

**CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION OF AFRICAN MISSION IN SOMALIA AS
TOOL OF PEACE-BUILDING: A CASE OF KISMAYO DISTRICT, LOWER
JUBALAND, SOMALIA (2011-2020)**

**MOSES KAMAU MUCHEMI
S202/OL/CTY/26807/2018**

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
SCIENCE IN SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE SCHOOL OF
SECURITY, DIPLOMACY AND PEACE STUDIES OF KENYATTA
UNIVERSITY**

DECEMBER, 2021

DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented in any other university.

Signature_____ Date_____

MOSES KAMAU MUCHEMI

S202/OL/CTY/26807/2018

Supervisor

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University supervisor.

Signature_____ Date_____

Dr. Xavier Francis Ichani, PhD

Department: International Relations, Conflict and Strategic Studies

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

LIST OF TABLES..... vii

LIST OF FIGURES..... viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS ix

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS..... xi

ABSTRACT xiii

CHAPTER ONE 1

INTRODUCTION 1

 1.0 Overview 1

 1.1 Background to the Study 1

 1.2 Statement of the Problem 5

 1.3 Objectives of the Study 7

 1.4 Research Questions 7

 1.5 Significance and Justification of the Study 8

 1.6 Scope of the Study 8

 1.7 Limitation and Delimitations 9

CHAPTER TWO 10

LITERATURE REVIEW 10

 2.0 Introduction 10

 2.1 Conceptualizing CIMIC 10

 2.3 Types of CIMIC Activities 11

 2.4 Community Partnerships in Peacebuilding 13

2.5 Assessing Peacebuilding Outcomes.....	15
2.2 Summary of Literature and Research Gaps	16
2.3 Theoretical Framework	17
2.3.1 Liberal Peacebuilding Theory.....	17
2.3.2 State Building Theory	19
2.3.3 Democratization Theory	20
2.4 Conceptual Framework	22
2.5 Conceptual Framework	24
CHAPTER THREE.....	25
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	25
2.0 Introduction.....	25
3.1 Research Design.....	25
3.2 Study Area	26
3.3 Target Population.....	26
3.4 Sampling Technique	27
3.5 Sample Size.....	28
3.6 Instruments of Data Collection	29
3.7 Pretesting of Research Instruments.....	30
3.8 Pilot Test of Research Instruments	30
3.9 Validity and Reliability	30
3.10 Data Collection	31
3.11 Data Analysis	31
3.12 Ethical Consideration.....	32

CHAPTER FOUR	34
CIMIC PROGRAMS FOR PEACE BUILDING IN SOMALIA	34
4.0 Introduction.....	34
4.1 AMISOM Peacebuilding CIMIC Programs.....	34
4.1.1 Community Based Conflict Prevention and Settlement CIMIC Programs.....	35
4.1.2 Security and Safety Enhancement CIMIC Programs.....	38
4.1.3 Post-conflict Recovery and Reconstruction	74
CHAPTER FIVE	95
COMMUNITY CIMIC PARTNERSHIPS USED BY PEACEKEEPERS IN SOMALIA	95
5.0 Introduction.....	95
5.1 Community Based Peace Building	95
5.1.1 Community Based Institutions for Peacebuilding Partnership/Cooperation	97
5.1.2 Types of Community Partnership in CIMIC Peace Projects.	102
5.1.3 Community Participation in CIMIC Peace Projects	103
CHAPTER SIX.....	106
OUTCOMES OF AMISOM CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION IN PEACE BUILDING.....	106
6.0 Introduction.....	106
6.1 Outcomes of AMISOM CIMIC Programs.....	106
6.2 Challenges Faced by AMISOM CIMIC Program.	110
6.3 Evaluation of Theories	115
6.3.1 Liberal Peacebuilding Theory.....	115
6.3.2 State-Building Theory.....	116
6.3.3 Democratization Theory	116

CHAPTER SEVEN	118
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	118
7.0 Introduction.....	118
7.1 Summary of Findings.....	118
7.2 Conclusion	120
7.3 Recommendations	121
7.4 Suggestions for Further Studies	122
References	123
APPENDICES.....	134
APPENDIX I: INTRODUCTION LETTER.....	134
APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE	135
APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW GUIDE.....	145
APPENDIX IV: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE.....	146
APPENDIX V : MAPS	147
APPENDIX VI: NACOSTI RESEARCH PERMIT	148

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Study Sample.....	28
Table 3.2: Respondents Subjected to Each Tool	29
Figure 4.1: Conflict Situation in Kismayo	35
Table 4.1: Effectiveness of Community-Based Conflict Prevention and Resolution Methods.....	36
Figure 4.2: SSR Adequacy as a Solution to the Security and Justice Problem	40
Figure 4.3 SSR Acceptability by Different Groups.....	41
Figure 4.4: SSR Alignment with the Policies of International Counterparts	42
Table 5.2: SSR Impact.....	50
Table 4.3: SSR Sustainability and Ownership.	53
Table 4.4: SSR Consistency with the Values	58
Table 4.5: Assessing Impact of DDR Program in Kismayo District Peacebuilding	60
Table 4.6: Efforts by Peace Actors in Establishing Administration and Governance in Kismayo.	77
Table 4.7: Level of Infrastructural Improvement in Kismayo.	81
Table 4.8: Measure of Social Integration	87
Table 4.9: Measure of Social Cohesion.....	89
Table 4.10: Measure of Social Contribution	90
Table 4.11: Measure of Social Acceptance	91
Table 4.12: Measure of Social Actualization	93
Table 5.1: Summative Score for Level of Prominence of Community Institutions for AMISOM CIMIC Partnership.....	99
Table 5.2: Community Participation in AMISOM CIMIC Peace Projects	103

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework	24
Figure 4.5: SSR Matching with Intended Outputs Purpose and Goal	44
Figure 4.6: Extent to which SSR is Attributed to Changes in Security Sector	45
Figure 4.7: Reasons for SSR Failure to Deliver on its Objectives	46
Figure 4.8: Making SSR More Effective.....	47
Figure 5.9: SSR Efficiency.....	48
Figure 4.10: SSR Economic Worthiness	49
Figure 4.11: SSR Coherence	56
Figure 4.12: SSR Coordination and Linkages.....	57
Figure 4.13: IED Awareness	64
Figure 4.14: Source of IEDs Awareness	65
Figure 4.15: Those who had Seen IEDs	66
Figure 4.16: Where IED had been Seen	67
Figure 4.17: People Reaction on Sighting IED	68
Figure 4.18: Suspected IED Maker	69
Figure 4.19: Main Victims of IED Attacks	69
Figure 4.20: Efforts to Address IED Threat	70
Figure 4.21: Encountered Remnants of War	71
Figure 4.22: Threat Posed by SALW	72
Figure 4.23: Functionability of the Judicial System. Figure 4.24: Credibility of Judicial System	85
Figure 6.1: Challenges Faced by AMISOM CIMIC Programs	111

LIST OF ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia.
CBA	Community-based approaches
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation.
CMCOORD	Civil Military Coordination.
CMRTs	Civil-Military Reconstruction Teams
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
EORE	Explosive Ordnance Risk Education
ERW/M	Explosive Remnants of War/Mine
ESCAP	UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
EU	European Union.
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia.
HRDD	United Nations Policy on Human Rights Due Diligence
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IED	Improvised Explosive Device.
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.
IGASOM	Inter-Governmental Authority Somalia Mission.
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations.
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.
JISA	Jubaland Intelligence Service
JSF	Jubaland Security Forces
LNGOs	Local Non-Governmental Organizations.
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations.
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
OSCE	UN or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
PKOs	Peace Keeping Operations.
PSOs	Peace Support Operations.
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop contributing country.
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
UN	United Nations.
UNITAF	United Nations Task Force
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Services
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia one.
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operations in Somalia two.
UNPKO	UN Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America.
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

Civil military cooperation: refers to the interface between military and civilians operating in the same peacekeeping theatre of operation on wide array of community security and development issues.

Community partnership: This implies the establishment of a relationship with the local community in executing peace projects to foster ownership and sustainability of peace projects.

Complex emergency: is used to refer to a humanitarian crisis where there is uncontrollable violence in a country, leading to extensive loss of human lives, displacements, widespread damage of properties and livelihoods which calls for a large-scale multidimensional humanitarian assistance faced by security constraints.

Conflict prevention: is a concept used in peace operation that employs diplomatic, civil and military means to monitor conflict drivers and intervene on a timely basis to prevent occurrence, reoccurrence or escalation of a conflict.

Development: refers to all undertakings or any kind of investment to improve the quality of life of a particular population.

Emergency relief: refers to provision of basic survival aid and protection to people affected by a humanitarian crisis to save lives by giving them short-term aid such as food, water, shelter sanitation and medical care.

Kismayo District: this is a coastal district in Southeast of Jubaland Federal state of Somalia regarded as the bastion of Al-Shabaab.

Peacebuilding: refers to all activities carried out by peacekeepers to instill structures in a community to make the community resilient to impacts of conflict through

amicable resolution of differences without resulting into violence amongst themselves and others.

Reconstruction: is a process that involves both short-term and long-term post conflict intervention programs meant to prevent occurrence, reoccurrence or escalation of a conflict.

Recovery: Efforts to reinstate destroyed livelihoods of people affected by a calamity and to rebuild them back to pre-conflict situation.

Rehabilitation: Efforts to repair damaged infrastructure that can save or support livelihoods in a post conflict situation.

State-building: The establishment of a centralized administrative power, it is concerned with activities to create functional state institutions.

ABSTRACT

The conflict in Somalia presents a typical example of crisis where sometimes the international response is at odd with the wishes of local administration and community hence hampering the outcomes of peacebuilding. However, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) has emerged as a key determinant of successful peacekeeping operation and a tool of enhancing peacebuilding. This study examined the wide array of approaches to CIMIC activities undertaken by African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops in Kismayo district of Somalia from year 2011 to 2020. The specific objectives of this study were to explore the extent to which CIMIC has been used as a tool for peacebuilding, to examine the types of partnerships used by peace actors in executing CIMIC programs and to assess the outcomes of the AMISOM CIMIC programs in fostering peacebuilding in Kismayo. The study was anchored on liberal peacebuilding, state building and democratization theories. The target population of the study included residents of Kismayo district entailing community leaders, humanitarian workers, civil society, Jubaland Security Forces (JSF) and AMISOM troops operating in the district. Onwuegbuzie and Collins typology of determining sample size in social science research was used to arrive at a sample size of 200 respondents. Primary data was collected using semi-structured questionnaires, interviews guide and Focused Group Discussions guide. Secondary data was sourced from published books, e-books, journals, reports, newsletters and conference papers. Collected data was grouped, corroborated, and presented using both quantitative and the qualitative research techniques in themes corresponding the objectives of the study. The study found out that 97% of Kismayo residents felt that AMISOM CIMIC program had reduced conflicts in the district, 83% felt that the security sector was effective in ensuring security and safety of the population. The study also found that demobilization, disarmament and reintegration CIMIC program had reduced chances of violent clashes in Kismayo by 89% chance. Al-Shabaab terror gang continued to threaten the peace efforts in Kismayo. The study recommends that more donor funding be channeled to Federal Governments of Somalia so that they develop strong security sector capable of defeating peace spoilers such as Al-Shabaab.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Overview

This chapter covers the background to the study which examines the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) from inception, evolution to the current practice. It also covers emergence of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) concept and its employment in peacebuilding. It also gives insights on the context of the conflict in Somalia. Thereafter, the research problem that informed this study is stated. The statement of the problem is then developed into study objectives and research questions that guided the study. The chapter then outlines the significance, scope, limitation and delimitation of the study.

1.1 Background to the Study

United Nation peacekeeping concept came to inception at the onset of cold war when rivalry between Eastern bloc of countries led by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Western bloc led by United States of America (USA) increased and often paralyzed the Security Council decisions (Sunil, 2018). Conflicts in this era were interstate and driven by ideology inclined to the interests of the two blocs. The concept was to have a neutral force intervening in resolving international conflicts rather than having the two superpowers directly intervening which could have led to a cataclysmic escalation of armed conflicts.

Since then, global security terrain has been dynamic leading to evolution of UN interventions. The first-generation interventions also known as traditional peacekeeping took place during cold war era. In this era, conflicts were interstate. UN response was deployment of light armed military contingents to create a buffer zone between the conflicting states. States in conflict had therefore to give consent prior to deployment and a formal agreement was entered to resolve the dispute. The mandate of these peacekeeping missions was monitoring and reporting violations to the peace agreement.

The second generation of UNPKO came after the collapse of USSR. The post-cold war era conflicts assumed a radical shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts driven by structural factors in a state. Conflicts were mostly pitching on ethnic group against another or state actors against non-state actors. This kind of conflicts attracted multi-functional Peace Support Operations (PSO). UN intervention in this context included: military forces, police and civilians, all working for a common goal to achieve a longer-term political settlement of the conflict and establish institutions that ensures sustainability of the peace process.

The third and current generation peacekeeping emerged to deal with complex emergencies with additional challenges of containing organized and more militant adept groups who opposed peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies in doing their work. Resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism created terror groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab who are increasingly taking advantage of existing conflicts to advance their agenda (Huntington, 1996). The context of carrying out the third generation of peacekeeping is therefore fluid. To this end, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate include peace enforcement and, in some instance, use of deadly force to preserve

life of the innocent civilians (U.N. Charter Chapter VI). Risks of collateral damage to civilian and their properties by peacekeepers in these operations are therefore very high. This calls for noble means of undertaking such operations. The adoption of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is one of such strategies available for peacekeeping contingents. The purpose of CIMIC is to win the hearts and minds of the local community to support the peacekeepers accomplish their mission.

CIMIC concept was employed for the first time in Bosnia-Herzegovina by NATO peacekeeping forces (Hans-Jürgen, 2012). Forces realized that they were increasingly depending on local populations for provision of resources, securing their freedom of movement and provision of mission critical information (Michael, 2001). Military personnel were tasked to manage civil-military interface which faced a lot of cooperation challenges. In Kosovo CIMIC was used as a tool to address a myriad of assigned civilian responsibilities and coordination tasks. UN CIMIC has liaison, support and conflict de-escalation lines of activities. CIMIC strategy has been employed by UN to address emerging complexities in Haiti, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Central Africa, Sudan and South Sudan. From this case studies CIMIC has readily been accepted as a means and end to facilitate execution of peacekeeping mandated tasks.

African Union deployed a peace operation mission in Somalia (AMISOM) following the passing of United Nations Security Council resolution 1744. This is a third-generation multidimensional mission mandated to support Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) implement a national security plan, train and mentor the Somali security forces, and creating a secure environment to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable

population. This is achieved by combating warlords and spoilers of the Somalia peace process including Al-Shabaab (AS) terror group.

Somalia conflict is a nexus of clan competition, civil war, warlordism and weak central government. Unrestricted flow of weapons from Middle East complicates the fragility of Somalia. This situation has given rise to terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab who derive economic benefits in the prevailing state of violence and lawlessness. Several formal peace agreements have failed to transform the conflict in Somalia. According to Menkhaus et al (2008), more than nine peace agreements have been signed since 1991. Most of them have been faulted as soon as they are signed. Several Transitional Federal Governments (TFG) have also been formed in Somalia (ibid). The first one formed in Nairobi, took more than two years before it stepped a foot in Somalia (ibid). Moreover, when it did relocate into Somalia it was unable to establish regime in the Capital of Mogadishu instead it operated from Baidoa. Successive regimes have been destabilized by warlords. Several external military interventions in Somalia have yielded very little. The USA led UN intervention early 1990s bore no fruits. The Ethiopian military intervention against the Islamic Court Union (ICU) in 2006 was necessary in forestalling the operations of the group but not sufficient to resolve the dispute. ICU transformed into more military adept group Al-Shabaab. On in October 2011, the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) joined AMISOM efforts to stabilize Somalia (Gorm, 2015). This intervention has made significant success albeit faced with several operational challenges such as incessant attacks from Al-Shabaab terrorist group.

Analysis of the history of Somalia peace process shows that most of the international responses have become tepid and insufficient. Initially, the focus was the Inter-

Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process in Kenya. Then came unilateral external military intervention by Ethiopia in 2006. All this have become stillborn. AU intervened through AMISOM which has equally been resisted. In correcting the prior flaws, iron out internal divisions among partner states and ensure wider participation and Somalia ownership of the peace process, AMISOM embarked on CIMIC seen as critical tool for winning local population's hearts, minds and countering peace process spoilers (Zaalberg, 2008). It is evident that peace building approaches through CIMIC activities transforms relationships so that the host community can corroborate with a wider range of actors beyond the intervening actors to include conflicting parties, diplomatic actors to foster broader peace strategies reception (Pottebaum & Lee, 2007). It is in the backdrop of this, that this study seeks to examine the impact of AMISOM CIMIC as tool of peace building in Kismayo District, lower Jubaland province of the Republic of Somalia between 2011 and 2020.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Armed conflict has been a common phenomenon in Somalia since the fall of President Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991. International interventions and peace initiatives have brought little tangible gains in restoring peace. Insecurity in Somalia has created an ungoverned territory where global terror groups have taken advantage to establish themselves. Initial interventions sought to create conditions that would facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief. This did not materialize as expected. African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was authorized by African Peace and Security Council and it deployed in 2007. There was a hostile reception for AMISOM troops especially by Al-

Shabaab. Due to this resistance AMISOM troops remained confined in the precincts of Mogadishu airport for quite some time. Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) intervened in Somalia in October 2011 to pursue Al-Shabaab who had encroached into Kenya. KDF operation gained success against Al-Shabaab group in Jubaland. KDF later joined AMISOM in 2012. With the re-hatting into AMISOM, KDF troops embarked on the pacification of the liberated areas and in doing so, CIMIC became a critical tool used in executing Peace-building projects within their deployment jurisdiction.

AMISOM uses UN's doctrine which is underpinned on Western models of social, political, and economic organization. States such as Somalia who have some elements of Islamic fundamentalism are not receptive to these Western models which they perceive as intrusion to their way of life. It is therefore important that input from the local population be considered in the construction of peace. However due to AMISOM's lack of a localized CIMIC partnerships framework and working models between peace support actors and local community, local population's input in peace building projects is subsumed, sidelined or ignored. The lack of a comprehensive framework for the conduct of CIMIC leads to situation where some actors develop peace projects that are not conflict sensitive thus exacerbating the situation. This not only leads to wastage of scarce resources but prolongs the peace process making the world unsafe. Thus, the need to assess AMISOM CIMIC framework in Kismayo District, lower Jubaland Federal State of Somalia from year 2011 to 2020.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study was to explore the conduct of AMISOM CIMIC program and its contribution to the peacebuilding in Kismayo District in lower Jubaland Federal state of Somalia from year 2011 to 2020.

The specific objectives of this study were to:

- i. To explore the CIMIC programs used as a tool for peacebuilding by AMISOM forces in Kismayo District of lower Jubaland, Somalia, 2011-2020.
- ii. To examine the types of community partnerships used by peace actors in executing CIMIC programs in Kismayo District of lower Jubaland, Somalia, 2011-2020.
- iii. To assess the outcomes of the AMISOM CIMIC programs in fostering peacebuilding in Kismayo District of lower Jubaland, Somalia, 2011-2020.

1.4 Research Questions

This study sought to answer the following research questions:

- i. Which CIMIC peacebuilding programs have been conducted by AMISOM forces in Kismayo District, lower Jubaland State of Somalia from the year 2011 to 2020?
- ii. What are the community partnerships employed by peace actors in executing CIMIC programs?

- iii. What successes has AMISOM CIMIC achieved in fostering peacebuilding in Kismayo District, lower Jubaland State of Somalia? If yes to what extent?

1.5 Significance and Justification of the Study

Literature on UN Peacekeeping has mostly centered on the role of troops in military intervention. Research have been conducted on the use of CIMIC as peace and security building tool, however, little scholarly work has been done on the practical assessment of this tool in an ongoing peace building initiative. Lack of developed doctrine for regional interventions such as AMISOM has left the approach to civil-military cooperation as, pragmatic improvisational and ad hoc such that cooperation is viewed as responding to specific needs on the ground (Currey 2003; Gordon 2001; & Gourlay 2000). This study documented the conduct of AMISOM CIMIC in Kismayo and added to the existing body of knowledge. Also, it provided insight into CIMIC partnerships and working models that can be employed by peace support actors in peace building elsewhere. It contributed to the emerging literature on the Civil-Military relationship in peacekeeping and the important part it plays in peace operations, thus negating the common notion that portrays it as secondary activity to peacekeeping force for it forms the core that creates community based long-term peace in post-conflict society.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This study covered AMISOM CIMIC activities in Kismayo district, Jubaland State of Somalia Republic from the year 2011 to 2020. Kismayo district is located on the Southeastern part of Somalia where two major rivers in Somalia (Shebelle and Juba) drains into Indian Ocean. The district is headquartered in Kismayo city which is also the

economic hub of the South Jubaland, due to its strategic location and well-developed infrastructure.

The academic scope of this study covered the description of activities and relationships between AMISOM peacekeeping force and Civilian peace actors within Kismayo district from 2011-2020. As Fukuyama (1992) argued that human history is cyclic, one cycle of event taking a reasonable time span, a period of ten years is sufficient to analyze the trend of a peacekeeping operation. The year 2011 is significant in that it is the year when KDF intervened in Somalia relieving pressure on AMISOM troops in Mogadishu which led to significant degradation of Al-Shabaab military capabilities which paved way to commencement of peacebuilding activities within Somalia.

1.7 Limitation and Delimitations

Due to insecurity within the area of study, access to areas where communities live to collect data posed a limitation to the study. However, established contacts from AMISOM sector six CIMIC officers were explored to mitigate this challenge. Vastness of Kismayo district also posed a limitation in terms of reach, this was mitigated by selecting representative sample from accessible villages and city suburbs. The Somali community is a closed community and soliciting information from them is a challenge more so if you are a foreigner. The use of local research assistants ameliorated this challenge. Time in field study was be limited due to cost implication. This was mitigated by employing research assistants who enabled simultaneous collection of data.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter was to review scholarly and theoretical works by writers who have shaped understanding of civic-military relations. These works and their brief summaries allowed understanding of CIMIC, put into perspective the role and conduct of CIMIC programs in the context of peacebuilding. It covers the kind of CIMIC programs that can be conducted in peace building projects and how local communities can be engaged in peacebuilding. The concept of humanitarian was also explored. Levels of CIMIC impact evaluation that are used to examine peacekeeping success are also covered in the chapter. The literature review was followed by an in-depth analysis of the theoretical framework that was adopted in the study. The chapter also discusses the conceptual framework. The chapter concludes by giving the scholarly gaps the study seeks to unearth and then the summary of literature reviewed.

2.1 Conceptualizing CIMIC

Several scholars have contributed to a more refined understanding of CIMIC through their work of developing programs and doctrines. NATO pioneered codification of CIMIC Doctrine. According to the doctrine, CIMIC is defined as co-operation and co-ordination, in supporting the mission, between the NATO Commander, external civil actors, local authorities and local population. This definition emphasizes on peacekeeping force's mission subsuming critical role played by other actors' efforts in peacebuilding. It enables a Commander to work with the civil components during operation and to

consider civilian implications during his operation planning. This facilitates establishment of a stable environment that enables achievement of the mission goal. It helps in building effective relationships and harmonize civil-military interactions during peace operations.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) views Coordination between Civilians and Military as a system of interaction, that entails negotiation, exchanges of information, mutual support, de-confliction and planning between humanitarian organizations, military elements, development organizations and local civilian population, to achieve intended objectives (DPKO 2000, article 8). UN has developed two definitions of civil-military coordination which creates confusion. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) views it as important interaction between military and civilian actors' whiles responding to humanitarian emergencies to avoid duplication of efforts, competition and inconsistencies in pursuit of common goals (OCHA, 2003).

2.3 Types of CIMIC Activities

United Nation was founded to maintain global peace and security. UN Charter Article 33(1) identifies five methods of preventing or pacific settlement of disputes as dialogue, negotiation and mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. The main work of a peacekeeper is to prevent recurrence or escalation of a conflict. Thus, these pacific methods guide peacekeepers.

Collier et.al (2007), highlights a complementary relationship of development and security. He argues that war retards development and development retards war. Olson & Gregorian (2007) observe that there in a strong interlink in security and development in

fragile states. Several peace-building scholars argue that peacebuilding is not just about ending violence but should aim at bringing sustainable peace in fragile countries. Some peacekeeping literature uses peacebuilding as a synonym for state building (Paris 2002; Barnett & Zuercher 2006). The emphasis on sustainable peace has made peacekeepers remain in a fragile country even after the end of violent conflict. They are reassigned state building related activities such as security enhancement and development. These are achieved through peacebuilding initiatives in a post conflict situation. Security Sector Reform (SSR), extension of rule of law, promotion and protection of human rights, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants, mine and unexploded ammunition clearance, electoral process support, restoration and extension of state authority are the main peace building activities that can be executed by a peacekeeping force (UN guidelines, 2008). Identified priority areas of assistance by the peacekeepers are economic recovery, reconstruction of social capital, rebuilding the governing functions and security enhancement (JICA, 2011). Reconstruction entails development of basic infrastructure such as damaged villages, water sources, enhancement of health and education provision, enhancing food security and communication lines. Economic recovery covers creation of a conducive environment for trading and economic development and increase income generating avenues. Rebuilding governing functions entails putting in place structures that assists extension of local and national authorities. Security enhancement encompasses local security forces training and mentoring, disarming and reintegrating combatants and clearing mines, IEDs and other unexploded ordnances that pose danger to the local community. African Union (AU) emphasizes that all post-conflict reconstruction and development process must address

the needs of countries and the needs of affected populations. AU thus identifies security, humanitarian emergency assistance, socioeconomic reconstruction, human rights, justice and reconciliation as the priority areas of coverage. These are essentially areas that are translated into CIMIC programs in any PSO.

2.4 Community Partnerships in Peacebuilding

Colletta & Cullen (2000) identified four community-based institutions that peacebuilders can partner with while implementing peace projects. They found out that Local leadership was indispensable in securing community peace project success. They defined local leadership as an official, traditional, and informal leader at the local level. These leaders include the communal chief and the local government administration. Lederach (1995) emphasizes that community-based approach is indispensable in peace building. He posits those myriad measures can be adopted to transform conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes. The approach is useful in re-connecting citizens with the state and to re-establish local governance. Peacebuilding community forums provides opportunity for healthy exchanges of ideas, interactions and joint decision making which attenuates the propensity of conflict occurrences.

Haider (2009) points out that communities can participate in re-establishing local safety and security by reporting any threats to relevant agencies. For instance, communities can be encouraged to volunteer information about local armed groups or mined areas which enables relevant agencies to deal with hence improving safety and security. Communities can also participate in services provision such as labour in executing peace projects which leads to socioeconomic recovery. Local forums and media can also be tapped to broadcast

peace messages in languages that is understood by the locals. They can also be used to expand reach of civic education to remote areas. Community traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms can also be used in resolving local disputes. This have been identified as an effective method that brings long-term healing. Where conflicts revolve around attachment to a particular culture or heritage in a community, such communities can be enlisted to participate in preservation of such, hence creating peace.

Community based approach to peacebuilding ensures demand-led approaches to peacebuilding projects leading to community ownership, which in turn contribute to peace sustainability. More so, this process helps in sustainable management of disputes within a community and overcoming mistrust between local population and peacekeepers. This approach can be employed to manage any stage of conflict spectrum. Haider (2009) identifies several community institutions that provide forums for peace discussions, decision making and implementation which is a good entry point for peacebuilding projects. These are cooperatives, and civil societies, community-based organizations and local leadership.

Peace-building activities takes place in a humanitarian space that delineates the ability of the intervening agencies' ability to operate freely to meet humanitarian needs of conflict-stricken communities (Leader, 2000). It is the same space that warring parties and the local community carryout their normal daily activities. It therefore extremely difficult to abstract belligerents from the local civilian population to create a safe humanitarian space where humanitarian agencies can discharge their duties, devoid of military influence (Roberts, 2010). Due to entrenchment of Islamic fundamentalism, peacekeepers in Somalia are perceived as invaders hence they are christened as “legitimate targets”

(Egnell, 2010; Harmer 2008). This perception has reduced the space for humanitarian action by hampering the humanitarian organization's reach to the population in need of humanitarian relief. This leaves this crucial task to AMISOM forces who better equipped to operate in such difficult circumstances (Bollen, 2008). They have the capacity to reach as far and quickly and has means to gain control of a humanitarian situation (Byman 2001; Abiew 2003 & Bollen, 2008). However, to succeed, the AMISOM forces need establish and develop CIMIC with the local civilian as they provide knowledge of the operating environment more specifically human terrain.

Gordon (2001); Currey (2003) & Gourlay (2000) have noted that in majority of peace support missions, civil-military cooperation approach lacks a guiding framework and as such, it remains improvisational, pragmatic and ad hoc. This presents a problem of continuity when actors change. Gourlay (2000) argues that interventions are circumstances specific thus making ad hoc approach to CIMIC appropriate. Zaalberg (2005) asserts that peace support missions tailor makes their operations to the expected challenges affirming the argument on appropriateness of the ad hoc approach. He further states that co-ordination of activities and agencies depends much on the people involved rather than on planning and standard operating procedures.

2.5 Assessing Peacebuilding Outcomes

CIMIC serves as a force multiplier as the peacekeepers use projects to build trust between them and the local population who in turn support the mission through provision of intelligence which is critical in targeting peace spoilers hence facilitating creation of a safe environment for humanitarian agencies to operate (Rana 2008; Franke 2006; Braem

2007 & Egnell 2010). Peacekeeping forces show their willingness to engage in society when they engage in peacebuilding, in addition gaining understanding on people's lives and behaviours (Fitz-Gerald 2000 & Braem 2007).

CIMIC impact in peace building can be assessed using various levels. Mercy Corps (2010) suggests that impacts of intervention can be evaluated by examining the changes in livelihood opportunities, economy, and social relationship for the population at risk of conflict. For instance, development of local market, improvement of market accessibility, revitalization of local industries and improvement of agriculture. Leeuw & Vaessen (2009) asserts that evaluation may look at impacts on drivers of conflict, such as reduction of incentives to participate in violence, addressing local grievances, or reduction in economic inequalities among conflicting groups.

2.2 Summary of Literature and Research Gaps

From the available literature on CIMIC in the context of peacebuilding, it was evident that there was no consensus on the concept. It is perceived differently by various scholars and organizations. It showed that the body of knowledge on CIMIC was not yet fully developed to eliminate ensuing confusion. While humanitarian such as OCHA perceive CIMIC as a coordinating function, NATO view it as a mission support issue. CIMIC frameworks are at the inchoate stage; they are not fully developed. Some scholars argue that there is no need to have a standardized CIMIC framework as each PSO comes with a specific environment. Others argue that all PSO's have a common goal of achieving universal peace thus a common guiding framework is of great importance. Various scholars have identified a raft of CIMIC activities that can be employed in peacebuilding.

Several community institutions that can act as CIMIC interface have been explored. However, there is no established framework that can be used across all PKOs. Peacebuilding literature seems to ignore how cultural identities in communities lead to conflict. This leaves a critical gap in this field since external interveners are required to understand how they can shape conflictual cultural identities to transform a conflict positively. Even though there is vast literature on the need of peace conflict interveners to foster local ownership of peace projects, not much is written on practical aspect of ensuring it happens. There is no template that is prescribed to guide this critical determinant of success peacekeeping mission. These are critical gaps that requires filling through more research and scholarly work in peace building studies.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

CIMIC concept is relatively new and as such an underpinning theory for this concept are not yet developed. However, the study of this field can be anchored on liberal peacebuilding, state building and democratization theories. These theories are chosen they complement each other in sufficiently anchoring this study.

2.3.1 Liberal Peacebuilding Theory

Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) posits those states and nations prospers or fail because of man-made political and economic institutions and not weather or geography. Explosion of conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq showed that the very way a state is build can be a source of conflict. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992); Paris, R. (1997); Doyle, M. & Sambanis, N. (2006) & Richmond, O. (2009) amongst other scholars are the proponents of liberal peacebuilding.

International peace-building activities since the end of the Cold War has promoted the role played by the United Nations (UN), regional organizations and other international organizations in rebuilding state functions. State-building is a key pillar of peace-building activities geared towards resolving armed conflicts (Hideaki, 2018). Shinoda (2003) posits that fragility of governance is the root cause of many conflicts. United Nations, (1998) affirms this by stating fragility arises out of the bad governance of states without sound social and economic infrastructure. This has necessitated the need of interveners in such conflicts to engage state-building activities. The principles that guide state-building are key in contemporary peacebuilding activities.

Liberal peacebuilding theory is relevant to UN peacekeeping operations since peace-related operations such as establishment of governance, the rule of law, security sector reforms (SSR), rebuilding damaged social, economy and physical infrastructure, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and the protection of civilians reinforce efforts for peacebuilding.

Richmond (2011), a critic of liberal peacebuilding theory states that peace-building practices by international community are based on the value system of liberal democracy. This is seen as western way of life which is not readily acceptable in some states. He further says that liberal peacebuilding makes fragile state dependent on continuous foreign interventions which is not sustainable in the long run. Roberts (2011) views liberal peacebuilding as a proxy by external actors to destroy traditional local conflict resolution mechanisms. Worse still external actors strengthen the mechanism of resource distribution, which is a maneuver by powerful states to exploit fragile governmental systems, hence it deteriorates the existing unjust social structure.

Church & Shouldice (2003) point out that peacebuilding efforts are aimed at either micro, mezo and macro tiers of influence. These are family unit level, community and state level. They argue that since it is difficult to cover all tiers level at once, the interveners are required to concentrate on one tier which will transfer the benefits to the others. This concept of transfer has been one of the foundational pillars of several projects, particularly at the level of elite interactions (Kelman, 1995). There is uncertainty around what is being transferred and how transfer occurs. This makes it difficult in evaluating the theory. Intangible changes such as perceptions, trust and attitudes that interventions try to effect are not measurable. This poses key challenges in testing the sustainability of peace projects.

2.3.2 State Building Theory

The end of cold war exposed a strong relationship between the stability of a nation and the method that was used in building that state. Explosion of conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq showed that the very way a state is build can be a source of conflict. It was clear also that conflict led to state underdevelopment. Contemporary proponent of state building such as Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) and Fukuyama (2004) are in agreement that states fail because of man-made political and economic institutions and not weather or geography.

State-building is the establishment of a centralized administrative power, it is concerned with activities to create functional state institutions (OECD, 2008). Peacebuilding on the other hand are activities needed to create the social foundations for a durable peace (ibid). State-building theory is relevant to UN peacekeeping operations since peace-related

operations such as establishment of governance, the rule of law, security sector reforms (SSR), rebuilding damaged economy and physical infrastructure, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and the protection of civilians reinforce efforts for state-building.

Cohen, Brown & Organski (1981) argues that the more power is centralized the more a state becomes effective in conducting military operations. This creates a dilemma for peacebuilders because it increases propensity of such state to wage war with another state. Shinoda (2003) argues that state-building is only peacebuilding when the government is strengthened but constrained by the social belief in the rule of law.

According to Zoe (2007), most scholars agree that state-building is the interventionist strategies to restore institutions and apparatus of a failed state. Hippler (2004) argues that peacekeepers need to know the intricacies of state-building as they can make this process easier or harder. Fukuyama (2004) emphasizes the primacy of good governance to state building. By assisting democratization which breeds good governance, peacekeepers play a critical role in state building. The 9/11 terror attack in the USA exposed the threat posed to the wealthy state emanating from underdeveloped fragile states. Such states who have huge influence in the United Nations shaping policies made UN peacekeeping mandates more inclined to state building. This theory is relevant to this study since peacebuilding activities that peace actors engage in are aimed at rebuilding a failed state.

2.3.3 Democratization Theory

Downs (1957) and Schumpeter (1976) argue that democracy was all about competitive selection of elites. They conceived democratization theory as how this elite competition

takes place as well as how it leads to legitimacy, accountability and representation of the resultant governing body. Warren (2014) and Mansbridge (2003;2014) holds that democratization is focused on building political and social institutions which bring stability in a state. Wagenaar (2014) and Dahl (2000) argue democratization is aimed at achieving democratic governance, avoiding tyranny, ensuring observance of essential rights, ensuring general freedoms, fostering self-determination, guarding moral autonomy, facilitating human development and prosperity, protecting essential personal interests, ensuring political equality and establishing a peaceful state.

Galtung, (1990) advanced the idea negative peace and positive peace. He argued that negative peace simply means the absence of open conflict but underneath this phenomenon lies structural violence. He further argued that upon addressing structural causes of violence, positive peace is realized. This is the ultimate desirable end state of any peace project. The current global peace project is premised on these ideas making this theory relevant in studying UN peacekeeping. International organizations such as the UN seek to achieve a long-term and sustainable positive global peace. This informs the shaping of peacebuilding efforts to transform the socio-economic conditions, creation of a liberal democracy, promotion of liberal human rights and the support for market liberalization of the affected country.

Democratization theory posits those democratic countries are hesitant to wage war against each other. Thus, peace operations should seek to instill democratic principles where they are deployed. The argument advanced by the liberal peace theory is that democratic principles lead to the creation of institutions that establishes checks and balances that presents hurdles to decision makers in waging war within or without a state. CIMIC is a

critical tool that the peace keeping force use to execute peace projects within their jurisdiction. These projects are meant to strengthen local population and their institution's resilience to conflict.

Paris, (2002) criticizes democratization peacebuilding projects saying that they are seen as promotion of liberal values. He points out that introduction of liberal market economy as Western domineering attitude that seeks to extend their economic exploitation to the weak and fragile states. He further states that most UN interventions have failed to deliver on their mandate due to their quest of hasty democratization of fragile states which fails and such states relapse to authoritarian.

2.4 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework is the researcher's conceptualization of the relationship between contextual variables in a study. Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) avers that use of graphics and diagrams, to depict the relationship helps in understanding interaction of variables and how they influence each other. In Peace-building process, the conduct of CIMIC programs is the independent variable that influence the outcome of CIMIC programs which are dependent variable. Community and other actors' participation influence the conduct of CIMIC and the outcome of the programs. This study conceptualized three main CIMIC thematic areas of peacebuilding. These programs are the independent variables (IV) of this study. The first IV is the conflict prevention program which indicators are presence of dialogue, negotiation, mediation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement in a community whose outcomes are reduced violent conflict and pacific settlement of conflicts which are the dependent variables (DV) affected by the presence of necessary human capital in the community to

execute the program and community partnership of the peace program. The second IV security enhancement program whose indicators are presence of reforms in the security sector, combatant's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration back into the community and general community safety and security. These leads to professionalization of security forces, reduced numbers of armed combatants and reduced incidences of IEDs, mines or unexploded ammunition. These are affected by communities' willingness to provide human capital, and intelligence own and run this program. Lastly is post-conflict recovery and reconstruction indicated by re-establishment of governance, restoring judicial system, local trade and economy recovery, reconstructed or rehabilitated basic infrastructure and improving social wellbeing. The outcome of these is extended local and national authorities, improved rule of law, increased revenue generating activities and improved basic infrastructure. These are affected by communities' willingness to volunteer human capital, provision of resources, owning and running the program, program financing, inter-clan dynamics and the prevailing political landscape. The interaction of these variables is as shown on figure 2.1. provided in the next page.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

Independent Variables

Dependent variables




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework
Source: Researcher, 2020

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.0 Introduction

This chapter is organized under the following subsections: research design, location of the study, target population, sampling techniques, sample size, and data collection instruments. Pre-testing of data collection tools, reliability and validity of the instruments, data collection techniques and procedures, data analysis and ethical considerations.

3.1 Research Design

Research design is a comprehensive plan for data collection in an empirical research (Bhattacharjee, 2012). This study used two types of research designs. First, the study utilized several case studies of CIMIC lessons learnt from other war-torn areas like the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone to provide the study with normative criterion of carrying out CIMIC activities. The study also used descriptive survey design. This study sought to describe activities undertaken under the rubric of CIMIC activities in Kismayo District, Southern Jubaland State in Somalia. It also helped in describing the extent of community participation and their attitudes (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). A combination of these two study designs was best suited to achieve the objectives of this study.

3.2 Study Area

The study location was Kismayo District of South Jubaland, Somalia. The state of Jubaland in Somalia is located on the Southeastern part of Somalia neighbouring Kenya to the Southwest and Ethiopia to the Northeast. It is divided into Gedo region, middle Jubba and lower Juba (See attached map). This is the most significant state in Somalia as it has fertile soils along the Juba valley where most of agricultural production in the country takes place. Consequently, this state holds majority of Somalia population estimated at 2.5 million. Kismayo district is strategic in this state. Kismayo coastal city serves as the headquarters for Lower Juba Province. It has a seaport, an airport and is connected to Mogadishu via a paved road. Due to its strategic location and good transport connection, this city serves as an economic hub for Jubaland and generates substantive revenue for the national government. The Port city was also chosen because it is hotly contested by warlords in Somalia. Al-Shabaab took control of the city in 2008 after defeating Colonel Barre Hirrale led militia in a fierce three-day battle. Al-Shabaab made Kismayo its logistic base and seaport for docking ships captured by their pirates. They received weapons and other supplies used to sustain their operations through this port. It is estimated that the group made a lot of money through illegal trade such as exporting of charcoal. Due to the military importance of this city, Al-Shabaab deployed a strong defense around the city.

3.3 Target Population

The target population is the group of elements to which the researcher wants to make inference. Borg & Gall, (2003) defined target population as all members of the real population of specimens from which a researcher wishes to generalize the results of the

study. The target population of this study included: Members of the local community, clan and community leaders, humanitarian aid workers and members of the civil society members of the Jubaland Security Forces (JSF) and AMISOM troops who have been deployed in AMISOM duties in Somalia from the year 2011 to 2020.

3.4 Sampling Technique

Sampling is the statistical process of selecting a subset from a population of interest for purposes of making observations and statistical inferences about that population (Bhattacharjee, 2012). The study utilized both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. In the probability methods, the study applied stratified sampling techniques where strata were subgroups of the target population which included two main categories: the civilians and security agencies (see table 3.1). The specific sub-groups of citizens had the following: Members of the local community, clan and community leaders, aid workers and members of the civil society. Security agencies' strata was composed of JSF members and AMISOM troops. Purposive sampling was used to identify key informants among these categories. Random sampling was used in seeking views of the local community on the success and role of the AMISOM CIMIC programs.

The sampling frame for the local grass root Somali leaders was obtained from public administration in Kismayo. A list of AMISOM troops who have been deployed in AMISOM duties in Somalia from the year 2011 to 2020 was obtained from the AMISOM Sector six headquarters records and a list of international and local staff working for various non-governmental organizations operating or who have operated in the area was obtained from their respective offices.

3.5 Sample Size

A sample refers to a carefully selected number of units or individuals from the target population from which data is gathered in a study (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). To determine a sample size, researchers employ several statistical formulas. Creswell & Baskarada, (2009) asserts that few participants who can describe their experiences or knowledge are the focus of qualitative studies. This study employed Onwuegbuzie & Collins (2007) typology to determine the sample size. Further, Onwuegbuzie and Collins, argue that a minimum sample size recommended for both quantitative and qualitative social science research depends on the design and data collection procedure. Using this typology, a sample of three participants per sub-group is deemed as adequate. Thus, the researcher will undertake to interview at least three key informants in each category. In data collection procedure, Onwuegbuzie & Collins, (2007) assert that 12 participants are sufficient for interviews, while 3-6 participants are sufficient for Focused Group discussions. Based on this criterion, the study utilized a sample of two hundred individuals as depicted in the table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Study Sample

Strata	Sub-group	Percentage	No. of participants
Civilians	Members of the Community	30	60
	Clan and Community elders	15	30
	Humanitarian Aid Workers	10	20
	Civil Society	15	30
Security Agencies	AMISOM/KDF troops	15	30
	Members of JSF	15	30
Total		100	200

Source: Researcher, 2020

3.6 Instruments of Data Collection

Primary data was collected using unstructured and semi-structured questionnaires, interviews and Focused Group Discussions. Questionnaires were administered to respondents who were purposively chosen based on their literate skills. Oral interviews were used to gather data from semi-illiterate and illiterate informants and those who could not be accessed physically. Key informant interviews were also used to gather data from clan elders, civil society, humanitarian aid workers, elements of AMISOM troops' command structure and CIMIC officers. Focused Group Discussion was also employed for collecting data from homogeneous groups like residents of Kismayo, members of JSF and KDF. The choice of survey media was dictated by the literacy levels of an individual and their accessibility. The number of respondents who were subjected to each tool of data collection is shown on table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Respondents Subjected to Each Tool

Sub-group	No. of participants	Questionnaire	Interview	Focused Group Discussions
Members of the Community	60	45	15	None
Clan and Community elders	30	20	10	None
Humanitarian Aid Workers	20	9	5	6
Civil Society	30	25	5	None
AMISOM/KDF troops	30	17	7	6
Members of JSF	30	20	7	3
Total	200	136	44	15

3.7 Pretesting of Research Instruments

The questionnaire, interview and Focused Group Discussion guides that were used in collecting data were pre-tested in universities and military barracks in Nairobi to assess whether they were intelligible to the targeted sample. They were also pre-tested to ensure their reliability of yielding valid measures of the constructs of interest (Bhattacharjee, 2012). After pre-testing, research instruments items not yielding sufficient data was amended accordingly until they yield required information.

3.8 Pilot Test of Research Instruments

The research instruments were pilot tested in Lamu district in Kenya where CIMIC was employed by Kenya security forces during operation Linda Boni. The security forces were using CIMIC programs to win the locals hearts and minds in an operation against bandits that were operating within the district. Developed research instrument were administered to 5 security officers, 5 NGO workers and 10 residents. This test helped in identifying potential problem areas and deficiency in the research instruments which were adequately addressed prior to the main research.

3.9 Validity and Reliability

Yin (2003) defined validity as “establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied”. He further stated that construct validity is strengthened by obtaining evidence from multiple sources, establishing a chain of evidence to enable the reader to follow where evidence is derived and to have draft case study report reviewed by the key informants. The validity data used in this study was secured by sourcing the data from multiple sources such as questionnaires and interviews responses from different people.

Reliability according to Yin (2003) is demonstrating that study operations can be repeated, and the same results obtained. The point is that if the same case study was to be conducted once again by another investigator, he or she should arrive at the same findings and conclusions when following the same procedures. The goal is to minimize errors and biases (ibid, pp. 37). To achieve this, project documented all steps during the study.

3.10 Data Collection

To sufficiently address the research questions, primary and secondary data was collected. Primary data was collected by administering unstructured and semi-structured questionnaire (written surveys) through local research assistants, e-mails and WhatsApp. Unstructured and semi-structured interviews (verbal surveys) were administered to selected key informants such as CIMIC officers and local leaders on a face-to-face bases, video calls and telephone. Focused group discussion was used to collect data from AMISOM troops, JSF and NGO groups that were easily found together. Secondary data was collected from various publications and reports that touches on AMISOM CIMIC.

3.11 Data Analysis

Collected data was transcribed, grouped and collated in themes before qualitative analysis. The collected data was examined in the following typologies corresponding the objectives of the study: to explore CIMIC programs conducted by AMISOM forces, to examine the types of partnerships used by peace actors in executing CIMIC programs and to assess the outcomes of the AMISOM CIMIC programs in fostering peacebuilding in Kismayo District of South Jubaland, Somalia, 2011-2020. Data collected was analyzed in three analytical frameworks. These include theoretical reflections, documentary

reviews, and content analysis. Content analysis was employed in analyzing qualitative data whereas descriptive statistics were employed in analyzing quantitative data.

3.12 Ethical Consideration

Ethical issues present themselves in any research. Informed consent, respect for anonymity and confidentiality are the major ethical issues a researcher may encounter. Ethical consideration in research enables the researcher to protect the dignity of the research subjects by avoiding publication of the information in the research that may harm their dignity. Informed consent means that a person is enlightened enough to assent to research participation knowingly and voluntarily. To obtain informed consent, researcher engaged research participants verbally and through writing. Prior to interviews, the informants were informed of the purpose of the research through interview consent form and through submission of the proposal to prospects key informants. The researcher also briefed the informants about the methods which were to be used to protect anonymity and confidentiality. For instance, no names were to be used where sensitive information was given. The research ensured confidentiality by assuring informants that they could freely give or withhold information depending on their freewill. The research also undertook to maintain confidentiality in reporting. The researcher also took precaution to manage anticipated emotional moments especially when interviewing victims of military interventions. For example, in the case of interviewing victims of violence, the interview may trigger painful experiences and the participant may become distressed during the interview. In such situation, the researcher had plans to refer such victims to counsellor or be in company of a counsellor. The researcher also sought necessary authorization

from the National Council of Science and Technology (NACOSTI) and the university before the commencement of the research. Finally, the researcher cited and acknowledged works reviewed or access.

CHAPTER FOUR

CIMIC PROGRAMS FOR PEACE BUILDING IN SOMALIA

4.0 Introduction

This chapter highlights the type of CIMIC programs that have taken place in place in Kismayo District from the year 2011-2020 based on core peacebuilding thematic areas of conflict prevention, security enhancement and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.

4.1 AMISOM Peacebuilding CIMIC Programs

The study sought to explore CIMIC peacebuilding programs that have been conducted by AMISOM and other peace actors in Kismayo District from the year 2011-2020. In this regard, the exploration followed three peacebuilding thematic areas of conflict prevention, security enhancement and post conflict recovery and reconstruction as per UN guidelines (2008). UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali in his report titled Agenda for Peace (1992), articulated peacebuilding as a new tool for preventing recurrence of conflicts in the world. He pointed out that peacekeepers should seek to rebuild post conflict societies by securing peace agreements and constitutions that are anchored on human rights. He further asserted that for a lasting peace to be realized, conflict resilience mechanisms should be enhanced in post conflict societies. These measures entail encouraging dialogue, negotiation and mediation, community security enhancement and post conflict recovery and reconstructions.

4.1.1 Community Based Conflict Prevention and Settlement CIMIC Programs

The study sought to investigate the state of conflict in Kismayo since AMISOM deployment from the population's perspective. Respondents were asked to state their perception of the conflict situation the district based on three Likert levels of **not improved at all=1, do not know=2, tremendous improvement=3**. The results are as presented in figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1: Conflict Situation in Kismayo

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the data presented in figure 4.1, 97% of the 136 respondents said that the conflict situation in Kismayo had improved tremendously, 2 % said that they did not know whether it had improved or deteriorated and 1% said it had not improved at all. Saferworld (2016) similarly had the same observation. They noted that nearly all residents of Jubaland were

acknowledging that the Jubaland Administration had greatly reduced violent conflicts within Jubaland state. This implies that Peace-building efforts were bearing fruits.

The study further sought to assess the effectiveness of methods employed by AMISOM in fostering community level conflict prevention. To achieve this, a questionnaire with five methods of preventing or pacific settlement of disputes redacted from UN Charter Article 33(1), was administered to respondents requiring them to rank the methods according to their effectiveness in Kismayo District. A Likert scale with five levels of Not effective=1, Less effective=2 moderately Effective=3 Effective=4 and very effective=5 was utilized. Consequently, the effectiveness of conflict prevention and settlement methods in the study are found to be as shown in table 3.

Table 4.1: Effectiveness of Community-Based Conflict Prevention and Resolution Methods

N= 136	1	2	3	4	5
Dialogue/negotiation	2 (1.47%)	6 (4.41%)	9 (6.62%)	20 (14.71%)	109 (81.15%)
Mediation	1 (0.74%)	3 (2.21%)	16 (11.76%)	35 (25.74%)	81 (59.56%)
Conciliation	5 (3.68%)	13 (9.56%)	23 (16.91%)	40 (29.41%)	55 (40.44%)
Arbitration	3 (2.21%)	45 (33.09%)	30 (22.06%)	24 (17.65%)	34 (25%)
Judicial settlement	40(29.41%)	34(25%)	29(21.32%)	20 (14.71%)	13 (19.56%)

Source: Researcher, 2021

According to the findings presented on table 4.1, 81.15% of the 136 respondents ranked dialogue and negotiations as the most effective methods of conflict prevention and

resolution. 59.56% of the respondents' said mediation was the most effective. This concurs with the Mohammed, (2021) suggestions that Somalia communities at the micro level willingly embrace dialogue, negotiations and mediation in addressing their differences. Somali have a clan institution called Xeer that constitutes traditional elders that set rules and obligations to mediate peaceful relations between Somalia's competitive clans and sub-clans (Andre, 2006). The study found that majority of the respondents still hold this institution in very high regard in handling disputes. Judicial settlement was ranked the least effective at 19.56%. This finding affirms the assertions of Andre (2005) that there is a lot of public distrust of formal systems amongst the Somalia population. Rose & Ssekandi (2007) further corroborated this when they asserted that traditional justice systems are largely relied on by Somalis particularly at the local level, because they lack trust in and perceive secular justice system as ineffective.

The proximate causes of conflict in Somalia are clan competition, political marginalization of the minority groups and weak central government that is incapable of performing its basic state duties (Wale & Shuna, 2019). Tshela, (2005) posits that when communities lack access to effective state services, they resort to their own traditional governance mechanisms or create new local ones. This may be the explanation of the situation in Kismayo District.

UN Charter Article 33(1) emphasizes on pacific resolution of conflict. The Somalia Xeer institution presents to the peace actors a readymade platform on which they can anchor their Peace-building activities. The study found out that AMISOM CIMIC programs had

created a conducive environment in Kismayo where stake holders were executing peace projects.

4.1.2 Security and Safety Enhancement CIMIC Programs

Hofreiter, (2015) defines security as a state in which a given object or entity does not feel endangered physically and in terms of its legal interests. It is the absence of or threat to physical or psychological harm. Safety on the other hand are efforts put to protect an object or entity from physical or psychological harm. When the security of and object is reduced, its safety is reduced in equal measures because it becomes exposed to risks to harm.

Security is a primal necessity to any state. It is the foundation on which a state is built. The security sector of a state refers to the organs, institutions, means and agencies bestowed with the responsibility of providing security and safety to the state, its inhabitants and institutions. The core security institutions of a state are military, paramilitary, police, other uniformed forces, intelligence agencies and other socioeconomic protective bodies. A state whose security institutions cannot guarantee security and safety to its citizen is considered as a failed state. Somalia became a failed state in 1991 after the collapse of President Siad Barre regime.

The study sought to assess the state of security situation in Kismayo District before AMISOM deployment in the year 2011 and the changes that have been experienced in this sector since then. In this regard, three thematic areas of security enhancement were evaluated. These areas entail Security Sector Reforms (SSR), Disarmament

Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Safety by clearing of mines, IEDs and remnants of war (unexploded ammunition).

4.1.2.1 Security Sector Reforms

Hanggi (2005) argues that post conflict situations cannot be truly overcome until security sector reform is achieved. This study sought to evaluate the status of the Security Sector Reforms (SSR) that have been implemented by the Jubaland Administration under the mentorship of AMISOM and other stakeholders. To achieve this, redacted tool developed by Simon & Duncan (2009) was used. The tool employs nine (9) criteria of evaluation: Relevance or Appropriateness, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Sustainability and ownership, Coherence, Coordination or linkages and Consistency with values of SSR program. A mixed questionnaire was administered to collect data from respondents.

4.1.2.1.1 SSR Relevance/ Appropriateness.

To evaluate appropriateness and relevance of SSR program, respondents were asked if the SSR was technically adequate solution to the security and justice problems facing the population in Kismayo. The results are as shown in figure 4.2.




Figure 4.2: SSR Adequacy as a Solution to the Security and Justice Problem

Source: Researcher, 2021

In figure 4.2, 68% of the 136 surveyed participants agreed that the SSR was technically adequate solution to the security and justice problems facing the people of Kismayo. This finding is corroborated by Nisar & Khalif (2021) position that “A capable intelligence and security capacity in Kismayo have limited criminality and the penetration of Al-Shabaab, enabling reforms in the justice sector to take place”. This is an indication that under the mentorship of AMISOM and other stakeholders, the Jubaland security forces were acquiring right technical skills that enabled them to fulfill the security needs of the people.

A follow-on question was posed to Survey participants to say if SSR was accepted by different groups, particularly the poor and vulnerable. The results are as shown in figure 4.3.




Figure 4.3 SSR Acceptability by Different Groups

Source: Researcher, 2021

In figure 4.3, 81 % of the 136 respondents agreed that SSR was accepted by different groups, particularly the poor and vulnerable. This finding is corroborated by Saferworld (2016) report that suggested 90% of the population in Kismayo supported Jubaland Administration. To achieve such a high approval by the people, it means that the SSR had gained community ownership which implies that this program will be sustainable even after AMISOM withdraws from Somalia.

Survey respondents were further asked if the SSR was in tune with the policies of international counterparts in the areas of development, security and peacebuilding. The results are as presented in figure 4.4.




Figure 4.4: SSR Alignment with the Policies of International Counterparts

Source: Researcher, 2021

From figure 4.4, the finding showed that 77.80% of the 136 respondents agreed that the program was aligned with the policies of international counterparts. An interview with AMISOM Police Commissioner explained the role of AMISOM police in support for election by stating that,

“AMISOM has been supporting the Somalia Police Force (SPF) to provide security during elections. We have been by their side, guiding and advising them. They have the key role to police the elections so that the process is credible.”

During a focus group discussion, AMISOM Contingent Commanders confirmed this finding by asserting that they were monitoring the actions of the security officers that they had trained and operated along to ensure that they observe human rights when executing their duties.

From these statements, it was clear that AMISOM is hands-on to ensure that JSF work within the stipulated international laws as obligated by United Nations Policy on

Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD) where a deployed peacekeepers contingent is required to ensure that the local forces operating under them observe human rights.

When asked what considerations they had for long-term capacity-building of JSF, AMISOM sector six commanders explained this,

“AMISON has a Transition Plan that would enable Somalia Security Organs gradually assume responsibility for security. The plan includes gradual transfer of responsibilities from AMISOM to Somalia forces. It also covers those parts of the country where AMISOM has never had a presence but where security institutions and capacity need to be built. Previously, JSF could not hold defensive positions without support from AMISOM but now they can do so. The goal for this plan is to progressively transfer security ownership of key towns, roads and national infrastructure to Somalia security agents, enabling them take lead in operations as AMISOM scales back its presence.”

This statement shows clearly that AMISOM was committed to long term capacity building of the Jubaland security sector to facilitate them take over responsibility of managing the security function in Somalia. Overall, the study found that the SRR program was very relevant for JSF as they were preparing to assume the management of security function in Jubaland when AMISOM completes drawdown from Somalia at the end of year 2022.

4.1.2.1.2 SSR Effectiveness

To evaluate effectiveness of the SSR, respondents were asked if its area of coverage matched the intended outputs, purpose and goal. The results are as presented in figure 4.5.




Figure 4.5: SSR Matching with Intended Outputs Purpose and Goal

Source: Researcher, 2021

According to the findings presented in Figure 4.5, 83 % of 136 respondents said that SSR coverage matched the intended outputs, purpose and goal. This was in line with the sentiments expressed by clan elders from Abdale Birole during an interview by asserting that, since the Jubaland battalion was deployed in the area, their wealth in livestock had increased. He said that before the deployment, Al-Shabaab used to raid them at will, kill them, rape women, kidnap youth and drive away their camel, goats and cattle.

During another interview one AMISOM contingent commanders averred that,

“Jubaland intelligence service has provided the Security Forces a capability for penetrating Al-Shabaab. Through cooperation with the local population, they have been able to detect Al-Shabaab agents before they commence any harmful act within the district”.

Nasir & Khalif (2016) also noted in agreement that intelligence and security in Kismayo had acquired capacity to limit criminality in the area. From these sentiments, it can be deduced that the SSR program was effective in enhancing peace building initiatives.

A follow-on question asked respondents what extent were observed changes the result of the SSR rather than other factors. Their responses are as presented in figure 4.6.




Figure 4.6: Extent to which SSR is attributed to Changes in Security Sector

Source: Researcher, 2021

From figure 4.6, 96% of the 136 respondents attributed changes experienced in Jubaland security sector to SSR program. This is corroborated by Menkhaus (2017), who asserted that the good security in Kismayo is mainly attributed to the effectiveness of the Jubaland State’s security sector.

Where the SSR did not deliver on its objectives, respondents were asked to explain why. The responses are as presented in Figure 4.7.




Figure 4.7: Reasons for SSR Failure to Deliver on its Objectives

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the findings presented in figure 4.7, clan dynamics contributed 50% of the failures of SSR to meeting its objective. The finding is corroborated by Abdeta, (2020) when he posited that majoritarian Clan identity played the biggest role in influencing Somalia’s government employment of the monopoly of violence. Saferworld (2016) reported that Clannism was a key driver of political problems in Jubaland and beyond. 30% of the respondents said that lack of ideal security system contributed to SSR failure. This can be attributed the fact that JSF security agencies are at their formative stage. The institution is yet to mature and hone operation procedures and processes. The training that JSF receives from different stakeholders also creates confusion because of differences in doctrine.

It can also be seen that the SSR had substantive political will. Only 1% of the failures of the program was attributed by lack of political will. This can be attributed to the fact that

the security agents had a full support from the political class since majority were recruited from friendly clans that are trusted by the Jubaland regime.

Survey participants were asked what can be done to make the SSR more effective. They responded as presented in figure 4.8.




Figure 4.8: Making SSR More Effective

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the data presented in figure 4.8, 60% of the 136 respondents were emphatic that SSR could be more effective with good security sector governance. The finding is in line with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1999) position that security sector "should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other service". UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) developed the principles of good governance. For security sector to be effective it should ensure equal participation all the constituents of a community. It should ensure that the rule of law is enforced impartially while fully protecting human rights, especially the minorities. The decisions taken and their enforcement should follow rules and regulations. All stakeholders should be given equal service within a reasonable

timeframe. Consensus should be sought while serving different interests in society. All members of the community must feel that they have a stake in it through equity and inclusiveness during recruitment. It should produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources. Finally, it should be accountable to the people it serves.

4.1.2.1.3 SSR Efficiency

To evaluate efficiency of the SSR program, respondents were asked to give their opinions as to whether the program was managed with reasonable regard for efficiency. They were also asked to say if the program was economically worth. The results are as presented in figure 4.9 & 4.10.




Figure 5.9: SSR Efficiency

Source: Researcher, 2021

From figure 4.9, 80% of the respondents said that the SSR program was efficient while 20% said it was not efficient. The respondents highlighted that JSF could deliver security professionally, at a reasonable cost, and in a way that helps to ensure the rule of law. This

is the criteria set by DCAF (2020). Information from a key informant indicated that JSF strength stood at 5000 soldiers, 1500 policemen, and 100 prison officers. This is a relatively small force charged to man a vast area, which they had done with relative success. With these facts, it can be concluded that the program was being run efficiently.

Survey respondents were further asked if the SSR was being executed economically worthwhile, given possible alternative uses of the available resources. The results are as presented in figure 4.10.




Figure 4.10: SSR Economic Worthiness

Source: Researcher, 2021

Analysis from figure 4.10 shows that 75% out of 135 respondents believed the SSR program was economically worth. 25% said it didn't have any economic value. Respondents looked at the economic aspect of SSR from effect it had brought to their day-to-day undertakings. During an interview, clan elders from Abdale Birole asserted that, the security deployment in their area had seen them increase their livestock wealth. Prior to

AMISOM capturing Kismayo, there was no civil police in the district. Businessmen explained how their businesses had collapsed due to frequent raids by khat chewing militias who controlled the town, there was no rule of law. The strong were stealing from us and we could do nothing to them. Reflecting on these sentiments and the security situation at the time of this study, it can be concluded that the tranquility brought about by the professionalization of JSF had created a conducive environment that had enabled the population to rebuild their economic activities.

4.1.2.1.4 SSR Impact

To evaluate SSR impact, respondents were asked to give their views on varied statements. Where (1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4= Agree, 5=strongly agree). The results are as presented in table 4.2.

Table 5.2: SSR Impact

N=136	1	2	3	4	5
SSR have affected well-being of people, institutions, groups and stakeholders	2 (1.47%)	7 (5.15%)	12 (8.82%)	50 (36.76%)	64 (47.05%)
SSR has contributed to the strengthening capacity and accountability of institutions	4 (2.94%)	6 (4.41%)	14 (10.29%)	73 (53.68%)	39 (28.68%)
SSR has led to the development and improvement of security policies	2 (1.47%)	10 (7.35%)	58 (42.62%)	50 (36.76%)	10 (7.35%)
Tremendous insecurity would have occurred without the SSR	3 (2.21%)	16 (11.76%)	17 (12.50%)	90 (66.18%)	10 (7.35%)

Source: Researcher, 2021

According to table 4.2, 47.05% of the 136 respondents strongly agreed and 36.76% agreed that JSF SSR had positively affected well-being of people, institutions, groups, and stakeholders. 8.82% were neutral and 6.63% disagreed. Positive impact of individuals is reflected on survey respondent's sentiments during interviews. When asked to comment about SSR training he attended one JSF respondent said,

“The SSR training would enable the troops to improve the conduct of military operations. We will share the knowledge and experiences shared with our colleagues who did not benefit from the training”.

During an interview, one community elder explained, that the police are helping them in dealing with criminal elements. Whenever such characters are detected amongst them, they call the police who arrest them.

During focus group discussion correction Officers in Kismayo prison said, they got their training in Mogadishu AMISOM camp. They said they were now 100 Officers in Kismayu prison administering 500 prisoners.

Special Representative of the African Union for Somalia reported to the Peace and security Commission in 2020 as follows.

“AMISOM will continue to support the government in its efforts to build up the capacity of the Somali National Security Forces and to rid the country of the Al-Shabaab menace.”

He added that with AMISOM's support, the Somali national forces have pushed the Al-Shabaab out most major urban centers in southern Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu and the port cities of Marka and Kismayo, as well as many other towns and centers, creating “the best chance Somalia has had in a generation to achieve a lasting

peace and to establish legitimate and representative institutions.” UNDP report on SSR 2014-15 noted that “Federal States’ security institutions increased professional capacity to exercise oversight and deliver security services in accordance with their mandates and in compliance with human rights standards”. From these sentiments, it can be concluded that JSF SSR have positive impact to individual’s practitioners in the form of increasing their professionalism. Security sector institutions have also grown out of this professionalism.

Before, deployment of AMISOM, there was no prisons. Criminals who were caught were executed summarily without any trial. To the general population, the peace that was brought about by these security professionals have created a conducive environment for growing their economic activities.

When asked if SSR had contributed to the strengthening capacity and accountability of institutions, 82.28% said yes and 7.35% no. Jubaland Intelligence Agency participating an AMISOM SSR training said,

“The training was helpful. It made me understand my obligations of protecting civilians during conflict, and how to handle captured combatants or those who surrender during counterterrorism operations”.

This indicates that SSR was building both individual and institution’s capacity and accountability in executing security mandate.

Asked whether SSR had led to the development and improvement of security policies, 42.62% of the respondents were neutral, 8.82% disagree and 7.35% agree. From this finding, is clear that SSR had no tangible impact on the policy front.

Asked what the security situation would have been like without SSR, 73.53% said that tremendous insecurity would have occurred, 13.97% said that no change to the situation and 12.50% were neutral. This finding indicates that majority of the respondents 73.53% had experience positive impact of the SRR program.

4.1.2.1.5 SSR Sustainability and Ownership

To evaluate SSR Sustainability and ownership, respondents were asked to give their views on varied, statements. Where 1= Disagree, 2=Neutral, 4= Agree,). The results are as presented in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: SSR Sustainability and Ownership.

N=136	1	2	3
Steps have been taken to create processes, structures and institutions and ownership through which the population can access justice and security over the long term.	7 (5.15%)	10 (7.35%)	119 (87.5%)
Jubaland SSR has plans to adequately build human as well as institutional capacity for JSF.	5 (3.68%)	6 (4.41%)	125 (91.91%)
Jubaland SSR is supported by local institutions and well-integrated with local social and cultural conditions.	6(4.41%)	9(6.62%)	117 (82.35%)
AMISOM has a credible exit strategy envisaged or in place.	4 (2.94%)	3 (2.20%)	129 (94.85%)

Source: Researcher, 2021

Respondents were asked if JSF SSR had taken steps to create processes, structures, institutions and fostered requisite ownership through which the population can access justice and security over the long term. A majority, 87.5% agreed, 7.35% were neutral and 5.15% disagreed that there was creation of processes, structures and institutions of ownership. During interviews, sentiments corroborating this finding were captured. AMISOM sector six commanders reported that AMISOM has assisted in training approximately 1500 policemen and rehabilitation of six police posts within Kismayo District. This had entrenched rule of law in the district. Community elders explained that the created police service was helping them in dealing with criminal elements. Whenever such characters are detected amongst them, they called the call the police who arrested them. The police also said that they were using the community elders to help them vet any suspicious characters. The elders were also helping them during recruitment where they were used in vetting potential recruits. This had reduced cases of recruiting Al-Shabaab sympathizers within the service.

The study established that Kismayo prison had been put back to use through the efforts of AMISOM and other stakeholders. 100 prison warders trained, and they were manning approximately 500 prisoners. In a focus group discussion, JSF commanders indicated that three military garrisons had been established. They also indicated that with the help of AMISOM, they had established recruitment procedures for troops. The local elders were being consulted in vetting recruits to ensure that those who joined the forces were not linked to terror groups. They further said that they had procedures in place for administering troops. From these sentiments there is clear indication that the JSF SSR program was creating institutions, processes and procedures.

When answering a question on whether Jubaland SSR had plans to adequately build human as well as institutional capacity for JSF, 91.91% of the participants agreed, 4.41% were neutral and 3.68% disagreed. This was confirmed by the fact that in all AMISOM forward operating bases, JSF were deployed along those localities. In an interview, AMISOM contingent commanders confirmed that they conducted all their operations together with JSF. This was done to train and mentor them.

On whether the SSR was supported by local institutions and well-integrated with local social and cultural conditions, 82.35% agreed, 6.62% were neutral and 4.41% disagreed. Similar findings were reported by Saferworld, (2016) when they noted that 90% of the population supported the Jubaland administration. The study noted that most of the security agencies were working hand in hand with the clan elders a fact that demonstrated that the SSR program was integrated with the local culture which predominantly recognize the elders as decision makers. On the question of if AMISOM had a credible exit strategy envisaged or in place, 94.85% agreed, 2.20% were neutral and 2.94% disagreed. In an interview with AMISOM sector six commanders asserted that,

“AMISON has a Transition Plan that would enable Somalia to gradually assume responsibility for security. The plan includes the gradual transfer of responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali forces. It also covers those parts of the country where AMISOM has never had a presence but where security institutions and capacity need to be built. Previously, JSF could not hold defensive positions without support from AMISOM but now they can do so. The goal for this plan is to progressively transfer security ownership of key towns, roads and national infrastructure to JSF, enabling them take lead in operations as AMISOM scale back its presence.”

These sentiments were in line with African Peace and Security’s Somalia transitional plan of 2018 which anticipated that AMISOM exit from Somalia by end of year 2021.

5.1.2.1.6 SSR Coherence

To evaluate SSR Coherence, respondents were asked if they were aware of mechanisms put in place for ‘whole-of-government’ support to SSR. The results are as presented in figure 4.11.




Figure 4.11: SSR Coherence

Source: Researcher, 2021

According to data presented in figure 4.11, 89% of the respondents said that there were mechanisms put in the whole government to support SSR. 11% said the SSR did not have government support. Similar findings were recorded by Saferworld (2016), where 68 % of surveyed participants attributed security improvement in 2013 directly to the Jubaland Administration. The remarkable success of JSF in securing the Kismayo District demonstrates that the security forces are fully supported by the government.

4.1.2.1.7 SSR Coordination and Linkages

To evaluate SSR Coordination and linkages, respondents were asked to state whether SSR had forged links with other relevant programs and frameworks, including peace

support operations, post-conflict recovery and Peace-building strategies and frameworks, and national development frameworks. The results are as presented in figure 4.12.




Figure 4.12: SSR Coordination and Linkages.

Source: Researcher, 2021

According to figure 4.12, 93% of the respondents the SSR had forged links with other relevant programs and frameworks. From the interviews conducted, survey participants particularly AMISOM and JSF demonstrated that they had very close operational links. Other national development frameworks were riding on the stability brought about by the security agencies. It was also noted that security agencies were cooperating with the local population. It was noted that the local elders were critical points that linked the security agencies and the community. Whenever the security agencies wanted to disseminate information to the public, they used community-based organizations such as women groups which afforded a wider reach.

4.1.2.1.8 Consistency with the Values

To evaluate SSR Consistency with the values, respondents were asked to give their views on varied, statements. The results are as presented in table 4.4.

Table 4.4: SSR Consistency with the Values

N=136	Disagree	Agree
SSR promotes norms of good and democratic governance, values respect for human rights and the rule of law.	47(34.56%)	89(65.44%)
SSR is designed and carried out in accordance with basic governance principles of transparency and accountability	57(49.91%)	79(58.09%)
SSR promotes equitable access to justice and security for populations, including the poor and vulnerable	46(33.82%)	90(66.18%)

Source: Research Data (2021).

From table 4.4, 65.44% of respondents agreed that JSF SSR was promoting norms of good and democratic governance values respect for human rights and the rule of law. Similar findings were recorded by UNDP 2014-15 reports which asserted that Somali federal security institutions had recorded an increase professional capacity to exercise civilian and political oversight, deliver security services and coordinate approach to security in accordance with assigned mandates and ensuring human rights compliance. A significant number of respondents, 34.56% disagreed. This could be as result of clan rivalry. Abdeta, B. (2020) had similar observation when he noted that establishment of Kismayo administration facing challenges between two contesting clans, the Darood and Hawiye. The two clans work to mutually exclude each other in the admiration. The clan that is left out of the administration feel marginalised.

When asked if JSF SSR was designed and carried out in accordance with basic governance principles of transparency and accountability, 58.09% of the respondents agreed that this was happening and 49.91% disagreed. In an interview, members of Bajjuuni minority clan complained, the security men were from only one clan and that they were harassing them when going about their fishing. Members of other clans that do not have powerful representation in the government such as the minority Bantus expressed the same sentiments indicating that the recruitment into the security sector was mired with nepotism.

On the question of if SSR promote equitable access to justice and security for populations, including the poor and vulnerable, 66.18% of the respondents said yes and 33.82% said no. As Christian (2004), explained that there were deliberate efforts to marginalize people who had no representation in the government. This could be the reason that has led the minority Bajjuuni, and Bantu tribes are left out of JSF.

4.1.2.2 Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) CIMIC Program

To assess impact of DDR in Kismayo, the study relied on Schulhofer & Sambanis (2010) criteria of examining if the program reduced the risk of civil war recurrence in the district; stimulated economic development; prevented or reduced postwar violence and crime; Bolstered political participation and civic engagement by ex-combatants; and ameliorated the impact of wartime trauma on postwar society and individuals. A questionnaire with five Likert type question on a five (5) scale response levels: ranging from 1= No impact at all, 2= A little bit of impact, 3=some sense of impact, 4= Quite a bit of impact, 5= Tremendous impact was utilized. Table 4.5 presents the results for the impact of DDR in Kismayo District.

Table 4.5: Assessing Impact of DDR Program in Kismayo District Peacebuilding

	Questionnaire N=136	Maximum Composite score	Actual score	Percentage score	1	2	3	4	5
1.	Has AMISOM DDR program reduced the risk of civil war recurrence in the Kismayo District?	680	606	89.11%	0	1	8	38	89
2.	Has AMISOM DDR program stimulated economic development?	680	618	90.88%	0	1	2	50	83
3.	Has AMISOM DDR program prevented or reduced postwar violence and crime?	680	569	83.68%	4	8	13	42	69
4.	Has AMISOM DDR program ameliorated the impact of wartime trauma on postwar society and individuals?	680	264	38.82%	50	60	13	10	3
5.	Has AMISOM DDR program bolstered political participation and civic engagement by ex-combatants?	680	444	65.29%	1	5	90	37	3

Source: Researcher, 2021

From Table 4.5, the research findings show that AMISOM DDR program has created a significant positive impact on peacebuilding in Kismayo District. Respondents indicated that the program had reduced the risk of civil war recurrence in the Kismayo District by 89.11% chance. As Schulhofer & Sambanis (2010) argues, this can be attributed to the

fact that the program had reduced the number of weapons in the hands of civilian by disarming militias. For instance, on 31st August 2014, AMISOM DDR prevailed upon the opposition leader Colonel Barre Hirale with about four hundred of his militias to lay down their arms and join the rest of Somalis in bringing peace in Kismayo.

On economic stimulation and development, respondents indicated that AMISOM DDR program had contributed by 90.88%. This corroborates International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2016) report that showed Kismayo was experiencing rapid economic growth and development. This attributed to increased security and political stability that facilitated huge growth in construction industry as people were reconstructing homes, refugees were returning home, increased investments from diaspora humanitarian agencies and international companies. Schulhofer & Sambanis (2010) posits that ex-combatant can contribute to economic growth when engaged in productive labor unrelated to conflict.

Respondents indicated that AMISOM DDR program prevented or reduced postwar violence and crime by 83.68%. This was a marked improvement from the Safer World (2016) report where 66 % of the people surveyed stated that security had improved since 2013. A study that was conducted by Life & peace institute on women and conflict in Kismayo, in the year 2018 showed that prior to AMISOM taking over, Kismayo security was in a dire situation. This is further corroborated by Peace Direct report (2019) which indicated that Kismayo was a battle ground for more than 30 rival clans and 2,000 militia members. Menkhaus (2017), corroborates the study finding of tremendously improved security when he explains that the good security was because of Jubaland authorities

making the city open to all former residents, even those from previously quarrelling groups. This reintegration of communities has reduced the risk of clan-based clashes over the city.

The study found out that AMISOM DDR program had not done very well in ameliorating the impact of wartime trauma on postwar society and individuals. The respondents scored it at paltry 38.82%. This can be attributed to the fact that the whole generation of Somalia youth were born knowing only violent conflict thus exposing them to huge risk of post traumatic disorder. This coupled with lack of established support system makes this sphere lag. The district has also very limited mental health infrastructure and professional resources to deal with post traumatic disorder. The Study found that AMISOM DDR program had bolstered political participation and civic engagement of communities within Kismayo District by 65.29%. Nisar & Khalif (2021) argued that the peace and tranquility being experienced in Kismayo was because of the Jubaland Administration led by President Madhobe embracing democratic principles. This has enabled every man or woman political space to vie for any political post or exercise sovereign right of electing leaders that he/she feels will represent his/her aspirations. The finding further corroborates Safer World (2016) report that “The Jubaland Administration has made concerted attempts at public consultation for political appointments and inclusion of minority groups.”

4.1.2.3 Enhancing Public Safety

UNMAS (2020) report indicated that Somalia still faces residual threat from Explosive Remnants of War and Mine (ERW/mines). These explosive hazards pose great threat to the civilian population. They also increase poverty as they prevent people from engaging in their normal economic activities. The ERW/mines are sought after by armed groups such Al-Shabaab for constructing IEDs, which is used for attacking civilians, security forces and AMISOM troops in Somalia. Since 2016, 2190 IED incidents were recorded in Somalia where 7,696 lives were lost majority being civilians (UNMAS, 2016). The country is also littered with thousands of unsafe weapons that continue to pose danger to civilians.

This study sought to evaluate CIMIC activities by AMISOM and other peace stake holder in enhancing public safety in Kismayo District from 2011 to 2020. This was done by evaluating CIMIC inputs, outcomes and impact in enhancing safety based on Improvised Explosive Device, Explosive Remnants of War or Mine and Threats posed by Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) thematic areas. Unstructured questionnaires and interviews were administered to key informants selected from local population, JSF, UNMAS and AMISOM.

4.1.2.3.1 Awareness of IEDs

The study sought to assess the general population's awareness of IED. Respondents were asked if they had ever heard of an IED. The result of responses is as shown in figure 4.13.




Figure 4.13: IED Awareness

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the finding, it was observed that there was generally high level of IED awareness amongst the population living in Kismayo District. 92% of the respondents indicated that they have heard of what an IED is. This corroborates the findings by UNMAS (2017), where 89% of residents in Mogadishu were found to be aware of IED. This indicate the IED threat was prevalent in most areas of Somalia.

Only 8% of the respondents indicated to have not heard of an IED. All those who had no idea of IED were female. This could be attributed to the fact that most women rarely ventured out unlike men. The study established that community-based organizations provided stakeholders with platforms for increasing IED awareness.

The respondents were asked where they got IED awareness from. The results are as presented in figure 4.14.




Figure 4.14: Source of IEDs Awareness

Source: Research Data (2021).

From the data presented in figure 4.14, it emerged that most residents of Kismayo obtain information from radio, 90% of them indicated to have heard of IED through this media. Television informed 80%, social media 60%, JSF 60%, and internet 58% and AMISOM 50%. From this finding, it can be concluded that the residents of the study area are well served with information media through which Explosive Ordnance Risk Education can be passed.

Respondents were further asked if they had ever seen an IED. They responded as presented in figure 4.15.




Figure 4.15: Those who had Seen IEDs

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the findings, it was established that majority 60% of the respondents had not seen an IED. Out of the 40% of those who reported to have seen an IED, 90% were security officers particularly from AMISOM. This could be explained by the fact that AMISOM troops responded to most IED incidents. The civilians who reported to have seen IED were found not knowing how it is assembled or detonated. This indicates that the civilians are highly vulnerable to accidentally injure themselves whenever they try to handle encountered IEDs.

A follow-on question was posed to the respondents as to where they had seen IEDs. They responded as presented in figure 4.16.




Figure 4.16: Where IED had been seen

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the data presented in figure 4.16, most of the IEDs, 80% were seen on the roads. This were most likely Al- Shabaab IEDs targeting JSF and AMISOM troops patrolling along main supply routes. Those IED seen near AMISOM bases, JSF camps and government building could also have been laid by the same terror group targeting those who frequent those areas. IED seen at Al- Shabaab camps could have been in assembly stages.

Further respondents were asked what their reaction on sighting an IED were. They responded as presented in figure 4.17.




Figure 4.17: People Reaction on Sighting IED

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the finding in figure 4.17 it emerged that only 1% of the respondents would do nothing on sighting IED. Majority of the respondent indicated that they would report it to AMISOM base 88%, local leader 78% and JSF 60%. It appeared that these were the main stakeholders in addressing the IED threat. It further indicated that the population had more confidence with AMISOM in dealing with IED. The slight smaller percentage reporting to JSF could be because of fear of victimization.

In addition, respondents were asked who they thought was responsible for placing the sighted IED. They responded as in figure 4.18.




Figure 4.18: Suspected IED Maker

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the data presented in figure 4.18, it emerged that Al-Shabaab 90% were the main suspect of laying IEDs.

A follow-up questions was asked as to who the main victim of the IED attacks was. The responses were as presented in figure 4.19.




Figure 4.19: Main Victims of IED Attacks

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the findings in figure 4.19, it emerged that the civilians suffered 94%, AMISOM 80% and JSF 75% casualties. This shows that even if the intended target was the forces, civilians end up being the most victims due to lack of Explosive Ordnance Risk Education.

The study further sought to find out whether there had been efforts by stakeholders in addressing the IED menace. Respondents were asked what they had witnessed, done or heard regarding addressing IED threat. Their responses were as shown in figure 4.20.




Figure 4.20: Efforts to Address IED Threat

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the finding in figure 4.20, 90% of the respondents indicated that information about IED threat was adequately shared, 70% indicated that survey and clearances were being done by stakeholders and 50% indicated that there was sharing of techniques and disposal procedures amongst stakeholders. However, it emerged that only 45% had witnessed IED risk education 30% stockpile destruction and paltry 10% indicated that there was victim assistance. It appeared that these critical areas were lagging.

4.1.2.3.2 Explosive Remnants of War or Mine threat.

The study sought to assess prevalence of remnants of war in the study area and further proceed to examine efforts by stakeholders in addressing this threat. To achieve this, respondents were asked to indicate whether they had seen, heard of remnants of war or mine. Their response is as presented in figure 4.21.




Figure 4.21: Encountered Remnants of War

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the data presented in table 4.21, it emerged that the most encountered remnant of war was small arms ammunition. 99% of the respondents reported to have encountered with remnants of small arms. 66% reported encountered unexploded ordnance and 61% land mines. This finding shows that Somalia has high levels of contamination. This finding affirms what UNMAS found in their study in 2017.

Respondents were asked to state what they had observed being done by stakeholders in addressing the menace. They responded as shown in figure 4.20. Additionally, it emerged that UNMAS had deployed community liaison officers who assisted in raising

community awareness. It was observed that stakeholders were adopting community approach in addressing the threat. This approach was proving effective because through community-based institution, a wider reach was made possible.

4.1.2.3.3 Threats Posed by Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Since Somalia became a failed state, all the security agencies were dissolved, and all weapons were left in the hands of civilian. This easy access to weapons is used to fuel insecurity amongst communities. Propensity of conflict escalation to full blown violence is increased exponentially with availability of illicit weapons. The study sought to assess the level of threat posed by these weapons and the efforts employed by stakeholders to mitigate this threat. They were asked to give their perception on the SALW threat on Likert scale of five levels. Their response is as presented in figure 4.22.




Figure 4.22: Threat Posed by SALW

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the data presented in figure 4.22, it emerged cumulatively that 65% of the respondents felt threatened by the presence of illicit SALW in civilian hands. This finding concurs with Regional Centre on Small arms (2015) report which indicated that proliferation of SALW contributed 92% of Somalia's fragility. Majority of the respondents recounted witnessing incidents of violent conflicts committed using SALW. Interestingly, the study found out that nearly every adult in Somalia had interacted with a weapon.

Further the respondents were asked to explain mechanisms they have witnessed being put in place by stakeholders to address the insecurity caused by SALW. A focus group discussion established that efforts to address this threat was being employed in two levels. The first level was at governmental level where stakeholders such as AMISOM, UNMAS and UNSOM were building capacity to Somalia government institutions such as JSF to manage weapons and ammunitions. JSF were being trained on weapons and ammunition management to reduce chances of misuse. In the same breath, JSF was being supported financially and militarily to defeat rebel groups such as Al-Shabaab who were misusing SALW against civilians.

The second level was at local level where stakeholders were helping in the creation of a conducive environment where communities could resolve their differences without resulting to violent conflict. Reconciliation forums were facilitated through community-based organization such as Women Solidarity Organization (SWSO). Awareness campaigns and amnesties to militias were used to encourage people to turn up their weapons to the government thus making communities much safer.

4.1.3 Post-conflict Recovery and Reconstruction

Post-conflict recovery and reconstruction is key to preventing conflict recurrence and critical toward achieving sustainable peace. If no well-managed, international actors may subsume the role of local population. This is a potential source of problem because local population is ultimately responsible for sustenance of peace effort. It is therefore very critical for the international actors to enhance capacities and commitment of the host national government and civil society, to sustain the process.

International actors are required to reach out to local organizations for partnership in reconstruction efforts. Reconstruction entails restoring functional components of society such as restoring internal security, re-establishing administrative and governance repairing and rebuilding damaged physical infrastructure, financial infrastructures, establishing a credible and functioning judicial system and ensuring social well-being (Anderlini & El-Bushra, 2004). Peacekeepers perform a critical role in establishing conducive environment where other partners such as IGOs, NGOs and LNGOs can successfully run their development support programs.

4.1.3.1 Restoring Internal Security

The study sought to evaluate CIMIC measures that have been employed in Kismayo District to restore internal security. Respondents were asked to explain their perception on the state of security in the district. At focus group discussion participants were emphatic that the security situation had greatly improved since deployment of AMISOM in 2011. A resident of Yontoy explained, how militia groups were fighting for the control of Kismayo town. They said that a week could hardly pass without major fighting within

the precincts of the town. Residents of Kismayo town explained, how arrests were being made by militias and the victims were summarily executed or had their limbs chopped off. Skjelderup (2020) similarly noted that Al-Shabaab had established a system of extorting locals of money, weapons and local materials such as food and livestock. He further noted that local youths were being conscripted in the ranks of Al-shabaab. These statement shows that prior to AMISOM deploying in Kismayo, anarchy reigned in the district.

When asked to comment on the current security status, khat traders said that the security had really improved, since there was no more extortion by thugs as before. They said their businesses had started recording profits.

AMISOM Police Newsletter (2018) reported that AMISOM Police had refurbished and constructed new police stations in Jubaland to help bring policing services closer to the people. It further reported that AMISOM Police had engagement meetings in Kismayo to educate police and residents on the importance of securing neighborhoods and community policing. In addition, three military garrisons were established within the district. Kismayo prison department was refurbished and operationalized. This shows security had improved in the town.

The study also found out that the economy in the district was booming, an indication that there was a stable security that was encouraging investors to come back and establish new businesses. The same was observed by Peace Direct report (2019) which noted that Kismayo enjoyed higher levels of stability than other areas of Somalia. Respondents explained that members of the community frequently collaborated with security

institutions in sharing information that assisted in controlling outbreaks of violence. Furthermore, it was observed that police checkpoints were mounted along all major roads and within Kismayo. Key community elders were on standby to resolve issues as they arise, they were being used by the police to provide facts that would support the peaceful resolution of dispute. Nasir & Khalif (2016) also noted in agreement that Jubaland Intelligence Agency (JISA) and security in Kismayo had acquired capacity to limit criminality in the area. He was emphatic that they had thwarted countless schemes by Al-Shabaab to attack targets within Jubaland.

Skjelderup (2020) acknowledged that Kismayo local administration, with military support from AMISOM was providing adequate security for the population making it possible for him, a non-Somali conduct ground research. AMISOM contingent commander explained that the community around that area had a community watch team that monitored the environment and through their local leaders, they volunteered information of suspicious people amongst them. He was emphatic that this cooperation had denied Al-Shabaab opportunity to lay any IED in that area.

4.1.3.2 Establishing Administration and Governance.

Reliefweb report (2002) noted that Somalia was in dire need of an efficient public administration, effective representative institutions, vibrant civil society and private sector. The report was emphatic that without these fundamental pillars, good governance in Somalia was a mirage. Brinkerhoff (2005) argued that communal institutions play a critical role in reconstructing a post conflict state. Pouligny (2005) posits that

complementarity and coordination between state organs and communal institutions forms the foundation of post- conflict state building.

This study sought to evaluate efforts employed by peace actors in establishing administration and governance in Kismayo District. Respondents were asked tick on the corresponding figures showing the extent to which they agreed /disagreed with written statements. (1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4= Agree, 5=strongly agree).

The results are as presented in table 8.

Table 4.6: Efforts by Peace Actors in Establishing Administration and Governance in Kismayo.

N=136	1	2	3	4	5
Peace actors AMISOM included are focused and committed to mentor, train and develop Jubaland Leadership to establish effective and efficient public administration (security, law and order, education, health).	0%	6 (4.41%)	1 (0.74%)	30 (22.06%)	80 (58.82%)
Peace actors AMISOM included are assisting Jubaland Leadership establish effective representative institutions.	3 (2.21%)	5 (3.68%)	8 (5.88%)	70 (54.47%)	50 (36.76%)
Peace actors AMISOM included are supporting establishment of vibrant civil society that holds leaders to account.	0%	6 (4.41%)	40 (29.41%)	60 (44.11%)	30 (22.06%)
Peace actors AMISOM included are supporting establishment of vibrant private sector that will grow and sustain Jubaland economy.	2 (1.47%)	4 (2.94%)	6 (4.41%)	66 (48.53%)	58 (42.65%)

Source: Researcher, 2021

From table above majority (58.82%) strongly agreed that Peace actors were focused and committed to mentor, train and develop Jubaland Leadership capacity. 22.06% agreed while 0.74% were neutral about the statement. This was in line with Report of the AU Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia 2013, where he emphasized that, “AMISOM will continue to maintain a robust posture, with the required multipliers and enablers, in order to facilitate the recovery of the areas that are still under the control of Al-Shabaab; establish special training teams to enhance the capacity of

Somalia’s national defense and public safety institutions and enhance its civilian capacity to support the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to restore effective governance, promote reconciliation, human rights and rule of law and ensure service delivery in the recovered areas.” During hand over of Dalhis Police Station in Farjano, Kismayo by AMISOM, one resident said, “It is historic that a police station which was operating under a tree, now has a roof with fully functional offices,” In an interview, one AMISOM Commanding Officer said, "we have been dispatching our patrols with medical personnel so that they could treat locals wherever they are patrolling. This has created good working relationship of AMISOM and the locals." Abdinur & Gebre (2017) in their study on governance in Puntland found that there were low judicial system ability and inefficient police force. This indicates that peace actors were seized to the mandate of making Jubaland progress better than other areas.

On the question of establishing effective representative institutions in Jubaland, majority of the respondents (54.47%) agreed that peace actors were assisting Jubaland to achieve this. 36.76% strongly agreed 5.88% were neutral, 3.68% disagreed and 2.21% strongly disagreed. Saferworld (2016) reported that progress had been made including all political

stakeholders into the Jubaland administration. Similarly, Abdinur & Gebre (2017), found that Puntland institutions had high levels of equity and participation from all groups. This was an indication that Federal States across Somalia were embracing inclusivity in their administration.

On whether peace actors were supporting establishment of vibrant civil society that holds Jubaland leaders to account, 44.11% of the respondents agreed and 22.06% strongly agreed that this was happening. 29.41% were neutral and 4.41% disagreed. Mohammed (2021) had similar observation when he noted that there were active and more vibrant civil society actors running, research institutes, universities and civil societies platforms established for unifying civil societies' voices, advocating in national agendas and decision-making processes. He further noted that there was a challenge in creating issue-based civil society associations and networks due to clan-based politics interferences. This finding is also affirmed by Peace Direct (2018) report that indicated that it was building capacity for women in Kismayo to be peace advocates in their communities. A civil society manager in Kismayo was quoted in Saferworld (2018) report saying "Traditionally, clan elders have been the core of civil society in Somalia. They have been mediators between society and authorities in the social and political spheres of Somali society." Abdifatah (2018) argued that civil society in Somalia support Peace-building process through facilitation, conflict resolution, advocacy, protection, human rights, conducting awareness campaigns for promoting peace culture and service provision. If this is true, then it can be argued that civil societies drive decision making in Jubaland. This is so because they are consulted by the administration on key issues affecting the

administration. Peace actors play a role in strengthening civil societies by creating conducive conditions for them to carry out their work.

On the question as to whether peace actors were supporting establishment of vibrant private sector capable of growing and sustaining Jubaland economy, 42.65% of the respondents strongly agreed, 48.53% agreed, 4.41% were neutral while 2.94% disagreed and 1.47% strongly disagreed. It was observed that privately owned businesses were booming in Kismayo town and its environs. Similar observation was recorded by Mohamed, Isak & Roble (2019) when they noted that, private sector greatly contributed to Somalia economy in providing job opportunities, labor force and was a key source of livelihood to many households. Additionally, it facilitated trade, contributed to economic recovery was a source of revenue at subnational and national. Telecommunication, electricity, money transfer services and public transportation was being driven by private individuals. This can be due to the security and political stability that peace actors had played a critical role to create.

4.1.3.3 Repairing and Rebuilding Damaged Infrastructure.

Kismayo Strategic Development Framework, report of 2019 indicated that conditions of basic infrastructure are very poor in general. Kismayo port was reported to be in chronic disrepair making 80% of port facilities are non-operational. Energy access such as electricity, biomass and fuels were reported to be severely limited for most of the population.

This study sought information on efforts employed by peace actors in repairing and rebuilding damaged infrastructure in Kismayo District. Respondents were asked to rank

on a scale of five points the improvement they had witnessed on basic infrastructure. (1= No improvement at all, 2= A little bit of improvement, 3=some sense of improvement, 4= Quite a bit of improvement, 5= Tremendous improvement). The responses are as presented in table 5.7.

Table 4.7: Level of Infrastructural Improvement in Kismayo.

N=136	1	2	3	4	5
Physical infrastructure	0%	3(2.20%)	18(13.24%)	102(75%)	13(9.56%)
Financial infrastructures	0%	4(2.94%)	12(8.82%)	76(55.88%)	44(32.35%)
Telecommunication infrastructure	0%	0%	2(1.47%)	30(22.06%)	104(76.47%)

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the data presented in table 4.7, majority of the respondents were emphatic that their general improvement of all forms of infrastructure. 9.56% reported that they had seen tremendous improvement, 75% quite a bit of improvement, 13.24% some sense of improvement and 2.20% a little bit of improvement. Nobody reported that there was no improvement at all on physical infrastructure.

Mohamed, Isak & Roble (2019) similarly noted that federal states and Federal Government were continuously getting new yearly investment which had increased the construction of roads, Airports, Ports and Markets in unexpected way. In an interview with Officer commanding AMISOM contingent protecting Kismayo Sea Port had this to say, “this port has seen tremendous increase in cargo handling. Every week there is a new cargo ship docking here. The warehouses that were damaged has been repaired.”

Reliefweb news on 7 Oct 2019 quoted AMISOM contingent commander verbatim, “One of the tasks of AMISOM is to open main supply routes. We have a stretch between Dhobley all the way to Kismayo which is important to the movement of people and goods, particularly in the Federal Member State of Jubaland.” By the time of this field research all main roads leading to Kismayo from Jamaame, Jilib, Afmadhow and Hola Wajeer had been opened by AMISOM. The study also established that 32km of roads within Kismayo town were paved through using World Bank support. Kismayo New airport under the protection of AMISOM had been refurbished. Movement of people and goods had become easier.

Education sector was not left behind. According to Kismayo Urban Profile report by UN habitat (2020), institutions such as Kismayo University, Jubaland University, Plasma University, and Daha University had resumed teaching and had estimated 1,200 students. Primary and secondary schools were operational too. Kismayo General Hospital was also refurbished and was operational. Other private hospitals had come up in the town too.

Wesco and Somtel private power generators had increased generation and customer base. It was estimated that they had a combine production of 2,400kW serving a customer base of about 12,500 (ibid).

On financial infrastructure, Mohamed, Isak & Roble (2019) asserted that Somalia had been without formal financial institutions and commercial banking sector since 1991. Respondents were asked whether this had improved, 32.35% of the respondents reported tremendous improvements, 55.88% reported quite a bit of improvement, 8.82% said there was some sense of improvement and 2.94% a little bit of improvement. No respondent

reported zero improvement. Similar findings were recorded by Mohamed, Isak & Roble (2019) who noted that Somalia financial sector had improved gradually over years. They further noted that local private banks had established micro investment department that provided loans and grants to encourage local entrepreneurs thus creating jobs for the educated youth. In 2008, a multinational money transfer and banking company Dahabshiil, acquired a majority stake in Somtel which gave it the necessary platform for expansion into a regional mobile banking sector that eased sending and receiving money in and out of Somalia hence contributing to economic growth (ibid).

On telecommunication infrastructure, Abdinasir, & Sarah (2010) noted that the civil war in Somalia had destroyed this sector completely. Respondents were asked whether this had improved in the recent past. 76.47% of them reported that the sector had seen tremendous improvement, 22.06% quite a bit of improvement and 1.47% some sense of improvement.

Mohamed, Isak & Roble (2019) corroborates this finding in their research that found out that in 2006, the sector grew by 15.6%. UN Habitat (2020) reported that Kismayo was served by multiple internet service providers led by Hormuud, Somtel, Global, Tayocom and Nation Link. The report further stated that there were many local radio stations such as Radio Kismayo, Radio Soyal, Radio Bur-kulan, Radio Star Fm, Radio Waamo and Radio Golis sport radio that covered Kismayo and its environs.

As Quetzalli & Gustavo (2013) argued, culture is indispensable in the process of human development. They further asserted that culture provide a common linkage of individual personalities with the community. Such individual's beliefs, values, attitudes and

identities are shaped by the culture of their communities. The Somali community has a strong culture that is expressed predominantly orally through music, poetry and storytelling. Other forms of expression include dancing, dressing and craft. To draw the youth towards their course, Al-Shabaab had to destroy all platforms that the youth could use to express culture. This created an identity crisis amongst the youth which made them vulnerable to radicalization. To reverse the effect of radicalization, peacebuilders in Somalia, interveners had re-established platforms where the young generation could express themselves culturally. Peace actors has taken advantage of tele-communication growth where they use tools such as AMISOM Radio-In-A-Box (RIAB), which enhances reach to a wider audience. This critical in countering Al-Shabaab propoganda thus improving prospects of peace.

4.1.3.4 Establishing a Credible and Functioning Judicial System

Nisar & Khalif (2021) notes that traditionally, Somalis depended on customary law of Xeer and sharia ‘a. This is an elaborate traditional justice system which recognized by the majority and whose adjudication in respected by almost all members of the community. Cases brought to them are expedited and the decision arrived at is bidding. However, the Siad Barre regime had subjugated this important institution. Following the collapse of that regime in 1991, Xeer and sharia ‘a resumed their traditional position.

This study sought to establish the developments that had taken place in Jubaland judicial system. Respondents were asked whether the judicial system Kismayo District was functioning and if it was credible. They responded as shown in figures 4.23 and 4.24.




Figure 4.23: Functional ability of the Judicial System.

Figure 4.24: Credibility of Judicial System

Source: Researcher, 2021

Analysis of data presented in figure 4.23, it shows that 95% of the respondents said that the judicial system was functioning and 5% said it was not. Out of those who said it was functioning, 95% said that that the system was delivering credible justice while 5% said that it was not credible as shown in figure 5.24. Nisar & Khalif (2021) had similar findings where he noted that the wider security environment and judge’s credibility in the

Kismayo had enabled hearing of many cases in the district courts. They further suggested that a credible rule of law was being applied under the Jubaland government. However, they noted that the police service was a weak link within the wider justice environment most probably because of lack of training or due clan dynamics that interfered with their duties. Saferworld (2016) noted that the Xeer judicial system may not be 100% credible due to the propensity of elders to be financially manipulated. It further noted that the collective nature of accountability in Somalia as opposed to individual, posed difficulty in enforcing decisions to the fullest extent resulting to unfairness and inequality in its decisions.

AMISOM and other peace actors was noted to have played a great role of building the police capacity to deliver credible justice. They also facilitated meetings where elders of conflicting groups had met and resolved their differences.

4.1.3.5 Ensuring Social Well-Being.

Corey (1998) proposed that social well-being have five dimensions of, social integration, social cohesion, social contribution, social acceptance and social actualization. Lack of social well-being in a community leads to tensions that if not well managed lead to conflicts.

4.1.3.5.1 Social Integration

Social integration is evaluated by looking into the quality of one's relationship with the community or society. There are instances one feels that the society does not reflect one's values and lifestyle (Seeman, 1991). This leads to social isolation of individual that makes them vulnerable to radicalization by terrorist groups.

To evaluate the level of social integration of individuals, respondents were required to state whether they were allowed to participate in political processes and in decision making. The results were based on three level of Not at all=1, somewhat=2 and to a great extent=3. Results are as shown in table 4.8.

Table 4.8: Measure of Social Integration

N=100 ordinary residents of Kismayo		1	2	3
Social integration	Are you allowed to participate in political processes and in decision-making?	20%	40%	40%

Source: Researcher, 2021

An analysis of data in table 4.8 shows that 40% of the respondents said that they are somewhat allowed to participate in political processes and in decision-making. 40% said that they are allowed to a great extent. This shows that majority of the residents feels integrated in the Jubaland political process which may lead to increased patriotism towards the state. These sentiments were confirmed by one elected official in an interview, He said, “the people’s participation have increased from 1 to 51 delegates electing the leader of their choice.” It was also noted that there were deliberate efforts to increase community participation in decision making through platforms such as Somalia Women’s Solidarity Organisation (SWSO) and Somali Women’s Studies Centre (SWSC). This platform affords women and youth opportunities to air their views which are subsequently aggregated and escalated to influence governance decisions.

A significant number of respondents (20%) felt that they were not allowed to participate in political processes and in decision-making at all. One interviewee had this to say “I feel that I don’t participate in elections of our leaders because those delegates who are purportedly representing us are there to push their interest. They are manipulated by powerful people at the expense of their people. I would feel fully represented if it is was a one-person, one-vote election”.

Asked what the role of external stakeholders was in ensuring that the population’s perceived integrated in political processes and in decision-making, one AMISOM police said that they were building the capacity of the Somali police and the individuals so that they provide and secure the lives of the people of Somalia. It was also found that AMISOM and other actors assisted in securing the electoral process in 2016 and 2019 to ensure it was free, fair and credible.

4.1.3.5.2 Social Cohesion

According to Agha Khan Foundation Social cohesion is defined as trust and cooperation in society. It further states that social cohesion is essential in tackling the underlying issues that can increase the risk of fragility and conflict. It is evaluated by the ability of an individual’s ability to care about the world they live in. Antvosky (1994) posits that coherence gives one resilience which faced by an unpredictable or traumatic life experience.

To evaluate the level of social cohesion, respondents were asked to rate their feeling while interacting with people in the community. Three levels of I do not feel comfortable at all.

=1, somewhat feel comfortable=2 and feel more comfortable=3 was used, and the results are as shown in table 4.9.

Table 4.9: Measure of Social Cohesion

N=100 ordinary residents of Kismayo		1	2	3
Social cohesion	I trust and feel comfortable with other people in the society	1%	13%	86%

Source: Research Data (2021).

According to data presented in table 4.9, majority (86%) of the respondents said they felt more comfortable while with other people in the society. 13% said they somewhat felt comfortable and 1% felt uncomfortable. This showed that the level of trust amongst the people was high which a good indicator of sustainable peace is. The study found out that peace actors were developing and executing community arts and cultural programs and events were fostering opportunities for community bonding. For instance, AMISOM CIMIC function in various operating bases were organizing youth sports activities that brought different people together. Further, AMISOM CIMIC community-based development programs such as rehabilitation of hospitals, schools, mosques, markets and police stations also were bringing the people together hence contributing to cohesion of Kismayo communities. A coherent community in Kismayo had brought about conflict resilience thus making peace in the district sustainable.

4.1.3.5.3 Social Contribution

Social contribution is evaluated by the sense of responsibility of an individual in contributing to the common good of the society. Individuals and groups support society by playing part in community development and in creating a prosperous living environment. Another example is when elders mentor the youth to be productive members of the society (Ericson, 1950).

To evaluate the level of social contribution, respondents were asked to state role they had played to make their neighborhood peaceful, secure and safe. Three scales of No role=1, somewhat played a role=2 and played a great role=3 was used. Results are as recorded in table 5.10.

Table 4.10: Measure of Social Contribution

N=100 ordinary residents of Kismayo		1	2	3
Social Contribution	What role have you played in making your neighborhood peaceful, secure and safe?	0%	11%	89%

Source: Researcher, 2021

Analysis of data in table 4.10 showed that everyone had played a role in making their neighborhood peaceful, secure and safe. 83% of the respondents had played a great role and the rest 11% had somewhat played a role. Peace Direct report (2019) had similar observations. They noted that local associations such as women's and youth groups were playing an extremely important Peace-building role in Kismayo. They form community

bulwark to conflict escalation. They are primary actors in developing local conflict resolution mechanisms. They are used by the community as an assurance of trust during dispute resolution processes. AMISOM CIMIC partners with these local groups in peacebuilding. This plays part in helping them spend more time together thus more growth and more output in terms of peacebuilding. These groups afford a wider reach to the community, and this explains why every person in the community feels that they have contributed to the peace, security and safety efforts.

4.1.3.5.4 Social Acceptance

Social acceptance is evaluated by the ability of an individual to feel comfortable with other people in the society (Horney, 1945).

To evaluate the level of social acceptance, respondents were asked to state what they felt about demobilized, disarmed and reintegrated ex-militiamen. A scale of two levels was used. I feel vengeful=1 and I have fully forgiven them=2. The results are as presented in table 4.11.

Table 2.11: Measure of Social Acceptance

N=100 ordinary residents of Kismayo		1	2
Social acceptance	How do feel about demobilized, disarmed and reintegrated ex-militiamen?	52%	48%

Source: Research Data (2021)

Table 4.11 shows that 52% of the respondents were feeling vengeful about demobilized, disarmed and reintegrated ex-militiamen. This means that more than half of the population in Kismayo have not healed from the atrocities meted upon them by the militias particularly Al-Shabaab. Similarly, Vanda, F. (2018) noted that most Somalia residents particularly those who experienced Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks had never forgiven them, and they often applauded extremely punitive measures against them.

This may be so because reconciliation amongst the Somali community has been ignored in the peace processes (Gundel, 2018). Power-sharing arrangements have been emphasized at the expense of grievances and interests of the population (ibid). He holds that the sporadic violence in many regions in the Somalia reflects historical feuds and grievances that still need to be resolved. He avers that Somalia reconciliation process should be preceded by bringing Somalis together to determine the best way key underlying issues are to be addressed, which may involve forgiveness or truth and justice. Keating & Waldman (2018) noted that previous reconciliation efforts were top-down where the state took lead. This top-down reconciliation approach has not brought any tangible results in Somalia. They further noted that a different approach of bottom-up reconciliation resulted relative peace, stable politics and clan-based administrations in regions like Somaliland and Puntland. Gundel (2018) agrees with this bottom-up approach. He suggests that sustainable reconciliation process can be derived from bottom-up, participatory action research (PAR) methodologies to identify grievances and the principles for their resolution. He recommends that the process be established from the ground up, starting at the district, regional then at the national level.

AMISOM CIMIC program through community partnerships have created platforms where community elders, women, youth cultural personalities and academics have been engaging in sustained peace dialogue that is contributing to healing of past wounds with an ultimate aim of creating a reconciled community in Kismayo.

4.1.3.5.5 Social Actualization

Social actualization is the evaluation of the society’s potential and trajectory people with a healthier social well-being are hopeful of the prospects of the society. Slore (1945) suggests that this can be done by evaluating the characters of public officials.

The respondents were required to state whether they agreed or disagreed with statements. Midpoint responses or uncertainties were coded as “don’t know”. The results are as represented in table 4.12.

Table 4.12: Measure of Social Actualization

N=100 ordinary residents of Kismayo		Disagreed	Do not know.	Agreed
Social Actualization	1. Most Jubaland administration officials are interested to serve common person.	6%	14%	80%
	2. Average people in Jubaland are getting worse not better.	92%	7%	1%

Source: Researcher, 2021

Analysis of data in table 4.12 reveals that majority (80%) of the respondents agreed that most Jubaland administration officials were interested to serve common person. This is an improvement to 57% Saferworld (2016) had observed. Services were seen to given to all without discrimination. Most respondents acknowledged that improved security due to AMISOM's relentless operations against Al-Shabaab had allowed extension of government services to remote areas outside Kismayo. One respondent from Bajuni minority community commented, "We have seen a tremendous improvement by Jubaland administration in providing basic services to all residents of Kismayo". Another interviewee was emphatic that quality of education, health, water and sanitation and public services had tremendous improvement courtesy of Jubaland Administration. 14% of the respondents said that they did not know and 6% said they didn't agree that most Jubaland administration officials were interested to serve common person. Most of those who did not agree cited clannism as an impediment to equal service delivery to all.

As for whether average people in Jubaland were getting worse not better, 92% of the respondents disagreed, 7% did not know and 1% agreed. Saferworld (2016) similarly had observed that 57% of lower Jubaland had seen improvement in education, health, water and sanitation, basic infrastructure and general service provision. This could explain why majority of the respondents felt that their lot was getting better and not worse.

CHAPTER FIVE

COMMUNITY CIMIC PARTNERSHIPS USED BY PEACEKEEPERS IN SOMALIA

5.0 Introduction

This chapter covers community level peacebuilding. It explores community institutions that are used as the entry points by external peace actors. The chapter also covers areas of community partnerships. The levels of community participation in various stages of CIMIC peace projects is highlighted in this chapter.

5.1 Community Based Peace Building

Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) posits those states and nations prosper or fail because of manmade political and economic institutions not their state of climate or geography. Drawing from the example of Korea, they point out that South Korea republic is a rich and prosperous country while North Korea republic is very poor despite the two sharing the same climate and geography. They attribute this disparity between the two countries to the divergent political and economic institutions created in those two countries. They note that South Korea's liberal democratic institutions have opened her economy thus making the country prosperous while repressive and undemocratic regime in North Korea has stifled the economy and thus crippled national growth.

Xi (2014) asserts that national security and social stability is the firm foundation upon which prosperous states are built. He further says that this is achieved through raising national security awareness amongst the people through meticulous public education. He identified Community level party, labor and farmers organizations as important

institutions to carry out thorough national security educational work amongst the people. Additionally, he holds that social stability is brought about by promptly solving all conflicts and disputes undermining social unity. Haider (2009) posits that Community-based approaches (CBA) to peacebuilding empowers local community institutions and groups allowing them direct control over peace projects. The basic premise is that communities are better placed to identify what they require to address their problems. Direct control fosters community ownership which contributes to the peace sustainability.

Mohamoud (2006) notes that there have been twelve failed attempts to establish Somalia central government. He referred these as top bottom approaches, where the idea was to first establish the central government then trickle down the administration. He attributes these failures to the fact that these efforts were externally driven where faction leaders, warlords and elites appointed themselves in government. He points that mistrust and lack of public base led to failure of their governments. Netabay (2007) notes that UN in 1993 and IGAD in 2004 tried a quasi-bottom-up approach where the objective was to establish strong regional administrations that will contribute to building a central government. This approach also failed to rebuild Somalia. He proposes adoption of a pure bottom-up approach. This is a comprehensive and community-centered long-term strategy that could bring a lasting peace in divided societies. In Somalia context, it requires empowering local people, raising public awareness, and ensuring representation and participation of all sections of the community in the process. Accessible community institutions like elders, women associations, youth groups, civil society religious groups and business associations play a crucial role in the peace process. This requires developing institutions from the grassroots level and developing capacity for self-government by promoting

equal representation of all communities. These stable units of self-government will form federal governments that will in turn form a central government. He advocates building of peace from within affected societies with an aim of changing local people's hearts and minds so that they work for peace and reconciliation whole-heartedly. Lederach (1997), argues along the same line of thoughts. He proposes that peace actors engage grassroots community institutions in building peace.

5.1.1 Community Based Institutions for Peacebuilding Partnership/Cooperation

Colletta & Cullen (2000) identified four community-based institutions that peacebuilders can partner with while implementing peace projects. They found out that Local leadership was indispensable in securing community peace project success. They defined local leadership as an official, traditional, and informal leader at the local level. These leaders include the communal chief and the local government administration. Traditional leaders are revered for their position in the community and religious or spiritual attributes. They carry influence due to charisma, special skills, or wealth. They are key to partner within peacebuilding because of the critical roles they play in social, religious, welfare and local political activities (ibid).

Civic associations are groups of people that can be from differing kin groups, who come to work together for a common purpose and have a visible identity for instance farmers', youth, widows, traders and more. They are used as vehicles for mutual help, self-help, cooperation and solidarity. Dorrance (2008) pointed out that Civic Associations are more of a political organization whose main goal is neighborhoods improvement through volunteer work by its members. They come in handy for Peace-building partnership due to their clear structures, roles, and rules within which group members operate. (ibid).

Cooperatives are autonomous voluntary association of people that work together for mutual economic, social, or cultural benefits through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise (ibid).

Community Peace-building partnership can also be obtained through Community Based Organizations (CBO). These are organizations that are based on membership that vary in size and focus. The most important part is that CBOs are representative of the community. CBOs may focus on a specific sector such as community water supply, food production, sanitation committees or community development councils. Slaymaker, Christiansen & Hemming (2005) asserts that CBOs can also comprise the local arm of non-governmental organizations.

In Kismayo there are several influential community institutions such as Somali Women Solidarity Organization (SWSO) who have been instrumental in fostering peace dialogue within the district. Local leadership such as Sheikhs, Sultans, Ugas, Nabadoon and senior elders from different clans in Kismayo are also indispensable in the region's peace process. Other useful associations such as civic association and community-based organizations are also good peace project vehicles that can be utilized by peace actors.

The study sought to assess community institutions that were partnering/cooperating with the AMISOM forces in CIMIC peace projects. To achieve this, the study employed a questionnaire with five community institutions requiring respondents to rank their prominence in Kismayo peacebuilding based on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 being the least prominent and being the most prominent. With a response rate of 136 the maximum

composite score was 680. Subsequently, the level of prominence of community institution that were used for AMISOM CIMIC partnering were found to be as shown in table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Summative Score for Level of Prominence of Community Institutions for AMISOM CIMIC Partnership

Community institution	Composite score	Total score	Percentage	Ranking out of 5 points. N=136.				
				1	2	3	4	5
Local leadership	680	566	82.2%	3	6	27	30	70
Community based Organization	680	504	74.1%	8	20	30	24	54
Civic Associations	680	365	53.7%	20	60	20	15	21
Cooperatives	680	292	43%	49	32	43	10	2

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the findings presented in table 5.1, respondents identified local leadership as the most prominent Peace-building community institution in Kismayo scoring it 82.2% of the total composite score. It was followed by Community Based Organization that scored 74.1%, associations scoring 53.7%, civic association 45.7% and Cooperatives 43%. Historically and traditionally, the wellbeing of African communities' rests squarely on the communities' elders. Whenever destructive disputes arise within or without the community, they take responsibility in ensuring that such disputes are resolved before

they escalate causing more damages. The study findings affirm Ibrahim, (2018) argument that clan elders perform a critical role in the intervention of Somalia conflict as insider-partial mediators. She further states that the fact that the elders are familiar with the internal dynamics of the conflict unlike external mediators. The elders' effectiveness is attributed to the trust and respect they command in a community which is drawn from their wealth of experience and altruism towards the community.

Somalia elders regularly convene informal assemblies known as Xeer where issues affecting the community are aired. As Menkhaus (2010) notes, Xeer is a democratic, open and consultative processes employed by the Somali elders in resolving a crisis at hand. The study found out that the Xeer process is the most prominent approach that has been employed by peace builders in Kismayo. The fact that this process is inclusive makes the decision arrived at acceptable to all members of the community. AMISOM has created a conducive situation which has made this process available where and when it is required. This has assisted prompt resolution of all conflicts that undermine people's unity in Kismayo district.

The study found that 74.1% of the respondents reckoned Community based Organization (CBOs) as a prominent peace-building vehicle. Women, youth and trade organizations were cited as critical vehicles for peacebuilding. Respondents averred that women's and youth groups provided a platform where discussions with the administration on issues affecting them. This process was helping in building trust in the government, hence bolstering its legitimacy.

External peace interveners such as AMISOM suggested that they use such associations in managing peace projects. They affirmed that these associations provide them with structures that guarantee sustainability of the peace projects. Further, they said that CBOs provided means of disseminating peace messages to the larger community. This was in line with Zaalberg (2006) findings in Afghanistan where NATO troops relied on information garnered from personal contacts with locals and civilian organizations to preempt a crisis. During focus group discussion, residents highlighted that CBOs were providing them with forums for relationship building and restoration of trust amongst different personalities hence bringing about social cohesion. They also said that when engaging in group activities, they get opportunities for socializing which helped them in post-traumatic healing.

The study found that 53.7% of the respondents identified civil associations as prominent in peacebuilding CIMIC partnership. During interviews civil societies participants highlighted that they were assisting in mediating between communities in conflict. They were also protecting citizens' lives through helping in disarming militias, providing early warning for impending conflicts thus facilitating early intervention. Further, they were helping different groups in advocating for their rights, monitoring and reporting on violations. Paffeholz (2010) argued, that direct provision of services to citizens is an important activity of civil society associations, especially in cases where the state is weak. The study found that there were civil organizations such as Jubaland Development Organization that were engaged in filling the gaps left by the Jubaland administration in terms of basic service provision. This had assisted in establishing social stability hence bringing peace in the district.

The study found that cooperatives were not prominent in peacebuilding CIMIC partnership. Participants scored it at 43%. This could be attributed to the fact that the business environment had not matured enough to create an environment for cooperatives formations, owing to lack of strong structures to support the same.

5.1.2 Types of Community Partnership in CIMIC Peace Projects.

Haider (2009) suggests that community-based approach is adaptable and can be used to achieve various development outcomes. She notes that this approach is best suited in transforming conflictual to peaceful relationships. Further, she holds that community partnership is a perfect vehicle to effect service delivery to conflict affected communities. For instance, peace actors can use this approach to assist communities build amenities such as schools, dispensaries, worship areas and water sources. Good governance can also be achieved through this approach when communities are empowered to hold their leaders to account of their actions.

This study found that peace actors were relying on this approach in enhancing security. The security actors were found to be relying on the community in provision of intelligence. Local elders were being used to vet potential recruits into the security forces. They were also providing information on presence of UXOs, mines and illegal weapons.

Peace actors in Somalia has also adopted community-based approaches in achieving socio-economic recovery. Local government, IGOs and NGOs have partnered with the communities to provide for services such as education, health, worship areas, water sources, livelihoods generation, infrastructure protection and rehabilitation. This

approach also brings different factions on a cooperation forum hence promoting understanding, integration and reconciliatory amongst different groups of people.

Community partnership has provided AMISOM and other peace actors with far reaching communication media through which civic education seeking to promote dialogue and debate on key issues in society is disseminated. Peace actors are utilizing revered clan elders in dispensing traditional justice and pushing for reconciliation.

5.1.3 Community Participation in CIMIC Peace Projects

The study sought to establish if the peace building projects in Kismayo were anchored on the community demand for peace or they were imposed on them by peace interveners.

Respondent were required to tick on the corresponding figures showing their perception on the extent of community participation in various stages of AMISOM CIMIC Peace-building projects. (1= No participation at all, 2= A little bit of participation, 3=some sense of participation, 4= Quite a bit of participation, 5= Strong participation). The response was as presented in table 6.2.

Table 5.2: Community Participation in AMISOM CIMIC Peace Projects

N=136	Ranking in perception	1	2	3	4	5	Compo site score	Score	Percentag e score
CIMIC project stage	Initiation	4	7	14	51	60	680	564	82.94%
	Planning	2	4	12	57	61	680	579	85.15%
	Execution	1	2	15	47	71	680	591	86.91%
	Sustainanc e/running	1	1	17	37	79	680	597	87.79%

Source: Researcher, 2021

From the findings recorded in table 5.2, 82.94% of the respondents said that the local communities were being involved in peace project initiation process. This is an indication that peace actors were cognizant to the fact that consulting with the local communities was very critical to the project acceptability. Iman (2017) had similar findings in Mogadishu when he observed that majority of residents were participating in peacebuilding. 85.15% of the respondents indicated that residents were participating in peace project planning. Marie (1996) posited that any project involving a community is sensitive and required that planners carefully analyze communities, adopt supportive approach. He noted that directing or patronizing them would lead to project failure. For peace building projects outside actors must involve the local population in planning to make them feel part of the process. This is important in fostering local ownership that leads to peace sustainability. 86.91% of the respondents said that the local community was involved in peace project execution. Similar finding was recorded by Iman (2017). He noted that the population of Mogadishu were taking it upon themselves to dismantle illegal roadblocks erected by militias. Relief web (2020) reported that community-based intervention was critical in Somalia peacebuilding because it was helping in strengthening social cohesion and enhancing peaceful coexistence amongst local communities. This explains why the local communities were wholeheartedly participating in peace projects since they had realized it was part and parcel of their wellbeing. It also indicates that these peace projects resonated well with the community's recovery needs. This explains why 87.79% of the respondents said that were engaged in running peace project. The goal of AMISOM CIMIC projects is to create sustainable peace in Kismayo. To achieve this the local community must be allowed to be the core of the peace projects, so that eventually when AMISOM completes drawdown the community will

continue sustaining the peace. Communities participate in peace projects through provision of labour services and provision of materials such as construction bricks. They also contribute to designing and planning of peace projects.

CHAPTER SIX

OUTCOMES OF AMISOM CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION IN PEACE BUILDING

6.0 Introduction

This chapter presents outcomes of AMISOM CIMIC Peace-building programs. It covers governance, security sector social economic and physical infrastructure improvement that have been realized in Kismayo. Challenges faced by peace actors while executing AMISOM CIMIC program has been identified in the chapter as insecurity, clan dynamics, peace spoilers, inadequate finances and doctrinal differences by troops contributing countries.

6.1 Outcomes of AMISOM CIMIC Programs

UN Secretary Boutros Ghali in his submission to the Security Council in 1992, argued that Peace-keeping operations to be successful, comprehensive efforts should be employed to identify and support structures which consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being of the affected people. AMISOM peacekeepers mandate's overarching objective is to establish sustainable peace in Somalia by developing and implementing peace programs that seeks to address the causes of conflict. Conflicts destroys confidence among conflicting groups. Peace actors in Somalia have instituted measures to assist rebuild confidence and good faith among conflicting groups thus reducing the likelihood of conflict. AMISOM CIMIC has created a secure environment which has enabled institutions like clan elders to embrace dialogue, negotiations and mediation in addressing their differences. This interclan communication channel has

enhanced confidence building amongst clans. This has reduced incidences of violent conflicts in Kismayo. Clan meeting or local community-based organization meetings provide peace actors with facts about the conflict situation, hence enabling them to take preventive steps such as preventive deployment of troops in hotspots or dispatching elders to engage in preventive diplomacy. Zaalberg, (2006) notes that peacekeepers in Kosovo laid great emphasis on supporting the establishment of an interim administration and on maximizing the IGO and NGO capability. In Somalia, this emphasis is still there but with a bottom-up approach. Peace actors are assisting local administration to regain control with the hope that this situation will create condition for establishment of a strong central government. He further argues that cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace. This has proven to be working in Somalia. Peace actors are bringing communities together by having them participating in project that are of mutual benefit to them. For instance, rehabilitating a school or a mosque brings communities together. This has contributed to building confidence amongst the communities and reducing hostile perceptions thus contributing to peace.

Hans-Jürgen (2012) posits that CIMIC enhances liaison, support and coordination between military and civil actors. This study found out that AMISOM CIMIC functions had assisted in developing communication channels between the military and civilian peace actors. This communication had fostered close working ties that have enabled this peace intervention to achieve its objectives of bringing peace to Kismayo.

Lack of governance is the major cause of insecurity in Somali. Borrowing from the Afghanistan model, the study found that AMISOM was decentralizing CIMIC activities up to Company operating bases. This has facilitated in extending the influence of the local government outside the Kismayo and provide secure environment for humanitarian agencies to operate. Seth (2008) advocates for peace actors to improve indigenous governance. He points out that professionalizing the security sector assists in strengthening governance and boosting local government's legitimacy. AMISOM CIMIC has assisted Jubaland Administration to consolidate authority in areas that were previously controlled by Al-Shabaab. Professionalized Jubaland Security forces have regained main centers such as Bulagadud to the North of Kismayo, Abdale Birolle to the West and Kuday to the South. Additionally, the security function has provided safe and secure environment within the district making it easier for civil servants to take services closer to the people. This has assisted in building trust and confident of the government amongst the people to the disadvantage of Al-Shabaab who employ propaganda to alienate the locals.

Professionalized Jubaland Security agents have the capacity to dominate major roads by constant surveying, patrolling and clearing, the security actors have reduced IED incidences along the main roads thus reducing the numbers of civilian casualties by IED attacks. In conjunction with the local population, the security functions have been able to adequately address the threat posed by mines and unexploded remnants of war hence increasing population safety. The assured secure and safe environment has emboldened the locals to increase their income generating activities. Improved economic and social situation of residents of Kismayu has made it difficult for Al-shabaab to regain roots. This

is because the local administration has portrayed to them its ability to guarantee basic services of security and justice, lack of which was being used by terror gangs to alienate the population.

The secure environment in Kismayu has enabled health providers to resume their services. Kismayo General Hospital is the main health facility in the city. Augmented by other NGO and IGO health providers, residents have adequate access to emergency and general health services. Stable source of livelihood has facilitated improved nutrition amongst the population. Child mortality has also reduced due to the accessibility of health services. Consequently, the population of Kismayo has increased. This is confirmed by Reliefweb (2016) reported 20% of the population in Kismayu were under the age of 5 years.

UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali on 17 June 1992 urged the peacebuilders to the prioritize rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife. AMISOM in conjunction with other peace actors have been providing technical and logistical support for reconstruction of basic infrastructure. Consequently, damaged villages and other amenities (schools, mosques, and hospitals) have been restored. Water and sanitation facilities have been restored too making the population healthier.

By creating an environment where local population can freely interact, peace actors have assisted in social integration, social cohesion, social contribution, social acceptance and social actualization of individuals within the Kismayo community. This has improved social well-being in the community which in turn has reduced tensions that otherwise would lead to conflicts. This has made the population in Kismayo more conflict resilient and thus peaceful.

Peace actors has provided necessary assistance JSF to manage the law enforcement function. Justice and corrections institutions have been rebuilt and operationalized. This has improved the rule of law within the district. They have also supported two elections that has seen increased participation and equitable representation of the people. This has increased legitimacy of the Jubaland Administration making it more effective in delivering its mandate.

Amnesty and DDR programs have reduced number of armed combatants amongst civilians, reduced the number of weapons in the hands of civilians hence limiting chances of minor disputes escalation to violent conflicts. Leveraging on the revered clan elder's institution to negotiate, foster dialogue and reconcile conflicting groups have resulted to pacific resolution of conflicts hence making the district more peaceful than most of other areas in Somalia.

6.2 Challenges Faced By AMISOM CIMIC Program.

This study sought to establish the challenges being faced by AMISOM while executing CIMIC programs. Respondents were asked to rank identified challenges of a scale of five levels. The results are as presented on figure 6.1.




Figure 6.1: Challenges Faced by AMISOM CIMIC Programs

Source: Researcher, 2021

As shown on figure 6.1, majority (84.47%) of the respondents said that Al-shabaab terror group was the main threat that faced AMISOM CIMIC programs. After the group lost most of the towns, it retreated in the rural areas and melted back into their clan militias. This makes it extremely difficult for the security agents to identify and target them. From this hide outs they have been able to carry out attacks on civilians to discredit the government. They have also targeted JSF and AMISOM with IEDs and suicide bombers within Kismayo. Reliefweb (2020, April 22) reported that between 2015 and 2016, 83% rise of civilian harm from Al-Shabaab attacks were recorded. It further reported that in 2018 and 2019, data showed that al-Shabaab were responsible for 83% of all civilian casualties in Somalia of which 94% were because of IED attacks. Throughout 2018 and into 2019 the group has demonstrated its capability of launching deadly and sophisticated attacks and remains a potent threat in Somalia and Kenya (Hilary, 2019). Voice of America (2014, December 3) reported that the group were resilient to concerted attacks by Somalia security forces and AMISOM. It noted that the group had demonstrated

capacity to regroup following setbacks, and adaptation to shifting circumstances. This statement clearly indicates that the threat of the groups to Somalia peace project is still high.

Politicians, businessmen and clan elders were pointed out by 77.21% of the participants as a challenge for AMISOM peace projects. Menkhaus (2006) has pointed similar observation when he posited that Somalia state building is a conflict producing exercise because most Somalia political actors view state control through a zero-sum lens. He identifies clannism as the main push for this view especially in Southern Somalia where the major clans are seen as occupiers of minor clans' territories. Many Somalia businessmen who have been thriving in a war economy feel threatened by Peace-building efforts thus they employ every effort to undermine it. Peace Direct (2019) has pointed out that to access to economic resources both inside and outside formal institutions in Kismayo is determined by how a group or an individual relates with the majority clans. They further pointed out that security and law enforcement agencies were largely majority clans who marginalize the minor clans who in turn seek alternative means to address their grievances. Such alternative means are seen as a threat by the ruling clans who embark on suppressing missions that leads to more conflicts.

Franke (2006) posits that effective CIMIC must navigate fragile political context carefully with an aim at creating acceptable, legitimate, representative, just, and stable institutions that bring about sustainable peace. The Politics of Kismayo are anchored on clan identity. Indulging in this politics, a peace actor may alienate may politically marginalized clans. When trying to win the hearts and minds of the local populace, they may place unrealistic

expectations to the peacekeepers (Egnell, 2010). This brings strain between the peacekeeper and the local population whenever such expectations are not met.

Doctrinal differences and competing interests amongst Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) was seen as a challenge to Kismayo peace projects by 72.65% of the respondents. In Kismayo, AMISOM Kenyan, Ethiopian and Burundi contingents. All these contingents were training and mentoring different groups of JSF using different doctrines of the three contingents, the trained personnel were having contradictions in their work environment. The Africa report (2019, August 23) reported manifestation of conflict of interests between Kenyan contingent and Ethiopian contingent in Kismayo. It reported that Ethiopia was seeking to deploy troops in Kismayo Airport which Kenya denied. Similar observations were recorded by Zaalberg (2006) who noted that peacekeeping operations are affected by differences in national approaches towards civil-military cooperation between national contingents. He noted that troops' actions in Kosovo were heavily influenced by their pursuit of their own national interest. Such feuds diminish synergy of efforts of these major peace actors in combating real threats to peace such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Peace actors are drawn from different cultural and perception backgrounds. Minear et al. (2000) observed that these cultural differences contribute to negative perceptions of other and discrepant mutual expectations amongst peace actors. This study revealed that there were reservations amongst the local population in engaging with foreign peace actors. Some of the population felt that peace actors were out to change their revered way of lives. The Civilian components felt that the military were rigid in conduct of their business. The military and civilian priorities of activities were not in sync. These tensions

were contributing to slow pace of activities that could have hastened the peace process. Somalia culture is expressed through language. Foreign peace actors rely on interpreters familiar with local customs while passing information. This has a challenge when the interpreters translate the message to suit certain personal views hence misrepresenting the peace actors.

Limited funding and insufficient logistics were identified by 51.76% of the respondents as an impediment to peace projects in Kismayo. Gary & Gielie (2007) similarly observed that African Union (AU) was being impacted negatively by insufficient funding to an extent that its ability to mount effective operations against Al-Shabab were diminishing as days progresses. Menkhaus (2006) also pointed out that the Somalia Security apparatus were not able to sufficiently manage the security function because they were critically underfunded. He attributed this to limited revenues generated by the government. He further observed that AMISON and Somalia security budgets were pegged on external aid that was unpredictable and unsustainable. This contributed to challenges in peace project sustenance. Ucko (2009) points that NATO peacekeepers in Afghanistan faced manpower challenges. The same challenge is experienced by Somalia peace actors. Nomadic pastoralism lifestyle of the Somalia population makes them move with from place to place in search of pasture and water for their animals. This makes it difficult for to provide physical security for them. Sometimes they are forced to move into Al-Shabaab controlled territories exposing them further.

6.3 Evaluation of Theories

6.3.1 Liberal Peacebuilding Theory

Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) posits those states and nations prosper or fail because of man-made political and economic institutions and not weather or geography. The main cause of fragility in Somalia is conflictual clan based political competition. This unhealthy political competition has destroyed social and economic infrastructure exacerbating fragility of. This has necessitated the need of international interveners to engage peacebuilding activities. Liberal peacebuilding theory is the guiding framework of UN peacekeeping operations. AMISOM and other actors are assisting Federal Government of Somalia in establishing governance, the rule of law and rebuilding damaged social, economy and physical infrastructure. Contrary to Richmond (2011), a critic of liberal peacebuilding theory, who states that peace-building practices by international community are based on the value system of liberal democracy, seen as western way of life which is not readily acceptable in some states, Somalia has readily accepted to embrace liberal democracy. AMISOM and other peace actors has supported the conduct of democratic elections in Somalia. This has increased the legitimacy of Federal Governments. However, this approach has made Somalia dependent on continuous foreign interventions which is not sustainable in the long run. International intervention has attracted powerful states in Somalia. These states are keen to establish their interest in the country at the expense of the Somalis.

Church & Shouldice (2003) point out that peacebuilding efforts are aimed at either mezo family unit level, community or state level. They argue that since it is difficult to cover all tiers level at once, the interveners are required to concentrate on one tier which will

transfer the benefits to the others. Kelman, (1995) holds that the concept of transfer has been one of the foundational pillars of several peace projects, particularly at the level of elite interactions. However, the case of Somalia the elites' interactions has not been successful. Experiment on intervening at the community level has posted some positive outcomes. Strong federal states with solid administration such as Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland are giving hope that this is the right approach to rebuild Somalia.

6.3.2 State-Building Theory

State-building is the establishment of a centralized administrative power, it is concerned with activities to create functional state institutions (OECD, 2008). This implies that state-building efforts by peace actors in Somalia should be concentrated at creating a strong central government. This has proven to be impractical. Several attempts to establish a strong central government has failed. Peace actors have opted for a bottom-up approach to state building. Peace actors are emphasizing on building strong federal states rooted on resilient communities. Once this federal state becomes sufficiently stable, the same efforts will be escalated to the national level and a central government will be built rooted on strong federal states.

6.3.3 Democratization Theory

Galtung (1990), argued that negative peace was the absence of open conflict but underneath this phenomenon lies structural violence. He further argued that upon addressing structural causes of violence, positive peace is realized. Democracy is theorized as a peaceful way of governing since it is seeking to achieve fair representation of all in governance. Furthermore, democracy creates strong institutions that eliminate

structural violence in a society. It creates necessary conditions for the promotion of human rights in a state.

Democratization peacebuilding project in Somalia has contributed to peace in Jubaland and Somalia at large. Jubaland government has adopted democratization project. Election delegates have been increased from one to fifty-one members. This has increased population's representation. The government created by this process is more legitimate to majority of the people. This has provided Jubaland administration critical popular support to extend its authority to previously Al-Shabaab controlled areas. Extension of authority makes peace in Kismayo sustainable because it denies Al-Shabaab grounds for collecting taxes. This makes them weak and susceptible to government onslaught.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

7.0 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations of the conduct of AMISOM CIMIC programs in Kismayo District, South Jubaland Somalia from 2011-2020. Recommendations for further studies are also presented in this chapter. Each section is presented as in line with the research objectives.

7.1 Summary of Findings

Kismayo population mirrors that of the entire Somalia with more than 70% of it being youth aged between 15 and 40 years.

There was widespread acknowledgement that the conflict situation was coming under control in Kismayo district. Majority of the respondents 97% of the respondents said that the conflict situation in Kismayo had improved tremendously. 81.15% of the respondents said that clan elder's institution through their effective dialogue and negotiations was responsible for the reduced conflicts in the district. Formal Judicial was not preferred by local population due to its ineffectiveness.

On enhancement of security, 68% said that JSF SSR was effective solution to the security and justice problems facing the people of Kismayo. However, 60% of the respondents were emphatic that SSR could be more effective with good security sector governance. 87.5% said that SSR had taken steps to create processes, structures, institutions and fostered requisite ownership through which the population can access justice and security over the long term. Respondents indicated that SSR program had reduced the risk of civil war recurrence in the Kismayo District by 89.11%.

On enhancement of safety, respondents said that concerted efforts by stakeholders in liaison with the Population of Kismayo had significantly reduced the Al-Shabaab IED threat in the district. The most threatening remnants of war are illicit SALW in civilian hands. 65% of the respondents felt threatened by easily available weapons that are often misused by militias.

On internal security, majority of the respondents acknowledged that Kismayo local administration, with military support from AMISOM was providing adequate security for the population making it possible for the locals and other actors undertake state building activities.

On establishing effective representative institutions in Jubaland, majority of the respondents (54.47%) agreed that peace actors were assisting Jubaland to achieve this.

On economic front, over 90% of the respondents agreed that Jubaland Administration in collaboration with peace actors were supporting establishment of vibrant private sector capable of growing and sustaining Jubaland economy.

Majority of residents of Kismayo acknowledged that Jubaland Administration with the help of other peace stakeholders had undertaken great improvement of physical, financial and telecommunication infrastructure within the district.

On restoration of the judicial system, 95% of the respondents said that the judicial system established by Jubaland administration was working and was rendering credible judicial services to the population.

Majority of residents of Kismayo reckoned that there was general improvement of their social wellbeing. They said that individual felt socially integrated in the community, there

was social cohesion, their contribution was being recognized by the community, they felt accepted by the community and that they had equal chances of self-actualization.

Civilians were found to be the main victims of IED, SLAW and war remnants. It was further noted that lack of IED risk education was exposing the civilians to more harm. Majority of the respondents said that there was great improvement in physical, telecommunication and financial infrastructure in Kismayo since AMISOM deployment and establishment of Jubaland administration.

Local leaderships were found to be the most prominent institution of CIMIC cooperation. The main areas of CIMIC cooperation were local security and safety enhancement and infrastructure development.

Respondents noted that CIMIC activities had reduced incidences of violence in the district, increased professionalism amongst the Jubaland security forces and improved the general social wellbeing of the community. Al-Shabaab threat was pointed out as the main threat to sustainability of peace in the district.

7.2 Conclusion

Following findings from the study it is concluded that peace building in Kismayo and Somalia by extension have greatly improved the security situation since the deployment of AMISOM. This is attributed to conflict prevention efforts at the community level which relies heavily on civil-military cooperation.

CIMIC has helped Jubaland administration create an efficient and effective security function. The DDR program has removed armed combatants and weapons amongst the population. This has reduced chances of armed conflict relapsing hence making the peace

in Kismayo sustainable. Public safety has been improved through CIMIC efforts that have reduced the threat of IED, SALW and unexploded munition in the district.

Post-conflict reconstruction CIMIC program has restored social and economic lifeline of the people of Kismayo. Sustained cooperation between peace actors and the local community has yielded the peace dividend that is being enjoyed in Kismayo.

7.3 Recommendations

It is recommended that efforts be employed in establishing truth, justice and reconciliation be created and devolved to the micro level where it will have more impact in healing the Somalia population.

It is also recommended that Somalia adopt a one man one vote policy on elections so that every citizen is allowed to participate in electing leaders who represent their aspirations. That way the government will have more legitimacy and wide support from the populace. Further, the clannism way of recruiting people into the government should be replaced with merit-based criteria that will take in the most qualified to serve in the government.

To produce a more capable security forces, a common Somalia security training doctrine need to be developed and disseminated to all troops contributing countries who are training and mentoring Somalia forces. This will ensure that the operation practices of troops trained by different contingents are in harmony.

Somalia security forces continue to face challenges on equipment especially arms due to existing arms embargo. It is for this reason that the Somalia security forces have not been able to defeat Al-Shabaab completely. It is recommended that the Federal Government be allowed to arm its forces adequately to enable it defeat Al-Shabaab once and for all.

On the same breath, more donor funds are required to enable the government to employ more security agents who will adequately cover vast country.

On state building theory, it is recommended that the state of Somalia be rebuilt by first stabilizing local governing structures, then scale it to federal governments and eventually bring the stable federal governments together to form the central government of Somalia. It is further recommended that civil-military reconstruction teams (CMRTs) be created and decentralized from the major centers. This will widen the reach of the reconstruction efforts into remote areas. The experiences in Kosovo and Afghanistan have demonstrated the importance and effectiveness of these decentralized Reconstruction Teams (Franke, 2006).

7.4 Suggestions for Further Studies

It is suggested that more studies be done on the efficacy of bottom-up state building model which seem to be having some potential in stabilizing Somalia.

References

- Abdeta, B. (2020). *The Security Sector Reform Paradox in Somalia*. LSE Conflict Research Program 2020.
- Abdifatah, H. (2018). *The Role of Civil Society in Peace Building in Somalia*: International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies Volume 7, Issue 6, 2020, PP8-16: <https://www.ijrhss.org/papers/v7-i6/2.pdf>
- Abdinur, S. & Gebre, M. (2017). *The Practice of Public Sector Governance in Somalia: The Case of Puntland*. Public Policy and Administration Research www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online)
- Abdulkadir, Y. (2019). Security Challenges in Somalia: Causes and Consequences. *IJIRST –International Journal for Innovative Research in Science & Technology*| Volume 6 | Issue 3 | August 2019ISSN (online): 2349-6010.
- Abiew, K. (2003). ‘*NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations*’, International Peacekeeping. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714002394>
- Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. (2012). *Why Nations Fails*. Crown publishing group
AMISOM News **Kismayo (2020, October 29) Retrieved from**. <https://amisom-au.org/2020/10/amisom-conducts-security-sector-training-for-troops-in-kismayo/>
- AMISOM police newsletter, (2018) <https://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/PoliceNewsletter-4th-Quarter-2018-v5.pdf>
.Accessed 21/5/21 0726 AM
- Anderlini, S. & El-Bushra, J. (2004). *Inclusive security, sustainable peace: a toolkit for advocacy and action*.
- Ankersen, C. (2007). *Civil-military cooperation in post-conflict operations: emerging theory and practice*. London: Routledge. United Nations Peace and Progress, Volume 2(1), pp. 23-48. Retrieved from <http://upp.unu.edu/>.
- Antvosky, A. (1994). “*The sense of coherence. A historical and future perspective*” University of Wisconsin press.
- Arthur, P. (2000). *Special relationships: Britain, Ireland and the Northern Ireland problem*. Belfast: Blackstaff
- Baruch, Y., & Holtom, B. C. (2008). *Survey response rate levels and trends in organizational research*. *Human Relations*, 61(8), 1139–1160. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726708094863>
- Bhattacharjee A. (2012). *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices*, 2nd edition. University of South Florida, abhattach@usf.edu.

- Bollen. (2008). *Effective Civil-Military Interaction in Peace Operations: Theory and Practice*. Hague, Netherlands.
- Borg, W & Gall, P. (2003). *Educational Research: An Introduction, 7th Edition*. Longman Publishing, England
- Boutros, G. (1992). An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Retrieved from.
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/A_47_277.pdf
- Braem, Y. (2007). *Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and practice*. Routledge, London.
- Brinkerhoff, D. (2005). *Rebuilding governance in failed states and post-conflict societies: core concepts and cross-cutting themes*. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.352>
- Byman, J. (2001). *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat-- Afghanistan, Iraq, and future conflict*. Greenwood publishing group, London.
- Charter of the United Nations and statute of the international Court of Justice, (1945)
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>
- Christian, W. (2004). *Differences That Matter: The Struggle of the Marginalized in Somalia*. Cambridge University press.
- Church, C. & Shouldice, J. (2003). *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions, Part II: Emerging Practice and Theory*: Printed by Browne Printers Ltd., Letterkenny, Ireland.
- Cohen, Y., Brown, R., & Organski K. (1981). 'The paradoxical nature of state making: the violent creation of order', *American Political Science Review*, 75(4), 901–910.
- Colletta, J. & Cullen, L. (2000). 'The Nexus between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda', World Bank, Washington DC,
- Collier, P et.al. (2007), *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil Wars and Development Policy*. World Bank and Oxford University Press, Washington, DC 20433
- Comte, A. (1875). *System of positive polity: General view of positivism and introductory principles*. London, UK: Longmans, Green and Company. Retrieved from.
- Conflict Management Division, Peace and Security Department, Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, Addis Ababa: Commission of the African Union, 2006, p. v, vii, 5
- Corey, M. (1998). *Social Well-Being* American Sociological Association
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2787065>

- Creswell, J & Baskarada, S. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed Methods Approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
- Currey, C. (2003). *A new model for military/non-governmental relations in post-conflict*. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.21236/ada415114>.
- Dahl, A. (2000). *On Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
- Diehl, P. Druckman, D. & Wall, J. (1998). *Determinants of Success in UN Peacekeeping*. Sage Publications, Inc.
- Dorrance, B. (2008). 'From Conflict to Reconciliation: The Use of Development Programmes to Restore Civic Trust in Northern Afghanistan', *Social Engagement, Empowerment and Change*, issue 11.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper & Row;
- Doyle, M.& Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- DPKO, (2000). *Article 8 Training for Peacekeeping: Towards Increased Understanding of Conflict Resolution*. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/13533312.2012.761841>.
- Education Development Center (EDC). (2008). *Yemen cross-sectoral youth assessment: Final report*. EDC/USAID.
- Egnell, R. (2008). *Between reluctance and necessity: the utility of military force in humanitarian and development operations, Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Retrieved from 19:3, 397-422, DOI: 10.1080/09592310802228716
- Ericson, H. (1950). *Childhood and society*. New York: Norton.
- Featherston. B. (1995). *Peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and Peacebuilding: A reconsideration of theoretical frameworks*. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/deref/http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1080%2F13533310008413825>.
- Fitzgerald, A. (2000). *Military Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations: Afghanistan and Lebanon*. Cranfield University Press.
- Franke, K. (2006). *Cultivating peace: contexts, practices and multidimensional models*. Cambridge Scholars Publisher.
- Franke, V. (2006). The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation In Stability Operations. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 11(2), 5-25. Retrieved July 12, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41852944>.

- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *End of history and the last man*. Free press London.
- Galtung, J. (1990). *Cultural violence*. *Journal of Peace Research*. journals.sagepub.com
- Gary, L & Gielie, D. (2007). The challenges, roles and functions of civil military coordination officers in peace support operations: a theoretical discussion *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 35, Nr 2, 2007*. doi: 10.5787/35-2-38
- Gordon, S. (2001), *Understanding the priorities for civil-military co-operation (CIMIC)*” Retrieved from <https://www.jha.ac/a068/>
- Gorm, R. (2015). *The October 2011 Kenyan invasion of Somalia: fighting al-Shabaab or defending institutional interests?* Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark.
- Gourlay, C. (2000). *Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions*. Disarmament Forum.
- Gundel, J. (2018) *Launching reconciliation in Somalia*. Retrieved from. <http://katuni.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/17-Launching-Reconciliation-FD.pdf>
- Guttieri, K. (2004). "Civil-Military Relations in Peacebuilding." *Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensforschung*. No2 pp.79-85.
- Haider, H. (2009) *Community-based approaches to Peacebuilding in conflict-affected and fragile contexts*. International development department, University of Birmingham
- Hanggi, H. (2005). “*Approaching Peace-building from a Security Governance Perspective*” inn Heiner Hanggi and Alan Bryden, eds., *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2005, 3-19.
- Hans-Jürgen, K. (2012), *Civil-Military Cooperation: A way to resolve complex crisis situations*. Nomos Publishing: Baden, Germany.
- Harmer, A. (2008). *Adele Harmer (2008) Integrated missions: A threat to humanitarian security? International peacekeeping*, Retrieved from 15:4, 528-539, DOI: 10.1080/13533310802239824
- Helander, B. (1997). *Is There a Civil Society in Somalia? Nairobi: UNDOS*
- Hilary, M. (2019) *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)*. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2019/01/27/not-with-a-whimper-but-with-a-bang-al-shabaabs-resilience-and-international-efforts-against-the-rebels/>.

- Hippler, J. (2004). *'Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building – Terminology and Political Concepts'* in *'Nation-building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation'*. Pluto Press.
- Horney, K. (1945). *Our inner conflicts. A constructive theory of Neurosis*. New York: Norton.
<http://katuni.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/17-Launching-Reconciliation-FD.pdf>
- Huntington, S (1996). *The clash of civilization and remaking of world order*. Free press, Croydon, UK
- IASC Reference Paper (2004), *Civil-military relationship in complex emergencies*. Retrieved from <http://ochaonline.un.org/mcdu/guidelines>.
- Ibrahim, H. (2018). "The Role of the Traditional Somali Model in Peacemaking," *The Journal of Social Encounters: Vol. 2: Iss. 1*, 60-68. Retrieved from. https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/social_encounters/vol2/iss1/5
- Iman, H. (2017). Community participation and peacebuilding in Mogadishu Somalia (Master's thesis). Kampala International University. Retrieved from. <https://ir.kiu.ac.ug/bitstream/20.500.12306/5379/1/AHMED%20HASSAN%20IMAN-UPLOADED.pdf>.
- IOM, (2016). *Youth, employment and migration in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa*.
- Irani, A. (2018). *"Positive Altruism: Helping that Benefits Both the Recipient and Giver"* Master of Applied Positive Psychology (MAPP) Capstone Projects. 152. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/mapp_capstone/152
- JICA. (2011). Japan International Cooperation Agency Peace-building thematic guidance.
- John, B. (1990) *Conflict: Human needs theory* The Macmillan Press, LTD Hound mills, Basingstoke and London.
- Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Spring 2006, Vol. 8, Issue 3.)
- Keating, M. & Waldman, M. (2018) *War and Peace in Somalia. National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab*.
- Kelman, C. (1995). 'Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Breakthrough.' *Negotiation Journal*, 19-27
- Kofi, A. (1999). *"Peace and Development - One Struggle, Two Fronts"*, address of the United Nations Secretary-General to World Bank staff, 19 October 1999
- Leader, N. (2000). *The Politics of Principle: the principle of humanitarian action in practice, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 2, London: Overseas Development Institute, London, United Kingdom*.

- Lederach J. P. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 20, 75, 84-85.
- Lederach, J. (1995). *Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures*, Syracuse University Press.
- Leeuw F. & Vaessen J. (2009). *NONIE Guidance*. Washington: USA.
- Life & Peace Institute (2018). *Women, Conflict and Peace: Learning from Kismayo*.
- Mansbridge, J. (2003). "Rethinking Representation." *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 515–528. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000856>.
- Mansbridge, J. (2014). "What Is Political Science For?" *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (1):8–17. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271300368X>
- Marie, K. (1996). *Transformative Community Planning: Empowerment Through Community Development. Prepared for the 1996 Planners Network Conference, "Renewing Hope, Restoring Vision: Progressive Planning in Our Communities."* Retrieved from. <http://www.plannersnetwork.org/case-studies-and-working-papers/transformative-community-planning-empowerment-through-community-development>.
- Menkhaus, K. (2006) Governance without Government in Somalia Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping. *Journal of International Security* Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter, 2006/2007), pp. 74-106 (33 pages). Retrieved from. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137508>
- Menkhaus, K. (2010). "Diplomacy in a Failed State International Mediation in Somalia," in *Whose Peace is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking*, edited by M. Bradbury and S. Healy. London: Conciliation Resources.16-19.
- Menkhaus, K. (2017). *Dadaab Returnee Conflict Assessment*, Report prepared for Danish Demining Group, 20-21.
- Menkhaus, K., Sheikh, H., Joqombe, A.& Johnson, P. (2008). *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988*. The Center for Research and Dialogue, Somalia. Retrieved from. https://www.interpeace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/05/2009_Som_Interpeace_A_History_Of_Mediation_In_Somalila_Since_1988_EN.pdf
- Mercy, C. (2010). *Evaluation and Assessment Poverty and Conflict Interventions: Conflict & Economics: Lessons Learned on Measuring Impact*. Portland, Oregon.
- Michael P. (2001), *Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations: hegemony or emancipation?* Retrieved from www.odi.org.uk/hpg/confpapers/pug

- Minear, L., Marc, S. & Ted, B. (2000). *NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis.* Occasional Paper #36, Thomas J. Watson Institute of International Studies, Brown University.
- Mohamed, M., Isak, A. & Roble, D. (2019). *Private sector developments in Somalia: analysis on some major sectors.* International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management (IJECM; ISSN 2348-0386)
- Mohammed, E. (2021). *Post Conflict National reconciliation in Somalia.* Linnaeus University.
- Mohammed, I. (2021) Dialoguing and negotiating with Al-Shabaab: the role of clan elders as insider-partial mediators. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 15:1, 1-22, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2020.1863099
- Mohamoud, A. (2006). *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa: The Case Study of Somalia.* Purdue University Press. USA.
- Mugenda, O. & Mugenda, A. (1999), *Research methodology.* Act's press, Nairobi.
- Mugenda, O. & Mugenda, A. (2003). *Research methods: Quantitative and qualitative Approaches.* Act's press, Nairobi.
- NATO, *Peace Support Operations, AJP-3.4.1, Brussels:* Military Agency for Standardization, 2001, 2-1 (0202),
- Netabay, N. (2007). *Bottom-Up Approach: A Viable Strategy in Solving the Somali Conflict.* Retrieved from. <https://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/netabay-bottom>.
- Nicolls, M. (2008). Independent midterm evaluation of the Countering Youth and Child Labor Through Education in Liberia and Sierra Leone (CYCLE) Project. International Rescue Committee.
- Nisar, M. & Khalif, A. (2021). *The Kismayo Bubble - Justice and Security in Jubaland.* Research at LSE
- OCHA (2003), annual report: OCHA New York.
- OECD, (2008). 'Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations: from fragility to resilience', Offprint of the Journal on Development 2008, 9(3), 13–14.
- OECD/DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance, p. 123.*
- Olson, L. & Gregorian, H. (2007), *Beyond Information Sharing & False Coherence: Interagency Coordination in International Peace Missions,* Policy Brief, Calgary: Center for Military and Strategic Studies.

- Onwuegbuzie, A & Collins, K. (2007). *A Typology of Mixed Methods Sampling Designs in Social Science Research*. Retrieved from. <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ800183.pdf>
- Paffenholz, T. (2010). *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*, Lynne Rienner publishers, Boulder, USA.
- Paris, R. (1997). Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism. *International Security*, 22(2): 54–89.
- Paris, R. (2002). *International peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice”*, *Review of International Studies*
- Peace Direct (2019) Opportunities for peace in Kismayo, Somalia Insights from local peacebuilders on the causes of violent conflict and the prospects for peace. Retrieved from. https://www.peacedirect.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/P861-PD-Somalia-LVP-Report_WEB-1-1.pdf
- Pottebaum, D. & Lee, C. (2007) *'In Control of Their Future: Community-Led Reconciliation and Recovery'*, Paper presented at the World Bank Workshop, 'Moving out of Poverty in Conflict Affected Areas', 16 April, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Pouligny, B. (2005). Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building ‘New’ Societies
- Quetzalli, P. & Gustavo, T. (2013). *Scoping Study on the Culture Sector in Somalia*. A Research Study Report UNESCO. Retrieved from.
- Reliefweb (2020, April 22) Al-Shabaab and increasing civilian harm in Somalia. Retrieved from. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/al-shabaab-and-increasing-civilian-harm-somalia>. Retrieved from. https://www.peacedirect.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Kismayo_Report_WEB2-April-2018.pdf.
- Richmond, O. (2009). A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday. *Review of International Studies*, 35(3): 557–580.
- Richmond, P. (2011). *'The Rule of law in liberal peacebuilding'* in SriramC.L., Martin-Ortega O., Herman J. (eds.), *Peacebuilding and Rule of Law in Africa: Just Peace?* London and New York: Routledge.
- Roberts, D. (2010). *Agent-Based Modeling in Humanitarian Interventions: Emerging Research and opportunities*. Retrieved from [https://www.google.com/search?q=Roberts.\(2010\).+SAgent](https://www.google.com/search?q=Roberts.(2010).+SAgent).
- Roberts, D. (2011) *Liberal Peacebuilding and Global Governance: Beyond the Metropolis*, London and New York: Routledge.

- Ronald, F. & Loreleigh, K. (1991). *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*. Sage publication. Research Article. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343391028001005>
- Rose, C. & Ssekandi, F. (2007). *The Pursuit of Transitional Justice and African Traditional Values: A Clash of Civilizations – The Case of Uganda*. *Sur, Rev. int. direitos humanos*. (4)7, pp. 100–12.
- Rummel, R. (1981). *Understanding Conflict And War The Just Peace: VOL. 5: Chapter 10*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications,
- Saferworld, (2016). *Forging Jubaland Community perspectives on federalism, governance and reconciliation*.
- Samuels, K. (2006) ‘State-building II: Issues of Design and Implementation’, International Peace Academy.
- Schulhofer, W. & Sambanis, N. (2010). *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs. An Assessment*. Fyris Tryck publisher, Sweden, 2010.
- Schumpeter, A. (1976). *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. 5th ed. Routledge
- Seeman, M. (1991). *Measures of personalities and Social psychological attitudes*. Wrightsman: San Diego: Academic press
- Seth, G. (2008) *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Vol. 4* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2008) p.24, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595
- Shinoda, H. (2003). *Peacebuilding and the Rule of Law: Theoretical and Functional Analyses of International Peace Operations*, Tokyo: Sobunsha (Japanese).
- Sigsgaard, M. (2012). Conflict-sensitive education policy: A preliminary review. Doha: Education Above All. Available at: http://protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ea_a_conflict_sensitive_education_policy.pdf
- Simon, R. & Duncan, H. (2009). *Evaluating for security and justice challenges and opportunities for improved monitoring and evaluation of security system reform programs*
- Skjelderup, M. (2020). *Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures: al-Shabaab and Clan Elders in Southern Somalia, 2008-2012*. Retrieved from. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1780686>

- Slaymaker, T., Christiansen, K. & Hemming, I. (2005). *Community-based approaches and service delivery: Issues and options in difficult environments and partnerships*.
<https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.540.7083&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Slore, L. (1945). "Social integration and certain corollaries: An exploratory study." *American Sociological Review*.
- Sunil, V. (2018). *History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operation during the cold war*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York.
- The Africa report (2019, August 23) Jubaland election results mired by conflicting regional interests. Retrieved from.
<https://www.theafricareport.com/16524/jubaland-election-results-mired-by-conflicting-regional-interests/>
- U.N. Charter (1945) Retrieved from. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>
- Ucko, D. (2009, December) 'What Role for Sweden? Small-State Contributions to Expeditionary Operations,' unpublished research report at the Swedish National Defense p.11.
- UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP" Retrieved from, <https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/good-governance.pdf>
- UN habitat (2020). *Kismayo Urban Profile report*.
- United Nations (1998). *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Document A/52/871-S/1998/318.).
- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, (2008)
- UNMAS, (2017). Knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs on Improvised Explosive Devices. UNMAS Somalia.
- Vanda, F. (2018). *The hard, hot, dusty road to accountability, reconciliation, and peace in Somalia: Amnesties, defectors programs, traditional justice, informal reconciliation mechanisms, and punitive responses to al-Shabab: United Nations University*

- Wagenaar, H. (2014). "The Agonistic Experience: Informality, Hegemony and the Prospects for Democratic Governance." In *Practices of Freedom*, ed. Steven Griggs, Aletta J. Norval, and Hendrik Wagenaar, 217–248. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107296954.010.](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107296954.010))
- Wale, O. & Shuna, K. (2019). Community level conflict prevention and peace building in DRC and Somalia. <https://nteragencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain-hosted-iasc/>
- Warren, M. (2014). "Accountability and Democracy." In *The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability*, ed. Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans. Oxford University Press. www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199641253-e-018.
- World Bank (2006). *Civil Society and Peace Building: Potential Limitations and Critical factors*. Social Development Dept. Report N0. 36445 GLB.
- Xi, J. (2014). *The governance of China*. Foreign Languages Press, China
- Yin, R. (2003) *Case study research design and methods 3rd edition*. Thousand Oaks Publisher. London-New Delhi.
- Zaalberg, T. (2006). "The Tools at Hand: Civil-Military Cooperation in Kosovo." In *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, 391-414. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006. Accessed July 12, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46mxbz.17>.
- Zaalberg, T. (2008). *The historical origins of civil-military cooperation* eBook Published 17 June 2019. London.
- Zoe, S. (2007). *Literature Review on State-Building*: University of Birmingham International Development Department'

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: INTRODUCTION LETTER

Dear Sir/ Madam,

I am Mr. Moses K. Muchemi a postgraduate student at Kenyatta University in the Department of Conflict, Peace and Security Studies carrying out a research study on **“CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION OF AFRICAN MISSION IN SOMALIA AS TOOL OF PEACE-BUILDING: A CASE OF KISMAYO DISTRICT, LOWER JUBALAND, SOMALIA (2011-2020)”**.

I humbly request your participation by answering of the questions in all sections of the questionnaire/interview guide to facilitate the research study. Your response will provide invaluable information that will be used improve conduct of CIMIC and to inform policy on the same. You will remain anonymous, and the information will be handled with utmost confidentiality. It will be used only for academic purposes.

Your participation is highly appreciated.

Thank you.

Moses K. Muchemi

APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire has been designed to collect information for purely academic purposes. Please answer all the questions. The information obtained through the questionnaire will be treated as confidential and will be used only for academic purposes.

Kindly do not write your name anywhere.

PART A: Background Information

1. Designation:

Members of the Community Community elder Humanitarian Aid /Civil Society Worker AMISOM Peacekeeper Somalia Security Forces

PART B: AMISOM CIMIC PROGRAMS

1. Community based Conflict Prevention and settlement.

a. What is your perception of the current conflict situation the Kismayo district since AMISOM deployment?

Not improved at all Don't know There is tremendous improvement

b. Rank the following Community level Conflict Prevention methods according to their effectiveness in Kismayo District. Not effective=1, Less effective=2 moderately=3 Effective=4 and Very effective=5.

	1	2	3	4	5
Dialogue/negotiation					
Mediation					
Conciliation					
Arbitration					
Judicial settlement					

2. Security and safety enhancement.

a. Security Sector Reforms (SSR).

Criteria	Questionnaire
Relevance/ Appropriateness	<p>1. Is the SSR a technically adequate solution to the security and justice problems facing the population? Yes [] No []</p> <p>2. Is SSR accepted by different groups, particularly the poor and vulnerable? Yes [] No []</p> <p>3. Is the SSR in tune with the policies of international counterparts in the areas of development, security and Peacebuilding? Yes [] No []</p> <p>4. Does the SSR balance considerations of long-term capacity-building? Yes [] No []</p>

Effectiveness	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Do changes in the SSR's area of coverage match the intended outputs, purpose and goal? Yes [] No [] 2. Are observed changes the result of the SSR rather than other factors? No relation [] To some extent [] To great extent [] 3. What are the reasons for the delivery or non-delivery of the SSR's specified objectives? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Complexity of the security and justice sector [] b. Lack of ideal security system [] c. Clan dynamics [] d. Lack of political goodwill [] e. Incoherence and lack of co-ordination [] 4. What can be done to make the SSR more effective? Good security sector governance (SSG) [] <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Improved security policymaking. [] b. Increased gender equality []
Efficiency	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Has the SSR been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency? Yes [] No [] 2. Is the SSR economically worthwhile, given possible alternative uses of the available resources? Yes [] No []
Impact	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the effects of the SSR on people and institutions? Positive [] Negative [] Explain your answer. 2. How has the SSR affected the well-being of different groups of stakeholders? 3. 4. To what extent has the SSR contributed to the strengthening capacity and accountability of institutions? 5. 1= No impact at all [], 2= A little bit of impact [], 3=some sense of impact [], 4= Quite a bit of impact [], 5= Tremendous impact [] 6. To what extent has the SSR led to the development and improvement of security policies?

	<p>1= Not at all [], 2= A little bit of extent [], 3= To some extent [], 4= Quite a large extent [], 5= Tremendous large extent []</p> <p>7. What would have occurred without the SSR?</p> <p>1= Nothing at all [], 2= A little bit of insecurity [], 3= To some extent of insecurity [], 4= Quite a large extent of insecurity [], 5= Tremendous large extent of insecurity []</p>
Sustainability and ownership	<p>1. What steps have been taken to create processes, structures and institutions and ownership through which the population can access justice and security over the long term? Yes [] No [].</p> <p>If yes, list the processes, structures and institutions,</p> <p>2. Has human as well as institutional capacity been built up?</p> <p>Yes [] No []</p> <p>3. Is the SSR supported by local institutions and well-integrated with local social and cultural conditions? Yes [] No []. If yes list the institutions.</p> <p>4. Is a credible exit strategy envisaged or in place? Yes [] No []. If yes, explain</p>
Coherence	<p>1. Are mechanisms in place for ‘whole-of-government’ support to SSR? Yes [] No []</p>
Coordination/ linkages	<p>1. Has the SSR forged links with other relevant programs and frameworks, including peace support operations, post-conflict recovery and Peace-building strategies and frameworks, and national development frameworks?</p> <p>Yes [] No []</p>
Consistency with the values	<p>1. Does the SSR promote norms of good and democratic governance, values respect for human rights and the rule of law?</p> <p>Yes [] No []</p> <p>2. Is the SSR designed and carried out in accordance with basic governance principles of transparency and accountability?</p> <p>Yes [] No []</p> <p>3. Does the SSR promote equitable access to justice and security for populations, including the poor and vulnerable?</p> <p>Yes [] No []</p>

c. Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

What are the impacts of DDR in Kismayo? (1= No impact at all, 2= A little bit of impact, 3=some sense of impact, 4= Quite a bit of impact, 5= Tremendous impact)						
	Questionnaire	1	2	3	4	5
1.	Has AMISOM DDR program reduced the risk of civil war recurrence in the Kismayo District?					
2.	Has AMISOM DDR program stimulated economic development?					
3.	Has AMISOM DDR program prevented or reduced postwar violence and crime?					
4.	Has AMISOM DDR program ameliorated the impact of wartime trauma on postwar society and individuals?					
5.	Has AMISOM DDR program bolstered political participation and civic engagement by ex-combatants?					

c. Enhancing public safety.

i. Removing IED threat.

(1) Have you ever heard of an IED? Yes [] No []

(2) Where have they got IED awareness from?

Source of awareness	
Radio	
TV	
Village elders	
JSF	
Social Media	
Friends/Family/College	
Newspaper	
AMISOM	

(3) Have you seen an IED? Yes [] No []

(4) Where did you see the IEDs?

On the road	
Al-Shabaab Camp	
Market	
Near villages	
Near government installations	
Near AMISOM bases	
In the field	
Near JSF camp	

(5) What did you do on seeing the IED?

Did nothing	
Report to AMISOM	
Report to JSF	
Report to Local leader	

(6) Whom did you suspect had laid the IED?

Al-Shabaab	
JSF	
AMISOM	
I Don't Know	

(7) Who are the main victims of IED?

Civilians	
JSF	
AMISOM	

(8) What efforts have you seen stakeholders employing in addressing the IED menace?

Information Sharing	
IED risk Education	
Survey and clearance	
Victim assistance	
Sharing of techniques and procedures	
Stockpile destruction	

- ii. Removing Explosive Remnants of War or Mine threat.
 - a. Have you encountered remnants of war or mine?

Remnants of small arms	
Unexploded ordnance (UXO)	
Land mines	

- b. What have you observed being done by stakeholders in addressing the menace?
- c. In your perception, what threat is caused by SALW?
- d. Explain mechanisms they have witnessed being put in place by stakeholders to address the insecurity caused by SALW.

4. Post Conflict Recovery and reconstruction.

- i. What would say about the current internal security situation?

ii. Tick on the corresponding figures showing the extent to which you agreed /disagreed with written statements. (1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4= Agree, 5=strongly agree).					
	1	2	3	4	5
Peace actors AMISOM included are focused and committed to mentor, train and develop Jubaland Leadership to establish effective and efficient public administration (security, law and order, education, health).					
Peace actors AMISOM included are assisting Jubaland Leadership establish effective representative institutions.					
Peace actors AMISOM included are supporting establishment of vibrant civil society that holds leaders to account.					
Peace actors AMISOM included are supporting establishment of vibrant private sector that will grow and sustain Jubaland economy.					

iii. Rank on a scale of five points the improvement you have witnessed on basic infrastructure. (1= No improvement at all, 2= A little bit of improvement, 3=some sense of improvement, 4= Quite a bit of improvement, 5= Tremendous improvement).

	1	2	3	4	5
Physical infrastructure					
Financial infrastructures					
Telecommunication infrastructure					

iv. Tick on the corresponding figures showing your perception on the extent of community participation of AMISOM CIMIC Peace-building projects. (1= No participation at all, 2= A little bit of participation, 3=some sense of participation, 4= Quite a bit of participation, 5= Strong participation)

Project phase	1	2	3	4	5
Initiation					
Planning					
Execution					
Sustenance/running					

v. Is the judicial system Kismayo District was functioning? Is it credible?

vi. Please answer the questions on the tables below.

Not at all=1, somewhat=2 and to a great extent=3		1	2	3
Social integration	Are you allowed to participate in political processes and in decision-making?			

I don't feel comfortable at all=1, somewhat feel comfortable=2 and feel more comfortable=3		1	2	3
Social cohesion	I trust and feel comfortable with other people in the society			

No role=1, somewhat played a role=2 and played a great role=3		1	2	3
Social Contribution	What role have you played in making your neighborhood peaceful, secure and safe?			

I feel vengeful=1 and I have fully forgiven them=2		1	2
Social acceptance	How do feel about demobilized, disarmed and reintegrated ex-militiamen?		

		Disagreed	Don't know.	Agreed
Social Actualization	1. Most Jubaland administration officials are interested to serve common person. 2. Average person in Jubaland are getting worse not better.			

5. Community based Peacebuilding.

i. On a scale of five points rank the following community institutions' prominence in Peacebuilding in Kismayo. (1= **No prominence at all**, 2= **A little bit of prominence**, 3=**some sense of prominence**, 4= **Quite a bit of prominence**, 5= **Tremendous prominence**)

Community institutions	1	2	3	4	5
Associations					
Cooperatives					
Civic Associations					
Community based organizations					
Local leadership					

ii. tick on the corresponding figures showing their perception on the extent of community participation in various stages of AMISOM CIMIC Peace-building projects. (1= No participation at all, 2= A little bit of participation, 3=some sense of participation, 4= Quite a bit of participation, 5= Strong participation).

Project phase	1	2	3	4	5
Initiation					
Planning					
Execution					
Sustenance/running					

5. In your opinion, what are the challenges experienced by AMISOM CIMIC programs?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

6. In your opinion what can be done to improve AMISOM Civil military cooperation in Kismayo?.....

.....
.....
.....

Thank you for your participation.

APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What is your designation?
.....
2. Where do/have you worked in Kismayo District?
3. Have you witnessed or participated in any peace project in your area?
.....
.....
4. What would say about the current internal security situation?
5. What is your understanding of Civil Military cooperation in peacebuilding?
.....
.....
6. What would you say on the Civil Military cooperation in peacebuilding within the district?
.....
.....
7. Are the local community involved in peace building initiatives by the AMISOM peacekeeping force? If yes, what are the levels of involvement?
.....
.....
8. What framework is employed by AMISOM troops in executing peace projects?
9. Has AMISOM troop's cooperation with Kismayo civilians contributed to bringing peace in the district?
.....
.....
10. What is the relationship between community involvement and sustainability of peace projects?
.....
.....
11. In your opinion what challenges face AMISOM Civil military cooperation?
.....
.....
.....
12. In your opinion can peace be sustained in Kismayo without AMISOM Civil military cooperation?
.....
.....
.....
13. What can be done to improve AMISOM Civil military cooperation in Kismayo?
.....
.....
.....


Thank you for your participation.

APPENDIX IV: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. Opening and welcoming note.
2. Overview of the topic “AMISOM civil military cooperation as a tool of Peacebuilding in Kismayo district, lower Jubaland, Somalia 2011-2020”
3. Ground rules.
 - a. All participants’ contributions are valid.
 - b. Participants will be recorded as they make their contributions.
 - c. Each Participant will speak at a time.
 - d. Disagreement with others is allowed, but you must respectfully allow them to air their views without interruption.
 - e. Mobile phone should be put on silent mode.
 - f. The moderator will guide the discussion.
4. Questions.
 - a. What would say about the current internal security situation?
 - b. What is the general perception of Civil Military cooperation in peacebuilding?
 - c. In your opinion can peace be sustained in Kismayo without AMISOM Civil military cooperation?
 - d. In your opinion what challenges face AMISOM Civil military cooperation in peacebuilding?
 - e. What can be done to improve AMISOM Civil military cooperation in Kismayo?

Thank you for your participation.

APPENDIX V : MAPS



Map of Jubaland state of Somalia

Source: Google maps

APPENDIX VI: NACOSTI RESEARCH PERMIT

 REPUBLIC OF KENYA	 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
Ref No: 43847	Date of Issue: 29May2022
RESEARCH LICENSE	
	
This is to Certify that Mr., MOSES MUCHEMI KAMAU of Kenyatta University, has been licensed to conduct research in Mogi on the topic: CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION OF AFRICAN MISSION IN SOMALIA AS TOOL OF PEACE-BUILDING: CASE OF KISMAYO DISTRICT, LOWER JUBBALAND, SOMALIA (2011-2019) for the period ending : 28/04y2022.	
License No: NACOSTI/21/10941	
479817 Applicant Identification Number	 Director General NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
	Verification QR Code 
NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document, Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.	