

**MANAGEMENT OF POSTCOLONIAL INTRASTATE
CONFLICTS IN UGANDA: A CASE OF NORTHERN UGANDA**



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DECLARATION


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DEDICATION

To my wife Anne and our children: Oliver, Emmanuel, Ruth and Glorious

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I would like to register my gratitude to the Almighty God for the life and good health He gave me during the research period.

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May the good Lord bless you abundantly!

ACRONYMS

FGD-AD:	Focus Group Discussion-Adjumani
FGD-AM:	Focus Group Discussion-Amuru
FGD-AMO:	Focus Group Discussion-Amolatar
FGD-AP:	Focus Group Discussion-Apac
FGD-G:	Focus Group Discussion-Gulu
FGD-K:	Focus Group Discussion-Kitgum
FGD-LI:	Focus Group Discussion-Lira
FGD-N:	Focus Group Discussion-Nwoya
FGD-OY:	Focus Group Discussion-Oyam
FGD-P:	Focus Group Discussion-Pader
HRW:	Human Rights Watch
HURIPPEC:	Human Rights and Peace Centre
ICG:	International Crisis Group
LC I:	Local Council One
LC II:	Local Council Two
LC III:	Local Council Three
LC V:	Local Council Five
LIGS:	Liu Institute for Global Studies
n. d.	No date
O.I	Oral Interview

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Showing examples of Military Coup d'états in Africa since the 1950s	7
Table 3.1 Showing Population of the Study.....	119
Table 3.2 Showing Districts.....	121
Table 4.1 Showing examples of Clans in Conflict Over Land.....	163
Table 4.2 Showing Causes of Political Conflicts in Northern Uganda.....	169
Table 4.3 Showing Causes of Inter-intra Clan Land Conflicts.....	177
Table 4.4 Showing Causes of Land Conflicts.....	178
Table 4.5 Showing Causes of Land Conflicts between Tribes.....	179
Table 4.6 Showing Effects of Conflicts on the State.....	189
Table 4.7 Showing Effects of Conflicts on Local People.....	192
Table 5.1 Showing Modern Mechanisms Used for Managing Conflicts in Northern Uganda.....	203
Table 5.2 Showing backlog of Land Cases in Gulu Magistrate's Court.....	221
Table 5.3 Showing Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Management Used in Northern Uganda.....	231

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Maps of Uganda showing some of the Postcolonial Conflict Hotspot Areas.....	20
Figure 2.1 Lederach's Peace-building Model.....	109
Figure 3.1 Map of Uganda Showing Area of Research.....	118

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Conflict(s). The word conflict is derived from a Latin word “*confligere*”- which literally means to strike together (Odongo, 2008, p. 5). While Nicholson (1992, p. 11) sees conflict as mutually inconsistent acts, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2000, p. 139) say conflict is a conscious opposition between human groups in pursuit of what are or what appears to be incompatible goals. According to Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (2005, p. 17), and Hoenscheid-Gross (2004, p. 16) conflict is the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups. In this thesis conflict is seen as a situation in which two or more people or groups are opposed to each other due to the incompatibility of goals that they pursue. This, therefore, means that for any conflict to arise there must be individuals, issues, and incompatibility of goals to be achieved.

Conflictants is a term devised in Peace Studies to refer to parties in a conflict. In this thesis the term conflictants is used to refer to people or groups in conflict with each other.

Intrastate Conflict(s) are conflicts that are of a Post-Cold War nature. Mary Kaldor (2008, p.1) described these Post Cold War conflicts as “new wars”, intrastate wars or, what Barbara Kempa (2007, p. 6) says could be referred to- in the scientific literature- as “civil wars”, or “ethno-political conflict”. In light of its internal nature, the 2007 Uppsala Conflict Database defines intrastate conflict as “a conflict that is expressed between a government and a non- government party, with no interference from other countries” (Hofsvang, 2008, p. 6). Much as this definition of the Uppsala Conflict Data Base 2007 is reflective of intrastate conflicts, in this thesis, we shall take intrastate conflict to mean the conflict within a state not only between government forces and rebel groups but also to include social conflicts that exist between different social groups within a country.

Modern Conflict Resolution Mechanism(s) are those mechanisms directed by State for resolving conflicts. In most cases this form of conflict resolution follows the top bottom processes of handling conflicts. Therefore, in this thesis, modern conflict resolution mechanisms are the currently existing non-traditional practices of conflict

resolution mechanisms in Uganda. They are conflict resolution mechanisms that are alien to the traditions of the beneficiaries. This is because they were initiated and designed without the input of communities in which peace is intended to be built (Kibwanga, 2009, p. 18).

Peace-building from below are grassroots or local community efforts directed toward addressing conflicts at local levels. It is empowering people at all levels in conflict affected communities to build an effective and sustainable peace

Postcolonial theorists are not agreed as to what constitute post colony. This disagreement is partially based on the question, whose colonialism? (Child, and Williams, 1997, pp. 1-2). While Ann McClintock regard the post colony to include the end of all territorial aggressions ever undertaken in human history (Child, & Williams, 1997, p. 2), Bill Ascroft, Gereth Griffiths and Hellen Tiffin (1998, p. 2) uses the term post colony to cover all the cultures affected by the imperial processes from the moment of colonialism to date. However, whichever way the description takes, in this thesis the term post colony is used to mean the period starting after 9th October 1962 when Uganda attained independence from Britain to the present.

Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanism(s) are indigenous or endogenous conflict management and conflict resolution mechanisms that use local actors, and traditional community-based judicial, and legal decision-making mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts within or between communities. Although this mechanism can be initiated at the top level, most people describe it as a bottom up process; where issues of conflicts are addressed at the grassroots. In most cases, this process is open, inclusive, cheap and the decisions taken are binding since it is done in the 'we' context. In this thesis, therefore, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are taken to be those communally grown conflict resolution approaches; directed towards building durable and peaceful relationships within communities and among individuals. These are mechanisms geared towards restorative justice where reconciliation and forgiveness are considered as paramount for peaceful co-existence.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
ACRONYMS	v
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	vi
DEFINITION OF TERMS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
ABSTRACT	xiv
CHAPTER 1	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Background of the Study	1
1.3 Statement of the Problem	24
1.4 Premise of the Study	24
1.5 Objectives of the study	25
1.6 Research Questions	25
1.7 Justification and Significance	26
1.8 Scope and Limitations	27
CHAPTER 2	30
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	30
2.1 Introduction	30
2.2 Review of Related Literature	30
2.2.1 The Nature and Manifestation of Intrastate Conflicts in Postcolonial Uganda	30
a) Ethnicity	33

b) Religious Conflicts.....	39
c) Resource Conflicts	42
d) Regionalism	44
e) Power struggle: Governance, Legitimacy and Security	47
2.2.2 The Causes of Postcolonial Conflicts in Uganda.....	49
2.2.2.1 Bakonzo and Bamba versus Batoro Conflict.....	49
2.2.2.2 The Bahima and Bairu Conflict in Ankole	53
2.2.2.3 Bagisu and Bakedi Conflict	55
2.2.2.4 The 1966 Constitutional Crisis	56
2.2.3 The Effects of the Postcolonial Conflicts in Uganda on the State and Social Cohesion of the People	74
2.2.4 The Attempts Made to Manage the Postcolonial Conflicts in Uganda: their Successes and Failures	78
2.2.4.1 Modern Methods of Conflict Management and how they have been used to address the general Conflict Situation in Uganda	79
a Commissions.....	79
b. Conflict Management by Military means	87
c. Conflict Management by Peace Talks/Negotiations.....	89
d. Conflict Management by Religious Means	91
e. Conflict Management by Legal means	94
2.2.4.2 Traditional Conflict Management Mechanisms which were Used to stabilise Uganda	96
a) Conflict Management through Fights.....	96
b)Conflict Management through use of Elders and Community Members	98
c) Conflict Management Efforts by Women.....	100
d. Conflict Management through Use of Traditional Rituals.....	103

2.3 Theoretical Framework: Peacebuilding from Below	104
CHAPTER 3.....	113
METHODOLOGY.....	113
3.1 Introduction	113
3.2 Research Design.....	113
3.3 Variables/Categories of Analysis.....	116
3.4 Area of the Study.....	118
3.5 Study Population	119
3.6 Sampling Techniques and Sample size.....	120
3.7 Research Instruments	122
3.8 Validity and Reliability	124
3.8.1 Validity	124
3.8.2 Reliability	126
3.9 Data Collection.....	128
3.9.1 Focus Group Discussion	128
3.9.2 Interviews	129
3.9.3 Observation.....	130
3.9.4 Document review.....	131
3.10 Data Analysis.....	132
3.11 Data Management and Ethical Considerations.....	135
CHAPTER 4.....	138
THE POST-COLONIAL INTRA AND INTER ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA.....	138
4.1 Introduction.....	138
4.2 The Nature and Manifestation of Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda ...	138
4.2.1 The Nature of Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda	150
Ethno-Political Conflicts: Power Struggle and Legitimacy	150

4.2.2 The Manifestation of Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda	168
4.3 Causes of the Postcolonial Conflicts between the Acholi, Lango, and Madi	168
a) Causes of the Ethno-political Conflicts in Northern Uganda	168
b) Causes of the Religious Conflicts in Northern Uganda	172
c) Causes of the Resource based Conflicts in Northern Uganda	176
4.4 The effects of the Conflicts in Northern Uganda on the State and Social Cohesion.....	188
4.4.1 Effect of the Conflict on the State	188
CHAPTER 5.....	202
THE ATTEMPTS MADE TO MANAGE THE CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN	
UGANDA: THEIR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES	202
5.1 Introduction.....	202
5.2 Modern Methods used to handle the Inter-Intra Ethnic Conflict in Northern Uganda	202
a. Conflict Management through use of Commissions.....	203
b. Conflict Management through use of the Military	206
c. Conflict Management through Negotiated Settlements.....	207
d. Conflict Management through use of Socio-Economic means	209
e. Conflict Management through use of Legal Attempts.....	218
f. Conflict Management through modern Religious means.....	223
g. Conflict Management by Civil Society Organisations and NGOs	228
h. Conflict Management by other means.....	230
5.3 Traditional Conflict Management Mechanisms Used to Address the Inter and Intra-Ethnic	
Conflicts in Northern Uganda: Their Success and Failures	231
a. <i>Conflict Management</i> through Fights	232
b. <i>Conflict Management through</i> Use of Elders and the Local Community	234
c. <i>Conflict Management through use of Women</i>	240
d. <i>Conflict Management</i> through use of Traditional Rituals	246
5.4 How Peacebuilding from Below was Used to Manage the Intra and Inter Ethnic Conflicts	
in Northern Uganda.....	256
CHAPTER 6.....	262
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	262
6.1 Introduction.....	262
6.2 Summary	262
6.2.1 The Nature and Manifestation of Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda	262
6.2.2 Causes of the Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda	263

6.2.3 The Effects of the Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda on the State and Social Cohesion of the Local People.....	267
6.2.4 The Attempts Made to Resolve the Conflicts in Northern Uganda: their Successes and Failures	268
6.3 Conclusion.....	274
6.4 General Recommendations.....	276
6.5 Recommendation for Further Research.....	278
REFERENCES.....	279
APPENDIXES	301
A1: List of Key Informants Interviewed	301
A2: Focus Group Discussion summary sheet.....	303
A3: Focus Group Discussion/Interview Guide.....	305
A4: Observation Protocol	306
A5: Literature Review Checklist.....	308

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses how the various postcolonial intrastate conflicts in Uganda and the Northern region in particular have been managed. In pursuit of this the nature, manifestation, causes, and effects of the postcolonial intrastate conflicts on the state and social cohesion of the local people were specifically teased out. The successes and failures of the mechanisms used for managing the conflicts were analysed with the intent to assess the efficacy of peacebuilding from below in managing ethno-social conflicts in Northern Uganda. The researcher used qualitative design. The data for the study was collected by the use of interviews, focus group discussion, observation and literature analysis. Through using the phenomenological and descriptive approach of data analysis, the study established that apart from the first two years of independence, Uganda has gone through different sorts of conflicts. At different points and geographical spaces, the triggers and drivers of Uganda's postcolonial intrastate conflicts have been ethnicity, religion, natural resources, regionalism, and the struggle for power thus leading to a deep seated division between Ugandans at the national level. The degeneration of some of these conflicts at local levels in Northern Uganda worked negatively to set the local people against each other. As such, wanton destruction of lives and properties, wastage of national resources, and mistrust became characteristic at local levels. Consequently, it led to retardation of development, dehumanisation, the expression of revenge attitude and destruction of social cohesion amongst local communities in Northern Uganda. Of the many attempts made to address the different conflicts in Uganda and Northern Uganda in particular, the efforts of the local people within the conflict area was found to be very instrumental in addressing issues of conflicts at local levels. This is because such people understand the local context of the conflict well thus making them address such it contextually. To help promote the efforts of the local community in managing conflicts at local levels, there is need for respect of established traditions, respect for elders, empowerment of the local peace teams and sincerity in such processes, to mention but a few.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This chapter gives a brief description of the postcolonial state within which the conflicts in Uganda was located. It also includes the research problem, objectives of the study, research questions, justification and significance of the study, scope and the limitations of the study.

1.2 Background of the Study

With the advent of independence in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, euphoria and hopes swept across the continent as one nation after another attained self-government. This excitement was candidly captured by Ramsay (1999) who notes;

The times were electric. In country after country, the flags of Great Britain, Belgium, France were replaced by the banners of new states, whose leaders offered idealistic promises to remark the continent and thus the world. Hopes were high, and the most ambitious of goals seemed obtainable. Even non-Africans spoke of the resource rich continent as being on the verge of development take off. (p. 3)

Indeed, so electric was this event to the masses in African that celebrations ran across the continent. Those who witnessed the unfolding of independence to this day still remember the events with nostalgia. The major driving force, and indeed a great source of inspiration for African nationalists was the astonishing success of the anti-colonialist crusade in India championed by Mahatma Gandhi. The struggle that Gandhi led made India to attain political independence in 1947 (Mazrui, and Tidy, 1986, pp. 16-18).

The attainment of independence, to most Africans, ended a period of great suffering, a period, as Es'kia Mphahlele described was characterised by the black man "...enters the white man's house through the backdoor.... does most of the dirty work.....cleans the street but mustn't walk freely on the pavement...build houses for the white man but he can not live in them...cooks the white man's food but eats what is left over" (2005, pp. 6-7).

Although Mphahlele's context of writing was of Apartheid in South Africa, most African countries that were colonised by European powers went through related experiences. To most Africans gaining political independence was the end of slavery, human degradation and exploitation. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana in particular was obsessed with this notion and became an ardent symbol of African freedom. According to Nkrumah, what happened during the colonial rule was a sad chapter in African history. He called Africans to prepare to bury the past with its unpleasant memories and look to the future (Nkrumah, 1961, pp. xi-xiv).

In a bid to free the African continent from colonialism, some of the leaders of the independent African states felt it was useless to celebrate their political independence when other parts of Africa were not liberated. This made the project of liberating African states to become imperative. To this end, during his maiden speech on the Independence Day of Ghana on 5th March 1957, Nkrumah asserted "We are going to rededicate ourselves in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa; for our independence is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the African continent". (British Broadcasting Cooperation [BBC] World Service, 14, Sept. 2000)

The passionate expression of the need for African leaders to resolve and dedicate themselves to the liberation of other African countries contained in the

speech of Nkrumah catalysed the zeal to liberating other African states that were under colonial rule. Indeed, in response to this, six years later in 1963, African leaders like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Apollo Milton Obote of Uganda, Modibo Keita of Mali, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Ben Bella of Algeria, Emperor Heile Selasse of Ethiopia, William Turban of Liberia, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria and others joined hands with Nkrumah to establish the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Katjavivi, 2013, p. 1). Basing on the principles of eradicating “all forms of colonialism from Africa” (OAU Charter, Article II d), the struggle for independence of other African countries was taken a notion higher. Some of the Pan Africanists like William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Edward Blyden and George Padmore (Ogba and Okpanachi, 2014, pp. 14-20) played a great role to shape the vision of these leaders.

On attaining political independence, leaders of most African countries saw the need for Africanisation of civil administration. Through this, many qualified Africans took over senior civil service posts that were previously preserved for Europeans (Wangome, 1985, p. 1). However, before most of these newly independent African states could consolidate their independence, the excitement and dream that gripped the nationals of most of the African countries were shaken as the euphoria started to die, it became clear that the state left by the colonialists started to grapple with myriads of issues.

However, before we can blame it all on these leaders, it is important to take a brief stock of the state these leaders inherited culturally, economically, politically and socially.

Culturally, says George Klay Kieh Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese (2004),

The colonial and imperialist power fashioned and handed to the first generation African leaders a state that was divided with various primordial antagonisms, this antagonism were politicized and manipulated during the colonial period. For example, the various colonial powers 'favoured' one ethnic group over the others, is a clear strategy of undermining the solidarity that was existent for struggling against the vagaries of colonialism and imperialism. In fact, in some instances, the colonial powers anointed one ethnic group as superior to the others. (p. 2)

Although to a greater extent the above assertion is true, this thesis argues that the way the African states were handed to the first generation African leaders could not have been a challenge if these leaders cared to dismantle such colonial vestiges and created a new and inclusive system where everybody felt a belonging. Unfortunately they did not do so.

Economically, few years after independence, some African statesmen found themselves trapped because they did not have the funds to run the affairs of their countries. Unlike the other East African countries, Uganda was able to take off very well and pay the cost of administration during the last quota of colonial rule through to the immediate post-colonial period (Tanga- Odoi, 2008, p. 10). However, with time Uganda also followed suit. In spite of the huge reserve of natural resources African countries are endowed with, they could not use these resources to bail themselves out of the trap because of the low market prices. These states did not have the means of processing these abundant resources into finished products, they failed to receive good value for their primary products. Most post-colonial African leaders failed to have the financial muscle to address domestic and social issues. In a bid to bail their states out of the financial crisis, the leaders resorted to borrowing money

from private European or American Banks and financial institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The danger this presented were the conditions they came with and the huge interest they attracted. This means that a lot of resources were committed to pay back these loans instead of addressing the welfare of local people.

In some African States the ruling class and their governments did not care to provide the required leadership to help their countries wade through the mucky waters. On the contrary, the leaders who had access to resources lived in plenty whereas the masses had nothing. As such, in most of these countries, adequate food, medical care, housing and access to clean water was next to luxury.

Politically, the post-colonial state in Africa became a reinvention of the colonial administration it preceded. The character and functionality of the colonial leadership continued right into the post-colonial government. For example although independent, most of the post-colonial governments in one way or the other, were appendages of their former colonial powers. Some of the leaders continued to depend on policies and decisions made by their former colonial powers. Definitely, one cannot design policies against status quo. Consequently, such patron-client relationship impacted negatively on the majority poor. They continued to suffering at the expense of the few elite who had access to resources. Unemployment, biting poverty, lack of access to health care and clean water, illiteracy, and shortage of food for the masses continued in some of the sates. This made, 'the custodian regimes, by and large, to lacked legitimacy' (Kieh and Agbese, 2004, p.4), thus making them to ceased to enjoy the support of the majority of their country's populace. In the circumstance, most of the post-colonial leaders became irrelevant to the needs and aspirations of the masses in their countries.

To make matters worse, some of these States became repressive, and started to use the instrument of violence in their possession to coerce the masses to bow to them. The press, opposition politicians and civil society organizations became a target. In other words, whoever had a descending voice from the establishment was persecuted.

Socially, the tension these caused made life even harder. Instead of living at peace with each other, people started blaming one another. Whereas the masses blamed the statesmen for economic plunder, nepotism, over clinging to power and other related ills, the statesmen in turn also blamed the masses for sabotaging. In the midst of this burgeoning crisis, the military stepped in, purportedly, to salvage the situation.

Starting in the early 1960s, the military started to wrestle out power from the hands of civilians and became governors of the African states. The military justified their intervention in politics as a 'messianic' mission designated to save the affected countries from the abyss of civilian incompetence (Heih and Agbese, 2004, p. 5). In other words, as Abese and Ihonvebere (2000) note, 'military intervention in African politics in the 1960 and 1970s was rationalized by the soldiers as a patriotic and selfless exercise to rid the continent of corrupt, incompetent and decedent politicians' (p. 5). This situation got worse in the mid-1960s as one country after another got herself in coup d'état, as seen in table 1.1 below

Table 1.1 Showing Examples of Military Coups d'état in Africa Since the 1950s

Country	Year	Description of coup d'etat
Congo-Kinshasa	1960	General Mobutu seizes power temporarily.
Togo	January 1963	Coup deposes President Olympio, who gets killed in the process.
Congo-Brazzaville	August 1963	Government of Abbe'Youlou overthrown.
Dahomey	Dec 1963	Colonel Sogho overthrows President Maga
	December	A second coup is staged.
Gabon,	Feb 1964	Coup d'etat occurs but is reverted by French forces.
Algeria	June 1965	Colonel Boumedienne overthrows President Ben Bella.
	Dec 1967	A second coup attempt is made.
Burundi	October 1965	The monarchy is overthrown by Army officers
	Nov 1966	Captain Micombero takes over in another coup
CAR,	January 1966	President David Dacko is ousted by Colonel Jean Bokassa.
Borkina Fasso (Upper Volta)	January 1966	Colonel Lamizana deposes President Yamego.
Nigeria	January 1966	General Ironsi is installed after a coup led by young officers.
	July 1966	General Gowon overthrows General Ironsi.
Ghana	February 1966	President Kwame Nkruma is over-thrown by the military led by General Ankrah
		Captain J Rowlings overthrew General Ankrah
Sierra Leone	March 1967	President Margai deposed by Lieutenant Colonel Juxon-Smith
	April 1968	A coup from the ranks over-throws Lieutenant Colonel Juxon-Smith. Civilian government re-installed under President Siaka Stevens
	April 1992	What started as protest for poor pay by the army ended up into a military overthrow of Joseph Momoh and the installation the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) headed by a 25 year old Captain Valentine Stessor
	25 May 1997	The government of President Kabbah and several agencies were forced to flee to Guinea. The junta, which called itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the leadership of a Major Johnny Paul Koroma (who was awaiting trial for an alleged coup attempt), invited the RUF rebels to help them administer the country.
	Feb 1998	ECOMOG troops, together with the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and loyal soldiers and police officers, successfully drove the AFRC junta out of Freetown. President Kabbah's government was restored a month later. The rebels retreated to the countryside where they continued to wreak havoc
Mali	Nov 1968	Young officers led by Lieutenant Moussa Traore depose the government of President Keita
Sudan	May 1969	Free Officers' Movement seizes power.
Libya	Sept.1969	The monarchy is deposed by Muamar Gadaffi
Somalia	October 1969	A revolutionary Council led by the military overthrows the government
Uganda	Jan 25 1971	Dr. Milton Obote was deposed by General Idi Amin
	1980	A palace coup that overthrows President Yusuf Lule and Binaisa was installed President
	1980	Binaisa was overthrown by the Military Council chaired by Paul Mwanga
	1985	Dr. Obote was overthrown for the second time by General Tito Okello Lutwa
	January 25 1986	Yuweri Kaguta Museveni overthrows General Tito Okello Lutwa

Sources: Major Jimmi Wangome (1985) Military Coups in Africa--The African "Neo-Colonialism" That is Self-Inflicted- Kenya Army CSC, pp 4-5; Ruth First,(1979), The Barrel of a Gun, London: Penguin Press, p.xiii; and the authors own compilation.

Table 1.1 above shows the postcolonial military coups in Africa reveals that some of the African countries have experienced military coups more than once since their independence. This is because of the desire to control power since any one in power also controls resources of the county. In most of these countries where military coups have taken place, some of the military coup leaders did not become any different in terms of running state affairs. Economic plunder, ethnic cleansing, cultural and religious tensions continued to define most of these states.

Whereas after the military takeover some of the African states moved on, in others a full scale civil war ensued. A typical example of this was the civil war that emerged in Nigeria as an aftermath of the coup and counter coup of January and May 1966 (Osborn, 2013, p.4). Citing the electoral fraud and the massacre of the President Major- General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, senior military officers and civilians from the Eastern Nigeria by Northerners, Colonel Odomegwu Ojukwu proclaimed the secession of the south-eastern region from Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967 (Atofarati, 1992, p. 5). In this struggle Colonel Ojukwu got an overwhelming support of the state parliament and the Igbo people. According to Lawrence Chinedu Nwobu (2013, p.5-6), this situation could have been salvaged if General Yakubu Gowon the military man who was installed as head of state after the counter coup had intervened and stopped the military from wanton massacre of the people from eastern Nigeria especially the Igbo. However, the silence on his part made the south easterners to have no option but to accept the secession agenda floated by Ojukwu. Unfortunately, in spite of the sympathy Biafra state attracted in Europe and elsewhere, only five countries-Tanzania, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia and Haiti- officially recognised it as a new republic. In a bid to keep Nigeria united the Federal

Government of Nigeria under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon organised a military action on Biafra State. The virulence with which this civil war was conducted terribly devastated the area.

In some African countries, the Cold War politics between the United States and Soviet Union plus their allies acted to complicate the situation further. For example, in countries that received diplomatic or military support from the Soviet Union like Angola under Agostinho Neto and Eduardo dos Santos, Mozambique under Samora Machel, Guinea Bissau under Amilcar Cabral, and Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nassar, the US and her allies supported subversive or rebel activities (BBC World Service, accessed 10th December 2013). Similarly, Uganda under Milton Obote, and Benin under Mathieu Kerekou who attempted to attach themselves to the Soviet Union diplomatically and ideologically bore the brunt of the western powers. In her bid to express her might, the Soviet Union also heavily supported rebel forces like the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola against the forces loyal to the USA. While the two Super Powers and their allies in Europe did not engage in overt conflicts during the Cold War period, they made African states to get caught up in fighting their proxy wars thus affecting African progress greatly.

In most African states, conflict situation continued throughout the Cold War period. At the end of the Cold War, while much of the developing world saw a recession of conflicts, it was not the case in Africa. That is, across Africa, at the same time there seemed to be an increase in conflicts and political violence. Williams notes that between 1990 and 2009 almost four hundred wars took place in Africa. This figure is perhaps so because Williams included wars ranging from minor to major. While during the Cold War period some of the conflicts were expressed between

states, after the end of the Cold War most of the conflicts turned out to be within states. Looking only at major conflicts in the developing countries, Yilmaz Musaffer Ercana (1997) notes, from 1988 (just a year to the end of the Cold War) to 2007, 48 major wars occurred around the world. Of these, Yilmaz argues, 'apart from four that were interstate in nature, like the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Chad-Libyan border dispute in 1994, Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute of 1990-2000, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2001, 44 of the conflicts were intrastate conflicts'. Unfortunately, most of these conflicts occurred in Africa.

In a related development, the former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) Koffi Annan (1997) asserts that "since the 1970s, more than 30 wars erupted in Africa with most of them being intrastate" (p. 2). Annan further observed that in 1996 alone, 14 out of 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts that caused lots of death. The observation of Annan could be corroborated by the study done by Richard Jackson in 2002 where several of these conflicts in the African continent were enumerated. For example, in 2001 alone, Jackson (2002) observes that "in mid-2001, serious internal conflicts raged in Algeria, Western Sahara, Sudan, Chad, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola, and Comoros" (p. 33). Besides these countries in active conflict in 2001, Jackson further asserts that "many African states faced instability, high level domestic political violence, or burgeoning secessionist or rebel movements. Countries such as Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Kenya, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria" (2002, p. 33), experienced latent conflicts.

Given such occurrences of conflicts in Africa, the question one asks is why conflicts increase in Africa after the Cold War and yet it has decreased in other

continents? Furthermore, as Jennifer De Maio (2012) asked, “What was it about Africa’s international relations and political dynamics that drove this spike in conflict?” (p. 1). Definitely, several issues come out in response to these questions. In her review of Paul Williams’s book on *‘War and Conflict in Africa’*, De Maio (2012) observes

Williams analyses the causes of conflict in Africa. He dismisses the idea that the causes of armed struggle can be reduced to one explanatory variable, such as the legacies of colonialism, socioeconomic inequalities, or ethnicity. Instead, he uses a culinary metaphor to argue that there are many ingredients that combine to cause war. He looks closely at five ingredients: governance systems and the role of neopatrimonialism; ethnic identity; sovereignty and self-determination; natural resources; and religion. With regards to the latter two variables, Williams contends that neither religion nor natural resources drives conflict. Rather, they are tools that are manipulated by powerful individuals to rally support and reify inter and intra group cleavages. (p. 1)

The argument of Paul Williams presented in the above review by De Maio make more sense. Unlike Williams who understands that each conflict situation whether in Africa or elsewhere is distinct, some analysts’ erroneously give the same causal factors to all conflicts in Africa. But the truth is that, notwithstanding the occurrences of these conflicts at the same time, each of them has distinct causal factors. While issues of governance, ethnic identity, sovereignty, natural resources, and religion became outstanding causes of conflicts in Africa after the Cold War, these factors in themselves cannot bring conflicts unless they are manipulated by some people for their personal aggrandisement.

The conflict in Central African Republic, for example, started in 1997 when soldiers mutinied over salary. Then from this initial conflict, several rebel groups rose up in 2005 to fight over power and resources. In the case of Chad, the conflict between Arabs and several African ethnic groups plus the conflict between rebel groups and the government is over ethnicity and power struggle (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research [HIIK], 1997, p. 2). As far as the conflict in the Comoros is concerned, the need of secession by Anjuan and Moheli from the government of Grande Comoros explains the emergence of the conflict in 1997. As time went by issues of power also boosted the expression of the conflict. For the case of Madagascar, ex-president Albert Zafy tried to lead a secessionist conflict of the Northern Province from the government of Madagascar (HIIK, 2010, p. 24). In regard to Tanzania, the conflict between the mainland and Zanzibar was rooted in the secessionist attempt by the Zanzibaris in 1997 (HIIK, 1997, p. 2).

Then the Congo Brazzaville conflict between forces loyal to president Lisouba and ex-president Denis Sassou-Ngesso that led to Sassou-Ngesso's cobra forces overrunning the capital Brazzaville in 1997 was a struggle for political power. In Botswana since 1997, there has been conflict between the government forces and the Basarwa rebels over incompatibility of ideology, secessionism and regional imbalance. In Zimbabwe the struggle over control of national power has pitched the Zimbabwe African Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government against the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) since late 1990s.

Invariably, since most of the postcolonial conflicts do not have clear frontlines and are fought by irregular or rebel forces that employ guerrilla tactics, the civilian population bear the brunt of the conflict (Short, Straw, and Hoon, 2001, p. 10). Sadly, most of these conflicts are sustained by children fighters (Vusa, 2000, p. 2). Whereas

some of the children join the fighting forces voluntarily, others are conscripted by force, trained as child soldiers and sent to the front line. In some instances, a category of these children are initiated into the armed force through letting them kill their own relatives so that killing becomes normal (Krige, 2008, p. 17).

Like other African countries, the postcolonial state in Uganda has been characterised by socio-political turmoil. The conflicts Ugandans got involved in have been ethnicity, regionalism, religious, and governance. The conflicts manifested through ethnic, political, and regional groups. For example, as the excitement of independence and glamorous take off was still being celebrated, the age old Bakonzo and Bamba resentment of the Batoro imperialism in Rwenzori region flared into a conflict. This made the Bakonzo and Bamba to organize the famous Rwenzururu Movement. As this was going on, another conflict erupted in Eastern Uganda between the Bagisu and Sebiny, and also the Bagisu and Bakedi over border demarcation (Khanakwa, 2012, p. 3). In Ankole, the Bairu started to resent the Bahima suppression (Doornbos, 1971, p. 2). On the religious frontier, the Protestant and the Roman Catholic religious rivalry re-surfaced (Mutwabwa, 2010, p. 27).

Politically, the first challenge ensued from the army in January 1964 when the army mutinied demanding for higher pay and more rapid promotion. Unlike the governments of Kenya and Tanzania that responded to similar demands by disciplining their army and instituting tight control, Apollo Milton Obote accepted the demands of the mutineers, increased their salary and promoted officers including Iddi Amin Dada (Byrnes, 1992, p. 22). This made the military to become a major constituency in brokering power.

Then from 1965 to 1970, the turmoil reached another level. Although many commentators blamed these unfortunate events on the British colonial administration,

the independence political leadership's greed for power, personal character, and myopic judgment were also to blame (Odoi, 2009, p. 12). The independence regimes' leadership skills was tested by the implementation of the 1962 constitution, the balancing of power within the coalition government, and unification of the different ethnic and racial groups. Furthermore, bridging the development gaps between the regions, handling religious rivalries, taming the characters of some leaders and their constituencies became a challenge. The confusion these series of challenges set worked negatively to disorganize the achievements the independent government made in the two years of independence.

In regard to the 1962 constitution, which Othman Haroub and Maria Nassali (2002, p. 9) say Jim Paul likened to a negotiated treaty, two major issues of conflict stood out. Firstly, the 1962 constitution's accord of federal status to Buganda and semi federal status to the kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro Kitara and Toro and somewhat the district of Busoga while leaving the non-kingdom areas to be governed following unitary system which brought suspicions (Mutwabwa, 2010, p. 25). The people from the non-kingdom area saw this as creation of states within a state. The special position this constitution gave to Buganda became a source of conflict between Buganda and the people from other parts of Uganda. The people from other parts of Uganda argued that since the British used the Baganda as their agents to colonise other parts of Uganda and consequently concentrated to develop Buganda at the expense of other parts, such special position given to Buganda would increase their dominance and arrogance. Secondly, as Rubaihayo (2010) argues;

The other most politically explosive...was the implementation of the constitutional provision which required a referendum to be held within two years of independence to determine the wishes of the people of Bugangaizi,

Singo, Buhekula, and Buyaga whether they wanted: 1) to stay under the jurisdiction of Buganda or; 2) transfer their allegiance to Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom or; 3) form a separate district. (pp. 24-25).

As it shall be seen later on, the result of this referendum actually became the source of disintegration of the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and Kabaka Yeka (KY) alliance. The friction it brought between Obote; Mutesa II, coupled with the ideological and ethnic struggle for supremacy within the ruling party led to the infamous 1966 constitutional crisis and its antecedent effects. As these unfortunate events were unfolding, the protagonists' seeking for support from the military made the army to become arbiter in political conflicts in Uganda to date.

As Haroub and Nassali (2002, p. 11) have argued, the 1966 crisis culminated into the suspension of the 1962 constitution, the introduction of the pigeon hole Interim Constitution of 1966 and then the Republican Constitution of 1967. The deposition and exile of the first president of Uganda, and the declaration of a state of emergency depicted a deeply polarised political atmosphere in Uganda. These happenings did not help to solve the situation, but created more chaos.

To make matters worse, the attempt of Obote to ally with the Socialist Block coupled with a rift between him and the army commander was used to ferment the 1971 coup that saw Iddi Amin Dada coming to the political limelight (Anyang'-Nyongo, *The Daily Monitor*, Tuesday, 23.10.2005). Although Amin's coming to power was highly welcomed by the Baganda and a few other people who were anti Obote, the attempted rebel invasion of 1972 made people to see Amin's true colours. Starting with the Acholi and Lan'gi army officers, and other civilians and religious leaders in key positions like Archbishop Janani Luwum, Amin tried to weed all people suspected to be in opposition to him (National Resistance Council [NRC],

2004, p. 17). Since a sizable number of the officers in his army came from the West Nile, it set the Acholi and Lan'gi against the people of West Nile thus making them to retaliate latter after the overthrow of Amin in 1979. With the parliament dissolved and the constitution suspended, Amin ruled by decree.

Amin's reign brought the Muslims who felt disenfranchised during much of Uganda's history to the limelight, thus leading to Muslim-Christian conflict (Odoi, 2009, p. 236). At the international level, the expulsion of Asians and Israelis, and the turbulent relationship with Kenya and Tanzania isolated the Amin regime greatly. However, Amin's ardent campaign for Third World liberation won him friendship from some African and Arab leaders (Mutiabwa, 2010, pp. 87-97, 110-114).

Although the overthrow of Amin' government in 1979 brought a sigh of relief, the arrogance that the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) soldiers came with returned Uganda into chaos. Mass murder, looting, and rape of women came to define the state. At the political level, the failure of the coalition government to work out proper administrative modalities led to four presidents ruling Uganda within a span of two years starting with Professor Yusuf Lule, Godfrey Binaisa, Paul Muwanga, and Milton Apollo Obote. Lamenting such rapid change of government, the religious leaders in Uganda wrote a letter to President Nyerere that reads in part;

As soon as it (*the UNLF*) had seized power, among all other things we were promised peace, stability, and security; "never again Uganda shall be ruled by the power of the gun"...*but*...the development which have taken place within the UNLF government have not been very promising. For three times the UNLF has changed government within a period of less than two years-thus we realize instability still lives with us. Shooting and killing have continued as in the times of Amin at times even worse. We have seen families being

exterminated; father, mother, and children all killed on the same day.
(Nsubuga, Mulumba, Nakyama, and Wani, 1980, p. 1)

From this quotation, we realise that the hope of many people who celebrated the fall of Amin were not met. What the liberators promised was not realised as such they started to regret because of the events that were unfolding. Thus, prior to sending the above letter to President Nyerere, the religious leaders had drawn the attention of President Binaisa on the worsening situation in Uganda (Nsubuga, Nsubuga, Nakyama, & Mulumba, 1980, p. 1). This degenerating situation was also echoed by a statement issued by the Bishops and clergy of the Church of Uganda (CoU) that met at Makerere University from 16-19 June 1980 (Wani, 1980, p. 1). Although in the letter to President Nyerere the religious leaders suggested that;

The present government should use all possible means in its capacity to fight insecurity, not to wait until they were elected into power as one of the members of the military commission said (*published in the Uganda Times of Monday September 1, 1980*): "if the UPM is voted in power it will ensure total security for all Ugandans within its first two weeks in office". (Nsubuga, et al, 1980, p. 1)

The campaign catchword from the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) candidate in the quotation of the church leaders is interesting. It may mean that the UPM leader either was the source of insecurity or he knew the people who were creating the insecurity that he could easily deal with them or negotiate with them to stop such acts. However, nothing was done to address this situation. Instead, the situation continued to degenerate further. Citing the example of Lebanon, the religious leaders suggested peace keeping forces from the UN, Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or the

Common Wealth countries to be set up, but nothing in line with their suggestion was put in place to address the emergency.

Another setback occurred soon after the December 1980s election that brought Obote to the presidency. The armed rebellion led by Museveni and the power struggle within the UNLA eventually led to the military coup that saw General Tito Okello Lutwa taking over government in 1985. General Lutwa was also overthrown by Museveni in 1986 after the failed Nairobi peace agreement of 1986. This did not only shutter the UNLA administration but also brought animosity at local levels between the Acholi and Lango since the Lan'gi saw the Acholi as the source of their woes.

The period between 1986 and 2011 has seen the emergence of many kinds of conflicts. These are: the more than twenty armed rebellions that emerged to contest the National Resistance Movement's (NRM) hold on the government since 1986, the various inter/intra clan conflicts, land conflicts, and cattle rustling. Though most of these conflicts have been contained militarily, the conflicts they generated at the local level lived on. It is to such conflict generated at local levels that this thesis is concerned with.


Unlike the human relational and transformational perspective of conflict that see conflicts as good and necessary aspect of human relations (Burton, 1990, p. 2), conflicts generally have devastating effects (Rout and Omiko, 2007, p. 3). According to Krishna Kumar (2010, p. 1), intrastate conflicts in African countries have shared a set of traits that have had major implications for human relations. Firstly, the belligerent parties deliberately inflicted violence on civilian populations. When studied carefully, about 95 percent of the casualties in most African conflicts were civilian (men, women, and children). Secondly, the conflicts led to the displacement

of people. Of these displaced people, women and children generally constituted a majority of the refugees and internally displaced populations. The refugee camps or refugee settlements are often in inhospitable environments which profoundly affected gender relations.


Thirdly, women's participation in war contributed to the redefinition of their identities and traditional roles. Women were both the perpetrators and victims of violence in intrastate conflicts. Fourthly, there was usually a conscious attempt to destroy the supporting civilian infrastructure, leading to increased poverty and starvation. These conflicts left a legacy of bitterness, hatred, and anger among the belligerent groups within the country that is difficult to heal.

The different conflicts have deepened the gulf between the ethnic, religious, political and regional groups at all levels. In Uganda, the brutality that people exerted on each other is heard for one to believe that Ugandans regard themselves as citizens of the same nation. These conflicts made the country to lag behind in social, economic, academic, and political development compared to the other East African countries she was ahead of in the 1960s (Mutibwa, 2010, pp. 122-123). Examples of these postcolonial hotspot conflicts that have gripped and distorted Ugandan society are presented in the figure 1.1 below.

Figure 1.1 Maps of Uganda Showing Some of the Postcolonial Conflict Hotspot Areas




**Former Uganda National Army
Rescue Front
(FUNA) 1980-1985**




**National Resistant Army (NRA)
(WNBF)
1980-1986**



**Uganda Freedom Movement
(UFM) 1980-1985**




**Uganda National
(UNRF 1) 1980-1985**




**National Resistant Army (NRA)
(WNBF)
1980-1986**



**Uganda People's Army (UPA)
1986-1992**




**West Nile Bank Front
1995-2001**




**Holy Spirit Mobile Forces Liberation (HSMF) 1986-1987
1986-1992**




Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) 1985-1988



National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)



Lord's Resistant Army (LRA) 1988-



Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 1995-



Key: Conflict hotspots

Source: Adopted from Ogenga Otunu, (2002), Causes and Consequences of the War in Acholiland, ACCORD, p. 15

Figure 1.1 above presents the postcolonial conflict maps Uganda. The parts shaded red on the maps show hotspot areas of postcolonial conflict in Uganda. Most of these hotspots are areas where rebellions had arisen to challenge the NRM government. A careful observation of the figure shows that most of the armed conflicts emerged in Northern Uganda.

However, based on human need to live in harmony with each other, from time immemorial, human beings have devised means to address conflicts whenever they occur. There are two approaches to addressing conflicts: the use of modern and traditional mechanisms. While the modern mechanisms are usually initiated and controlled by the state, the traditional mechanisms are community initiated and

controlled. Examples of the modern form of mechanism that have been tried out in Uganda, and elsewhere in Africa are: a) official diplomacy that involves negotiated settlements by the use of third parties, b) setting up of commissions of inquiries to look into issues of conflicts, c) the use of the military, d) the use of modern religions and religious leaders, e) use of legal means, f) demonstrations and riots, and g) the use of economic measures. Whereas some of the conflicts where State parties are involved have been addressed by the use of the modern mechanisms, these mechanisms have failed to adequately address community level conflicts.

The other form of mechanism that has been used to address conflicts has been the traditional mechanism like: a) use of elders and the community as mediators, conciliators, arbitrators and adjudicators, b) the resort to fights as a way of testing each other's strength so that the parties get to respect each other in the future, c) the use of women through marriage, child upbringing, and as advisors to men, d) the use of traditional rituals of reconciliation, and e) the use of youth groups.

Given that the conflicts this thesis set to address are community based amongst and between the Acholi, Lango and Madi there is need to analyse the efficacy of peacebuilding from below basing on the "traditional restorative justice system to restore peace amongst people after conflict" (Fink, 2005, pp. 128-129). This is because peacebuilding which takes place within the local community framework is multifaceted and can be intertwined with a number of sub-categories under the umbrella of 'track II diplomacy' that is diplomatic maneuvering outside of the formal political framework. Along with the general study of bottom up peacebuilding popularly articulated by John Paul Lederach (1997), local communities and their role in conflict resolution has come to the fore in recent years. This is

largely due to the failure of most of the state led alternatives (Paris, 2002, pp. 112-134).

Paffenhulz Thania and Reychler Luc (n. d, quoting from George and Hildegard, 2003, p. 12) presents traditional mechanisms as the best means for addressing community level conflicts. They assert that traditional mechanism, “places emphasis on the process nature of the activities concerned, where certain elements must be included or at least intended in the mix” (p. 340). The process nature Paffenhulz, and Reychler (n.d, p. 340) talked about here include, a) honest acknowledgement of harm/injury each party has inflicted on the other, b) sincere regret and remorse for the injury done, c) readiness to apologise for one’s role in inflicting the injury, d) readiness of the conflicting parties to let go the anger and bitterness caused by the conflict and injury, e) commitment by the offender not to repeat the injury, f) sincere efforts to redress past grievances that caused the conflict and compensate the damage caused to the extent possible, and g) entering into a new mutually enriching relationship. When these processes are followed in addressing conflicts with the ultimate goal of restoring relationship other than creating more chaos, conflicts could be amicably settled and peace is restored between belligerent parties.

Although some people are skeptical about local community’s ability to effectively manage conflicts through the use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, there are a lot of success stories reported around the world. People at the grassroots have successfully addressed conflicts in Sri-Lanka, Tibet, Cambodia, Fiji, the Lebanon, the Philippines, and former Soviet Union-especially in the Caucasus region (International Alert [AI], 1996, p. 2). In Africa, local people have effectively addressed conflicts in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, Kenya,

Mozambique, South Africa, Sierra Leon, and Liberia. Hence advocating for conflict management by local people is not a new phenomenon.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

This thesis focuses on assessing how peacebuilding from below can be used for managing postcolonial conflicts in Northern Uganda for the purpose of restoring harmonious living at local levels. Given that the postcolonial state in Uganda is replete with conflicts first at the political level, and then at local levels, the hatred, intrigue, and divisions these conflicts generated at both state and local levels presented a lot of challenges to governance and relationship. Instead of looking at each other as citizens, Ugandans have resorted to use political, ethnic, regional and religious cleavages as basic identity markers.

In the case of Northern Uganda, the conflicts have greatly affected the relationship between the Acholi, Lango, and Madi thus distorting the harmonious living even at the tribal, clan and family levels. At the political level, ally building became characteristic of the relationship between the three tribes, although in most cases such alliances have been temporal. Although attempts have been made to address the issues of conflicts by using both modern and traditional mechanisms of conflicts management, no concrete solution has since been found given that some war entrepreneurs kept on frustrating such efforts.

1.4 Premise of the Study

This study is premised on the assertions that;

1. Conflict is a reality in human relations. Although at times conflicts bring positive changes, but whenever they occur it distorts human relations.

2. Human beings' need for peaceful co-existence usually drives them to address issues of conflicts whenever they occur.
3. Conflicts at community levels can best be managed by the local people within the conflict area. This is because such people look at the common humanity of the parties in conflict and thereby address the issues of conflict with some background knowledge. In most cases, managing conflicts through such bring positive results.

1.5 Objectives of the study

This study sought to;

1. Investigate the nature and manifestation of the postcolonial conflicts in northern Uganda.
2. Examine the causes of the postcolonial conflicts in Northern Uganda.
3. Analyse the effects of the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda on the state and social cohesion of the people of Northern Uganda.
4. Assess the successes and failures of the attempts made to resolve the postcolonial conflicts in Northern Uganda.
5. Assess how peacebuilding from below could be used to manage local conflicts that are inter and intra-ethnic in Northern Uganda.

1.6 Research Questions

The thesis focused on answering the following questions;

1. What is the nature and manifestation of postcolonial conflicts in Northern Uganda?
2. What are the causes of the postcolonial conflicts in Northern Uganda?

3. What are the effects of the postcolonial conflicts in Northern Uganda on the state and social cohesion of the local people?
4. What attempts have been made to resolve the postcolonial conflict in northern Uganda- their successes and failures
5. How could peacebuilding from below be used to manage local conflicts that are inter and intra-ethnic in Northern Uganda?

1.7 Justification and Significance

This study was conceived because of the persistent conflicts during Uganda's postcolonial period. Although there is a huge body of literature on conflicts in Uganda, the literature that studied management of intrastate conflicts using peacebuilding from below as a premise of analysis are scanty. This thesis therefore comes to fill that gap by trying to show the importance of local people in unlocking their own conflicts instead of using people from outside the conflict area who did not feel the pinch of the conflict.

The significance of this study lies in its ability to evaluate both the modern and traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in the same piece and showing their abilities and shortcomings in addressing conflicts. Although some western and African scholars treat anything relating to African traditional mechanisms with disdain, this study helps to shade some light for people to understand that not all that is African is bad.

Furthermore, the study also helps to show that, even before Africans got in touch with the international systems, Africans have been addressing conflicts following their community's endogenous mechanisms. This study therefore, helps to contribute to the rejuvenation of the wealth of African traditional experience in

dealing with conflicts and thus expose 'African traditional diplomacy' for addressing issues of conflicts in other continents of the World.

1.8 Scope and Limitations

This study was carried out in Uganda with special focus on the three tribes: Acholi, Lango and Madi of Northern Uganda. These tribes were chosen for this study because there has been expression of conflict between and amongst them at different historical points. These conflicts are expressed at both political and local levels. The conflicts between and amongst these tribes have greatly affected the harmonious relationship between and within them. This study therefore, sought to find out the best conflict management mechanisms that could be used to address the relational challenges between and amongst these tribes.

From such a broad spectrum, this study specifically investigated the nature and manifestation of postcolonial intrastate conflicts in Uganda so as to locate the conflicts in Northern Uganda between and amongst the Acholi, Lango and Madi. It then examined the causes and effects of the conflicts with the aim of assessing their magnitude on the state and social cohesion of Ugandans and the people of Acholi, Lango and Madi in particular. Some of the key attempts that were made to address the conflicts at both state and local levels are highlighted and the successes and failures of such attempts are also noted. This was done so as to assess how peacebuilding from below could be used to manage specific conflict situations in northern Uganda.

This research covered the period from October 9th 1962 when Uganda attained political self-rule from the British colonial administration to 2014 when the process of thesis writing ended. However, in an attempt to help understand the current occurrence of the postcolonial intrastate conflicts in Uganda, some historical issues of

conflicts have been highlighted. This helped to boost the understanding of the present manifestation of conflicts in Uganda and that in northern Uganda in particular.

During the research process, the researcher encountered and addressed a number of challenges. Amongst these are: the challenge of locating the hotspot areas of conflict and respondents since almost all parts of Northern Uganda experienced some sort conflict. So, determining the intensity of each of the conflicts and who to get information from was not easy. However, through purposive sampling, out of many locations and respondents, some places and people were chosen to give representative voice of the rest.

During the data collection process some respondents were not free to divulge certain information given the sensitivity attached to them. To address this fear, the researcher and his assistants promised that the identity of such people would be kept secret and indeed during the process of compiling the thesis such people's identity are hidden by the use of the term 'anonymous'.

There were instances when incomplete transcribe of information from the data collected were registered, especially where data was collected using local languages. In such instances the researcher gave the recorded conversation to some other person to transcribe again so that, instead of summarizing the content of the interviews, the independent transcribers transliterate the conversation. This helped to elicit some silent information that did not come out clearly earlier on.

While looking at the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms some of the respondents feared to discuss or imagined the difficulty of participating in a traditional ritual of reconciliation given that they have adopted new religions of Christianity and Islam. In addressing this, the researcher did assure such people that describing how things used to be does not mean participating in them but rather the

aim here is to see how to contextualize such mechanisms in a way that suits peoples' current context. Indeed, when the researcher and other colleagues were requested by Uganda Christian University to come up with a liturgy for the Anglican Church of Uganda, he was given the task of drafting a reconciliation liturgy. When the draft of the reconciliation liturgy came out, it helped to address the fear of some Christians, though the same is yet to be done for the Muslim believers.

The background information presented above gives us a basis to reviewing some literature that is in line with the topic, problem and objectives, as reflected in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In the background to the study presented in the previous chapter it was noted that the postcolonial African States have been riddled with conflicts of various types and degree. These conflicts disrupted the socio, economic, and political progress of most African countries. The state in Uganda was not exceptional. This chapter reviews literature that focuses on the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda. Special attention was given to analyse the nature, manifestation, causes, effects and attempts made to manage the different postcolonial conflicts and what they achieved.

Besides, this chapter also explicates the theoretical framework on which this study was based. Since the concern of this study was to look at management of intrastate conflicts that manifest at community levels, the theory of “peacebuilding from below” that promotes the involvement of local communities in the process of addressing conflict was adopted.

2.2 Review of Related Literature

There is a huge body of literature on conflicts in general, but there is scanty literature on the management of postcolonial intrastate conflicts in Uganda. Therefore, this part of the chapter shall focus on analysing some of the available literature that fit the scope of our objectives.

2.2.1 The Nature and Manifestation of Intrastate Conflicts in Postcolonial Uganda

In most of the available literature on the formative years of Uganda’s postcolonial period, authors like Patrick Rubaihayo (2005), Samwiri Karugire (1988), Tersis

Kabwegere (1977), and Pheres Mutiabwa (2010) among others assert that the first two years of Uganda's independence were years of progress and cordial relationship amongst the political elites. Rubaihayo (2005, p. 24) in particular notes that, soon after independence the government embarked on transforming the Ugandan society from the colonial vestiges to a productive and free society. Social services, infrastructure, trade and commerce were developed following UPC's manifesto to fight ignorance, disease and poverty. To address this, the independence government under the leadership of Apollo Milton Obote built schools, hospitals, roads, and established parastatal bodies. Agriculture being the backbone of the economy and livelihood of many people; cooperative societies were set to promote agricultural production and marketing of farm produce. Besides, government institutions were developed with a competent and effective public service. The political astuteness shown by the UPC government within these two years made some members of the Democratic Party (DP) and the Kabaka Yeka (KY) to cross over to the ruling party. Although many political analysts like Karugire (1988), Kabwegere (1977), and Mutiabwa (2010) blame this act for the erosion of democratic governance in Uganda, I believe it was right to break down barriers between the different political and ethnic groups in Uganda at the time. According to Mutiabwa (2010, pp. 29-35), such a vibrant independent Uganda made a local artist compose a song in praise of Obote.

However, the problem that the independent government got embroiled in so far exceeded their capacity to handle. While some of these conflicts were inherited from the colonial government, others were failures to take appropriate decision. Marximino Ngabirano (2010) sees the nature of conflicts in postcolonial Uganda to have been Religious and regionalism expressed between the religious groups and the

different regions of Uganda. Samwiri Karugire (1988), agreeing with Ngabirano adds ethnicity on the list. Ngabirano observes;

For example, the first years of independence up to 1967, the conflict factor in was mainly between Protestants against Catholics, and the central region dominating the political life. Between 1967 and 1971, the centre of conflict became Protestant against Catholics and domination of the Northern region. During the rule of Amin Dada (from 1971 to 1979), the issue of conflict shifted to Muslims against Christians and Northern domination against other regions. From 1979 to 1986 the issue of conflict turned to Protestant against Catholics and the Northern region still dominated the army and some key political positions. Yet from 1986 to date the Protestant and Catholic factor still remains and while regional domination has shifted to Western region. (p. 61)

Then on his part, Karugire (1988) asserts;

At the time of independence, Ugandan politics had become polarized along religious lines. Secondly, regionalism or ethnic nationalism had assumed a fundamental character while, at the same time, a national institution such as the National assembly was no more than a forum of district delegates. The Ugandan army was ethnically unbalanced. And the then government which took over the control of the Uganda at independence was itself composed of an artificial alliance, and the partners in that alliance had a history of mutual antagonism. (p. 49)

Although the comments of Ngabirano and Karugire form key aspect of our analysis, in this thesis it is argued that differences in region, ethnicity and religion are not in themselves bad but rather the way people use these differences is the problem.

The review of literature on the nature and manifestation of the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda focuses on themes such as ethnicity, religion, regionalism, resources and power struggle.

a) Ethnicity

Academics and policy analysts like Hannes Tornberg (2012), Mahmood Mamdani (1996, 2004), Hofsvang (2008), Odoi Tanga Frederick (2009), and James Waswa Kintu (1995) attached ethnicity as one of the major causes of conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Although ethnicity in itself is not bad, but only when it is used as an identity marker it becomes a source of conflict. In his 2004 work, John Paul Lederach asserts that “internal conflicts build around identity groups living in close proximity” (p. 8). According to developmental psychologists such identity conflict arises when the groups start to dichotomize their identity by organizing themselves and their environment into two sets: us or not us, pleasure or pain, good or bad, right or wrong and so forth. Postcolonial theorists like Edward Said (2003), Achille Mbembe (2001), and Homi Bhabha (1994), argue that such identities were creation of the colonialists. Said (2003), in particular observes that western academia created the concept of the “other” the Orientals who are essentially different from the Occident. In light of this, Said argues that when the Europeans began to identifying “Us” the Europeans as against all “those” non-Europeans (Omenya, 2010, pp. 29-33), Africans copied and are now using it against each other. In line with this, Mahmood Mamdani (1996, pp. 19-102), writing about the genocide in Rwanda, argues that the Hermitic theory attached to the origin of the Tutsi that the European anthropologists devised made the

Tutsis to be identified as the “other” by the Hutus. Consequently when the genocide began the concept of “the otherness” was used to kill those who did not belong.

In Africa and Asia identity conflict clearly expresses itself in politicised ethno-religious polarisation. Hofsvang (2008, pp. 10-11) quoting from Lake and Rochild (1998) distinguishes between three different perspectives of ethnicity and ethnic conflict based on the pre-modialist, instrumentalist and constructivist approaches. The pre-mordialist, he observes, looks at ethnicity as a natural attribute of an individual or a group given that ethnic identity is an immutable feature of a human being. As such ethnic conflict and tension is seen to have been rooted in ethnicity itself and in the strong emotions connected to the sense of ethnic affiliation.

On the other hand, the ‘instrumentalists view ethnicity as a kind of identity, organised to achieve a specific end. This view sees ethnic identity as part of the larger political process that seeks to obtain collective material rewards. Therefore, the solidarity among members of an ethnic group is based on the expectation of material rewards provided collectively whenever the person who is rallying support achieves the end he/she agitates for. Hence, when ethnicity is used by individuals as a political instrument to achieve a desired outcome or reward, competition over scarce resources, territory, or other historically determined institutions and structures are inevitable. The constructionists argue that national and ethnic identities that are products of historical forces, often recent, even when the identities are presented as old are used by a group like political parties as means to exclude others from a system. In this way, possibly if ethnicity is taken as a means of a groups’ way of achieving power, the struggles between such groups for power can cause conflict.

But given that not all relationships between different ethnic, religious, or political groups that live adjacent to each other are conflictual, this thesis would

attempt to grapple with why many groups sustain peaceful relationships despite the different ethnic identities. Consequently, in this thesis the researcher joins Odoi Tanga Frederick (2009) to argue that “ethnicity in itself is not bad but politicised ethnicity” is that which causes conflicts amongst different groups of people.

In the case of Uganda, the current geopolitical state was a creation of colonialism through a process that started during the last quarter of 19th Century and ended in early 20th Century (Commission of Inquiry into Violation of Human Rights [CIVHR], 1994, p. 13). Prior to the advent of the European colonialism, the different ethnic groups currently found in Uganda lived as entities. However, through migrations, intermarriages, conquests and trade, created positive living (Karugire, 1980, pp. 1-16). By the time European colonial administration was established, some of the small groups had started to fuse to form larger groups. The Bagisu, and partly the Banyankole fall in this category. Then other groups like the Bakedi, West Nilers, and the inclusion of some groups into Buganda (Green, 2010, p. 19), and Tooro, were both cultural expansionism and European colonial imposition. Used properly, such fusion of diverse groups into a unified entity could have assisted in promoting unity in diversity. Ugandans did not exploit this. Instead, people started to practice negative ethnicity against people of other ethnic groups. Ethnicity was used to compete for political power, access to economic resources and other benefits in a way that greatly harmed the relationship of the different ethnic groups (Mhuri, 2010, p. 23). This resulted in some people becoming ethnocentric. Consequently, marginalisation, exclusion, and exploitation of others set in. Furthermore, physical, psychological, spiritual, economic, political, and social control by those who felt they are a dominant ethnic group became characteristic in some parts of Uganda. As such, in some places, small scale xenophobic attacks led to violent clashes.

In the light of the above, ethnicity in Uganda happened at three basic spheres: social, political and economic. At the social or cultural sphere, the age-old ethnic conflict between the Bakonzo and Bamba on one end and the Batooro on the other end flared up. Then in Ankole, a rift emerged between the Bahima and the Bairu (Green, 2010, pp. 12-13). In Buganda area, migrants from other regions and the Baganda started not to fare well, while in eastern Uganda, relationship between the Bakedi and Bagisu, and the Bagisu and Sabiny got tense. This thesis therefore, argues that, although ethnicity in itself is not bad, when it is used for identity making, it becomes negative or abused.

Politically, given that the independence government was a coalition government formed by the KY (a purely Baganda pressure group) and UPC (a party formed by the non Baganda with leadership ambitions), ethnic cleavages came to the fore. Although in the case of the Bakonzo, Bamaba and the Batooro conflict, and the Bahima and Biru conflict the antagonism was between tribal cleavages, at the political level, party and regional cleavages became the source of identity. Much as some of the available academic literature blame such on the colonial policy of divide and rule, but when African leaders inherited the African States they did not care to make policies to redress the mess they were left in. As Karugire (2003) observes, “personalities of those who governed after independence played a vital role in determining whether or not the inherited ethnic diversities could be coalesced or mitigated in order to create social peace and harmony” (p.3). In spite of the independence government of Uganda’s attempt to create an inclusive government where people from the diverse tribes of Uganda came together regardless of their ethnic differences, the imposing character of these coalition leaders, their political ambitions and arrogance, made it impossible for them to continue further.

Before long, strife arose in the UPC party that made the party to get divided between the Bantu South and the non Bantu groups from North and East. In other words, the use of ethnicity as a marker of identity set the different ethnic groups in Uganda against each other thus causing people not to treat each other well. In all these, although one may think the Bantu or any other ethnic groups are a unified force, there existed conflicts within these ethnic groupings. For example, while the Baganda consider the Basoga as inferior people, they also look at the Banyoro as their arch enemies given that their territory was expanded at the expense of the Banyoro.

In such state, those who belong to the same ethnic group used their identity to shape the meaning of the common good (Shue, 1980, p. 144-152). That is to say, in all that people do, ethnic sentiments undercuts the nationalistic approach and ceases to be a force that enhances any sense of nationhood and common good (Tarimo, 2009, p. 33). Consequently, political centralisation based on ethnic line was ushered in the politics of Uganda. As Odoi-Tanga (2009), quoting Barongo (1989, p. 29) observes, the phenomenon of excessive centralisation of power in a multi ethnic Uganda has been the source of conflict and instability since independence. This is because the base for political activity and decision making is narrowed down to a uni-focal area which allows the participation of a small section of the political elite (Odoi-Tanga, 2009, p. 29). Invariably, since there is absence of effective lower levels and country wide participation, the struggle to gain access to political power at the centre became intense, thus ushering in conflicts.

Apart from the political and social spheres, ethnic conflict in Uganda's postcolonial state permeated the public service. Kamkumba Ijuku (1989, p. 16) observes that 'the present system and politics in Uganda tend to emphasise differences rather than similarities'. Depending on who is the chief executive of a department in

government, it is common to find that people from the same ethnic group forming the majority in a particular sector of the government. This is not because people from other ethnic groups do not qualify to occupy such positions, but the desire to bring people of the same ethnic group takes the day. Since politics and administration are so interlinked, there is an overt policy in Uganda's politics of excluding some groups within the same system (Odoi, 2009, p. 18).

With all these taking shape, Okanlany (1996, as quoted in Odoi, 2009, p. 18) rightly asserts that ethnicity played an important role in the political crisis of Uganda. Much as Okalany looked at it as an attempt by the people who felt excluded to right the wrong of British colonialism's creation of 'favoured' societies against others, the desire for each ethnic group to entrench itself in power in order to control resources was at the centre of these entire unfortunate occurrences. While there existed differences between different African communities, Kabwegere (1977) notes that the colonial practices of divide and rule aggravated these differences. According to him the practice was designed to reduce social interaction and emergence of a collective form of behaviour among the oppressed. After independence, instead of working towards correcting this ill, the post-colonial leadership made the colonial state's strategy of fragmentation and isolation of distinct tribal unites to remain. This worked to promote ethnic competition and conflicts (Berman, 1998, p. 328).

However, unlike the case of Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi where ethnic division led to overt fights between the different ethnic groups at local levels, in the case of Uganda it did not bring overt fights at local levels. Therefore, this thesis tried to look at how ethnicity could be positively promoted for harmonious celebration of the rich ethno cultural diversity in a nation.

b) Religious Conflicts

Scott Appleby (2002) analysed the role of religion in violence and peace. In his analysis, he noted that religion plays a dual role of conflict generation and peace building. Appleby effectively proved this by giving concrete examples from Middle East, Europe, Africa, and other parts of the world where religion has been used both to generate and solve conflicts between people. Following the lead of Appleby, Matthias Basedau and Alexander De Juan (2008), in particular, looked at the role of religion in peace and conflict in Africa. They argue that since the event of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terrorism, religion has been portrayed as a potential source of extremism and violence, predominately in the form of political Islam and Islamist terrorism. Religious beliefs and actors play a role in several of today's violent, political conflicts, such as in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, northern Uganda and Sri Lanka (Basedau and De Juan, pp. 6-30). Religion is also seen as a prime motivating and legitimising force behind terrorist activity at the international, regional, national, and community levels (Mason, 2011, p. 1).

Unlike Appleby who did not identify religious aspects that generate conflicts, Basedau and De Juan identified the following factors in religion that are responsible for the emergence of conflict;

Demographic religious structures and dynamics, that is, the share and relative number of people affiliated with different religions or denominations in a given society as well as changes in these structures; the content and intensity of religious identities (as a social identity) as well as their relationship to other identity markers such as ethnicity or region; religious or theological ideas such as values, commandments, and beliefs, as well as their interpretation; the

characteristics of religious organizations and institutions; and the (possibly idiosyncratic) traits of individual religious leaders. (2008, p. 7)

Indeed, looking at the ethno-religious conflicts such as in Nigeria, the aspects of demographic religious structures and dynamics, theological ideas, characteristics of religions and religious leadership defines the nature and manifestation of conflicts. In the case of Uganda, this thesis looked at how the theological interpretation of the rebel leadership, especially the Ten Commandments propounded by the Holy Spirit Movement Force (HSMF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the character of Alice Auma Lakwena and Joseph Kony, acted as a catalyst to draw the attention of the followers into the rebellion.

This, without doubt, demonstrates that religion has invariably been used as a fault line and a source of identity marker through which conflict got expressed between its adherents. In an interview that Lyandro Komakech (2012) conducted in Kasese, a certain elderly man noted;

The introduction of western religious beliefs interfered with the indigenous African beliefs, promoted by the traditionalists (Bafuruki). Before the introduction of western religions, there was peace and harmony in the community. When the western beliefs arrived, the community became divided into those who belief in the traditional religions (Kafir) and those who followed western religions. (p. 4)

The observation of Komakech is a representative experience of people from the different parts of Uganda. For example when the Abrahamic religions like Islam and Christianity were introduced in Uganda, people got divided along religious lines. It is important to note that, during the formative years of these religions, power contest

along religious lines became evident. Firstly, this was expressed between the new religious groups and the traditional establishment represented by the Baganda establishment. Secondly, a rift that developed between the Muslims and Christians. And thirdly, the two Christian denominations the Protestants and Roman Catholics fought (Karugire, 2003, pp. 10-13). From then on, religion became a bigger force in national politics and gaining of state power. Authors like Kasozi, Ngabirano (2010), Museveni (2007), Mutiabwa (2010), Karugire (2003), and a host of others indeed argue that at different time in the history of Uganda, the political leadership used religion to play the different groups against each other. In trying to explicate this notion, Museveni notes;

Since the politicians at the time of independence were politically and ideologically bankrupt, their reliance on divide-and-rule tactics included using religion in secular matters such as winning political votes. All the independence political parties were involved in these practices-with the DP allied to Roman Catholics, the UPC to Protestants and the KY to Protestants in Buganda. Obote, however, took it further than most. He interfered particularly with the Church of Uganda (the former Anglican Church) by heightening any anti-Baganda sentiments among the non-Baganda Protestant Clergy....

...Obote went on to the extent of setting a UPC Muslim organization known as NAAM (National Association for the Advancement of Muslims) to rival the traditional Muslims community leadership of Prince Badru Kakungulu. Muslims in Uganda had to choose between the two rival mosques of Kibuli and Wandegeya. (2007, pp. 41-42)

Although to a certain extent it is true that the first political parties, especially the Uganda National Congress (UNC) basically Baganda Protestant in leadership and following and the DP formed as a pressure group to fight for the rights of Roman Catholic civil servants, the UPC is somewhat different because its leadership at independence comprised of both Roman Catholics and Protestants coming from the different regions of Uganda. At least some notable figures in UPC like Felix Onama, and Cuthbert Obwangor were staunch members of the Roman Catholic Church. Even if Obote erred in some state practice, lambasting him for all the ills of the time is more destructive to nation building than forging social cohesion. What took place then is not different from what is taking place now. That is why Ngabirano could comfortably equate the times by noting ‘the first years of independence up to 1967, the conflict factor was mainly between Protestants against Catholics’...‘from 1986 to date the Protestant and Catholic factor still remains..’(Ngabirano, 2010, p. 61).

c) Resource Conflicts

Conflicts over natural resources abound in the world. In explaining resource conflicts, Burton (1990, p, 2), links conflicts to people’s need for such resources. He contends that human beings have a number of essential needs that help them survive. While using Maslow’s (1970) analysis of human needs, Burton argues that such needs go beyond the mere need for food, water, and shelter. According to him human needs include physical and nonphysical elements needed for human growth, development and things human beings set to achieve in life (Marker, 2003, p. 1). From this explanation we can see that while Maslow (1970) sees needs to be hierarchical in nature, starting with basic needs like food, shelter and water, then followed by need for safety and security, then sense of belonging or love, self-esteem, and finally

personal fulfillment, the needs theorists like Burton see needs not to be hierarchical but rather pursued simultaneously by human beings.

Azar (1990, p. 3), Kelman (1994, p. 194) and Burton (1990, p. 2) identify needs to be those for safety/security, belonging/love, self-esteem, cultural security, freedom, distribution of justice and participation. Unlike the needs identified by the above scholars, this thesis looked at how the need for land and its resources led to conflicts during postcolonial Uganda between communities, government and communities, and between individuals. The fact is that land is an important resource. It is a commercial asset that can be used and traded; it is a critical factor of production. It is an essential part of the national patrimony, and a key factor in shaping individual and collective identity through its history. Hence access to it is an important human right and social justice issue (IDC, 2008, pp. 1-2). Given the importance attached to land, is that why conflicts related to it exist across Uganda and elsewhere in Africa? The answer such a question is what the study tried to grapple with.

Pamela Khanakwa (2012) aptly describes the land conflict in Eastern Uganda between the Bagwere and Bagisu. She noted that the conflict over land between the two communities has been there for a long time. In spite of this no concrete solution was found to address it. According to Jean Daudelin (2003), in post conflict societies, land violence manifests around core issues like: access, security, distribution, tenure regime governance and few caveats (Daudelin, 2003, pp. 1-5). Unlike in the case of Kenya where the postcolonial land reallocation is the major challenge on the social cohesion between the different communities (Medard, 2010, p. 19), in Uganda the situation has been different. However, like the case of Bagisu and Bagwere, land conflicts abound in Uganda after the creation of many new districts, and the

resettlement of people who were initially displaced by the numerous civil wars during Uganda's postcolonial period. It is the intention of this thesis to find out why such conflicts emerge and how they could be addressed.

Writing about natural resources conflict between the local community and the government of Uganda in Kasese district, and between pastoralists and agriculturalists in Kibale and Karamoja, Margaret Rugadya (2009, p. 13) vividly describes the intensity of these conflicts. In the case of Kasese District, she says that of the total land size, the Government holds 65% of the land, leaving the indigenous tribes of Bakhonzo, Basongora and Banyabindi to be squeezed into "a corridor of survival". They are made to share the remaining 35% of the portion of land that was not taken over by the Government for game parks or forest reserves. With reference to Kibale, she examines the contentious land wrangle between the Banyoro, the absentee Baganda landlords and the Bakiga migrants. In Karamoja, she describes the contest over pasture and water resources between the different Karimojong groups and their neighbours. In all these conflicts the local communities have suffered greatly. This thesis used such conflicts as a premise to understand and explain how natural resources generated conflicts at community level in northern Uganda to the extent of distorting harmonious living. An understanding of such could help in devising means to address the natural resources conflicts in northern Uganda between the local communities.

d) Regionalism

There is a huge body of literature linking regionalism to the nature and manifestation of conflicts in postcolonial African states. In the case of Uganda, Kasozi (1994, p, 48) asserts that by the 1955 Uganda had become a series of concentric rings, with Buganda at the centre. While Busoga, Bugisu, Teso, Toro and Ankole became the

semi periphery, Kigezi, West Nile, Bunyoro, Lango and Acholi reclined on the periphery. Karamoja was categorized as belonging to the periphery of the periphery. A situation of regional segregation that got set early in the history of Uganda was used in the postcolonial period as the basis of treating people from the different regions of Uganda. To this effect, Kasozi (1994) observes;

There have been varying levels of inequality between regions and districts, and therefore between ethnic groups. The people of Teso, for example enjoyed greater privileges and received higher incomes than the people of Mubende district in Buganda.

The people of Toro earned more than those of Kigezi, and West Nile tobacco growers were better off than the people of Koki in Buganda's Rakai District. There was also localized inequality within districts themselves in Ankole. The Bahima, whose distinct physical features were different from those of the Bairu, constituted a ruling class based on ownership of cattle and thus controlled the distribution of resources to the area instead of the Bairu agriculturalists. In Teso there was inequality of development and opportunity between the Southern and Northern parts of the district, a division that interfered with the functioning of the district administration. In Acholi there were complaints that some clans and certain areas received a larger share of government benefit than the others. In Toro District, the Bakonzo and Bamba claimed that their home counties were left underdeveloped and neglected even though their areas produced most of the districts' resources. They sought to have their district constituted as a separate entity to be called Rwenzoruru. The people of Sebei felt that their resources were being unequally consumed

by the Bagishu and persuaded the colonial government just before independence to create a new Sebei District. (pp. 48-49)

Almost in agreement with Kasozi, Mujaju (1999) notes “The British colonialism created regional imbalance and ethnic specialization. Southern, and to some extent eastern Uganda became region of peasant production of cotton and coffee...others such as Acholi, Teso and to some extent West Nile became catchment areas for the armed forces”. (pp. 14-15)

The observation by Mujaju captured the centre of contention in Uganda. With the Buganda centrally located, the colonial administration decided to concentrate most of the economic activities in Buganda. It made things appear like the land in other parts of Uganda is next to nothing. While referring to this historical divisionism in Uganda, Professor Ben Tyonomugisha made the following opening remarks at the 2011 Transitional Justice Institute held in Kitgum;

I grew up knowing that this country is divided between northern and southern. We were told that northerners eat people. Because of such stereotype, in the 1960s when my cousin was admitted to go for studies in West Nile-my uncles sat and said “how could you go to the abadokolos” animal like people, the cannibals. When president Museveni was fighting in the bush the people from the north were called “Anyanya”, an exclusion, marginalization term. Then people from the south started talking as we-the southerners and they the northerners. Hence, such talks explain the exclusion and marginalisation of northerners-making it not different from Apartheid. As such, it is even of recent that the southerners and northerners could inter-marry. (Tyonomugisha, 21/11/2011)

This perspective is shared by scholars like Lwanga-Luyingo, Mutiabwa (2010), Mamdani (1996), Ginyera Pincywa, Museveni (2010), Martin Doornbos (2001) and others. This thesis benefited from such analysis in assessing if such situation exists in the relationship between the tribes within Northern Uganda itself.

e) Power struggle: Governance, Legitimacy and Security

Burgers and Burgers (2003, p. 3) writing on domination or pecking order, link conflict to struggle for power and status. Indeed struggle about who is or who is not on top of the social and political hierarchy has been an issue that has bogged people from time immemorial. Since any form of power, whether political, economic, military or cultural is usually competed for by groups for their own survival, the emergence of conflicts is unavoidable.

In the case of Uganda, Karugire's (2003) analysis seem to show that right from independence, there has been power struggle between people from the different parts of Uganda. The view of Karugire reinforces what Elliot Green (2010) says that "in Uganda ethnicity has proved to be even more salient as a political force than in many other African states" (p. 3). Karugire elucidates this by saying;

Because of the different political complexions of the societies which constituted Uganda...it was necessary to retain the service of a British Governor General as a titular head of state while an 'acceptable' Ugandan was being sought. This search was not an easy one. A Ugandan head of state by whatever title he was to be known (...), was of special interest to all districts and kingdoms. Each of these units were intent on producing a candidate and some, like Buganda and Busoga, were not even willing to countenance the election of anyone except their own respective rulers.

In order to create the implementation that all districts and kingdoms would have and equal opportunity in presenting presidential candidates to the Electoral Commission, which was the Ugandan Parliament, a Constitutional Heads (Elections) Act No. 66 of 1963 was passed by which all districts were empowered to elect Constitutional Heads and these theoretically were to be equivalent of kind of the Kingdom areas. To carry this act of bad faith further, the “Constitution of Uganda (First amendment) Bill, 1963” provided that the candidates of President and Vice-President were restricted to rulers of federal states (i.e. kingdoms) and constitutional heads of districts, and thus a permanent stamp was put on parochialism. (2003, pp. 49-50)

With such tension right from the onset, Ugandans have not had the opportunity to look beyond the interest of their people. Whoever came to power first looked at his close associates. This made every region or tribal group to strive to get the person who is their own to the top so that they participate in enjoying the national cake.

Kaldor (2008), writing about issues of governance, legitimacy and security observes that ‘in every era there is a complex relationship between the process of governance (how human affairs are managed), legitimacy (on which the power to govern is based) and forms of security (how organised violence is controlled)’ (p 180). In the case of Uganda, however, right from the 1970s to date issues of governance, legitimacy and security have been of great concern. Most of the governments achieved state power through illegitimate means. The ability to maintain order, to protect individuals in a physical sense, to provide a secure basis for administrative capacities, to guarantee the rule of law, and to protect territory externally are all primary functions of political institutions from which they derive legitimacy (Kaldor, 2008, p. 180), but most of the post-colonial governments of

Uganda fell short of such parameters. Therefore, since it is not possible to provide security without underlying legitimacy, the successive governments of Uganda have been challenged by rebel groups thus leading to conflicts of all sorts. This study tried to analyse the implication of such happening on human relations at local levels.

2.2.2 The Causes of Postcolonial Conflicts in Uganda

Although the 68 years of British rule did not see many overt inter or intra community conflict expressed in Uganda, the British rule was characterised by simmering conflicts that got overtly expressed during Uganda's postcolonial period. Frantz Fanon (1963, p. 31), Mamdani (2001, pp. 19-30), and Kofi Annan (1998, p. 2) blamed the genesis of such conflicts on the legacy of European Colonialism. They argued that the creation of artificial boundaries and the form of rule the colonial administration employed ushered in crisis in African states during postcolonial period. In other words, the British colonial government sowed seeds of conflict which they did not wait to harvest (Odoi, 2009, p. 50). Since each of these conflicts occurred in a particular place and having distinct causal factors, lumping them as though they are the same conflict does no justice to our understanding. In the argument that follows, attention is drawn to explain the causes of some selected conflicts that occurred during the postcolonial period of Uganda.

2.2.2.1 Bakonzo and Bamba versus Batoro Conflict

On the verge of independence, each tribal group in Uganda positioned themselves for the share of the benefits of independence. As for the Bakonzo and Bamba, they got a negative share. The Tooro agreement of 1900 that included the Bakonzo and Bamba within Tooro sphere of administration placed them in an obscure position. Although Kasozi (1994, p. 17) counts the Bakonzo and Bamba among the nonstratified tribal

groups of Uganda, the Bakonzo and Bamba do not agree with this notion. Quoting from the Bakonzo Life History Society, Peterson (2012) says the Bakonzo and Bamba claimed to have existed as a distinct polity even before ‘the Batooro who came from Bunyoro grazing ...cattle and made themselves...rulers in the country which was not theirs’ (p. 5). The inclusion of the tribal groups around the Rwenzori area under the Tooro lordship is aptly described by Steinhat (1977, pp. 36-57).

Whether they are pastoralists who came from Bunyoro or not, when the Batooro were used by the colonial administrators to administer the Rwenzori region on their behalf, it made the former to rule over the Bakonzo and Bamba. As lords, the Batooro treated the Bakonzo and Bamba as second class citizens and used derogatory words like you are ‘backward’, ‘idiots’, ‘uncultured’, ‘dogs are better than you’, or likening Konzo children to ‘small rats’. In some instances, Peterson (2012) observes, “people who wished to purchase goods from...Tooro shopkeepers were made to kneel and plead for his attention” (p. 4). To make matters worse, the Batooro occupied all positions of administration, teaching, and business in the Bakonzo and Bamba areas. This means, in culture, education, politics, and economics, the Bakonzo and Bamba were not any near the Batooro. Furthermore, in as much as Tooro Kingdom collected 50% of the tax revenue in the 1950s from Konzo farmers, the Bakonzo and Bamba received less of the proceeds from the taxes (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1991, p. 39).

Earlier, between 1919 and 1921, an attempt from Bakonzo and Bamba to resist Batooro imperialism was crushed by a combined Tooro Kingdom and IBEAC forces. To stop the Bakonzo and Bamba from ever raising against the Batooro imperialism, the ring leaders of this rebellion (Tibemwenda, Nyamutswa, and Kapolio) were pursued, killed and buried in the some grave at Kagando (RLP, 2012).

The Bakonzo and Bamba did not give up in agitating for their rights. They sent their grievances to both the colonial Governor Andrew Cohen and the incoming Prime Minister Apollo Milton Obote. In these petitions sent in August and September 1962, respectively, they requested for a separate Rwenzori District to be composed of the counties of Bwamba, Burahya and Basongora. However, they did not receive any response. According to Amos Muhunga Kambere (2010, p. 21), as a result UPC lost the 1961 and 1962 elections in Rwenzori region to DP. Although the stand of Cohen could be understandable given that what the Bakonzo and Bamba were going through were their creation, Obote's inactivity was hard to understand. The patience of the Bakonzo and Bamba ran out when the Tooro Kingdom Prime Minister with his committee refused to amend the Tooro Kingdom constitution to enable the minority groups in the kingdom to contest for the post of the Prime minister. This made fourteen Bakonzo and Bamba councilors under the leadership of Mukirania, Kawamara, and Kopalya walked out of the Tooro Parliament in 1962 (Cook and Doornbos, 1982, p, 37)

Consequently, on 30th June 1962, the Bakonzo and Bwamba declared their independence from Tooro Kingdom. Starting in August 1962, the 'Rwenzoruru' directed attacks on government installations where the Batooro were in-charge. Eventually, all Batooro teachers, businessmen, clerks and administrators were chased away from Rwenzoruru area and the Bakonzo and Bamba took over (Cook and Doornbos, 1982, pp, 37-38). In fact, they had curtailed the operations or activities of foreign religions in Rwenzoruru. For example, a 1965 circular letter proclaimed that "in Rwenzururu Kingdom there is no special place belonging to Protestants or Muslims or Catholics. Troublesome religious leaders were instructed to

go and fight in *their* mother countries: Germany, Mecca and Rome” (Peterson, 2012, p. 7).

As a matter of urgency, the government appointed a commission led by Sebaguya to look into the situation in Bwamba and Basongora. In 1964, as a way of paying back, Tooro Kingdom declared fourteen days for massacring the Bakonzo. In this genocide, men, women, children and the unborn were slaughtered, hacked and burnt to death. Houses were burnt, properties were looted and destroyed. After this wanton destruction of lives and properties, Uganda government sent the police to rescue the remnants of the Bakonzo and Bwamba and took them to Kahunge refugee camps. In the middle of this, John Babiha, the vice president of Uganda, a Mutooro-announced that the Bakonzo were extinct and declared the area a Game Reserve. This sarcastic statement by Babiha drew stern criticism from Honorable Balinda who condemned the act of massive slaughter of the Bakonzo and supported the idea of a separate district for Bakonzo and Bamba (Obusinga Bwa Rwenzururu, 2009). Cruel was this treatment that it worked negatively towards harmonious coexistence between the Bakonzo/Bamba and the Batoro to date.

What happened to the Bakonzo and Bamba was a terrible expression of negative identity through use of ethnicity. The above literature helped us to understand how suppression of one group’s identity could be used to arouse group dynamics to fight for their own survival. The basic question that this leaves us with is, could it have been such negative act of one group against another that has caused most of the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda? The answer to such a question can help unlock a way for community healing in Uganda.

2.2.2.2 The Bahima and Bairu Conflict in Ankole

Like Tooro Kingdom that was expanded to include diverse communities who eventually failed to live harmoniously, was also the Ankole kingdom. According to Kabwegere (1994, p. 27), the initial kingdom of Nkore was a small swath of land covering Isingiro, Kashari and part of Nyabusenzi. Doornbos (2001) aptly observes that 'Ankole's expansion was largely based on the annexation to the west of Rwampara, and Shema counties and of Igara, Bunyaruguru, Buwheju and Mitoma to the north' (p. 34). With time, after adding south west Shema and south west Igara, Kajara was added in 1914. Although the initial kingdom comprised of the Bairu agriculturalists and Bahima pastoralists, the annexation of the additional parts brought in other groups of people like the Buwheju who had some Babito connections and the Bunyaruguru whose dialect is distinct.

The Bahima conquered the Bairu indigenes and established a Hima rule over them. By the time the colonial administration was established, these two distinct groups had, in a way, merged and lived together for many years (Mwakikagile, 2009, p. 19). Though this relationship was characterised by unequal treatment. Whereas the Bahima, who exclusively provided the political elite, enjoyed ultimate control of the economy, the Bairu stood largely outside direct political involvement and enjoyed lesser rights and privileges in their contact with the Bahima (Doornbos, 1973, p. 479). As Yoga Adhola (2011, p. 1) observes, the Bairu were accorded inferior legal status and obliged to pay tribute to the Bahima. In other words the Bairu became a lower caste. Besides, the Bairu were not permitted to own productive cows, nor were they allowed to marry Hima girls. Yet Hima boys could take Bairu girls as concubines. If a Muiru came to possess a productive cow, any Muhima had the right to take it away from him. The Bairu were barred from military service and could hold high official

political positions, except local administration in Bairu villages. The Bairu were only incorporated into the military when external attacks on the Hima kingdom started (Mwakikagile, 2009, pp. 20-21).

Such inhuman treatment indeed made it rife for the Biru to fight back during postcolonial Uganda. As a precursor to this, in the 1940s the Bairu at Mbarara High School formed the “Kumanyana” organisation. This helped them to push for the election of Kesi Nganwa as the Engazi (Chief Minister) of Ankole (Adhola, 2011, p. 1). According to Adhola,

The effect of modern education ... instill egalitarian orientations and aspirations among an increasing number of Bairu giving rise to a growing sense of dissatisfaction over their status as second class citizens. The Bairu also developed an awareness of greater self-sufficiency from this mastery of modern skills, as well as from new sources of income made available to them through the cultivation and sale of cash crops. (p. 1)

As an engine of conscientisation, modern education actually came timely to liberate the Bairu from such ill treatment. However, what could not be forgotten was the harm and strained relationship that this caused between these groups.

Modern religion and political party inclination added to this existing precarious state. To some extent, to be a Muiro, a Roman Catholics and a DP could be seen as a tragedy given the exclusion that came with it. Although the abolition of kingdoms and their paraphernalia brought to rest these struggles over the Bahima dominance of the Bairu, the rise of Museveni to power rejuvenated a sense of superiority in some of the Bahima Protestants over the Bairu in general, and those who are Roman Catholics in particular. Statements from Muhima to newlywed

Protectorate government in Uganda, relocated the administrative offices of Bukedi district from Budaka to Mbale in Bugisu' (Khanakwa, 2012, p. 3). This was abated by separating the administration of Mbale from the Native administration of Bagisu and Bakedi (Mwakikagile, 2009, p. 131). When the Bagisu tried to extend beyond the 1954 boundary set by the colonial government, the conflict flared again (Karugire, 1980, pp. 175-6).

The tension generated by the struggle over land between the Bagisu on one hand and the Bagwere and Iteso on the other drew the attention of the central government that responded by setting up a boarder commission. This commission was sent to investigate the causes of the conflict, establish which people were the majority on the disputed land and come up with a clear report. The commission recommended that the eastern part of Mbale be given to Bugisu. This angered the Bagwere who felt the Bagisu had been given their land (Khanakwa, 2012, 4). In the scuffle that ensued, the Bagisu acquired some of the land they wanted by forcing the Iteso and Bagwere away from the disputed land, thus leading to loss of properties, land, farm produce, animals and lives. The conflict further led to the arrest of some people and the introduction of the derogatory term "Bamia" meaning "foreigners" given by the Bagisu to the Iteso, thus leading to the shuttering of the previously cordial relationship that existed between the Bagisu and the Bakedi.

The above literature helped to evaluate if there are occurrences like this in the way the Acholi, Lango and Madi have related with each other.

2.2.2.4 The 1966 Constitutional Crisis

The 1966 crisis began as a result of the attempt by the independence Government to address the issue of the lost counties, as required by the constitution (*The Drum*, October, 1964). According to Patrick Rubaihayo (2006, p. 25) during the Lancaster

House constitutional conference in the United Kingdom, it was resolved that a referendum be held within two years after independence to determine the wish of the people in the lost countries.

Pursuant to the requirement of the 1962 Constitution, in 1964, following a Parliamentary sanction, a referendum was carried out in the four counties of Buyaga, Bungagaizi, Singo and Buhekula. Prior to the referendum Buganda tried all possible means to keep these counties under Buganda by trying to make the election results declared invalid. They did this by sending a number of ex Baganda servicemen to these counties. Besides, Kabaka Mutesa personally intervened to torture and kill some Banyoro residents of Buyaga and Bungangaizi counties (Byrnes, 1992, p. 22). In spite of these, the majority of the people, during the referendum voted to return to Bunyoro since they had longed for it (Rubaihayo, 2006, p 25). Unfortunately, the President who was at the same time the Kabaka of Buganda, was required to sign. However, the apparent conflict of interest made Mutesa to refuse to sign the referendum result. When the Prime Minister, Milton Obote signed the referendum result as required by the constitution, a state of animosity ensued between him and the President. Although the Banyoro, through this, got their land back in theory, practically the land still belonged to the Baganda absentee land lords who were in possession of the land titles. This even explains the land conflict in Kibale between the Banyoro, Bakiga and the Baganda.

Instead of using best practice to sort this out, both Obote and Mutesa had resorted for support from the army (while Obote called Idi Amin Dada, Kabaka Mutesa enlisted the support of Shaban Opolot) to settle this animosity (Mutiabwa, 2010, pp. 65-70; *The New Vision*, 13 October, 2005). Although it is true that the army invaded the Kabaka's palace, people do not care to tell what exactly happened that

prompted such response from the army. According to Miria Kalule Obote, the mistake of the Mengo was stocking the Kabaka's palace with arsenals, having the Lukiko rule to throw the central government out of Buganda, encouraging Baganda loyalists 'to ambush army lorries, to dig trenches in the middle of major roads in Buganda, and to attack police post' (Kalule-Miria, 2006, p. 16). Unless such lopsided recounting of the political history of Uganda is corrected, people would only work towards deepening and entrenching negative ethnicity other than creating social cohesion to the diverse people of Uganda.

With all these at hand the internal division within the ruling party, Obote ordered the military to intervene, and eventually suspending the 1962 constitution at the advice of the Attorney General, Godfery Binaisa (Kulule, 2006, p. 16). Definitely the action taken was harsh, but as Miria Kalule Obote (*Sunday Vision* 23 December 2005), and Andrew Mwenda (*Daily Monitor*, October 25 2005) agree the Kabaka and some characters were also to blame for some of these unfortunate occurrences in the political history of Uganda. Mutiabwa (1993, p. 43) observes that Kabaka Mutesa's conceited and arrogant, conservative, obstinate, extremely proud and full of ambitions' character did contribute to this fracas.

The storming of the Kabaka's palace, the arrest and detention of five cabinet ministers, the suspension of the constitution, the dissolution of kingdoms, Obote's attempt to move to the left and the eventual death of Kabaka Mutesa in exile generated a lot of opposition for the independence government both inside Uganda and outside. It was, to some extent, this that led to the 1971 military coup that saw the ousting Obote from Power. The analysis presented in the above literature helped to shade light on the one of the source of conflicts between the Acholi, La'ngi and Madi.

2.2.2.5 The Reign of Amin

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the rapid waxing of the bond between Obote and his army chief Iddi Amin Dada. Many factors were responsible for this state. Many scholars thought Obote's intension to discipline Amin because of over expenditure on the army, and his continual support for the Anya Nya rebels of Sudan in spite of the shift of Foreign Policy to Khartoum to have been responsible for this. The fact is that western powers, especially the British and the Israelis used Amin and Felix Onama, the then UPC Secretary General, to stage the coup on Obote (Museveni, 2007, p. 46-47, 49). This view was confirmed by Kaunda who said at the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government in Singapore, "Britain's Prime Minister Edward Heath...told Nyerere, Obote and myself that one of us would not return home" (Mauda and Musamali, 2005, p. 56), and indeed Obote did not.

Although many people opposing Obote were jubilant with the military coup, Obote's supporters started preparing to fight the military government, a situation Muveseni (2007) candidly described. Aware of some 'clandestine' moves going on, Amin unleashed his virulence on the Acholi and Lan'gi whom he suspected were in support of Obote. To consolidate his hold on power, Amin recruited heavily from the West Nile and other regions, dissolved the parliament, suspended the constitution, replaced the disbanded General Service Unit (GSU) with State Research Bureau (SBR), and ruled by decree. The headquarters of the SBR at Nakasero became a scene of torture and grisly executions. Although many scholars like Karugire (2003) blame the human rights abuses during Amin's presidency on him as a person, the situation that pertains at the time could have been responsible for his action. For, there were some people like Museveni, Oyite Ojok, Adoko Akena and others, who

were carrying out subversive activities (Museveni, 2007, p. 48). It suffices to say that such characters have also contributed in fueling the killing of people during Amin's rule.

According to Byrnes (1992), in spite of the displayed military chain of command, Amin's government was arguably more riddled with rivalries, regional divisions and ethnic politics than the one it replaced. For example, the army was an arena of lethal competition in which losers were usually eliminated. The officers disaggregated themselves based on where they trained from. Unlike in the 1971 and 1972 where Amin's right hand men slaughtered the Acholi and Lan'gi, the Kakwa started to fight the Lugbara. Given this state of uncertainty Amin shifted his support to the Nubians and former Anya Nya rebels from Southern Sudan that he recruited into the Uganda Army (Byrnes, pp. 26-27).

The army was increased. Some of them were given administrative positions, and they did what pleased them at will. The chaos that ensued led to many disappearances, including some American journalists Nicholas Stanch and Robert Spindle. With the support from Libya and other Arab countries, Amin heavily spent on the army. When he expelled the Asians, the army and his Nubian cronies received the loot. He established another secret agency, the Police Safety Unit (PSU) that joined the SBU to weed traitors (Byrnes, 1992, pp. 27-29).

In another development, during this time, the age old religious conflict reemerged when Amin tried to pay more attention to the Muslims. Many Ugandan Muslims with a sense of history believed this was a redress of the 1889 defeat of the Muslims by Christians. Christians on their part believed that they were under siege as a religious group (Byrnes, 1992, p. 30) since Amin viewed the church as a political center of opposition. Based on this, a number of priests and ministers disappeared in

the 1970s. This state was climaxed by the murder of Archbishop Janani Luwum, Erinayo Oryema and Oboth-Ofumbi on the same day in 1977 (Selfe, 2004, p. 173). Some analysts say this marked the start of the end of Amin's reign. For, soon in 1978, the once reliable Malire Mechanised Regiment mutinied, an act that other units followed. To divert attention of the mutineers, in October 1978, Amin sent troops and annexed the Kagera area of Tanzania. This opportunity was used by the TPDF and the UNLA troops to come to full gear and flushed Amin out, in spite of the 300 soldiers and hard ware support he got from Libya (Byrnes, 1992, p. 30).

From the above analysis we have seen that issues of cronyism, ethnicity, religion, and power struggle stand on top of issues of conflict that raged in Uganda for nice years. Explicating the issues of conflict here helped to expand our understanding of how such issues fueled the conflicts during the reign of Amin and the effect that bought at local levels.

2.2.2.6 West-Nile Conflict

West Nile region lies in North Western Uganda. It is comprised of the districts of Adjumani, Arua, Koboko, Maracha, Moyo, Nebbi, Yumbe, and Zombo. This region is inhabited by ethnically distinct groups. Among these are the Lugbara, Kakwa, Aringa, and Madi (Lomo, et al, 2004, p. 4). Since the overthrow of Amin in 1979, the West Nile experienced four major rebellions and several social conflicts at local levels. Among the rebellions that emerged in West Nile are: the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), the Uganda National Rescue Front I (UNRF I), Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II), and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBFB).

Unlike in the Acholi sub-region, the conflict in the West Nile has been distinct in terms of its duration, the level of motivation of rebel combatants, its intensity and degree of brutality. The magnitude of casualties and civilian displacement, and its

economic impact (Gersony, 1997, p. 81) was also quite distinct. Like the Acholi, the people of West Nile were prominently represented in the Uganda army, given that they were strong supporters of President Obote's UPC party. When Idi Amin, an ethnic Kakwa from Koboko, overthrew the Government of Obote in January 1971, the prominence of the people from West Nile in the Ugandan army increased. It is believed that when the Acholi and Lan'gi became a target of the administration of Idi Amin, soldiers from West Nile participated in the large-scale massacres of Acholi and Langi officers (Gersony 1997, pp. 7, 81). Furthermore, when the government of Amin was overthrown, the retreating soldiers of the Uganda Army wrecked further havoc in Acholi and Lango area.

On reaching their different destinations in the West Nile, these retreating soldiers at first kept calm. However, when the Tanzanians entered West Nile, some of these former soldiers in the Uganda army went into hiding while others ran into the Sudan and Zaire. Although the entrance of the Tanzanian forces into the West Nile was peaceful, it changed when the UNLA went to West Nile. As Gersony asserts;

The Amin regime left a legacy of bitterness within Uganda towards the West Nile. The Acholi and Lango military elements of the Obote I army which bore the brunt of the early Amin massacres harbored a hatred for the West Nilers who had supported the Amin regime. Further, many Ugandans believe incorrectly that the West Nile prospered as a region as a result of Amin's favoritism. (Gersony, 2004, p. 52)

While it is right to say that a lot of bitterness was formed towards the people of West Nile because of what happened during Amin's reign, it is utterly incorrect to think that all the killings during that time were done by the people from West Nile. For example, the dreaded State Research Bureau was filled up by Banyarwanda,

Banyankole and Baganda, though with equally many elements from West Nile. Hence, peoples' believe that the State Research Bureau was filled with the people from West Nilers is not correct.

Notwithstanding the fact that the UNLA forces engaged in brutal reprisals against the local civilian population in West Nile. The event that surrounded how the national army (a section of the FRONASA and Kikoshi Maalum) conducted themselves in West Nile is best described by Pecos Kutesa (2006). He attested to have witnessed utter brutality committed by government soldiers, especially in Arua (Kutesa, 2006, pp 16-17). In response to this, in late 1980, ex-Amin forces invaded West Nile from Zaire (DRC) and Southern Sudan. They forced some UNLA units out of the West Nile region. These rebels were organised into two groups: the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), and the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) forces. While the UNRF basically comprised of the Aringa and Madi under the command of Amin Onzi and Brigadier Moses Ali respectively, the FUNA were mainly composed of the Kakwa under the command of Colonel Lumago. These rebel groups used several reasons to justify their armed rebellion. These include but not limited to their desire to come back to power since that was the source of their income, the need to liberate the people of West Nile from the brutality that the UNLA forces were meeting on them, and proof that they were equally armed men (Lomo, *et al*, 2004).

However, when the UNLA regained control over the area, they engaged in large scale destruction of property in both Arua and Moyo. One UNLA massacre on 19th June 1981 gained international prominence. This was the massacre at Ombachi where hundreds of displaced civilians had taken refuge at the Comboni (Verona)

Fathers Catholic Mission, over which the flag of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was flying.

Nonetheless, when Basilio Okello sought for the assistance of the people of West Nile after overthrowing Obote in a military coup; both sides took the opportunity of this dialogue to reconcile their past differences (Amin's slaughter of Lan'gi and Acholi in the military in 1971; and the UNLA's reprisals in the West Nile in 1980/1981). They agreed to engage in no further conflicts with each other. Shortly after their meetings in Arua, a delegation of Arua elders traveled to meet a similar Acholi delegation in Gulu District's Patiko trading center. In a traditional ceremony (which was reportedly interrupted by the imminent arrival of NRA forces), they signed a mutual non-aggression pact (Gersony, 2004, pp. 52-53).

2.2.2.7 The Luwero Triangle Conflict

The Luwero Triangle war, commonly known as the NRA bush war started in 1981 soon after the December 1980 general elections, which was contested by the Democratic Party claiming that it was rigged in favour of the UPC candidate Milton Obote. Although Museveni used this as a ground to lead a rebellion against the elected government, according to a study conducted by Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC) the;

“Luwero Triangle” conflicts were the consequence of an ethnic-oriented war that was initiated by the NRM/A in “Luwero Triangle” against the ‘northerners.’ This was because of the belief by the NRM/A leadership that Uganda’s politics had since independence been ‘dominated’ by the ‘northerners’ in the country as a result of their domination of the armed forces. According to this leadership therefore, this ‘domination’ by the ‘northerners’ was no longer acceptable and had to end. (HURIPEC, 2003, pp. 11-12, 28)

Whether true or not, the HURIPEC report seems to be pointing to ethnicity, regionalism and the desire to hold power by any means as reasons for starting the Luwero triangle war. In a documentary on the conflict in northern Uganda, one of the person interviewed says

He (Museveni) had no reason to do so (go to the bush) because he himself was even defeated by one Gordon Kahangi in his home constituency. Even to make matters worse, his party had only one candidate in the parliament. And his party's other candidates who were defeated did not complain of unfairness during the polls. (Documentary, 13/2/2011).

One could easily buy the hypothesis of anti-northerners presented above given that the NRA rebels popularised the 'anti-northerners' notion and garner support of the Baganda. To effectively do this, during the heart of the conflict, Muguzi (2011) assets;

Some NRA soldiers would disguise in military uniforms similar to that of the UNLA soldiers and deployed to terrorize the villagers under the guise of UNLA soldiers after which a representative of the NRA/M would come and address after the 'UNLA soldiers' have disappeared and advise them to vacate their village or join the NRA. (p.95)

Of course, in a situation where people have don themselves in a military gab of the time, no ordinary person could identify who they really are. Therefore, it is easy to blame the atrocities committed by the NRA on the government forces. Knowing that it was easy to blame on the government, the rebels were equally brutal, especially to people who did not adhere to their suggestions. Whenever they capture a government

soldier coming from northern Uganda they killed them in the most brutal way possible. In describing how such prisoners of war are treated, China Keitetsi (2002), who was one of the child soldiers say;

When we got back to our camps the prisoners were ordered to dig their own graves and some of our officers told us to spit in their eyes. The enemy would be told that no bullet would be wasted on them. I could feel tears dropping in my heart while I watched the enemy being told how they were to be killed. After you have dug your graves I will call for the best men who will hit you on your head with an akumbi-a short but heavy hoe. After the men had finished digging they were ordered to stand next to their graves. They were hit on the foreheads and on their back of the heads until they dropped into their graves and died. (p. 97)

From the above, we can see that once one is identified as 'the other', an enemy instead of a fellow countryman, then a sense of humanity ceases to resonate in relationship. While to those who belong to the same group and ethnic identity shape the meaning of the common good, ethnic sentiments undercuts the nationalistic approach and ceases to be a force that enhances any sense of nationhood or common good (Tarimo, 2009, p. 33). To facilitate this anti Northern project, Muguzi (2011, p. 98) retorts, Museveni made alliance with Yusuf Lule and also brought in Ronnie Mutebi, the son of the late Kabaka and promised to restore the disbanded monarchy.

Generally speaking, during the conduct of this conflict the ferocity unleashed on the people of Luwero by both the rebels and the government forces left a deep seated hatred in the Baganda for the people from the north in general and the Acholi and Lan'gi in particular.

In fact, in a 2003 documentary filmed by Adam Branch, a PhD candidate of Colombia University, Lawrence Kiwanuka Mukibi a journalist asserts that “the majority of the atrocities during the Luwero Triangle war were committed by the NRA rebels” (Documentary, the Acholi People). To confirm this assertion Kiwanuka says “at one time when the NRA rebels found Muslims praying in a mosque, they decided to kill all of them because of their purported support for the UPC government”. According to this same source, the incidences where the government participated in killing people in Luwero were when their fellow Baganda accused them of being rebel collaborators.

As a result of this assumed victimisation, when the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU) was sent to Namokora in Northern Uganda, they unleashed a revenge on the people of the place. Such retaliatory attitude partly contributed to the emergence of some of the rebellions in Northern Uganda.

In an attempt to seek for a peaceful resolution of this conflict, after the overthrow of Obote in 1985, General Tito Okello called for a peace talks so as to establish a government of national unity. During the talks, Bethuel Kiplagat, the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya who moderated in the talks say;

They began the talks by hurling insults at each other and continued to do so throughout the proceedings. Museveni denounced the previous regimes in Uganda as ‘primitive’ and ‘backward.’ He initially refused to negotiate with the Military Council delegation, dismissing them as ‘criminals’. He in turn was accused by the Military Council of delaying the negotiation process unnecessarily. He then failed to show up for the consecutive four days, having left for Europe through Dar es Salaam. On his return Museveni and his

NRM/A raised new demands for the agenda. Once agreement was reached on an agenda item, Museveni would change his position the following day; or put forward new demands on the same matter. (Kiplagat, 2002, p. 25; HURIPPEC, 2003, p. 31).

The defiant stand of Museveni and his constant reference of the government delegation as criminals is interesting. Yet according to Bob Astles (*Daily Monitor*, Thursday, 13 October 2005), Museveni was to blame for the mess in Uganda, especially for “leading a guerrilla war of Westerners against the Northerners”. Such a negative identity might stem from his negative sentiment of people from Northern Uganda (Muguzi, 2011, p. 98). However, in spite of such turbulent environment, a Peace Pact was sealed in 1985. Although the Peace Accord stipulated that in the government of national unity Tito Okello would retain the presidency and Museveni becomes his vice, Museveni decided to turn around and overthrew his own government, a clear indication that he was obsessed by the need to control.

Since part of the intention of this thesis is to analyse the causes of conflicts in postcolonial Northern Uganda and their effects on inter community relationship, the presentation above helped to mirror the start of the disintegration between the Acholi and the Lan’gi and how the Acholi built alliance with the Madi against the Lan’gi.

2.2.2.8 The Teso Conflict

The conflict in Teso pitched the Itesot against the NRA government and the Karamojong cattle rustlers. It also set the Iteso against each other. This conflict that had multi causal factors is best described by Professor Justine Epelu-Opio (2009). To start with, he said, following the fall of Kampala to the NRA in January 1986, the defeated UNLA soldiers retreated in disarray to their home regions. Some of the

soldiers plus the major bulk of the Special Force who participated in Luwero Bush war, retreated to Teso. Since at the peak of the Luwero war some of the “Teso Home Guards” that former President Amin formed to provide protection for the people of Teso against the Karimojong cattle rustlers boosted the fight; when the NRA government took over power, these home guards were disbanded by the Special District Administrator (SDA) in Soroti, Lieutenant Rwakatare-Amooti (Epelu-Opio, 2009). This action by the government left Teso open to Karamojong cattle rustlers’ attack. It is said that after disbanding the “Peoples’ Militia”, the SDA became arrogant. He attempted to confiscate weapons from all security personnel who had returned to their home village and prohibited the people of Teso from moving livestock outside Teso sub-region yet senior NRA officers flouted this prohibition to make a profit by selling Teso livestock elsewhere.

As a result of such humiliation, the vestiges of the gun holders in Teso decided to launch the Uganda People’s Army (UPA) rebellion. The initial command of this rebellion was in the hands of people like Hitler Eregu, Elot Justine, Oronya, Osingiri, Ikuret, Okiror Sunlight, Obote Ederu, Martin Olupot, and Sam Otai. Then characters like Omaria, Major Ouol, Musa Ecweru and Smith Opon Acak who were in Nairobi created an external wing of the rebellion (RLP, 2014).

The wanton killings like those in Mukura where people were suffocated in train wagons, grabbing of cows by herders who used to keep animals for the Itesots, looting of properties; making defamatory statements about the people of Teso, and the Karamojong cattle rustling that were reportedly guarded by helicopter gunship further acted to propel the rebellion (Epelu-Opio, 2009). The situation was made worse after recovering the animals from the raiders, the government forces purportedly took them to the barracks and refused the owners of these animals to claim them back. It was

said that when a certain man followed the animals of his brother to the barracks and called one of the bulls by name, the bull ran towards him, and he was killed (LRA Juba Peace Talk delegation, 2006). Hence when Lakwena and her groups were passing through Teso to Jinja, some of the UPA rebels joined hands with her forces to fight the NRA government.

Although the rebellion was intense, the need for peace made people like Bishop Gersom Ilukor and other elders of Teso to continually appeal to the rebels and government for peaceful resolution of this conflict. The elders from Teso urged for the formation of the Teso Commission (formed in 1990) so as to seek an end to the conflict, an effort which bore fruit in 1992, when the insurgency ended (Gersony, 1997, p. 106). While some of the former rebels were resettled in their villages, others were integrated into the police, army or the prisons. Given the grievous acts committed by some of these people, they refused to go back home. However, in an attempt to cause total healing, some elders resorted to the use of the traditional Teso peace building mechanism “the Ailuc” to bring peace (Epelu-Opio, 2009). Unfortunately, as the Iteso were beginning to recover from the effects of the rebellion, the incursion of the Lords’ Resistance Army in 2003 – 2005 disorganised them (RLP, 2014). This brought total displacement and loss of many lives. While the able youths were pressured to join “Arrow Militia”, other people were confined in camps where shelter was a problem. This led to idleness, over drinking local brew, gossiping and spreading rumors.

Although the conflict in Teso was a different case, this thesis benefited greatly from the way the causes and effects of the Teso conflict is analysed. This therefore, shows how a community who are pressed could organize to fight to protect their

rights to life. The literature helped us to see whether this was why some rebel groups emerged in Northern Uganda.

2.2.2.9 The Conflict in Acholi and other parts of Northern Uganda

From its start to date, the broader conflict in Northern Uganda has passed through four distinct phases. The first phase emerged when some former Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) formed the Uganda People's Defense Movement/Army (UPDM/A) under the leadership of Brigadier Odong Latek (Global IDP Project, 2003, p. 18). The second phase emerged when the Uganda People's Defence Army (UPDA) were joined by the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces and Holy Spirit Movement (HSMF/HSM) led by Alice Auma Lakwena. The defeat of Lakwena's forces in Jinja in 1988 (Westbrook, 2000, sects III, VI) ushered in the third phase under the command of Severino Lukoya Kiberu, Lakwena's father. The fourth phase emerged when some remnants of Lakwena's and Kiberu's forces joined the rebel faction under the leadership of Joseph Kony to form the Uganda Peoples Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA). After a series of change of names, this group finally came to be known as the Lords' Resistance Army (Global IDP, 2003, p. 24) and the conflict generated by their rebellion is still felt today.

In Lango area, about the same time a short-lived group calling itself Cel-lbong also launched an armed rebellion against the NRM Government. Cel-lbong operated in Lira and Apac Districts (Bigombe, 1993, p. 114).

Although human rights abuses committed by the NRA in the guise of crushing pockets of rebellion in northern Uganda was generally considered as the trigger point of the conflict, many reasons are given to justify the emergence of the conflict in northern Uganda (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 18; Gersony, 1997, pp. 20-37). The reasons for the emergence of the conflict have been categorised as immediate and

killing of five people. The death of these people made some Acholi youths in Gulu to retaliate on the Langi. Around the same time in Teso, a Member of Parliament urged his people to kill all Acholi who were 18 years old (Global IDP, 3003, pp. 19-20). Then in Adjumani District, some people celebrated the death of innocent abductees who were mowed by a UPDF helicopter gunship. Yet not all the Acholi supported the rebellion.

Besides the above conflicts, many academic and policy papers have been written on struggle over land as a source of conflict in northern Uganda. Land related conflicts manifest between and within tribes, community and government or cooperations. According to Urmilla Bob (n.d, p. 49), Sub-Saharan Africa has a history of land dispossession and contestation which have resulted in various types of inequalities and a skewed distribution of land resources. This is not necessarily a new phenomenon but its magnitude and dynamics have taken a different form of recent. For the case of northern Uganda this has been partly attributed to the LRA war that destabilised the region. Examples of land conflicts abound in northern Uganda. Common among them are the Apaa and Lakang land conflict in Amuru (Otim, 2013 4-11), Lamogi sub-county- Guru Guru Settlement land conflict in Amuru District (ARPI, 2012, pp. 5-10), Elegu land conflict in Adjumani and Amuru (RLP, 2012, pp. 9-23), among others. Besides the Refugee Law Project (RLP), land conflicts in northern Uganda have been documented by the Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI), Gulu Civil Society Organisation (GUSCO), and Kal-Kwaro Acholi among others. In all these literatures, land conflict in Northern Uganda is seen as one single thing that has now caused a lot of division amongst the local community far beyond the rebellions. People who have been living as good neighbours have turned to be bitter enemies and communities are set against government institutions.

The literature cited helped the researcher to analyse how such rebellions and their effects, and the land conflicts in Northern Uganda contributed to shattering the harmonious living between tribes, clans, families and persons.

2.2.3 The Effects of the Postcolonial Conflicts in Uganda on the State and Social Cohesion of the People

The effects of the conflicts during Uganda's postcolonial period have been felt differently by different people. In most cases, these effects are best explained by the reaction of the state and the people at different times of conflicts. While in some instances the people of other parts of the country celebrated the pain of other people of another part where conflict is raging, in some instances the whole population came together to fight for a common cause. Whereas on the side of the state, the first reaction was to intervene militarily and then dialogue follows whenever the military attempt fails to realise any truce. It is the explanations of these events that we shall turn to below.

The postcolonial conflicts in Uganda have deepened the ethnic, regional, religious and economic divide in Uganda to the extent that people treated each other as though they are not human beings. This division based on such differences, as Kabwegere (1977, p. 44) argues, reduced social interaction and the emergence of a collective consciousness. The policies that were developed by the postcolonial governments promoted disunity, ethnicity, and parochialism. This disorganisation and lack of the development of a nationalistic spirit but rather promotion of differences based on ethnicity was responsible for the torture of the Bakonzo and Bamba by the Batoro (Peterson, 2012, 3-9), the Bairu by the Bahima (Doornbos, 2001, pp. 35-39), and the several ethnic conflicts.

The ethnic polarity in the post-colonial Uganda made people to develop negative identity against each other. The negativity went far to undermining those in the other parts of the country. For example, during the 1966 crisis, while the Baganda were sulky, people from other parts of Uganda did not care. Most considered the crisis to be the undoing of the Baganda. That explains why, when the Baganda issued statements condemning the move and formally appealed to the Secretary General of the United Nations for help, people from the other parts of Uganda were instead celebrating (*Uganda Argus*, 7th March, 1966). When Abu Mayanja questioned the Prime Ministers' suspension of the Constitution, other ethnic groups supported the action of the Prime Minister. For instance, the Kigezi council saw this act as a brave and wise move on the part of the Prime Minister "to save the dignity and status of our constitutional leaders" (*Uganda Argus*, 11 March 1966). Cuthbert Obwangor, then Minister also saw that act of the government to be appropriate for the time because "they could not just see Buganda tear the country apart and look on".

To further show how people were not concerned when the Baganda were sulking, Mudola (1993/6, p. 100), with reference to the *Uganda Argus* of 21st March 1966, says, in a special congratulatory note to celebrate the action of the Prime Minister- apart from the congratulatory message sent by the district council- the Rukairwa Engabo ya Kigezi John Bikangaga, congratulated the Prime Minister for such a brave stand against the Baganda. The Bunyoro Rukuraato deplored "the act of some people which were designed to overthrow the elected government and recording its support for the Prime Minister for the action he had taken to counter the danger to Uganda" (*Uganda Argus*, 16th March 1966). The Lango district council also supported the measures taken by the Prime Minister to quell the rebellion in Buganda (*Uganda Argus*, 21st March 1966). Similarly, the Ankole Eishengero supported the

stand taken by the Prime Minister on the country's political situation in the 1966 (*Uganda Argus*, 28th March 1966; Mudoola, 1993/6, p. 98). The Omuhikirwa of Tooro retorted that the new constitution of Uganda was suitable and tuned to the needs of the country (*Uganda Argus*, 3rd Aug. 1966).

While these congratulatory messages were being splashed on the new administration, the people of Acholi, West Nile and Teso kept their silence. For, some of the leaders who swiftly supported Obote were self-seekers who wanted to be rewarded with government appointments. As Mudoola (1993, p. 100) asserts, it was 'these leaders' self-interest and self-preservation coupled with the anti Baganda sentiments in Ugandan politics that made some of these leaders to congratulate Obote.

Besides, the cultural leaders from other parts of Uganda, Mudoola (1993/6, p. 100) observed that Obote's act was welcomed by the Roman Catholic Church, the Archbishop Eric Sabiiti of the Church of Uganda, the NAAM, the Trade Unionists, and the Youth. The congratulatory note sent by Archbishop Sabiti drew a hostile reaction from Sem Gwayambade (20/6/1966, p. 2). In a hand written letter he sent to the Archbishop, Gwayambade inquired if the Archbishop was delegated by "the Uganda synod" to do so.

When Obote was overthrown by Amin, many people from Acholi and Lango sub-regions were facing it rough, the Baganda and people from other parts of Uganda were not mindful. Others actually thought they were being rewarded for what they did; the same expression some people from other parts of Uganda have about the rebellion in Northern Uganda. Consequently, after the overthrow of Amin, some innocent people from west Nile bore the brunt of what happened during the reign of Amin innocently (Kutesa, 2006, pp. 16-20). In a like manner, during the insurgency in Northern Uganda, the conduct of the soldiers and the rebels themselves did not

show that they were for the common good of the innocent civilians. To make it even worse, people from other parts of Uganda saw the conflict as a payback for what the UNLA did in Luwero and other parts of Uganda (Gersony, 1997: 8). This is a clear indication that Ugandans are not actually one people but rather a fragmented society. In other words, Ugandans have not lived as Ugandans. They have not supported each other in times of conflict or crisis.

Looking at the reports of the two commissions, the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of People in Uganda (CIDPU) (1975), and the 'Commission of Inquiry into the Violation of Human Rights' (CIVHR) (1994), a lot of people are reported to have been killed. The irony is that these people were killed by people who should have protected them. Besides, other massacres like the Mukura in Kumi, the Barlonyo in Lango, and the wanton destruction of life and property in parts of Northern Uganda were all done by Ugandans with impunity.

Justine Nannyonjo (2005), writing about the conflict in Northern Uganda discussed the gruesome conduct of both the LRA and UPDF. She says;

Although intended to protect civilians from rebel hostilities, internally displaced persons (IDPs) do not appear to be adequately protected in the camps, as these are attacked regularly by the LRA. Property has been destroyed or looted, homes burnt, people remaining behind in the villages killed, and vehicles ambushed. All this has increased vulnerability within the IDP camps and has added to the trauma and to the numbers of IDPs and 'night commuters', the children who flee at night to the safety of the cities. It has also restricted movement of people and caused inter-ethnic clashes among the Lan'gi in Lira district and the Acholi, thus, posing a potential threat for further violence.

The UPDF forces are also alleged to have inflicted on northern Ugandans inhumane cruelties of torture, rape and sexual assault, child recruitment, and instant execution during detention. The UPDF are rarely prosecuted for these crimes, and investigations of abuse are not made public, creating the appearance of impunity, with a subsequent loss of public trust. (Nannyonjo, 2005, p. 5)

In the first place, life in IDP camps as presented above was inhuman, degrading and cruel. This experience alone made the people of Northern Uganda to lose trust in the government of Uganda. Besides, the experience of desperation and torture during the rebellion led to deepening of mistrust between the Acholi, Lan'gi, and Madi. As such, this analysis informed the study by analysing the deep division that the post-colonial conflicts have caused among Ugandans in general and the people of Northern Uganda in particular.

2.2.4 The Attempts Made to Manage the Postcolonial Conflicts in Uganda: their Successes and Failures

Both modern and traditional conflict management mechanism were tried in addressing the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda. The discussion that follows explicates this by first presenting the modern method then followed by traditional methods of conflict management that were used for addressing the various postcolonial conflicts in Uganda.

2.2.4.1 Modern Methods of Conflict Management and how they have been used to address the general Conflict Situation in Uganda

There are many modern methods that have been tried out in resolving some of the conflicts that took place during Uganda's post-colonial period. This section shall be looking at some of the key modern mechanisms that have been tried out in Uganda.

a) Commissions

Right from independence, various commissions have been put in place to investigate the causes of conflicts that have set people against each other in Uganda.

Like the 'Muster Commission' also known as the 'Integrations Commission' (Ibingira, 1973, pp. 165-185), many commissions have been set to address different conflicts in Uganda. The first commissions are the Boarder Commissions meant to address border conflict between Bakedi and Bagisu, and the commission set to look into the conflict between the Batoro and Bamba/Bakonzo. Although well intentioned, these commissions did not achieve the objectives for which they were set. Such failure to establish concrete resolve led to the reemergence of conflictual relationships between the different groups of people over the same issues.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Congo Gold meant to investigate Amin, Obote, Onama and Adoko Nekyon did not succeed. In a letter to the Reverend Henry Okullu, the editor New Day, Charles Leger (1966, p. 2) noted that "before the result of this report was published, the central government and the Baganda went into war". The release of the investigation into the Congo Gold scandal result was partly flouted by the army's threat on the parliamentarians. When the army surrounded the parliament and later on some ministers who supported the need to investigate the scandal got arrested. This move scared many who demanded the result of the investigation.

The Teso commission was also set to investigate past atrocities during rebellion. This commission composed of people like Grace Akello, a former Commonwealth Secretariat Staff in London (Gersony, 1997, p. 57), James Ecere and others, was able to convince the UPA rebels to give up arms and join hands with the government for the good of the people of Teso. As part of the settlement, some of the former rebels were reintegrated into the army, police and prison service. Others who did not want to join the forces were resettled in their respective villages. For the members of the local communities concerned, the government promised to compensate them for the losses they incurred during the rebellion. However, some people have not been compensated to date.

Besides the above, there are two other commissions of significance that attracted international attention. These are, the "Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of People in Uganda since January 25th 1971" (CIDPU, 1975), and 'Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights' (CIVHR, 1994). Uganda is also celebrated as the first country in the World to have set up Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) to address conflict issues in the 1970s. Truth Commissions are generally understood to be bodies set up to investigate a past history of violation of Human Rights in a particular country. Such violation of Human Rights included; violation by the military, or other government forces, or armed oppositions forces. According to Eric Brahm (2004, p. 1), Hayner (2002, p. 16), and Zwanenburg (2003, pp. 125-131), the major characteristics of Truth Commissions are: a) they focus on the past, b) investigate a pattern of abuse over a set period of time rather than a specified event, c) a temporary body, usually operates over a period of six months to two years and completes its work by submitting a report, and, d) it is usually officially sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by the state.

Brahm (2004, p. 6), quoting from Popkin and Naomi Roth-Arriaza, says Truth Commissions are set to; .

1. Contribute to transmission of peace by creating an authoritative record of what happened...
2. Providing platform for the victims to tell their stories and obtain form of redress...
3. Recommending legislative, structural or other changes to avoid a repetition of past abuses and
4. Establishing who was responsible and providing a measure of accountability for the perpetrators.... (Popkin and Roth-Arriaza, n. d, p.12)

Perhaps based on these and other related reasons, the government of Uganda under the leadership of President Idi Amin set up the Truth Commission. This commission was comprised of S.M. Kyefulumya- Superintendent of Police, A. Esar, Superintendent of Police, and Captain Haruna of the Uganda Armed Forces and chaired by Justice Mohamed Saied (Legal Notice No. 2 of 1974), did not assist to bridge the gap between the victims and perpetrators of the crime. It can be reasoned that the failure of this commission was because it was set up during the time when people who had the information could not easily give such information for fear of their lives. The very commissioners, however, could not easily release such sensitive information because of the risks involved. For example, while the Pakistani judge reportedly lost his government job, another commissioner was accused of murder and sentenced to death; and a third fled the country to avoid arrest. Given such a tense state, ordinary people could not have come openly to testify that their dear ones were either killed or arrested.

Despite its failure to bridge the gap between the peoples of Uganda; the first Truth Commission was able to hint that the Public Security Unit and the State Research Bureau bore the main responsibility for the disappearances of people during that time. The report also criticized some army officers for abuse of office. The Military Police and the Intelligence Services were blamed for the countless cases of disappearances. Although the report did not see the day for implementation, it made specific recommendations concerning reforms in the Police and Intelligence Services and training of government officials on the application of the law as it relates to citizens' rights.

The membership of the second Commission comprised of Honourable Justice Arthur Oder (chairman), Dr. Edward Khidu-Makubuya, Dr. Jack Luyombya, Mr. John Baptist Kawanga, Mr. John Nagenda, and Mrs. Joan Kakwenzire (members) (CIVHR, 1984, p. 3). By means of a "Legal Notice" dated 16 May 1986, the Justice Minister, Joseph Nyamihana Mulenga, established the Commission conferring on it a mandate to inquire into all aspects of violation of human rights, breaches of the rule of law and excessive abuses of power, committed against persons in Uganda by the regimes in government, their servants, agents or agencies from 9th October 1962 to 25th January 1986.

The challenge of this commission was that it had a wider mandate, which made achieving the objectives for which it was set became a problem. Coupled with this the commission lacked funds, its itinerary, and insurgency in the North and North-East (CIVHR, 1994, pp. 16-17). From the record of the commission, what I deduced is that the report was intended to justify certain propaganda, entrench biasness and solely blame the ills of Uganda on, especially Obote and Amin (CIVHR, 1994, pp. 6,

15, 22-23, 26-30), yet, as Museveni (2006, pp. 50-52) says they were carrying out some 'clandestine' activities in Uganda.

Although the victim-oriented approach of the Truth Commission is often a basic precondition for peaceful co-existence, development and reconciliation could only re-emerge after past crimes and injustices are dealt with. Unless one confronts the legacy of the past horrors, there will be no foundation on which to build a new society (Hayner, 2001, p. 1). This was the problem with the two commissions that were supposedly set up to bring order by addressing past atrocities. None of the said commissions came up with a list of names of people who openly came up to confess the crimes they committed on the innocent people of Uganda. Had it happened, like the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (Hayner, 2003, pp. 16-71), Uganda's Truth Commissions could have been used as prelude to prosecution (Quinn, 2003, p. 16).

According to Grossmann (2003, p. 23), if procedures for handling Truth Commissions were followed, the following advantages could accrue over criminal procedure:

- a) They are able to act significantly more quickly and comprehensively, and therefore, to make a stronger contribution to the process of stabilization and perhaps even pacification.
- b) They possess (psychological, social and political) potentials for conflict management which criminal laws lack completely.
- c) As a rule, they operate over a limited period of time and produce concrete results at a specific point in time. By contrast, court cases are often interminable and fail to reach any relevant conclusion due to formal questions and appeals not to mention the whole range of legal procedures which must be

applied to address the intricate aspects of a given situation of injustice and crime (Grossmann, 2003, p. 23).

But since it was never the case, none of the truth commission did resonate into peace. This might have been so because the Truth Commission was made to include only a few who could not express their views for fear of their lives. The analysis presented herein helped to shade light on how a well-intended programme of conflict management ended up shielding the wrongs of others and incriminating the rest.

Other types of commission that have been established to address Uganda's chaotic post colony have been the Human Rights and Amnesty Commissions. While the Human Rights Commission was set up to investigate issues of Human Rights abuses by the successive governments of Uganda since independence to the present, the Amnesty Commission was established to help provide clemency and protection for people who took up arms against the government of Uganda since January 1986. Through an Act of Parliament, the Amnesty Act, 2000 (Cap. 294, Laws of Uganda) entered into force on 21st January 2000. The Amnesty Act reads in part;

1. An amnesty is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January 1986, engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda by:-
 - a) Actual participation in combat;
 - b) Collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion;
 - c) Committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed rebellion;

or

- d) Assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed rebellion.

2. A person referred to under subsection (1) shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment for the participation in the war or rebellion for any crime committed in the course of the war or armed rebellion.

Although a careful look at the Acts 1(a)-(d) seems to be stating that the amnesty was only meant for people who have, in any way, participated in rebel activities, in reality some people who did not participate in any rebellion were made to apply for Amnesty. Those who were rescued from the hands of rebels were also forced to apply for Amnesty. Perhaps this was why Ojera James (2008, p. 96) made a daunting observation on the Amnesty Act when he argues that;

It would appear that the government also saw the opportunity to use the amnesty process to its own manipulative advantage. The implementation of the process has been suspect because the measures do not go far enough to reassure the rebels: a number of the returnees were subsequently arrested by the government and charged with treason. Moreover, most of those people from northern Uganda who are expected to benefit from the amnesty are victims of abduction. To give them amnesty in the legal sense is to criminalize them unjustly. That simply adds to the bitterness, of which they already have plenty, stemming from their experience of abduction. (Ojera, 2008, p. 96)

Besides Ojera's observation, the government seemed to have designed the amnesty in her favour. Consequently, peace by means of amnesty was not a principled peace since it hid the truth. Painful as it is, truth must be brought out and responsibilities must be assigned and accepted for peace to prevail.

Amnesty is based on the assumption of the rebels' guilt, the idea that the government is all-merciful, and the assumption that both sides will abide by the spirit of the declaration and accept the amnesty. None of these assumptions were valid. In the case of Uganda, there is no reason to believe that if the rebels accept the amnesty they will be safe, because the president continues to threaten to kill the rebel leaders. Since there is no evidence to show that either side in the conflict has a mechanism in place to ensure that the conditions under which the amnesty is given are strictly enforced, giving amnesty or accepting it without carefully, seriously and honestly negotiating these terms is like putting the cart before the horse.

Ojera further asserts that the Amnesty Commission was designed by the government as part of the carrot and stick approach, meant to isolate the leadership of the rebels by encouraging defections by the rank and file. Indeed the provision of the amnesty law attracted some of the rebel groups to lay down their arms and take on this offer. Unfortunately, the ex-combatants were enticed and recruited into the UPDF. Eventually after some rudimentary orientation they were sent off to fight the rebels they had just escaped from (Ojera, 2008, p. 96).

Another shortcoming of the Amnesty Act is that it has to be continuously amended in order to extend it. The Ugandan Amnesty (Amendment) Act, 2006 (Cap. 294. 2A, sec. 16, 1-3) gives a government minister the prerogative to declare individuals ineligible for amnesty. This means that granting Amnesty to individuals is at the whims of the minister concerned as opposed to the need of an individual for amnesty. This grossly violates the objective for which the amnesty is required. This has partly contributed greatly to the fears of many people who had taken up arms against the Uganda government from seeking amnesty.

Much as the acclaimed amnesty failed to meet people's expectation for peace, it has been a very useful propaganda tool for the regime as a substitute for serious efforts to engage in a peaceful resolution of conflict. In the meantime, former abductees who did not need amnesty in the first place have been paraded as examples of the resounding success of the amnesty law. In this thesis the researcher used the loopholes of the Amnesty commission to argue that issues of peace should not be politicised if real peace is to prevail.

b. Conflict Management by Military means

Looking at the preceding literature, right from the start of the very first conflicts during Uganda's post colony, successive governments greatly made use of the military in trying to resolve conflicts. Although Wycliffe Keita (2008, pp. 2-3), quoting from Ami Omara Otunnu (1987) argued that the military became a big force in Uganda's postcolonial politics because of Obote's yielding to their demands when they mutinied in 1964, I tend to differ from such a positions. Since the colonial administration had been using the military to subdue their foes like during their extension of colonial rule to Bunyoro, the suppression of the Acholi during the Lamogi Rebellion, and the punishing of the Lan'gi for providing refuge to Omukama Kabalega of Bunyoro and Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda (Kibwanga, 2008, p. 34), the post-colonial government picked a leaf from this and saw the use of the military as an effective means of bringing order. As such, starting with the Bagisu-Bakedi and Bakonzo/Bwamba-Batoro conflicts, we see the military being used to cause order in a state of chaos. It may be argued that the army was used in the Bakonzo/Bwamba-Batooro case because the Bakonzo and the Bwamba had organised themselves into armed insurrection, the fact was that the Bakonzo and Bwamba were trying to respond

to the Batooro ferocity unleashed on them after a two weeks operation meant to wipe them off. It did not warrant the government to respond in such a manner.

Similarly, the military was used to address the conflict between the Baganda and the central government. As Mutiabwa (2010) says, both Kabaka Mutesa II and Prime Minister Obote sought for assistance from the army. While Mutesa II sought the support of the Army commander Brigadier Opolot-partly because of his marital link to the Baganda, Obote enlisted the service of the deputy army commander-a fellow coming from the North. This trend of using of the military continued during the constitutional crisis when the military was deployed to surround the parliament during the censure debate on Obote, Amin and Onama. The prominence given to the military made them to respond in settling the differences between Obote and Amin by taking over the government and using violence against whoever was suspected to be in opposition.

This trend continued even after the liberation war in the early 1980s. All the rebellions that arose when the UNLA assumed power were responded to first by fights before other means were devised. For example the rebellion in the West Nile and the Luwero Triangle had the military deployed to contain them. In the case of Luwero Triangle, a special operation code named "Operation Bonanza" was set up to deal with the rebels. But due to intrigue within the military ranks, this group did not do what they were assigned to do but instead ended up committing several human rights offences. Even after the coming into power of the NRA/M government, the 21 rebellions that arose since 1986 to date were responded to militarily before negotiations were thought of.

Although some of these military operations directed to rebellions or conflicts tried to address and end the conflicts, some of them led to their escalations. This

thesis tried to evaluate whether the effect of such military intervention on the local people where such interventions happened are like that on the people of Northern Uganda during the series of conflicts.

c. Conflict Management by Peace Talks/Negotiations

Peace negotiations are a key aspect of addressing issues of conflict amicably. In dealing with management of intrastate conflicts, the work of William Zartman (2003), Fisher and Ury (1992), Michael Ercolano (2001), John Burton (1990), Mulu Francis (2008), and a host of other scholars assist greatly. According to Michael Ercolano III (2001: 8), in peace negotiation people tend to explore the ideas of achieving mutually beneficial terms through cooperation. That means-looking at the interests, needs, and positions of both parties.

In spite of unseriousness, successive governments of Uganda right from independence, have tried to use peace talks as a means of addressing conflict. One of the first such talks was that which involved the government of Uganda and the Rwenzururu movement that culminated into the granting of the Rwenzori region districts to avoid them continually being suppressed by the Batooro (RLP, 2014). Although this first initiative did not completely end the conflict since the Rwenzururu movement continued their fight and remained in the mountain, the negotiations in the early 1980s eventually saw the renouncing of rebellion by the Obusinga Bwa-Rwenzururu and handing over their arms to the government. As a token, the Obusinga was resettled and sent for further studies in the United States.

In 1985 after the overthrow of Obote's government, the very first peace deal was sealed between the Military Junta and the UNRF I in Nimule when Brigadier Bazilio Olara Okello went to solicit for support from Brigadier Moses Ali's group. According to General Moses Ali there was no formal agreement signed between them

and the UNLA and in spite of the previous bad relations between these groups, the UNRF I forces were able to join hands with the Lutwa administration to bail Uganda out of the chaos.

After wining, the Military Council chaired by General Tito Okello Lutwa called the various rebel groups for talks. This event culminated into the Nairobi Peace talks between the Military Council and the NRA rebels. As seen previously, this peace talk famously came to be known as "Peace Jokes" because of the un-seriousness shown by Museveni and his team. In spite of this, under the chairmanship of President Daniel Arap-Moi of Kenya, a deal was sealed. Among other things, it stipulated that General Tito Okello Lutwa would retain the presidency while Museveni deputizes him. However, the period of the peace talks was used by the NRA rebels to reorganize, recruit, and rearm itself. The recruits were only given rudimentary military training. This was because there was little time to spend in training. No wonder, such haste training made some of these people to commit atrocities given that they did not know the ethics of war. The failure of the observance of this peace pact was later to be used as a reason by former UNLA forces to stage a rebellion in northern Uganda because they saw Museveni as a cunning person who does not keep his word.

When the NRA took over government, the very first pacification was through the use of armed force. However, due to some pressure from the community the government reluctantly started extending their hand in talking peace with the numerous rebel groups that came up to challenge their hold on to power. Among these were the peace talks with the UPA of Colonel William Omaria, the UPDA of Otema Allimadi, and the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) of Bamuze. While some of these peace agreements were kept, others did not stand the test of time.

Other attempts made to reach a peaceful negotiation between the government of Uganda and the LRA rebels all ended in failure. Key among these failed talks were: the Betty Bigombe I & II talks, the initiatives by the religious leaders and the elders, the district peace team, the presidential peace initiatives and the infamous Juba Peace talks of 2006.

Although some of these peace talks had the potential of holding, it has been observed that some of the talks had failed because some army officers turned the conflict into an enterprise given that they were receiving special war allowances. Others say some of these talks failed because president Museveni wanted to crush the spirit of the Acholi (whom he fears most) so that they will never come to the limelight of governance in Uganda (The Acholi, Documentary).

Since conflicts are caused by various issues, this thesis argues that the best practice in conflict management requires a multi-faceted response from different components of approaches. Therefore, as Abdu-Nimer (2003, p. 9) observes, this thesis argues that a lasting resolution for any conflict requires both systemic and individual analysis and intervention. This means that there is need for a collaborative approach that addresses both these levels.

d. Conflict Management by Religious Means

In the discourse by Scot Appleby (2002), and Alexander and De Juan (2007), on the Ambivalence of the Sacred, the role of religion in causing peace and conflicts manifested in Uganda. Many examples of religious peace initiatives abound in Africa. While religious bodies participated actively in breaking the Apartheid regime in South Africa, religious personalities like Archbishop Desmond Tutu and a host of religious leaders in South Africa agitated for peaceful co-existence between the multiracial communities of South Africa. The World Council of Churches (WCC)

and All African Conference of Churches (AACC) have been at the forefront fighting for a peaceful resolution of conflicts between the Government of Sudan and the Anya-Nya I, which ended in the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Accord (Mulu, 2008, p. 40).

Religious means of conflict management also helped in addressing the Biafra war of 1968. The WCC in a letter adopted by the 4th assembly urged the warring factions to end hostilities and resort to peaceful negotiation. The WCC also encouraged Christians on both sides to be peace makers (Amissah, 1968, p. 1). Indeed, when the talks to settle the Biafra War were about to start in Kampala, the Archbishop of Canterbury wrote a letter to the Archbishop of Anglican Province of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Boga Zaire requesting him to organise a joint service for the people who had come to participate in the talks at Namirembe Cathedral. His argument was that “since on both sides there were substantial numbers of Christians, having such a joint service would help to calm the tension in the talks” (Amissah, 1968, p. 1).

In the case of Uganda, the literature from the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC), the Interreligious Council of Uganda (IRCU), and other individuals like Carlos Rodriguez, Archbishop Odama, and Bishop Ochola, and a host of other literatures are commendable. Through this we see some religious leaders in Uganda becoming ardent supporters of peaceful coexistence of the different tribes in Uganda. In most cases this was done through preaching and teaching in churches, participating in civic education and election monitoring, and organising peace seminars in regions affected by conflicts. During the Juba Peace Process between the LRA and the government of Uganda, for example, members of the UJCC participated actively. UJCC also participated in organising peace workshops in Kasese, Soroti, Kotido,

Moroto, Lira, Gulu and Arua, to mention but a few, meant to address issues of conflict and reenactment of peaceful living (UJCC, 2008). Apart from this umbrella body, each of the traditional Christian denominations has set in place Peace and Justice Desks at their establishments.

Besides the intra Christian Religious body, the different religious bodies in Uganda joined hands through the United Religious Initiative (URI) in promoting the golden rule “doing to others as you would have them do to you” expressed in each of them to promote peace amongst God’s creation. Then the Christian and Muslim groups have formed the Inter-religious Council of Uganda that works towards bringing peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims in Uganda through joining hands to fight the ills that affect humanity regardless of religious affiliation.

In Northern Uganda, the work done by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) is commendable. Apart from working towards convincing the rebels and the government of Uganda to talk peace, members of the ARLPI have now actively engaged in addressing land related conflicts through mediation by the peace team. They also work towards promoting community healing by mediating between different clans that have been set against each other by conflict. This could be exemplified by the involvement of Bishop Mark Baker Ochola II in mediating between the Pubec and Pajong warring clans in Muchwini sub-county (USAID, n.d).

During the rebellion in Teso, both religious and traditional leaders were all out to convince both the government and the rebel forces to resolve the conflict peacefully. The retired Anglican Bishop of Soroti Diocese Gersom Ilukor and others did their best in calling the sons of Teso to leave rebellion and join hands in rebuilding their lives (Epelu-Opio, 2009).

Among the Pokot of Uganda, Michael Chore (2012) asserts that “through evangelising their husbands and children, Christian women have assisted to dissuade the men from participating in cattle rustling”. Then as they continue to stay together, these women urge their husbands to come to church. Whenever these men and boys came to church, their wives and mothers stood up to give testimonies on how it feels to have peace in the absence of cattle rustling. Such testimonies usually strike the men who participate in rustling, making some of them to keep away from the practice.

The engagement with such literature helped us on how to penetrate and theologise some good aspects of traditional cultural practices that are good for peacebuilding so that they can be made acceptable to the masses of people who have adopted the religion of Christianity and Islam.

e. Conflict Management by Legal means

The government of Uganda has been making use of legal mechanisms for addressing conflicts right from the early years of her independence. This could be seen in the arrest and trial of the Rwenzururu leaders, the arrest of some people during the constitutional crisis and their subsequent trials and so forth.

A lot of people who have been involved in conflicts of different kinds were brought to the courts of Laws of Uganda at different points in time. Through some court proceedings, conflicts were settled. In some instances where the courts have not attended to such conflicts effectively, some inmates are kept in prison for long.

Apart from the national courts of law, in 2003, the Government of Uganda, after failing to handle the rebellion in the northern Uganda, referred the case to the ICC. After a critical study and ground work, the ICC issued a sealed warrant of arrest for the five top LRA commanders on 8th July 2005. This warrant of arrest was unsealed on 14th October 2005 (ICC-OPT, 2005, p. 2). The crimes for which the top LRA

commanders were indicted are: 1) at least 2,200 killings and 3,200 abductions recorded between July 2002 and June 2004 in over 850 attacks; 2). Attacking and pillaging communities in Uganda and Sudan; 3). Killing without reason thousands of men, women, boys and girls from different communities; 4). Destroying villages and camps, burning entire families; and 5). Abducting thousands of persons (especially children), forcing boys to be killed and girls to be sexual slaves. Each of the five commanders had specific charges attached on them.

When the government of Uganda referred the LRA case to the ICC, a lot of debate was generated. The debate was centered on the issue of “Justice verses Reconciliation”. While the position of the government was to take the legal path, many people felt that this issue could be addressed locally through dialogue and reconciliation by the use of endogenous mechanisms. Some section of the people reasoned that the failure of the Juba Peace talks was due to the retention of ICC arrest warrants. In reference to the ICC, Zachary Lomo (2006) asserts that since the “root causes of the conflict in Uganda is complex, the use of the ICC by the government would not sufficiently address it” (p. 2-4). To expand on his view he argues that justice is not just trying, convicting, and sentencing those who have committed crimes to prison in order to appease those who suffered as a result of the actions of the accused. Doing so could tantamount to avenging the dead! According to him true justice must first and foremost ensure that those alive can continue living in dignity and security. This requires a more holistic approach than the self-righteous of the ICC and its supporters.

To give it a home base, the Government of Uganda has also established a special division in the High Court of Uganda to try some of the LRA commanders (Ogola, 2013, p. 2). The first person to have ever been tried in this court is Kwoyelo.

However, instead of being convicted, since he had applied for amnesty, the High Court of Uganda in Kampala presided by Justice Vincent Tiwangye Zehurikirize, ordered the Amnesty Commission and the Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP) to grant Kwoyelo a certificate of amnesty and immediately release him (Akullo and McClain, 2012, p. 1).

This study analysed whether the ICC can effectively be used as a means to mitigate intra community conflicts, and to recommend for the use of alternative mechanisms.

2.2.4.2 Traditional Conflict Management Mechanisms which were Usstabilise Uganda

Traditional approaches to conflict resolution are indigenous and endogenous processes... inherent in a given society following years of tradition (Murithi, 2010, p. 17). The basic features of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are: restoration of order and relationship (Faure, 2000, p. 163, cf. Zartman, 2000b, p. 222). It is a bottom up approach with the active involvement of local people (Vuu, 2007, p. 8, cf. Brook-Utne, 2001, p. 4), holistic and consensus based (Boege, 2004, pp. 8-9), and done in a "we group" (Odama, 2005, p. 3). Some of the common traditional conflict management mechanisms are discussed hereunder.

a) Conflict Management through Fights

The natural response to conflict is "fight or flight". According to Janae Malan (1997, p. 10), fights, as a way of conflicts resolution, predominated methods of conflict resolution in ancient times, though with possibilities of talks. Although Malan's description is more of a conjecture of the ancient past, his mental configuration of how people lived in Africa shades some bit of light in our understanding of the

probable mechanism that were used to address conflicts. He based his analysis on the premise that such conflicts could have been occurring between people who lived adjacent to each other. Whether Malan's depicting of the past was a true reflection or not, the resort to fight by ancient communities in Africa does not mean Africans were savage and did not know how to handle conflicts amicably. It rather shades light on how the ancient people tried to handle conflicts in a way that made people to respect each other after testing their strength. This same style of resolving conflicts was adopted as a first principle for addressing conflict by some communities in post-colonial Uganda. Typical of this was the fight between Bagisu and Sabiny, the Bagwere and the Bagisu.

Although some people look at fights as an ideal means of settling conflicts, De-Borno (1985) discouraged it. She reasons that fights are not a beneficial, sound or gratifying approach to dealing with a conflict situation. This is because it is tedious and involves tactics, strategies, taking offensive and defensive positions, losing and winning grounds and exposing ones' weak points.

However, the traditional intent to address conflicts through fights was to serve as a deterrence measure. This implies that if each of the conflicting parties tested what their opponents are capable of doing to them, they would stop the fights and start to cooperate with each other. Indeed, some of the inter-tribal fights during the postcolonial Uganda helped to calm conflict situation after the conflictants have tested what their opponents were capable of doing to them.

Such literature on fights as a method of conflict management informed the analysis in this study by assessing whether it is a best way of addressing conflicts in modern times.

b) Conflict Management through use of Elders and Community Members

While fights were the first reaction to conflicts in a traditional context, peaceful means of ending conflicts were also devised to avoid conflicts from breaking down human fabrics. In some of the conflicts in postcolonial Uganda, the mediation, negotiation, arbitration, adjudication and reconciliation done by elders and the community members assisted in settling the conflicts (Opak, 2010, p. 35). In most cases, during the meetings in which elders sit to address issues of conflicts, neutral communities could be requested to act as mediators and arbitrators. Decisions are arrived at by a consensus. Among other things, the elders come up with a compensation scheme to appease the affected communities. The scheme serves as a preventive measure to future conflicts.

It has been argued that when Tito Okello appealed to the UNRF I and FUNA for help, the elders from both sides used this opportunity to settle their past differences. After talks between the elders from both sides that took place in Arua and Patiko, the people of West Nile and Acholi agreed not to engage in further conflicts with each other. In a traditional ceremony, the two groups celebrated a mutual non-aggression pact (Gersony, 1997, p. 75). But unfortunately the LRA conflict that saw massive deaths registered by the people of West Nile region in ambushes worked to disorganize this enacted pact.

In referring to what some elders in Nebbi did, Gersony (1997) argues that these elders used their position in society to mediate and negotiate for the youth who had joined the WNBF rebellion to be accepted by the local community. The elders saw the youth as their children and reasoned that, though misled, they could still be reconstituted and integrated into the community for productive life. This eventually saw the former rebels being accepted into their communities (p. 57).

In 1985, the elders in the West Nile region assisted greatly in brokering peace between the incoming NRA/M government and the fighting forces in the region. According to Robert Odedo (2005, p. 20), using their past experience of conflicts in the area, the elders in West Nile appealed to the FUNA, UNRF I, UNLA and also subsequently to the UNRF II and the WNBF to lay down their arms and give peace a chance.

Among the cattle keeping communities in Karamoja, before the cattle rustlers go to raid, elders usually give their blessings. However, to stop the raiders from going to raid, the elders could refuse to give their blessing to such raids. Whenever this happens, the warriors or those who are dying to go for a raid would stop their actions. The understanding is that if they go ahead for the raid without the blessing of the elders, they are going to get ill omen.

Through mediation of elders from both Teso and Karamoja, the people of Teso and Karamoja were able to settle their border conflict during the "Magoro Accord". This action of the elders helped to usher peaceful coexistence between the Iteso and Karamojong. This peaceful coexistence resonated in the two groups sharing of resources especially water and pasture (Bainomugisha, Okello, and Ngoya, 2007, p. 18).

In most African traditional societies, elders are given such respect because of the authority they command. This authority make them effective in maintaining peaceful relationships and community way of life. The authority the elders wield is derived from the position they hold in society. They control resources, marital relations, and networks that go beyond the clan boundaries, ethnic identity and generations. Secondly, the elders are believed to hold and control supernatural powers reinforced by the belief in superstitions and witchcraft (Masinde, Adan, and Pkalya, 2004, p. vi).

Hence, once a group of elders reach a position, it is required that the community pays attention to whatever decision they have reached.

This study therefore, reflected on how such successes exhibited by this form of conflict management could be used to address emerging conflicts in Northern Uganda.

c) Conflict Management Efforts by Women

The role of women in traditional peacebuilding in Africa is ably described in the UNESCO funded research done in Somalia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Central Africa, Namibia, and Burundi (Muñoz, 2003). In each of these countries, women are playing key roles in bringing about peace in their local communities. These roles include instilling the culture of peaceful living in the children through good upbringing and advising their husbands whenever there is apparent state of conflict (Ntahobari, and Ndayiziga, 2003, pp. 13-21). They also mediate within the family between husbands and wives, and the community at large (Ngongo-Mbede, 2003, pp. 28-34), and acting as peace envoys through marriages (Matthey, Dejean, Deballe, Sapiro, Koulaninga, and Moga, 2003, pp. 40-44). Women, through spiritual healing, have also participated actively in bringing peace during and after civil wars in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola (Becker, 2003, pp. 51-61, cf. Lihamba, 2003, pp. 119-124).

Furthermore, through marriage women also act as bridge builders. As such, this position help women to participate actively in negotiation during conflicts. A good example of this was their participation in the peace process of Puntland (Mohamed, 2003, pp. 97-106, and Dirie, 2000, pp. 1-7). Among pastoralist communities in Kenya, when old women stand in between warring groups, those who are involved in the fight would stop their conflicts instantly (Masinde, et al, 2004, pp.

3-8). Through such acts, therefore, women have been able to reconcile communities and also work towards keeping the peace.

In Uganda, women have invariably been used by different communities during conflict situations as envoys of peace from time immemorial. Women have helped in bridging gaps between different conflicting communities in Uganda through marriage relationships, upbringing of children, and enforcing peace by all means including striping nakad as in the case of the Acholi.

In regard to the role of women in peace building through intermarriages, Adhola's (2011) description of the intermarriage between the Bahima and Bairu who he said assisted in narrowing the gap between the two groups provides us with a good example. He says when the children born through such marriages started to demand for the right to keep cattle, which originally were prohibited for the Bairu, it opened the door for the Bairu to start keeping animals. Also in the case of the Bakiga and Banyoro conflict in Kibale, the choice of a Munyoro man who had married a Mukiga lady to be the Local Council Five Chairperson helped to settle the political impasse in Kibale.

Women in Uganda have also actively participated in brokering peace between rebel groups and the government forces at different stages. A good description of women brokering peace in Uganda is given, among others by Odedo (2005) and Agom (2011). According to Odedo, during the rebellion in the West Nile region, a predominantly women peace team assisted in ending the rebellion. These women appealed to their children and relations in the rebel ranks to give peace a chance (Odedo, 2005, p. 14). Since in Africa any one would not want to let down his/her mother, any appeal from a "mother" figure is observed. In a like manner, when 152 students from Aboke Girls Senior Secondary School were abducted by the LRA

rebels in northern Uganda, two women, Angelina Atyang and Sister Rachelle, went to plead with the rebels to release them. The bravery shown by the two women made the rebels to set 139 girls free (Angom, 2011, p. 82). Furthermore, the association that Angelina Atyang and mothers of the other abducted girls' formed helped to create awareness in the world about the devastating effects of the conflict in Northern Uganda.

In traditional setting, whenever conflicts are being solved, women were called in to witness the proceedings. This was done purposely to help these women neutralize the tempers during the talks. In case there are some people who decided to take to a fight during such session, the women who were present could stand between them and the fight would not take place. At the family and community levels, women have invariably been used to solve simple conflicts amongst fellow women since it is believed that a woman is more likely to open up to another woman (Odedo, 2005, p. 14). Also whenever a conflict is between brothers in a family, the intervention of an aunt is sought for.

In a study carried among the Zulu and Xhosa on women and peace, Christopher Isike and Ufo Okeke Ugodike (n.d, pp. 21-52) observe that women act as human shield. Invariably, during some of the clashes in Uganda, women have also acted as human shields to men and boys. As mothers, the humane heart in women forced them to protect some people who were being tortured. These women could just fall on the victims of torture, regardless of whether the person who is being beaten is known to them or not. In most cases when these happened, the aggressors also stopped their aggression.

The above literature benefited the study in seeing how the efforts of women can be made use of in conflict situations in order to bring people to a common understanding.

d. Conflict Management through Use of Traditional Rituals

Rituals have been part of conflict management at local levels from time immemorial. They form part and parcel of a community's culture. Given that most communities in Africa have a communal view on crimes, it is understood that the offense committed by one person can resonate to the whole community. Since there is a thin line between the sacred and the ordinary, whenever conflicts occur reconciliation rituals were performed to bridge the gap between the two parties.

Writing about rituals of reconciliation Coleman (2007, pp. 55-62) and Pajibo (2008, pp. 18-22) describe the Palava, sharing of cola nuts, and sassywood or trial by ordeal used by local communities in Liberia. These are rigorous processes that involve appealing to the divinities and the ancestral spirits. The fact that most Africans consider the spiritual world as important aspects of the present, whenever people are subjected to such processes they fear to repeat the offences that made them to go through such processes. Coleman (2007) and Pajibo (2008) argue that during the aftermath of the brutal conflict in Liberia, these rituals were effectively used to heal relations at community level.

Another good example where rituals are used in conflict management is described by Akeme (n.d) among Nigerian communities. According to him the Yoruba concept of '*omoluabi*', the Hausa concept of '*mutum-kirki*' and the Igbo concept of '*ezighu-nwa*' introduced the relevance of ontological capacity for peace-building by cultured individuals (Akeme, n. d, pp. 127-135). Therefore, such endogenous mechanisms have proved viable in intra and inter community conflict

management other than the enforced peace by the government through the use of modern mechanisms. Then in Angola and Namibia the ritual of *conceloh* have been applied by the local communities to sort out issues amongst them. Then in Northern Mozambique and Zimbabwe the Magamba spirit is being effectively used to bring conflicts to an end (Igreja and Dias-Lubranca, 2008, pp. 68-70).

Looking at the management of circles of conflicts among pastoralists in Western Kenya between the Pokot, Turukana, and Marakwet; Masinde, *et al* (2004) made a good analysis on how traditional rituals are effectively used to address conflicts and thereby restoring peace amongst the local people. In a working paper for the Ugandan Coalition for the International Criminal Court (UCICC) on approaching national reconciliation in Uganda, Stephen Arthur Lamony (2007) highlighted several rituals of reconciliation among the different communities in Uganda. He looked at the rituals of reconciliation among the Acholi, Teso, Madi, Lango, Lugbara, Banyakigezi, Ankole, Japadhola, Baganda, Bagisu, Basamia and Banyole. His description shows that these rituals have been effectively used to manage conflicts at local levels in these communities. Referring to the Madi and Kakwa in particular, Odedo (2005, pp. 13-26) asserts that there exists a strong belief about the effectiveness of rituals in peace building and conflict resolution. Therefore, analysis of these different literature enabled the researcher to gauge whether rituals could still be effectively used today to restore peace amongst local people.

2.3 Theoretical Framework: Peacebuilding from Below

After the end of the Cold War, the predominance of western ideology ushered a fresh discourse on liberal/democratic peace theory and consequently liberal peace building. Liberal democratic peace or liberal peacebuilding draws from the 18th Century philosophy of Immanuel Kant that is premised on the notion that liberal democracies are more peaceful and law abiding in comparison with other political systems

(Tziarras, 2013, p. 1). Put in another way, this theory holds that democracies are more peaceful and cooperative in international relations. They do not engage in war with each other. Such democratic development reinforces peace and stability. This means that, for liberal peace (a state of peaceful coexistence between democracies) to be realised, democracies have to be stable, and such stability should go beyond economy and military stability. It further implies that such peace and security should be based on the values of democracy and justice (Tziarras, p. 3).

This theory assumes that democratic implementation would function as a basis for global peace. That democratic states have limited freedom of movements since they have to act transparently and give account to the citizens who voted them. Hence, democratic statesmen will unlikely involve in secret policies, to pursue geopolitical deceptions of the states, or engage in war (Haward, 1981). It further suggests that economic interdependence in the international system creates favourable condition for international cooperation among states and people since they are destined to achieve the same goals (Levy, 2002, pp. 356-357). As such, they cannot engage in war that could disrupt such progress. Then through the creation of international law and international organisations for the regulation of international interdependence, their good relationships are secured. In a world with gradual developing linkages, political powers and provinces of international organisations tend to be enlarging, while the prosperity and security of every local society is gradually more linked to the global prosperity and security of the global society.

According to Sabine Kurtenbach (2007), as its starting point, the liberal peace theory advocates 'a threefold transformation process of democratisation, economic liberalisation and pacification as the foundations of peacebuilding' (p.7). The assumption made herein is that, each of these three fold process could cause a positive feedback on each other. Basically, such analysis uses the experience of Western

Europe and the body of sociological, political and economic research developed in this context (Kurtenbach, 2007, p. 7). However, as Zeonas Tziaras (2012) observes, “the question that the liberal/democratic peace theory raises are not only related to how one defines democracy or peace but also to whether the model of liberal democracy is suitable for every society or every post conflict states” (p. 2). Further still, basing on the role liberal democracy plays in state peacebuilding in fragile countries, it raises questions regarding the moral dilemmas of imposing liberal democracy as a form of neo-imperialism rather than development.

This is because the theory seems to assume that war can only occur between states but not within states. It suggests that when people engage in gainful economic ventures across borders, going to war is not an issue for fear of the devastations that might come as a result of war. This totally places issues of peace and security in the hands of the international system, and not the state or local communities. Then this theory does not account for why democracies are aggressive towards non-democracies (Tziarras, 2007, p. 5).

However, to assume that the so called democracies do not fight each other or at least do not have internal conflicts is far from the truth. For example, in a 1976 study carried by Small and Singers on relationship between democracy and war during the period of 1816-1965, it was revealed that, although ‘bourgeois democracies’ seem not to fight each other, they are ‘participants and initiators of major international wars (Small and Singer, 1976, pp. 67-68). Furthermore, a keen look at the democracy web reveal that some of the countries shown as democracies like India, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa face a lot of internal social inequalities, insurgencies, and or organised crimes (Tziarras, p. 6).


From a cultural or ideological perspective, the values that liberal peacebuilding operations impose are not universal but consistent with the ideological and cultural values of the internationally most powerful actors, usually the western ones (Barkawi, and Laffey, 1999, pp. 403-434). Moreover, the western model of peacebuilding which is largely based on democratic peace theory has turned into a panacea for international peace making interventions and has thus become rather doctrinal instead of adapting model. Therefore, at both the operational and indigenous approaches, it could improve or co-exist with the western model making it more effective by addressing dynamics in given cases (Ginty, 2008, pp. 139-163).

Given that liberal peace theory emphasises peace-building between democracies based on economic and security co-operations, the issue of peace remains a preserve of the state and UN organisations. Such arrangements are only good for dealing with interstate conflicts. Yet if conflicts are resolved so that people live in peace at the social, political, national, religious or historical levels (Hiroshi, 2007, p. 5), then the participation of the local community in this process is paramount. The fact that intrastate conflicts occur at local levels, the social, cultural, religious and economic activities of non-state, local or civil society actors can substantially contribute to the process of relational peace. Therefore, the inclusion of local actors in peacebuilding is a move away from such conception where issues of peacebuilding are located outside of the society in question. From a constructionist perspective, the state is a secondary constructed institution and an appendage to the primary world of people. Hence excluding or disqualifying the ordinary people from peace related responsibility is disastrous.

The theory of peacebuilding from below emphasises the need for local communities in managing conflicts. This theory was developed by John Galtung

and popularized by John Paul Lederach and Adam Curl. According to Lederach peacebuilding works better when long term infrastructures for peacebuilding is boosted by supporting reconciliation potential of society. In his view when this is done it will help to build destroyed relationship and cause reconciliation within society. This at the same time will facilitate the strengthening of society's peacebuilding potential. Bringing in such discourse in peacebuilding caused a swift in the discourse on peace and other closely related areas of security and development from state security to human security. This implies that there is a need to include indigenous communities as active participants in their peace and security. Lederach (1997) postulated a conceptual model to explain local people's potentiality of peace building as shown in figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1 Lederach's Peacebuilding Model Showing Actors and Approaches to Peace Building



Source: Adopted with modification from Lederach, J. P, (1997), *Building peace: Sustainable Peacebuilding in Divided societies*, Washington DC: US Institute for Peace, p. 39.

In the model shown in figure 2.1 above, Lederach proposed a pyramid model of an affected population consisting of three categories. The first category, which he calls top level, comprises of key political, military and religious leaders with high visibility. The second, or mid-level category comprises of leaders respected in sectors such as education, business, health, agriculture, religion, NGOs or ethnic groups.

Then the third category or grassroots level comprises of leaders of local communities, indigenous NGOs or local health officials.

Although Lederach sees peacebuilding activities taking place at all the three levels, the best practice of peacebuilding among the local people takes place at the mid and grassroots levels. While the top level deals with official state level approach to peacebuilding, the mid-level and grassroots level deals with local communities who represent the majority of people. Peacebuilding from bellow adopts a community based bottom-up peacebuilding (Paff, 2009, p. 9).

The systematic formulation of the middle range approaches to peace in this model is significant. In this framework a great deal of attention is paid to indigenous resources, thereby showing a substantial shift from state centric to multi track approaches to peacebuilding (Hiroshi, 2007, p. 7). This constructive model of second track diplomacy or track two citizens diplomacy is relevant to dealing with conflicts at the grassroots levels.

As Davis and Kaufman (2002, p. 2) observe, Lederach's model of peacebuilding brings together personalities, opinion leaders or other currently or potentially influential individuals from communities in conflict, without official representative status, to work together to understand better the dynamics underlying the conflict. Through this process transformation of conflict from violent (or potential violent) to a collaborative process of peacebuilding or sustainable development might be promoted.

The promotion of peacebuilding from below helps to empower people at all levels in conflict affected communities to build an effective and sustainable peace (Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2000, 2007, p. 36). As Curle (1994) argues, the ineffectiveness of conflict resolution by outside bodies and individuals, calls for

developing a peacemaking potential from within the communities that are affected by the conflict. Such people, therefore, should be from within the locality and conversant with the traditional peace-building and conflict resolution process. In Lederach (2007, p. 39) view, such “indigenous empowerment” would make the people who participate in the conflict resolution to actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting.

From this it could be seen that peacebuilding by the local community is invisible. Other than only paying attention to such “hidden” peace practice at the non-governmental level, the local community’s efforts have to be appreciated. As Sponsel notes, “Nonviolent and peaceful societies appear to be rare not because they are, in fact, rare, but because nonviolence and peace are so rarely considered in research, the media, and other arenas” (Sponsel, 1994, p. 18). How can we therefore make this invisible peacebuilding visible? An empirical study on peacebuilding from below has been systematically conducted by Jack Sugden (n.d). Participating as a Football for Peace volunteer on two separate occasions in Israeli in 2010 and 2011, Sugden concluded that ‘people to people projects taking place within a particular context...make up an essential part to any peacebuilding’ (p. ii).

Kosuge Nobukho (2005) compared the post-war reconciliation between Japan and Britain with that between Japan and China. She indicated that intense activity by private citizens was one important factor that had made a difference in the progress of reconciliation in each case (Hiroshi, 2007, p.7). Equally, Kaldor indicates the potential for peacebuilding of indigenous people when she notes, “In all the new wars there are local people and places who struggle against the politics of exclusivism the Hutus and Tutsis who called themselves Hutsis and tried to defend their localities against genocide”(2006, p. 11).

Several authors pay attention to the post-war peace-building in Germany by civil society actors (Ackermann 1994, Asmuss, et al. 2005, Gardner Feldman 1999/2006). Ackermann (1994) argues "It is crucial to note that reconciliation was carried out at first through numerous informal contacts that French and German politicians and private citizens deliberately sought in the immediate post-war years. Reconciliation, initially took on the character of "track two diplomacy" (p. 238).

This thesis, therefore, analyses the role of local communities in bringing peace in the face of conflicts in Northern Uganda. Essential to this, was the understanding that some of the traditional paradigms of conflict resolution that fall within the bracket of peacebuilding from below like the role of elders (Somjee, 2007, pp. 1-2) in resolving conflicts, the use of rituals of reconciliation like *Mato Oput* (Nkutu, 2007, pp. 3-4) among the Acholi and other related forms of reconciliation rituals among the Lango and Madi, the use of third parties, the role of women (Chinue, 2006, pp. 1-16), the role of religious leaders and the community have yielded results already. The fact that a lot of efforts by the local people was directed to addressing the conflicts in Northern Uganda, using the theory of peacebuilding from below in this thesis as a theoretical basis helped to test the effectiveness of local communities in bringing about peaceful relations in post conflict Northern Uganda.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter some of the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda are reviewed. In particular the review centered on the nature and manifestations, causes and effects, and the attempts made to address them. Taking from the previous chapter, this chapter on methodology explains the method employed to build up this thesis. In particular, it looks at the research design, area of study, sampling, and sampling techniques. Further still, it explores the methods used for data collection, data analysis, data management, and some ethical considerations employed. Through this, best methods of deriving the accounts on management of intrastate conflicts in northern Uganda have been highlighted.

3.2 Research Design

The general design used in this thesis is the qualitative method. Qualitative research is the non-numerical assessment and analysis of information so as to determine underlying meaning and pattern of relationships. Qualitative research is interpretivist approach or relativist paradigm. It involves a deductive process and focuses on analysing phenomena under study in their complexity, based on their natural setting, and the data collected, forms the bases of the conclusion drawn.

In carrying out this study, the researcher maintained objective description of facts gathered from the field about the phenomenon under study. While collecting the data from the respondents, the researcher block the influence of his personal experience, impression and biases based on his knowledge of some of the conflict

situation. By maintaining such objectivity, the researcher was able to minimise determining facts from his own perspective rather than based on the data collected.

In order to understand the perceptions and perspectives of the people in the war-torn areas of northern Uganda, a phenomenological design was used. The term phenomenology refers to a perception of the meaning of an event, as opposed to the event as it exists external to the person (Leady, and Omrond, 2007, p. 153). According to Patrick Aspers (2009, p. 1), phenomenology, as a body of inquiry, was developed by Edmund Husserl (1857-1938). Husserl developed the phenomenological theory during an ideological crisis when the 'social order of European capitalism had been shaken to its roots by the carnage' of World War II and its turbulent aftermath (Eagleton, 1983, p. 54). Eagleton (1983) argues "through the phenomenological theory Husserl 'sought to develop a philosophical method which lends absolute certainty to a disintegrating civilization'". (p. 54)

Writing on Husserl's idea about phenomenology, Thomas (2004) asserts that "Husserl rejected the belief that objects in the external world exists independent and that the information about object is reliable" (p. 4). Instead he argues that people can be certain about how things appear in, or present themselves to, their conscience (Eagleton, 1983, p. 56). Therefore, this implies that certainty ought not to be deduced outside immediate experience. In this way one is able to reduce the external world to the contents of personal consciousness thus enabling realities to be treated as pure phenomena and the only absolute data from where to begin. As Eagleton observes, the aim of phenomenology is 'to return to the concrete, captured by the slogan "Back to the things themselves"' (1983, p. 56).

From such a backdrop, asserts Narayan Prasal Kafle (2011), later theorists such as Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), re-directed phenomenology "form a

phenomenological discipline which focuses on consciousness and essence of phenomena to elaborating existential and hermeneutic dimensions” (p. 181). Applied to research, therefore, phenomenology is the study of the nature and meaning of phenomena. According to Kafle (2011, pp. 181-182) focus in phenomenology is on the way things appear to us through experience or consciousness. The phenomenological researcher aims is to provide a rich textured description of lived experiences.

During the data collection, people’s perception and the experiences lived during a particular conflict situation, and what it meant provided the basis of researcher’s interaction with the respondents. Although the researcher personally experienced some of these conflict situations highlighted in the thesis, during the data collection process and writing the report, the researcher tried as much as possible to block his personal views as he listened to the respondents tell their tales. The researcher described the phenomena given by the respondents by blocking or suspending his personal opinion so that ‘things themselves can be returned to’. Through this, the researcher was able to get the convergence (essence) of the respondents’ experience. After getting the required information from the different sources, the researcher was able to connect them to give a composite whole.

After collecting the data from different sources, the researcher corroborated the information from these different sources with each other. The purpose of corroborating the information was not to confirm whether people’s perceptions are accurate or true reflections of a situation but rather to ensure that the research findings accurately reflect people’s perceptions, whatever they may be. This therefore, helped to increase the researcher’s understanding of the probability that the findings could be seen as credible or worthy of consideration by others.

One process the researcher used in corroborating the data collected was triangulation. Denzin (1978) has identified several types of triangulation. One type involves the convergence of multiple data sources. Another type is methodological triangulation, which involves the convergence of data from multiple data collection sources. A third triangulation procedure is investigator triangulation, in which multiple researchers are involved in an investigation.

Related to investigator triangulation is researcher-participant corroboration or cross-examination. The researcher used all the three types of triangulation in this work. The researcher looked at all the information from the different sources, isolated similar points and merged these points together. In the methodological triangulation, the researcher used different data collection methods to get data from the study population and then used themes developed in the work to place the data collected from these sources in their rightful locations.

The researcher triangulated the data collected by the different research assistants with his own and came up with similar view. This helped in coming up with authentic and representative view of all the people in question.

3.3 Variables/Categories of Analysis

The term variable is derived from variations (Kombo and Tromp, 2006, p. 21). In research variable are properties or characteristics of some event, object, or person that can take different value or amount as opposed to constants such as things that do not vary. This thesis has two variables: the independent and dependent variables. The independent variable is the predictor or explanatory variable and the dependent variable is the outcome variable, the point the researcher is attempting to predict. In experimental research independent variable is that variable that is controlled and manipulated by the experimenter and the dependent variable is not manipulated but

rather observed or measured for vitiations as a presumed result of the variation in independent variable. On the other hand, in non-experimental research, the independent variable is the variable that logically has some effect on a dependent variable. In other words, the independent variable is the presumed cause and the dependent variable refers to the outcome.

In this thesis, therefore, the independent variable is 'intrastate conflicts in Uganda' and the dependent variable is 'management of'. Following from this, the researcher tried to describe the relationships that exist between different tribal and political groups in Uganda while noting some conflict situation and analysed the causal factors of the different conflicts. This led the researcher to study the effects of these conflicts on the harmonious relationship of the people of Uganda in general and northern Uganda in particular. The researcher then moved on to look at the various conflict resolution mechanisms that were used to address some of the conflicts and how such attempts have helped to heal strained relationship between people.


3.4 Area of the Study

The study was conducted in Northern Uganda among the Acholi, Lango, and Madi.

These three tribal groups are found in 14 districts of Uganda. In the map 3.1 below

the area of the research is indicated by the borderline highlighted in purple.

Figure 3.1 Map of Uganda Showing the Area of Research



Source: United Nations Maps of Uganda by Districts, available from <http://www.ugandamission.net/aboutug/map1.html>, accessed on 8th April 2013

3.5 Study Population

In Northern Uganda, the targeted populations for the thesis were the Acholi, Lango, and Madi who live in northern Uganda. The people who were included as respondents are policy makers, researchers, people who lived, experienced or participated in the conflict, the victims of the conflicts, members of the NGOs who were working in Northern Uganda, the military, former rebels, and peace practitioners.

Table 3.1 showing the study population

Tribe	District	No of Sub-counties	Distirct population
Acholi	Agago	09	184,018
	Amuru	04	135,723
	Gulu	17	298,527
	Kitgum	10	167,030
	Lamwo	09	115,723
	Nwoya	04	41,010
	Pader	09	142,320
Lango	Aleptong	05	163,047
	Amoltar	04	96,189
	Apach	10	249, 656
	Dokolo	05	129,385
	Kole	05	165,922
	Lira	10	290,601
	Otuke	04	62,018

	Oyam	07	268,415
Madi	Adjumani	06	202,290
	Moyo	08	194,778
Total	17	126	2,906,274

Source: Summary from 2002 Uganda National Population and Housing Census, pp. 100-107

Table 3.1 above shows all the seventeen districts of Northern Uganda where the Acholi, Lango and Madi are found, and the population of each district. The population figures used in the above table are those got from the National Population and Housing Census of 2002.

3.6 Sampling Techniques and Sample size

Given that the research is qualitative in nature, a non-probability sampling strategy was used to identify the respondents. Within the non-probability sampling technique, the researcher used purposive, convenient, snowball and voluntary sampling techniques.

Purposive sampling technique is a sampling technique in which a researcher chose people purposely based on their knowledge of the phenomena under study. This sampling technique was used to purposely select respondents from hot-spot conflict areas. The people who were selected are those who are knowledgeable about what actually happened during the conflict in their area. These include people who are direct victims of the conflict or those who are perpetrators or the bystanders who knew about the different conflicts in their area.

In areas where the population was scattered, the researcher employed convenience sampling to select the respondents (Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight, 1996, pp. 162-163). In order to avoid choosing people just for convenience sake, when

Others	-	-	-	-	-	37
Total	10	1,872,165	84	25	816,868	297

Source: the researchers' own compilation with reference to the 2002 Uganda National Population and Housing Census, pp.100-107

Table 3.2 above, shows the 10 districts out of 17 in Northern Uganda where respondents were got from. The 10 districts comprised of 84 sub-counties. In order to avoid selecting people from the same place or areas where the intensity of conflict was high were identified. From such areas, the leadership of the area was used to identify respondents who have information on conflicts in their area. In situations where people were identified as respondents and they happened not to be in such areas, they were followed to areas where they have relocated, or called and interviewed on phone. In each of the sub-counties selected, 10 respondents were chosen. In total, data was collected from 297 respondents by using interviews/speeches (86), focus group discussions (211), and observations.

Whereas, the number of sub-counties chosen from some district is not commensurate to the total number of sub-counties therein, the researcher was able to identify conflict hotspot areas in each of the selected districts and avoided to choose two or more conflict hotspots that are adjacent to each other knowing that the people from one of such hotspots could explain what happened at the neighbourhood. In doing so, the researcher was able to collect information that was representative enough to explain what happened in northern Uganda.

3.7 Research Instruments

Research instruments are the tools a researcher uses to collect data from the field. According to Janet Barret (2007, p. 418), the researcher is the basic instrument in research. This notion stems from the distinctive function of the researcher's

knowledge, perception, and objectivity in data gathering. Besides, the researcher's ability to transform the raw data into a coherent whole adds to explicate this notion. The researcher's level of data analysis, developing descriptive codes for patterns in the data, and inductively generate larger themes that emerge interactive passes through the records. This stage also involves getting meaning out of the data, and relating their interpretations to other sources of insights about the phenomena, including findings from related research, conceptual literature, and common experience. Data analysis and interpretation are often intertwined and rely upon the researchers' logic, artistry, imagination, clarity and knowledge of the field under study (Barrett, 2007, p. 419). Hence, taking myself as the basic research instrument, the clarity of my focus, my articulation of what I want to do and my analysis helped me to formulate other instruments of research for collecting and recording the data from the field.

The instruments of research that were used during the data collection process were of two kinds: instruments of data collection and instruments of data recording. Whereas the instruments of data collection are tools that assist in gathering the required information in research, the instruments of data recording are tools that are used to keep record of the data gathered from the field. The instruments of data collection that were employed during the data collection process are: focus group discussion/interview guide, and observation/document analysis protocol.

While designing the data collection instruments, the researcher ensured that the instruments are comprehensive enough. The instruments were designed in a way that they captured the focus and aim of the research, the identity of the respondents and assuring them of confidentiality (see appendix 3). The researcher also ensured that the language used in the instruments was age appropriate, and the issues in them

are arranged in a way that one leads to other following the objectives and research questions. This arrangement helped even those who assisted the researcher as research assistants to collect data from the field without messing up information.

While carrying out interviews, focus group discussions and observation, the researcher ensured that the instruments for recording the data are available all the time. Every interview and focus group discussion, pens and pencils, and papers were used to jot down proceedings. In circumstances where respondents consent to have the proceedings recorded or their photos taken, the researcher used tape recorders and cameras.

3.8 Validity and Reliability

3.8.1 Validity

Cronbach and Meehl first introduced the issue of validity in quantitative research in the mid-20th century in relation to the establishment of the criteria for assessing psychological tests (Kuzmanić, 2009, p. 40). Validity has been linked to the notion of psychometrics and has often served as an argument for disqualification of qualitative research, claiming that qualitative research is not scientific since it does not meet the required objective quality criteria. The question of validity in qualitative research together with notions such as reliability and generalisability falls under a wider theme of quality of research. The importance of determining general criteria of validity within qualitative research relates to the quest for establishing qualitative methods as an autonomous research tradition, not disregarded by scientists within the quantitative positivist tradition.

Validity is the extent to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure and performs as it is designed to perform. It is rare for an instrument be 100% valid, so validity is generally measured in degrees. As a process, validation

involves collecting and analysing data to assess the accuracy of an instrument. There are numerous statistical tests and measures to assess the validity of quantitative instruments, which generally involves pilot testing.

External validity is the extent to which the results of a study can be generalised from a sample to a population. Establishing external validity for an instrument, then, follows directly from sampling. Recall that a sample should be an accurate representation of a population, because the total population may not be available. An instrument that is externally valid helps obtain population generalizability, or the degree to which a sample represents the population.

Content validity refers to the appropriateness of the content of an instrument. In other words, do the measures (questions, observation logs, etc.) accurately assess what you want to know? This is particularly important with achievement tests. If, for instance, one wants to maximise the validity of a unit test for a group of people in a locality, he/she would be required to take representative questions from each of the sections of the unit and evaluating them against the desired outcomes.

To achieve external and internal validity in this thesis, the researcher did the following. For ensuring external validity, the researcher used a score test on the instruments of data collection by giving them to some individuals to read through and see if the questions are clear. These people scored the instrument by ticking the questions that are clear to them and crossing those that are not clear. Then after that the researcher revised the instruments for the sake of making the questions ask what they are intended to ask. Then in order to realise internal validity, the researcher carefully set the questions in the research instruments so that they address the issues the objectives intend to address.

3.8.2 Reliability

Although the term 'Reliability' is a concept used for testing or evaluating quantitative research, the idea is most often used in all kinds of research. If we see the idea of testing as a way of information elicitation then the most important test of any qualitative study is its quality. A good qualitative study can help us "understand a situation that would otherwise be enigmatic or confusing" (Eisner, 1991, p. 58). This relates to the concept of a good quality research when reliability is a concept to evaluate quality in quantitative study with a "purpose of explaining" while quality concept in qualitative study has the purpose of "generating understanding" (Stenbacka, 2001, p. 551). The difference in purposes of evaluating the quality of studies in quantitative research is one of the reasons that the concept of reliability is irrelevant in qualitative research. According to Stenbacka, (2001) "the concept of reliability is ... misleading in qualitative research. If a qualitative study is discussed with reliability as a criterion, the consequence is rather that the study is no good" (p. 552).

On the other hand, Patton (2001) states that validity and reliability are two factors which any qualitative researcher should be concerned about while designing a study, analysing results and judging the quality of the study. This corresponds to the question that "How can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences that the research findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to?" (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 290). Healy and Perry's (2000) assertion that the quality of a study in each paradigm should be judged by its own paradigm's terms that can best answer the question raised. For example, according to Lincoln and Cuba (1985), while the terms Reliability and Validity are essential criterion for quality in quantitative researchers,

in qualitative methods the terms Credibility, Neutrality or Confirmability, Consistency or Dependability and Applicability or Transferability are to be the essential criteria for quality. To be more specific with the term of reliability in qualitative research, Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 300) use “dependability”, in qualitative research which closely corresponds to the notion of “reliability” in quantitative research. They further emphasize “inquiry audit” (p. 317) as one measure which might enhance the dependability of qualitative research. This can be used to examine both the process and the product of the research for consistency (Hoepfl, 1997). In the same vein, Clont (1992) and Seale (1999) sanction the concept of dependability with the concept of consistency or reliability in qualitative research. The consistency of data will be achieved when the steps of the research are verified through examination of such items as raw data, data reduction products, and process notes (Campbell, 1996).

To ensure reliability in qualitative research, examination of trustworthiness is crucial. Seale (1999), while establishing good quality studies through reliability and validity in qualitative research, states that the “trustworthiness of a research report lies at the heart of issues conventionally discussed as validity and reliability” (p. 266). When judging (testing) qualitative work, Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest that the “usual canons of ‘good science’...require redefinition in order to fit the realities of qualitative research” (p. 250).

In contrast, Stenbacka (2001) argues that since reliability issue concerns measurements then it has no relevance in qualitative research. She adds the issue of reliability is an irrelevant matter in the judgement of quality of qualitative research. Therefore, if it is used then the “consequence is rather that the study is no good” (p. 552).

To widen the spectrum of conceptualization of reliability and revealing the congruence of reliability and validity in qualitative research, Lincoln and Guba (1985) states that: "Since there can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the former [validity] is sufficient to establish the latter [reliability;]" (p. 316). Patton (2001) with regards to the researcher's ability and skill in any qualitative research also states that reliability is a consequence of the validity in a study (Golafshani, 2007, p. 602).

Therefore, given the above explanation, in order to enlist reliability in this thesis, the researcher ensured that the instruments for data collection were followed strictly during interviews and focus group discussion. Information got from the respondents through focus group discussion was triangulated right at the source. This, therefore, helped in realising reliable information.

3.9 Data Collection

After identifying the respondents, interviews, focus group discussions, observations, and review of documents were used to collect data from the field.

3.9.1 Focus Group Discussion

Focus group discussion is the process of gathering information from a group of people in a single sitting through the use of FGD guide. The research extensively used this method of gathering data during the data collecting process so as to obtain different perspective on a phenomena that can be triangulated out rightly. It also helped to clarify questions through dialogue, and prevent giving implied position on a given aspect of the research.

The respondents for the FGDs are mostly composed of people who were purposively identified by community elders and research assistants based on their

knowledge about the different conflicts that their community under-went. As these groups were gathered for the discussion, some nearby people voluntarily joined in and provided valuable information about some of the conflicts in their areas of abode.

The researcher started every FGD by introducing himself, informing the members about the reason for collecting the data, and laid some ground rules. Some of the ground rules include: asking members to switch off their mobile phones during the discussion so that there is no interruption of the process, allowing one person to talk at a time, asking the participants to respect each other during the discussion, and requesting active participation of all. As such, most of the respondents felt the climate was not intimidating, free, and conducive for them to express themselves.

After this, the researcher moved on to logically introduce the discussion. During the discussion, the researcher ensured that everyone observed the ground rules laid and the researcher maintained ethical standards in research. At every FGD, the researcher went with another person. As one of them led the discussion, the other person took note or recorded the proceedings of the discussion. In instances where the discussions were tape recorded, the researcher sought for the consent of the members in the FGD before starting to tape record.

Some of the silent issues that emerged during the FGD- like facial reaction, tone, and change of mood were carefully observed and noted in the note book. Noting down such silent issues during the FGD helped to enrich the quality of the data collected.

3.9.2 Interviews

In research, interviews are face to face, one on one collection of data through asking questions related to a study found in interview guide. While most of the participants who were interviewed were chosen purposively because of their proximity to us,

others were chosen because some respondents led us to them. Then other respondents go on board by voluntarily coming to be interviewed after hearing from others that some people are gathering information about resolution of intrastate conflicts in Uganda. The people from whom data was collected through interviews included: community leaders, academics, politicians, religious leaders, and people who have personally experienced the brunt of the conflict in his/her area.

During the interviews, the research team maintained eye contacts with the respondents, asked questions starting from general to specific and probed for detailed explanation. The basis of these questions was the interview guide. In a bid to salvage time, most of the interviews were tape recorded with the consent of the respondents and then transcribed later on.

In instances where the respondents were far, especially the respondents who were identified by others based on their expert knowledge, phone interviews were contacted. However, before interviewing such people, the researcher introduced himself to them, informed them of the reason for the interview, made appointments with them through the person who identified them and agreed on the appropriate time for the interview. This method worked well for the researcher during the data collection process because it saved him from incurring too much on transport. Since there are phone services that facilitate long chats for less money, the researcher exploited these services to aid this process. In most cases while interviewing the respondents through the phone, the researcher recorded the conversation using the voice recorder on the phone.

3.9.3 Observation

Observation of human action provided data about the behaviours of people as well as social processes as they are enacted within the realms of the social reality of

participants. Observation enables the researcher to identify the conscious as well as the taken-for-granted actions that participants rarely articulate despite their participation. These insights were then discussed and extended through follow-up interviews (Daymon and Holloway, 2011, p. 259).

3.9.4 Document review

Besides the primary data collected from the field through focus group discussion, interviews, and observation, the researcher also made extensive use of secondary data. These secondary data were from books, journals, and magazine articles, policy papers, theses, dissertations, audio visual, DVDs, archival materials and periodicals.

Some of the films, video clips and audio tapes that provided valuable information for building up this thesis are:

- a) The Acholi- this is a documentary that has testimonies of different people. Some of the people who gave testimonies are rape victims, community leaders, cultural leaders, church leaders, politicians, journalists and academicians. This alone assisted greatly to tell the story of what happened from the perspective of the people who experienced the conflict.
- b) Account of sexual and gender based violence- this documentary contained several clips compiled by the Refugee Law Project of Makerere University. Some of the clips are entitled 'Gender against men', 'Getting out', 'Justice for torture victims', 'What about us', 'We died long time', 'Ignorance is also dangerous', and '10 years of Amnesty'.
- c) 'BBC World Service-Documentary archive -Ep. 2. This contains an interview by a BBC correspondent of Chris Dolan head of the Makerere University Refugee Law Project and some male rape survivors'

- d) The audio transcripts that was recorded by the researcher. The information from these documentaries and audio record greatly helped to give moving testimonies that re-enforced and triangulated information collected through using other data collection tools.
- e) Then archival materials such as newspaper cuttings, letters and memos have also provided invariable information for this thesis.

In order to get such information, several libraries, websites and archives in Uganda and Kenya were visited. Among the libraries are: Uganda Christian University library, Makerere University Peace Studies library, Nairobi University library, and Kenyatta University library. Besides, a lot of books were also downloaded from the internet, especially from the websites of the University of Peace, University of Bradford, HIIK Conflict Barometers, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) year books, among others. The data from the secondary source which is found right from chapter one to chapter five has helped to enrich the scope of analysis in this thesis.

3.10 Data Analysis

The eventual goal of phenomenological data analysis is to present an exhaustive, analytic description of the phenomenon under study; it should reflect the rich, 'lived' experience of the participants. The description may be in the form of an extended paragraph which indicates the meanings of the phenomenological experience (such as how clients interpret their interactions with consultants) and reveals the essence of the phenomenon (such as the nature of the successful consultant client relationship).

participant's own terms. What you are trying to do is to spell out the meaning of each significant statement according to its original context. This helps to bring out meanings that initially may be hidden

4. Repeat this process for each interview or written account and then organise all the different meanings into clusters of themes.
5. Then provide a detailed analytic description of participants' feelings and perspectives contained in the themes. Colaizzi calls this step 'exhaustive description'. This is where you integrate all the clusters of themes into one account that articulates participants' views of the phenomenon.
6. At this point, you attempt to formulate an exhaustive description of the whole phenomenon under investigation and identify its fundamental structure, or essence, that is, the nature of the successful consultant client relationship.
7. The last step is the 'member check', in which you take your findings back to participants, asking them if your description validates their original experiences. Hycner (1985) advises you to do more than this. He suggests that you show participants a summary of each interview with the themes that you have found highlighted. This enables you to modify your ideas or add new ones (Daymon, and Holloway, 2011, pp. 185-186).

Although the researcher tried to follow most of the stages suggested above, some respondents work were not presented for proofreading, as required by stage 7. This was so in situations where the respondents are not easy to find. But what was done is to play the tape record and ask if they had given the information they offered with clear conscience.

During the stage of data analysis and interpretation, the researcher constructed some matrices that he developed following sub-themes that are under each objective.

This helped the researcher to delve into the knowledge of uniquely historical information. Thus, data was analyzed by “identifying common themes in people’s description of their experiences” and perspectives (Leedy, and Ormrod, 2001, p. 154) about the inter-intra community conflict in Uganda generally and northern Uganda in particular.

Since the events under study occurred in a historical context, a critical investigation of the development of such events and experiences of the past, a careful weighing of evidence and the validity of sources of information on the past and the implication of the weighed evidence was taken into consideration (Onyango, 2010, p. 46). This then assisted in having the data organized categorically and chronologically while reviewing it repeatedly and continually (Creswell, 2003, p. 203). In this work, certain information from respondents are quoted verbatim. However, those respondents who preferred to remain anonymous are not mentioned by name.

Whereas the tape recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, and analyzed by identifying statements that relates to each theme, such information is then grouped together into meaningful units. In the process, divergent information was isolated and put in perspective as isolated or opposing views. This process helped to construct a composite whole (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001, pp. 153-154) as it is now.

3.11 Data Management and Ethical Considerations

Data management is the process of overseeing data that is being generated during a research project. Managing data is an integral part of the research process. It can be challenging particularly when studies involve several researchers and/or when studies are conducted from multiple locations. It should be noted that, data management depends on the types of data involved, how data is collected and stored, and how it is used throughout the research lifecycle.

The outcome of research depends on how well the data is managed. Managing data helps you as a researcher organise research files and data for easier access and analysis. It helps to ensure the quality of your research. It supports the published results of your work and, in the long term, helps ensure accountability in data analysis.

In the process of this research, the types of data that was generated include: sketchbooks, films and audiotape records, correspondence, photographs, video clips, transcripts, codebooks, methodologies and workflows, and standard operating procedures and protocols. After collecting the data, especially interviews that were recorded, films, video clips, and some literature in soft form, the researcher transferred them into the computer, created file folders for each category and stored them safe. Knowing that the computer could easily get some challenges or be stolen, the researcher acquired an external drive and saved the data in it. Furthermore, the researcher kept some of the data by sending them to his email addresses. Then the data that came in hard form, are kept in a safe location in the house, but with the hope of either scanning them or type them so that they could also be kept safely in soft form. In managing the data like this, the researcher was helped to find and understand it when needed, avoid unnecessary duplication, and validate results whenever he required.

In as far as ethical consideration is concerned, while presenting the findings and interpretations, the researcher tried to be as honest and objective as possible. The information presented here does not contain untrue, deceptive or doctored results (Kombo and Tramp, 2006, pp. 132-133). In areas where their researcher had prior information, he did not make such knowledge to be a source of proving if the respondents were knowledgeable, but rather, kept it to himself. Every data that the

researcher collected was kept safe. In instances where the respondents did not want their identity to be disclosed, while presenting the data from such respondents, the researcher used the term 'anonymous'.

In the next chapter, we shall concern ourselves with presenting and discussing the data that was collected following the methods presented herein.

CHAPTER 4

THE POST-COLONIAL INTRA AND INTER ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, a detailed description was given on how data was collected from the field. In this chapter, therefore, the researcher presented and discussed the finding from the field. To ease following the argument derived from the field, the findings are presented and discussed following the objectives of the study, that is: the nature and manifestation of conflicts in Northern Uganda, and the effects of the conflict in northern Uganda on the social cohesion of the people.

Each of these objectives that formed the themes under which the information collected from the field are further divided into sub-themes and such subthemes helped to further break down the presentation and discussions. Whereas some of the data presented are tabulated, others are strictly presented qualitatively.

4.2 The Nature and Manifestation of Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda

The nature and manifestation of post-colonial conflicts in Northern Uganda is best gleaned from a historical perspective. Historically, the relationships between the different tribal or ethnic groups and sub-groups in Northern Uganda have invariably been characterised by both peaceful and conflictual coexistence, even before the advent of colonialism. This fact was attested to by Birch (1938, pp. 119-122), Father Tarantino (1949, pp. 230-234), and Father Crazollara (1954, p. 342), among others.

A closer look at the migration and settlement of the Acholi, Lango and Madi in Northern Uganda reveals that the Madi migrated from the Sudan before the former two tribes. Within these Madi tribal groups, different sub-groups came at different

time. For example, the Madi are said to have come in two waves. The first group migrated before AD1000 and second group came after AD 1000. On entering Uganda, the Madi groups scattered around much of the present Uganda (Nyakatura, 1973, pp. 18, 25, 131; Apuuli, 1994, pp. 1-10). It should be noted that during both periods of migrations, Madi groups were not monolithic in nature but rather composed of diverse Madi Moro linguistic groups (Thomas and Scott, 1935, p. 471). Thus, internal and external conflicts explain their scattering around much of the present Uganda (Nyakatura, 1973).

Hence by the time the Luo arrived in the present Uganda between 1200 and 1300 AD (Clazollara, 1954), they found when the Madi were settled. Perhaps due to their conflictual encounter with the Madi, many of the Luo groups moved southwards and established the Babito dynasty in Bunyoro and subsequently the kingdom of Ankole and Buganda before proceeding to found other kingdoms in Northern Tanzania (Moncreiffse, 2004, p. 5). The few Luo groups that remained behind settled peacefully among the Madi.

Just like the Madi who came earlier on, the history of the Luo was also a history of numerous groups who migrated and mixed with others. However, because of their internal organisation and pride in their language, the constant socialisation, intermarriages, exchange and assimilation enabled the different Luo groups to harmonize their language. Through this process, some of the Madi, especially the Madi Opei group and others, adopted the Luo language.

On arriving in the present Uganda, the different Luo groups also conflicted. Perhaps the Southward movement of the Luo could be partly explained by such internal conflicts amongst the different group over water, pasture and hunting rights. This implies that through such conflictual interactions the weaker groups were easily

subjugated and after which either assimilated or forced to move on. Alternatively, it might have been the brave who decided to move while leaving the weakling to stay behind. Whichever the case, in an attempt to maintain relative peace and protection, the weaker groups that got subjugated were made to pay tribute to the chief of the victorious group. Such tributes were either paid by working for the wives of the victorious chief or bringing a particular part of every game meat from animals they killed during hunting (Atkinson, 2010, pp. 92-95). In some instances, peace between such groups was maintained through intermarriage.

Since the Luo had already adopted and skillfully adjusted to the idea of royalty; most of their groups were headed by chiefs (*rwot* or *rwodi* in plural) who claim royal descent and possessed royal regalia. The most important of these regalia was the royal drum. According to Thomson Harlacher (2009, p. 17), the oral tradition of many Acholi chiefdoms claim that when the Luo groups appeared with their chiefs and royal drums, the Madi who had already occupied the area were extremely impressed and accepted to live with them. It was through such interaction that the Luo language gained prominence to the extent that some of the Madi lost their own language to the Luo. To ensure the togetherness of these groups, the chiefs of the different Luo married from different clans. In some instances others also developed skillful negotiation tactics integrated other clans into their chiefdoms. These chiefs maintained loyalty from the people by extending generosity towards the local population in terms of giving out game meat they received as tribute from subjugated clans (Harlacher, 2009, p. 24).

However, even if a subjugated clan joined any chiefdom, they continued to practice their own traditional practices within the larger political entity. This implies that the clan heads from the subjugated clans continued to lead their clans and settle

internal disputes. Besides, the leaders of incorporated clans were given to play important roles in the chiefdom such as senior councilor of the chief serving as representatives of their people. As representatives of their clans, the clan leaders also acted as spokespersons of their clan in the chiefdom council. This role also involved participating in chiefdom wide rituals whenever they were called upon. Given the immensity of the roles these clan leaders played in the chiefdom, the chief rewarded them with some gifts (Harlachar, 2009, p. 18). This arrangement therefore, helped to reduce the emergence and manifestation of conflicts.

In spite of the tedious process of movements, by the end of the 18th century the different Luo speaking groups had occupied the present Acholi area of central northern Uganda, harmonised their different languages and developed a common socio-political order that distinguished them from other people around (Harlachar, 2009, p. 16). Consequently towards the end of the 19th century, there developed around 70 independent chiefdoms in Acholi area composing of 300-350 clans. The five largest of these chiefdoms, says Atkinson (2010, p. 77), “had a population of 5,000 people”.

Although the amalgamation of the different clans into chiefdoms assisted in scaling down the numerous inter-clan conflicts, it shifted the fault-line of conflicts from between clans to between chiefdoms. In most cases, however, the relationships between chiefdoms within a zone that met far more regularly was cordial compared to the relationship between chiefdoms from different zones that had less frequent interactions. Some of the inter chiefdom conflicts occurred when two or more chiefdoms ally to attack another that they regarded a bully. During such duels, of course, a lot of lives and properties were lost and other people ended up being taken as prisoners of war.

Despite of some skirmishes that took place between the invading Luo and the settled Madi; through trade, political alliances and intermarriages, the Madi and their Luo counterparts learnt to live in peace side by side. With time the relationship became so strong that it helped the two groups to exert considerable influence on each other. Through this process, they were able to adopt each other's' traditions and ritual practices. For example, the Luo adapted the Madi tradition of using the Madi hoe (Madi aco) for paying bride price until such a time when the Luo started using cattle for paying dowry that they acquired through raids (Atkinson, 2010, pp. 100-102). In order to maintain their scarcity and the prestige value, the Madi hoe (Madi Aco or Madi Kweri) were not produced by the Acholi and Lan'gi smiths but only by the Madi. Perhaps this was so because there was scarcity of iron ore in Acholi and Lango area. In order for the Acholi to get this prized item, they engaged in batter trade with the Madi. Besides their trade in the iron implements with the Madi, the Acholi also traded in ostrich eggs, beads and ostrich feathers with people from the East. These items were used for decoration during traditional dances.

By the time the Ateker group moved in large numbers between 1000 and 1600 AD from Ethiopia through Karamoja to the present Lango area, they found the Madi and the Acholi settled. The Ateker and Luo people also intermingled at various points, thus leading to fusion of cultures and the creation of new ethnic communities, particularly the Lan'gi and Kumam (Karugire, 1980, p.7). Like in the case of the Madi, also the Ateker group lost their language and adopted the Luo language. Given their fierceness and war like nature, the Lan'gi (part of the Ateker group) engaged the Madi in a series of fights. On their part, due to their numerical minority and the challenge the Lan'gi were posing to the Madi, the Luo group among whom the Lan'gi settled allied with the Lan'gi against the Madi. According to an extensive research

done by Driberg, who lived among the Lan'gi for seven years as a colonial administrator, there were many traditional songs and games among the Lango alluding to such battles between the Lango and the Madi in which the Lan'gi were almost invariably defeated (Driberg, 1923, p. 29).

However, from 1906, the cordial relationship between the Acholi and the Lan'gi broke down due to a quarrel, thus forcing the Acholi to move away from the fierce Lan'gi (RLP, 2014, p.136). Such a break of the alliance between the Acholi and the Lango made the Acholi to have no option but get to terms with the Madi, who were exerting a great deal of pressure on the western flank of the Acholi. Consequently, in the face of the allied forces of the Acholi, Alira and the Madi, the Lan'gi were forced to give way for the Acholi expansion eastwards (Driberg, 1923, pp. 29-30). Looking at such alliances, one could well say that the alliance between the Acholi and the Lan'gi against the Madi that broke after the overthrow of Obote, leading to the Acholi and Madi to ally against the Langi in the 1980s is not a new phenomenon.

Notwithstanding their losses in battle at the hands of the allied forces, the Lan'gi made many attacks on the Acholi for which the Acholi also reciprocated. However, unlike the Lan'gi attacks, the Acholi did not attack deep into Lango territory instead the Acholi generally used to confine their attacks only to adjacent villages that are peripheral to the Lango core. This was possibly due to the fear that they were ill equipped to withstand the rigor of the Lan'gi in battle (Driberg, 1923, p. 30).

The desire of the Lan'gi to assert themselves and make their presence felt, in spite of earlier losses, made the Lan'gi to lead several attacks on the Madi, who were many days walk away from them. Although these attacks continued to be futile, there

were instances when the Lan'gi raided the Madi and come back with cattle and prisoners of war. In situations where during such raids women and girls taken, those who participated in the raids could marry the women and girls or gave them to their relatives in marriage. This scenario was confirmed to Driberg by Oleny of Aboke who said his "grandfather married a Madi who was carried off on one of these raids" (Driberg, 1923, p. 30). Talking about one of such disastrous raids Driberg asserts that;

But a disastrous expedition against a Madi chief called Kawali it is sung "agungamweng finished his men on the march, because in it the Lango were destroyed by the spate of the river called by them Nyangoragot, than were killed by the Madi. (Driberg, 1923, p. 31)

From the above proceedings we do learn that although there were some border skirmishes between the Acholi and Lango, there were not much overt wars between them unlike in the case of the Madi and the Lango. Up to 1897, the inherent like of war by the Lan'gi made their history to be one of internal strife on one hand and of military assistance lent to warring factions in Bunyoro on the other (Driberg, 1923, p. 33).

However, apart from inter-tribal conflict between the Acholi, Lango and the Madi, there existed inter/intra clan conflicts over pasture, water, land, power and hunting rights. In spite of this, the Acholi, Lango, and Madi tribal groups or clans were not always in conflict. In some instances, these groups also cooperated with one another. They established basic forms of government which gave precedence to the clan. Such clans were so established and managed their own affairs independently, apart from occasions when it was necessary to collaborate with others, such as during wars or cultural festivals (Macrieffe, 2004, p. 5). Whenever tension arose within a

group, before or after a skirmish, one group would move on leaving behind the other in order to avoid further skirmishes. In situations where no movement occurred, the elders from the groups that quarreled could convene a council that every member of the community attended to iron out their differences. In some instances, to pacify the relationship between the tribal or clan groups, intermarriage was encouraged. Hence such intermarriages assisted in helping the different groups to either avoid attacking others or lending their support to one another in case of attacks from an incoming or a neighboring group.

Starting from the middle of 18th century to the Turko-Egyptian attempt to annex Northern Uganda, the people of Northern Uganda have already had contacts with the Greeks, Arabs and Ethiopians (Crazollara, 1954). So, by the time the British dispatched Major Macdonald to set a garrison in Gulu, Northern Uganda, the Acholi, Lango and Madi had exploited their contacts with the Arabs, Ethiopians and the Greeks to acquire modern arms. The presence of these rifles in the hands of the chiefs had fundamentally changed the status of the age-old acrimonious intra and inter-ethnic relations in Northern Uganda. The chiefs started building up retinues of armed followers on the model of the Egyptian administrative posts. They equipped such armies with rifles to attack neighboring chiefdoms and other ethnic groups and rob cattle, slaves and women (Behrend, 1999, p. 16). This situation was confirmed by Mzee Akena Ismail Owile- an Acholi of Payira origin of Lamogi clan in an interview conducted by my research assistant Kitara Wilson. Akena narrated the incident of the war between the Acholi of Palabek under the leadership of King/Chief (Rwot) Bwomono and the Madi under the leadership of their King/Chief Toya in 1905. He said;

When the fight broke out between the Acholi and the Madi, the Acholi of Palabek were seriously defeated. The people of Palabek and their King/Chief (Rwot) took refuge and sought for help from the Acholi of Payira under the leadership of Rwot Awic. Rwot Awic of Payira joined with the people of Palabek to revenge. Although their first attempt to fight the Madi failed and the team was beaten seriously, after a serious reorganization of the population they were able to defeat the Madi.

After this incident, further conflicts between the Acholi and the Madi were prevented through intermarriages. The Acholi and Madi then began to join hands to the fight against other tribes attacking them. Furthermore, business like batter trade also helped to prevent war between the two tribes. (Akena, interview, 17/4/2012)

Indeed, when some respondents were asked about the past relationship between the Acholi and Madi, most of them attested to the fact that the two groups had a mixture of peaceful and conflictual coexistence. Hence, it is therefore wrong, as some academics portray, to say that the Acholi and Madi are war like people. Their practice of settling their differences and joining hands for their common good is commendable.

From the above, therefore, by the time effective colonial administration was set up in northern Uganda, intra and inter-ethnic, chiefdom and clan conflicts were actively in play. The native report on the pacification of the Acholi of 1910, for example, shows the rough degree to which rifles had spread. Consequently, when the colonial administration began to register guns and disarm the Acholi in particular, the

chiefs of Gondokoro and Gulu were in possession of nearly 1500 rifles (Behrend, 1999, p. 17).

After setting a garrison, Macdonald signed a series of treaties with the local chiefs in an attempt to legalise the British colonial administration's hold on Northern Uganda and also control the flow of guns. In fact, Behrend (1999) continues to say "And there is a note in the 1913 report that- in the month of March alone, more than 1400 rifles were collected" (p. 17). With such fire arms in their hands, the chiefs in Acholi like Awich of Payira clan took advantage of the Nubian mutineers who were in his service to inflict pain on other chiefdoms. In some instances, rifles and military powers were used to settle past squabbles. Consequently, the attempt by the colonial administration to collect these rifles that the local chiefs used to inflict pain on other groups with met some sort of resistance. It was precisely because of this that the Lamogi Rebellion of 1911-12 in East Acholi emerged. It was only after crushing this rebellion and the deportation of Rwot Awich to Kampala that a state of peace ensued briefly in east Acholi.

The little peace experienced after reducing the numbers of rifles helped to curtail instances of raids for cattle and the desire of some chiefs to subjugate others. Unfortunately, from 1912 when the British colonial administration attempted to replace the deposed chiefs with those that they appointed, a new set of cycle of violence ensued. We should note here that such squabbles did not only confine themselves within chiefdoms or clans, but rather extended across tribal boundaries. For example, under the British colonial rule, the Acholi and Madi were imbued with tribal characteristics. According to John Markakis (1994), "The Acholi were encouraged to think of themselves as "warrior race", while the Madi were regarded as peace loving intellectuals.... Yet both the Acholi and the Madi were in fact a colonial

creation" (p. 123). Such a wrong conception by the people was eventually manipulated by unscrupulous politicians for their own selfish gains. According to Young (1976, pp. 216-273) this worked negatively to sowing the seed of divisionism. Such divisionism led to the development of "us and them" tendencies.

In 1906 the Acholi and the Lan'gi were driven into a terrible conflict by a British colonial official called General Bwana Tong who was the district commissioner of Lango. The death of Bwana Tong's body guard, a Munyoro, purported to have been killed by the Lan'gi, acted as a starting point to this conflict. In an attempt to punish the Lan'gi, Bwana Tong crossed to Acholi where he mobilised the chiefs to wage war against the Lan'gi as a revenge for his body guards' death (RLP, 2012, p. 16). This act sowed the seed of discord between the Acholi and Lan'gi. This therefore, made most respondents to say the recent events such as border disputes and military coups have just come to deepen the already existing wound of the two tribes.

It is right to state that colonialism in itself facilitated and activated conflicts in Northern Uganda in significant ways. They were able to set the people against each other by their use of the divide and rule policy. Further still, by using the local people to torture their kinsmen, and creating artificial boundaries to divide people into districts, the colonial administrators increased the avenues of conflicts between the people of northern Uganda.

Some respondents say, the colonial administration forcefully removed the traditional chiefs who tried to resist their rule and replaced them with people from chiefdoms or clans that cooperated. These new chiefs who came to the helm of authority unexpectedly became a source of pain to many. To enable the colonial administrators appreciate their hard work, these newly installed chiefs and headmen

forced the local people to do work in a dehumanizing manner. To help these newly appointed chiefs wield real power, the colonial administration allowed them to have access to rifles. But unfortunately, some of these chiefs started to use the privilege of maintaining “a monopoly of force for self-aggrandizement and as an instrument of vengeance against old and new rivals” (Behrend, 1999, p. 17). Perhaps it was due to such misuse of power that the Acholi decided to reject some of the authorities of the chiefs imposed on them. Instead, they elected their own chiefs (rwodi or jogi kweri-chiefs of hoes) who assisted in settling and administering local issues like land disputes and so forth.

As noted above, the local people rejected the newly elected chiefs imposed on them by the British colonial agents. They referred to them as “rwodi kalam” because of their arrogance, harshness and referred to some of them as foreigners who did not know their systems (Odoi, 2009, p. 107). Because of the Lamogi rebellion, the practice of imposing chiefs on local population affected the Acholi area more than Lango and Madi area. For example, when Rwot Okello-Mwaka was imposed on the Puranga, Rwot Alikes of Payira was given authority over the Labongo clans and Rwot Atyak was deposed in 1927 because of failing to carry government orders and replaced with Atayo from Patiko (Karugire, 1975, p. 125). A lot of discontent was registered by the clans on whom people of other clans were imposed. In situations where the colonial administrators attempted to amalgamate different clans together, a great deal of resistance ensued to the extent that clans ended up fighting with each other. A good example of this was the refusal of the Alero clan to be amalgamated with the Koc and other clans just as the Paimol refused to accept a chief to be imposed on them. The continuous resistance of the Paimol clan to this chief eventually led to the eruption of an uprising in 1918 that was brutally crushed and the

leaders of the uprising killed in a public firing squad so as to instill fear in the rest. Unfortunately, the public execution did not kill the spirit of the people to resist. When Lakidi-chief of the Paimol was replaced with Amet chief of the Lira-Amiel, increased hostilities ensued between the two clans (Odoi, 2009, p. 108).

What took place in Acholi sub-region was not quite different from what was experienced in Lango and Madi sub-regions. The contest for favour from the colonial administrators and torturing of local people by their agents were the same. An isolation policy was, for example, preferred for the Madi by the colonial administration, especially after the First World War. To cover up this deliberate policy that prevented people of Madi sub-district from moving about, they argued, the Madi might infect other people with diseases like sleeping sickness which they were suspected to have been carrying. Yet the real matter was that- since the Madi had an elaborate interaction with the Arabs, they feared that the Madi, who they thought were corrupted by the Arabs, would corrupt the others. To enforce this isolation policy, while in Acholi and Lango the colonial administration administered by using local language for communication, among the Madi they used English as a medium of communication. According to Markakis (1994, p. 125) this explains why the Madi do not have a complete bible in their own language to date.

After the brief scan of the pre-colonial relations between the Acholi, Lan'gi, and Madi, let us now turn to analysing the nature and manifestation of conflicts between these three tribes during Uganda's post-colonial period.

4.2.1 The Nature of Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda

Ethno-Political Conflicts: Power Struggle and Legitimacy

The relationship between and amongst the Acholi, Lango and Madi, at socio-political level, during the immediate postcolonial Uganda was a direct reflection of their pre-

colonial and colonial period relationships. They related both cordially and conflictually at different times.

Recalling what he witnessed, Opigo Dominic Barigo (O.I, 14/ 2/ 2010) nostalgically noted that during the immediate postcolonial period, the three tribes related cordially. As a matter of fact, Opigo asserted that at national or public functions “whenever the Acholi were staging traditional dance, President Milton Apollo Obote, Felix Onama, Idi Amin Dada and a host of Acholi dignitaries could all join the dance and danced next to each other cheerfully”. This shows a spirit of solidarity, oneness of purpose and cross cultural relationship. Possibly this was brought about by their belonging to the same party, the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) or their thinking that they all hail from northern Uganda.

Notwithstanding the externally portrayed unity brought by the political party affiliations, like in other parts of Uganda, affiliations to the two principle parties, the UPC and DP, along religious and denominational lines created a sense of division amongst the people of northern Uganda. It should be noted here that, while a good number of the Acholi and Madi are Roman Catholic, the situation in Lango is different. When the non Baganda within the UNC broke away and formed the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) with Apollo Milton Obote-a Lan’gi and Protestant as its leader, the competition between the UPC and DP party members at the national level trickled down to the lower levels. The bitterness this caused re-ignited the old animosity between tribes and clans that had been somewhat suppressed by the colonial machinery. According to Opigo (O.I, 23/3/2011), in Madi sub-region, the situation got tense to the extent that a certain girl called Angella, though a Roman Catholic but because her father was a supporter of UPC, was dismissed from a Roman Catholic founded school. In the Acholi sub-region, since the majority of the Acholi

were members of the Roman Catholic Church, UPC did not receive an outright support. Although people from other parts of Uganda seemed to see the UPC as a political party headed by a person from the north, so the northerners supported it massively, in reality it was not the case. Instead, there arose a lot of contestation between the Acholi and the Lan'gi as to how a Lan'gi could lead the Acholi who regarded themselves highly.

Given the obtaining political tension at the time, in the Acholi sub-region the local communities went to the extent of composing songs to show this political divide and their subsequent detest for each other. Those in the DP sung "*Muni oyube me nyono wii wa*" which is literally translated as "it was a design by the Europeans to sit on us". On the other hand those in the UPC sung "*kwon pa DP pe acama*" which literally mean "I cannot share food with the DP" (RLP-Pader, 2012, p. 11). A careful look at these phrases illustrate how party politics did even divide family members who used to sit together to share food.

Besides the party politics, the relationship between the Acholi, Lan'gi and Madi at the political level was dented by, first, the murder of Brigadier Yere Okoya and his wife at their home in Gulu in 1970, and second the 1971 and 1985 military coup d'états. Looking at the murder of Brigadier Okoya in 1970 as a source of political divide between the Acholi, Lango and the Madi, some of the Acholi thought Okoya's murder was authorised by Obote and executed by Amin. Since Amin was not a Madi, why should the Madi suffer such assumed position other than the Kakwa tribe where Amin came from? The problem is the geographical responsibility. Because people in Acholi or Lango do not know how to differentiate the people of West Nile, at times the Madi have ended suffering for crimes they did not commit. Whether it was Obote who ordered for the killing of Brigadier Okoya and his wife or

not, a rift had developed that led to destruction of trust and harmonious living. Yet according to Dick Nyai and Haruna Ndema (Conference presentation, 17/3/2015) Okoya's father said it was an Acholi who killed the Okoya's on their compound near Gulu town. This corroborates the statement Yobbo (2009, accessed 30th December 2013) that Okoya's father exonerated Amin from his son's murder.

The coup d'états that came in 1971 and 1985 just added fuel to the already tense state. The majority of the respondents in Acholi and Lango said the overthrow of Obote by Amin with the aid of Onama (Obote's Minister of Defence) and western powers and its antecedent effects on their people made them see everyone from West Nile, first as betrayers, secondly as their tormentors, and thirdly as a source of their woes. Since the Madi are part of the West Nile group, they were seen to be the same as the people of Amin. As such, they saw the government of Amin as illegitimate because he did not come to the presidency with the popular mandate of the people. The assumed illegitimate nature of Amin's government, coupled with his henchmen's weeding the Acholi and Lan'gi in the government, made the Acholi and Lan'gi to organise rebel groups so as to fight back. Eventually when they succeeded with the help of Tanzania and other Ugandan dissident groups to overthrow Amin's regime in 1979, they had to pay back. Indeed, Kutesa (2006) succinctly narrated what took place in Arua when the Uganda National Liberation Front/Army UNLF/A reached.

Although the Madi welcomed the Tanzanian Liberators and lived with them harmoniously, save for some pockets of killings of purportedly former soldiers of Amin, plus raping of women and sodomy, the situation turned violent when the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) army replaced the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces (TPDF). Between 1981 and early 1985, the scotched earth policy was employed by the UNLA forces in some areas of Madi, the current Adjumani and

Moyo districts. The soldiers burnt houses, looted household properties, removed iron sheets from houses and schools, looted food stuffs like groundnuts, maize, cassava and sim-sim from people's gardens, and raped women and girls at will with impunity. In some instances, when the UNLA soldiers were rapping people's wives, daughters, sisters or mothers, men were forced to witness so as to prove that they were really defeated. Dramile (O.I, 21/7/2009) confirmed this assertion by saying "soldiers forced a certain gentleman to make his sister lay in his laps as they rapped her".

According to Nzima (O.I, 12/11/2011), such a daunting humiliation brought about by the behaviour of some of the soldiers forced a section of the Madi to take up arms against the government. Although Nzima (O.I, 3/11/2011) seemed to have seen the emergence of the rebellion in Madi sub-region as a way of preventing the UNLF forces from destroying properties and killing innocent people, General Moses Ali added other reasons for the emergence of the rebellion. During an interview with General Ali, he said;

We were soldiers ourselves. They chased us out of power and our sources of income. We wanted to come back to power. Since they forced us out through the use of arms, we had to organize ourselves and return through the use of the same. (O.I, 16.12. 2011)

The above assertion indicates that the struggle to hold onto power at all cost was a must because he who is in power has whatever he wants. Therefore, maintaining state power meant having everything at one's disposal. Hence, getting someone out of such position creates a contested state.

In the contest of power that ensued, some of the Madi joined the UNLA army. Whenever there were fights between the rebels and the government forces, the rebels could instruct their brothers in the UNLA to turn the cape of their hats

backwards for easy identification. In some instances, Madi soldiers in the government army would intentionally leave bullets for the rebels at the battle field. The rebels would pick and use for more attacks (Lomure, O.I, 18/5/2009). This made the Madi rebels also to inflict great pain on government forces. The information from these documentaries and audio record greatly helped to give moving testimonies that re-enforced and triangulated information collected through using other data collection tools. Some Madi took advantage of the chaos to start accusing their enemies to the UNLA soldiers. The soldiers killed the accused people in the guise of killing rebels. Usually, when such situations occurred, reprisals at clan and family levels took place (Nzima, O.I, 12/11/2011).

The friendship between the Acholi and the Lan'gi did not last for long. At the peak of the Luwero Triangle war of 1981-1985, the Acholi in the army started to accuse President Obote and his Lan'gi cohorts about their behaviour. Among the accusations that were leveled against Obote were exposing the Acholi to die in the war while keeping the Lan'gi away from the battle front, setting some parallel command structure during the execution of the war thus undermining the command of General Bazilio Olara Okello who was supposed to be the overall commander of the front line. The situation got worse after the death of General David Oyite Ojok. The death of Oyite in itself caused some internal rift between the Lan'gi of Loro where Oyite comes from and the Lan'gi of Akokoro where Obote originates. The reason being that the Langi of Loro thought Obote was responsible for the death of their son. Although this tension still exists between the two clans in Lango, they have managed to keep the conflict at a simmering level.

However, after the death of Oyite, much as there were senior Acholi officers who could have replaced him, Obote's delay and subsequent appointment of Brigadier

Smith Opon Achak, a junior army officer, to the position of chief of staff infuriated the Acholi in the army. The resultant military coup of 1985 organised by Acholi army officers was a direct effect of this. Immediately after this coup, the new government expelled most Lan'gi from government positions and the army. In Lira and Apac, a lot of looting of Lan'gi households by Acholi soldiers took place. The behavior of the soldiers during this period was characterized by absence of law and order (Gersony, 2004, p. 11). To prove the old saying that there is no permanent enmity or friendship in politics right, when things became tough Bazilio Olara sought the support of the UNRF I and FUNA (Ali, O.I, 16/12/2011). This event made the Acholi and Madi to sort out their differences and joined against the Lango.

As the Lan'gi were sulking and mourning the loss of power, the brutality and the looting meted on their people and properties, they retaliated by killing some Acholi who were staying in Lango sub-region. This act also made the Acholi to respond in a similar measure (Ameny, O.I, 3/12/2011). This situation made Erik Sam, a Lan'gi, to say;

Because of the overthrow of Obote and the subsequent looting of properties, killing of innocent civilians, defecating in hotels, government offices and other public places plus the general destruction the Acholi soldiers caused in Lango, I had hated the Acholi to the extent that I did not even feel like seeing any of them. (O.I, 1/12/2011)

The hatred and unfriendly relationship between the Acholi and Lan'gi, as portrayed above, was further aggravated in 2002 when the LRA extended their operations in Lango sub-region. The abductions, looting of food stuffs, and killing of innocent people done by the LRA on the Lan'gi brought back the memories of what some of the Acholi did to them after the overthrow of Obote II government. In one of the

focus group discussion conducted in Lango sub-region, the respondents said “the way the LRA rebellion made the government to force the civilian population into the IDP camps where our people encountered untold suffering is hard to bear with” (FGD-L1, 23/3/2010). As such, after the Barlonyo massacre in which over two hundred people were purportedly killed by the LRA rebels although the LRA denied having done it-made some Lan’gi retaliated on some innocent Acholi who were in Lira. The Acholi youth in Gulu were also prompted to reciprocate by beating up some Lan’gi, at the time, living in Gulu.

In fact, the LRA war did not only entrench bitterness of the Langi on the Acholi, but the Madi on the Acholi. Although some Madi like Odego (aka Jurukadi), Alice Auma and her father Kibero Lokoya, among others, played a key role during the early phase of the armed rebellion in Acholi land, the phase of the rebellion they participated in did not see such virulence on the civilian population as the LRA conflict did. Accordingly, given the emotions observed during data collection and the views expressed by most respondents from Lango during interviews and FGDs, a tense relationship still exists between the Acholi and Lan’gi. This is why, according to a respondent who preferred anonymity (interview, 21/12/2011), when Olara Otunu was elected to lead the UPC party, most Lan’gis opted either to join the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) or the National Resistance Movement (NRM).

The LRA rebellion did not only set the Lan’gi, Madi and other neighbouring tribes against the Acholi but it also set the Acholi clans against each other. In a Focus Group Discussion held in Kitgum, a respondent said;

Because of the insurgency in northern Uganda, people from other parts of Uganda regard people from Northern Uganda to be killers. Whereas in Northern Uganda, the people neighboring Acholi think the Acholi are the ones

who are killers. Then within Acholi people blame the people of Gulu where Kony comes from. On their part the people of Gulu blame the clan of Kony and the clan blames the family as the family also blames Kony as a person. (FGD-K1, 23/11/2011)

The transfer of blames from one group to another, as seen above, has further complicated the situation. In such a game of blame, Kony himself could also end up blaming the people for whom he purports to be fighting for.

The LRA rebellion has sparked off inter-clan conflicts in many parts of northern Uganda from 1988 to present. One such example of the conflict was the conflict between the Pajong and Pubec. Describing this conflict, Kitara asserts;

At the height of the LRA insurgency, the LRA abducted a young man from the Pubec clan. In an attempt to hide his place of origin, the young man deceived the LRA that he was from the neighboring Pajong clan. Some years after the man's escape from the LRA in 2002, the rebels followed him to recover their gun. On failing to trace for him they retaliated on the villagers and brutally murdered 56 Pajong clan members. The death of these innocent members from Pajong clan sparked off a great deal of animosity between the two groups to the extent that even after the rebellion, the Pajong clan could not let the Pubec occupy the land which they had occupied before the conflict. As a result of this frequent unrest between the two clans, post conflict resettlement in Mucwini Sub-County became hard. (O.I, 2/12/2011)

In such a circumstance where clans have taken arms against each other, even if one was not a party to the conflict, due to group dynamics one can easily be attacked for no good reason. The situation of the conflict has been further complicated when land

rights have been brought in. The Pajong are now saying the Pubec should go back to the place where they originated from. The big question is where is this land that the Pubec are to go to?

In another part of Kitgum, Oguti (O.I, 16/2/2009) argues, inter clan conflict arose when a former NRA spy gunned down a man from another clan, possibly alleging him to have been a rebel. This made the members of the clan of the person who was killed to revenge on the clan members of the person who killed their clans mate. A similar situation occurred in Pader district between the Jo Kalyech clan and members of the Karwot clan. According to Okidi (O.I, 28/6/2010);

The conflict between the Jo Kalyech and Karwot began when a member of the Jo Kalyech clan was killed by someone from the Karwot clan. As a result of this, the people from the Jo Kalyech clan avenged the death of their member by attacking the Karwot clan. This attack forced the Karwot clan members to flee and the Jo Kalyech people destroyed and looted their properties, thus ushering in a tense condition between the two clans for sometime.

Apart from the examples mentioned above, there are related cases across Northern Uganda. Some of the sad examples are situations where such victims were forced to kill a relative or a person who was trying to escape so as to discourage them from escaping or get courage to do more. In fact another girl was forced to bite her sibling to death. So when she escaped from rebellion her relatives took her for a murderer, yet the death of her sister was not her own initiative.

a) Religious Conflicts

Besides the ethno-political conflicts expressed between the Acholi, Lango and the Madi, most respondents say another form of the postcolonial conflict in northern

Uganda is religious conflicts. This form of conflict was ushered in when foreign religions and the introduction of religious denominations concurrently with the colonial administration. Although the introduction of Christianity, in particular, assisted to transform Northern Uganda by wiping out some bad cultural practices, it equally brought in negative relations at local levels. When the Christian missionaries set foot in Northern Uganda, Scott Appleby's (2002) "Ambivalence of the Sacred" thesis was proved right. The two Christian denominations, Roman Catholicism and Anglican Protestantism, in the course of their competing for followers, set sharp divisionism between kinsmen, a situation that continued well in the postcolonial Uganda (Odoi, 2009, 113). The division that this new religions brought has somewhat curtailed free interaction between people. Even services like education and healthcare became segregative.

Although religion in itself is not a problem, its politicisation can lead to great damage in human relations. In northern Uganda, as elsewhere in Uganda, the aggregation of UPC and DP along religious/denominational lines over time made the political elites to use it to cause division amongst the local community. Tense was the situation such that many people found themselves caught up in conflicts they did not know.

In such a scenario, as elsewhere in Uganda, the Muslim whose missionaries did not introduce educational and health services suffered greatly. However, it was not until when the Protestant Missionaries opened the door of their schools and health centers that the Muslims started to go to school and receive better health services. Furthermore, at one time, these apparent religious differences made marriages across denominational divides to be difficult. In extreme cases this state that ensued made people start looking at each other with suspicion, whether they were related or not. In

Madi area this went to the extent making some people to see those with whom they go to the same church closer to them than their own blood relatives.

In another development, the education the missionaries introduced required adaptation of European Christian values as opposed to traditional African values. This ended up setting the young generation against the old people. Indeed as Karugire asserts, “The introduction of western education and values effectively disenfranchised those who for one reason or another did not get that education to become spectators rather than participants in the colonial administration” (1975, p.144). The fact that education had become the passport for one to work in the new dispensation made the chiefs who did not get exposed to this new order to lose their positions to the young people. In some cases these new administrators were sons of the former servants of the traditional chiefs.

In Acholi area it led to the emergence of the terms “rwodi Kalam” (chiefs of the pen) and “rwadi moo” (chiefs of oil) to differentiate the chiefs who were appointed to such position based on their attainment of education and those who were anointed with shea butter. With such terminologies in place, the rift between the old generation and the new one became obvious. Therefore, when the young generation accepted to be used by the colonial administrators as change agents, the older generation regarded them as spoilers of cultural norms and values, especially when it came to torturing elderly people who are poll tax defaulters.

b) Resources Conflicts

In Northern Uganda the contest over natural resources is centered on land and forest reserves (FGD-LI 1, 24/1/2010). Land conflicts arose because land is an important resource. It is a commercial asset that can be used and traded. It is a critical factor of production, it is an essential part of the national patrimony, and it is a key factor in

shaping individual and collective identity. Therefore, to deny someone land means denial of an important Human Rights and social justice (IDC, 2008, p. 1). Although virulently contested now, the conflict over land in northern Uganda between the Acholi, Lango and Madi is not a recent phenomenon. As noted elsewhere at the beginning of this chapter, the contest over land forms part of the history of migration and settlement of the different communities in the region. Whereas the conflicts over land for pasture and hunting rights during the earliest period of migration and settlement were settled through one of the conflict parties' relocating to a fresh place, the increase in population that made people to take a settled life could not warrant them to do the same.

In a study carried out for the World Bank by Margaret Rugundya, Eddie Nsamba-Gayiiya, and Herbert Kamusiime (2008, p. ii), 85% of their respondents experienced threats to tenure security to the extent that 59% felt these threats to be significant. Furthermore, the same study revealed that unlike in previous years where there were minimal cases of land conflicts, the current trend of land dispute has shown steady rise from 12.8% at the time of displacement to 15.5% during displacement and 16.4% prevalence during the post conflict period. Indeed during the data collection process for this study, many respondents confirmed that there was a substantial occurrence of land conflicts in different parts of northern Uganda. These conflicts are expressed between and within ethnic groups, clans, and families. At another level, there are conflicts expressed between local communities and government institutions. Table 4.1 below shows examples of clans that were in conflict over land and their location within northern Uganda.

Table 4 1 1 Showing Examples of Clans that have Conflicted or are in Conflict over Land in Northern Uganda

Tribe	Clans in Conflict	Sub-county	District
Acholi	Ngachino & Pobar; Pobar & Rudi;	Agoro	Lamwo
	Lupulungir & Kila; Rudi & Kila; Obere & Kila Mogi Gem & Pachwa; Idobo & Kal Odoko Taya;	Lalogi	Amuru
	Palaro & Lukwo; Lukwo & Koro; Palaro & Lukal; Oyapele & Ofodro Lamogi & Paboo	Paboo	
	Gem & Lapyem; Ogole & Palwo; Angako & Pachiko	Atiak Acholibur/Laguti; Pajule	Pader
	Pajong & Pubec; Ywaya & Alokolum Palaro & Atiak; Koch & Bobi	Muchwini Anaka Palaro; Omonro/Alero	Kitgum Nwoya Gulu/Nwoya
Lango	Bako & Onywal Ityeda	Okwang Amugu	Otuke Alebtong
Madi	Pabongo & Lajopi; Palanyua & Lowi; Lowi & Pabongo; Paloka & Pabongo; Lajopi & the Muslim Community; Pakelle & Ali; Ali & Pabongo	Adj. Town Council Ofua	Adjumani

Source: the Researchers' own Compilation from Field Data

From the above highlight of the nature of conflicts in Northern Uganda, it has been revealed that these conflicts have been manifesting between and amongst the local communities of Acholi, Lango and Madi. Furthermore, some of these conflicts were between these tribal groups on one hand and the government or investors on the other. Even though the intensity of its current nature and manifestation could be different, these conflicts are a continuation of the pre and postcolonial social and political conflicts in the developing world. This therefore, affirms the notion that conflict is part of humanity and it has been in existence from time immemorial at all levels of human relation.

Apart from the conflicts that were expressed within the local communities, there also exist conflicts between tribes and districts. From the data collected, it was

found out that the conflicts in this category were caused by: shifting or disappearance of boundary markers between tribes and districts; competition by tribes to use natural resources like forests; political jurisdiction vis a vis tribal occupation; and deliberate influence of the local communities by their leaders to encroach on the land of other people (Most FGDs).

The land conflict over disappearance or shifting of boundary was found to be prevalent in Lalogi sub-county between Oyam and Gulu Districts. The conflict over political jurisdiction verses tribal boundary pitched the Acholi in Pader District against the Lan'gi who are in Pader District. Based on a interview with a respondent (Anonymous, 2/3/2012), the curving out of some Lan'gi into Pader district was a political move by the late President Milton Obote to get votes in the then Kitgum District. He said that since most of the Acholi were members of the Democratic Party, Obote feared to lose out from among the Acholi. So he curved some people from Lango into Acholi sub-region, who would be able to give the required votes for him in Acholi area. However, this later on turned against the Lan'gi, who found themselves in Pader District because the Acholi in Pader say Pader district belongs to the Acholi not the Lan'gi.

The Madi who settled in Bibia-Ellegu currently in Amuru District also demand the place to be reverted to Adjumani district, since they are not Acholi. As the battle for Bibia was going on, some Acholi from Amuru have also encroached on the land of Adjumani district claiming that it is their land. In 2012, this struggle drew the attention of the officials from the Ministry of Land, Housing and Natural Resources. These officials' attempt to show the demarcation between Adjumani and Amuru District attracted angry reaction from some youths of Amuru District. These youths wanted to fight the people from Adjumani who accompanied the ministry officials at

the spot of contest (Dramwi, O.I, 2/2/2012). Some respondents from Adjumani District said the Acholi from Amuru district are being encouraged by their member of parliament to encroach into Adjumani District. Given this political backing, some of the illegal occupants took the law into their own hands and harass strangers. In fact Dramwi (O.I, 2/2/2012) observed that there was a time a certain youth from Amuru shot a UPDF soldier with an arrow thinking that the UPDFs were deployed to protect Madi interests. This event forced the army to respond by killing one of the youths and injuring others.

Regarding the land conflict between the government or investors and the local communities, the summary on table 4.6 below explains it all. According to the respondents, forceful taking of land from the local communities by the government for game or forest reserves and construction; allocation of land belonging to local communities to investors; and local communities' occupation of government land-are the major causes of the land conflicts between the government or investors and the local communities.

The forceful eviction of local communities from land gazetted for wild life and forest reserves as seen from what is happening in Adjumani, Kitgum, Gulu, and Oyam districts, is yet another manifestation of conflict between the local people and the government. While in Adjumani and Oyam districts the conflict between the local people and the central government is over allocation of chunks of land for wild life reserves, in Gulu, Pader and somewhat Kitgum districts, the conflict is over allocation of land for forest reserves. Writing about the eviction from Adjumani districts' "East Madi Wildlife Reserve", in The New Vision News Paper, Martin Okudi notes that;

Over 180 households, majority of them from Amuru and Adjumani districts who have unlawfully encroached on the East Madi Wildlife Reserve are set for

forceful Recently, UWA evicted 99 households in the reserve. (Okudi, *The New Vision* 30/12/2011)

Although in the above case it was the people who encroached the game reserve and are refusing to leave the land where they were settled during the LRA insurgency, there are some places where the government took community land for forest reserves without following proper channels of land acquisition for public use. In either case, such forceful eviction of people on land led to conflict between the two parties. Much as, if the government wants to take a portion of community land for public use there are conditions of acquiring it, in most cases government institutions at local levels fail to follow such regulations, thus resulting into conflicts. For example, in Kitgum district at Labongo Amida sub-county, one case still baffling the sub-county administration is a case where an old woman is claiming that the sub-county offices were built on her land without due compensation as required by article 26 2)a of the 2005 land act and article 237 2)b of the 1995 Constitution.

Another type of the land conflict found in Northern Uganda is the un-transparent acquisition of land for commercial use by investors and local people. In Aleptong, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader districts, the Madhivani Group of Companies, the Divinity Union Limited and Salim Saleh were cited by many respondents to be the main culprits engaged in this type of land conflict with the local community. While in Aleptong President Museveni is said to have taken chunks of land from the local people for his farm (Opio, O.I, 13/9/2011), in Pader, Kitgum and some parts of Amuru districts, his brother Salim Selah attempted to open a farm through his company Divinity Union Limited, for growing cereals. Furthermore, in Amuru district, the allocation of chunks of land to Madhvani Groups of Companies and the acquisition of large portions of land by Indians in Kitgum and Pader districts have

drawn a lot of anger from the local population. The anger this generated made a certain teacher in Lira district to say;

The allocation of these chunks of land for people from other parts of Uganda is being done by Omara Atubo, the Minister of Lands, who has forgotten that he is a Lan'gi. If I could only get a chance of getting near him, I will kill him because it seems our peoples' staying in the protected camps is good for him.

(Anonymous, O.I, 23/2/2009)

Such statements coming from an educated person gives a negative impression. The simple implication that can be drawn from this is that people feel bad whenever they see their land being taken by the powerful and influential people in the community. This made them to devise ways of fighting to retain their land.

Although in the forgone case the problem was between the local communities and some investors, there are also cases of land dispute that emerged between the local communities and government institutions when, from the 1980s, some people intentionally settled on portions of government land or land earmarked for road reserve and stubbornly refused to vacate these pieces of land. In Adjumani district, for example, Adjumani Town Council is in conflict with many people because of their refusal to vacate portions of land designated as road reserves. The Town Clerk of Adjumani Town Council said;

Although we have compensated some of the claimants of these portions of land, they have refused to leave. Whenever we try to send the tractor to open the roads, people from these communities pick sticks and threaten to beat our workers if they do not leave. (Lagu, OI: 14/4/2010)

The occurrence of land conflicts, as note above, has retarded development given that they frustrate both government and individual development programmes.

4.2.2 The Manifestation of Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda

The post-colonial inter and intra ethnic conflicts in Northern Uganda manifests between and amongst the Acholi, Lango and Madi. Though some of the conflicts are simmering, in most cases, they manifest violently. The conducts of the parties in these conflicts were extreme as such adversely affecting their cordial relationship.

4.3 Causes of the Postcolonial Conflicts between the Acholi, Lango, and Madi

From the data collected through interviews, focus group discussions and analysis of relevant literature, two broad causes of conflicts have been established. These are the ethno-political causes and social causes of the conflicts. In the presentation, therefore, we shall start with presenting the political causes of the conflicts and after which the social causes of the conflicts would be presented.

a) Causes of the Ethno-political Conflicts in Northern Uganda

When the various respondents were asked to mention and explain the causes of the ethno-political conflicts at both the national and local levels, majority of them cited the issues that are summarized on table 4.2 below.

Table 4 2 showing the Causes of the Postcolonial Ethno-political Conflicts in Northern Uganda

<p>The murder of Brigadier Pierino Yere Okoya and his wife by agents purported to have been sent by Milton Obote.</p> <p>Overthrow of Obote by Amin in a military coup and its antecedent virulence shown on the Acholi and Lan'gi, thus acting to pitch the Acholi and Lan'gi against the Madi.</p> <p>The 1978 overthrow of Amin and the repressive retaliation shown to the people of West Nile between 1980 and 1985 that made some Madi to dislike the Acholi and Lan'gi,</p> <p>Overthrow of Obote by Tito Okello, an event seen to have united the Acholi and Madi against the Lan'gi,</p> <p>And the series of rebellions starting with the Kikosi Malum, UNRF1, UPDA, HSM, HSA, and LRA.</p>

Source: field data

From table 4.2 above, the main reasons the respondents gave to explain the postcolonial ethno-political conflicts in Northern Uganda are: the 1970 murder of Brigadier Yere Okoya and his wife, the 1971 and 1985 military coups, and the several rebellions that emerged to challenge the legitimacy of the governments of the time. The respondents said the following in explaining this.

During the interviews, most of the adult respondents who witnessed the murder of Brigadier Yere Pierino Okoya and his wife stated that starting from that time, the relationship between the Acholi and Lan'gi, on one hand, and the people of west Nile on the other, worsened. Although no one was named as the killer of Okoya and his wife, some people thought it was Amin who ordered for it. According to Boyi-Yobbo (a blog posted on 10/24/2009), those who hold this view give two reasons to explain why Amin could have done so. The first reason was the quarrel in a senior command meeting in November-December 1969 after the attempted assassination of President Obote's at Lugogo. Then the second reason related to the above is the failure of Amin to rescue President Obote when his life was threatened and Okoya

who was far was the one who, on hearing the news, rushed and protected Obote. Amin feared that Obote could promote Okoya in his place. According to Nyai (Conference speech, 17/3/2015), unlike those who thought Amin killed Okoya and his wife, Okoya's father and General Tito Okello Lutwa gave descending views that seemed to be exonerating Amin of the murder. In August 1985, shortly after Obote was overthrown for the second time, the elderly father of the late Okoya told a tribal meeting in Gulu that his son had not been murdered by Amin. Then in 1994, when General Lutwa accompanied President Museveni to open a health center in Gulu, he was said to have commented;

There are some people who up to now know who killed Okoya but they are quiet. Okoya was killed in the same way that Colonel Omoya was killed... Right now you have started to gang up under the same system and the people who killed your sons. (Yobbo, a blog posted on 10/24/2009)

The question is, who was General Lutwa referring to? Was he referring to Lakwena and Kony who were in the bush fighting, was it to Amin who was in Saudi Arabia, or to Museveni who was with him?

Although Yehuda Ofer (1976, p. 60) says by the time Okoya was killed Amin was in Cairo, President Obote had planned to exploit this situation to trim Amin's popularity within the army by starting to rumour that Amin had a hand in this assassination. When Felix Onama, the then Minister of Defense, who had investigated the murder learnt of the plan of President Obote to detain Amin on his return to Uganda over the trumped-up charge of assassination of Okoya, the spirit of neighbourliness came up. Consequently the plan to overthrow Obote was hatched by the two close associates of the president.

According to Opigo (O.I, 13/4/2010), the elaborate ritual that was performed at the burial of Okoya and his wife, like burying him with brooms and a sheep could as well explain the emergence of the protracted conflict in Northern Uganda. Whichever way the murder of Brigadier Okoya and his wife could be explained, the significance of this event to this thesis is that the event created a rift between the Acholi and Lan'gi on one hand, and the Madi of West Nile on the other. Hence, instead of the previous cordial relationship that existed between the political leadership from Northern Uganda, the leaders started to be cautious of each other. This made the masses at the local levels to start doing the same.

Opigo (O.I, 13/4/2010) further asserts that "The blame and counter blame brought about by this and other issues like Obote's attempt to move to the left were used to organize a coup d'état against him in 1971". While some people celebrated the 1971 coup, at regional level, it caused further severance of relationship between the Acholi, Lan'gi and the Madi. The mass murders of the Acholi and Lan'gi during Amin's reign further worked to complicate this situation (Nyeko, workshop speech, 21/11/2011). It made the Acholi and Lan'gi to stand against the Madi. As such, when Amin was overthrown in 1979 and the Acholi and Lan'gi who were in the UNLA reached Madi area they ended up revenging on the innocent civilians.

The attempt of the Madi to defend themselves against the UNLF forces caused untold suffering to the local people (Ali, O.I, 16/12/ 2011). While the UNLF soldiers killed and destroyed properties, the rebel group also caused a lot of havoc to the government forces. From 1979 to 2006, there have been active rebel groups in Northern Uganda. The activities of these rebels have invariably set them against the local people. In most cases, while some of these rebels were in active rebellion, they chose to inflict pain on their own people or the people at the neighborhood. At the

end of active rebellion, whenever such characters came back home, the people on whom they inflicted pain attempted to revenge. In some instances such revenge was directed to innocent relatives of those who did the havoc. In the Acholi sub region, for example, the crimes committed by the LRA rebels have set the relatives of those who committed the crimes against the communities where such crimes were committed. In such circumstance, a person became a victim and ends up bearing responsibility of another person just because he belonged to the clan or family with another person who committed the crime.

b) *Causes of the Religious Conflicts in Northern Uganda*

When the respondents were asked about the causes of religious conflicts, they gave the following responses. According to William Pashi (O.I, 11/1/2014), one of the causes of religious conflicts is the threat by family of people who convert from one religion to another. Most victims of such come from the Muslim community. When a Muslim converts to Christianity, his/her family threatens to kill or beat him/her if he/she does not renounce Christianity. When Christians convert to Islam they are not persecuted. Apart from such conflicts brought by inter-religious conversion, there also exist intra religious conflicts as a result of crossing to another denomination of the same religion. Due to such intra religious rivalry, a respondent who preferred anonymity said his grandfather was forced to stop paying his fees at a university just because some people rumoured that he had converted from Roman Catholicism to Anglicanism (O.I, 20/4/2011). The tension this cause at local level make is hard for people to interact freely thus frustrating social cohesion of the local people.

Another cause of religious conflict in Northern Uganda is the wrong interpretation of the holy books, the Bible and the Quran. At the intra-religious level in regard to Christianity, Pashi (O.I, 11/1/2014), asserts 'instead of preaching the

word of God, some preachers from certain Christian denominations attack and denounce the practices of other denominations'. In one FGD conducted in Adjumani, a respondent said 'the same is true within the Islamic faith, whereby the Tabliques regard other Muslim sects irreligious because to them they are following wrong practices' (FGD AD 1). Whenever the one who was attacked attempts to respond, bitter exchange ensues thus sparking ugly exchanges.

At inter-religious levels, conflicts between Christians and Muslims are brought about by some Muslim clerics interpreting the Bible wrongly to their convert. While the Muslims do this to Christians, Christians seem not to bother reciprocating. Although the conflicts generated by such have not reached to the crisis level, it has caused a dent on harmonious relationship between members of denominations and religious groups (Pashi, OI, 11/1/2014).

The involvement of spiritual medium and the strong character of cult leaders also ferment conflicts in Northern Uganda. The activities of Alice Auma, Kibero Likoya and Joseph Kony, perfectly fulfilled the saying of Besadau and De Juan (2008, p. 7), that religious or theological ideas such as values, commandments, and beliefs, as well as their interpretation, and the (possibly idiosyncratic) traits of individual religious leaders can ferment conflicts. This is the premise that Alice Auma used in 1987 to form the Holy Spirit Movement from the vestiges of the Uganda People's Defense Army (UPDA). She used the guise of being possessed by a spirit of a dead Italian soldier, Alice set herself to liberate the Acholi from the gruesome killings, rape, and destruction of food and water points by the NRA. She used this as a basis to wage a rebellion on the advancing NRA forces. With a strict spiritual code like: renouncing witchcraft, remaining chaste, prohibition of smoking, drinking of alcohol or quarrelling; removing all sins in their lives and dedicating themselves to the work

of purifying the Acholi and the nation of Uganda, Alice recruited over 15,000 people into this rebellion (Mutaizibwa, May 21 2011, *The Observer*). Through using a combination of myth, voodoo, traditional beliefs and quotes from the Bible, Alice made her followers to believe that the bullets of the government soldiers would not harm them if they lived a life of spiritual purity and anointed themselves with water and shea butter. The rebel forces were required to carry stones to the battle field. They were made to believe that when they throw these stones they would turn into grenades and explode. While at the battle field, the rebels were required to go singing and some with the Bible in their hands (Allen, 1991, pp. 370-374). With much vigour and enthusiasm, the need to be liberated made the local people to believe in Alice and supported her agenda.

The defeat of Alice Auma Lakwena in 1987 made her father Severino Lukoya Kiberu to come into play to gather the vestiges of her forces to continue the fight 'to save the male Acholi youth from Museveni's plan to destroy them' (Gersony, 1997, p. 29). Referring to himself as 'God the Father', Kiberu asserted that the powers of Alice had been transferred to him (Gersony, 1997, p. 29). Okidi (O.I, 22/3/2012) asserts that unlike Auma, Kiberu was not friendly. He used force to coerce people to believe in his being the successor of his daughter. People in their desperation believed in him. Those he convinced to follow him were made to be singing while going to attack the enemy. But unfortunately this trick did not work out for him. When they attempted to do so, many young boys and girls were mowed down like grasshoppers by the NRA forces who were using superior weapons.

In 1989 the rebellion of Kiberu ended when he was captured at the battle field by the NRA forces (RLP, 2014, p. 148). Since around the same time Kiberu came on the scene, another person who claimed to have gotten a spirit possession in the name

of Joseph Kony, had come up, the vestiges of the forces of Kiberu and Auma got organized under his leadership. Claiming to be a mouthpiece of God, reinforcing the Ten Commandments and acting as a political oracle in a time of profound crisis, Kony won the approval of the people to lead them in their liberation struggle (Gersony, 1997, pp. 30-31). To reinforce the loyalty of the people to his leadership, Kony used a syncretistic belief that incorporated aspects of Acholi traditional belief, Christianity, Islam, and witchcraft to deceive the masses of the people to accept his agenda (Ereku, O.I, 12/12/2011). All in all, the conflict the activities of Auma, Likoya and Kony generated set the local people against each other since those who believed in what the leader says saw the rest of those who did not support them as enemies.

The grabbing of schools founded by one Christian denomination also caused by another was another source of conflicts. Some respondents say this kind of conflicts commonly manifest between the Anglican Church and the Roman Catholic Church. When the researcher asked how such conflicts come about, some respondents say in most cases some priest from the Roman Catholic Church influence the local community to change of foundation body. In most cases they make the schools first to become a community school there after they work to have it changed to Roman Catholic foundation. During an interview (2/6/2010) with a respondent in Adjumani who preferred anonymity, one of the Roman Catholic priest was quoted to have said 'we started fighting with the Protestants some time back and we shall continue to fight until we take over this school'. In Lira, reverend Jennifer Luwum (O.I, 22/3/2013) observes she witnessed such a conflict between members of the two Christian denominations.

Leadership struggle within religious groups is also reported by some respondents to be a source of religious conflicts in Northern Uganda. According to

Ocheng (O.I, 4/1/2014) a leadership crisis arose among the Muslims of Adjumani that show the removal of the former Imam and replacing him with another one. Besides this, there is also a rift between the Muslim community from Yumbe who are resident in Adjumani and those whom they got there. The significance of such conflicts to this study is that they have caused a lot of rift between the local people, thus shuttering the social cohesion amongst the people.

Marriage across religious divides is another source of religious conflict. This is fiercely contested when a Christian man attempts to marry a Muslim lady. But when Muslim men marry Christian ladies the Christians do not react that way. In attesting to this, Avudraga Robert (O.I, 4/1/2014) asserts "I was refused to have access to my child and wife because my wife's parents said unless I convert to Islam they will not allow their daughter to come to me". The expression of such conflict act to shatter the social cohesion of the people.

Whereas the above issues that were identified by some respondents are pertinent issues in the religious conflicts, other respondents reasoned that the underlying issue is the use of religion as a political tool for subjugation. The understanding here is that when a person from a particular religious group or denominational group is put in a position, the members of that particular religion or denomination are set to benefit (Most FGDs). As such, when the local population are made to easily belief in political leaders who come up with such statements.

c) Causes of the Resource based Conflicts in Northern Uganda

The natural resources like land has caused conflicts in Northern Uganda. These conflicts are expressed between and within tribes, clans, families, districts, government institutions and the local population. Several causes of land conflicts were given by the respondents during interviews and focus group discussions.

Besides, some of the literature that were consulted also reported some of the causes of land conflicts in northern Uganda. On table 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, the summaries of the causes of land conflicts in Northern Uganda are given, then explanations to the same follow after table.

Table 4.3 Showing Causes of Inter-intra Clan or Family Land Conflicts in Northern Uganda

1. Boundary because land markers have disappeared
2. Taking of communal grazing, forest or farm land by an individual for personal possession
3. Unscrupulous acquisition of land by people from other parts of Uganda for commercial farming e.g. Madhivani Group of Companies desire for land for sugar cane plantation and the desire of land by Gen. Selah's Divinity Union Limited in Amuru District.
4. Death of elders who were conversant with land demarcation
5. Wrongful witness after receiving bribes from the rich
6. Intentional settling on the land of other people who had gone into IDP camps by others who remained around and their refusal to vacate such land
7. Misunderstanding of the land law (after 12 years the land becomes yours)
8. Upgrading of some former IPD camps into trading centers and the refusal of some people to vacate land given to them for temporary settlement during displacement
9. Population increase that could not be supported by small portions of land yet the people need to survive by extending their land boundary for agriculture purposes
10. Greed by a section of the people to acquire land for resale thus ending up selling other people's land
11. Segregation of people based on tribes/clans or family background
12. Erosion of cultural ties and family affinity
13. Disrespect of elders by the youth
14. The need to chase formerly welcomed people or their attempt to deny land to the descendants of those who welcomed them
15. Communal solidarity-where a whole community takes to fight over loss of land by an individual
16. Denial of land for the weak, elderly, orphans and widows by the community
17. Ownership conflicts due to legal pluralism-i. e. when several people claim ownership of the same portion of land due to multiple sale of the same land by the owner to different people; or due to lack of legal ownership documentation.
18. Eviction of people from land by some people who claim real ownership over land
19. Sale of land that belongs to other people or community
20. Refusing land for disfavored wife and her children
21. Land inheritance conflicts within a clan, or family
22. Renting of somebody's land for financial gain without the owner's due authorization.

Sources: Field Data from Interviews and some Literature on Land Conflict in Northern Uganda

The above table shows resource, in particular land, conflicts amongst the local people.

A closer study of the issues raised by the respondents revealed that local people's conflicts over land in northern Uganda revolves around issues of acquisition, retention and usage.

Table 4.4 Showing Causes of Land Conflicts between the Government/Investors and the Local Communities in Northern Uganda

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Government taking community land for game or forest reserves 2. Government taking people's land for constructing administrative structures on it without appropriate compensation 3. Community land allocated by the government to private developers (e.g. the case of Divinity Union Ltd and Madhvani groups of companies in Amuru and other parts of northern Uganda). 4. Land Boards giving mandate to an individual to get title on a communal land without consulting with the local community 5. Communal land allocated for construction of schools, roads or health centers without compensating the former occupants (e.g. in Adjumani Town Council) 6. Occupying government land by individuals 7. Unclear demarcation of state land by armchair land officers 8. Government allocating individual or communal land for IDP camps or army/police barracks/posts (as in Acholi and Lango sub-regions). 9. Proposed Security Production Program seen as the government's intention to demarcate and register land so as to grab the land because that can now allow individuals to sell off land originally communal in nature (as in Amuru district). 10. Government possession of land given to NGOs during displacement without the consent of the land owner (e.g. the case between Otim and Kitgum district local government) |
|---|

Sources: Field Data from Interviews and some Literature on Land Conflict in Northern Uganda

Table 4.4 shows the causes of land conflict between the local people and the government/investors. A closer look of table 4.4 above reveals that the conflicts between the local people and the government are over land usage and ownership. In certain circumstances the government is on the wrong because it was found that it has not acquired the land following proper procedures. In other instances it is the local communities that invaded land the government designated for development or forest and wild life reserves. However, the significance of this to the study is that it led to

the emergence of conflicts between the local people and government institutions/investors.

Table 4.5 Showing Causes of Land Conflicts between Tribes in Northern Uganda

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Shifting, or disappearance of boundary markers between tribes/districts 2. Forest reserves that used to be used by both tribes as between the Acholi and Lan'gi in Lalogi sub-county is being claimed by one tribe/clan. 3. Political jurisdiction verses tribal boundary (as in Lango and Acholi in Pader/Lira districts) 4. Intentional encouragement by some Members of parliament to their people to occupy other peoples' land as in the case of the Amuru and Adjumani border conflict in Ellegu and Appaa |
|--|

Sources: Researcher's field data from interviews and some literature on land conflict in northern Uganda

From table 4.5 above, we see some of the causes of land conflicts between the Acholi, Lango and the Madi. In most of the conflicts identified disappearance of boundary markers, need for use of forest resources, political jurisdiction and intentional encouragement by political leadership of the local people to occupy pieces of land are responsible for the land conflicts. These conflicts mostly manifest around border areas.

When asked during the data collection process about why there are many land conflicts in Northern Uganda, most of the respondents attributed the genesis of the current land conflict in Northern Uganda to the different politically motivated conflicts that led to the rise of rebel groups in Northern Uganda. Of all the rebellions, the LRA rebellion in particular, was singled out to have been responsible. As Levine and Adoko (2006, p. 1) argued, in 1996 and 2002 when the conflict between the LRA and the government of Uganda was intensifying, the UPDF forced millions of civilians into Internally Displaced People's (IDP) camps across Northern Uganda. Although the government argued that this was a security plan meant to protect

civilians from rebel attacks, the very supposedly good plan eventually turned into a source of new conflicts. While in the IDP camps, people were denied access to their ancestral land. It was said by some respondents that whenever a person was found in his/her original place of abode, such a person was declared a rebel. So strict was the order that people decided to abandon the idea of going to do any work on their ancestral land. Eventually, some people took advantage of the absence of the people on their land and claimed such empty pieces of land for themselves.

However, a drastic turn of events occurred in 2006 when the LRA and the Government of Uganda began the Juba Peace Talks. The signing of the cessation of hostility and other items on the agenda of the peace talk saw the return of calm to Northern Uganda. Consequently, this state ushered in a new lease of life to the people. Given such apparent peace, the Government of Uganda encouraged the displaced people to return to their ancestral lands from the IDP camps. Indeed, the United Nations office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that over 90% of all IDP's have returned to their villages and homes as a result of this encouragement from the government. However, most of these returnees' excitement of returning home to engage in agriculture after losing their livestock during displacement was frustrated when they found their pieces of land had been grabbed by other people.

The problem of the returnees from the IDP camps was further compounded by the land tenure system practiced in Northern Uganda. During the data collection process, it was found out that unlike in other parts of Uganda where people follow mailo, freehold, and lease hold land tenure systems that attaches legal ownership over pieces of land, in Northern Uganda most people still follow the customary tenure system of land ownership. Although both the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of

Uganda and the 1997 Land Act (as amended in 1998) recognise the customary tenure systems alongside the mailo, freehold, and the lease hold tenure systems; the lack of official documentation showing the demarcation and the parties who own such pieces of land in customary tenure has made it a tricky way of owning land. Hence, those who are knowledgeable and powerful take advantage of such a fluid system to exploit the weak and powerless on their rights over communal land.

This problem was further compounded by death of elders who were conversant with the boundaries of the different pieces of land (Oywellu, Conference presentation, 22/3/2014) and the disappearance of land markers given the absence of the elders who knew where the markers were (ARLPI, 2010, p. 13). Some unscrupulous people took advantage of this to grab land. When the people on whose land the illegal occupants had settled came back from the IDP camps, the illegal occupants refused to vacate. They argued that the land laws of Uganda covers them because they had stayed on the said pieces of land for some time now (Ogenga-Latigo, Conference presentation, 21/3/2013).

The situation was even made worse where orphans, widows and the elderly found people settled on their ancestral land. The vulnerability of these groups was exploited to the maximum by those who considered themselves powerful and well connected. In some cases, the situation got tight to the extent that some of the elderly and widows had nowhere to go back to. Those who were born in the IDP camps or other places of refuge are undergoing worse experiences. The loss of the boundary markers as well as the weak institutions that could be easily compromised by corrupt officials made no one to clearly tell the young generation who did not know the boundary of their ancestral land. Hence, the need for the rightful owners to possess

their land sparked off conflict between them and the illegal occupants (Ogenga-Latigo, Conference presentation, 22/3/2013).

It was found out that some land conflicts arose due to the misinterpretation of customary land laws and a lack of understanding of people's land rights. In the customary tenure system, women and children do not have rights over land. The right of ownership of land by women is dependent on their surviving husbands. Once the husbands of these women die, and they refuse to be inherited by any of the late husbands' surviving brothers, these women's rights to land ceases. When asked why people treat widows like that some respondents said;

Why should a widow be allowed to possess the pieces of land for her late husband after refusing to be inherited? Suppose she brings another man from a different clan to remarry her; would the people of her late husbands' clan still have any right over that land? Since it is more likely that the new husband would want to even inherit the land and other asserts in a widows' possession, the best thing is to deny this widow rights over her late husbands' land. (FGD, G. 2)

Although article 33 (i); 33 (ii) 6 of the Ugandan constitution advocates for full and equal dignity between men and women, equal treatment in politics, economy, and social actions; and condemns laws, customs, cultures/traditions which are against the dignity and welfare or interest of women or which undermines their status; the above description gives the fact that many people still hold to their culture. That is why they can boldly say "culturally women do not have right over land". Unfortunately, this cultural position is enforced by the 1997 Land Act sec. 27, as amended in 1998 that says "any decision taken in respect of land held under customary tenure...shall be in accordance with the customs, traditions and practices of the community concerned"

(Kagwa, 2010, p. 28). The denial of land for women in the context of institutionalised male dominance in a vertical structure with very high correlation between position and gender, legitimised by gender is a manifestation of extreme patriarchy (Gaultang, 2003, p. 40).

In the case of orphans, the customary land law only recognises boys of a certain age to have the right of inheritance to their late fathers' pieces of land. However, in many instances after the death of their fathers when the uncles of these young boys inherit their mothers, the uncles also take over the pieces of land left by their late brothers and give the orphans limited access to the pieces of land. In as far as girl orphans are concerned, it was found out that if their mothers refused to allow one of the brothers' in-law to inherit them, the orphans were chased away with their mothers from the land of their late father. The argument advanced in support of such acts is that since these girls would eventually get married to people from other clans, allowing them to own pieces of land in the absence of their father would make the clans they would marry into end up taking over such pieces of land.

Some of the land conflicts were found to have been caused by the refusal of some people to vacate IDP Camps. In most cases such conflicts pitched the bonafide land owners against the people to whom the government made them to give land for settlement during the rebellion. The reasons for this is because after staying in the IDP camps for more than two decades, the life in the camps turned out to be more attractive for some people. Since some of the former IDP camps have turned out to be trading centers, a lot of economic activities take place in them. As a result, there are some people who preferred life in these former IDP camps to going to start a new life in their ancestral areas. In order to keep hold on these pieces of land, some of the people in former IDPs are trying to use the current land amendment laws of Uganda

to claim ownership of the plots they were given to settle on during the time of insurgency (FGD, AM, 1).

Related to the above, the illegal sale of family land by member(s) of the family without due consent of the rest of the family members. This practice was more prevalent in the former IDP camps and urban areas. In regard to illegal sale of land in the former IDP camps, some respondents in Gulu district had this to say;

On realising that some of the former IDP camps in Amuru, Gulu, and Pader districts have been earmarked to be developed into Town Boards and Town Councils, members of some families from whom the government requested the land on which the IDPs had settled started to connive with people who are interested in pieces of land to illegally sell plots of land to those who want to buy them without the consent of their family members. (FGD-G.1)

In trying to expound on the above, Rubangakene (O.I, 18/3/2012) said a classic example of such occurrence was in Anaka where a young man got himself into a bitter conflict with his father because he sold part of the family land without consulting the father.

In regard to illegal sale of land in towns that causes conflicts, two examples among many come handy. The first example happened in Adjumani district where a certain man sold a portion of their family land without the consent of the rest of the family members. According to Pashi (O.I, 2/6/2011), when the rest of the family members got to know about the deal and tried to protest the sale of the piece of the land, the person who bought the piece of land tried to use legal means to possess that piece of land by force. However, when the issue went to the land tribunal, the magistrates' court and eventually the high court, the family members were able to get back their land. Although the family regained their land, enmity has already been

created between the two groups of people. Hence, instead of looking at each other as neighbors, these people have now become enemies.

The second example of illegal sale of land that led to conflict happened in Gulu in Pece Division. In narrating this incident, Rubangakene had this to say;

In Pece division of Gulu Municipality, a certain man left his sister to take care of his plots of land. This man, during the active period of the LRA rebellion, relocated to Kampala. While on this land this lady got married and brought her husband to stay with her on her brother's land. Then when calm returned to northern Uganda and the real owner wanted to start making use of his land, he found the husband of her sister had sold some part of the land. He did not only sell the piece of land, but he also tried to claim that since he had stayed on this land for more than ten years, he is now the bonafide owner. This situation alone acted to divide this man with his sister to the extent that they could not see eye to eye. The situation became so tense that the owner of the land took his brother in law to the courts of law. (O.I, 18/3/2012)

From the narrative of Rubangakene we could deduce that some people who remained took advantage of the properties of people who were not around. Perhaps they thought these people had gone not to come back to their properties. These two examples is a clear revelation to the fact that land is an important asset that denying the right to it to a person means denying livelihood. It is also important to note that regardless of how close people have been, when issues over land are not settled amicably, it can cause relations between people to be shattered just as we have seen in the above examples.

Furthermore, the struggle over land was found to stem from inheritance or sharing of family land. While this in rare cases manifest at the clan level, in most

cases it plays at family levels. Oryema Erinayo narrated one example of such a family feud over land in Pader district that involved half-brothers. He says;

There was a man who had children from two wives. One of the wives produced only one son and the other one has produced about three sons. It so happened that the wife who had given birth to one son died some time back and the other wife was the only wife that survived. This surviving wife connived with her sons to chase away the boy whose mother had died from the family land. The issue was taken to be settled by the elders. When the children of the surviving wife saw the elders had sided with their half-brother they decided to take the case to the courts of law. Up to now the case has not been settled. (Oriama, O.I, 13/2/2010)

The way people try to renege land based on majoritarianism, regardless of whether they are using the land or not, show peoples' ill intentions. Good enough in the conflict case mentioned above the elders testified truthfully. However, taking the case to the courts of law worked negatively to widen the divide between these brothers.

Some respondents observed that the current land wrangle in Amuru is a result of people's greed for land and other natural resources. Ogenga Latigo (Coference presentation, 25/6/2013), for example, asserts that "different pronouncement of fertility, productivity, oil and other minerals motivated all Ugandans and outsiders to come" to Amuru. Unfortunately some of these people started to go to Amuru before people started going back to their ancestral land from the IDP camps. In other words, those who settled on the empty land were motivated by the absence of people on much of the land in Amuru district during the period of displacement.

Apart from the people who acquired land in Amuru from other parts of Uganda, some indigenes of Amuru also attempted to individualise communally owned land by

denying farmland and gardens for the rest of the members of their clan. Since those who felt deprived did not have any alternative land to settle on, they were forced to act in ways that pitched them against the person(s) who grabbed their land. In some instances this state was aggravated by some Local Council officials or village elders who, instead of assisting in settling these land wrangles, ended up siding with the wrong parties in the conflict.

The arbitrary boundaries that were drawn to separate groups of people who did not know what a boundary was before caused land conflicts. Hence, "such lines drawn on colonial maps or images in peoples' heads were increasingly operationalized, reinforced and reified" (Odoi, 2009, p. 115). The struggle that this later on caused to ensue translated into tribal politics. This made power and influence in Northern Uganda to start being expressed through such fault lines. This made people to start competing for scarce economic investment opportunities.

From the above, we could deduce that poverty among the poor and greed among the rich has contributed greatly in bringing about land conflicts. The rich people seem to be taking advantage of the large scale unemployment and low economic opportunities that afflicted much of Northern Uganda to deny some people land rights. The need to preserve their rights over communal land made the weak and powerless to use other means thus leading to conflicts.

Besides the above reasons that led to the occurrence of land conflicts in northern Uganda, respondents like Okidid (OI, 22/3/2010) attributed the occurrences of land conflict to an increase in population over the years. Since the distribution of relief food rations have stopped after the end of the LRA insurgency, there is now increased demand for land for cultivation purposes so as to support feeding the increased population. As people try to access land for food production by starting to

claim back the land that their ancestors had donated to schools or churches, conflicts are sparked. Such claim is so rampant in northern Uganda to the extent that some people are trying to get back the land their parents or grandparents gave to some communities (Ogenga-Latigo, Conference presentation, 25/6/2013). Those who try to do so claim that since their population has grown and the land on which they settled is not enough for them, there is need for the people who were welcomed by their grandparents to leave so that they would have enough land for cultivation. The problem with this is, where do those who are being required to leave go? Hence the attempt of such people, as in the case of the Pubec and Pajong in Mucwini in Kitgum district, and the Jo Kalyech and Karwot in Pader district.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons plus wrong use of money acts as a catalyst to all these. The use of the gun in 2007 for chasing away people from their land in Amuru district by Colonel Oketa, and in Appa in 2013 by UWA officials and the police attests to this.

4.4 The effects of the Conflicts in Northern Uganda on the State and Social Cohesion

The conflicts that have been raging amongst the people of Northern Uganda have left a great deal of effects both on the government of Uganda and the local people. In this sub-section, we shall turn our attention to explain this, starting with the effects of the conflict on the state and then the effects of the conflict on the local people.

4.4.1 Effect of the Conflict on the State

The different conflicts that emerged in Northern Uganda affected the state on a large scale. Table 4.6 below summarises some of the major effects of these conflicts on the state.

Table 4 6 Showing the Effects of the Conflict on the State**1. Economic Cost**

- a) Cost of the war to Uganda after 20 years: \$1.7bn.
- b) Cost of the war to Uganda annually over 20 years: \$ 85m
- c) The annual cost of the war is approximately equivalent to Uganda' total annual income from coffee exports
- d) The equivalent amount of money could provide safe, clean drinking water to 3.5 million people per year – or the total population of Liberia.
- e) Conflict slowed down government efforts to cause development

2. Relational cost

- a) Peoples' mistrust and loss of confidence in the government as reflected in voting pattern
- b) Taught people the way of taking power by force
- c) Loss of human resources as a result of brutal killings and exile
- d) Led to brain drain where a lot of skilled man power left the country for other countries

Source: GSCOPNU, (2006), *Counting the cost: Twenty years of war in northern Uganda, Gulu:* GSCOPNU, pp. 7-8, and field data

The above table presents the data from the study done by other people and the respondents who were consulted. The data reveals that the conflict in northern Uganda had economic and relational effects. These effects are discussed as below.

To start, the political conflict experienced by Ugandans brought in the culture of taking up government by use of arms instead of the use of constitutional means. Starting with the military coup that was waged by Amin in 1971, capturing power by coups became a trade mark. Among other known coup attempts were: the 1972 attempt by General Charles Arube; the 1975 attempt by Lieutenant Colonel Gori; the 27th May 1980 coup by General David Oyite Ojok and Paul Mwanga; the 27th July 1985 coup by Generals Bazilio Olara Okello and Tito Okello Lutwa; the March and September 1986 alleged attempts by unspecified army officers to topple the NRA government. The October 1986 alleged attempt by Paulo Mwanga, Doctor Kirya,

Lwanga and Nyanzi; and the 6th January 1987 alleged attempt by unspecified individuals (Marshal, n. d, p. 7) to take over power add to this list. In all these, some innocent people lost their lives and properties, thus causing a lot of division at social cohesion at national level (FGD-AM 1, 19/2/2010).

The series of conflicts created a high level of mistrust at political level. In most cases the moment close people turned to be bitter enemies, the bitterness that follows is detrimental. A good example is the case of the bitterness that ensued between the political leadership in Acholi, Lango and Madi due to the coups and counter coups that were organized by members from these communities. The twenty years of civil unrest in Northern Uganda destroyed, the trust of people from Northern Uganda on the current political system. Although the government could have address this conflict like it acted on other rebellions in other parts of Uganda since 1986, their failure to do this made the people in northern Uganda to confirm their suspicion. Invariably, this has sown seeds of hatred, bitterness and deepened the age old north-south divide in Uganda. To some extent, some section of the people from Northern Uganda saw this as a planned genocide by the NRM government on their people given that some of the ways employed were cruel. This is especially with reference to the rape of women by reportedly people who tested positive with HIV and AIDS.

The insecurity, wanton destruction of properties and human lives, cramming people in the IDP camps where they lived in squalid conditions, retarded economic and social development of people in Northern Uganda (FGD-DO 1, 14/2/2010). To contain the situation, a lot of State resources were wasted to support the worthless war (as seen in table 4.6 above). Some people were accused of using the insurgency to enrich themselves by diverting the funds meant development of the war affected areas for their self-enrichment. Through such, state resources that were meant to do right

things ended up being wasted by few individuals. As a result, post conflict reconstruction presents a huge challenge to the government of Uganda. Unless something is done to handle the corrupt officials who squanders monies meant for programs meant to leapfrog the people into better lives after their IDP camp experiences, some people in northern Uganda will continue not to trust the government.

During the conflict period, many people took refuge to other countries. This resulted into brain drain. The same is true up to date as some of the people who ran out of the country think Uganda is not yet safe to return to. The apparent politics of identity that was created made some of those who went into refuge to fear being identified negatively on return. Hence, to avoid such dehumanisation and demonisation attributed to them as killers, rapists, thugs, and so forth, they are better off staying in exile.

The people who were abducted by the rebels have bitter feelings against the government because they were not protected by the UPDF. One such a person said “the government instead is treating the people who abducted and tortured us better than the way they treat us” (Amony, O.I, 13/11/2011). Re-echo of such sentiment is indicative that if such people have the means of doing away with the incumbent regime, they would attempt to do so.

Effect of the Conflict on the Local People

Table 4.7 below shows some of the effects of the conflicts in northern Uganda on the local people. The summary is somewhat revealing as discussed below.

Table 4 7 showing the effects of the conflict in northern Uganda on the local people

1. Internal displacement

- a) Between 1.8 and 2 million people are internally displaced and living in camps (about 8 per cent of the national population).
- b) Approximately 1.2 million of these people are internally displaced in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader (representing 94 per cent of the local population).
- c) In Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader an area the size of Belgium is now depopulated.
- d) There are 202 IDP camps in northern Uganda, some with populations of over 60,000.
- e) Population density in some camps is as high as 1,700 people per hectare.
- f) 50 per cent of IDPs are under the age of 15.

2. Mortality

- a) Rates of violent death are three times higher than those reported in Iraq following the Allied invasion in 2003.
- b) Crude mortality rates are more than three times higher than those recorded in Darfur in October 2005.
- c) There are 901 excess deaths every week. This means 129 people die every day as a result of violence and conditions in camps.
- d) Each day, 58 children under the age of five die as a result of violence and

3. Abduction

- a) More than 25,000 children have been abducted during the war
- b) At time of heightened insecurity, up to 45,000 children were night commuters each evening to avoid abduction by the LRA.

4. Education

- a) 737 schools in northern Uganda (60 per cent of the total) are non functioning because of the war
- b) 250,000 children in northern Uganda received no education at all

5. Humanitarian access

- a) 80 per cent of the camps in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader can not be accessed without military escorts.

6. Socio-Economic Cost

- a) 95 per cent of the people in camps in most parts of northern Uganda lived in absolute

poverty

- b) Early marriage
- c) Spirit of revenge and violence set in
- d) Mental health problem

Source: GSCOPNU, (2006), *Counting the cost: Twenty years of war in northern Uganda, Gulu*: GSCOPNU, pp. 7-8, and field data

The above table summarises the view from GSCOPNU and field data on the gruesome effects of the war in northern Uganda. Here, issues like internal displacement, high mortality rate, abduction, degeneration of education, lack of access to humanitarian services and the cost of the conflict in terms of socio-economic sector is revealed.

While explaining this Ochola-Onono and Oryem (2000, p. 1) assert that, the series of conflicts left so many people orphaned and destitute with no one to take care of them. Indeed, right from the 1971 coup to the LRA conflict, a lot of people have lost their loved ones (FGD-AP 1, 9/12/2009). Unfortunately, some of those who died left young children and elderly people without any one to provide them with the care they need (FGD-AP 2: 14.9.2009). Apart from those who were killed during the insurgencies, some people died of HIV and AIDS (FGD-OY 1: 29/1/2010), a situation which Olara Otunnu (Documentary, 'The Acholi') asserts was used by the NRA government as an instrument of violence during the twenty one years of insurgency in northern Uganda. Although some of the orphans were taken care of by their relatives, given that those who took them up were needy themselves, they could not meet all the social, educational and physical needs of the orphans (FGD-AD 1, 20/3/2010). This only worked negatively to increase the misery of the people after going through a period of suffering.

The political and armed conflicts in Northern Uganda have greatly affected the civilian population. Women and children, in particular, bore the brunt of the conflict,

especially after the death of some men. These armed conflict led to the feminisation of poverty since women became the sole providers for the family. Yet women are not as mobile as men and they do not have ready access to credit and resources. In as far as the children are concerned, their conscription into the rebel and government militia ranks imposed a special burden on them. The children became the sole recruits into both the government and the rebel forces. This made them to be denied the opportunity to go to school and receive care from their families. Those who were afraid to join these forces stayed at home or ended up on the streets. Even if some of the children joined the forces willingly or by force, the final analysis is that their physical and mental developments have been impaired, thus immersing them into the culture of violence (FGD-G 2).

Due to the insecurity and fighting during the active phase of the rebel led conflicts in Uganda. In Northern Uganda in particular, many people went into exile or got displaced within the country (FGD-OY 2, 6/2/2010). For example, during the 1970s, many people ran to Tanzania and Kenya and in the 1980s some people went to the Sudan and Zaire, now DRC. While in exile, some of the people lived in squalid conditions. Feeding, sanitation, educational facilities and social services in their places of refuge were very poor. In the 1990s to mid-2000s, instead of going into exile, people were forced into IDP camps that were created across Northern and Eastern Uganda. In a documentary entitled 'the Acholi', Olara Otunnu argued that when a similar situation started to happen in Burundi around the same time, the international community forced the Burundi government to disband the IDP camps. They conditioned the Burundi government to let the people go back into their villages. But unfortunately the same international community kept quiet when this was happening in northern Uganda. Since the silence of the international community on

the plight of the people of northern Uganda made them to be exposed to untold suffering; some section of the people of northern Uganda lost hope in the international system. While in these IDP camps people tested homelessness, abject poverty and accompanying war distress. This was because they could not meet their basic needs since the crops and farmland they depended on were destroyed. The cramming of people into IDP camps without enough sanitary facility led to outbreak of preventable diseases that killed many people.

The inhuman treatment that was unleashed on the people of Northern Uganda during the periods of insurgency left bitter memories. Common among such inhuman treatment were: rape of women and girls in the presence of their husbands, parents, brothers and children (Ali, O.I, 16/12/2011), having sexual relationship with men – sodomy in the presence of their family (RLP-documentaries: ‘they slept with me’, ‘silent victims of rape’ and ‘gender against men’). Furthermore, the some UPDF defecated in the water pots or food staffs of these powerless people as the LRA concentrated on cutting off body parts like lips, nose, breasts, ears, and arms and wounds left after injury (RLP- documentary, ‘untreated wounds’). While recounting such a daunting experience in Pader district, Andrug Morris asserts;

A certain man, whose dog tried to bark when the LRA were entering his compound, was forced to tie this dog on his back like a child. Then one of the rebels got firewood that had fire on it and started to burn the anus of the dog. Since it was tied on the owners back, the dog thought its owner was the one inflicting this pain on itself. In its desperate attempt to escape, the dog started biting its owner several times at the back of his head, thus leaving him with multiple wounds on his head. (O.I, 24/8/2008) .

Such sufferings made people look forward to an opportune moment to revenge on the purported criminals.

The conflict also destroyed societal social fabric and coping mechanism. Since civilians were direct targets of both the rebels and government forces, people disperse in different directions for their security. In the process some of the key cultural value the support provided by wider family and kinship system were destroyed. Consequently, this exacerbated division between groups and increased intra-group insecurity and hostility. It also acted to disrupt inter-group economic relations (RLP-documentary, 'we died long time ago').

In a way of adding insult to injury, when people were displaced by conflicts, men lost their traditional position of being the bread winners at home. While in the IDP camps, it was the women who were receiving the relief food and other properties. This provision by the UN to families made family respect to cease and everybody started behaving contrary to family norms. After the UN had stopped providing food rations to families, some women resorted to befriending soldiers in order to survive. This exposed them to sexually transmitted diseases like Human Immuno Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Since men became powerless, the majority resorted to bettering their wives in their attempt to assert their position as men. As a result, a lot of families broke during the time in the camps. In some cases some of these families have not been able to come together up to today.

Many respondents felt that the conflicts in Northern Uganda affected the culture of the people negatively (FGD-AP 3, 22/12/2009). During the IDP camp life, some respondents said, families were forced to share small huts with all the members, for fear of risking the girl child's life. Through such, children got exposed to sexual

practice early in life since some of the parents could wait but start having sex before the children were asleep.

The conflict reduced people of Northern Uganda into abject poverty, especially after losing their livelihood. Quoting from Uganda Bureau of Standard and UNDP's statistics, Robert Senath Esuruku has this to say about the poverty levels in northern Uganda;

While the national average of Ugandans living in absolute poverty declined from 38.8 per cent in 2002/03 to 31.1 per cent in 2005/6 and to 24.53 percent in 2009/10, poverty in northern Uganda increased from 2.9 million in 2002/03 to 3.3 million in 2005/06 and decreased to 2.9 million in 2009/10. Despite the overall significant reduction in poverty, the northern Uganda regions remained poorer than other regions....

The human development indices (HDIs) and human poverty indices (HPIs) demonstrate that Northern Uganda is lagging behind the rest of the country in regional and district specific breakdowns. While the national HDI had improved from 0.488 in 2003 to 0.581 in 2006, there were regional imbalances that were skewed against the northern region. The central region, for instance, scored the highest HDI of 0.650, followed by the eastern region with an index of 0.586. The western region registered 0.564 while the northern region brought up the rear with 0.478.

Furthermore, while the national income per capita is estimated at Uganda shillings (UGX) 570,000, the figure for the Northern region stands at a paltry UGX 153,000, which is about 27 per cent of the national average. Although at national level income poverty fell from 56 per cent in 1992 to 31.1 per cent in 2006 and 24.5 in 2009/10, 46.2 per cent of the residents in the

northern region have remained poor,.... Although the mean consumption expenditure per adult equivalent has increased from UGX 55,092 in 2006 to 62,545 in 2009/10, the expenditure in the north has remained at UGX 38,988.

(Esuruku, 20012, pp. 149-151)

The data shown above is a real reflection of the poverty level in Northern Uganda. This state made most people hailing from Northern Uganda to think this is a deliberate ploy by the government to crush their spirit. Due to such level of poverty, many people from northern Uganda have failed to support their families. Instead, some became dependent on food rations from World Food Programme to the extent that they want to be supported even after the end of the LRA insurgency.

Since people got used to being provided for, some have failed to adjust to the life of hard working and fending for themselves. The situation is even worse among those who were born in the IDP camps. The dependency syndrome that developed among the local people made a number of youths to resort to stealing or roaming around in trading centers without any gainful employment. Talking about such characters, Atim Josephine said;

I tried to put my aunts' son in school but he refused to study. When I told him to be assisting my grandmother with garden work, he said he does not have the strength to dig, yet this boy works as a crate loader at the coca cola depot in Gulu town. (Atim, O.I, 28/5/2011)

Conflicts over land has divided people. Those who used to live harmoniously have killed their relatives over land. In Gulu, for example, "land crisis led to the burning of a lady with her two daughters in their house near Gulu High School" (Atine, O.I, 23/2/2009). In Lira, a man confessed having killed twelve people from

the same family due to land conflicts. The trauma such incidences caused has made some people to go mad thus forcing them to kill their own parents, children or relatives (Kitara, O.I, 20.11.2011).

According to Wade Snow (2009, p. 1), the resulting violent conflicts have greatly contributed to the lowest return rate of the former IPDs to their ancestral land in Gulu as compared to other war affected districts. This is because people fear getting involved in bitter conflicts over land, a common form of conflict during the post LRA insurgency.

In regard to the female fraternity the effects of the conflict have been: physical/sexual abuse, psychological trauma, pressure to restore traditional norms, dislocation, additional responsibilities, and often head of households, low education and discrimination. Those who could not bear such burden have since become helpless.

The destruction of properties and infrastructure of Northern Uganda like roads made Chris Dolan (Conference presentation, 21/11/2011) to assert that “the people of Northern Uganda were exposed to structural violence, an event that one lives to remember for the rest of his/her life”. The memories of such bad roads come to mind vividly because people have lost many lives on it. For example during the 1990s, a lot of people died on the roads in northern Uganda. This has made the people who are still alive to regard the roads in northern Uganda as “the road that kills” (Dolan, Conference presentation, 21/11/2011).

Other effects of the conflicts that the respondents have mentioned and the researcher observed during the data collection process include income disparity between the people in northern Uganda and other parts of Uganda, loss of livelihood after losing source of income thus subjecting them to abject poverty and starvation.

The school drop-out rate during IDP life also shot up. This led to increase of crime rate in the IDP camps thus making people to develop the spirit of violence as defense mechanism. Consequently, this led to high prevalence rate of sexual and gender based violence -in some instances murders of spouses have been reported.

The politicisation of conflicts-led to negative identity. For example, it made the Acholi to be collectively branded as rebels even by their neighbours the Lango and Madi. Such generalisation of a community through stereotype is what brings in failing to look at people as individuals but rather as a community which is not fair.

The protracted armed conflict resulted into many people suffering from post-traumatic disorders in northern Uganda. As such, a respondent who preferred anonymity said “there are more lunatics in northern Uganda today than before due to their experience during the active phase of the LRA rebellion” (O.I, 13/4/2012). After the cessation of hostility, the youths who were targeted for abduction and conscription into the rebel and government militia forced to become child soldiers, failed to have productive lives on returning home. The attempt by some of these youth to become productive made them to resort to early marriages. This was especially true among the girls among whom the highest incidences of this was reported. Some of these girls got married at the tender age of thirteen years and others were impregnated at twelve years old. This created a scenario where a child takes care of another child (Dulua, O.I, 24/3/2010).

Besides the above effect, issues like famine, destruction of properties and social amenities like schools, health centers, and roads, retardation of development, and increase in illiteracy amongst the local people were reported. Furthermore, during the data collection process, jealousy by some section of the community towards those who they regard to be better off was also reported. Such negative

feeling amongst local people further works to complicate harmonious post conflict resettlement in northern Uganda.

CHAPTER 5

THE ATTEMPTS MADE TO MANAGE THE CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA: THEIR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

5.1 Introduction

After looking at the nature, manifestation, cause and effects of the conflicts in the previous chapter, this chapter looks at the attempts made to resolve the conflicts in northern Uganda: their successes and failures. This was done with the view to assess how peacebuilding from below could be used to address community level conflicts in northern Uganda. Indeed from time immemorial, people have inbuilt desire to deal with conflicts whenever they emerge. This desire for peaceful co-existence amongst the local people, made them to seek for peaceful means of ending the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda and that in Northern Uganda in particular. In the bid to bring lasting peace, both modern and traditional mechanisms were used as discussed below.

5.2 Modern Methods used to handle the Inter-Intra Ethnic Conflict in Northern Uganda

There has been many attempts made to settle the intra and inter-ethnic conflicts during Uganda's post colony right from 1962 by the use of modern conflict resolution mechanisms. Below is a discussion of the examples of the attempts made to settle conflicts by the use of modern mechanism in northern Uganda.

Table 5.1 Showing Modern Methods used to manage the Inter-intra Community Conflicts in Northern Uganda

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Use of commissions 2. Use of the military 3. Negotiated settlements 4. Socio-economic attempts 5. Legal attempts 6. Modern Religious means 7. Other means |
|--|

Source: Field data

Table 5.1 above shows the commonest modern means that were used to address some of the post-colonial conflicts in Northern Uganda. The table reveals that the mechanisms the different governments of Uganda employed to address some of the conflicts in Northern Uganda. The means that have been tried have been the use of commissions, military, negotiated settlements, socio-economic measures, legal means and modern religion. Each of these attempts have had successes and challenges as discussed below.

a. Conflict Management through use of Commissions

The very first attempt to manage the conflict that pitched the people of Northern Uganda against each other was done by Amin who set up a commission in 1971 to investigate into the disappearance of people from 25th Jan 1971 to 1974. Although this commission was not purposely set to make terms between the people of Acholi, Lango and Madi sub-regions, if it were done in good faith, it could have helped to bridge the existing gap between these tribes. The hearings held in Gulu, Kitgum and Lira (Commission of Inquiry Into Disappearance of People in Uganda [CIDPU], 1975, p. 6) helped those who testified to air out their grievances. However,

as earlier on seen, this commission did not achieve its objectives because it only accounted for 308 people who disappeared (CIDPU, 1975, p. 6) and failed to do so about the many people in Northern Uganda who disappeared.

Another commission was created in 2000 when the government of Uganda, through an Act of parliament enacted the Amnesty law. Many people in Northern Uganda welcomed it with enthusiasm to the extent that some people saw it being in line with the cultural practice of forgiveness. As such it assisted in making some people to leave rebellion and come home. However, some people who were innocently taken into exile were not happy with the amnesty because they said they did not do anything to deserve getting forgiveness from the government. Instead they said they should have been the people to forgive the government because it was the failure of the government to protect them that made the rebels to abduct them. One respondent in particular, who was abducted when she was twelve years and given to Kony for a wife said;

The government is too impartial in dealing with us who were from the bush. While they assist the people like Brigadier Banya, Sam Kolo and others who tortured us in the bush, they are giving us no assistance. Yet we have children we came with from the bush to look after (Amony, O.I, 23/11/11).

In another development, Nyero Caesar, who was abducted by the rebels for only six hours said;

As we were going with the rebels, we entered in a UPDF ambush and I was able to escape. To avoid being branded a rebel, I had to introduce myself to the LC I where I first met human settlement. When I got home, I was told to go and report to the authorities so that I could be given the amnesty certificate. But I was not a rebel, how could I ask for the amnesty certificate which was

meant for people who had taken arms against the government of Uganda?
(Nyero, O.I, 24/11/2011)

The testimonies of Amony and Nyero shows that some people are not happy with the amnesty given that it was lack of the governments' protection that made the LRA to abduct them. Instead, the amnesty was forced on the local people to improve on the government's public image but not actually giving amnesties to people who had taken arms against her. In other words, people are not convinced about the intention of the government when they came up with the amnesty law.

Apart from the above assertions, however, the implementation of the Amnesty has been problematic because of the following reasons: some abductees said they had no access to radio to get such information, while others say Kony said it was a ploy of the government to entice them to be killed. Besides, some respondents said the government was not doing enough to support the amnesty especially when the president continually said the amnesty did not extend to top commanders and it ended in April 2004. Furthermore, the president's continual talk about killing the rebels, and of wiping them out made them to be scared. The question one should ponder is whether amnesty is real, or is it another way of luring the rebels to the gallows.

Furthermore, the apparent contradiction between the Amnesty Act and the Terrorism Act made some people to be uncertain of the operation of the two Acts. As such, some people argue, if the rebels came out of the bush because of the amnesty, would the Terrorism Act not take its course? (RLP, 2004, pp. 45-46). Indeed when the rebels saw what had happened to their colleagues in the UPDA that were integrated into the army after the Pece Peace Accord, the mysterious death of some made those who were still in the bush to fear to make any attempt to come out and take advantage of the amnesty (Gersony, 1997, p. 57). The bitter recollections of

what happened made some of the rebels to see the amnesty as a trick to entice them so that they could be eliminated one by one.

b. Conflict Management through use of the Military

The successive governments of Uganda have preferred the military means for managing conflicts. Starting with Amin in 1972 when the country was attacked by the Ugandan dissidents from Tanzania, the military was used to hunt for the Acholi and Lan'gi who purportedly to have been rebel collaborators. The hunting of the supposed rebels continued up to 1978 when the Uganda army entered Tanzania with the hope of crushing the rebels. Unfortunately or fortunately, this ended up in the defeat of the Amin regime in 1979. Instead of calling for a peaceful settlement of the conflicts, when the UNLA forces unleashed havoc on the people of west Nile sub-region in the 1980s, the majority of the inhabitants of Madi went into exile for fear of their lives. When Obote went to Moyo in 1981 he tried to urge Onama and the people of Moyo to return home and join hands in rebuilding the UPC and the country. In the contrary the behaviour of the soldiers scared the people off (Opigo, O.I, 12/1/2011).

When the UNLA forces from Acholi and Lango disagreed, they resorted to the gun. This ended up in the 1985 military coup. In the same vein, after the overthrow of Tito Okello in 1986 by the NRA/M forces, the series of rebellions that emerged in Northern Uganda were first approached militarily before some talks were initiated. To effect this, various operations like operation north (alternatively known as "Operation Sim-sim"), Operation Iron Feast I and II, and Operation Lightning Thunder were set. Besides, several militia groups such as the Amuka, Arrow squads, the Local Defense Units (LDUs) and Mobile Forces were deployed by the government to guard the people of Northern Uganda. The military operations led

against the LRA forces was actually the ideal method of bringing peace that the NRA government had chosen. To this end a joint Ugandan, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) military operation was launched to break the back of the LRA on 13/12/2008 (Mukasa, *The New Vision*, 14/12/2009). However, according to Reagan Okumu the MP of Aswa county the joint forces attacked empty camps (Mugerwa and Kasasira, *The Daily Monitor*, 17/12/2008).

When the UN troops were sent to beef up the military operations in the eastern DRC, the ICC chief prosecutor Jose Moreno-Ocampo thought those forces should be provided with Special Forces that could move against Kony and arrest him (Apunyo, *The Daily Monitor*, 30/4/2008). When the operation failed and the UPDF formally withdrew in March 2009 and left the operation in the hands of DRC forces (Oluka and Butagira, *The Daily Monitor*, 16/3/2009), Ocampo thought it was a mistake (Apunyo, *The Daily Monitor*, 30/4/2008).

The unfortunate result of the use of the military as a means of pacifying conflict parties escalated their differences. This led to full scale civil wars in Northern Uganda at different points. This made the warring groups to always wish for a chance of avenging for the loss they incurred during their time of powerlessness. In a way, military means of bringing peace and order caused more chaos than order that was wished. In most cases the very military personnel who were sent to protect people turned out to be dangerous to the peace they were supposed to keep.

c. Conflict Management through Negotiated Settlements

As the military operations were going on, the government of Uganda also initiated several negotiations. In particular, the negotiation between the government and the UPDA under Brigadier Odong Latek which led to the signing of the Pece Peace Agreement between the UPDA and the Government of Uganda in 1988

(Olango, O.I, 2/2/2010). The essence of this agreement was to bring peace in Northern Uganda. It made a section of the rebels to leave rebellion and join the government, which brought peace. Unlike the first negotiation, the subsequent negotiations ended up failing to meet the objective for which they were set out. Among these were the Betty Bigombe negotiations of 1993/4 (Ogwang, *The New Vision*, October, 4 2012), the attempt by the Sant Egidio, and several NGOs (Ambaku, 23/2/2010). The negotiation that Bigombe facilitated failed due to the ultimatum the president gave when he said “the LRA rebels should end the rebellion within seven days or else he finishes them militarily” (Olango, O.I, 2/2/2010).

There was also a negotiation between the governments of Sudan and Uganda meant to end the rebellion. Although this negotiation brokered by the Carter Center assisted in bringing peace between Uganda and the Sudan, it did not translate into real peace for the people of northern Uganda. When the UPDF went into the Sudan, the rebels kept coming to abduct and attack the civilian population, thus causing more conflicts within and between the people of northern Uganda (FGD-G1).

A serving Senior Army Officer who preferred to be anonymous said “some of the peace talks could have ushered in the much coveted peace but the senior officers who were direct beneficiaries of the conflict could not let it succeed”. Instead they kept on “frustrating some of the peace efforts” (OI, 24/5/2010). In one case, this officer said their “commander had to deploy soldiers in a place where people were going to meet with the rebel groups to talk peace” (Anonymous, O.I, 24/5/2010). In like manner when some people were sent to deliver a letter to the LRA, the UPDF decided to ambush and killed them in the river while bathing (Gersony, 2004, p. 54). Therefore, given such scenarios, the different peace talks that were initiated could not achieve any substantial effort but rather all the efforts ended up in disarray.

Starting with the Betty Bigombe peace talks with the LRA leadership in June 1993 up to the end of the Juba peace talks in 2008, President Museveni has not been interested in them. In a discussion with Jean Eglund, Museveni said “his government will not beg Joseph Kony to come out of the bush (Monitor Reporter, 2/5/2008). To the extent he said he never sent the peace team to the talks. People like Ruhakana Rugunda were just doing their job (Muhumuza, *The Daily Monitor*, 27/5/2005). As such, even when the UN special envoy for the LRA affected area Joaquim Chissano tried to initiate a fresh talks with the LRA team, the talks could not hold (Gyezeho, *The New Vision*, 19/3/2009). Although this was partly because the LRA taught Chissano was pro government of Uganda, the deeper issue was lack of political will to the peace talks (Musoke, *The New Vision*, 9/9/2009).

d. Conflict Management through use of Socio-Economic means

The government of Uganda, individuals, and development partners attempted to resolve the conflict in Northern Uganda using socio-economic revamping of the region. The reason behind this move was that when people have strong economic base, none of them would support any conflict because they have thing to lose during conflicts. But if people do not have tangible investments to lose, they see wars or conflicts as a way of enriching themselves.

Among many attempts that were not taken up for implementation was the 1996 proposal developed by Members of Parliaments (MPs) from Acholi sub-region. In this proposal the Acholi parliamentarians, besides asking for the government to enter into dialogue with the rebels, requested the government to provide humanitarian assistance and end human rights abuses. They further asked the government to initiate economic integration. To achieve this the parliamentarians had proposed a budget of 2 billion Uganda shillings. Instead of supporting this project, the then Vice

President who was also the Minister of Agriculture, Doctor Wandera Kazibwe, preferred a parallel project of opening land for agriculture in Karamoja at a place called Kolo. This unplanned project took about 800 million shillings without any tangible result (HURIPPEC and LIGS, 2003, p. 149).

The presidential advisor for the North, Salim Saleh (a.k.a Caleb Akandwanaho), attempted to mitigate the protracted LRA insurgency when he hatched a business plan to be run by his Divinity Union Limited (DUL). He had planned to turn the vast land where the LRA moved freely and carried out military operations into an agricultural productive belt. Although this project was to extend up to Masindi and Luwero, the former Districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Nebbi were earmarked. In the then Gulu District (currently divided into Gulu, Nwoya, and Amuru Districts), an estimated 600 square Kilometers of land from the east bank of River Nile to the Lolim-Aswa valley up to Adjumani district border was identified for growing maize, rice, sunflower, beans and soybeans. This stretch of land used to have farms belonging to prominent Acholi leaders like Otema Alimadi, Wilson Lutara, Onengi Obel, Peter Oola, Anania Akena, Alfred Ocen, Opio Koorom and Elijah Lalim, among others. To be incorporated in this, was also the land from Pakwach to Pawor that used to be cultivated by the Jonam Palango Group, women, youth, and clan groups. It was reasoned that when this was done it could give rise to an African Prairies grain belt (Saleh, n. d, p. 1).

In the former Kitgum district (now divided into Kitgum, Pader, Agago, and Lamwo districts), the highly fertile agricultural land in Orom, Agoro/Lututuru, Aruu/Agago and Lamwo were earmarked for growing wheat and barley. To facilitate easy move in these areas, Saleh's construction company, Sabotar was to construct feeder roads from Kalongo to Pader and Kona Kilak and from Patongo to Wot and

Dure on Kitgum Lira Road. When this was done, it was reasoned, it would improve the security in the area since it would help to move soldiers swiftly. When peace is in place food production could be enhanced among the people, leading to drastic transformation in northern Uganda. In the former Nebbi District (now Nebbi and Zombo Districts) the western bank of River Nile in Jonam County (Pajogoro Alwi) was earmarked. This stretch has over 16 square Kilometers of the Kubba farm project undertaken by Amor Investment Ltd for growing maize by the use of irrigation. In the over 600 feet altitude, the hilly county of Okoro bordering DRC exist Abanga farm, formally owned by the government. Divinity Union Limited wanted to partner with Nebbi district local government and use it for cultivating maize, wheat, barley and other crops. It was hoped that when this venture was undertaken it could help to reduce the LRA threats. Since feeder roads were going to cress cross the area, it would be used by the UPDF to deploy firster in case the LRA attacked. The Jonam farming groups, the large land owners of Aswa-Kilak were seen as significant stake holders who could have formed community defense strategy with the UPDF and LDUs against the marauding LRA rebels. Then that of Kitgum would have reduced both LRA attacks and the attacks from the Karamojong (Saleh, n. d, p. 2).

However, before this plan could see the next day for implementation, many people from Northern Uganda objected the idea. Their reasoning was that “probably the people in northern Uganda were forced into the IDP camps so that those who feel they are powerful enough could come and parcel out their land like this” (Okot, 22/10/2012). Since this time coincided with the land crisis in Zimbabwe, some people reasoned that may be the government wanted to give off their land to the Zimbabwean White farmers who were chased away by President Robert Mugabe (FGD-AM 2). The suspicion of the people from northern Uganda was somewhat

confirmed by the donation of 50,000 acres of land by Salim Selah to Bangladeshi businessmen (www.Suubi.wordpress.com, accessed Dec. 2011).

After the flop of the Divinity Union Limited project, in 2003 Selah came up with another plan and asked the parliament to budget shillings 4billion for each of the IDP camps scattered across Northern Uganda. In a *New Vision* article that HURIPED and LIGS (2003, p. 147) quoted, it was reported that a number of Acholi MPs had supported the request. Norbert Mao, the then MP for Gulu Municipality was quoted to have said that “the project was overdue” and that “we cannot wait for the last bullet to talk of economic transformation”. However, in an article in the *Monitor Newspaper* (30th June 2003), this view was vehemently challenged. In the *Monitor Newspaper* article it was argued that Selah’s proposal started from a mistaken premise that the Northern insurgency was economically driven and ignored or downplayed, perhaps, the most important question, democracy and political consensus at a wider national level. It was reasoned in the paper that although money can buy many things like building roads, leveling mountains, buying food and machines, etc, it cannot buy permanent peace. It continued to say that;

So long as there is lack of political consensus and trust, attempts to build the economy in the north will come to naught because a few rebels will destroy all. The level of corruption in Uganda, and in the military especially, you cannot discount the fear that many people along the bureaucracy that simply stand in the queue to the line their pockets with this money to the disadvantage of the intended beneficiaries. What is critical is for the government to offer a genuine olive branch under the aegis of neutral mediators-perhaps the UN. Only such a move stood a chance of bringing peace and prosperity to northern

Uganda, which guns and money had failed to achieve. (*The Monitor News Paper*, 30th June 2003)

The above view was actually reflective of many people in Uganda during the active years of the LRA insurgency. Although many people yearned for real economic empowerment, the only fear some people express was the corrupt officials through whose hands these monies would pass. The fear was that even if these monies are availed, since it will pass through the end these people, it might end up rehabilitating the relatively well-off bureaucrats other than the supposed beneficiaries.

In 2003 after the above proposals failed to take off, the government of Uganda came up with a Security Production Program (SPP) in line with the Israeli Kibbutzim and Mosheim system for economic empowerment. Part of plan was setting up Security Production Units to be manned by locally formed committees. These committees will divide the land into equal size plots for allocation to each household. It was argued that since community leaders, local chiefs and district land registrars would be involved in acquiring certificates of communal ownership, it would give the project a legal status in using the land. In case the land on which the project falls happens to be a private land, a memorandum of understanding would be signed between the land owner and the community who will be using it. To effect this project, the government had ordered 120 tractors and ploughs from Iran. The project was set to roll for 3 years. While the Ministry of Internal Affairs through the police would be responsible for community policing and other line ministries would carry out responsibilities according to their mandate in collaboration with the NGOs, the UPDF would continue to fight the insurgents at the periphery (HURIPEC and LIGS, 2003, pp. 161-168).

Much as the SPP was meant to be a temporary project, the way it was planned gave an impression that it was intended to be a permanent project. According to HURIPPEC and LIGS (2003, p. 149), in the final analysis it was based on the idea that the conflict will be managed on a long term low intensity conflict management strategy. Although it was said that a section of the population had accepted this offer, the MP for Aruu County Odonga Otto in a one paged critique daunted it. Odonga reasoned that the SPP assumed insecurity to be permanent as a way of helping the IDPs "to learn to live the conflict", thus betraying the whole purpose for moving people in the camps (2003, p. 1). He further argued that the SPP security provisions were a myth given that time coincided with the rebels' penetration of the camps. He also said that the plan of settling 17500 people in SPU compared to 300-400 in the case of Israel-would not be beneficial. Instead, it would disrupt cultural and moral fabric and give lee way for people to sell off the land allotted to them, thus presenting a lot of challenges to post IDP resettlement period (Odonga, 2003, p. 1). When asked about their opinion on this arrangement, the majority of the respondents seemed to have toed Odonga's argument. Some of them said the crowding of people into the IDP camp actually was a gimmick by the government to grab their land.

In 2003, through a World Bank funded development project, the government of Uganda launched the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF). This fund was meant to enable Northern Uganda to catch up with the rest of Uganda (Richard, 2010, p. 1; HURIPPEC and LIGS, 2003, p. 151). The fund was divided into two phases: the first phase worth \$ 133 million started to be implemented in March 2003 and ended in May 2009; and the second phase worth \$ 100 million was approved in May 2009 and implementation started on 25th November 2009. The life span of each phase was to be five years.

The NUSAF funds are meant to be transferred to the communities through direct financing of sub-projects the communities identify so that its goal of targeted investments in participatory, equitable and sustainable promotion of reconciliation and eradication of poverty in 18 districts of northern Uganda is achieved. To operationalise this, four objectives were set: strengthening community participation, leadership development and resource mobilisation; improving quality and access to social services and community initiated infrastructure such as roads, schools, health centers, and water resources; supporting community reconciliation and conflict management through local institutions and civil society organizations (CBOs); funding income generating activities for vulnerable groups; and supporting institutional development (Kavuma, 2010, pp. 1-2; HURIPEC and LIGS, 2003, pp. 151-152).

From the onset, when the NUSAF project was launched, it did cause a lot of excitement amongst the people of Northern Uganda. Many people were encouraged to form groups and come up with projects. However, the corruption that infiltrated the first phase of NUSAF could not help them realize their dreams. In some districts of Northern Uganda, NUSAF officials awarded projects to themselves; got part of the money they gave to groups as professional fees; and or concocted non existing projects after using the money. According to Dulu Mark, in Adjumani district for example;

Some of the NUSAF officials used non-existent group name and put certain people as though they were the beneficiaries. But when it came to implementing the project, the real owners chased the people they had used from the project. That is why you see all these quarrels between the local community and NUSAF officials". (Dulu, O. I: 8/4/2008)

The project did not help people to come out of the trauma of conflict. Instead of helping people build an economic base and consequently avoid engaging in any other conflict that might arise since they would have things to lose in case conflicts erupt, the NUSAF project created more conflicts than it tried to solve. In some places, Dulu (O.I: 8/4/2008) recalls, "You may see a nice signpost pointing to a NUSAF project, yet there is nothing to show that there exists such a project".

Given such wide irregularities registered during the first phase of the NUSAF programme, the approval of the second phase nearly failed. However, after some discussions it was finally approved and the coverage was extended to 40 districts, up from the former 18 under the first NUSAF (Kavuma, 2010, p. 2). This second phase of NUSAF now formed part of the Peace, Recovery and Development Project (PRDP) for Northern Uganda. In their appraisal of the first phase of NUSAF, the World Bank noted that NUSAF II would contribute to resolving some of the challenges encountered in the first phase by building on the lessons learned from it (Kavuma, 2010, p. 2).

Just before the launching of NUSAF II, in 2007 the government of Uganda came up with another flowery project. This was as a result of the pressure from the international community. This time around it was the Peace Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP) which is seen to be a comprehensive framework by the government for developing Northern Uganda. Although the PRDP was said to be a Northern Uganda development project, there are some districts that are not geographical in northern Uganda that are included on the beneficiary list. This created a debate as to whether there are two different Northern Uganda: Political north and Geographical north.

The PRDP is meant to be a coordination framework along which all donors, government and other development activities in Northern Uganda should be harmonised and monitored. This presents a three year comprehensive development plan which mobilizes and allocates additional resources to the region in order to ensure economic development among communities in the North, thus bridging the existing economic gap between the North and South. The PRDP aims at stabilising the Northern region in order to consolidate peace and thereby lay the foundations for recovery and development. Four specific strategic objectives were put in place: consolidation of state authority; rebuilding and empowering communities; revitalising the economy; and peace building and reconciliation.

The Project, coordinated by the department of pacification in the office of Prime Minister (OPM) and financed by the government of Uganda, development partners and implementing partners to the tune of \$ 600 million, was an equivalent of 1.1 trillion Uganda shillings. The development partners and NGOs engaged in various programs in Northern Uganda dedicated to long term strategic interventions aimed at sustainable recovery and development achievements (OPM, 2011, p. 2; Celebrating Achievements under PRDP Plan 2007-11).

Though the PRDP projects have been initiated in the North and Eastern Uganda, the issue of corruption at the implementation level and the ability of this programme to bring lasting peace still looms in the minds of many people. This doubt in people's mind was based on the experience they got from NUSAF phase I. So far, the administrative costs have taken much of the budget compared to what individuals have reaped from it. A respondent reasoned, "the empowering of the community other than individuals at the household level by this program beats people's

understanding of how the PRDP would recover people economically” (Odoch, O.I, 3/12/2011).

e. Conflict Management through use of Legal Attempts

A lot of legal attempts have been made to sort out issues between conflicting parties in Northern Uganda. At the national level, the need to have a home environment for trying war criminals made a Special War Crime Division (SWCD) to be created in the High Court of Uganda in 2010. This docket was specifically created to address war crimes committed by, especially top LRA commanders (Ogola, Conference presentation, 21/3/2013). When this court was created, it attracted mixed feelings. While some people were happy with this court, others did not see any reason to jubilate by its creation. The people who are not happy with the creation of this section of the court reasoned that this court and the International Criminal Court (ICC) was the reason why Kony did not sign the Juba Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Although Barney Afako argues that even when Kony were sentenced he would not be killed, (Mujaju, The Daily Monitor, 21/5/2008), none of the LRA leadership could believe in that.

A similar court was first set in Nuremberg after the end of World War II, to try Germans and Japanese after their defeat by the allied forces. After the Nuremberg trials, Kwoyelo, a former LRA commander, became the first to have been tried by such a court. The trial of Kwoyelo generated a lot of controversy. Since he had applied for amnesty and the constitutional court ruled that he had no case to answer but rather be given the amnesty like others, his freedom was not granted. In spite of this ruling, the government of Uganda still holds him captive. Instead the government referred his issue to the ICC after accusing him of maintaining some links with the LRA rebels.

Like the special crime division, the ICC that was tried became infamous. After creating the ICC in 2002, in 2003 Uganda became the first state to refer a case to it for investigation. This resulted into indicting of the top LRA leadership in 2005 (Akhavan, 2005, p. 403). This was done after doing thorough groundwork and establishing that there were good grounds to have these top commanders tried for war crimes. According to the ICCs' Justice, Peace and Security, these efforts will help to integrate military efforts and negotiation to protect people. In executing this, the ICC assures the public that they are working with international, national, and local authorities and leaders. Specifically these local leaders are from Acholi, Lango, Madi and Teso communities. Such collaboration was seen as part of a common effort to achieve justice and reconciliation, the rebuilding of communities and an end to violence in Northern Uganda (ICC-OPT, 2005, p. 5). To this end, the ICC thought the arrest warrants they issued would help to galvanize efforts to apprehend suspects. This arrest was the supposedly the responsibility of State Parties and the International Community given that the LRA rebels operate in Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, the Sudan and Uganda (ICC-OPT, 2005, p. 8). Although Ocampo thought arresting Kony would bring peace the following day (Apunyo, *The Daily Monitor*, 30/4/2008), the ICC has not been able to arrest or try the top LRA commanders indicted. Instead current reports indicate that the LRA is still a major force.

Although the root causes of conflicts in Uganda date back to the independence period, the ICC has been restricted to try crimes committed from 2002. This meant crimes committed by other State agents prior 2002 would not be tried by this court. Hence, apart far from accusing it only of trying people from Africa, the ICC in Uganda is blamed for its selective and tailor-made policy to only deal with the LRA,

leaving out the UPDF officers and men who committed heinous human rights abuses during the rebellion in northern Uganda.

In situations where one clan caused destruction to the other while fighting over land rights, the local people reported the case to the courts within the districts where such offences were committed. Courts like the LC I-III, sub-county land committee, District Land Tribunal, Grade I, II, High court and the Police have all registered a great deal of cases related to land conflicts across Northern Uganda. Unfortunately, even when the government revoked the mandate of the LC I, and II from settling land disputes and disbanded the District Land Tribunal courts; it was found out that in Acholi sub-region the LC I's and II's are still illegally hearing land related cases. Many respondents noted that a lot of corruption cases are reported in such courts. A respondent said, "unless one went with money to register a case, even if the property belonged to him/her, the offender who comes with money would have the case declared in his/her favor" (Anonymous, O.I, 15/4/2010). A case in point was in Adjumani where a respondent who preferred not to be named (O.I, 4/3/2009) said the coordinator of NUSAF programme bribed a magistrate and witnesses with 10 million and 3 million shillings respectively to have land dispute ruled in his favour". Given the prevailing poverty with people unable to meet the court demands, and the immensity of the cases, there is a great backlog of unattended court cases as seen in table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2 Showing the Backlog of Land Cases at the Chief Magistrate's Court in Gulu District

Type s of land cases	Registered land cases from January 2003 to July 2010	Completed land cases as at July 2010	Outstanding land cases as at July 2010	Percentage of land cases outstanding as at July 2010
Civil suits	444	196	248	55.9%
Civil appeals	575	274	301	52.3%
Miscellaneous applications	982	486	496	50.5%

Source: Gereth McKibben, and James Bean, (2010), Land or else: Land-based conflict, vulnerability, and disintegration in northern Uganda, p. 34.

Table 5.2 above revealed the availability of case backlog in Gulu high court. Besides the data collected from the field, the reasons for such case backlogs in the courts of law were also gleaned by the researcher from the work of McKibben and Bean (2010, p. 34). In their work McKibben and Bean (2010) gave the following as the reasons for such case backlog, especially in Gulu Chief Magistrate's Court;

1. The Chief Magistrates' Courts inherited a surfeit of land cases from the former District Land Tribunals;
2. LC2 Courts and Sub-County Court Committees critically lack capacity to the point of being dysfunctional; cases that could have been resolved or decided within these lower tribunals end up on the workbenches of the Chief Magistrates' Courts;
3. Fresh applications are being made at an alarmingly faster rate than those being resolved or decided. These Courts will continue to be stretched as 295,000

IDPs still situated in IDP camps or transit sites in the sub-region continue their process of return to their places of origin; and

4. Chief Magistrates' Courts shouldered vast geographical jurisdiction. For instance, the jurisdiction of the Gulu Chief Magistrate's Court spans Amuru, Nwoya, and Gulu districts, whilst Kitgum Chief Magistrate's Court covers Pader, Agago, Lamwo, and Kitgum districts. Part of the reason for this is re-districting, but the fact remains that the huge geographical area Chief Magistrate's Courts are required to cover is creating insurmountable obstacles for already overworked legal officers. (2010, p. 34)

From the above, it was understood that the case inherited from the District Land Tribunals, the incapacitation of the LC and sub-county courts to address land conflicts and the fresh registration of land cases explains the backlog. Due to vastness of the geographical scope of cases that the Gulu court holds, the situation is understandable. However, some people blame this on the lack of goodwill on the part of the government of Uganda. On realising such delay in justice process, the Government should have recruited more judges so that such case backlogs could be dealt with.

On the other hand some respondents do not believe the government could address this case backlog. They thought the only problem that bogs the capacity of courts in addressing land cases is because of the corruption involved in courts. To them the slowness in addressing such cases have been exaggerated. Then another related reasons given to explain delay in hearing land cases was attributed to many people's mistrust of the formal legal system as a viable means of addressing communal conflicts. Even if they register their cases in courts of law they do not follow them up.

On the whole, much as courts have tried to settle land cases, they created more challenges than addressing the challenges. In a focus group discussion in Lira (FGD-L 2), respondents observed that in situations where courts award land cases to a wrong party, the award intensified conflicts at local level. Hence, because of this, many people opt to settle land cases out of court. This is because they would want to continue as friends even after the issue is settled. In other words, courts of law bring in negative peace instead of positive peace.

f. Conflict Management through modern Religious means

The introduction of Christianity and Western education by the Christian missionaries, in particular was good and bad to people of Northern Uganda. This, however, does not mean that Islam did any better. The Christian Religion assisted in unifying people of diverse background. For example, the earliest preachers of the gospel in Northern Uganda were not actually White Missionaries but rather people from Buganda, Bunyoro and those from within Northern Uganda. Through this people's efforts, those who were not even related by blood were able to look at each other as one people, thus breaking barriers that divided human being.

Through provision of modern education, the young generation was removed from their parents and taken to boarding schools. This helped those people to learn how to stay with people from other areas. After their education, the young generation did not only see the need to fight with people from other areas but they stopped fighting. Instead of fights they started to cooperate regardless of their background. In other word the missionaries and eventually the colonial administrators, effectively used schools as nurseries for change in the wider community of Acholi, Lango and Madi (Omona, 2007, pp. 50, 58).

Right from the 1980s conflicts in Northern Uganda, the leaders of the different religious groups or religious denominations stood with the suffering people. Starting from the invasion of the so called liberators from Tanzania in the early 1980s, religious leaders in Madi sub-region assisted to save the lives of many people who were wrongly accused of being “Oyoro” (rebel). In the present Adjumani district, for example, an Anglican priest called Andrew Olal saved the life of Oling Paul by making him to put on a clerical dress (Ocaya, O.I, 2/3/2010). At the Roman Catholic mission, Father Eugenio Mangi, an Italian Priest was able to stand with the people when life looked impossible (Nzima, O.I, 23/5/2011). These religious leaders were ever present with the people and through that they were able to appeal to the political leadership of the time.

Writing about the role of religious leaders in Acholiland during the 1980s to mid-2000s, Father Carlos Rodriguez asserts that;

...religious leaders in the region focused primarily on providing moral and practical support to their parishioners and Church institutions became centers of support for thousands seeking shelter from the violence. Over time, a greater consensus emerged amongst church leaders in the North on the need to be proactive in ‘bearing witness’ about the conflict and to engage directly in peace building. This transformation has resulted in a number of initiatives that have placed religious leaders at the heart of efforts to support a political resolution of conflict and to address the consequences of the war. The most prominent bodies conducting these initiatives have been the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (JPC). (Rodriguez, 2002, p. 54)

From the above observation of Carlos, it can be deduced that religious leaders in Northern Uganda have been all out to protect the local people from the rebels and errant soldiers. Religious leaders like Archbishop John Baptist Odama, Bishop Mark Barker Ochola II, Bishop Onono Onweng, Father Carlos Rodriguez, and a host of others were all out seeking for a peaceful end to the conflict in northern Uganda. After forming an umbrella group as a result of the plight of the local people, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), the Acholi religious leaders came out of their denominational isolations and joint hands to work for the good of the people of Northern Uganda. By doing this they became the voice of the voiceless and the conscience of the people. Through their joint efforts and being in solidarity with the suffering people of Northern Uganda, their religious leaders were able to draw the attention of the government and international community about the plight of the local people. For example, in a dramatic event when the bishops from Northern Uganda, especially in the Acholi sub-region, spent a week sleeping on the streets with the children who were commonly referred to as “night commuters”, the International Community’s attention on the plight of these children was drawn (Ocola, OI, 23/4/2013).

In 1991 when both the LRA and UPDF intensified committing atrocities like burying people alive, torture, rape of women, girls and men, the Acholi Religious leaders wrote a pastoral letter to the LRA, GOU, Local and International communities drawing their attention to what was happening on the ground. As a result of this, the International community came up with the programme of giving food aid to the local people, though that for the people of Kitgum and Pader were delayed by a year (Ocola, *Conference presentation*, 20015).

When the UPDF launch the infamous “Operation Iron Feast” and the LRA with support of the Khartoum government, reacted by intensifying attacks on the local people and military installations, the resinous leaders became a bridge between the GOU and the LRA. According to Bishop Ocola (OI, 23/4/2013), when the LRA beheaded UPDF soldiers, and committed other atrocities in Acholi, Lango, Madi and Teso, the religious leaders went quickly to quell the situation. If it were not for this swift act of the religious leaders, some people were ready to retaliate on the innocent Acholi. Actually an MP from Teso urged the people of Teso to kill all the Acholi above 18 years old they might come across. The same was in Lango after the Barlonyo massacre which the LRA denied having committed. (Golobal IDP, 2004).

During the 2006 failed Juba Peace Talks, religious leaders from Northern Uganda were represented. On a wider scale, the Uganda Joint Christian Council and the Inter-religious Council of Uganda also sent representatives to the Juba Peace Talks.

In order to appeal to the conflictants, the religious leaders use religious teachings and practices. These teachings and practices reveal spiritual and moral formulations that support reconciliation and harmony within and between humanity and divinity. Since they based their teaching and practices on the scripture, the religious leaders helped people to understand and capture the philosophical basis of reconciliation. This this the people in conflict are made to know that reconciliation is an act of God which He initiated through the death of Jesus Christ (Naber, and Watson, 2010, pp. 87-90). Using this as a basis, during and after the conflicts, religious leaders encouraged the offended people to take initiative to reach out the offenders and sort out their differences.

Religious leaders are also actively participating in settling inter-ethnic conflicts in Northern Uganda. For example the conflict between that Acholi and Lango as a result of the overthrow of Obote by Acholi Generals is being sorted by religious leaders in the area. According to Erik (O.I, 1/12/2011), based on the biblical message for the need to reconcile with enemies, the religious leaders softened the hearts of the Lan'gi through preaching reconciliatory sermons. Erik further asserts that in this venture women played a central role. In 2010, for example, the women from Lango organised a peace mission to Kitgum. As part of this, these women stayed there for one week sharing the word of God. During their encounter with the Acholi, people tearfully confessed their past wrongs and vowed to live as one people. In the same year, on two occasions, the act of the women from Lango was imitated by men from Acholi who came and met with elders from Lango. This act prompted the Lan'gi also to travel to Gulu for the same. Although the current land dispute between the Acholi and Lango seem to be working against this arrangement, many people are looking at this as a great achievement.

Religious organisations, particularly the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, that were active in negotiating peace and providing support for the afflicted population during the conflict, have now turned attention from the LRA War to the 'land wars' (<http://www.arlpi.org/>). The land disputes that the religious leaders are involved in settling are between different groups in northern Uganda (Snow, 2004). With donor support, they have produced a guide to community-based resolution of land wrangles.

From the above, it could be seen that religious leaders and communities throughout Africa have played key roles in bringing about transitions from conflict to genuine peace, justice and reconciliation. The Faith-based organisations' staff and

members in Northern Uganda, priorities peace and reconciliation initiatives, disseminate information, mobilise religious communities and conduct human rights training, monitoring and advocacy. In some instances, they also provide for (legal) defense of victims of violence and, others, support their lobby and advocacy (Naber and Wartson, 2010, p. 5).

Based on their efforts, some semblance of peace was achieved amongst the local people since the local people see religious leaders as persons who understand their needs and who kept with them in all situations.

g. Conflict Management by Civil Society Organisations and NGOs

Throughout the cycle of conflicts in northern Uganda, Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and both International and Local Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have played tremendous role in addressing the issues of conflict. While some of them assisted in food aid, others did actively participate in the negotiation for peace in the area.

Like the religious leaders, during the post conflict period, the CSOs working in Northern Uganda have been actively involved in addressing land conflicts in several ways. While some of the CSOs specialise in doing research and documentation, others participate in law and rights education, advocacy for vulnerable people in land conflicts, and mediation in land conflicts. To help them do their work, some of the employees of these CSOs say they are heavily subsidised by international donors. As newer governance theory posits, civil society organizations play important roles in defining and implementing rules for steering interaction. Although in doing this they do not generate legislation as national bodies do, but their

guidelines, manuals, educational materials, and advocacy activities constitute a kind of 'soft law' that also affects the steering of social life in the affected communities.

The SCO in northern Uganda under their umbrella group, the Gulu NGO forum also appealed to the government of Uganda revive the stalled peace talks with the LRA arguing that only a political solution could end the conflict (Mukasa, *The New Vision*, 19/3/2009). According to them pursuing a military solution to conflict are not sustainable. Although not well perceived, it awoken in the government to consider allowing the initiative by the UN through Chissano to get set.

A wide range of international NGOs are involved in carrying out recovery work in post-conflict Northern Uganda. Recently, many of these organisation have turned their focus on land issues. These field organisations include World Vision, Norwegian Refugee Council, CORPUS, Human Rights Focus, ARLPI, and International Alert. On their part, the Land Equity Movement of Uganda (<http://www.land-in-uganda.org/>) has conducted important research and documentation in northern Uganda that are informing policy on land use in post conflict northern Uganda.

Whereas these organisations vary in their legal approach, they have a tendency to found their legitimacy on discourses of universal human rights and values of respect, dignity, reliability, and fairness. Their intention is to promote equal rights to land among Ugandan citizens, regardless of ethnicity, gender or age, and have been especially active in their defense of women and youth rights. In doing this their interest is to see principles of human rights, national law and customary law to corroborate each other so that the rights of the vulnerable people are met. In this regard, the statement of the Acholi Cultural Leaders Association on the land rights of women and people with disabilities.

Apart from promoting equal rights, the NGOs through the donor resources, provide job opportunities for local educated elites serving middle-class political interests. Through such opportunity provided to the local communities, the sons and daughters of northern Uganda are able to raise monies to pay the fees of their siblings or themselves (Landtrust, n.d, accessed on 24/5/2015).

h. Conflict Management by other means

In Northern Uganda the administrative reforms that begun in the late 1940s, and continued throughout to early 1950s to the present greatly helped in bringing people from diverse ethnic and clan groups together. When these diverse people started to discuss issues that affected their areas at a round tables, they were able to access areas that used to be inaccessible. Thus such local people's diplomacy was able to narrow the gap that existed before.

Eventually the closer collaboration between the tribes was boosted when Gulu was elevated to the status of Provincial Headquarters of Northern Province (Markakis, 1994, p. 124). Consequently this opened avenue for the Lango and Madi who could not to go further south seeking for employment opportunity to be employed in Gulu. While at their employment stations, the people from the diverse background were able to relate peacefully. This therefore, helped them to start changing their traditional perspective of "the other".

The introduction of modern communications technology has also greatly worked to narrow the gap between the people in Northern Uganda. The mobile phones and FM radio stations that abound in Northern Uganda have come timely to step this venture to higher levels. As a way of healing, some community leaders were hosted for a phone in talk shows by some of these FM radio stations. Through these, some rebel leaders also participated in some of the discussions. Besides through radio

broadcast, educative programmes that call for unity, land management, and so forth were aired. Such radio programs helped to expose the people of northern Uganda to a wider context and thereby instilling in them the value of peaceful co-existence thereby helping them to start abandoning “negative identity”.

5.3 Traditional Conflict Management Mechanisms Used to Address the Inter and Intra-Ethnic Conflicts in Northern Uganda: Their Success and Failures

Every human society is imbued with traditional mechanisms for addressing conflicts whenever they occur. These principles and practices embodied in traditions have been central to the support for reconciliation and amnesty within any community. Right from the early 1970s when the postcolonial inter/intra-ethnic, clan or family conflicts in northern Uganda started, a lot of traditional mechanisms have been applied in trying to bring peace. Some of these traditional mechanisms that were used to pacify northern Uganda are shown on table 5.3 below.

Table 5.3 showing the Traditional Conflict Management Mechanisms Used for Addressing the Inter and Intra Community Conflicts in Northern Uganda

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conflict Management through fights 2. Conflict Management through use of elders and the community 3. Conflict Management through use of women 4. Conflict Management through use of traditional rituals of reconciliation

Source: field data

Table 5.3 above shows some of the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that were used to address some of the postcolonial conflicts in northern Uganda. The commonest mechanisms used were fights, use of women, use of elders and the

community, and traditional rituals of reconciliation. As with the modern mechanism, the achievements and failures each of them yielded is discussed below.

a. *Conflict Management through Fights*

A critical study of the different conflicts that emerged in Northern Uganda reveals that the reactive approach has been the first response to settle them. This is regardless of whether the conflict was social or political in nature. In regard to political conflicts, starting from the coup that brought Amin to the presidency, any group that felt cheated reacted with a fight. For example, when Amin and members of the Uganda Army hailing from the West Nile region started to witch-hunt the Acholi and Lan'gi in the army and other civil service positions, they formed the Kikosi Malum to fight back. Then when the Amin regime was overthrown in 1979, the Madi also responded to the UNLA administration, mostly composed of the Acholi and Lango officials by organising UNRF 1 rebel group to fight back. The same has been happening when the NRA administration set foot in Northern Uganda in 1986. Though the membership of these fighter groups comprises both former military and nonmilitary personnel from these tribes, the idea of organizing such resistance seems to be stemming from the traditional way of not conceding defeats out rightly. In most cases, the effects of such military fights have always been devastating, to some extent, some of them have assisted in bringing down the conflictants into working relations.

Besides the political conflicts that were attempted to be settled by the use of fights, fights have also been tried out for settling many of the social conflicts that emerged in northern Uganda over land, theft, murder and so on. Among the many fights that were used to settle conflicts, we could take the fights between the Pajong and the Pubec in Mucwini (Kitara, O.I, 21/3/2011; Luwum, O.I, 12/10/2013) and the Jo Kalyech and the Karwot (Okidi, O.I, 30/7/2009) as examples. Although such

fights did cause more havoc than settling the conflicts in question, they did assist to prevent further attacks from the attacker. In other words, in traditional setting, responding to conflicts through fights is a defensive way of ending conflicts.

The same response was shown during the border conflicts between the Acholi and Lango, and the Acholi and Madi. In the case of the Acholi and Lango border conflicts in Pader and Aleptong, Gulu, Oyam and Lira, each of the groups raided the other and caused some destructions. The border conflict between the Acholi and the Madi saw some Acholi youth organise an informal vigilante group in preparation for a fight. Indeed, according to Dramwi (O.I, 4/2/2012), when the officials of the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources went to show the rightful border between Adjumani and Amuru districts, these vigilante groups came and tried to attack those who were with the government officials.

In a related development, in the land wrangle between the Acholi and Madi at Bibia, Omach Anthony Atube the Local Council Five chairperson of Amuru District tried to call for a fight between the Acholi and Madi because he thought the Madi were being incited and protected by General Moses Ali to occupy Acholi land (Lagu, O.I, 12/3/2012). Such threat of violence helped to curtail the advance of the aggressors since it showed them the readiness of the aggrieved for a fight. This therefore, made each side to calm down for a negotiated settlement.

Although generally identified as fights, some of the so called fight are actually threats of fight meant to show the readiness of each side to attack. Of course destructive it might be to the opposing sides if it occurs, the traditional intent of threat of a fight was to make people respect each other. Consequently the end of such threats are gateway to mediation by a neutral party. Indeed in some of the conflicts in

northern Uganda between the clans and tribes were addressed after a fight or threat to fight.

b. *Conflict Management through Use of Elders and the Local Community*

In the Acholi, Lango and Madi cultural setting, elders and community members are very important. Whereas the elders are the custodians of the community norms, values, and beliefs, the members of the community provide the setting within which such cultural aspects are expressed. Once conflicts occur in any community, the members of the community gather in the presence of the elders to address them so that such conflicts do not destroy social cohesion. It is therefore the role of elders and the community to address conflicts both at the preventive and resolution levels. At the preventive stage, whenever elders get to know of an impending from another community or two parties within the community are having simmering conflict, they try to nib the conflict before got to overt expression. At the resolution level, after preliminary consultation, the elders' council drew the attention of the whole community to settle the differences between the parties in conflict. In case this occurred within a clan, the elders sat and addressed the issues of conflict before they got overtly expressed.

In most of the conflicts that took place in northern Uganda, the elders from both sides of the conflict have worked hard to initiate means to address them amicably. For example when the Pajong and Pubec clashed, elders from the two communities through mediation by neutral clans helped to calm the situation (Ogora and Biane, n.d). After a long negotiation and the assistance from NGOs, communal projects were imitated to help make people from the two communities to constantly interface thereby forging peaceful coexistence. In this case, a borehole was put in place where

people from both communities constantly meet while drawing water (Okidi, 24/3/2010).

To support their action, the elders argued that since people from the two communities have been living adjacent to each other for such a long time there was not need to continue with the conflict. Of course the process of achieving this peace was not easy. Nevertheless through the process of establishing the initiators, their motives, they were able to identify the issues of conflict and found the constituent of the conflictants. In the case of the Pajong and the Pubec, the elders established the source of the conflict to be the mistake made by an escapee who disguised to have belonged to the Pajong clan yet he was a member of the Pubec. Finding the root course of the conflict helped the elders to identify the wrong party. They, in a trial like manner, heard from both parties and their witnesses.

The role the members of the community played in addressing this conflict was engaging the parties in a deeper reflection of their previous relationship and interrogating them and the witnesses so the truth comes out. Since as Malan (2004, p. 10) argues, generally in Africa when an elder from a village starts to speak, the intention was not to blame the conflictants but rather to sooth the bad feelings so that the relationship could be re-enacted, the elders and members of the community did exactly that.

Although the rule is that during such sorting of differences, no weapon was allowed at the venue of discussion, in the case of the land conflict between the Acholi and Madi at Appa some of the youth from the Acholi side came with spears and bows. However, in order to maintain peace and order, the government got some police and soldiers to be present. The presence of these personnel was just but to oversee security matters. Indeed when some youth from Acholi were suspected to be

intending to disorganise the talks, the police and armed forces who were seen to be neutral were able to oversee security matters.

When the first attempt of the talks failed, the matter was referred to the next level. This follows the traditional requirement that in case a complainant was not satisfied with the settlement, they were given the liberty to appeal to the next level. In this case, instead of following the traditional hierarchy of the family, hamlet, village, clan and finally chieftaincy, the case was referred to the land office so that border demarcation is clearly shown.

It should be noted that in the traditional arrangement the people who participated in preventing or solving conflicts acted as facilitators and mediators. In situations where the parties could not accept or come to terms, the service of a stronger third party to enforce terms on the conflictants was employed. In situations where deals were reached, the offender was made to accept responsibility for the offense committed; he/she asks for forgiveness, the offended was requested to forgive, the offender then paid the required fine, and the two parties were led to reconcile. It was at such points where the ritual of Mato oput (Acholi), Kayo cuk (Lan'gi), and Tolu koka (Madi) took place.

Although in a traditional context the participation in such gathering was the preserve of men who were of age, elderly women and male youth were also encouraged to attend. While for the male youths it was seen as a training ground, in regard to women, they were supposed to follow the case attentively, keep all the resolutions passed so that they could be used later on. In contentious issues, elderly women were given the chance to speak. Through this, the elderly women acted as advisors to their husbands on what to do and what not to do based on their past

experiences. In settling most of the conflicts in northern Uganda, the parties concerned tried to follow this process.

Elders also played a great role in preventing and resolving conflicts amongst the pre-colonial communities in Northern Uganda through teaching the young generation about the relationships that existed between clans in different locations. For example, the three branches of Bobi clans which are found in Puranga, Padibe and Pajule claim that they are related. The Agoro clans which settled in Palwo in the 19th Century are said to have migrated from East Acholi. In Puranga, the Paciko clan claim common ancestry with the Paciko in Pairo (Uma, 1971, pp. 2-4). The Palaro, Paluga, and Pagoro in Adjumani district all trace their roots to similar clans in Acholi area. Then the Pabango in Adjumani and those in Acholi all belonged to the same clan. Therefore, through tracing such distant relations, the elders helped the young generation to be in harmony with one another across the ethnic divide. Such incidences provided the benchmark for peaceful co-existence between clans before the arrival of the Arabs (Odoi, 2009, p.78).

In regard to the ethno-political conflicts amongst the people of northern Uganda that started with the killing of Brigadier Okoya, the overthrow of Obote by Amin in 1971 and the subsequent massacre of the Acholi and Lan'gi for which the UNLA retaliated on West Nilers in the 1980s, the Madi and Acholi elders met and re-enacted the strained relation following traditional means. Although this relationship was again strained by the LRA rebellion, some people still talk about what was done in the 1980s and how it brought peaceful co-existence. A group of elders went to meet Kony at his Ri-Kwangba hideout to talk peace (Olupot, *The Sunday Vision*, 11/5/2008). Although this trip did not bring in peace dividend, what was done saw

the elders' concern for peace. To cement this further, a lot of intermarriages have taken place between the Acholi and Madi since then.

According to Bearnny Afako;

Through the mediation of the traditional chiefs (rwodi) many offences, including homicide, have traditionally been resolved by reconciliation. Whenever a homicide takes place the rwodi intervene in the situation to 'cool down the temperature' and to offer mediation. Although the traditional chiefs had, since 1911, been supplanted by the colonially appointed chiefs (Rwodi Kalam) their legitimacy has never been destroyed.... The unique contribution of the rwodi is through their mediation of the reconciliation process, *matoput*, which many Acholi believe can bring true healing in a way that a formal justice system cannot. (Afako, 2002, p. 63)

In the conflict between the Pajong and the Pubec in Mucwini, and the Jo Kalyech and the Karwot over the death of their clans men, Kitara (O.I, 21/11/2011), and Okidi (O.I, 30/7/2009) respectively said the mediation done by the elders and the NGOs did assist greatly in bringing order and reconciliation. In both instances, after a series of talks, the offending clan accepted the wrong done, and asked for forgiveness. This was followed by giving some animals to compensate for the lives lost, before reconciliation ceremony was arranged. In the case of the Pubec and the Pajong, Bishop McLeod Baker Ochola II was very instrumental in negotiating the reconciliation of the parties (Kitara, O.I, 21/11/2011). To facilitate the furtherance of the relationship between the Pubec and Pajong, a borehole was constructed to serve both communities in 2010. The understanding is that as these groups keep on meeting at the borehole while fetching water, they will be able to interact and develop better

relationships. Through such interactions, the young people would be able to identify marriage partners from across the clan thus helping to cement the relationship further.

Mediation of land conflicts by local communities abound in Northern Uganda. Section 88 (1) of the 1997 Land Act as amended in 1988 recognizes the operation of such groups in mediating land conflicts. As a result, if land conflicts were reported to courts of laws, the courts referred them to be addressed by such local set-ups in which elders, neighbours and the whole community came together to mediate. Given that the local people who are conversant with the conflictants and the portions of land they are conflicting over, many people praised the mediation work done by local people in addressing land conflicts. During a presentation at the 4th Institute of Transitional Justice in Kigum, Komakech (22/3/2014) contends, “traditional justice is becoming a new phenomenon because communities demand for it given their contextual relevance”. In relation to addressing land conflicts in Northern Uganda, Komakech (Conference presentation, 22/3/2014) asserts “over 70% of the land cases in Gulu and over 80% of the land cases in Kitgum referred to traditional mechanism and they were settled”. As such, according to him, the role of elders and the community as a traditional conflict resolution mechanism should be encouraged.

Among other reasons in praise of the elders and the community in administration of traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, the respondents say their role in land mediation proved to be time saving and cost effective. That the chiefs and elders plus all who are involved possess complimentary understanding of natural boundaries and the relationship and connections required to ascertain pre-war land ownership between tribes, clans, families, and individuals. Furthermore, chiefs and elders are respected by local community which is an essential element in enforcing that final decision and full compliance (All FGDs, cf. ARLPI, 2008, p. 33).

Besides, given that the community leaders and members are contextually relevant, and participate voluntarily, whatever they agreed upon has high degree of truth because of the collectiveness of the decision taken. In some of the ruling where rituals and curses are involved, they help to threaten and restrict people from repeating such offenses (Komakech, Conference presentation, 22/3/2014).

Based on the above, the use of elder and the community have greatly assisted in addressing conflicts in northern Uganda because of their accessibility to local people within walking distance. The carrying of proceedings in local language helps everybody present to hear what is said without the need of a translator and such people give contribution to the process. Because the process is carried in the locality of the crime, prison sentences are not there. Hence, in case an offender is required to pay reparation, he/she continues contributing to the economy and the social wellbeing of the community (Komakech, 2012, p. 70).

c. Conflict Management through use of Women

In most patriarchal African settings women were restricted from participating openly in resolving conflict. Yet in other parts of the World open participation of women in preventing and resolving conflicts has been of great importance. Unlike in other places right from the pre-colonial period to date, women in Northern Uganda have played a vital role in bringing about intra and inter-ethnic harmony. They participated in preventing and resolving intra and inter-ethnic conflicts through marriage and children upbringing. In as far as marriage is concerned, it was a common practice that when a man married from a family all his relatives and that of the woman or women in a way became relatives.

Right from the pre-colonial periods, chiefs and other people made use of this arrangement to pacify their chieftaincies. They ensured that they married from the

clans within their chiefdoms and the neighboring chiefdoms thus helping to prevent conflicts emerging from within and without the chiefdom. This worked well in a way that when some groups attempted to attack such chiefdom, the clans or chiefdoms from which the chief had married would provide whole hearted support so that they preserve the safety of their relatives within the court of the chief (Oboma, O.I, 11/2/2010).

In some instances, chiefs encouraged inter royal marriages so that those who were neighbouring each other do not engage in acrimonious relations. Odoi (2009) elucidates the link of the Acholi chieftaincies of Payira, Padibe, Palabek and Atyak through marriage. He notes that "The mother of rwot Camo of Payira and the grandmother of rwot Ogwok of Padibe were daughters of rwot Bwomona of Palabek. The mother of rwot Adinga of Atyak was also the daughter of the rwot of Palabek." (p. 79). The connection through marriage, noted above, helped to deter fights amongst clans since when people traced their ancestry, they could find no need to fight each other given that doing so meant fighting a relative.

As in the pre-colonial period, during Uganda's postcolonial period, it was required that in intra and inter-ethnic conflicts, women, children and the crippled were not killed. Instead, the women and girls who were collected during such raids were given in marriage to members of the victorious clan. While recounting the battles between the Lan'gi and the Madi, Driberg (1923, pp. 29-33) notes that some Lan'gi married Madi women whom the Lan'gi took during raids. When such women traced their roots back to where they were picked from, the two clans would eventually be united through such marriage arrangement. This is a situation that resonated to the whole tribe or clan. In the 1980s the marriage between David Oyite Ojok and Perina

(a.k.a Mama Simba) helped to save the people of Adjumani from the virulence of the UNLA soldiers (Nzima, O.I, 13/1/2010).

In some situations to cement the relationship between communities further, when a lady from a clan got married to a person from another clan, more ladies from the clan of the lady who got married in that clan would follow suit if the men in that clan are well behaved. Such arrangement helped to extend the horizon of the relationship from one family to several families. While in some Madi clans, the lady who got married first in that clan could divorce her husband and go back to her parents' home, in other clans it was a normal practice and therefore encouraged. Some respondents indeed said arrangements such as these helped many communities who were once enemies to reconcile.

As mothers who raise up children, women also acted as instillers of culture of peace in their children. Just as it was during pre-colonial dispensation, even during the postcolonial period, it was/is a common saying "your mother did not teach you manners" if a child misbehaved. This means as mothers, women are teachers of peaceful co-existence right from infancy. In the traditional setting, women instill such teaching in their children through story telling (Acholi/Lan'gi-Ododo and Madi-Odo(go), riddles (Acholi-koc lit; Langi-Ichina and Madi-Pregelem), and proverbs (Madi-lejo ekwi) from tender age. By the time children start to attend the fellowship of others at the evening fire place (Acholi/Langi-wang oo and Madi-lange) to get further instructions about facts of life, they would have passed through the tutelage of their mothers. Because of such central role women play in the lives of children, the least person a child would want to disrespect was the mother. In fact, according to Olweng Kevin (O.I, 28/10/ 2009), "this explains why people usually cry in the name of their mothers-even if they are old- whenever they are hurt or going through pain".

Although women were not directly involved in the settlement of conflicts as noted above, they played a critical role in ensuring that conflicts were resolved amicably. Though women were not allowed to contribute ideas at the gatherings whenever people gathered to discuss issues of conflict, whenever they retreated to their houses they gave formidable advice to their husbands that helped them in making decisions. When asked why this is so, a respondent simply said that women were not allowed to actively get involved in conflict resolution because they do not know the tradition of their husbands and also because some of them can easily react to situations (Anonymous, OI, 23/5/2010). Since they are allowed to influence secretly, men usually consult them quietly. This, therefore, explains why when men had tough decisions to make, they first consulted with their wives before they took any decisions (Marrie, *et. al*, 2003, p. 38). On their part, to help disarm men's masculine ego, the women called them by the name of their first born and gave them advice of life, which of course includes how to make decisions in situations of conflict. Although Diana Namirembe Nkesiga (O.I, 7/11/ 2009), sees this as a kind of "woman's manipulation of men for their own ends", whatever advice they give to men during such critical periods help the men to make sound decisions.

In as much as Amin was considered to be brutal to the Acholi and Lan'gi, his marriage to a Lan'gi lady was said to have protected the lives of some people (Opigo, O.I, 12/4/2010). Unlike what happened during the genocide in Rwanda where people killed their spouses of a different ethnic background, in Northern Uganda such marriage created unity. When there was a change in government, some people's lives were spared because their in-laws were able to give them full protection based on the relationship brought by marriages.

During the UNLA regime, the people of Adjumani district survived because of the marriage between Oyite Ojok and Pierina Arach Oyite (Opigo, O.I, 21/5/2012). When the UNLA soldiers got to Pakelle and the current Adjumani Town Council, they did not behave brutally safe in two areas outside town where people were treated harshly. During that same period, the marriage of some army commanders to other Madi girls helped to protect the lives of people. Much as, on the other hand, such marriages made the “Oyoro” (rebels) in Madi area to inflict pain on the people whose daughters got married to soldiers, to a greater extent such marriages assisted in cementing inter-ethnic relations in northern Uganda to date.

For example Saverion Lukoya, the father of Alice Auma Lakwena the leader of the Holy Spirit Movement is a Madi who got married to an Acholi lady and raised their children among the Acholi in Gulu. Even when there was tension between the Acholi and the Madi, Lukoya’s marriage to an Acholi girl helped to protect his life. To the extent that when Alice Auma began her rebellion, the people of Acholi did not say this Madi girl has caused a problem to us, but instead they identified with her based on the relations brought about by marriage. Furthermore, the inter-marriage between the different clans in northern Uganda is also a real resource in as far as bridging the gap between groups who could otherwise be in bitter fights is concerned.

The work done by Betty Bigombe in trying to negotiate for the peaceful resolution of the conflict between the government of Uganda and the LRA was commendable (Oywa, 2002, p. 61). The LRA rebel leadership was able to give her audience. If it were not for intrigue within the government circles, she could have seen an amicable ending of the LRA conflict. Besides, many women peace teams took to activism to the extent that in 1999 women organised a peaceful demonstration in Gulu town. According to Oywa (2002, p. 61), this happened at a time when no one

could talk about the war. Wearing rags and singing funeral songs, the women marched through Gulu town demanding an end to the conflict. As a result of this, “many from the LRA gave up fighting and returned home” (Oywa, 2002, p. 61).

In a related development, the work done by Angelina Atim and the other women whose daughters were abducted by the LRA during the Aboke Girls incident was commendable (Atim, O.I, 13/1/2011). These women, through the organisation they formed were able to draw the attention of the International Community on the plight of children in conflict situations. Besides, given that women have power to convince their sons and husbands, during the Juba Peace Talks between the LRA and the Government of Uganda, the government peace team made use of Kony’s mother and wife to talk to him. Among (O.I, 22/11/2011), Kony’s wife, asserts “when we went to Garamba in the DRC, I tried to convince my husband in vain”.

In regard to women’s role in protests as a means of addressing conflicts in Northern Uganda, Norbert Mao (21/3/2013) gave two scenarios during a Transitional Justice Institute in Kitgum. In the first case, he asserts, “about 80 elderly women in Amuru came nude to meet the Residence District Commissioner (RDC) and Indian investors”. The scary spectacle made the RDC and his team to take off thus assisting to prevent the investors from grabbing the land of the poor. The second scenario was when women tried to resist police brutality during a demonstration in Gulu town in 2010. While recounting the story Mao asserts, “in order to slow down the movement of the police vehicle, women poured some beans on the road thus making the police vehicles to make a U-turn instead of going forward”. Although such practices are somewhat crude ways of handling issues, but it gives us a mirror of what women can do to bring peace regardless of whatever it takes. For example, to get elderly women undress in public means their utter disgust of a situation since it is a curse to see the

nakedness of your mother. Such act of public nudity was a way of a curse to those who witnessed it. In this case the RDC and the Indians who had gone to take advantage of people's poverty were cursed by those women.

Actually, a lot of work is currently being done by women as far as seeking for reconciliation is concerned. While talking about conflict resolution through modern religions, we noted the work done by women groups in extending an arm to reconcile the Acholi with the Lan'gi. Indeed, the works these women do is being appreciated by many people in Northern Uganda, given that the reconciliation they bring amongst formerly divided communities is immense.

Based on the highlights above, many respondents think that if women are given enough support in peacebuilding, their efforts could greatly lead to uniting people during and after conflicts. In the case of Northern Uganda the work of women has been very instrumental in bridging gaps that have been created by conflicts.

d. Conflict Management through use of Traditional Rituals

Another way through which pre-colonial Acholi, Lango and Madi communities solved their conflicts was through the use of traditional rituals of reconciliation. Rituals were employed to seal the peace pact and at the same time to prevent re-emergence of conflicts. According to Oywellu (Conference presentation, 31/3/2013), since rituals are given by God to the people, they are good means of sealing agreement after conflicts. Indeed, when respondents were asked about what commonest rituals were performed to bring people together after the series of conflicts in Northern Uganda, most of them mentioned the following: rituals of blood pact, stepping on an egg, bending of spear, cleansing of a place, and other rituals of reconciliation. In most cases, cosmic forces are invoked to witness what people are getting committed to. Cosmic forces were called to witness this so that when the

parties who go through such rituals break the oath they made, it is understood that the spirits would deal with them. Hence avoiding the torture by cosmic forces required the parties to observe the pact they entered into. Below is a brief description of some of these rituals of reconciliation that have been used to bring peace in northern Uganda.

i) The Ritual of Blood Brotherhood. The ritual of blood-pact or blood brotherhood was performed when two people or communities that were initially not related with each other want to enter a relationship. After giving each to the other some blood drained from the umbilical cord area to lick, some utterances were made to seal the relationship. Henceforth, such people started to look at each other as brothers/sisters (All-FGDs). Once that was done, the parties were not allowed to intermarry and were supposed to stand together in case of attacks. Although this ritual was mostly used during pre-colonial period, the commitment that some communities made has maintained such relationships up to today. As such, some people feel if people who have conflicted and reconciled could get into such a venture, their relationships could be cemented better (Most-FGDs).

ii) The ritual of stepping on an egg (Acholi/Lango- *nyon tong gweno*; Madi- *au ele tuka*). The data collected reveals that, while among the Acholi the ritual of stepping on an egg (*nyon tong gweno*) was performed to cleanse a person who has been away from his/her clan of some strong spirit, among the Madi it is not limited to that. The Madi also perform this ritual on a stranger to show that he/she is being welcomed to their territory peacefully (Oboma, O.I, 21/7/2009). For example, when the NRA forces were entering the Madi territory, a group of elders came and made the leadership of the forces to step on ages to symbolize being received peacefully.

In the Acholi sub-region, many people who returned from LRA captivity were not received home unless this ritual was performed at the courtyard. Once it was done, some water was sprinkled on them using tree branches to cleanse them from assumed bad omens. Through this rituals those who were returning from the bush started to feel free knowing that something that was not right has been cleansed from them and thereby resuming normal life in the community. In other words this ritual has some psychological effect on the recipients given that once gone through they feel some sort of freedom.

iii) *The ritual of cleansing taboo committed during a conflict (Acholi/ Langi - Tumbu Kir; Madi-ebu'ru ka).* To maintain relationship between the living, the ancestral spirits and the gods, the pre-colonial societies established a series of taboos. When a person broke a taboo in the course of a conflict, the whole community he/she belonged to were said to be affected (All- FGD). Among the Acholi, things that amount to "Kir" (taboo) include, but not limited to, quarreling over land, quarrelling at water source or while collecting firewood, fighting within a family to the extent of throwing food at one another, refusing to cooperate in a dispute like refusing to accept or admit a wrong committed or unwilling to talk in a dispute resolution (Ocan, 2011, p. 60). Since it was/is believed that whoever commits such a taboo brought bad omen to him/herself and the whole community, the elders of the community from which the person who has broken a taboo would sit and inquire of what happened from a medicine man or a ritual leader. The person from whom the inquiry was sought in turn gave the prescription of what to do. If the taboo committed was grave, a goat would be sacrificed to cleanse the person(s) who had broken the taboo. Describing how the Acholi perform this ritual, Ocan Ali Onono (2011) asserts that;

During the purification, the religious leader slaughters the animal while making pleas: “You goat, your blood is to take away the dirt...that occurred at home. Today we are not killing you without a cause; let your blood wash away this sin so that people stay in good health”. He then cuts the goat open, takes the content of the lower (wee) and puts them on the feet and the position of the heart (pal cwiny) of the victims of the offense.... He also sprinkles it on the houses to make sure that the offense gets off the offender, offended, and the whole family. (p. 61)

After the above purification ritual, the persons who committed the taboo was warned not to indulge in such act again. If it was a quarrel over land, they were cautioned that if they continued such quarrels, the ground would open and swallow them up. Then the water used for washing hands would be either sprinkled on the people who came or it was poured towards the direction of the setting of the sun to show that the conflict that separated the people was being sent to set with the sun (Ochola II, O.I, 23/11/2011).

Although this ritual does not have some physical healing that people could see outwardly, the internal spiritual healing it causes manifests to outward wellbeing of people in the community. Most people in Northern Uganda link peace to good health and wellbeing, such rituals have caused a great deal of healing in communities where they were performed.

iv) Reconciliation Ritual (*Acholi-mato oput; Langi-kayo cuk; and Madi-tolu koka*). It was a common belief among the pre-colonial Acholi, Lan’gi and Madi communities that violent conflicts strain relationships leading to loss of harmony amongst people who related cordially. Whenever conflicts that resulted into wanton

destruction of lives and properties occurred, the practice was that reconciliation rituals are performed to re-enact the strained relationship.

In the Acholi reconciliation ritual (*mato oput*), a concoction made out of *oput* root, fermented millet and blood of a slain animal was taken by members of the offending and offended clans (FGD-AG, AM, G, K, N and P). The *oput* tree was perhaps chosen because of two basic reasons: first it grows in group, and second, its roots are bitter. Therefore, using its root for the ritual of reconciliation implies seeking for reenactment of togetherness after a bitter past. Before people reached to the stage of performing the ritual of drinking the bitter concoction, a lot would have taken place. These include but not limited to breaking of relationship, initiatives by elders from the offending clan to talk through a third party and the coming together of the two groups to sort out what led to the strained relationship (Ocan, 2011, pp. 61-67).

During such a discussion, the offender was made to accept the offense and asked for forgiveness. The offended in turn was also asked to forgive the offender. Then the offender was required to pay for the lost life (Oywellu, Conference presentation, 22/3/2013). The compensation could be either in form of cattle or a young girl who would be married to a close relative of the dead person so that she reproduces a replacement. The elders then pronounced some curses to avoid the repeat of the offense. The liver of the animal from which blood was drained for mixing with the *oput* root and the fermented millet was roasted. People present from both groups were called to share the meal. This then marked the start of the celebration of the re-enacted relationship (Ochola II, O.I, 23/11/2011). The climax of this ritual was the drinking alcohol together as members celebrate the re-enacted relationship. While the *Lan'gi* (Agang-Okello, O.I, 20/02/2009) and *Madi* rituals (Oboma, O.I, 21/7/2009) of

reconciliation- *kayo cuk* and *tolu koka*- respectively follow the same format with that of the Acholi, their only difference is the absence of drinking of the concoction made out of a bitter roots. But in essence, they are the same things in different contexts.

There have been many instances of conducting rituals of reconciliation after conflicts in Northern Uganda. For example, early in November 2001, a group *mato oput* ceremony was held in Pajule. This involved about 20 former LRA combatants who returned around that time and those who have already settled in the community (FGD P 1). The ceremony was supported by Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), churches and the Acholi in the Diaspora. Government officials, the amnesty commissioners, senior army commanders in the region and several representatives of NGOs attended the function. This demonstrates the support of the wider Ugandan community to this kind of community healing process (Oywellu, Conference presentation, 22/3/2013). Similar ceremonies of this kind took place in Pabbo, in Amuru District, and other parts of Acholi (Afako, 2002, p. 63).

In addition to *mato oput*, some respondents in Kitgum, Gulu, Amuru, Adjumani and Lira (FGDs) contend that individual cleansing rituals routinely took place whenever people who were formerly abducted by the LRA or those who were LRA combatants returned to their community. Most agencies that received and reintegrated ex-combatants ensured that traditional rituals are integrated into the process. In a demonstration of the value attached to traditional approaches locally, Kitgum district earmarked some funds for elders to carry out atonement rituals (FGD-K1, 2, and 4). The Amnesty Act enjoins the Amnesty Commission to 'promote appropriate mechanisms of reconciliation in the affected areas' (Section 9c), and the Commission has been supportive of the initiatives in Acholi. Although all these

efforts have contributed to a successful reintegration process, it is difficult to attribute specific effects to each element.

While recounting the effectiveness on *mato oput* in addressing inter-tribal conflicts, Oywellu (Conference presentation, 22/3/2013) cited that which was performed in 1985 to right the wrongs between the Acholi and the people of west Nile. Similarly, he argued, the same can be done this time to address the challenges brought about by the LRA conflicts between the different tribal groups in Northern Uganda. According to him *mato oput* is a good ritual because it reduces impunity and brings true reconciliation. The assertion of Oywellu was confirmed by most respondents who were asked about the effectiveness of the *mato oput* ritual in healing relationship between former enemies. The respondents praised this ritual because it is done in the open where the whole community is involved and because of its convenience and the reparation aspects contained therein. Furthermore, respondents say the system is free of corruption, unbiased, socially relevant and convenient, and celebrative. The elaborate curses pronounced as a way of sealing the deal helps to make the parties keep the promise and reinforces their promise not to repeat the offense (Komakech, Conference presentation, 21/3/2013).

v) *The ritual of cleansing an area (Acholi/ Lango -moyo piny; Madi-vu ideka).*

This ritual was performed in a context of post conflict period. It was done to appease the ancestors so as to cleanse an area of evil spirits that were believed to have infested an area where battle took place. In most cases, in such conflicts blood might have been shed (Ojera, 2008, p. 106). In order to appease the spirits of the living dead and the gods, goats were sacrificed then the ritual leader pleaded to the spirits not to attack the living people of such a community. In areas where mass killing took place like Mucwini, Namukora, Anaka, Patongo, Atyak (FGD-AM 1), Palabek (FGD-K4),

Barlonyo (FGD-L3), and areas of Ofua (FDG-AD 2 and 3), before people went back to resettle, the ritual of cleansing the ground was performed. This helped the returnees to psychologically feel that the place is safe for rehabilitation. However, in some areas like Atyak (FGD-AM 1) and Barlonyo (Ogwang, Conference presentation, 22/11/2011), where a lot of people were buried in mass graves, memorial prayers are conducted yearly to help people come to terms with the cruel past and learn the culture of the peace. Then at the Mucwini massacre site a prayer was conducted by the Reverend Father Cena (Ogora and Baine, n.d). To commemorate the life of those who died he erected a cross with the inscription that reads “Pray for 56 people killed on 24/7/2002 Massacre at Pajong”. This event acted to cool the tempers of the Pajong clan members.

During the data collection, the researcher observed that in places where such rituals were not performed, the spots where people were killed were left fallow. To the extent that people even fear to cultivate such areas for fear of getting attacked by spirits of dead people. Although some Christians fear to openly participate in this traditional ritual, the church came up with performing some prayers to cleanse the place (FGD-AM 1 & 2). Even though it is Christianized in such contexts, the essence and reason for performing the prayers still remains appeasing peoples’ feel for psychological safety.

vi) *The ritual of cleansing a person (Acholi/Lango-moyo kum; Madi-ekweri ka)*. Cleansing practices are important elements of traditional practices among the ethnic communities in Northern Uganda. Throughout Acholi, Lango and Madi, the practice of cleansing a person forms the core of reintegration process after conflicts. Although it is most commonly practiced as part of the process of welcoming a person back into the community, it also remain integral to the response mechanisms for a

killing or other act properly understood in the community as an abomination (Komakech, 2012, p. 70). The practice of this ritual varies from clan to clan and tribe to tribe. The central objective was to cleanse someone who is running from captivity. Such captivity could have been caused by a bad act committed, especially if a person killed another person during the time of absence from home. Such a person made people at home to know about what happened (FGD-K2). Before the culprit enters the court yard, the ritual of stepping on egg is performed. Then at an arranged time, the ritual of cleansing the body was performed (FGD-G3). The act of cleansing such a person functions as part of a final reconciliation process to normalise relations between a victim and a perpetrator. Most of the people who were interviewed and those who participated in the FGDs confirmed that during the LRA insurgency, this ceremony was performed on the people who escaped from the rebel captivity. Since this is a welcoming practice for individuals who have been absent from a community for a prolonged period of time, most of those on whom this ceremony were performed felt integrated in the life of the community.

Among the Madi, this ritual is not only performed to cleanse the body of a person who had killed another human being, but also when a person killed wild animals like lions, leopard, tiger and so forth. This ritual was done with the understanding that if the spirit of the dead person or animal were not appeased, it would manifest in the person who had killed it. It was believed that the manifestation of the spirits of the dead could easily make the person who killed him/her to kill another innocent person at home. When this ritual was performed, it was believed that it chases away such spirits and reconciles the killer with the people at home (FGD-AD2). According to Komakech (2012), as an act of ascend to the process of reconciliation, community members often slaughtered a bull, sheep or a got.

Komakech (2012) further argues that, 'in northern Uganda, the communities closely associated cleansing with the idea of cooling one's temper after becoming hurt or disturbed' (p. 71).

In an interview with Opigo (OI, 2/4/2010) he described an instance in which this ritual was performed on him and the thrill that it brought in his life. This ritual was after surviving a nasty LRA bus ambush in 2005. He said during this ambush some people were killed and the blood of these dead people spilled on them. Hence, those of them who survived had to be cleaned of the bad omen that could come from the blood of the dead that spilled on them. In the traditional set up, this ritual is an important aspect of restoring balance, both mentally and emotionally. It also serves as a necessary preparatory step in readying both individuals and community for a further process of reconciliation (Komakech, 2012, p. 71).

vii) *The ritual of bending of the spear (Achoi/ Lango-gomo tong; Madi-aju si anyuka)*. This ritual was performed by members of two or more clan(s) or chieftain(s) who used to be in war with each other for some time after realising the dangers caused by the conflict they engaged in. It was required that, a talk was initiated between elders of such communities. After such talks, a day was set for a joint meeting. During this meeting, elders from the different clans recounted their past harmonious relationship and then highlighted how the conflict had destroyed such a state of peace. After this, the ancestral spirits from both sides were invoked to witness what was taking place and then the people were made to promise not to engage in further conflicts. The final stage of the ceremony was eating and drinking to seal the peace accord.

There have been many incidences where this ritual was performed after the conflicts between the government and UNRF 1, UPDA, HSM and LRA in Northern

Uganda (Most of the FGDs). This was done to show that the parties have agreed to settle down for peaceful coexistence. Through this, for example, the UNRF I were able to join hands with the UNLA forces to fight the NRA rebels. The joining of hands after putting aside previous hostilities prevented the UNRF I from taking up power from General Tito Okello Lutwa, even when some of the UNLA administrators began to call them names. According to General Ali (O.I, 16/12/ 2011) their act of calmness was informed by the Madi culture that required one not to take up arms against the other with whom s/he has eaten from the same dish. Otherwise if it were not for that they would have taken power from the UNLA.

5.4 How Peacebuilding from Below was Used to Manage the Intra and Inter Ethnic Conflicts in Northern Uganda

The descriptions above shows how both modern and traditional conflict management mechanisms helped to address the conflicts in Northern Uganda. From this it could be to easy to tease out and see the power of peacebuilding from below expressed through the work of religious leaders, CSOs and NGOs, women, elders and the community members, and traditional rituals of reconciliation have assisted in giving out some peace dividends to the people of northern Uganda.

In regard to the efforts of religious leaders, as noted somewhere in this study, since the 1970s when the relationship between the Acholi, Lango and Madi started to deteriorate, religious leaders featured prominently in bridging the gap between these communities. The religious leaders who assisted in this process were those who have been part of the local community. They understood whatever people were going through and came to the scene from that perspective. Though not earlier on mentioned, the work done by Archbishop Janani Luwum, who eventually got killed, was a testimony to this. As a person who hailed from northern Uganda, in the 1970s

when there was mass disappearance of people from the Acholi and Lango communities, he was able to face the regime's leadership (Ford, 1978). Though this cost his own life, his act was becoming the voice of the voiceless and the conscience of the community was able to draw the attention of the international community on what was going on in Uganda.

In the early 1980s religious leaders in northern followed this example. For example in the Madi sub-region the different Christian denominations opened up their facilities for the people who were running away from their homestead due to the insurgency then. In the present Adjumani district the work of the Reverend Father Eugenio Mangi of the Roman Catholic Church and the Reverend Andrew Ali Olal of the Anglican Church were testimonies to this. These clergy walked the lonely path with those who were in need. When Reverend Olal was arrested with others the UNLA and taken to Gulu, he protected those with whom he was in the cell from Adjumani. His constant plea to their innocence eventually made the authorities to release them (Ocheng, OI, 2//3/2011). Of course around the same time, a lot was done by other religious leaders to save innocent people.

Starting from 1997 to the present, the Acholi Religious Leaders have worked tirelessly through their organization ARLPI to bring peace in northern Uganda. The work of the ALRPI was augmented by the UJCC and IRCU during the Juba peace talks and many other related programs so the peace was ushered in. This act of identifying with the people won the trust of the community to the extent that whatever position the religious leaders come up with, the local community stood by it (FGDs in Acholi sub-region). The current engagement of the ALPI in sorting out land disputes in northern Uganda has calmed the level of violence as a result of land conflicts

(Ochola, OI: 23/4/2012). The local community is happy with the work of the religious body.

From the data collected, it was found out that the work done by the CSOs and NGOs have greatly assisted in managing conflicts amongst the local people thereby bringing in relative peace in northern Uganda. The involvement of CSOs in addressing land conflicts has brought in tremendous reconciliation amongst the local communities. Through research, documentation and advocacy the evil of land grabbers have been brought to the public domain thereby making some of them to shy away and leaving the poor to remain on their pieces of land. The CSOs' participation in mediation in land conflicts at no cost has also endeared them to the local community thus building the local people's confidence unlike the courts of laws where fees are charged.

Like the CSOs, the work of the NGOs in post conflict recovery have greatly facilitated in local community to do joint projects. In Mucwini, for example, the borehole that were drilled by the NGOs is helping the Pubec and Panjong communities to constantly interact whenever they come to fetch water. Such interactions have helped to build each community's confidence on the other thus facilitating reenactment of the old time peaceful relations (Kitara, 20/3/2012). Of the NGOs, those who are assisting in reconciling the local communities in northern Uganda are World Vision, Norwegian Refugee Council, CORPUS, Human Rights Forum, ARLPI, and the local NGOs formed by the local people in northern Uganda. As part of their post conflict rehabilitation project the NGOs have concentrated their activities in creating income generating ventures in which the returnees from the IDPs have engaged themselves. They believe that once the local people are engaged in

productive activities, they will have no time to involve themselves in conflicts that might end up destroying whatever they have invested.

Furthermore, the NGOs provide employment opportunities to the educated among the communities they work with. The income these employees of the NGOs generate has enabled them to send their siblings and children to school. As part of their job, these NGO employees are busy spreading the message of the need for peaceful co-existence. At time some of these programs on peace are broadcast on the local FM radio station that the local people can access through their mobile phone handsets thus instilling the culture of peace at local levels.

The elders and community members have equally been busy in peace campaign. The work of the elders in peace started right at the time of active insurgencies up to this time. During the insurgencies, the elders have initiated various activities directed towards attainment of peace in northern Uganda. Through assistance from both the local and international communities, the elders have successfully organized the "Kacoke Madit" where people gathered to talk peace. These talks paved them a way of approaching both the government and the LRA forces to initiate a negotiated settlement. Although in the process some of the elders ended up being killed, the work they initiated did not go unnoticed in as far as working towards peace in northern Uganda was concerned.

Currently the formal establishment of elders' forum in every district has made the work of the elders even easier. The people who are elected to these forum are those whose integrity are not questionable. With the assistances from community elders and the masses, whenever conflicts arise they ensured that they are addressed immediately. In most cases, whatever decision that these elders and the local community reached at, the parties in conflict followed. The penalty that are imposed

on wrong doers during such meetings have assisted to send threatening messages to those who are contemplating to initiate conflicts.

The participation of the elders and local community members in receiving people who participated in the rebellion or who were once abducted by the rebels has been commendable in bringing about peaceful co-existence in northern Uganda. Through the ritual cleansing that are performed on the returnees, these returnees feel welcomed into their communities. Although there are pockets of individuals who are not happy with such works of the elders and the community members, but by and large what is being done by them has greatly improved relationship at community levels. While doing these the elders ensure that the, programs and associated efforts they are participate in are meant to restore stability following the tradition of the people in question (Fisher, et al, 2005, pp. 13-14; Gross, 2004, p. 17; Neufeeldt, et al, 2002, p. 80; Miller, 2005, p. 26). Since the local communities consider the effect of one persons' crime to affect the whole community (Odama, 2005, p. 3) they work wholeheartedly to see to it that the community does not suffer as a result of one person's misdeed. They made effective use of the traditional family-hood negotiations and the attitude of togetherness in the spirit of human-hood to effectively bring harmony amongst people (Malan, 1997, pp. 14-15).

As part of the greater community, women and women groups rendered immense contribution in bringing about peace in northern Uganda. Through marriage, upbringing of children, giving advice and actively participating in negotiations, women in northern Uganda became heroes in peacebuilding. As noted earlier on, right from pre-colonial time the marriage between the Acholi, Lango and Madi have assisted in pacifying the area (Driberg, 1923). During the UNLA regime, the marriage between David Oyite Ojok and Peirina Arach assisted to reduce revenge

attacks in the present Adjumani district (Opigo, OI,21/5/2012; Nzima, OI, 13/1/2010). Besides, the efforts of Betty Bigombe in initiating peace talks with the LRA (Oywa, 2002, p. 61), Angelina Atim, Sister Racheal (Atim, OI, 13/1/2011), and a host of women peace forums in northern Uganda attest to success registered by women in bringing peace in northern Uganda.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapters trace the nature, manifestation, causes, effects and attempts made to address postcolonial conflicts in Uganda both at the national and local levels. A lot of revelations came out in as far as the situation in Northern Uganda in particular and Uganda at large is concerned. This chapter, therefore, summarises the issues of conflict that have been reflected in the previous chapters, and also gives the conclusion and recommendations.

6.2 Summary

Conflict, the pursuit of incompatible goals by two or more people is a natural phenomenon in human life and is been as old as human race. As an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change, conflict is an expression of heterogeneity other than homogeneity of people's interest, values and beliefs. People's attitudes, behaviours and structures are found to be central means through which conflicts are expressed. The issues that have been discussed in the findings are summarised here under.

6.2.1 The Nature and Manifestation of Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda

As it is elsewhere in Africa, the post-colonial terrain in Uganda has been dotted with numerous conflicts, at the national and local levels. The data collected revealed that the postcolonial conflicts in Northern Uganda are a continuation of the pre-colonial and colonial conflicts. Unlike the pre-colonial conflicts that were conflicts over grazing, gathering, and fishing rights, the postcolonial conflicts

presented in the form of ethno-political, religious, and natural resources conflicts. In spite of the occurrences of these conflicts, there were moments when the communities in Northern Uganda lived in harmony or sought for alliances.

The ethno-political conflicts manifest between and amongst the Acholi, Lango and Madi at tribal, clan, and individual levels. The religious conflicts manifests between religious groups like Christians and Muslims, and the denominations within these two religions. The natural resource conflicts manifest both between and within the tribes, clans, families and individuals. Furthermore, natural resource conflicts have pitched government institutions against local communities and individuals. Given that most of these conflicts occur within local groups, they manifest both simmering and violent.

6.2.2 Causes of the Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda

The findings from the data collected revealed that each of these categories of conflicts had different causes. For example, the ethno-political conflicts that the people of Northern Uganda got embroiled in were caused by a number of factors.

The murder of Brigadier Pierion Yere Okoya and his wife in 1970 was seen by many respondents to have started shattering the cordial relationship that existed between the three tribes. This presented as a source of conflict because it was assumed that the Okoyas were killed by Amin. In spite of the fact that Amin came from the Kakwa tribe in West Nile, since some people could not differentiate between the different tribes in West Nile region, the Madi found themselves branded as Amin's people. Although General Tito Okello Lutwa and the father of the late Okoya were said to have exonerated Amin from this killing, some Acholi and Lan'gi tried to use this as a political tool to fight the people from West Nile, including the Madi.

The military coup that Amin and Onama staged in 1971 against Obote, with the assistance from the Israelis and British government, worked to confirm and deepen the conflict between the Acholi and Langi against the Madi and the people of West Nile. The gruesome killings of the Acholi and Lan'gi and the destruction of property that were registered by the two communities in much of the 1970s made them to organize themselves to fight back. Then eventually when the UNLA, with the assistance from Tanzania and other rebel groups captured state power in 1979, the Acholi and Lan'gi in the military and government took revenge between 1980 and 1985 on the people of West Nile. The looting, rape of women and girls, killings by the UNLA, and the humiliation this caused also made the Madi to organize themselves into a rebel group under the command of General Moses Ali. It was found out that the conflict that ensued as a result of this also cost the government a lot of resources.

Then the conflict between the Acholi and Lan'gi army officers and leaders in the government that precipitated the 1985 military coup by General Tito Okello Lutwa, an Acholi, shattered the cordial relationship between the Acholi and Lan'gi. This made the Acholi to seek for military support from the Madi, thus uniting the Acholi and Madi against the Lan'gi. The humiliation the soldiers caused to the Lan'gi, the destruction of property, losing of jobs and lives this brought made some Lan'gi to be bitterly opposed to the Acholi, and of course the Madi. Then when the LRA conflict spearheaded by the Acholi spread to Lango area and, especially with the killings at Barlonyo, the hatred of the Lan'gi against the Acholi was raised to another level.

It was found out that the effects of the different rebellions, especially the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Auma and Kibero Likoya, and the Lord's Resistance Army

of Joseph Kony, made the relationship in northern Uganda to be shattered right from the tribal level to individual levels. Although these rebellions were directed to the sitting NRA government, the conduct of the rebel forces made the Lan'gi and the Madi to detest the Acholi. Even within the Acholi some clans develop hatred for other clans where the rebel leaders came from. In some instances, whenever the LRA attacked a place outside Acholi sub-region, in case there were some Acholis living in such areas, the local communities tried to revenge on them.

Given that some of the contests between these groups at the political level came with loss of power and resources, the desire to regain power and resources usually made the expression of some of the conflicts to be violent. This in turn aggravated the acrimonious relationship between and amongst these groups and their constituencies. To make matters worse, the political divide between the UPC and DP added to deepen the divides between the communities.

The religious conflicts that manifest at both the intra and inter religious and denominational levels have several causes. One of the causes of such conflict was found to be the conversion from one religion or denomination to another. Although the intra religious conversions are not seriously contested, inter religious conversion are found to be contested seriously. This is so, especially when a Muslim converts to Christianity. In most cases such event is pushed further through politicisation.

Furthermore, wrong interpretation of the scriptures (the Bible and Quran) was found to be another source of religious conflict. To explicate this point, some of the respondents cited a situation where a preacher uses the scripture to attack or denounce the practice of other religions or denominations within the same religion, or using the scripture on one religious group to give it wrong interpretation just meant to denounce

it. The later form of use of scripture was found to be common with the Muslims who are using the bible and wrongly interpreting it for the sake of attacking Christians.

It was also found out that the involvement of spirit mediums and the strong character of cult leaders worked to perpetuate and spark off conflicts in the name of religion. Most of the respondents said such form of conflict stemmed from the practices of Alice Auma Lakwena, Kiberu Likoya, and Joseph Kony. Their use of the scripture and purported authority that they got from god meant to liberate the people of northern Uganda duped many people to fight for many years. The conflict this generated at the local level left a deep seated hatred between and amongst the tribal groups and the local people.

Besides, religious conflicts were found to have been caused by struggle for leadership, marriage across the religious or denominational divides and grabbing of assets, especially schools founded by one denominational group by another. All these have worked negatively to divide the people who should have, otherwise, been relating cordially.

The major cause of conflict in Northern Uganda is the resources conflict that is being expressed between the tribal groups, local communities, state and individuals over ownership, use, and possession of land. These conflicts were found to have been aggravated by the disappearances of boundary markers, dying of witness, sell of land by unscrupulous individuals to others, and forcefully occupying land that does not belong to one. The economic pronouncements, especially discoveries of mineral resources in these areas, the wrong use of money and proliferation of small arms and light weapons helped to fuel this conflict.

6.2.3 The Effects of the Postcolonial Conflicts in Northern Uganda on the State and Social Cohesion of the Local People

The postcolonial conflicts in Uganda at large, and Northern Uganda in particular affected both the state and the local communities in various ways. Starting with the state, it was found out that the conflicts in northern Uganda, especially the protracted conflict between the government and the LRA, cost the government of Uganda a tune of 1.7 billion US dollars. This means in each of the 20 years the government was spending \$85 million, some money that could have been used for developmental projects. The government of Uganda also lost human and capital resources through the massive destructions and killings. It was also found out that as a result of these conflicts, many people in Northern Uganda lost trust on the government since some of the atrocities like killings, forceful evictions, destruction of properties were done by government agents.

At the local levels, the different conflicts in Northern Uganda retarded personal developments, caused wanton destruction of properties and lives, it forced people to live in destitute and squalid lives given the abject poverty they were made to be in. The rapping of men, women and young children by the armed groups (LRA and UPDF) exposed many people to HIV and AIDS and other health complications. These have caused deep seated hatred, frustrations and raising in people the desire to get an opportunity to revenge.

Since land turned out to be a prime factor in the conflict, neighbors have ended up turning against each other. The torture and land grabbing people are exposed to, almost on daily basis, made widows, orphans, the elderly and the powerless to lose community support systems. Furthermore, since many people have died in all these years, orphaned children were made to go without education. The

psychological torture brought about by losing one's land made some people to develop mental problems thus raising the number of lunatics in northern Uganda. Such situations and others have left deep seated pain in people that are very hard to fathom.

6.2.4 The Attempts Made to Resolve the Conflicts in Northern Uganda: their Successes and Failures

Not all conflicts are bad because some of them help people to become innovative. Whenever conflicts emerge, communities have devised means of settling them. In the case of the postcolonial intrastate conflicts in general and those that occurred in northern Uganda, both modern and traditional mechanisms have been tried out in an effort to bring order in a state of chaos. These mechanisms have produced both positive and negative results in as far as addressing conflicts are concerned. From the data collected, the following were found out.

In regard to the modern mechanisms, the attempts that have been made were ranging from commissions of inquiry, legal means, negotiated settlements, economic measures, and modern religious means. The commission of inquiry that was isolated among many was the commission of inquiry into the disappearances of people in Uganda since 1971 that President Amin set in 1974. Although the commissioners collected testimonies from Gulu, Lira and Kitgum, the report that came out did not account for all the people who disappeared, leave alone the hardship that was incurred in implementing the recommendations of the commission. Instead of causing healing between the Acholi and Lan'gi, on one hand, and the people of West Nile where the Madi are, on the other, the mistrust between these communities continued.

Another commission that respondents say attempted to address the postcolonial conflict in northern Uganda was the Amnesty commission. Although

well intentioned, the implementation of the Amnesty Act has left suspicion instead of trust in the system. In spite of it helping to have some people leave rebellion and come home, the way the Amnesty process was conducted made some people to be very suspicious. More so, since people like Kwoyelo who were granted amnesty are still leaving in confinement, some people ended up treading the path of the amnesty with caution. Furthermore, the forcing of those who were rescued from rebel hands to seek for Amnesty made some people to think the Amnesty was devised as a means for the state to clean her image at the international level.

The data collected also demonstrated that the use of legal means like formal law courts, Local Council (LC) and sub-county courts, land tribunal and the ICC have been used to sort out some of the conflict issues in the postcolonial Northern Uganda. Although some conflicts were able to be addressed through the use of the legal means, the hatred it created at local levels, especially in cases of land, has been deep seated. In the case of the ICC, many people in Northern Uganda are opposed because of the issue of the arrest warrants issued to the top LRA commanders. This was blamed for the failure of the Juba peace talks. Furthermore, some say, certain issues of conflict require performance of traditional rituals which cannot be provided by court of laws, the theoretical peace brought by court ruling cannot adequately create peace.

Negotiated settlement was another modern means that has been highlighted on as used by the state and the NGOs in trying to resolve the different postcolonial conflicts in Northern Uganda. The negotiated settlement which are said to have somewhat achieved positive results were the Nimule negotiation between the UNLA juntas and the UNRF 1 rebel groups and the Pece Peace Accord that was signed between the government of Uganda and the UPDA rebels. While the first accord made the rebel groups to join with the government forces to contain that aftermath of

the 1985 military coup, the Pece Peace Accord made some of the UPDA forces to be integrated into the NRA army. The rest of the attempted negotiations like the Bigombe peace efforts, the Carter Centre, Sant Egidio, Juba Peace negotiation, and those tried by some army officers were not able to yield any positive fruit because of the intrigue, bad will and arrogance of the government, and so forth. Some people in northern Uganda understood this to be the government's intention to let the rebellion in northern Uganda to continue so that their spirit as a people is killed forever.

Besides the above, the respondents say military means of enforcing peace was another modern means that the successive governments of Uganda tried out right from the start of the postcolonial period, be it at the national or regional level. The commonest examples that have been cited in the work are the deployment of armed forces in the early 1980s to fight the UNRF 1 rebels in the Madi sub-region, and the series of military campaign that were set to quell the rebellion in northern Uganda starting in the mid-1980s. Although the use of the military was meant to coerce one group to accept the will of the powerful so that peace is achieved, each protagonists in the case of the northern Uganda conflicts have proved to be strong given that the rebellion has since moved on. Examples of some of the military means that have been tried are noted to be the several mobile forces groups, the local militia groups like the Amuka, Rhino and the Local Defense forces, operation sim-sim, operation Iron feast 1 &2, and operation lightening thunder. The challenge that was noted with the military means of settling conflict was the wanton destruction it causes thus making the local people to detest it as a formidable means of bringing peace. Apart from this, members think that even if peace could come out through this mechanism, it would be a negative peace other than positive peace.

Socio-economic development means was yet another modern mechanism that was tried out for bringing order during the Northern Ugandan political and social conflicts. The proponents of this means had two strong reasons. That if the bush of Northern Uganda were cleared by investors, the rebels would have nowhere to hide, and that if people were to have productive work to do, the wealth they would have generated through this would not make them think of wars. To this effect, therefore, different economic means were suggested. Among these were the attempts to establish a sugar cane plantation by the Madhvani group of companies, the cereal production belt suggested by the Divinity Union group, the resettlement schemes following the Israeli model, the NUSAF and PRDP Programs.

The above means of attempting to create peace were found to be damaging their expectation. The conflicts generated made people to lose their land and in the process setting one community against the other. Besides, some of the leaders in northern Uganda think that some of these measures, instead of enriching people, would make them perpetually poor in their own land. Even what was meant to be done by the NUSAF and PRDP were not realized because of the corruption that marred these programmes.

The use of religion as a means of resolving conflict was yet another modern method that has been highlighted above. Given that most of the religious leaders in Northern Uganda are people from within, they were able to identify with the suffering people and draw the attention of the international community on the plight of their people. The work done by the church and Para-church or religious groups since the 1970s to give hope in the face of suffering has been commendable. More so, the work of individual religious leaders, religious organisations like the Uganda Joint Christian Council, the Inter-religious council of Uganda, the Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace

initiative, women peace groups and so forth attest to this. These groups got involved in a wide range of activities like negotiating with the rebels and government, pacifying communities in land wrangles or wrangles as a result of the effects of other conflicts and so forth. In a way, the work done by the religious group is the single most viable modern means that made a bit of peace dividend to be achieved. This perhaps was due to the fact that the religious groups' identifying with the local community. Some of the religious groups even tried to Christianise some of the traditional practices so that they could perform such rituals with modern understanding. For example, the ritual of reconciliation and cleansing areas where heinous murders took place has been taken up by some of the Christian denominations.

In regard to the traditional mechanisms, the common attempts made to address the various postcolonial conflicts in Uganda have been mediation, conciliation, and arbitration made by elders, chiefs, opinion leaders, and community members. Fights, use of women, and traditional rituals have also been tried out. The use of elders, the community members and third parties to address conflicts have been very instrumental in settling conflict in northern Uganda. The effective work of reconciliation by different groups in northern Uganda throughout Uganda's postcolonial period attests to this. People talk positively about the traditional mechanism of addressing conflicts because of their openness, convenience, cost effectiveness, and corruption freeness. They are also said to be accessible to local and rural people within walking distance, proceeding carried out in local language by local people, simple procedures that do not require translator services, the process does not delay unlike in the formal court system. It is easy to educate all members of the community about the roles to be followed allowing prison budget to be directed

towards social development purposes. Besides, offenders continue to contribute to the economy, and paying reparation to victims thus avoiding economic and social dislocation of families. Although some people say given the non-literate nature of this mechanism it is hard to substantiate its efficacy, but given the peace achieved through this mechanism, many people still yearn for it.

Another traditional mechanism that has been highlighted was fights. A case in point in this was the fight between the Jo Kalyech and Jo Karwot in Pader, and the Pubec and Pajong in Kitgum (Mucwini) over land rights. The traditional intent of fights was to make the protagonists to test their abilities so that after feeling what each could do to the other they would be able to respect each other. Indeed, in many instances when two groups start to fight, they have been able to test what the other is able to do and they sit down to talk peace. This way could explain how some of the rebellions and land conflicts in northern Uganda have been settled.

In the traditional conflict resolution dispensation, another mechanism that proved effective was the use of women. It has been noted above that women have been invariably used at different times to quell potential or real conflicts in northern Uganda. The women did this through their marriage to people from another tribal group or clan, upbringing of children while instilling in them the culture of peace, negotiating peace between belligerent groups, advising their husbands during time of crisis, and playing the role of mothers to all. Through their physical involvement in negotiations, protests, convincing warring parties to leave enmity, women in Northern Uganda have been credited for bringing the people together. Among many, the works of Betty Bigombe, Angelina Atim, the women peace groups and others are commendable in pacifying the north. As such, women are regarded as unsung heroes

of the conflict in northern Uganda given the peace dividend that came through their activities.

The roles traditional rituals of reconciliation have played are also seen to be an effective way of traditional conflict resolution mechanism. During and after the various conflicts that people in northern Uganda went through, the communities in northern Uganda have used various rituals meant to bring people together after conflicts. While some of these rituals were used during or after the conflicts, others have been an extension of the ritual performed by great grand-parents that are still binding people in their different communities. Among the rituals that are being used to cause healing among the local communities are: the ritual of blood brotherhood, stepping on an egg, cleansing of a person who committed a taboo during conflict, cleansing of an area, cleansing the body, bending the spear and the comprehensive ritual of reconciliation.

Since rituals were given to human beings by God, their use to cause healing amongst local communities is healthy. In most cases, the curses, reprimands and rituals people go through during such process help to deter people from committing such offences again. Given their popularity at the local context, many people believe these rituals are better ways of reuniting communities that have been in conflict.

Many people preferred traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution over and above the modern mechanisms because they can easily be accessed, are less costly, and discussed in the open. They help to heal relationships firster and in most cases involve provision of fair reparation.

6.3 Conclusion

From the above discussion, it has been noted that conflicts have been manifesting itself during much of the postcolonial history of Uganda in general, and

between and amongst the communities in northern Uganda. The commonest conflicts that people got embroiled in included ethno-political conflicts, religious conflicts, resource conflicts, all having some economic implications. These conflicts did not have the same causes. However, in most of them issues of ethnicity, struggle for political power, use of religion and religious doctrine as identity marker, contest over land and other natural resources stood out. These conflicts have affected both the state and the local communities in various ways.

In assessing the attempts made to address some of these conflicts, given that the thesis is on resolution of intrastate conflict, the theory of peace building from below was adopted to test how mid-level and grass root peacebuilding work could be used in resolving communal or social conflicts. Looking at both the modern and traditional means of the attempts made in addressing community level conflicts, the activities of local communities through the use of both modern and traditional mechanisms of addressing conflicts at local levels have been found to be best suited. Since social conflicts occur in local context between relatives or people who have been living adjacent to each other, an attempt to employ modern mechanisms that is state-centric or official for that matter, to resolve such conflicts would only work to divide the people instead of healing their differences. Therefore, as Hyse Lucy (2004, p. 192) asserts, tradition-based practices have the potential to produce a dividend in terms of the much needed post-conflict accountability, truth telling and reconciliation that is not negligible. Consequently, through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and other modern mechanisms that use the expertise of local people, positive effects could be expected with regard to the more general transitional justice goals of healing and social repair.

6.4 General Recommendations

The conclusion that the mid and grass root level means of managing conflicts is best suited to address local conflicts, notwithstanding some challenges, I recommend the following as ways of promoting and addressing issues of conflicts at local levels.

There is a need to inculcate cultural practices that are relevant for resolving conflicts to the young generation. This is because they seem not to understand how traditional conflict resolutions are considered out. Traditional elders are, therefore, urged to teach the young generation about their culture so that they get to know the need for coexistence with others. If possible, the teachings that used to take place in the evenings around family fire places in form of riddles, folk stories, wise sayings and so forth should be encouraged by such elders in people's homes.

Traditional leaders and elders should organise cultural galas and sports activities that brings the young and the old people together. To help unite different communities, such events provide the best avenues for the elders to inculcate the need for harmony and solidarity in the community instead of fights.

The community should show solidarity and bring characters who stir conflicts to their normal senses by forcefully acting on them. In the category of people who stir conflicts are the land grabbers.

There is need for the youth to respect their elders. Since one set back of local conflict resolution mechanism is the loss of trust by the young in the elders, people need to restore respect for their elders. To the elders, I recommend that they should respect their age and desist from being compromised by money so that they are able to stand for the truth in all circumstances.

In order to address the issue of double standard and giving false witnesses in courts over land conflicts, I recommend that cultural leaders and elders should walk their talk. That is, whenever issues of conflict are brought to them, the cultural leaders and elders should not be seen taking sides. Instead, the traditional leaders and elders should be seen soothing the hurt feeling so that healing is realized amongst conflictants. This will also help to make the community to once more build their confidence in them.

There is also a need for the population to call for reconciliation at all levels: national, ethnic, clan, family and personal levels. In order to facilitate this, both religious and traditional leaders need to be encouraged to lead the path. Religious and traditional mechanisms for reconciliation need to be encouraged so as to help reconcile people at the national and community levels.

To all the parties taking part in the community level conflict resolution, there is a need for openness and credibility so that the process of peacebuilding is not frustrated. This also follows the need to maintain whatever decisions that have been made during such community healing processes.

The politicians should avoid inciting violence at community level. Instead as local leaders they should use their offices to cause peaceful coexistence between the people they lead by not siding with any groups in conflict but rather being neutral.

The district land officer should not work in isolation while processing the documents for issuing land titles, but rather work hand in hand with other stakeholders so that unscrupulous land deals are avoided. If done, it will help to stamp out dubious land transaction at the district level.

In order to address the rampant mental health issues in northern Uganda, the political leaders in the districts of Northern Uganda need to find ways of raising funds

for establishing mental health clinics where mental health cases can be treated from. When set, such centers could also serve as centers for handling post-traumatic disorders that are prevalent in most parts of northern Uganda. In such clinics, community elders could also participate in administering traditional coping mechanisms.

To the None Governmental Organisations that work in communities where conflicts are taking place or post conflict context as in the case of northern Uganda, I recommend that they fully participate in sorting conflicts other than fanning conflicts. Given their presence in a local area of conflict for some time, their understanding should help them use their rightful processes that are acceptable to the communities in question without imposing decisions from outside the context of the local communities.

6.5 Recommendation for Further Research

In order to study some of the issues raised in this thesis at greater depth, I recommend the following area for further research.

- The effects of ethno-political and religious conflicts on harmonious living in Northern Uganda.
- The challenges of land conflicts on post conflict reconstruction in northern Uganda

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APPENDIXES

A1: List of Key Informants Interviewed

Name	Place of interview	Date of interview
Anonymous	Lira	23/02/2009
Anonymous	Kitgum	04/03/2009
Anonymous	Gulu	02/06/2010
Anonymous	Lira	20/02/2011
Anonymous	Kampala	18/09/2011
Anonymous	Adjumani	21/12/2011
Anonymous	Pader	13/04/2012
Achiga, Estings	Kampala	12/11/2010
Ali, Moses (General)	Kampala	16/12/2011
Agang, Okello Jimmy	Lira	20/02/2009
Akena Ismail Owile	Gulu	17/04/2012
Ambaku Moses	Gulu	23/04/2010
Ameny, Christopher	Lira	03/12/2011
Amony, Emily (Mrs Kony)	Gulu/Kitgum	21/11/2011
Andruga, Morris	Mukono	24/08/2008
Atim, Josephine	Cape Town	28/05/2011
Atine, Wilson	Gulu	23/02/2009
Asobasi Gilbert	Mukono	24/03/2010
Avudraga, Robert	Adjumani	04/01/2014
Byaruhanga, Christopher	Mukono	26/01/2012
Chore Michael	Amudat	05/05/2012
Drabile, Omal	Kampala	14/02/2010
Dramile, Wilson	Adjumani	21/07/2009
Dulu, Mike	Adjumani	08/04/2008
Dulua Christine	Mukono	24/03/2012
Erick, Sam	Lira	01/12/2011
Ereku Moses	Adjumani	12/12/2011
Etiang, P. O	Tororo	07/04/2011
Igga, Michael	Adjumani	07/12/2009

Irota, Joshua	Tororo	13/03/2011
Kabazungu, B. (Rev)	Mbarara	11/04/2011
Kahuma, James	Mukono	01/04/2011
Kalegyo Edison Muhindo	Mukono	12/01/2011
Kansiime Elly	Mukono	18/03/2011
Kasaijja, Solomon	Mukono	02/06/2010
Kidega, Walter	Gulu	09/04/2011
Kiseka, Evans (Rt. Rev)	Luwero	23/12/2011
Kitara, Wilson	Gulu	22/11/2011
Lagu, Samuel	Adjumani	28/01/2012
Lomure, Ben	Adjumani	18/05/2009
Luwuum Jenniffer	Kitgum	22/03/2013
Mali, Christopher	Kasese	18/03/2011
Mirembe, Diana	Entebbe	07/11/2011
Mugarura Julius	Kampala	02/08/2011
Mwesigwa, S. Fred. (Rt. Rev)	Mbarara	04/02/2012
Nina, James C. (Rev),	Hoima	02/04/2011
Nyero, A. Ceasar	Gulu	24/11/2011
Nzima, Bolt Bob	Kampala	12/11/2011
Oboma Madile	Kampala	21/07/2009
Obwangor, Cuthbert	Soroti	26/04/2011
Ocaya Patrick	Adjumani	02/03/2010
Ocheng, Noah	Adjumani	04/01/2014
Ochola, Mark Baker II (Rt. Rev)	Gulu	22/11/2011
Odoch, Moses	Gulu	13/12/2011
Oguti, Tomas	Pader	16/02/2009
Ojwang, Benjamin (Rt. Rev)	Kitgum	13/02/2010
Okidi, Charles	Kitgum	12/01/2012
Okodu, George	Soroti	18/03/2011
Okwii Michael Esakhan	Soroti	15/02/2010
Olango Willy	Gulu	02/02/2010
Olweny, Kevin	Gulu	28/10/2009

Onzima, Justine	Mbarara	14/01/2012
Onzima, Fanuel	Arua	25/08/2009
Onzo, E. Richard	Kampala	14/01/2012
Opigo Dominic	Kampala	12/01/2011
Opio Stephern	Lira	02/03/2010
Oriama, Charles	Pader	13/02/2010
Pashi, William	Adjumani	12/01/2012
Rubangakene Godferry	Gulu	18/03/2012
Simbo, Andrew	Kitgum	23/11/2011
Ssekago, Paul	Luwero	21/04/1998
Wabudundu, Silvester	Mbale	09/12/2011
Wamera, E.	Tororo	08/04/2011

A2: Focus Group Discussion summary sheet

Tribe	District	Sub-county	Sex of participant		Total	Date of FGD
			Male	Female		
Acholi	Agago	Adilang	5	4	09	20/12/2009
		Patongo	4	4	08	18/12/2009
	Amuru	Atyak	6	4	10	22/01/2010
		Paboo	4	3	07	12/01/2010
	Gulu	Paicho	5	4	09	03/05/2011
		Bar-dege	3	4	07	10/02/2010
		Patiko	4	5	09	17/06/2010
		Lalogi	3	3	06	19/06/2010
	Kitgum	Mucwini	4	3	06	23/03/2011
		Labongo	4	4	07	05/02/2010
	Amida					

		Kitgum Matidi	5	3	07	09/12/2009
	Nwoya	Purongo	5	4	09	14/02/2010
		Anaka	5	3	08	22/12/2009
	Pader	Acholibur	4	4	08	07/01/2010
		Kilak	3	4	07	15/10/2010
		Pajule	3	3	06	03/02/2010
		Puronga	4	4	08	09/02/2010
Lango	Lira	Agwata	3	5	08	16/01/2010
		Ogur	5	3	08	24/01/2010
		Omoro	4	4	08	23/01/2010
	Otuke	Orum	5	3	08	20/01/2010
		Okwang	4	5	09	12/02/2010
	Oyam	Minakulu	6	4	10	29/01/2010
		Otwal	7	3	10	06/02/2010
Madi	Adjumani	Dzaipi	3	4	07	30/02/2010
		Ofua	4	2	06	13/05/2010
		Pakelle	3	3	06	10/04/2010
Total			115	96	211	

A3: Focus Group Discussion/Interview Guide

Introduction

My name is Omona Andrew David (Rev.), a PhD candidate of Kenyatta University, Nairobi-Kenya. I'm seeking information for my research on the topic 'Management of postcolonial intrastate conflicts in Uganda: A case of northern Uganda'. I have been prompted to do this research because of the conflict that engulfed Northern Uganda during much of Uganda's postcolonial period that translated into local conflicts and caused relationship amongst the local communities to get spoilt. The information you provide shall not be used for any other purpose apart from this research. Therefore, kindly provide the information you have on the topic under study without any bias so that balanced information is put down for academic purposes.

- 1. The nature and manifestation of intrastate conflicts in postcolonial Uganda/ northern Uganda**
 - Since 1962, have there been some conflicts in your area?
 - If yes, what has been the nature (type) of conflicts in your area?
 - How have the conflicts you have mentioned manifested?
 - Who are the principal parties of the conflicts you have mentioned?
- 2. The causes of the postcolonial intrastate conflicts in Uganda/northern Uganda**
 - What are the causes of the conflicts you have mentioned above?
 - How have the people reacted in the face of the conflicts?
- 3. The effects of the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda on the state and social cohesion of the people Uganda/northern Uganda**
 - What are the effects of the conflicts you have mentioned on the state

- What are the effects of the conflicts on the social cohesion of the people of northern Uganda?

4. Attempts have been made for managing the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda: the successes and failures these attempts registered in resolving the post-colonial conflicts

- What are some of the attempts (both modern and local) made to address the conflicts you have mentioned above?
- What impact have the attempts made on social cohesion of the people of northern Uganda?

5. The Best mechanism for managing intrastate community based conflicts

- Between the modern and traditional conflict management tried for addressing the conflicts you have mentioned, which one assisted to bring in social cohesion amongst the local people?
- What would you therefore, recommend?

A4: Observation Protocol

(Done both concurrently with interviews and independently)

Management of postcolonial Intrastate Conflicts in Uganda: A case of Northern Uganda

1. The nature and manifestation of intrastate conflicts in postcolonial Uganda/ northern Uganda

- Look at the facial expression of the person recounting the story to see if the person is bitter, guilty or excited

2. The causes of the postcolonial intrastate conflicts in Uganda/northern Uganda

- Observe if people are jittery while recounting the causes of the conflict in their area
 - How do they feel if names of certain people thought to be leaders are mentioned?
- 3. The effects of the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda on the state and social cohesion of the people Uganda/northern Uganda**
- Observe the general infrastructure, schools, roads, hospital, peoples' houses, business premises, farms.
 - Observe the physical damages of the conflict on human beings- health wise and see if there are those who are maimed, injured etc.
 - See how the facial and emotional expression/reaction of the people are while telling the story to determine if there is much bitterness or some psychological effect the person is suffering
- 4. Attempts have been made to manage the postcolonial conflicts conflict in Uganda: the successes and failures these attempts registered in resolving the post-colonial conflicts**
- Observe the marks left by the attempts made- if there is co-existence or still some bitterness so to judge the effectiveness of the mechanism
 - Do people express positive or negative emotions while talking about what the attempted conflict resolution achieved?

A5: Literature Review Checklist**Management of Postcolonial Intrastate Conflicts in Uganda: A case of Northern Uganda**

- 1. The nature and manifestation of intrastate conflicts in postcolonial Uganda/ northern Uganda**
 - Major postcolonial conflicts in Uganda.
 - Manifestations of the conflicts: violent, moderate, or latent
 - The principal parties of the conflicts
- 2. The causes of the postcolonial intrastate conflicts in Uganda/northern Uganda**
 - The causes of each of the conflicts mentioned
 - Reaction of the people and the state in the face of the conflicts
- 3. The effects of the postcolonial conflicts in Uganda on the state and social cohesion of the people Uganda/northern Uganda**
 - The effects of the conflicts on the state
 - The effects of the conflicts on the social cohesion of the people/Ugandans
- 4. Attempts have been made to manage the postcolonial conflicts conflict in Uganda: the successes and failures these attempts registered in resolving the post-colonial conflicts**
 - Attempts made to address the conflicts: both modern and local
 - The impact of the attempts made on social cohesion of the people of Uganda