

**SOCIAL MEDIA AND ELECTION VIOLENCE: CASE OF NAIROBI CITY  
COUNTY, KENYA (2007-2017)**

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UNIVERSITY**

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## **DECLARATION**

This Proposal is my original work and has not been presented for a degree or any other award in Kenyatta University or any other University

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this study to my wife Lilian Kamala and my Children Brian, Ian, Jerry, Calvin and Hadassah for foregoing much so that I can proceed with my studies.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<b>CA</b>	Communications Authority of Kenya
<b>IEBC</b>	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>KNCHR</b>	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
<b>ODM</b>	Orange Democratic Movement
<b>JP-K</b>	Jubilee Party of Kenya
<b>WDM-K</b>	Wiper Democratic Movement - Kenya
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>NCIC</b>	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
<b>SUPKEM</b>	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
<b>NCCK</b>	National Council of Churches of Kenya
<b>ACK</b>	Anglican Church of Kenya
<b>CJPC</b>	Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
<b>FGD</b>	Focused Group Discussions
<b>NACOSTI</b>	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
<b>KII</b>	Key Interview Informant
<b>FGDP</b>	Focused Group Discussions Participant

## OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

<b>Election Violence</b>	Killings, Property destruction and clashes experienced immediately before, during and after political elections fanned through social media platforms Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp.
<b>Slum</b>	Refers to informal settlements in Nairobi City County that are hotspots of election violence.
<b>Stereotype</b>	Disparaging portrayal of people from other ethnic group or political inclination other than yours on social media.
<b>Location</b>	Administrative zones that experience violence during and after elections.
<b>Social Media</b>	For this study it will mean Facebook and Twitter where users influence ideas, beliefs and perceptions and actions.
<b>Youth</b>	In this study youth refer to persons that were aged between 18 -35 years during the periods of 2007 to 2018 and were both registered voters and followers of political parties in Nairobi City County
<b>Negative ethno-stereotype Messaging</b>	Messages, videos or remarks on social media that stoke hatred and disdain against members of other ethnic groups or political inclinations.
<b>Fake news</b>	Refers to misinformation and deceptions that is sensationalized and spread on social media with the intention to damage an agency, political party, ethnic group or a person.

## ABSTRACT

Reintroduction of multiparty politics in Kenya in 1992 bolstered cases of election violence in the country. The 1990s, when Social Media was non-existent, election violence was isolated in the then Rift Valley province. Post-election violence of 2007 was widely covered internationally and was comparatively the worst in Kenya's election landscape. Social media was first used for political agitation and plotting in 2007 electioneering. Social Media has since become a requisite tool in Kenya's election landscape. The platform is used by political leaders to spread information, campaign and mobilize. The population preference of Social Media as a source of information poses a challenge to security and unity of the nation as it has been employed to incite hatred and violence. Despite the increasing scale of election violence in the era of Social Media, there is minimal research on the link between Social Media and Election Violence. This study investigated the connection between social media and election violence in Kenya. The target population comprised of voting residents of Nairobi City County, Official Officer of NCIC, Official of CA, Officer from Police Headquarters, leaders of political parties, political parties' youth leaders and religious leaders. The study was guided by Human Needs theory and the Social Identity theory and adopted a descriptive survey research design. Cluster sampling and purposive sampling method was used to select target areas and obtain respondents from the study population respectively. Key informant interviews, focus group discussions and structured questionnaires were utilized in data collection. Quantitative statistics was evaluated using expressive indicators by adoption of SPSS software and Microsoft excel and presented using percentages and frequency tables whereas qualitative data was evaluated and categorized according to key paradigms that were in the research. Data was thematically analyzed and interpreted based on the research objectives. Verbatim reporting was used qualitative data presentation. The findings of the study are useful to the National and County governments' institutions, technology companies, and religious groups in mounting policies that will curtail misuse of social media and instead promote its effectiveness in promoting tolerance. The study found that there is a link between the social media activities and political violence in Kenya that mostly takes place before, during and after election.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background to the Study

Social media plays a very fundamental role in the lives of people. Social media refers to podiums that function like virtual public of Internet users who share mutual interests like hobbies, religion, or politics. This study focused on Facebook and Twitter since they are the most widely used platforms in Kenya. While Social Media networks generates employment and cultural exchange opportunities, they are also subject to abuse.

Social media networks present a means to keep in touch with relatives, friends, acquaintances. They also provide a means of collaboration on various fronts (Gherheş & Obrad, 2016). This explains why companies find it effective to run marketing programs on social media because social media connects business to millions of their clients, government and social institutions can mount productive awareness campaigns on social media networks. Morton (2015) notes that social media portents a podium for inciting social disorder and violence.

Freedom House (2017) points that during the 2016 USA presidential election campaigns, social media networks were flooded with divisive political and fake content, correspondents reporting on political or social topics confronted an upsurge in antisemitism, death threats, and provocation on social media in the period leading up to the election. It was also reported that false social media accounts were used to organize protests and counter-protests. Given that social media transcends social boundaries and established norms of control, it portents a means of influencing masses towards certain behaviour that includes violent behaviour.

Ketabchi, Asadpour, & Tabatabaei (2013) notes that the post-election protests witnessed after announcement of the Iranian presidential election of 12 June 2009 were attributable to Social media such as Twitter and Facebook. The platforms were utilized in dissemination of news, pictures and recordings of the proceedings in that timeframe. It is believed that these social media platforms aided demonstrators to consolidate and succeed in their demonstrations. Wolfsfeld, Segev, & Sheaffer (2013) opines that social media presents an immense motivation on collective action. Accordingly, these platforms can furnish a campaign with powerful, brisk, and cheap podium for conscription, funding, dissemination of news and pictures, collaboration, and enlistment for action as attributed to the collapse of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. It is of interest to note that popular commentators called this revolt as 'Facebook Revolutions'. This perspective shows that Social media offers a cheap and fast option to reach out and influence supporters with almost zero resources as it triggers a self-motivation to the masses. These platforms therefore can become ideal tools for the political class to advance their political actions including calls to violence. In this age of technological upsurge, populations are spending most of their time collaborating through internet social networking sites. The Standard Media (2015) reported that Kenya had seen a steady rise in the number social media opinion makers who exercise their freedom of speech on politics and social issues affecting them, this could explain the frequent news reports that have blamed social media negative messaging steeped in negative ethno-stereotyping for cheering and endorsing political intolerance and violence during election periods. In these uncensored and unhindered social media publics, damaging and treacherous conversations between already structurally conflicted populations go unnoticed or ignored. If this trend

continues, Kenya could be faced with unending political violence in electioneering periods.

This raises the debate on whether Kenya should move towards controlling social media. According to Garlick & Chli (2009) controlling social communication placates insubordinate cultures, but with contrary impact on tranquil ones. Kenya has for a long time been described as a paradise of peace in the region and therefore restricting social communication will accordingly incite upheaval, however, the outcome of non-censorship has equally created a rebellious society.

According to Rawlance, Albin-Lackey, & Neistat (2008) the most volatile periods in Kenya's post-independence election history was between 1991 and 1993. In 1991 after pressure on Kenyan government from its citizens and development partners, multiparty democracy was re-introduced. Numerous opposition parties were registered but the ruling party, KANU continued etched in authority triumphing in the polls of 1992 and 1997 despite the violence and allegations of voting wrongdoings. A significant part of election related violence happened during the campaign phase and was intense in the former Rift Valley and Western provinces. During this period there were no social media platforms in Kenya. However, the violence experienced after the 2007 polls was a shocker to the nation and to the world; during this period the estimated Internet users had increased to stand at 40.5 million people (CA, 2017b). Likewise, according to Google's Consumer Barometer, Internet access to Kenyans stood at 57% in 2017. This means that the biggest percentage of Kenyan population is active on social media platforms and therefore it is a critical platform for motivation, mobilization and recruitment hence a need for Kenyan governance systems to address its influence on election violence. These trends provide

important leads as to the influence social media has had and will continue to have on Kenya's electoral system.

KNCHR (2008) recognizes three unrelated but occasionally synchronized forms of polls violence – impulsive, planned and revengeful. The report explains that initial stage of post-election violence of 2007 ignited immediately the presidential winner was declared, when opposition begun mass action, particularly in Kisumu and in Nairobi's informal settlements; the subsequent upsurge comprised of planned attacks former Rift Valley Province which seemed to have aimed non-Kalenjin populations and those deemed as sympathetic to the government, including the Kikuyu, Kisii and Luyha communities. In revenge, mobs of Kikuyu populaces consequently attacked non-Kikuyu communities in Naivasha, Nakuru and Mathare. UNCHR (2008) shows that, over 1,200 persons lost their lives, thousands more injured, more than 300,000 were internally displaced and about 42,000 houses and numerous businesses were plundered or shattered. Substantial accounts of gender-based violence were also testified. During the Electioneering period of 2012, same patterns of violence was experienced. It is important to note that during these periods there was considerable increase in the use of social media platforms by Kenyans. Election violence has radically changed the ethnic composition of many zones of Kenya. In Nairobi City County, informal settlements of Mathare, Kibera and others have been divided into territories where gangs from one ethnic cluster or another protect 'their' zones. This is heightened by the fact that mobilization of Kenyan voting patterns and political parties is along ethnic perceptions with a hope that a wining of either guarantees prosperity, justice and security for one ethnic affiliation against the opposing

affiliations. This scenario when projected and manipulated on social media pose the danger of inciting masses against each other.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Social media plays a central role in the lives of many people in the world and in particular Kenya. It generates prospects for the population while at the same time it transcends ethnicity, religion and race boundaries making it a potential unifying tool for the nation. However, frequent news reports have blamed social media negative messaging steeped in negative ethno-stereotyping for inciting and cheering political intolerance. CA (2017a) provides strict guidelines on social media messaging but the platforms continue to gain notoriety in stirring political intolerance therefore negating the benefits social media can bring to the nation. There is limited research on social media and election violence in Kenya and this study therefore aimed add to the existing body of knowledge on social media by investigating the link between Social Media and election violence in Kenya, by studying election violence trends in Nairobi City County between 2007 and 2017.

## **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of the study was to analyze the role of social media in election violence in Kenya. The specific objectives of the study were as follows;

- i. To investigate the influence of social media on political communication in Kenya
- ii. To probe if false news on social media platforms incite election violence
- iii. To analyze how social media has enhanced recruitment of people to election violence in Nairobi, City County

- iv. To examine the influence of negative ethno-stereotype messaging on social media on violence during election period.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

- i. Is there a link between social media and political communication in Kenya?
- ii. Does false news spread on social media platforms provoke election violence in Kenya?
- iii. Does the existence of many popular social media platforms enhance recruitment to election violence in Kenya?
- iv. Does negative ethno-stereotype messaging on social media inflame election violence in Kenya?

#### **1.5 Justification and Significance of the Study**

Kessler (2013) opines that social media is more than an interaction tool but a unifying podium. It empowers membership, lobby assembly establishment and cohesion in innovative ways; ways that do not adapt to prevailing traditional methods or physical boundaries. Social media, specifically Facebook and Twitter have become popular mobilization tools in Kenya's electoral process and so has election violence scaled up over the years. Few studies exist on the link between social media and election violence and this study was carried out to add to new insights to the existing body of knowledge on social media use in Kenya. Nairobi City County has assumed the epicenter role of election violence that systematically ignites the entire nation into violence at a rate never experienced before. Nairobi City County has been selected because it is the presidential tallying center and it is from here a presidential winner is declared. The announcement has become an election violence-trigger to a population already divided and incited

during electioneering period. It is only through an empirical study that resultant evidence can be used to improve on policies and measures to curb use of social media in stirring election violence in Kenya. By contextualizing social media and Kenya's election violence, the study is useful to Kenya National and County institutions, technology companies, and religious groups in formulating policies that will curtail abuse of social media and instead promote its effectiveness in promoting patriotism amongst Kenyans.

### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

The research concentrated on the election years of 2007, 2012 and 2017. These three election years represent the period when social media was widely used in the political arena. According to Communication Authority of Kenya, at these periods the estimated internet users stood at 40.5 million people (CA, 2017b) and therefore social media was an ideal campaign tool and was used in mobilizing support for candidates, political parties and coalitions. Social media platforms were also used to share pictures and video scenes of violence experienced during these election periods and was widely used in post violence peace campaigns. The research was executed in Nairobi, City County, Kenya. Nairobi City County was preferred because it is the national tallying center from where presidential votes are tallied and a winner declared. This declaration has traditionally become the trigger to election violence.

### **1.7 Limitation and Delimitations**

Researcher anticipated hesitation from leaders of political parties in providing required information, however, the researcher ensured that he explained that the research was purely for academic purposes and assured them of confidentiality of information provided.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter examines literature linked to how social media has influenced political communication in Kenya, how false information on social media incites election violence, how social media is used to recruit persons to election violence and how negative ethno-stereotype messaging on social media ignites election violence. It also contains theoretical and conceptual framework and the knowledge gaps that were be addressed by this study.

#### **2.1 Internet and Social Media Penetration**

Kaplan & Haenlein (2010) posts that as of January 2009, Facebook had enlisted more than 175 million users, which is marginally less than the population of Brazil (190 million) and over double the population of Germany (80 million). It additionally pointed that 75% of Internet surfers utilized “Social Media” in the second quarter of 2008 by enlisting in social media which was a substantial upsurge from 56% in 2007. The upsurge was not restricted to youngsters but 35—44 years old, increasingly populated the ranks of new members, audiences, and critics. From these statistics one can fairly say that Social Media represent a world-shattering new trend that should be of interest to society and more so to the political arena.

CA (2016) shows that there is over 90% mobile infiltration in Kenya. Between April and June 2016, mobile telephony ownership stretched to 39.7 million up from 38.3 million owners chronicled between January and April of the same year. This converts to an upsurge of 3.7 percent or 1.4 million new mobile users enlistments during that quarter.

That was a huge limp from 2014 when smartphone interest was polled as being only 27%.

Likewise, according to Google's Consumer Barometer, Internet access to Kenyans stood at 57% in 2017. The biggest percentage of these digital devices that support social media platforms are in the hands of the Kenyans. This level of internet and social media connectivity has opened a world of opportunities to the Kenyan populations including a platform to showcase their talents, provided employment opportunities, a scene of cultural exposure and a forum of learning and free expression. This level of social media penetration points to the direction that it portends an influential role in the social-political aspects of the Kenyan society and of concern is the political landscape that is ethnically structured. (Łubiński, 2021) appreciates that there are several groupings which use social media for propaganda, recruitment, with an aim for indoctrination and incitement to criminal acts. In this regard, social media in Kenya presents a front in which election violence incitement, recruitment or mobilization can become a reality.

## **2.2 Social Media and Political Communication**

Dijck & Poell (2013) appreciates that social media platforms have their own unique ways for advancing approval of individuals, effects, or thoughts, which is measured mostly in quantified terms. Decorated in Facebook's Edge Rank and Twitter's Trending, themes are systems that celebrate some subjects and diminish others. Facebook's Like-scores automatically choose controversial and encouraging appraisals of subjects, rather demanding intricate valuations. Comparatively, Twitter's Trending subjects allows manipulators to enhance specific matters or issues, while Retweets provides a means to extensively "approve" a specific tweet. This easy way requiring no in-depth analysis to

endorse ideas but rather clicking to align with friends or potential associates is popular with the populations. From this type of ranking, superusers, opinion shapers, idea celebrities or populations -with-clout are easily perceptible and sought after for both positive and negative ends. These drivers of social media ratings of ideas play a key role for political outfits during electioneering period. They play pivotal roles in political membership recruitment drives, agenda selling, and campaign programs. This kind of reality qualifies social media outlets as open grounds for abuse that can lead to election violence.

Center for Multiparty Democracy Kenya (2015) explains that most Kenyans contribute objectively well in their part nominations and in countrywide polling crusades. They aid in crafting crusade artworks and catchphrases, contribute in polling and gathering of sentiments on significant party-political subjects to sustain political parties and their aspirants. They are involved in dissemination of political mantra and participate in parades, which are key events in political campaigns in Kenya today. These roles find alignment with creativity on social media platforms. However, given the polarized and ethnic politics in Kenya, subjects have used these roles on Kenyan social media to mobilize violence against perceived enemies much to the benefit of politicians. (Mkinen & Kuiru, 2008) notes that the social media offered swifter, more subjective, and more detailed reportage during the 2007 election crises. This insight aligns with the findings of this study which revealed that people relied on social media platforms for political interactions during election period with a high preference for Facebook followed by Twitter. People mostly accessed their social media platforms via their mobile telephones enabling political messages to reach a large population within a short time with less resources. The

study revealed that people spent more time on social media making it an effective political communication tool. The study also revealed people had a web of followers on social media therefore making social media an effective platform for political messaging.

### **2.3 Social Media and Fake news**

Although the political practice has a stretched account of misrepresentations and widespread misperceptions, false news on social media has triggered extensive alarm in recent years. Moretti (2017) considers that during the 2016 USA presidential elections, the average USA adult read and recalled one or conceivably numerous forged bulletin articles with bigger coverage to those favoring Trump than Clinton. Given the final outcome of the presidential race one may be inclined to believe that fake news on social media hold a sway in competitive elections and the losing side is bound to respond, as in the case of Kenya, through violence. Frederiksen (2017) shows that that false news is an inescapable difficulty associated with Kenyan elections with majority of citizens having gotten fake news and majority perceiving this news as being intentionally falsified. This misinformation is fixed and spread on social media outlets particularly Facebook and Twitter. It is hence imperative to take a measured approach in how social media information should be handled before, during and after elections in Kenya. The study discovered that majority of people had encountered fake news on social media with only. The study further revealed that this type of messaging triggered violence during election period as the fake news incited persons to engage in political violence during election period. With the snowballing effect of connectivity by followers on various social media platforms the incitement through fake news physically manifested on the streets through violence and destruction of properties belonging to perceived political enemies.

## **2.4 Social Media and Recruitment to Election Violence**

Kessler (2013) notes that the social media is not just a communication tool; it is also a connection tool. It enables affiliation, interest group formation and solidarity in new ways; ways that do not conform to existing social groups or geographic locations. Persons express self-understandings of events and matters, and not depend on the interpretations of their leaders. (Łubiński, 2021) points out that Social media is an efficient platform to mobilize support, disseminate narratives, wage information operations, or even coordinate military operations in the real world, In this regard Kenyan political class have coined narratives to align with trending problems among the populations in Nairobi slums, and pushing such narratives on social media platforms to recruit populations on either side.(Łubiński, 2021) further notes that an inherent factor in the intensive use of social networks is that they are vulnerable to manipulation. These popular platforms become difficult to monitor, especially to ensure that the content distributed to followers on these platforms is accurate. This explains why competing political groups snow-ball with emotive political narratives creating a perfect ground for violence during electioneering periods. Social media then becomes captive of the motives behind its users.

The study revealed that all people subscribed to one or more social media platform and relied on it for political interactions during election period. Majority agreed that Social media was used to recruit persons to violence by being called to either participate in strikes, civil disobedience, violence or causing havoc to perceived enemies.

## **2.5 Negative Stereotyping on Social Media and Election Violence**

Casilli & Tubaro (2012) admits that in during the August 2011 eruption of public strife in the UK, there was general agreement from both mainstream media and political wing that the social media use played a big part in the unrests. Using social media, riot mobs quickly spread misinformation through social media platforms thus establishing a sphere of influence on the direction the London riots took.

Social media permits formation of online communities that co-exist in live and recorded connections. These connections can be organized such as logical comebacks to messages that are controlled such as dialogue between groups of supporters or anonymous such as in Twitter, where issues are not associated with an individual but grouped as ad hoc submission of hashtags that can be used to find and connect messages by a diversity of many manipulators (Chen, Peter, 2013). This unchecked setup within social media environments has been used by the persons to spread information with demeaning stereotyped that has negative ethnic connotations. This string of communication breeds tensions during electioneering periods. The study revealed that majority of experienced their ethnic group been derogatively profiled on social media and this coupled with other variables incited persons to use violence to defend their ethnic positions and interests.

## **2.6 Theoretical Framework**

This section discusses Human Needs and Social Identity theories and demonstrates their bearing to the research.

### **2.6.1 Human Needs Theory**

Carlsson (1999) Human Needs theory hypothesizes that in order to live and achieve well-being, humans require certain prerequisites. They are known as human needs which comprise physical and non-physical essentials required for human growth and progress, as well as all those things human beings are naturally determined to achieve. If these needs are deprived, human beings employ violence to assert their rights and fulfil their needs. Violence is thus likely to occur as a struggle for the need for identity, recognition, and other such human, communal ideals. This theory is central to this study as it will help identify the reasons why the populations are quick to embrace violence during electioneering periods. In the era of social media, this violence has found expression on social media platforms and it has the potential to transform to physical violence with the slightest trigger such as a dispute in election results in case of Kenya. However, the Human Needs theory alone did not explain why Kenyans were organized along the “us-versus-them” divisions and hence the researcher used a second theory, Social Identity theory, to explain this phenomenon.

### **2.6.2 Social Identity Theory**

Tajfel & Turner (2004) propose that categories that individuals ascribe to are an important source of self-importance and confidence. These groupings provide a feel of communal distinctiveness: a feeling of fitting in the societal domain. To be able to grow self-image, people enrich the standing of their in- group. For example, individuals can grow their self-image by segregating and being biased against the group they don't belong to. Consequently, we split the realm into “them” and “us” based through a process of societal labeling. Social identity theory states that the in-group will discriminate


against the out-group to enhance their self-image. The principal premise of social identity theory is that group members of an in-group will pursue to find undesirable characteristics of an out-group, thus augmenting their self-image. Henri Tajfel suggested that stereotyping is founded on an ordinary mental process: the inclination to cluster things together. In doing so we incline to overstate the variances amongst clusters and the likenesses of things in the identical clusters. This theory explains how supporters of ODM, JP-K, WDM-K and their leaders organized themselves against those of their perceived rival.

## **2.7 Conceptual Framework**

Based on the literature review above, a conceptual framework illuminating the connection amongst variables that explain social media and election violence is shown in figure 2.1 below. It shows the connection amongst the variables. The study's dependent variable was the election violence. Independent variable was social media.

The above conceptual framework illustrates how the three independent variables political communication, recruitment and negative ethnic stereotyping on social media influence Election violence which is the dependent variable. The intervening variables determine the extent of influence the independent variables have on Election Violence.

**Figure 2. 1 Conceptual Framework**



## 2.8 Summary

Critical examination of the literature reviewed shows that, little has been done on the impact social media has on election violence in Kenya especially in Nairobi City County. Many studies previously conducted focus on efficacy of social media networks with few studies conducted on social media and mass action but outside Kenya in countries like India, and United Kingdom. The current study therefore tasked to identify the link between Social Media and Election Violence in Kenya focusing on a case of selected populations in Nairobi City County. The motivation of this inquiry was to add insights to the existing body of knowledge on Social Media and Election Violence in Kenya

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This chapter presents how the study was carried out. It contains description and elucidation of research design, study area, target population, sampling technique, sample size and research instruments.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The research employed a descriptive survey research design. This design was useful in collecting information from respondents on their attitudes and opinions in relation to social media and election violence because it allowed the use of a wide variety of research methods to investigate different variables and the researcher did not control or manipulate any of the variables, but only observed and measured them. This research design was also an appropriate choice because it helped to identify characteristics, frequencies, trends, and categories of research variables.

#### **3.2 Study Area**

The inquiry was done in Nairobi City County, Kenya. Nairobi City County was selected because compared to other major towns, it is the epicenter of election violence and the national tallying center for presidential results which has become a trigger for election violence in Kenya. Kibra, Mathare, Ruaraka, Embakasi North, Embakasi Central in this County represents the face of Kenya in terms of ethnic and political composition.

Nairobi City County is found in Kenya. It is located 1.19 degrees south of the Equator and 36.59 degrees east of meridian 70. Its altitude fluctuates between 1,600 and 1,850 metres above sea level (Mitullah, 2003).



### **3.3 Target Population**

Sekaran & Bougie (2016) explains that population is the total collection of individuals, happenings or things of concern that the researcher wishes to investigate. IEBC (2017) puts total number of cast voters in Nairobi at 2,250,853 and this was the target population in this study. The population categories for this study comprised of 2007 – 2017 voters in Nairobi City County because they were actively involved in political election processes and were the base of social media users, Official from NCIC as this institution is mandated to promote national unity, CA official because this institution is the regulatory authority for the communications sector in Kenya, Kenya police service representative provided insight on law enforcement and social media, Elected Members of parliament from Nairobi City County, Nairobi City County and Youth leaders of political parties with representation in Parliament are key because provided insights on how they mobilized their followers during electoral process and the leadership of SUPKEM, NCCCK, CJPC and ACK as they played a big role in the peace process before, during and after election violence periods

### **3.4 Sampling Size**

Krejcie & Morgan (1970) formula for sample size was used in this study. They discern that as the population surges, the sample size rises at a reducing proportion and remains ultimately constant at marginally above 380 cases (**Table 3.1**)

#### **Table 3. 1 Determining Sample size for Finite Population**

To ease the method of determining sample size for a finite population, KrejScie & Morgan (1970), came up with a table using sample size formula for finite population; Where  $N$ =population size and  $n$ =Sample size required.

N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	100	80	280	162	800	260	2800	338
15	14	110	86	290	165	850	265	3000	341
20	19	120	92	300	169	900	269	3500	346
25	24	130	97	320	175	950	274	4000	351
30	28	140	103	340	181	1000	278	4500	354
35	32	150	108	360	186	1100	285	5000	357
40	36	160	113	380	191	1200	291	6000	361
45	40	170	118	400	196	1300	297	7000	364
50	44	180	123	420	201	1400	302	8000	367
55	48	190	127	440	205	1500	306	9000	368
60	52	200	132	460	210	1600	310	10000	370
65	56	210	136	480	214	1700	313	15000	375
70	59	220	140	500	217	1800	317	20000	377
75	63	230	144	550	226	1900	320	30000	379
80	66	240	148	600	234	2000	322	40000	380
85	70	250	152	650	242	2200	327	50000	381
90	73	260	155	700	248	2400	331	75000	382
95	76	270	159	750	254	2600	335	1000000	384

**Source:** Krejcie and Morgan (1970)

Krejcie and Morgan (1970) point that using the above calculation, as the population increases the sample size increases at a diminishing rate and remains eventually constant at slightly more than 380 cases. According to the table, the research's targeted population of 2,250,853 translated to a sample size of 384 and was categorized in the table 3.2 below;

**Table 3. 2: Sample Size**

TARGET POPULATION	POPULATION SIZE	SAMPLE SIZE
Youth leaders of Political parties from Nairobi with representation in Parliament (ODM, WDM-K and JP-K)	7	7
Nairobi City County Voters in constituencies that are election violence hotspots (Kibra, Mathare, Ruaraka, Embakasi North, Embakasi Central)	2,250,853	365
Members of Parliament in Nairobi City County from election violence hotspots (Kibra, Mathare, Ruaraka, Embakasi North, Embakasi Central)	5	5
Secretary Generals of SUPKEM, ACK, CJPC and NCKK	4	4
CEO of NCIC	1	1
Police Spokesperson	1	1
CA Director, Consumer and Public Affairs	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>384</b>

**Source: Author, 2018**

Based on table 3.3, a total of 365 questionnaires targeted Nairobi City County Voters in election violence hotspots of Kibra, Mathare, Ruaraka, Embakasi North and Embakasi Central. Focus group discussions (FGD) were targeted at 7 Youth leaders of Political parties from Nairobi with representation in Parliament and 12 interviews

scheduled targeting members of Parliament from Nairobi, NCIC CEO, SUPKEM, ACK, CJPC and NCKK secretary generals, Police Spokesperson and CA Director, Consumer and Public Affairs.

### **3.5 Sampling Technique**

Purposive sampling was utilized to choose respondents because it allowed the researcher to select respondents who had the required information with respect to the objectives of study. Cluster sampling was employed to identify locations that experienced the most violence as was pointed out by the police reports. Youth leaders of political parties in Nairobi City County with representation in parliament were selected purposively for this study. Members of Parliament from Nairobi City County specifically those from election violence hotspots were purposively selected in this study. The Chief Executive officer of NCIC, Secretary generals of SUPKEM, NCKK, CJPC and ACK, Police spokesperson and CA Director, Consumer and Public Affairs were purposively selected to provide insights from their institutions point of view.

### **3.6 Instruments of Data Collection**

Both primary data and secondary data was utilized in the inquiry. Primary data was obtained by using questionnaires and focus group discussions (FGD) while secondary data was obtained from journals, books, articles and institutional reports. Data was analyzed using quantitative and qualitative methods.

#### **3.6.1 Questionnaire**

A questionnaire with closed and open-ended questions was utilized to collect quantitative and qualitative data about Social Media influence among the populations in Nairobi City County (Appendix II). The questionnaire targeted the Nairobi City County voters that are social media users. It was the utmost appropriate tool due to its ability to gather more data in practically quick span of time. The questionnaires

comprised of sections on, social media and political communication, social media and false news, social media and recruitment to election violence and social media and negative ethno-stereotypes.

### **3.6.2 Focus Group Discussions**

One Focus group discussion (FGD) was conducted with Youth leaders of Political parties from Nairobi with representation in Parliament and a total of seven youth leaders participated. The focus was on perceptions of the link between social media and election violence Nairobi.

### **3.6.3 Interview Schedule**

Interview Schedule gave the researcher a chance to directly gain professional insight, opinion and attitude on the link between social media and election violence. Twelve interviews were scheduled targeting members of Parliament from Nairobi, NCIC CEO, SUPKEM, ACK, CJPC and NCKK secretary generals, Police Spokesperson and CA Director, Consumer and Public Affairs.

### **3.7 Pretesting of Research Instruments**

In this study, the instruments used were pilot tested in Kiambu county covering a small sample population. The researcher evaluated if the instruments drew the required information from respondents. Kiambu county was selected for pretesting because of its close proximity to Nairobi and because it is also an election violence hotspot and use of social media is also popular. The pretesting informed corrections on the research instruments.

### **3.8 Validity and Reliability**

To ensure validity, the researcher engaged a peer reviewer and sought assistance from mentors. The research instruments were pretested and corrections made where

necessary to ensure that they drew the required information. After data collection transcripts were inspected to ensure coherence.

### **3.9 Data Collection Techniques**

Responses were sought from adult social media users of Nairobi City County, the main epicenter of election violence. The researcher recruited three research assistants to assist in the administration of the questionnaires. Before deployment, the three research assistants were trained on the objectives of the research, etiquette and time management. The questionnaires were distributed by the researcher and the research assistants and later collected after duration of one day and in some cases the questionnaires were collected immediately after the respondents finished filling them. face-to-face interviews were carried out in the offices of the key informant. The researcher sought permission to take notes on the interview responses. One face-to-face FGD was conducted by the researcher at a booked restraint in Nairobi and the researcher sought the permission of the seven participants to record the proceedings of the discussion to ensure that all their views were captured. The researcher also recorded details of FGD observations in a field notebook. The interviews and FGD were controlled to elicit deep clarification and understanding. Secondary data was collected from books, journals newspapers and reports. Secondary data provided a useful background and historical trend on social media and election violence.

### **3.10 Data Analysis**

Qualitative and quantitative methods were used. Quantitative statistics was evaluated using expressive indicators by adoption of SPSS software and Microsoft excel. The quantitative statistics was exposed to calculations of statistics such as tabulations, percentage, totals and frequencies and presented using tables and charts to give telling clarification.

Qualitative data was evaluated and categorized according to key paradigms that were in the research. Qualitative data reinforced quantitative data. Through qualitative data, the investigator gathered data on the link between social media and election violence. Respondent's attitudes and insights on social media and election violence were revealed using FGD.

### **3.11 Ethical Considerations**

A research authorization was obtained from the University and permit to conduct the study was sought from NACOSTI. Information obtained from the respondents was treated and handled with great care and confidence. The researcher and research assistants were appropriately addressed, respected the respondents and all the established order and used polite language during the study. The researcher did not interview persons under the age of 18 years. Names of student respondents and their institutions were not referenced in this research. The researcher and research assistants were also sensitive to cultural, individual, and role variances in the target population. The researcher findings are public and can be used to contribute to the public good. Political affiliations of voters and their identities were not made public and the research was conducted in a safe setting. The participants' names were not captured on the questionnaires to ensure confidentiality and the questionnaires were not shared but kept under lock and only accessible by the researcher.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATIONS

#### 4.1 Introduction

The section covers a presentation of the study findings with illustrations and discussions. Further, results interpretation is covered.

#### 4.2 Data Presentation

##### 4.2.1 Response Rate

A sample size of 384 participants was targeted. 365 questionnaires were issued but only 349 were duly filled. Dully filled questionnaires were considered by the researcher. Responses from one focused group discussion of seven youth leaders and five interviews of 6 key interview informants were considered for analysis and this constituted an overall 95.27% response rate as shown on Table 4.1.

**Table 4. 1: Response Rate**

<b>Target Sample</b>	384
<b>Questionnaire Response</b>	349
<b>FGD Response</b>	7
<b>Interview Response</b>	6
<b>Total Response</b>	362
<b>Response Percentage</b>	95.27%

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

#### 4.2.2 Demographic Details

This section provided data about participants and was essential for determining if the study participants were a representative sample of the targeted population for generalization purposes.

#### 4.2.3 Gender Distribution


**Table 4. 2: Gender Distribution**

Table 4.2 and chart figure 4.2 shows the distribution of respondents in terms of their gender

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Female	93	24.22	25.69	25.69
Valid Male	269	70.05	74.31	100.0
Valid Total	362	94.27	100.0	
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

**Figure 4. 1: Gender Distribution**



***The Research Findings (2020)***

Of the participants, 25.69% were female and 74.31% (majority) were male. Anyango et al. (2018) note that women are assigned to the domestic role in Kenya thus dissuading them from mainstream political activities and this is reflected in the participation of women in this research. This is reflected in the gender response rate which shows that, it is easier to access males and actively participated in the election processes.

#### 4.2.4 Age Distribution

**Table 4. 3: Age Distribution**

Table 4.3 shows age distribution of respondents


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 18-23years	180	46.9	49.7	49.7
24-29years	82	21.4	22.7	72.4
30-35years	70	18.2	19.3	91.7
Over 35 years	30	7.8	8.3	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

The above results demonstrate that 91.7% of participants were 18-35 years old and only 8.3% were aged over 35 years. This informed the study that the youth constituted majority of respondents as they constituted the group aged between 18-35 years.

#### Graph 4. 1: Age Distribution

Figure 4.1 shows age distribution of respondents



Source: The Research Findings (2020)

The findings (Graph 4.1) shows that 180 respondents constituting 49.7% of respondents were aged between 18-23 years, while 80 respondents which was 22.7% of respondents were aged between 20-29 years and the least age bracket was those aged over 35 years and they constituted on 8.3%. This informed the study that Kenyan youth were the most active and predisposed group in political activities during the periods 2007 to 2017.

#### 4.2.5: Length of stay in respective constituency


This section indicates how long participants had stayed in their respective political constituencies between 2007 and 2017

**Table 4. 4: Length of stay in respective constituency**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
0-5years	30	7.8	8.3	8.3
5-10years	97	25.3	26.8	35.1
Over 10years	235	61.2	64.9	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing				
System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

**Figure 4. 2: Length of stay in respective constituency**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 illustrate that 64.9% of participants had stayed in their specific constituencies for over 10 years, 26.8% for 5-10 years and Only 8.3% for between 0-5 years. This means that majority of sampled respondents had experienced election violence which occurs after every 5 years.

#### 4.2.6: Occupation of Respondents


This section indicates the respondents' occupations between the year 2007 and 2017

**Table 4. 5: Occupation of Respondents**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Student	49	12.8	13.5	13.5
Employed	36	9.4	9.9	23.4
Self-employed	111	28.9	20.7	44.1
Unemployed	166	43.2	48.9	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

Source: The Research Findings (2020)

**Figure 4. 3: Occupation of Respondents**



Source: The Research Findings (2020)

Of the participants, 48.9% were unemployed, 20.7% were self-employed, 9.9% were students and only 9.9% were in formal employment during the period between 2007

and 2017. This population of the self-employed and the unemployed formed the masses that were recurrently mobilized during election periods.

#### 4.2.7: Media Subscription


This section shows the respondents subscription in the various social media platforms between the years 2007 and 2017.

**Table 4. 6: Social Media Subscription**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid YouTube	66	17.2	18.2	18.2
Facebook	194	50.5	53.6	71.8
Twitter	86	22.4	23.8	95.6
Others	16	4.2	4.4	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

**Figure 4. 4: Social Media Subscription**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

From Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3, 53.6% of the participants subscribed to Facebook, 23.8% on Twitter, 18.2% on YouTube and 4.4.% subscribed to other forms of social media. This means that the majority of sampled respondents subscribed to the Facebook and Twitter. This is the reason why most of the political party's messaging were mostly found on Facebook and Twitter.

#### **4.2.8: Social Media Access Tools**

This section indicates how the respondents accessed in their social media platforms between the years 2007 and 2017


**Table 4. 7: Social Media Access Tools**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Mobile Phone	234	60.9	64.6	64.6
CyberCafe	98	25.5	27.1	91.7
Personal Computer	30	7.8	8.3	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing				
System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.6 and Figure 4.4 indicate that 64.6% of participants accessed social media through their mobile phones, 27.1% through Cybercafés and only 8.3% accessed via Personal computers. With high internet connectivity and mobile telephone penetration, mobile phones were the preferred tool for connecting on social media while Cybercafés provided another avenue of staying connected to political activities during the elections.

**Figure 4.4: Social Media Access Tools**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

#### 4.2.9: Time Spent on Social Media

This section indicates the length of time in a day the respondents spent on the various social media platforms between the years 2007 and 2017


**Table 4. 8: Time Spent on Social Media**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Less than 1Hour	97	25.3	26.8	26.8
Valid 1-6Hours	191	49.7	52.8	79.6
Valid 12-24Hours	74	19.3	20.4	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5 indicate that 52.8% of participants spent between 1-6 hours on Social Media, 20.4% spent 12-24 hours on social media and 26.8% spent less than 1 hour on social media. These findings reveal respondents spent most of their time on social media and therefore it was a crucial source of political information and an important tool for political mobilization during the electioneering period.

**Figure 4.5: Time Spent on Social Media**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

**4.2.10: Number of Contacts/Friends on social media**


This section indicates the respondents’ followers on the various social media platforms between the years 2007 and 2017

**Table 4. 9: Number of Followers on Social media**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Less than 10	5	1.3	1.4	1.4
10-60followers	40	10.4	11.1	12.5
Valid 61-90 followers	100	26.0	27.6	40.1
Over 91 followers	217	56.5	59.9	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

**Figure 4.6: Number of Contacts/Friends on Social media**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

The findings shows that 55.9% of participants had over 91 followers on social media, 27.6% had 60 followers, 11.1% had between 10-60 followers and only 1.4% had less than 10 followers on social media. These findings reveal respondents could reach many of their followers and the spiral of reach of social media had a multiplier effect on communication reach.

#### **4.2.11: Conviction to support a political candidate or ideology on a Social Media**

This section shows the possibility of respondents being convinced to support political candidate or ideology on the various social media platforms between the years 2007 and 2017.


**Table 4. 10: Conviction to support a political candidate or ideology on a Social Media**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	255	66.4	70.4	70.4
	No	95	24.7	26.2	96.6
	I don't know	12	3.1	3.3	100.0
	Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing	System	22	5.7		
Total		384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.9 and Figure 4.7 demonstrate that 70.4% of the participants agreed to have been convinced to support a political candidate or ideology on social media, 24.7% were of contrary opinion while only 3.3% could not tell if they had been convinced to support a political candidate or ideology on social media. These findings show that Social Media had been used to convince persons to support political ideologies, candidates and even political violence.

**Figure 4.7: Conviction to support a political candidate or ideology on a Social Media**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

**4.2.12: Invitation to defend a political candidate or political party or coalition on a Social Media**

This section shows respondents response on being invited to defend a political candidate or party or coalition on the various social media platforms between the years 2007 and 2017.


**Table 4. 11: Invitation to defend a political candidate or political party or coalition on a Social Media**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	261	68.0	72.1
	No	78	20.3	93.6
	I don't know	23	6.0	100.0
	Total	362	94.3	100.0
Missing	System	22	5.7	
Total		384	100.0	

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.10 and Figure 4.8 shows that 72.1% of participants agreed to have been invited to defend a political candidate or political party or coalition on social media, 21.5% were of contrary opinion while only 6.4% could not tell is they had been invited to defend a political candidate or political party or coalition on social media on social media. These findings show that Social Media had been used to invite people to defend a political candidate or political party or coalition even political violence.

**Figure 4.8: Invitation to defend a political candidate or political party or coalition on a Social Media**




Source: The Research Findings (2020)

**Table 4. 12: Methods used to defend political candidate, party or coalition**

	Defense Method	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strike	117	30.5	32.3	32.3
	Violence	140	36.5	38.7	71
	Havoc	8	2.1	2.2	73.2
	Civil Disobedience	97	25.3	26.8	100.0
	Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing	System	22	5.7		
Total		384	100.0		

Source: The Research Findings (2020)

**Figure 4.9: Methods used to defend political candidate, party or coalition**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.11 and Figure 4.9 indicate that 38.7% of participants used violence to defend a political candidate or political party or coalition, 32.3% participated in strikes organized by political candidates, parties or coalitions, 2.2% were called upon to cause havoc on their perceived opponents and 26.8% participated in civil disobedience. These findings show that Social Media was used to incite political followers to defend political candidate or political party or coalition through violence, strikes, causing havoc and civil disobedience.

#### **4.2.13: Political mobilization on Social Media**

This section shows respondents' responses on use various social media platforms by political parties to mobilize supporters between the years 2007 and 2017.


**Table 4. 13: Political mobilization on Social Media**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Calling out for political meetings	254	66.1	70.2	70.2
Asking the supporters for their financial support	26	6.8	7.2	77.4
Providing political party information through social media	82	21.4	22.6	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing				
System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.12 and Figure 4.10 indicate that, of the participants, 70.2% confirmed that political parties used social media to call out for participation in political meetings, 22.6% indicated that political parties used social media to provide political information and 7.2% indicated political parties used social media to solicit financial support. These findings show that Social Media was used to mobilize political activities.

**Figure 4.10: Political mobilization on Social Media**



Source: The Research Findings (2020)

#### 4.2.14: Fake news of political nature on Social Media


This section shows the of respondents encounter with fake news on the various social media platforms between the years 2007 and 2017.

**Table 4. 14: Fake news of political nature on Social Media**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	301	78.4	83.1	83.1
Valid No	53	13.8	14.6	97.7
Valid I don't Know	8	2.1	2.3	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

Source: The Research Findings (2020)

**Figure 4.11: Fake news of political nature on Social Media**



Source: The Research Findings (2020)

Table 4.13 and Figure 4.11 indicate that 83.1% of participants agreed to have encountered fake political news on Social Media and only 14.6% indicated to have not encountered fake news on social media to provide political information. 2.3% could not tell if they encountered fake news on social media. These findings show that Social Media was used to spread fake news that incited violence.

#### 4.2.15: Responses to Fake news on Social Media

This section shows the of respondents’ responses to fake news on the various social media platforms between the years 2007 and 2017.


**Table 4. 15: Responses to Fake news on Social Media**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Defend my party	180	46.9	49.7
	Gave a warning to the individual	80	20.8	71.8
	Addressed the issue head-on	102	26.6	100.0
Missing	Total	362	94.3	100.0
	System	22	5.7	
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.14 and Figure 4.12 shows that 49.7% of respondents resorted to defending their parties when they encountered fake political news on Social Media, 26.8% indicated to have flagged and addressed the fake news on social media while 22.1% gave warning to individuals that sent the fake news on social media. These findings show that Social Media was poisoned by fake news and counter-accusations that inflamed political discourse.

**Figure 4.12: Responses to Fake news on Social Media**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

#### 4.2.16: Accountability for Flagging Fake news on Social Media

This section shows the of respondents’ responses on who should flag fake news on social media platforms.

**Table 4. 16: Accountability for Flagging Fake news on Social Media**


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
The Social Media Firms	150	39.1	41.4	41.4
The public	146	38.0	40.3	81.7
The government	40	10.4	11.0	92.7
An independent body	16	4.2	4.4	97.1
I don't know	10	2.6	2.9	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

From Table 4.15 and Figure 4.13, 40.3% wanted the public to be accountable for flagging fake political news on Social Media, only 11% wanted the government to take this responsibility, 41.4% wanted the owners of Social Media firms to be responsible while 4.4% wanted an independent body to take this responsibility. Only

2.9% did not know who should be accountable. These findings point to the need for cooperation between all stakeholders in addressing the problem of fake news on social media.

**Figure 4. 53: Accountability for Flagging Fake news on Social Media**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

#### 4.2.17: Responses to fake commentary or video on Social media


This section shows the of respondents’ take on fake political commentary or video on social media platforms

**Table 4. 17: Responses to fake commentary or video on Social media**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Ignore	69	18	19.1	19.1
Valid Verify	15	3.9	4.1	23.2
Valid Counter action	278	72.4	76.8	100.0
Valid Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	22	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

**Figure 4. 64: Responses to fake political commentary or video on Social media**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.16 and Figure 4.14 indicate that 76.8% of the participants confirmed they would take a counter action if they saw a fake political commentary or video on Social Media, only 4.1% would verify the information while 19.1% would ignore fake political commentary or video on Social Media. This finding reveals that Social

Media is a platform that elicits action and counter action that can spiral into incitement and political intolerance.

**4.2.18: Social Media Fake messaging and incitement to violence during election period.**

This section shows the of respondents’ take on fake messaging on social media platforms and incitement to election violence between 2007 and 2017


**Table 4. 18: Social Media Fake messaging incites violence during election period**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	281	73.2	77.6	77.6
	No	64	16.7	17.7	95.3
	Am not sure	17	4.4	4.7	100.0
	Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing	System	22	5.7		
Total		384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.17 and Figure 4.15 displays that majority of participants 77.6% agreed messaging on Social Media incited violence during election, 17.7% disagreed while 4.67% were not sure.

**Figure 4. 15: Social Media messaging and incitement to violence during election period**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

**4.2.19: Social Media and recruitment to violence during election period**

This section shows the of respondents’ take on social media platforms being used in recruitment to election violence between 2007 and 2017.


**Table 4. 19: Social Media and recruitment to violence during election period**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	201	52.3	55.5	55.5
Valid No	95	24.7	26.2	81.4
Valid I am not sure	57	14.8	15.6	100.0
Valid Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	20	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

Table 4.18 and Figure 4.14 demonstrate that majority of the participants 55.5% agreed Social Media was used to recruit persons to violence during election, 26.2% disagreed while 15.6% were not sure.

**Figure 4. 16: Social Media and recruitment to violence during election period**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

**4.2.20: Ethnic profiling on Social Media during election period**

This section shows the of respondents’ take on ethnic profiling social media platforms and to between 2007 and 2017.


**Table 4. 20: Ethnic profiling on Social Media during election period**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	224	58.3	61.9	61.9
Valid No	84	21.9	23.2	85.1
Valid I don't know	54	14.1	14.9	100.0
Total	362	94.3	100.0	
Missing System	20	5.7		
Total	384	100.0		

**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

The findings on table 4.19 and Figure 4.15 demonstrate that 61.9% of the participants had their ethnic group described derogatively on social media during election period while 23.2% of the respondents had not experienced such description. From the table 14.9% did not know if their ethnic group had been described derogatively.

**Figure 4. 17: Ethnic profiling on Social Media during election period**



**Source: The Research Findings (2020)**

### **4.3 Discussion of Findings**

#### **4.3.1. Influence of Social Media Platforms on political communications in Kenya**

The study's primary purpose was to investigate the place of social media in election violence. This informed the fashioning of four objectives with the first one aiming at ascertaining the influence of social media on political communication in Kenya. Respondents were asked to indicate the social media platforms they subscribed to, time (hours) they spent on social media, how they accessed their favorite social media platforms, the number of contacts/friends they had on their social media networks, invitations they received on social media to support political candidates or ideology and how political parties mobilized their agenda on social media. Findings are summarized in Table 4.5, Table 4.6, Table 4.7, Table 4.8, Table 4.9, Table 4.10 and Table 4.12.

The results revealed that all respondents subscribed to social media platforms with Facebook leading with a 53.6% preference followed by Twitter with 23.8%. Because of high mobile telephone penetration, 64.6% of the respondents used their mobile phones to access their social media platforms. The study revealed that all the respondents spent

some time on social media with 52.8% of the respondents spent between 1-6 hours on social media, 20.4% spent between 12-24 hours on social media while 26.8% spent less than one hour on social media. The study also revealed that all the respondents had followers on social media with 59.9% of the respondents having over 91 followers and only 1.4% of the respondents had less than 10 followers. The findings concur with USIU Africa (2018) which records Facebook and Twitter as top social media platforms and also found that most Kenyans aged between 21-35 years spend more than 3 hours on social media daily.

These findings therefore, revealed that social media is a powerful communication channel that can be used to reach a large population within a short period. The portability and convenience of mobile phones increases the chances of reaching groups that have no mobile phones by physically sharing communication thereby increasing their circles of influence. In addition to the research sought to understand the views of youth leaders of political parties in Nairobi through a focused group discussion where FGD1 note;

“Social media is popular with the youth and therefore provides us the best chance to mobilize the youth in political activities” (10<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Garden Square- Nairobi)

In addition, FGD2 reiterated that;

“Social media is an inexpensive way to reach out to party supporters in a short time enabling the party to respond to changing political demands in time.” (10<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Garden Square- Nairobi)

The study thus revealed that political parties being aware of the power of social media harnessed its potency by using it for political communication by convincing the public to support their political candidates or ideologies, inviting the public to defend political

parties or coalitions and mobilizing the public to attend political rallies as shown in Table 4.9, Table 4.10 and Table 4.12 respectively. These findings are in agreement with Omotayo & Folorunso, (2020) who point that advantages associated with use of social media have made political leaders, all over the world adopt the platform to campaign during elections, solicit for votes, maintain closeness and transparency with citizens and mobilise citizens and candidates towards active participation in the political processes.

#### **4.3.2. Fake news on Social Media Platforms and incitement to election violence**

The second objective was thought-out to establish if fake news on social media platforms incited election violence. Tucker & Guess (2018) opine that the spread of political misinformation and propaganda in online settings is usually considered to have negative societal consequences. This opinion aligns with the findings on this study. As revealed in Table 4.13, 83.1% respondents confirmed to have encountered fake news on social media with only 14.6% disagreeing. This type of messaging triggered violence during election period as captured in Table 4.17 where 77.6% agreeing that this messaging incited violence. During the focused group discussion FDG3 stated;

“Politics in Kenya is ethnic based and we cannot therefore expect messaging on social media to be otherwise.” (10<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Garden Square- Nairobi)

Mengü & Mengü (2015) highlight that uncontrolled use of the influence of social media may lead to the spread of hate speech, infringement of personal rights, psychological attacks, symbolic violence, spreading negative discourses. In an interview, KII2 stated that;

“Social media is flooded with dubious political statistics which when proved wrong by real polls results excites and incites political followers to violence.”

(13<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Nairobi)

A snowballing effect of negative messaging on various social media platforms can reach a tipping point and physical manifestation of these messages taken to the streets through violence and destruction of properties belonging to perceived political enemies.

#### **4.3.3. Social Media and recruitment to election violence**

The third objective was intended to analyze how social media has enhanced recruitment of people to election violence in Nairobi, City County. Majority of the respondents agreed that Social media was used to recruit persons to violence as revealed on Table 4.11 which shows that all the respondents were called to either participate in strikes, civil disobedience, violence or causing havoc to perceived enemies.

The call to violence and causing havoc constituted 40.9% while a call to participate in strikes which are normally violent was at 32.3%. This brings to accumulative call to violence to 73.2%. This finding confirms that majority of the respondents agreed that social media was used to recruit persons to violence during the election periods. In the focused group discussion, FGD4 expressed that;

“It is only natural to defend your party by all means and as a youth social media gives equal chance to do so by being party keyboard warriors and even a call to come out on the street in solidarity with party actions” (10<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Garden Square- Nairobi)

From Table 4.3 the research revealed that 91.7 % of these respondents were youth and the research findings are in agreement with Ismail (2017) who opines that youth take up several roles in intercommunal violence: as combatants, victims and targets of violence. The recruitment to violence is further fueled by the occupation composition of the residents in the violence prone constituencies with 48.9% being unemployed and 20.7% being self-employed.

Majority of the respondents had been domiciled in their constituents for more than one election cycle and therefore regimented in readiness of the recurrent election violence cycles. In one of the interviews, KII4 stated that;

“Residents of Kibra and Mathare are usually clustered in ethnic blocks and have lived in the same area for a very long time. During election period it becomes very easy for politicians to mobilize people from their ethnic groups and social media has made it more easier and cheaper to do so even without visiting the place.” (17<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Nairobi)

These findings are in agreement with Łubiński (2021) who opines that Social media is an efficient tool to mobilize support, disseminate narratives or even coordinate military operations in the real world and has become one of the most powerful tools for coordinating world’s political movements Kenya included.

#### **4.4.4. Negative ethno-stereotypes messaging Social Media and election violence**

The fourth objective was to examine the influence of negative ethno-stereotype messaging on social media on violence during election period. As revealed in Table 4.19, majority of the respondents, 61.9% agreed that their ethnic group had been derogatively profiled on social media and this only worsened a political environment

that was already poisoned by variables already discussed. In one of the interviews, KII3 stated that;

“Hate messaging on social media targeting certain communities perceived as pro-government or anti-government during electioneering periods is a major reason for hostilities and violence that rocks Nairobi during election time”  
(15<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Nairobi)

In addition to these sentiments, KIII added that;

“Social media is replete with stereotyping of communities and this is a threat to law and order. The police are always alert on such messaging and are on record having arrested perpetrators.” (13<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Nairobi)

#### **4.5 Summary of Findings**

From 95.2% rate of response, male dominated gender accounting for 74.31% while the female accounted for 25.69% of respondents. Between the years 2007 and 2012, 48.9% of respondents were unemployed, 20.7% of respondents were self-employed, 12.8% were students and only 9.4 were formally employed. All of respondents subscribed to a social media platform which formed the main point of political interaction during election period with Facebook and Twitter being the most preferred social media platforms.

This current study revealed that majority of respondents at 74.4% agreed that social media played a role political violence experienced during elections of 2007 to 2017. Furthermore, opinion was divided on who should be accountable for controlling and mitigating against fake news on social media with 40.3% of respondents fronting for self-regulation, 11% wanting the government to be accountable while 41.4% wanted the social media firms to regulate political contents on their platforms.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

Summary of findings, conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for further researches are covered in this final chapter.

#### **5.2 Summary of Findings**

The study's primary objective was to analyze social media's role in Kenyan election violence. The findings are presented;

##### **5.2.1 Is there a link between social media and political communication in Kenya?**

The study findings exposed that all respondents relied on social media platform for political interactions during election period with Facebook leading with a 53.6% preference followed by Twitter with 23.8%. Because of high mobile telephone penetration and 64.6% of the respondents using their mobile phones to access their social media platforms, political messages reached a large population within a short time with less resources. The study revealed that all the respondents spent some time on social media with 52.8% of the respondents spending between 1-6 hours on social media, 20.4% spending between 12-24 hours on social media while 26.8% spending less than one hour on social media meaning political communication was effective on social media. The study also revealed that all the respondents had followers on social media with 59.9% of the respondents having over 91 followers and only 1.4% of the respondents had less than 10 followers making social media an effective platform for political messaging.

##### **5.2.2 Does fake news spread on social media platforms provoke election violence in Kenya?**

The study discovered that 83.1% respondents had encountered fake news on social media with only 14.6% disagreeing. The study further revealed that this type of

messaging triggered violence during election period as the fake news incited persons to engage in political violence during election period. With the snowballing effect of connectivity by followers on various social media platforms the incitement through fake news physically manifested on the streets through violence and destruction of properties belonging to perceived political enemies.

### **5.2.3 Does the existence of many popular social media options enhance recruitment to election violence in Kenya?**

The study revealed that all participants subscribed to social media and relied on it for political interactions during election period. Majority of the respondents agreed that Social media was used to recruit persons to violence as the study revealed all the respondents were called to either participate in strikes, civil disobedience, violence or causing havoc to perceived enemies.

The call to violence and causing havoc constituted 40.9% while a call to participate in strikes which usually turned violent was at 32.3%. This translates to 73.2%. call to violence during the election periods.

The recruitment to violence was further fueled by the occupation composition of the residents in the violence prone constituencies with 48.9% being unemployed and 20.7% being self-employed. This constituted 69.6% vulnerable persons likely to be engaged in prolonged violence as only 9.9% of the respondents were in formal employment.

Additionally, majority of the respondents had stayed in their constituents for more than one election cycle with 26.8% of respondents having been residents of their

constituents for between 5 and 10 years while 64.9% having been residents for over 10 years meaning that patterns of recruitment to violence were anticipated.

#### **5.2.4 Does negative ethno-stereotype messaging on social media inflame election violence in Kenya?**

The study revealed that majority of the respondents, 61.9% had their ethnic group derogatively profiled on social media and this coupled with other variables incited persons to use violence to defend their ethnic positions and interests.

### **5.3 Conclusion**

Based on the findings the study draws a conclusion that, in the study area, social media is the most common sources of political interaction with Facebook being the most preferred platform followed by Twitter. Furthermore, majority of residents of Nairobi County spent more than 5 hours on social media per day.

Further, social media greatly played election violence increment roles before, during and subsequent election violence periods. Some of the roles included; calls to participate in strikes, civil disobedience, violence or causing havoc to perceived enemies.

The study concludes that social media significantly influenced people through spread of fake political messaging, negative-ethnic stereotyping and recruiting persons to participate in violence.

Socio media played positive role: calling for unity and preaching peace; conducting civic education; public awareness and public discussion of issues of contention during political negotiations.

The findings confirmed that engagements on social media during electioneering period expressively prejudiced the public's perceptions and actions. Hence, the

investigator concludes that social media generally contributed to election violence in Kenya.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

These recommendations were made;

1. There exists uncontrolled fake news spread on various social media platforms, hence social media firms should adopt a common position on political fake news on social media. This will help in mitigating the spread of false news on social media with a view of encouraging clean political engagements.

2. A tailored regulatory mechanism for social media engagements should be designed by the regulatory authorities with public consultation. This is so because of their immense influence and popularity amongst population especially the youth.

3. Strict rules, laws and penalties should be designed by the regulatory authorities and law enforcers for personalities and social media platforms using social media for negative reasons

#### **5.5 Suggestion for Further Study**

In spite of this research being successful, numerous problems are still unsolved and more others came up during the research. The generation shift in communication has resulted to sub-culture growth on social media. Thus a study to be done in areas of emerging sub-cultures on social media and political revolutions.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix I: Introductory letter

Kennedy Amimo Akatsa,  
P.O BOX 2630-00100  
Nairobi.

Dear Respondent,

#### **RE: REQUEST TO ADMINISTER RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE**

I am a Masters of Arts (Peace and Conflict Management) student at Kenyatta University carrying out academic research in social media and election violence in Kenya using a case of residents on Nairobi City County. I kindly appeal your input in filling this questionnaire. Your inputs will be held in confidence and only be used for the purpose of the research.

Thank you in advance

With regards,

Kennedy Amimo Akatsa

## Appendix II: Questionnaire

This questionnaire is split into five sections. Section A will gather general information about the respondent. Section B will collect information on social media and political communication. Section C will be assemble information on Social media and fake news Section D will gather information on social media and recruitment to election violence Section E will collect data on negative ethno-stereotype messaging and election violence. NB: Your responses will be held in confidence. Your support in completing this questionnaire will highly be valued.

### A. DEMOCRAPHIC DETAILS

1. Indicate your Gender (tick appropriately):  Male   
Female
2. For how long had you lived in this constituency between 2007 and 2017? (tick appropriately):  
 0-5 years  
 5- 10 years  
 Over 10 Years
3. What was your occupation between 2007 and 2017? (tick appropriately):  
 Student  
 Formal Employment  
 Self Employed  
 Unemployed
4. Which of the following social media network were you subscribed in (tick appropriately):  
 Yutube  Twitter  
 Facebook  Others

5. How did you access your social media network (tick appropriately):

- Mobile Phone
- CyberCafe
- Personal computer

Others: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

6. On average, how much time did you spend daily on a social networking sites?  
(tick appropriately):

- Less than 1 Hours
- 1 – 12 Hours
- 13-24 Hours

7. How many followers did you have on a social networking sites? (tick appropriately):

- Fewer than 10
- 10-60
- 16-90
- Over 90

**B. SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION**

8. Were you ever convinced to support a political candidate or ideology on a social networking sites? (tick appropriately):

- Yes                       No                       I don't know

9. If you answered **Yes** above, kindly explain how you were convinced:

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10. Were you ever invited or stimulated to defend a political candidate or political party or coalition through a social media networking sites? (tick appropriately):

Yes

No

I don't

know

11. If you answered **Yes** above, please explain how you defended the political candidate, party of coalition:

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12. How did your political party mobilize its agenda and campaigns on social media networking sites?

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**C. SOCIAL MEDIA AND FAKE NEWS**

13. Did you see fake news of political nature on Social media?

(tick appropriately):

Yes                       No                       I don't  
Know

14. If you answered **Yes** above, what was your response:

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15. Who should be accountable for classifying fake news on social media?

(tick appropriately):

- The Social Media firms
- The public
- The government
- An independent body
- I don't know

16. If you saw a commentary or video on Social media that you agree is fake what would you do?

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**D. SOCIAL MEDIA AND RECRUITMENT TO ELECTION VIOLENCE**

17. Do fake messages on social media incite populations in your area to violence during electioneering period? (tick appropriately):

Yes       No       I am not sure

18. If you answered **Yes** above:

Explain \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

19. Do you rate social media as a tool used to recruit person to participate in violence during electioneering period: (tick appropriately):

Yes       No       I am not sure

If you answered **Yes** above

Explain \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**E. SOCIAL MEDIA AND NEGATIVE ETHNO-STEREOTYPES**

20. During electioneering period was your ethnic group described derogatively on a social media networking sites? (tick appropriately):

Yes                       No                       I don't know

21. If you answered **Yes** above: how did you respond:

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22. How did negative ethno-stereotypes on social media incite violence during elections?

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### **Appendix III: Focus Group discussion guide**

This discussion is categorized in three parts. Part A will be used to obtain information on social media and election violence mobilization and recruitment. Part B will be used to generate information on negative ethno-stereotype messaging on election violence. NB: Your responses will be held in confidence. Your honest participation in these discussions will be very valuable.

#### **A. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A RECRUITMENT AND MOBILIZATION TOOL FOR ELECTION VIOLENCE**

1. How is social media used to incite violence by populations during electioneering period in your area?
2. What social media platforms are popular in among the populations during electioneering periods in your area?
3. Does the extensive social media outlets enhance recruitment of populations to electioneering violence in your area? Explain

#### **B. SOCIAL MEDIA AND NEGATIVE ETHNO-STEREOTYPES**

4. How is hatred message received and propagated on social media in your area?
5. Do the populations in your area interrogate the truths about negative ethno-stereotypes on social media before responding?
6. Do you agree that negative ethno-stereotypes on social media incites violence in your area? If yes explain

## Appendix IV: Interview Schedule

This interview aims at collecting data from CA Official, officials of NCKK SUPKEM, Sitting/Former member of parliament from Nairobi and Police headquarters.

The interview intends to get information to evaluate the link between social media and election violence in Kenya. Your assessments will be solely for academic purpose and useful in persuading policy on social media usage in the County.

### Section A: Background data

Your Title:

.....

Gender:

.....

Age:

.....

Employer: .....

How long have been in institution? .....

### Section: Interview Questions

1. When there is election violence, what specific caution should be taken about information shared on social media?

2. Material shared on social media do have the first impact on understanding and subsequent discernment on the matters. Social media users employ more often vivid remarks by opinion leaders and key politicians to manipulate their messaging. Additionally, emotional references to history dictates many social media outlets. What impact could this have on election violence?

3. A single narrative (factually correct), can be manipulated on social media to stir election violence.

a) What is your take on this statement?

b) What processes are in place to ensure that facts are not manipulated for intention to incite election violence?

c) Indicate the level of ensuring that manipulation of facts on social media does not promote election violence

4. “During electioneering period, social media users share stories, picture and videos on how certain politicians or communities are sidelined by their competitors, with the narrative that they would benefit if there is a change of guard in governance.

a) To what extent do you think such messaging negate the spirit of nationalism

b) Could such messaging be attributed to be a cause of election violence?

5. Statistics have been used to excite passion on social media during electioneering period especially when presidential results are spread to be varying and inconsistent.

a) To what extent do you think this incites election violence?

b) How can we avoid such mistakes in future?

6. Sweeping statement by an individual or a small number of individuals are habitually crafted by most social media users during electioneering period as the official decree. This, to most people, is alleged to be the channel through which hate speech spread.

a) Do you agree that sweeping statements inspire hate speech?

b) How can this cause or inflame election violence?

c) Are there measures put in place to counter the spread of fake news on social media?"

## Appendix VI: Interview and FGD Coding

<b>A</b>	<b>CODE</b>	<b>INTERVIEWEE</b>
	KII1	Police Spokesperson
	KII2	Secretary General SUPKEM
	KII3	Secretary General NCKC
	KII4	Former Member of Parliament in Nairobi
<b>B</b>	<b>CODE</b>	<b>FDG PARTICIPANT</b>
	FGD1	ODM Youth leader Mathare
	FGD2	ODM Youth leader Kibra
	FGD3	ODM Youth leader Embakasi
	FGD4	JP Youth leader Kibra
	FGD5	JP Youth leader Mathare
	FGD6	WDM Youth leader Embakasi
	FGD7	WDM Youth leader Ruraka

## Appendix VII: Budget

<b>Item</b>	<b>Cost</b>
Research Assistants allowance for 3 Assistants @ 700 per day for 30 days	40,000
Hire of hall/room for FGD @ 4,000 per slum location	12,000
Transport FGD members 100 per person for 18 members	1800
Stationery and printing costs	17,000
Report production	4,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>74,800</b>

### Appendix VIII: Work Plan

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Action By</b>	<b>Deliverable</b>
Concept Note	August 2018	Researcher	Concept Note
Presentation of Concept Note	August 2018	Researcher, Panel	Approval to develop Proposal
Proposal Development	August-September 2018	Researcher, Supervisors	Draft Proposal
Presentation of draft Proposal	October 2018	Researcher, Panel	Approved Proposal with corrections
Revision of Proposal	February 2019	Researcher, Supervisors	Revised proposal
Documentations to graduate school for school presentation	May 2019	Researcher, school, department	Letter of Approval
Documentations to Nacosti	November 2019	Researcher	Research permit and recommendations
Pretesting of data collection instruments	November 2019	Researcher, research assistant	Revised data collection instruments
Recruitment and training of 3 Research assistants	November 2019	Researcher,	Trained Research assistants
Data collection, Auditing and Data Entry	December 2019- Jan 2020	Researcher, Supervisors	Data Audited Data Computerized Data
Data Analysis	Jan 2020	Researcher	Findings
Presentations of Finding	July 2021	Researcher, Graduate school	Approval of findings and correction
Effecting corrections and binding thesis in KU format	October 2021	Researcher, Graduate school	Thesis, letter of completion
Graduation	December 2021	Researcher	Master of Arts degree in Peace and Conflict Management