emerging protectorate nation. Further to this was the birth in the 1950s and 60s of the religiopolitical parties (Mudoola, 1996). These parties were founded on religious lines. UPC was Protestant (Anglican leaning), DP - Roman Catholic leaning, and KY - Buganda traditionalist leaning. Thus, religion in Uganda became, and continued to be, an inalienable reality in politics. And, by default, it continued to define the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims.

This reality constituted the central aspect of this study. Specifically, it was to demonstrate the inextricable nature of religion in politics by examining the Anglican and Islamic political theologies during the NRM Administration from 1986 to 2016. And, even though the Administration's policy on national unity may have mitigated, as shall be seen, the attendant influence of both Anglican and Islamic political theologies was clearly demonstrated in the political participation by the two religious groups.

The following conceptual model is adopted for the study:

Figure 2:3 Conceptual Model



Source: Field Survey, July, 2021

This model highlights the relations between the variable in the study as follows: Anglican and Islamic political theologies (A), seen as the independent variable, are inseparably fused with aspects of socio-cultural context (B), seen as the dependent variable. Participation in politics is the intervening variable. The inseparable fusion of religion in aspects of the socio-cultural realities demonstrates the nexus between religion and politics, and specifically renders religion a driving factor in Ugandan politics (C). By becoming the arena in which political theologies—both Anglican and Islamic—political participation indirectly influences the relationship of the Anglicans and Muslims

Relations between Anglicans and Muslims (D) is the dependent variable. The study examined casual effect, both positive and negative, of Anglican and Islamic political thoughts (A) on political participation (C) and, ultimately, the emerging patterns of relations between Anglicans and Muslims (D).

From the foregoing examination, it is possible to notice the overlap between politics and religion as two spheres of human function demonstrates that are part of nearly every aspect of life. Also, it is difficult to effectively define either one in isolation of the people. And, by taking politics out of the confines of formal exercise of authority within the machinery of government, to the broader conception of politics as 'public life' or 'public affairs,' the political theorist above underscore the all-pervasive nature of both politics and religion postulated by key scholars of religion. Their all-pervasive nature seems to cause an interface of the two, and rise to a political theology which, is a framework for thinking about politics from a religious point of view.

This chapter presented the literature review, theoretical framework and the conceptual model. The literature review underscored the methodological and thematic relevance of various works to the study in as far as they highlighted variances and similarities, based upon which the current study was justifiable. It focused on four-fold thematic areas defined by the objectives. The theoretical framework showed the philosophical framework upon which the study was conducted. The conceptual model showed relationship between variable in the study. In the next chapter, we examine the methodological detail for the study.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the research methodology. Its goal is to highlight the methodological detail for the study on Anglican and Islamic political theologies and their implication for Anglican-Muslim Relations during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. Attention is given, to the various methodological issues of the study. Specifically, the chapter highlights the research design, variables/categories of analysis, study population, sample size and sampling techniques used in the study. It also looks at the study's data collection methods and instruments, data collection procedures, data validity and reliability. Lastly, the chapter deals with data management and analysis, as well as measurement of variables and conclusion.

3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

This study adopted a purely qualitative design, that is to say, it used descriptive or narrative data expressed in non-numerical terms (Amin, 2005, p.43). This is where the data collection drew on the opinion of the respondents. Such opinion was derived from in-depth interviews, self-administered questionnaires, literature analysis of works written in the period before and with in the research period. This design was preferred due to the fact that the study required delving into the historical and political issues that provided the background to the nexus of religion and politics in Uganda. This was only possible through in-depth analysis of the historical and political circumstances against which to understand the interplay of theologies in national governance and to highlight the extent to which they have influenced Anglican-Muslim relations. For this, therefore, the researcher chose the qualitative design.

The strategies of qualitative design adopted were phenomenological and historical approaches.

Phenomenological Approach: this approach was preferred to enable the study of the 'real world' through the perception of the respondents (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001, p. 147ff; Amin, 2005, p. 49ff; Creswell, 2013, p. 210). According to Leedy and Ormrod, the approach, by looking at "multiple perspectives on the same situation,…can then make some generalization of *what something is like* from an insider's perspective" (2001, p.153). This evaluation of the interphase of religion and politics as it was during the

study period required a phenomenological approach. It was engaged in order to enable a sustained and intensive examination of Anglican and Islamic political theologies so as to understand their causal influence on Anglican-Muslim relations during the NRM administration between 1986 and 2016. The causal influence was examined at the level of national politics. This was in order to show the impact of political theologies on Anglican-Muslim relations.

The phenomenological analysis was particularly useful for the purpose of understanding the Anglican and Islamic political theologies and their attendant influence on the Anglican-Muslim relations during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. This consisted in a study as is—of the persistent political involvement despite the NRM Administration's regulation of non-participation of religious groups in national politics. In this way, it helped highlight the factors, religious or otherwise, that have lent the two religious groups to continued political participation. However, the phenomenological analysis of religiopolitical interphase drew heavily of the historically formative events. Thus, in order to put to perspective the current the religiopolitical interphase, the study also assumed a historical approach.

The Historical Approach: this is described by Leedy and Ormrod as one that consists of the "ever-flowing stream of event and continuing changes in human life and its situations—its language, customs, philosophies, religions, art, architecture, and so on" (2001, p. 172ff). By this definition, it is implied a purposeful examination of the broad sweep of historical events out of which one can derive meaning. The goal ultimately is, according to Leedy and Ormrod, "to present a factually supported rationale to explain why they happened" (2001, p. 172). This approach was preferred for two specific reasons.

Firstly, to draw on history an interpretive understanding of facts regarding religion and politics in Uganda. The interphase of religion and politics in Uganda is hardly understandable outside a historical survey. As will be demonstrated, an understanding of religion and politics in Uganda is deeply embedded in long history of Uganda that spans all the way from the ancient Buganda. Among such factors was the British imperialistic interest in conflict with the trading Arab/Swahili interest in Uganda that leant the latter to anti-Islamic stance. Others were internal, and comprised the traditional civic religion that ensured the traditional structures of the nexus of religion and politics in Buganda, and the political conflict and rivalry arising from competing

power bases in the Ancient Buganda. The other factors were influx of foreign religious groups - Islam, Protestant and Roman Catholics alongside the indigenous Ganda traditional religion. The above historical analysis helped to highlight how the internal factors intensified by the religious plurality resulted into xenophobia, hostilities, and ultimately the birth of the religiopolitical cleavages in Buganda during the 19th century. From this historical analysis is understood the religiopolitical dynamics that shaped the continued involvement of religion in Ugandan politics till the period leading to, and following the coming of the NRM Administration into power.

By taking this perspective, this study attempts to correct the revisionist interpretation of the historical birth of religious cleavages as instruments of colonisation (Museveni, 1989, p. 55; 2000, p. 258). While Museveni's evaluation of the political history herpes on the colonial conspiracy theory, the factually supported rationale of the historical religiopolitical nexus is traced to the ancient Buganda civic religion and the attendant competition of chiefs for political recognition. The analysis taken by the study seeks to anchor the religiopolitical interphase on the religio-cultural history of Buganda. By so doing, it seeks to demonstrate the deep spiritual understanding of the religiopolitical interphase in Buganda, that the heavily political Anglican Church and Islam build on to loosely establish their religion political roots.

Secondly, this was also preferred so as to make a longitudinal survey covering the 30 years of NRM's rule. In order to do this, the study undertook a document analysis and oral interviews. These helped to unveil the historical issues against which to understand and accurately describe the causal influence of the political theologies on Anglican-Muslim relations. By so doing, the longitudinal approach underscored the unfolding themes from the causal influence of political theologies and the attendant impact on Anglican-Muslim relations.

For the study, both approaches were used complementarily. The common goal for both as used in this study was to gain the meaning of events as they happened historically, and continue to influence the interphase of religion and politics in Uganda during the study period. Thus, as the phenomenological analysis helped to gain insights on the Anglican and Islamic political theologies and their causal influence on Anglican-Muslim relations during the NRM administration between 1986 and 2016, the historical analysis provided the historical antecedents of the religiopolitical nexus in the ancient Buganda.

3.2 VARIABLES/CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS

This study comprised three variables: the independent, intervening and dependent variables. The independent variables were the Anglican and Islamic political theologies, and these were depicted as impacting ultimately the Anglican-Muslim relations. Both Anglican and Muslim faiths were identified as having heavy political orientation. The Anglican Church was originally born in sixteenth century as a national Church of England with a strong religiopolitical identity. This defined its territorial nature, which by default was the nature of the local churches born out of its missionary efforts. Similarly, Islam is a heavily political religion, with a historical religiopolitical identity started by the Prophet Muhammad. These religious groups were seen, therefore, as explicating religiopolitical ideas that defined their political participation. In that way both the Anglican and Islamic political theologies were looked at as inseparably fused with aspects of socio-cultural context.

The dependent variable was the nature of relations between Anglicans and Muslims, here showed as dependent on the political theologies espoused by both the Anglicans and Muslims. The study posited the embeddedness of these within the socio-cultural context. From within this context the religiopolitical ideas of the two religious groups were demonstrated as having a causal effect. The causal effect of the political theologies in the study was seen as necessarily influencing the relationship of the two groups. By examining the historical development Anglican and Islamic faiths within the context of Buganda, the study highlighted the causal effect of the political theologies by first influencing the birth and formation of a religiopolitical identities. Second, in the effect of the new identities on the emergent relationship of the two that was characterised by xenophobia and hostilities, flaring into war of religion, essentially fought over the political space in Buganda. Based on the historical antecedents, the study by positing a casual effect of political theologies, examined the effects, both positive and negative, of Anglican and Islamic political thoughts on political participation and, ultimately, the emerging patterns of relations between Anglicans and Muslims.

The nature of political participation was seen as an intervening variable. This was categorized as such to explain the impact of political theologies that defined the relations between Anglicans and Muslims during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. The study highlighted the inseparable fusion of religion in aspects of the socio-cultural realities, and it demonstrated the nexus of religion and politics as a historical reality that persists even to the present times. Religion, thus, remains a driving factor in

Ugandan politics. By becoming the arena in which both Anglican and Islamic political theologies were expressed, political participation was seen to directly influence the nature of Anglicans and Muslim relations.

This causal examination of variables presumed in the analysis is derived from the understanding of the comprehensive nature of religion (Kung, 1996, p. xvii). The study, thus, examined the causal impact of political theologies on the groups' involvement in politics, and how this in turn impacted the Anglican-Muslim relations. It was highlighted that Anglican and Islamic political theologies could not be understood in isolation of the socio-cultural realities, such as culture, history, politics and governance. These were seen to be continuing to impact, not only their political involvement, but also the Anglican-Muslim relations.

3.3 Site of Study

The study was carried out in the central district of Kampala, the nation's capital city. It is located in the heart of ancient kingdom of Buganda, and the current centre of political activities. The district comprises the nation's administrative headquarters. It has five divisions, namely: Kampala Central, Makindye, Nakawa, Rubaga and Kawempe (See Appendix A1, Map of the Study Area, p. 231). The choice of Kampala District is of strategic importance to the study for historical reasons. It is the heart of the history of religion and politics in Buganda and of the Protectorate Administration. Specifically, Kampala Central is the seat of the Uganda government, and hosts the nation's political and administrative institutions—the Parliament, State House and High Court. Furthermore, it hosts the headquarters of political parties—Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC), Democratic Party (DP), and Conservative Party (CP). Rubaga hosts the headquarters of the Anglican Church and Uganda Muslim Supreme Council UMSC). The centre of the Anglican Church is on Namirembe Hill, on which stands the provincial Cathedral of the Church of Uganda. The UMSC has its headquarters in Old Kampala. It constitutes the one of the largest Muslims faction in Uganda. In that way, the two are brought to close proximity. Both Kawempe and Makindye Division have a huge Muslim population of Muslims. Makindye Division in particular has a solid Muslim community surrounding the Kibuli Mosque. Kibuli was the mainstay of Uganda Muslim Community (UMC), the main Islamic faction headed by Prince Badru Kakungulu, now by Prince Nakibinge. Due to the leaning to the Buganda monarchy, the groups has always

identified with the Kabaka and Buganda. Kawempe Division, in a similar way to Kibuli, hosts the second largest faction of Muslims in Kampala. Nakawa Division is inhabited by the elite working in Kampala Central, and have a heavy concentration of Anglicans and Muslims.

Kampala City provided an ideal location for examining the impact of political theology in political participation, and in the Anglican and Muslim relations. It is the headquarters of the Anglican religious community, with its adherents found throughout the City suburbs. It is also the home of the three prominent factions of Islam—Kibuli, UMS and Kawempe factions. By focusing on Kampala, the study provided a microcosmic picture that illustrated the impact of political theologies on relation of Anglicans and Muslims.

3.4 TARGET POPULATION

Demographically, the cosmopolitan city of Kampala comprises people of all the 54 ethnic groups of the nation and other international communities. Its total population currently is about 1,516,210, with 722,638 males and 793,572 females (National Population and Housing Census, 2014, Provisional Results). The city's five divisions comprise people of diverse socio-political, economic and intellectual backgrounds. These include civil servants, employees of various parastatals, national and international NGOs, CBOs and CSOs, universities, media houses, the business community and religious communities. Of these, the researcher targeted political analysts in media houses, academics in universities, Anglican and Muslim religious leaders, and elders, and politicians. These were targeted based on their expertise in religion and politics.

3.5 SAMPLING TECHNIQUES AND SAMPLE SIZE

Owing to its qualitative nature, the study samples were identified using non-probability techniques or the none-random methods. The use of the terms 'non-probability' or 'non-random' entail a high level of selectivity when identifying study samples (Cohen et al., 2007; p. 124). Two non-probability techniques were employed: purposive and snowball sampling techniques. The choice of these techniques was due to the priority of limited respondents to ensure quality and content of responses. This was due to the fact that religion and politics are subjects in the public domain. For that matter, data collection had a strong potential to reach a saturation point. Moreover, the researcher felt that the subject under investigation required a level of academic expertise that was not

commonly available. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to keep the study sample to a limited but strategically select number of respondents. In that way, the three sampling methods were employed.

Purposive sampling technique, also called judgmental sampling (Kumar, 1996; p.162). By using this sampling technique, the researcher made a judgment call on an individual or situation based on the usefulness of the sample for yielding desired information. Using this technique, the researcher identified samples from religious groups. Samples were restricted to individuals rather than groups. This was in conformity with the COVID-19 regulations regarding avoidance of gatherings of people. The choice for the purposive sampling technique was made as guided by Cohen et al., (2007; p. 115) on the criteria of "their typicality or possession of the particular characteristics being sought." That is to say, the researcher identified a respondent that typified the understanding of political theologies and their implication for Anglican-Muslim relations. Samples were selected based on potential for expert opinion. For that matter, the researcher targeted political analysts, politicians, religious leaders, elders and communities of both Anglican and Islamic religious groups, leaders of Faith-based Organisations working in related field. This created higher chances of getting a more informed opinion on the subject of study.

Snowball technique, this was especially useful for generating opinions that begged further inquiry. Snowball sampling method was particularly used in cases where it was difficult to identify a respondent with a potential for informed opinion. In addition, considering that the discussion was on issues of politics and religion, it was hard to get individuals to engage on the subject at policy levels. Furthermore, owing to the sensitive nature of the study respondents often were not available for fear of the likely repercussions. In such cases, the researcher identified a few of individuals who served as informants to identify, or put the researchers in touch with others who would qualify for inclusion and these, in turn, identify yet others (Cohen et al., 2007; p. 116). The goal was to secure as best as possible information that supplemented thematic issues from the literary study.

Convenience Sampling, also known as accidental or haphazard sampling as the researcher "selects units that are convenient, close at hand, and easy to reach" (Amin, 2005, p. 242). This was helpful, especially due to the constraints on data collection

process resulting from COVID-19-related restriction on movement and community gathering. These had rendered the use of the above sampling methods limited. As a result, the researcher engaged convenient sampling techniques. This comprised engaging respondents that were readily available at the time and place of need. For example, the faculty members at Uganda Christian University. These were both lay and ordained, but, whose perspectives were deemed useful for the study. Other respondents were identified out of the unlikely circumstance of a meeting at a conference and workshop. These were identified on the basis of their learning and experience in politics and civic involvement.

In light of the above constraints, a limited sample of respondents were selected based on their expertise and availability. However, use of google forms broadened the scope. Altogether, 81 respondents were available. Out of these, 64 were available either on phone or physical interview, while 17 responded via google forms. The choice of these were based on their availability for the phone interviews. Due to the sensitivity of some issues, many potential respondents were hesitant to talk about the subject on phone, preferring face-to-face interviews. For others, the subject was simply not of interest. Consequently the choice was limited to those interested and were available through the above-mentioned media. The benchmark of two respondents were sampled per category. The sample of two per category was desirable due to their potential for alternative narratives. However, the number was open to more samples. These were increased by even numbers for the same reasons. Thus, some categories of respondents had the minimum of two sample, while other had more samples. The samples of two were further allowable due to the possibility of broader perspectives from questionnaires and supplementary literature review.

Those that were available were categorized as follows:

Political Analysts (07) - These were drawn from broadcast and print media houses in Kampala from where the researcher purposively selected samples based on the criteria of availability and expert knowledge on religion and politics in Uganda during the study period. From these, an expert analysis of religiopolitical interphase and the impact of religion on national political discourse, and the relation between Anglicans and Muslims in Uganda, was drawn. Of these, two were from the State-sponsored Uganda Broadcasting Cooperation (UBC) *Spot On,* which is a major forum for engaging on social issues and has hosted prominent national political and religious leaders. The two respondents were chosen based on their availability to offer perspectives on the subject from the State perspective. The other two were from National Television (NTV) *4th*

Chapter, also a forum for examining issues of politics and society. Being an independent media house, respondents from NTV were chosen purposively in order to provide an alternative vision to state-sponsored media house. From the print media houses, the researcher purposively selected four samples based on the criteria of availability and expertise.

Hosts and guests from each of the television programmes were sampled, and from print media, respondents were purposively targeted for their broad experience and expertise on topical issues in the area of religion and politics. These were:

- ***Politicians*** (10) - these were members of the main political groups: NRM, UPC, and Forum for Democratic Chnge (FDC). Through purposive and snowball methods, the researcher identified high profile politicians, both active and retired. These were targeted to give the political opinion on the nature of the interphase of religion and politics in Uganda in general, and specifically with their political parties during the study period.
- ***Academicians*** (14) - These were sought from among the universities in and around Kampala City. Of these, a representative sample of four universities were purposively targeted. They were from Makerere University, Kyambogo University, Kampala International University and were from Uganda Christian University. These universities were targeted because they have departments of Religious Studies and Political Science. The researcher targeted lecturers in history, politics, religious studies and divinity/theology. The persons were deemed to possess expertise on research and teaching of religion, politics and inter-religious relations. From them, therefore, was sought expert knowledge on the historical and contemporary interphase of religion and politics in Uganda.
- ***Religious leaders*** (14) - Leaders of the two religious groups were both conveniently and purposively selected. Purposively, respondent were selected based on their demonstrated expertise on religion and politics. Conveniently, respondents were selected as opportunity presented, such as in a workshop. From the Anglican Church, these were targeted church leaders at the levels of bishop, priest, and senior administrators. Similarly, from the Islamic community, members of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC), Kibuli Islamic Community and other religious leaders and academics were targeted because of their potential for expert knowledge. From them, therefore, was sought expert

knowledge of religious ideas that impinge on political participation by members of the religious communities.

- ***Faith Based Organizations*** (12) - The three main Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) in Kampala comprise: Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC), Inter-Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU) and Nile Dialogue Platform (NDP). Senior officers of all the three FBOs were targeted. From them data on the impact of the involvement of Anglican and Muslim religious groups in politics on Anglican-Muslim relations was sought.
- ***Legal Experts*** **(04) -** These were chosen purposively for their legal expertise on National Constitutional. Specifically, these legal experts were sought to give the interpretation of constitutional provision regarding the status of Uganda as secular state and it implications for Church's involvement in politics.

Table 3:1 Sample Population

SN	Category	Characteristics		Total
1	Political Analysts	Spot On	02	
		4th Chapter	02	**08**
		Journalists	04	
2	Politicians	UPC	04	
		NRM	04	
		FDC	02	**10**
3	Religious Leaders	Anglican	08	
		Muslim	06	**14**
4	Faith Based	UJCC	04	
	Organization (FBO)	IRCU	04	**12**
	Leaders	NDP	04	
6	Academicians	Makerere University	02	**16**
		Kyambogo University	02	
		Kampala International University	02	
		Uganda Christian University	10	
7	Legal Experts			**4**
7	Total			**64**

3.6 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

This study's research instruments comprised the following: an individual interview guide and a self-administered questionnaire. Originally, the researcher had planned to have an FGD guide. However, due to COVID-19 restrictions on gatherings, it was not possible to have FGDs. Thus, the researcher resorted to the use of tools with minimum requirement for physical contact.

i. **Individual interview guide** (See Appendix A5 i, p. 235) - this was a semi-structured designed thematically according to the objectives of the study. It was preferred for use in this study because of its flexibility in allowing for follow up exploratory questions during the interview. The interview guide was used for the key informants. These consisted of political analyst, politicians, academicians, religious leaders and religious elders.

ii. **Self-administered questionnaire** (See Appendix A5 iii, p. 237) - this was used in cases where respondents were not available for the interview due to the distance or personal schedule constraints. Instead, questionnaires were sent to them electronically as customized google data collection forms. Their use consisted of posting the self-administered questionnaire through online Google forms and sending them via email to respondents (Amin, 2005, p. 282). A total of 50 questionnaires were sent out to respondents. Practically, the use of self-administered questionnaires through Google was necessary in light of the challenges of COVID-19-related restrictions on movement and community gathering. Consequently, some of the initially identified data collection methods were not possible. For example, the researcher could no longe hold FGDs of members of the Anglican and Islamic religious communities.

These two methods broadened the coverage of selected respondents. However, Google forms had limitation. First, the response rate was very low. Out of a total of 50 forms sent out, only 17 were returned. This is partly because most respondents were not familiar with the method, while others may have ignored the forms altogether. Not surprisingly, there was such a low response. Second, it was hard getting in-depth response. This is partly because some respondents may have used phones for receiving and responding, and there was hardly any space to express in-depth opinion. In spite of these limitations, the Google forms eased the burden of coverage during the COVID-19-imposed limitation on group meetings. Moreover, it cut the cost of phone calls, as well as the time the researcher had for doing actual interviews, transcription, and data analysis.

3.7 PILOT STUDY

A pilot study was undertaken in Mukono, in the outskirts of Kampala City. Mukono provided religious and socio-political conditions similar to the study site. It was, therefore, ideal for the purpose. The pilot study was done using six samples of both Anglican and Islamic religious groups. The goal was to check for comprehensive coverage of the subject and to get feedback from respondents and experts based upon which the tools were revised. Based on the feedback, the tools were revised.

3.8 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

3.8.1 Validity

The study was subjected to the following types of validity tests:

Internal validity: in order to do this, a sample population that was representative of the research population was used. Also, the study sought to maintain authenticity of data by recording issues through the perspective of the respondents. This involved objective listening, asking follow up questions and seeking clarification during the interview; accurate recording and verbatim reporting of data. Additionally, the study sought to maintain credibility by reporting facts in a complete and balanced way. This involved suspending personal biases in order to make as much as possible an objective reporting.

Construct validity: this involved constructing the research instruments in line with the conceptual framework of the study. The conceptual framework of the study was influenced by the understanding of religion as an "all-embracing reality" (Kung, 1996, p. xvii). By examining the Anglican and Islamic political theologies, the construction of the instruments reflected the anticipated causal relationship of the theologies with politics and their attendant impact on the Anglican-Muslim relationship. In order to ensure this, instruments were subjected to critical perusal by an expert on research and Christian-Muslim relations, and the final approval by the supervisors.

Triangulation: this involved comparing multiple data sources in search of common themes and to clarify emerging issues. Data collected from in-depth interviews were supplemented by data from the self-administered questionnaires administered through Google Forms, by documentary surveys and archival research.

3.8.2 Reliability

In order to realise the reliability of instruments, measures were taken to ensure internal consistency. This was the extent to which items within a single instrument yielded

similar results. In order to ensure this, questions in the instruments (questionnaires, Interview guide and FGD guide) were uniform. It also involved making them intelligible to the respondents, thereby forestalling the danger of receiving inaccurate responses.

3.9 DATA COLLECTION

The study employed the following methods of data collection: field research, library research and archival research. Here-below are detailed discussions of each.

a. Field Research: this consisted of the following methods:
   i. **Key informant interviews**: this involved interviewing representative figures from the sample population above. These consisted of political analyst, politicians, academicians, religious leaders and religious elders.
   ii. **Use of Self-administered questionnaire**s: this involved distribution of questionnaires in electronic form to respondents that were not available for interview due to distance or constraints on their personal schedule. These were customised for use in the format of Google forms.

Respondents for the key informant interview and self-administered questionnaires were drawn from socio-cultural and religious backgrounds, as well as professional fields as indicated above in Table 3:1 Sample Population. These included journalist/political analysts, politicians, academicians, teachers, layers, businessmen, bankers, priests, and retired civil servants. All the respondents were selected purposively and through snowball sampling techniques, targeting a small number of select respondents. Field research commenced in June 2021 to March 2022.

Data was collected in two phases. The first phase constituted the ground-breaking interviews of key informants. Owing to the nation-wide shut-down due to COVID-19, initial data collection was done through phone conversation with respondents and face-to-face individual interviews. The second phase of data collection was done following the initial interviews. This was to supplement data from the first phase using in-depth and analytical opinion. In addition to these phases, further data collection was done through in-depth interviews of key informant interviews. This was meant to patch up the glaring gaps in the already collected data. Such gaps included basic nature of political theologies and their implication to political involvement.

The phases were determined after evaluating a number of circumstances, among which were the financial constraints and the COVID-19 limitation. Most importantly, it

was necessitated by the need to break off general interview and concentrate on more focused in-depth interviews. Field experience demonstrated that the subject of investigation raised issues in the public domain—religion and politics. Most of the respondents were born and raised during the immediate pre - or during the NRM administration; and therefore, had a general idea of the unfolding events following the onset of the administration. Consequently, there was much data generated in the first round of data collection, and data collection soon reached a saturation point. That is to say, from the initial interviews little else was new. For that matter, the researcher called off the initial rounds of interviews and concentrated on priority persons selected on the basis of potential for more analytical opinion. Furthermore, the researcher observed that the analysis of the influence of political theologies on Anglican-Muslim relations needed more expert opinion. Therefore, more focused attention was given to select respondents.

Due to the constraints resulting from the nation-wide shut-down as a result of the COVID-19 threat and the attendant financial constraints, some of the initially identified data collection methods were not possible. For example, the researcher had earlier planned to have FGDs of each religious communities. They had been targeted due to their characteristic attribute of knowledge and experience in politics during and beyond the 30 years of NRM administration. However, as a result of the lockdown it was not possible to have gatherings. Also, for the same reasons, it was hard to physically reach many respondents for individual interviews. With the exception of a few face-to-face interviews, the researcher resorted to conducting phone interviews and to the use of self-administered questionnaires through google forms.

b. Library Research: this consisted of the following methods:

   i. **Documentary Analysis**: this was based on published books, research papers and dissertation. These were mostly available at Bishop Tucker Library, Uganda Studies Programme Library and Hamu Mukasa Library at Uganda Christian University. Literature available on the internet was also downloaded for use. The documentary analysis consisted of the historical and political issues - these were examined to provide the background to the nexus of religion and politics in Uganda, and the religious/political theology and philosophy in order to gain a broader understanding of the history, and nature of religious political theology of both Anglican Church and Islam.

   ii. **Archival research**: materials for archival research were available at Uganda Christian University (UCU) Archives. These included collections on the life

of the Church at its formative stages, the church's position on politics, and relations with other religious groups. Also, documentary analysis was based on church/mosque documents available through the Bishop Tucker Library archives. Such documents included reports on their political programme activities, minutes of meetings held on issues of religion and politics, policy documents, theological statements and letters addressing related areas. It also consisted of newspaper articles, as well as, internet articles on religion and politics, commentaries on NRM policy on politics and religion.

3.10 DATA ANALYSIS

Data for this study was analysed manually. The preferred method originally was NVivo software. This however, was not possible, rather, manual data analysis was done. The reasons for change of analysis method was that, the initial data collection and interpretation was done during the lock-down and the technical services required were not easily reachable. The choice, therefore, was to do it manually. Moreover, the method of data collection, as above mentioned, was somewhat staggered in phases for financial reason, and above all to enable easy management of data influx on religion and politics that was available from respondents.

The manual analysis was embarked on following the conclusion of the interviews phase. It began with transcribing primary data consisting of interviews from the voice recorder of the phone. This was successfully done though interviews, and yielded much data that rendered the process of transcribing long and cumbersome. The second stage, done only whenever it was necessary, was to subject the transcribed data to accuracy check by cross-checking with the informant. This was followed by documenting the primary data in a Microsoft Word document.

Analysis involved creation of a matrix consisting of four Research Questions that guided the attainment of the research objectives. These were: What was the NRM Administration's policy on religious groups' involvement on national politics between 1986 and 2016? How did the Anglican political theology influence national politics between 1986 and 2016? How did the Islamic political theology influence national politics between 1986 and 2016? In what ways did Anglican and Islamic political theologies influence the Anglican–Muslim relations in Uganda between 1986 and 2016? The matrix, thus, replicated the structure of the questionnaire. The Research Questions provided the major thematic areas, while, the sub-questions provided sub-themes.

The next stage was to populate the matrix with the relevant responses in relation to the questions. To this populated matrix were added the supplementary data from the subsequent interviews from the Google form. Data from Google Forms was pre-analysed according to the themes and sub-themes mentioned above. For that matter, it was easy to download the data into the relevant sections of the matrix. The content of the matrix was then reviewed to ensure a logical flow of data according to the sub-themes.

Further analysis involved merging secondary data into the matrix. Secondary data was from literature analysis done of the sources from the library, archives and internet. In this way, triangulation provided a fairly complete outlook of the data.

3.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The study sought to conform to the set ethical consideration. In order to ensure this, the Declaration of Originality Form was submitted to the University's Graduate School in addition to the proposal to the university's Ethical Committee to ensure conformity to the university's ethical considerations. The researcher also ensured informed consent of participants. Since the method of data collection most used was individual interviews, the consent of the respondents was sought following a careful explanation of the nature of the study. Only one interview appointment was turned down by a member of the opposition who felt that he was not the right person to discuss religion and politics during the NRM Administration. For the self-administered questionnaires disseminated through google form, the consent form was included in the questionnaire. In addition, the consent note assured the participants of the confidentiality of their identity in cases where they did not wish to be identified by name. Regarding the use of names, generally, most respondents did not have a problem revealing their personal identity. As a result, in nearly all cases, names of respondents are retained.

Thus far, this chapter exmined the research methodology, highlighting the methodological detail for the study on Anglican and Islamic political theologies and their implication for Anglican-Muslim Relations in Kampala during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. Attention was given, to the various methodological issues of the study. In the next chapter, will presents the main study. Data from the field will be presented, analysed and discussed according to the study objectives.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND

4.0 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented the research methodology. It detailed ways in which the study was undertaken. This chapter presents research findings based on the study objectives from which the research questions were derived to provide the basis for inquiry. These questions were broken down into specific questions in order to generate in-depth responses from respondents. The specific questions, thus, formed the findings sub-themes.

The study postulated Hans Kung's theory of religion as an "all defining reality" (1996, p. xvii). Religion, according to him, "…is a *lived life*, inscribed in the heart of men and women, hence, for all religious persons, something that is extremely contemporary, pulsating through every fibre of their everyday experience" (1996, p. xvii). Hans Kung, by so stating, highlights the comprehensive nature of religion and sees it as criss-crossing all aspects of life. In that way, religion defines all of life of a religious community. By adopting this perspective, the study sought to highlight the defining influence of religion on political participation and relations between Anglicans and Muslim. This was done against the background of the inextricable relationship of religion and politics in Uganda. This is observable historically from the background study of religious wars (1888-92) that saw the birth of religiopolitical cleavages. It was further observable during the Protectorate era (1894-1962) in the emergence of the religiopolitical parties in the 1950s and 60s, UPC for predominantly Anglicans, DP for predominantly Roman Catholics, and KY for Buganda traditionalists. This trend would continue long after independence (1962) with the formation later in the 1980s of the Coservative Party (CP), a party predominantly for Anglican Baganda, and even to the immediate pre-NRM era. All these illustrated the historical nexus of religion and politics and the attendant religiopolitical fragmentation in Uganda's history.

By examining the Anglican and Islamic political theologies, the study sought to investigate the influence of religion in political involvement and Anglican-Muslim relations. The goal was to understand their presuppositions in as far as they impinged on political involvement, and how these defined the relationship of the Anglicans and Muslims. By understanding their defining influence, this study ultimately sought to show how political theologies persistently provided the frameworks for political participation,

thus, highlighting the all-pervasive nature of religion (Kung, 1996, p. xvii). Persistence of religion in Ugandan politics was understood as a broader manifestation of both Anglican and Muslim political traditions, and by default, their attendant influence on Anglican-Muslim relations. This was to demonstrate that religion as a comprehensive reality, cannot be understood in isolation of the socio-cultural realities (politics being an important one). The study, thus, went beyond the empirical manifestations of religion to examine Anglican and Islamic political theologies, especially during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. Details of the findings are here-below presented and discussed.

4.1 NRM ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON RELIGIOUS GROUPS' INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL POLITICS BETWEEN 1986 AND 2016

4.1.1 NRM's policy on religion and politics

The first objective of this study was to examine the NRM Administration's policy on religious groups' involvement in national politics between 1986 and 2016. It was conceived against the backdrop of the NRM Administration's widely pronounced goal of eliminating religiously "sectarian" politics by advancing national unity (Museveni, 1989, p.5). Sectarian politics in Uganda refers to the late nineteenth century religiopolitical alliances or cleavages associated with the populations of particular religious leanings. Membership consisted of the Missionary/Muslims leaders, local chiefs and local populations. Four of these corresponding with the religious groups in Buganda at the time were formed. They were the Protestants/Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Muslims and Traditionalists. The formation of these cleavages laid the foundation for the birth in 1950s of the religiopolitical parties (Mutibwa, 2008, p. 17; 1992, p. 13; Karugire, 2010, p. 49). The attendant socio-political fragmentation resulting from the cleavage is what the NRM Administration sought to correct by advancing national unity (Aseka, 2005, p. 367; Museveni, 2000, p. 6).

The premise upon which this objective was pursued is that while the NRM administration sought to stem the influence of religiously sectarian politics, this was not sufficiently realised. Rather, between 1986 and 2016 there was heightened religious groups' political involvement. In pursuit of the objective, the study put the NRM's policy into the perspective of the study. This is by examining the roots of sectarian politics in

Uganda, the NRM Administration policy on religious groups political participation, and its impact on religious groups' political participation.

4.1.2 Roots of Sectarian Politics in Uganda before the onset of the NRM Administration

In examining the roots of sectarian politics the following was the research question: How did religion come to be such a dominant and divisive force in Ugandan politics? The goal was to highlight the birth of religious plurality, the formation of the religiopolitical cleavages and the emergence of the religious-based political parties. The study traced the roots of religiously secterian politics to the pre-Protectorate era at the coming of the British imperialists and Arab traders, and the introduction of both Islam and Anglican faiths. This was examined under the theme Trade, Imperialism and Religion in Buganda.

4.1.2 Trade, Imperialism and Religion in Buganda

The thematic area of trade and imperialism provided the beginning point for the exploration of the roots of religiopolitical nexus and the emergence of religiously secterian politics. Scholars of Uganda's religion and history have traced this to the hostile milieu of religious plurality in Buganda (Low, 1967; Wandira, 1978, Mutibwa, 1978, 2008 and 2016, Hansen, 1984; Mudoola, 1996; and Gifford, 1999. Into this kingdom, both Islam and the Anglican faiths were introduced in the early 1840s and late 1870s respectively. The above analyses, however, focus more on the affairs of religions in Buganda which, while useful in themselves, are narrow. By so doing they illustrate the endemic temptation among many scholars to see the problems of religionpolitical nexus within the historical context of Buganda. The problem is that they limit the scope to the immediate pre-colonial era. Instead, the argument might benefit from the examination of the geopolitical issues involving the broader British imperial and Arab commercial interest in Buganda. These issues had a direct impact on the turnout of circumstances in Buganda in two significant ways. First, in sawing the seed of, and heightening, the antipathies born out of the long-standing fear by the British for the Muslim interest in Buganda; and second, by causing Mutesa I to embrace the British against the threatening Egyptian agents and the Muslims from the North. All these would generate a dynamic in Buganda that would lead to religionpolitical alignment.

By exploring the above subtitle, the goal was to show how, on the one hand, imperialism and religion, representing the British interests, on the other, how trade and

religion, representing the Arab/Swahili interest, define the long history of the religiopolitical nexus in Buganda in the 18th century. It is the two interests, rather than simply the religiopolitical interplay in Buganda, that provided the long roots of the religiopolitical nexus in Buganda, and later, outside Buganda.

4.1.3.1 Trade and Religion: Arab and Swahili Interest in Buganda

Arabs and Swahili first came to the ancient Buganda kingdom during the reign of *Kabaka* Sunna (c. 1832-1856) (Kiyimba, 1990, p. 84). It was then that Islam, the first foreign religion in the land, was taught. The teachers came from the offshore islands and the coastal towns of East Africa trading through Karagwe (King/Kasozi/Oded, 1973, p. 3-5). The exact date is disputed. Kanyeihamba (1998, p. 7) puts it to 1844. However, between 1840-1844 there was a stream of Muslim visitors to Buganda whose main interest in penetrating the hinterland was the search for new sources of ivory and slaves, which, once found, were traded for beads, firearms and cloth.

The faith was first taught within the court. This is significant in the sense that the king, the courtiers, and senior chiefs were the first audience. This ensured that the seed of faith was planted among personalities of political significance in the kingdom. From there the faith spread through informal interaction as Arab and Swahili traders conducted trade activities. For three and half decades after its inception, the kingdom remained exclusively the domain of Islam, rivalled only by the powerful indigenous religion. Despite this, it seems like the Islamization effort did not realise much success. There is evidence that Islam had its first convert until 1860, nearly twenty years after the initial teaching of the faith (Schacht, 1965, p. 65). The reason why this was so remains a matter of conjecture. It might be reasonable, however, to assume that being the first religion in the kingdom, it had to wrestle with the intact Ganda culture and the attendant conservativism. Not surprisingly, despite enjoying listening to the teaching and recitation of the Qur'an, Sunna was never converted (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 7). Furthermore, the Arab and Swahili interest was primarily trade rather than conversion of the indigenous Baganda. Moreover, the traders operated within the king's court, with limited contact with the local population. This is probably due to the need to keep traders under the watchful eye of the king, thereby enabling him to monopolise their trading activities. Another plausible reason for Islam's slow growth was the social and political dynamics of Buganda. Here, in the highly structured and authoritarian system subjects often took the path taken by the leader. Thus, if the king converted then the kingdom would have

followed his religion. By Sunna not converting, all others in the court had little interest. Karugire reports that *Kabaka* Sunna "expressed some intermittent interest in Islam but he was not converted and towards the end of his reign he became positively hostile to all foreign traders and banned them from his kingdom" (2010, p. 60). These two factors may have been responsible for the slow conversion to Islam despite its earlier introduction. Despite the Arabs and Swahili primary concern with trade, they had a considerable influence among the locals, though their religion did not take firm root until later during the reign of *Kabaka* Mutesa I.

Mutesa I came to power in 1856, and he reigned until his death in 1884. The period was Islam's heyday. This is because of Mutesa I's political and diplomatic interests in Islam through which he had hoped to gain the support and to maintain good relations with the Muslim visitors and the Sultan of Zanzibar. Through Arabs he acquired firearms which were used against traditional enemies such as Bunyoro, Toro, and Busoga. Islam in the kingdom was, thus, a means of consolidating his political and military might.

Owing to Mutesa I's interest in Islam he had it taught and practised in the kingdom. He personally instructed his courtiers and chiefs to study the new religion, ordering them to pray regularly and to keep the tenets of the faith (King/Kasozi/Oded, 1973, pp. 4-5). To further demonstrate his interest in Islam, Mutesa I built a mosque, which acted as the royal chapel as well as the *madrasah*. He also appointed a caretaker and a caller to prayer. As a practising Muslim, he observed Ramadan (Kasozi/King/Oded, 1973, p. 6). He also outlawed the traditional religions and made Islam obligatory for all his subjects, whose failure to conform to the king's orders resulted in cruel treatment and eventual death by burning, drowning or spearing (Kasozi/King/Oded, 1973, p. 6). Mutesa I is said to have made it the state religion, "and issued decrees requiring all his subjects to observe the Islamic law" (Kanyeihamba, 1998: p. 7). This benefitted greatly the spread of Islam in the kingdom. Given the highly hierarchical nature of the system of governance, the religion of the king was that of the kingdom. This in turn yielded the desired corresponding effect. For example, in the bid to gain the king's favour, many courtiers and chiefs became Muslims and carried out the king's instructions to ensure conversion among the locals.

Despite his attraction to Islam, Mutesa I, like his father, remained ambivalent in his religious affiliation. He did not totally reject the indigenous religion. He, however, gave a choice to his subjects. The ambivalence demonstrates some of the early patterns

of the interaction of Islam and the indigenous religion. Yet, there is no doubt that Islam had gained root in Buganda. For thirty years, it had been proclaimed, and its influence strongly felt in significant political circles.

However, by 1876, the glory of Islam was fading, ushering in the dawn of the Anglican faith in the kingdom. A number of factors led to this. First, was the clash between the Muslims and Mutesa I, leading to the Muslim martyrdom in 1876 (King, Kasozi, Oded, 1973, p. 6). Second, was the geopolitical dynamics that led to the influx of foreign interest in Buganda (Kiwanuka, 1972, p. 154; Karugire, 1978, p.1). Of significant importance was the Egyptian quest for control of the head waters of the Nile. Third was the European geographical expeditions to the interior, and the arrival of Henry Morton Stanley. This opened Buganda to another historical phase of imperialism and religion, for which the British were prominent players.

By the time of Stanley's arrival, Islam had for thirty years been proclaimed in the kingdom. Mutesa I's non-conversion not-with-standing, its status as the state religion enabled it to play a defining role in Buganda. To the extent that the faith was proclaimed basically from within the King's court ensured the elite audience of the courtiers, including senior chiefs and the conversion of significant personalities like Nuhu Mbogo and Kapalaga, both of whom would later be pillars of the faith. The rise of a group of young Baganda Muslims to challenge Mutesa I's level of conversion to Islam in 1876 illustrated the growing power of the converts (Kayunga, 1973, p. 11). Yet, Buganda was at the dawn of another era of religion and imperialism that was ushered by the arrival of Henry Morton Stanley.

4.1.3.2 Imperialism and Religion: the British interest in Buganda

Arrival of Stanley opened up a new phase in Buganda's history. Stanley, though only an explorer rather than a missionary, he introduced Mutesa I to Christianity, and considered it a rival religion to Islam (Kiwanuka, 1972, p. 168; Karugire, 1978, p. 3). Karugire (1978) has examined the coming of missionaries to Uganda against the general background of "the influx of European powers into the interior of East Africa from the middle of the 19th century," identifying three types of visitors (p. 1). These were, first, the travellers or explorers whose apparent interest was to gather scientific knowledge in this region of Africa. Second, were the Christian missionaries whose avowed purpose was to extend the benefits of their faith to the heathen Africans. Third, were the agents of imperial rule whose main mission was to establish administrative control over the

Africans on behalf of their respective home governments. He concludes saying: "The three categories were not themselves mutually exclusive; that is to say, there was a sense in which the three groups of Europeans had a unity of purpose" (Karugire, 1978, p. 3). The purpose accordingly was to bring in different ways of western civilisation. This broader background is particularly helpful in as far as it anchors the discourse of religiopolitical nexus in Uganda on the then broader geopolitical circumstances. This study builds on Karugire's (1977, 2010) works, especially his portrait of the broader geopolitical and commercial dynamics that had a bigger bearing on the coming of the Anglican/Protestant faith and Islam to Buganda in the 18th century.

The three-fold form of visitors above represent the over-arching British interest in Buganda—assuming control of Buganda for their broader geopolitical interest. Karugire (2010), makes a compelling argument against which the issues of Buganda, and the subsequent protectorate status might be better understood. He argues: "…the coming of the British to rule Uganda owed nothing to the local initiative within Uganda" (2010, p. 54). By local initiative, he implies Mutesa I's interest in the coming of missionaries that about which H. M. Stanley wrote in 1875. Karugire (2010) further explains:

> The tempo or momentum of imperialism was such that Uganda would have been colonized irrespective of the existence of the Christian missionaries and the well-disposed king in in Buganda. The factors upon which the decision to occupy Uganda was based were more important than Uganda itself, and to use Mutesa's unproven invitation and labouring missionaries is to obscure the issue by promoting excuses to occupy the position of cause (2010, p. 54).

Karugure identified these factors as, first the British obsession with India, in light of which is understood the second, the desirability of acquiring Uganda as a British possession. In relation to the first, Karugire (2010) cites Colin Cross (1968. p. 80) on the British entanglement in Africa which resulted from its entanglement in India:

> Africa lay on the way to India and whether the route was round the Cape or through the Suez Canal it was regarded as essential to prevent hostile European powers establishing bases there. …To protect the Suez Canal, it was regarded as essential to control Egypt. To control Egypt it was essential to control the hinterland, Sudan. To control Sudan and the source of the Nile, on which Egypt depended, it was necessary to control Uganda. To control Uganda it was necessary to have the railway running from the East Coast. To control the railway it was necessary to control Kenya, the territory which the railway crossed ((p. 53).

In relation to the second, Karugire (2000) cites Lord F. D. Lugard (1893, p. 381), a British imperialist in Uganda:

> The 'Scramble for Africa' by the nations of Europe—an accident without parallel in the world—was due to the growing commercial rivalry, which brought home the civilised of Europe the vital necessity of securing the only remaining field for industrial enterprise and expansion. It is well, then, to realise that it is for our *advantage* [emphasis original]—and not alone at the dictates of duty—that we have undertaken responsibility of East Africa. It is in order to foster the growth of trade of this country, and to find an outlet for our manufacturers and our surplus energy, that our far-seeing statesmen and our commercial men advocate colonial expansion (2010, p. 53).

These citations above are made by Karugire in support of his main thesis that broader imperial interests, rather than simply the interest of Mutesa I and security of Missionaries, were the compelling reason for the British interest in Uganda. Their import in particular is to pitch the argument of the religiopolitical nexus in Uganda beyond the immediate post war dynamics in Buganda. Instead, it is to highlight the geopolitical dynamics that, at the time, lent Uganda to the British imperial interest, the security of which the British sought to defend.

Stanley, however, was probably not the first to give a positive appraisal of Buganda for the purpose of the Christian gospel. Captains John Speke and James Grant were in the kingdom in 1862. They were on the expedition to discover the source of the Nile. In the process of which they had met Mutesa I at his court. It was then that Speke conceived the idea of the evangelisation of Buganda (Karugire, 2010, p. 60). In respect to this he had made a spirited appeal to this home community. Gray (1953) shows how Speke had conceived a scheme for the "regeneration of Africa" outlined in two letters written to the CMS for a united church mission to the African lake kingdoms (1953: 150-51). This scheme encompassed the Christianizing efforts as well as the ideas for colonization and the introduction of civilization through assistance from the British government. So strong was his conviction on this that it is believed that during the final months of his life Speke evinced some inclination to participate personally in the introduction of Christianity in Africa (Casada, 1983, p. 510). Casada (1993) further points out that Speke's spirited representations of his missionary endeavour contained a "multiplicity of aims and overtones of imperialism that characterized his thinking on other matters," but they also show that he was thinking along the lines such as Stanley. However, there was a cold response by the CMS, especially after his death in 1864. Yet, Speke's efforts highlight the thematic issue of the contribution of the explorers in

creating the awareness of the need for an evangelistic expedition to the African people. Casada (1983, p. 510) put it that they marked

> …a beginning contact between explorers and philanthropic or missionary organizations; a link that was to become a permanent feature of British exploration and exploitation in central Africa. The explorers' revelations of a vast pagan population in the region instilled the leadership of the humanitarian societies with a lasting sense of purposefulness; moreover, both these groups and explorers realized there were mutual benefits to be derived from the establishment and maintenance of close connections with one another (p. 510).

Casada goes on to observe: "It seems that this becomes very much of a common pattern, Africans spiritually and a concomitant extension of British influence through missionary endeavour were among several interrelated ambitions shared by both explorers (1983, p.511). This common pattern would also be illustrated in the endeavours of Grant, Speke's companion.

Casada (1983) writes that Grant publicly reiterated Speke's hopes that "civilisation may be introduced among . . . the fine and independent races of Uganda and Karagwe ... by Christians" (1983, p. 511). Two aspects distinguished his interest. The first, as Casada (1983, p. 511) points out, was protecting the people from Islam. The second, was that his vision for Africa was focused on the kingdom of Karagwe. However, for Buganda's case, the dominant presence of Islam influenced Grant's vision. Despite his interest in Karagwe, he was in support of Stanley's focus on Buganda, and of the preparatory efforts for the mission. He also made a personal contribution, and served in the advisory capacity to the committee.

Grant's protectionist effort of the people of Buganda from Islam is illustrative of the general British anti-Islamic attitude in their sphere of influence. This stance would later be played out in Buganda. As for Grant's, his reactions were drastic. It is reported by Casada (1983, p. 511) that "he publicly protested against Colonel Gordon's threatened encroachments in Uganda" saying that "…such a development 'would be a sinful proceeding' and that 'placing them [the people of Uganda] under the yoke of Egypt' would do irreparable damage to 'the noble endeavours being made by Christian society for the good of the races of Central Africa" (p. 511) Karugire (2010) would put it more bluntly: "One might observe in passing that the British decision to discourage the Egyptian expansion southwards did not stem from any desire to maintain, less still to enhance, either Bunyoro or Buganda but rather to save the region from the spread of

Islam" (p. 62). It would seem by this that Grant was merely expressing a generally shared anti-Islamic attitude.

It is possible also that from the widely known enthusiasm of Speke and Grant about the mission to Central Africa, David Livingstone had come to know about Mutesa I. This had increased his hopes that, through Mutesa I's aid, the civilization and enlightenment of the vast potion of Central Africa would become most possible (Kiwanuka, 1972, p. 169). However, the aspirations of Speke, Grant and Livingstone would find strong expression in Stanley. Speke's interest in the evangelization and protection of the people from Islam so expressed, would resonate well with Stanley's vision for Buganda. In much the same way, such anti-Islamic efforts would act to the interest Mutesa I whose goal was to find a solution for Gordon's southward push to annex Bunyoro and ultimately his kingdom for the Egyptians. Stanley's arrival to the scene in 1875 would serve the interest of Speke, Grant and Mutesa I.

Stanley had earlier visited East Africa in 1875 at the service of the Royal Geographical Society (RGS). During that visit, he had sighted Victoria Nyanza—later to be named Lake Victoria—in February 1875. This followed the earlier 'discovery' by Speke and Grant of the same lake in 1862. Stanley sighted it on February 27th that year, and later circumnavigated it (Stanley, 1875, p. 134). It was during this exploration effort that he met Mutesa I. The impressions Stanley had of Mutesa I's statesmanship is widely registered (Kiwanuka, 1972, p. 168; Karugire, 2010, p. 61). The impressions he had were no different from Speke had in 1862. For Stanley, however, the impression of Mutesa I's intelligence and statesmanship, and the kingdom's suitability for mission endeavour, was deeply ingrained.

When the two men met, Stanley endeavoured to teach Mutesa I the rudiments of the faith, praising particularly the word of God, "the Bible which had made England so prosperous" (Stock, 1898, p. 176). Stanley's efforts in expounding the rudiments of Christianity played well into the hands of Mutesa I, who became attracted to the attendant benefits of Christianity to the Kingdom. Christianity would not only be a novelty in the kingdom, but would also be a rival religion to Islam. Moreover, the superiority of the English would back his military campaign against the Egyptian imperial agents in Sudan. His interests in the new faith would soon be penned in a letter by Stanley to the Queen of England requesting for missionaries. This letter that appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* of 15 November, 1875, opened way for the coming of Christianity into the Kingdom. His letter read:

> *I have indeed undermined Islamism so much* that Mtesa [Mutesa] has determined henceforth, until he is better informed, to observe the Christian Sabbath as well as the Muslim Sabbath… He has further commanded the ten commandments of Moses to be written on a board for his daily perusal…as well as the Lord's Prayer and the golden commandment of our Saviour, Thou shall love your neighbour as thy self. This is great progress for the few days that I have remained with him and though I am no missionary I shall begin to think that I might become one if such success is feasible. But, oh! that some pious, practical missionary would come here! What a field and harvest ripe for the sickle of civilisation…It is not the mere preacher, however, that is wanted here. The Bishops of Great Britain collected, with all the classic youth of Oxford and Cambridge, would affect nothing by mere talk with the intelligent people of Uganda. It is the practical Christian tutor, who can teach people how to become Christians, cure their diseases, construct dwellings, understand and exemplify agriculture, and turn his hand to anything like a sailor—this is the man who is wanted. Such one, if he can be found, would become the saviour of Africa…Now, where in there in all the pagan world a more promising field than Uganda?...Here gentlemen you opportunity—embrace it! The people of the shores of Lake Nyansa call upon you. [cited in Byaruhanga (2008, p. 53). Emphasis mine].

These words expressed the impressions Stanley had of Mutesa I and his enthusiasm for the potentially productive mission field, which is obviously the important point in the letter. However, that the letter contained anti-Islamic undertones bespeaks of the broader agenda that Stanley was seeking to address. This, as already hinted above, seems to address the hidden fears of Speke, and beyond him, of the imperialistic England whose interest in Uganda are above-cited. Thus, while the letter expressed Mutesa I's interest, it might as well be seen a convergence of the interests of the two men. Stanley too had vested interest. Mention of a kingdom already "ripe for the sickle of civilization" seems to agree with the suggestion by Luck (1963) that in Mutesa I, Stanley saw "the possible means for realizing Livingstone's great dream, whereby the slave trade in Africa would be suppressed by the opening up of the country to Christianity and civilization" (p. 21-22), Stanley's campaign also evoked interest in England, and the letter elicited a dramatic effect.

On April 27, 1876, a group of eight missionaries set sail from the English port of Southampton, on their way to Buganda. A year later, on June 30, 1877, two members of the group, Shergold Smith and C. T. Wilson, set foot in the court of Mutesa I I (Tuma/Mutibwa (eds.), 1978, p. 17). They were received and made to settle at the court of the *Kabaka* where they began teaching religion. The number of foreign missionaries was increased by another group of missionaries. These were of the Roman Catholic sect, the Algerian White Fathers, which included Fr. Lourdel and Brother Amans, arrived in February, 1879.

4.1.3.3 Religious Plurality and the Emerging Political Power Dynamics in Buganda

Both groups of missionaries settled within the king's palace alongside Muslims. This confined the work of missionaries to the court, where they had ready audience of courtiers available to listen to the teachings of the missionaries. These included the king, the nobility, the senior chiefs of the kingdom and pages, the king's harem, attendants, bodyguards, and slaves. From these ranks came the first audience of the Gospel, and the first converts to Christianity.

From 1878, the developments occurred that were to completely alter the socio-political and religious tepestry of Buganda. Two of which are worth mentioning. The first was the religious plurality from the confluence of the Indigenous Religion, Islam, Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism churches (Karugire, 1978, p. 5; Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 9). From then on, there were four religious communities: the Traditionalists, Muslims, Anglicans and Roman Catholics.

The second was the emergence of the religious communities consisting of members of the kingdom's aristocracy. This had remarkable effects both socially and politically. Socially, it marked the onset xenophobic sentiments and the wars of control of the kingdom of Buganda among the four religious groups. The hostilities were expressed between the traditionalist and the adherents of the new religions, as the former fought resiliently to survive the onslaught of the globalizing influence of the new religions. Then, it was between Muslims and the two Christian groups, and finally between the adherents of the two strands of the Christianity—the Anglicans and Roman Catholics. In these early hostilities lay the roots of subsequent hostility that characterized the inter-religious encounter. They defined trends in the initial and subsequent encounters at the birthing of the nation of Uganda.

Politically, the effects were to shore up following his death in October 1884. Within eight years following his death Buganda entered a dramatically defining era. The ascension to the throne of Mwanga, Mutesa I's son and the subsequent persecution of the Christian, would intensify the already evolving revolution that was to was to have permanent with long-term effect of birthing the religiopolitical cleavages.

The succession of Mutesa I by a not-so-able Mwanga accentuated the power dynamic where the chiefs tended to have more influence. These chiefs had long before began to horn their position as the shakers and movers of Buganda politics (Kiwanuka, 1972, p. 131ff). It was the stature of such chiefs of which Mwanga became a victim. The

incumbent Prime Minister at the time was Mukada. By diplomatic means Mutesa I had been able to stem the pressure from imperialistic forces, and had exerted tact to manage the internal affairs of the kingdom (Kiwanuka, 1972, p. 131ff). He had also succeeded in containing the highly charged and potentially explosive religiopolitical atmosphere in Buganda. Increasingly, however, towards the end of his rule the need for stronger leadership was evident (Kiwanuka, 1972, p. 186ff).

Coming to power at the 18 years of age, Mwanga probably was least qualified to navigate the kingdom affairs. T. B. Fletcher, a CMS Missionary described him as "weak, frivolous, suspicious and passionate," while Kiwanuka describes him as "fitful, revengeful and capable of the most predictable action (1972, p. 194). Both descriptions of Mwanga of Mwanga's character flows put him in the most unfavourable light as Buganda's king at such turbulent times. Yet, he would have to deal with the volatile state of affairs in the kingdom. The intrigue was beginning to degenerate into religious politics as chiefs belonging to different religious groups found new identities in the new religions. While the key players remained the senior chiefs, there was a new breed of leaders, the pages, belonging to the four religious streams. At first, nobody would have predicted the threat they would pose, and their potential for wide-ranging impact in Buganda. Yet, the Muslim holocaust by Mutesa I's era in 1776 already was a warning shot declaring an imminent leadership revolution occasioned by the new religious group. The swift response of Mutesa I then had saved the situation. Unfortunately for Mwanga, he had to deal with the four groups of religiously-alligned Buganda aristocracy that had already constituted themselves as the foundations of the power bases. Correspondingly, formation of these groups saw the significant loss of authority of the king; he simply had to play along (Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021). Clearly, the unfolding religiopolitical dynamics in the kingdom were far too complex and required the tact and diplomacy. Unfortunately, Mwanga lacked these in his father's measure, leading to the crisis in leadership heralding a religiopolitically-driven revolution and the collapse of the monarcy.

Several factors precipitated the the political crisis of the kingdom. These are discussed by Kiwanuka (pp. 95-95), and while substantial, make the point about the king's character and his vulnerability in light of the religiopolitical power struggle. The other significant factor was the ensuing competition religious groups for royal favour. This exercerbated the fractures in the kingdom. Kasozi (OI, 19/10/2021) observes that:

> What took place, especially at Mwanga's palace [during the killing of the Martyrs] is often seen as religion, but it was politics. It is because the Martyrs were struggling over who should lead. But because people had embraced foreign religions at that time, there were: Muslims, Protestant, Catholics and traditionalist were struggling for power.

Kasozi's comment is made with hindsight, but helps highlight the early signals of fragmentation in the kingdom based on religiopolitical interest. Also, it is clear that the shock waves of the developments in and around his kingdom made the young Mwanga vulnerable to the influence of both the old chiefs, already unsure of their position, and the Arabs. The misguided counsel of these two groups led to the persecution of Christians. The persecution had began as a measure to curb the rebellious attitude of the Christian pages in the court but came to a climax with the massacre by burning of 32 Christians on June 3, 1886.

Details of the events preceding and the aftermath of the persecution are discussed by Stock, 1898, p. 183ff. and Faupel, 1962, p. 207. The persecution, however, was counter-productive, and in the subsequent years had far-reaching effects in the kingdom, both religiously and politically. Pertinent to the ongoing discussion is that it led to the emergence of powerful Christian political parties that would ensure the viability of the two Christian communities after the persecution. Somehow, confining Christian missionaries within the court had been for political expediency to Mutesa I, that is to say, ensuring close surveillance of the missionaries. To Christians, however, it ensured the conversion and emergence of a powerful Christian aristocracy. Amid the precarious circumstances in the kingdom after the massacre, the aristocracy and missionaries determined that for their physical safety, as well as the survival of Christianity, they had to take control of political power in the kingdom. The events that followed ushered in a religious revolution, sometimes called the Buganda Revolution or also Buganda Civil War (Tuma/Mutibwa, 1978; Pirouette, 1968, 1878; Hansen, 1986 and Gifford, 1999).

4.1.3.4 The Civil War and the Birth of Religious Cleavages

The civil war consisted of a series of religious battles fought by religious groups against each other from 1888 to 1892. In September 1888, the Christian aristocracy, composed of both Protestants and Catholic chiefs, formed an alliance of convenience with the disgruntled unconverted chiefs and Muslims. The quadripartite alliance overthrew Mwanga and enthroned his brother, Kiwewa. According to Tuma (1993, p 4), it was clear by this that from Muslims and Christian missionaries there had emerged a small but

powerful class of people, the converts who were the power brokers in Buganda. These developments without any precedent, were ushering in a new phase in the politics of Buganda, where the new religious groups were to be key players. (Tuma, 1993, p 4).

The victory of the alliance, however, did not settle the situation in the kingdom. For soon the alliance broke up. It was clear that each group had continued to harbour secret agenda. Thus, in 1890 Muslims turned against the Christians and drove them out of the kingdom. By this, the secret agendum of Muslims may have been unveiled, that is to say, the need to recover the long-lost position of Islam as Buganda's national religion, a position lost to the Christians at the advent of Missionaries. They would subsequently seek not only to establish their political authority, but also to ensure that Buganda was ruled by a Muslim king. Thus, when Kiwewa delayed his circumcision, the Muslims deposed him and Kalema, his brother, installed in his stead.

These developments forced the defeated Christian to re-organize their spheres of operation. Catholics fled to the neighbouring county of Buddu while the Anglicans fled to the neighbouring kingdom of Ankole. However, in February 1890, the Christian coalition, using Mwanga as puppet, fought its way back into the kingdom. This would mark the demise of the resurrected Islamic kingdom in Buganda. Christians were once again in control. The Christian coalition, however, was short lived. The old antipathies between Protestants and Catholics soon resurfaced, leading to an open war between the two groups on January 24, 1892 (Tuma, 1993, p. 4). The war ended in February 1892, and Protestants, with the help of Captain Frederick D. Lugard, emerged victorious.

The most immediate result of the war was the victory of the Anglican-based cleavage. This consisted of the Baganda political elite, the Missionaries and predecessor of the colonial power, the British Imperial East African Company (IBEAC). This victory had the initial double effect in Buganda, and would be felt in the rest of what would be Uganda as Rheenen (1976, p. 20) would put it. First, the involvement IBEAC ushered in the British imperialistic interest in Buganda. Two years later, this would translate Uganda into British Protectorate. Second, simulteneously it marked the onset and spread of Anglican hegemony in Buganda and the rest of the country. Furthermore, the war fully brought to fore the new power brokers in Buganda: the oligarchy consisting of powerful chiefs that would take charge of the affairs of the kingdom, the converts and the Christian missionaries or Muslim leaders.

Yet, the wars had a long-term effects on the religiopolitical climate in Buganda, and in the wider Protectorate nation. A lot of these effects would linger on till the

immediate NRM Administration in the early 1980s. First, they established the foundation for the formation of the political cleavages. These cleavages, as we have already seen, assumed a religiopolitical identity, and in the years to come, would provide the fault line for the religiously and politically fragmented Buganda Kingdom (Tuma, 1993, p. 4). These fragmentation would then translate into the rest of the Protectorate by the British indirect rule through the Baganda chiefs (Tuma/Mutibwa, 1978; Pirouette, 1968, 1978; Hansen, 1986 and Gifford, 1999). Out of these cleavages, as Mudoola (1996) and Mutibwa (2008) show, were born in 1950s and 60s, the religious-based national political parties. The Uganda National Congress (UNC) was born in 1952. It was the progenitor of Uganda People Congress (UPC), and a party predominantly for Anglicans. Others similarly born were: *Kabaka Yekka* (KY) (meaning the King Alone) party in 1950 for conservative Buganda traditionalists, and the Democratic Party (DP) 1960 predominantly for Catholics. While earlier the cleavages were identity markers, the birth of religious-based political parties through them demonstrated the abiding influence of religious ideologies in politics.[1]

Second, the wars directly established the Anglican hegemony in Buganda, and later in the rest of Uganda. From then there was shift of power-base from the *Kabaka* to the Anglican oligarchy (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p.10). The Anglican hegemony, however, was a result of more than the triumph of the Anglican cleavage. It was partly the effort of Bishop Tucker's systematic campaign in England for Buganda's status as British protectorate (Griffith, 1998, p. 123).

4.1.3.6 Bishop Alfred Tucker and his idea of Evangelical Tradition of Political Involvement

Bishop Alfred Tucker arrived in Buganda towards the end of the war in 1892 to assume the bishopric of Eastern Equatoria. In the politically turbulent conditions, increased missionary involvement and the young church needed a strategic scheme for their protection. Championing the idea of exclusivist "evangelical tradition of political involvement," Tucker campaigned for the establishment of the Protectorate

[1] These parties remained active even up to the immediate pre-NRM Administration era. With the similarly religiously-based Conservative Party (CP), they presented presidential candidates in the 1980 General elections. Ironically, the only non-religiously-based party was Museveni's Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM). This perhaps reflects the anti-religious sentiments espoused by the president of the party. These sentiments would crystallise in the Bush war anti-religious ideology that would define the immediate NRM Administration's stance towards religious involvement in politics.

Administration. It was a theological justification for declaration of British Protectorate over Buganda. Its goal was to preserve the nascent church from the turbulence that had wracked Buganda. To this end, CMS had raised funds to support the continued presence of IBEAC in Buganda (Griffiths, 1998, p. 123ff, Mutibwa, 2016, p. 17).

Byaruhanga argued that Bishop Tucker in campaigning for the establishment of the British takeover of Uganda was seeking "to find a permanent solution to the escalating religious wars" amidst of which the nascent church in Uganda was in danger (1989, p. 87ff). It seems, however, that this was a norm rather than an exception as Griffith, citing cases of similar circumstances that missionary activity faced in the Gold Cost, Nigeria and Nyasaland (1998, p. p. 125ff), has put it. However, the peculiar circumstances of Tucker can perhaps be conceived in light of the precarious state of the nascent Church in Buganda as well as the local Christians and Missionaries. The death of Hannington, and subsequent persecution leading to the death of several young Christians by the despotic Mwanga generated the need among missionaries to ensure the survival of the nascent church. Moreover, his arrival in 1892 after the skirmishes that saw the coalition of Christian forces drive the Muslims out of Buganda. Byaruhanga (2008) points out that the Muslims fighters in retreating had formed an alliance with Kabarega of Bunyoro, and were looking for an opportunity to fight their way back to Buganda (p. 87). From the concerns of both CMS and WF missionaries, and the British agents in East Africa, it is evident that the Muslims constituted a formidable threat (Byaruhanga, 2008, p. 88ff). Such circumstance may have highlighted the looming threat of Islam.

The threat of Islam perhaps needs to be cast in the broader light of the British imperialistic interest. Mention above has been made of the convergence of the British imperialistic and the Egyptian Islamic interest in Buganda. Thus, as the civil war was coming to an end, the British needed to take a decision regarding Buganda. The post on the *London Times* of 28th September, 1892 highlighted the spirited campaign for occupation of Uganda. Karugire cites Low (1954):

> Such a withdrawal [from Uganda] would be nothing short of national calamity. It would mean not only the loss of a great amount of capital already expended, but the destruction of our influence and prestige throughout Central Africa, the practical defeat of the anti-slavery policy, the persecution of the numerous missionaries labouring in Uganda, *and the reconquest by Mohammedan fanatics of the only African state that has shown disposition to accept Christianity*. Whether we desire it or not, the British East African company must be identified for all practical purposes with national policy (2010, p. 54) [emphasis mine].

It is clear from this that coupled with the broader British imperial interest was the fear of the Muslim reconquest of Buganda. Having wrested Buganda out of Muslim control, it would be understandable that the British would regard their withdrawal from the post-war Buganda as a loss. Thus, the bigger religious issue, besides securing the persecuted missionaries and their efforts, was stemming Islam's influence in Buganda. Karugire observes when he said: "…[The] British government's decision to discourage Egyptian expansion southwards did not stem from any desire to maintain, less still to enhance, the independence of either Bunyoro or Buganda but rather to save the region from the influence of Islam" (2000, p. 62). By this, the battle lines between the Anglicans and Muslims had already been drawn in principle.

The threat of Islam as seen above brought a new dimension to the political circumstances against which Tucker's theology may be understood. Whether Tucker played his politics according to the British anti-Muslim interest is hard to demonstrate. It seems however, that there was a convergence of interest in both the British and Tucker's interests in securing Buganda. It is within these circumstances that he championed his exclusivist theology. His immediate response had been to ensure the survival of the Church. For this, he made two efforts. From within the church, he put in place a local Church Council to lead the church in the event of a persecution and expulsion of missionaries (Griffith, 1998, p. 98; Byaruhanga, 2008, p. 125). For political protection, however, Tucker looked to European powers, and his theology was a justification for his quest for British protection over Buganda.

Tucker's political theology would later be adumbrated in the World Missionary Conference of 1910 at Edinburgh. Tucker would outline the two-fold reason for which he deemed necessary the close connection between the mission and government. These were, first, a matter of propriety for the British imperial agents to consult missionaries whose presence predated the latter, the second being that all political activities had to be channelled through the administrative director of the mission (Griffith, 1998, p. 124). Ideologically, Tucker's did not conceive the ideas of missionary political activities isolation. Rather, he drew on Henry Venn, the General Secretary of CMS at the time.[2]

[2] Venn's political ideas were conceived in respect to the ideals of the established Church of England (Griffith, 1998, p. 60ff). We mention here two specific aspects of Venn's political attitude that provided the background for Church-state relationship in the missionary lands. First, that the Church's established status on the ground provided the rationale for it to exercise influence on political affairs, and second, that a Christian government could be expected to promote Christian principles. These ideas were born out of the long history of the Anglican Church as the established church in the British colonial history. Venn, thus, upheld an arrangement for the churches established in colonial nations in which the church authority

Drawing from Henry Venn, Tucker sought to use the pattern of Church-state relations throughout the missionary lands as a model for the emerging Anglican Church in Uganda over which he had been appointed in 1890 (Griffith, 1998, p. 66).

The impact of Tucker's exclusivist theology is hard to estimate. This is first, because simultaneously as the Anglican and other religious cleavages, there emerged other interest groups, among which were trade unions, students/youth groups, ethnic groups, women groups, cooperative unions and traders (Mudoola, 1996, p. 2). By looking at this list, it is clear that the Anglican cleavages competed with several others. Second, in addition, the Protectorate administration upheld its policy that claimed that the colonial presence was the interest of the ruler and the ruled. In light of this, it was the colonial agenda, rather than simply the parochial missionary agenda of Bishop Tucker, that mattered. Moreover, the Anglican Church was never declared the "official church," although for its close collaboration with the Protectorate administration, "they were aptly rewarded in their politico-evangelisation mission with the emergence of Protestant establishment in the kingdoms and districts of Uganda (Hansen, 1984, p. 318, cited in Mudoola, 1996, p. 43).

It is clear, however, that the emergent Anglican hegemony was a collaboration between the Protectorate Administration, the Anglican missionaries and the local Buganda chiefs. In the subsequent years their authority, which began in Buganda, was spread throughout the emerging Ugandan nation through the British indirect rule. Local Baganda evangelist and priest accompanied the chiefs and Protectorate officials, acting as chaplains. Thus, once the Protectorate administration was established in 1894, Tucker's theology provided the ideological justification for the close church/state relations. Also, it spurred the Anglican Church into political action, practically thereby entrenching the Anglican political hegemony.

There has been a protracted debate regarding Tucker's role in the establishment of the Protectorate Administration. Some scholars have argued that the wars set the stage for the establishment in 1894 of the Protectorate Administration in Buganda (Rheenen, 1976, p. 20; Griffiths, 1998, p. 123ff). In light of which, Tucker's role becomes prominent. Others have argued to the contrary, seeing that the Protectorate

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was diffused to the British government, but the Church maintained a quasi-established church. This meant that the Church and the state were not one, but in close working relations. This would provide the necessary balance between the authority of the Crown and local ecclesiastical authority. He would also expect the Christian government to promote Christian principles. Ironically, Venn upheld the CMS policy of non-interference of missionaries with political affairs.

administration was a culmination of the British imperial interest in Uganda (Karugire, 2003, p. 53ff, Mutibwa, 2016, p. 1ff.). In that way, Tucker's role is seen as inconsequential. The merit of the argument need not cloud Tucker's mission interest and his need for a peaceful environment for the evangelization of Buganda, even though it may have been secondary as Mutibwa (2016, p. 1ff.) argues. For in general, the concern of the Anglican cleavage following the wars was not simply keeping power, but also to ensure their continued mission work—the reason for Tucker's spirited campaign for a British protectorate status of Uganda in 1892. However, in view of the mega vision of the British interest in Buganda, it is doubtful if that alone may have attracted the British protectorate interest in Buganda. Rather, it might be plausible to think, as Karugire does, of "the fundamental factors which made it imperative for the British government to decide to occupy Uganda," as he argues "would still have been uppermost in the minds of the British leaders whether or not missionaries and Mutesa I existed (2003, p. 52). It would then be understandable why Museveni (1989) held the colonial powers complicit for using the Church to advance their own imperialistic interest. The former, according to him, "introduced this very distorted usage of the church to manipulate the population in order to serve their own selfish interest" (Museveni, 1989, p. 55).

The emerging consolidation of the Anglican hegemony, however, had long-term effects. First, it widened the rift between the Anglican and Muslim relations, consequently worsening the already poor relations between the two groups and relegating Muslims (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p.10). Mention has already been made of the British anti-Islamic stance. Mutibwa (2016), for instance shows how, once in power, the "major organs of government in Buganda, and eventually in Uganda would remain in hands of the Protestants" for the next 80 years or so (p.17).

Second, it ensured power shift from the *Kabaka* to the Protectorate administrators now working through Anglican Baganda chiefs, among whom was Kagwa. Earle (2012) put it thus:

> Through superior weaponry, Buganda's colonial state was restructured around the charisma of towering Protestant personalities by the end of the 19th century, not the least Apollo Kaggwa. Throughout the 20th century, Buganda's colonial state favoured a certain cadre of Protestant chiefs—proponents of Buganda's newfound political hegemony and religious orthodoxy.

In so saying, he vividly describes the ascendency to power in Buganda by the new Protestant native powerbrokers: "The aspiring Ganda powerbrokers used Uganda's

colonial administration and their newfound Protestant devotion to galvanise power and to reinforce authoritative space in Buganda's hierarchical politics" (Earle, 2012).

Third, with the entrenchment of the Anglican hegemony, the sociopolitical pecking order was established. Mutibwa points out that "power and influence went with the practitioners' religions" (2008, p. 17). Essentially the political pecking order was: Anglicans, sustained by the colonial power, in the leading position, then the Roman Catholics, Traditionalists and Muslims. Formation of religion-political parties in the 1950s and 60s illustrated the deep-rooted religiopolitical consciousness.

Fourth, in a nation already fractured along religious lines, the emergence of the Anglican hegemony and the quasi-established status of the Anglican Church, influenced by the exclusivist political theology, reinforced the Anglican-Muslim divide in the political circles. Muslims were politically relegated, weak and humiliated. In the years following, opportunities for Muslim political involvement were severely limited due to lack of literacy. There was a glaring educational gap caused when they shunned missionary schools. The reasons for this was that Muslims were suspicious of European interest. They believed that the Missionaries were here to convert them and their children to Christianity (Kezaala, 20/10/2021). This attitude remained so strong among the Muslims that between 1900 and independence, very few Muslims encouraged their children to go for secular education. This attitude was reinforced by conversion of Yusuf Kironde Lule who was from a very prominent Muslim family, and when he went to university in South Africa he converted to Anglicanism. This was a terrible blow to the Muslims, and according to Kezaala (OI, 10/20/2021) all the Muslim clergy preached against that. However, while keeping their children away from secular education helped protect their community from potential proselytising efforts of Christian missionaries, Muslims lagged behind in education. Kanyeihamba shows the level to which Muslims fell behind in education: "In 1963 Muslims had only one secondary school as compared to twenty-six for Catholics and ten for Protestants" (1998, p. 13). In consequence of this, by 1965, there was only one Muslim with a university degree (1998, p. 13).

In two ways, the weakened position of the Muslims had a damaging effect on the Muslim political participation. In the first place, it limited their prospects for political engagement in the fast transforming Buganda (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 13). By default, it also limited their capacity to articulate a political position and to gain footing in the Protectorate Uganda. Kiyimba (1990), a Muslim scholar, acknowledges the challenges thus: "When later the colonial administrators arrived and established a firm grip over the

country, it was the Christians who would provide educated people to take charge of the protectorate's political, social and economic affairs." (p. 91). Kezaala (OI, 20/10/2021) also put it this way: "Muslims were regarded as a by-the-way, and nobody recognized them in a political sense." This may have been put rather strongly, yet it reflects the state of affairs at the time. Low literacy levels of the Muslim community became a major drawback to political participation by Muslims. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was no Muslim-based political party, and that Muslim political participation remained minimal. The thin line of political survival was through Badru Kakungulu. Kakungulu was a prince, being a brother to the late *Kabaka* Mutesa I, and therefore, a key stakeholder in the king's issues. That is why when KY party was formed Badru Kakungulu was strongly in support of it. Naturally, Muslims were under obligation to support the *Kabaka* and KY (Kezaala, 10/20/2021).

Secondly, it reduced Muslim political players as pawns under the UPC Administration. By turning their attention to KY, Muslims continued to wield a potent political force. It is this status of the Muslims that would set the pace for their relationship with Anglicans in the subsequent decades. The UPC party was quick to realize and to exploit potential strength of Muslims. The birth in 1965 of the National Association for the Advancement of Muslims (NAAM), rather than help the Muslim interest, served mostly UPC's interest to bolster its position against during the post-independence era. In this way, Muslim political participation was from a point of weakness than strength until Idi Amin, a Muslim, who took over power by force of arms, ousted the Anglican-dominated UPC government.

Idi Amin was believed to be the Constantine of Islam in Uganda, as his eight-year rule brought Muslims from a position of relagation to the socio-political and economic limelight through association with the international Islamic organization. The process of recovery was brought to an end when he was ousted from power and the establishment of the second Obote Administration (1980-1986). Durimg these years, however, reinvested their political efforts differently by associating with the Administration at different levels. This constituted the Muslims' on-going fight for political space.

The fore-going discussion has highlighted the roots of the religiopolitical cleavages in the pre-Protectorate Egyptian and Bristish interest in Buganda, and the resultant fragmentation of the cleavages on populace in Buganda. The religious wars marked the galvanization of the religiopolitical cleavages, and the end of which saw the coming of Bishop Tucker. Spurred by the exclusivist theology of Bishop Tucker,

Anglican hegemony endured long into the complex religiopolitical structure of the emerging pre-independence Protectorate nation. It also points out the emergence of the various interest groups against which the Anglican groups would compete, and how, with the help of the Protectorate administration, the Anglicans maintained a lead in the emerging Anglican hegemony of Buganda. It provides the background against which the NRM anti-religious groups' participation can be understood. From it is derived President Museveni constant references to complicity of religious groups in political fragmentation and the divisive use of religion by colonialist. It was this history of religiopolitical fragmentation that the NRM Administration sought to address.

Against this backdrop the immediate post-war NRM administration sought to reorganise the Ugandan political landscape. The extent to which religion had defined politics in the pre-NRM era may have provided for Museveni the framework for his anti-sectarian rhetoric at the onset of the NRM Administration. Thus, he sought to replace the "sectarian, divisive and bankrupt" political parties with the Movement system of governance (Museveni, 2000, p. 16; Onyango-Oloka, 2004). His was a government of national unity, and to this end, all religious-based party politics were suspended, and participation by members was to be on individual merit (Aseka, 367). Subsequently, in 2005, the National Constitution, recognizing "religious diversity," stipulated non-adoption of State religion and guaranteed religious freedom to every citizen (Preamble III: I; Articles 2:7 and 37:1c). The implications of these were two-fold. First, no religious group would assume exclusive political hegemony, second, while not assuming a national religion, Uganda would be a secular state. Secularizing politics was the way to stem the divisive effect of religion in politics.

This historical survey set the background for the Administration's anti-religious group political participation. The study subsequently focused on the NRM Administration's policy of religious groups' participation in politics. It examined, first the ascension to power of the Administration, second, its policy on religion and third, the impact of the policy of groups' political parcipation.

4.1.4 The Rise and Ascension of NRM to Power

January 25 1986 marked the onset of the Administration. It was the culmination of a five-year guerrilla war, also called the Bush War, fought in the Central Region of Uganda called Luwero Triangle between February 1981 and January 1986 (the Triangle consists of the then Buganda Districts of Luwero, Mubende, Mpigi and Mukono). The

war started as a protest against the election widely believed to have been rigged in favour of the UPC Administration of Milton Obote in the 1980 General Elections (Mutibwa, 2008, p. 188; Karugire, 2003, p. 88f). With the similarly religious-based newly founded Conservative Party (CP), the three historical political parties—UPC, DP and KY—presented presidential candidates (Museveni, 1989, p. 118). Ironically, the only non-religious-based party was Museveni's Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM). The non-religious bias of UPM perhaps reflected the pre-war anti-religious bias of Yoweri Museveni. Also, it bespoke of bigger agenda of uniting the religiopolitically divided people (Museveni, 2000, p. 15). These sentiments would crystallise in the bush war anti-religiopolitical stance that would define the immediate NRM Administration.

Apollo Milton Obote was sworn into power on December 11, 1980, marking the onset of the second UPC Government. Often called Obote II Administration, it was a history-making event that brought in a president in Uganda into power after losing (Mutibwa, 1992, p. 148). Obote had previously lost to Idi Amin in January 1971 following military coup. After the Tanzanian-led Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLA) army deposed Idi Amin in April 1979, ground was laid for his possible return from exile in Tanzania in May 1980. Preceding his coming to power were, however, three presidents of the UNLA era in quick succession. These were: Yusuf Kironde Lule (April - June 1979), Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa (June - May 1980) and Military Commission by Paulo Mwanga (May-December 1980) (Museveni, 1997, p. 109ff; Mutibwa, 2008, p. 175ff).

Obote II Administration did not have support in the central districts of Uganda, and was characterised by intense antipathy (Mutibwa, 1992, p. 148). Further instability and civil strife were exacerbated by the guerrilla war between 1981 and 1986 by the National Resistence Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni, following his unsuccessful election (Makara, 2010, p. 82). Museveni had been a member of UPC Youth Wing, and had fought in the anti-Amin wars under the umbrella of FRONASA. He became a Minister of Defence during the Obote II Administration, and later the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission that ruled in the interim before the Presidential Elections. When his UPM party failed to win the election, Museveni, refusing to recognise the credibility of the election, started a guerrilla war (Museveni, 1997, p. 109). Scholars have taken different sides regarding the legitimacy of the was. Some see the war as needless, since it was based on greed for power and the desire to wrest power from the northerners (Mutibwa, 1992, p. 151). The explicitly anti-Obote stance by Mutibwa gives a protracted

argument, seeing the NRM's going to the bush being an effort "to remove a bad and repugnant system" (Mutibwa, 1992, p. 151).

Obote II Administration did not last long. It was fraught by internal wrangles based on tribal interest. It eventually fell to the junta of ethnic Acholi military officers led by Gen. Tito Okello Lutwa on 27th July 1985. The new Administration was faced with a number of independent fighting groups. These included the NRM of Museveni, already fighting in the bush; the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) led by Dr. Andrew Lutakome Kayiira; Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU); Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), and Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) of Brigadier Moses Ali. In the bid to reduce the threat from these, the Administration courted these into power-sharing. All except Museveni's NRA accepted the offer.

Museveni had fought to overthrow Obote, yet the task had been accomplished successfully by the military junta. His continuing to fight was more about the 'want it all' mentality. Mutibwa argues that Museveni found that, while Obote was gone, there was little else to demonstrate the fundamental change requisite upon the country (1992, p. 180). Yet, Museveni by going back on the agreement during the Peace Talks, continued fighting until the military junta lost control of Kampala to the NRA on January 25th 1986 ushering in the NRA/NRM Administration.

It is curious that at the onset of the NRA guerrilla war, no mention was made by Museveni of religions and their divisive effect in politics. This perhaps is because the matters of winning the war than propagating his ideology were at the fore. Also, it is likely that since religion continued to be such a controversial subject ideological reasons it seemed prudent to keep it to the background. This was so considering that he needed to marshal support from all interest groups regardless of their religious identity. Thus, while the theme of unity was prominent in Point Three of the Ten-Point Program, as Rubongoya (2007) put it, the challenge of religious fragmentation remained at the background (p. 66). Yet, it remained the general backdrop against which to understand the Administration's ideology on religion. And, upon coming to power, the Administration assumed a 'no-party' system of governance, sometimes also referred to as the 'broad-based' system of governance. It was so called because it accommodated all the fighting groups, political parties and interest groups. As it will later unfold, the thematic issues of religion and unity were central to the Administration's political discourse.

Due to the centrality of the the above thematic issues, this study considered the NRM Administration stance on religious participation in politics. This was in order to locate it within the general philosophical framework of the Movement ideology.

4.1.5 NRM Administration's policy on participation of religious groups in politics

Understanding of the Administration's policy on political participation of religious groups was a central aspect of this study. It begged an examination the NRM administration's stance on involvement of religious groups in national politics. The aim was to highlight the framework within which the religious groups participated in politics between 1886 and 2016.

The general response from interviews initially indicated that there was no policy document that outlined the Administration's position regarding involvement religious groups in national politics. Instead, what was perceived as the 'NRM administration policy' was inferred from the general utterances of the members the Administration regarding participation of religious groups in politics. From these, respondents tended to 'read' the Administration stance. For instance, Obetia said, "I have been reading between the lines, [and from] the way the NRM behaves, it is hard to find a policy document. However, one is able to understand their attitude through public utterances" (Obetia, OI, 14/7/21). Similarly, Marachtho, observed that, "Utterances from the president and people around him [demonstrated] that they would not want religious leaders to get involved in politics" (Obetia, OI, 4/7/2021).

Respondents also expressed the reason for Administration's stance. It was the quest for national unity in light of the historical religiopolitical fragmanentation. Ubomba said:

> Going a little bit earlier than 1986, which is [the period] leading to the coming into power of the NRM Administration, politics in Uganda has been tuned by religion. NRM was not new to what it is doing, neither was what the Administration doing in 1986 new in light of the religiopolitical dynamics during the first former Obote regime (1963-1971), and after him came Idi Amin (19971-1979), and in the 1980s (OI, 26/7/2021).

It is this religiously-tuned politics that, according to him, generated the dynamic that NRM was seeking to address. Musana (OI, 30/9/2021) too shared the same perspective, pointing out that: "[the Administration came] from the history of Uganda which was characterized by political exclusion, marginalization, call it polarization." Up until then, Musana observes, "The establishment was dominated by religiopolitical groups" (OI,

30/9/2021). It is this background of religiopolitical fragmentation, according to him, that set the tone for the Administration's attitude towards religious involvement in politics. Similarly, Turyahabwe, pointed out that:

> … the revolutionaries, witnessed the troubled state of politics in Uganda from the 1960 and 1980s where [the Protestant Church] was associated with UPC, and Roman Catholics were DP, so that the rest of the people who did not belong to any of the religions did not fit anywhere (OI, 13/7/2021).

With this hindsight, members of the Administration saw religion as a divisive factor, and the singular destructive force in Uganda.

From the above responses, it appeared as though the religiopolitical history of Uganda defined the Administration's stance, and the expressed complicity of the Church in political fragmentation, rather than a written policy, prescribed the place of religion *vis a vis* politics. Considering that from utterances, respondents were able to extrapolate the stance of the Administration towards the political participation of groups, it was necessary to further interrogate these utterances in order to understand the framework from which the NRM Administration's stance was drawn. Attention was, therefore, given to the Presidential Speeches. These were deemed to exemplify the NRM stance towards religions. By examining them, this study sought to authenticate the claim by respondents that while there was no policy statement, such utterances pointed to the Administration's stance.

4.1.5.1 Presidential Speeches as a pointer to the Administration's Stance on Involvement of Religious Groups in Politics

Presidential speeches that were examined comprised those given at the very onset of the Administration, and were deemed to reflect the Administration's immediate post-war ideology. These speeches, given at various national and international fora, have now been published in a book entitled *Path of Liberation* (1989). The book contained the six speeches given earlier in his presidency between 1986 and 1989. Another book, *Sowing the Mustard Seed* which was published in 1997, is an autobiography in which he outlined his struggle for freedom and democracy in Uganda. The other, *What is Africa's Problem?* was published in 2000. While reprinting in it his earlier speeches, he incorporated more speeches under various thematic areas of Military Strategy in Uganda, African Politics, and Africa in world Politics. He also outlined NRM's solution to

African problem of social change. Out of the various speeches and excerpts from these books were drawn motifs that seemed to inform the general perception of the Administration's stance towards participation of religious groups in politics.

One motif was the delineation of religion and politics due to the divisive nature of the former. In the inaugural address to the nation on January 29, 1986, at Kololo Airstrip, Kampala, the newly sworn-in President of the Republic of Uganda, Chairman of NRM, and the Commander-in-Chief of the NRA, made clear the Movement's stance regarding religious groups' participation in politics: "We do not tolerate religious and tribal division in our Movement, or divisions along party lines such as UPC, DP, UPM and the like. Everyone is welcome on an equal basis" (Museveni, 1989, p. 6). The backdrop against which to understand this statement is the pre-NRM religiopolitical fragmentation, which accentuated the politically-divisive use of religion by past leaders. This had ensured the rise and flourishing of religiously-alligned historical parties - UPC, DP, KY and CP. To this problem, the Movement Administration prescribed the solution of national unity. This solution was embedded in the Ten-Point Programme, the Bush War guiding document.

Another motif was the Church's complicity in aiding sectarianism. Museveni expressed this explicitly or otherwise in many of his speeches. For instance, in Inaugural Address, he faulted the politicians who joined the struggle for independence in the 1950s for "pursuing the same sectarian politics that characterised the colonial period" (Museveni, 2000, p. 78). This was one in which religion was used for selfish gain. This point further featured at the Presidential address at the conference of Catholic bishops in Ggaba on June 4, 1986. Museveni helped them to understand the ills the Church had visited on people in Europe during the Middle Ages and in Uganda where religion was used to bring about "unprincipled division among the people" (Museveni, 1989, p. 55). He added that in Uganda, the colonial powers "introduced this very distorted usage of the church to manipulate the population in order to serve their own selfish interest" (Museveni, 1989, p. 55). Behind this statement was the history of use of religion in Uganda for ill intensions by different political parties, thereby occasioning sectarianism.

The other motif was national unity as the solution to the challenge of sectarianism occasioned by the religiopolitical cleavages in the late 1880s. This mostly constituted the goal of the new Administration, and resonated in a number of public addresses in local and international fora. This solution was presented, first in the inaugural speech (Museveni, 1989, p. 6) where he introduced the Ten Point Programme. It was then

resounded three weeks into his presidency while addressing the NRA in Gulu on 13th February, 1986: "Our line is to make all Ugandans as one, and to take every Ugandan as equal." Addressing the army on the subject of 'The NRA and the People,' he encouraged soldiers while doing their work to "adhere to our political line," meaning to keep good relationships with the population unlike the past leaders. Ostensibly, he was referring to the need to keep people together.

The motif of national unity was resounded in several of his other addresses. For instance, in his address to the nation on January 26th 1987 at the celebration of the first anniversary of the NRM Administration (Museveni, 1989, 27). In this address, he underscored "the biggest weakening factors in Africa," being tribalism and other forms of sectarianism, to which he was totally opposed. 'Other forms of sectarianism,' while not cited, leaves one to make a personal judgement based on general prevailing attitude where religion had been used to divide people. Also, in his address to the nation on the occasion of the 27th Independence Anniversary, October 9, 1989, he resounded the solution in what he called a "radically different line on economy and politics" In relation to politics, one of the two solutions was unity (Museveni, 1989, p. 2).

Clearly, in quest for unity, Museveni in his speeches, drew a line between religion as a divisive force in the history of Uganda, on the one hand, and on other hand, politics. It is against this that Point Number Three of the Programme was on consolidation of national unity and elimination of all forms of sectarianism may be understood (Museveni, 1997, p. 217). Not seeing how religion should have been so closely identified with politics, and consequently occasioning such fragmentation, the President asked a rhetorical question: "But why should religion be considered a political matter?" His opinion was explicitely put: "….Religious matters are between you and your God, whereas, politics is about roads, water, drugs in hospitals, and school for children" (1989, p. 6). This statement made explicit the Administration's stance towards religion and politics as two aspects that do not belong together. So much was it a central theme in his speeches that it sounded as though the anti-religious political involvement stance was read from an existent script or otherwise. This was further evidenced by the constant references to the role of religion in fostering sectarianism, pointing out the religiopolitical cleavages in Buganda, and in the emerging nation of Uganda. These were seen as a vivid reminder of how in Uganda, religion was used to bring about "unprincipled division among the people" (Museveni, 1989, p. 55). Furthermore, these cleavages were referred to as illustrations of how the colonial powers "introduced this

very distorted usage of the church to manipulate the population in order to serve their own selfish interest" (Museveni, 1989, p. 55).

These three thematic issues resonated in several presidential addresses. Over time, they reinforced the anti-religious political involvement narrative. Unfortunately, references to religion and the role of unscrupulous leadership in promoting sectarianism were common place in his speeches. It was easy, thus, to extrapolate from the speeches what appeared as a 'policy position,' written or other wise from which the Administration functioned. This inclination was particularly tempting considering, as respondents have clearly indicated, that there was no written policy statement outlining the NRM Administration's position (Marachtho, OI, 4/7/2021; Obetia, OI, 14/7, 2021). It was clear from examining these speeches that President Museveni spoke as the official spokesperson of the NRM Administration. These speeches, thus, authenticated the claim by respondents that such utterances pointed to the Administration's stance. Museveni's reading of history of Uganda also seems to make obvious the fact that the religiopolitical cleavages provided the foundation on which the pre-independence political parties were born. In that way, he demonstrated the problematic involvement of religion, and the Church, in politics.

While there was no documented policy, however, clearly these speeches seem to have been drawn from a framework within which President Museveni read the religiopolitical history of Uganda. They highlighted the complicity of religion in general, and in particular, of the Church in religiopolitical fragmentation. It is also clear from the above that contrary to the points of view strongly put by the respondents regarding the absence of a policy document on religious involvement in politics, the Administration's stance was strongly shaped by the Ten-Point Programme. Constant citation of the Ten-Point Programme pointed to the theoretical framework out of which the speeches were made. In light of this, the study interraogated the Ten-Point Programme to highlight its influence on the Administration's stance on religious groups participation in politics.

4.1.5.2 The Ten-Point Programme and Question of Religious Groups' Political Participation

Respondents identified the Ten Point Programme as the primary influence on NRM Administration's ideology in general, and specifically, its stance toward religious participation in politics (Marachtho, OI, 4/7/2021; Ubomba, OI, 26/7/2021). This is partly because nearly all speeches made references to the Ten-Point Programme. It was

easy, therefore, to see how the Programmes provided the framework for the Presidential speeches.

The Ten-Point Programme was written during the bush war. Deemed as the blue-print for the NRM Administration (Rubongoya, 2007, p. 66; Mutibwa, 1992, p. 179), it was the NRA/M foundation document. It was the written expression of the original NRM/NRA ideology, and thus, the authoritative document out of which the Administration's governance programme, and stance on religion was gleaned. It provided the framework from which the speeches were drawn (Museveni, 1989; 2000).

Drafted during the guerrilla campaign in the bush, it was debated by the National Resistance Council of the NRM together with the High Command and Senior Officers of the NRA under the chairmanship of Yoweri Museveni (Museveni, 1997, p. 217; Mutibwa, 1992, p. 179). The Ten-Point Programme served as a blueprint for the fundamental change (Rubongoya, 2007, p. 67). It provided a coherent political and economic explanation and the solution thereof for which the NRA was fighting against the Obote II Administration. Later in his writings, Museveni would argue that it also contained the "proposals for a political programmes that could form the basis for a nationwide coalition of political and social forces that could usher in a new and better future for the long-suffering people of Uganda" (1997, p. 217; 2000, p. 256). In this respect, the Ten-Point Programme became the Administration's guiding ideology.

Embedded in the Programme were proposals for the NRM political programme. These were: 1. Restoration of Democracy, 2. Restoration of security of person and property, 3. Consolidation of national unity and elimination of all forms of sectarianism. 4. Defending and consolidating National Independence, 5. Building an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy, 6. Restoration and improvement of social services and the rehabilitation of the war-ravaged areas, 7. Elimination of corruption and misuse of power, 8. Redressing errors that have resulted in the dislocation of sections of the population and improvement of others, 9. Co-operation with other African countries in defending human and democratic rights of our brothers in other parts of Africa, and 10. Following an economic strategy of mixed economy.

As can be gleaned from the inaugural address to the nation, the Programme was the outworking in practical terms of the bush war ideology. The preamble in part read: "You may not be familiar with our programme, since you did not have access to it while we were in the bush, so I shall outline a few of its salient points" (Museveni, 1989, p. 1). It was indeed the Movement's blue-print for national governance. According to

respondents, it was this framework that shaped the Administration's stance regarding participation of religious groups in politics (Marachtho, OI, 4/7/2021; Ubomba, OI, 26/7/2021). Only three of the points were discussed in this address. The rest would be unfolded over the subsequent months.

Point three of the Programme particularly sought to address the problem of sectarianism and social fragmentation. Among the forms of fragmentation was one born from the involvement of religion in politics. The Movement sought to consolidate national unity and to eliminate such forms of sectarianism. In the commentary to this particular point during his Presidential inaugural speech on January 29, 1986, Museveni, said, "We do not tolerate religious and tribal divisions in our movement, or divisions along party lines, such as UPC, DP, UPM, and the like. Everyone is welcome on an equal basis" (2000, p. 7). By this was established the level ground for all regardless of religiopolitical, social and cultural background. The reason simply is that, "Politics in Uganda has been used by past politicians along sectarian, religious and tribal cleavages" (2000, p. 258). Such sectarianism was intolerable to the NRM, and "one's religion, color, sex, height is not a consideration when new members are welcomed in the National Resistance Movement" (2000, p. 258). He would reiterate this conviction in an address to the Elders in Gulu on March 12, 1986, saying, "We went to the bush to oppose murder, tribalism, and any other form of sectarianism. In the [NRM], we ruthlessly oppose tribalism and use of religion in politics" (Museveni, 2000, p. 13).

Point three also sought to address a mix of religiopolitical, tribal and ethnic fragmentation. These had created fault lines at the national scale. Consequently, as a nation, Uganda had remained weak. This state of affairs was intolerable, and to it the NRM Administration sought to bring a solution through its broad-based system of governance. This mission was voraciously pursued in the first few years of the Administration. Achievements therefrom were noted by the local as well as the international community. Describing the first ten years of the Administration, Dicklitch said:

> The NRM regime has accomplished much in almost ten years of rule. Most impressive is the relative degree of political and economic stability that the regime has been able to secure…The NRM has also attempted to 'de-ethicise' the political arena, build national unity, develop a new constitution, and cultivate a populist 'grassroots' system of governance through the Resistance Council/ Committee system (1995/1995, p. 108f.).

Dicklitch sees Point three on Unity in the Ten-Point Programme as an achievement:

> The NRM has invited leaders and other political notables from the major parties to join in ruling Uganda. Cabinet appointments to political rivals and Ugandans from sensitive regional and ethnic groups…have been used to co-opt opposition and counteract the claim of south and southwest dominance. For example, the leader of the DP was appointed second deputy vice-president and minister of foreign affairs, and the CP leader was appointed minister of finance and economic planning (1995, p. 109).

These appointments, according to her, gave the NRM the image of a broad-based no-party movement. However, she noted the challenge posed by this to the parties:

> They divided political parties internally between those who wanted to collaborate with the NRM and those who viewed it as a 'sell out.' The NRM's most conspicuous success was its unbroken relationship with the President of the DP and his party faction from the first NRM government in 1986 through [Constituent Assembly] elections, even though the DP itself remained under restriction (p. 109).

From the above, one might conclude that the provisions of the Ten-Point Programme gradually found acceptance among Ugandans. However, it remained a bush war document. Its legitimacy was as good at the Administration that proclaimed it. Yet, its provisions reflected the historical reality of Ugandan politics that the Administration sought to address. Specifically, the complicity of religious groups in fragmenting the populace, remained a critical issue. This is what constituted the Presidential addresses right from the onset of the Administration, thereby highlighting what respondents saw as the framework from which the speeches were made.

While the Ten-Point Programme provided the Movement's governance philosophy, the aspirations of the Ugandans, and specfically of the NRM Administration, on religion and politics was expressed in the 1995 National Constitution.

4.1.5.3 The 2005 National Constitution and the Question of Unity

The National Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) nearly ten years later galvanized the Administration's quest for unity. This was by providing for the relevant articles in the Constitution that bespoke the Administration's goal of national unity. Details of the background issues occasioning, and the protracted process of formation of the 1995 Constitution lie outside the scope of this work. Two issues, however, are clear. First, that the constitutional formation process was not a post-war development. Rubongoya argues that, as early as the beginning of the war in 1981, the constitutional plan was published in *National Resistance News*, the bush war paper (2007, p. 76). This was to be the task of the interim administration based on the popular will, and drafted and promulgated by the Constituent Assembly. This was indeed kick-started in 1988

with the establishment of the Constitutional Review Commission. Second, in consideration of the above, the spirit of the Constitution, as a matter of cause, reflected an NRM character in spite of the popular involvement across several fronts. Moreover, members of the Constitutional Review were appointed by the President ostensibly to "represent the broad spectrum of opinion in the country" (Museveni, 1997, p.194). Yet, their election by the President may have rendered them partisan.

The argument for the dominant NRM character in the National Constitution can be seen against the fact that key among the issues for discussion was that of political parties. Parties may be a veiled reference to Uganda's religiopolitical parties, mention of which was not politically palatable. Ironically, however, it was too early then to say, as Museveni did, that people did not want to return to political parties. Moreover, the independence of the Commission was questionable, and their appointment by the President predisposed members to the more NRM interests. The NRM, as Museveni would put it, "argued that there was no healthy grounds for party political polarisation in Uganda at the time" (Museveni, 1997, 195). The fear was that Uganda was not ready for political parties, but the issue really was that the NRM, as already mentioned, shunned restoration of political parties. The superimposition of the Movement system over and above the political parties made membership into parties inconsequential even though people continued to identify with their political parties.

Furthermore, as already indicated, the traditional political parties were even less celebrated due to their religious leanings and historical divisive element. In keeping with the Administration's quest for unity as discussed above, it would seem that in the new dispensation political parties were synonymous with religious groups, and were not to be tolerated. It is not surprising that in the final provision of the Constitution regarding multi-party system of governance as a possible alternative, for a political party to operate, it had to adhere to strict principles. It must be "national in character," and "shall not be based on sex, ethnicity, religion, or other sectional division" (Article 71, a & b, p. 46). Understood from the historical context of the polarising effect of religion in politics, the statement bespoke the NRM Administration's quest for unity.

Moreover, by putting into perspective the discourse on the 1995 Constitution in relation to political parties and religion, it is possible to see how the Administration's bush war stance on religion and politics may have influenced specific clauses of the Constitution. For instance, in the Political Objectives of the Constitution, Article II on Democratic principles clause IV alluded to the centrality of unity for the nation. Thus it

stated, “The composition of Government shall be broadly representative of the national character and social diversity of the country” (p. 2). In Article III on National Unity and Stability (p. 3), the theme of unity was explicitly addressed in the following clauses:

- All organs of State and people of Uganda shall work towards the promotion of national unity, peace and stability.
- Every effort shall be made to integrate all the peoples of Uganda while at the same time recognising the existence of their ethnic, religious, ideological, political and cultural diversity.
- Everything shall be done to promote a culture of co-operation, understanding, appreciation, tolerance and respect for each other's customs, traditions and beliefs.

These Constitutional provisions legitimized the NRM’s quest for unity. While the Ten Point Programme outlined the bush war ideals, the aspirations to unity were now nationalised through their provision in the supreme national document. The Constitutional provisions read in the NRM’s spirit, thus, pointed to the goal of National Unity. Article III: I; Chapter 2:7 on Non-adoption of State religion provided the finale to this goal. It stated: “Uganda shall not adopt a State religion.” (p. 13). This clause can be understood against the background of religiopolitical hegemony of, first, the Anglican cleavage, and later the Anglican-leaning UPC that, until the early 1970s, saw the Anglican Church as the quasi-state religion. This status would change during Idi Amin’s eight-year rule, when Islam was declared a State religion to relegation of other religious groups. Against this background, the clause made explicit the secular thrust of Ugandan politics. This probably is the same spirit in which Clause 37 in the same Article provided for “Right to culture and similar rights” stating: “Every person has a right as applicable, to belong to, enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, cultural institution, language, tradition, creed or religion in community with others” (p. 13).

These three—the Presidential Speeches, Ten Point Programme and the National Constitution—provided the framework within which religious groups participated in politics. They also illustrate the Administration’s reading of Uganda’s history, and demonstrate the complicity of the Church in the religiopolitical fragmentation. This reading was reflected in the Ten-Point Programme, which served as the blue-print of the NRM Administration. The Administration’s solution of a deliberate effort at realizing

unity needed to be constitutionally legitimized. Thus, in 2005, the Government of Uganda promulgated a national constitution.

Clearly, Museveni's reading of the historical religiopolitical issues influence his perspective of the problematic involvement of religion in politics. This was clear even before the onset of the Administration (Museveni, 1989; 2000). Thus, once the Administration assumed power in 1986, the principles of the Ten-Point rogramme were adopted for use. They would then remain central to the Administration, defining its stance towards religious involvement in politics for the years to come.

It is also obvious that the Administration had zero tolerance for potentially divisive effect of religion in public institutions. This was demonstrated right from the onset by the removal of chaplaincies in the police and the army (Nima, OI, 14/7/2021). Chaplaincies for the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches had been established in the police, prisons and military barracks right from the Obote II Administration. At the onset of the NRM Administration, they ceased to be except in prisons barracks. Other forms of prohibition included expressions of religiously divisive language in religious gatherings such as churches (Nima, OI, 14/7/2021).

4.1.6 Revisiting the NRM Administration's Stance: A Search for the Meta-narrative

The NRM Administration's stance towards religious groups' participation in politics raised the question regarding the possible meta-narrative by which the Movement ideology was driven prior to, and in the time following the onset of the Administration. Certainly, the theme common to the Ten-Point Programme, Presidential speeches and the Articles of the Constitution is the search for unity against the fragmentation caused by unscrupulous use of religion in politics. Clearly, this pointed to a meta-narrative behind the Administration's stance. It was, thus, important for this study to establish this. In an attempt do this, the study examined the widely held assertion that in his early political career Museveni espoused Marxist ideologies, which defined his stance towards religion (Ubomba, OI, 26/7/2021; Musana, OI, 30/9/2022; Alaso OI, 19/3/2022). In light of this, a study was made on the life of Museveni as the President and Chairman of the NRM, seeking to understand the formative influence and the explication of the Marxist ideas in his political career. This was necessary in order to understand the roots of Administration's defining vision, and how this might have influenced the Administration's stance towards religious groups' participation in politics.

Respondents strongly held the view that Museveni's Marxist leanings may have defined his stance on religions and politics (Musana, OI, 30/9/2022; Alaso OI, 19/3/2022). The argument is seen against the background that as far back as the late 1960 and 1980 Museveni, espoused Marxist ideologies. Respondents argued that the Administration's stance towards religious participation in politics had roots in this background. Musana (OI, 30/9/2021), for example, argued that the NRM at its onset was skewed towards the Marxist ideologically. With this orientation, obviously its view of religion was Marxist. Similarly, Alaso (OI, 19/3/2022) cited this background and its associated agnosticism as havimg influenced NRM ideology. Other respondents, however, saw it differently. Marachtho (OI, 4/7/2021), for example, dismissed this as "fairly far-fetched." She argued that the politics of the time was such that you were either Marxist or you were not, or either leaning to the East or West. Similarly, Ubomba (OI, 26/7/2021) contested the theory of Museveni's Marxist leanings, seeing the bush war as merely a fight against the UPC rather than an ideological war. After all, Museveni would later embrace the Capitalist ideals.

The double pronged argument above perhaps points to the double side of the Administration as it forged its identity over the first thirty years in power. To the extent that it was wresting power from a heavily religious-based administration to the disadvantage of those who had been politically less privileged, it would be prudent to steer clear of the heavily religious politics. Once in power, however, members of the Administration positioned themselves for regime hegemony characterized by a monopoly of power (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021). Yet, the theme of early Marxist leaning and the eventual shift away from it is, thus, persistent. Nima's opinion is that the President seems to have gone through a "metamorphosis from the original Marxist to a more capitalistic stance. The original attitude left an impression that lingers on" (OI, 14/7/2021).

The metamorphosis theory may be plausible on two counts. First, that even though the initial orientation of the Movement and its administration was Marxist, there was over time a shift to a Capitalist orientation. Second, it appears that the label of religious partisanism is used for any activity that seems to pose a threat to the goals of the Administration. What was, therefore, regarded as 'sectarian' and unacceptable was that which posed a threat to the Administration's interest or the national unity. In order to strengthen this narrative, the Administration appealled to historical sectarian use of religion. They were critical of sermons that raised political issues or even mere political

outspokenness. For instance, Alaso reports that when a religious leader made a statement in favour of the establishment, there would be no backlash. If, however, any religious leader did so to the contrary, there would be such statements as, 'Religious leaders are over-stepping their mandate' (Alaso, OI, 19/3/2022). Such seems to indicate a protectionist attitude by the Administration of the national politics from religious influence. This is probably the reason for the exclusion of religion in some public institutions (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021; Nima, OI, 14/7/2021).

In order to understand the controlling vision of the architect of the Movement's ideology, particularly in relation to religion and politics, a literary analysis was done. Bubongoya's *Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda* (2007) provided a broad perspective of Museveni's NRM Administration, and was useful for understanding his policy framework. It was examined alongside Museveni's literary works. The focus was on understanding a number of formative factors that may have influenced his evaluation of religion and its place in politics.

From the analysis, a number of formative factors may be gleaned. Significant of which was his journey of faith. Museveni in his autobiography shows how this resulted from his up-bringing between an ardent Anglican Christian mother and a fairly liberal father (Museveni, 1997, p. 6). In retrospect, he would attribute the changes in his family life to his parents' conversion to the Anglican faith. The change, however, was more than simply religious-it was also cultural, a general outlook on life, habits, etc. He would, however, appreciate his father's liberal faith. Being over-Christianized, as his mother had become, meant "pseudo-Europeanisation" (Museveni, 1997, p. 7). His cultural patriotism was expressed in his deep appreciation for his Kinyankole traditions. Yet, this also highlights the ambivalence of his administration. While deeply appreciating culture, he also appreciated elements of modernity that came with Christianity.

Another factor was his liberal attitude to life. Outside of home, his political vision was shaped by his early education life in two significant ways. First, for A-level, he went to Ntare School in 1960 and was nurtured in a fairly liberal spirit. This was infused in him by an equally liberal head teacher, which to Museveni was good as it helped instil in him "personal responsibility and self-discipline" (Museveni. 1997, p. 13). Second, he got 'born-again' in 1962, and while this would otherwise have been positive due to the moral teaching from the missionaries, he was irked by the puritanical discipline and practice of public confession of sins (Museveni, 1997, p. 14). The major contention against his

school's spiritual mentors, however, was their conservative attitude with regard to political involvement, which to the latter was regarded as worldly. In 1966, he ended his 'born-again' commitment and maintained a liberal spiritual stance. He would later put it this way: "Since then, I have remained a non-denominational, God-fearing man. I believe that God is not a Muslim, a Protestant, a Catholic, or Jew. He is above all these petty differences created by groups that are not always independent of pecuniary interest" (Museveni, 1997, p. 14).

From Museveni's early life then are born the anti-religious sentiments. These would later resonate with some of his ideologies as revolutionary. For example, his distaste for 'pseudo-Europeanisation' at the time would set the tone for his later expression of similar sentiments for colonialists upon their complicity in the divisive use of religion. Specifically, the idea of religious groups and their 'interests' would be reflected in his later writing (Museveni, 2000).

Museveni's religiously liberal mind and distaste for the European influence, was galvanized by the third factor of his higher education. For his further education, he went to University of Dar es Salaam, a hotbed of socialist and Marxist political paradigms (Rubongoya, 2007, p. 61). From this context was formed his Marxist tendencies. It also provided fertile ground for the continuation of his pan-African activism. Museveni would then go on to write his thesis on the applicability of Frantz Fanon's ideas on revolutionary violence to post-colonial Africa—Fanon was inclined to socialist/Marxist ideologies. Even though Museveni's thesis is not available for review, it is clear that his cumulative rural experience and academic influence of Fantz Fanon, seem to have been ideologically formative, shaping the framework for articulating his analysis of the social and political issues in Africa. Rubongoya (2007, p. 61) points out that this academic background strengthened his "worldview and convinced him of the need for a fundamental transformation" for the African societies." It is such characteristics that the peasant ideology, guided by "insidious forms of superstitions that limit entrepreneurial capacities" (Rubongoya, 2007, p. 61) and breeds backwardness.

Later, Museveni abandoned his Marxist ideals and embraced the neoliberal structural adjustments advocated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Cia.gov). The reasons for this are not within the scope of this study. Suffice it to say, the Marxist ideas formed the bedrock of his bush and immediate post-bush ideologies. Out of this Marxist background is born Museveni's opposition to political

parties in general and multi-party democracy in particular. Rubongoya (2007) cites Museveni:

> Uganda's history was replete with examples of political parties that served as conduits through which parochial, ethnic and religious interest have subsumed national priorities. They have perverted the development of national unity and consciousness, thus undermining the roots of modern economic systems (p. 61).

Therein, perhaps, lies the ideological basis for the Movement Administration's stance towards religious groups' involvement in Ugandan politics. Museveni reasons that "superstitions, sectarianism and absence of capitalistic class have slowed the development of modern progressive forces and left the peasantry open to the machinations of uncouth, irresponsible political parties' elites"-the reason why he advocated and implemented the 'Movement' or 'no party' democracy (Rubongoya, 2007, p. 61). Thus, in seeking to bring about 'fundamental change,' Rubongoya sees this to have "meant not restructuring society but also changing the political culture of Uganda's political elite" (2007, p. 61). This is what he sought to do in championing popular democracy upon coming to power. In his leadership, Rubongoya argues that Museveni, "appeared to reflect an intimate acquaintance with the everyday life and experiences of masses." According to him, "to ignore this background is to miss an important trajectory in the growth of his thinking and leadership, both as a guerrilla fighter from a peasant background and as a president of Uganda…" (2007, p. 63).

It would appear from Rubongoya's argument above that the combination of his peasant background on the one hand, and his socialist and Marxist leaning did combine to provide for Museveni the ideological foundation for NRM political paradigm. Although conceived in the bush, it would later provide the *modus operandi* for the Administration. Thus, Rubongoya argues:

> Museveni's social roots cannot be divorced from the character, nature and, and outcome of the bush war or from the political vision he projected after assuming the state power. These form the normative foundations for the early period of the *Pax Musevenica.* Indeed once in government, the same political values become the springboard from which he would launch sweeping changes to the political, social and economic landscape of Uganda (2007, p. 63).

It is safe to conclude that, based upon this ideological foundation, Museveni's reading of history readily identifies the problematics in the colonial and post-colonial developments. Prime among which was the persistent influence of religion in national

politics. This had not only defined the outlook of religiopolitical parties up to 1980 national election in which he stood as a presidential candidate and subsequently lost. It had also left the Ugandan community fragmented and weak. It is this past that the Administration, right from the onset sought to put to history.

4.1.7 From Fragmentation to Political Unity: Museveni's Solution to the Challenge of Religiopolitical Fragmentation in Uganda

While the above exposition of Museveni's social and ideological background helps us appreciate the roots of the NRM's attitude of religious groups' involvement in politics, it does but partially explain the reason for the inclusiveness of the Administration's ideology, especially towards the diverse religious groups. Uganda, however, was not only polarized along religion-political lines; there were several fault lines. These are worth a mention in order to highlight the real burden of the Administration on issues of Unity. Dicklitch (1995/1996, p. 105) demonstrates the level of divide: "In Uganda, there was, and remains, a regional split most vividly illustrated by a north/south divide; religious chasms separating Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims; and ethnic cleavages epitomized by civil wars." Dicklitch further observes that:

> Rather than mitigating inherited divisions, the political parties that existed after independence only exacerbated them. The major ethnic, religious, and regional differences were magnified within the major political parties: the DP, the UPC, the KY, the CP, and the UPM. Most of these parties manipulated and amplified traditional differences to serve their own interests (1995/1996, p. 107).

Here Dicklitch puts the discourse within a broader perspective from which one can appreciate the underlying NRM policy on unity. The depth of these difference could not have been underestimated then and even now. According to her,

> Parties can argue all they like that they no longer represent 'narrow, sectarian interests,' but people still associate them with particular religions, regions, and ethnic groups, not to mention regimes. And in the past, instead of providing a viable alternative to repressive rule, parties were actively involved in sustaining it (Dicklitch, 1995/1996, p. 107).

So strongly put, this statement points the extent to which religiopolitical consciousness remained such a strong force defining political participation. This aptly explains the Administration's stance towards religion, and provides the background against which to understand the deliberate effort to eliminate all that was considered partisan. Thus, in the bid to eliminate what he considered "vehicles of class, religious and ethnic sectarian

politics, Museveni suspended political party activity shortly after taking over power" (Dicklitch, 1995/1996, p. 107).

Regarding religious secterianism in politics, Museveni (2000) would later articulate his perspective in an address to the Conference of Catholic Bishops at Ggaba on June 4, 1986 thus: We in the National Resistance Movement have no prejudice whatsoever against any religious ideas…Nevertheless, we cannot escape the fact that the Church has sometimes been used to serve wrong interests in society (p. 16). This poignantly underscores NRM understanding of complicity of religious groups in partisan politics. Thus, drawing on the divisive effect of religion, Museveni said: "Here in Uganda we have seen that sometimes religion is used to bring about unprincipled division among the population" (2006, p.6). Complicity for this is borne by the "colonial powers who introduced this much distorted use of Church to manipulate the population in order to serve their own selfish interests" (Museveni, 2000, p. 16). From the history of religion in Ugandan pre- and post-colonial era, he shows how this played out: "Here in Buganda, they favoured the Protestant Church and they used it against other religions. It was even enshrined in the 1900 agreement that the *Kabaka* had to be a Protestant, and that he would not marry a Catholic" (Museveni, 2000, p. 17). Lending itself to use in such a way, religion ceased to be "a vehicle of communion between man and his creator, God. It had instead become a tool for control of other men" (Museveni, 2000, p. 17).

Complicity for this state of affairs is shared by the perpetrators who used religion in a misleading manner. Reference is here made to the successors of the colonialist, who "should have been able to sort out things by now," but alas, they did not. A finger is also pointed to the leadership of the succeeding regimes for distorting things. In particular, Milton Obote and Idi Amin used Islam for their own purpose, as a consequence, Islam in Uganda "had become unmanageable" (Museveni, 2000, p. 17). The two—the colonialists, and subsequently the succeeding leaders of Uganda—provide illustrations of the way religion was, in the past, used for wrong reasons.

By belabouring the problem of religion in politics, Museveni wishes to justify the NRM's position "against traditional ideas that have sustained the status quo" (Museveni, 2000, p. 17). From it, he draws a sense of mission saying: "It is incumbent on us to repair the distortion in Ugandan politics that has caused so much damage." By taking this position, he hastens to state that the Administration is not simply opposed to religion, but rather, the improper use of it:

> The National Resistance Movement is not opposed to the role of the churches and religion, if they can be used positively. The Movement expects the churches to assume their rightful place in the development of nations and indeed committed to the support and encouragement of the spiritual and moral rehabilitation of their society" (Museveni, 2000, p. 17).

This statement represented the Movement's stance towards religion in general, and in particular, involvement of churches in politics. It is one in which churches' efforts are expected to complement the NRM's programmes of "restoration of morality and human dignity" (Museveni, 2000, p. 17). He would conclude his address to Bishops saying, "Our government looks forward to working closely with the Church" (Museveni, 2000, p. 17). This was said in reference to not only the churches, but generally to all religions. Specific reference to the Church perhaps is because of the long history of the involvement of churches in the Ugandan politics through political parties. However, the mere mention of it in relation to use of religion by both Milton Obote and Idi Amin renders Islam equally complicit for the poor image of religious groups' involvement in Uganda politics.

From Museveni's statements above, his view of religion and politics is explicit. Accordingly, they are two separate domains, and that one can be and had been "used to serve wrong interest in society (Museveni, 2000, p. 16). The clear demarcation between the two, and the instrumentality of one by another is brought out clearly in the commentary to Point Three of the Programme in the Presidential Inaugural address of January 29, 1986: "Past regimes have used sectarianism to divide people along religious and tribal lines. Why should religion be considered a political matter?" (Museveni, 1989, p. 5). This rhetorical question is answered thus: "Religious matters are between you and your god whereas politics is about roads, water, drugs in hospitals and schools for children" (Museveni, 1989, p. 5).

This stance on religion and politics is seen as correctional to the long history of misuse of religion. The restoration of national unity in the Ten Point Programme was in part meant to expunge the religiopolitical consciousness that had for nearly a century bedevilled Uganda's politics. The quest for restoration of unity can thus partly be understood against the general background of the sectarian religiopolitical nature of Uganda's colonial and post-colonial politics. The correctional measure was packaged in the rhetoric of the 'fundamental change.' First introduced in his inaugural address during the swearing in ceremony at Kololo Airstrip, it pointed to a new state of affairs for Uganda about to be ushered in by the new Administration (Museveni, 1989, p. 1).

The Administration's stance towards religious groups participation in politics was thus born out of fear to alienate masses based on historical religiopolitical identities. This can be understood from the irony that while stemming religious sectarianism in politics, the Administration simultaneously was creating room for political participation by the hitherto dormant religious groups-Muslim and Pentecostal. This irony is behind Obetia's (OI, 14/7/2021) observation: "There seems to be a greater goal for which clamping down on religion was simply a strategy." According to him, this might be expressed by the fact that the Administration did not simply ban religious groups altogether. Rather, all religious groups were given a level platform. Furthermore, the President has since identified closely with the otherwise less prominent religious groups such as the Muslims and Pentecostals (Kalyegira, OI, 19/8/2021).

The presumed goal of unity was to address the need for the Administration to galvanize political support from members of different religious groups. This is particularly so in light of the large numbers of Roman Catholics in the NRM, who by default, were part of the Administration from the onset. Regarding this, Nima observes:

> If you recall, the Catholic Church was very supportive of the Movement while in the bush. The Archbishop of the Catholic Church supported them by supplying food. At every opportunity, he was hailed as one of the supporters. Even upon assuming power, there were several Catholics in the Administration. Catholic priests were very much involved in the Movement. (OI, 14/7/2021).

Coupled with the above conspiracy theory, the other reason championed by Nima was the need to keep cohesion among the hitherto fragmented and warring local religious communities (OI, 14/7/2021). She points out that the politics behind the ideology on religious groups' involvement in politics follows the trends in Western Uganda, the home of the top leaders of the NRM Administration:

> The politics of religion in Western Uganda was different from politics of religion elsewhere. In [Eastern Uganda], those wars of religion had really died. Some of the candidates in in the UPC party during the 1980 election were Catholics, and there is a case of an Anglican who was a DP candidate. In Western Uganda, the division was so strong. You are an Anglican, then you are a UPC, and you are a Catholic, then you are DP, full stop! A lot of hostility underlay this identities. Until 1980s, the hostility was not between parties, it was rather between religions. So that experience in the West was nationalized.

This localised perspective is informative of the situation in Western Uganda where Museveni was born and raised, and he would have internalised all this experience of sharp religious fragmentation. It is no wonder that addressing the evil of social and

religious division is prime in his national political agenda. Outside the Western Uganda, Nima observes, however, that these divisions were not comparably sharp. Regarding the Muslims, for example, she points out that the Anglican-led Obote Administration, and the Anglican Church in general, right from the early missionary times were tolerant. The first Muslims to be educated in Uganda were educated by the Anglican Churches, among whom was Abu Mayanja. The Catholics tended to enforce conversion, even for the Anglicans that went through their schools. This was not the case for Anglicans; Muslims who attended their schools were not required to convert" (Nima, OI, 14/7/2021)).

Part of the irony behind the Administration's attitude towards religious groups' participation in politics, was also the observation by the respondents that the Administration remained accommodative to various religious groups. Here-below we examine how this was.

4.1.8Accommodation of Religious Groups

According to respondents, the accommodation of religious groups tended to predispose the Administration to tolerance towards religious institutions. This is demonstrated in the Administration's magnanimity toward various religious groups. Marachtho (OI, 4/7/2021), for example, expressed that: "We have seen the President and the NRM give religious leaders gifts of all kinds, and they (religious leaders) go to State House from time to time." Such gestures might seem to some as aimed at biasing religious groups in favour of the Administration, but according to her, it illustrates its effort of inclusion (Marachtho, OI, 4/7/2021).

Tolerance was also demonstrated in the use by the Administration of religion for its pragmatic benefits. Thus, Turyahabwe (OI, 13/7/2021) argues that Museveni's interest is in "a religion that unites, preaches prosperity, makes people work hard against poverty." He would then go on to say, "Museveni is liberal, and what works for him is what he will go by. Otherwise, religion is a private affair." Ubomba (OI, 26/7/2021) also argues that "NRM in 1986 took up these [religious] groups to work with," but never emphasized one religious group over another. The normative practice, according to him, was that "the Administration talks favourably to all religions regardless" (OI, 26/7/2021). In the spirit of inclusiveness, the Administration also embraced traditionalists as long as adherent "could cooperate and were not against development." (Turyahabwe (OI, 13/7/2021). Such pragmatic consideration seems to point to the Administration's

evaluation of religion as useful only in as far as it supported their agenda, but sought to downplay its partisan interests in politics.

The pragmatic consideration in the evaluation of religious groups's usefulness to the Administration's development agend necessarily affected the nature of the groups' involvement in politics. In light of this, the study investigated the impact of NRM's stance towards religious groups' involvement in politics. This is here-below discussed.

4.1.9 Effects of the NRM Administration's Stance on the involvement of religious groups in national politics during this period

Respondents were asked the following question: In your observation, are there any effects of the policy, both positively and negatively, on the involvement of religious groups in national politics during this period? The question sought to determine ways in which the policy had impacted the participation of religious groups in politics. The responses varied, and were both positive and negative as here-below outlined.

4.1.9.1 Positive Effects of the NRM Administration's Stance on Religious Groups in Politics

Regarding the positive effect of the stance, among the responses was that it fostered inclusivity in the Administration. As Marachtho (OI, 4/7/2021) points out: "Right from the onset, NRM administration demonstrated inclusivity of people of all religious, political and cultural backgrounds. Religiously, these included the Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Traditionalist, and Muslims." Involvement of people of different religious backgrounds had positive effects. It precluded religious labelling, which though obvious, were kept to the background.

By so fostering inclusivity, it also helped draw strength from the diversity of people from different religious background represented in governance. An example of this cited was the deliberate effort at political power balancing: "The president and the chairman of the National Resistance Movement was an Anglican; Vice chairman, Haj Moses Kigongo, a Muslim; the Vice President Catholic, and once between 1986-1996 was a gender consideration where a woman held office." Ironically, Ubomba cited openness to religious involvement in politics while constraining against creation of religious-based political parties. Members of a religious groups did not enter political arena and campaign along religious lines. Rather, they were involved as individuals (OI,

26/7/2021). By so saying, he was referring to the level political play-ground in which all religious groups participated.

Furthermore, religious groups were delinked from politics direct political involvement. Instead, it gave bishops or other Church leaders opportunity to freely criticise the Administration, and did not create political bishops or religious leaders. Rather, for the most part, these took part in a fairly disinterested way. In that way, there was no doubt that religious leaders played a role in politics, and of course it affected the way they related to the State, the Church related to the State (Ubomba, OI, 26/7/2021), OI,). By default, this helped to refocus church leaders on spiritual matters. Also, it prevented political conflicts among religious institutions.

Lastly, it kept religious groups out of the troubled history of the church-state relationship. Ubomba observed that, "religiously aligned political parties, though continuing to exist, were mere labels with little of the original force. However, the religiopolitical groups remained potent" (OI, 26/7/2021). It is the reason why the hostility was simply not towards religious leaders; rather, it was towards religious alignment of political parties: "The whole thinking was that religion and politics mixing was part of the big problem. And, during the pre-NRM era, there had been a resurgence of religious groups, where the Anglican-dominated UPC took an upper hand, yet Muslims and Roman Catholics remained relegated" (Ubomba, OI, 26/7/2021).

Inspite of the gains to the Church from the NRM's attitude, there were still a few challenges encountered. These will be highlighted in the following discussion.

4.1.9.2 Negative Effects of the NRM Administration's Stance on Religious Groups in Politics

Respondents also observed, among other issues, the secularization of state. According to Obetia, this seems to have reinforced the original pre-bush war attitude against the participation of religious groups in politics (OI, 14/7/2021). With this came other derivative practices that tended to define the mood of religious groups' involvement in politics, such as the regulation against chaplaincies in barracks (Nima, OI, 14/7/2021).

In addition, the State gagged religious voices, and down-played the value of religiopolitical tags, such as DP, UPC, and CP that, until then, characterized the political rhetoric. Instead, it consistently 'patted' the religious leadership on the back, and had them "sing praises to the regime so as to rally support for it in every election" (Ubomba, OI, 26/7/2021). Thus, there was a limited public political statements and non-

confrontation with the state by religious leaders (Ubomba, OI, 26/7/2021). Having been gagged, the Church simply looked on as things happened, including cases of brutalization of civilians by the security operatives. There was also a case where the Church did not make an appropriate response to criticise an act that was regarded reprehensible (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021). Such cases illustrated the extent to which the Church was intimidated into silence. Once intimidated, the Administration was left to define the state politics unchallenged by any form of authority. The effect of this, was absolutizing of power (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021).

Furthermore, keeping religion out of politics affected the way ordinary citizens related to the State. For example, Ubomba (OI, 26/7/2021), argued that because the ordinary belong to the Church, and considering that people are the Church, any politics that supposedly kicks the Church out also kicks out its citizens. This tended to justify the fact that attempts to keep religious groups out of politics was to keep away those who should not be part of the NRM out of politics.

It also created a false sense of political neutrality. According to Ubomba, "while religious groups were required to take a more neutral stance to issues, groups did not ceased to use religious identities as lobbying for inclusion" (OI, 26/7/2021). Interests by different religious leaders were always at play in politics. This, however, was not expressed directly as it was during the pre-NRM days, yet, one could still see the indirect impact of religion on political trends. A case in point was when Muslims and Catholics, who had been particularly excluded, put pressure on the Government for inclusion. Such pressure paid its dividends, especially when it came to political appointment as a means of balancing religiopolitical forces.

Further still, as a single political block, Muslims remained at a somewhat disadvantaged position due to their numerical minority compared to the Christian groups. Kasozi (OI, 19/10/2021) observed that the NRM Administration policy may have been more favourable to Muslims in many respects, especially in the bid to level the political playground. Yet, numbers remained a limiting factor to their participation. Moreover, they could no longer constitute themselves into a party in the same way as other historical religious groups in the past. All they seemed to get are 'token appointments.' Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021). Such tokenism left Muslims disgruntled and the affirmative action through the religion-political power-balancing seems not to have pleased them.

It further exacerbated conflict among many religious groups seeking to draw attention of state. This was mostly in competition for gains from the lavish distribution of

resources by state in the bid to win the allegiance of religious groups. While religious groups were constrained from political involvement, the Administration seems to have given the impression that its 'agenda is to keep religion out of Politics' Yet, it opened doors to political involvement in religious activities (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). This is in the bid to maintain inclusiveness as well as a good standing among religious leaders, that the Administration acted generously to religious groups. For example, the Administration showered bishops with regular gifts. Whereas at first this was mostly to Christian religious leaders, and has now been extended to Khadis (Anonymous, 17/10/2021).

Related to this, it lent religious groups to dependency on the benevolence of Administration. In instances, where religious groups competed for the attention of the State, the proverbial 'brown envelope' culture thrived as groups often positioned themselves for gain (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). This tended to institutionalise a *patronato* relationship of state and religious groups (Gustafson, 1992, p. 20). This is a relationship characterized by the independence of the church as the state religion but under the patron hood of the state. Thus, while the religious groups had remained independent, there was mutual exploitation between the state and religious groups. This was expressed by the state use of religious groups to legitimize its position through power balancing, the latter took advantage of this relationship to exert their position and influence in politics. In many case, the state exerted undue pressure on religious groups for its own interest. Often, stringent measures were taken against religious groups. Such was the case of Muslim leadership conflicts where the State imposed a heavy hand upon the various factions on the account of matters of State interest (Kanyeihamba, 1998).

In a subtle way, demarcated spheres of influence for politics and religion further created tension between religious groups and State. This is vividly expressed by Obetia (OI, 14/7/2021): "…when you sing their praise you will become a darling. When you do your prophetic ministry by saying this is wrong, this is unethical… you become a target, an enemy. The consequence of this is that fear was instilled on religious leaders. It also exposed religious groups to unbridled hostility towards Church leaders (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021). This was at a critical time when religious communities in exercise of their civic role, sought guide and help society to make critical judgments on what the government is doing. Stifling religious voice had several implication. It meant leaving society blind to what is happening around. Moreover, in such circumstances, most capable religious leaders were denied opportunity to air out their voices as far as political

matters in the country are concerned. According to Marachtho (OI, 4/7/2021): “One had to be brave to participate in politics.” Yet, those who did, paid a price for political participation as illustrated by the case of Bishop Zac Niringiye:

> [The experience of] people like Bishop Zac Niringiye meant that you had to be brave to be involved in politics. But they also illustrate the risk of being in collision course with the Administration’s interests. He was misunderstood many times in his activism for human rights. Also, his political participation was muzzled. (Marachtho, OI, 4/7/2021)

This was not just an isolated case. During the elections of 2016, for example, there were bad exchanges between the President and the Bishop of Rwenzori Diocese in regard to the influence of State in the election of a particular candidate. In such circumstance, church leaders also risked being banned from campaigning for any candidate at any level of position. Such bold acts of political involvement express the dissatisfaction among respondents with the Administration’s stance that has delineated religion from politics. Musana (OI, 30/9/2021), strongly expresses discontent with resultant diminishing of Church from politics. “There is no way you can separate religion from politics. Religion itself by its nature is a social affair, and therefore, there is no way you can separate the two.” In spite of this, Church leaders participated, especially in causes that were not in collision with, or explicitly in support of the Administration’s positions.

In general, however, the examination of the impact of the NRM’s stance towards participation of religious groups in politics yielded both positive and negative consequences. Moreover, it highlighted the level of ambivalence of the Administration regarding political involvement by religious groups and leaders. The strong inclination towards non-involvement seems to be stronger, giving the impression that delineation of religion from politics was the norm.

The foregoing discussion, tried to put the NRM’s policy on religious grpups’ participation into the perspective of the study. This is by examining the roots of religiopolitical nexus and the birth of cleavages. It also examined the onset of the Administration, its’s policy on political participation of religious groups, and its impact on religious groups’ participation in politics. The premise upon which this objective was pursued is that while the Administration’s policy was meant to stem the influence of religiously sectarian politics, this is not sufficiently realised. Rather, between 1986 and 2016 there has been a heightened religious groups’ political involvement in Ugandan politics.

Finding pointed to the fact that religious group's participation in politics was generated by several complex historical and national factors, all of which are read from a script that ideologically caste religion and its use by the colonialist and their successors, as responsible for the divisionism in Ugandan politics. Ultimately, they occasioned the call for unity. Further to this, the Administrations attitude was not against religious groups' participation *per se*; rather, it was the wrong use of it for dividing the population as it had been done by the colonial and post-colonial administrations in Uganda. It is the reason for the Administration's quest for national unity.

The discusion thus highlighted the irony behind the basic premise of the objective, that is, even though the NRM Administration's Ten-Point Programme, and its point on National Unity sough to bring religious groups' political participation to a close, this seemed a less successful effort. The Administration's ambivalence in the treatment of religious groups with hostility, yet with balanced tolerance, simply demonstrated that religion could not easily be delineated from politics. Rather, religion was a persistent and endemic reality defining political reflection as well as expression. Both Anglicans and Muslims, though in varying ways, have continued to influence political trends.

In order to demonstrate the persistence and endemic religious influence in politics at varying level, the study then proceeded to examine the influence of religious groups on national politics. This first by examining the influence of Anglican political theology on national politics during the study period.

4.2 INFLUENCE OF ANGLICAN POLITICAL THEOLOGY ON NATIONAL POLITICS DURING THE NRM ADMINISTRATION BETWEEN 1986 AND 2016

The examination of the influence of Anglican political theology in national politics during the NRM administration was based on the research objective two: To evaluate the influence of Anglican political theology in national politics during the NRM administration between 1986 and 2016. Ultimately, the objective sought to identify the influence of Anglican political theology on Church's political participation. In order to realise this objective, the study interrogated expressions of Anglican political theology in national politics in 1986-2016.

This objective was premised on the idea that involvement of Anglicans in Ugandan politics was grounded in the foundation of an Anglican political theology. In pursuit of this objective, the study explicated Hans Kung's description of religion as a

comprehensive aspect, and rather than being an issue of the past, it is a contemporary experience. According to him, religion is "…is a *lived life*, inscribed in the heart of men and women, hence for all religious persons, something that is extremely contemporary, pulsating through every fibre of their everyday experience." (1996, p. xvii). By drawing on Hans Kung, the study examined the Anglican political theology, seeking to identify the emerging political ethos. By using Hans Kung's idea of religion as a lived experience, this study sought to demonstrate how the Anglican political ethos demonstrated the Church's political theology.

In general, respondents indicated that since the declaration of the British protectorate over Uganda in 1894, the Anglican Church's identity with the Protectorate Government and the UPC Administration during the post-independence era, defined its political involvement (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021; Turyahabwe, OI, OI, 13/7/2021; Musana, OI, 30/9/2022). Eminent scholars of history and politics have written in general regarding religion, the state and politics. In these studies Anglican Church's participation has been highlighted. Among them are, Low (1967); Hansen (1984), Wandira (1978), Mudoola (1996), Gifford (1999), Karugire (2010), and Mutibwa (1978, 2008; 2016). These works furnish the general background against which to understand the Anglican political participation. Hansen (1984), for instance, shows how the early colonial period played a formative role for both the church and state in establishing themselves, and in so doing provided the context within which to understand the emergent church-state relationship. Later works, such as by Mudoola (1996), depict a similar motif. Mudoola examines the dynamic interaction of Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and the formal political structures, and shows the identification of national institutions with particular socio-political forces. In particular, he shows how the Anglican Church acted as the quasi-establishment Church (p. 12-13).

Although showing the institutional church-state relation, Karugire (1980, 2003) similarly shows the identification of religion and politics from the pre-colonial time. Karugire in his first volume (1980) sheds light on the establishment of the eighty-year long Anglican hegemony in Uganda. In the other volume, (Karugire, 2003), the liberal nature of the Anglican political theology is demonstrated by the easy marriage of religion to politics following the religious wars. Both volumes analyse the extent of the Church proximity to state, but show the Church's liberal disposition in political involvement. In a similar way to most of the books written on Church and politics in Uganda, Karugire's works (1990 and 2003) are historical, and are useful for situating Church-state historical

relations. In spite of the extensive coverage on Church and politics, much of the literature highlights historical and political events, which define the thrust of their writing. Yet, it is clear from the above that the Anglican Church operated as the quasi-establishment church, and there is no attempt to explicate the theological underpinning of this status.

This status, however, was challenged, first by Idi Amin's eight-year administration (January 1971-April 1979). During his era, Amin's affirmative action for Muslims through economic and political opportunities diminished the Anglican influence in politics. This was made worse by the conflict between Amin and the Church, leading to the death of Janani Luwum, the Archbishop of the Church of Uganda, in February 16, 1977 (Pirouette, 1980). The Anglican Church would recover its quasi-establishment position during the Obote's second administration from 1980 to January 1986, before the administration lost power to the Military junta of Okello Lutwa, and eventually to the NRM/A in January 1986.

At the onset of the NRM Administration, the ideology on National Unity challenged the Church's quasi-establishment status when all religious groups' participation in politics was stopped (Museveni, 1989, 2000). Constrained by the NRM bush-war regulation on non-Church political involvement, one was hard pressed to identify a specifically Anglican political ethos. Equally, it was hard to understand the influence behind the Anglican Church's political involvement. It was necessary, therefore, to investigate the nature of Anglican political ethos so as to be able to identify some theological motifs underlying Anglican political participation. This was by interrogating the nature of the political participation by Anglicans during the study period. The goal of this was to highlight how the Anglican political theology influenced their political participation.

4.2.1 Understanding Anglican Church's Political Theology

In order to understand the influence of Anglican Church's political theology in national politics, it was necessary, first, to examine the nature of Anglican political theology. This was meant to identify the working knowledge of political theology, especially for the Church of Uganda, and if there was such a thing, whether they would be able to identify it. A working definition of 'a political theology' was given as religious ideas that influenced the Church's involvement in politics. Anglican political theology then was seen as religious ideas that influenced the Anglican Church's involvement in politics.

Based on this working definition, respondents were then asked if they were aware of a political theology espoused by the Church. The responses to the question indicated a lack of a clearly defined political theology for the Church of Uganda. Regarding this, Obetia said: "CoU has no political theology apart from some of the statements such as: 'a bishop should never be political or never be partisan' (OI, 14/7/2021). Also, Musana expressed the following: "I do not see a defined Anglican political theology…Not in Uganda" (OI, 30/9/2021). A similar observation was made by Turyahabwe:

> I have not heard a strong Anglican leader preaching on that, although, as people, we have our political inclination. It is difficult for you to come out and say, as in the 60s that this is our political philosophy. What we have as an Anglican theology is not pronounced as you would have in the Catholic Church, and history bears it out that they support their own when it comes to political platform (OI, 13/7/2021).

The quick contrast above by Turyahabwe of the Anglican with the Roman Catholic Churches is of specific interest. Unlike the Anglican Church, the latter's political consciousness is outlined in the Catholic Social Services. It was demonstrated in a high level of political consciousness, and demonstrated through their deliberate participation right from the high echelons of ecclesiastical authority to the grassroots. In contrast, the Anglican Church was seen by Musana to have exerted minimal political influence at national level (OI, 30/9/2021). According to him, this resulted from failure by the leadership of Church of Uganda to offer relevant political guidance. Ultimately, therefore, there was generally low consciousness of Anglican political theology in the Church.

Inspite of the low political consciousness resulting from lack of a clearly articulated political theology, the study went on to investigate the theological ideas that influenced the Church's political participation.

4.2.2 Theological Ideas that Influenced the Anglican Church's Involvement in Politics during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016

The study interrogated the assertions by respondents that implied that the Church did not espouse a clearly defined political theology. This was aimed at establishing the theological ideas that influenced Anglican political participation. In order to do this, the researcher triangulated responses from oral interviews with the documentary analysis.

Findings demonstrated that the Church had a long history of political involvement defined by Bishop Tucker's Evangelical Tradition of political involvement

(Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021; Turyahabwe, OI, 13/7/2021; Griffith, 1998; Byaruhanga, 2008). Furthermore, it was revealed that the voices of the diocesan Bishops have been the mainstay of Church political involvement. Lastly, it was revealed that there were a variety of religious ideas that guided political action among Anglican Christian. These are here-below delineated.

4.2.2.1 Recidual Effect of Bishop Tucker's Evangelical Tradition of Political Involvement

It has already been hinted that the initial principle based upon which the Church's political involvement was founded was the Bishop Tucker's Evangelical Tradition of Political Involvement. The residual impact this theology during the NRM Administration is hard to identify. This is for a couple of reasons. First, Tucker's political theology was merely part of his public relations campaign in England rather than a *de facto* theology for the Native Anglican Church. Griffith observes, that Tucker wrote his paper delivered at the Missionary Conference from the "standpoint as a bishop and Director of the mission in Uganda" and that his focus was particularly on the relationship between the C.M.S mission and the British political authorities (1998, p. 125). Seen as such, although the ultimate beneficiary was the Church in Buganda, we understand, not only the background issues, but also the general tenor that characterised his political theology, and how it was directed. The Church might simply have walked a well-beaten political path with little or no understanding of the underlying theology. Yet, this political theology, rudimentary as it was, provided the theological framework for political participation of the Native Anglican Church then led by Bishop Tucker, and in the subsequent decades. In that way, its impact can be seen in contributing towards paving a tradition of Anglican political involvement.

Second, religious groups were politically active prior to Tucker's delineation of his theology in Scotland, and the Anglicans were already firmly in position in Buganda's echelons of power. Practically, however, his theology translated into, or rather, simply complemented the colonial effort to entrench Anglican hegemony in Buganda, and later, gave it a national flavour with the extension of the Protectorate administration to the rest of the country. At the time, Anglican chiefs controlled Buganda and various parts of Uganda, and indirectly through them the Protectorate administration after the declaration of the Protectorate status of Buganda in 1894 (Niringiye, 2016, p. 58). While the Protectorate Administration never declared it, the Church identified itself as the quasi-

establishment church. Tucker may have conceived the idea of the British takeover of the Buganda administration as a matter of expedience. However, its impact had galvanied the close Church-state relations. The Church henceforth was to play a key role in the politics of the emerging Protectorate administration. One would therefore, argue that the political ethos of the Church of England merely spurred to vibrancy the Anglican cleavage that had formed in the pre-war Buganda. It shored to political limelight the Anglican cleavage and enabled it to come to power in 1892. The Church-state nexus that defined the Anglican political ethos further strengthened it during the protectorate era.

Once the Protectorate Administration was established in 1894, however, it defined the close relationship between the Church and Protectorate administration. Consequently, the over the years replicated the political ethos of its mother—the Church of England, cultural variations not-withstanding. The emerging political ethos for the Native Anglican Church (NAC) as it was then called, followed that of the mother Church—the Church of England.[3] It followed by default that the NAC was to be established in the same style as the Official Church, although as Mudoola puts, it did not become a national church (1996, p. 43). Later in 1962, the Archbishop had expressed a wish that the Church of Uganda be recognised as the "Official Church," to which Obote objected on the grounds that the new Constitutions did not allow (Mudoola, 1996, p. 44).

Also, it had a rather indirect impact through missionary education in the formation of the political mind of the pioneer politicians. Okullu argues that "it was through Christian schools that our present leaders acquired the skills and sharpened the toll with which they eventually drove away the white man (Okullu, 1974, p. 1). This statement is expressed in light of the anti-colonial sentiments that birthed the independent movement. It does, however, express the general point about the impact of missionary education of the formation of the political mind of the African leaders. A case in point for Uganda was Milton Obote, who on the Uganda's Independence Day in 1962, declared that "had it not been for the revolutionary teaching of the Church, Uganda would not have achieved its independence when it did" (Okullu, 1974, p.2). Such feelings as expressed by Obote seem to have come out of an awareness of the role played by the Church in the formative stages of Uganda political history.

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[3] The Church of England, out of which is derived the 'Anglican Church' (Latin *ecclesia anglicana)*, originally used to refer to part of the Catholic Church situated in England (Ward, 1998, p. 13). However, it assumed a national identity during the English Reformation by an Act of Parliament in the Act of Supremacy in 1534, becoming the Church of England. The Church of England, thus, became the officially established Christian church in England and the Mother Church of the worldwide Anglican Communion.

The residual impact can further be seen in the long history of religiopolitical cleavages and the birth of religious-based political parties in 1950s and 60s (Mudoola, 1996; Mutibwa, 2008). A specifically Anglican-based political party—Uganda National Congress (ANC) was born in 1952. It was the progenitor of the UPC, a party predominantly for Anglicans. At the first elections in Uganda, the British protected their interests in Uganda by having an Anglican—Milton Obote—as first Prime Minister over Bendicto Kiwanuka, a Roman Catholic. Obote himself sought to identify closely with the Church (Mudoola, 1996, p. 43). The Church also sought to identify closely with the state.

Although indirectly, it is clear from the above that Tucker's theology provided for the Church its initial theological framework for thinking about politics. It ensured a close working relationship between the Church and state. Mudoola comments on the state of affairs:

> While the colonial power just stopped short of recognizing the Anglican Church as the 'Official Church', the missionaries were aptly rewarded in their politico-evangelisation mission with the emergence of Protestant establishment in the kingdom and districts of Uganda (1996, p. 43).

The close Church-state identity would continue even during the time of Archbishop Brown, the leader of the Anglican Church in the 1950s and 1960s. Mudoola would see this as "providing bases of legitimacy of colonialism and colonialism as providing a political umbrella for the Church's work" (1996, p. 44-45). During these years, the Church seems to have maintained a strategic political position. This position seems to have ensured its robust political participation, until in the early 1970s.

However, while the political roots of the Church of Uganda for a long time remained strong, they weakened at the hands of native Church leadership (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021). The decline came to its lowest point during the Idi Amin Administration (1971-1979). (Turyahabwe, OI, 13/7/2021). The years of Amin's Administration were tough for the Christian community in general. Along with other religious groups, the Anglican Church, as Pirouette (1980) shows, "found themselves dragged, against their will, into becoming foci of opposition, until eventually they became feared by those in power" (p.13). The return of multi-party system of governance in Uganda following the ousting of Idi Amin in 1979 saw the general re-awakening of the religiopolitical parties. For the Church, there was a further demonstration of religiopolitical interest when in 1980 CP, a predominantly for Anglican Baganda, was born. This illustrates the continued

deep-rooted religiopolitical consciousness (Carbon, 2000, 517; Museveni, 2000, p. 16). In that way we see the resurgence of Anglican political participation.

The above resurgent political activity simply demonstrated the the influence of historical religiopolitical nexus. It remains to be demonstrated what theological ideas influenced the Church's political involvement in during the NRM Administration between 1986 to 2016.

4.2.2.2 The Bishops' Political Voice as the influence to Church's political participation.

In pursuit of the theological ideas influenced the Church's political involvement, the question, thus, was: What drives the Anglican political ethos in Uganda? In answer to this question, it was established from respondents that the bishop's political voice moved the Church's political direction. By the Bishop's political voice, respondents implied that the position of the bishop as a leader defined the political direction at different localities. Obetia, for example, said: "The Church's political decisions are based on the bishop and where he stands" (OI, 14/7/2021). The localisation of the political vision to the person of the bishop pointed to the extent to which the Church's ecclesiology was the driving factor for the Church political vision.

Reference to the Church of Uganda ecclesiology defining its political theology point to the high office of a bishop in the Anglican Church, and the potential for its political influence. This is embedded in the Anglican heritage. It can be traced to the theology espoused by Jeremy Taylor, Bishop of Down and Connor. Embedded in this idea is the principle that, "the Church is present as a whole in a council or synod" (Evans and Wright, 1991, p. 217). This is said in reference to the representative role of the Bishop. According to Taylor, "… the determination of the councils pertains to all. And is handled by all, not as a diffusion but in representation." Citing St. Cyprian, he underscores the role of bishops in Church: "the Church is in the bishop," viz, by representation, "and the bishop is in the church."

The idea of the Church being the bishop and the bishop being the Church is central to the local dioceses in the Church. It is perhaps even carried to its logical conclusion to the extent that the influence of the bishop in politics is no longer implied; rather, it is actualised. References by Obetia (OI, 14/7/2021), regarding the Church's political decisions being based on the bishop and where he stands, point to this. This

ecclesiological tradition, to a large extent, though only partially conscious, drives the Church's political tradition. Obetia draws the implication of this when he said:

> "For the Anglican Church, where the bishop stands is where the Church stands. And, so far, where the archbishop stands [politically] is where the Church stands. In a sense, [the Church] is bishop cantered, it is leader-cantered. Our ecclesiology is very strong and it guides our political philosophy" (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021)

For the Church of Uganda, this has given birth to the polity of diocesan autonomy. This polity has tended to strengthen the high level of autonomy in the Anglican structures, giving bishops the more central place in the provincial church. The result of this is clearly seen in the lack of a generally agreed upon political opinion in the Church. Thus, Obetia (OI, 14/7/2021) pointed out: "The Church's politics is localized in the jurisdiction of a local diocesan bishop or its archbishop. For that matter, there is no generally espoused political vision for the Church." He further said that, "The consequence of the episcopal-driven politics in Church of Uganda is almost obvious: localisation of political vision. This is intensified by the lack of a political theology espoused by the Church of Uganda" (OI, 14/7/2021). This in turn translates to the generally low political consciousness and the Church's naivety to its political theology.

By the same token, the extent to which the Church's minimal political consciousness has been explicated at local levels is mired by several factors, as described by Obetia: "….the Church leadership is relatively weak and compromised, and that the political icons, if they exist, are limited. The consequence of this is lack of political vision for the Church. Yet, the bishop remains an icon for political leadership at the diocesan level" (OI, 14/7/2021). His further assessment of the Church's capacity to offer a political vision is revealing of the reason it faces challenges in exercising political action:

> …when we do [episcopal] leadership elections, it is not really spiritual uprightness that guides. It is the little benefit that we stand to gain when one is up there that guides our selection. This is a dangerous era we are in. Right now, [the Diocese of] Kumi is struggling. This is because people come into such position of crucial leadership through a process that considers peripheral issues.

Turyahabwe (OI, 13/7/2021) was in agreement with this opinion, and further said: "Political icons in the Church are numbered." By implication, this meant that the Church's political voice was not so significantly strong as to draw attention. It would

sound from this that the style of leadership election had affected the quality of leadership in the Church. Like Obetia, Turyahabwe believes that this had yielded a form of leadership that was compromised and weak. This weakness was reflected in the preoccupation of a bishop on local politics. Consequently, this has rendered the Church of Uganda leadership limited in its ability to exercise national political authority.

Obetia points out another challenge faced by the Church—lack of political intelligence. Leaders, he says, "may not be politically aware of what is happening, and how things are happening now. This has yielded a lack of social and political vision among the Church leadership" (OI, 14/7/2021). In consequence: "It [has] dulled our prophetic ministry, and rendered blunt our [ministry's] cutting edge. The Church has no clear political direction. This political blindness and political naivety is dangerous."

It is clear from the foregoing discussion why political voice is so varied and weak. The localized political vision of the Church in the person of the local bishop narrows the political vision to a diocesan scale where the local agenda defines the political agenda. From this vantage point, they are highly autonomous and weaker politically at the provincial level. Cumulatively, it seems to have impacted the Church's capacity to offer a political vision and to exercise any political action. It is partly also the reason why the Church seemingly is lacking in political icons that articulate the Church's broader political vision. It necessarily follows, by implication, that the Church's political voice was not so significantly strong as to draw attention. Following this, the study investigated other theological motifs that influenced the Church's involvement.

4.2.2.3 Other Theological Motifs that Influenced the Anglican Church's Political Involvement

Besides the position of the bishop, respondents also indicated several religious/theological motifs that drove Anglican political participation. The following theological were distinguishable: Leadership is from God; God is a political God; Man is a politician, and is created to rule; the inextricable relationship between Church and politics, and Church and state being irreconcilable entities.

Underlying the conviction that leadership is from God was the idea that "[h]honesty in leadership was paramount, and choosing persons that are honest to serve in political posts was key" (Chobe OI, 17/6/2021). Chobe shows how some people participated out of spiritual convictions: "It is proper for the church to be involved in politics because our God is a political God." He further asserted that "a state without

leadership is a troubled one'! (Chobe OI, 17/6/2021). His understanding of the word church (*ecclesia*), in itself is political. This, therefore, makes the church relevant and active in politics, for godliness exalts a nation (Proverbs 14:34).

Respondents also believed that man is essentially political. Aliganyira (OI, (13/6/2021) said: "Every human being is a politician by nature. We are born politicians." She drew this from the understanding that at creation, God put everything in place in five days, on the sixth day he created man, and man's position was to rule and take control of whatever was in place what God had created (13/6/2021). This theological position emphasised the inherent political nature of humanity, and closely related to this is the assertion that "man is naturally a political animal" (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). The implication is that participants naturally acted politically. He further cites that the Anglicans in history 'protested' against the Roman politics of governance. By this he implied that protesting against a political establishment, such as Rome, was part of the Anglican political ethos. For him, "politics influences the way of living of the people, which is also the concern of the Church." He concluded saying, "it is hard to divorce politics from church."

Others saw the intricate relationship between the church and nation, and that both the church and state are caring for are the same people, and are concerned about issues such as peace and security, justice. In that way the church is involved in the politics of the nation (Odur, OI, 17/6/2021). Closely related to that was the conviction that Church and state are inseparable. "Uganda politics are played by Church members, therefore, there is no way they are not involved. Although the Church addresses issues holistically, politics tends to look at one side of human life" (Odur, OI, 17/6/2021). Otara (OI, 17/6/2021) also articulated it this way: "Well, if you look at the church as the people and not the building, then I think that people who get involved in politics are people who go to the church…If that is so then it means the church which is the people are active in politics." He furtherr points out that there are some definite areas or instances where the church as an institution also comes into politics, in most cases as a mediator [between] aggrieved parties for the puspose of peace building, and I think the church has done good in that aspect of politics" (OI, 17/6/2021). By seeing the Church and state as inseparable, the two were thus understood as mutually coexisting, and membership as overlapping.

Those who were opposed to Christian participation, especially of the involvement of Church leadership in politics, also had theological support. For them, as Turyahabwe

(OI, 13/7/2021) expressed, the Church leadership were guided by the general evangelical spirituality from which the Church in general draws social-political vision. This is one whereby church and politics are two irreconcilable entities. Thus, he said:

> The unwritten tradition of Church of Uganda political participation is that if you join politics you resign [from active church ministry]. The implication here is that anyone who join politics ceases to be useful to the Church in the sense that you are no longer directly involved. So if you want to join political affairs, then you have to leave Church affairs (OI, 13/7/2021).

This statement expresses the opinion of some members of the Church of Uganda that is born out of a conviction that politics is 'a no-go area' for the Church leaders.

The above theological positions variably express personal conviction rather than the Church's canonical teachings. The high level of variation and the prominence of personal political opinion was illustrated by the protracted debate on Bishop Zebedee Masereka, a retired bishop of South Rwenzori Diocese. Masereka had offered to stand for an elective political position of MP for the Elderly. This raised concern among the Church of Uganda leaders, and the exchange arising therefrom demonstrated a clear lack of an agreed political direction.

The initial concern was expressed by Bishop Niringiye on August 7, 2020 in a post that appeared in the Church of Uganda Leadership Forum: "What is the position of our church for an ordained minister to join partisan politics? It is possible that some will plead that he is retired? However, he is still an ordained minister in the Church of Uganda." The response to this inquiry was to reveal a lot about the Church's political ethos. One issue that came to the fore was the Church's position regarding participation in politics by serving clergy. This was cited from Resolutions adopted by the 20th Provincial Assembly (PA) of the Church of Uganda held at UCU, Mukono on 18th – 21st August, 2010. *On Politics and the 2011 Elections***,** the PA had given the following guidance:

- That the Church of the Province of Uganda should pray that the elections will be violence free.

- That in light of the divisive nature of politics, no ordained person and commissioned worker shall seek an elective post. However, should they wish to do so, they should follow the same procedure as the civil servants and resign from his/her work in the church.

- That the clergy and lay readers should desist from direct involvement in politics.
- That no clergy should openly support a party or carry a party card.
- That display of political party materials on church premises is prohibited.
- That the clergy and commissioned workers can encourage Christians to stand for elective positions at all levels.
- That should a clergy choose to resign from his/her work in the church to join politics, he/she shall not wear clerical robes and failure to abide by this will warrant for disciplinary measures to be employed.

These resolutions represented the Church's joint political position at the time. They were probably the first ever, expression of the Church's political position. They reflected what at the time was construed as the Church's immediate calling: to pray that the elections will be violence free and to stay clear of the partisan politics. Also, it was deemed reasonable for the Church to not display of political party materials on church premises, and for the clergy and commissioned workers to encourage Christians to stand for elective positions at all levels.

The extent to which these Resolution would be implemented to their logical conclusion was questionable. Thus, for example, Sabiiti (OI, 7/8/20201) cited the issues regarding the Church's power to enforce these resolutions. In general, Sabiiti's concern was quite understandable. This is for the reason that some clergy, while not concealing party leanings or not carrying a party card, still worked for the parties. Moreover, powers vested in the person of bishop gave him the liberty to take an autonomous and a binding political decision. Yet, it appeared that some bishop openly showed support for the ruling Administration. For this reason, the position Church expressed in the Resolution was hardly regarded. Moreover, given the compromised situation of the Church through gifts by the State, Church leaders were more inclined to openly support the Administration.

Unfortunately, these resolutions had not been published widely, and, therefore, had very little measurable influence. Not surprisingly, the people and Church leaders seemed not to be aware of the decisions made by its highest ruling council. If they were at all, the decisions were not conclusive. For example, could a retired bishop, or clergy in general, entre active politics and yet wear clerical robes. Lack of clarity on such issues is probably the reason the retired bishop saw no harm in joining elective politics.

Attempts to guide the Church in assuming a reasonable stance in relation to the candidature of the retired Masereka were fairly protracted. Argument ranged from emotional to use of simple analogies to well-reasoned positions. One spirited arguments was by Joseph Abura, Bishop of Karamoja (8/8/2020):

> Are we already blind to our history even right in Uganda? ... A number of Clergy including the Religious (hope you know what I mean) are in active politics and in parliament. Today's parliaments worldwide are passing laws which are weird and openly against especially the Christian religion. Yet, we complain in quiet, and perhaps in prayer only without action. This increasingly secular world is going to another direction where all who think [that] politics is not for the ordained. Moreover, even at appropriate time, such as in retirement, is [joining politics] not right? We have to think twice.

His counsel was, "let our usual noise be responsible." This implied that the Church's voice needs to: "be pro-people, development and a means of correction of many issues gone funny in our socialites;" Also, the Church ought to have such mature, tested, and well informed, morally upright persons with human voices, such as Bishop Masereka, in parliament and in government. Furthermore, it might requires "amending our constitution." Short of any reasonable human answer,

> The base line, however, must be about what the Lord God says. Let the one who wants to enter active politics be sure the Lord who is Lord of the choices of leaders be clear about it, so that IF GOD SAYS 'YES,' WHO WILL SAY 'NO' IRRESPECTIVE OF YOUR LAWS? For God chooses people for this and that, but may change their directions and calling as long as it is WITHIN THE SERVICE OF THE SAME PEOPLE (Abura, 8/8/2020).

For the retired bishop aspiring for elective political office, he said:

> Now it is time to serve in other capacities. The church must not muzzle your vision but should know you are not going to lead cows or goats but the same people of God, moreover in a wider capacity. If other *wazei* choose you by the will of the Lord, please, move on (Abura, 8/8/2020).

Bishop Abura here seemed to argue in pragmatic terms, that is to say, according to what would be reasonable at the time. His opinion is strongly put, and supports the need for the Church leaders to be politically proactive, and if the Resolutions seem to muzzle the Church leadership in the bid for political action, it is time to amend them.

Another equally pragmatic point of view is by Stephen Mungoma (9/8/2020):

> How many resolutions of the Church of Uganda have been ignored or not adhered to by the very people who made them? Few treat them seriously. We shall all get involved in party politics and be voted into positions in our parties and after all "the Lord has spoken" to us.

These words were said in salient support for an a political action. However, they are informed by the precedent where even the PA Resolutions in the past have been disregarded by the Church leaders in celebration of the autonomous decisions. Thus, the principle of precedence rather than a well-thought out theological position should be given priority.

A different point of view tended to see the problematics in the position taken by Bishop Abura and Stephen Mung'oma. Bishop Niringiye (8/8/2020), for example, said:

> The Civil Rights Movement was indeed a political movement, but it cannot and should not be likened to elective party politics. If Bishop Masereka was leading a movement for the care and dignity of Older Persons in our society, I do not think that the resolution of the Provincial Assembly would bar him. I also read from others, that the Lord has spoken to Bishop Masereka. By implication, this means that the Lord did not speak to the Assembly that resolved to limit the role of ordained leadership of the Church. The right step then would be to move to amend the resolutions.

The argument of Bishop Niringiye in the discussion sounded a bit more sobering to the Church in light of the larger picture that seemed to have been overlooked by Abura and Mung'oma. Their argument sounded like the already existing position of the Church through its legislative body, the PA, did not necessarily matter. The implication is that what worked then over-ruled all other considerations. In that way, the PA Resolutions were irrelevant.

The extreme positions taken by the two bishops heightened the dilemma of many. For example, Samuel Bakutana expressed:

> Our very own who would genuinely stand for the cause of the church are scared away from political involvement, [being] reminded that POLITICS IS A DIRTY GAME. Even when one of us stands for elective politics, we do not support them! Even when a retired clergy gets involved either in elective politics (e.g. Bp Masereka) or the cause of advocating for justice (e.g. Bp Zac), we have no kind words for them (9/8/ 2020).

This dilemma was probably shared by many people as they tried to reconcile the conservative political attitude emphasizing distance from, and the liberal attitude open to, political participation. Samuel Bakutana put his dilemma in heart-searching questions:

> Who bewitched us? What do we want? Which bible do we read? What happened to the leadership/influence/dominion mandate? What are the boundaries of the "salt of the earth" imperative? What is the relevance of the church in social and political affairs? How is the church influencing the narrative at all? Who is actually setting the agenda for the church? (9/8/2020)

The strong arguments for and against the candidature of Bishop Masereka did not have a resolution. However, the debate was of significance to the Church's political theology. First, it shored up the Church's political stance imbedded in the PA Resolutions that would otherwise have evaded notice by many Anglicans. These remain the Church's legal position, which outlines the Church's theological stance (Obura, 13 /8/2020). Second, it highlighted the various theological convictions regarding the Church's participation in politics. And, while the PA Resolutions expressly state the Church's theological position, the various strands of theological positions highlight the need to rethink certain provisions. Third, considering the various theological positions, especially the strong critiques on the current theological position in favor of revision according to the changing circumstances (Tumuhimbise, Obura, 13 /8/2020), one might as well say that the various strands represent the general Church's political ethos that is sharply varied, and how that has impacted the participation by Anglican in politics.

Responses to the question regarding what influnece the Church's involvement in politics highlighted other none-theological motifs. And these shall now be discussed in the next section.

4.2.2.4 Non-Theological Motifs that Influenced the Anglican Church's Involvement in Politics during the NRM Administration between 1986-2016

From the responses, the Church's participation was influenced by several none-theological motifs. Among these was the need to see change in the status quo. Nagami (OI, 26/7/2021) cited, "continued bloodshed of innocent victims, rampant corruption and the need for change" as driving factors towards political involvement" in the bid for change. She observed that Anglicans have in the past supported the regimes that fight to ensure peace in the country. For the same reason, the Church had the mandate.

There were also value-driven considerations. Chobe (OI, 17/6/2021) cited, "desire to see values restored. Such included honesty and faithfulness in handling the country's resources, unity and need to abolish tribalism in the country, need to practice true love by government supporting church projects." A response such as this pointed to the fact that beyond the daily sundries of life, there were people for whom political involvement was a higher calling. Similarly, frustration of some Christians as a result of the flaws observed in current politics caused them to want to make a positive contribution. Thus, some Christians were driven into politics in order to make a difference. For Okwera (OI, 17/6/2021), "People join politics in order to tell the truth. In

politics some people do not tell the truth, those wishing to join as Christians want to go and say the truth to save people from lies." Related to this, Christians were involved in support of good character. The reason being, as Ogwang (OI, 4/9/2021) puts it, "people believe in a person of good character, they believe his reason will be fair. But if [the candidate is] from another religious denomination the people cannot trust that." On this, Christians are often guided by the church and also by the opinion leaders.

Participation in politics was also seen by respondents as part of their life growing up, as well as call of duty (Kintu, OI, 3/11/2021). Others still drew from long-established Anglican political ethos. Lugemwa (OI, 17/6/2021), for example, cited "certain established traditions,' especially in relation to presidential positions: "In Uganda the president has to be male and Protestant/Anglican." By this, he pointed to the residual traditional Anglican political ethos. He went on the say, "definitely the political strength of the Anglican Church seems to have established this as an unwritten tradition. Consequently, a majority of democratically elected presidents of Uganda have been Anglican." A related sentiment was expressed by Nagami (OI, 26/7/2021) when she said: "The idea that the president comes from the Church of Uganda gave some people impetus to look at the government as ours as opposed to theirs."

A closely related issue was the socio-cultural factor. Ubomba (OI, 26/7/2021) identified Anglicanism as a dominant socio-cultural factor. "Remember, most of the schools passing on this culture have been Anglican, or in general, Christian. And so, naturally, ideas—political theology—through that went indirectly into the population of the country." He identifies how, during most of the years in which Museveni has been ruling, political trends have been predominantly Anglican-influenced, especially less from the national levels, but more from the local levels where local Christians in churches acted boldly. However, he pointed out that [generally Anglicans] want an Anglican to be in power is still very true in terms of negotiations from the bottom to come up (Ubomba, (OI, 26/7/2021). These sentiments may be said concerning people's experience at the urban as well as it the rural contexts. He further points out that the Anglican political hegemony seems to be so deeply entrenched that it is difficult to change until the education culture is transformed, or nationalistic considerations have been inculcated in our young people very strongly (Ubomba, (OI, 26/7/2021).

Some Christians also joined politics as a result of awareness of their civic responsivity. They understand by so doing that involvement of Church of Uganda Christians in politics is a right and mandate of every citizen of Uganda regardless of

religious affiliations (Otara, OI, 17/6/2021). Other reasons were more sentimental: quest for public recognition. Others are swept along by the current. Most of them do it because others are doing it. Similarly, others were involved in order to acquire independence and power to influence and also pay back expectations.

It is clear from the above that besides theological motivation non-theological considerations influenced political participation. Even what was cited by respondents as theological consideration was superfluous. This tended to confirm the observations made by respondents above that there was generally low consciousness of Anglican political theology in the Church, and that that Anglican Church's participation in politics was not necessarily theologically driven. Instead, non-theological considerations also motivated political participation. This was particularly indicated by the level of variability in political participation that highlights the emerging Anglican political ethos.

4.2.3 Instances of Church Involvement in national politics

Based on the above-expressed low consciousness of Anglican political theology, it was necessary to interrogate the emerging Anglican political ethos or ways in which the Anglicans expressed their political responsibility, and out of which to understand the extent to which this had impacted Anglican participation in national politics. In light of this, respondents were asked to share instance of the Anglican Church's involvement in politics. This was intended to understand the unique motivation, forms and extent of Church political involvement. For this the study drew from individual interviews. It also drew from the field survey using questionnaires sent on-line to respondents. Both methods yielded various levels of Church's political involvement, and are summarized in three forms: Individual involvement, Church Leadership Involvement and Institutional Involvement. These are here-below discussed.

Individual involvement was described as personal involvement by members of the Church without necessarily being influenced by the Church. First, this was by local members offering themselves for elective political positions at local and national levels. On this, Kakembo (OI, 4/7/2021) said; "We have a number of our Christians who are in politics. Some of them stood for the office of counsellors at local, Municipality, and District levels. Members of the Church also stood for Members of Parliament (MP) for Woman, the Disabled, and for the County." A personal testimony by Kakembo indicated his level of involvement:

> I got involved in Uganda's politics since 1995 as a youth chairperson at LC II level and later campaigned for the position of LC III Councillor to the district from 2002 to-date. I have also held the positions of Deputy Speaker, and now the Vice Chairperson of the District **(**Kakembo, OI, 4/7/2021)

Also, Ogwang (OI, 4/9/2021) said; "I have played a role as a political leader. I was a treasurer in UPC. At the moment, I am the chairman LC of my village. Inside me, is UPC." Similarly, Ekwang (OI, 10/10/2021) was proud to identify himself as politician, particularly because of the achievement of his party (UPC): "Politically, it has done so much for the country." Others, however, were involved simply as registered voters. In this way, the motivation in general was awareness of civic duty. Others offered support to the Church of Uganda candidates. In cases where the candidate was a prominent member of the Church and had a track record of faithful service, the Church in the local areas delivered a block vote. In this case the motivation was quest for faithful delivery of political responsibility.

Others were involved at policy level, such as offering political consultations to candidates, advocacy and lobbying for extension services nearer to the people (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). Also, they advised people against making wrong choices and guarding against bribery. In relation to this, they took part in political campaigns and encouraged the participation of able young adults, both men and women, in decision-making on matters of importance to them. Here, voters valued political participation as a means of influencing matters affecting them.

Others assumed different positions during the electoral process, such as civic education, while others took part in consultation and workshops organized by UJCC on elections early in 2016 (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). Some worked as election observers, while others articulated political slogans emphasizing moral value such as unity, transparency, accountability and observation of human rights (Namubiru, OI, 23/7/2020). The goal for this was to minimize or eradicate "the vices of political divisions, corruption, and abuse of human rights, conflicts and other social injustices that compromise harmony in many communities" (Namubiru, OI, 23/7/2020). This was born against the background of wide-spread cases of elections-related human rights abuses, violence and injustice. Their goal, therefore, was to contribute towards eradication of such expereince.

Individual involvement demonstrated the extent to which individual politically persuaded persons made a deliberate choice. Without necessarily acting in conformity to

the Church's position, the individual made an independent choice. Such efforts were echoed by Turyahabwe when he said: "as people, we have our political inclination" (OI, 13/7/2021). Others, citing the age-old adage that "Man is a political animal" (Anonymous, 17/10/2021).

Responses also indicated that while there was a tradition of political participation among the Church leadership it was variably expressed. This mostly was out of individual conviction. Musana (OI, 30/9/2021) put it thus: "It was mostly individuals taking a very vocal stand. [We] know that there have been leaders, such a Yona Okoth and Cyprian Bamwoze, who were very vocal in UPC, and acted in their individual capacity." The two were high-level Anglican Church leaders. Yona Oktoth served a Bishop of Bukedi Diocese (August 1972-January 1984) before he was made the Archbishop of the Church of Uganda. Cyprian Bamwoze was a long-time Bishop of Busoga (August 1972-January 1999). Both men were known political activists and UPC supporters. Yet, while politically active, neither of them espoused the Church's political ideas, ideals and any principles underpinning their political activity (Musana, OI, 30/9/2021). Instead, they acted as convinced politicians of the old UPC party offering alternative ideology.

In other cases, Church leadership involvement was vicarious. That is to say, they were involved as a representative of the Church. Such activities included mitigating the challenges arising from political conflict. Sentongo (OI, 10/10/2021), for instance, said: "As a Christian and church leader, I sensitized people about politics, and taught them how to live in community, and encouraged them to register and vote." He also encouraged them to vote for the people who live in the community with whom they were familiar, and those that were qualified to stand. He, however, cautioned them against the potentially divisive nature of politics, and encouraged them to remain united. Beyond talking, he actively participated as an observer and in talks with candidates as individuals and in groups, discouraging them from violence. Also, he discouraged divisive politics, and as much as possible, encouraged them to go and vote. His attention was on value-centred leadership, and said: "…it [was] important that they take a stand" for a candidate "they believe is able to deliver godly values in terms of justice, fairness and equality" no matter who they are. Other forms of vicarious participation by Church leaders was reconciling the politicians and their supporters with those of a different political camp (Kibirigye, OI, 30/07/2021). For instance, after the elections, bishops undertook to reconcile both winners and losers. This helped control tension in the region. In several

other instances where campaigns were characterized by use of abusive and vulgar language on personalities, bishops were said to have challenged the perpetrators, and encouraged all candidates instead to share their manifestos (Sentongo, OI, 10/10/2021).

Church leaders also provided counsel and spiritual support to individual candidates. They served as spiritual advisors to political candidates (Tegule, OI, 30/07/2021). The Church leader also prayed for fairness, and condemned violence during campaigns, and engaged in sensitising people on politics. Also, the Church, Government and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) worked together, especially in civic education programmes, elections observation and monitoring. Kibirigye also said that the Church got involved in mitigating the effects of conflict, and sensitizing those candidates on the need to sell themselves through their manifestoes rather than trading insults publicly (OI, 30/07/2021). This was in cases where poor inter-personal relations between candidates had degenerated to proportions of attacking the private lives of persons.

Churches also hosted programmes organized by elders and intellectuals. The purpose of these, as Kibirigye put it, was "sensitizing the congregations for political activity" (OI, 30/07/2021). This was in the bid to get church members to register and to turn up to vote in large numbers. Some of their advice was rather parochial, for example, they "discouraged church members from voting [for] none church goers, and encouraged the church to support and be able to seek support for the church projects and programmes" (Kibirigye, OI, 30/07/2021).

Thus seen, in individual Church leadership involvement, leaders got politically involved out of personal conviction outside without necessarily espousing the Church's position. They took part in various ways, and in forms that were within their means.

Involvement of the Church as an institution constituted third-party involvement. That is to say, the church acted as an institution. Respondent cited the Church's participation in the Presidential candidates' debate prior to the 2016 presidential election. For this, the church participated under the umbrella of the IRCU. The Church also partnered with CSOs for civic education. One of such organization was UJCC, which worked to create awareness on people's role in politics. Also, they encouraged participation by church members in all election processes. Through the same partners, the Church guided government on elections-related programmes. For instance, through UJCC, church-affiliated body, it advised government on the gaps realized or envisaged during and after the elections, respectively. In this way, the church meetings acted as a campaign platform for the potential Christian voters.

The Church also acted as an arbitrator between aggrieved individuals from different political parties. These were instances where politics was marred by violence (Sentongo, OI, 10/10/2021). In such cases, the Church, as an institution, built bridges between warring political parties. Also, the Church offered moral and spiritual support to candidates. In many cases, Church leaders encouraged Christians to engage in prayers, and created opportunities for interaction with politicians (Sentongo OI, 10/10/2021). In other cases, the Church played an advisory role, cautioning Christians against making wrong choices and encouraging them to guard against bribery. Also, when they attended church service, aspirants for elective positions were cautioned against excesses in politics. Sometimes the churches simply opened their doors to aspirants to speak to the members of the congregations.

Through these three ways the church was seen to be involved in political activity. Some of them were initiated by the Church, such were those that were within their means. Others were initiatives by the partner civil society organization. Either way, these and such other efforts ensured the Church's participation in political activities.

4.2.4 Levels of Participation by Anglican Church Members

From the various forms of Church's involvement in political activities as indicated above, it was possible to draw various levels of commitment by both the Church members and leadership. The levels of involvement seemed to demonstrate the level of motivation for political participation. Based on the responses, it was established that the level of participation of the Church in political activity varied significantly, ranging from explicit to non-involvement.

First, there were cases of full involvement by both Christians and Church leaders. For example, Church leaders were involved in politics as part of their role in advising, first, the politicians and second, Christians in exercising their civic obligation as stakeholders in the government (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). Church leaders also worked collaboratively with civic leaders to offer guidance. Through media, especially the local FM Radio Stations, community meetings and church meetings, Church leaders provided the guidance needed to the Christians (Kimuli, OI, 23/07/2021). In cases such as above, leaders assumed the biblical role of a watchman in politics, and adjudicating in political activity (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). They guided the political aspirants and encouraged them to understand their divinely appointed political role. They also used their strategic position to work collaboratively with civic leaders to do civic education (Kimuli, OI,

23/07/2021). Also, Christians took part in all elections-related activities. In general, the local spread of the church ensured access far and wide to even hard-to-reach areas with the double-pronged message, first, to politicians and second, to Christians actively involved in politics.

Activities that Church leaders were fully involved in were deemed less divisive, and, for that matter, not problematic. These activities were, therefore, unlikely to raise concerns from among political leaders or the local electoral officials. A case in point was at the debates of the Bill on Homosexuality: The Church leaders came out and were very vocal, they put their position out there, and the fact that the Bill turned out the way it did and became" (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). In cases such as these above, both the Church leaders and the Christians came out boldly to participate.

There were, however, a case where Christians, and especially Church leaders, kept away from any politics in the bid to avoid the direct engagement with politics. These were cases where, according to Tumusiime, it was difficult to identify fully in political activity (OI, 24/8/2021). Such cases included where some Christians strongly identified with particular parties. These were mostly for UPC and DP, rather than the NRM. In such cases, as Mugabi put it thus, "Leaders refrained from giving their views openly on the politics of Uganda, but remained supportive to the government activities by encouraging the people to participate as requested, especially participation in civic education programmes" (OI, 19/8/2021).

Also, due to their office, some Church leaders remained non-partisan. This was, first, for fear of being reprimanded by their superiors for reason of political partisanship; secondly, for fear of being caught up in violent confrontation between conflicting political parties (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). One way of exercising caution was to identify with multiple political ideologies (Serukuuma, OI, 2/6/2021). The reason for this was that "with politics in Africa, especially in Uganda, if you [stayed in one political party] in the event of a violent change of government, they can hunt you down." Being politically non-partisan was thus seen as playing safe, rather than out of fear.

The Church's involvement in many times was kept at a low profile in order to avoid violent confrontation. Instead, Church leaders and Christians sat back and prayed. Such a passive stance with regards to political participation was a consequence of fear to appear confrontational on cases where the state acts violently during election times, as well as in court-related injustices. In such cases, Church leaders chose alternative ways of exercising their civic responsibility. Such ways included giving guidance from behind

the scenes. Okwera shared that from behind the scenes, they guided people to understand that biblically, “a leader is chosen by God,” and that people merely confirm through the formality (OI, 17/6/2021). In this respect, it is needless to fight over position. Rather, people ought to learn to work together, sharing political goals.

For others, rather than simply politicking, they remained at the level of voting. For Oketch (OI, 17/6/2021) shared his experience: “Personally, I have been involved in electing any candidate for whom I am supposed to vote. To do with politics, I have not been campaigning for a particular person of my interest.” This is for the reason avoiding any form conflict with people. Opio also confessed having not participated in politics for the reasons that, “It is a waste of time, especially when you go to attend rallies and people tell you a lot of nonsense" (OI, 17/6/2021). While such lack of political substance put him off, his civic responsibility was expressed in voting.

Others remained nominal participants in politics, that is to say, they participated as enlightened Christians (Kintu, OI, 3/11/2021). In some cases, Christians were silent because they had been warned against partisan politics, but, inwardly they had their own choices, no matter whether the candidate is good or bad. In some cases, cautious participation, which tended to register low participation, was mostly on moral ground. This is for the reasons such as: “politics is dirty, sinful and worldly,” and any involvement by Church would be to clean up by working hand-in-hand with the Government” (Mukasa, OI, 10/10/2021).

Others chose the path of political apathy or non-political involvement. Whereas the level of involvement above gave the impression that the Church was actively involved in politics, there were also cases of political apathy. Although reasons for this were varied, the over-ridding reason was moral. In a way similar to those that chose the path of caution, those preferred complete non-involvement (Namyalo, OI, 17/6/2021). Reasons often cited were the ‘evils’ associated with it included; malice, character assassination and mudslinging.

Another moral reason for non-political involvement was expressed with similarly strong sentiments such as: “there is no love among people [involved in politics];” rather “politics always causes conflict and embarrassment” (Akena, OI, 2/6/2021). Others expressed personal frustration with politicians: “[Politicians] are not honest. Mainly there is no truth in what they say... Most of them are shameless in telling lies” (Okello, OI, 5/5/2021). Also, Nankya (OI, 30/9/2021) said: [Politicians] do not rely on the truth. They just say anything to destroy someone’s image.” All these sentiments express frustration

in many potential Anglican political players over the flawed political processes as well as the wrong premise based upon which politics is done in Uganda.

Another challenge that bred apathy was the frustration arising from the compromised position of the Church. It was noted that the emerging culture "in all dioceses in Uganda" was "that at the consecration of any Bishop the government usually offers a brand-new vehicle" (Namyalo, OI, 17/6/2021). This, and other forms of support, were seen to compromise the healthy involvement of the church in politics. Such deep-seated distaste for political involvement in the Church and its resultant effects was expressed in several ways. Some Christians withdrew from political involvement for fear of associating themselves with political-related evils. (OI, 30/07/2021). For that reason, they marked out the church as "a no-go zone for politics" and vice-versa, contending that as Christians, they are "never involved in politics. Instead they are only involved in church-related activities" (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). In some places whenever politicians came to campaign in church, members told them: "This is a place for God and Jesus Christ, and here…we praise the Lord. But if you want to do your politics, there is a tree over there where you can go and do politics" (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). Others never attended rallies because the 'politicking' was embarrassing and a total waste of time as candidates often demonstrated lack of political substance. Such people simply waited to vote.

Other non-political involvement resulted from extenuating circumstance. Oyet (OI, 17/6/2021), for example shared that the nature of his work prevented his involvement. Asked whether the bishop took the trouble to enlighten them of their civic responsibility, and even encourage civic participation among Christian, the answer was on the negative. Thus, the choice to participate or not in politics at whatever level, according to Oyet was left not to individual discretion, but to divine prompting: "If anyone wants to go to parliament it is by the grace of God and not us" (OI, 17/6/2021).

The variations in patterns of political participation as observed above indicated the extent of political participation by the Church of Uganda Christians and leaders. These variation revealed aspects of the emerging Anglican political ethos. In the first place, in talking about political participation, members did not explicitly identify themselves as members of the church. Kintu (OI, 3/11/2021) expressed: "It is believed that majority of Church of Uganda Christians are not actively involved in politics." This was translated to mean they are not politically involved under the Church umbrella

driven by the Anglican political theology. Rather, they were involved as private individual Christians.

Also, very explicit is the fact that in political participation, respondents distinguished the church members from its leadership. In that respect, while only Christians could freely participate, Church leadership, except in certain specific ways, did not call upon their pastoral or leadership role. For example, Bainomugisha (OI, 10/10/2021) said that, "the level of involvement of Church of Uganda Christians in politics is not full." This implied that during campaigns unlike Christians, bishops and some Church leaders were not expected to be explicitly involved.

In addition to this, there is lack of integration of Bible and politics. Oyet (OI, 17/6/2021) observed that such attitude among the people is demonstrated when the Bible is quoted erroneously to silence masses: "There is a Bible verse that talks about respect. [Perpetrators of political apathy] basically depend on similar Bible verses that make you humble," rather than on the entire Bible for guidance. This seems to point to the wide-ranging lack of literacy of politics and its relationship to the Bible. Oyet further observes that: "there has been a lot of civic education but I think the church has to come out and educate the people using the relevant bible verses that can help them to understand that they are created and put in this world to understand and play your responsibilities" (OI, 17/6/2021). Short of this, masses will go by the dominant political opinion.

Another issue was cited by Obetia when he said: "In the constitutional amendment, Government had its way." This was in reference to the fact that in politics the Church is somewhat disempowered. It was mentioned against the backdrop of the 1995 Constitutional Amendment, where Uganda was declared a secular state, the result of which Church leaders were stripped of power to influence politics. Disempowered by the constitution, Church leaders came heavily under the NRM patronism. Obetia said: "NRM patronized the church through it donations to bishops, dioceses and individuals" (OI, 14/7/2021). Accordingly, such handouts have tended to stifle the church voice against some government policies. It appears from this that some political leaders were not interested in any checks and balances by church leaders.

The foregoing discussion examined the influence of Anglican political theology in national politics. This was Objective One of the study, and was premised on the assumption that involvement of Anglicans in Ugandan politics was grounded in the foundation of their political theology. In pursuit of this objective, the study explicated

Hans Kung's description of religion as a comprehensive aspect, rather than being an issue of the past, was a contemporary experience.

The discussions highlighted the emerging Anglican political ethos. In general, it would appear that there is a low political consciousness in the Church as there was no explicite theological teaching. In stead, political participation was based on the way individuals interpreted their civic responsibility as informed by the Bible. This has in turn led to varying styles and levels of political participation. Also, it can be noted that respondents tended to draw a distinction between the Church as an institution and its leadership and the Christians. While the Church as an institution and its leadership were constrained against active involved, Christians were free to participate at all levels. However, while in general, Anglicans participated in politics, there is a section who for moral reasons, had chosen to stay away from political participation.

While the discussion highlighted to some extent the basic assumption of the premise, the study points to the fact that there was little theological influence behind the Church's participation in politics. This was partly from the religiopolitical ethos of the the Church of England, its mother church, from which it derived its political consciousness. Coupled with this was the recidual impact of Bishop Tucker's theology, which spurred political consciousness of the Anglican Church as the Establishment Church during the Protectorate and post-Protectorate period. During the study period, however, local bishop's political voice moved the Church's political direction. By the Bishop's political voice, it was implied that the position of the diocesan bishop as a leader defined the political direction at different localities. Besides these, several factors, some of which were within, while others were external to the Church, strongly motivated political participation. All these defined the Anglican Church's political ethos. However, contrary to the basic assumption of the objective, involvement of Anglicans in politics was influenced by several external factors rather than a defined political theology. Moreover, variant theological opinions espoused by bishops and other Christians motivated divergent reasons and styles of political participation. Consequently, this led to the variant expressions of Anglican political ethos.

A similar observation though different is made for the Muslim community. Similar in the sense that there was a long-established ethos of political participation, and no singular political theoogy spurred political participation. However, as we shall now observe, peculiar factors the lent Muslims to political participation.

4.3 INFLUENCE OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEOLOGY ON NATIONAL POLITICS DURING THE NRM ADMINISTRATION BETWEEN 1986 AND 2016.

The examination of the influence of Islamic political theology on national politics during the NRM administration was based on research objective three: To evaluate the influence of Islamic political theology in national politics during the NRM administration between 1986 and 2016. This objective sought to investigate how Islamic political theology had influenced national politics during the period of study. This objective was premised on the assumption that involvement of Muslims in politics was grounded on their political theology. Thus, this objective explored the extent to which the Islamic political theology had influenced the Islamic community's political participation during the NRM's Administration between 1986 and 2016.

As in Objecctive Two, this study explicated Hans Kung's description of religion as a comprehensive aspect, and rather than being an issues of the past, it is a contemporary experience (1996, p. xvii). Kung's description of religion resonated with the generally accepted notion among Muslims that Islam is "a complete comprehensive way of life" (Ahmad, 1979, 367, cited in Voll, 2013, p.65). By so describing Islam, scholars of Islam have demonstrated the extent to which it is a lived experience: "Islam is not simply a creed to be preached to the people by pronouncements. It is a comprehensive and manifest path, representing a liberating movement to free all of humanity" (Qutb n.d., 89–90, cited in Voll, 2013, p. 56). Also, al-Ghazali has argued that Islam is not simply a rationalist philosophy that humans can study when they feel like it. "Instead, it is a comprehensive path . . . for the reconstruction of the affairs of the individual, the society, and the state [dawla]" (al-Ghazali 2005, 10–11, 16, 45) (cited in Voll, 2013, p. 58). The logical conclusion out of this is that Islam makes no barriers between secular and sacred. Applied to politics, religion is a necessary aspect of it. Al-Gazali would argue that "governance is an unavoidable necessity in order for dīn to achieve its goals" (al-Ghazali 2005, 10–11, 16, 45) (cited in Voll, 2013, p. 58). Sayyid Qutb, similarly argues: "In the Islamic tradition, there is no distinction between religion and politics and no separation of church and state." It is based upon this that it is accepted that "Islam is "*dīn* and *dawla*" (religion and state); *dīn wa dawla*)" (Qutb n.d., 89–90, cited in Voll, 2013, p. 56).

Based on the comprehensive nature of Islam, this study examined how this notion was applicable in Ugandan politics. Specifically, it focused on how Islamic political theology had influenced politics during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016.

4.3.1 Understanding Islamic Political Theology

In order to establish the influence of Islamic political theology, respondents were first asked if they understood the Islamic political theology. The goal was to establish if the respondents were aware of the Islamic political theology and if they were able to identify ways in which it was expressed.

Responses demonstrated that the idea of Islamic political theology was academic, and that it was not within their competence to articulate it in the formal Islamic way. However, Kirarira expressed that Muslims were generally aware of their civic responsibility (OI, 20/7/2021). Consequently, they were actively involved at various political levels. In attempting to define it, respondents expressed political theology in descriptive ways. Some respondents, for example, understood it as an effort to leverage Muslim solidarity towards a political goal. They described it as the "Islamic brotherhood mentality; the unified global force and support from the strongholds of Islam e.g. UAE, Libya, Mecca, etc." (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). This was understood from the commonly perceived global Islamisation theory, that is to say, the agenda to the Islamise the entire world through various expressions of Sharia, such as *Khadhi* courts and Sharia banking. Another respondent conceived the Islamic political theology as an effort to "take control of the nation by occupying the highest political offices [in order] to make decisions that favour them and bring down Christianity" (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). Such perceived conspiracy theories tended to be dominant especially among the non-Muslim respondents. From this perspective, all Muslim activities, religious and otherwise, were perceived. Such included education as further illustrated by a respondent: "[Muslims] have started schools that are Islamic-based where they teach their values and beliefs" (Anonymous, 17/10/2021).

To some respondents, Islamic theology was understood in terms of fostering Muslim solidarity. That is to say, a Muslim supporting a fellow Muslim in an election. For instance, Kirarira (OI, 12/11/2021) cites how he has been approached to side with a fellow Muslim, yet, as a senior Muslim leader, that is not how the Qur'an works. He says: "The Quran does not encourage support for a Muslim simply because they are a Muslim. Rather, it encourages support for one who is a practising Muslim, one who is

morally upright, not corrupt, does not take bribes, etc." In light of this, Kirarira cautioned against simply supporting a fellow Muslim:

> One can be a Muslim and yet does not support the programmes of Muslims. Such thinking has been costly. Good non-Muslim candidates have been lost in the interest of Islamic solidarity. Sectarian tendencies tend to blind people to the candidates that are highly qualified (OI, 12/11/2021).

While he did not dismiss attempts to leverage Muslim solidarity in politics, especially appealing to the Qur'an, he urgues that one who is elected needs to be a practicing Muslim: "People will follow him not just because he is a Muslim" (Kirarira, OI, 12/11/2021). The implication is that Islamic solidarity in politics is not based simply on the nominal Muslim identity. Rather, it is based on the candidate's respectability or credibility within the Muslim community.

Others understood Islamic political theology in descriptively and in demographic terms. Accordingly, "Islam in its theology encourages numbers" (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). For this reason, they are not keen on issues of family planning. "They…produce as many as they can, and if possible, marry even the non-Muslims. This is a strategy to increase numbers." The importance of numbers in this respect is understood in relation to elections: "If democracy is about numbers, then they will be in a stronger position than Christian sticking to three children and a wife."

Others understood political theology in terms of the Sharia—the Islamic law. From the framework of the Law, drew principles that support Islamic political participation. For instance, Turyahabwe (OI, 13/7/2021) said: "First, Sharia in Islam is a comprehensive law that is not only about the religion, but also about all the affairs of man…[The] Sharia is theological in nature in the sense that it disciplines all affairs." In Uganda, as he saw it, the Sharia has the support of the National Constitution and the State. It is for this reason that Muslims have come in to ensure that it is enforced. The implication of this is that the Sharia has provided a framework that now defines what Muslims do. In addition, the Sharia is meant to ensure "their well-being on earth." So, if anyone wants good things—development—one has to be involved. It is the reason, according to him, that so many of them are now involved in the politics of Uganda. Furthermore, political theology "is expressed through deliberate active participation in politics." This is illustrated in the level of participation in elective politics.

> Look at the Kampala region in general, the majority of people in elective positions are Muslims. There is a large number of them in the Parliament. They probably understand that in order to benefit they need to be involved in the decision making. This will also help them consolidate their operation, especially their business (Turyahabwe OI, 13/7/2021).

From the perspectives above, we see that the Sharia is perceived to lay the legal framework that encourages participation in politics as a means to Muslim welfare.

It appears from the above responses that respondents tended to associate Islamic theology with its external expression. It pointed the challenge faced by respondents in articulating clearly an Islamic political theology. Instead, variations in opinion were from a much popular level, and ranged from those given by a Muslim to that by a non-Muslim. As a result of the varying level of articulation, one was hard pressed to establish an Islamic political theology from the responses.

The reason for the lack of clearly articulated Islamic political theology is traced to at least two issues. The first is the historical draw back as a result of shunning missionary education (Kasozi OI, 19/10/2021; Kezaala, OI, 20/10/2021). Muslims shunned missionary schools believing that Missionaries were interested in converting them and their children to Christianity (Kezaala, OI, 20/10/2021). As a result, literacy among Muslims remained generally low and they failed to articulate a political position.

The second is the sharp divisions among the Muslim community in Uganda, with groups espousing a strongly differing political opinion. As far back as the colonial time, the Muslim community was divided. The clear distinct groups were the Ahmadiya, Bohra, Ismailis, Sunni (Press Release, October 1967: Archbishop, Church of Uganda Archives, CUA-5, V, General File, Box/Folder 62/2, 1961, 1965, 1967-1969). Other groups that were represented in the country were the Saudi Arabia-based Wahabi, Iraqi-based Tabliqs, Libyan-based Sunni, and Pakistani-based Shiites (Kezala, 20/10/2021). These represented the divisions in the global Islam at the time and perhaps even now. There were, however, divisions in the Islamic community that were locally birthed. These were the *Juma ne Zukuli*, *Bukoto Nateete Juma*, and the Uganda Muslim Community (Press Release, October 1967: Archbishop, Church of Uganda Archives, CUA-5, V, General File, Box/Folder 62/2, 1961, 1965, 1967-1969). The locally birthed divisions over time seemed to have concretized in to the broader historical divides of: Kibuli, Old Kampala and Kawempe groups. The first two were more prominent.

The study went on the examine the roots of the locally-birthed division among the Uganda Muslim community. This was to highlight the divisions, diversity of opinion

and mutual suspicion that has plagued the development of Islamic politica theology in Uganda. The roots run deep in the history, especially following the death of Prince Nuhu Mbogo, the brother of *Kabaka* Mutesa I and the post-war leader of the Muslims in Buganda. Following the defeat of the Muslims by the Christian, and the onset of the Anglican-dominated Protectorate Administration, Muslims rallied behind Mbogo. Kanyeihamba argues that as a prince and favourite brother of Mutesa I, "Mbogo wielded his influence for the advancement and protection of Muslims" (1998, p. 11). He, therefore, remained the *de facto* leader of the Muslims in Buganda. However, following his death in 1921, the Muslim community broke up into factions. Kanyeihamba shows the points of division:

> Between the death of Prince Mbogo in 1921 and the founding of the [NAAM] in 1965, the Uganda Muslim community was divided precisely over who was to be its leader and on minor issues of doctrine and worship. The death of Mbogo left a vacuum in the leadership of the Muslim community (1998, p. 11).

Mbogo himself had wished to see the leadership maintained by a member of his immediate family, and particularly, in his 21-year old son, Badru Kakungulu. Mbogo's wish came under contestation, leading eventually to the emergence of a rival group. From then on the Muslim community got split into two groups: one led by Badru Kakungulu in Kibuli, which came to be called the Kibuli group; and the one led by Ssekimwanyi and Mugwatto of Butambala, which came to be called the Butambala group. While the issues of leadership succession were at the fore in the split, the issues were complicated further by doctrinal and worship-related issues.

The Butambala group on the one hand insisted on two issues. First that "it was in order to use the Gregorian calendar to calculate the Muslim year instead of sighting the moon" and second that it was not necessary "for an extra prayer on Friday on the *al-Zuhuri*" following the *Juma* prayer (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 11). The Kibuli group, on the other hand, insisted on having *al-Zuhuri* prayers. Attempts to resolve the difference between the two groups were futile. However, at the assembly held at Kibuli to resolve issues, Prince Badru and a majority of the delegates are said to have agreed to give up the extra prayer, and became known as the New Juma (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 11). It is further said that, "they constituted themselves as the Uganda Muslim community, with their headquarters at Kibuli, and Prince Badru Kakungulu as their leader" (p. 11). From the minority groups there were formed three splinter groups: the Zukuli group who

established their headquarters at Kawempe; the Old Juma group who refused to recognize Badru Kakungulu and continued the use of the Gregorian calendar to determine the Muslim year, and were based at Bukoto. Then there was the Kibuli group led by Prince Badru. This was the state of the Muslim community till 1965.

By 1967, the divisions among the Muslims in Uganda had taken a more political dimension that distinguished the Uganda Muslim Community (UMC) and the National Association for the Advancement of Islam (NAAM). The establishment of NAAM in 1965 created a section of Muslims who were UPC-leaning (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 15). The confusion that ensued following this can best be illustrated in the letter to the Archbishop of the CoU, Rwanda and Burundi (Letter to the Archbishop, October 1967: Archbishop, Church of Uganda Archives, CUA-5, V, General File, Box/Folder 62/2, 1961, 1965, 1967-1969) by the General Secretary of the Uganda Muslim Community. The letter in part mentions "…statements and acts of provocation and interference and committed by the newly-founded Muslim sect…" It highlights the role played by Shaban Nkutu, a UPC Muslims stalwart, among which was to mastermind the election of Swaibu Mayanja as Shaikh Mufti to preside over all the Muslim community. The development was apparently recognised by the UPC Administration as the function at which the election took place was attended by two Government ministers, including several MPs, Kingdom and District leaders. The Shaikh Mufti so elected as the head of the Muslims in Uganda was supposed to be respected (Letter to the Archbishop, October 1967: Archbishop, Church of Uganda Archives, CUA-5, V, General File, Box/Folder 62/2, 1961, 1965, 1967-1969). It is obvious that this development was not acceptable to the UMC. Moreover, the NAAM authorities were installing Imams in mosques of UMC, which resulted to a fight between the supporters.

Problems associated with the creation of the NAAM were further highlighted by the Press Statement in October 1967 by the UMC. This Statement decried the problems created by NAAM, among which were: forced occupation of Kibuli, the Headquarters of the UMC, by NAAM to be converted to headquarters of Shaikh Mufti, imposition of the Shaikh Mufti and appointment of mosque leader even to mosques of the Muslim community not belonging to NAAM. The Statement categorically rejected the imposition of the act: Shaikh Mufti had "no authority over the Ugandan Muslims" and NAAM could not make any appointment in Mosques or institutions belonging to UMC as such acts were seen to be " …a direct contravention of the Constitution." (Letter to the

Archbishop, October 1967: Archbishop, Church of Uganda Archives, CUA-5, V, General File, Box/Folder 62/2, 1961, 1965, 1967-1969)

Developments such as above pointed a lot to the challenges arising from the division faced by the Ugandan Muslim community at the time. For instance, it highlighted state interference for the political reasons fo suppressing the kingdom-leaning Kibuli sect. It, therefore, pointed to the politics behind, that is to say, the UPC-backed NAAM versus the Kibuli/Mengo-barked UMC. This was clearly indicated by the discriminate application of NAAM's impositions on: "…the many mosques belonging to the various Muslims sects…Only mosques belonging to UMC had been attacked by supporters of NAAM" (Letter to the Archbishop, October 1967: Archbishop, Church of Uganda Archives, CUA-5, V, General File, Box/Folder 62/2, 1961, 1965, 1967-1969). Furthermore, with the growing prominence of NAAM, the Kibuli-based UMC sect was on the losing end of the political spectrum, consequently it was politically disadvantaged. The implication was that a section of Muslims, resenting the UPC-barked NAAM imposition, allied with the DP. With this development came further weakening of Muslim participation in politics.

Similarly, the establishment of the UMSC in 1972 during the reign of Idi Amin, created another power base at Old Kampala for a faction of Muslims. It was created to mobilize Muslims in all activities, such as education, spirituality, politics, and the like. It was also supposed to be a tool, and politically, a means of reawakening the Muslims. Interestingly, all these groups were based at Kampala, and over time, the divisionism in the Muslim community was intensified.

It was within the above context that groups espousing strongly varying political opinion were operational. Kezala (OI, 20/10/2021), for example, shows the characteristic variances. The Saudi Islam, according to him, was highly indoctrinated into Wahabism and was very revolutionary, seeking to adhere to the tenets of Islam rather than simply political Islam. They would look down on Libyan Islam as political. And, while critical of the political Islam of Libya, Saudi Islam uses the principles of Islam to stay in office. The Libyan-based Sunni espoused traditional Islam. However, Libya's curriculum is highly political in terms of 'free Africa, free Islam.' It never trained militants; it was never controversial as the Saudi Islam was. Form within Uganda, there emerged a combination of Saudi Wahabism and the Pakistani Shiitism through the person of Jamil Mukulu, currently a dissident Muslim leader fighting the Ugandan government in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). According to Kezala (OI, 20/10/2021), Mukulu's

form of Islam was an offshoot of Saudi and Pakistani Islam, and is characterised by the quest to make a Muslim nation world-wide. They are also related to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, whose strong conviction is expressed as, "we shouldn't be led by a none-Muslim." These strands have been so influential among Muslims, especially in Kampala which is the point of convergence for all groups.

Unfortunately, the various strands operated in a community that was sharply divided along leadership lines. It would appear that the differing political opinions wedged in the various fault lines of the Muslim community. Consequently, they seem to have exacerbated the historical problem of leadership in the Uganda Muslim community. Kezaala observes:

> Unfortunately, Muslims are affected by their divides. We do not have strong influential characters in leadership, and, currently, we do not have leadership. Due to the divisions in the Islamic community, it is hard to get them mobilised around a leading religious figure. Any point of view is interpreted as belonging to a particular group (OI, 20/10/2021).

The consequences of this state of affairs to the Muslim community, as Kanyeihamba put it, were disastrous for the development and advancement of Muslim institutions:

> Disruptions and invasion of each other's places of worship and premises, which resulted in commotion in prayer or closing of mosques, were frequent. Disputes in land and sites for mosques and school became common. No agreement could be reached for appointing Deputy Registrars of marriages, each sect insisting that only its adherents were qualified for the job. Rival groups built mosques and schools in the same towns, sometimes within short distance of one another (1998, p. 13).

This description highlights the challenge of divisionism in the Muslim community that characterized its formative stages. This challenge has remained strong.

Yet, the political confusion within the Muslim community has another layer of ethnicity. Shaikh Kasim Mulumba was the Mufti during the second Obote second Administration. Kezaala (OI. 20/10/2021) shows how Obote went to Old Kampala and requested Sheikh Kasim Mulumba to mobilise the Muslims to support UPC Administration: "Mulumba is reported to have refused, saying: My duty is to lead Muslims. Those who want you will come…Basically, Mulumba was anti-Obote." (OI. 20/10/2021). Later, Shaikh Kamulegeya became Mufti, and deputized by Shaikh Abubkar Waiswa, an ethnic *Musoga* from Jinja. This sparked a war between the supporters and the non-supporters of UPC. That fight resulted in a compromised form of

government, and Shaikh Ibrahim Luwemba was elected Mufti. Kasim Mulumba resigned, but soon passed on. However, this brought about a problem in the succession. Shaikh Kasim Mulumba had the potential to mobilise support from the ethnic *Baganda* because he was educated. So, Luwemba had that backing. However, without Kasim Mulumba, Luwemba was weakened. He had no support from members of the ethnic *Baganda*, who would have wished to have their own in the leadership of the Muslim community. Yet, Shaikh Ibrahim Luwemba was the Mufti for the rest of Ugandans—a *Muganda* immigrant to Busoga, and for political reasons was paraded as a *Musoga*. Such tended to highlight ethnic politics rather than spiritual values that defined the Muslims activities in Kampala (Kezaala, OI. 20/10/2021).

Kezala (OI, 20/10/2021) further gives an analysis of the politics within the Muslim community resulting into a divisionism and lack of political focus. At the onset of the NRM Administration, Mufti Ibrahim Luwemba gained support from the Administration, and beat Prince Kakungulu to the leadership of Muslim community. Yet, this was not acceptable for Price Kakungulu to have been beaten by a *mukopi* (non-royal) and a *Musoga*. Refusing to admit defeat Ahmad Mukasa led breakaway faction based on ethnic and political interest, arguing against being led by a *Musoga*. At the coming into office of the current Mufti, Shaban Mubaje, it was hoped that he would be a unifying factor. Both the major faction: Kibuli and UMSC, accepted him for the reasons that he was young. Also, he was also accepted by both the young and old clergy.

It is clear from the above that the Muslim community had been plagued by divisionism. Consequently, there arose diverse political opinions, and mutual suspicion among the various faction. Despite the divisions, Muslims have continued to be actively involved in Uganda politics. They were able to exert considerable political influence. In light of this, the study then investigated the religious iseas that influenced Muslim involvement in politics.

4.3.2 Religious Ideas that Influenced the Islamic community's Participation in Politics between 1986 and 2016.

While the foregoing discussion hinted the high level of political awareness and activism of Muslims, it was necessary to determine the extent to which these political activities were driven by religious ideas. The following, thus, is an investigation on the Islamic teaching that influenced Islamic participation in Kampala between 1986 and 2016. This was to highlight the religious foundation for Islamic political action.

We have observed above that the level of political awareness can be traced to the historical fact that Islam was the first foreign religion in Buganda, and Mutesa I declared it as a state religion. It has since survived in the royal ranks through Prince Mbogo, Mutesa I's brother who became its *de facto* leader. We also observed that Kung's description of religion resonated with the generally accepted Islamic notion the religion is "a complete comprehensive way of life" (Ahmad 1979, 367, cited in Voll, 2013, p.65). In so doing we underscored Islam as a comprehensive way of life and how scholars of Islam have demonstrated the extent to which it is a lived experience, and how it makes no barriers between secular and sacred. We have further observed the variation in the political ideas espoused by the various sects in the Islamic community. Here now we examine the religious ideas that underpin political participation in such a way as to demonstrate. In order to do this, the following research question was posed to the respondents: What religious ideas that influenced the Islamic community's participation in politics between 1986 and 2016?

Responses indicated two aspects of a political ethos that pointed to the Islamic political theology. These were; the example by Prophet Muhammad of the integration of religion and politics, and the emergent political tradition over the periods of the caliphates, the dynasties, and the sultanates.

First, the Prophet Muhammad set a tradition (*Sunna*) of integration of religion and politics, and out of it had emerged the integral aspect of Islam as a religion. Laku (OI, 21/6/2022) indicated that Muhammad established a leadership tradition in which "politics and religion go hand-in-hand" rather than politics overriding religion. Based on this, was derived the characteristic Islamic political ethos in general, and specifically in Uganda that has sought to involve religion in politics. Thus, Idris unequivocally said of the emergent Islamic political ethos: "Islam and politics go together" (OI, 21/6/2022). From this, it is clear that the Islamic political ethos was defined during Islam's formative period by the combined religious and secular leadership role in the person of Prophet Muhammad. At Medina, the Muslim community was constituted, and the Prophet became its ruler, taking the position of a statesman, judge, and military leader, as well as the Prophet of God (Seyyed, 1993, p. 452; Schirrmacher, 2011, p.71. Regarding the formative role of Muhammad's on the Islamic political ethos, Idris said:

> When Prophet Muhammad came to Medina from Mecca, he started an Islamic state. He found many warring tribes—the Jewish and Arab tribes. The first thing he did was to put

> together a constitution that would bring together all the warring tribes, helping them know the don'ts and dos. This was [called] the Madina Chatter (OI, 21/6/2022).

Once in place, this constitution enabled him to regulate the way people lived and prosecuted wars. Until then, the pre-Islamic tribes lived as loose tribal groups, with each keeping their different faiths. However, they came together to fight common enemies. When Prophet Muhammad became their leader, he assumed the role of religious leader and head of state. By so doing, he established a tradition where both the roles of a civic and spiritual merged in the leader, and religion and politics were seen together. According to Idris and Laku (OI, 21/6/2022), Muhammad established the tradition that has since defined the Islamic political ethos.

Even though his religiopolitical leadership finally came to its full expression in Medina, the roots of Muhammad's leadership go all the way to Mecca. At Mecca, he became the religious leader of the Islamic faith following the initial revelation in AD 610. At the very onset, the harsh context of Mecca was not accommodative to his teaching against *riba*, idol worship, and injustice in favour of equality. His teaching went counter to the cherished ideals of the leadership of Mecca (Idris, OI, 21/6/ 2022). The only recourse was to immigrate to Medina where he had freedom. That is why in Islam, *Hijra* is part of religion. This would become a central tenet of the Islamic ethos as Idris further illustrated:

> When you feel that your religious obligations are restricted, you are obliged to move to another place. It is the reason why Muhammad moved from Mecca to Medina, where he found a fertile ground to exercise his faith. Here, he not only consolidated his teaching, but also his leadership position, establishing a mechanism whereby power resided in him. Only then did he teach religion with freedom (OI, 21/6/ 2022).

It has been argued by Watt (1961, p. 356) that upon his death, Muhammad left both religion and state. The emergent state operated on democratic principles. Thus, the time following the Prophets death, also referred to as the period of the four Caliphs, highlighted democratic dispensation (Jomier, 1989, p. 224). Idris (OI, 21/6/ 2022) showed that before Muhammad was buried, people first looked for the successor. Abu Bakr was elected to lead the community. Similarly, when Abu Bakr died, Umar was elected before anything would happen. So for the community, the political leadership was very crucial. Thus, the early period of Islam highlighted the importance of leadership for the Muslim community (Idris, OI, 21/6/ 2022). This was illustrated by the fact that the survival of the Islamic empire depended entirely on leadership.

Second, the Islamic political ethos is heavily influenced by the emergence of the Caliphates following the Prophet's demise in A.D. 632. Muhammad had set the pattern for the succeeding generation of leaders on the Muslim community, as Idris indicates: "When [Muhammad] passed on, his *caliph,* Abu Bakr, assumed the same responsibility, leading the Muslims politically and religiously" (OI, 21/6/2022). Religiously, he attended to their religious need—leading prayer. Politically, he organized armies to go to battles, and maintained diplomatic relations with different governments, writing letters to kings, kaisers, and so on. He was a religious and political leader.

The early Caliphate, as Esposito (1998, p. 38) puts it, "established the pattern of organization and administration of the Islamic state. Islam provided the basic identity and ideology of the state, a source of unity and solidarity." The first of these was Abu Bakr (632-634), following him was Ummar ibn al-Khattab (634-644), then Uthman 644-656), and Ali Ibn Abi Talib (656-661 (Jomier, 1989, p. 20). All these were accomplished leaders who, after Muhammad, had the task of not only consolidating, but also to administering the emergent vast Islamic Empire. During the reign of Umar, described as "a very great politician" (Jomier, 1989, p. 20), Islam gained vast territories: Syria (between 634 and 640), Jerusalem (638), Egypt (642). Jomier shows that the leadership and authority of the caliphs were premised on the claim that they were the "successors of the Prophet as head of community" and "the Prophet's practice provided the model of governance. The caliph exercised direct political, military, judicial and fiscal control of the Muslim community" (p. 38). The era of the first caliphs set the tenor of the Islamic community as established by the Prophet. It was characterised by the centrality of religion in matters of governance, law taxation and the social organization of society. This pattern would continue during the Umayyad Empire.

The coming into power of Mu'awiyya in 661 marked the onset of the Umayyad rule, which would later turn out as a hereditary rule, ensuring the Arab hegemony throughout the conquered lands. While under the early Caliphates, Islam had spread to the captured areas of Egypt, Libya, the Fertile Crescent, Syria, Iraq, Persia and Afghanistan, during the Umayyad, the empire stretched further. It would bring under the Arab Islamic rule the Maghreb (North Africa), Spain, Portugal Western Europe, then further into the Indian Subcontinent. The expansion represented the growth of an empire defined by Islamic ideas. As Esposito notes, "Umayyad rulers relied on Islam for legitimacy and as a rationale for their conquest. Caliphs were the protectors and

defenders of the faith charged with extending the rule of Islam" (Esposito, 1998, p. 40). This pattern would continue under the Abbasid Caliphate.

The onset of the Abbasid Caliphate in 750 C.E with the ascension of Abbas into power, saw the continuation of the Arab Islamic hegemony. Central to it was the alignment of government with Islam. Esposito (1998, p. 35) points out that the Abbasids became great patrons of the emerging religious scholars, the *Ulama*. They supported the development of Islamic scholarship and discipline, build mosques, and established schools. Significantly, the Abbasids continued the Arabization of the conquered land—language and culture, superseding the ancient languages of Syriac, Aramaic, Coptic and Greek. In that way, Arabic, as Esposito puts, it became the language of common discourse, government, and culture throughout the empire (1998, p. 35). This would be the case until the Mongol invasion and capture of several territories of the vast Abbasid Empire, bringing it to an end in 1258, and marking the onset of the Sultanate Period.

The Sultanate period saw the emergence of three prominent Muslim empires: the Ottoman Turkish Empire, the Persian Safavid Empire, and the Indian Mughal Empire. Trimmed in size to more localized empires, the emergent empires maintained aspects of the tradition of Islamic hegemony. Esposito further shows how this happened:

> The Ottomans drew on their Mongol-Turkish and Islamic roots and tradition, combining a warrior heritage with an Islamic tradition that believed in the universal Islam's mission and sacred struggle (*jihad*), to establish themselves as worldwide progenitors and defenders of Islam. They became the great warriors of Islamic expansion through military conquest. The titles taken by the Ottoman Sultans, such as "Warrior of the Faith," and "Defender of the Sharia" reflected the religiopolitical justification and rationale (1998, p. 62).

This tradition would be perpetrated in the Safavid Empire (1501-1722). Originally, it began as a revivalist Sufi brotherhood calling for the restoration of purified Islam, but by the fifteenth century, it had transformed itself into a religiopolitical movement. According to Esposito (p. 62), it combined the *Shii* messianism and a call for armed struggle (jihad) against other Muslim regimes, which it denounced as un-Islamic. The proclamation of Ismail, head of the Safavid family, of himself as the Shah of Iran, established the religiopolitical status of the Safavid Empire. *Shii* Islam was its official religion as an Islamic empire.

The emergence and development of Islamic rule from the time of the Prophet, through the time of the caliphates and sultanate period, are illustrative of the abiding nexus of religion and politics in Islamic political ethos. Seyyed argues that Islam has

never separated religion from politics; rather, it upholds the principle of the rulership of Allah over the Islamic community, through nomocracy—rule of the divine law (2003, p.110). Esposito (1990) similarly shows the comprehensive nature of Islam, arguing that it is "relevant to and integral to politics, law, education, social life and economics. These institutions or areas of life are not viewed as secular but rather as religious (Islamic), based on the belief that Islam is a *way of life*, and thus religion and society are interrelated" (1998, p. 159).

In Uganda, this is defined by the emerging tradition of Islamic political involvement. Islam, right from the onset, identified with the strong culture of political involvement. Even though the first Muslims were overly oriented to trade than to the spread of faith, the 30 years following the establishment of the religion saw Buganda heavily inundated with Islamic political ideas. In the first place, Islam became the state religion with every aspect of the Islamic culture widely practiced. Then there was established the stricter form of Maliki Islam and the resultant threat to the Kabakaship posed by the young converts seeking to overthrow the non-Muslim Mutesa I (King/ Kasozi/Oded, 1973, p. 6). Later, there was a formation of the religiopolitical cleavage consisting of Arabs, Swahili and the local converts, which participated in the religious wars of 1888-18892. The formation of the cleavage illustrated the attempt by the Muslims to use religion as a principle for governance in Buganda where the Arab and Swahili leaders supplied the leadership for the emerging religiopolitical cleavage.

After the wars, the pattern set by the Prophet Muhammad almost naturally emerged in Buganda. The person who would revive their political hopes, and behind whom they rallied was Nuhu Mbogo, the brother to Mutesa I (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 11). Earlier in 1890 following the expulsion of Kalema, the Muslim king, by the Protestant and Roman Catholic coalition, Muslims had chosen Mbogo as their *Kabaka*. When Lugard and his IBEAC assumed transition leadership over the post-war Buganda, he had to enter into political negotiations with Mbogo. He was given opportunity to be king or be circumcised as an Imam, and he chose to be circumcised and became a Muslim (Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021). However, he remained the political as well as the religious leader of the Muslim community. Later, Lugard brought Mbogo from Butambala to stay near Kampala. He would remain the rallying point of the Baganda (Schacht, 1965, p. 93; Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 11). Later, when he died in 1921, his son, Kakungulu succeeded him as a political and well as a religious leader. The pattern set by Mbogo and his son after him seemed to strike a common code in the Islamic political

ethos where the civic position is combined with religious leadership. Beginning with the Prophet Muhammad at Medina, and continued with the Caliphate, the emerging Islamic empire, civic leaders doubled as religious leaders (Seyyed, 1993, p. 452; Schirrmacher, 2011, p.71). These illustrated the emerging tradition of nexus of religion and politics in the Kingdom.

Later, during Amin's era, a similar pattern was observable. The difference, however, was that Amin did not declare himself the leader of the Muslim community. Rather, in his position he patronised the Muslim community by instituting a policy of affirmative action for Muslims. This was by electing Muslims into positions of leadership and economic support. He further opened up of the nation to Muslim fraternities through membership to OIC. The consequence of which was the revival of the lost glories of the ancient Islamic state. In that way, the Islamic political ethos in Uganda charted a way established by the prophet in Medina.

Following the expression of Islamic political theology, the study investigated its specific instances of political involvement. This was to highlight the extent to which Islamic political theology influenced Muslims political participation.

4.3.3 Specific Instances of Muslim Involvement in national politics during the NRM administration between 1986 and 2016.

Moving on from thinking about the conceptual nature of Islamic political theology as understood by Muslims, the investigation focused on the actual instances of Muslim involvement in politics. This was aimed at establishing the explication of the Islamic political thought. It built on above observation that Kung's description of religion resonated with the generally accepted notion among Muslims that Islam is "a complete comprehensive way of life" (Ahmad 1979, 367, cited in Voll, 2013, p.65). The study, thus, sought to demonstrate how Islamic political theology was comprehensive expressed. It is clear from the attempt to understand the conceptual nature that, as al-Ghazali has argued, Islam is not simply a rationalist philosophy that humans can study when they feel like it (al-Ghazali 2005, 10–11, 16, 45) (cited in Voll, 2013, p. 58). For that matter, the study sought to see how it was expressed in political involvement among the Muslim community.

In order to do this, a two-pronged question was asked of all respondents: In your opinion, has Islamic political theology influenced the involvement of Muslims in

national politics during the NRM administration from 1986 to 2016? If yes, cite specific circumstance and when it happened.

Responses to this question indicated that Muslims were generally aware of their religious obligation to participate in politics. For that matter, they had taken politics very seriously and had indeed been involved in national politics in different ways (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021; Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021). Kasozi, (19/10/2021) observed that Muslims had been part and parcel of Uganda political history from the pre-colonial, colonial and up to the present. Another respondent observed that they were also far ahead in political involvement, and while Muslims were few, they were more influential (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). Obetia (OI, 14/7/2021) further underscored the centrality in general of politics in Islam saying, "Muslims are very political, and that Islam is a political religion." By looking at Islam in Uganda, it is possible to see how its history seemed to reinforce their political theology. This tradition went as far back as the time of the ancient Buganda during the reign of Mutesa I (1856-1884). This was Islam's heyday in Buganda, and it was the national religion of the kingdom. In the subsequent years, Muslims in Uganda developed a culture of political participation.

One way in which Muslims were actively involved in politics was through participation in armed struggle. Kasozi (19/10/2021) shared that Muslims had actively participated in the wars of resistance in Uganda. First, during the pre-NRM era where Muslims took part in the anti-Idi Amin military campaign during the 1970s in Tanzania. Second, during Museveni's military and political campaign that spanned all the way from the bush-war times when Muslims were recruited into the NRM/NRM ranks. Many Muslims took part in the Luweero Triangle war as leaders and fighters in Museveni's NRA war against Obote II Administration. Notable names in the bush war include Abas Kibaso, Haruna Kiyingi, and Haji Moses Kigongo who would later became the Vice Chairman of the NRM. Other leaders in the NRM included former Minister Janet Mukwaya, and her late husband Abe Mukwaya, and many others. Also, some of them participated by simply leveraging their economic and political strength for support Museveni's guerrilla war. Due to their known political and economic strength, the NRM sought an alliance with Muslim communities (Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021).

Once Museveni was in power, the Administration defined anew the nature Muslims' political participation. This is first by establishing various levels of popular political participation through the LC/RC structure. From his personal experience as a politician, Kezaala shows how this was:

> When Museveni come into power with his NRM, I registered as a member of the Movement. I joined the RCs. RCs took in every one, including Muslims, and gave them opportunity for political participation in Uganda. They never looked at your education, rather, they looked at your credibility in the community—how do they see you? Do they trust you? That is why you see many Muslims getting to leadership at RCs levels than ever before. They were elected on merit since we were all under one party—the NRM (OI, 20/10/2021).

The coming of NRM Administration into office gave opportunity to the rank and file of the Muslims community to engage in political activity. Membership to the RCs did not have the requirement of education. All that was required was citizenship, local residency, and secondment after nomination, having been voted in office. Kezala further shares:

> Resistance Councils had the educated and the non-educated, and I sat on the same council as the professor—nothing to do with education. It was the first time I took part in a political activity. I was elected as a youth counsellor for Mengo-Kisenyi group. That made me become a councillor at Kampala City Council. Later, I became the publicity secretary for Kampala Youth Council" (OI, 20/10/2021).

The second way was through the affirmative action for women. One of the groups that was advantaged by the policy on affirmative action was the Muslim women:

> Muslims coming into leadership, included females. Under the affirmative action, women were accepted in leadership. But as Christian women were elected into offices, there was need to balance religious representation. Thus, they would say, let us now have a Muslim. And, if there were more Muslim women, there would be a deliberate effort to have a non-Muslim—this was so as to be seen to be supportive to them just like they had supported us (Kezaala, OI, 20/10/2021).

Through structures set up for popular participation, Muslims began to engage freely in politics. Participation was free from any form of encumbrance, and was politically formative to Muslims who had hither-to been politically at the periphery. Kezaala shares his personal experience:

> I got into politics without any invitation, except that the opportunity was available for those who wanted and were interested. No body stopped me. That is when I first learned how to debate. Later we went to the Constituent Assembly (CA). The CA had one challenge. The politicians advised people that we are going to make the constitution, you are either a lawyer or you are not. This paused a challenge. Even Muslims who were educated then, kept quiet about it because it never favoured them. It was Kafumbe Mukasa who advised that what mattered was not even knowing English, rather it was knowing what you want. For me this was the first time to engage in politics. So was the case with many in the grassroots, especially the Muslims, it was the opportunity to take an active role in politics. (OI, 20/10/2021)

All these were possible under the auspices of the NRM administration. For Muslims, the favour they found under the Administration helped them see Museveni as one who gave them equal opportunity. Participation was no longer about how much one had, and the level of education. The question was: how much is one able to bring to society? In such circumstances, many *hajjis* that were good at articulating issues were elected into position despite not being highly educated. The Administration changed trends in Muslims' political participation.

> We were standing for an elective position against princesses and we were beating them. Society needed change more than yesterday. Previous participation was part of political manoeuvres—buying you off, bringing you in, etc. But in Museveni's era, as long as you are of a particular village, and are mature, that is all it needed... When I came in, I was sitting in the council meetings with Capt. Francis Babu. That was the beginning of Muslims engaging themselves in active politics. (Kezaala, OI, 20/10/2021).

As a result of this, there was a wide Muslim support for Museveni. Also, Muslims began to recover their political position to a point of becoming vocal in articulating their political voice. Muslims began to agitate for a share of the national cake, telling Museveni: "we elected you, but we do not see Muslims! Where are they?" Muslim voices got more pronounced during Museveni's era. They also took part in activities such as trading associations, taxi associations, etc. While these seemed non-political, they were. Kezaala puts it this this way: "For me that is politics. It is not simply business; that is politics" (Kezaala, OI, 20/10/2021). Such bespoke of the comprehensive understanding of Islam as a religion in which there is no dichotomy between faith and other aspects of life whether or not they were conscious (Hans Kung, 1996, p. xvii).

The third way was vying for elective positions in local government. They took positions of District Chairpersons and Speaker, Women's Representatives, which was not the case before. Also, Muslims were appointed into high-level political appointments. Such offices included those of RDCs. Such a free political atmosphere stimulated Muslim participation in politics. For Kampala, Kateeba shared that, "…the top management of the City Authority was headed by Muslims. Of the City divisions and council membership, all except a few are predominantly Muslim-headed" (19/8/2021). Alaso describes this as "a deliberate awakening of Muslims in governance" (OI, 13/3/2022). The awakening, as Alaso described, further illustrated the upsurge of political Muslim leadership in Kampala. She describes it thus:

> There was a time when, for two consecutive terms, it was impossible for you to have anyone who is not a Muslim as an MP in Kampala. It was a prayer item for some Christian MPs. At that time we had Latif Sebagala—Kawempe, Munyagwa, Nsereko, Nagayi Nabila, Elias Likwago, Kasozi Ibrahim, Semujlu Nganda in Kiira. Everybody literally. The year before, there was an exception of Richard Sebiluba Mutumba of Makerere, but was also defeated and substituted by Muslim (OI, 13/3/2022).

The above-mentioned Muslim names for more than twenty years dominated Kampala's political landscape. According to Alaso, behind this awakening was an expression of "the increased awareness, increased aggression," which she attributed to the availability of funding from the Arab world for promoting Muslim leaders in the Kampala" (Alaso, OI, 19/3/2022). In relation to this, Kirarira (IO, 12/11/2021) has argued that this needs not appear surprising. The reason Muslims have been visible in Kampala politics is because of the tendency for Muslims to aggregate in a Muslim neighbourhood in urban areas. This makes them appear to be a dominant factor in the urban and semi-urban areas as they are able to leverage their numerical strength in those local areas.

Muslims also participated at high levels as Ministers. For example, Kezaala (OI, 20/10/2021) points out, "if you look at the first democratically elected government of Museveni, we had more ministers, and they were reasonable Ministers. Even in the second round, they had reasonable ministers." Among the Muslims in first NRM government were: Ali Kurunda Kivenjinja, Minister for Relief and Social Rehabilitation, Internal Affairs and as Deputy Prime Minister of Uganda, Bidandi Ssali, Minister for Local Government from 1989 to 2004, Rukia Isanga Nakadama was Mayuge Woman MP and Minister of State for Gender from 2006-2016.

The fourth way of participation was through politically-motivated religious activism. These seems to have pronounced more Islamic political activity. Maractho (OI, 4/7/2021) made an interesting observation saying: "… we do not have many Muslims in Uganda. Yet, when you think of politicians in Buganda, the majority of them are Muslims." This statement underscores the irony in Muslim political participation, which is that, while the number of Muslims is low, their voice in public is disproportionately high. Marachtho further observes:

> The ones that are there are very vocal…and when they speak it is as if three people have spoken. Some of the Muslim politicians, such as Elias Lukwago, Haji Nsereko, are very vocal people, and it makes their presence seem like a lot, but in reality, they are not. So, when you look at politics at the national level, they are actually a minority (OI, 4/7/2021).

It suggested that the few Muslims are well placed, and from that vantage point were able to advance their issues more aggressively. Behind this irony is the fact that there is growing confidence driving the quest for political space among the Muslim community.

Most of the Muslim activism is by the minority *Tabliqs*. According to Musana (OI, 30/9/2021), this is not a political party. Their interest rather "is in it having an Islamic dispensation, Islamic government, because for them the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet give guidelines, and so they desire to have an emphasis on the Sharia governing human interactions." Their goal defines their non-participation in partisan politics: it is Islam being the rule, a theocracy kind of thing" (Musana, OI, 30/9/2021). Similarly, Marathcho (4/7/2021) observed the involvement of such radicalistic groups which she associates with the Islamic jihadist and ISIS, and also in the last 20 years Muslims arrests associated with terrorist activity, have been made. Yet, their involvement has not evolved organically. Rather, it has been reactionary, that is to say, their involvement has sort of been influenced by the politics or event of the day.

The political awakening by Muslims seems to have reached its zenith through the formation of a political party dominantly for Muslims. This was at the formation of Mohammed Kibirige Mayanja's Justice Forum (JEEMA) Party. It would appear as an explicit expression of a variant Islamic political theology inspired by Sudan's Umar Hasan al-Bashīr. As a national political party, JEEMA was formed in 1996. It became the first religious group to register a sectarian Muslim-based political party. Ostensibly, it was a non-religious party and registered non-Muslims membership. Yet, to some, it was seen as a revival of the Muslim's hope for political leadership in Ugandan politics. Kato, in his article, *Kibirige Mayanja gives Muslims Hope,* that appeared on the national daily, The New Vision of Nov 02, 2005 reported that Kibirigye's "standing in the 1996 elections was a culmination of so many years of planning and dreaming." In light of this, it is not clear the extent to which his efforts were motivated by Islamic political theology. Kinyiri, however, associated its formation with the visit to Uganda by Hassan Al Turabi, a Sudanese Muslim cleric and politician who inspired the vision for its formation (OI, 12/11/2021).

Al Turabi joined the politics of Sudan and became a political leader championing religious ideology alongside Umar Hasan al-Bashīr and his National Islamic Front (NIF) (Voll, p. 62). The state programmes in Sudan helped shore up his ideas, as Lowrie puts:

> In a review of the developments in the 1980s, Turabi emphasized the importance of action in the public political arena: "You don't develop a program by sitting in an ivory tower and writing out an economic program or a social program. You develop it in public life through interaction with public opinion. . . . This is how political programs are developed" (1993, 17, cited in Voll, p. 62).

The perspective here shows how al Turabi understood the integration between the religion and state. In that way, he explicated the Islamic thinking of the 1980s and 1990s that Islam is both "*dīn* and *dawla*." His thinking would later shift to "Islam as the comprehensive program (*minh ā j*) for state and society," and Islam as "the solution" *(Islam huwa al-hal*). According to Voll, this was to become became a widely used slogan of Islamist opposition movements (p. 62). Voll further shows that it was such ideas that defined "the vision of an Islamized modernity in the final decades of the twentieth century." A characteristic of such ideology was a conservative understanding of *Shari`ah*, out of which was born a political theology that "the Islamization of society is the primary goal and that politics is a major arena in which activism is necessary" (Voll, p. 62). Al Turabi was a proponent of such thinking.

Details about the nature of Al Turabi influence on Kibirige are not clear. However, Al Turabi as a known student of Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt, was a champion of aspects of freedom of Muslims and leading. Such were the themes that resonated in his speeches when he came to Uganda. For example, he is said to have asked Muslims the question: "Why are you accepting to be led? Lead yourself" (Kezaala, 20/10/2021). Accordingly, "leading yourself" did not necessarily mean getting an organization and leading; rather, it meant, "emancipating oneself before society so that as society sees value in you, you will lead then." When he came to Uganda his rhetoric and seemingly neutral religious orientation attracted many Uganda Muslims. Among those included Dr. Sulaiman Kigundu, Iman Idi Kasozi, and the young Muslim men at Makerere University. They were enthused by his ideas, and consequently started the Uganda Muslim Youth Assembly (UMYA). At first, the Assembly appeared a civic organization meant to educate Muslims. However, when UMYA failed to mobilise the nation for Islam, they established a school in Bweyogerere near Kampala, which was called Hassan Turabi Secondary School. Unfortunately, it remained ethnically parochial, attracting only Buganda. This raised the problem of ethnicity, as a result of which they failed to gain acceptance among the general Muslim community. Nonetheless, Mayanja Kibirige saw possibility of translating the vision into a Muslim-based political party, and came up with JEEMA.

Although Kibirige's interest in politics was shored up by the coming of Hassan Turabi, his political interest did not just begin with JEEMA. Rather, it dates way back in 1966. Then, he was only 16 years old (New Vision, Nov 02, 2005). The political atmosphere at the time seemed to call for renewed political effort among the young enthusiasts. It was the time following the attack by the national army on the palace of the *Kabaka* of Buganda. This had sparked strong resentments among both young and old Baganda against the Obote II regime. As for the teenage Kibirige, this was the beginning of the dreams to ever rule Uganda. It is said that after the attack, he vowed to become Uganda's president when he grew up. This dream would later come to near fruition thirty years in 1996 when he stood for election as the president of Uganda.

First, he stood for the position of Member of Parliament for Kawempe North, though he was not successful. Later, in 1996 he would form JEEMA. Its membership constituted the same people of UMYA. Kezaala argues that the party leadership was ambivalent in its political agenda: "On the surface, they wanted to take up national leadership, but critically, they wanted to present themselves as UMYA leadership and do whatever they could do there" (OI, 20/10/2021). Partly because of this, they did not establish a strong presence locally. This may also be attributed to its parochial political vision, as Kezaala further points out: "…the biggest dilemma was that it was created in a similar style in which UPC, DP were formed. The foundation was measured religiously" (OI, 20/10/2021). The parochial nature of its political vision was further illustrated by the fact that it was based in Kawempe, a traditionally Muslim constituency. This pointed to the fact that the roots of the party lay deep in the Islamic community. According to his aides, "Kibirige targeted his fellow Muslim community to give him a springboard." Kato cited how, Sulaiman Muyambala, Kibirige's political campaigner, "mobilised in mosques and actually many Muslims identified with him." (New Vision, Nov 02, 2005). For that reason, he had expectations for Muslim support during the 2001 presidential election, and from Alhajji Nasser Sebaggala, also a presidential candidate who was disqualified for lack of paper qualification. The expectation of the leadership may have been that it would easily appeal to the religious sentiment of the Muslims seeking to establish an Islamic hegemony.

Unfortunately, Kibirige never won anywhere, not even Butambala. Yet he was a Muslim. Moreover, while JEEMA was a predominantly Muslim party, it neither had a philosophy, and nor an ideology. Yet, it registered as a political party. Imam Kasozi, a member of the party who addressed the first press conference that announced the

formation of the party in 1996, seems to give a different reason for its formation. This reason, however, had little or no religiopolitical undertones. Rather, it bore an advocacy agenda. According to him, JEEMA came as an answer to a cry against assumed oppression. "'Assumed' because it may not be real, but those who are suffering see it as real" (Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021). The backdrop for the perceived oppression was the high-handed way the Administration handled the leadership crisis in the Muslim community. Kasozi reports:

> In the 80s there was a crisis in the leadership of Muslims, and in the 90s, Muslims had several court cases. For years, Muslims could not determine who was wrong. Several other Muslim groups emerged, and Government would ally with one to oppress the other. So, in 1993 Museveni nominated five people to settle Muslim issues. These were: Ambassador Raphael Ocan, Hajjat Haruna, Justice Kanyeihamba, Engineer Katama and Gatrude Njuba (OI, 19/10/2021).

This committee allegedly imposed solutions to the long-standing Muslim leadership problems in ways that did not favour the Muslim community at all. Instead, it all worked to the favour of the Administration's interest to keep all warring parties relatively happy in order to maintain unity among the community.

Genuine as the reasons for its formation may be, JEEMA party was doomed to failure. Kibirige's lack of success is attributable to a number of factors. The first being lack of financial support. Second, lack of popular support due to its narrow base—it was Muslim-based party, and yet it did not receive wide support even from Muslims. Third, he did not have sufficient experience in political leadership. That this was probably a factor is understandable against the historical backdrop in Uganda where, except for the brief nine years of Amin, Muslims for the most part remained outside the power corridors. Yet, as an educationist, Kibirige, had contributed enormously in this area. In his manifesto, he had hoped to restore justice and improve education. He seems to have drawn this from his rich background as an educationist. Before joining politics, he had served as Director of Planning at Makerere University and had been in education management for most of his career life. According to Kato, he joined the Ministry of Education in 1974 and has been in education since then. As a professional education manager, he had hoped to transfer this experience to the national level. Kato shows that, "in both the 1996 and 2001 campaigns, Kibirige had one of the best-explained manifestos. He believes that if Ugandans were following important issues, then he was

the right presidential candidate. Yet, he was only a career civil servant, not a politician. He, therefore, did not have the political wit, as Kato further shows:

> Kibirige's other problem is that after every election, he goes away from politics and waits for another election. Although he has been an executive member of the Group of Six (G-6) political parties, he has not been actively political. Some of his supporters argue that Kibirige should have stood for at least a Parliamentary seat both after the 1996 and 2001 elections to keep his political light burning. Instead, he simply disappeared back to Makerere University for his civil service job. (New Vision, Nov 02, 2005).

Fourth, Kibirige seems not to have got enough support from the numerical minority Muslims. This was illustrated by the fact that when in the 2001 election he would not qualify to stand for the presidency, Alhaji Sebaggala instead supported Col. Kizza Besigye of Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) rather than a fellow Muslim. This probably shows the extent to which Muslims did not have confidence in fellow Muslims.

Kibirge's political career may have ended short of realising his presidential dream. Yet, it was a bold step in the politically secularised Uganda, guided by the Administration's ideology against explicitly religious group participation in politics. It illustrated, among many things, that politically Muslims had come of age.

Two issues particularly stood out. The first is that Muslims in Uganda had generally been associated with politics, and were keenly aware of their political obligations (Obetia, OI, 14/7/2021; Kasozi, 19/10/2021). Second, the history of the struggle to regain political control in Uganda, rather than simply a political theology, seems to have informed their political participation. Even the resurgence of Islamic interest, as demonstatrated by Kibirige Mayanja's JEEMA party, was rooted in a historical fator and only assumed a a thelogical dimension superfluously by the ideas of Umar Hasan al-Bashīr. None-the-less, Muslim's political participation had been demonstrated.

Data findings further indicated that a number of factors played an influential role in Ugandan politics during the NRM Administration. These were: The initial revival of the Muslims fortunes during the eight-year rule of Amin from 1971 to 1979, Uganda's membership to Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), patronage of Muammar Gaddafi, sociological factors, and support of the Administration. These are here-below discussed in detail.

The eight-year rule of Idi Amin was a key factor in Muslim participation in Ugandan politics. Amin came to power in January 1971 through a military coup,

marking the end of Milton Obote II Administration. His coming to power turned him into a politician. Upon ascending to power, the effects of Muslim marginalisation began to be felt. In his first cabinet, he was the only Muslim in a predominantly Christian cabinet, but after a year he had three others join the cabinet (Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021). The numbers were critical for ensuring security and support from Muslims, although race/ethnicity and faith were factors for inclusion into the cabinet. Thus, when things became tough for him, he relied, first on Muslims and second on people of West Nile and of Nubian origin. There were also converts in Islam who came into the faith in the search for security, and participated in politics as nominal Muslims (Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021).

In a number of ways, however, the coming of Amin into power laid the foundation for the political participation of Muslims during the NRM Administration. This he did by, first, leveraging religious freedom and foreign support. The result of this was that Muslims came to exert a commanding presence alongside the Christian groups, albeit not as an organized religious party. Second, by appointing several Muslims into political positions, thereby reversing the historical damage from political marginalisation (Kiyimba, 1990). Thus, benefiting from the social and economic empowerment, Muslims were able to recover from their political slump to claim their place (Rubongoya, 2007; 47ff, Niringiye, 2016; 194). Third, by the formation of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) in 1972 at the effort of Amin brought the Muslim community to the threshold of international scene.

In addition to the revival of the Muslim fortunes, the other factor was Uganda's membership to Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). In 1974, through Idi Amin, Uganda was made a member of OIC. According to Osire (OI, 28/5/2021), this is arguable the biggest contributor to Islamic participation in national politics. With it came two developments that by far enriched the contribution of the Muslim community in politics. Factors that occasioned the quest for membership are not quite clear. Kasozi, however, points to the dire economic state of the nation at the time (OI, 19/10/2021). The fact of economic conditions forcing Amin into an alliance with Muslims is corroborated by Kato (n.d, pp. 21-22). He cites that by 1972, Amin's prodigious style of leadership had driven the country into economic shambles, out of which he needed help. For this, he sought help from Western nations. However, his human rights records and democratic practices, by the standard of Western powers, were desperately wanting. In February 1972, he had an unsuccessful attempt at securing financial support from West Germany.

Upon his return, frustrated he turned to Muamar Gaddafi of Libya. Amin's collaboration with the Israelis raised Gaddafi's concerns. Any support would only be realised on the condition that Amin would "immediately denounce and dissociate" from the Israelis. In desperate need, Amin was happy to oblige, and in return of which he received financial and military support (Kato, n.d., pp. 21-22). This effort set Idi Amin on a collaboration path with the Arab world since it ensured an ally against the common enemy, the Israelis.

The door to wider collaboration with the Arab world opened in 1974 when King Faisal of Saudi Arabia came into Uganda (Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021). This visit was of strategic importance to Amin to boost his association that had opened with Gaddafi. Upon returning home, Faisal at the meeting of Muslim nations presented Amin as a Muslim brother, and Amin was welcomed into the organization. Also, they showed him the advantages of membership—even long after him.

Against this background, Amin signed up Uganda as a member of OIC. Essentially, it was not because Uganda was an Islamic country; after all, Uganda was predominantly Christian. Rather, Amin's interest was basically the monetary benefits accruing from membership (Kasozi, 19/10/2021). The need for an economic lifeline provided by the international Muslim community resulted from the hardships obtaining in Uganda following his takeover of government. Particularly attractive about the benefits of the Islamic financial system, in contrast to the Western financial system, was the possibility of interest-free borrowing from Arab banks, such as Kuwait and Saudi banks. By belonging to it, Uganda was also able to secure assistance from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the OIC and the Islamic Development Bank.

Membership to OIC was received with mixed feelings by the non-Muslim community. Yet, to the Muslims, its contribution to the Islamic community and to the nation was invaluable as it put Uganda in the windfall of Middle Eastern funds. First, for the establishment of the Islamic University of Uganda (IUIU). The idea to start IUIU was conceived at the second summit of the OIC, in 1974. Its main objective was to serve the higher education needs of the English-speaking Muslim community in southern and eastern Africa. The idea came to fruition when the university was inaugurated in February 1988. The coming of the university in 1988 marked the reversal of the condition of lower literacy levels that had plagued the Muslim community for more than a century since the onset of formal education by missionaries. Its contribution to the education of thousands of university students cannot be disputed. Its campuses spread throughout the nation ensure a broader catchment for the university. It churns out

graduates of national and international origin in a broad range of areas, including Law, Science, Education, Management Studies, Arts and Social Sciences, Islamic Studies, Arabic, and other Postgraduate courses. The students' population at the University campuses is predominantly Muslim, with a minority population of students of Christian origin. These have gone out into the professional world with the qualifications, and if they are non-Muslims, they have gone out with a grain of Islamic teaching that inundates the curriculum. The scholarships available to Muslim students have become an attraction to Christian students seeking a university qualification. In a way, Muslims have tried to break the stigma created by the domination of education by Christians.

The consequence of this politically is that there was renewed confidence in the political future of Islam in Uganda. Details of this will be explored in relation the impact of the renewed identity on the Anglican–Muslim relation. Coupled with the establishment of the university, however, membership to OIC enabled Uganda to get loans from Islamic Development Bank (IDB) (Kiyimba, 1990, p. 102).

The third factor that bolstered Islamic political involvement was the coming of Muamar Gaddafi to Uganda. While the contacts between Uganda and Gaddafi go as far back as 1972, his return to Uganda in 1975 had far-reaching consequences. At first, as Kasozi (OI, 19/10/2021) puts it, this was largely not because Idi Amin was a Muslim. Rather, it was because of the newly identified solidarity between Amin and Gaddafi against the West. Coincidentally, they were Muslims. Gaddafi is said to have offered Amin military aid, especially to fight against the rebels. Yet, Gaddafi's alliance with Amin was also political, and it was the politics of looking for a like-thinking person sympathetic to his pan-Africanist cause. In Amin, he found such a person. For the Muslim fraternity in Uganda, the alliance profitably paid its dividends. This was the financial contributions of Gaddafi that ensured the recovery of Muslim's political confidence, and subsequently shoring up the position of Muslims in government. His coming to Uganda was instrumental in causing Amin to strengthen the position of Muslims in national governance. The affirmative action on Muslims in governance by Amin enabled them to recover politically from several decades of domination.

These three factors, happening during Idi Amin's Administration, played a crucial role in the recovery of Muslim's political fortune. Support from the international Islamic community, coupled with Idi Amin's personal effort, rejuvenated the Muslim community. Amin is said to be the 'Constantine of Islam,' referring to the pivotal role he played in history towards the recovery of Islam in Uganda (Rubongoya, 2007, p. 47ff;

Niringiye, 2016, p. 194). Even though Muslims suffered stigma following the fall of Amin in 1979, Muslims would rise again to prominence under the NRM administration, where the relationships established earlier by Amin with the international Islamic community, especially with Libya, would ensure the revival of the Islamic culture. However, the era of Amin highlights the major theme of globalization of Islam through international linkages. For Muslims, the strong economic and political patronage by the international Islamic community ensured the Islamic community as a force to reckone at Amin's era, and later in power balancing during the NRM Administration.

Ironically, Maractho was hesitant to attribute Muslim participation in politics to external players:

> I think there has been an over-hipped theory [regarding] the involvement of external financing coming from the Middle East…Our government itself is borrowing from there. So, I think [the Muslims] have some support, but so do the others! The religious support at different levels sometimes is financial. At least I have been to a Church where support is financial or one who is to be elected. And so I would not connect it directly to an increase in financing from the Arab organisations (OI, 14/7/2021).

This argument may be sustainable to the extent that there is massive investment from the international community outside the Islamic fraternity. This makes it more like the general trend than an exception. Yet, one cannot ignore the massive involvement of the international Islamic community in Uganda then and since the coming of the NRM in 1986. Gaddafi has since then remained a household name in Uganda. For instance, when Museveni started the guerrilla war he got much support from the Arab world in general, and specifically from Gaddafi (Kezala, OI, 20/10/2021). As a reward, Libya has many businesses and other interests in Uganda. This has continued to bolster Muslim positioning in places of prominence, say in the Office Third Deputy Prime Minister, and Vice Chairman of the NRM. These two have tended to eclipse their minority position. Also, Anguyo put it thus: "Muslims are 1,758,977 [according to the 1991 Census] of the population. The positions they hold in government, the establishment of businesses and the influence they hold in the country is out of proportion" (2012, p. 12-13). He further shows how Gaddafi has, since his first appearance, "returned to Uganda…in a big way. He has shown interest in the Kings of Toro and Buganda. Gaddafi has invited the King of Toro to Libya. He has promised to rebuild his palace and support the kingdom in many ways" (Anguyo, 2012, p. 12-13).

The pertinent point here is that in the same fashion as the early Arab Muslims targeted the politics and political leaders, and they succeeded, so are they continuing. Gaddafi offered Amin the much-needed support. Similarly, he supported Museveni throughout the guerrila war. He gave Museveni, beyond the military support, the massive economic investment that supported the Museveni poverty alleviation programme. But the ripple effect of this politically is that it has showered up the position of Muslims from political marginality to a position of national prominence. Thus, Anguyo believes that "It is not difficult for the Muslims to take over the leadership in our countries" (2012, p. 12-13). This may be a long-term dream. However, already Muslims are in majority elective leadership positions in Kampala. In light of this, it might be only a few year before they are in a position to take over national leadership.

Anguyo's point above can be interrogated in light of the current Muslim demographics in positions of political significance in the country. Respondents, for example, pointed to the Parliament and highlighted the growing number of Muslim parliamentarians. This corresponds to the growing prominence of Muslims in politics. Coupled with this is the dominant presence of Muslims in the media industry. Nima shows how they controlled the media, pointing out its critical role in mobilization, a factor Muslims have effectively leveraged politically:

> The people behind the media houses are majorly Muslims. Once you control media, then you control opinion. For example, NBS radio and TV are both owned by Anas Kalisa. They have been supportive of the government, and so they have attracted affirmative action. They have controlled the media, they have very good lobbying skills, even for ministerial appointments (OI, 14/7/2021).

By leveraging the media, they have lobbied for one-third of ministerial appointments to be for Muslims even when they are one-fifth of the population. And, even when they are given positions they complain that they have been marginalized.

Others have associated the current Islamic political activism with the quest for lost glory. Turyahabwe (OI, 13/7/2021):

> [This is] because, one, they are not yet involved in senior positions where they would like to be. Two, a few days after [the January 2021] elections were over, the Mufti said, now ours are there, we need them to be included in the cabinet. Three, if you are following the politics of Uganda, people are saying, now that the president is an Anglican, who should be the Vice President?

Such a question points to the extent to which history rather than religious ideas was the primary consideration for political participation.

Correspodents have also pointed out that another factor that has strengthened Islamic political participation is their capacity in Muslims for long-term planning. This is probably in support of their quest for the lost glory. In contrast with the Anglicans, their plan for political participation is long-term. Turyahabwe thinks that Anglicans may now be suffering from complacency, saying, after all, they have been in politics longer; but not so for those that have not been there: "They are saying it's now our turn. Send a candidate, and lobby, so that that if there is something good coming, then we shall come in" (OI, 13/7/2021). Perhaps it is not that Muslims have not been there. Rather, it is that they had thirty years of Islam's heyday which they lost and are seeking to regain.

Turyahabwe continues to observe that Muslims' political recovery process is pegged on very strategic planning (OI, 13/7/2021). Accordingly, when they see an opportunity they exploit it. That general knowledge that Muslims are very political, and that their religion is very politically alert, helps their presence in politics, and they value their position. "Islamic political philosophy is that yours is for you, others cannot put their case." (Turyahabwe, OI, 13/7/2021). Part of their strategic thinking comes with their ability to read the times. In places where the Movement as a party seems weak and unpopular, Muslims have switched allegiance to the emerging political parties. In relation to this, Haji Kirarira observes that:

> "there are many Muslims who stood against NRM went through. I knew someone who was an NRM supporter, but saw that there were limited opportunities to go through and decided to cross to NUP. But this was because of purely political reasons. Other Christian never voted a Muslims but voted for a DP candidate who lost" (IO, 12/11/2021).

The idea of strategic thinking was very helpful towards strengthening Muslim participation in politics.

The other factor was sociological. That was the tendency for the Islamic communities to agglomerate around urban centres. This explains the apparent increase in Muslim participation in politics, especially in the city and suburbs of Kampala. Their concentration in such places has given them political capital over and above other religious groups. City and urban-dwelling seems a general occurrence as Kirarira put it:

> It is not only Kampala. Throughout the country, Muslims have come up more than before into elective politics. I want you to realize one thing: Muslims like to live in

> towns, and I am not sure if religion encourages this. But there are more Muslims in town than in the villages (IO, 12/11/2021).

Urban dwelling by Muslims in Uganda is traceable to historical reasons, as Kirarira further puts it:

> The Muslims who were denied education came to town to look for business and became labourers, they are the ones that became squatters in towns and cannot go back to the village, and those who have not gone to school have come to town to gamble. So there are many living around urban centres (IO, 12/11/2021).

Related to the above historical factor is the mutual support offered to fellow Muslims in the local Muslim community. A respondent observed that the feeling that every Muslim is brother or sister is strong, and the boldness to collectively voice their issues even when it is sectarian, has been key. The bond among the global Muslim community is a very strong concept (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). Their ability to support fellow Muslims was associated with the fact that they come from oil-rich countries, and have money to influence global politics. They have a lot of money to finance their people in politics, education and business Education.

Lastly, Muslims received support from the Administration (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). This was mentioned in relation to the fact that quite influential personalities in the Administration have leveraged their positions for benefiting Muslim participation in public. For example, the Vice-Chairman of NRM, Hajji Moses Kigongo, also, Gen. Moses Ali, the Second Deputy Prime Minister, and several others in high level placement. These have sought to champion the interests of Muslims whenever there is an opportunity. An aspect of the Administration's support is the emerging culture of power balancing—an affirmative action to strategically locate people according to religiopolitical and gender interest in a deliberate plan to balance political power. This culture seems to be deeply entrenched, and increasingly it is clear that specific positions are gazetted for Muslims. "In every cabinet, the president has to ensure offices are balanced to include Moslems" (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). The office in question is that of the Second Deputy Prime Minister, which has been held perpetually by General Moses Ali. Clearly, however, it is possible to see the NRM spirit of accommodation of different political players. As a result of which, however, Islamic political involvement seems to have gained traction.

The foregoing discussion was based on Objective Three, and was an examination of the effect of Islamic political theology on national politics during the period of study. This objective was premised on the assumption that involvement of Muslims in Ugandan politics was grounded on the foundation of their political theology. Thus, in pursuit of this objective, the study explored the extent to which the Islamic political theology had influenced the Muslim community's political participation in politics during the NRM's Administration between 1986 and 2016.

The discussion established that concept of Islamic political theology was not familiar at the popular level. Muslims, however, were active in politics. This is because they were generally aware of their political obligation and actively participated at various levels national and local governance. They were also involved in politically-motivated religious activism, and that some Muslims belonged to radicalist groups. Also, the formation more recently of JEEMA, a predominantly Islamic national party, and the increased number of Muslims in Parliament and heightened efforts at lobbying for ministerial appointments, underscores the endemic political ethos of Islam. And, although their political theology is not well-articulated it is strongly acted out following the historical examples of Prophet Muhammad, and the emerging Caliphate and the Sultanate close nexus between religion and state. In Uganda, Muslim political participation, however, was born less from an articulated political thelogy than from the quest for political space following political marginalization. And, as has been observed, this is quite in sync with the Islamic political ethos where religion and politics are not delineated. This is evidenced by their resilience and strategic effort in leveraging the global Islamic community to support their bid for political space in Uganda politics. Thus, during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016 the resurgence of Islamic activity illustrated that the Muslim community has been more deliberate in political participation. Although this was attributed to the heavy funding by external partners, it was also aided by the level ground provided by the Administration's period between 1986 and 2016. It would, therefore, appear that contrary to the assumption of the research premise, the Muslim political ethos is strongly driven by historical factors than political theology. Morever, the varying Muslim political traditions obtaining in the nation renders it difficult for a particular political theology to be overtly proclaimed. Over all, the extent to which the Islamic community in Uganda has awakened to its political responsibility demonstrates the extent to which Muslims have not spared effort and opportunity to claim political position, and how this is driven by its political

consciousness albeit less clearly articulated. In that way, it has highlighted the general notion that in the Islamic tradition, there is no distinction between religion and politics and no separation of church and state. Rather, Islam is *dīn* and *dawla*.

4.4 Influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Anglican-Muslim Relations (1986-2016).

The above discussion highlighted the Anglican and Islamic theologies, seeking to show their influence in the emerging political ethe of the two religious groups. This section examines the influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on the relationship of Anglicans and Muslims. This constituted objective four of the study, which was: To assess the influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Anglican–Muslim relations between 1986 and 2016. The research question derived from this objective was: In what ways did Anglican and Islamic political theologies influence the Anglican–Muslim relations in Uganda between 1986 and 2016? It sought to build on the foregoing discussion to highlight the impact of the political theologies on the groups' relations.

The premise based upon which it was examined was that Anglican and Islamic political theologies have a causal effect on Anglican–Muslim relations. By this, it was understood that the religious groups' political theologies influenced the political ethe, and in turn, influenced the Anglican-Muslims relations. In light of this, the study investigated the ways in which the Anglican and Islamic political theologies had influenced the Anglican-Muslim relations. This objective was particularly important against the backdrop of the defining nature of religiopolitical identities, and the perceived influence on relations among religious groups. It sought, therefore, to ascertain the attendant influence of political theologies on relations between Anglicans and Muslims during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016.

4.4.1 Ways in which Anglican and Islamic political theologies have influenced Anglican-Muslim Relations

In order to understand ways in which Anglican and Islamic theologies had influenced Anglican-Muslim relations, the respondents were asked the following question: In your observation, what are ways in which the Anglican and Islamic political theologies have influenced relations between the two religious groups?

Responses to this question were various, and can be summarised as follows: First, that during the NRM Administration, history rather than political theologies remained a defining factor in the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims in their political participation. Second, as a result of the above historical roots religious identity remained a defining factor in political participation and by default, Anglican-Islamic relations. Third, during the NRM Administration, while the Muslims gained political space, Anglicans remained politically disadvantaged. These are here-below discussed.

4.4.2 History as the Defining Factor in the Relations between Anglicans and Muslims

Respondents indicated strongly that the relations between Anglicans and Muslims was shaped by historical rather than theological issues (Okoboi, OI, 8/3/2022; Turyahabwe, OI, 137/2021; Nima, OI, 14/7/2021; Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021; Kezaala, OI, 20/10/202). This implied that the hangover of historical factors had continued to shape the mode of the Anglican-Muslim relationship. Musana (OI, 30/9/2021), for example, made reference to the outcome of the religion-political wars of the nineteenth century that put the Protestants/Anglicans on the political pedestal, simultaneously leaving Muslims totally marginalized. For him, these wars, rather than political theologies, provided the background of the social and political differentiations between Anglicans and Muslims. From then on, Muslims had been hankering for political presence and self-determination.

Works by some scholars, such as Karugire (1978) and Kanyeihamba (1998), seem to lend credence to the claims of respondents above. Karugire, for instance, has anchored the poor relations between Anglicans and Muslims on the anti-Islamic sentiments of the British imperialist in competition for the territory and trade interest for which Uganda was central (Karugire, 2010, p. 52ff.). This was further observable at onset of religious plurality and the ensuing xenophobia, except that this time competition for space was among the four religious groups in Buganda—the Traditionalist, Muslims, Anglicans and Roman Catholics (Karugire, 1978, p. 5; Kanyeihamba, 1998, 9). The aftermath of the wars of religion in the Buganda kingdom seemed to seal the fate of Muslims, especially with the emergence of the Anglican hegemony that saw Muslims fall behind in politics and education (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 13). Since then, Muslims were overtly and covertly engaged in a protracted process of recovery of the lost political

space. It is against this background, Musana states that Muslims had been hankering from political space (OI, 30/9/2021).

One way Muslims hankered for political space was through education in the hope that the educated Muslims will one day take up political positions. This, however, was a long, hard process as highlighted by the respondents (Kasozi OI, 19/10/2021; Kezaala, OI, 20/10/2021). Following the wars, Muslims were politically relegated, weak, and humiliated. Opportunities for political involvement by Muslims were severely limited due to lack of literacy. Suspicious of European interests, Muslims shunned missionary schools. They believed that the Missionaries were interested in converting them and their children to Christianity (Kezaala, OI, 20/10/2021). This attitude remained so strong among the Muslims that between 1900 and independence, only very few Muslims encouraged their children to go for secular education provided by Missionaries. This attitude was reinforced by the conversion of Yusuf Kironde Lule who, coming from very prominent Muslim family, converted to Anglicanism when he went to university in South Africa. This was a terrible blow to the Muslims, and according to Kezaala (OI, 10/20/2021) all the Muslim clergy preached against attendance by Muslim children in Missionary schools. Instead they encouraged Muslim parents to take their children to the Quranic schools.

Over time, the poor attitude towards Missionary education by Muslims took a toll on the Islamic community. While keeping their children away helped protect their community from the potential proselytisation to Christianity, Muslims lagged behind in education. By 1965, there was only one Muslim with a university degree (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 13). Politically, the consequences of lack of education were damaging in at least three ways. First, it stifled Muslims' capacity for effective political engagement in the fast-transforming Buganda (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 13). By default it also limited their capacity to articulate a political position and to gain a footing in the Protectorate Uganda. Kiyimba acknowledges the challenges thus: "when later, the colonial administrators arrived and established a firm grip over the country, it was the Christians who would provide educated people to take charge of the protectorate's political, social and economic affairs" (1990, p. 91). The consequence of this is that there developed an asymmetric relationship between Anglican and Muslims in the public square, with Muslims operating from an educationally disadvantaged point to enter a highly competitive political arena dominated by Anglicans (and Catholics). The lag in political participation would later be the justification for Idi Amin's affirmative action for

Muslims in the 1970s aimed at bolstering Muslims' national position (Rubongoya, 2007, p. 47ff.; Niringiye, 2016, p. 194).

Second, socially, it affected the realtions between Anglicans and Muslims. The anti-Islamic nature of the British may have been compounded the outcome of the wars, leading to the ensuing asymmetric relations of the Anglicans and Muslims. During the Protectorate era, however, this attitude seems to have been replicated, though there is no evidence of a deliberate policy to this effect. Moreover, efforts by Lugard in dealing with Mbogo, helped Muslims in the process of recovery from defeat. Also, the assistance of the Protectorate Administration in setting up a school and providing the first teacher illustrated their good will towards Muslims. Yet, the lopsided relations between Anglican and Muslim was strongly registered. Kezaala expressed thus: "Muslims were regarded as a by-the-way, and nobody recognized them in a political sense" (OI, 20/10/2021). This may have been put rather strongly put, yet it reflects the attitude behind the relations between the Anglican and Muslims. It also translated into the political arena during the Protestant-dominated Protectorate era, ensured the subservient position of Muslims, giving them less opportunity to feature in politics.

Third, the Muslim community remained economically backward. They engaged in petty trade and odd jobs, such as taxi and lorry drivers, shop keepers, etc. Consequently, the Muslim community, in contrast with the Anglicans, did not have the opportunity to participate in the broader public life and to compete favourably against the well-educated and highly placed Anglicans (Schacht, 1965, p. 93).

The consequence ultimately of the above development is that Muslims remained politically weak and unable to effectively compete with the Anglicans. In this way, historical factors pre-determined the placement of Muslims in politics, where their disadvantaged position at the end of the wars resulted in the asymmetric relations with Anglican. In the subsequent years, their Muslim identity only counted in as far as they served the utility value of other religiopolitical groups. In relation to this we look at the second issue arising from the responses, which is religious identity in politics as a defining factor in the Anglican-Muslim relations.

4.4.3 Religious Identity in Politics and Anglican-Muslim Relations

The second theme from the responses was that religious identity remained the defining factor in the Anglican-Muslim relations in politics. Respondents strongly indicated how, over the next several years of the Protectorate administration, religion remained identity

marker (Okoboi, OI, 8/3/2022; Turyahabwe, OI, 137/2021; Nima, OI, 14/7/2021; Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021; Kezaala, OI, 20/10/202). Okoboi (OI, 8/3/2022) shows that in the subsequent years, the nature of power relations among the different players. The political pecking order was: Anglican, Catholics, Traditionalists and Muslims. In a nation already fractured among the religious lines, the emergence of Anglican hegemony and the quasi-established status of the Anglican Church, influenced by the exclusivist political theology, reinforced the Anglican-Muslim divide in the political circles. (Okoboi, OI, 8/3/2022; Kezala, OI, 20/10/202).

During the Protectorate era, however, Anglicans in general maintained an open working relationship with Muslims (Ogwal, OI 10/10/2021; Kirarira, IO, 12/11/2021, Kezaala, OI, 20/10/202). Hajji Shaban Nkutu, for example, a Muslim politician, was the Chairman of UPC (Ogwal, OI 10/10/2021), andAdoko Nekyo and Abas Balinda, were appointed cabinet ministers in the 1960s (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 15). The UPC Administration accommodated Muslims as means of bolstering its position against the DP and KY (Kezaala, OI, 20/10/2021). Consequently, in 1965, it formed the controversial NAAM, which served mutual interests of both UPC and Muslims. On the one hand, it worked for the UPC's political interests against UPC and KY, and on the other hand, it served the interest of Muslims seeking from their weak position to take advantage of post-colonial developments to make an alliance with the victors (Kanyeihamba, 1998 p. 15, Mudoola, 1996, p. 7). Overal, the religious identities remained sharply defining to both Muslims and Anglicans in politics, and by default, the Anglican-Muslim relationsin politics.

The coming of Idi Amin into power in 1971 ushered in a new style of relationship between the Christians and Muslims. Idi Amin, a Muslim, came to power in January 1971, and he would rule until April 1979. Seen as the Constantine of Islam (Rubongoya, 2007, p. 47ff), his eight-year rule brought Muslims to a position of socio-political and economic emancipation through association with the international Islamic organization. Muslims rediscovered their potential in economics, business and education. In one way or another, these three became the new defining identity as a community recovering from political domination. From a minority position, Muslims exerted their economic and business muscle, and gained political strength. Also, Amin made a deliberate effort to revive Muslim's fortunes with the formation of the UMSC, as well as to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties with global Muslim community. This ushered Muslims on the road to a renewed fight for political space once lost in early 1890s. The fight for

political space would define anew the Anglican participation in politics, and ultimately the Anglicans-Muslim relationship. Just as it had happened for Muslims in the Protestant-dominated UPC Administration, the relationship between the Anglican Church and the Muslims during Amin's era was defined by the interest of the Administration.

Similar trend was observable during the UNLA and Obote II era which spanned from April 1979 to December 1980. It was characterised by a rapid succession of presidents of the UNLA Administration. These were: Yusuf Kironde Lule (April to June 1979), Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa (June 1979 to May 1980) and Military Commission, headed by Paulo Mwanga (May to December 1980) (Mutibwa, 2008, p. 175ff). For this era, hardly do respondents report any significant religiopolitical activity. This is probably because attention at the time was focused more on surviving the political upheavals, and little attention on anything else. It is glossed over, and the attention is focused on the Obote II (December 1980-January 1986).

The period of rapid succession was, however, a very important moment for the Anglican-Muslim relations in that it gave birth to a Tabliq movement within the Muslim community. This was born out of fear for repraisal against the Muslim community following the ousting of Idi Amin, and sought to "prepare for a struggle against any future persecution or exploitation of Muslims" (Kanyeihamaba, 1998, p. 18). Also, the era is widely believed to have been preparatory for the return of Milton Obote. Thus, the Muslim community was naturally thrown into confusion, and the UMSC struggled to survive the immediate post–Amin UNLA era. Kanyeihamba shows how the Muslim community, especially the ardent supporters of Amin, suffered in the hands of the UNLA and the divisions that arose based on political alignments (Kanyeihamba, 1998, p. 18).

The situation, however, changed to the better at the onset of Obote II Administration. Responses point to the characteristic feature of the Administration being a replication of the old-time relationship with Muslims (Kirarira, IO, 12/11/2021). The picture painted by respondent is that Muslims played a central role (Nima, OI, 14/7/2021; Kasozi, OI, 19/10/2021 and Ogwal, OI, 10/10/2021). However, their role was less for power balancing as it was more as a domesticated membership that drew Muslims from across the nation. After all, following the Islamic renaissance during Amin's era, the stature of Muslims had changed to that of significant political and economic player (Kirarira, IO, 12/11/2021).

It is significant to note that the Okello and Obote II eras created different dynamics within which to understand the relationship of Anglicans and Muslims. First of all, the eras were characterised by social-political upheavals, and economic hardships. A response to these conditions by the religious groups, especially the Anglican Church, was always urgently necessary. Second, during the era, identity and influence gained by Muslims after the affirmative action by Idi Amin seemed to have been undermined by the divisions in the community, leaving them relatively weaker. Third, during the six years of Obote II (1980-1986) the Anglicans were in a much stronger position. Their alliance with the UPC-Obote Administration gave them breathing space. Yet, the esteem of the Muslim community was not completely shuttered. Gradually, they showed signs of recovery, and consequently were beginning to be more proactive in their relations with Anglicans.

With the growing confidence of Muslims, it seems like the Anglican–Muslim relations was entering a new dimension. It was one characterised by mutual respect. No longer were Muslims surviving in the political shadows of the Anglicans. This is illustrated by the effort of the Archbishop to reach out to the Chief Khadhi of the UMSC. In a letter of 22 February 1984, the Archbishop requested a meeting to "discuss how the two religious leaders can work together to rehabilitate the morals of the people" they lead. This letter was received with enthusiasm and anticipation of the meeting.

By looking at religious identity and relations between Anglicans and Muslims, a few observations can be made. First, the sitting Administration made attempts to accommodate religious groups for the strategic political reasons. This, however, was mutually beneficial to the groups and the Administration. Second, accommodation of religious groups in the political circles was matched by the good relations between Anglicans and Muslims. However, where tension existed between the groups there was need to re-think strategies for survival. Third, with the various Administrations, Muslim political status assumed a new height. While in the Obote Administration, Muslims remained in strategic political alliance, during Amin's Administration, the newly discovered potential in economics, business and education boosted their political strength. From a minority position, Muslims were thus able to exert their economic and business muscle, which translated into political strength. Fourth, the peculiar circumstance of the various Administrations set the pace of the relations between members of the two religious groups. These were mostly influenced by the sitting Adminstration. Thus, during Amin's Administration, unlike the accommodative spirit of

the UPC Administration, Islamicisation efforts drove the Church on the defensive. Lastly, the above-mentioned phases of political development and participation of the Anglican and Muslim communities illustrated the extent to which religion, woven into politics, elicited varying levels of political participation and relations between Anglicans and Muslims. This lent credence to the thematic issue raised by respondent that history and religious identity remained the defining factors in the inter-religious encounter. Undertone of this theme would resonate into the NRM Administration, and would provide the justification for the realignment of political participation and the relations between Anglicans and Muslims.

4.4.4. Realignment of Religious Groups' Participation in Politics and the Anglican-Muslim Relations during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016

Kanyeihamba (1998) and Niringiye (2016) have given a general hint as to the relationship between the Church and state during the various phase. From these studies one gains a general picture of religiopolitical interphase. In this section, we examine the the intricacies of the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims. Specifically, we examine the nature of relations ensuing from the participation of Anglicans and Muslims in politics during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. The importance of this is to show how political participation influenced Anglican-Muslim relations during this period.

The study continued to explicate Hans Kung's idea of religion as "a comprehensive reality" (1996, p. xvii). Specifically, the influence of religion in creating a community and home (1996, p. xvii), and how it enhances the reality of religious plurality at the time. In Uganda, as we have seen, religious plurality did not simply remain a nominal issue, but, influenced the struggle for political space between Anglicans and Muslims. As observed above, the tenor of relationship was influenced by the peculiar circumstances of the Administration. And, during the NRM Administration, the agenda for national unity defined the tenor of relations. This was by creating a level ground for all religious groups. In that respect, the Anglicans and Muslims were operating on equal footing.

According to respondents, relations between the Anglicans and Muslims during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016 were fairly good, being fashioned along the lines of mutual relationship (Kirarira IO, 12/11/2021; Anonymous, 17/10/2021). This was in part a result of the inclusive nature of the Administration.

Kezaala, for example, said that even before the Administration came to power, leading Muslims were targeted and brought on-board to enhance the political working relationship with the Muslim community (Kezaala, OI, 21/10/2022). Later, this inclusiveness was expressed in terms of the broad-based Government.

The idea of the broad-based system of governance was depicted by Museveni thus: "…the [NRM] is a home of DP, UPC, CP and UPM members." This was one whereby "…one's religion, colour, sex or height…" were not considered when welcoming new members. Rather, a person was valued on merit. Founded on the idea of National Unity embedded in Point Three of the Ten-Point Programmes, the broad-based system of governance in effect realigned the political participation of both the Anglicans and Muslims. The implication of this, according to Turyahabwe, is that everybody was on-board based on individual merit (OI, 22/10/2022). By bringing them on-board it would help the Administration to marshal the contributions of all political players.

The broad-based system of governance took an affirmative action towards the marginalised groups, including women. There was, thus, a deliberate effort at including Muslims in governance. By making Haji Moses Kigongo the Vice Chairman of the NRM, Turyahabwe argued that it was a means of mobilizing the Muslim's support (Turyahabwe, OI, 21/10/2022). The affirmative action, specifically on Muslims, ensured positions of prominence to Muslims. For instance, aside from the above-mentioned case of Moses Kigongo, General Moses Ali was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister, a position he has held for more than fifteen years. In this way, Ugandan politics that had basically been dominated by Anglicans and Catholics now became more inclusive. Muslims, thus, became equal players.

From respondents, we note three issues. First, the NRM Administration, like the previous ones, in general accommodated Muslims to the extent that the latter served the goal of National Unity. This seems to have translated to the good relations of Anglicans and Muslims. Respondent have argued that the notion of conflict between Anglicans and Muslims seems a bit misleading, and needs to be corrected. For instance, Kirarira expressed that while Muslims worked closely and at peace with Catholics than with Anglicans, yet politically, they are more at peace with Anglicans (OI, 12/11/2021). Kirarira, a Muslim leader and passionate advocate of interreligious dialogue, worked hard through the Turkish-based Nile Dialogue Platform to foster peaceful relations with Christians. Based on his experience, he observed that the perceived poor relationship

between Anglicans and Muslims did not take into consideration the fact that they have always been together.

Futher to this, just like the previous Administrations, many Muslims in studded the NRM Administration (Kirarira, OI. 12/11/2021, Kezaala, OI, 21/10/2022). This is said in relation to the historical facts. Yet, the accommodation of Muslims by the Administration based on the goal of National Unity resonated with the above-explicated thesis that history and religious identity rather than political theology defined the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims. Thus said, it authenticated the thematic issue in this study that although Muslims suffered severe political relegation, they gradually recovered and actively participated under the umbrella of other parties. They thrived under Amin's affirmative action before defaulting to the old-style status where they were nestled in the UPC party. Yet, the Administration's policy on National Unity caused a realignment of religiopolitical forces. By secularising politics, participation by religious groups was on a level ground.

Second, we note that the Administration ushered both Anglicans and Muslims into a different political milieu characterised by a political plurality in which religious identities was inconsequential. Yet, despite the politically levelling agenda, both the Anglicans and Muslims did not start from a weaker point. Anglicans had earlier been, and remained at the helm of political power at all times except during the Idi Amin Administration. Muslims too picked up on the political momentum built up during Amin's Administration, and levaraging their newly acquired economic, business and education strength, they soon became a political force.

Third, the political level ground was considered level was ws meant to tap contributed of religious groups towards the national goal (Turyahabwe, 21/10/2022). In that way, the value of religious groups was now defined in utilitarian terms. That is to say, it was understood in as far as it served the Administration's interest of keeping the various religiopolitical and ethnic groups together under the umbrella NRM Administration. By this, the religiopolitical situation hit a political *déjà vu*. As it had happened previously, the value of a religion was reckoned merely in terms of how it served the interest of the Administration in power. It had happened in both the UPC, and in Amin's Administrations, now it worked the same way for the NRM Administration. The difference, however, was that in the religiously fragmented political milieu, the Administration's emphasis on national unity was to bring in the hitherto less active

groups, especially Muslims, in order to achieve the goal of political stability (Turyahabwe, OI, 21/10/2022).

Given such utilitarian interest of the value of the Anglican Church to the Administration's political interest after the realignment was bound to be rethought. It is in this respect that the Anglicans remained somewhat politically disadvantaged. Historically, they had been in power over a fragmented political system, by default they shared in the complicity of fostering religiopolitical sectarianism. In addition, the socio-cultural and political institutions of Uganda, until the onset of the NRM Administration, had been dominated by the Anglicans. In this respect, the Administration's policy on none-participation of religious groups worked in favour of the Muslims, in order to tap their potential contribution. According to Obetia (OI, 1/14/2021), this brought Muslims into the political limelight.

In a different way, Muslim's constribution was qualitatively different. Theis participation would bring a new niche of economics and business into politics, thus making them more desirable political players. With this niche, Muslims had more bargaining power. Opportunity, therefore, was available for a new front from which Muslims re-expressed their political prowess. Ubomba expressed that, "Muslims [were] kind of hungry to be present, both politically, economically, and otherwise" (OI, 27/7/2021). Increasingly, Muslims' strength was drawn from their diplomatic ties to the global Muslim community in a way that was not matched by Anglicans (Osire, OI, 28/5/2021). With the support from the international community, Muslims leveraged their niche area. Consequently, this elevated their political stature. Moreover, they also massively invested in politics, education and business to strengthen their bid for political power. Not surprisingly, there was a wave of political involvement among the Muslims, especially in Kampala where they had taken the positions of Lord Mayor, Councillors at various levels (Alaso, OI, 19/3/2022; Turyahabwe, OI, 21/10/2022). Effectively, Muslims were no longer simply pawns on the political chessboard. Rather, they assumed the status of equals, if not stronger players in national politics. Moreover, the level political ground, not particularly giving an advantage to Anglicans, provided opportunity for Muslims to exert their economic potential towards their own recovery (Kezala, OI, 20/10/21). They thereby were able to claim political space, which made them no more less dependent, but rather equal and essential political players.

This newly achieved status gave Muslims a new political game plan. Politically, they strategically invested their weak numerical strength by supporting political causes

that they had a good chance to win rather than simply supporting of the Administration. Within Kampala City that has the largest conglamoration of the Muslim community, Muslims have the commanding lead in the number of representatives in elective positions (Alaso, OI, 19/3/2022). Once in elective position, their renewed confidence made bolstered their political optimism. The following statement by Turyahabwe reflects their collective sentiments: “few days after elections were over, the Mufti said, ‘now ours are there, we need them to be included in the cabinet.’ If you are following the politics of Uganda, people are saying, now that the president is an Anglican, who should be the Vice President?” (OI, 13/7/2021). This statement was made in the context of the January 2021election, and in anticipation of the Presidential announcement of the list of cabinet nominees. Additionally, following the political trend of religious power balancing, Muslims, like other religious groups were anticipating that the same trends would follow. Power balancing refers to the deliberate effort to share political power according to the religious and other interest groups. For Muslims, however, it was a relief that a good number of their candidates had made it into Parliament. It is the reason for heightened anticipation for cabinet appointments.

Similar sentiments were also reported differently by Turyahabwe (OI, 13/7/2021) in reference to the Muslims who said: “Since we cannot get [the presidency], we should have one of the Prime Ministerial offices.” This anticipation was similarly expressed when in a TV talk show they said, ‘“Our Children are now educated, they have graduated with degree in Law, so they can be elected and become enactors of the Law”’ (Turyahabwe, OI, 13/7/2021). The buzzword is ‘It is now our turn,’ a reflection of the fact that the century of low literacy that saw Muslims as lorry drivers, abattoir operators and low-level employees, was over. Now was the time to claim a slot in the national Parliament and Cabinet. Such optimism represents a trend where Muslims had broken the proverbial ‘glass ceiling’ as a result of ‘domination.’

In addition, Muslims in their historical consciousness as a marginalized religious group now could stand and claim rights to political space and inclusion. According to Musana, there are two reasons for which Muslims are strong. The first is their unity of negotiation as a result of which UMSC provided the forum for negotiation, and the second is the increased number of educated Muslims (OI, 30/9/2021). He noted that opportunities have been greatly enhanced by the increased number of educated Muslims, as a result of which they could speak authoritatively (OI, 30/9/2021).

Muslims' bargaining power in politics is said to have been boosted by their leaning towards global Islamic community through its membership to the OIC (Osire, OI, 28/5/2021). Imam Kasozi further illustrated this when he said:

> If you are doing trade and commerce, [and] you are dealing in oil production you have to recognise that membership. When you have the Arabs trading with us, such as when Muamar Gaddafi was alive, and other groups of Islamic countries, they indirectly contribute to providing Islam as a major political actor in Uganda (OI, 19/10/2021).

Kasozi further showed how with this came a shift of fortunes considering that the Muslim community only makes call to an international organization, such as the World Muslim League, for fund for fellows to go abroad and study and they come back (OI, 19/10/2021). This ultimately translated in the renewal of confidence among Muslims.

The resurgence of Muslim political effort seems to have been given a new direction to the Anglican-Muslim relations. Responses cited a number of indicators to this. Among which were: awareness of the need for good neighbourliness, spirit of accommodation, and participation in common ventures. In light of the need for good neighbourliness, a respondent a respondent cited expressions of awareness by both groups of the need for inter-religious connectedness: "Lately, there are a lot of inter-religious [efforts]. Even during political events, they have come up with a common political statement and taken a stand on something." (Ubomba, OI, 26/7/2021). It is not clear which of the two groups was more amenable to interreligious peaceful co-existence. However, both seem to be intentional about recognizing each other, especially where there are common interest. One of such areas is in the way they relate to the state. On national events, they have come together to cooperate. A respondent further expressed that Anglicans have been more hospitable to Muslims (Anonymous, 17/10/2021). Also, the respondent cited that both Anglicans and Muslims have accepted the elected local leaders no matter their faith. In this way, the respondent highlighted how members of religious communities have had to put up with the excesses of other religious communities. For instance, the Anglicans continued to co-exist with Muslims, even when the former, especially the militant Al Shabab group, have been accused of killing Christians all over.

It seems, however, that efforts towards peaceful coexixtence are mutual, and continue to grow with time. Respondents cited continued the harmonious work among various religious groups. Ubomba cited participation of the leadership of religious

groups in national events, “where they acknowledged each other faithfully and both acting together, standing on the same platform in support of one another” (OI, 26/7/2021). The most important reference point is the Interreligious Council of Uganda (IRCU), which is an umbrella organization for different religious organizations and faiths (Ubomba, OI, 26/7/2021). This has facilitated a hermonoius working for bot Muslims and Anglicans alongside other religious groups. Kezaala argues that this was born as an effort by the NRM to enhance inter-religious relationship, and an illustration of the inclusive spirit of the NRM Administration (Kezaala, OI, 21/10/2022). It has served as an umbrella body that encourages religious communities to have a united voice on issues. As a member of the IRCU, the Anglican Church has taken its place in the constellation of religious groups, playing along and acknowledging the existence of, and appreciating all other religions.

Objective Four examined the attendant influence of political theologies on relations between Anglicans and Muslims during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. It explicated the comprehensive nature of religion by examining its attendant effect on relations between Anglicans and Muslims (Kung, 1996, p. xvii). By looking at the emerging patterns of relations between the Anglicans and Muslims, we can see the defining nature of religion. By it the groups experienced the a self-definition, from it the values and norms were generated. Furthermore, it was experienced from it the formative influence on the religious community and its home, thereby distinguishing their peculiarities, giving meaning to life, and defining values and norms that underscored their unique identities. It is, therefore, easy to see how the religious communities with their identity markers and locus of practice or home, had curved out a religious as well as political territory. It took cognisance of the fact that the locus of the practice of religion, and for that matter, expression of political theology, was necessarily invaded by another, giving rise to the phenomenon of religious plurality and challenging the idea of an isolated religious territory. By explicating Hans Kung’s view of the comprehensive nature of religion, Objective Four, thus, underscored how religion, in so creating a religious community and a home, and giving rise to the religious groups’ religion-political realities, defined the Anglican-Muslim relations in Uganda. By being so intricately woven into the socio-cultural reality religion and politics necessarily became part and parcel of each other. In this objective, thus, we highlighted the ways in which Anglican and Islamic political theologies influenced the sharing of the Ugandan political space during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016.

The premise based upon which it was examined was that Anglican and Islamic political theologies have a causal effect on Anglican–Muslim relations. However, findings indicated that history and religious identity rather than only political theologies defined these relation. However, during the NRM Administration, Muslims demonstrated political, financial and economic power, as a result of which it assumed an equal political player alongside the Anglican Church, the historical quasi-establishment church. This was boosted by the the introduction of the NRM Administration ideology on religious freedom. This gave the Muslims political freedom, and leveraging it, they strengthen their political position. This put them in a position where they could compete favourably with Anglicans for national political space.

The foregoing discussion presented the data analysis and interpretations based on the four objectives of the study. The data presented was discussed based on the emerging thematic issues. The analysis drew on Hans Kung's understanding of religion as an all embracing reality (1996, p. xvii). From this, the study derived a framework from which it examined Anglican and Islamic political theologies, seeking to understand their causal influence the groups' political participation and relations between Anglicans and Muslims between 1986 and 2016. The analysis in general showed the overlap between politics and religion as two spheres of human function. The two were seen as part of nearly every aspect of life, and it was difficult to effectively define either one in isolation of the people. By focusing on politics within the confines of formal exercise of political authority, to the broader conception of politics as 'public life' or 'public affairs,' it was demonstrated that religion was an all-pervasive reality in Uganda's politics. Both Christianity and Islam exemplified a comprehensive influence. It is their all-pervasive nature, rather than simply the distinct political theologies, that provided a framework for thinking and participating in politics, thereby influencing the emerging relations of the two groups.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 INTRODUCTION

Thus far, this study has looked the Anglican and Islamic political theologies and their attendant influence on the Anglican-Muslim relations in Kampala during the administration of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) between 1986 and 2016. Specifically, Chapters 1-3 introduced the study by examining the background to the study, literature review and Research Methodology of the study. The finding were presented, analysed and discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter now brings out the summary, the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

5.1 SUMMARY OF STUDY

In 1986 the NRM Administration implemented the Ten-Point Programmes, its bush war governance blue-print. Central to it was the realisation of national unity by eliminating the religious "sectarian" politics. The background to this was the history of religious partisan politics that saw the Anglican Church as the quasi-national church hoisted to prominence, to the relegation of Muslims in politics by the colonial masters. While implementing the goal of national unity, the Administration abolished the religiopolitical parties, and at the promulgation of the National Constitution in 2005, secularised national politics. In spite of this, religiopolitical parties remained active.

The problem investigated was the persistence of Anglican and Muslim political interest despite NRM Administration's ideology, and how this might have influenced the relations of Anglicans and Muslims. While the NRM administration secularized Ugandan politics, it seems to have simultaneously opened up space to religious-based political interest. In this political milieu, Anglicans and Muslims seem to have repackaged themselves politically, demonstrated varying levels of political involvement. On the one hand, Anglicans were politically less proactive, yet, their numerical superiority and a stronger history of education kept them entrenched into the socio-political systems. On the other, Muslims, coming from a position of political relegation, proactively exerted considerable lobbying force, and using socio-economic, and cultural influence, sought to gain a political foothold. Consequently religion continued to be an important part of political discourse. The renewed claim for political space by the Anglicans and Muslims pointed to a realignment of religiopolitical forces in the

secularised Ugandan politics. As a consequence of which, both religious groups were able to claim political space. By this, the relationship between the Anglicans and Muslims seems to have entered a new defining era.

This study posited that the persistence of religion in politics was due to its intrinsic nature as a reality that criss-crosses all aspects of life—socio-political and economic, and, therefore, likely to cause tension in sharing political space. It is the reason why, despite the NRM's ideology on non-involvement of religious groups in politics, religion remained an intrinsic aspect of the political discourse.

This understanding of the nature of religon was influenced by Hans Kung's idea of it as an encompassing reality. Kung (1996, p. xvii) defined religion as: "…*a social and individual relationship, vitally realized in a tradition and community* (through doctrine, ethos, and generally ritual…), *with something that transcends or encompasses man and his world*." (Emphasis original). He depicted religion as a lived experience, written in the hearts of adherents, and an extremely contemporary reality that forms the core of their very existence. Religion, thus, is an all-pervasive reality, providing the mechanism for understanding and interpreting the world, events and circumstances. By arguing as above, Kung underscores religion as an all-embracing reality, and that it influences every aspect of life of the adherents. In so saying, he underscored religion as a comprehensive reality. It provided a basis for understanding the inextricable nature of religion in socio-cultural realities.

The implication of this for the study is that it highlighted idea that people's political, social and economic lives have a religious value, and religion in inextricable in politics. By seeing religion as a lived experience, Kung thus demonstrates how, from a religious point of view, one might be able to perceive of political issues, and influenced thereby, one might then be able to participate from a religiously-informed point of view. This perspective, thus, highlighted the influence of religious thought beyond politics to the Anglican-Muslim relations in Uganda's public culture described by Alava and Sentongo as "highly religious" (2017, p. 678). The highly religious culture is observable historically through the inextricable relationship between religion and politics. The religionization of politics, right from the religious wars (1888-92), through the Protectorate (from 1894-1962), and from independence (1962) to the present, simply demonstrates religion as a defining experience of Ugandan politics. It is from this perspective that the study undertook to examine the Anglican and Islamic political theologies, seeking to underscore their causal influence on Anglican-Muslims relations.

The study specifically sought to: Examine the NRM Administration's ideology on religious groups' involvement in national politics between 1986 and 2016; Evaluate the influence of Anglican political theology in national politics during the NRM administration between 1986 and 2016; Evaluate the influence of Islamic political theology in national politics during the NRM administration betwee1986 and 2016; and, Assess the influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Anglican–Muslim relations during the NRM administration between 1986 and 2016.

Based upon the above specific objectives, the following research questions were used to guide the study: What was the NRM Administration's policy religious groups' involvement in national politics between 1986 and 2016? How did the Anglican political theology influence national politics between 1986 and 2016? How did the Islamic political theology influence national politics between 1986 and 2016? In what ways did Anglican and Islamic political theologies influence the Anglican–Muslim relations in Uganda between 1986 and 2016? Here-below are the summary of findings:

5.2.1 NRM's policy on religion and politics

Based on the first objective, it was established that the Administration's position regarding religious involvement in national politics was the outworking in practical terms of the bush war ideology, known as the Ten-Point Programme. The ideology defined from the onset and for the next thirty years the Administration's stance towards religious involvement in politics. During the years following the onset of the Administration, the Ten-Point Programmes was adumbrated in literature compiling the Presidential speeches. Point Number Three thereof was on consolidation of national unity and elimination of all forms of sectarianism. The point was conceived to address the national fragmentation based on religious, political, and ethnic divides. Until 1986, religion was a defining feature in political participation in Buganda, and later Uganda. It created the fault lines along which Uganda was fragment into UPC, predominantly for Anglican, DP, predominantly for Roman Catholics, KY for Buganda traditionalist, and CP in the 1880s, for Buganda Anglicans. It is the perceived complicity of religious groups in national fragmentation that provided the backdrop against which Point Three was articulate. It thereby provided the justification for the delineation of religion and politics in Uganda at the onset of the NRM Administration. This stance was further galvanised by the National Constitution. Promulgated in 2006, ten years following the

onset of the Administration, the National Constitution III: I; Chapter 2:7 and 37, provided for the Non-adoption of State religion.

Findings also established that, while Point Three of the Programmes sought to address the problem of national fragmentation, it had a double effect on the involvement of religious groups in national politics. Positively, it fostered inclusivity in the Administration and openness to religious involvement in politics. Also, it fostered a strong interreligious bond among the various religious groups. In addition, the policy delinked the religious groups from politics, and also gave the religious groups opportunity to constructively criticize some aspects of the Administration, although any involvement in politics was deemed illegal. Lastly, by default, it refocused church leaders on spiritual matters, as well as prevent political conflicts among religious institutions. Negatively, the policy galvanized the secularization of State. Furthermore, the State succeeded in gagging of religious voice. Lastly, it lent religious groups to dependency on the benevolence of Administration in a *patronato* relationship with state.

The study also established that, even though the NRM Administration's Ten-Point Programme, and its point on National Unity sough to bring this to a close, this seemed a less than successful effort. The Administration's ambivalence in the treatment of religious groups with hostility, yet with balanced tolerance, simply demonstrated that religion could not easily be delineated from politics. Rather, religion was a persistent reality influencing political reflection as well as expression. Both the Anglican and Muslims communities, though in varying ways, had continued to influence political trends. It is the persistent religious influence in politics that was central to this study.

5.2.2 Influence of Anglican political theology in national politics during the NRM administration between 1986 and 2016

The second objective sought to establish how the Anglican political theology influenced national politics between 1986 and 2016. Findings established that the Anglican ecclesiology provided for the Bishop as the representation of the Church in a local setting. In this way then, the Church's ecclesiology defined its political theology. That is to say, where the Archbishop or bishop stands is where the Church stands. This had a number of consequences to the Church's political theology. For instance, the Anglican political ethos was expressed variantly, and there was no clearly articulated theological position. It was also established that the Church leadership did not seem to have the capacity to offer a national political vision. This is for the reasons that the Church was

limping from its leadership crisis. This weakness was reflected nationaly by its inability to influence political trends. Findings also indicated that in spite of the variant expressions of political theology, Christians were politically involved as individuals rather than as members of the institutional Anglican Church. As a result, there was a decline in the institutional church political responsibility. Furthermore, it was established that Anglican political involvement was expressed as individual members of the Church, as the Church leadership and as an institution. However, the levels of participation varied significantly, ranging from explicit, cautious to non-involvement.

5.2.3 Influence of Islamic Political Theology in national politics during the NRM administration betwee1986 and 2016.

The third objective investigated the influence of Islamic political theology in national politics with the goal to establish its influence in Ugandan politics. Finding established that Muslims did not articulate a political theology, although they were generally politically active. Instead, members of the Muslims community espoused strongly differing political opinions based on the historical Kibuli, Old Kampala and Kawempe groups. Findings also established that over time, Muslims had continued to be politically active even in the current Administration, participating at all levels, right from the bush war times, and even later in government. This was attested to by the Muslim participation in the local government and in the top management of Kampala City Authority. Muslims, however, did not register political party, but rather were associated with the UPC and DP parties for pragmatic reasons. The closest to having a party was the formation of JEEMA Party in 1996. It was the first to register as a sectarian Muslim-based political party.

Muslim involvement in politics was attributable to a number of factors. These included membership to the global Islamic community, the OIC. This had by far enriched the contribution of the Muslim community in politics and education. The consequences of this was that there was renewed confidence in the future of Islam in Uganda. It was also established that the current Islamic political activism was a result of their capacity for long-term planning, an aspect that had kept alive their hopes for political leadership. This was demonstrated by the quest for the lost glory following the demise of the Islamic state in Buganda during the late 1880s. Similarly, Muslims were strategic, and were willing take and exploit opportunities. Lastly, it was established that support from the Administration and from local Muslim community was strong. In

consequence, Islamic political involvement seems to have gained more traction from the NRM effort at power balancing. This political culture seemed to have deeply entrench them in the national politics, and increasingly it is clear that specific positions are gazetted for Muslims.

5.2.4 Influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Anglican–Muslim relations between 1986 and 2016

The fourth objective sought to examine the extent to which the Anglican and Islamic theologies had impacted in the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. From the responses three thematic issues emerged prominently. The first was that during the NRM Administration, history rather than political theologies influenced relationships between Anglicans and Muslims in their political participation. The religiopolitical wars of the 19th century had put the Anglicans on the political pedestal, simultaneously leaving Muslims totally marginalized. They provided the background against which Muslims have since the early nineteenth century fought for political self-determination. The second theme was that religious identity remained the defining factor in the Anglican-Muslim relations. Four political players emerged—the Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Muslims and Traditionalist. In the subsequent years, the nature of relationship was influenced more by the relationship of the state to the religious groups. This was seen through four distinct eras. First, the Protectorate era, that characterised the formation of interest groups, prominent of which these were the religious-based groups. This era was dominated by the Anglican-based UPC Administrations, and Muslims only survived politically allying with Anglican-based UPC party. The second was Idi Amin's reign, during which Muslims rediscovered their potential in economics, business and education. The formation of the UMSC, as well as the strengthening of diplomatic and economic ties with global Muslim community, ushered Muslims on the road to a renewed fight for political space once lost in early 1890s. This would define anew the Anglican participation in politics, and ultimately the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims. The third era was the UNLA era (April 1979 to December 1980). Following the Islamic renaissance during Amin's era, the stature of Muslims had changed to that of significant political and economic player. Fourth, during the six years of Obote II era (1980-1986). Anglicans were again in a much stronger position. However, while their alliance with the UPC-Obote Administration gave them a bit of breathing space, simulteneously, it also

gave Muslims room for political participation. The above-mentioned phases of political development and participation of the Anglican and Muslim communities illustrated the extent to which the religion remained woven into politics, and the history and religious identity being the defining factors in the inter-religious encounter.

During the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016, relations between Anglicans and Muslims continued to be influenced by the struggle for political space. However, the agenda for national unity created a level ground for all religious groups, though the nature of relations continued to be constrained by the state interests. Also, relations between the Anglicans and Muslims during the NRM the dministration were mutual as a result of the NRM Administration idea of inclusiveness. The affirmative action, specifically on Muslims, ensured their positions. These were all founded on the idea of national unity, as a result of which foundations of political participation of both the Anglicans and Muslims, and other marginalised groups, including women, were realigned. In this way, Ugandan politics that had hitherto been dominated by Anglicans and Catholics, became more inclusive, making Muslims equal players.

5.3 CONCLUSIONS

The study, thus, makes the following conclusions:

- The persistence of Anglican and Muslim political interest despite NRM Administration's ideology, and its influence on the relations of Anglicans and Muslims owed less to their political theologies of the groups than to the intrinsic nature of religion as an inextricable in socio-cultural reality. Thus, while at the onset the NRM administration secularized Ugandan politics, the policy on National Unity aimed at staying the influence of religion in politics was of little significance. Instead, it opened up space to religious-based political interest. Consequently, Anglicans and Muslims repackaged themselves politically, demonstrating varying levels of political involvement. In that way, religion continued to be an important part of political discourse.
- The hangover of historical factors continued to shape the social and political differentiations between Anglicans and Muslims. The seed of poor relations between Anglicans and Muslims had earlier been sowed by the anti-Islamic sentiments of the British imperialists in competition for the territory and trade interest for which Uganda was central. It later strengthened at the onset of

religious plurality and the ensued xenophobia, where the competition for space was among the four religious groups in Buganda—the Traditionalist, Muslims, Anglican and Roman Catholics. The emergence of the Anglican hegemony saw Muslims fall behind in politics as well as in education. Since then, Muslims were overtly and covertly engaged in a protracted process of recovery of the lost political space.

- The above historical factors continued to shape the mode of the Anglican-Muslim participation and relationship during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. As observed, there was minimal theological underpinning for political participation during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. For the Anglican Church, while there was no specific political theology. Similarly, for Muslims, although they were politically active, there was little theological underpinning to their political activity. Rather, historical factors of socio-political marginalisation and the desire to overturn the status quo, spurred Muslims to political action.
- Consequent upon the above, there was little casual effect—both positive and negative—of religious political thought on patterns of relations between Anglicans and Muslims during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016. Rather, the background of the political wars of 19th century and the attendant social, political differentiation and stratification remained the driving factors of the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims. Also, the fight for political space has since been on-going both overtly and covertly, with the goal for Muslims being to taking their place on the political round table. Ultimately, therefore, a non-theological issues seems to be the new defining factor in the relationship between Anglicans and Muslims.
- The notion that there was on-going conflict between Anglicans and Muslim during the NRM Administration between 1986 and 2016 was partially sustainable. For, while historically, Muslims fought to regain the lost fortunes, the Anglican-Muslim relation was more peaceful in politics. Muslims worked well with the UPC Administration as the ‘allying group.’ During the NRM Administration there was no open hostilities. Instead, the emergence of IRCU, the inter-faith group, helped mitigate the historically poor relationship between Anglicans and Muslims.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

5.4.1 For the State

The study recommends that the State:

i. Exercises caution while instituting religio-cultural elements that would potentially breed religiopolitical tensions between Anglicans and Muslims. Such include inclusion in the National Constitution explicitely religious aspects such as the *Sharia* Law and its related functions—*Sharia* Banking and *Qadi* Courts.

ii. Distinguishes the religious communities (the Church and the Umma) as institutions from its leadership and general membership. Often the 'church' is used synonymously with church leadership. Thus, for instance, when it is said that the 'Church should not be involved in politics,' it is really meant that church leadership, rather than members should not be politically involved under the institutional umbrella.

iii. Implement genuine Political freedom free from manipulation and/or coercion of religious communities to engage in partisan politics. The consequence is that people tend to have no spiritual motivation to participate in politics; instead, they shy away from politics for fear of explicit partisan environment.

5.4.2 For the Church and Muslim Communities

The study recommends that the Church and Moslem communities:

i. Develop a programme for political civic education to guide their members on their civic responsibility.

ii. Consolidate their historical good relations and develop mechanism for peaceful political participation and relations.

5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The following recommendations are made for further research:

- An examination of the wider socio-political and cultural implication of religious freedom of the inclusion in the National Constitution of the provision of religious aspects such as Qadi Courts and Islamic Banking.
- A study of key locally-based political theologians of both the Anglican and Islamic communities in order to highlight their political theologies.

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APPENDICES

A1: MAPS

Map of Uganda

Source: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/images/africa/political-map-of-Uganda.gif

Map of Study Area: Kampala City Council



Source: www.sciencedirect.com

A2: CHAPTERISATION

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 Literature Review

Chapter 3 Methodology

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Chapter 4 Data Analysis, Interpretation and Summary

Chapter 5 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Study

A3: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

i. Interview Guide

Research Topic: ANGLICAN AND ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ANGLICAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN UGANDA (1986-2016)

Interview Guide

Dear Sir/Madam,

This research examines the Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Ugandan national politics during the National Resistance Movement (NRM) administration in Uganda in order to demonstrate its implication for Christian-Muslim relations. It is purely an academic study and whatever you share will enrich the study. Also, the information given in confidentiality will be treated as such.

Yours sincerely;

Rev. Samuel Opol

Section A: NRM Administration policy on religious involvement in national politics (1986-2016).

1. Kindly share what you know about the NRM administration's policy on involvement of religious groups in national politics during the period 1986-2016. Are there policy documents highlighting this?
2. What are some of the reasons why this policy was established?
3. In your observation, are there any effect of the policy both positively and negatively on the involvement of religious groups in national politics during this period?
4. Please, cite specific instances, and when and how the policy influenced religious involvement in politics.

Section B: Influence of Anglican political theology on national politics during the NRM administration (1986-2016).

1. In your opinion, have the Anglicans Church's ideas influenced trends in in national politics during the NRM administration during the period 1986-2016? Yes/No.
2. If yes, cite specific circumstance and when it happened.

3. Identify, if possible, some religious ideas that influenced the Anglican Church's involvement in politics during this period.
4. Explain any factors that may have helped Anglicans to play an influential role in Ugandan politics during this period?
5. If not, explain why.

Section C: Influence of Islamic political theology on national politics during the NRM administration (1986-2016).

1. In your opinion, have Islamic ideas influenced political trends in Uganda during the NRM administration during the period 1986-2016? Yes/No.
2. If yes, cite specific circumstances and when it happened.
3. Identify, if possible, some religious ideas that influenced the Islamic community's involvement in national politics during this period.
4. Explain any factors that may have helped the Islamic community to play an influential role in Ugandan politics during this period?
5. If no, explain why.

Section D: Influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Christian-Muslim Relations (1986-2016).

1. In your observation, are there ways Anglican political ideas have influenced relations between Anglicans and Muslims in Uganda during the period 1986-2016?
    a. If, yes, mention specifically how this was so.
    a. If no, explain why this is so.
2. In your observation, are there ways Islamic political ideas have influenced relations between Anglicans and Muslims in Uganda during the NRM administration?
    a. If, yes, mention specifically how this was so.
    b. If no, explain why.

Thank you for your participation.

ii. Self-administered Questionnaire/Google Form

Research Topic: ANGLICAN AND ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
ANGLICAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN UGANDA
(1986-2016)

Questionnaire

Informed consent note

Dear Sir/Madam, This research examines the influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Ugandan national politics during the National Resistance Movement (NRM) administration in Uganda in order to demonstrate its implication for Christian-Muslim relations. It is purely an academic study and whatever you share will enrich the study. Also, the information given in confidentiality will be treated as such.

Yours sincerely;

Rev. Samuel Opol

Section A: NRM Administration policy on religious involvement in politics (1986-2016).

1. Kindly share what you know about the NRM administration's policy on involvement of religious groups in national politics during the period 1986-2016. Are there policy documents highlighting this?

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2. What are some of the reasons why this policy was established?

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3. In your observation, are there any effect of the policy both positively and negatively on the involvement of religious groups in national politics during this period?

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4. Please, cite specific instances, and when and how the policy influenced religious involvement in politics.

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Section B: Influence of Anglican political theology on national politics during the NRM administration (1986-2016).

1. In your opinion, have the Anglicans Church's ideas influenced trends in the national politics during the NRM administration during the period 1986-2016?
   Yes/No……..

If yes, cite specific circumstance and when it happened.

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2. Identify, if possible, some religious ideas that influenced the Anglican Church's involvement in politics during this period.

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3. Explain any factors that may have helped Anglicans to play an influential role in Ugandan politics during this period?

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4. Explain, if any, factors that helped Anglicans to play an influential role in Ugandan politics during the NRM administration?

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5. If not, explain why.

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Section C: Influence of Islamic political theology on national politics during the NRM administration (1986-2016).

1. In your opinion, have Islamic ideas influenced political trends in Uganda during the NRM administration during the period 1986-2016?
   Yes/No……

If yes, cite specific circumstances and when it happened.

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2. Identify, if possible, some religious ideas that influenced the Islamic community's involvement in national politics during this period.

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3. Explain any factors that may have helped the Islamic community to play an influential role in Ugandan politics during this period?

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4. Explain, if any, factors that helped Muslims to play an influential role in Ugandan politics during the NRM administration?

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5. If no, explain why.

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Section D: Influence of Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Christian-Muslim Relations (1986-2016).

1. In your observation, are there ways Anglican political ideas have influenced relations between Anglicans and Muslims in Uganda during the period 1986-2016?

   Yes/No…….

   If, yes, mention specifically how this was so.

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   If no, explain why this is so.

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2. In your observation, are there ways Islamic political ideas have influenced relations between Anglicans and Muslims in Uganda during the NRM administration?

   Yes/No…….

   If, yes, mention specifically how this was so.

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If no, explain why.

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Thank you for your participation.

A4: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM KU GRADUATE SCHOOL TO COLLECT DATA

KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: kubps@yahoo.com
dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke
Website: www.ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 8710901 Ext. 57530

Our Ref: C82EA/23654/13 **Date:** 21st May, 2018

The Director General,
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation,
P.O. Box 30623-00100,
NAIROBI

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FOR MR. SAMUEL OPOL D. MIN - REG. NO. C82EA/23654/13

I write to introduce Mr. Opol who is a Postgraduate Student of this University. He is registered for a Ph.D. degree programme in the **Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies in the School of Humanities & Social Sciences.**

Mr. Opol intends to conduct research for Ph.D. thesis entitled, **"Anglican and Islamic Political Theologies and their Implications for Anglican-Muslim Relations in Uganda (1986-2016)".**

Any assistance given will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

MRS. LUCY N. MBAABU
FOR: DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

RM/cao

A5: CONSENT FORM

Dear Respondent,

My name is Samuel Opol (Rev). I am conducting a research for a PHD in Religious Studies at Kenyatta University.

My topic of research is ANGLICAN AND ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ANGLICAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN UGANDA (1986-2016). It examines the Anglican and Islamic political theologies on Ugandan national politics during the National Resistance Movement (NRM) administration in Uganda in order to demonstrate its implication for Christian-Muslim relations. It is purely an academic study and whatever you share will enrich the study. Also, the information given in confidentiality will be treated as such.

Participation in the study is voluntary and care is taken to ensure that no negative consequences will be encountered by the respondent as a result of participating. Also, confidentiality will be ensured at all times, and unless expressly so consented, pseudo names will be used.

Yours sincerely;

Rev. Samuel Opol

(PhD Student)

A6: LIST OF RESPONDENTS
a). List of Key Informant Interviewed

Name	Sex	Occupation	Place of Interview	Date of Interview
Akena, Polly	M	Banker	Kampala	2/6/2021
Alaso Alice Asianut	M	Politician	Phone	19/3/2022
Aliganyira, Florence	F	Priest	Kampala	1/6/2021
Alinda Jimmy	M	Priest	Phone	19/8/2021
Bainomugisha, Gerald	M	Businessman	Kampala	10/10/2021
Baitwa, Philip	M	Attorney	Phone	14/8/2021
Chobe, Latima	M	Priest	Kampala	17/6/2021
Ekwang, Joseph	M	Politician	Phone	10/10/2021
Kakembo, Brian	M	Librarian	Kampala	4/7/2021
Kalyegira, Timothy	M	Journalist/Political Analyst	Phone	19/8/2021
Kateeba, John	M	Priest	Phone	19/8/2021
Kasozi	M	Religious Leader	Kampala	19/10/2021
Kezala, Najib	M	Religious Leader	Kampala	20/10/2021
Kibirigye, Sam	M	Banker	Kampala	30/7/2021
Kimuli, Paul	M	Banker	Kampala	23/7/2021
Kintu Imelda	F	Housewife/Teacher	Phone	3/11/2021
Kintu, Titus	M	Journalist/Political Analyst	Phone	3/11/2021
Kirarira, Issa	M	General Secretary, Nile Dialogue Platform	Mukono	12/11/2021
Kinyiri	M	Religious Leader	Phone	
Kwizera, Esther	F	Attorney	Phone	8/9/2021
Lugemwa, Paul	M	Teacher	Phone	23/7/2021
Marachtho, Emilly	F	Political Analyst/ Senior Lecturer, UCU	Mukono	4/7/2021
Mugabi, Paul	M	Businessman	Phone	19/8/2021
Mukasa, Peace	F	Accountant	Phone	10/10/2021
Musana, Paddy	M	Senior Lecture, MUK	Phone	30/9/2021
Nagami, Agnes	F	Attorney	Kampala	11/10/2021
Nalwoga, Milly	F	Teacher	Kampala	17/6/2021
Namubiru, Annita	F	Politician	Kampala	23/7/2020
Namyalo, Prossy	F	Teacher	Mukono	17/6/2021
Nankya, Dorotthy	F	Nurse	Phone	30/9/2021
Nima, Joyce	F	Peace Activist	Phone	14/7/2021
Obetia, Joel Samson	M	Retired Bishop and Teaching Fellow, UCU	Mukono	14/7/2021
Odur, Pius	M	Self-employed	Kampala	17/6/2021
Oguli, Margaret	F	Judge of High Court	Phone	13/7/2021
Ogwal Atim, Cecilia	F	Politician	Phone	4/8/2021

Ogwang, Micah	M	Politician	Kampala	4/9/2021
Okalany, Paul	M	Engineer	Phone	4/8/2021
Okech	M	Politician	Kampala	17/6/2021
Okello, Sam	M	Accountant	Phone	28/5/2021
Okoboi, Amodoi John	M	Lecturer	Kyambogo	8/3/2022
Okwera, Jimmy	M	Veterinary Doctor	Phone	30/7/2021
Onapito Ekomoloit	M	Political Analyst	Phone	19/3/2022
Opio, Philip	M	Accountant	Kampala	17/6/2021
Osire, Francis	M	Religious Leader	Phone	28/5/2021
Otara, Michael	M	Businessman	Kampala	17/6/2021
Oyet, Justin	M	Agriculturalist	Kampala	17/6/2021
Sentogo, Chris	M	Priest/Religious Leader	Kampala	13/7/2021
Serunkuuma	M	Business	Kampala	2/6/2021
Ssali, Ibrahim	F	Teacher	Kampala	20/7/2021
Tegule, Charles	M	Teacher	Kampala	30/7/2021
Tumisiime	M	Teacher	Kampala	24/8/2021
Turyahabwe, Amos	M	Priest/Religious Leader	Mukono	13/7/2021
Ubomba Jaswa, Peter	M	Professor	Mokono	26/7/2021
Wakhungu, Nathan	M	Priest/Lecture	Kampala	25/1/2022

b. Other Respondent (on Google Forms)

Name	Sex	Occupation
Anonymous		odongo4africafoffice@gmail.com
Anonymous		thethingsofheaven@gmail.com
Acema, Patrick	M	Priest
Bagabe Okahaabwa,	F	Lecturer
Gulumaire, Andrew	M	Priest
Kansiime, Ely	M	Lecturer/Priest/Religious Leader
Kiconco, Frank	M	Priest
Kisenyi, Vincent	M	Lecturer
Lytaaya, Emmanuel	M	Priest
Majwala, Henry	M	Priest/Religious Leader
Nima, Joyce	F	Peace Activist
Nsubuga, Brian	M	Priest/ Religious Leader
Omace, Henry	M	Lecturer
Omona Andrew David	M	Senior Lecturer
Oneka, Joseph	M	Lawyer
Osire, Francis	M	Priest
Turyahabwe, Amos	M	Lecturer/Priest/ Religious Leader