

**DIPLOMATIC TRENDS BETWEEN KENYA AND SOUTH KOREA
RELATIONS, 1964-2016**


**WILLINGTON OUMA OTIENO
C50/37756/2016**

**A RESEARCH THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF LAW, ARTS
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY OF KENYATTA
UNIVERSITY**

JULY, 2024

DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree or any award in any other university.



Signature..... Date 9th July, 2024

Willington Ouma Otieno.
Department of Security, Diplomacy and Peace Studies

APPROVAL

This thesis has been submitted with our approval as the University Supervisors.

Dr. Pius Kakai

Signature..... Date
.....

Department of History, Archaeology & Political Studies
Kenyatta University

Dr. Peter Wafula

Signature..... Date

Department of History, Archaeology & Political Studies
Kenyatta University

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to everyone in my family for their endless love and support during this academic journey.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I owe many people my gratitude because they each did their part to make this effort successful.

I wish to start by thanking God for making this possible for me.

Secondly, my profound gratitude goes to Professor Olive Mugenda, former Vice Chancellor of Kenyatta University for granting me a scholarship to pursue a Master's degree at Kenyatta University. I remain grateful forever.

Thirdly, to my supervisors Dr. Pius Kakai and Dr. Peter Wafula Wekesa, this journey was very long but you never gave up on me. Instead, you remained kind, loving and very supportive all through. I sincerely say thank you to each of you.

Fourth, I owe special thanks to everyone from my family (my mum, brothers Aricho, Chefa, Omosh, JJ and Emily) for giving me all the support I needed. Guys, that was indeed amazing and a show of great love.

Equally, my special thanks to all my classmates, Timothy Sati "Mzito", Osiemo Nyabicha (you accommodated me in your room), Christopher Pennie (the Prince from Liberia), Ivone, Gessare, and Verah. Our experiences in KU we can never forget, especially the survival.

Finally, my gratitude goes to all the comrades, post graduate students (over 20,000 both in the main and all satellite Campuses across Kenya), for the trust they had in me and voted me to be their leader. It was an honour to serve you as your congressman for the academic year 2017/2018. I undeniably delivered.

Together, we have made it and I say thank you all!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS AND TERMS	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	ix
ABSTRACT	xi
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.0 Introduction	1
1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem	9
1.3 Research Objectives	9
1.4 Research Questions	9
1.5 Justification and Significance of the Study	10
1.6 Scope and Limitations	11
1.7 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework	12
1.8 Theoretical Framework	24
1.9 International Regime Theory	24
1.9.1 Realist Theory	25
1.9.2 Research Methodology.....	28
1.9.3 Research Design.....	28
1.9.4 Location of the Study	28
1.9.5 Target Population	29
1.9.6 Sample Size and Sampling Technique	29
1.9.7 Research Instruments	30
1.9.8 Data Collection Procedures	30
1.9.9 Piloting Study and Reliability of Research Instruments	31
1.9.9.1 Data Analysis Procedure	31
1.9.9.2 Data Management	31
1.9.9.3 Ethical Considerations.....	32
CHAPTER TWO.....	33

2.0 KENYA-SOUTH KOREA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE JOMO KENYATTA ERA, 1963-1978	33
2.1 Introduction	33
2.2 Early development of Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations	33
2.3 The Korean Question and Her Diplomatic Endeavors	35
2.4 Kenya's Independence and the Politics Behind Kenya- South Korea Diplomatic Ties in the Jomo Kenyatta Era	42
2.5 Summary	57
CHAPTER THREE	59
3.0 DYNAMICS OF KENYA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA IN THE MOI ERA 1978-2002	59
3.1 Introduction	59
3.2 Moi's Leadership Style and Diplomacy in the First Decade of Moi Era	59
3.3 The Reign of President Chun Doo-Hwan and Kenya's Economic Relations, 1978-1990	63
3.4 Cold War Politics and South Korea's Quest for African Countries	68
3.5 Kenya's Diplomatic Shift to the East	70
3.6 Cultural Diplomacy and Kenya's Diplomatic ties with South Korea	73
3.7 Summary	80
CHAPTER FOUR	82
4.0 KENYA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATION WITH SOUTH KOREA DURING KIBAKI AND UHURU KENYATTA ERAS 2003-2016	82
4.1 Introduction	82
4.2 Mwai Kibaki regime and foreign diplomacy	83
4.3 Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in the Post Moi Era	84
4.4 Policy Shift Towards the East and Kenya's Diplomatic Relations with South Korea	86
4.5 Kenya-South Korea Economic Diplomacy in the Post Moi Era	88
4.6 Summary	105
CHAPTER FIVE	109
5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	109
5.1 Introduction	109
5.2 Summary	109
REFERENCES	118
A. 1: Interview Schedule	141

Section One: Demographic	141
Section Two: Specific Questions	141
A. 3: Map of the Study Area: South Korea Embassy and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Nairobi County.....	145
A. 4: Approval of Research Proposal	146
A. 5: Research Permit	147

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS AND TERMS

Diplomatic Relations: Refers to friendly bilateral ties and international system collaboration between nations.

Doctrine of Che-u Religion: A belief or set of beliefs held and taught by a Choe Che-u to counter the spread of Christianity and the decline of traditional religious beliefs in Korea.

Foreign Policy Document: A document which contains written foreign policy of Kenya providing a general overview of Kenya's relations with other countries and her international diplomatic exchanges.

International Relations: The practice of how states relate in the international system. It involves interconnectedness of politics, laws and economics on the global level.

Regime: Refers to a form of government or system of rules applied to regulate and control operations of both citizen and the Government in place

Tonghak Movement: An ideological movement in South Korea which also turned out to be a political movement.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CMF	Chief Minister of France
EAC	East Africa Community (EAC)
EU	European Union
EDCF	Economic Development Cooperation Fund
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FORD K	Forum for Restoration of Democracy-Kenya
HDI	Human Development Index
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ISOC	Internet Society
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KAIST	Kenya Advanced Institute for Science and Technology
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KCA	Kikuyu Central Association
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
KOICA	Korean International Cooperation Agency
JKIA	Jomo Kenya International Airport
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LEGCO	Legislative Council of Kenya
LPK	Labour Party of Kenya
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHR	National Human Resource
NPK	National Party of Kenya
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODA	Official Development Assistant

PIMAC	Public Private Infrastructure Investment Management Centre
SKE	South Korean Embassy
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SPSS	Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences
US	United States
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WW1	World War One
WW2	World War Two

ABSTRACT

The emergence of new international economic giants such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, has impelled Kenya to reframe her diplomatic connections on the global arena. Since 2016, there has been a bid to reestablish Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations in order to increase cooperation and collaboration between the two countries. It is noted that irrespective of the fact that the two nations signed diplomatic relations in 1964, the relations are yet to be fully realized. The study examines how Kenya's relations with South Korea was like in the Jomo Kenyatta era, 1963 – 1978. It interrogates dynamics of Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea in the Moi era, 1978 -2002 and further examines how Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations progressed in the Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta eras, 2003 – 2016. The study employed the realism theory which assumes that the notion of national interest is all about desire for power, and that power is the essential compass that guides political realism through the complex terrain of international relations. It also made reference to the international regime theory which is a collection of common expectations; norms and principles; plans; and financial and organizational commitments that a number of countries agreed to. The study adopted descriptive and explorative research designs. The main primary sources of data were interviews, archival data from the Kenya National Archives and the Kenya foreign policy documents. Secondary data was generated through critical textual analysis of books, published reports, magazines, dissertations and journals. The findings revealed that Kenya's desire to position herself on the global stage for economic growth, prestige and reputation; Korean Question and; USA global influence defined Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations from 1964-1978. Also, findings indicated that Kenya's diplomatic trend was cautious while South Korea adopted a more radical revolutionary ideology prioritizing economic growth (self-reliance) and modernization. Further, the study indicated that the Moi era was characterized by high-level visits which saw President Chu Doo-Hwan of South Korea visiting Kenya and later in 1991, president Moi visited South Korea. Findings of this research provide helpful information on how the relations between the two countries has been since 1964 to 2016 and maybe useful for the formulation of better foreign policies for use by both the two countries in upscaling their influence across the globe. Additionally, the study is important in the sense that it adds to the body of knowledge for the academicians, and may acts as a guide for researchers and policymakers.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This section provides the background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, research objectives and research premises. Further, it contains the justification and significance of the study in addition to the scope and limitations.

1.1 Background to the Study

International relation is believed to be as old as the human society is. According to Adler (2013), countries have cooperated for centuries hence it is an act that predates western practices. Drezner (2000), notes that the cooperation which existed amongst countries such as France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Netherland, England, and later Belgium were the very first international relations on the international system. Cooperation amongst all these countries was prompted by common attributes many of which were trans-boundary in nature such as values, language and tradition or cultural practices (Jackson and Sorensen, 2016).

Originally, it was believed that diplomatic relations started as a regional concern whereby countries within specific regions were involved. This is because issues were regionally based. However, as Jackson and Sorensen (2016), argued that as time went by, trans-boundary issues such as population explosion, war, environmental challenges, insecurity, technology and terrorism expanded the relations to include more other countries across the globe.

Tanabe (2016), for instance, observes that the need for a peaceful Europe in 1648 brought together European countries and forced them to reach an agreement on a peaceful solution as a way of attaining socioeconomic and political strength in Europe. It is the document that ultimately became recognized as the Treaty of Westphalia. The Westphalia treaty re-defined international relations by narrowing it down and basing it on the principle of sovereignty. The principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty as argues Mingst (2008), laid a foundation upon which international relations were founded. Also, many other rules, amongst which included noninterference of internal affairs of another country and creation of permanent military organizations were made to help preserve the agreement. However, because of mistrust, ideological differences and fear, the cooperation to remained tense, conflictual, and weak.

Gleijeses (2018), points out that even though the Soviet Union and the United States collectively struggled as allies during the World War One against Axis Powers, their relationship remained tense because; i) the United States was more concerned about Joseph Stalin, the Soviet ruler who they saw as a tyrant ruler and ii) the US was against Communism system which the Soviet Union propagated. The Soviet Union notably had three reasons why it was against United States: they had issue with the American dominance on the international stage; the United States refusal to also recognize USSR as an equal legitimate power; and thirdly, the fact that United States took time before joining World War Two. USSR claimed that this led to the death of thousands of Russians. As a result, these grievances created mutual mistrust and enmity between the two powers.

When World War Two ended in 1945, United States and the Soviet Union both embarked on what Snyder (2018), refers to as expansionist agenda, where-by each side wanted to have influence and control the world. The post war saw the USSR expanding its control in the Eastern Europe. Indeed, the expansionism agenda between the two powers spread over to Africa. This is how the United States and the Soviet Union bloc were caught up in the power struggle (Rothermun, 2014).

Clayton (2014), claims that African countries which were taken over by the US had their cooperations with other countries across the world which were described and controlled by the same power. The same case applied to those controlled by the Soviet Union. It became difficult for African countries to decide which country to relate with as this was a decision for either the USSR or the US to make.

However, this slowly started to change, especially when many African countries got their independence from colonial governments. Ofcansky (2018), posits that this marked the beginning of a new phase of diplomatic African countries' relations with the world at large. Many of the leaders who took over could now decide (in the era of the Cold War) which countries to relate to and whether to side with USSR or the US.

The states-as-actors approach assumes that the general interest and behavior of any country is similar. In this regard, states' behaviors are likened to those of human beings and having human-like characteristics. This is to say that states must be able to make self-choices, and have preferences capable of addressing fears and anger in order to achieve intended satisfaction. Additionally, just like human beings, there must be common motivations that propel the states to their aspirations. According to Moegi (1993), every country must endeavor to be on the lookout for gain, desire for more power and wealth

and be reluctant to part with possessions. As states interact on the global international geographical chessboard, geopolitical considerations are key.

Moegi (1993), noted that as states seek to cooperate and interact, the process is dominated by aggravated conflict. For instance, the propinquity to the interest of another state's zones such as harbors, waterways, is likely to create conflict and hamper cooperation between states. It has also been observed that the geographical distance between countries generally does not affect a country's accessibility to its traditional role of protecting her people since technology has otherwise reduced such distances (Moegi, 1993). When analyzing levels of Kenya and South Korea relations, then geopolitical considerations of inter-state relations is vital in understanding how the two countries have slowly developed their relations.

In 1964 when the Cold War was gaining momentum, Kenya and South Korea formulated their diplomatic relations. However, the relations between South Korea and many African countries only picked very well in March 2006 when Roh Moon Hyun, the then President of South Korea officially visited some of the African countries including Egypt, Nigeria and Algeria (Darracq and Neville, 2014). Later in November 2006, a follow-up Summit was organized in Seoul which brought together various leaders from both Africa and South Korea. It is this summit that appeared to have changed how Africa and South Korea viewed each other. South Korean's relations with African countries changed for the better. At this time, political, diplomatic and economic engagements between the two countries picked.

In 2014, a report by the *Chatham House* noted that the Africa and South Korea relations were motivated by three major events: first, the move by South Korea to establish herself

as a major power on the global stage. This was prompted by the continuous hostility and threats from North Korea. It was aimed at countering any move and influence from North Korea towards South Korea. South Korea increased her engagements with African countries and many others across the globe. She aspired to become a global power (Kotra, 2012).

Secondly, the increased productions in South Korea led to a search for a larger market. The rapid industrial transformation of South Korean industries made her domestic market to become saturated. The country therefore embarked on making her manufactured goods and services export-oriented (Bloomberg News, 8 July 2013). Consequently, Africa became a major target as a potential destination for South Korean products. The region had shown an unrelenting potential for growth and various infrastructural development in terms of availability of labour and wide fertile land. (MOFAT, Seoul, March 2012.).

According to Lee, A. Y., Oh, Y. A., Kim, S. O., Kim, D. S., & Park, S. A. (2018), the third reason why South Korea expanded her presence in Africa was her pursuit for energy and food for her citizen. The Korean War of 1950 to 1953 brought great changes in the Korean agricultural sector. Before the war, a big population of about 70-80 percent actively engaged in farming. This number reduced significantly to about eight (8) percent as a result of reduction in South Korea's food production. As a defense mechanism, the government of South Korea imported over 70-80 percent of the food supply from other countries. Lee, et al (2018), note that the vast fertile African land commanded a lot of interest for South Korea prompting her need to look towards Africa.

In this regard, *the Chatham House report (2014)* indicated that the need for South Korea to take advantage of vast fertile African land made her sign several agreements with

several Sub-Saharan countries. These agreements were aimed at giving South Korea a right to use the vast fertile African land. For instance, the government of Madagascar and South Korea signed a land lease contract in which up to 50% of Madagascar's lesser agricultural farmland to South Korea for a duration of 90 years in return for the construction of infrastructure. However, the deal did not last long because it was invalidated by Andry Rajoelina in 2009 when he assumed the office. Rajoelina accused Marc Ravalomanana, his predecessor, of unfairly entering into a deal with South Korea (Danarson, 2021).

Similarly, Salahuddin, M., Habib, M. A., Al-Mulali, U., Ozturk, I., Marshall, M., & Ali, M. I. (2020), argue that what appeared as a quick move by South Korea to renew bilateral relations with African countries was based on the fact that South Korean economy entirely depended on the imported supply of materials which could easily be gotten from Africa. In fact, it was noted that South Korea was amongst the top five countries importing crude oil and the fourth-largest natural gas importer in the world. According to Behmiri and Manso (2013), the growing energy concern for South Korea and the fact that most African countries have vast oil and gas reserves were the main reason why the country was renewing its bilateral cooperation with African countries.

According to Asongu (2017), in its attempt to strengthen its relations with African countries, the government of South Korea incorporated different mechanisms and strategies such as the introduction of Africa-Korea Economic Cooperation, Africa - South Korea Forum and the Africa – South Korea industry collaboration.

Many of the African countries have continually responded positively to the Korean call for cooperation. Dinnie (2015), noted that most countries in Africa embraced the

cooperation because of their desire of creating a conducive environment and opportunities for their people. For this reason alone, over twenty countries in Africa have open and established missions in Seoul, South Korea (Saxer, 2017).

The Africa Development Bank Group (AFDB) together with the government of South Korea, in October 2016, co-hosted the fifth Ministerial Conference of the Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC) in Seoul under the theme "Turning Africa's Agriculture via Industrial growth and Equitable Financing". The objective of the conference was to emphasize on the need to strengthen Africa and Korea bilateral relations. According to Kim (2016), attendees of the conference included representatives such as heads of state and governments, ambassadors, Ministers of Finance, non-governmental organizations and bank managers from various countries in Africa. All of the attendees in the conference agreed that South Korea was indeed determined to reach her international status as a powerful superpower. South Korea took advantage of the summit to strengthen ties with countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

During the summit (October, 24th to 27th, 2016), five ways of strengthening Africa-South Korea cooperation were suggested and agreed upon, including, financial and economic agreements, knowledge sharing, grants for Africa, technical assistance and private-public cooperation (Hwang, 2014). Following the agreement, through the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), the government of South Korea, through African Development Bank and Exim Bank of Korea signed up to US \$600 million, a financial agreement to finance various projects in Africa including Kenya.

Kenya and South Korea established diplomatic ties in 1964. However, Kenya preferred to use her embassy in Japan to oversee South Korea until July 2007. This was when

Kenya proclaimed a shift from mainly political to focusing more on economic diplomacy in her foreign policy. As an act of strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries, Kenya dispatched the first ever ambassador to South Korea in 2009 to oversee South Korea directly from Seoul.

The sending of the Kenya's Ambassador to South Korea was prompted by the need of Kenya to expand her relations with likeminded countries like South Korea. It should be noted that from the early 1960s, Kenya and South Korea went through same experiences in terms of their history, socio-political, economic and leadership styles. These experiences have, in one way or the other, contributed in shaping and influencing the trend in which the relations between the two countries happened from 1964 to 2016. However, there has been little effort put into examining the patterns in Kenya-South Korea diplomatic ties over this this time.

The study investigates developments in Kenya-South Korea bilateral relations from 1964 to 2016, so as to give analyzed and thorough statistics on the relations. The study assesses how nationalistic ideological trends contributed in shaping Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations. It further looks at how the politics of the Cold War influenced Kenya-South Korea relations, as well as how Kenya's leadership styles impacted on the relations. The study equally examines the elements of international trade relations.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations were signed in 1964. South Korea (immediately) opened its embassy in Nairobi while Kenya preferred to oversee South Korea from Japan. However, Kenya began performing her diplomatic mission in South Korea in 1982. Subsequent to the country's paradigm shift in its foreign policy from purely political to a stronger focus on economic diplomacy, the country opened a consular in Soeul in 2007, and had its first ambassador (Amb. Ngovi Kitau) sent in 2009. However, the visit to Kenya in 2016 by Park-Guen-hee (the then president) of South Korea revealed that since 1964, the two countries have not achieved much as it was intended. Both Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya and Park-Guen-hee of South Korea acknowledged a need to relook at the relation with a view of strengthening it in order to achieve intended goals. The study therefore undertakes a review of Kenya and South Korea diplomatic relations by examining trends of this relations from 1964 to 2016.

1.3 Research Objectives

The objectives of the study were:

- i. To examine Kenya and South Korea diplomatic relations in the Jomo Kenyatta era, 1963 – 1978.
- ii. To assess the dynamics of Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea in the Moi era, 1978 -2002.
- iii. To evaluate trends in Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations in the Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta eras, 2003 – 2016.

1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions guided the study:

- i. How was Kenya's relations with South Korea like in the Jomo Kenyatta era, 1963 – 1978?
- ii. What were the dynamics of Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea in the Moi era, 1978 -2002?
- iii. How did Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations progress in the Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta eras, 2003 – 2016?

1.5 Justification and Significance of the Study

The visit to Kenya by South Korea's President Park Geun-hye in 2016 revealed gaps which existed in diplomatic relations between the two countries. Speaking in Nairobi, both President Park Geun-Hye and Uhuru Kenyatta admitted that the relation between the two countries has not been very strong as it supposed to be. In this regard, they agreed to re-look into their relations and further identify areas of possible relations. The intention of this was to strengthen and enhance the relation of the two countries work better than before.

It was during this visit when the future-oriented relations in various areas were established such as: high-level diplomatic visits, including presidents, prime ministers, and speakers of the National Assembly; signing trade and investment agreements to promote economic partnership; and opening the Department of Korean Studies at the University of Nairobi; development cooperation; science and technology; Information and Communication Technology; climate change; health care, new growth industries and various culture avenues.

Probing the factors behind the inspirations for strengthening, maintaining and extending Kenya and South Korea diplomatic relations was necessary as the findings of this

research provide helpful information on how the relations between the two countries has been since its formulation in 1964 to 2016. Findings maybe useful for the formulation of better foreign policies for use by both the two countries in upscaling their influence across the globe.

Also, the study accounts for Kenya's foreign policy and national interests as far as her relations with states in Asia is concerned. Thus, findings herein may be useful for Kenya in her attempt to increase and strengthen her international presence amongst Asian nations, as she positions herself as a strategic political and economic partner of South Korea in Africa.

South Korea was chosen because, just like Kenya, South Korea was also one of the major capitalist allies of the United States, and the two countries are therefore of the same ideological and economic orientation the entire world was concerned.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

This research focused on Kenya-South Korea diplomatic trends, 1964 - 2016. The study's geographic scope was constrained to Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya, which hosts Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of South Korean, where the study was conducted.

Albeit the year 1964 was selected as the start of the study, the researcher dived into the period before 1964 to better understand the emergence of Kenya as a sovereign state.

In terms of limitations, language barrier was a major challenge in the study, especially at the South Korean Embassy in Nairobi. However, the researcher hired two research assistants who were competent in Korean in order to get around this challenge.

Also, some of the respondents were reluctant to give information because of the sensitivity of the information. The researcher had to assure them that all information given are purely meant for education purposes. As well, the researcher confirmed to them that their identities will not be revealed.

Further, there were several delays in securing appointments with some of the respondents even as others kept on postponing. The researcher overcome this by being patience and with several follow-ups.

1.7 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This section analyses and interrogates various literature relevant to the study. Besides identifying the existing knowledge gaps in the already done works, existing literature helped the researcher in advancing arguments and providing pieces of evidence/support for his claims, arrived at during the study.

The chapter has delineated the theories used throughout the study and indicated how various theoretical concepts have been applied. The discussions in the study were built using the liberal theory of international relations.

1.8 Inter-State Relations

State-to-state relations is not really a new occurrence on the international scene. It is a fundamental human action that transcends all social structures and is considered as an essential avenue for countries to settle their complex issues (Adler, 2013). Different nations have used diplomacy as a key element in the creation of their foreign and domestic policies, and it is what oftentimes defines the behaviors of all players on the global stage. The importance of state-to-state interaction in the global society cannot be overstated.

Adler (2013), further argues that the significance of diplomatic ties through peaceful and cooperative international relations is a topic of worry to any government as the world continues to become closer due to new developments such as: increased communications technologies, a complex interdependent world economy, and rapid air transportation. According to Mingst (2008), diplomatic relations among nations could be dated back to medieval times in the 15th century. This was when the first diplomatic missions were created in Italy during the Italian system of city-states.

During this time, Niccolò Machiavelli, an Italian political thinker, served as the Republic of Florence's foreign affairs minister for nearly fourteen years. Niccolò Machiavelli, while serving as a diplomat and foreign affairs minister helped the Republic of Florence to launch many missions with many countries, including Rome and France. He made repeated trips to the courts of Louis XII and Spain, earning him a good reputation (Knutsen, 2016). In France (1624-1642), a similar system was witnessed when Cardinal Richelieu, the Chief Minister of France (CMF), portrayed diplomatic contacts with countries as a continuous issue rather than a one-time event.

Cardinal Richelieu merged all international affairs activities into a single ministry. Later, France established missions in all of the world's major cities (Adler, 2013). The studies above trace the emergence of diplomatic relations in Europe which the current study utilizes in laying the foundation upon which the Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations are based.

According to Jackson and Sorensen (2016), in Europe, the cross-border relations started when the treaty of Westphalia was agreed upon and signed in 1648. The treaty opened doors for numerous European countries to reach out to neighboring countries and began

making contacts. On the same note, scholars like Ling (2016), Buzan (2015), and Lawson (2015), believe that the treaty marked the beginning of international relations as countries began to interact on a global scale. The principles of territory, sovereignty, and non-interference in other states' foreign affairs were founded and institutionalized by the Peace of Westphalia. It further led to the formation of permanent national military forces (Bakker, 2014). In light of these circumstances, the current study examined whether the Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations was anchored on the principles of the Treaty of Westphalia and whether the relations have been of mutual benefit or not for the two countries.

Looking at the growth of international relations among states, moreso, soon after the 1st and 2nd World Wars (1914-1918 and 1940-1945). Holsti (2016), claims that relations developed gradually, particularly when the other powers, such as China, United States, and Japan embraced a new form of diplomacy. The study benefited from Holsti's observation which shed more light on how China, United States and Japan operates and has been able to shape the diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Korea. The study therefore utilized the entry of these major powers into the international scene to analyze how that entry informed Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea.

Separately, Keohane (2017), looked at the evolution of African diplomatic ties. According to his conclusions, most countries began "real" diplomatic ties following their independence in the 1950s, when they began making their own objective judgments. African countries' diplomatic ties had previously been determined by their former colonial powers. Maumo (2009), cites Israel as an example of a country that developed a complex network and strong diplomatic ties with various countries in Africa such

as Kenya, Nigeria, DRC, Ghana, Tanzania, and Gabon, after they gained independence from Britain. The studies above generally focused on the individual initiatives by African countries upon independence, to establish diplomatic ties with other countries but have not specifically addressed the diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Korea which the study sought to interrogate.

Mendonça, S., Damásio, B., de Freitas, L. C., Oliveira, L., Cichy, M., & Nicita, A. (2022), noted that many African countries have increased their bilateral engagements with latest global financial powers like Singapore, China, Hong Kong, and South Korea because of the justification deduced from the assertion that technological indirect costs in foreign investments yield spillover exchanges in different forms. In addition, when adding to the argument as to why developing countries opted for the "look East policy", Moyo (2009), emphasized that Eastern countries do not impose the same stringent restrictions on their aid as Western countries.

Second, she believes that the West was (and still is) seeking to impose its values, culture, and ideologies on Africans, which China, for example does not. Third, she argues that the support that African countries receives from the West has done more harm than good. The above observations were useful for the study since they aided in throwing additional insights on the new trends in Kenya's and South Korea's diplomatic ties in the post-Kibaki era.

Arshad-Ayaz (2020), argues that despite the attempt by several African countries to improve on their relations with newly emerging powers, research has shown that foreign direct investments have contributed significantly to underdevelopment in many African countries. However, Orr and Kennedy (2008), argue differently in their work noting that

many scholars have focused solely on economic relations, overlooking other important aspects in which African countries have interacted with some other countries outside of the continent. Some of these aspects include: diplomatic relations, sports diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy and military diplomacy. These were the gaps the study aimed to close, by going beyond just looking at Kenya's relations with South Korea from an economic lens but also from other lenses such as political, technological and even military.

Looking at Kenya and Britain diplomatic relations, Kamau (2013), observes that the United Kingdom signed a bilateral relations agreement with Kenya with the aim of: preserving and promoting her investments, protecting her residents who chose to remain after independent, and to boost trade, mainly on tea and coffee exports, with Kenya. As Kamau further notes, Kenya and the United Kingdom successfully maintained diplomatic ties throughout the post-colonial times as a way of enabling Kenya realize her vision 2030. Whether or not this same school of thought influenced the Kenya-South Korea relations is something that the study was interested in interrogating.

In his study on the Kenya-US relations, Moegi (1993), argues that although relations had been strong from since Kenya gained independence in 1963, the US began what was afterwards dubbed as the "Small Military Assistance Program (1974) when Kenya faced an escalating threat from Uganda and Somalia, both of which were armed by the Soviet Union. To counter the threat, Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, travelled to Nairobi to finalize arrangements for the sale of 12 F-5 jet fighters.

This action showed readiness by the US to maintain and strengthen her presence in not just Kenya, but the Horn of Africa, despite tense relations with Ethiopia at the time of

Haile Sellasie's ouster. Also, President Jimmy Carter, in March 1978, received a Kenyan delegation led by then Vice-President Daniel Arap Moi, who expressed Kenya's worries about circumstances that were going on in the Horn of Africa. The delegation went ahead and requested for more support in military equipment. President Carter affirmed American financial and military support and pledged to continue the arms embargo on Somalia. However, Moegi (1993), also notes, trade, investments and foreign assistance had an impact on the relationship between Kenya and the US.

Additionally, he avers that Kenya's geopolitical location in the Horn of Africa and her security issue with Somalia are some of the aspects that have had significant impact on Kenya-US interaction and relations. Moegi's study has captured Kenya-US relations up to Moi's era, whereas the study goes beyond Moi's era and looks at the dynamics and areas of Kenya-South Korea relations in the Kibaki era when a new constitutional dispensation determined how Kenya's foreign policy and her dealings with other states would be formulated and conducted respectively.

On Kenya-France relations, Kombo (2019), argues that the strategic location of Kenya in the continent has been a main driving force behind France's efforts to expand relations with Kenya. This, France has done by using soft power language as a cultural tool to enhance diplomatic relations with Kenya. However, whereas the French has gained additional popularity in Kenya. The impact French on French-Kenyan relations, specifically in terms of economic and political links, remained unclear.

This notwithstanding, France continues to strengthen her approach to developing her relations with Kenya, especially given the growing influence of China in the region. France's language and soft power strategy have largely worked to achieve the country's

short-term goals in Kenya. For instance, more Kenyans have become familiar with the French language and culture. Additionally, as Kombo (2019), continues to argue, France's soft power policy in Kenya has been making gradual gains towards having Kenyans embrace the French culture.

Consequently, the Kenyan government and its French counterpart have strengthened their bilateral and multilateral relations. Based on the above observations, it was important to interrogate the nature, trends and dynamics of Kenya-South Korea bilateral cooperation, with a view of assessing whether or not these relations have been anchored on soft power and the use of language as the driving force during the beginning of formal links between the two nations.

Imbisi (2015), on the other hand examines and accounts for German-Kenyan development cooperation 1963 - 2003. He discusses the history, characteristics, and progress of Germany's development support in Kenya. His observations are set with regard to the history of Cold War politics and the circumstances which informed the consensual growth of cooperations between Kenya and South Korea. Imbisi (2015), continues to argue that Germany, in one way or the other, took a lead in the way she has related with Kenya and many other countries across the world.

For instance, Germany operationalized her donor and foreign assistance policy within Kenya's formal policy frameworks, which was referred to as the *Friedenpolitik doctrines*, Hallstein and economic self-interest. There have been other reports that did spell out German's official aid policies and practices. Imbisi (2015), further claims that, while Germany's foreign assistance strategy aided Kenya's modernization and neo-classical prosperity, it also further entangled Kenya in a reliance relationship.

Still, as the writer continues to argue, the two countries have developed an interdependent relationship. He notes that German aid connections with Kenya were minimal in 1990 and 2002 because Germany was also on the forefront of pressing for democratic changes in Kenya.

The study has brought to the fore Germany's official policy framework and conditionalities as far as her economic relations with Kenya is concerned. The study therefore utilized this western form of information authored and authorized by the West, to understand whether countries from the East also imposed conditionalities in their relations with African states, within the context of Kenya-South Korea relations. The absence or presence of such conditionalities and official policy framework are some of the loopholes this research intended to fill.

In Africa, during the apartheid era, Kenya had a clandestine engagement with South Africa. However, critics disagreed, claiming that the interaction by Kenya with South Africa during the apartheid period could be viewed using the lens of the country's post-independence external strategy standards and practices, rather than living peacefully. That Kenya failed to see the premeditated relevance of backing the ruling political party by then (African National Congress) in its struggle against apartheid both under Jomo Kenyatta and subsequently Arap Moi (East African Community, Facts & Figures Report, 2013).

Closer to home, Kenya has worked to enhance her strategic national interests by accepting political agendas which were regionally inclined, as a cautious attempt to safeguard her economic and geopolitical objectives. As a result, Kenya remains a host country for several diplomatic missions in Nairobi. This has contributed in helping the

country maintain her bilateral connections with her neighbors leading to the signing of bilateral economic and trade collaboration agreements with various countries.

Moreover, according to Kamau (2013), Kenya's history of regional cooperation is extensive, especially with Tanzania and Uganda which are her two East African neighbors and significant commercial partners. In 1948, the East African High Commission was established to support inter-territorial cooperation. As Kisiangani, E., Kok, N., Dzinesa, G., & Sangqu, S. (2014), contend that the relations between Kenya and her neighboring countries such as Tanzania and Uganda originated from the late 18th and early 19th centuries when the three countries were dubbed the British East Africa Protectorate. The focus of these two studies is on the emergence of Kenya's diplomatic ties with her neighbors at a regional level, a discussion that the current study utilizes to assess the emergence of Kenya's diplomatic ties with South Korea at a cross continental level, which both Kamau and Kisiangani et al did not capture in their works.

Hwa (2015), extensively compared inequalities between South Korea and Kenya, where he dwells widely on economic progression of the two countries over time. He identifies some factors which helped South Korea build and develop her economy into a middle-class economy before Kenya. Hwa notes that, South Korea adopted a rapid change in her educational system where she promoted technological improvement and encouraged citizens to explore this area. As a result, South Korea built a positive political attitude and social consciousness among her citizens, which contributed much to the realization of improved economy ahead of Kenya.

Hwa's study compares factors which have helped South Korea to develop into a middle-class society, but fails to explore the nature of Kenya and South Korea diplomatic

relations has progressed, whether political, economic or cultural. This was the lacuna that the present study aimed to close.

Although other studies such as UNDP (2013), Pradhan (2009), Mudipanu and Yeo (2008), as well as Henrich et al. (2010), have examined and compared the economic rise of Asiatic states such as South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand among others, these studies specifically focused on active heavy investment by some of these states. As a result, their citizens' capital development was supported, and none-income disparity was reduced. Second, unlike underdeveloped nations like Kenya, the government of South Korea focused on its citizens' national human resources (NHR), changed the country's education system, and strengthened science and technology development (Republic of Kenya and UNDP, 2013).

Mudipanu and Yeo (2008), nonetheless, in order to get a general conclusion, concentrated on the connections involving South Korea and a couple of African nations, such as the DRC, South Africa, and Ghana. Also, in their study of the extent to which South Korea has ties with countries in African, Henrich et al. (2010), observed that the relations dwelt on the business-related cooperation angle.

The study further observed that Samsung, Daewoo, Hyundai and LG42, all of which are South Korean companies, procured over 90% of business projects between 1985 and 2005 in African countries and projected that future collaboration between African countries and South Korea would be more symbiotic in character, with both benefiting from each other. They maintained that by partnering with South Korea, Sub-Saharan African countries would be able to achieve more sustainable growth and expand their

share of the global market, particularly in exports. Given these observations, it is evident that there is a lacuna in scholarship which necessitates this current study.

There was need to interrogate specific relations between Kenya and South Korea at a diplomatic and bilateral level. Such a study taking that diplomatic dimension between the two countries has not been given any serious scholarly attention, hence did the study. Further, just like Mudipanu and Yeo (2008), who have discussed Africa's relations with South Korea in a general manner, combining several areas such as economic relations, bilateral trade agreements, and diplomatic relations with many Sub-Saharan countries, Henrich, et al. (2010), in their findings have also given a general explanation on Africa cooperation with South Korea, which may not accurately depict the scope of South Korea's cooperation with certain African countries. Thus, a thorough examination of South Korea's relations with particular Sub-Saharan African nations was necessary. This current study emphasizes on Kenya and examines trends in Kenya and South Korea diplomatic cooperation.

While Hwa (2015), looks at the economic inequality between Kenya and South Korea.

Hyun (2015), in his study uses police services to discuss comparatively the emergence and progression of corruption in Kenya and South Korea over the time before, during and even after independence. He goes on to explain how, in contrast to Kenya, South Korea has been able to manage the vice, and argues that South Korea has made significant success in the war against corruption. Hyun's study examines corruption in Kenyan and South Korean security system, but fails to assess the relations between the two countries.

On the other hand, Maurer and Morgus (2014), study focuses on the progress that the two countries have made in terms of cyber security as a collective diplomacy. In

their argument, they note that both Kenya and South Korea have made significant achievements and progress in this area.

They further claim that just like does South Korea, Kenya is very interested in information and communication technology (ICT) making it an area which the two countries could cooperate on. They take note of Kenya's continued concern on matters cyber security. UNESCO and Internet Society (ISOC) have also looked at Kenya's and South Korea's cyber security along the same line. Together with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), these three organizations have looked at the internet set-up in aspects such as: access, connection and speed in Kenya and South Korea and established that in terms of these three aspects, South Korea is much advanced than Kenya.

These studies have compared internet connectivity between Kenya and South Korea, but have failed to interrogate whether cyber security was able to inform Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea. Nevertheless, this current study utilizes the results of above studies to lay the foundation upon which Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea were based.

It is therefore evident from the reviewed literature that there are gaps that exist as far as Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea is concerned, since a number of studies have just looked at the involvement of South Korea with African states from a general perspective. No specific study has interrogated Kenya's diplomatic relations with South-Korea by examining the emergence and genesis of their diplomatic relations, the nature of their diplomatic relations across various political regimes in Kenya up to 2016, and the

changing diplomatic trends amidst the politics that surrounded Cold War as well as the new constitutional dispensation (2010) in Kenya which shaped international relations.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework which supports the study is Realism Theory. However, the study also made reference to the International Regime Theory.

1.9 International Regime Theory

According to Waltz (2014), International Regime Theory gained popularity in the 1960s as a result of various problems with the realist model's key assumptions that international system is politically marked by anarchy. Robert Keohane, one of the most important contributors to International Regime Theory, doubted whether a long-term cooperation among states can be achieved in anarchical environment. International Regime Theory, according to Keohane (2004), is a collection of common expectations; norms and principles; plans; and financial and organizational commitments that a number of countries throughout the world have agreed to. Similarly, international institutions are defined as sets of hidden or open rules comprised of the decision-making methods by which various stakeholders agree in specific issues deemed necessary for the relations.

In this case, Keohane (2004), argues that principles could be facts, causation or prudence. Norms, on the other hand, are the accepted standards of behavior that are either good/right or bad/wrong. They might also be viewed as responsibilities. The particular standards that guide behaviors are known as rules. The overall application of collaborative choice and agreed action is referred to as decision making. According to Regime Theory, international institutions have a direct impact on the behavior of states and other participants in global politics. Regardless of the fact that the global order is

anarchic, the idea claims that governments can still work together on trans-boundary concerns.

Cooperation can take place in a range of spaces including: trade, human rights and even maintaining global peace. Regimes are designed to work together in order to achieve a specific goal. For Booth and Erskine (2016), the team spirit of cooperation among different actors is what has necessitated actions of these actors (individual actor or organization) to align with the others through policy coordination and agreements.

In their conclusion, Booth and Erskine (2016), observed that collaboration in the international system occurs when various players alter their conduct in anticipation of other people's desires. This served the study's objectives, especially, in explaining the development of Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations over time. Kuyper (2014), on the other hand, believes that Regime Theory may not be the ideal theory for comprehending the international system. This is due to a number of flaws, particularly in the way its assumptions are employed to construct hypotheses.

For one, it has been critiqued for overemphasizing the world's anarchic nature; second, it has been challenged for focusing too much on international politics while disregarding internal politics, which critics claim is the predictor of reasons why states cooperate. This therefore, renders the International Regime Theory inadequate to study Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations, which is also influenced by domestic factors. The study therefore adopted Realism Theory as its theoretical framework of analysis.

1.9.1 Realist Theory

In the context of international relations, the Realist Theory, commonly referred to as Political Realism, consists of different types of methods and models used in analyzing

global politics. For realists, states are indeed the main players mostly on global scene. This is due to the fact that each state is interested with its own security, and pursuit for national objectives. The state likewise possesses coercive power and is supposed to act rationally (Morgenthau, 1978). Hans Morgenthau (1978), was a key figure in the realist school of philosophy. He asserts that the most crucial element influencing how the global system functions is power. For him, the fact that the global structure lacks morality in the manner in which states cooperate, the result is anarchic, where there can never be a worldwide government to regulate the states' conduct of business.

As primary players on the global system, states have continually engaged in both external and internal affairs in their attempt to improve successful strategies, as well as external efforts to engage or disengage with other states so as to protect, spread and maximize influence. As part of the balance of power, which mostly determines the pattern of interactions, alignments and groupings, Morgenthau contends that, member countries and participants must rely on any form of structure they can come up with to protect their security and survival because the global system is disorderly by design. This strategy is based on the idea of consciousness. Further, he goes on to say that when structures shift, the patterns of interaction and alliance among their members also change, including the expected outcomes of such interactions. Additionally, there is also a power theory version inside the realist theory.

Hans Morgenthau coined the term "power theory." This is what he refers to as Political Realism, which is a theoretically and empirically consistent explanation of international politics. This work's analysis is primarily focused on the notion of national interest, that is defined in terms of power, as the essential compass that guides political realism

through the complex terrain of international politics. This idea attempts to offer reason capable of providing an understanding on what international politics is. It sets politics apart as a distinct area of influence and understanding from other sectors like economics, aesthetics and religion. Whether international or domestic, and without such conceptions, a theory of politics would be impossible because it would be challenging to distinguish between political facts or bring some degree of logical sequence to the realm of politics.

According to Polin (2019), the phrase "national interest" was coined in by Plato to describe his elitist ideology of the philosopher king, whereby behaviors and the actions of men (material and/or ideal) are overtaken directly by national interest (ideal or material), not ideas. This is what he refers to as the "public good" or "polis good." The "universal welfare," according to Aristotle, is the national interest. For him, the process entails open and ongoing debate as well as the voicing of varied perspectives on the common good. Morgenthau contends that national interests should drive diplomatic policy rather than idealistic and dangerous moralistic, juridical and ideological standards.

The term "national interest" has a residual meaning of survival. As a result, nation-states must defend their political, physical and cultural identities as a bare minimum. Physical identity is defined as the preservation of a nation-territorial state's integrity, whereas political identity is defined as the preservation of existing political-economic systems, and cultural identity is defined as the preservation of linguistic, ethnic and religious standards.

According to Adnan (2014), the concept of national interest may suggest certain core principles or aims that most citizens embrace to some extent (like security, peace and prosperity). The relevance of economic considerations in shaping foreign policy is

emphasized in this approach. During The study, Realism Theory provided an understanding on the development and progress of Kenya and South Korea bilateral relations while examining how each regime, beginning from President Jomo Kenyatta in 1964 to President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2016, viewed and pursued the idea of national interest in their bilateral relations with South Korea.

1.9.2 Research Methodology

The following topics are generally included in this section: research design, study area and study population, sampling size and methodologies, research tools, data collecting, data analysis procedures, data management, and ethical considerations.

1.9.3 Research Design

The study adopted qualitative research design and concentrated on descriptive and explorative procedures. The qualitative research design was significant in that it produced descriptive data which allowed the researcher to contact important sources in order to acquire in-depth material on Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations throughout the study period. The researcher was able to provide specifics by detailing the data's findings. The researcher used an exploratory design to delve into and identify the extent to which Kenya and South Korea were linked from 1964 to 2016.

1.9.4 Location of the Study

Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya, served as the study's location. Also, it is the administrative centre of Kenya as well as the commercial capital. Nairobi occupies an area of 696 Square kilometers and was chosen because the Kenya's Foreign Affairs Ministry of Kenya as well as the South Korean Embassy are situated there. For this reason, carrying out oral interviews with key informants and other targeted respondents

of the two governments was possible. However, concerning coverage and reaching out to retired diplomats and embassy officials, the researcher was forced to go to the outskirts of Nairobi in order to schedule and undertake oral interviews with these officers (Ref A2).

1.9.5 Target Population

Kenyans and South Koreans from the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the South Korean Embassy in Westlands, Nairobi, were the study's target demographics, who were or still are staff of the said institutions. This is because they were best placed to give insight on the relations under study, as they were aware of the diplomatic engagements between Kenya and South Korea. Renowned scholars of international relations and diplomacy were also part of the population. Similarly, key respondents for The study included Kenyan ambassador to South Korea and South Korean ambassador to Kenya, alongside relevant attachés of the two governments. Other target population for The study included retired diplomats and academicians, Korean religious organizations, staff working at the South Korean cultural centres in Kenya, staff working in South Korean television stations, staff in the Kenyan embassy in Korea, South Korean traders in Kenya, Kenyan students in South Korea, Kenyan traders and entrepreneurs importing or exporting goods to South Korea, among others.

1.9.6 Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The study employed a non-probability sampling strategy, often known as purposeful or purposive sampling, to pick respondents among Kenyans and South Koreans who were relevant to the study (at Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of South Korea in Nairobi). Purposive or deliberate selection of specific people the researcher knew could provide important information for the study was used as the sampling approach. The sample size of the study was narrowed down to 77 respondents distributed

as: 15 officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 retired diplomats; 10 Academicians; 5 South Korean commercial and political attachés, 10 staff at Korean cultural centre; 5 television station officials in the South Korean embassy in Nairobi; 15 Kenyan traders/entrepreneurs importing and exporting goods to and from South Korea; 10 South Korean traders in Kenya; and 2 International law experts. The study settled on 77 respondents because of the repetitive nature of responses given by respondents. At this sample size, the researcher concluded that the study had reached the saturated point and achieved the desired outcome.

1.9.7 Research Instruments

Field interview schedules, questionnaires, telephone/mobile phones, recording devices (tape recorder/phone), and e-mail were used to collect primary data. Furthermore, the researcher utilized open-ended questions, which allowed him to obtain thorough information from the respondents (Ref A1). During the interviews, the researcher used a probing strategy, which involved asking the respondents questions from the interview schedule, and the interviewer would then ask for clarifications and examples wherever necessary, for the purposes of clarity and collection of in-depth data.

1.9.8 Data Collection Procedures

The study drew on two complimentary sources: written and oral sources, which were categorized as primary and secondary data. In-depth oral interviews provided the primary data. The Kenya National Archives materials, parliamentary Hansards, and Kenya foreign policy documents were used to compile the primary written sources. To gather data, the researcher employed both primary and secondary sources. The researcher mostly relied on information gathered through interviews and focus group discussions.

Secondary sources of information included current reports about Kenya foreign policy document, existing academic literature such as: newspapers, theses, books, journals and the internet.

1.9.9 Piloting Study and Reliability of Research Instruments

Prior to conducting the in-depth inquiry, the researcher conducted a pilot study. He visited the Embassy of South Korea in Nairobi to pre-test research instruments, and interviewed five respondents, because the Embassy only allowed for five. During the piloting study, research tools continued to produce consistent responses which convinced the researcher that they (tools) were reliable, and the researcher then proceeded accordingly.

1.9.9.1 Data Analysis Procedure

The researcher rigorously selected and filtered the data after it was acquired. Sorting and sifting, according to Woodwell (2013), entails looking for kinds, classes, sequences, patterns and processes. The data was then reassembled and recreated in a more thorough and relevant manner.

1.9.9.2 Data Management

Data management or documentation is the way in which a researcher keeps or stores all of the field data gathered to prevent and avoid cases of omission and destructions of valuable data. In The study, summaries of the collected data were recorded on a paper and the original documents kept safely for possible future references.

1.9.9.3 Ethical Considerations

The researcher got all relevant clearances and letters from Kenyatta University, and a research permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI), which is one of the conditions the research to take place. During the study, the researcher provided the permission letter to the Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of South Korea in Nairobi, respectively. The researcher informed all respondents that all information they provided would be utilized exclusively for academic purposes and kept private. The next chapter (Chapter two) discusses the emergence of diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Korea.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 KENYA-SOUTH KOREA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE JOMO KENYATTA ERA, 1963-1978

2.1 Introduction

This chapter traces the beginning of Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations immediately Kenya received her independence in 1963, becoming a republic in 1964. It investigated the relations between the two countries in period between 196-1978, at a time the global space was characterized and occupied by the events of the Cold War politics. This period is crucial because it is a period when most countries in Africa were gaining independence and their support by other states for positions in the United Nations Committees and resolutions was crucial.

The chapter therefore interrogates the “Korean Question” which was at the centre of world politics as South Korea expanded her diplomatic ties with many of the African states, which were just getting out of colonialism. The chapter highlights the politics (both local and international) behind Kenya-South Korea diplomatic ties in the Jomo Kenyatta era. It also analyses the trends and patterns of South Korea - Kenya diplomatic relations, while taking into consideration the economic models that Kenya was operating under, as captured in the manifesto of Kenya’s ruling party, the Kenya African National Union. This manifesto was anchored on an economic model known as African socialism, captured in the sessional paper no 10 of 1965.

2.2 Early development of Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations

A year before Kenya broke loose from the grip of colonial rule, South Korea, which was by then a rickety Asian nation was laying the cornerstones of what would later become an

economic powerhouse admired across the world. As Kenya was at the pick of demanding self-rule, South Korea pursued redemption from crippling poverty. South Korea's journey to a modern industrial hub had just begun with the rollout of an ambitious development plan to boost growth and warm up welfare of citizens.

During an interview with Heon (O.I, 2020) at the South Korean Cultural Centre in Nairobi, it was noted that, "the successful progression of Korean economy is hinged on the implementation of Economic Development Plan of 1962, which aggressively promoted exports for capital accumulation and was spearheaded by a team of top economists and business experts"

In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, who is often placed amongst the likes of Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, and Julius Nyerere as the crop of leaders that ushered independence to formerly colonized African states was at the forefront of changing Kenya's global narrative by establishing working system and networks across the world.

At the same time, Kenya's stated official foreign policy being 'positive non-alignment' i.e. a rejection of 'Western Capitalism and Eastern Communism', the country maintained favorable relations with Britain and the United States, sustaining a pro-West and pro-capitalist outlook. As a result, foreign policy decisions were made from these perspectives, which affected domestic policies as well.

The pro-West and pro-capitalist outlook which Jomo Kenyatta embraced and had Kenya's foreign policy formulated around, made Kenya and South Korea to reach out to reach other with a desire to cooperate together on the global stage, taking note that South Korea was an ally of the United States of America.

Also, during the interview, one respondent Kim (O.I, 2021), noted that, “bilateral relations between Kenya and South Korea became possible because of Jomo Kenyatta desire to participate and have a voice in world issues, and more specifically, African issues.” For this reason, Jomo Kenyatta initiated Foreign Policies with the ability to achieve both domestic international objectives with the ability to form a strong post-colonial Kenyan state.

It is noted that the year the founding President Jomo Kenyatta declared war on poverty, disease and ignorance, South Korea faced acute starvation due to consistent war at the Korean peninsula, prompting goodwill from nations as a matter of urgency. Jomo Kenyatta gave a helping hand to South Korea of up to \$10,000 (Sh892,200) loan and relief food. This was an act which cemented friendship between the two countries and laid a foundation upon which the two countries established diplomatic relations.

2.3 The Korean Question and Her Diplomatic Endeavors

Darracq & Neville (2014) maintain that the past and present of South Korea's Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) strategy should be evaluated through the lens of inter-Korean ties. South Korea's engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was to a large extent influenced by Cold War political rivalries. Also, the events on the Korean peninsula played a major role in the country's early diplomatic adoption of SSA, and the same continues to influence her operations in the region.

The 'Korean Question' became a constant topic at the United Nations after the Korean War ended. South Korea became increasingly worried about Pyongyang's rapid forging of diplomatic connections with newly independent Sub-Sahara African countries. South Korea was concerned that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was

increasingly establishing friendships with many countries across the world, an act which, South Korea thought could lead to UN recognition of the DPRK at the expense of the South. Though North Korea was expanding her influence, the country was still poor, with an income per capita comparable to Ghana's at the time of independence in 1957, but still had a substantial diplomatic edge over the South as a richer nation. Fearing international isolation, South Korea began accumulating foreign partners in SSA in 1961, starting with Benin (formerly Dahomey), Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, and afterwards Kenya (Darracq & Neville, 2014).

Kenya's extreme anxiety of Soviet control, known as "Russophobia," dates back to the colonial administration's perception of all independence fighters as Soviet-inspired communist agitators prior to independence. When Kenya became an independent state, the new leadership acquired the established economic base as well as superstructural notions, including that of Russophobia. All communist elements in Kenya were repressed within a few years, and Kenyan leaders still linked any criticism of government policy to Soviet-style communism.

Also, what made Kenya to get into Cold War politics could perhaps be explained in terms of the American need for a new military dominance in the world, and further, the rise of the Soviet Union's influence as a global power with interests and participation in various parts of the world. This Cold War politics thus drew both South Korea and Kenya on the side of the USA, and this explains why it was easy and possible for both Kenya and South Korea to engage in a non-suspicious diplomatic relation (Makinda, O.I, 2021).

According to Mahoney J, Thelen K, eds (2015:97-120), Kenya acquired her governance structure as a result of favorable conditions that prevailed under the international law.

This was made possible because of the independence which Kenya gained from Britain in 1963, especially, when Kenya accepted obligations, rights and advantages accrued in the international law. Mahoney and Thelen (2015:97-120), showed that the country acquired administrative norms, institutions and processes that were close to western ideals. That Kenya-Britain cooperation demonstrated that Britain accounts for 75 percent of Kenya's armaments trade, with Kenya accounting for a significant portion of investments within the East African region by Britain.

Kenya's politico-military collaboration with the United Kingdom played a critical role in helping the country to receive support from the United Kingdom in the face of foreign criticism. Kenya's foreign policy was greatly impacted by bipolar politics, which placed the communist East against the capitalist West. This started way back at independence. The war for Kenya's independence had a sprinkle of communism, mostly promoted by the rhetoric about the peasant revolution fueling the insurrection against the colonial authorities. After independence, despite political rivalries mirroring competing ideological goals, Kenya's foreign policy shifted direction. Jomo Kenyatta, the country's first president, linked his administration with the West after dabbling with communism, while Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, his Vice President looked East.

When writing about the East and West government's conflict in the Standard Newspaper, Andrew Maina alludes to a treatise titled "Studying Foreign Policy: Seminal Events that Shaped Foreign Policy 1963-66, where he pointed out how the ideological fight between these two powers brought out an important issue in the bipolar world order. For Kenya, the question was, which way will Kenya go? The moderate camp, led by Kenyatta and

Mboya, believed Kenya should tilt westward, whilst the radical camp, led by Odinga and Ochieng Oneko, saw opportunities in both the east and west (The standard, 2013).

Kenya's liberation from Britain, was foreshadowed by a series of incidents, including armed uprisings, primarily by African resistance movements. The famous one was the Mau Mau insurrection, which lasted from between 1952 and 1956. Despite the loss of the Mau Mau movement, Kenya's decolonization process was hastened, predominantly from 1960 to 1963. Owners of the land were uneasy, particularly due to the obvious anti-colonial wind whipping through Africa, and the Security concerns from the Cold War mostly accentuated this. The colonial authorities attempted to ensure that Kenya was inherited by British-inclined individuals and institutions after independence. The African leaders who were educated in the British system were recruited to join political leadership (Hornsby, 2012). This explains why, in the early years of Kenya's independence, her diplomatic ties were mostly focused on the West.

In his article on *diplomatic collisions that shaped foreign policy*, Kamau (November, 2013) notes that the leadership style of Kenyatta on foreign relations and policy formulation was highly influenced by the writings of William Attwood, who was the US Ambassador to Kenya. In 1966, William Attwood wrote memoirs he titled, *The Reds and the Blacks*, which discussed about the political and ideological differences between Kenyatta and Odinga. For him, in the early 1960s, Kenya was a country whose leaders were in a nightmare, since the country had not drawn a clear line on its foreign policy.

For this reason, both the East and the West had equal chances. In fact, the then Minister of state James Nyamweya accused Odinga of trying to pull the country towards the East whereas the country was pulling to the center (non-aligned). As noted by one diplomat

interviewed, many events which happened in the early stages of Kenyatta regime in Kenya either regionally or internationally molded and contributed much to how he led Kenya at home and on the global stage.

On the other hand, while Kenya was establishing herself on the global stage and recovering from the effects of colonization, South Korea was recovering from many coups and revolutions she had been going through from both the first and second republics. When Chung-hee came to power in 1961, just like Kenyatta, he embarked on building the image of South Korea both locally and internationally. In a focus group discussion with officers at the South Korean Embassy, the participants noted that Park Chung-hee prioritized two areas namely, the growth of an economy (self-reliance) and modernization of South Korea. The participants noted that Park Chung-hee developed a slogan of "Development First, Unification Later" to help him realize his agenda. This was intended to counter balance South Korea's relations with other countries during the Cold War era (FGD, SKE, 30/7/2018). The "Development First, Unification Later" sentiments became a major powerful slogan for South Korea's economic growth and rapid development in many sectors, including the industrial sector.

According to Westad (2005), the Cold War period was a time when many countries lived under the protection of the United States of America in terms of policy formulation, politics and security. During this time, the USA played a major global role not only in setting up the agenda for South Korea politics but also controlled how it was exercised. The era of Park Chung-hee (1961-79) constituted South Korea's traditional foreign policy that reflected areas covering matters security, legitimization and development. Even though Park Chung-hee was a military general, he concentrated mostly on building South

Korea's prosperity and her economic progress, which made his era to be referred to as an era of development. Park Chung-hee further insisted on the need for South Korea to have self-capacity that could enable the country to defend and protect itself from any potential enemy. This is a fact that made him to also focus on issues touching on security.

The history of South Korean foreign policy can be separated into four phases: First Republic (1948-1960), Second Republic (1960-1961), Third Republic (1961-1971), and the Reform Government of 1972. The second period was transitional and it replaced the First Republic, which had been overthrown by students' rebellion. However, it did not last for long since it was overthrown by a military coup in less than one year. In the first period, South Korea denied the existence of the third world, faith-fully adhering to the Dullesian view of the world. On the basis of the two-camp theory, South Korea settled on the three foreign policy doctrines, which many considered to be negative. The doctrines included practices such as: no contact with the communist bloc; no contact with North Korea; and no contact with the third world. During this period of the bipolar world, South Korea maintained diplomatic relations exclusively with western bloc countries.

The reason why the First Republic did not contact third world countries, however, was more practical than ideological. Diplomatic relations with Afro-Asian countries were avoided by South Korea not because she opposed these countries, but because the cost of running diplomatic missions in the countries was seen to outweigh any economic and political benefits. This is supported by the facts that: until 1960, Afro-Asian countries were numerically weak in the United Nations Assembly. During the First Republic period, South Korea had diplomatic relations with neither Afro-Asian countries nor Latin American countries, except Brazil. Nevertheless, the First Republic quickly recognized

newly independent Afro-Asian states and expressed a willingness to establish diplomatic relations at some time in the future, even though it was ideologically opposed to non-alignment (Library of Korean National Assembly, 1974).

The Second Republic followed the same policies as the First and established diplomatic relations only with western countries. During the third period, South Korea began to reach out actively to third world countries. Nevertheless, until 1966, South Korea took the position that if any country opened diplomatic cooperation with North Korea, then South Korea would cut her relations with that country - the Korean version of the Hallstein doctrine (Sang-Seek, 1978). By the end of 1971, there were over 41 independent states in Africa with diplomatic relations with South Korea. This became a big improvement in South Korea's relations with African countries considering that before 1960, South Korea did not have any diplomatic relations with African countries.

Over the last half-century, South Korea faced a dilemma of conflicting ideas as a result of various changes which occurred at the regional and global stages, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Issues such as: individualism versus communitarianism, nationalism versus globalism, centralization of power versus regional autonomy in domestic politics, and liberal democracy versus paternalistic authoritarianism contributed much towards the dilemma. South Korea's foreign policy was (and has been) greatly influenced by these competing beliefs and ideas.

According to Caprio (2011), there are a number of reasons that contributed to the unique diplomatic pattern South Korea adopted. He noted that the tense situation on the Korean peninsula; the strong and positive impression conceived during the period of Japanese colonial rule; the eccentricities of leaders' behavior, attitude and perception; the highs and

lows of internal politics; and the geo-strategic pressure on South Korea's setting have all caused South Koreans to move up and down between both the two extreme values of clash and accommodation, between racism, bigotry and toadyism toward greater powers and between bilateralism and multilateralism.

South Korea's contemporary diplomacy arose during a perilous period in which national survival was the primary concern, in the wake of her independence and the Korean War. Since then, she has pursued diplomacy in the framework of the ongoing inter-Korean hostility. Both the South and North Korea have been concerned with the "threat" from each other's side for nearly forty years, since the armistice that ended the Korean War. Chae, R. (2015), observed that for a long time, South Korea had no diplomatic contacts with any socialist country, including the Soviet Union. Instead, the two countries, South and North Korea, strengthened their alliances with foreign powers whilst opposing each other. Both Koreas justified social institutionalization and dictatorial governments in the name of defense against each other.

2.4 Kenya's Independence and the Politics Behind Kenya- South Korea Diplomatic Ties in the Jomo Kenyatta Era

Prior to independence, the political climate was fascinating, with the British advocating for moderate African leaders like Tom Mboya and Ronald Ngala, and avoiding radicals like Jomo Kenyatta, who was accused of masterminding the Mau Mau uprising (Hornsby, 2012). The British and Kenyan colonialist authorities were also anxious about the expansion and influence from Chinese the Soviet Union, that either they believed may weaken the influence of the West and endanger Kenya's development. Given this worry, the Britain tried to sway African separationist views toward moderate rather than extremism, as Oginga Odinga did (Hornsby, 2012).

By 1960, however, calls for Kenyatta's release by Kenya African National Union (KANU) founded on May 14, 1960 led by Odinga and James Gichuru reached their peak. They insisted that before any agreement with the British could be achieved, Kenyatta had to be released. In 1960, when Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was founded, its leaders, led by Ronald Ngala as well joined the call (though hesitantly) for Kenyatta to be release. Due to its apparent propensity to protect European settlers more than KANU did, KADU had the support of the European Union (Kamau, 2013). Kenya gained independence as a result, with Jomo Kenyatta as the first President.

According to Kyle (1999), Kenyatta's government's policies, while ostensibly non-aligned, had a clear tilt toward the west. Indeed, as Hornsby (2012) has pointed out, Kenya's foreign policy was built on links with the United Kingdom. Due to the idea of African socialism presented in Sessional Paper No. 10, Kenya's officially uncommitted internal economic strategy continued to be pro-Western, and far more particularly, pro-British, which introduced a clear direction to Kenya's relations with the world, and more specifically, Britain.

African socialism made Kenya borrow technological know-how and proven economic strategies from any country which welcomed foreign investment (CAB, 1965). According to Mahoney and Thelen (2015:97-120), one goal was to promote Kenya to potential foreign private businesses, with the British being a top contender. African socialism was also written with the intention of being consumed outside of Africa as a statement of intent to the global system. This internal economic ideology served as a backdoor approach for Kenya to disassociate herself from radicalism and hence from Soviet influence (Kamau, 2013).

Platteau (2015), argues that lack of institutions in Africa in a bigger way resulted in the establishment of personal rules, as described in African socialism and its application to planning in Kenya. The presidency, which is frequently assisted by the individual ministries of foreign affairs, is the most important policy making institution in the context of foreign policy. In this regard, Kenyatta's foreign policy reflected his leadership style. Kenyatta entered the presidency at a time when he was hailed as a hero by Kenyans and denounced by the colonial authorities as a leader condemned to darkness and death.

Kenyatta appeared to have already made up his mind about Kenya's foreign policy agenda when the country gained independence. His wishes were clearly expressed in successive policy documents like the KANU manifesto and the sessional paper no. 10 of 1965, which stated Kenya's economic blueprint with a preference that the country should be built on the principles of free enterprise, linked to the west, and that foreign capital accumulation would be necessary for economic growth, leading to the passage of the Foreign Investment Protection Act of 1964. In terms of Kenya's economic growth, African socialism, as pushed by the Kenyatta, laid the groundwork for Kenya's connections with South Korea.

The diplomatic relationship between South Korea and Kenya in the Kenyatta era was thus driven by diplomatic agenda and motives specific to the two countries and which revolved around their individual national interests. According to Platteau (2015), South Korea's foreign policy vision have been rooted in the country's desire for the realization of a happier Korean people, Korean Peninsula, and global community. Based on this desire, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks to accomplish and create stability and economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, as well as to be

a dependable Korea that contributes to humanity's advancement and a fascinating country with happier people, in accordance with this goal. To this purpose, the Foreign Ministry engages in trust-building diplomacy in collaboration with the people, focusing on the policy responsibilities as listed.

Just like South Korea which underwent tough times before her independence as a theatre of war between the USA and the USSR during the colonial period, Kenya likewise faced difficulties under British colonial control. As a result, Kenya and South Korea required socio-political and economic stability in 1948 and 1964, respectively. Thompson (2014) stated that the only way forward for these countries was for them to have a stable political system, national security and prosperous economic growth. On the same, Kydd (2015) contends that the desire for prosperity influenced how Kenya and South Korea developed their foreign policies and further interacted with others. The new changes in both countries redefined their engagement and relationship with other countries on the world arena.

As noted from the above discussions, Kenya was driven by a common interest and united by a shared goal, which rotated around the removal of several chains that the colonial government had imposed on the country. On the other hand, South Korea was on the move to end military rule and communist influence and to achieve economic transformation. As a result, Kenya and South Korea were unable to adopt or pursue unpopular or extreme foreign policies, and instead chose moderate philosophies that would appeal to other countries (MFA, FGD, 2020).

Several scholars have characterized Kenyan philosophical trends during the Kenyatta era (1964-1978) as cautious, claiming that this was reflected in the country's foreign policy

formulation. Rono (2018) for example claims that Kenya's moderate approach enabled the young country avoid the extremist rhetoric that has characterized the foreign policies of many other newly independent African countries, such as Tanzania. According to Holsti (2015), any move that could have irritated the flow of foreign money while also affecting Kenya's national development agenda could have been suicidal. This cautious approach in formulation of foreign policy characterized Kenya's engagement with South Korea. This cautious approach was informed by the Cold War politics that dominated the political scene at the international level.

Similarly, during Park Chung Hee's Third Republic, South Korea's ideological movement saw a significant shift. Park Chung-hee, according to Lyong Choi (2016), adopted a more radical revolutionary ideology during his reign which influenced how he perceived other countries. During an interview with Sila (O.I, 2019) at the South Korean embassy, he informed that Park Chung-hee's foreign policy was heavily influenced by the United States and was vulnerable to Washington's demands. He noted that:

“Park Chung-hee once told his followers that South Korea needed a solid leader with the ability to counter communist influence coming from communist countries like China and the Soviet Union, and that South Korea really needed a leader who would open up the country to the rest of the world and link it up with other countries.” (Sila, O.I, 2019)

Continued US influence on South Korean foreign policy, as put forth by Pengying (2018) drove South Korea to craft an anti-communist foreign policy where she identified specific countries preferred for South Korea to formally relate with. This strong United States influence on South Korea had a strong influence on Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations. On the 30th of July 2021, a focus group discussion with a group of officers at

the Korean Embassy revealed that South Korea started contacting other nations with the US's help who were favorable to the US and were a part of the powerful US financial allies and partners in both Europe and Africa (FGD, 2021).

Based on these realities, and the liberal school of thought which is anchored on the principle of international cooperation, mutual prosperity and honest interaction between states, South Korea, led by Park Chung-Hee, managed to establish various diplomatic ties with Kenya, ranging from economic, political and cultural which culminated with the signing of these various diplomatic agreements between Park Chung-Hee and Jomo Kenyatta in 1964.

Following Kenya and South Korea's signing of agreements which were meant to strengthen their diplomatic ties, in the first decade of Kenya's independence, the country witnessed heightened ideological contestations from the local political leaders who held different ideological views. This could be explained from a classical realists' point of view, who believe that basically the human nature of seeking self-interest could make individuals and states act in a way of following interests more than pure ideologies.

Classical realists hold that the determination for influence and the drive to control are major essential facets of human nature (Baylis & Smith, 2019). These are some of the western forms of knowledge that threatened to destabilize the Kenyan state amid her pursuit for cordial diplomatic ties with South Korea in the Kenyatta era. To a larger extent Kenya-South Korean relations in the Kenyatta era were characterized by radical views of national leaders which depicted a robust sense of morality and idealism.

Arnold (2016) backs this up by stating that different national leaders' adoption of differing ideological convictions resulted in ideological competition inside Kenya's ruling

party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Kenyatta and his Vice President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga were primarily affected. While President Kenyatta chose to work more closely with the West, Odinga went East and globalized the Cold War politics, which informed how African states formulated their policies and chose states to relate with diplomatically. According to Adar (2018), Kenyan politicians exploited the Cold War events to posture themselves in internal politics. In a broader sense, the Cold War influenced Kenyan foreign policy decisions, such as non-alignment and African Socialism. In the words of Bonnett (1966), it felt as if the Cold War was being fought inside KANU.

The above contestation in Kenya's political space made a clear distinction between the west-leaning group (majority) and the east-leaning leaders, led by Odinga (the minority). According to Hornsby (2013), Odinga led a delegation of over twenty-five members of parliament to the Soviet Union as one of Kenya's leading national ideological leaders, who also argued for a communist agenda. Morton (1998), in his biography of Kenya's former President Daniel Arap Moi, goes into great lengths discussing how Odinga's actions caused ideological strife in the country.

He noted that because Odinga was anti-Western, the British government kept a close eye on him and carefully watched his connections with the Eastern bloc countries. According to Morton, Odinga's team was on a mission to make Kenya more socialist-friendly with China and other Soviet Union member states. President Kenyatta and his administration, as well as Britain, were convinced in 1966 that Odinga's group had become a big threat that needed to be dealt with.

In order to accomplish so, the ruling party, KANU, established eight powerful vice-presidential positions. Odinga was forced to resign from his important position as vice president. According to Okumu (1973), between 1964 and 1978, ideological tensions dominated the thoughts of many Kenyan independence movements, defining the nature of Kenyan foreign relations and determining which countries Kenya chose to collaborate with or not.

In the words of Goscha and Ostermann (2004), the Cold War was an important aspect of the global system that influenced decolonization and the emergence of new governments. As a result, it served as a backdrop for the development and implementation of newly aggressive foreign policy. Even if their form of involvement was really to follow policies of neutrality and non-alignment, new states had to engage in Cold War debates in their foreign policies. By joining the non-aligned movement, countries in the developing world were building Cold War dynamics rather than simply responding to them. At independence, foreign policies had to be reinvented, including the establishment of missions (embassies and high commissions) in foreign countries.

The order in which these were established reveals the importance that Kenya's new government placed on relations with specific countries. Kenya only opened eight foreign missions at first: the United States, United Kingdom, China, France, West Germany, the United Nations, Egypt, and the Soviet Union (Kirk-Greene, 1974). This demonstrated a willingness to form alliances with big communist and Western powers. Like many other countries in Africa, Kenya, had little resources when she gained independence, so policymakers had to make decisions about how to spend them and which countries and ties to emphasize (Adar, 2018).

According to Adar (1994), in his assessment of Kenyan policy behavior, Kenya was at a diplomatic crossroads during Kenyatta's reign, as the country was still looking for methods to establish itself in the split international order. According to Adar (1994), the minister of foreign affairs was unable to carry out both official and informal foreign policy implementation at the time. On the same note, a focus group discussion noted that, while Kenya had foreign affairs ministers, they were merely puppets who couldn't make decisions about Kenya's international relations, which Kenyatta and Moi did. The Kenyan president was in charge of the ministry of international affairs (MFA, FGD, 25/7/2018). Kenyatta established diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1964 during this period. South Korea created an embassy in Nairobi right away to get things started, whereas Kenya preferred to oversee South Korea from Japan.

The Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations were therefore confronted with these Cold War dilemmas. Nevertheless, based on South Korea's interest and emphasis on trade diplomacy, between 1965 and 1973 she concentrated on concluding her trade agreements, sending trade missions, and giving economic aid to various states which she had cooperated with. By 1973, there were intense goodwill missions from South Korea to Kenya, and also other African states, in order to counter the influence of North Korea which had equally launched an aggressive diplomatic campaign to a number of African countries (Sang Seek, 1978).

The fundamental question around this could be why was there a sudden interest in African countries by South Korea? According to Odila (O.I, 2020), this could be explained within the context and situation in which both South Korea and North Korea were finding themselves in. For instance, around that time, both South Korea and North

Korea were actively engaged in competing for African votes in the United Nations General Assembly (Maina, O.I, 2020).

2.5 Trends and Patterns of Kenya- South Korea Diplomatic Relations

The Korean diplomacy with African countries has been focused on improving the quality of human life in Africa through development assistance based on the experience of South Korea's development. South Korea is a country which experienced painful colonization by imperialism, and devastation by the civil war in early 20th century. In 1960's, South Korea was among the poorest countries in the world. South Korea, however, would achieve economic development by utilizing the support of developed countries with the mentality of hard work, honesty and good governance (Platteau, 2015),

South Korean planners began an aggressive implementation of export incentive policies in the early 1960s, which exposed the economy to the constraints and opportunities of international trade. Furthermore, land reforms had already been completed, allowing the economy to engage in expansion with a reasonably level distribution of income among the country's citizens. The educated and hardworking labor force enabled effective export production at low costs, making South Korea competitive in the export economy. By the early 1960s, South Korea was in a better position for industrial development than Kenya, thanks to careful use of foreign aid and other considerations.

South Korea's trade policies went through an import substitution era, with indigenous industries receiving high and fluctuating protection. Import-oriented policies were phased out in favor of export-oriented policies. South Korea implemented pro-export policies that resulted in a free-trade zone and a slew of other export incentives. Based on this shift to efficient production of exports, South Korea had to look for diplomatic relations with states that could not produce what she produced, but, were very much in need of these products and at a cheaper rate ((MFA, FGD, 25/7/2018). In this case, Kenya became one of the major potential markets for South Korea's products, especially electronics and

technology, thereby necessitating signing of bilateral agreement to enhance Kenya's diplomatic ties with South Korea on economic matters.

South Korea's shift from an import-oriented to an export-oriented economy provided the framework for industry to quickly adopt foreign best practices amidst a very flawed technological market. The focus on export competitiveness provided a fair and accountable method for business people and officials to assess the merits of certain programs. These policies therefore worked best for South Korea in driving her diplomatic agenda based not only on South-South cooperation, but also between one of the rising economies in Asia and developing countries in Africa.

Based on comparative advantage, for a variety of factors, Kenya has not yet reached the same level of industrialization as South Korea. First, following the tensions and fears that plagued the South Korean economy in the years leading up to independence, planners implemented an import-substitution and industrialization policy. Second, government initiatives to promote import substitution, which originally resulted in rapid development, gradually slowed as the economy was driven well beyond efficient limitations. Nevertheless, the industrial structure was distorted by a slew of other unproductive manufacturing businesses. This was attributable to lack of economic shrinking and reorganization required for a seamless transition to the second phase of the international market.

While South Korea had a good start in the process of industrialization which informed her diplomatic relations with African states, it is important to note that Kenya's policymakers for a long time favored inward-looking policies, until 1992 when significant economic reforms of making the economy more outward-looking started,

which (outward-looking economic pattern reforms) slowed down Kenya's economic cooperation with South Korea. Nevertheless, it did not affect her overall diplomatic ties and relations with South Korea. Kenya and South Korea faced similar economic difficulties in the early 1960s. Following colonialism by Britain and Japan, both countries underperformed in the global economy.

Indeed, due to a lack of technology, productivity in the two countries were at an all-time low. The situation was so dire that the Korean people were on the verge of starvation, necessitating international assistance as a matter of urgency. Interestingly, in 1963, Kenya gave a loan of \$10,000 (Sh892, 200) and relief food to the Asian country. That was the year Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first president, declared war on ignorance, disease and poverty. The loan was repaid three years later evidently suggesting mutually beneficial diplomatic relations between these two states (Business Daily, 9/10/2014).

When comparing Kenya's GDP per capita with South Korea's, Seo (2013) noted that Kenya's GDP was \$109 in 1964, whereas South Korea's was \$120. One year later in 1965, both countries were at \$105.128. Furthermore, during the 1960s, approximately 40% of the populations of both countries lived in abject poverty, which made Kenya and South Korea to be classified as poor and low-income countries. Consequently, the diplomatic relations that the two states were in around that time and the bilateral agreements entered into were done in equal terms (Cheong lee, O.I., 2020).

Picking from South Korea's policy shift of economic development, the Kenyan government also adopted the same model that South Korea had adopted in the 1960s in order to spur her economic growth. This changing trend of policy by Kenya towards import substitution was witnessed in the 1970s when the country faced a widespread

decline in her overall economic performance. By encouraging and financing new industrial ventures, the administration by then chose to deepen its role in the economy by employing an import substitution approach. These changing trends in Kenya's economic sector also changed the patterns of negotiation and bargaining between Kenya and South Korea on a number of diplomatic issues and more so on the dollar diplomacy as far as Kenya's foreign policy implementation was concerned.

The other development which influenced the drive towards import substitution was the Export Compensation Manufacturer's Act of 1974 which was enacted to encourage the use of non-traditional export of items in the context of import substitution. However, just like South Korea, the breakdown of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977 slowed down Kenya's industrial export production significantly as the incentive structure favored domestic production. This resulted in an inward-looking manufacturing industry whose growth was severely restricted by the size of the domestic market.

Furthermore, during the interview, Chege (O.I, 2018) noted that during the coffee boom in the late 1970s, budgetary discipline deteriorated, which was exacerbated by a deterioration in the country's foreign balance of trade following the second oil shock in 1977. The import substitution approach was generally anti-export, while inadequate local demand hindered the international system drive. Early attempts to change to export promotion were hampered

by low productivity, structural rigidities, and macroeconomic instability (Chege, O.I, 2018) Although these economic shocks disrupted Kenya's economic growth, Kenya had already identified her partners who could help her in realizing her objective of being an

economic power house in the East African region, and South Korea was handy, as she has remained a yardstick for measuring Kenya's economic development.

Besides the economic growth dynamics, Africa functioned as a battlefield for formal recognition between USSR and the US during the Cold War period covering much of the second half of the twentieth century. During this period, the struggle for hegemonic control in Africa by both North and South Korea can be placed within this perspective: prior to the 1990s, North Korea had a stronger diplomatic engagement with Africa than South Korea. During the 1950s and early 1960s, North Korea provided military assistance to a number of African countries in their fight for independence. By propagating anti-Western rhetoric, North Korea gained a large number of supporters. In particular, her ideological pillar of Juche—which, in Korean, means self-reliance or autonomy—was attractive to several post-colonial African regimes.

The height of North Korea's Third World diplomacy was in the 1970s. According to Kim (O.I, 2020), while the two Koreas struggled publicly or secretly to establish relations with African countries, both sides' diplomatic policies deteriorated. North Korea's quality projects which were once successful in Africa became preserve of the profoundly secluded "Hermit Kingdom".

Likewise, the development model export by South Korea to Africa was not very extensive as compared to the effort exerted by other competing interests like China and other emerging countries. Growing partners undertook inroads into Africa, providing previously unseen assistance. In these circumstances, it became difficult to pinpoint what made South Korea's developmental experience so unique. For example, after President

Park's tour to Uganda and Kenya, Turkish President Recep Erdogan followed closely behind, visiting both Kenya and Uganda.

Furthermore, the development process in South Korea, which was achieved under an authoritarian regime, was difficult to emulate democratic countries in Africa. Also, according to Kim (O.I, 2020), North Korea's foreign policy being one-of-a-kind but founded on poor development, and South Korea's foreign policy being one-of-a-kind but far from unique put the two countries at a point they both needed to rethink their policies, especially to help them maintain diplomatic advantage in the modern world.

In 1978, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first president, died having left Kenya in a development trajectory that was anchored on Kenya's economic relations and diplomatic ties with South Korea. His successor, President Daniel Arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta immediately and promised to follow Kenyatta's footsteps in enhancing Kenya's economic and diplomatic ties. It is against this backdrop that the next chapter scrutinizes the continued diplomatic relations between South Korea and Kenya, under the Moi regime.

2.5 Summary

The chapter has examined Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations in the Jomo Kenyatta era when Kenya's economic policy and manifesto was anchored on an economic model known as "African socialism" as documented in the Sessional Paper no 10 of 1965. The chapter established that South Korea's engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was shaped by Cold War political rivalries, which brought the Korean question into the fore, as far as Korea's membership in the United Nations was concerned. Kenya found herself

in the mix of the Cold War politics, which pushed the country to be on the same side as South Korea.

Kenya's foreign policy was greatly impacted by bipolar politics, which pitted the communist East against the capitalist West in the early days of her independence. This chapter has also highlighted how local politics in Kenya were influenced by Cold War politics, with local leaders being divided along ideological lines. It was observed that Kenya's diplomatic relations during the initial stages of her independence majorly focused on the West.

It was also observed that between 1963-1970, South Korea adopted a powerful development slogan under president Chung-Hee which aimed to steer South Korea to economic growth and rapid development, especially in the industrial sector. Other factors such as the Korean War also shaped the way South Korea followed and formulated her modern diplomacy. The chapter concluded that, the non-aligned nature of the country's foreign policy and the leadership style of Kenyatta helped in shaping the country's diplomatic relations with the West and South Korea, which by then was a darling of the West.

The chapter notes that the diplomatic relations between South Korea and Kenya in the Kenyatta era were driven by specific diplomatic agenda and motives specific to the two countries, which revolved around their individual national interests. The next chapter, discusses dynamics of Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea in the Moi era, 1978 to 2002.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 DYNAMICS OF KENYA’S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA IN THE MOI ERA 1978-2002

3.1 Introduction

The chapter examines dynamics of Kenya’s diplomatic engagements with South Korea in the Moi era, during the period between 1978 and 2002. It analyzes the first decade of Moi era while connecting it with South Korea’s economic relations with Kenya during the reign of president Chun Doo-hwan, 1978-1990. The chapter further scrutinizes Cold War politics and the South Korea’s quest for African countries. It then concludes by dissecting Kenya’s diplomatic shift to the East and the diplomatic bilateral ties with South Korea.

3.2 Moi’s Leadership Style and Diplomacy in the First Decade of Moi Era

Kenya's growing centralization of state authority to the presidency, like in most African countries, began in the early years of independence. This led to what Nzomo, 2016; Adar, 2015; Adar, 2007; Okoth, 2007 referred to as the “big man” syndrome, in which the boundary between personal interests and the public good is obliterated. This implies that a president's personal interests and worldview, to a large extent determine his leadership style, and also have significant impact on the kind of foreign policy a country settles on.

This includes goal identification and eventual state behavior towards its cooperation with other states (Hornsby, 2012). While Daniel Arap Moi’s government demonstrated consistency in foreign policy, there were also significant discrepancies, as the Moi regime exhibited a unique leadership style that had a significant impact on Kenya's diplomatic ties with other countries. This was demonstrated by Moi’s personalized style and centralized approach to diplomatic and foreign policy issues as well as political

leadership in general (Adar, 2007). Some of these decisions especially on who to become Kenya's diplomatic friend were determined by the internal and international political landscapes which many times were characterized by mistrust (Hornsby, 2012)

According to various academics, Moi's type of leadership was characterized by patronage through domination, authority, and presidential orders. Adar (2007) notes that there were little consultations on international policy guidelines, citing the case of the 1980 agreement between President Moi and the United States of America regarding the use of Kenya's military facilities in Mombasa by the US Rapid Response Force. He goes on to say that such a decision needed parliamentary permission, which was typically disregarded, or that parliament was merely acting as a form of identification. (Adar, 2007).

During the reign of President Moi, the foreign policy of Kenya, particularly on the global stage, remained openly pro-western, as President Moi displayed his pro-capitalist credentials and Christianity as a badge of honor. President Moi noted in 1981, in response to opponents who claimed Kenya's relations was overly pro-Britain and largely pro-western, and that the country took no orders from anywhere. However, this did not affect Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea, which were already in place. This was confirmed by a report from a team constituted by Moi in 1989 to explore the possibility of Kenya having a consulate in South Korea. The team recommended the indeed Kenya needed a consulate in South Korea.

In his first decade of leadership, President Moi made use of foreign policy to entice crucial resources for economic development (in terms of Financial and technical support, commercial linkages and international investments), not just from Western countries, but

also from the Asia countries. The intension was to use these resources to help Kenyans improve their living conditions. Indeed, under Moi's rule, Kenya and South Korean trade went up by 41 per cent (Kenya Times, 1987).

The same approach and trend also characterized Kenya's diplomatic relations with Britain, with the Kenyan government's uppermost commitment making Kenyans' living standards much better. Kenya's foreign policy with South Korea, as an additional trading partner, thus remained intact. Also, there was some level of dependability as far as the foreign policies of the two countries (Kenya and South Korea) were concerned, based on the sheer need of necessity, thereby affirming the symbiotic and close relations that these two states enjoyed as trading partners (Otieno, O.I., 2020).

Given that trade between Kenya and South Korea went up by 41% in the first decade of Moi's regime, it is worth noting that Kenya acknowledged the balance of trade between herself and South Korea, and realized that the economic growth of a state depended on the realities that accrued from trading with more developed partners such as South Korea. However, by 1987, the Kenya-Korea trade balance declined (Kenya Times, 1987).

As Platteau (2015), puts it, there was a need to enhance both trade and diplomatic relations in order for Kenya to achieve some form of economic benefits from South Korea. Additionally, the government of President Moi, taking into consideration issues of national interest, developed some pro-Eastern orientation, with the rise of South Korea as a major economic power house and as an alternative trading partner. With the diplomatic nexus between Kenya and South Korea having taken root, the two countries signed a deal which saw exporters of Kenyan goods to South Korea enjoying lower tariffs.

The Moi era was characterized by the use of the provisional Constitution of Kenya (independence constitution) and the intelligence agency (special branch). Both the constitution and the intelligence service gave President Moi a free way to determine the kind of foreign policy approach that Kenya would adopt in her relations with other states. President Moi would under the constitution appoint ministers and abolish public offices as per article 24 of the Constitution of Kenya.

President Moi adopted and put into effect his own decisions regarding foreign policy by relying on these fundamental clauses. Under the leadership of the president, the Special Branch, then known as the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) and now the NIS, played a substantial and important role in determining Kenya's foreign affairs under the Moi administration. Lee, D. & Hocking, B. (2015), noted that President Moi, like his predecessor Jomo Kenyatta, depended heavily on the Special Branch for information.

The form and organization of state authority and governance, which were centralized under the presidency, had an impact on Kenya's foreign policy during the Moi era. President Moi enacted constitutional amendments that reflected his autocratic style of rule (Hornsby, 2013). Another organization that had a large impact on Kenya's international relations under the Moi administration was the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which was the country's leading political party.

In particular, KANU became the president's spokesperson following the implementation of Section 2A of the Constitution in 1982, which turned Kenya into a de facto one-party state (Adar, 2007). It was anticipated that the multiparty politics, which were once again reintroduced in 1991, would influence substantial changes in the involvement of parliament as a crucial institution in the development of Kenya's foreign policy and

modify the prominence of KANU in judgement call. However, because the ruling party defeated the opposition in the 1992 general elections, KANU continued to hold a significant amount of power for an additional two consecutive five-year periods in Kenya. With a centralized approach to state authority and weakened parliamentary dissent, the Moi government was able to retain major control over decision-making and following foreign policy actions with the help of KANU legislators, with parliament acting as a rubber stamp (Odinga, R. A., & Elderkin, S. (2013).

In 1991, President Moi visited South Korea with a delegation from his KANU party. His visit was meant to attract investment and promote tourism. Khamisi (O.I, 2019) observed that President Moi was accompanied by a large group of Kenyan businessmen and an arrangement was made for them to meet their South Korean counterparts. Based on South Korea's exponential economic growth, South Korea had become a major international trader belonging to the group of the so-called Asian tigers. Moi was looking at South Korea as a potential partner in business and investment. This trip included Joe Khamisi alongside the managing director of Safari Park, a hotel owned by a South Korean group. Moi's reign and leadership style, although dictatorial, laid a better foundation for consequent diplomatic and bilateral relations between Kenya and South Korea.

3.3 The Reign of President Chun Doo-Hwan and Kenya's Economic Relations, 1978-1990

Relations between South Korea and Africa remained underdeveloped between 1978 up to the 1990s because of the ideological and geographical distance. In order to strengthen relations with African countries, President Chun Doo-hwan visited four countries in Africa (Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria and Gabon) in 1982. This was prompted by the fact that South Korea was competing with her northern opponent for UN recognition.

However, South Korea's limited human and financial capabilities at that time precluded her from adopting a meaningful foreign strategy for Africa (Chong, O.I., 2020).

Kenya and other African states would later play their diplomatic role, having been persuaded by South Korea in some of the deliberations that went on in the United Nations forum. Consequently, Kenya was one of the UN member states that recognized South Korea as a state (Chee, O.I., 2020). Thereafter, on September 17, 1991 the two Koreas were at the same time admitted to the United Nations (UN). Moreover, after the fall of the iron curtain, South Korea lowered her economic, political and security investments in Africa, as former Eastern bloc countries proved to be more theoretically viable allies (Kim, 2010).

After South Korea joined the UN, her involvement with Africa quickly waned, and in four years, the South Korean closed 11 embassies in the continent (Chong, O.I., 2020). This could explain the lull in high delegation visits from South Korea to Kenya and vice versa during the period 1978 – 1990, which later changed due to change of strategy by South Korea in terms of her foreign policy for Africa, and individual states in Africa, after the end of the Cold War.

This is supported by Nicolas (2020) who noted that towards the end of 1990s, South Korea's cooperation with Third World nations, like Kenya, created more opportunities for South Korean enterprises, facilitated industrial development, and assured the availability of natural resources, particularly energy. However, it took South Korea another ten years to entirely refocus her attention on Africa (Nicolas, 2020). Nevertheless, in the 1990s other positive developments took place between Kenya and South Korea. One major development was that in 1995, South Korea initiated a plan to set up a car assembly in

Kenya. Around the same time South Korea pledged a US \$50 million aid to Kenya (*Kenya Times*, 1993).

Although Kenya and South Korea around this time witnessed some contestations as far as Cold War politics at the global level was concerned, however, Kenya's political relations with China, which was formally a communist state, did not affect her (Kenya) diplomatic, political and trade relations with South Korea. Kamau (2013) observes that, sometimes making absolute statements on the effects of politics on trade, and especially when such politics are global in nature, is very difficult.

Nevertheless, the implication of political effects on trade usually depends on the other trading partner, which also brings about differing outcomes for imports and exports. Thus, the Kenya-South Korea situation provides us with a lens of understanding how diplomatic relations were enhanced between the two countries in the Moi era in Kenya, since this was also the first time that a South Korean president visited Kenya.

Further, even with globalization and liberalization of economies of states, the Cold War politics did not so much play out as a driving force or a hindrance to diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Korea, despite the fact that Kenya had started engaging with other formally communist states such as China. In essence, there was no diplomatic row between Kenya and South Korea despite the fact that Kenya engaged China in some infrastructural developments, for example the building of the Moi International Sports Centre, Kasarani.

It is clear that South Korea used trade as a vital strategy for her economic progress, an act which until now continues to play a significant role in the country's long-term economic growth (Lee, 2018). On the other hand, the role of political relations in manufacturing

industry has been constant since South Korea's entry into the global economy. Despite the global politics that have characterized the nations' relations, the political contacts between Kenya and South Korea (upon which their collaboration is based), have played a prominent role in encouraging bilateral trade between the two countries (Lee, 2018).

While South Korea was undergoing a shift towards Africa in her security and economic policy, and strengthening her position within the UN circles as the world body, her diplomatic partner, Kenya, was also undergoing some internal economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, based on the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The Kenyan government-initiated SAPs in the 1980s to address concerns about the foreign strategy's distortions by, among other things, strengthening competitiveness and reducing excess capacity in the industrial sector.

As observed by Gerdin (1997), the government abolished price controls and then liberalized imports through elimination of import and foreign exchange licensing, as well as the rationalization of tariff regimes. The publication of a session paper on Economic Management for Renewed Growth kicked off a substantial restructuring of policies and institutional structure (Republic of Kenya, 1986). The strategies outlined in this paper were designed to eliminate the 'anti-export bias that had been present in prior policies.

Additionally, the government pledged to abolish all existing import licenses and fees, including withdrawing the import licensing schedules in 1993, and all price restrictions were lifted for capital and current transactions in 1994. Kenya became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the same year, an act which led to opening of the

Kenyan economy." The introduction of the SAPs led to the liberalization of the country's economy for both the output and input markets.

Chirwa (2000) further observed that the opening of the local economy to international competition enabled the two countries to create opportunities for their products. The above observations are supported by Pollins (1989a, 1989b) who believe every country's decision on import goods and services are influenced by either the general foreign policy or status of relations between the two countries, or just by purposive attempts by the importer. Accordingly, in his conclusion, Pollins (1989a, 1989b) argued that diplomatic relations between and amongst states equally affects levels of their bilateral trade. President Chun Doo-hwan's period, therefore saw enhanced diplomatic and economic relations between Kenya and South Korea.

It is noted that during the reign of president Moi and president Chun Doo Hwan of South Korea, bilateral relations between Kenya and South Korea expanded gradually. The study noted, during the interview, that in 1997, for example, the two countries established Joint Economic Committee which was to look into possible areas of relations and available opportunities in both countries. Until 2016, this committee has organized for four successful joint meetings, which has sought to improve on trade and economic relations. Through these meetings, the study noted that educational and technical assistance were strengthened and even formalized (Hassan, O.I., 2023).

Since President Chun Doo Hwan's term ended in 1993, President Kim Young Sam was elected as South Korea's 7th President and served from February 25, 1993 to February 25, 1998, making him the country's first civilian president in nearly 30 years. During his time in power, he prioritized increasing Korea's international visibility. In November 1994, he

presented his globalization agenda to make it more concrete. During his campaign, President Kim Young Sam stressed the need for South Korea to actively play more part in the world affairs. Consequently, in 1993, Han Sung-joo, South Korea's Minister for Foreign Affairs announced the four essential aspects of the new government's diplomacy. These were: Globalization, multi-dimensional, diversification, and futuristic orientation. South Korea utilizes her economic prowess as a state identity and upon which she bases her relations with Kenya.

In terms of financial connections, increased collaboration and economic interdependence is regarded to be the most enticing feature of the South Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations. This feature of the region allows South Korea to demonstrate her constructivism-oriented regional power processes in a healthy context. Apart from that, South Korea possesses a soft power component that distinguishes her from classic Western-middle powers (Canada and Australia) Westad (2005). It is this middle power mechanism that South Korea has exploited by engaging Kenya in her pursuit for economic cooperation and global presence within the East African region. This middle power identity has provided Kenya an opportunity to identify with technological products from South Korea while at the same time allowing South Korean companies to operate within the economic space of Kenya.

3.4 Cold War Politics and South Korea's Quest for African Countries

In order to understand South Korea's post-Cold War interaction with African countries, the nature of its geopolitics must be considered. This is because South Korea's and North Korea's policies and presence in Africa have been affected by their diplomatic competition and quest for international recognition. As early as in the 1980s, the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea had established diplomatic relations with over 40 African countries, whereas South Korea only had 28.

In response, President Chun Doo Hwan came very strongly in stressing on closer economic cooperation with Third World countries. This helped in fostering South-South diplomatic engagement with the outside world. However, despite consecutive South Korean governments' efforts, Africa has remained a minor player in her international affairs.

Accordingly, the visits of President Chun Doo Hwan to Africa: Kenya, Nigeria and Gabon were not only aimed at gaining support for South Korea's admission to the United Nations and assuring better ability to influence UN operations, but also at improving South Korea's global standing. Both the North and the South were recognized as members of the United Nations General Assembly in 1991.

Korea-Africa ties however remained stagnant even with the UN's recognition of both Koreas, and the conclusion of the Cold War. In the years that followed, as Elem (2018) records, South Korea began to pursue what was commonly referred to as the northern diplomacy, which in turn, decreased the number of her embassies and consulates in Africa from 18 to 13. The other reason for stagnation of ties between Kenya and South Korea which Otavio (2018), alluded to was the prioritization of the South Korea relations with newly-established former Soviet Union.

In the late 1980s, after the fall of communism, South Korea entered a new era which enabled her to deepen her ties with Africa. Over the years, South Korea's foreign policy has become progressively pragmatic, just the same as many other countries in Africa. Many African actors have regarded South Korea's quick economic expansion as

a desirable model. Indeed, Samsung and LG, two South Korean worldwide electronics giants, have dominated the international market and helped to improve South Korea's image across the African continent. Also, according to Kim (2016), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) membership of South Korea supported the nation's planning framework and made use of her public diplomacy, which the country used to impart to other developing economies.

It is therefore evident that the Cold War politics although not meant to spur diplomatic relations between South Korea and African states, had the theatre of the war shift to the UN, where both Korean states used their influence to rally African states behind each one of them as a way of cementing their position in the UN and at the global level. The fight over admission to the UN would therefore bring South Korea and Kenya closer as far as their diplomatic ties was concerned.

3.5 Kenya's Diplomatic Shift to the East

From 1990 onwards, Kenya's international relations with other states and non-state organizations were founded on democratic values. This implies that many donor countries' terms were not followed by Kenya. According to Darracq & Neville (2014), much of the conflict between Kenya and her traditional Western partners such as the United States, Britain, and the International Monetary Fund came as a result of Kenya rejecting conditions (ideological, economic and political) set by partners. Such conditionality pushed Kenya to open up and strengthen her diplomatic relations with countries from the East. States such as South Korea and China therefore capitalized on the economic conditions set by the West to penetrate into the Kenyan economic space.

Moi's era assumed international resonance in its economic and political developments. Consequently, Moi's government continued to court the "Look East Policy". Through the policy, the Moi regime and other subsequent governments tried to invite countries that Kenya considered as trusted allies and potential investors, namely: Malaysia, China, South Korea, and Iran. The Look East policy sparked varied responses in the local politics.

It did not take long before the United States expressed concern over Kenya's cooperations with China, albeit having a soft spot on Kenya's relations with South Korea, perhaps because the United States and South Korea were key allies and therefore South Korea was not considered to pose a serious security threat to the general interest of the United States of America. This is evidenced by the fact that there has never been any break in the relations between the USA and South Korea in form of threats of economic sanctions by the USA to South Korea or even Kenya while engaging in diplomatic and bilateral relations (Wachira, O.I., 2021).

The "Look East Policy" by Kenya played well in the hands of South Korea because the latter, in recent years has built a massive network of high-ranking government officials, pro-Korean policymakers and business executives in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to boost her political and economic clout in the region. The South Korean government has been able to conduct conferences and workshops whereby high-level government representatives from Africa were welcomed to address related themes such as ICT development, global warming, and business in order to strengthen cooperation between South Korea and African nations. Similar to the US Peace Corps, South Korea

also has a program named World Friends Korea, which is a state-run effort for abroad volunteers.

These programs extensively helped to promote South Korea's brand in Sub-Saharan Africa, enhancing her own visibility and reinforcing alliances with countries like Kenya, with whom she already has strong ties. Moreover, as Darracq and Neville (2014), observed, the government of South Korea has also been using educational scholarship for Kenyan students, alongside others from the East African region, to go study at South Korean universities, hoping that those students upon finishing their studies will take a pro-Korean story back to their various countries.

Such diplomatic endeavors and approaches were also enhanced by South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs decision to make Kenya a hub for processing South Korean visas for countries such as Uganda, Mauritius, Comoro, Seychelles, Somalia and Eritrea, in the initial stages of putting up her embassy in Kenya, before narrowing it down to Kenya and Somalia after establishing embassies in those other countries. This was meant to develop deeper ties not only with Kenya but also with other states across the Horn of Africa.

South Korea's diplomatic ties with Kenya were majorly boosted by economic and cultural exchanges between the two states. Indeed, South Korea was categorical in her diplomatic pursuit and urged Kenya to positively support her efforts to diversify South Korea's export market. This was captured in a meeting held in Seoul, South Korea, headed by President Park Chong, who explained that the government of South Korea planned to realize merchandise exports of more than \$50 billion by the mid-1980s. His

main objective and the aim of South Korea was to substantially increase the share of export volume to Africa.

This meeting perhaps informed and laid the foundation for the subsequent visits of South Korea leadership to Kenya, and largely to other African states in the 1990s. The bottom line and the main agenda for most of the South Korean leadership visits to Kenya was to further their mutual interest as the two states worked to strengthen their bilateral cooperation. Some of the discussions by a South Korean delegation to Kenya also touched on international and regional matters, thereby giving the Kenya-Korea relations a new dimension in their diplomatic history (Korean Newsletter, 1982). It is therefore, important to note that Kenya's strategic location and her position within the international community cannot be ignored, even as Africa as a continent at some point remained a virtually closed continent to South Korea.

3.6 Cultural Diplomacy and Kenya's Diplomatic ties with South Korea

Kenya and South Korea have continued to practice cultural diplomacy as a soft power approach towards realizing certain diplomatic objectives, and the presence of these individual states across the globe. Diplomacy, according to Musyoka (2019), is defined as the management of relationships between nations, as well as between countries and other players.

Thus, diplomacy is involved with developing and implementing foreign policy, that ensures states all over the world promote and practice peaceful coexistence, and creates a dialogue between nations. Musyoka (2019), continues to argue that the primary focus of international actors is not just political, but also cultural (education, art), where players can pursue their own agendas without the government's

interference. Cultural diplomacy is primarily concerned with high culture, for example, education (publications, less popular culture, radio or TV).

It can be funded by the government, as well as private institutions or non-governmental organizations. Although embassies play an important role in cultural diplomacy, they are not the only ones involved. In Kenya for instance, in the education sector, a number of Kenyan institutions offer Korean language. There is, for instance, a certificate course in Korean language at the University of Nairobi, which confirms the power of language and the role played by words to construct reality (Ashcroft, 1989:89).

According to Joseph Nye in his book *The Future of Power* (2011), the narrative of soft power indicates that cultural practices form part and sometimes is a resource of soft power. However, where language comes in within the common discourse that equates popular culture, then soft power loses its meaning. South Korea administration's view of Korean language as its promoting tool within the realm of globalization and geopolitical positioning campaign therefore provides us with a persuasive chance to study the role of language instruction in the effort of Korea's soft power in East Africa with specific reference to Kenya (Hashimoto, 2018).

As much as South Korea was eager to push for her soft power in Kenya, it was considered a mutually beneficial move between the two countries, since Kenya has relied on this soft power in the move towards achieving her vision 2030. For example, the construction of an advanced institute supported by South Korea. This is the Korean Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST), whose objectives are to fast-track transformation and modernization of Kenya to a middle-

income country by 2030, and to cast like a catalyst for advancing national development.

Cultural diplomacy, according to Tayeb (1998), is a way for countries to gain respect and understanding from other countries. The logic is that when a country's culture incorporates universal ideals and interests that others share, it raises the likelihood of achieving its desired outcomes due to the appeal and duty that it produces. Cultural interactions, in particular, are extremely important in improving cross-national ties. The exchanges aid in the promotion of trust and understanding, both of which are necessary for the resolution of issues and the building of bilateral ties. People in many cultures prefer to form a relationship and establish confidence before engaging in business transactions and other activities.

Koehler (2018), in support notes that the role of culture in diplomacy cannot be underestimated. He argues that culture has become increasingly more important in the age of economic globalization, which is marked by more intricate patterns of interconnectedness in the social, economic and cultural realms. The question of power balance among states has become more unpredictable, dynamic and volatile in this century. Koehler (2018), further notes that cultural contacts between Kenya and South Korea exercised a lead role in strengthening ties for the two countries. The (cultural) exchange program between Kenya and South Korea for instance was designed to majorly focus on education and cultural events.

This includes exchange program in cultural exhibitions and scholarships, whereby each country sends her students to study in the other country's respective

universities. Interaction between South Korea and Kenya, whether through students, professors or visitors, brings the two countries closer together. The purpose of interactions was to foster mutual trust, understanding and respect (Ochieng and Kim, 2019). Indeed, Kenya's Kenyatta University has a number of collaborations and Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with a number of South Korean Universities such as Yonsei University, Kyung Hee University, Seoul National University, Chosung University, Gyeongju University and Chosun University among others (O.I., Maritha, 2020).

All these cultural exchanges are informed by the need to spread Korean language. It is against this background that many institutes offering Korean language have been initiated in Kenya, most importantly as a way of spreading Korean culture. Indeed, Park Yuhjin, a visiting South Korean Professor in Kenya acknowledged that the number of Kenyans pursuing Korean related courses have increased, more so at the University of Nairobi.

The courses vary from translation, Korean language to history, economics, culture, literature and politics, with some of them being provided online with help from the South Korea Foundation sponsorship, which is an organization run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The program was started by Park Guan Hee when she visited Kenya in 2016 as part of South Korea's public diplomacy mission (YiWhan-woo, O.I., 2022). The ultimate goal of all these endeavors is to foster better understanding and cooperation between Kenya and South Korea.

The South Korean cultural surge became a worldwide phenomenon, with an impact felt all over the world and Kenyans have become consumers of South Korean cultural

products. Contrary to popular assumption, most Kenyans have seen the benefit of closeness to South Korea through the values portrayed in Korean music, drama and movies. From amongst many South Korea's values and principles, the East African audience is said to have responded positively to Confucius principles like family love, inclusive in filial piety. Importantly, the exposure to South Korean principles in movies and videos made Kenyans to develop a positive opinion toward South Korea.

Ochieng and Kim (2019) continue to argue that these developments may allude to the fact that culture as an alternative method, (cultural diplomacy), could be an important weapon for South Korea to expand her soft power across the world and build contacts with several other states, using it for implanting influence in the global community thus generating beneficial economic externalities. Through cultural diplomacy, the cultural interactions between South Korea and Kenya have shown that there is a great possibility of developing healthier relations, mainly in outspreading South Korea's soft power in countries such as Kenya, and creating robust opportunities for cooperation on numerous concerns of mutual interest.

Additionally, Kaisii (2017), emphasizes that the South Korean way of maintaining interpersonal peace, family values, their non-confrontational way of life and cohesion are consistent with the African way of doing things. Also, K-TVs (Korea Televisions channels) have been recognized in the way they usually package South Korean cultural programs hence making them have excellent qualities that command worldwide attention (Roll, 2018). Furthermore, cultural commodities can entice individuals to travel to the nation of origin.

On the consumption of South Korean audio-visual products (AVPs), Parc (2018), indicated that a steady increase has been observed throughout Africa, which is in tandem with the expanding South-South cultural interchange. Apart from the hegemonic global South AVPs countries, the South Korean AVPs have been welcomed with open arms. From 1993, the two regimes (Kenya and South Korea) have championed for a new way of government intervention, strategy and pillar of economic growth, especially to the creative industry. Thus, production and exportation of AVPs was institutionalized the same way the electronics and automobile industries were. The film industry was converted by the government to become a manufacturing sector, from just a service sector, a move which allowed them to receive public funding and bank loans.

Also, the Ministry of Culture in South Korea at some point carried out a pilot program to monitor growth in the creative industry. This method was used by the Economic Planning Board in the 1960s and 1970s to supervise and coordinate national economic development. Likewise, a development blueprint for becoming fifth-largest cultural power in the world was released, detailing specific goals like, ten-folding content export volume in five years, reflecting a succession of Five-Year National Development Plans with particular export targets (Kim, 2020).

This was part of a neoliberal approach by South Korea to extend her influence outside Asia, and the Kenyan populace seemed to have bought South Korean culture. It is therefore evident that cultural proceeds are likely to have played a role in the promotion of South Korea's relations with Kenya, and even other countries across the globe. The likely outcome is the positive projection of South Korean cultural products and image amongst many countries in Africa including Kenya. The same would be the impact for

Kenyans living in South Korea who directly consume South Korean cultural products like music, drama, movies and K-pop (Waitara, O.I., 2021).

Traditionally, it has been assumed that Africa and Asia share no cultural affinities. It was thus perplexing to note that among South Korean principles, Confucianism appeared to be more appealing and compatible with the practices of the Kenyan people and their behavior. Considering this, logically, it was presumed that South Korea could take advantage of this perceived value to improve bilateral relations with East African countries. Indeed, from many of the existing evidence, several governments in Africa found the history of South Korea's civilization appealing and worth imitating.

For this reason, many a times they sent their officials on benchmarking visits because they perceived South Korea as a learning template for sociocultural and socioeconomic success. Therefore, the Korean cultural centers and institutions in various parts of Kenya give hints of everyday presence of South Korea's culture, which is part of the cultural diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Korea.

South Korea established herself as a neighborly community group, which facilitated her sharing of cultural ideas. Programs and activities in the cultural centres include workshops, dance, special seminars, taekwondo and traditional instruments. Kenya has therefore utilized and accepted South Korean cultural values also as a way of entering into the rich technological and economic arena of South Korea, with a view of enhancing her diplomatic ties with South Korea as one of the major rising economies from the East. It is significant to note that the Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations were heightened in the Kibaki era (2002-2012) after the end of the Moi regime, as the new government

was keen on exploiting relations with countries from the East, as opposed to the traditional and colonial trading partners from the West.

3.7 Summary

This chapter has focused mainly on the dynamics of Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea in the Moi era. The argument is that, Moi's leadership style of centralization of state power informed how Kenya related with other states. During the Moi administration, there was consistency in the foreign policy process. However, to some extent there were also some considerable inconsistencies as the same regime exhibited uniqueness in leadership style, which substantially influenced the outlook of Kenya's diplomatic relations with other states. Like his predecessor, the country's foreign policy, particularly in international affairs, was openly pro-Western during Moi's regime. Nevertheless, South Korea-Kenya diplomatic ties had already been established and during Moi's first decade, Kenya's trade with South Korea had gone up by 41%.

With the diplomatic nexus between South Korea and Kenya having taken root, the two countries signed a deal which saw exporters of Kenyan goods to South Korea enjoying lower tariffs.

By 1991, president Moi visited South Korea with a delegation from his KANU party. His visit was meant to attract investment and promote tourism (Khamisi, 2014). Evidently, Moi's reign laid a better foundation for consequent diplomatic and bilateral relations between Kenya and South Korea. Earlier on, both geographical and ideological distances posed a challenge to the diplomatic relations between these two states, especially during the reign of President Chu Doo-Hwan of South Korea prompting him to visit Kenya in his African tour of 1982.

It is therefore evident that the visits of these two heads of state individually to South Korea and Kenya respectively enhanced their diplomatic ties especially in the economic sector, amidst the Cold War and the structural adjustment programmes that characterized the Moi era in Kenya. The chapter concludes that the shift in the policy orientation of Kenya to the “Look East Policy” drove Kenya closer to South Korea as a reliable trade partner therefore enhancing her diplomatic cooperations not only with South Korea but also with many other countries from the East.

Finally, the discussion herein has given weight to the international relations theory as presented by realists by indicating that in cooperating and having diplomatic relations with South Korea, Kenya was simply pursuing her economic development which forms part of the country’s national interests. The discussion also acknowledges that by virtue of investments assistance and support in economic development, South Korea was as well protecting her own national interests. The next chapter, discusses Kenya’s Diplomatic Relation with South Korea during Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta Eras 2003-2016.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 KENYA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATION WITH SOUTH KOREA DURING KIBAKI AND UHURU KENYATTA ERAS 2003-2016

4.1 Introduction

On 27th December, 2002, over five million Kenyans voted for Mwai Kibaki as the third president, in what was Kenya's first electoral and democratic change of administration since independence (Barkan, 2004). The election signaled the end of Daniel arap Moi's 24 - year rule. Kenya got an opportunity to reclaim her promising history of stability and economic prosperity. One of the remarkable political and economic developments during Kibaki's era was his shift from Kenya's traditional economic partners - Western nations to nations in the East. This was a policy shift that differed from the previous policies during Kenyatta and Moi eras.

According to Chong (2020), following a break in South Korea's involvement with Africa in the 1980s, the country's re-engagement with countries in Africa began in 2006 with Roh Moo-Hyun's (2003–2008) second presidential visit to Africa. During his visit, his government unveiled a program known as "Korea's Initiative for African Development", which outlined South Korea's international development strategy in her cooperation with African countries. The program focused on three key areas: sharing development experience, tripling Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa by 2018, and convening regular meetings with government officials from Africa, like heads of state and ministers.

This chapter, therefore, explores the nature of Kenya-South Korea diplomatic ties in the Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta Era. It begins by exploring changes and shifts in Kibaki's

foreign policy. The chapter then interrogates Kenya's economic diplomacy with South Korea as well as aspects on cultural diplomacy between the two states.

4.2 Mwai Kibaki regime and foreign diplomacy

When Mwai Kibaki became the third president of Kenya, his government was more concerned with the economy of the country, which needed to be fixed before any other thing. The newly elected president articulated the main priorities that would characterize his term, in one of the most compelling and motivating speeches of his presidency. The president noted: "The economy, that you all recognize has been under-performing over the last decade".

He reiterated that under his leadership, the government would implement policies aimed at economic reconstruction, job creation, and infrastructure rehabilitation (Kibaki as quoted in *the Standard Newspaper*, January 1, 2012). President Kibaki had more focus on infrastructural development, which drove him to "Look East" in order to accomplish his policy on the same. It has been argued that this infrastructural development created a conducive environment for doing business.

Despite the infrastructure improvements, President Kibaki strongly believed in having a free and open market, steering clear of populist initiatives that would have harmed the economy's ability to grow through a dynamic private sector (*Standard Newspaper*, 1/1/2012). Although, Kibaki's priority was in improving infrastructure he also placed priority in other areas like: health and education. In fact, during his campaign in 2002, Kibaki promised of introducing free primary education for children in Kenya, a promise he fulfilled. Following the introduction of the free primary school education, it was

reported that over 150,000 children, many of whom were locked out because of school fees issues, returned to school in January 2003. To ensure this program succeeded, a fifth of the government budget was spent on education (*The East Africa*, 16/6/2012).

During Kibaki's tenure, there was a popularized misconception that Kenya was militarily weak in comparison to her more martially active neighbors such as Uganda. This became one of the factors in the country's foreign policy that led to her miscasting as a reluctant regional power. It is therefore in the context of the political and security imperatives required to achieve regional and global competitiveness as outlined in Kenya's Vision 2030 that the country's foreign policy was retooled under Kibaki (Barkan, 2004).

4.3 Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in the Post Moi Era

According to Howell (2008), Kenya's interactions with the international system were shaped by two main policies: the country retained a moralistic and idealistic stance outside of Africa, while maintaining a conservative and legitimist posture within the East African region. Though, in these relations, national territory protection and economic development remained paramount. President Kibaki adopted a more decentralized approach to governmental administration, including foreign policy, in comparison to his predecessor. However, Kenya's fundamental foreign policy goals and values showed consistency with those followed by his forerunners. During Kibaki's time, Kahler (2015), notes that Kenya's foreign policy formulation was majorly guided by issues such as: respect for territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for international norms and international law and good neighborliness.

It was noted that whereas Moi's administration was adamant to embrace reform initiatives, this completely changed during Kibaki's regime. His administration gained office when the country was confronted with problems such as a weak economy, a negative worldwide image, and low donor trust (Government of Kenya, 2003). The country's dismal economic performance had become the major cause of poverty, high domestic and foreign debt, unemployment, declining school enrolment, health problems and a generally bad quality of life. President Mwai Kibaki's led coalition (the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)) was thus faced with serious need for economic recovery, and the regaining public confidence in bodies like the legislature and the judiciary, whose effectiveness and importance were weakened by the Moi government (Kagwanja, 2012).

The Kibaki administration adopted two state strategic plans on progress in response to the daunting challenge of economic rebalancing the nation. These included Kenya Vision 2030 and the Economic Recovery for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003–2007, both of which fell under the Ministry of Planning and National Development. Kenya's international relations was significantly impacted by the policy instruments. President Kibaki engaged in a number of bilateral and multilateral measures with the United States and European Union among others, which paid off in terms of external aid, with an emphasis on arresting the economic trajectory and regaining donor goodwill (Kagwanja, 2012). Additionally, Kibaki's administration established new embassies with the goal of promoting the flow of foreign direct investments into Kenya as part of its new foreign policy stance (Green, 2016). As Kenyan government officials worked with western counterparts in anti-terrorism measures, Kenya's relations with international donors were entirely restored.

4.4 Policy Shift Towards the East and Kenya's Diplomatic Relations with South Korea

According to Waller (2016), the Cold War period ushered in a new Kenya, with new administration all together. The Moi administration's departure ushered in a seismic shift in both internal and foreign policy. In terms of foreign policy, Waller (2016), contends that post-independence Kenya may well have embraced the non-aligned movement's philosophy during the Cold War time in the 1960s and 1970s, but, technically, Kenya's foreign policy was unmistakably pro-western in practice. He noted that during the Moi years, what began as a policy leaning under Kenyatta became a de jure policy position.

Later in the years, even as the political and military concerns that controlled countries relations, with western nations, more so during the Cold War, were fading, challenges and opportunities arose, particularly on economic motivations that drove the realignment of assistance flows (Murero, 2019). These challenges and opportunities were also reflected in the Bretton Woods institutions' enforcement of aid regulation and structural reforms programs (SAPs) in developing countries.

As a consequence, most emerging economies' relations with Western counterparts significantly started to deteriorate. At the same time, many countries in the Asian region emerged and created international influence. In order to wield their newfound power, they formed alliances with emerging countries, not only as sources of raw materials and marketplaces for manufactured products, but also as allies in the fight against the global north's supremacy (Murero, 2019).

Based on the above, both President Mwai Kibaki and later Uhuru Kenyatta's administrations concurrently shifted and actively responded to various changes in the local political setting, caused by the election of different leaders. The political changes that characterized the Kibaki leadership shaped the economic diplomacy pillar that was already in existence. As Murero (2019) noted, the administration for example altered and enlarged the economic diplomacy pillar, previously known as economic development, in order to pursue different foreign policy tactics aimed at meeting the country's newly organized economic objectives. The demand for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and aid flows was strategically increased, and non-traditional allies were pursued for participation. Following this development into new markets for goods and services, markets in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia were added.

The post-Moi phase witnessed a rapid heightening of South Korea-Kenya relations, as well as contacts with other Asian countries. Although Kenya was formerly seen as a western darling, both internal and systematic causes contributed to the country's tilt to the East. The Kibaki government was able to reach this goal by focusing on local sources of revenue as well as new international partners, with South Korea emerging as a prominent player in Kenya's economic development. Kenya's engagement with the East marked a fresh beginning, owing to the fact that countries like South Korea and other 'Asian Tigers' members had policies with which Kenya could relate. Second, Asia Pacific economies offered, and continue to offer, a different focal point for diplomacy and foreign policy (Murero, 2006).

Indeed, most countries in the East including South Korea expanded their engagements with African countries. This was because countries in Africa were attracted by the

principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country, which most of the African countries appeared to embrace. Kenya found herself exploiting this window based on the neo-liberal approach by Kibaki's government, which was yearning for economic growth after two decades of Moi rule which saw Kenya being overtaken by Malaysia, a country which was at par with Kenya as far as economic growth of the countries was concerned (Otenyo, O.I., 2021).

Kenya's relative political stability, as well as her strategic geographic location as a gateway to east and central Africa, made the country an appealing investment destination for South Korea and other Asian nations such as China. As a result, the government of President Kibaki significantly and strategically condensed western donor aid dependence. With this shift, Kenya progressively became funded by both resources generated internally, for instance, through increased tax revenues, and externally through new connections with Asiatic states such as South Korea (Matlou, 2015).

4.5 Kenya-South Korea Economic Diplomacy in the Post Moi Era

Seoul's Africa policy was shaped by its diplomatic competition with Pyongyang. Subsequent to the close of the Cold War, many African countries faced marginalization in South Korea's policy priorities. However, starting from 2000s, increasing concerns over food security and energy needs compelled Seoul to review its Africa policy (Otavio, 2018). In the mid-2000, South Korea adopted a significant shift in her relations with Africa. In 1982, President Jeon Doo-Hwan became the very first South Korea's President to visit Africa, where he visited Nigeria, Gabon, Senegal, and Kenya.

The second South Korea state visit happened in March, 2006, when President Roh Moo-Hyun visited three African countries - Egypt, Algeria and Nigeria - to promote South Korea relations with Africa. That was the next visit by a South Korean president to Africa in 24 years (www.howwemadeitinafrica.com). President Roh's visits signified a watershed moment in South Korea-Africa relations, helping to stimulate South Korea's desire to participate in and build strong diplomatic ties with African countries. The visit by President Roh resulted in the formation of the Korea Africa Forum, in which the first meeting was held successfully in Seoul, South Korea, in November 2016, and at which the Seoul declaration was adopted, in which the Republic of Korea pledged to participate actively in African development (www.saiia.org.za).

By August 2006, South Korea already had full diplomatic relations with all fifty-three countries in Africa, with her embassies opened in various capitals within the continent. With this in place, South Korea held her first Korea-Africa Forum (KAF) in November 2006 where a discussion on how to better the cooperation happened. This forum is held after every three years in either Seoul or Busan, South Korea. In 2008, South Korea established two other cooperation forums namely: the biennial Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation Conference (KOAFEC) and: the Korea-Africa Industry Cooperation Forum. As noted, the decision to have cooperation forums with African countries was to accommodate South Korea's saturated domestic market which had begun to shift toward export.

Essentially, a strong manufacturing industry was critical to the South Korean economy's growth. Over 82 percent of the country's exports came from her top 30 business conglomerates otherwise known as chaebol, including: Hyundai, LG, SK, Samsung

and Lotte. Opondo (2014), noted that the massive infrastructural development in South Korea led to the increase of surplus production of goods and service. In this regard, Africa was seen as a frontier market for South Korean goods. Thus, many South Korean big companies like Samsung, Hyundai, LG and even the South Korea Television Channel became popular in Kenya and other African countries.

Since the establishment of the Africa-Korea Forum, the presence of multilateral cooperations from South Korea has significantly increased, many of which have big investments in Kenya and Africa at large. A few examples of these cooperations are Posco Steel, Hyundai Motors, Samsung and LG Electronics, all of which have continually penetrated the African market. According to Opondo (2014), Chaebols are big business conglomerates controlled by families and in South Korea alone, they account for a whopping 67.8% of the country's GDP due to their massive size and broad reach across many enterprises and industries. These are part of South Korean private investments in a number of states in Africa, thanks to the cordial diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Korea.

Samsung is one of the largest of these powerhouses, with its wider presence in Africa dating back to the early 2000s. Samsung was able to seek for the best places to develop facilities in the continent thanks to its significant market penetration in Africa. The company appeared to have the negotiating strength which helped it to demand for tax breaks in Kenya to compensate for unfair practices from counterfeit products, in order to develop an assembly factory in Kenya. On the surface, the requirement appeared acceptable in the context of combating the marketing of counterfeit goods.

However, Opondo (2014), observed that any tax break offered to Samsung, on the other hand, would give the business an unfair advantage over genuine competitors like Apple and Chinese giants Huawei Technologies and Xiaomi. The decision by the Samsung company to build a plant in Kenya revealed the company's strategy for growing and consolidating its market dominance in East Africa while also limiting competition. The company supplied laptops, television sets, refrigerators and printers to the East African market by importing finished goods from other regional operations, such as the one in Durban. A facility in Kenya would thus save money on both logistics and labor. Samsung's journey to regional popularity in the African electronics sector was rewarded when the annual Brand Africa 100 survey named it the most admired brand (Opondo, 2014).

Further, the establishment of Kenya's embassy in South Korea in 2007 contributed to a significant increase in trade between the two countries. For instance, Trade between Kenya and South Korea improved marginally in 1993 after dismal performance between 1991 and 1992 while between 2005 and 2006, exports from South Korea to Kenya increased sharply, followed by a sharp decline in 2007. Chae, (2015) argues that the global financial crisis and political instability in Kenya during 2007 and 2008 may have been the main causes of the export decline. On the other hand, Kenya's exports to South Korea from 2003 to 2006 increased by 400%, from US \$ 50 million to US \$ 200 million, but declined to US \$ 150 million in 2007, a 25% decline (Chae, 2015).

Kenya's Ministry of Trade indicates that the value of trade between Kenya and South Korea between 2008 and 2020 jumped from Ksh8.47 billion to Ksh22.82 billion respectively. This was a 169.42 percent growth in 13 years in the post Moi era. From

South Korea, Kenya primarily imports nuclear reactors, iron and steel, man-made staple fibers, plastic, machinery, boilers, electricals, organic chemical, and electronic equipment. Conversely, Kenya exports tea, coffee, flowers, copper, aluminum, live trees, plants, furniture, precious stones, coins and articles of apparel, wood, and articles of wood and metals, to South Korea. This kind of engagement has seen Kenya's diplomatic ties with South Korea improving a great deal (The Star, 2021 Kenya eyes Duty Free Access to South Korean Market).

Chae (2015), further notes that Kenya's exports to South Korea in 2010 were US\$2.2277 million while imports were US\$248.672 million. In 2013 Kenya's exports to South Korea were US\$12.5039 million while imports were US\$284.139 million. Although Kenya has maintained strong economic ties with South Korea, it is evident that she continued to experience a trade deficit between 2010 and 2013, which had a negative effect on the level of economic development, job creation and balance of payment. On the other hand, South Korea experienced a trade surplus during the same period.

The difference between South Korea's imports and exports from and to Kenya respectively was very insignificant during the same period. This was expected to have had a positive impact on South Korea's economic growth, balance of trade and job creation. Nevertheless, to enhance Kenya - South Korea diplomatic relations, in 2010 Kenya's Vice president Mr Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka visited Seoul and met with the senior executive members of the Daewoo group, who included the vice president of Daewoo, Mr. Jeon Dyeung.

In this meeting, Mr. Dyeung briefed Mr. Musyoka of the US\$1.3 billion coal-fired power plant that Daewoo had committed to put up for KenGen in Mombasa. This power plant

was expected to generate over 600 Megawatts of electricity, thereby indicating the level of cooperation that Kenya and South Korea had in the energy sector (Chae, 2015).

Additionally, the two bilateral partners have their trading partners spread around the globe. Out of the ten major global trading partners, they share five as their major trading partners, including China, Germany, Japan, United Arab Emirates and the United States. As expected, neighboring countries form part of their major trading partners as well. South Korea was at the 26th position in Kenya's trading list, while Kenya was at the 104th position in South Korea's trading list between 2010 and 2013.

South Korea was Kenya's 18th largest source of imports, while Kenya was one of South Korea's insignificant sources of imports during Kibaki's period (Chae, 2015). Although this picture shows some imbalance between Kenya and South Korea in trade terms, diplomatically, this economic relation took care of Kenya's economic interest in the global space thereby enhancing her diplomatic ties with South Korea as well as enhancing her presence in the Asian market and continent.

Apart from economic and bilateral relations, many regional and international topics of mutual importance are shared by the two countries. Kenya encourages attempts to achieve stability, peace and denuclearization in the Korean peninsula via peaceful discussions, dialogue and diplomacy (The Korea Post - <http://www.koreapost.com>). Since diplomatic relations were established on 7th February, 1964, Kenya and South Korea have had great bilateral relations. These ties have allowed both countries to develop and strengthen their economic, political and cultural collaboration.

Ideally and realistically, Kenya has provided to South Korea a space in Africa which South Korea has exploited in her attempt to expand her regional and global influence while exporting her unique model of economic development (Otavio, 2018). As a result, South Korea's foreign policy for Africa is now primarily influenced by economic factors such as the need for energy, security and new export markets for South Korean goods. This has been accompanied by South Korea's desire to exert more influence in international politics.

The election of the Saenuri party led by Park Geun-Hye as the President of South Korea came around 2012 and almost coincided with the end of President Kibaki era in Kenya. Park indicated after her election that her government would continue to play an important role in international affairs, emphasizing on the three primary pillars of: people (sociocultural cooperation), prosperity (economic cooperation) and peace (political and strategic cooperation). Notably, she stated that all her foreign policy would be done in a way that protected South Korea's national interests, which was interpreted as a counter measure against North Korea. Notably also, the two pillars on prosperity and people characterized South Korea – Kenya relations in the first term of president Kenyatta's II regime (2013-17).

Indeed, around 2010's, the relationship between South Korea and Kenya became deeper and much closer due to the launching of direct air flight (Korean Air), the opening of Korean study department in the University of Nairobi and increased official development fund through the establishment of the resident office of KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency) in Nairobi. Korean Air began flights from Seoul to Nairobi in June 2012. In fact, during the launch and while advertising the beginning of the flights, Korean

Air on its Twitter account noted: “fly Korean Air and enjoy the great African Savanna, the safari trip, and the indigenous people”.

However, it could be argued that during Kibaki regime, there were some challenges over Kenya’s diplomatic relationship with South Korea. Some scholars such as Murunga and Nasong’o (2006) argue that for a long time, Kenya and South Korea bilateral cooperation primarily faced difficulties because it took time to have engagement at high level, between the senior officials from the two countries. According to the scholars, this was a sign that Kenya-South Korea bilateral cooperation had not fully developed. Nevertheless, this changed from 8th – 11th July, 2012, when Kim Hwang-Sik, South Korea's Prime Minister, made an official visit to Kenya for the very first time since 1964.

During a meeting in Nairobi with his Kenyan counterpart, Raila Odinga and President Mwai Kibaki, South Korea's Prime Minister shared South Korea's experience in transforming herself from a war-torn country to an economic powerhouse. In November, 2012, the South Korea’s Prime Minister visited Kenya and held a bilateral meeting with Mwai Kibaki, former president of Kenya. However, not much of what they discussed was implemented, and interaction between the two countries went quiet for four subsequent years until 2016 when this relationship was re-awakened through the visitation to Kenya by Park Geun-hye, former president of South Korea. To appreciate the connections between South Korea and Kenya, it is vital to examine what trends were applied by the two countries in accelerating their diplomatic ties after their initial encounter in 1964 (The Korean Herald, 2012).

Kim Hwang Sik’s visit was part of his official trip to countries in Africa and efforts to boost bilateral ties between South Korea and Kenya. The Prime Minister’s visit was made

shortly after Korean Air launched its direct flight from Seoul to Nairobi. H.E. Kim Hwang Sik first paid a courtesy call to President Kibaki and Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, and then had a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Raila Odinga. In his diplomatic engagement with President Kibaki of Kenya, Kim discussed various ways to promote the two countries, bilateral relations, including development of education and agriculture cooperation, Korean companies' investment in the LAPSSET project, and building partnerships in the areas of ICT energy and water. Prime Minister Kim also visited the Olkaria geothermal power plant, one of which would be constructed by a South Korean company called Hyundai Engineering.

During this official visit, H.E. Kim Hwang Sik further witnessed the signing of an MoU between the University of Nairobi and the Korean Foundation to support the promotion of Korean studies at the University (<https://overseas.mofa.go.kr/ke-en/brd/m>). In his reciprocal visit to South Korea, Kenya's Prime Minister, Raila Odinga and South Korea's Prime Minister Kim Hwang-Sik agreed to step up bilateral cooperation in development, business and culture during their talks in Seoul.

The two leaders also swapped views on the situation in the Korean peninsula and ways to boost collaboration in the international arena (The Korean Herald, 2012). The Kenyan community in South Korea has also been in the forefront in cementing Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea. Kenya's participation in the Seoul Friendship Fair, Kenya Culture Day, Africa Day and Yeosu 2012 Expo in South Korea are just a manifest of commitments by the Kenyan community in South Korea towards promoting Kenya-South Korea bilateral relations.

In terms of bilateral trade, South Korea has been a vital supporter of Kenya's development agenda, notably since the opening of the KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency) offices in Nairobi. Over the years, the volume of trade between Kenya and South Korea has steadily increased. This is evidenced by the fact that Kenya's, tea flowers and premium coffee have found recognition in South Korea. KOICA's mandate in Kenya has been to aid in the achievement of sustainable socio-economic development in the country. Additionally, Kenya has continued to partner with other critical South Korean agencies such as Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), Korea Importers Association (KOIMA), Korea Chambers of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), Korea EXIM Bank and the Korea-Africa Foundation, all of which have increased trade value and volume to Kenya. Specifically, KOTRA was established with the goal to develop and promoted trade and business dealings between the two countries. On the other hand, the Korea Project on International Agriculture (KOPIA), was established to help partner countries (Kenya and South Korea) cultivate sustainable agricultural practices that result in increased productivity. All these partnerships have been able to enhance Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea.

Kenya has also participated in many of South Korea's Coffee Expo where Kenya has always had opportunities of showing her worth at the exhibition centre. These exhibitions are always attended by high profile government officials led by the Cabinet Secretary for Industrialization. In these exhibitions, Kenya did not only showcase her rich coffee, but also used the same to deepen her relations with South Korea. In such Expo, the leader of Kenya's delegation used that opportunity to invite and woo investors to Kenya as a preferred investment destination and further pushed for market access for Kenya's

products to the Asian nation and markets (Kephis, 2020). Mukami (2016) observes that trade between Kenya and South Korea in 2014 stood at Ksh. 29.10 billion (US\$288 million).

In May 2015, Kenya initiated a bilateral agreement with an intension of accessing South Korea's market for various products from Kenya. South Korea, through the Kenyan Embassy in Seoul, responded in January 2016, specifying that both broccoli and unripe banana were exempted from Pest Risk Analysis (PRA), as long as they were accompanied by a plant health certificate (phytosanitary) from Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS). Thus, with the approval from KEPHIS, Kenya was free to export unripe banana and broccoli to South Korea.

In addition to unripe banana and broccoli, Kenya exports other agricultural commodities to the South Korea such as: Freesia, Gypsophilla, Calla Lillies, Roses, Lavender, Limonium, Solidago, Zantedechia, Carnations, Hydrangea, and Craspedia. Propagation materials such as *Dianthus caryophyllus*, *Aster spp*, *Euphorbia spp*, *Fuschia hybrida*, *Kalanchoe Poinsettia spp* and *Chrysanthemum* areas as well as exported to South Korea. Kenya continued to work with South Korea to expand her goods exports covering agricultural produce like: avocados, carrots, passion fruits, corn, sugar snap peas, snow peas, pineapple fruits and karella (<https://kephis.org/>).

During President Uhuru Kenyatta's first tenure, he signed a number of bilateral agreements with the South Korean government. For instance, in May, 2016, Kenya-South Korea signed over seven pacts, which boosted efforts, especially by Kenya, in her interest to becoming a technological, economic and industrial powerhouse in the East African

region. It was as a result of one of the pacts that South Korea's Export-Import Bank pumped an initial Ksh 5 billion to support the agricultural sector to improve Kenya's food security. This agreement which took the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Korean Bank was signed by Willy Bett, the then Cabinet Secretary for agriculture.

The pacts were signed when President Park Geun-Hye visited Kenya and co-chaired a bilateral meeting with President Uhuru Kenyatta in Nairobi. The signed MoU covered areas touching on science and technology, trade and investment, as well as e-Government and industry. Also covered were areas on health, higher education and innovation as well as the development of electric power and nuclear energy (www.president.go.ke).

Later on, the then Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for education, Fred Matiang'i, together with Yun Byung-Se, South Korea's Foreign Affairs Minister, signed an MoU on scientific and technological cooperation and called for the two countries to share policies and innovations in science and technology. The MoU established exchange programs between Kenyan and South Korean research and development institutes. Kenya and South Korea would also exchange human resources through education and training initiatives as part of this MOU. The MoU would also encourage Kenya and South Korea to collaborate on the integration of digital city solutions. Furthermore, the accord on e-Government collaboration would see Kenya and South Korea share technical exchanges and best practices possible in order to improve the efficiency and efficacy of government services for the benefit of their people. This pact/MoU was signed by Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed for Kenya (Murero, 2019).

Within the same bilateral talks, Adan Mohamed, Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Industry, Trade and Cooperatives signed an MoU on cooperation in industry, trade, investment and industrial complex development with his counterpart Joo Hyunghwan Korean Minister for trade, industry and trade. The aim of the MoU was to have Kenya and South Korea working collectively in building their automobiles and electronics, textiles, leather processing and food processing industries. In addition, the two governments agreed to collaborate on the development of special economic zones and industrial complexes.

This agreement led to the signing of an MoU on Energy and Petroleum by Charles Keter, the then Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Energy and Petroleum, and Joo Hyunghwan, South Korea's Minister for Trade, Industry and Energy. The MoU targeted the development of electric power and nuclear energy by the two countries. It offered Kenya a chance to access South Korea's expertise in electricity generation, since the latter has a unique power development model, which has secured a steady supply of electricity through continual construction and safe power plant operations (Murero, 2019).

In addition, Cleopa Kilonzo Mailu, the then Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Health, and Chung Chinyoub, South Korea's Health and Welfare Minister, under the same agreement signed a health MoU to expand the two nations' collaboration in the detection and treatment of noncommunicable illnesses. Kenya would thus benefit from South Korea's assistance in cervical cancer screening and cryotherapy, as well as diagnostic building capacity in radiology and nuclear medicine (www.president.go.ke). Also, another deal was signed by Fred Matiang'i, the then Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for

Education on the establishment of a South Korean University estimated to be worth US\$10 million.

During the same time, South Korea launched a Korea Aid project, which was understood as a creative mixture of public diplomacy and medical & social charity work. Thus, Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations continued to show positive improvement and expected to have a brighter future (<http://ken.mofa.go.kr/korean/>). Further, Kenya is also one of the top 15 countries which benefits from Korea's Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). These acts could be explained within the realist and liberal theoretical perspectives, in that Kenya was in real need of development in order to spur her economic growth in the wake of a rising global economy.

The signing of MoUs with South Korea, a country from the East depicts Kenya's liberal stand on what she felt was good for her own national interest and for the prosperity of her people. It is within this liberal theoretical dispensation that President Kenyatta was able to condemn nuclear tests carried out by North Korea in January 2016, and the launch of a space rocket in February of the same year. Kenyatta's argument was that such provocative acts would invariably lead to further tensions in the Asian region, and more so between South Korea and North Korea (Murero, 2019).

Additionally, the visit of South Korea's president to Kenya saw the establishment of "Korea Aid", with emphasis on education, health, culture and Saemaul Undong (Lee, 2020). Through Korea Aid, several ODA projects were initiated in East Africa and thereafter were carried out under the same program. In East Africa's remote places, mobile clinics and libraries were incorporated. Projects in Saemaul Undong too were upgraded. Some of the initiatives were carried out in collaboration with the United

Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Village Program. During her tour to Kenya, President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya stated that:

"As a country, we strive to be such people, and we see the Republic of South Korea as confirmation that everything can be achieved with the appropriate investment, and that future economic powerhouses could emerge from anywhere in the planet, including Africa". (Africanews.com).

During Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya –South Korea bilateral relations thrived on comparative advantage that the two countries have. South Korea, for instance, had an advantage in heavy industries while Kenya has an advantage in light industries such as textiles. Also, South Korea, was able to tap on Kenya's rich agricultural products such as: tea, coffee and flowers. As a way of fostering their diplomatic relations, the Kenya assured South Korean investors and businessmen of its support to ensure that these investors make profit from their investment (Otieno, 2021).

By 2016, trade between South Korea and Kenya was still skewed in favor of South Korea. Kenyan exports to South Korea between January and September 2016, for example reached a total of 98,184,000 USD, with South Korea importing up to 120,578,000 USD. It was projected that trade between South Korea and Kenya would continue to rise in the future even as the two countries continued to increase and strengthen their bilateral and diplomatic engagements.

While moving in the right direction by emulating the economic path and growth of South Korea, the Kenyan Government led by President Uhuru concentrated more on infrastructural development that would facilitate the country to become a middle-class economy by 2030, having a sustainable growth rate of not less than 10%. All this was captured in President Uhuru's vision 2030 plan. This was expected to be achieved by

allowing Korean companies to invest in competitive fields such as energy, manufacturing, IT, mass rapid transportation systems, agribusiness, road rail and port construction, as well as top export commodities from Kenya such as: horticultural products, coffee, cement, Tea, petroleum products, fish, leather and textiles (The Korean Post, 2016).

4.6 Cultural Diplomacy in the first term of Uhuru Kenyatta's era

Culturally, South Korea continued to use her soft power to enhance her relationship with Kenya. Seoul continued with her conventional sources of soft power, informed by legitimacy of foreign policy, culture and political value. In the context of Korea-Africa relations, as an aspiring middle power, South Korea mostly relied on her rich culture because of the geopolitical challenges found within the Korean peninsula (Chong, O.I., 2020).

Just like in the Kibaki era, Korean cultural diplomacy in Kenya was mainly led by the Korean embassy, with various cultural activities such as Korean food promotion (the Taste of Korea program), Korean film screenings and taekwondo competitions. These regular programs were led by the Korean Cultural Centers since it started in 1971 (Chong, O.I., 2020). It is evident that a number of Kenyan youths have adopted the Korean culture of Taekwondo as exemplified Taekwondo clubs spread across all Kenyan schools, from primary to university levels.

One of the major strategies South Korea has taken advantage of in her global public diplomacy is the use of taekwondo, as part of her sport diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016a). The Korean government understood that by promoting taekwondo as a diplomatic activity, people have the capacity to form a better image of the country and

that this would also aid in realizing its foreign policy goals. Regardless of the fact that the Ancient Olympic Games were profoundly linked to both war and peace, sport diplomacy as part of cultural and public diplomacy is a relatively recent issue in International Relations 1971 (Chong, O.I., 2020).

As Kim (2019) observed, given Seoul's preoccupation with soft power domination, the country increased its cultural soft power, which ended up in the successful Korea Aid initiative, which was implemented in Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya. Upon its launch, during Park Geun-Hye's state trips to these countries, the Korean government hailed Korea Aid as a "new sophisticated mobile development cooperation achieving missions of both ODA and cultural diplomacy" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016b; Yim, 2002).

Additionally, there was an expansion of Korean institutes and courses in the Korean language in Kenya. Teaching capacity increased and Korean Studies were taught at institutions of higher learning such as the University of Nairobi, and international schools such as Manahaim School and College (Ziegler, O.I., 2021).

The South Korean Study Centre established at the University of Nairobi, apart from promoting academic and cultural exchange programmes, also enhances and contributes to mutual understanding between South Korea and Kenya. This partnership, which came as a result of cooperation between the two governments, would later culminate in the publication of a book titled *The Essay as a Handshake: Impressions on the Kenyan-Korean Interface*. The book reflects on the relationship between Kenya and South Korea over the past 40 years and is testament of the spirit of cooperation and mutual agreement

in education and research signed in 2010 between the Academy of Korean Studies and the University of Nairobi.

Cultural diplomacy has also been applicable in the liberal Kenya's media space, which accommodates South Korean television station "the Good News Broadcasting System (GBS)", which started in 2009 with the aim of giving viewers high quality content as far as viewership is concerned (Kibatha, O.I., 2019). South Korea has also slowly been imprinting her culture in Kenyan streets, with people able to buy groceries in places such as the Korean Market on Oloitoktok road, at Food Plus and at Corner Store Ltd in Parklands Avenue. According to Kibatha, ready meals, infused with Korean culture are also available in Korean restaurants such as East Seoul Street Food based in the Village Market among other Korean restaurants in Nairobi and Mombasa (Kibatha, O.I., 2019).

Such are the characteristics of cultural diplomacy that Seoul has brought to the Kenyan social spaces, with very positive responses from Kenyans. All these have been made possible through the expansion of South Korea's cultural policy, which has been one of the reasons why culture and the arts are considered vital part of government policy (Yim, O.I., 2002). Indeed, Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea have been anchored on the two South Korean pillars namely: national interest of the two states and, the need for global presence for the two states.

4.6 Summary

This chapter has interrogated Kenya's diplomatic cooperation with South Korea during the post Moi era, which includes the Kibaki era and the first term of Uhuru Kenyatta era, spanning from 2003 to 2013. In this chapter, there has been a continuation of policy shift

towards the East, which was advantageous to South Korea in her relations with Kenya. In the two eras, revamping of Kenya's economy was at the centre stage and included a lot of infrastructural development. To realize this, the two governments established strategic policies on development, that is, the Kenya Vision 2030, Employment Creation 2003-2007 and Economic Recovery for Wealth Creation.

The chapter notes that the post Moi era as well saw a rapid growth of South Korea-Kenya relations, alongside other Asian states. As established, most countries in the East, including South Korea's engagement with African countries was mostly based on the continent's position on non-interference in their foreign policy, which many African governments found appealing. Kenya found herself exploiting this window of "Look East" based on the neo-liberal approach by Kibaki's government which was yearning for economic growth after two decades of Moi rule. In Korea, Seoul's Africa policy was shaped by its diplomatic competition with Pyongyang.

The chapter notes that the year 2006 clearly marked a shift in South Korea's foreign policy, when the country pronounced the year as the "year of friendship with Africa". Following the declaration, Roh Moo-Hyun, the then President of South Korea initiated several Korea-Africa initiatives which enhanced South Korea's relations with Kenya, alongside other African states. In the two eras of Presidents Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta, South Korea's companies such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai and other South Korean multinational corporations invested in Kenya.

Similarly, noted that during Uhuru Kenyatta's time, there were several forums which were successfully held between Kenya and South Korea. For instance, in 2014, the following conferences were held: Kenya Korea Economic Forum; United Nations

Telecoms Union Conference; World e-Parliament Conference and training for ICT in Education.

In 2015, the two countries further organized for the following forums: the World water forum expo and fair, world educational forum; training programme and the national Assembly; World games for military; Busan Global Partnership Forum.

In 2016, there were the following forums: the Kenya Korea Nuclear energy cooperation program; Global Infrastructure Cooperation Conference (GICC); Knowledge sharing program dissemination seminar, Global ICT leadership forum; Korea Africa Economic cooperation (KOAFEC) Ministerial Conference and; Kenya Korea Industry Cooperation forum.

Apart from economic investments, diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Korea were also enhanced through cultural diplomacy. South Korea employed this strategy of using culture as part of her soft power to enhance her diplomatic relations with Kenya. This entailed the creation of institutes to teach the Korean language through partnership with institutions of higher learning in Kenya such as the University of Nairobi.

Similarly, cultural diplomacy has been evidence in the adoption of Taekwondo in Kenyan schools' clubs, the opening of Korean cultural centres, television station and Korean restaurants where Korean food is cooked and sold to Kenyans. The chapter concludes that Kenya's diplomacy with South Korea was centered around both economic and cultural interests of the two states. The next chapter gives a summary, conclusion and recommendation of the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The study set out to examine diplomatic trends between Kenya and South Korea relations, 1964 to 2016. This chapter provides a summary of the findings of the study based on the chapters discussed. It conveys conclusions and insights from the findings and further gives recommendations on thematic areas that need further research.

5.2 Summary

The study has conceptualized the idea of diplomacy in chapter two and observed that diplomatic relations between states started through the Westphalia Peace Conference in Europe before spreading to the other parts of the world. Most importantly, diplomacy was advanced due to conflicts between states, based on realist principles. The chapter observed that Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations began immediately after Kenya's independence, and this was driven by Kenya's geo-political position in East Africa.

Due to the Cold War politics, South Korea saw it fit to bring more allies and friends on her side as a way of countering the rising influence and hegemony of North Korea in world politics. Also, South Korea wanted to secure a position and influence among non-state actors such as the United Nations, hence the need for support from other nations. It has also been observed that Kenya was amongst the very first countries to have diplomatic relations with South Korea in Africa. The chapter concludes that the emergence and consolidation of Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations was enhanced by the signing of social, economic and political agreements, the changing nature of world

politics, a shift in Kenya's foreign policy to focus more on countries in the East, as well as globalization.

Chapter three dealt with South Korea's diplomatic relations with Kenya in the Jomo Kenyatta era when Kenya's economic policy and manifesto were anchored on an economic model known as the African socialism, as documented in the Sessional Paper no 10 of 1965. It is evident in the chapter that the relations between South Korea and the Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) were influenced by the political animosities experienced during the Cold War which brought the Korean question into the fore as far as Korean membership in the United Nations was concerned. Kenya found herself in the mix of the Cold war politics, positioned on the same side with South Korea as USA allied states, thereby justifying the ease with which Kenya and South Korea were able to advance their diplomatic relations.

Kenya's foreign policy at independence was deeply influenced by bipolar politics which drew a distinction between the capitalist West against the communist East. This chapter has also highlighted how local politics in Kenya was influenced by Cold War politics, with local leaders being divided along ideological lines. The chapter observed that Kenya's diplomatic relations during the initial stages of her independence majorly focused on the West. On the other hand, between 1963-1970, South Korea adopted a powerful development slogan under president Chung-Hee, which aimed to steer South Korea to economic growth and rapid development especially in the industrial sector.

As noted, other factors such as the Korean War also shaped the way South Korea formulated and followed her modern diplomacy. The chapter concludes that, the non-aligned nature of Kenya's foreign policy and Kenyatta's leadership style helped in

shaping Kenya's diplomatic relations with the west and South Korea which was a darling of the West. The diplomatic relationship between South Korea and Kenya in the Kenyatta era was thus driven by specific diplomatic agenda and motives specific to the two countries, which revolved around their individual national interests

In chapter four, the study focused mainly on the dynamics of Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea in the Moi era. As argued, Moi's leadership style of centralization of state power informed how Kenya related with other states. Whereas there were consistencies in the foreign policy process during the Moi government, some considerable inconsistencies were also observed, even as the same regime exhibited an exceptional leadership style with substantial influence on Kenya's diplomatic relations with other states. Like his predecessor, during Moi's tenure, Kenya's foreign engagement strategy, was openly pro-Western. Nevertheless, South Korea-Kenya diplomatic ties had already been established and during Moi's first decade, Kenya's trade with South Korea had gone up by 41%.

With the diplomatic nexus between South Korea and Kenya having taken root, the two countries signed a deal which saw exporters of Kenyan goods to South Korea enjoying lower tariffs.

By 1991, president Moi visited South Korea with a delegation from his KANU party. His visit was meant to attract investment and promote tourism (Khamisi, 2014). Evidently, Moi's reign laid a better foundation for consequent diplomatic and bilateral relations between Kenya and South Korea. Earlier, both geographical and ideological distances posed a challenge to the diplomatic relations between these two states, especially during

the reign of President Chu Doo-Hwan of South Korea, prompting him to visit Kenya in his African tour of 1982.

It is therefore evident that the visits of these two heads of state, to South Korea and Kenya respectively, enhanced the countries' diplomatic ties especially in the economic sector, amidst the Cold War and the structural adjustment programmes that characterized the Moi era in Kenya. The chapter concludes that a shift in the policy orientation of Kenya, named the Look East Policy, drove Kenya closer to South Korea as a reliable trade partner, therefore enhancing her diplomatic dealings with many other countries from the East. Nevertheless, as noted, the early years of South Korea diplomacy in Africa were partly dedicated to obtaining formal support from African states in her quest to join the United Nations. Kenya therefore became a useful partner for South Korea in her efforts to play *real politik*s in the global arena.

Chapter five notes that, in the Kibaki and the first term of Uhuru Kenyatta eras, spanning from 2003 to 2013, there was a continuation of policy shift towards the East, which was advantageous to South Korea in her relationship with Kenya. In the two eras, revamping of Kenya's economy was at the centre stage and included a lot of infrastructural development. To realize this, the two governments established strategic policies on development, that is, Kenya Vision 2030, the Economic Recovery for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007.

The post Moi era also witnessed a fast-paced expansion of South Korea-Kenya relations, alongside other Asian states. Most countries in the East, including South Korea, were also at the same time expanding engagements in the African continent, hinged on the latter's foreign policy stance of non-interference, which was attractive to many African

countries. Kenya found herself exploiting this window based on the neo-liberal approach by Kibaki's government, which was yearning for economic growth after two decades of Moi rule.

In Korea, Seoul's Africa policy was shaped by its diplomatic competition with Pyongyang.

Also, as noted, the year 2006 clearly marked a shift in South Korea's foreign policy, when Seoul declared it as the "year of friendship with Africa". In that year, the then South Korea President, Roh Moo-Hyun, set in motion several prominent South Korea-Africa initiatives which enhanced Korea's relations with Kenya, alongside other African states. In the two eras of Presidents Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta, South Korea's companies such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai invested in Kenya, as well as other Korean multinational corporations.

The chapter also observes that apart from economic investments, diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Korea as well enhanced through cultural diplomacy. South Korea employed this strategy of using culture as part of her soft power to enhance her diplomatic relations with Kenya. This entailed the creation of institutes to teach the Korean language through partnership with institutions of higher learning in Kenya such as the University of Nairobi. Similarly, cultural diplomacy has been evident in the adoption of Taekwondo in Kenyan schools and clubs, the opening of Korean cultural centres, television station and Korean restaurants where Korean food is cooked and sold to Kenyans. Indeed, Kenya's diplomacy with South Korea was centered on both economic and cultural interests of the two states.

6.3 Conclusion

Based on the objectives of the study, namely: to examine the emergence of the Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations; to analyze Kenya and South Korea diplomatic relations in the Kenyatta era, 1963 – 1978; to assess the dynamics of Kenya’s diplomatic relations with South Korea in the Moi era, 1978 -2002; and to evaluate trends in Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations in the Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta eras, 2003 – 2016, the findings revealed that immediately Kenya attained her self-rule from the British Government, the country signed various bilateral agreements with the rest of the world, South Korea being one of them.

However, Kenya’s foreign relations were highly influenced by her geo-political position in the East African region, as President Jomo Kenyatta became a strong defender of the East Africa regional cooperation. The findings noted that politics of the Cold War highly contributed to the choice of the foreign countries that Kenya related to. Also, according to the findings, the rising influence and hegemony of North Korea in world politics made South Korea to reach out to Kenya and other African countries as a way of countering the influence and hegemony of North Korea. Kenya thus became one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to officially formulate diplomatic relations with South Korea. The emergence and consolidation of Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations was enhanced by signing of economic, social and political agreements.

In the Jomo Kenyatta era, 1963 – 1978, Kenya’s economic policy and manifesto was anchored on an economic model called “African socialism” documented in the Sessional Paper no 10 of 1965. Findings established that in the early days of Kenya’s independence, South Korea's engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was shaped by Cold War political rivalries where Kenya found herself on the same side as South Korea,

both as allies of the USA, as bipolar politics pitted the communist East against the capitalist West.

Also, as noted, local politics had a great impact on Kenya's bilateral relations with South Korea and other countries, especially those which sided with the East in the Cold War. This was because local leaders embraced different dissenting ideological views. Further, findings established that between 1963-1970, South Korea adopted a powerful development slogan under President Chung-Hee, which aimed to steer South Korea to economic growth and rapid development especially in the industrial sector. The slogan helped in facilitating and strengthening South Korea's relations with Kenya.

Regarding dynamics of Kenya's diplomatic relations with South Korea in the Moi era, 1978 -2002, Moi's leadership style of centralization of state power played central role in how Kenya related with South Korea. It was noted that during the Moi administration, there was consistency in the foreign policy process. However, there were considerable inconsistencies as the regime exhibited uniqueness in leadership style, which substantially influenced the outlook of Kenya's diplomatic relations with other states. Findings noted that Kenya's foreign policy under President Moi was openly pro-Western. Nevertheless, there was advancement in the manner in which Kenya and South Korea related. This was the era when trade between the two countries went up by 41%. This was also the time the two countries signed a deal which saw exporters of Kenyan goods to South Korea enjoying lower tariffs.

The findings revealed that it was during Moi's reign that the two countries had their heads of Governments visiting each other's country. This happened in 1982 when

President Chu Doo-Hwan of South Korea came to Kenya and later in 1991 when President Moi visited South Korea with a delegation from his KANU party.

In reference to the trends in Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations in the Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta eras, 2003 – 2016, The study established that Kibaki administration laid a foundation in infrastructural development following the establishment of strategic policies on development including Kenya’s Vision 2030, and Economic Recovery for Employment and Wealth Creation 2003-2007 upon which Uhuru Kenyatta largely relied on.

The findings revealed that the Kibaki-Uhuru Kenyatta’s eras saw strengthened relations with not just South Korea, but other Asian states as well. Based on the neo-liberal approach and the need for economic growth during this period, Kenya opened an Embassy in Seoul, South Korea. The study notes that Kenya’s relations with South Korea took a turn for the better in 2006, when Roh Moo-Hyun, the then President of South Korea declared it as the “year of friendship with Africa”. It was this declaration which enhanced South Korea’s relations with Kenya and many other countries in Africa. As a result of good bilateral relations between Kenya and South Korea, the eras of presidents Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta, saw some of South Korea’s giant companies such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai invest in Kenya.

6.4 Recommendation

The study noted that the Republic of South Korea and Kenya are keen to strengthening diplomatic relations and further exploring opportunities in more areas for possible cooperation as well as expanding progressively into various fields such as: development cooperation; science and technology; Information and communication technology;

climate change; health care; new growth industries and various culture avenues. In this regard, the study recommends that there is a need for the two countries to: Set up a Joint Economic Committee to fast-track the agreed areas of cooperation; Incubate expertise and experience, particularly in the use of innovation and technology for instance at; the Konza Digital City; the Nairobi Intelligent Transport Project; and a capacity building programme in vaccine production in Nairobi, which highly contributed to a turn-around-economy of South Korea. Also, the study recommends that all pending Draft Treaties and Memorandum of Understandings are signed and implemented. Further, there should be more senior level interactions/official visits by the two countries.

REFERENCES

BOOKS

- Abbas, T. (2017). Imagined Communities. *The Wiley Blackwell: Encyclopedia of Social Theory*, 1-4.
- Adam, S. (2016). *The wealth of nations*. Aegitas.
- Adar, K. G. (1994). Kenyan foreign policy behavior towards Somalia, 1963-1983. Lanham, Md.
- Adar, K. G. (2007). 'Kenya-US relations: A recapitulation of the patterns of paradigmatic conceptualization, 1960s-1990s', in Munene GM, JD Olewe Nyunya & KG Adar (eds) *The Educational Publishers*, 1995.
- Adler, E. (2013). Constructivism in international relations: sources, contributions, and debates. *Handbook of international relations*, 2, 112-144.
- Adrian B. (2007). *The making of modern Korea*. Oxford: Taylor & Francis
- Akande, D. (2018). The Immunity of Heads of States of Nonparties in the Early Years of the ICC. *AJIL Unbound*, 112, 172-176.
- Allen, B., Porter, D., & Thompson, G. (2014). *Development in Practice (Routledge Revivals)*.
- Almond, G. A. (2015). *Appeals of Communism*. Princeton University Press.
- Adrian B. (2007). *The making of modern Korea*. Oxford: Taylor & Francis
- Arnold, G. (2016). *The end of the Third World*. Springer. *Paved with Good Intentions*. Routledge.
- Arshad-Ayaz, A. (2020). Educating for Sustainable Peace: Neoliberalism and the Pedagogical Potential of Social Media in Creating Conditions for Civic Engagement and Peace. In *social media as a Space for Peace Education* (pp. 83-113). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

- Barston, R. P. (2014). *Modern diplomacy*. Routledge.
- Bakker, M. (2014). A History of Economic Cross-border Agreements in Europe.
- Baradat, L. P., & Phillips, J. A. (2016). *Political ideologies: Their origins and impact*. Taylor & Francis.
- Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2013). *The globalization of world politics: an Introduction To international relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baylis, John & Smith, Steve (2006) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Third Edition, Oxford University Press. Oxford
- Betts, R. K. (Ed.). (2017). *Conflict after the Cold War: arguments on causes of war and peace*. Taylor & Francis.
- Bennett, B. (1966). 'Kenya's 'Little General Election'', *The World Today* 22, No. 8, 337
- Berger, P. L. (2017). The desecularization of the world: A global overview. In *The New Sociology of Knowledge* (pp. 61-76). Routledge.
- Bienen, H. (2015). *Kenya: The politics of participation and control*. Princeton University Press.
- Booth, K., & Erskine, T. (Eds.). (2016). *International relations theory today*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Bradshaw, M., & Stenning, A. (2016). *East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union: the post-socialist states*. Routledge.
- Bratton, M., & Walle, N.C.D., (1997). *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brock, S., & Mares, E. (2014). *Realism and Anti-realism*. Routledge.
- Buzan, B., & Lawson, G. (2015). *The global transformation: history, modernity and the*

- making of international relations* (Vol. 135). Cambridge University Press
- Caprio, M. E. (2011). *Japanese assimilation policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945*. University of Washington Press.
- Calder, W. (2013). *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire*. London: Harper Press.
- Carmody, P. (2017). *The new scramble for Africa*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Carp, E. W. (2017). The Origins of the Nationalist Movement of 1780–1783: Congressional Administration and the Continental Army. In *Revolutions in the Western World 1775–1825*. Routledge.
- Chafer, T. (2002). *The end on empire in French west Africa: France's successful Decolonization*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Clayton, A. (2014) *The wars of French decolonization*. Routledge.
- Connolly, W. (2017). *Political science and ideology*. Routledge.
- Cook, D. A. (2016). *A history of narrative film*. WW Norton & Company.
- Cooper, A. F. (Ed.). (2016). *Niche diplomacy: Middle powers after the Cold War*. Springer.
- Cumming, G. (2017). *Aid to Africa: French and British policies from the Cold War to the new millennium*. Taylor & Francis.
- Craig, T. L. (2017). *The White Spaces of Kenyan Settler Writing: A Polemical Bibliography*. Brill.
- Chae, R. (2015). Diplomatic war: Inter-Korean relations in the 1970s. *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies*, 27(2), 307-330.
- Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann (eds.) (2009). *Connecting Histories:*

- Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Davis, L. E. (2015). *The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict Over East Europe*. Princeton University Press.
- David Percox, (2004). *Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and Decolonisation*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Danarson, J. H. (2021). *Mitigating the Impediments to Political Communication in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons Learned from the Daewoo Land Deal of 2008 in Madagascar*. Scientific Research Publishing, Inc. USA.
- Diehl, P. F., & Frederking, B. (Eds.). (2015). *The politics of global governance: International organizations in an interdependent world*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Dinnie, K. (2015). *Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice*. Routledge.
- EAC (East African Community), Facts & Figures Report (2013), <http://www.eac.int/>, accessed 28 August 2014
- Emerson, R. (2017). Nation-building in Africa. In *Nation Building in Comparative Contexts*. Routledge.
- Escobar, A. (2018). *The making of social movements in Latin America: Identity, strategy, and democracy*. Routledge.
- Edson, R. (2007). *Korea's twentieth-century odyssey*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Falkner, R. (2017). The anarchical society and climate change.
- Fukuyama, F. (2006). *The end of history and the last man*. Simon and Schuster.
- Frieden, J. A., & Lake, D. A. (2015). *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions: Third International Student Edition*. WW Norton & Company.
- Gilpin, R. (2016). *The political economy of international relations*. Princeton University

Press.

Golder, M., & Wantchekon, L. (2004). Africa: Dictatorial and democratic electoral systems since 1946. In *The Handbook of Electoral System Choice* (pp. 401-418). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Goscha, E. and Ostermann, F (2009); *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945–1962*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Gebreyesus, A. T., Koskei, S., Shen, Y., & Qian, F. (2017). Review of EIA in East Africa: Challenges and Opportunities in Ethiopia and Kenya. *Earth Sciences*, 6(4), 44.

Gulliver, P. H. (Ed.). (2013). *Tradition and Transition in East Africa: Studies of the Tribal Factor in the Modern Era*. Routledge.

Gleijeses, P. (2018). *The Cold War: A World History*.

Hashimoto K. (2018). Introduction: Why Language Matters in Soft Power. In: Hashimoto K. (eds) *Japanese Language and Soft Power in Asia*. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore.

Hakemy, S. (2017). *Capitalism and Freedom*. CRC Press.

Hastedt, G. P. (2017). *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Heimsath, C. H. (2015). *Indian nationalism and Hindu social reform*. Princeton University Press.

Hermann, M. (2007). *Comparative foreign policy analysis: Theories and methods*. Upper Saddle.

Hill, C., Smith, M., & Vanhoonacker, S. (2017). *International relations and the European Union*. Oxford University Press.

Hocking, B. (Ed.). (2016). *Foreign ministries: change and adaptation*. Springer.

- Holsti, K. (2016). *The Peacemakers: Issues and International Order*. In *Kalevi Holsti: Major Texts on War, the State, Peace, and International Order*. Springer International Publishing.
- Holsti, K. J. (2015). *Why nations realign: Foreign policy restructuring in the postwar world* (Vol. 3). Routledge.
- Hoover, J. E. (2015). *Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and how to Fight it*. Pickle Partners Publishing.
- Hornsby, C. (2013). *Kenya: A history since independence*. IB Tauris. University Press of America, c1994.
- Howell, J (2008) *An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hudson, V. (2007). *Foreign policy analysis: Classic and contemporary theory*. Lahman, MD: Rowman & Littlefield publishers. *Science* (Vol. 169). Springer Science & Business Media.
- Jackson, R., & Sorensen, G. (2016). *Introduction to international relations: Theories and approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jeong, H. W. (2017). *Peace and conflict studies: An introduction*. Routledge.
- Johnston, A. I. (2018). International structures and Chinese foreign policy. In *China and the World* (pp. 55-87). Routledge.
- Kahler, M. (Ed.). (2015). *Networked politics: agency, power, and governance*. Cornell University Press.
- Kenyatta, J. (2015). *Facing Mount Kenya: the traditional life of the Gikuyu* (Vol. 219). East African Educational Publishers.
- Kim, E. M. (Ed.). (2014). *The South Korean development experience: beyond aid*. Springer.
- Kim, S., & Bryant, F. B. (2017). The influence of gender and cultural values on savoring in Korean undergraduates. *International Journal of Wellbeing*, 7(2).

- Keohane, R. I. (Ed.) (2004). *Satow's diplomatic practice*. Oxford University Press.
- Knutsen, T. L. (2016). *A history of international relations theory*. Oxford University Press.
- Khamis, J (2014) *Dash before Dusk: A slave descendant's Journey in freedom*, Nairobi: East Africa Educational Publishers.
- Kraidy, M. (2017). *Hybridity, or the cultural logic of globalization*. Temple University Press.
- Krenn, M. (2015). *Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945-69: African Americans and the State Department, 1945-69*. Routledge.
- Kwang-rin, L. (1986). The Rise of Nationalism in Korea. *Korean Studies*, 10, 1-12. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23718828>.
- Lee, Ki-baek, tr. by E.W. Wagner & E.J. Shultz (1984). *A new history of Korea (rev. ed.)*. Seoul: Ilchogak.
- Lee, D. & Hocking, B. (2015). 'Diplomacy in Bardie, B. Schlosser, D & Morlino (eds.) International Encyclopaedia of Political Science, London: Sage.
- Lee, A. Y., Oh, Y. A., Kim, S. O., Kim, D. S., & Park, S. A. (2018). Survey on demand and operation status of care farms in South Korea. *Journal of People, Plants, and Environment*, 21(1), 1-13.
- Lumpe, A., Vaughn, A., Henrikson, R., & Bishop, D. (2014). Teacher professional development and self-efficacy beliefs. In *The Role of Science Teachers' Beliefs in International Classrooms* (pp. 49-63). SensePublishers, Rotterdam.
- Macdonald, D. S. (2018). *The Koreans: Contemporary politics and society*. Routledge.
- MacKenzie, J. M. (2016). British Empire: 3. Africa. *The Encyclopedia of Empire*.
- Maloba, W. O. (2017). *The Anatomy of Neo-Colonialism in Kenya: British Imperialism*

- And Kenyatta, 1963–1978*. Springer.
- Maloba, W. O. (2018). Back Home: Politics of Nationalism, Mau Mau, Prison, and Surveillance. In *Kenyatta and Britain*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Mark, S., Trapido, S., & Marks, S. (2014). *The politics of race, class and nationalism in twentieth century South Africa*. Routledge.
- Mendonça, S., Damásio, B., de Freitas, L. C., Oliveira, L., Cichy, M., & Nicita, A. (2022). The rise of 5G technologies and systems: A quantitative analysis of knowledge production. *Telecommunications Policy*, 46(4), 102327.
- Mhango, N. N. (2016). *Africa's Best and Worst Presidents: How Neocolonialism and Imperialism Maintained Venal Rules in Africa*. Langaa RPCIG.
- Migdal, J. S. (2018). The state in society. In *New Directions in Comparative Politics*. Routledge.
- Miller, N. (2018). *Kenya: The quest for prosperity*. Routledge.
- Mingst, K. (2008) *Essential of international relations*. New York; W.W Norton
- Mitchell, N. (2018). *Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the cold war*. Stanford University Press.
- Moegi, K. (1993) receives South Korean President, accessed on 15 September 2021 <https://www.africanews.com/2016/05/31/kenyatta-receives-south-korean-president-in-nairobi/>.
- Morgan, M. (2001). *Classics of Moral and Political Theory*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Morton, A. (1998). *Moi: The making of an African statesman*. Michael O'Mara Books.
- Moyo D. (2009). *Dead Aid*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Mwanzia, J. S., & Strathdee, R. C. (2016). *Participatory development in Kenya*. Routledge.

- Myrdal, G. (2017). *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, Volume I*. Routledge.
- Nahm, Andrew C. (1996). *Korea: A history of the Korean people* (2nd ed.). Seoul: Hollym.
- Ndulu B. J., et al (2008). *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960-2000*, Vol.2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ooi, S. M., & McEvoy-Levy, S. (2017). Leadership for emancipatory peace: lessons from the South Korean student movement. In *Peace Leadership* (pp. 155-170). Routledge.
- Oberschall, A. (2017). *Social movements: ideologies, interest, and identities*. Routledge.
- Omosa, M. et al (2006). *Theory and Practice of Governance in Kenya*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi.
- Oyugi, W., Wanyande, P., and Mai, O (2003) *The Politics of transition in Kenya from KANU to NARC*. Heinrich Boll Foundation: Nairobi.
- Ofcansky, T. P. (2018). *Uganda: tarnished pearl of Africa*. Routledge.
- Ozkirimli, U. (2017). *Theories of nationalism: A critical introduction*. Palgrave.
- Pantin, S. J., & Teelucksingh, J. (Eds.). (2017). *Ideology, Regionalism, and Society in Caribbean History*. Springer International Publishing.
- Parc, J. 2018. "Evaluating the Effects of Protectionism on the Film Industry: A Case Study Analysis of Korea." In *Handbook of State Aid for Film*, edited by P. Murschetz, R. Teichmann, and M. Karmasin, 349–366. Cham: Springer.
- Park, J. D. (2019). *Re-inventing Africa's development: Linking Africa to the Korean development model* (p. 449). Springer Nature.
- Park, T. (1999). Change in U.S. Policy Toward South Korea in the Early 1960s. *Korean Studies*, 23, 94-120. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23719217>.

- Parrington, V. (2017). *The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America: Main Currents in American Thought*. Routledge.
- Percox, D. (2004). *Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and Decolonisation*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Polin, R. (2019). *Plato and Aristotle on constitutionalism: an exposition and reference source*. Routledge.
- Porter, T., & Williams, R. (2016). *States, markets and regimes in global finance*. Springer.
- Poppy Cullen (2018). 'Playing Cold War politics': the cold war in Anglo-Kenyan relations in the 1960s, *Cold War History*, 18:1, 3754, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2017.1387774.
- Reed, A. (2018). *Without justice for all: The new liberalism and our retreat from racial equality*. Routledge.
- Rono, J. (2018). Kenyan foreign policy. In *African Foreign Policies* (pp. 100-117). Routledge.
- Rourke, J. (2001). *International Politics on the World Stage*. 8 ed. McGraw-Hill Company Rowman & Littlefield publishers.
- Salahuddin, M., Habib, M. A., Al-Mulali, U., Ozturk, I., Marshall, M., & Ali, M. I. (2020).
- Renewable energy and environmental quality: A second-generation panel evidence from the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. *Environmental Research*, 191, 110094.
- Siringi, E. M. (2018). Kenya-China Trade Relations: A Nexus of "Trade not Aid" Investment Opportunities for Sustainable Development. *Journal of Economics and Development Studies*, 6(2), 1-10.
- Shilaho, W. K. (2018). Autocracy, Big Man Politics, and Institutional Atrophy. In *Political Power and Tribalism in Kenya*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

- Smith, H. (2015). *North Korea: Markets and military rule*. Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, S., Dunne, T., & Hadfield, A. (2016). *Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases*. Oxford University Press.
- Snyder, S. B. (2018). *The Cold War: A World History*.
- Snyder, G. H., & Diesing, P. (2015). *Conflict among nations: Bargaining, decision making, and system structure in international crises*. Princeton University Press.
- Sorensen, J (2010). *Challenging the aid paradigm: Western currents and Asian alternatives* (Ed.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sparks, C. (2015). *China, soft power and imperialism*. London: Routledge.
- Spykman, N. J. (2017). *America's strategy in world politics: The United States and the balance of power*. Routledge.
- Tignor, R. L. (2015). *Capitalism and nationalism at the end of empire: state and business in decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-1963*. Princeton University Press.
- Toyin, Falola (2002). *Colonial Africa 1885-1939*. Vol 3 of Africa Ed. Durham: California Academic press.
- Van Hensbroek, P. B. (2017). Philosophy of Nationalism in Africa. In *The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy* (pp. 405-416). Palgrave. New York.
- Vernon McKay (1966). 'International Conflict Patterns', in *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*, ed. London: Pall Mall.
- Waltz, K. (2014). Political structures. *The Realism Reader*, 103
- Weber, C. (2013). *International relations theory: a critical introduction*. Routledge.
- Wedgwood, C. V. (2016). *The thirty years war*. New York Review of Books.
- Williams, H., Matthews, E. G., & Sullivan, D. (2016). *Francis Fukuyama and the end of*

- history*. University of Wales Press.
- Wohlforth, W. C., & Brooks, S. G. (2015). American primacy in perspective. In *Paradoxes of Power* (pp. 29-38). Routledge.
- Woodwell, D. (2013). *Foundation of Research: How do we know what we know?* London: Sage.
- Wright, S. (2018). *African foreign policies*. Routledge.
- Wright, S. (2018). *African foreign policies*. Routledge.
- Yeo, K., Wildman, J., & Choi, S. (2017). The Effects of Confucian Values on Interpersonal Trust, Justice, and Information Sharing of Korean Workers: A Multilevel Analysis. *Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, 11*.
- Yordanov, R. A. (2016). *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Lexington Books.
- Zinn, H. (2015). *A people's history of the United States: 1492-present*. Routledge. Princeton University Press.

JOURNALS

- Adar, K (2018). 'Playing Cold War politics': The Cold War in Anglo-Kenyan Relations in the 1960s, *Cold War History, Vol 18, Issue 1 pp 37-54*.
- Agrawal, G. and Khan, M.A. (2011). Impact of FDI on GDP Growth: A Panel Data Study. *European Journal of Scientific Research .257-264*.
- Alfaro, L. and Charlton, A. (2009). Foreign Direct Investment and Financial Development. An Analysis of Complementarities and Channels and some possible extensions. *Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1), 1-1*.
- Mahoney J, Thelen K, eds (2015). *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis. Strategies for Social Inquiry*. Cambridge University Press
- Asongu, S. A. (2017). Knowledge Economy gaps, policy syndromes, and catch-up strategies: Fresh South Korean lessons to Africa. *Journal of the Knowledge*

- Economy*, 8(1), 211-253.
- Baldwin, R. (2016). A domino theory of regionalism. *Jagdish Bhagwati, Pravin Krishna, and Arvind Panagariya, Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements.*
- Barany, Z. (2015). Exits from Military Rule: Lessons for Burma. *Journal of Democracy*, 26(2), 86-100.
- Barkan, J (2004). Kenya after Moi, *Foreign Affairs Vol 83*, No 1 pp87-100.
- Barton, M. S. (2015). The Global War on Anarchism: The United States and International Anarchist Terrorism, 1898–1904. *Diplomatic History*, 39(2).
- Bennett, G (1966) ‘Kenya's ‘Little General Election’’, *The World Today* 22, no. 8 : 337.
- Behmiri, N. B., & Manso, J. R. P. (2013). How crude oil consumption impacts on economic growth of Sub-Saharan Africa? *Energy*, 54, 74-83.
- Brown S. (2001). ‘Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya’s Daniel arap Moi in power’, *Third World Quarterly*, 22.5.
- Burgess, R., Jedwab, R., Miguel, E., Morjaria, A., & Padró i Miquel, G. (2015). The value of democracy: evidence from road building in Kenya. *American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1817-51.
- Chege, M. (2008). Kenya: back from the brink? *Journal of Democracy*, 19(4), 125-139.
- Daniel J. H. Wand; Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez and Moritz Vormbaum, *Africa and the International Criminal Court, Journal of International Criminal Justice*, Volume 15, Issue 2, 1 May 2017, Pages 401–403, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqx018>
- Devlin, J., & Clark, T. (2015). Capitalism, Ethics, and Inequality, an Essay. *JL Bus. & Ethics*, 21, 103.
- Doyle, M. W. (2016). The politics of global humanitarianism: The responsibility to protect before and after Libya. *International Politics*, 53(1), 14-31.

- Drezner, D., W. (2000). "Bargaining enforcement and multilateral sanctions: when is cooperation is counterproductive?" *International organization* 54:73.
- Drummond, M. P., Aisen, M. A., Alper, M. C. E., Fuli, M. E., & Walker, M. S. (2015). *Toward a monetary union in the East African Community: asymmetric shocks, exchange rates, and risk-sharing mechanisms* (No. 15-16). International Monetary Fund.
- Eisenhower, D. D. (2014). The Domino Theory Principle. *Geopolitics: An Introductory Reader*, 108.
- Fagerberg, J., & Srholec, M. (2015). *Capabilities, Competitiveness, Nations* (No. 2015/2). Lund University, CIRCLE-Center for Innovation, Research and Competences in the Learning Economy.
- Farah, I., Opanga, V., Toure, S., & Ninga, S. (2015). China in Africa: A call for Makumism in Africa's development. *Development*, 58(4), 608-613.
- Goldstein, S., J. (2005). *International relation*. 6th Ed. New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley. *Governance Forum*. Nairobi, September 2011.
- Henrich, J. et al. (2010). "Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment". *Science* 327, 1480-1484 (doi: 10.1126/science.1182238).
- Hobbes, T. (2015). The State of Nature and the State of War. *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, 78.
- Howell J. (2008). 'An analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 6.1.
- Hwa, Seo, Seol. (2015). *A comparative study of inequality in Kenya and South Korea, 1960s-2014*. Master's thesis, Vow.
- Hwang, K. D. (2014). Korea's Soft Power as an Alternative Approach to Africa in Development Cooperation. *African and Asian Studies*, 13(3), 249-271.
- Internet Society (ISOC), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

- (OECD) & the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). "The Relation between local content, Internet Development and Access. Prices". *Internet Governance Forum*. Nairobi, September 2011.
- Joshua, S. M., & Kapinde, S. A. (2016). "Pulpit power" and the unrelenting voice of Archbishop David Gitari in the democratization of Kenya, 1986 to 1991. *Historia*, 61(2), 79-100.
- Kamau, J. W., & Mwaura, F. (2013). Climate change adaptation and EIA studies in Kenya. *International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management*.
- Kaisii, A. (2017). "Globalization, Hybridization and Cultural Invasion. Korean Wave in India's North East," *Asian Communication Research*, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 10-35.
- Kisiangani, E., Kok, N., Dzinesa, G., & Sangqu, S. (2014). Africa Watch. *African Security Review*, 23(1), 84-92.
- Kim, S. M. (2016). The domestic politics of international development in South Korea: stakeholders and competing policy discourses. *The Pacific Review*, 29(1), 67-91.
- Kim, S. (2020). Aggressive yet benign: Korea's engagement in creative industries in Africa' *International Journal of Cultural Policy*'Vol 26, Issue 7.
- Kirk-Greene, A.H.M (1974) 'Diplomacy and Diplomats: The Formation of Foreign Service Cadres in Black Africa', in *Foreign Relations of African States: Proceedings of the Twentyfifth Symposium of the Colston Research Society held in the University of Bristol April 4th to 7th, 1973*, ed. K. Ingham (London: Butterworth, 288).
- Kombo, R. O. (2019). *Soft Power and Language: French Interests in Kenya (1990-2018)* (Doctoral dissertation, United States International University-Africa).
- Kpundeh, S.J., (ed.) (1992). Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices. Washington D.C.: National Academy of Science and Social Movement for Reunification during the April Revolution Period, 1960–1961." *Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no. 4: 1237.
- Kuyper, J. W. (2014). Global democratization and international regime complexity.

European Journal of International Relations, 20(3), 620-646.

Kydd, A. H. (2015). Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification? *The Washington Quarterly*, 38(2), 63-77.

Lawler, J. (2016). 13 Social care and social work leadership. *Leadership in Organizations: Current Issues and Key Trends*, 249.

Leeson and Dean (2009). "The Democratic Domino Theory". *American Journal of Political Science* and Social Movement for Reunification during the April Revolution Period, 1960–1961." *Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no. 4: 1237.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2015). Not Just What, but When (and How): Comparative-Historical Li, T. M. (2014). What is land? Assembling a resource for global investment. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 39(4).

Ling, L. H. M. (2016). A Discussion of Robert Vitalis's White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations. *Perspectives on Politics*, 14(4), 1126-1126.

Mabera, F. (2016). Kenya's foreign policy in context (1963–2015), *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 23:3, 365-38.

Marschall, S. (2016). The heritage of post-colonial societies. *The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008)*, 347.

Martin, J. L. (2015). What is ideology? *Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas*, (77).

Matlou, M. (2015). Elections in Africa: give us this day our daily bread, and all our problems are solved. *Journal of Pan African Studies*, 8(4), 2-32.

Maurer, T. & Morgus, R. (2014). "Tipping the scale: An Analysis of Global Swing States in the Internet Governance Debate". *Internet Governance Papers No 7*.

Mohiddin, A. M. (1969). Socialism or Capitalism? *East Africa Journal*, 6(3), 7-16.

Mueller, S. D. (2014). Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): politics, the election and the law. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8(1), 25-42.

- Nasong'o, S. W., & Murunga, G. R. (2006). Bent on self-destruction: The Kibaki regime in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 24(1), 1-28.
- Mutie, S. M., Mang'oka, A. S., Chemwei, B., & Kitonga, N. N. (2015). Jomo Kenyatta's Speeches and the Construction of the Identities of a Nationalist Leader in Kenya. *English Language and Literature Studies*, 5(2), 53.
- Nepstad, S. (2015). How regimes counter civil resistance movements; the cases of Panama and Kenya. *Civil resistance: comparative perspectives on nonviolent struggle*, 121-144.
- Ochieng, H.K & Kim, S. (2019). Cultural Exchange and Its Externalities on Korea-Africa Relations: How Does the Korean Wave Affect the Perception and Purchasing Behavior of African Consumers? *East Asian Economic Review Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 2019) 381-407*.
- Odinga, R. A., & Elderkin, S. (2013). *Raila Odinga: the flame of freedom*. Mountain Top Publishers Limited.
- Okumu J. (1973). 'Some thoughts on Kenya foreign policy', *African Review: a Journal of African Politics Development and International Affairs*, 3.2
- Opondo, P. A. (2014). Kenyatta and Odinga: The Harbingers of Ethnic Nationalism in Kenya. *Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research*.
- Orr, R and Kennedy, J. (2008). "Highlights of Recent Trends in Global Infrastructure: New Players and Revised Game Rules." *Trans National Corporation*, 17(1).
- Otieno, G. (2005). The NARC's anti-corruption drive in Kenya: somewhere over the rainbow? *African Security Studies*, 14(4), 69-79.
- Ozturk, I., & Al-Mulali, U. (2015). Natural gas consumption and economic growth nexus: Panel data analysis for GCC countries. *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, 51, 998-1003.
- Pradhan, R. P. (2009). The FDI- Led- Growth Hypothesis in ASEAN- 5 Countries: Evidence from Cointegrated Panel Analysis. *International Journal of Business*

- Quoted in de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno 'The End of the Cold War; Predicting an Emergent Property', 'Journal of Conflict Resolution', Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1998, Sage Publications.
- Renshon, J. & Stanley, R. (2008). "The theory and practice of foreign policy Decision making," *Political psychology* 29:509-536.
- Rothermund, D. (2014). The era of non-alignment. *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War. Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*, 19-34.
- Sang-Seek, P. (1978). Africa and Two Koreas: A Study of African Non-Alignment African Studies Review, Apr., 1978, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Apr., 1978), pp. 73-88.
- Saxer, C. J. (2017). The Korea Question and the Nordic Response: From War Participation to Diplomatic Recognition. *KOREA JOURNAL*, 57(1), 128-152.
- Seuk-Ryule, Hong. (2002). "Reunification Issues and Civil Society in South Korea: The Debates.
- Shambaugh, D. (2015). China's soft-power push. *Foreign Aff.*, 94, 99.
- Smolovic O., Grint, K., & Cammock, P. (2015). Public leadership development facilitation and the crossroads blues. *Management Learning*, 46(4), 391-411.
- Sonmez, S. F., & Sönmez, S. (2017). TOURISM, TERRORISM, AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY. *Anatolia: Turizm Arastirmalari Dergisi*, 28(1), 110-137.
- Steeves, J. (2006). Presidential succession in Kenya: The transition from Moi to Kibaki. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 44(2), 211-233.
- Tanabe, J. (2016). Peace: A Very Short Introduction. *Revista de Paz y Conflictos*, 9(1).
- Taylor, C. F. (2017). Ethnic politics and election campaigns in contemporary Africa: evidence from Ghana and Kenya. *Democratization*, 24(6), 951-969.
- Throup, D. W. (2016). Joel Barkan and Kenya. *African Studies Review*, 59(3), 115-127.

- Throup, D., (1993). "Elections and Political Legitimacy in Kenya". Africa Confidential, Vol. 63.
- Ugangu, W. (2016). Kenya's Difficult Political Transitions Ethnicity and the Role of Media. In *Political Influence of the Media in Developing Countries* (pp. 12-24). IGI Global. United States and Africa: From Independence to the End of the Cold War. Nairobi: East African.
- Vines, A. (2016). Continuity and change in Angola: insights from modern history. *International Affairs*, 92(5), 1229-1237.
- Waller, R. (2016). The Souls of White Folk: White Settlers in Kenya, 1900s–1920s by Brett Shadle. *African Studies Review*, 59(3), 235-236.
- Wantchekon, L., Klasnja, M., & Novta, N. (2014). Education and human capital externalities: evidence from colonial Benin. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(2), 703-757.
- Weiss, T., & Weber, K. (2016). Globalization in action: Templates, tensions and strategies of action in Kenyan technology entrepreneurship. *Google Scholar*.
- Widner, J. (2005). Africa's democratization: A work in progress. *Current history*, 104(682), 216.
- Woods, N. (2008). Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the Silent revolution in development assistance. *International Affairs*, 84(6), 1205-1221.
- Yi-Whan-woo (2022) After years of teaching in Kenya, Park is still hungry about promoting Korea, *Korea Times*.

Thesis and Dissertations

- Hwa, Seo, Seol. (2015). *A comparative study of inequality in Kenya and South Korea, 1960s- 2014*. Master's thesis, Vow.
- Hyun, H. (2015). *An Investigation of Strategies to Control Corruption in the Police Service: A Comparative Study of Kenya and Korea from 1988 to 2007* (Doctoral dissertation, Kenyatta University).
- Imbisi, J. I. (2015). *Development Assistance In Kenya: An Evaluation Of German Donor*

Aid In Post Independent Kenya, 1963-2003 (Doctoral dissertation, KENYATTA UNIVERSITY).

Lyong Choi (2016). *The Foreign Policy of Park Chunghee: 1968-1979*. Thesis.

Maumo, L., O. (May, 2009). *Kenya foreign policy towards Israel 1963:2002): Contradiction between rhetoric and practice*. Research thesis, UON.

Musyoka, D.K (2019). *The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Promoting Economic Development In Africa: A Case Study of Kenya*, M.A Thesis, University of Nairobi.

Rattray, M. F. (2014). *Functional Anarchism (s) and the Theory of Global Contemporary Art* (Doctoral dissertation, Concordia University).

Sabala, M.K. (1997). *A comparative study of industrialization strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa and South - East Asia:Case study of Kenya and South- Korea*, M.A Thesis University of Nairobi.

Seong-Ho, S., & Lee, R. (2015). *Comparing United States and China's Foreign Aid in Africa:The Case Study of Kenya* (Doctoral dissertation).

Van den Berg, B. C. M. (2017). *American Propaganda Against the Enemy: Korea and Vietnam* (Bachelor's thesis).

Xidias, J. (2017). *Imagined Communities*. Macat Library.

Reports

Business Daily, (2014). *How South Korea rose from the ashes to outshine Kenya with rapid economic growth*, *Business Daily*.

Darracq, V., & Neville, D. (2014). *South Korea's Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: Fortune, Fuel and Frontier Markets*. Chatham House.

Kephis (2020). *Korea Coffee Expo to Promote Kenya's Coffee and other Produce for Economic Growth and Development*.

Otto L. (2012) 'Kenya and the pest of piracy: a prospective partner for peace', Institute for Security Studies Situation Report 22 February 2012, retrieved from <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/22Feb12Kenya.pdf> on 20/04/2018.

Republic of Kenya & UNDP Kenya, *Kenya National Human Development Report 2013*, (Nairobi: NDPKenya, 2013).

The 2014 Chatham House report entitled 'South Korea's Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: Fortune, Fuel and Frontier Markets', South Korea's increasing presence in sub-Saharan Africa is motivated by three factors.

Newspapers and Newsletters

Anyang' Nyong'o, P. (January 29, 2012). "Political Parties and Ideology in Kenya". *The Standard*. Retrieved from <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke> on 10/2/2018.

AFP (2013, November). "China backs African bid to suspend ICC Kenya case". *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <https://mobile.nation.co.ke> on 5/14/2018.

Bowcott, O. (2014, October). "Kenya's Uhuru Kenyatta becomes the first head of state to appear before ICC". *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com> on 5/14/2018.

Cyrus, O. (2017, April). "Seven refugees arrested in Dadaab camp for hosting terrorists". *The Standard*. Retrieved from <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke> on 5/15/2017.

Gachie J. (2012). 'Kenya foreign policy and international relations: Kenya and the world', *Soft Kenya, 2012*. Retrieved from <http://softkenya.com/world/> on 19/10/2018.

Gekera, E., & Opiyo, D. (2013, October). "President Kenyatta's Stinging attack on ICC and Europe". *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-Kenyatta-AU-Summit-ICC/1064-2029784-opkfd1z/index.html>. Accessed on 5/15/2015.

H.E. Kim Hwang Sik, Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea officially visits the Republic of Kenya. Retrieved from <https://www.iol.co.za> on 26/4/2018 on 27 October 2021.

- Irungu, D. (2013, May). “Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and Politicizing the International Criminal Court”. *The Conversation*. Retrieved from <http://theconversation.com> Retrieved on 5/15/2018.
- Kaikai, L. (2013, December). “Moi, the passing cloud that did not go away.” *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <https://www.nation.co.ke> on 27/3/2018.
- Kagwanja, P. (2015, January). “Two faces on Kenyan-Competing ideologies mining the road to 2017.” *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <https://www.nation.co.ke> on 26/4/2018.
- Kagwanja, C. (2015, December). “China, Kenya forging friendship.” *Business Report*.
- Kamary, B. (2014, September 27) “Kenyans in S. Korea celebrate life, times of their Outgoing ambassador”. *The Seoul Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.theseoultimes.com> on June 7, 2017.
- Kinyanjui, M. (2016). “Africa union backs Uhuru’s call to withdraw from the Rome Statute.” *Daily Nation*, Retrieved from www.nation.co.ke. Retrieved on 31/1/2017.
- Koreans find breaking up with chaebol hard to do’, *Bloomberg News*, 8 July 2013.
- Koehler, H. (2018). “*Culture in the Age of Globalization*” [doc.research.org/2018/06, culture-in-the-age-of-globalization](http://doc.research.org/2018/06/culture-in-the-age-of-globalization) (accessed on august 29/2020).
- Menya, W. (2018). “Terrorism remains Kenya’s top security threat”. *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <https://www.nation.co.ke> on 12/12/2018.
- Mugwe, D. (2013, January). “Kibaki’s leadership on economic performance after 10 years in office.” *Business Daily*. Retrieved from <https://www.businessdailyafrica.com> on 21/04/2018.
- Mutambo, A. (2016).” Kenya rejects dismissal of UN Peace keeping force commander.” *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from www.nation.co.ke. Retrieved on 31/1/2017.
- Murero, S. M. (2019). The Role of Domestic Politics In Influencing Foreign Policy Formulation: A Case of Kenya’s ‘Look East’ Economic Diplomacy 2002 –

- 2016, M.A Thesis, United States International University, Nairobi.
- Nation Reporter (2017, November). “Uhuru Kenyatta’s inauguration speech”. *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <https://www.nation.co.ke> on 5/15/2018.
- Oluoch, F. (2010, May). “Kenya reaps handsome rewards from its robust look east policy.” *The East African*. Retrieved from <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke> on 23/04/2018.
- Otavio, V. (2018). Unpackaging South Korea’s engagement with Africa, Retrieve from <https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/unpacki-ang-south-koreas-engagement-with-africa/62140/>
- Pengying (2018). “UNHCR Repatriate 78,088 Somali refugees from Kenya”. *Xinhuanews*. Retrieved from <http://www.xinhuanet.co> on 5/14/2018.
- Platteau, J. P. (2015). *Institutions, social norms and economic development*. Routledge.
- Pps (2003, May, 28). “Kenya: President Kibaki spells out Kenya foreign Policy.” *The Standard*. Retrieved from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200305271115.html> on 22/04.2018.
- Roll, M. (2018). Korean Wave (Hallyu) – *The Rise of Korea’s Cultural Economy & Pop Culture*. (accessed July 14, 2019).
- The Korea Post (<http://www.koreapost.com>).
- Wekesa, E. (2018, April). “Jomo Kenyatta’s Agenda still big enough to guide us today.” *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <https://www.nation.co.ke> on 18/04/2018.
- Westad, O. A. (2005). *The global Cold War: Third World interventions and the making of our times*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wilson, T. (2017). Stronger for Scotland: The Rise of the Modern Scottish Nationalist Movement. (2002, December, 30) *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com> retrieved on 27/3/2018.
- Wright, S. (2018). *African foreign policies*. Routledge.

APPENDICES

A. 1: Interview Schedule

Section One: Demographic

1. Gender
 - a. Male []
 - b. Female []
2. Age bracket:
 - a. 25-30 years []
 - b. 31-40 years []
 - c. 41-50 Years []
 - d. Over 50 Years []
3. Level of Education:
 - a. College Diploma []
 - b. University degree []
 - c. Post Graduate degree []
 - d. Others Specify.....
4. Designation.....
5. For how long have you been serving in your current position?
 - a. Less than 5 years []
 - b. 5-7 Years []
 - c. 8-10 Years []
 - d. 11-13 Years []
 - e. Over 15 Years []

Section Two: Specific Questions


6. Is there diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Korea anyway?
 - a. YES []
 - b. NO []
7. In your view, do you think that the nationalistic ideological movements in Kenya and South Korea contributed to the nature in which the two countries related?
 - a. YES []
 - b. NO []
8. Were there any nationalistic ideological movements in Kenya and South Korea between 1964-1978? Name them?
 - a. NO []
 - b. YES []

17. Since 2016 when President Park Geun-hee came to Kenya, signed many treaties, MOUs and agreements with Kenya, in your view did that change the nature of Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations as compared to how it was from 1964-2012?
- a. NO [] b. YES []
18. With the new changes (political, economic and/or constitutional) going on in both the two countries, in your view, what is the future of Kenya-South Korea diplomatic relations?

A. 2: List of Key Informants


NO	NAME	DATE OF INTERVIEW	LOCATION OF INTERVIEW
1.	Odila	17/6/2020	Upper hill, Nairobi
2.	Maina	8/8/2020	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi
3.	Sila	10/4/2019	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi
4.	Cleong Lee	02/4/2020	CBD, Nairobi
5.	Otieno	18/3/2020	CBD, Nairobi
6.	Chee	07/07/2020	CBD, Nairobi
7.	Maritha	23/4/2020	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi
8.	Wachira	19/6/2021	CBD, Nairobi
9.	Waitara	10/03/2021	Kenyatta University
10.	Otenyo	18/08/2021	Upper hill, Nairobi
11.	Mwema	27/5/2021	Karen
12.	Ziegler	28/016/2021	Kenyatta University
13.	Jane	23/4/2021	Kenyatta University
14.	Oscah	29/07/2021	CBD, Nairobi
15.	Kenzau	13/5/2021	Upper hill, Nairobi

A. 3: Map of the Study Area: South Korea Embassy and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Nairobi County



Source: Google Earth Maps 2017.




A. 4: Approval of Research Proposal



A. 5: Research Permit

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. WILLINGTON OUMA OTIENO
of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 43844-100
Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct
research in Nairobi County
on the topic: TRENDS IN KENYA-SOUTH
KOREA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,
1964-2016
for the period ending:
12th July, 2019

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/18/85651/23285
Date Of Issue : 14th July, 2018
Fee Received :Ksh 1000



**Applicant's
Signature**

**Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation**