

KSh 3000

**THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA AND ITS IMPACTS ON  
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOOD SECURITY PROJECTS IN  
SANAAG REGION**

DAVID MUGO (BA)

C153/CT/PTY/26731/2011

RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES  
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF  
ARTS OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

December 2013

**KENYATTA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY**

## DECLARATION


This project report is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Signature..........Date .. 6-12-2013 .....

David Thiongo Mugo

C153/CT/PTY/26731/2011

This project report has been submitted for the review with my approval as the university supervisor

Signature..........Date .. 6/12/13 .....

Daniel M. Muia, PhD;

Senior Lecturer and Chairman;

Department of Sociology;

Kenyatta University;

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

I wish to acknowledge the support of my supervisor Dr. Daniel Muia, Senior Lecturer and Chairman Department of Sociology Kenyatta University for diligently guiding me throughout this enormous task. Your wisdom, insight and patience were of great significance.

Special appreciation goes to my wife Anne and sons Wesley and Adrian for their love, care, encouragement and support I will forever treasure.

It has not been possible to mention everybody all those who helped me in the success of this work by name. To all of you I sincerely appreciate your contribution.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION .....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
LIST OF TABLES .....	vii
LIST OF FIGURES .....	ix
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .....	x
DEFINITION OF TERMS .....	xi
ABSTRACT.....	xiii
CHAPTER ONE .....	1
INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1 Background of the study .....	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	3
1.3 Research questions.....	4
1.4 Objectives of the study.....	4
1.5 Research Premises .....	4
1.6 Justification and Significance .....	5
1.7 Scope and Limitations.....	6
1.8 Limitations of the study .....	7
CHAPTER TWO .....	8
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK .....	8
2.1 Review of related Literature .....	8

2.1.2 Conceptions of Food Security .....	9
2.1.3 The evolution of Humanitarian Food security projects.....	11
2.1.4 Politics and Food AID in Somalia.....	13
2.1.5 Food Security projects in Sanaag Region .....	15
2.2 Conceptual /Theoretical framework.....	16
2.2.2 Gaps in literature reviewed .....	19
CHAPTER THREE .....	21
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	21
3.1 Introduction.....	21
3.2 Research Design.....	21
3.3 Variables /Categories of analysis.....	22
3.4 Site of the study .....	22
3.5 Target Population.....	22
3.6 Sampling Technique .....	23
Table 3.1: Sampling Procedure .....	24
3.7 Research Instruments .....	25
3.8 Validity and Reliability.....	25
3.9 Data Collection Procedure .....	26
Figure 3.1 Data Collection Process.....	27
3.10 Data analysis Procedure.....	28
3.11 Data management and Ethic Consideration .....	28
CHAPTER FOUR.....	30
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION .....	30

4.1 Introduction.....	30
4.2 Demographic information.....	30
4.3 Effects of clan conflict on implementation of food security projects.....	35
4.4 Impact of armed militia in the implementation of food security projects.....	41
4.5 Effect of inter government conflict in implementation of food security projects.....	47
4.6 Strategies to improve implementation of food security projects.....	56
CHAPTER FIVE.....	62
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	62
5.1 Introduction.....	62
5.2 Summary.....	63
5.3 Conclusions.....	65
5.4 Recommendations.....	67
REFERENCE.....	69
APPENDICES.....	72
A1: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION.....	72
A2: QUESTIONNAIRE.....	73
A3: ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF SOMALIA.....	77
A4: SOMALIA SECURITY RISK MAP.....	78
A5: NORTH WEST SOMALIA LIVELIHOOD ZONES MAP.....	79

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Sampling Procedure.....	24
Table 3.2: Operation of variables.....	
Table 4.1 Academic qualification of the respondents.....	31
Table 4.2 Years have you worked with your organization .....	32
Table 4.3 Nationality of the respondents .....	33
Table 4.4 Extent to which clan conflict has affected the program implementation. ....	36
Table 4.5 How the clan conflicts affect food security implementation .....	37
Table 4.6 Policy measures taken by your organization to ensure implementation..	38
Table 4.7 Effect of clan conflict factors on your organization in terms of food security projects effectiveness .....	40
Table 4.8 If armed militia affect food security implementation .....	41
Table 4.9 Extent armed militia affect food security .....	42
Table 4.10 How the armed militia affect the food security implementation in Somalia .....	43
Table 4.11 Policy measures put in place for effective food security projects .....	44
Table 4.12 Effect of armed militia to your organization and society in terms of food security projects effectiveness .....	46
Table 4.13 Extent has this inter-government conflict affected the program implementation .....	48
Table 4.14 Impact of government conflict/policies in your area that can affect the effective implementation of food security projects.....	49

Table 4.15 Policy measures taken by your organization to ensure implementation of food security projects despite inter government conflict threat.....	51
Table 4.16 Effect of inter-government political interferences to your organization in terms of food security projects effectiveness.....	52
Table 4.17 Reasons that make that type of conflict impact greatly in projects .....	54
Table 4.18 Extent to which your organization involves the stakeholders in the planning of food security projects.....	56
Table 4.19 Security policies or mitigation measure your organization has developed to mitigate the threat to implementation of projects .....	58
Table 4.20 Extent to which your organization has engaged the local community organizations NGOs/CBOs in implementation in Somalia .....	59

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework .....	17
Figure 3.1 Data Collection Process.....	27
Figure 4.1 Gender of the respondents .....	31
Figure 4.2 Marital status of the respondents.....	31
Figure 4.3 Ages of the respondents.....	32
Figure 4.4 Clan conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia .....	34
Figure 4.5 a Does inter-government conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia.....	46
Figure 4.5b Prevalence of the three types of conflicts in the implementation of food security projects.....	51
Figure 4.6 Has your organization develop resilience strategy.....	59

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<b>CBR</b>	Cash Based response Projects
<b>CCS</b>	Center for Creative Solutions
<b>CECORE</b>	Center for Conflict Resolution
<b>CFW</b>	Cash for Work
<b>CRD</b>	Center for Research and Dialogue
<b>DEC</b>	Disasters Emergency Committee
<b>FAO</b>	Food Agricultural Organisation
<b>FGD:</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>FSNAU</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>NGO</b>	Non Governmental Organization
<b>NPA</b>	Norwegian People's Aid
<b>SACB</b>	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
<b>TFG:</b>	Transitional Federal Government
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNOCHA</b>	United Nation Office for Coordination of Humanitarian
<b>UNDSS</b>	United Nation Department of Safety and security
<b>USAID</b>	United States AIDS
<b>WASH</b>	Water, sanitation and Hygiene
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme

## DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Food security projects:** Within the context of humanitarian aid delivery this actual implementation of food security policies, projects supported and implemented by humanitarian organization to support affected population.

**Communal Conflict:** Communal conflict is conflict between two or more distinct communities that neither targets nor directly involves the state. These conflicts tend to be episodic, rather than sustained campaigns, like armed conflicts. Sometimes involving an ethnic aspect or clan.

**Affected population:** Within the context of humanitarian aid delivery, this refers to all people who have been directly or indirectly impacted by the civil conflicts in Somalia.

**Implementing agency:** Refers to local, international and United Nations bodies providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia. It will also be used interchangeably with the terms humanitarian organization.

**Al Shabaab's (AS):** meaning "The Youth" in Arabic they are the largest group among several armed Somali groups and impose Islamic law. They are involved in extorting money from local and humanitarian communities.

**Donor community:** Refers to all governmental and nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and charities providing financial support to aid organizations working in Somalia.

**Humanitarian aid** - this is also called emergency aid and refers to rapid assistance given to people in immediate distress by individuals, organizations, or

governments to relieve suffering, during and after man-made emergencies (like wars) and natural disasters

**Humanitarian worker** - A personnel who facilitates the delivery of humanitarian aid to needy communities on behalf of the employing agency or organization

**Cash Based Response projects:** This refers to projects implemented using of cash in the support of drought stricken population instead of helping in-kind. The cash based mechanism includes unconditional cash, vouchers, cash for work, and food basket. Cash based response is more recommended as the most flexible, immediate and viable programming option.

**Security levels:** in accordance to the UN security risk management policy, the level of risk are described as below.

- i. **Unacceptable** – This means very great significance such areas are out of bound, no project implementation can take place due to risk of Al shabab
- ii. **Very High** – This means great significant such areas implementation can take place under very good security and caution.
- iii. **High** – This means moderate significant, implementation and access is okay with care
- iv. **Medium** – This means small significant, there is low risk
- v. **Low**- this means very small significant, no risk at all.

## ABSTRACT

The right to food is one of those most consistently mentioned in international human rights documents. It is the most frequently violated in recent times. The targets set by the Millennium Development Goals Africa steering group convened in September 2007 for the reduction of hunger have largely failed, this according to “*assessing Progress in Africa towards the Millennium Development Goals report 2013*”. Africa’s food insecurity challenge is manifested by high prevalence of hunger and malnutrition, particularly among children, despite food production having grown faster than world population. Approximate 840 million people worldwide are malnourished, the highest percentage of these being in Africa. The magnitude of the problem in Africa has now reached unprecedented crisis levels 38 million people face an urgent and imminent threat to their peace, security and stability. Some of the Africa most affected country is Somalia, since the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991, much of Somalia has been affected by recurrent waves of armed conflict and insecurity. According to FSNAU April 2013, the number of people in acute food insecurity are almost one million, between late 2010 and early 2013. In this regard, my paper addressed the issue of food project implementation with special attention to assess the conflict in Somalia and its impacts on implementation of food security projects in Sanaag region. This study looked at current projects in the region and their intervention, in order to show how insecurity affects the effectiveness in the implementation. The study assessed communal conflict, armed militia conflict, inter-government conflicts, as possible influence key to effective implementation of food security projects. The study also established strategies that organizations and government can adopt to ensure effective implementations of their projects. The study focused on the various foods security projects in this region. The study employed a descriptive survey design in order to collect adequate and relevant data for analyzing the topic under study. The data was collected through questionnaires as per the stated objectives. The collected data was analysed using SPSS and Microsoft office excels and findings presented in tables and charts for clear visualization of the findings. The study has established that clan conflict affect the implementation of food security projects in Somalia as have been reported by most of the respondents in the study. The study has established that armed militia conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia. This means that the Threat of Al-shabaab is greatly felt by the agencies that try to give food aids to the victims of conflict due to Al-shabaab. The study has established that stakeholders’ involvement in the food security is implementation is crucial and most of the NGOs and the organisations in the Sanaag area involve the necessary stakeholders in the drafting of the policies ensuring the implementation of food security. The study therefore recommends that The study recommends that there is need for the government of Somalia and the government of the neighbouring countries of Somalia such as Kenya to promote inter-clan peaceful coexistence through sensitization on the importance of peace such as development and self-reliance to promote the implementation of food security in Sanaag area and Somalia as a whole to eradicate hunger which has devastated the area since the 1990s. The study recommends the governments of Somalia and regional countries such as Kenya to work on a formidable plan to eradicate the armed militia (Al-shabaab) through a well coordinated military action to promote peace and eradicate unnecessary demands put in place by the militia group in order to enhance the implementation of the food security in the area.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background of the study

Food security is defined as situation when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. (FAO, 1996; 2012). In 2012, it was estimated near one billion persons in the world are faced with food insecurity, and suffer from chronic hunger. It is a crisis with devastating and far-reaching effects. In developing countries, the situation in regions under protracted crisis of under nutrition is much worse compared being nearly three times compared to the average (FAO 2010).

However, there exists a complex interaction of food insecurity and conflict. This is as a result of the intensified struggle for access to livelihood opportunities in environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. These pressures not only put existing food systems under stress, but also turn them from predictable mechanisms of production, processing, distribution and consumption into rather volatile, unpredictable and uncontrollable systems of survival (Pingali, Alinovi & Sutton, 2005). Thus, chronic violence and conflict tend to reshape existing mechanisms of food production and food access, to distort the available assets and choices of households, and to force households into adapting their livelihood systems (Lautze & Raven-Roberts, 2006).

Countries and areas in protracted crisis are defined those with institutional variability, very weak governance structures, with the state having a limited capacity to respond to, and mitigate, the threats of conflict, disease and disruption to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection". In such countries, although protracted crises are diverse in their causes and effects, food insecurity is a common feature, (Harmer & Macrae, 2004; Pingali *et al.*, 2005; Alinovi Hemrich & Russo, 2008).

Somalia is a country that has for many faced a progressive breakdown of governance structure, crumbling state institutions, conflict, a devastated economy, distrust of the state, and increased informal activity. Civil war broke out resulting in violence anarchy and rise of clannism. The present Somalia is characterised by weak institutions of a strong autonomous business class and fragile security situation. The country then reverted to the social safety net in determining the business environment in Somalia, a reliance on customary and informal legal framework, run down physical infrastructure leading to high cost operating environment due to risk adverse nature and absence of reliable sources of market information

However, to date, no studies have been implemented to interrogate the impact of conflict to food security project implementation in Somalia, nor are there lessons developed that would guide effective delivery of food security programmes in Somalia. It is a crisis with devastating and far-reaching effects. This undermines the objectives of the millennium development goal (hunger reduction and

elimination). The challenge of feeding the world efficiently and equitably whilst consideration is not insurmountable.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

There is evidence development projects in protracted crisis neglect risk management and coping strategies for local households, the larger institutional shifts as a result of conflict and crisis, the development partners apply standard relief interventions under a narrow focus targeting food provision and supply of relief (seed and tools distribution), provision of micro-credit, establishment of public private partnerships and conflict resolution, whilst ignoring the complex web of spatial and temporal vulnerabilities generated by the protracted crisis. This has been attributed to lack of use of participatory planning methodologies. The implication of this is that where's food security policy measures are either being developed or revived, the ability to enforcing them in the midst of a fluid economic environment is indeterminate. The likely results include a limited impact of such measures and spiralling food insecurity and poverty in spite of massive external investments in Somalia regions.

Critical evaluation of policy effectiveness is not carried out in majority of the developing countries like Somalia. However, to date, no studies have been implemented to interrogate the impact of conflict to food security project implementation in Somalia, nor are there lessons developed that would guide effective delivery of food security programmes in Somalia. Despite its usefulness, therefore, it is in this respect that the researcher carried out a study so as to evaluate the effectiveness of Somali Policy measures in ensuring food security by investigating the condition (resources utilisation, opportunities and constraints) and

behaviour of food system stakeholders and their relationship to deliver effective policies

### **1.3 Research questions**

1. What are the effects of clan conflict in the implementation of food security projects in Somalia?
2. What are the impacts of armed militia conflict in implementation of food security projects in Somalia?
3. What are the effects of inter-government conflict in the implementation of food security projects in Somalia
4. What are key strategies to improve implementation of food security projects in Somalia?

### **1.4 Objectives of the study**

1. To establish the effect of clan conflict on implementation of food security projects in Somalia
2. To examine the impacts of armed militia in the implementation of food security projects in Somalia
3. To establish the effect of inter-government conflict in the implementation of food security projects in Somalia
4. To establish strategies to improve implementation of food security projects in Somalia

### **1.5 Research Premises**

1. Clan conflict hinder greatly implementation of food security projects in Somalia

2. The armed militia hamper the implementation of food security projects in Somalia
3. The inter-government conflict undermines the implementation of food security projects in Somalia
4. Community participation, collaboration and training can help to improve implementation of food security projects in Somalia

### **1.6 Justification and Significance**

The Somali conflict has affected the lives of millions of people, causing widespread displacement, physical and emotional injury and loss of life. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been forced from their homes due to conflict and continue to be the largest single population group in crisis. They increase pressure on the communities where they settle and competition over natural resources and income earning opportunities.

This study sought the establishment of a common understanding and building consensus among aid agencies, donors, policymakers and civil society, including those working on peace-building, stabilisation and human rights on food security projects implementation under protracted crisis situation. In particular it would lead to establishment of links between food security, agriculture, livestock, the political economy, conflict and stability and has determined how changes in the agriculture and the rural economy and society may underpin, deepen, or entrench protracted crises. This would assist humanitarian organization in Somalia, donor agencies and implementing organization in the identification of food security problems, analysis of policy options, the development of alternative management process and preparation of consistent strategies to improve food security.

Somalia as a country under protracted crisis needs to build a case for prioritizing her food security issues. This could be done by initially providing an informed platform for a sound dialogue among humanitarian and development stakeholders from different perspectives linked to food security, implementing existing development initiatives using a food security lens, elaborating further on the food security policy framework to enable sound enforcement in protracted crises situations; transform from short-term response cycles to a long-term horizon, risk reduction and management.

In addition, the study sought to delineate how the institutional and funding challenges within Somalia which must be overcome in the current aid architecture in order to mainstream food security into national and sub-national programmes in crisis and transition situations, the potential contribution of food security policies and programmes to the consolidation of peace, and identification on how peace building elements can be integrated into food security policies and programmes in protracted crises. Finally, the study has suggested concrete mechanisms that could provide a space through which to support the protection, promotion and rebuilding of livelihoods and food security in protracted crises.

### **1.7 Scope and Limitations**

The study covered Sanaag region in Somaliland. This region was selected owing to its relative security level. It is also one of the preferred regions by most humanitarian organizations because it has entry points from Ethiopia. In this study food security project is defined as intervention activities to people in immediate distress by individuals, organizations, or governments to relieve suffering, during

and after man-made emergencies. It is focused on relieving suffering caused by natural disaster or conflict, and providing resilience on food security. The type of food security projects discussed here include cash based intervention projects, which provide food aid, non food items, medicines and treatments. Therefore the project sought to fill a humanitarian gap by addressing distress and improving resilience of the community.

### **1.8 Limitations of the study**

The prevailing security status in remote part of Sanaag region is fragile; therefore, the study was largely conducted in Nairobi and Hargeisa town as all the agencies working in the region have their headquarters based either in Nairobi or Hargeisa. Therefore, inaccessibility to Sanaag rural area in Somalia posed a limitation to this study

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1 Review of related Literature

This chapter reviews existing literature on food security projects. The existing literature alongside establishing the independent variables much more briefly with regards to how they affect implementation of the projects in drought and famine areas. Further, this section introduces challenges and research findings by other scholars, and humanitarian organization as well. The success of any food security policy is effective project implementation which is critical stage of any project. At this stage activities of the project are actually carried out and funds are disbursed to facilitate the activities (Benjamin 1985). Little & Mirless (1976) argue that indeed project implementation is a process of refinement and can actually be considered to be a mini cycle within the large project cycle.

Researchers and historians agree that humanitarian aid has been an important part of all civilized societies throughout history. From international aid donations to neighbourhood food drives, humanitarians express their desire to care for humanity in many different ways. According to Krotz (2009), aid can be delivered in response to a request from the needy or as an assertion of oneself into a perceived need. Krotz emphasizes that the universal human spirit hears the cry of the needy and yearns for opportunities to do well. These yearnings have become an important part of the culture of the Western world. Humanitarian aid has evolved over the years into the widely diverse and international industry that it is today. Non-profit organizations, for-profit businesses, and governments participate in

humanitarian aid each in their own way and all with noble causes and good intentions (Harvey P., 2010).

Therefore is therefore need for research in this field to investigate how well the humanitarian food security projects can be improved and done efficiently. Review of related information will therefore be very crucial in this study as it will give details of what has been done and what is lacking in this body of knowledge. It will also help identify gaps in the research field. Literature review will be a key element in reconstructing past humanitarian assistance to Somalia and understand the contextual variables of the response.

The first information source exists of literature. Both primary literature and secondary sources in the form of academic books, articles, working papers (primary literature) and newspaper articles, country specific files from governmental sources and topic/geographic maps (secondary sources) will be used. Statistics from official databases from the UN agencies will be incorporated. Extensive use of diverse official websites such as the website of the UN agencies will be used because they contain important information. All existing documentation provided to and identified will be reviewed in detail. Some key documents have already been identified by searching the evaluation websites and databases (UNOCHA, UNICEF, FAO and WFP) and documents posted on Relief Web and donor web pages, such as USAID fact sheets, ECHO funding decisions and others. Every document reviewed will be registered on the references list.

### **2.1.2 Conceptions of Food Security**

The term food security is derived from the international development literature of the 1960s and 1970s and is conceived as a strategy to meet aggregate food needs in

a coherent way (Anderson & Cook, 1999). Following the world oil crisis as well as the related food crisis of the early 1970s and the African famine of the early 1980s, public interest in global and domestic food security intensified. At the same time, the literature on food security multiplied along with food assistance crises in developing countries and growing numbers of food banks in the United States and Canada. In the early 1980s, Amartya Sen's work on "food entitlements" helped bring about a paradigm shift away from food access and toward food as a basic right, bringing the issue of food insecurity to centre stage as a global dilemma (Maxwell, 1996; Sen, 1981). Since the initial use of the term food security, a variety of definitions have been proposed. One study listed approximately 200 definitions and 450 indicators of food security (Hoddinott, 1999). Early definitions of food security focused on the ability of a region or nation to assure an adequate food supply for its current and projected population (McKeon, 2006).

Different conceptions of food security differ in the way that their authors answer the following questions in Table 1 about the distribution, production and consumption of food (McKeon, 2006). Today the term food security is understood and used in multiple ways at the level of individual, household, community, regional, national and world (Power, 2005). Individual or household food insecurity can be distinguished by a focus on problems of food access rather than on concerns related to the organization of a food system (Tarasuk, 2005). Focusing on food security at these levels helps promote solutions that will address low-income citizens' specific concerns (Power, 2005).

The most popular definition of food security was developed at the World Food Summit in 1996 and adopted by the Government of Canada: "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe

and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (Food & Agriculture Organization, 1996). The conceptualization of food security goals by Koc et al. (1999) goes beyond the adequacy of food quantity and quality and extends to the four “As”: availability, accessibility, acceptability and adequacy. Food security requires that there is sufficient food for all people at all times (availability) and that it be accessible to all equally (accessibility). Adequacy is defined as access to food that is nutritious and safe, and produced in environmentally sustainable ways. Acceptability addresses access to culturally acceptable food, produced and obtained in ways that do not compromise people’s dignity, self-respect or human rights. A fifth additional component is agency, which focuses on program and policy development that enable the achievement of food security (Tarasuk, 2005).

### **2.1.3 The evolution of Humanitarian Food security projects.**

The current global food crisis which is causing shortages and steeply rising prices is exacerbating both the incidence and depth of food insecurity. Unpredictable weather and high demand, of hunger is sweeping the world’s most desperate nations,” according to a World Food Programme representative (Stringer, 2008). This has created a host of humanitarian, socio-economic, developmental, political and security-related challenges and, most notably, immediate hunger needs. Although most analysts believe the current acute crisis will eventually end, “underlying it is a basic problem that will only intensify unless we recognize it and try to remedy it” (Sen, 2008). A fundamental question remains unanswered: How will we address global food insecurity and, in Somalia, how we will do so for those most at risk.

The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security as existing “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life”. Commonly, the concept of food security is defined as including both physical and economic access to food that meets people's dietary needs as well as their food preferences. In many countries, health problems related to dietary excess are an ever increasing threat, In fact, malnutrition and food borne diarrhea are become double burden. Food security is built on three pillars; Food availability: sufficient quantities of food available on a consistent basis. Food access: having sufficient resources to obtain appropriate foods for a nutritious diet. Food use: appropriate use based on knowledge of basic nutrition and care, as well as adequate water and sanitation. Food security is a complex sustainable development issue, linked to health through malnutrition, but also to sustainable economic development, environment, and trade.

The right to food is one of those most consistently mentioned in international human rights documents, but it is the one most frequently violated in recent times. Targets set by the World Food Summit in 1996 for the reduction of hunger have largely failed, despite food production having grown faster than world population. Global, national and human security issues are increasingly converging, and in some regions overlapping. Some 840 million people worldwide are malnourished, the highest percentage of these being in Africa. The magnitude of the problem in Africa has now reached unprecedented crisis levels—some 38 million people face “an urgent and imminent threat to their peace, security and stability”.

The reasons why action plans to address food security have continued to fall short can be attributed to faulty analysis and faulty actions. What is needed is an

understanding that goes beyond conventional, orthodox wisdom to work more strategically in developing and implementing effective, international, national and regional policies. Availability, access and affordability are all elements of food security, complex issues that encompass a wide range of interrelated economic, social and political factors, internal and external, which challenge Africa's ability to address food security. Ultimately hunger is a political creation which must be ended by political means.

#### **2.1.4 Politics and Food AID in Somalia**

Food shortages caused by conflict in Somalia are fast becoming a terrifying famine and aid agencies have been unable to help as they usually would. Several major players, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN's World Food Programme (WFP), have been forced to withdraw parts of their programmes because of violence and theft. But it gets worse: US anti-terrorism laws are hampering efforts to feed the starving.

Feeding Somalia is all the more difficult because of the politics of the war on terror. In July 2012, the al-Shabaab militia, which at that point controlled most of the country, register with them – the kind of thing governments tend to do. It also shut down a number of United Nations agency offices, citing "un-Islamic" behavior. The US agency Care closed its operation completely. If the big food aid agencies wanted to deliver aid, they had to negotiate with al-Shabaab; but in the United States, al-Shabaab is a designated terrorist organization. US treasury rules forbid any US-based organization from any activity that might "materially benefit" a terrorist group, and al-Shabaab has always "taxed" food convoys, and confiscated food. The result is that US aid has plummeted, and groups such as Mercy Corps

have complained that an "overzealous" approach from the US government has made working in Somalia even harder.

WFP may be an international agency, but the bulk of the food aid it delivers is American too. Although it won't reveal figures, the shortfalls in its programme, meant to support one million people in Somalia, are thought to be in part due to a collapse in supply from the US. To make matters worse, last month an Associated Press report revealed that the agency still sees food habitually stolen by officials from its hot meals programme in Mogadishu, with some shipments diverted straight to the markets.

Getting food into Somalia and getting it to the people who desperately need it is proving extremely complicated. A customs row has held up the first plane of an emergency UN airlift in Nairobi. The World Food Programme says no food was shipped into the Somali between April and July 4 2013. Not knowing for how long its stocks would last, it had to stretch what food it did have. It had to ration the rations. Some say that unless the political implications of food aid distribution are tackled, droughts like this will be difficult to prevent and to manage. The WFP is feeding 1.5 million people in Somalia, including more than 300,000 people in Mogadishu in July alone. It is doing so in dangerous conditions: 14 members of staff have been killed in Somalia in the last two

A state in Somalia has said it is sending back Turkish food aid because it was politically motivated and violated the state government's sovereignty. The Puntland and Somaliland government said in a statement on Saturday that a ship

carrying food aid from capital Mogadishu to “specific districts of Puntland/Somaliland” arrived in the port of Bossaso but the governments was not notified about the shipment beforehand.

### **2.1.5 Food Security projects in Sanaag Region**

Sanaag region is on the north eastern tip of Somaliland and neighbors Sool and Togdheer regions. The population of Sanaag region is estimated at 270,367 (UNDP 2005), with more than 79% living in the rural areas. Some part of Sanaag region is claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland, particularly areas bordering Puntland, which are predominantly inhabited by clans who have close kinship affinity with the clans in Puntland. However, Somaliland controls the majority of the districts in the region. The region is divided administratively into four districts of Erigavo, Ceel Afweyn, Badhan and Laas Qoray. In terms of livelihoods, Sanaag is predominantly pastoral with pockets of agro-pastoral areas. Cultivation of frankincense is a livelihood activity for small number of people in the region. The region, like most of the neighboring regions, experienced recurrent droughts for many years which severely depleted livestock herds and resulted in urban migration. For better protection, displaced people from drought-affected regions moved to areas where their sub-clans reside and where humanitarian assistance and other public services are available. The exact number of people displaced by these droughts is unknown because most have integrated into host communities. Humanitarian access and security remain a huge challenge to the overall humanitarian effort in Sanaag due to the political dispute of administrative ownership of the region between Puntland and Somaliland. The main humanitarian issues in the region include lack of adequate livelihood sources, especially among

drought-affected pastoralists and urban poor; and hyperinflation, which affects the purchasing power of the most vulnerable groups.

**Situation Analysis:** According to UNOCHA (Oct 2012) the following Response and Gaps were identified by the cluster. There was a history of isolation and neglect of Sanaag region. Sanaag is in north-eastern Somalia, and is the second largest region in the nation. Horn Relief estimates the population of eastern Sanaag to be approximately 117 000 people. More than 70 percent of this population is nomadic pastoralists. Sanaag lies between the borders of the semi-autonomous State of Puntland in the northeast, and the self-declared State of Somaliland in the northwest. Both governments claim territorial authority over the land. Although both governments invest heavily in their political and territorial interests, neither administration has contributed to meaningful development or emergency relief in the region. Despite the territorial dispute, there has been very little violence in Sanaag since the war broke out in 1991. In fact, because of its peace and stability the region became a refuge for thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) seeking safety


## **2.2 Conceptual /Theoretical framework**

Below conceptual framework shows the identified variables and their interrelatedness that mitigate in the research framework. The inter clan conflict, militia conflict and government conflict may favour or hinder project implementation.

Independent variables  
variables

Intervening variables

Dependent



**Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework**

### **Theoretical Framework**

In the early 1990s, Campbell (1991) offered a refined conceptualization of food insecurity, which included its risk factors and consequences. In this conceptualization, she indicated that there were two sets of potential consequences of food insecurity. The first set of consequences refers to one's nutritional status and includes the typical physical and physiologic symptoms of suboptimal nutritional status, such as anthropometric, biochemical, and clinical symptoms. The second set of consequences refers to those related to poor nutritional status, including health and quality of life indicators. In her framework, Campbell divides health into social and mental well being in addition to physical health. Campbell

makes the very important point that food insecurity can affect health and quality of life either directly or indirectly through nutritional status.

### **Conceptual Model of food insecurity and determinants of access to food resources**

This conceptual model provides a framework for understanding what factors account for variations in availability and accessibility to resources such as food. The model shows food insecurity as the outcome of a variety of factors that determine food accessibility, including residential setting; perceived collective social functioning, which accounts for plausible causal links between perceptions of collective social functioning; and food insecurity such as individual experiences with communally-based means of food redistribution, and a range of personal characteristics. These are components featured in the model based on research that was reviewed Dean & Sharkey (2011).

**Context:** There are spatial explanations for variations in food accessibility (spatial context) opportunity structures in impoverished rural or urban settings can enhance or limit the availability of food. Rural rather than urban setting negatively impacts food availability, Rural setting less variety of healthy foods, food quality or freshness is lower, and food is more expensive. Location impacts accessibility, deprived areas may have more or less food stores of varying characteristics, rural residents must travel further distances to supermarkets, Food insecurity varies across geographical setting, especially regionally

**Collective social functioning** (i.e. the social, cultural, and historical commonalities of a particular community), Social capital (i.e. combined resources which derive from an individual's mutually recognized social relations) impacts accessibility of

resources through social control, family support and support and benefits outside the family. Dean & Sharkey suggest that measures of an individual's subjective experience of personal disparity in access to resources (financial and social) are likely to be associated with dietary outcomes; i.e. perceived personal disparity is causally related to food insecurity and reflects experiences with unequal distribution of food and food-related resources (SNAP, WIC), discrimination

**Personal characteristics** which determine access to resources, Educational attainment, low-income status, being at or below the poverty line, accessing senior nutrition program benefits (over age 60), race and ethnicity

**Food depletion at the household level** is defined as a household running out of food; accounts for the sufficiency and adequacy of food in regards to its availability, access and utilization

### **2.2.2 Gaps in literature reviewed**

The quality of secondary data dictates the scope of primary data collection, Secondary data, documents, and reports on food security are generally not prepared by the same people or institutions that do the primary data collection; hence the goals and purpose of primary and secondary data may not be the same. It is therefore essential that data quality be carefully assessed, particularly where part of the analysis involves a direct comparison of secondary data with the data being collected.

From deteriorating livelihoods to a crisis of acute food insecurity, there is no sufficient data on food insecurity since the area has not been well researched. The lack of response to the crisis in Sanaag can also be attributed to lack of documented policy and response systems. In complex humanitarian situations characterized by

population displacement, it is unlikely that current secondary data will be available. Given the time and resources required for research, it is essential that every effort be made to collect secondary data beforehand to streamline the process and provide the essential contextual information that can orient primary data collection.

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the research design used in the study, site of the study, target population; sample size, data collection and analysis as well as ethical consideration in the management of data have been outlined in this chapter.

#### 3.2 Research Design

A thorough review of the literature on the subject matter has been done. The review included general literature and empirical data including previous relevant research results, financial data, environmental impact data, historical survey data, community asset audit data, and any plans relevant to rural communities.

Both qualitative and quantitative methods have been used to implement a participatory assessment of the selected policy measures. Policy impact evaluation has been used to determine the effectiveness of measures on food security.

Orodho (2003) defines a research design as the scheme, outline or plan that is used to generate answers to research problems. Further Donald (2006) notes that a research design is the structure of the research, it is the “glue ” that holds all the elements in a research project together. According to Kombo and Tromp (2006), research design can be thought of as the structure of research. It is important to highlight the two main methods when investigating and collecting data quantitative and qualitative.

This study used descriptive survey research design to analyze the conflict and its impact on implementation of food security projects. According to Mugenda &

Mugenda (2003), descriptive research is a process of collecting data in order to answer questions concerning the current status of the subjects in the study. A descriptive research determines and reports the way things are and it attempts to describe such things as possible behaviour, attitudes, values and characteristics.

### **3.3 Variables /Categories of analysis**

This study depended variable was effective implementation of food security projects while the independent variables was conflict, Militia conflict and inter-state conflict. The study had also have intervening variables which include climate and international donor influence and relations.

### **3.4 Site of the study**

The study was conducted in Sanaag region which is in the north eastern tip of Somaliland and neighbors Sool and Togdheer regions. The population of Sanaag region is estimated at 270,367 (UNDP 2005), with more than 79% living in the rural areas. Some part of Sanaag region is claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland, particularly areas bordering Puntland, which are predominantly inhabited by clans who have close kinship affinity with the clans in Puntland. However, Somaliland controls the majority of the districts in the region. The region is divided administratively into four districts of Erigavo, Ceel Afweyn, Badhan and Laas Qoray. In terms of livelihoods, Sanaag is predominantly pastoral with pockets of agro-pastoral areas

### **3.5 Target Population**

Target population in statistics is the specific population about which information is desired. According to Ngechu (2004), a population is a well defined set of people,

services, elements, and events, group of things or households that are being investigated. The target population composed of the major implementing agencies in the region (UNOCHA, FAO, UNICEF and UNHCR) of Sanaag Region Northern Somalia. Mugenda & Mugenda, (2003), explain that the target population should have some observable characteristics, to which the researcher intends to generalize the results of the study.

This area of study was selected because the region has the highest number of humanitarian responses implemented in Somalia. According FSNAU report 2013 Current situation indicates a significant improvement of food security situation in most livelihoods. Contributing factors include significant humanitarian interventions and improved social support. There are also well established agencies located in the region that can provide information in regard to the study in question.

### **3.6 Sampling Technique**

Ngechu (2004) underscores the importance of selecting a representative sample through making a sampling frame. From the population frame the required number of subjects, respondents, elements or firms were selected in order to make a sample. Where external validity is important, one need to carry out random sampling from properly defined population. The study adopted the simple random sampling design. Simple random sample is a subset of individuals (a sample) chosen from a larger set (a population). Each individual was chosen randomly and entirely by chance, such that each individual has the same probability of being chosen at any stage during the sampling process, and each subset of  $k$  individuals had the same probability of being chosen for the sample as any other subset of  $k$  individuals. This study picked a random sample of 40 respondents from the 100

potential participants. The respondents were from the higher level officers and field officers from the four major humanitarian organizations operating in Sanaag region who has vast knowledge and experience on implementation of food security projects.

The Ratio (f) of sample population is given by:  $f = n/N$

Where: n is the random sample (40)

N is the total population (100)

For this study, respondents were drawn from four selected UN agencies. A random sample of 40 respondents was used in this study out of the 100 humanitarian workers from the four agencies. Therefore the sample size for individual agency was  $40/100$  ( $8/20$ ) multiplied by the total number of the agency workers. Table 3.1 shows the approach applied to selecting the sample size.

Agency	Total no workers	Calculation Sample size	Sample Size
Save the Children	28	$=40/100 \times 28$ People	12 People
World Vision	26	$=40/100 \times 26$ People	11 People
UNICEF	24	$= 40/100 \times 24$ People	9 People
FAO	22	$= 40/100 \times 22$ People	8 People

**Table 3.1: Sampling Procedure**

### **3.7 Research Instruments**

To carry out interviews and focus groups discussions (FGD), to collect the different level of data produced by personal interaction, the researchers designed an interview schedule or topic guide. This was a list of questions or topic areas that all the interviewers used. Asking everyone the same questions means that the data you collect would be much more focused and easier to analyse. On the other hand open ended questionnaire was used. This was provided to some participants for triangulation.

### **3.8 Validity and Reliability**

Validity is the degree by which the sample of test items represents the content the test is designed to measure. Content validity which was employed by this study is a measure of the degree to which data that was collected using a questionnaire represented specific content that addresses the study objectives (Berg & Gall 1989).

Before a questionnaire was finally administered to the respondents each question and the questionnaire went through some rigorous evaluation to ensure its validity and Reliability (De Vaus 2002). This process is called pilot testing or pre-testing. In this study, a few questionnaires were administered to humanitarian aid agents whose response were used to rectify the questionnaires to ensure that they were understood by the respondents as intended by the researcher and enhance the validity of the questionnaire.

Reliability refers to the consistency of measurement and is frequently assessed using the test-retest reliability method. The researcher tested the reliability of the questionnaire by giving it to some humanitarian aid agents and checks its consistency in producing the results that are expected to answer the research

questions. The aim was to correct inconsistencies arising from the instrument, which will ensure that they measure what is intended.

### **3.9 Data Collection Procedure**

#### **Questionnaire**

A quantitative survey questionnaire was designed to assess the livelihood impacts of the initiative on the wider community. If designed appropriately (e.g. a representative sample drawn from a rigorously defined sampling frame) the data can be used to extrapolate the economic and social impacts to the whole community. To enable ease of completion of the questionnaire and to assist in the effective analysis of the data, a ranking scale was used for the quantification of attitude data, along with a series of closed questions and forced choice questions to verify and analyse the characteristics, perceptions, and requirements of the sample respondents more easily.


#### **Key informant Interviews**

The second stage in the data collection involved the use of key informant interviews, an anthropological technique utilizing rich information sources, which has defined sample selection criteria. A sample of 10 national figures in positions of leadership and responsibility within the profession were chosen. Since the total population of possible key informants is small, this was necessarily a convenience sample, though there was an element of a judgement approach, since efforts were made to ensure that participants came from a range of academic, managerial and political backgrounds. The advantage of this approach lies in its simplicity but it was difficult to determine at the sampling stage whether the informants fulfilled the published selection criteria. Data collection also involved in-depth interviews with

practising project managers throughout the Sanaag Region. The aim was to develop an understanding and an interpretative framework of the process of interaction. The purpose of interviewing managers was to find out what is on their minds, what they think or how they feel about project implementation.

### **Focus groups Discussion**

The third stage of the study involved food security specialists together in focus groups to collect the different level of data produced by personal interaction. For pragmatic reasons, this had to be conducted in my own locality, and it was important for the study that the participants were able to interact in a productive, rather than dysfunctional way. I was able to use my local knowledge to satisfy these sampling requirements using a combination of convenience and purposive techniques.



**Figure 3.1 Data Collection Process**

### **3.10 Data analysis Procedure**

Qualitative data was gathered from key informants and the review of documents compiled, organized, analyzed and interpreted on the basis of food security strategies and programs, regional policies as well as the implementation of the programs and their outcomes.

### **3.11 Data management and Ethic Consideration**

Consent involves the procedure by which an individual may choose whether or not to participate in a study. The researcher's task is to ensure that participants have a complete understanding of the purpose and methods used in the study, the risks involved, and the demands placed upon them as a participant (Best & Kahn, 2006; Jones & Kottler, 2006). The participant must also understand that he or she has the right to withdraw from the study at any time.

Determination of whether information has been communicated to a participant in an effective manner is based on both substance and manner. What information is given, and how is it presented. The information must be planned and presented so it can be completely understood, and it must be fully understood by the participant. It is the researcher's responsibility to see that this is accomplished. This perspective places a great responsibility on an investigator and makes assurance that effective consent has been obtained even more complicated.

Voluntary consent is concerned with each individual's ability to exercise the free power of choice without the intervention of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other forms of constraint or coercion. This right to exercise choice was present throughout the entire research process. The intent of this interpretation is that no

such “constraint or coercion” must be either explicit or implicit on the part of the investigator.

Capacity is a person’s ability to acquire and retain knowledge. The ability to evaluate the information received and make a choice based on this evaluation is fundamental to the element of capacity. Based on the person’s ability to acquire, retain, and evaluate information.


## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

#### 4.1 Introduction


This chapter gives the research findings as per the objectives of the study and interpretation geared towards answering the objectives of the study. The research findings have been presented in tables and charts.

#### 4.2 Demographic information




**Figure 4.1 Gender of the respondents**

The study findings in figure 4.1 indicates that majority of the respondents were male accounting for 53% (n=21) and 48% (n=19) of the respondents were female.



**Figure 4.2 Marital status of the respondents**

The study findings in figure 4.2 indicates that most of the respondents (65%, n=26) are married while 35% (n=14) are single.



**Figure 4.3 Ages of the respondents**

The findings in figure 4.3 indicate that 33% (n=13) of the respondents were aged between 31 and 45 years while 20% (n=8) were aged above 55 years of age. The findings indicate that 25% (n=10) of the respondents were aged between 18 years and 30 years while 23% (n=9) were aged between 46 years and 55 years.

**Table 4.1 Academic qualification of the respondents**

	Frequency	Percent
Certificate	4	10.0
Diploma	6	15.0
Graduate	16	40.0
Post graduate	14	35.0
Total	40	100.0

The study findings in table 4.1 indicates that 40% (n=16) of the respondents have undergraduate degree while 10% (n=4) of the respondents have certificates which may mean that they have either form four certificates or education level below the diploma education. The study findings reveal that 35% (n=14) of the respondents have post graduate degree while 15% (n=6) have diploma education. The study reveals that most of the respondents have the undergraduate degree.

**Table 4.2 Years respondent have worked with that organization**

	Frequency	Percent
Less than 2	13	32.5
2-5	10	25.0
6-9	6	15.0
10-13	4	10.0
14-17	3	7.5
Above 18	4	10.0
Total	40	100.0

The findings in table 4.2 indicates that most of the respondents have worked in their respective organisations for less than 2 years accounting for 32.5% (n=13) of the respondents while 10% (n=4) have worked for either 10-13 years or have worked for more than 18 years with their organisations. The findings also indicate that 25% (n=10) of the respondents have worked for the organisations for 2 to 5 years and the least number of respondents (7.5%, n=3) have experience of 14 to 17 years with their organisations.

**Table 4.3 Nationality of the respondents**

	Frequency	Percent
Briton	2	5.0
Canadian	1	2.5
Italian	3	7.5
Kenyan	8	20.0
Somali	19	47.5
Tanzanian	2	5.0
Ugandan	1	2.5
Yemenian	2	5.0
Zimbabwean	2	5.0
Total	40	100.0

The study findings in table 4.3 indicate that majority of the respondents were Somali nationals accounting for 47.5% (n=19) of the respondents while only 2.5% (n=1) were either Canadian nationals or Ugandan nationals. The study findings also indicate that 5.0% (n=2) of the respondents were either Briton nationals, Tanzanian nationals, Yemen nationals or Zimbabwe nationals. The study findings indicate that 20.0% (n=8) of the respondents were Kenyans and 7.5% (n=3) were Italians.

### **Focus Group Discussion**

The researcher held a focus group discussion with food security projects implementers in month of October 2013 at Hargeisa in Somalia . The focus group was conducted as part of the research data collection procedure. The populations represented at the discussion , including: project managers, agronomist, field officer and agriculture engineers, Through the focus groups, the researcher gathered

information to help analyzing the research questions participants provided information in two ways: written responses and group discussion. The discussion was designed to gather information from the project implementers in regard to the following outcomes:


- i. To establish the effect clan conflict on implementation of food security projects in Somalia
- ii. To examine the impact of armed militia in the implementation of food security projects in Somalia
- iii. To establish the effect of inter-government conflict in the implementation of food security projects in Somalia
- iv. To establish strategies to improve implementation of food security projects in Somalia

### **Participant Demographics**

Ten participants took part in the focus group Discussion:

- i. Four women and Six men
- ii. 3 Project managers, 2 Data officer, 2 Monitoring officer, 2 Information management officer
- iii. 6 Somalia Nationalities, two Kenyan, one American and one ugandan
- iv. 3 Participants students were 18-30 years old; 4 were 31-45 years old; 3 were 46-55 years old
- v. All 10 participants were based in Somaliland Sanaag region.

### 4.3 Effects of clan conflict on implementation of food security projects



**Figure 4.4 Clan conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia**

The researcher wished to determine if clan conflict affect the implementation of food security projects in Somalia and majority of the respondents indicated that clan conflict affect the effective implementation of food security projects in Somalia accounting for 73% (n=29) of the respondents while only 28% (n=11) of the respondents indicated otherwise as shown in figure 4.4. *“clans effect is inevitable because they usually fight for who to control the project this in most cases hamper the implementation process”* female monitoring officer said.

The Conflict Analysis Regional Report (2012), on Somaliland admits that there were clan political incidents that created grievances among a group of Dhulbahante in Sanaag region. *“yes clan conflict so much especially when the NGO is in process of picking/targeting the beneficiaries for support some clan usually fight to get lion share”* male project manager said. *“some clan demand the NGO to hire their people as staff failure to that the NGO operation is threatened by elders”* male data officer said. And according to the views of male project manager he said *“yes the clan form the foundation of our society and therefore they have effect t every community activities and especially when they conflict”*. The Focus group

discussion participants confirmed the view in that projects implemented in borders on the two feuding clan could set in motion a cascading effect.

**Table 4.4 The extent to which clan conflict has affected the program implementation**

	Frequency	Percent
Great	8	27.6
Moderate	18	62.1
Small	3	10.3
Total	29	100.0

The findings in table 4.4, the researcher wanted to indentify from the respondent how the clan conflict has affected the implementation of food security projects. With the reference to UNDSS Somalia report (2013) classification of risk, Great means very high significance, Moderate means high risk while small means low risk. Respondent indicated that clan effect moderately as reported by 62.1% (n=18) of the respondents while 27.6% (n=8) of the respondents indicated that it has affected food security implementation to great extent while only 10.3% (n=3) indicate that it has affected food security implementation to small extent. *“the clan conflict hamper the implementation since the elders are the one who decide who to be assisted therefore they favor their own”* said one of male monitoring officer.

According to n the literature review elders were identified having some influence on beneficiary selection this according to CBI monitoring unit FAO, (2013). This result was confirmed from the focus group discussion , male data office said *“due to money involved in these project clan politics plays a major role I think self centeredness can paralyze all organization operations”*.

“Somali culture is divided into clan and every activity the dominant clan has to have its way in so doing they affect projects” female Project manager said. According to FGD view this clear indication that clan conflict has effect to the implementation of the food security projects.

**Table 4.5 How the clan conflicts affect food security implementation**

	Frequency	Percent
Declined to access food from opposing clan	9	22.5
Delay implementation	5	12.5
Destruction of projects materials	7	17.5
Poor/refuse participation	7	17.5
Sabotage implementation	12	30.0
Total	40	100.0

The study findings in table 4.5 indicates the following;

**Sabotage implementation:** 30.0% (n=12) of the respondents indicated that clan conflict leads to sabotage of the food security implementation, this interruption included damage of project materials and fighting,

**Delay implementation:** While 12.5% (n=5) indicated that it delays implementation of the food security through disagreement on beneficiaries selection.

**Destruction of projects materials:** The findings also indicate that 17.5% (n=7) of the respondents indicated that it either destructs implementation or results to poor or refusal in participation in the implementation of food security, focus group discussion identified lack of participation be feuding clans in project implementation.

**Declined to access food from opposing clan:** The findings also indicate that 22.5% (n=9) of the respondents indicate that clan conflict affect implementation of food security by decline to access to food from opposing clan. It was indentified in the focus group that some community could not share water catchment and canals for domestic and livestock use. A male project manager said *“the dominant clan can even deny the minority the permission to access the water or they can even charge some money”*. The access denial was also identified in literature review, according study conducted by Mercy Corps ( 2010) during cash for work project implementation. another female project managers said that *“some clan may refuse to share a certain water point, catchment due to conflict between them*. However a male data officer added that *“tag war between clans of who to be a beneficiary may delay agency operation”*. In this view it clearly shows how clan conflict have diverse effect and hamper implementation of projects.

**Table 4.6 Policy measures taken by your organization to ensure implementation**

	Frequency	Percent
Clan dialogues	14	35.0
Clan trainings	16	40.0
Involvement in decision	10	25.0
Total	40	100.0

The study findings in table 4.6. The researcher further sort to find out the policy measure their organization has put in place it indicate that;

**Clan trainings:** 40.0% (n=16) of the respondents indicated that despite the clan conflicts their organizations has put in place clan trainings on food implementation

to ensure the success of the food security implementation, the focus group highlighted various empowerments programme initiated to help communities, one of the participant a male monitoring officer said *“if clan elders are empowered they will be very supportive in the community”*. This was clear indication community empowerment was very crucial to improvement of food security.

**Involvement in decision:** While 25% (n=10) has made involvement of the clans in decision making as a way of ensuring food security implementation this was seen also as good strategy for sustainability and improving participation.

**Clan dialogues:** 35% (n=14) indicated that there is clan dialogues for the effective implementation of food security this included elders meetings. The literature review identified various dialogues forum in the region to restore peace UNHCR (2012). Focus group emphasized importance of dialogue to help community stability a male monitoring officer said the following; *“dialogue may help since all clan need each other and share a lot of resources, “when community have been involved in decision making it becomes easy since they participate”* conflict resolution and dialogue was sighted as one way of averting the conflict and helping community work together.

**Table 4.7 The Effect of clan conflict organizations in terms of food security projects effectiveness**

	Frequency	Percent
Community disharmony	16	40.0
Lack of food	11	27.5
Withdrawal by NGOs	13	32.5
Total	40	100.0

The researcher wanted the respond to explain the long-term effect of conflict to entire society. The findings in table 4.7 indicate that majority of the respondents **Community disharmony:** (40%, n=16) indicated that clan conflict affect their organizations in terms of food security projects effectiveness through community disharmony this meant the community bond was very weak, according to participants in the focus group *“generally this conflict bring disharmony in the community people never leave in peace its very bad experience”* female monitoring officer said.

**Lack of food:** while 27.5% (n=11) leads to lack of food, the focus group indicated the conflict has caused many people to suffer from hunger. The survey conducted by WFP (2011) in Somaliland confirmed that society disharmony conflict and lack of coordination might be causes to hunger. According to focus participant *“when community fail to work together their influstructure become downgraded and they cannot produce any more food, conflict also cause NGO not to implement food projects”*

**Withdrawal by NGOs:** The findings also indicate 32.5% (n=13) of the respondents indicated that that clan conflicts results to the withdrawals of NGOs

that affect their organizations in terms of food security projects effectiveness. The participants sited threat and intimidation as reason why the NGOs withdraw since some clan may issue some threat to staff. According to literature review three NGOs withdrew their services at one point due to conflict this included save the children and mercy corps this according to monitoring units report UNDSS (2012). in FGD a male information officer had the following to say on NGOs withdrawal; *“NGOs usually withdraw their support when our clans fight, the clan fights usually affect the poor since they cannot afford even food to eat”*. According to the findings the conflict seem to cause the community not to work together due to dissonance and lack of cooperation especially when doing community work.

#### **4.4 Impact of armed militia in the implementation of food security projects**

**Table 4.8 If armed militia affect food security implementation**

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	40	100.0

The researcher wanted to indentify from the respondent whether armed militia affect implementation. The study findings in table 4.8 indicate that all the respondents indicated that armed militia conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia. Male project manager in Focus group sadi the following *“terrorism acts is a real threat to agencies and their work, these militia are part of our society and they influence and intimidate NGOs”*. This was also confirmed in the study conducted by CECORE reviewed that armed conflict has a nuanced relationship between food insecurity and violence Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE) 2010. An agronomist in the

focus group discussion explain the following and said “*we have lost very many humanitarian workers and the problem NGO usually suspend their activities we suffer more*”. The militia in the Sanaag region was indentified to have adverse effect to the food security due to their negative impact.

**Table 4.9 Extent armed militia affect food security**

	Frequency	Percent
Great	21	52.5
Moderate	15	37.5
Small	3	7.5
Very small	1	2.5
Total	40	100.0

The researcher further sort to find out to what extent armed militia affected food security. The study findings in table 4.9, with the reference to UNDSS Somalia (2013) classification of risk, Great means very high significance, Moderate means high risk while small means low risk. The results indicate that 52.5% (n=21) of the respondents indicated that armed militia conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia to great extent while 2.5% (n=1) indicated it affects the food security project to a very small extent. The findings indicate that 37.5% (n=15) of the respondents indicated that armed militia conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia to moderate extent. A male data officer has the following o say “*terrorism acts by militia usually caused fear not only to NGOs but also to the beneficiaries these militia usually target even locals who are working in these NGOs they make the whole community unsafe*”. The monitoring unit report of UNDSS Somalia (2013) has indentified some regions as not accessible due to Al shabab. “*we have lost very*

*many humanitarian workers and the problem NGO usually suspend their activities we suffer more*” male project manager said. It was clear that based on findings the community have lost some of their colleagues through brutal murder which had negative effect to project implementation. .

**Table 4.10 How the armed militia affect the food security implementation in Somalia**

	Frequency	Percent
Abducting and killing NGOs/humanitarian workers	16	40.0
Asking for protection tax from beneficiaries/NGOS	12	30.0
Dictating beneficiary targeting	4	10.0
Suspending NGOS operation-those not abiding their rules	8	20.0
Total	40	100.0

The study findings in table 4.10 indicates the following,

**Abducting and killing NGOs/humanitarian workers:** 40.0% (n=16) of the respondents indicated that armed militia affects the effective implementation of food security due to the problem of abduction and killings done by the militia men this was identified by focus group where FAO has lost many staff through abduction. *“sometimes they can abduct the foreign staff and ask for ransom, these militia usually target even locals beneficiaries and ask for tax which you have to abide otherwise one will be in trouble”* said one of a female data officer.

**Dictating beneficiary targeting:** 10.0% (n=4) of the respondents indicated that they dictate the beneficiary target of the food projects the FGD identified this as an issue since militia beneficiaries were not necessarily vulnerable group.

**Protection tax:** The findings also indicate that 30% (n=12) of the respondents indicated that militia men ask for protection tax from the beneficiaries this was seen in the discussion as one factor hindering beneficiaries participation in project due to fear of intimidation in case study in Kismayo and Mogadishu by Mercy corps (2012), protection tax was heavily used by militias to beneficiaries.

**Suspending NGOS operation:** While 20% (n=8) of the respondents indicated that they suspend the NGOs operation for those which do not abide by their rules some of the NGOs which suspended their activities included Medicine Frontiers this according to report from UNDSS (2013). Female monitoring officer, narrated how militia dictated the targeting of beneficiaries she said, *“sometimes militia give the NGO the list of beneficiaries to be supported and of course those are not needy people they are their friends”*

**Table 4.11 Policy measures put in place for effective food security projects**

	Frequency	Percent
Compromising and paying militia tax	7	17.5
Using elders to negotiate with militia	9	22.5
Using UN security protection	10	25.0
Withdrawal from militia zones	14	35.0
Total	40	100.0

The findings in table 4.11 indicate the following,

**Withdrawal from militia zones:** majority of the respondents (35%, n=14) do withdraw from the militia zones in order to ensure implementation of food security projects as a result militia conflict threat in Sanaag region. According to FSNAU (2013) cited the lack of response to the crisis in Sanaag is not only a result of the lack of policy and response systems, but reflects the complex political situation and Militia interference causing withdrawal by donors.

**Compromising and paying militia tax:** while 17.5% (n=7) indicates do compromise and pay taxes demanded by the militia groups in order to ensure food security projects are implemented this was mostly done by local NGOs as opposed to international agencies. *“most of NGOs especially the local pay the taxes since they have no option but international agencies and UN usually withdrawal their services once militia ask tax” said male project manager.* UN monitoring group (2011) identified at least 50% of local NGOs compromise and pay taxes to militia, however this was different from international agencies which prefer to withdraw.

**UN security protection:** 25% (n=10) use the UN security protection according to FGD this mostly applied to international agencies which limited their operations specific areas perceived safe this according to conflict and transformation report Colleta (2012). female project managers said, *“sometimes UN provided security but this comes with cost and its reserved to specific areas so most NGO do not depend on that protection so much but it’s a mandate to international staff”.* The discussion and findings concurred that the conflict has a lot of consequences.

**Table 4.12 Effect of armed militia to organization and society in terms of food security projects effectiveness**

	Frequency	Percent
Frequent death reported	17	42.5
Isolation and increase hunger	4	10.0
Lack of support and donor withdrawal	13	32.5
Lack of sustainability and incompleteness of food projects	6	15.0
Total	40	100.0


The study findings in table 4.12 indicate the effects of armed militia conflict in **Frequent death:** 42.5% (n=17) of the respondents indicated that they contribute to deaths that are frequently reported in the area this through abductions, kidnapping and brutal murder. According to FGD even local people who worked with agencies were also vulnerable. The literature review sighted abduction in Sanaag region as threat and security concern UNOCHA (2011). According to FGD project manager said *“the target is mostly foreign staff and lately even local staff who work in those NGOs are victims”*

**Isolation and increase hunger:** 10% (n=4) indicated that they contribute to isolation of some areas during the food security projects implementation resulting to hunger, this through lack regional support from neighboring countries hence lack of food donation and support. According to research carried by ODI (2012) communities of Sanaag has been isolated for over ten years unlike south central where there is many intervention programmes this has been caused by militia conflict. *“we have lost very many humanitarian workers and the problem NGO usually suspend their activities we suffer more”* said one of male data participant in focus discussion.

**Donor withdrawal:** while 32.5% (n=13) indicated that they lead to lack of support and donor withdrawal FGD sighted many agencies who were unable to operate due to insecurity of militia report by CCS (2012) said after Al - Shabab leaders threatened that NGOs might be attacked. As a result, Care, International Medical Corps and other NGOs working in Somalia were obliged to withdraw entirely because of such threats. “ *people will continue going hungry since militia usually make the NGO withdraw their services* ”said female monitoring officer.

**Lack of sustainability:** 15% (n=6) indicated that they contribute to lack of sustainability and incompleteness of food projects. According to FSNAU livelihood report (2013), Sanaag region was among most unstable in food sustainability. At FGD when asked the impact of militia to society and food security female information officer said; “*because of these conflict we lack consistence and our society become isolated, no one want to come to Somalia*” It was clear from the discussion and findings that militia has immense negative effect to community and food security project implementation.

#### 4.5 Effect of inter government conflict in implementation of food security projects



**Figure 4.5 a Does inter-government conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia**

The study findings in figure 4.5 indicate that majority of the respondents agreed that inter-government conflict affect the effective implementation of food security projects in Somalia accounting for 90% (n=36) of the respondents while 10% (n=4) indicated that it does not affect. *“when Somaliland government barn UN flight landing Hargeisa they impacted very negative foe two moths all work got paralysed”*said male monitoring officer.

**Table 4.13 Extent the inter-government conflict affected the program implementation**

	Frequency	Percent
Great	10	27.8
Moderate	19	52.8
Small	6	16.7
Very small	1	2.8
Total	36	100.0

In this question the researcher wanted the respondent highlight the extent intergovernmental conflict affect implementation, with the reference to UNDSS Somalia (2013) classification of risk, Great means very high significance, Moderate means high risk while small means low risk. The study findings in table 4.13 indicate that of those who indicated that inter-government conflict or policies affect food security implementation, 27.8% indicated that it greatly affect the food security implementation while 52.8% indicated that it moderately affect food security implementation while only 2.8% indicated that it affects food implementation to a very small extent. in the literature review a study conducted by OPM (2012) identified there was high taxation of good transiting in different

regions in Somalia making operation expansive. The focus group gave a scenario where UN flights has been suspended for two months from landing Hargeisa main air port due to political reasons, a male project manager said the following; -“*the government usually fail to support NGO since they feel like they are competing the donor funds*, a female information officer said “*Puntland government has very high taxes for commodities coming to Somaliland yet they are neighbors, this can discourage operations*”. This was clear indication from finding that government was acting as an obstacle rather than supporting operations.

**Table 4.14 Impact of government conflict in your area that can affect the effective implementation of food security projects**

	Frequency	Percent
Delay of implementation due to politics	9	25.0
Failure to enhance security	3	8.3
Forcing NGOs to implement projects of their choice	8	22.2
Introduction of many taxations at borders	10	27.8
Suspending NGOs which are not their choice	6	16.7
Total	36	100.0

In this research question the researched was expecting the respondent to highlight some impact of inter-government conflict. The study findings in table 4.14 indicate the following;

**Introduction of many taxations at borders:** 27.8% (n=10) of the respondents indicated that the inter-government conflicts results to introduction of many taxations along the borders of the various governments the FGD identified the high taxation at Puntland borders and airport. FAO (2010) some FAO funded NGO were

unable to implement due to taxation by governments. *“Puntland government has very high taxes for commodities coming to or from Somaliland yet they are neighbors, this can discourage operations”* said a male project manager

**Regional Politics:** 25% (n=9) indicated that it results to delay of implementation of food security projects due to politics involved Africa Peace Forum (2011) The Puntland regional administration claims Sool and Eastern Sanaag as part of Puntland on the grounds that people of Sool and Eastern Sanaag are akin to the Harti clan of Puntland. This affect most of operation at the ground. FGD said Political factors largely influence the implementation in Somalia. Somalia is currently divided into three political zones; the northeast, the northwest and south & central zones. Often implementing agencies are faced with difficulties if they choose one zone over the other from political bodies. Harvey (2012) this leads to slow projects implementation. Sometimes there is no political will from the existing government and this jeopardizes the exercise. *“ Puntland government in 2012 has rejected various projects sponsored by FAO due to same issues”* said one of FGD participant”” said male data officer.

**Failure to enhance security:** while only 8.3% (n=3) indicated that it results to failure to enhance security in the areas of food security implementation. In the FGD female information officer said *“when Somaliland and Puntland government fight over section in Sanaag region those agencies cannot continue with activities the government conflict gives militia and clan chance to expand their territory”*

Based on the findings and discussion it was clear the government hamper the operation of agencies involved in food security work.

**Table 4.15. Policy measures taken by your organization to ensure implementation of food security projects despite inter government conflict threat**

	Frequency	Percent
Capacity building to government officials	13	32.5
Involvement of government in project implementations	4	10.0
Lobbying for state support	17	42.5
Request of UN for state dialogue	6	15.0
Total	40	100.0

The researcher wanted to indentify from the respondent how their organization has developed mitigation measures. The study findings in table 4.15 indicate that, **Lobbying for state support:** according FGD and other respondents this was most applied strategy 42.5% (n=17) of the respondents do have their organisations lobby for state support to ensure implementation of food security projects. FGD sighted use of diplomatic channels to reach attention of presidents and ministers support. *“our managers and coordinators usually lobby through ministers for support but this come with a cost”* said a male project officer.

**Involvement of government:** while 10% (n=4) of the respondents indicated that their organisations do involve the government in the project implementation. WFP (2010) in their report illustrate how they used government for monitoring their activities in Sanaag, this helped to build good rapport. Two monitoring officer and project managers in FGD also identified FAO having used government monitors to enhance CBR operation female information officer said *“we involve the ministry official during our planning and implementation stages this saves us from this*

mess” in addition a male data officer said “we also assign the government to conduct monitoring and evaluation for our projects and pay them this improves our rapport”. The finding shows the importance of empowering government officials and lobbying for support.

**Table 4.16 Effect of inter-government political interferences to organization in terms of food security projects effectiveness**

	Frequency	Percent
High cost of implementation due to cumulative tax	6	15.0
Increased famine and food shortage	4	10.0
Lack of effective food policies	22	55.0
Poor security causing NGOs withdrawal	8	20.0
Total	40	100.0


The study findings in table 4.16 indicate the following

**Lack of effective food policies:** 55% (n=22) of the respondents indicated that inter-government political interferences have the effect of providing no effective food policies to their organization more so entire society in terms of food security projects effectiveness. “we don’t have food policies that guide our operation instead we deal with emergencies all the time” said a male project manager.

**Increased famine and food shortage:** while 10% (n=4) indicated that inter-government political interferences results to increased famine and food shortage to the entire society in terms of food security projects effectiveness.

**Poor security:** The study findings also indicate that 20% (n=8) of the respondents indicated that inter-government political interferences results to poor security and withdrawal of NGOs hence affect their organization more so entire society in terms of food security projects effectiveness this was also identified of literature reviewed on conflict and dialogue report by Gassim (2013). According to female project managers said the following concerning security, “ *the government conflict gives militia and clan chance to expand their territory the fact the government keep fighting the hunger and famine will still continue*” This a certain that government conflict has effect on food security.

**4.5b The prevalence of the three types of conflicts ( clan, Armed militia and inter-government) in the implementation of food security projects.**



**Figure 4.5b Prevalence of the three types of conflicts in the implementation of food security projects.**

The study findings in figure 4.5b indicate that majority of the respondents agreed that clan conflict is more prevalent and sufficiently affect the effective implementation of food security projects in Somalia accounting for 44% (n=18) of the respondents according to a male project manager during focus discussion he said “*clan and inter-government conflict are the major obstacle to project*

implementation, often clan and sub-clan kin, clash to acquire dominance in so doing it affect the area security” 29% (n=12) indicated that inter- government conflict has major effect in their operation “ Sanaag region is in context boarded between the two governments this makes things hard for us, here militia are not that prevalent like south” said a female data officer. 27% (n=11) indicated that Militia conflict is threat to implementation of food project in Sanaag. These result are confirmed by Conflict Analysis Regional Report Somaliland, (2013) states that despite the territorial dispute, there has been minimal militia violence in Sanaag since the war broke out in 1991. In fact, because of its peace and stability the region became a refuge for thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) seeking safety. On the other hand inter-government conflict was rated second this was supported by literature review, When FGD asked the same question male data officer said, “ the competition for control of scarce resources for instance water has led to intense disputes among clans and sub-clans.” according to UNOCHA (2012) Humanitarian access and security remained a huge challenge to the overall humanitarian effort in Sanaag due to the political dispute of administrative ownership of the region between Puntland and Somaliland.

**Table 4.17 Reasons that make that type of conflict impact greatly in projects**

	Frequency	Percent
Clan have greater influence at the ground	10	25.0
Clans are main employees and beneficiaries	8	20.0
Government Denial of visa/permits for projects approval	6	15.0
Government interference in beneficiary targeting	6	15.0
Militia create fear causing funding withdrawal	4	10.0
Militia restrict implementers mobility to some regions	6	15.0
Total	40	100.0

The researcher wanted to indentify from the respondent some of the reasons that make that type of conflict impact greatly in their projects. The study findings in figure 4.5b indicate the following;

**Clan have greater influence at the ground:** 25% (n=10) indicated that the clan has greater influence at the ground, this was supported by UN Monitoring group (2013) where FAO Somalia implementing partners (NGOs) has to use the community elders to indentify and monitor their activities. The FGD response complemented the result where one said “somali culture gives elders a lot of power and they have a lot of control to all activities in their communities therefore NGOs has to involve them always, sometimes they dictate the beneficiaries”

**Clans are main employees and beneficiaries:** 20% (n=8) indicated that NGOs has to depend on clan for employees and beneficiaries. According to UN guidelines at least 80% of employees are supposed to be local this leaves organization without option on avoiding clan conflict. FGD confirmed that a certain dominant clan can demand the NGO to hire their people only.

**Government Denial of visa/permits for projects approval:** 15% (n=6) indicated that government hamper the operation for making difficult in issuance of permits and visa. FGD narrated a situation where Hargeisa Airport has suspended all UN flights for two months due to political difference with other governments. “*this was a big setback since very little was being done at the ground since all international staff had to leave Somaliland during that period*” said female information officer. Another participant male data officer said “*process of acquiring visa in Somaliland is cumbersome for international staff this hamper operation*”

**Government interference in beneficiary targeting:** 15% (n=6) indicated that the government of Somaliland dictated the beneficiaries and type of project to be implemented. This was confirmed by Un Monitoring Group (2012) where FAO cash based intervention activities has to be suspended due to disagreement with government. -*“sometimes government dictated the activities and beneficiaries to NGOs.”*said male data officer.

**Militia create fear causing funding withdrawal:** 10% (n=4) indicated militia conflict has forced some agencies suspend their activities, this was supported by literature review, Chonghaile (2011) said Al-Shabaab has a history of blocking food aid delivery in areas it controls. In November 2011, al-Shabaab raided the Somali offices of UNICEF and the World Food Programme, forcing those programmes, as well as 14 others including the Red Cross, to suspend relief work in North west Somalia which is part of Sanaag. male project manager said “*Organizations that continued to provide aid sometimes are met with new, higher taxes forced levies of goods on aid shipments”.*

#### 4.6 Strategies to improve implementation of food security projects

**Table 4.18 Extent to which your organization involves the stakeholders in the planning of food security projects**

	Frequency	Percent
Great	11	27.5
Moderate	18	45.0
Small	10	25.0
Very small	1	2.5
Total	40	100.0

The researcher wanted the respond to tell the extent of stakeholders involments in their projects. The study findings in table 4.17 indicate the four levels Great which means stakeholders has a big say and very significant in decision making, moderate means partial involvement, small means very little involvement while very small mean non involvement of stakeholders.

**Moderate:** majority of the respondents (45%, n=18) do have their organisation moderately involve the stakeholders in planning of food security projects

**Small and Very small:** while 25% and 2.5% (n=1) respectively do his or her organisation involve the stakeholders to a very small extent in planning of food security projects.

**Great:** 27% said they greatly involve their stakeholders especially in plaaning Further discussion in focus group highlighted that mostly local NGO involves stakeholders that international agencies which decision are made in their head quarters. "Some agencies involved the beneficiaries in planning as matter of formality but final decision has already in the agency management board rooms" said one of the respondent.

**Table 4.19 Security policies or mitigation measure organization has developed to mitigate the threat to implementation of projects**

	Frequency	Percent
Change of attitude by Somalia/NGOs towards the underlying problem	6	15.0
Community inclusive participation and dialogue	6	15.0
Good leadership, training and empowerment	5	12.5
Improve donor and international reactions	3	7.5
Improve inter-governments collaborations	4	10.0
Improve on food policies /resilience strategies	10	25.0
Improve security for NGOs and entire community	6	15.0
Total	40	100.0

The findings in table 4.18 indicate the following;

**Resilience strategies:** majority of the respondents (25.0%, n=10) have improved on food policies and resilience strategies as a security policy or mitigation measure their organizations have developed to mitigate the threat to implementation of projects, however the FGD explained that improvement of resilient was as result of pressure from donor agency for instance UNOCHA and FAO which has insisted on resilient strategy as requirement before approval of funding to NGOs, CAP (2013)

**Improve donor and international reactions:** while 7.5% (n=3) have improved donor and international reaction as a security policies or mitigation measure their organizations have developed to mitigate the threat to implementation of projects.

**Community inclusive participation:** 15% of respondent admitted Community inclusive participation helps implementation. One of FGD participants made the following remarks on community participation and involvement “NGOs usually

*make their our plan secretly but community participation in all levels will improve delivery ”*

**Good leadership, training and empowerment:** 12% saw training and empowerment as a good strategy for improvement. FGD also explained that training and empowerment was as result of pressure from donor agency as requirement before approval of funding to NGOs, CAP (2013). The FGD male information officer said the following, *“people have negative attitude toward intervention programme but this has to change but good leadership can help and of course empowering our elders”* . It was clear from the finding it was important the government to improve security and initiate clan dialogue also participants found it its important NGOs and government relation to be harmonized instead of competing.

**Table 4.20 Extent to which organization has engaged the local community organizations NGOs/CBOs in implementation in Somalia**

	Frequency	Percent
Great	16	40.0
Moderate	10	25.0
Small	3	7.5
Very small	11	27.5
Total	40	100.0


The researcher wanted the respond to tell the extent of local organization involvement in their projects. These include veterinary organization, women groups, environment groups among others. The results in table 4.19 indicate four levels Great which means stakeholders has a big say and very significant in

decision making, moderate means partial involvement, small means very little involvement while very small mean non involvement of stakeholders.

**Great:** The results in table 4.19 indicate that most of the respondents (40.0%) have had their organizations to a great extent involve the community organizations in implementation of food security in Somalia. The FGD also saw this a way of having control to the grass root beneficiaries a male data officer said - “ *UN has guideline and require a certain percentage of decision and staff to be local again it leave the agency with other option than to use the local organization especially un accessible areas.*”

**Very small :** while only 27% (n=11) has had his or her organization involve the local community to a very small extent in implementation of food security in Somalia.

**Moderate:** 25% do have their organisation moderately involve the local organization in planning of food security projects. In UNOCHA (2012) review some remote areas in Sanaag region were not accessible due to presence of Al-shabab. Most of UN agencies uses local and community organization to implement in such places. According to FSNAU (2013). Monthly Food Security Report recommended that Grassroots organizations should be consulted and supported in their efforts to promote sustainable livelihoods. When FGD was asked the same question a female information officer said “*Local organization has more knowledge and skills on problems affecting community*” said one of participant during FGD. It was clear based on the findings engaging local organization is one way of dealing with community conflict resolution and sustainability of food security.



**Figure 4.6 Has your organization develop resilience strategy**

The results in figure 4.6 indicate that 60% (n=24) of the respondents have had their organisations not develop resilience strategy and training to help sustainability on food security a male information officer said ” *it’s unfortunate most organizations are still focused on emergency than long-term resilience plan by doing so we lack food security and sustainability*”. 40% (n=16) indicated that their organisations have developed resilience strategy and training to help sustainability on food security. Building and promoting sustainable livelihoods over the long term will reduce risk of acute food insecurity and should be the priority in addressing food security in Somalia this according to FSNAU (2013) Monthly Food Security Report recommendation. In the FGD when asked the same question male project managers said, “*some of these organization lack sustainability and fully depend on donor lack of resources, skills and manpower lead to this mess, we ever focus on emergency instead on resilience projects*”

Based on the finding it was clear that although most of the agencies does not have well designed resilience strategy most of participants felt it was important since donors has put a requirement of these plans in funds application so we have to improve but it’s a new thing.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter gives the summary of the study findings where the findings are compared with the findings of other relevant studies which were earlier carried, conclusions that were drawn by the researcher according to the findings of the study and the recommendations made by the researcher for the status improvement. The study further illustrates the recommendations that can be adopted by the relevant authority to ensure effectiveness on the food security implementation and areas for further research.

This study was undertaken to fill the research gap that exists by investigating the conflict in Somalia and its impacts on the implementation of food security projects in Sanaag region. The purpose of this study was to analyze the effect of conflict on the effective implementation of food security in Somalia. The study was carried out through descriptive research design. The data was analyzed using qualitative and quantitative techniques. Qualitative method involves content analysis and evaluation of text material. Data was collected through the use of questionnaires where the questions were structured in such a manner that all the objectives of the study were captured. The researcher used descriptive statistics where frequencies and percentage of responses were obtained. The data analyzed was presented in tables and charts for clear visualization.

## 5.2 Summary

1. On the effect of clan conflict on implementation of food security in Somalia. The study has established that clan conflict affect the implementation of food security projects in Somalia as have been reported by most of the respondents in the study. The respondents indicated that clan conflicts moderately affect the implementation of food security in Somalia. The study has established that clan conflict affect food security implementation through various ways ranging from sabotage of the food security implementation, delays in implementation of the food security, disruption of implementation of food security, poor or refusal in participation in the implementation of food security by the community and the NGOs and decline to access to food from opposing clan resulting to community disharmony, lack of sufficient food and withdrawals of implementing NGOs. The study established that clan conflict has made the organizations that work within Sanaag area come up with strategies to combat food insecurity. The strategies that have been determined by the study include, clan empowerment on food implementation, involvement of the clans in decision making and clan dialogues for the effective implementation of food security. Therefore clan conflicts have negative effect on the effective implementation of food security in Sanaag area which confirms the study conducted by Krotz (2009), who indicated that food aid is greatly affected by conflicts and disharmony amongst the food aid recipients.

2. On the effect of armed militia on implementation of food security, The study has established that armed militia conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia. This means that the Threat of Al-shabaab is greatly felt by the agencies that try to give food aids to the victims of conflict due to Al-shabaab. This is supported by the report of UNOCHA (Oct 2012) in which the report indicated that Al-Shabaab has greatly affected the distribution of food and supply of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. They effect as confirmed by the report was intimidation, abduction and killings of the people and the members of the agencies offering aids, demanding for protection tax from the beneficiaries and NGOs and they suspend the NGOs operation for those which do not abide by their rules. Despite the challenges of the armed militia, the study has established that organizations working in Sanaag area have put in place measures such as withdrawal from the militia zones in order to ensure implementation of food security projects, compromise and pay taxes demanded by the militia groups and use the UN security protection to ensure their success in food security implementation. This explains the continued stay of the NGOs in the area despite the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.
  
3. The study has established that inter-government conflict results to introduction of many taxations along the borders of the various governments, delay of implementation of food security projects due to politics involved, failure to enhance security in the areas of food security implementation and thereby greatly affecting effective food security

implementation. This point is stressed by the report of WFP (2013) that Getting food into Somalia and getting it to the people who desperately need it is proving extremely complicated as customs row has held up the first plane of an emergency UN airlift in Nairobi. The study has also established that individual organisations that provide food in Somalia face the consequences of inter-government conflicts and such effects include lack of effective food policies, increased famine and food shortage to the entire society in terms of food security projects effectiveness and poor security and withdrawal of NGOs hence affecting the organization more so entire society in terms of food security projects effectiveness.

4. The study established that some of the key strategies include Stakeholders involvement in the food security is implementation is crucial and most of the NGOs and the organisations in the Sanaag area involve the necessary stakeholders in the drafting of the policies ensuring the implementation of food security. The study findings indicate that the organisations have improved on food policies and resilience strategies as a security policy or mitigation measure their organizations have developed to mitigate the threat to implementation of projects as well as improved donor and international reaction as a security policies or mitigation measure their organizations have developed to mitigate the threat to implementation of projects.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

The researcher therefore based on these findings concludes the following;

1. Clan conflict moderately affect the implementation of food security projects in Somalia and the effects include ranging from sabotage of the food

security implementation, delays in implementation of the food security, disruption of implementation of food security, poor or refusal in participation in the implementation of food security by the community and the NGOs and decline to access to food from opposing clan.

2. Armed militia in Somalia greatly affects the food security implementation as they pose restrictions and demands to the agencies that provide humanitarian and food assistance to the people. The agencies that do not comply with their demands are usually suspended by the militia group as well as killed. This leads to increased inefficiency in the implementation of food security to eradicate the effect of food insecurity.
3. Inter-government conflicts significantly effective implementation of food security in Somalia as manifested by the study in which the study has established that the inter-government conflict leads introduction of many taxations along the borders of the various governments, delay of implementation of food security projects due to politics involved, failure to enhance security in the areas of food security implementation and thereby greatly affecting effective food security implementation. This delays the provision of the essential humanitarian services such as food to the victims of conflict in Somalia.
4. There have been significant strategies developed by the agencies and the NGOs involved in the implementation of food security in Somalia aimed at improving the provision and implementation of food security in Somalia. Such strategies the organisations have include improved food policies and resilience strategies as a security policy or mitigation measure their

organizations have developed to mitigate the threat to implementation of projects as well as improved donor and international reaction as a security policies or mitigation measure their organizations have developed to mitigate the threat to implementation of projects. This ensures the success of the implementation of food security.

## **5.4 Recommendations**

Based on the study findings, the researcher makes the following recommendations to the study:

### **5.4.1 Recommendations to the policy makers**

1. Promote peaceful coexistence of different governments and clans

The study recommends that there is need for the government of Somalia and the government of the neighbouring countries of Somalia such as Kenya to promote peaceful coexistence of different governments and clans through sensitization on the importance of peace such as development and self-reliance to promote the implementation of food security in Sanaag area and Somalia as a whole to eradicate hunger which has devastated the area since the 1990s.

2. Work on a formidable plan to eradicate the armed militia

The study recommends the governments of Somalia and regional countries such as Kenya to work on a formidable plan to eradicate the armed militia (Al-shabaab) through a well coordinated military action to promote peace and eradicate unnecessary demands put in place by the militia group in order to enhance the implementation of the food security in the area.

3. UN agencies and other implementing agencies to scale up resilience projects and involvement of the community in solving their problems

The study recommends UN agencies and other NGOs to scale up resilience projects that provide food to the conflict victims in Sanaag and improve on their coordination and put in place clear policies that ensure smooth provision and clearance of food and other humanitarian aids to the victims to avoid delays. The study recommends that the NGOs and the stakeholders in the provision and implementation of food security should work hand in hand through a well coordinated unit of decision making organ and the involvement of the community in solving their problems to facilitate food provision and the implementation of food security.

#### **5.4.2 Recommendations for further research**

The study recommends that there should be a study to determine the effect of current global food crisis which is causing shortages on the economy of Somalia and give recommendations on how it can be improved.

The study recommends that there should be a study done to determine the effect of available food policies on the implementation of food security in Somalia.

## REFERENCE

- Abdi, A.A. (1998). *Education in Somalia: history, destruction, and calls for reconstruction. Comparative*
- Abild, E. (2009). *Creating Humanitarian Space: a case study of Somalia*. Research Paper No.184. UNHCR: online publication.
- Adams, L. and Harvey P. (2006) *Learning from cash responses to the tsunami*: London: O.D.I
- Adams, L. and Harvey P. (2006) *Learning from cash responses to the tsunami*: Issue Paper 2 ODI Humanitarian Policy Group, London: Overseas Development Institute
- Adams, L. and P. Harvey (2005) *Learning from cash responses to the tsunami*: Issue Paper 3 ODI Humanitarian Policy Group, London: Overseas Development Institute
- Andrew J (2006) *cash transfer programming in urban emergencies a toolkit for practitioners*, Overseas Development Institute.
- Alinovi L, Hemrich G, Russo L . *Food Security in Protracted Crises Evidence from Sudan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo*; Practical Action, London 2008
- Babbie, E.R., (1998). *Survey Research methods*. 2nd edition. Belmont, California: Wadsworth publishing Company.
- Brewin, M. (2010) *Evaluation of Cash Component of German Agro-Action Project: Mitigation of Drought Impact Through WASH and Cash for Work in Highly Affected ASAL Areas of Eastern Kenya*. German Agro-Action and USAID.
- Corden, A. and Sainsbury, R. (2005b) *Research Participants' Views on Use of Verbatim Quotations*, available at <http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/spru/pubs/sstrels.html>.
- Corden, A. and Sainsbury, R. (2005c) *The Impact of Verbatim Quotations on Research Users: Qualitative exploration*, York: Social Policy Research Unit, University of York.
- Corden, A. and Sainsbury, R. (forthcoming) *Using Verbatim Quotations in Publications Reporting Findings from Qualitative Social Research: A study of recent texts*, York: Social Policy Research Unit, University of York.
- Degan A. et al, (2010) *Network Paper Cash relief in a contested area Lessons from Somalia*. Somalia consortium. Nairobi
- Greenhalgh, T. and Taylor, R. (1997) 'How to read a paper: papers that go beyond numbers (Qualitative Research)', British Medical Journal.

- Guluma, Y. (2009) *Cash for work projects: a case study in the North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo*. Goma: Save the Children (UK).
- Guluma, Y. (2003) *Update of the Household Economy Analysis of the Rural Population of the Plateaux zone, Masisi, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo*. Goma: Save the Children (UK).
- Guluma, Y. (2004). *Studies on alternatives to food aid – case study DRC: cash for work projects*, save the Children UK
- Guluma, Y. (2009) *Evaluation of the Cash Consortium in Southern Somalia*; FAO
- FAO WFP (2010) *State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010: addressing food insecurity in Protracted Crisis*, Rome,
- Frize, J. (2002) *Review of Cash for Work Component of the Drought Recovery Turkana and Wajir Districts*. Kenya
- Harvey P. (2007) *Cash-based response in Emergencies*, ODI Humanitarian Policy Group, London: Overseas Development Institute
- Harvey P. K. Haver, J. Hoffman and B. Murphy (2010) *Delivering Money: Cash Transfer Mechanisms in Emergencies*. Save the Children UK
- Hanna M. and Cate O. (2009) *Cash-based interventions: lessons from southern Somalia*, Save the Children UK
- Horn relief (2011) *Guidelines for Cash Interventions in Somalia*. Somalia consortium. Nairobi
- Human development network (2011) *Evaluating the Liberia Cash for Work Program*: Overseas Development Institute
- International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (2007) *Guidelines for cash transfer programming*. Overseas Development Institute
- Khogali, H. & Takhar, P (2001). *Evaluation of Oxfam GB Cash for Work Programme*, Kitgum/Pader District, Uganda,
- Kerzner H. (2001) *project management: System approach to planning, scheduling and controlling* 7<sup>th</sup> ED. John Willy and sons Inc
- Kothari, C.R (2008) *Research methodology*
- Lothike, E. (2005) *Cash for Work in Emergencies: Turkana Kenya*.
- Long, A. F. and Godfrey, M. (2004) 'An evaluation tool to assess the quality of qualitative research studies', *Int. J. Social Research Methodology*
- Mark E. (2010)). *Liberia Cash for Work Temporary Employment Project: A Qualitative Assessment*. Liberia
- Mercy Corps (2005) *Cash for Work Program in Post-Tsunami: Aceh Indonesia*
- Mercy Corps (2010) *Cash for Work guidance*. Unpublished draft.

Mercy Corps (2005). *Internal program documents and discussions among Aceh Cash for Work Program* : Indonesia

Mugenda, O. and Mugenda A. (2003) *research methods*. Act Press. Nairobi

Pernal J. (1995) *Cash-for-Work and Food Insecurity in Koisha, Southern Ethiopia*

Rauch, E. and H. Scheuer (2007) *SDC Cash Workbook: A practical user's guide for the preparation and implementation of Cash Projects*. Bern: Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation

Red Cross (2005) *Cash for Work-Workbook Guidelines for Cash for Work (CFW) Projects*. Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation

Ritchie, J., Spencer, L. and O'Connor, W. (2003) '*Carrying out qualitative analysis*', *Qualitative Research Practice*, London:

Spencer, L., Ritchie, J., Lewis, J. and Dillon, L. (2003) *Quality in Qualitative Evaluation: A framework for assessing research evidence*, London

USAID & Mercy Corps Southern (2009) *Somalia Livelihoods Recovery Program*. Briefing Sheet February 2011.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2010a). Briefing Sheet February 2010.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA 2012). *Cluster 2006 - Appeal for Improving Humanitarian Response Capacity*.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2010). *Somalia Humanitarian Overview*. 3 (2).

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2010). *Somalia. Consolidated Appeal 2010*.

United Nations Security Council (1992). *Resolutions 1 S/RES/794* United Nations Security Council (2010). *S/2010/91. Monitoring Group for Somalia*.

World Bank (2005). *Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics*.

World Bank (2009). *Governance Matters 2009. Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2008*.

World Food Programme (WFP,2008). *World Food Programme Strategic Plan 2008-2011*.

## APPENDICES

### A1: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

David Thiongo Mugo

P.O Box 11158-00400

Nairobi

Dear respondent

Re: Collection of survey data

I am a postgraduate student at the Kenyatta University, school of distance and continuous education. In order to fulfil the degree requirement, I am undertaking a research project on the factors that influence effective implementation of cash for work projects in Sanaag Region in Somalia. You have been selected to form part of this study. This is kindly to request you assist me collect the data by filling out the accompanying questionnaires, which I will collect from your premises.

The information you provide will be used exclusively for academic purposes. My supervisor and I assure you that the information will be treated with strict confidentiality. Your name in my report, a copy of this final paper will be availed to you upon request.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation

Yours faithfully

David Mugo

MA Public policy and administration Student

Kenyatta University



**Part B: Clan conflict factors**

1. Does Clan conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia?
2. To what extent has this clan conflict affected the program implementation.

Not at all  Little extent  Moderate  Great Extent   
Greater Extent

3. Please name a few impact of clan conflict in your area that can affect the effective implementation of food security projects.

.....  
.....

What are some of the policy measures taken by your organization to ensure implementation of food security projects despite clan conflict threat in Sanaag region?

.....  
.....

4. How do clan conflict factors affect your organization more so entire society in terms of food security projects effectiveness?

.....  
.....

**Part C: Armed Militia factors**

1. Does armed militia conflict affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia?
2. To what extent has this armed militia conflict affected the program implementation.

Not at all  Little extent  Moderate  Great Extent   
Greater Extent

3. Please name a few impact of armed militia conflict in your area that can affect the effective implementation of food security projects.

.....  
.....

4. What are some of the policy measures taken by your organization to ensure implementation of food security projects despite militia conflict threat in Sanaag region?

.....  
.....

5. How do armed militia affect of your organization more so entire society in terms of food security projects effectiveness?

.....  
.....

**Part D: Inter- Government Conflict factors**

1. Does inter-government conflict/policies affect the effective implementation of food security project in Somalia?

2. To what extent has this inter-goverenment conflict affected the program implementation.

Not at all  Little extent  Moderate  Great Extent   
Greater Extent

3. Please name a few impact of government conflict/policies in your area that can affect the effective implementation of food security projects.

4. What are some of the policy measures taken by your organization to ensure implementation of food security projects despite inter government conflict threat in Sanaag region?

.....  
.....

5. How do inter-government political interferences affect your organization more so entire society in terms of food security projects effectiveness?

.....  
.....

6. Among the three types of conflicts ( clan, Armed militia and inter-government) which is more prevalent or have high magnitude in your projects?

7. What are reasons that make that type of conflict impact greatly in your projects?

**Part E: Strategies to improve Implementation**

1. To what extent do your organization involves the involve the stakeholders in the planning of food security projects?

Not at all  Little extent  Moderate  Great Extent   
Greater Extent

1. What are the security policies or mitigation measure your organization has developed to mitigate the threat to implementation of projects?

.....  
.....  
.....

To what extent has your organization engaged the local community organizations NGOs/CBOs in implementation here at Somalia?


Not at all  Little extent  Moderate  Great Extent   
Greater Extent

2. Resilience strategy and training help sustainability, has your organization developed one on food security?

Yes  No


**Thank you for your participation**

### A3: ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF SOMALIA




Source: Swalim & Protection Cluster June 2013

# A4: SOMALIA SECURITY RISK MAP



Source: United Nation Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) Somalia June 2013

**A5: NORTH WEST SOMALIA LIVELIHOOD ZONES MAP**



Source: FSNAU Livelihood Zones July 2013

**KENYATTA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY**  
CITY CAMPUS