
BY

NJAGI ARTHUR MUNENE

REG. NO C50/10697/04

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY.

NOVEMBER 2013.
DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Signature ………………………………. Date ………………………………..

Arthur Munene Njagi, BA, Dip HRM

C50/10697/04

This thesis has been presented for examination with our approval as university supervisors.

Signature…………………………………Date……………………………..

Dr. Felix Kiruthu

Department of History, Archeology and Political Studies

Signature…………………………………Date……………………………..

Dr. Joseph Wasonga

Department of History, Archeology and Political Studies
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my parents for their undying support of my academic pursuits, my dear wife Martha and daughter Kestar.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Kenyatta University for offering me the opportunity to undertake my Master of Arts studies and opening my eyes to the significance of scholarship.

I would like to appreciate the scholarly input of my tireless supervisors Dr. Felix Kiruthu and Dr. Joseph Wasonga.

For my thesis to take shape, many people have made immense contributions. Without my numerous respondents, I would not have had data for this study. In the course of my studies I worked closely with a number of teaching and non-teaching staff who were all supportive immensely in several ways. I would like to thank Prof. Aseka, Prof Gabriel Jal (deceased) Prof Henry Mwanzi, Dr. AH Jama, Dr. Lazarus Ngari, Dr. Omwoyo, Dr. Pius Kakai, Dr. G Murunga, Dr. E.Kisiang’ani, Dr. E. Gimode and Dr P. Wafula. My sincere thanks go to the entire staff of Department of History, Archaeology and Political Studies for their moral support during my studies.

I cannot forget my postgraduate colleagues, Mr. Geoffreyson Khamala, Mr. Eliud Lubanda, Ms. Martha Muraya, Mr. Gordon Onyango, Mr. Philip Chemelil, and Mr. Simon Kinyua all of whom I shared with the challenges of academic life and consoled each other when the going got tough at some point. I would like to acknowledge my dad and mum for giving me the opportunity to pursue my studies, the encouragement and support I got from my brothers and sister. Mr. A.D Bojana
also deserves special gratitude for editing the final work. Last but not least I would like to thank my wife Martha and our daughter Kestar for their encouragement and long wait.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page................................................................................................. i
Declaration............................................................................................... ii
Dedication................................................................................................. iii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................ iv
Table of Contents...................................................................................... v
Operational Definition of Terms. ............................................................... viii
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................ ix
Abstract................................................................................................... xii

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION...................................................... 1

1.1 Background to the Study................................................................. 2
1.2 Statement of the Problem............................................................. 5
1.3 Research Questions.......................................................................... 5
1.4 Study Objectives............................................................................. 6
1.5 Research Premises.......................................................................... 6
1.6 Significance of the Study............................................................... 7
1.7 Scope of the Study ......................................................................... 9
1.8 Literature Review........................................................................... 10
1.9:0 Theoretical Framework.............................................................. 30
1.9:1 Research Methodology............................................................... 36
1.9.2 Research Location..................................................................................36
1.9.3 Sampling Techniques and Procedure......................................................38
1.9.4 Data Collection Scope.............................................................................40
1.9.5 Data Analysis and Interpretation.............................................................42
1.9.6 Limitation of the Study............................................................................42

CHAPTER TWO: THE RATIONALE & EVOLUTION OF KENYA-BRITISH MILITARY RELATIONS

2.0 Introduction.................................................................................................44
2.1 Background to the Evolution of Kenya –Britain military relations...........45
2.2 Britain, and Kenya’s Decolonization Experience.......................................51
2.3 Conclusion..................................................................................................58

CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT OF THE KENYA-BRITISH MILITARY RELATIONS ON KENYA’S FOREIGN POLICY

3.1 Introduction.................................................................................................61
3.2 The Kenyatta Regime 1963-1978.................................................................62
3.3 The Moi Regime 1978 -2002...................................................................76
3.4 The Kibaki Administration-2002-2005......................................................86
3.5 Kibaki administration &, the renewed China-Kenya Relations..............94
3.6 Conclusion..................................................................................................100

vii
CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF KENYA –BRITISH MILITARY RELATIONS ON KENYA’S NATIONAL SECURITY

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................107

4.2 Kenya & National Security Interests............................................108

4.3 Kenya and threats to National Security.........................................110

4.4 Kenya Military and security sector...............................................117

4.5 Conclusion.....................................................................................121

CHAPTERFIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction ................................................................................124

5.2 Summary and Conclusions..........................................................126

5.3 Recommendations ........................................................................130

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....................................................................................133

APPENDICES.....................................................................................150

APPENDIX I- Interview Guide..............................................................150

APPENDIX II-List of Informants..........................................................153

APPENDIX III-Kathendini Training Area..............................................156

APPENDIX IV-Archer Post training area ..............................................157

APPENDIX V-British Army Training Areas in Kenya..............................158
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Base:** The term base is confined strictly to installations over which the user state has a right to exclusive control in an extraterritorial sense.

**Facilities:** This term is used by the study to mean that the installations over which the user states control is *ad hoc* or is shared with the host state and the right of continued access to the facility remains precarious. While it may be conceded that a base is better suited for describing major installations, the convention adopted by this research is of using the terms bases and facility interchangeably.

**Installations:** This term is used as a generic term subsuming both “base” and “facility.”

**Cooperation:** This term is used to connote a form of mutual relationship between states.

**Interdependence:** This term is used in this research to refer to a form of interstate relationship that is complementary and beneficial among the cooperating states. Interdependence among states is more defined in trade relations.

**Decolonization:** Study utilizes this term to not only mean the transfer of alien power to sovereign nationhood; but the term context in the study entails the liberation of the worlds of spirit and culture as well as economics and politics.

**Post-Independence:** This study utilizes the term to refer to the period when Kenya became independent sovereign state from the colonial control of Britain.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACOTA: Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance

AFRICOM: Africa Command

APP: African Peoples Party

AU: African Union

ATPU: Anti Terrorism Police Unit

BAPSTC: British Army Peace Support Training Centre

BATUK: British Army Training Unit Kenya

BASLK: British Army Staff Liaison-Kenya

COMESA: Common Market for East and South African

CPGB: Communist Party of Great Britain

EASTBRIG: East African Standby Brigade

EOD: Explosive Ordinance Disposal

DFID: Department for International Development

GSU: General Service Unit
FOCAC: Forum on Africa-China Corporation

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IPSTC: International Peace Support Training Centre

IMATC: International Mine Training Action Centre

IMF: International Monetary Fund

JICA: Japan International Cooperation Agency

KANU: Kenya African National Union,

KAR: King’s African Rifles

KAF: Kenya Air force

KADU: Kenya African Democratic Union,

KCA: Kikuyu Central Association

LAPSSET: Lamu Port South Sudan –Ethiopia Transport Corridor

LEGCO Legislative Council

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NAM: Non Allied Movement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAASP</td>
<td>New Asia–Africa Strategic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARC</td>
<td>National Alliance Rainbow Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC’s:</td>
<td>Newly Industrializing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO’s</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC:</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFD:</td>
<td>Northern Frontier District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC:</td>
<td>Oil Producing and Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation Of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHMS</td>
<td>On Her Majesty Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA:</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICAD:</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK:</td>
<td>United Kingdom (This term used interchangeably by the study to refer to Britain.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN:</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environmental Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USA: United States of America

USAID: United States Assistance In Development

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WARSAW: Treaty Pact formed during Cold War by Central and Eastern Europe Communist States to counter alleged NATO alliance
ABSTRACT

Decades after the end of colonisation the intellectual debate over the positive and negative impacts of colonisation in Kenya is still very much alive. This study is not interested in justifying or condemning colonialism. On the contrary it focuses on Kenya-British military relations as one of the enduring independence period legacies in Kenya and is centered within Kenya’s problematic decolonization experience and the wider context of the Cold War ideological confrontation. The desire by Britain to relentlessly pursue its imperial interests beyond Kenya’s independence forms the thrust of this thesis and the study only adds up to the various attempts made by the Kenyan people to dismantle colonialism, both in its formal and informal dispositions. The objectives of the study were; to examine the nature and rationale of the evolution of Kenya-British military relations in the independence period, to evaluate their impacts on Kenya’s foreign policy relations with other states and third, examine the impacts of these relations on Kenya’s national security in the independence period. The study employs the realist school of thought in tracing the continuous British military presence in Kenya while igniting debate on Kenya’s decolonization experience. For the investigative aim of this thesis, the study focuses on the colonial legacy in Kenya-British military relations within the independence period regimes of Kenyatta (1963-1978) Moi (1978-2002) and Kibaki (2002- up to 2005). Nevertheless the three regimes simply provide in terms of their institutional transition an attempt by the study, a modest evaluation of the present Kenya-British military relations. Primary and
secondary sources of data were used in this study. Secondary sources included mainly written sources. The study found out that the British Army in spite of being an ‘enemy’ military during the Mau Mau War of independence and the ongoing Mau Mau atrocities cases against the British government, the same army continues to use the Kenyan hinterlands as military training areas long after Kenya’s independence thereby shaping Kenya’s military relations with its former colonial master. The study concludes that in spite of negative civil-military relations at the local level, the relations at national level have proved beneficial to both countries. More so the study informs that military relations between states have largely played a major role in determining the subsequent trajectory of economic, trade, diplomatic and political relations between the co-operating nations. It thus affirms the argument advanced by the study that the trajectory of development in Kenya continues to be determined and shaped not only by the conjuncture of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial socio-political and economic structures but also by the military linkages.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study sought to examine Kenya-British military relations as one of the most enduring independent Kenya colonial legacies. In particular this study investigates the factors that underpinned and have sustained this relationship several years after Kenya gained independence. In addition, it has also examined the impacts of these relations on Kenya’s foreign policy posture in the independence period as well as its national security interests.

More so the study was inspired by the general concern that while the British military was an ‘enemy military’ during Kenya’s pre-independence and decolonization period and viewed with hostility during the independence struggle, Kenya’s independence period political dispensation continues to sustain these relations. Interestingly, Britain too continues to pursue these relations relentlessly beyond Kenya’s independence.

Finally there has been a greater Kenyan public and academic interest especially on defence and national security issues and this has brought into attention the continuous long-term stationing of the British military in Kenya as an armed foreign force in peacetime; a distinctive characteristic of the geopolitics of the second half of the 20th century.
1.1 Background to the Study

The presence of foreign military bases and facilities in the developing countries of Africa, and Latin America can be traced to the end of the Second World War in 1945 (Woodliffe, 1992). First, the end of this war marked the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the chief arbiters of international affairs. Second, the Second World War marked a culmination of ideo-political and intellectual engineering that pitted the West and the East mainly, the consolidation of the Eastern bloc which was communist led by the USSR and the Western capitalist-oriented block headed by the United States of America (Percox 2004).

The ideological divide between the emerging military and economic powers further informed the positions to be taken by developing countries. In the case of the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the most immediate factor affecting them was the war between the allies and the major superpowers. Both USA and USSR relied on their allies and their colonies to help with the efforts of this ideological war. While the USA rose as the major undisputed superpower after the Second World War, its major concerns were maintaining its newly acquired global status and security interests and curb the spread of communism, while the USSR through her aid sought loyalty of non-communist countries and
this strategically shifted the focus on the security affairs of the third world (Fawcett, 2000).

Africa became a major theatre and centre of the protracted East-West confrontations being experienced in Europe when these spillover effects of this ideological war formed the basis of the Cold War and this began to be felt in the liberation and nationalist movements in Africa and other satellites states. For British East Africa, the Cold War confrontations and the spillover effects were felt largely in Kenya and (present day Zimbabwe).

Kenya which is the focus of this study was unique for it hosted a large number of white settler population and more so an Indian community that had largely been involved in the construction of the Kenya–Uganda railway. However, the main militant force of opposition to the British presence took the form of the Mau Mau national liberation movement (David, 2005; Elkins, 2005; Odhiambo, 2003; Wunyabari, 1993).

Not only did Mau Mau impact heavily on the pre-independence Kenya politics it also largely influenced the independence period interplay of domestic politics in Kenya and continues to date as shall be espoused further by the study. While the British embarked on sustained counterinsurgency campaigns against the Mau Mau, of remarkable interest to this study is the British military strategy in Kenya.
In fact, the British military enjoys a string of military bases in Kenya under the Status of Foreign Forces Agreement signed by the two countries where Kenya has permitted the British military to use its hinterlands for military training. Nevertheless by leaving the precise role and mission of British military in Kenya unresolved, the looseness of this arrangement has not only opened the way to the period of tension in the relations between Kenya and Britain as was witnessed in 2005 when both countries had a diplomatic spat, but has also helped understand Britain’s global military posture in the wake of the collective security initiatives as molded by the geo-strategic interest of its biggest ally, the United States.

This global reflection has also had some greater social and political consequences on the national security, foreign policy and internal political dynamics of Kenya as the host nation that ultimately this study set to explore.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This study sought to assess the Kenya-British military relations as one of the enduring colonial legacy within Kenya’s independence period and political dispensation. While the independence period has witnessed cordial diplomatic, trade and economic relations between the two countries, military relations have, experienced intermittent irritations bringing into attention the continuous long-term stationing of the British military in Kenya. This study examined the factors that motivated and sustained the Kenya-British military relations and explored the nature of these relations and concludes by evaluating their impacts on Kenya’s foreign policy and national security interests from independence in 1963 to the year 2005.

1.3 Research Questions

The Study posed the following questions;

i. What factors motivated and sustained the present Kenya-British military relations?

ii. What has been the nature of Kenya-British military relations in the independence period?

iii. How has the Kenya -British military relations impacted on the foreign policy of Kenya?
iv. What has been the impact of Kenya-British military relations on Kenya’s national security?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study were:

i. To examine the rationale behind the Kenya-British military relations in the independence period.

ii. To investigate the nature of Kenya-British military relations in the independence period.

iii. Examine the impact of the Kenya-British military relations on Kenya’s foreign policy relations with other states.

iv. To investigate the impact of the Kenya-British military relations on Kenya’s national security interests.

1.5 Research Premises

The study was guided by the following research premises:

i. That the geo-strategic interests have motivated Britain’s stationing of military facilities in Kenya in the independence period.

ii. The long-term stationing of the British military facilities in Kenya manifests neo-colonialism.

iii. Kenya-British military relations have to a large extent influenced Kenya’s foreign policy relations in the independence period.
iv. Kenya-British military relations have impacted on Kenya’s national security in the independence period.

1.6 Justification and Significance of the Study

This study is not a military study *per se*; rather it confined itself to an evaluation of the colonial legacy in the form of military co-operation between Kenya and Britain and its impact on Kenya. The researcher acknowledges that recently there has been a sustained effort by the US government to set up an African command (AFRICOM) base in Africa and Kenya has featured prominently among the targeted host nations in the greater horn region (Uzodike G and Isike, 2009: 26). This move has not only reinforced Kenya and Africa’s growing importance in military, geo-strategic and economic importance but has significantly placed Kenya in the international limelight.

The study is crucial in trying to shed more light towards this development. More so with the end of the Cold War and fall of its beacon the Berlin wall in November 1989, the study focuses attention on the new paradigmatic shift in both military and strategic thinking on the future of the long-term stationing of foreign armed forces in peacetime. Of significance are the policy suggestions made by the study to policy-makers in government and the research recommendations pertaining to Kenya’s benefits and losses for having military relations with Britain espe
cially at a time when China is increasingly making inroads into Kenya and the entire African continent.

More so, this study informs the sub-discipline of international security studies and therefore, provides a foundation for further research in the field of security studies. The findings of this study do provide insights into ways of containing the widespread piracy in the Indian Ocean waters emanating from the lawlessness state of Somalia, that has not only interfered with international maritime commerce, fishing and oil explorations, but also provides the rationale for the multilateral efforts by Britain, US and France militaries to fight piracy in the Indian ocean (US Congress Research Services Report R40528, 2009).

In addition the study provides insight into how Kenya has strived to realistically enhance its national security interest by having military relations with Britain and also enlightens on an understanding of Kenya’s foreign policy posture towards its neighbours like war-torn Somalia and regional organizations like the African Union. The study is also significant as it re-examines Kenya’s commitment to strengthening of relations within the Commonwealth of Nations as one of the pivotal member states in the East Africa region.
1.7 Scope of the Study

This study’s scope is to reflect on the Kenya-British military relations in the independence period. It effectively begins in 1963 when Kenya attained independence as a sovereign state and became a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Commonwealth of Nations represents an association of 53 independent nations, (except Fiji Islands that is currently suspended from the Commonwealth countries) of which are former British colonies or related dependencies.

According to Fenwick (2009), England maintained political ties with its former colonies primarily through the Commonwealth of Nations. Initially created as a forum between the metropole and its colonies, this institution was particularly valued by England during the World Wars in the coordination of economic and defense policies and Membership within the Commonwealth of Nations was one way to keep these states oriented to the West.

The year 1963 becomes significant to this study as it marks the time when Kenya began to make its own decisions as an independent and sovereign state. On the other hand, the year 2005 remains crucial to the study as it marks two years after President Moi’s departure from power and also epitomizes the year when Kenya not only reviewed its defense policies especially on matters of arms and military
equipment sourcing, but also marked the time when British-Kenya diplomatic relations were at their worst. A diplomatic row had emerged over the future of the British military trainings in Kenya, with the indictment of corruption allegations in the new Kibaki administration by the then British High Commissioner to Kenya Sir Edward Clay. Further rape claims against the British soldiers in Laikipia and Samburu districts had all jeopardized diplomatic relations between Nairobi and London (Daily Nation: 18/9/2005).

Second, the year 2005 offers the study a substantial period to assess the new Kibaki regime and its relations with Britain three years after Kibaki regime had gazetted the lifting of the ban of Mau Mau as an organisation, in effect recognising Mau Mau as freedom fighters and not terrorists as had been branded by the colonial era legislation.

1.8 Literature Review

A review of the extant literature has shown that Kenya-British military relations have not to the researchers' knowledge been conclusively and thoroughly researched. Limited scholarly investigation has been concluded. The study acknowledges that there has been other studies done on; The Sino-Kenyan relationship by Mahoney (2010) Brautigam (2009) and US-Africa relations by Nyiring’uro, (1999) Macharia Munene (1995), Japan-Kenya Relations (Imbisi,1996) Shiroya (1992). For instance, the studies by Macharia Munene (1995), Korwa
Adar, (1995) Nying’uro (1999) have focused on the broader US-Africa relations without an in-depth look into the specific military relations between Kenya and Britain. An attempt has been made to review literature of relevance to this study. This study has reviewed and benefitted from the recent studies by Percox (2004), Parsons (2003) among others who have systematically highlighted the military relations between Kenya and Britain in the immediate period before and after Kenya gained independence.

Aseka (2005) asserts that the idea of sovereignty in international relations theory is increasingly being subjected to unprecedented challenges by forces of globalization. One can as well talk of imperial globalization in reference to globalizations direct subordination of territories that proffers a regime of global surveillance. To him, the West has established means of disciplinary surveillance through bilateral agreements under which pacts of military alliances between African countries and Western countries are being hammered out.

He argues further that the politics of military alliances seem to have narrowed down globalization to military globalization and recommends the need for the Third World countries to make the geopolitics of security in the hinterlands and seashores a major subject of inquiry. This study responds to this call for more inquiry into the role of military alliances in the era of globalization.
Adar (1995) reflecting on the US-Kenya relations reveals that Kenya’s dependence on the Western industrialized countries established during the British colonial rule places Kenya into the global capitalist economy. He argues that this dependence perspective emphasizes external constraints that limit Kenya’s foreign policy towards the United States and other Industrialized countries due to her status as a weak state in the international system. Kenya offer of military facilities at Mombasa to the US in 1980 also placed her into the global East-West paradigm. This successful acquisition of military bases in Kenya driven by the Carter doctrine led to an increase in the flow of economic and military aid to Kenya.

He further argues that the Kenya-US relations have been consistent and that this consistency emerges as a result of Kenya’s dependence relations and her geopolitical considerations. Adar study sets the foundations into an understanding of the dependence nature of Kenya within the context of the global capitalist economy. By focusing on Kenya military relations with Britain this study attempts therefore to interrogate further this interdependence relationship within the realm of military linkages between the two cooperating nations.

Shiroya (1992) reveals in his study that the Second World War in 1940’s affected the Africa-European relationship in more than one ways and more so militarily. Kenya he notes contributed significantly (although many of them were conscripted to join the British military and more so the Kings African Rifles) into the
British Army recruitment in the East Africa region and a significant number of Kenyan African soldiers fought alongside British soldiers in the British Army’s 21 brigade for the freedom of Britain.

Shiroya’s study is relevant to this study as it lays foundation and also forms part of the colonial legacy in the present Kenya-British military relations. As a stark reminder of this legacy, each year the British government and more so the British High Commissioner representative joins other Kenyans and Commonwealth countries representatives and veterans in remembrance day to commemorate the ex-World War soldiers who died in the struggle outside the War cemetery in Nairobi.

The fallen heroes contribution and service to the British army remains an obligation that British government has remained committed to including stipends to the surviving war veterans under the British Legion Kenya Association.

Although the British government has had to contend with the accusations of neglect by the African Ex-service men the War Cemetery in Kenya remains a stark reminder of these soldiers contribution to the British War history efforts and hence continues to build on the Kenya-British military relations. This study therefore acknowledges Shiroya’s contribution into an understanding of the present Kenya-British military relations.
Leys (1975) focusing on Underdevelopment in Kenya gives a brilliant survey and informs that from the onset, Kenya was incorporated into a capitalist economy model. For him underdevelopment meant to be progressively incorporated into a permanent relationship with the expanding capitalist economy. Ley’s study lays the foundation of understanding the British interests in Kenya, and more so justifies the desire by Britain to pursue a moderate government that was, after all, the best safeguard of Britain's interests in Kenya.

Central to this vital interests was the white settler economy and Leys study more so informs the substance of independence in Kenya as one that was a planned transition from a monopolistic colonial economy to a neo-colonial economy which would not merely preserve the major existing metropolitan interest but which would adapt Kenya both to the new forms of international capitalism. True to it, on gaining independence the moderate Kenyatta’s government agreed to the willing buyer willing seller system of transferring land from the white settlers to Kenyan farmers.

As long as there were unwilling sellers and buyers found it difficult to raise the funds necessary to buy a portion of land in the White highlands, there were still British citizens occupying central positions within the Post–colonial agricultural economy. This meant that private foreign investment as a means by which to en
-courage economic growth, a policy which remains to this day key component of economic and development policies.

To date, British investments in Kenya are currently estimated to be worth more than £4 billion (Sh510 billion) and half of the top 10 taxpaying companies in Kenya are British owned. By stationing a military base in Kenya Britain foresaw the need to secure their vital interests in case of unforeseen upheavals and the security of foreign investments to them was paramount. Throughout colonial Kenya's history, Britain's wider interests and global competition and its administrative and political structures were secured by the buildup of security forces and the occasional resort to arms.

By arming the Kenyatta state Britain ensured that future threats to Kenya's stability could be dealt with by largely 'political' means, lengths to which Britain went in order to establish and maintain this government in power. Ley’s study helps explain Britain's reasons for close involvement in defence matters in Kenya from independence. It meant that Britain enjoyed a large degree of continuity which this study seeks to highlight by focusing on these sustained military relations between the two countries.

Percox (2004), though acknowledging that there is little scholarship that has been produced on British policy in pursuing her interests beyond Kenyan independence; confirms that Britain’s quest for continued interest in Kenya was well-
calculated in order to pursue what he calls "imperial" African interests well beyond Kenya’s independence. He asserts that Britain by maintaining her strategic priorities in Kenya and cultivating the "moderate" Kenyatta government, giving up the unacceptable colonial army base, but retaining military camps, rights of overflying, staging and training the Kenyan military, including internal security all indicate Britain’s vision of maintaining her strategic priorities in Kenya.

Percox thus shows that Kenyan de-colonization and British defense interests were intimately linked and vital within the context of the Cold War and East-West regional rivalry. He argues that the British decolonisation and defence policy in Kenya were far more intricately connected than has hitherto been acknowledged, if only as evidenced by the post-independence defence agreement and Britain’s, continued involvement in the defence and internal security of its former colony well beyond December 1963.

Percox study reveals that Kenya’s enhanced strategic significance ensured that Britain had no intention of abandoning the colony. To him, political concessions to African nationalism were presented as demonstrations on Britain commitment to developing Kenya in an orderly manner rather than to accelerate the transfer of power. Indeed, the presence of a permanent garrison of British troops in Kenya for the British meant that it would in itself act as a stability influence in the background to the colony political life and illustrates the evolution of British
defence and internal security policy in Kenya in relation to changing economic and political circumstances. Percox’s study therefore informs this study as it seeks to explore further if indeed the continuous long-term stationing of the British military forces in Kenya, has in any way manifested neo-colonialism, or has enhanced Kenya’s strategic significance in the East African region.

Parsons (2003) explores the Kenya-British military relations in an account of causes and effects of the 1964 East African army mutinies and traces the roots of the 1964 army mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. He notes that the mutinies were firmly rooted in the colonial past when economic and strategic necessity forced the former British territorial governments to rely on Africans for defense and internal security.

While the East African mutinies demonstrate that the propensity of an African army to challenge civil authority was directly tied to its degree of integration into post-colonial society, Parson’s study outlines Kenyatta’s commitment to the British blueprint in rebuilding the Kenyan army. Moreso it shows his resolve to preserve the colonial military tradition of an apolitical army that was loyal to the state, as he sought to benefit from Britain politically and economically. Parsons study shows that the lack of financial resources and military expertise to create new armies, by the independent african governments necessitated the need to retain the basic structures and character of the inherited armies and Kenya was no
exception. This study therefore seeks to investigate this continuity by focusing on the Kenya- British Military relations in the period after Kenya’s independence.

Kyle (1999) reflecting on the politics of the independence of Kenya observes that the colonial government had the headache of grooming a post-colonial successor who would protect their interests in their absence, retain the status quo and or adopt policies largely influenced by Britain. The dominant thinking in Britain was that loyal leaders amongst those who had represented Kenya in the Lancaster conference and those that had been elected to Legco were to be prepared to assume leadership in the country.

Kyle notes in his study that several issues were discussed in the Lancaster House conference talks in 1962 including the fate of the future role of the British military in Kenya. He informs that the future sustenance and use of the military base at Kahawa meant that the British soldiers had to be relocated to Aden base in the Suez if Kenya was to gain independence, and that the only change was to be that the word ‘base’ would be dropped in favour of ‘facilities’ and they would only be used to serve rapid deployment purposes.

His study therefore lays the foundation into an understanding the precise role of the British military facilities in Kenya, which also forms the basis of this study.
Okoth (1990) reflecting on the Uganda -Kenya relations argues that Uganda-Kenya relations have experienced intermittent tensions although there has not been armed conflict between the two countries. He describes the tensions as heightened mudslinging, name calling, confrontation of politics and aggressive pursuits of separate and divisive ways despite the rhetoric to the contrary.

He further argues that concurrence of national interest between Kenya and Uganda leads to cooperation between the two countries and that the two countries cannot afford to engage in a military conflict since Uganda is Kenya’s major trading partner in the World. Kenya benefits a lot from Uganda in terms of trade and commerce, transportation, education opportunities and employment among others and both collaborate on both regional security and global political issues. They therefore need each other and issues that strain relations between the two countries can be resolved diplomatically.

Okoth study provides insights into an understanding that the pursuit of national interests characterizes the nature of relations among states in the international system. It’s worth noting therefore that Kenya and Britain too have experienced intermittent relations especially on matters concerning the British military operations in Kenya and it’s against that background that this study attempts to explore these relations.
Nyunya (1977) argues that for anyone to understand military interactions between Kenya and the major powers, it is important to know her sources of economic aid and technical assistance, since they are significant because of the great value Kenya has put on economic development, and therefore, one would expect Kenya’s trade and military interactions to be consistent with the major sources of her economic aid. According to Nyunya, Kenya-Britain trading dyad significantly reveals that 75% of Kenya’s arms trade is with Britain, with Kenya holding a considerable percentage of British investments in the East African region.

He points out that Kenya’s politico-military cooperation with Britain guarantees Kenya’s support against foreign aggression. While Nyunya’s study does not deeply interrogate the military relations between the two countries but, it offers a substantial foundation on the British-Kenya historical bilateralism from the time when Kenya gained independence. This study therefore focuses on Britain as a major trading partner and a source of arms and military equipments including the expertise to the Kenya military in the independence period. It seeks to interrogate further if indeed the trade relations do impact on the trajectory of the military relations taken by Kenya and Britain.

Orwa, (1994) reflecting on overall Kenya’s foreign policy and development strategy from the time when Kenya gained independence, argues that Kenya’s foreign policy has been consistent and describes it as continuous and changing both under...
Kenyatta and Moi regimes. He argues further that Kenya inherited from Britain political values, institutions and structures that conformed to the Western ideals. All kinds of economic, political and military aid has been sought from Western countries and this has strengthened Kenya’s relations with the West. Orwa describes Kenyatta’s foreign policy between 1963 and 1978 as one determined by both the national and systemic variables. He describes Kenyatta’s foreign policy as one of realism in relation to East Africa region, and idealism in the wider world. (Orwa, 1994:300).

However, he notes that during the Cold War, Kenya’s foreign policy posture in international affairs was that of non-alignment. Non alignment meant a less radical posture that would have threatened the continued inflow of external capital as well as development aid Kenya needed for its economic growth. Further he notes that when Moi succeeded Kenyatta, Kenya’s foreign policy did not change noticeably.

This study therefore revisits the Kenya-British Military relations taking into account the military as an instrument of foreign policy to examine if indeed the Kenya’s foreign policy has been impacted upon by the same. The study notes that the Kenyan military as an institution remains one of the most Westernized inherited institutions and legacy from the time when Kenya gained independence.
Shaw and Aluko (1984) reflecting on Kenya’s foreign policy in the immediate period after independence, argue that its best seen in terms of its political and economic moderation and of its continuing reliance on the Western world. Although Kenya is not capable of much influence in international power politics, it is convenient for Kenya to assert its ideological independence of other blocs and to insist that its sovereignty entitles Kenya to make judgments on world issues in accordance with its aspirations, needs and circumstances.

In conclusion, both warn that while Kenya needs to maintain its economic, cultural and other ties with one or the other of the major powers, it must guard against entangling itself in agreements or military alliances and pacts that may limit the freedom of action in international affairs. This study therefore builds on the works of Shaw and Aluko as it seeks to examine the colonial legacy in Kenya-British military relations and how the same has interplayed with the present challenges of geo-politics, the shifting of global power relationships and globalization dynamics in the international system.

Opondo (1988) argues that Kenya’s commitment to non-alignment rejects military facilities belonging to ideologically committed nations on her soil and insists that any mutual defense pact between her and a major power must not prevent it from developing its internal material power and strength upon which its own security depends. Opondo notes that in the run up to the June 1963 elections, both
KANU, in its manifesto, and KADU, orally, had made statements to the effect that in accordance with the principles of non-alignment they would not permit the existence of foreign military bases on our soil yet in reality Kenya remained aligned to the West and more so militarily. While the central question in his study is to establish when and with regard to which aspects of non-alignment one can talk of Kenya as having been non-aligned or otherwise, this study seeks to evaluate the present Kenya-British military relations to show that Kenya remained aligned to the West even at a time the major independence political players had orally committed to the non-alignment policy.

Hornsby (2011) in his recent study demonstrates this by illuminating how independent Kenya's politics have been dominated by a struggle to deliver security, impartiality, efficiency and growth, but how the legacies of the past have continued to undermine their achievement, making the long-term future of Kenya far from certain. He observes that Kenya's independence has always been circumscribed by its failure to transcend its colonial past.

The decisions of the early years of independence, and the acts of its leaders in the decades from Jomo Kenyatta, Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga to Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki - have changed the country's path in unpredictable ways. He notes the command and control system that the British created to maintain order was propagated into the independent state almost unchanged. Hornsby notes
that Kenyatta and his advisers were concerned from the first about Kenya’s security and the desire for political order was one of their core motivating factors.

Further his study makes clear how Kenyatta entered into military agreements with Britain in 1964 and a formal defence agreement on 3rd June 1964 whereby in spite of the British troops stationed in Kenya would withdraw by 12th December 1964 they would in the meantime build the Kenya Rifles into a proper national army. This included the resourcing and training a new Kenya Air Force (KAF) and creation of a small Kenya navy. His study informs further that the UK would relinquish rights to most of their military properties, but interestingly the British also agreed to continue, subject to any prior commitment and to prior authorization to make available British troops stationed in Kenya to assist the Kenyan government in dealing with internal disturbances (Hornsby 2011:98, 99).

Hornsby study is more recent and informative and confirms the quest by this study to evaluate the Kenya- British military relations and these commitments after Kenya gained independence.

Talalayev- Boyarshinov (1961) in his analysis of the presence of foreign armed forces in other countries across the globe broadly contends that foreign military facilities are an infringement on the territorial sovereignty of a state. For this reason, he suggests that agreements on such facilities are “unequal and void” but it is
also obvious that a state is entitled to allow such facilities in its territory if it gives its free consent, thus, such facilities may not necessarily be a burden for the host state, but may be entirely within its interest and perhaps even established on its request. He contends that since military base agreements provide for an important but partial delegation of sovereignty, this delegation is based exclusively on the host state consent and it is only operative as long as such consent is present.

To him military base agreements are by their very nature different from other international agreements and treaties in that they by necessity require the continuous consent of the terminal host state. This study benefits from the broader insights of this scholar’s work and it seeks to evaluate if Kenya has indeed delegated temporary sovereignty to the British visiting forces especially in areas where the British military training takes place.

Delupis (1974) reflecting on the overall treaty practices argues that any treaty a state accedes itself to certainly limits the independence of a state and that this is not necessarily undesirable. He argues further that, by acceding to numerous technical conventions on international cooperation, states do become dependent and interdependent and they become dependent not so much on each other as on the common system established for the common good. To him, such intertwining of relations under present international law is inevitable and indeed promotes cooperation between nations. It is clear also that a state has the right to enter into
bilateral treaties on, for example, military facilities and the modern international law cannot regard all such understanding as void. In many cases, he argues it is abundantly clear that it is the new state that insists on the military facilities. It is not invariably a great power, which “forces” the developing state to accept the facilities. When, for example, Britain withdrew forces from East of Suez Canal many developing countries requested Britain to keep the military facilities in their own interests.

Therefore, to him, developing countries can validly conclude treaties on military facilities since they are not void under international law and in some instances; such facilities have been established in the interest of the developing nations.

He further asserts that treaties restricting territorial sovereignty could be referred to as “Potentially unequal treaties” for they are only fair and just in so far and for so long as the host state gives full and free consent to the territorial restrictions such treaties impose. Treaties of this kind involve a waiver of sovereignty, which by definition can only be temporary, as the state must at any time, with fair warning be entitled to resume the sovereign functions or to recover possessions and control of the portion of territory over which sovereignty has been restricted. These rights of denunciation follow from the rules of independence and self-determination when there is no longer any consent to tolerate such infringements upon the sovereign rights of the state.
Although this study informs on the treaty practice across globally, this study focuses on the Kenya- British military relations and hopefully seeks to shed light and bring into the focus the Memorandum of Understanding governing these relations and also on the Status of Foreign Forces agreement between the two countries.

Woodliffe (1992) contend that base-denial diplomacy as well as base-acquisition diplomacy has become an important hallmark of contemporary foreign policy politics. In a still broader sense, military access problems have become prominent in a bewildering number of national security and arms control contexts, including arms transfers, nuclear non-proliferation and rescue missions in the developing countries.

While there are numerous comprehensive accounts of the history of military base arrangements overseas in previous eras, to him, many states have generally regarded the retention of foreign facilities on their territory as incompatible with their newly won independence and view them as relics of the colonial era.

In former colonies of Africa, the decision to dismantle and remove these facilities has not come as a surprise. In a few of the new states where the base arrangements were renewed, often simultaneously with the granting of independence by the colonial power who invariably would be the beneficiary, the reality of the consent given on these occasions has not gone unchallenged.
He notes that elsewhere, overseas facilities first established on allied territory in the course of the Second World War, have become part of the permanent defense arrangements in Western Europe in the wake of collective security concerns. With the end of the cold war, it ushered in the notion of collective security and this has seen the NATO alliance efforts aimed at making it as difficult as possible for either side to restart the Cold War again. This study thus interrogates the Kenya-British military in the wake of collective security concerns and seeks to inform if indeed this legacy has set the foundation for the future entry of NATO into the East Africa and Greater Horn of Africa regional security matrix.

Hans Morgenthau, (1962) agree that the most important military connection between the third world countries and the industrialized countries is that of arms trade. He argues that provision of economic or military assistance can create effective allies because it communicates favourable intentions or because the recipient becomes dependent on the donor and to them, military aid is a reliable tool of influence. Regardless of the context, the provision of military assistance is believed to give suppliers significant leverage over recipients.

Such aid is most likely to create reliable proxies when the recipients are so vulnerable and dependent that they are forced, to follow the patron’s wishes even when those wishes conflict with their own. In the Kenyan situation, this study acknowledges the fact that the colonial period in Kenya ensured the establishment
of the client-patronage relationship especially on matters of defence sourcing, with much of the military aid coming from Britain. By focusing on the Kenya-British military relations in the independence period the study attempts to illustrate these client-patron relations that did not only keep Kenya pro-Western but has also shaped the foreign policy and national security interest of Kenya as a host nation.

While this study has benefitted immensely from the reviewed literature it cannot ignore the recent works by Brautigam (2009) and Mahoney (2010) who have highlighted China-Africa relations broadly and more so provided the first comprehensive account of China's aid and economic cooperation overseas.

The entry of China in Africa forms a crucial discussion for this study in its broader perspective on the shift of relations between independent Kenya and Britain military relations. Brautigam tackles the myths and realities, explaining what the Chinese are doing, how they do it, how much aid they give, and how it all fits into their "going global" strategy. Drawing on three decades of experience in China and Africa, and hundreds of interviews in Africa, China, Europe and the US, Brautigam shades new light on a topic of great interest that this study also attempts to add to that knowledge which in summary has greatly shaped the Western powers relations with Africa.
1.9.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Although there are many contending theories of international relations (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981; Holsti, 1985), the study utilizes the realist and neo-realist theory of international relations, to give an analysis of the military relations between the two nations. The leading scholar of the realist school of thought is Hans Morgenthau (1978).

In his book *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Morgenthau argues that power remains a key variable in the conduct of affairs in the international system. For him, the international system is anarchic since there is no morality in the conduct of affairs and there is no international government to oversee the conduct of affairs by the states.

States are the main actors in the international system and they engage in internal and external efforts to increase effective strategies and also undertake external attempts to align or realign with other states in order to propagate and protect their own interest and maximize their power.

This influences the pattern of interactions that will take place including the number of states to align with each other in opposing groupings as part of a balance of power. Morgenthau argues that since the international system is anarchic by virtue
of its structure, there is need for member states and actors to rely on whatever means of arrangements they can generate to enhance their security and survival.

This system is based on self-help. He argues further that as structures change so does interaction and alliance patterns among its members as well as the outcome that such interactions can be expected to produce.

Morgenthau views survival and stability as minimum goal of foreign policies that nations pursue. Thus, all nations are compelled to protect their physical, political, and territorial integrity against encroachments by other nations. According to this theory, national interest is akin to national survival. He further contends that, as long as the world is divided into nations, the national interest is indeed the last word in world politics.

Nevertheless, Morgenthau argues that since the international system is based on balance of power, nations follow those policies designed to preserve the status quo, achieve imperialistic expansion, or to gain prestige. Kenya-Britain military relations guarantee Kenya support against foreign and domestic enemies as well as her internal security and stability.

For Britain, her global military posture and security has been enhanced beyond her territories, while Kenya has had her stability and security interests in the Greater Horn of Africa region enhanced as well. It’s a fact that Kenya has had in-
termittent border tensions with Ethiopia and Somalia in the North since independence. By having military relations with Britain, therefore the study sought to find out if Kenya has benefited in any way in its quest for territorial protection.

Classical realism theory has been criticized for being state-centric; that it downplays the role of other non-state actors play in the international system. Critics argue that the role of multinationals and other non-state actors like terrorist groups has been ignored (Dougherty, 1990). This study recognizes that terrorist groups have largely influenced the conduct of international relations more so in the period after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the USA that saw the emergence of multilateral initiatives championed by US and her allies in the war on terror.

Neo-realism or structural realism (Waltz, 1979) on the other hand takes a different approach, by trying to bridge the gap between classical realism’s central thesis on power and balance of power with idealism’s central thesis about the role of legality and morality in international relations. Without sacrificing the balance of power thesis, neo-realists accept the role played in international relations by international law and morality.

Building on Morgenthau’s work, therefore Kenneth Walz adapts the realist theory to incorporate the notion that it was the international structure, not the deliberate willed actions of men and women, which influenced states’ behavior. According to Waltz it is the structure of the international system itself that determines the
behavior of states. In the years since, Walz’ neo-realism, or structural realism, has of course been further refined by other scholars. Indeed, contemporary realist theory or neo-classical realism now contains within it a number of critical debates. There is, for example, the debate between offensive and defensive realists. Offensive realists hold the view that the constant ebb and flow of security and power between states guarantees that the international system will be dominated by opportunistic states forever fearfully looking over their shoulders at potential and actual competitors.

According to this offensive interpretation, states must continuously seek to strengthen themselves and their position vis-à-vis other states, even in the absence of a directly perceived threat. As a result, the behavior and desire of states are mainly shaped by a perception of the relative capability of other states.

Both defensive and offensive realist expect policy-makers to act competitively, but the difference lies in the way that they arrive to this conclusion. Classical realism considers that the behaviour of the states evokes power-oriented strategies because of statesmen's desire of power as an end in itself, whereas neo-realism sees the rise of such power-oriented strategies necessitating the need to compete for security. According to neo-realism, an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others. The term ‘security dilemma’ describes the condition in which states, unsure of others’ intentions, arm for the sake of security, setting in
motion a vicious cycle of response and counter-response. Security dilemmas result from situations, not states’ desires. A classical example within the international system is when US and Soviet forces in Europe during the Cold War met the conditions of a security dilemma. Neo-realism suggests that two bipolar great powers share interests in acting to maintain the international system, rather than to transform or transcend it. Waltz’s theory answers questions that the classical realism cannot face.

By concentrating on the nature of the system-level structure, Waltz introduced assumptions about morality, legality, power and interest. Neo-realists were thus able to see power in a different way. For the classical realists power was both a means and an end, and rational state behaviour was simply accumulating more power. Neo-realists found that a better guide was provided by assuming that the ultimate state interest was in security, and while gathering power often ensured that, in some cases, it merely provoked an arms race.

The above theoretical context was utilized by the study to determine whether commercial and power interests have been overriding any other interests in Kenya-Britain military relations. Notably, Britain was unhappy when Kenya sought to purchase her military hardware and vehicles from the Asian countries i.e. Japan and China starting from the year 2003. In addition, the theoretical context is relevant when trying to grasp the role of globalization forces especially af
ter collapse of the former Soviet Union as a significant factor in the international system and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. The vitality of the debates outlined above suggests that realism is a sufficiently thriving force in international relations practice for theorists to want to figure it out. This thesis represents a contribution to that debate.
1.9.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To have an empirical contribution, the study was grounded on a case study of two British-Kenya joint military training facilities, namely Kathendini in Kirinyaga District and Archers Post facility in Samburu District though largely the researcher also held interviews with respondents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed select retired army and security experts. This enabled the researcher in grounding his ideas and assumptions on a specific context for empirical data. More so, the case study approach of the two areas gave a more optimal view required by the study from the districts to have unbiased broader interpretations of the findings.

The researcher had hoped that useful information could have been gleaned from interviews with surviving and key ex-Mau Mau veterans but due to the ill health, some were never honored. In addition attempt to cast the net more widely among the intelligence and top rank military officers, received no reply. However given this caginess, anonymity must be respected.

1.9.2 RESEARCH LOCATION

The research was conducted in two areas, namely Kathendini military training facility situated in Kirinyaga District and Archers Post training facility in Samburu District in order to base the study in a specific context. Archers Post training area was an outpost base for white settler & hunters and a cozy retreat for the white settlers during the colonial days and it falls under the infamous white high
lands (DN July, 3 2001), while Kathendini is situated on the outskirts of Mt Kenya forest where Mau Mau armed struggle was intense and as unconfirmed oral history informed the study, the area was a ‘prohibited area’ dreaded by many Africans during the state of emergency and a landing base for the same British military during the Mau Mau counterinsurgency and state of emergency in 1952 against Mau Mau (Muriuki O.I 2005, Mbogo, 2006:OI).

In both select areas, the British Army presence has been in existence intermittently as far back as 1963 when Kenya gained independence (Lekolol,2007:OI, Siamanta, 2007:OI, Lolosoli 2007: OI, Kiage, 2006:OI, Mugo, 2006:OI). The British troops have maintained a base at Nanyuki town and the surrounding Archers Post town though not densely populated as the researcher found out, the British Army to date conducts training at ranges and private ranches located at some distance from the local villages.

The researcher noted that some of these private ranches are owned by third generation descendants of British white settlers, and indeed it did emerge as an issue pertaining to communal land ownership and the civil-military relations within this locality.

From Archers Post, the researcher visited Nanyuki area and adjacent areas of, Mukogodo, Morupusi, Isiolo, Mailui, Malalal and Dol Dol areas, while at Ka
thendini, Kiandumu, Kamwana, Kiambatha, and Githure areas were visited (see the study area maps under appendix I, II and III). The study relied partly on primary data from the two locales of Kathendini and Archers Post in Kirinyaga and Samburu districts. This historical connection and the diversity of the two areas lay the foundation for the research.

However, the study acknowledges the presence of other British military training facilities in Kenya, namely; within the Kahawa Barracks formerly (Templar Barracks) the British Army maintains its presence and also at the Nanyuki Showground and Manda Island -Mombasa. Nevertheless several other foreign troops operate at the Kenyan coast including a German surveillance team.

1.9.3 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE AND PROCEDURE

A purposive random sampling technique was utilized to draw up the list of prospective informants for the study. Due to the limitations of time, the researcher narrowed his sample size to 80 respondents who would thereafter be considered and were willing to participate in the field research and were categorized as below.

(a) Village Elders

From the village elders and ex-Mau Mau fighters, the researcher solicited background information pertaining to the historical development of Kathendini and
Archers Post as military training facilities. The researcher also solicited information on the civil-military relations concerns of these localities. The researcher managed to interview at least 16 informants and those aged 60 years and above from the two localities were sampled and interviewed.

(b) Government Officials

A number of government officials within the provincial administration and department of defense were targeted and participated in this study. Others included international law experts, a retired former diplomat and former soldiers. The researcher managed to interview at least 24 people from this category of informants for purposes of convenience.

The ministry officials were resourceful on the broader foreign relations between the two countries and although cagey and selective on the matters pertaining to military relations, they were useful with information requested by the researcher.

(c) Women Group Leaders

Fourteen (14) women leaders from the two localities were sampled and interviewed. From this group of respondents, the researcher hoped to capture an engendered perspective on the overall civil-military concerns and issues affecting these localities.
(d) Youths, NGO leaders and Religious Leaders

A total of 4 youth leaders and 4 religious leaders from Kathendini area and 8 from various faith based organizations, and 10 from the Non-Governmental Organizations operating in the Archer Post, and Dol Dol areas, were interviewed making a total of 26 informants.

1.9:4 DATA COLLECTION SCOPE

This research depended on both primary and secondary sources of data. The instruments for collecting data from the field involved oral and written evidence through face to face interviews and written questionnaires.

Face to face interviews were booked in the case of the political affairs officer attached to the British high commissioner offices in Nairobi and the external defense attaché advisor based at the UK-Kenya relations desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Researcher managed to visit the then Ministry of Defence offices. International law legal experts, retired diplomats, members of the intelligentsia, active and or retired military experts as well as security consultants were also interviewed not necessarily at the locations sampled above. Documentation of these sessions was made through taking notes and where necessary and permissible tape recording.
(a) Primary data

First, the study solicited data through field research that involved visitations and oral interviews conducted within the two locales. The aim was to get the people as first level stakeholders and their first-hand information pertaining to these training facilities as well as assess the local impacts out of the same.

Second, the research-er visited the Ministry of Foreign affairs specifically the UK-Kenya relations section, the Ministry of Defence, the British High commissioner offices in Nairobi for oral interviews with the relevant defence attaches of the two governments.

The study also benefited from archival data including de-classified information in form of treaties, intelligence reports, agreements and protocols both bilateral and multilateral entered by the two countries and that the researcher found relevant to the study, mainly drawn from the Kenya National Archives, and the United Nations Treaty Series publications available on the internet and some in the local libraries.

(b) Secondary Research

Library research initially informed the secondary source of information for drafting of this thesis. Moi library at Kenyatta University, Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library at the University of Nairobi, the University of Nairobi’s Institute of Dip
lomacy and International Studies library, French Institute of Research in Africa libraries all were the major sources of the secondary data. However, further re- view focused on scholarly books, related theses, unpublished dissertations, jour- nals, local daily newspapers and magazines, NGOs, UNEP & UNDP reports and bulletins and more so the internet.

1.9.5 DATA ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION

The primary data, obtained and stored from the field was transcribed. Local lan- guages, mainly; Samburu, Maasai and Kikuyu were used where respondents were not conversant with English and Kiswahili languages. The researcher employed two research assistants familiar with the local languages especially Samburu and Maasai.

The information collected was analyzed, synthesized, collated and the resultant data were categorized in accordance with the objectives of the study. An assess- ment of the objectives and the findings of the study was done and based on this categorization, subsequent chapters were obtained. Conclusions and recommenda- tions for further research were made.

1.9.6 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This study focused on the Kenya–British military relations between the years 1963 up to the year 2005. The year 1963 marks the onset of independence period
and year 2005 represents a significant period in which to interrogate Kenya’s po-
litical history three years into the NARC administration under president Kibaki.
Although the research has reached its aims, there were some unavoidable limita-
tions. First because of the time limit the study focused on a small group and two
locales and therefore had to generalize the results, ideally the study should have
involved more participants across the country.

Second, the study acknowledges that locating personnel with access to the neces-
sary information as well as the traditional secrecy on military matters were some
of the biggest obstacles to the study. Both long distance travels to reach the
research areas of Archer’s post, Nanyuki and Dol Dol, as well as encountering
minimal information from respondents formed some of the challenges.

A majority of the interviewee’s mainly ex-military and retired soldiers requested
anonymity and they were not included on the list of interviewers and respondent;
equally some officers from the intelligence were very inquisitive about the study
some demanding to view the researchers permit. I cannot forget the secrecy en-
countered and disappointments from defence officers who only referred me to
their uncooperative superiors.

However the researcher and his tried hard to get as much information as he could
from the few interviews he succeeded in interviewing.
CHAPTER TWO
THE RATIONALE AND EVOLUTION OF KENYA-BRITISH MILITARY RELATIONS

2:0 Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide insights into the nature and rationale of the Kenya-British military relations. It explores the core factors and fears within the British defence interests in the East Africa region that necessitated the sustenance of military relations between Kenya and Britain. Britain’s strategic planning to respond to the revolution in Zanzibar in 1964 straight from troops stationed in Kenya (Speller, 2007) and the British military interventions to quell the three East African Army (Parsons, 2003) mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya itself in 1964 all provide valuable justifications into an understanding on the rationale of some of the factors that largely influenced British military stationing in Kenya.

In conclusion the chapter reveals that Britain maintained its economic hegemony over the colonies through military power, strategic alliances, and the collaboration of indigenous rulers. In the end the legacy is a remarkable shift in the rationale for British relations with Kenya, stepping away from the remnants of imperialism, backed by a military presence, to a profitable, purely commercial relationship between the two countries in the independence period.
2.1: Background to the Evolution of Kenya-British Military Relations

The evolution of Kenya-Britain relations can be traced back to the British colonial control of Kenya, which began with the Scramble for Africa in 1876. This was followed by the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 that set the rules of colonial occupation and thereafter the partitioning of Africa into various spheres of influence.

Amidst the geopolitical disputes notable was the 1890 Anglo-German Agreement better known as the Helgoland-Zanzibar treaty that settled most, if not all, of the complex colonial issues that arose from the ambitions of Great Britain and Germany in Africa. While the apparent goal of the treaty signed in 1890 was the exchange of Helgoland for Zanzibar, the principal motivation was the settlement of Anglo-German colonial boundaries and disputes in Africa, especially in East Africa. These two small islands of Zanzibar and Helgoland (also known as Helgoland) the former located off the coast of modern-day Tanzania and the latter off the coast of Germany in the North Sea, were strategically included in this accord and had a large role in other inter-European territorial arrangements (Pyeatt; 1988).

The outcome was that Britain would control the North, including Uganda, Germany would control the South. This agreement was formalized and Kenya was now under British authority.
Profoundly, the Berlin conference was instrumental in not only erecting artificial boundaries around present day Kenya, but also in wresting diplomatic initiative from Kenyan people. In 1894 and 1895, Britain declared protectorate over Uganda and Kenya, respectively. Kenya’s boundaries were demarcated without the consultation of Kenya’s people. It can be deduced that the colonial boundaries led to the establishment of a large territorial entity that arbitrarily brought together over forty previously independent communities into one territorial entity (Ogot, 2000).

The colonial state, and later the post-colonial state as argued by Ogot would find it a daunting task wielding these communities into one nation-state as shall be highlighted later by the study. The Berlin Conference divided Africa into spheres of influence mainly amongst the major European imperial powers of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Portugal, with each of the powers adopting own strategies of administering the acquired spheres of influence. This step marked the onset of British colonialism and imperialism in the African continent and became known as the Scramble for Africa.

For Kenya, Britain interests became well-defined when The Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC) was granted a royal charter in 1888 and the subsequent declaration of the East African protectorate in 1895 so as to forestall the advent of other European powers in the region and to delimit the Sultan of Zanzi
bar dominion on the mainland (Kanyinga, 2000). Worth noting is the fact that the political, economic and geo-strategic considerations of the East Coast of Africa had attracted the attention of other major colonial powers besides Britain and Germany all of whom had laid claim to the East Coast of Africa.

The East African Protectorate, which replaced the Imperial British East Africa Company, was created in 1895 and comprised present-day Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (Tanganyika was colonized by the Germans and became a British protectorate after World War I and later became modern day Tanzania).

The notion of Kenya as a colonial state began with the arrival of the British military in 1895. It’s imperative to note here that the driving force for the European powers to claim part of East Africa was driven largely by among other reasons, the prestige of possessing a colony outside Europe, resettlement of surplus populations, the search for raw materials and new markets as well as the desire to spread Christianity and more importantly for this study the search for and control of the source for river Nile.

The source of the Nile River was especially important to the British strategic defense. They believed that whoever controls the source of the river Nile controlled North Africa and Egypt, and therefore the Suez Canal and the trade routes to India and Asia (Olson, 2008). It’s worth noting that all the Kenyan nationalities resisted
British control by waging struggles on many fronts; For example, forces under Waiyaki wa Hinga attacked and burnt the British station in Dagoretti in 1890, the Nandi resistance (the most tenacious of all) led by Koitalel arap Samoei of 1890, the Bukusu resistance of 1896, Giriama resistance of 1900, Gusii resistance 1907 remain hallmarks of the African initial resistances to colonial rule and all of which formed the initial aggressive acts to the British in Kenya. As a result they became the causes of the first military expeditions and have been explored in depth by scholars like (Maxon 1971; Matson, 1972; Bantley, 1981).

This East African protectorate was under a territorial force called the Kings African Rifles (KAR), whose sole mandate was to protect and secure both the economic and strategic interests pioneered by the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). It’s evident that the Portuguese had succeeded in gaining control of much of the Kenyan coast as evident by the vestiges left behind by the Portuguese like the Fort Jesus built in 1593 and the pillar of Vasco da Gama in Malindi. The Portuguese interests in Kenya and East Africa were centred mainly on controlling trade routes to India.

Kenya’s strategic location in East Africa and its valuable point of entry into the Horn of Africa had considerably given it more leverage amongst the other East African nations from the onset of colonial control and this fact had featured well in the British interests in the East Coast of Africa.
Kenya’s colonial history is unique because Britain’s colonial policy towards Kenya was long-term geared towards resettling a large number of white settler community and making Kenya a white man’s country. The Imperial British East Africa Company, the main commercial administrator of British East Africa, begun the construction of the Kenya- Uganda railway at the Kilindini Harbour in Mombasa in 1895 and around 1900, the rail line arrived at the city of Nairobi and around 1901 it arrived at Port Florence (current day Kisumu city).

With the success of the Railway line, the first white settlers began arriving in Kenya as early as 1902. Under the Crown Land Ordinance of 1902 the sale and leasing of land to settlers began (Sorrenson, 1968:55, Okoth-Ogendo 1991).

Further any this ordinance underlined that the crown had original title to the land, and deserted or vacated land reverted back to the crown. Kenya was declared a white man’s crown colony in 1920 and in light of this development, two parallel dual economies mainly native economy and settler economy on the other hand were established (Dilley, 1966).

Subsequently, the colonial administration saw the need to alienate Africans from their land for colonial settlements in the Kenyan highlands dubbed the ‘White Highlands’ where these white settlers were to occupy and embark on large scale plantation farming to sustain themselves and their economy. Gradually as Leys informs, the colonial administration established itself through several sets of legislations
most of which aimed at protecting the interests of the state officials and those of the white settler farmers (Leys, 1975).

Notable was the Kenya (Annexation) Order-in-Council, 1920 and the Kenya Colony Order-in-Council, 1921 that vested all arable land in the British Crown and totally disinherit ed indigenous Kenyans of their land (Dilley, 1966). These legislations created the reserves for ‘natives’ and located them away from areas scheduled for European settlement and this gave way for the colonial administration first to control and to suppress the envisaged competition from the native African and Asian economies.

Locally punitive legislations and taxation laws banning the Africans from cash crop farming were introduced by the colonial authority which forced the Africans to work in the settler farms after they were forcefully evicted from their farms and pushed to reserves where land ownership was not encouraged. The Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, of 1938 gave legal effect to this dual policy of European “White Highlands” (or high potential areas) and African “Native Reserves” (or marginal lands) (Okoth, 1991).

Within the international system and right at the same time, the Second World War (1939–45) broke out, and Kenya being an ally to Britain became an important British military base for successful campaigns against Italy in the Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. It’s worth noting that the same British military had conscripted Kenyans to serve their interests during the First World War and the Second World War. This fact is highlighted by Shiroya’s study on the role of African soldiers in World War II when he argues that the African participation posited African
soldiers to politically galvanize against colonial rule as a result of their wartime experiences (Shiroya, 1992).

Notable from Shiroya’s study was that the African soldiers in the war had fought alongside British Soldiers for the freedom of Britain and they felt that they too were entitled to the freedom of their own country, from Britain itself. Shiroya concludes that the military experience of numerous Kenyans was a major factor in the Mau Mau war as shall be espoused later in the study, as many ex-servicemen joined the freedom struggle and served in the Mau Mau armies, mostly in leadership positions, having soldiers and battle experiences.

Worth noting, during the immediate pre-independence period, the British-Kenya military relations were geared towards colonial policing, with initial co-operation between the British military forces consisting of the First Lancashire fusiliers (from the Canal Zone) as well as the local African troops known as the Kings African Rifles. The British troops would be primarily in charge of law enforcements in the white highlands while the KAR troops would patrol and engage Mau Mau in trouble spot areas (Wunyabari, 1993).

2.2 Britain and Kenya’s Decolonization Experience

This study acknowledges that decolonization as a theme is a much wider concept than the mere winning of independence or transfer of power and in respect to that
this concept is utilized to discuss the notions of liberation in Kenya. Ogot (1995) reflecting on Kenya’s decolonization experience has argued that decolonization does not only mean the transfer of alien power to sovereign nationhood; but it must also entail the liberation of the worlds of spirit and culture as well as economics and politics. He raises question of how far Kenya is avoidably neo-colonial, and how much independence is available to any state national economy or culture in today’s world. The central focus on Kenya’s decolonization experience revolves around the Mau Mau National liberation movement and subsequent British military counterinsurgency on the same.

Catalysed by the British determination to quell their fear of the spread of communism as an ideology in Kenya and the East Africa region, Kenya’s decolonization experience took a rather violent path. Having been formed in the early 1940s, Mau Mau has been cited as the biggest security threat to Britain’s colonial control of Kenya, especially the uprising’s culture of violence which had not only rationalized its actions but those of the British (Kisiang’ani, 2004).

First, the clamor by Africans for return of alienated land by the British and freedom from British cruelty mainly associated with the white settlers, colonial chiefs and home guards, all triggered widespread resistance that saw the birth of the Mau Mau national liberation movement. The movement not only demonstrated strong nationalism but significantly catalyzed Kenya’s decolonization process. With its
relentless struggle for independence, restitution of land appropriated by the white settlers, and the unconditional release of their leaders, Mau Mau became more violent with its power being felt through the increased assassination of Europeans and their African collaborators (Kisiang’ani, 2004).

Nevertheless, the revelations by the study’s informants who were (Chege; OI: 2007, Njiru OI 2007, Muthee OI: 2006, Wairimu OI :2006,) Mau Mau veterans informed the study and gave credibility to this school of thought; majority felt that “having been warriors and part of the Mau Mau liberation movement, the British military training in Kenya evokes vivid memories of the Mau Mau war and the state of emergency. Viewed by many in Kenya as an imperialist power that was antithetical to the progression of Mau Mau Nationalism and whose influence had to be removed, their long-term stationing indeed evokes the question of whether Kenya gained independence or is still under Britain sovereignty.

Their confessions to the study of having fought the Wabeberu (Swahili for colonialists) in order for Kenya to attain self-rule and the frequent return of the British soldiers at Kathendini and Archers post, areas for training since the Mau Mau war has left me perturbed” (Chomba O.I , 2006: Njega O.I 2007, Murandi OI 2007 ). Similar sentiments were expressed by Mbogo (O.I 2006) Njiru O.I 2007, Muriuki (OI: 2007) all of whom participated in the Mau Mau liberation movement in the Mt. Kenya forest.
Percox (2004) notes that Kenya and Rhodesia (current day Zimbabwe) were strategic in Britain’s post-World War II imperial defense planner’s thinking. In fact, it was considered to be “desirable” to develop the Royal Air Force (RAF) bases in the two countries. Britain quest to protect its remaining British population and their investments as well as the protection of their land in a post-independent Kenya has been espoused further by this form of interdependence.

A moderate government was, after all as Percox informs in his study, the best safeguard of Britain’s interests in Kenya. However, these developments had significant consequences to the overall decolonization experience and especially on nationalist sentiments as has been espoused earlier.

Remarkably as highlighted the ensuing State of Emergency in 1952 marked a significant move towards the British military strategy and operations in Kenya and the subsequent laying down of the groundwork for the future military cooperation between the two countries. Sir Evelyn Baring the then colonial governor requested and obtained British and African troops including the Kings African Rifles (KAR) for use against the Mau Mau insurgency.

A massive counter offensive campaign against the Mau Mau by the British army was launched in the main trouble spot areas of Central Kenya and Eastern parts of the country where it is believed to have been the home turf of the rebellion (Kanogo, 1987).
Shiroya (1992) acknowledges that the presence and role of the ex-Second World War servicemen in the Mau Mau movement cannot be ignored given the sustained and spirited campaign the Mau Mau had put against the British military.

Kisiang’ani (2004) informs that the Kenyan decolonization experience took a rather violent path characterized by the Mau Mau national liberation movement. Given the years of major investments in the Kenya colony despite the wave of decolonization in Africa looming, there was still divided opinion on the timelines for the formal withdrawal of British administration from the Kenya colony. He concludes by observing that at the attainment of Kenya's independence in 1963, Kenya mainly gained the flag independence, the rest was a well-calculated transitional move by the British to re-invent and Africanize colonialism so as to maintain their hegemony over the African country.

According to Mazrui (1979) the British felt that were the Mau Mau liberation movement to triumph over the British, Kenya would have fallen to the communist influence and that Mau Mau afforded communism as an ideology the opportunity to exploit the dominant tension characterizing Kenya’s pre-independence power struggles to the detriment of the capitalist -oriented Western world. This communist fear had been heightened by the alleged earlier secret visits made by Jomo Kenyatta to Moscow and his articles and publications in the communist Party of
Great Britain’s (CPGB) newspapers while he was a student in London in the early years of 1929-1930 (Beck, 1966).

Given the Mau Mau and the Kenyan situation, the British defense policy planners felt that the dilemma would only be resolved (if only temporarily, given later developments) by installing friendly governments and liberal democratic institutions before independence and by making *ad hoc* defence arrangements with the newly independent nations on request. Despite the occasional setback, the strategy was in general fairly successful. First, the end of the Second World War only triggered Britain on its part, to rethink its colonial policy as its economic might was weakened by the effects of the War.

For Britain and its major ally, the United States, their main fear was that a British withdrawal that time would leave a power vacuum in the third world countries which the Soviet Union either directly or indirectly would be only too happy to fill in. Second, Britain lacked the military capability to contain the growing demands for independence inside the colonies, while on the other hand, British material and economic interest was shifting away from empire towards Europe.

Nissimi, (2001) notes that a military base in Kenya seemed to offer the ideal linchpin of Great Britain post-war strategic realignment to meet the challenges of a bipolar world.
For them a military base known as ‘Templar barracks’ had been for some years under construction at Kahawa, Kenya and the same had been identified as the most suitable location for a theatre reserve after the Suez Canal Aden base had been denied to them in a rather dramatic circumstances. The outcome of the Suez crisis of 1956 and the strategic reemphasis on conventional warfare all restored Kenya to the strategic map of the British defense planners and the subsequent world politics.

The fears that Kenya was bound to establish a socialist system after independence were unsettling to Britain and its Western allies. Considerably the Mau Mau liberation movement helped resurrect the idea of the military base although the rationale had changed. While the military base would simultaneously protect the British settlers and strengthen the anti-communist crusade, the latter introduced the Cold War component of Britain’s defence strategy beyond Kenya’s independence and significantly shaped the independence Kenyan politics and Britain’s unswerving loyalty to realism. This came to play constantly as it sought to follow realist principles by installing post-colonial regimes that were well-disposed to the interests of the West.

In Kenya ultimately, the tensions were more heightened between the pre-independence and early independence period power struggles between the two major contesting parties, namely; KANU and KADU; the principal domestic
elite-driven political entities that had taken sides on the basis of ideological persuasion. This culminated in domestic conflicts largely centered on the Vice-president Oginga Odinga described as pro-East, against Jomo Kenyatta’s pro-West capitalist leaning administration (Ogot 1995).

This argument has been exemplified further by Percox (2004) when he reveals in his reading that Kenya’s decolonization takes the form of a bargain’’ between Britain Cold ‘’warriors’’ and ’moderate’’ African nationalist who see the advantage of strong internal security apparatus built up in the 1950s in the suppression of Mau Mau and a firm military alliance with the British who in fact on two separate occasions as the study will show in the following chapter intervened to keep the ruling party KANU and Kenyatta in power during the early independence period.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has endeavored to explain the nature and rationale of the evolution of Kenya-British military relations. Britain’s relentless efforts to pursue her imperialist interests beyond Kenya’s independence catalyzed by a violent decolonization path are well highlighted.

First, by securing Kenya as a colony Britain from the onset deterred its European rivals in the scramble for Africa from securing the region thus giving her unlimited access to the economic, strategic and political control of the region.
Second, Kenya’s geo-strategic location endowed with a port of Mombasa and as the gateway to the landlocked East Africa regions, and more so playing host to a considerable population of British settlers highlights Britain’s continued interest in Kenya. In addition to the vast British interests in the country and the well-established infrastructure and economy, Kenya’s profile remained high within the British rationale on foreign policy relations with Kenya.

As highlighted earlier by the study, even when the KANU manifestos of 1961 and 1963 clearly read that Kenya would not permit “the existence of foreign military facilities on her soil” and that the soon to be established government committed itself to supporting world efforts for universal disarmament, on the contrary, Kenya continued to host the British forces in the independence period. These developments support the assertion that although the year 1963 marked the independence from Britain, it only led to the birth of a ‘new nation’; the neo-colonial nation-state. The state was neo-colonial because it had changed its political leadership but maintained the critical pillars of formal colonialism (Kisiang’ani, 2004).

In summary therefore, independence marked not so much a departure from the colonial socio-economic as well as trade relationships, but as an enlargement and enhancement of that dependent relationship with the colonial patterns emerging relatively unscathed. As has been shown clearly, British efforts to repress Mau Mau were only aimed at retaining, rather than relinquishing control. The aim,
however, was to delay rather than to accelerate the transfer of power. For instance the State of Emergency, imposed in October 1952 as discussed only legalised the repression of the Mau Mau and their supporters. Britain's use of massive force, combined with the introduction of piecemeal political and selective socio-economic reforms during the Emergency can be seen, not as a direct response to Mau Mau, as such, but as a form of continuity.

With the foregoing therefore, the question of sovereignty emerges; that long after gaining independence, Kenya may have just but gained the flag independence since on the contrary the subtle colonial vestiges to date as characterized by the military relations with Britain have remained intact and hence tying Kenya’s dependence on its former colonial power.

At the end, the chapter reaffirms that the three main British interests involved in Kenya were largely the preservation of the military bases viewed as essential for British global strategy, the need to ensure that the area remained economically friendly to the West and more so the need to secure the area as a stable home for those people of Asian and European population who over the years had been encouraged to settle in Kenya by successive British governments.
CHAPTER THREE


3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines Kenya foreign relations from 1963 to year 2005, it endeavors to put into perspective Kenya-British military relations vis a vis her foreign policy behaviour and posture in the three post-independence eras of the late President Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), the era of President Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) and the era of President Kibaki (2002 up to 2005).

It seeks to examine if indeed by having military relations with Britain; Kenya’s independence period foreign policy had in any way continued to be impacted upon and largely influenced by the foundations of these military relations with Britain. Deeply it seeks to find out if the presence of British military facilities belies any pretence to a truly independent Kenyan foreign policy.

This chapter acknowledges that although immediately after independence Kenya adopted a non-alignment policy in its foreign policy relations, nevertheless due to Kenya’s economic ties with Britain, the country leaned towards the West as opposed to the East (Okumu, 1997; Makinda, 1983). This diplomatic position described as ‘quiet diplomacy’, an extremely moderate and cautious stance of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states while handling own external affairs provides a crucial platform in this chapters’ endeavor to understand Kenya’s foreign policy dynamics in the three post-independence regimes.

It's worth noting at this point, that Kenya’s foreign policy in the region has been shaped by factors such as the presence of overlapping ethnic community across borders and the fact that Kenya is a littoral state of the Indian Ocean. This has influenced Kenya and its relations with landlocked neighbours (http://www.kenyamission-un.ch).

Nevertheless, Kenya has been at the forefront of efforts geared at promoting peace and security both at regional and international levels. For instance Kenya understands that a peaceful Somalia and Sudan guarantees its own national security first, hence it has played an active role in the Southern Sudan and Somalia peace processes and has at the international level, continued to contribute its military troops to the United Nations and African Union led peace-keeping missions in major trouble spots in Africa and the rest of the world.

3.2 The Kenyatta Era 1963-1978

Kenya attained its independence in 1963 taking rights, privileges and obligation in the international political system under international law and inherited its system of governance from the colonial authorities. In the build up to Kenya’s in
dependence, three constitutional conferences were held in Lancaster House, London in the years 1960, 1962 and 1963 to facilitate the process of granting independence and self rule to Kenya by the British. Ogot (1995;53) informs that there were three main interests the British wanted to safeguard during these negotiations: their military bases, Kenya’s economic ties to the UK, and the interests of the immigrant populations.

It’s worth noting that several issues were also discussed in the Lancaster House conference talks in 1962 including the fate of the future role of the British military in Kenya (Kyle 1999), the White settler population residing in the country, the Somali question and the unsuccessful search for a plebiscite in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (an area of over 100,000 square miles) by Kenyan Somalis and its union with Somalia.

The independence government under Kenyatta was therefore faced with many internal and territorial problems that may have contributed to the continued stationing of the British military presence in Kenya. Politically, the new regime continued to be faced with ethnic and ideological divisions particularly with secessionist movements and other neighbour countries’ expansionist policies.

First, the Somalis in Ogaden and the Haud in Ethiopia had initiated the whole campaign by forming an irredentist movement during the pre-colonial era. The 1961 claim for the Northern Frontier District (NFD) now North Eastern Province
by the Somalis on the basis of historical, cultural and racial reasons had persisted up to the post-independence period (Biwott, 1992).

Of all the discussions at Lancaster House Conference, Kenya’s’ pre-independence talks had considerably pitted KANU and KADU, the main dominant political parties in the country then and whose respective ideological divide had profoundly shaped the respective Kenyan delegations to Lancaster.

Parsons (2003) notes that Britain was carefully orchestrating these talks and the British government closely monitored these events as they unfolded. In this regard, Britain sought to ensure that the new post-independence Kenya government would be friendly to Britain, it would protect the British interests and as if to lay ground in order to accomplish these ends, Britain sought to negotiate a constitution for Kenya on terms that can only be described as favorable to British interests.

By “attempting to orchestrate a transition to independence on terms favorable to themselves, British authorities bartered fundamental political and economic concessions for an informal promise of continuing influence in post-independent Kenya” (Miller and Yeager 1994: 30-31). The British post-colonial policy in Kenya was to relinquish formal political control while retaining immense influence through cultural, trade, economic and more so the military links literally came in to play during the independence talks.
According to the late Mr. Martin Shikuku (2008: O.1) one of the veteran Kenyan independence struggle politicians and one of the Lancaster house conference delegates during the independence talks in 1963, the retention of the British military bases was extensively discussed both in Kenya Legislative Council and British House of Commons (UK parliament Hansard reports 1961, 1962) with the British government expressing their fear on the fate and future of the white settler’s population in Kenya in the independence period.

Although Tom Mboya, for one, had consistently stated as early as 1961, that there could be no place for foreign military bases on sovereign Kenya’s soil, even tabling several private, member’s Motions in Legislative Council to that effect, the British hoped that a ‘responsible’ African government would recognise the benefits of British troops in terms of external defence requirements.

In November 1962, when Kenyatta, then President of KANU, congratulated the Permanent Representative of the Saudi-Arabian Delegation to the UN on his recent demand for the removal of British military bases in Kenya and Aden, it thereby finally became a practical certainty that it would be politically impossible to retain large numbers of British troops for more than a very limited period, no matter who, ultimately, was to rule Kenya (Percox 2001).

It should be stressed, though, that this did not spell the end of Britain’s strategic interests in Kenya. With the Lancaster talks Britain considerable concern was on
the preparations for granting of independence to Kenya. Britain hoped to be able to leave behind a political structure which would `safeguard their vital interests’ principal among these interests, of course, was the British Army's base at Kahawa and the RAF installations in Nairobi and elsewhere in Kenya. A major difficulty for Britain at the time was uncertainty over the levels of British forces, if any, that would be retained in Kenya after independence.

By January 1963, the likelihood of the withdrawal of British troops from Kenya, and probable restrictions on their use after independence, forced British ministers to concede that Kenya's military had to be built up vigorously. Britain would have to continue to plan for the phased withdrawal of its forces, making any proposed arrangements to expand and, more importantly, to train Kenya's forces thereafter, all the more vital (Percox; 269; 2001).

For the British, Kenya had been identified as the most suitable location for a theatre reserve after the Suez Canal Aden base had been denied to them in a rather dramatic circumstance. A military base had been for some years under construction at Kahawa and with the call for independence; the worry was on the viability of the military base given the fact that they had less than twelve months to conclude independence talks (Kyle, 1999).

As the study shall reveal the future sustenance and use of the military base at Kahawa meant that the British soldiers had to be relocated to Aden base in the Suez
if Kenya was to gain independence, and that the only change was to be that the word ‘base’ would be dropped in favour of ‘facilities’ and they would only be used to serve rapid deployment purposes (Kyle, 1999). Though Kenya would never attain the kind of defensive pole position that had been ascribed alternately to Aden, Cyprus, Egypt Singapore or Malaya, it would remain an important fall-back option and would help to maintain a significant degree of British influence in a sensitive region of the world (Percox, 2004).

Percox notes that Britain public acceptance of KANU demands for closure of the Kahawa base suggests that it seemed expedient to remove one of the main African ‘extremist’ objections to the independence settlement and the diminution of sovereignty represented by a British military base in Kenya. Notable on the Lancaster House talk was the establishment of a federal system of government that was mooted as suitable for the diversity existing in Kenya. Parliament was designed after the Westminster bicameral house with lower and upper chambers. The prime minister as the head of government was to be answerable to the queen in the interim period while full autonomy was to be granted later. All these represented attempts by Britain to consolidate her military, economic and strategic interests beyond Kenya’s independence.

Behind these manoeuvres by Britain though, there were fears that post-independence Kenya would be a socialist leaning country unless great effort was
made to win over the politicians to support the Western capitalist ideology. Amidst the pre-independence politics, Kenyatta quickly moved to allay the fears of the European settlers and convince them, with their knowledge and investments, to remain in Kenya and told a meeting of British white settlers unsettled about their role in the future of Kenya:

‘But let me tell you Jomo Kenyatta has no intention of retaliating or looking backwards. We are going to forget the past and look to the future. I have suffered imprisonment and detention; but that is gone, and I am not going to remember it” (Meredith, 2011).

This remarkable public statement and assurance by Kenyatta to the white settlers in Nakuru coming four months into independence can only be viewed as a reaffirmation of his commitment to protecting the British interests beyond Kenya’s independence and in the coming transition period.

The granting of independence to Kenya in 1963 marked the first major political transition since its emergence as a distinct territorially circumscribed geo-political entity in the late 19th century. Kenyatta led KANU in the 1963 election victory and formed the independence government as Prime Minister on December 12th, 1963 and became Kenya’s’ first President in 1964 when the country attained republican status (Oyugi et al: 2003 19). In November of 1964 Kenyatta convinced
the rival Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and its leader, Ronald Ngala, to dissolve and join Kenyatta's Kenyan African National Union (KANU) party to form a single chambered National Assembly. Ngala had championed for regional autonomy or Majimboism while Kenyatta's party stood for a strong central unitary government. The *Majimbo* form of government though adopted at independence in line with KADU’s demands, it was however was done away with in early 1965 (Oyugi et al 2003).

Kenyatta had to deal with three urgent transitional problems with deep roots in Kenya’s colonial history. As indicated there was the Somali secessionist threat soon after independence. With the support of the Mogadishu government, the Kenyan Somalis who had even boycotted the 1963 elections engaged the Kenyatta government in an armed confrontation, in their effort to secede from Kenya. It took Kenyatta three years of military operations against the *Shifta* to secure the area.

The second problem occurred on 12th January 1964 when Kenyan African soldiers mutinied to protest unfulfilled independence dreams and the continued domination of the armed forces by British officers. Kenyatta used regular British officers to end the mutiny, improved the barrack conditions, and elevated many African officers to key positions. More importantly the military mutiny of 1964 in Lanet revealed the fragility of the immediate post-independence Kenya leader
ship and army to control and redress the situation. Only when the British military intervened at Lanet did the gesture solidify Kenyatta’s regime and reinforced Kenya’s military relations with Britain.

Percox (2001) informs that the intervention of 24 Brigade to assist in quelling the revolt demonstrated in no uncertain terms that Kenya still relied upon British military largesse. More so it solidified Kenyatta’s regime and reinforced Kenya’s military relations with Britain.

Although Kenyatta refused to make the required public pronouncement of gratitude being fully aware of the political risks inherent in such a gesture, Edgerton (1990) notes that he took steps to ensure stability within the Kenya Army by infiltrating all units with intelligence personnel who would alert the government at the first hint of dissent within the ranks. Following the Lanet unrest, African officers assumed operational command of major units but a British training team still oversaw the Kenyan army for most of the decade.

As a result the British forces left the country and behind a military training team known as ‘BATTUK’ consisting of approximately British officers and Newly Commissioned Officers, the mission provided for training and logistical support for the army, navy and airforce.

While this was politically acceptable because the mission officers no longer occupied command positions in the Kenyan army, more significantly, this study notes that an informal defense arrangement with Britain reassured Kenyatta that
he could rely on direct British military support in the event of an army mutiny or attempted coup. In return for this aid, Kenyatta granted the British military continued access to Nairobi’s Eastleigh and Embakasi airfields and port facilities at Mombasa (Parson 2003). Indeed, President Kenyatta gave the British Army, under the aegis of the British Army Training Liaison Staff Kenya, a 15-year contract to carry out training in Kenya (DN: 11/14/2005).

This commitment had been reached when the then Commonwealth and colonial secretary Duncan Sandys had visited Kenya on 12th March 1964 and informed the British cabinet that he had reached a ‘broad agreement’ that Britain would help to train the Kenya army and air force and would also transfer ‘certain items of equipment and accommodation to the Kenya forces. In exchange, Kenya would grant British military units visits to training and exercises facilities (Percox, 2004). In exchange, the Kenya government would grant overflying and staging rights to British military aircraft, and naval facilities at Mombasa. They had also agreed that British units might visit Kenya at intervals for military training and exercises (Percox 2001).

The assumption was that the military facilities were linked “with the preservation of their interests” mainly to sell British arms to Kenya, and in practice the military would continue to act as promoters of these considerable sales. Percox notes that the climax of this arrangement, however, had come in a telegram from the then British High Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, dated 10th March 1964, in
which he outlined the contents of a recent letter from Kenyatta: `I shall be grateful if the British Government will agree to retain in Kenya after 12th December 1964 sufficient British Army and Royal Air Force personnel to carry out these duties in Kenya which are beyond the present capability of Kenya Armed Forces (Percox 2001). Britain helped Kenya in establishing an Army in 1969 and gave Kenya the resources it needed to help establish the Kenyan defence forces, and consequently became Kenya’s largest supplier of arms, and training of troops. Nevertheless strong military ties between the two countries were entrenched and in line with the inherited traditions, Kenyatta maintained the colonial traditions of a political military which in practice meant unquestioning obedience to his regime (Parsons, 2003).

Within the military, Kenyatta retained the traditions of the old colonial army, with the KAR battalions retaining the ceremonial silver services and memorabilia of the KAR predecessors, while the command rank and file structure remained unchanged except for the fact that the Kenyan coat of arms replaced the royal emblems. The uniform of the Kenyan Army also remained relatively unchanged in the post-independent era and as mentioned in terms of equipment, the British government financially aided the equipping of the Kenyan Army.

As part of their training majority of the Kenyan military personnel commissioned after independence have attended trainings at Sand Hurst military acade
my in Britain and as such therefore, it’s not surprising that Kenya’s military remains the most westernized of all the inherited institutions (Nying’uro, 1999).

In terms of foreign policy posture Kenyatta regime pursued a non-alignment policy. By being officially non-aligned, Kenya was seeking to participate in international politics without losing its identity.

Positive neutrality required that Kenya’s relations with the major powers be carefully balanced and it is on this account that the British were formally forced to close their base at Kahawa formerly known as Templer Barracks and Kenya pledged that its territory could not be used by either NATO or Warsaw Pact powers in any localized conflicts in which any of the part of Africa or Asia or the Middle East was involved (Ochieng’ 1989).

In line with the KANU’s Manifesto of 1961, 1963 the sentiments equally rejected ideological rigidity. Non-alignment was thus formulated to mean a policy of equidistance between East and West. Equidistance thus underscored the existence of a coincidence of interests between Kenya and the capitalist countries of Western Europe and North America (Orwa, 1989).

While Kenya’s diplomatic history and economic relations do suggest that Kenya interacts with the former socialist countries like Soviet Union and China, its military relations, do not conform to the other two levels of relations namely; diplo
matic and economic. Kenyatta remained more committed to pursue liberal capitalist agenda that has considerably shaped the quest for political reforms in the independence period. More so in 1964, Kenyatta had accepted Sir Malcolm MacDonald, the last British governor general to Kenya as the first British high commissioner to Kenya. Four years after _Uhuru_, over 1,700 Britons still held various state jobs in the civil service with some holding very senior important and strategic positions in the military.

Kenyatta even retained the services of the European officers such as Ian Henderson, the police inspector who had prepared a case against him in Kapenguria, Whitehouse, the DC who had been his gaoler at Lokitaung, a British settler Bruce Mckenzie held the strategic Ministry of Agriculture while another settler Humphrey Slade remained the speaker of the national assembly. This gesture in addition to Kenyatta’s preservation of critical pillars of the colonial state all helped to reassure his commitment to British interests at least in the transition period and beyond.

Whereas many critics have viewed Kenyatta, the father of nation and independence as an anti-reformer, this study argument is that a closer examination of Kenyatta’s government in independent Kenya illustrates how and why the colonial status-quo remained largely intact during a period of purported decolonization. The main principles and strategies of Kenya’s economic devel
-opment strategy after independence had been laid down in the *Sessional paper no 10 of 1965* entitled “African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya” where, the independent government had outlined its political and economic philosophies rejecting both Western capitalism and Eastern communism while embracing capitalism with an African spicing (Ochieng’ 1989; Ogot, 1995).

However according to Maxon (1992) these socialist goals never became policy. He describes, Kenyatta as a capitalist who guaranteed the continuation of trade with the industrial North through the protection of norms of market forces and private ownership.

The policies of export of raw materials and reliance on foreign capital for industries created a pattern of dependence while British interests continued to thrive. Even if Kenya’s significance to British defense strategy did indeed diminish from the early 1970s onwards, that Britain achievement in keeping Kenya pro-Western will not have been lost on its principal ally and the fact that Britain had laid the foundation for this must surely be beyond dispute. British relations under Kenyatta regime succeeded in protecting its military interests by maintaining infrastructure on the ground and as long as Kenya sided with the West in the Cold War struggle, Britain was unperturbed by Kenya’s diversifying its foreign relations.

On his part, Kenyatta had naturally played his own part in securing his political position by first dismantling the *Majimbo* state and then forming the republic at the end of 1964 and as shown by the study his defence agreements with Britain in
the same year only entrenched his regime allegiance to the West at a heightened Cold War period.

3.3 The Moi Era: 1978-2002

Amidst the succession politics that ensued however, when President Kenyatta died on August 22, 1978, Vice-President Moi took over leadership in accordance to the constitutional provisions. While the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 heralded a period of political uncertainty and tension in the country on becoming president, Moi emphasized his history as Kenyatta’s loyal follower, endorsed previous government policies, associated himself with the mainstream capitalist political elite and announced that he would follow in Kenyatta’s footsteps popularly coined as ‘Nyayo’ (Swahili for footsteps) as if to reassure the ‘wailing’ nation of his commitment to the founding father’s vision. Moi’s foreign policy and economic development schemes were just that: a continuation of Kenyatta era policies (Mahoney, 2010)

Moi also continued with Kenyatta’s style of consolidation of power in the executive. Like Kenyatta, he exaggerated the concept of togetherness to eliminate foreseen or imagined political opposition by entrenching the strength of the one-party system and a lack of opposition that remarkably left him able to freely follow capitalist forms of development and further opening of markets to foreign investment (Mahoney 2010).
Like Kenyatta before him, Moi was careful to keep off the formation of any socialist ideologically-focused political party. He too continued to pursue the non-alignment stand as pertains to Kenya’s foreign policy practice and although the non-alignment stand was an external development triggered by the Cold War, this study notes that its adoption by Kenya as the country’s posture in international affairs was not in any way an expression of idealism or radicalism in international affairs.

It was a realistic response by first the Kenyatta regime and also continued further by Moi to uncertainty about the reliability of the existing bipolar international system and the lingering fear that independence of the new state could be threatened by the resurgence of neo-colonialism. It therefore acted as an affirmation of Kenya’s independence and determination to participate fully and objectively in international affairs.

Whilst Kenyatta’s regime had close ties with Western countries in terms of economic and diplomatic relations, Moi’s regime especially since 1988 had strained relationship with Western countries for what Moi saw as foreign meddling of internal affairs (Orwa, 1992).

Therefore, political power struggles continued to be centred on both ideological and ethnical cleavages and more so Moi continued to vindicate communism and
socialism spread as a way to isolate and vilify his opponents. Further calls from senior government officials came in when in 1978 Mwai Kibaki then Moi’s chosen Vice-President, publicly announced “there is no room for communists in Kenya” (Miller & Yeager, 1994).

During Moi’s regime Magero (2007) notes in his study that diplomatic relationship with the Eastern bloc improved including the 1980 visit by President Moi to China and subsequent signing of economic and cultural agreements and this marked a significant turn in foreign policy and diplomacy.

He notes that President Moi, who had repeatedly accused China of plotting revolution in Kenya in the 1960s, lost no time in reaching out to the post-Mao People’s Republic of China. Moi’s main motivation was to diversify the sources of Kenya’s external development funds, Moi held talks with China’s de facto leader, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, and Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang. Kenya had dispatched an ambassador to China at the end of 1978, thus opening the embassy that had been technically closed at the height of the “Cultural Revolution” in 1967.

China had in the meantime appointed an ambassador to Kenya Ji Pengfei, the then vice premier of China’s State Council, visited Kenya in August 1980, and Moi paid a state visit to China a month later, the first of the three he was to make there before his retirement in 2002 (Chege, 2008). The man who had berated China in
Kenya’s parliament in 1966 now came back full of praise for China’s modernization, orderliness, and cleanliness. As a result of Moi’s first visit to China in 1980, Kenya and China concluded two agreements. The first one was on “economic and technological cooperation,” covering a wide variety of projects: a new sports stadium (which had been under discussion since 1977); technical support for two new universities; scholarships; and military and cultural exchanges.

The most important component of the economic cooperation agreement, however, was the Moi International Sports Centre in a suburb just outside Nairobi’s central business district. It was built at the cost of 930 million Kenya shillings (approximately $52 million), 48 per cent of which was financed by Kenya (Chege, 2008). It included a sports stadium with a seating capacity of 60,000 people, an Olympic-size swimming pool, and a modern gymnasium thrown into the bargain. It was intended for completion in time to host the fourth All-Africa games in 1987 and to thus showcase the new China-African cooperation to all of Africa.

Remarkably, in the year 1980 president Moi’s government had signed the facilities access agreement with the US, where Kenya allowed over flights, landing rights at three airfields, and access to the Mombasa sea port and in return to benefit in military assistance (Macharia, 1995). A notable development in this regard
was the fact that the US a major ally of Britain, was able to launch and dock their warships within the Kenyan territorial waters during the 1990-1991 Gulf war. This meant that Kenya became entwined in the US global coalition against the late Saddam Hussein by offering the US military over-flying rights and the rights to dock their warships in Mombasa port. This was an important foreign relations development during the president’s Moi’s era as it proved that over the years, the US policy towards Africa in general was determined by more or less the same considerations and parameters. It gave priority to geo-strategic interests over concerns for democracy in US-African policy (Macharia, 1995).

However President Moi too had his share of rebellion and threat of national security during his tenure as president. In August of 1982 junior members of the Air Force staged a coup against the government, occupying Jomo Kenyatta and Wilson Airports in Nairobi, the general post office, and the office of the Voice of Kenya radio station (Morton, 1998).

Slowly reports began to trickle in that the coup was financed by foreign communists, though there was little hard evidence to prove this and it seems that those who participated in the coup did not have any ideological motives (Time Magazine, 16 August, 1982). The attempted coup of August 1, 1982, staged by some units of the Kenya Air Force led to restrictions on political and associational life in the country. The political scene became punctured with court martial, political
trials, banning of publications, and harassment of critics and suspected opponents of the regime. This way President Moi worked to consolidate his authority and neutralize his opponents. Indeed, one of the grievances that possibly led to the abortive coup in August 1982 was the constitutional amendment that introduced section 2a, which took place in June the same year. The coup was, therefore, a consequence rather a cause for the amendment (Dianga, 2001).

Of considerable interest to the study was the comment from the then Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who was later to remark in August 1982 during the failed Kenya Air force coup de tat that Britain was carefully watching the situation (Miller & Yeager, 1994). This comment coming from the prime minister of Britain is significant as it indicated that the role of British military stationed in Kenya could again, therefore, not be ignored.

In Europe, a rapid succession of events had combined to bring about a massive re-alignment in East-West relations. The landmarks of this geopolitical re-alignment included; the unification of Germany in 1990; the dissolution of the Warsaw treaty organization in 1991; emergence of the democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, and the liberalization of the soviet economic and political system. Throughout the Cold War period, Britain and its allies were more concerned with fighting Soviet influence in the region rather than promoting democracy. The end of the ideological war brought about a change in the international political scene include

81
ing ushering in the notion of collective security and the NATO alliance efforts aimed at making it as difficult as possible for either side to restart it (Woodliffe, 1992).

Cold War policies were abandoned and undemocratic states forced to democratize and with the mutual obligations that had come with it losing credibility Kenya’s strategic position was no longer of much greater importance. Its strategic importance which derived from its relative proximity to the Middle East was lost with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the opening up of military bases in the region for US forces. Kenya’s position within the geo-political calculations in Washington, London and Brussels was now peripheral (Branch 2011).

The country’s leadership was pressured to change the constitution in order to ensure the country held multiparty elections. The repeal of the Kenyan constitution not only rejuvenated the democratic space in the country but also had significant impacts on the political culture in the country. As a show of following in the footsteps of first president, Moi’s foreign policy and economic development schemes were just those: a continuation of Kenyatta era policies, and notable for the study was the continuity in granting the British military further stationing and training in Kenya.

While President Kenyatta had given the British Army, under the aegis of the British Army Training Liaison Staff Kenya a 15-year contract to carry out training in
Kenya, in 1988 President Moi renewed it for a period of 10 years. But when the British government joined other Western countries in demanding more democratic space in Kenya, the Moi government reduced the period to five years and subsequently made it three years. (DN: 11/14/2005).

This move by President Moi is significant to the study as the said period coincided with the clamor for multiparty politics in Kenya when all Western countries pushed forth the repeal of the constitution to allow for multiparty politics in the country. More so at a time when the Moi government had been accused by Western countries of having an appalling human rights record instituted with systematic terror against political opponents, China overlooked these realities as it strengthened its economic relations with Kenya—but then so had some Western governments like Britain (until the late 1990s) and France (Chege 2008).

Like Kenyatta, Moi was involved in direct efforts to mediate internal conflicts in the African sub-region namely; Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Mozambique. Unlike Kenyatta, President Moi was more active in peace mediation talks and when he assumed the reigns of OAU chairman in June, 1981 at the annual summit referred to as Nairobi I, he quickly asserted himself as a prominent leader in the process to reconcile the Chadian factions. Notably, the conduct of foreign policy under former President Moi was highly centralised and reflected his self-interest in defending his government against international and
domestic criticism. Moi thus became more interested in neutralising those perceived to be opposed to him. He centralized and personalized power in the image of the ‘Nyayo’ philosophy that mirrored Kenyatta’s style of leadership and cloaked in the aspirations of peace, love and unity in an attempt to stand out as a nationalist in his own right.

He attempted to exert his regime and Kenya as a pillar in diplomacy in the African region and particularly in the Horn of Africa and the East Africa sub-region by attempting to resolve internationalized conflicts in the region. This was a significant step to shape the direction of Kenyan foreign policy under president Moi. This was demonstrated by the attempt to manage the Uganda conflict that was between Tito Okello’s government and Yoweri Museveni’s rebel group in 1985, and that of the Mozambique conflict that was between Frelimo government and Renamo rebel group in 1989 in the management of the Sudan conflict from about 1995 and Somalia conflict from 2000 (Mwagiru, 1994).

Even though the management of the Sudan and Somalia conflicts was not strictly a Kenyan affair, Kenya played a significant role under Mois leadership by hosting and providing the chief mediators. It was also under his tenure that the revival of East African community on 30th November 1993 came into focus, when the heads of state of the three countries signed the Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Cooperation, marking
the start of a new round of cooperation. Since then, the three countries have re-established the EAC and are cooperating in a wide range of areas, including education, cultural matters and defence. With the conclusion of the IGAD mediation on the Sudan and Somalia conflicts and subsequent signing of peace accords, Kenya received significant accolades in its diplomacy of conflict management in the region.

With the end of the Cold War, the clamor for multiparty politics in Kenya and the push for the repeal of the constitution to allow for multiparty politics in the country dealt a big blow to president Moi regime posture and more so when all Western countries exerted pressure on his regime to address these reforms. Foreign interference also took a center stage during Moi’s regime especially with Western countries for what Moi saw as foreign meddling of internal affairs (Orwa, 1992).

A notable development under Moi included the 1980 and 1988 visit to China and subsequent signing of economic and cultural agreements between the two countries. One can argue that, amid the many failures of the Moi era, one positive development it made was to lay the foundations for improved trade and economic cooperation with China, thereby diversifying the country’s investment sources and widening the country’s access to external markets, without jeopardizing existing ones (Chege, 2008). Internationally, Moi concentrated on boosting Kenya’s image through participating in military peace keeping missions and ne
-gotiation of peace agreements under the auspices of the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN). The country maintained its traditionalist approach but intensified working for its interests through international organizations which it was party to. It also took part in conferences and became signatory to many international charters such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in Nairobi in 1986, yet it did not care for its implementation (Adar, 2000).

This enhanced the nation’s prestige both continentally and internationally but it could not stem the wave of criticism over governance especially in an international environment characterized with the end of the Cold War and constant domestic pressure with the decline of the economy; increasing corruption and human rights violations.

3.4 The Kibaki Administration 2002-2005

The presidential term of former president Moi ended in the historic 2002 election after the convergence of parties under the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) banner. The events leading to this election proved to be of pivotal significance to Kenya’s history and national security concerns and have been subject of major scholarly inquiry (Wanyande, 2003; Throup, 1998; Kanyinga, 2003; Nasong, 2007, Murunga, 2007:). Mwai Kibaki won the election on a platform of change particularly the enactment of a new constitutional order (as was later to be
achieved in the constitutional referendum of 27th August, 2010). His team campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, pledging that the new government would be transparent and accountable to the people of Kenya.

With the coming of the NARC Administration, President Kibaki began his term declaring an end to tribalism and corruption, yet only two years after assuming power his government was faced by corruption and malgovernance allegations notable being the Anglo-leasing scandal. President Kibaki’s administration had committed itself to reforms and change, the desire to shift from the old corrupt networks and traditions that had characterized the former bureaucracy and regime of president Moi.

The new Kibaki administration had opened up the tendering systems especially on the defence and arms sourcing and an unprecedented anti-corruption wave in the country coupled by an increased public interest on defence issues and budget had rattled the traditional British market sourcing the wrong way.

Kibaki’s government drew rage from the international community and local diplomats including the then British high commissioner to Kenya, Sir Edward Clay who had a diplomatic spat with a cross-section of Kenyan authorities when the activities of the British military in Kenya were brought into attention. On the 14th August 2003, over 200 Kenyan women accompanied by their mixed race children marched to the British High Commission in Nairobi to present a petition to the
Ambassador many of them Maasai and Samburu women who claimed that they were raising mixed race children as a result of being raped by British soldiers during training exercises in the country and the marched to the British High Commissioner offices. Nevertheless, the decision by Kenya to open tendering system for the military equipment sourcing is attributed to the diplomatic spat between Britain and Kenya. (Daily Nation: 18/9/2005).

In the ensuing diplomatic spat, Adam Wood, then incoming High Commissioner to Kenya, said Britain would consider relocating military exercises if Nairobi failed to renew the accord; "As far I am aware, we have addressed all the technical issues," Mr. Wood was quoted in an interview broadcast on a Kenyan television. Sources confirmed that some exercises had been moved already, notably to Belize, and plans were being drawn up for the full-scale withdrawal of training programmes from East Africa.

For purposes of military training, Kenya’s military officers have been sent to the UK, Israel and the US. This training has influenced equally the sourcing of arms, with NATO countries supplying 80% of its needs. In addition Kenya continues since 1964 to maintain direct military links with the West (Ochieng’ 1989).

As a matter of fact, the British military continues to enjoy a string of military bases in Kenya under the Status of Foreign Forces Agreement signed by the two countries where Kenya has permitted the British military to use its hinterlands for
military training. With the presence of British military forces on her majesty service within Kenya’s territory, the debate has been focused on Kenya’s independence status long after the end of formal colonialism. Before British army recruits are sent to the frontline, they normally undertake live ammunition drills at the British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) on artillery ranges spread Kenya's dusty and barren northern rangelands of Samburu and Dol Dol, Archers Post often with Kenyan military participation. The area's rugged escarpments, scorching 35 degree Celsius heat and semi-desert conditions are seen as an ideal test of a soldier's battle-readiness, and bear similarities to the terrain in southern Iraq.

The officer commanding, Major Tony Finn speaking to a local daily in the year 2005 pointed out the significance of these exercises when he said; "The exercise provides a wonderful opportunity to conduct training in arduous and unfamiliar territory with extended lines of communication. It replicates current operational environments; and is vital for the soldiers to take these experiences, learn from them and take that knowledge forward on future operational deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

These comments are significant to this study as they focus on the foreign relations between Kenya and these countries of the Middle East bearing in mind that Pakistan and Afghanistan too are respectively the world’s second- and third-largest
buyers of Kenyan tea and this development could cause major disruptions in tea exports to these markets. More so the statement coming from the British authorities and events in Kenya had also sparked debate in the House of Commons bringing into focus Britain’s military human rights records in the Kenya and the rest of the world. With the indictment of corruption allegations in the Kibaki administration by the then British High Commissioner to Kenya and with rape claims against the British soldiers in Laikipia and Samburu districts, diplomatic relations between Nairobi and London became jeopardized (DN:18/9/2005).

The NARC government delayed to renew the annual permit allowing British military training exercises partly due to Britain's slow progress in investigating the 694 claims of human rights violation and rape by its servicemen, stretching back to 30 years and British High commission office was getting frustrated. An official close to the British High commission in Nairobi too was quoted expressing these frustrations when he said, "Kenya has been ideal for a long time, but it is not without parallel," (Daily Telegraph 6/12/2005).

This study observes that in spite of these frustrations the British military never really pulled out of the Kenyan soil. Amnesty International a non-governmental organization, documented serious allegations on human rights violation against members of the British army posted to Kenya for training covering a period of over 35 years, approximately from 1965 to 2001. Nevertheless, negative civil-
military relations continued to cloud the British army relations with Kenya with sustained calls by major non-governmental organizations for the close of “colonial vestige” in the affected areas in Kenya. Anti-base sentiments have frequently been prompted by the friction between the visiting forces and the local population (Mr. Ole Kaunga, 2008: 01).

Nationally, the fact that the training of British soldiers in Kenya is followed by their subsequent deployment in trouble spots areas in the world including the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan had all put stress upon Kenya’s relations with these countries (Daily Nation, November, 2005).

Locally, these developments had impacted heavily on the Muslim population in the country that was seen as suspect community in the war against terrorism by US coming after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US (Otenyo, 2004; Mogire, 2008).

Kenya too had been exposed to terrorist attacks before in 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and the same had made Kenya vulnerable target of new terrorism associated with the late Osama bin Laden and due to its close relationship with the West – especially Britain and the United States, perceived connection between Israel and the latter. Second, the winning elections of NARC in the 2002 general election characterized the declining role of personalized government affairs. The demand for performance in delivering to the electorates became com
pelling. The Kibaki regime desperately seeking resources to implement its election campaign pledges embraced a foreign policy of economic development. In this regard, it became more concerned with the attraction of foreign investment to increase employment opportunities. It also moved around the world in search of development partners to help in the reconstruction of the economy as well as diversifying its traditional import and export markets.

Regional integration, particularly the COMESA and East African Cooperation took centre stage and Kibaki took a leading role in fast tracking the East African integration. Regionally, Kibaki’s administration endeared and focused on the EAC revival with renewed interest by other countries in the region, such as Rwanda and Burundi, which applied to join the EAC, and the heads of state of these two small countries have been attending EAC summit meetings.

Its under his leadership that the protocol on the establishment of EASBRIG-East Africa Standby Brigade was formed in February 2004 when under the auspices of IGAD the 1st meeting of East Africa Chief of Defence staff adopted a policy framework to establish the EASBRIG that was later approved by the respective Heads of State during the 1st assembly of EASBRIG meeting held in April 2005 in Addis Ababa Ethiopia. From the 13 member states of EASBRIG Kenya was nominated to host the headquarters of EASBRIG. The East African brigade would
be part of the African Union’s 15,000-strong African Standby Force to respond to disasters and conflict in the region. The high level of focused partner support particularly from the UK is a powerful asset to the operationalisation of EASBRIG and more so the inception of training cycles at the Regional Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) Nairobi has assisted in the implementation of the EASBRIG strategy (www.easbrig.org).

Internationally there was renewed building of relations with China by the Kibaki administration, including official high powered delegations exchanging bilateral agreements between the two countries and indeed under President Kibaki, Kenya's foreign policy underwent a significant shift both in themes and fora. According to the Ministry of foreign affairs, Kenya's foreign policy was now based on three interlinked pillars: Economic diplomacy, Peace diplomacy and Environmental diplomacy. Kenya's foreign policy would be informed by the necessity to secure the regional and wider economic objectives and already the Kibaki administration put in place a look-East strategy as a means of reducing their dependence on traditional Western markets.

The study establishes that the forum for pursuing Kenya's foreign policy has also changed significantly to reflect changes in the international system. One of the factors that has influenced the change in fora of implementing Kenya's foreign policy is the growth in multilateralism. In addition to the traditional organizations
such as the United Nations, Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and African Union (AU), Kenya now has been actively involved in engaging other countries at a multilateral forum such as China under Forum on Africa-China Corporation (FO-CAC) Japan under Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TI-CAD) and other Asian countries under New Asia–Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP).

3.5 Kibaki administration, and renewed China-Kenya Relations.

The current diplomatic cooperation arrangement between Kenya and China covers several areas dating back from when the People's Republic of China established the diplomatic relations with the Republic of Kenya on the day of December 14, 1963. As highlighted, Kenya’s first high profile delegation to China was in 1964 led by the then Vice-President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. In the initial days of the establishment the relations between the two countries saw a fair development.

Although China embraced communism and Kenya at independence adopted a capitalist system, their relations have largely remained cordial. China was the fourth country to recognize Kenya’s independence in 1963 when the two countries exchanged diplomatic representations (Onjala, 2008).

The Chinese embassy in Kenya is arguably their largest embassy in Africa both in terms of size and employees and is strategically located in a relatively high-
security area near the Defence Headquarters, Kenya Army Barracks, and closer to the Kenya’s State House. Similarly, Kenya has an embassy in Beijing which serves China and a few countries in the region. By the time Mwai Kibaki became president in 2002, relations with the Peoples Republic of China had improved considerably.

Following the major groundwork of enhanced relations between the two countries by former Moi regime, the changing state of domestic political relations apparently had induced incumbents to turn towards Chinese finance as a means of stabilizing political power at home as it shall clearly emerge later in the study. China-Kenya economic relations in the Kibaki era also began with high-level political contacts between the two states followed by a series of agreements under the auspices of the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). But this time unlike in the past, independent operators from Kenya and China were part of these high level meetings (Chege 2008).

As a follow up, President Mwai Kibaki made a state visit to China in August 2005, with 11 Kenyan trade- and investment-seeking delegations in China. He held extensive talks with President Hu Jintao and Chinese government officials, resulting in a five-part agreement covering official development assistance in grants (for infrastructure and energy), extended air services between the two countries, technical assistance for assessment and classification of standards in
industrial products, and modernization of equipment and training at the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation. This visit was followed by a highly successful Chinese trade exhibition in Nairobi that saw a Chinese trade delegation come to Nairobi following up clues and suggestions from the China Trade Centre in Nairobi—the largest in eastern Africa.

For the Kenyan government, China’s recent entry into the Kenyan economy has been a useful leveraging tool (Chege, 2008). Notable is Kibaki’s first official visits to China during his first term, yet did not make a single visit to Britain.

Beijing’s strategy has been extremely successful largely because it is accompanied by a “clear government policy in support of African commercial ventures, abundant financing and tax benefits for Chinese firms operating abroad and robust diplomacy toward the region. China’s Africa strategy, described as “political warfare,” has also been very successful because Beijing possesses advantages in dealing with African nations that the United States does not.

First, many African governments do not consider China to be imperialist. Second, China’s noninterventionist policy does not demand good governance, democracy, human rights or governmental transparency. Third, China uses its position as the sole “developing” member of the United Nations Security Council (the Security Council) to advocate for smaller countries and their interests (Sprance 2008).
China’s massive loans and infrastructural development projects not only mean that Kenya is less dependent on other forms of development aid, the Chinese money also means that other Western donors are more willing to accede to some of Kenya’s demands and/or release more stringent conditionalities as they are now in competition with China.

Since gaining independence, Kenya had single sourced its defence equipments and needs from Britain. While Kenya has been offered alternative arms sourcing from China, its continuous military relations with Britain can be seen as a hindrance to exploiting this alternative market of sourcing from the Chinese market. Kenya’s main multilateral donors have traditionally been the EU, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, while its main bilateral partners are the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, the Nordic countries, Italy, and now China (Chege, 2008). The improved political environment between the two countries was a result of Kenya’s stagnant economic growth throughout the 1990s, and of course China’s capability to fill in the vacuum left by Western donors (Chege 2008).

With difficult economic prospects and a turbulent political environment, Kenyan political incumbents found economic involvement with China to be more palatable than they had in the 1960s and 1970s. President Kibaki’s delegation visit to Shanghai, and discussions with its mayor Han Zheng, on the functioning of
special export industrial zones gave Kenyan business delegations opportunity to explore prospects in tourism, joint ventures in power generation, and machinery. As a consequence trade between Kenya and China has increased exponentially from the paltry $5.4 million in 1966 to $475 million in 2005 trade and is expected to continue increasing (Chege, 2008).

Twelve bilateral trade agreements between China and Kenya were signed between 2004 and 2006 alone (Crilly, Rob in USA Today 21st June, 2005). China’s emergence as one of the major non-Western sources of development finance to Kenya has not only seen the decline in future prospects for British assistance and relations, but the same has seen the loosening of the political and economic leverage traditionally exerted by Britain.

These developments have increasingly thawed relations with Western world countries and more so Britain as China increasingly stamps its presence in the region. It’s worth mentioning here that China has been accused by Western countries including Britain of dumping counterfeits goods in Africa and claiming the same has strangled multinational and small local companies operations. For instance Eveready East Africa, the British –American owned battery company operating in East Africa has lost 70% of the market share to counterfeit batteries coming from China (DN 19/5/2010).

Considerably, the fact that Chinese entry in Kenya has seen the Chinese government also profit from arms and military trade with Kenya, Kenya has not turned
fully to Chinese-manufactured arms as often as other African nations such as Namibia, Sudan, or Zimbabwe, however, Kenya has begun using China as an alternate arms exporter for its military vehicles and equipment. This includes a fleet of four Chinese made Z9WE attack helicopters which are manufactured by Harbin Aircraft Industry Group, a China Aviation Industry Corporation owned company (Wezerman, 2009).

In April 2006, the Chinese President, Hu Jintao visited Kenya in his tour of five African countries as the head of state, he made a visit to Nairobi to sign a twenty-year, billion-dollar oil exploration deal for drilling near Isiolo (in Northern Kenya) as well as off the northern coast. In the same trip, Hu donated half a billion shillings towards malaria prevention programme, and gave Kenya a Shs1billion grant and a Shs 5bn loan facility. Notably in 2006, the Chinese defense Minister Liang Guangli pledged to help modernize the Kenyan army. Twelve bilateral trade agreements between China and Kenya were signed between 2004 and 2006 alone. (Crilly, Rob in USA Today, June 2005).

This development coupled with Chinese policy of mutual economic benefit, the anticipated Chinese sponsored construction of the Lamu Port and construction of the road connecting to Ethiopia to booster the interior access to Ethiopia; popularly referred to as the LAPSSET project, has raised Kenya’s leverage in the region once again.
3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has endeavored to illustrate that the independence period conduct of Kenya’s foreign policy has largely rested with the presidency as has been shown by the analysis of the three regimes of Kenyatta, Moi and now Kibaki. These powers have vested in the presidency by section 16 of the Constitution of Kenya, Amendment Act No. 28 and in Section 23 of the Kenya Constitution. The president is the initiator, articulator and director of foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is Kenya's face to the rest of the world.

The first phase of Kenyan foreign policy was that of ‘wait and see’ meaning it was reacting to the unfolding events in the international system and internal political dynamics were dominated by restructuring and rebuilding the nation. Where these key variables were seen to be threatened by either domestic or external challenges, the Kenyatta regime took action to defend them.

He perceived communism ideology as the main threat to his regime and as shown, he detained opponents at home and broke diplomatic relations with foreign governments that he regarded as conspiring to change the internal political and economic systems of Kenya as a means of shifting Kenya's foreign and domestic policies. Given the intensity of the Cold War, Western countries
never took issue with his government over detention of the regime political opponents nor did the Western countries question the existence of a single party. Regionally, he embraced the idea of regional integration and took practical steps to ensure that the idea of the East African Community became a reality and this embracing and cultivating of personal political relationship with other East African leaders played an instrumental role in facilitating the success of regional intergration. However, as shown in the chapter, the conflict of opinion derived from personal and nationalist interests continued to cloud over initial attempts to regional integration in East africa region.

On his part, President Kenyatta took measures to defend Kenya’s security against Somalia including armed operations and laid foundations for greater economic diplomatic and security relations with the Western world. Consequently, Kenya has continued to depend on the Western countries for political, economic and security, a relationship that has affected its foreign policy making and practice. It is also this dependency relationship which defined the non-alignment policy in the Kenyatta government.

In terms of foreign relations this study notes that, Kenya has never been non-aligned in the classical sense since correctly defined non-alignment for Kenya was a mere public relations posture within the rank of third world countries and as shown a rhetorical commitment that was only a noble escapist aspiration to
chart a course through the storm of Cold War. In this case, Kenya’s immediate needs of enhancing its national security at a time when it had experienced territorial tensions with the neighboring Somalia with the expansionist threat by Uganda over claims to parts of Western Kenya all made a more ‘idealistic’ foreign policy a distant prospect for Kenyatta regime to pursue. On the other hand, Kenya’s foreign policy practice under Moi cannot be said to have been substantially different practice with the Kenyatta era. However under him the foreign policy behaviour was largely unilateral in nature.

Unlike Kenyatta, from the previous review of his era, Moi personally visited many countries to promote Kenya’s national interest at the international level and this strengthened Kenya’s close relations with the Western European countries. In this respect, president Moi was more involved directly in regional conflict resolution and other peace initiatives within the East Africa region.

For instance the chapter has highlighted his role and direct efforts to mediate internal conflict in the sub –Sahara region and showed that he continued to be guided by the principles of good neighborliness non-alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Amidst the terrorist attacks targeting the American embassy and the Israel interests in 1998 and 2002 respectively, president Moi continued with the posture of non-alignment with diplomatic support of the non alignment movement while intensifying the
relations with the Western countries. Both President Kibaki and Moi’s foreign policy formulation and implementation can be termed as active-passive foreign policy makers. This means that active-passive leader always adopts old policies in decision making process and are said to adopt the wait and act or see nature in decision making process or foreign policy formulation. Moreover, another feature that differentiated the formulation and implementation of Kenya’s foreign policy during the presidency of both Kibaki and Moi regime was their presidential personal diplomacy and involvement in the management of foreign policy.

President Kibaki had been known in maintaining a low profile in the management in Kenya’s foreign policy formulation by involving other departments and parties like the ministry of foreign affairs and the vice president in the diplomatic negotiation of Kenyans foreign policy implementation and formulation.

Unlike his predecessor, Kibaki’s state visits have been limited to only summits and international conferences at some level with most of his state visits being left in the hands of either the Prime Minister Raila Odinga or the Vice president Kalonzo Musyoka who were involved in most of the diplomatic state visits and missions. Remarkably under Kibaki there was rationalization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enable the country to manage its foreign policy.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is Kenya's face to the rest of the world. The drafting of the foreign policy document has been going on to give the Kenyan for-
-eign policy a direction to avoid ad hoc and personalization of foreign policy and diplomatic service, a significant departure from the foreign policy approach of previous regimes.

In summary the chapter has endeavored to illustrate that post-independent period conduct of Kenya’s foreign policy has largely rested with the presidency as has been shown by the analysis of the three regimes of Kenyatta, Moi and now Kibaki. These powers have vested in the presidency by section 16 of the Constitution of Kenya, Amendment Act No. 28 and in Section 23 of the Kenya Constitution.

The president in the independence period remains the initiator, articulator and director of foreign policy. The foreign ministry's responsibility is that of advice and execution in consultation with the president and its mandate has been to lead, coordinate and manage Kenya's foreign relations in pursuit of the country’s own national interests in the ever-changing global environment (G.O K 2005).

The chapter has also shown that the country's foreign policy has been guided and shaped by basic and universally recognized principles and norms of preservation of national security, promotion of peaceful co-existence, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference with internal affairs of other states and adherence to the charters of the United Nations and African Union. Thus, from the start, respect for territorial integrity, peaceful cooperation and co-existence in Africa, and non-alignment in
East-West power conflicts have been the cornerstones of Kenya’s foreign policy. This non-alignment policy continues to be ascribed to date. What is however notable is the fact that since gaining independence in 1963, the British influence in the country and their interests have continued to play a key role in deciding the country’s foreign policy behaviour and hence military arrangements.

As has been shown, during Kenyatta’s regime the country was struggling to set up its road map in governance and international relations and Kenya did not construct a clear direction of its foreign policy. The management of foreign policy and diplomatic service, therefore, was fragmented without properly conceived systematic approach. This can be demonstrated by the Cold War divide that locked and tangled President Kenyatta and his vice-president Oginga Odinga who were key to the founding and governance of the country.

However this does not mean that Kenya did not have a foreign policy but a closer read by the study on the KANU manifesto of 1961 and 1963, statement of the president and sessional papers and in the independence declarations one deduces that Kenya’s foreign policy was scattered, and therefore can be described as being in an ambiguous motion during his regime. Although Kenya from the beginning opted to retain and improve on the pre-independence links with the West it hardly made any efforts to be really non-aligned and nevertheless, Kenyatta though endearing himself with capitalism ideology, he retained Kenya’s relations
with China. This can well be informed by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga high-powered Kenyan “goodwill delegation” to Beijing to discuss enhanced ties between the two countries in the early years after gaining independence.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPACT OF KENYA-BRITISH MILITARY RELATIONS ON KENYA’S NATIONAL SECURITY FROM 1963-2005

4:1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to assess and discuss the impacts of the Kenya-British military relations on Kenya’s national security interests in the independence period. It discusses the independence period national security interests, the threats to Kenya security and a brief look at the Kenya’s military and security sector. Beyond the general recognition that the role of the Kenyan armed forces is the defence of the nation against external aggression and to assist the police in the maintenance of law and order, there is no documented articulation as Kenya’s official defence policy.

However, the study notes that there have been official statements which give a general direction to Kenya’s geo-strategic concerns and priorities. In the absence of an officially articulated and recognized defence policy, the tendency has been to equate regime security with national security.

Nevertheless, some of Kenya’s national security concerns include; the increased threats of non-state actors like terrorism, the Indian Ocean piracy coming from the lawlessness in neighbouring Somalia has threatened global maritime commerce and more so Western shipping interests. There is also the influx of refugees within the Horn of Africa region into Kenya as a result of the protracted contemporary
conflicts in Somalia and Sudan, the challenges in the management of border security with Ethiopia and Sudan, the threat of HIV and Aids pandemic, all of which have had consequences to Kenya’s national security interests. Besides the Kenya Police, the Kenyan defence organs consist of the Army, the Navy and the paramilitary General Service Unit.

4.2 Kenya’s National Security Interests and Threats Since 1963

As far back as 1966, President Kenyatta stated that: ‘Kenya wishes to live in harmony with her neighbours; we covet no inch of their territory. We will yield no inch of ours. We stand loyal to the OAU and its solemn decision that all African states shall adhere to the boundaries inherited at independence.’ Speaking in 1978, President Moi affirmed that: ‘The safety and security of our people and the integrity of our nation comprise the first responsibility of the government, but let me remind you that the defence of this country will depend on the loyalty and devotion of all our people just as much as the uniformed forces.’

From the foregoing statement one can easily conclude that Kenya favours a broad-based defence policy, predicated on a human security perspective. Empirically, it would appear that Kenya’s grand strategy is to achieve peace and security through good neighbourliness, non-aggression, and internal peace and security (Wuyi, et al. 2006, 115). Post-independence Kenyan governments have all upheld this commitment to guarantee the security of the Kenyan people and the
preservation of national integrity and sovereignty within secure borders. As discussed in the foregoing chapter Kenya’s foreign policy followed a non-aligned, but pro-western, foreign policy and even adopted anti-colonialist posture by even opposing the apartheid policy in South Africa mainly through the framework of the OAU.

For Kenyatta and his regime, territorial integrity, national security and independence and sovereignty have been highlighted as key determinants of foreign policy and in this case critical pillars of national interest. Moreso his policy regarding these issues took a defensive posture which was consistent with policy of good neighbourliness and conformed to the provisions of the OAU Charter on non-interference in the internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity of member states.

Kenya’s diplomatic relation with its neighbor Uganda under Kenyatta was brought to test, on 15th February, 1976 when Amin laid claims to the Western part of Kenya announcing that despite his preference for peace, he would consider engaging Kenya in war in order to recover it. In response, Kenyatta was swift and decisive of not yielding an inch of Kenya’s territory with a stinging supply shortcut to Uganda. This was a clear demonstration by Kenyatta that respect for Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty would never be compromised.
4.3 Threats to Kenya’s National Security

As highlighted earlier by the study, besides the two opposition political parties KADU and African Peoples Party (APP) that threatened Kenya’s internal and national politics, Kenyatta had to contend with the secessionist claims in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) now North Eastern Province to Somalia by the Somalis and more importantly the Kenya Rifles mutiny of 1964 in Lanet. The intervention of 24 Brigade to assist in quelling the revolt demonstrated in no uncertain terms that Kenya still relied upon British military largesse (Percox 2001).

Although Edgerton (1990) notes that Kenyatta refused to make the required public pronouncement of gratitude being fully aware of the political risks inherent in such a gesture, this study confirms that an informal defense arrangement with Britain reassured Kenyatta that he could rely on direct British military support in the event of an army mutiny or attempted coup.

Under the terms of the 1964 Anglo-Kenyan Defence Agreement, British troops in Kenya would, if required, assist in ‘dealing with internal disturbances’, while Britain also agreed to ‘cancel the eight interest free loans (totaling £6.05 million) made to the Kenya Government during the period September 1954 to March 1960’ (Percox,2001:273). In return for this offer, Kenyatta granted the British military continued access to Nairobi’s Eastleigh and Embakasi airfields and port facilities at Mombasa (Parson 2003).
Under the aegis of the British Army Training Liaison Staff Kenya, Kenyatta allowed the British ground forces to train in Northern Kenya up to three times per year in a 15-year contract to carry out training in Kenya (DN: 11/14/2005). In pursuit of the national interest regionally, Kenya and Ethiopia joined forces in 1969 and signed a defense pact to enhance a joint military effort in the region in the event of their common enemy, Somalia, invading any of the two countries (Biwott, 1992).

The defense pact with Ethiopia, a Soviet ally irrespective of Kenya’s traditional phobia of communism defines Kenya’s national security interest as having taken precedence over other factors, and Kenya therefore focused its attention on the stability of the region defined within the framework of the national interest. Kenya, which shares borders with Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia, emerges as a relatively stable anchor state in a volatile and violent sub-region.

Kenya participates actively in several regional security and economic initiatives and is a member of among others the East African Community, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation, and more so a signatory and member of the Nile River and riparian states treaty (Adar 2007). This co-operation is borne out of the realization that the development and prosperity of Kenya are intimately tied with its neighbours in the region.
With the advent of globalization and liberalization, the country’s external relations have been governed more and more by the need to promote a favourable environment for trade and investment. *The Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1997 on Industrial Transformation to the year 2020 and also as a blueprint for the Vision 2030*, clearly defines Kenya’s approach to regional integration arrangements (GoK, 1997). It identifies institutional and legal framework as pre-requisites to fostering international and regional trade which could benefit Kenya.

This pro-active and participatory role in the economic and trade dynamics in the region is geared towards fighting poverty and improving the welfare of the citizens of Kenya. The new global context thus adds a dimension to the US-Kenya-Britain trilateral relationship whereby both the US and Britain have almost certainly looked to Kenya for enhanced cooperation and assistance especially in the counterterrorism and anti-piracy efforts, and the Kenyan government anticipated-ly turning to the United States and Britain for financial support and military funding.

Kenya has therefore assumed an added significance in the hierarchy of British and U.S. security interests in the Horn region in the build up for AFRICOM. However, the study notes that the US championed AFRICOM initiative has largely been mandated to securing of resources like Oil in the Horn of Africa region, containment of international terrorism and their associated training grounds as evident by
the Somalia crisis, as well as the containment of expansive China that is currently Africa’s third largest trading partner after the US and Britain. On record, China has considerably secured several exploration and drilling rights in Kenya and other African states (Gilbert, Uzodike and Isike, 2009).

The establishment of AFRICOM, therefore, is seen as reflecting an evolution in policymaker’s perceptions of the continent’s security challenges and US strategic interests there. It has identified five factors which have shaped increased US interest in Africa in the past decade namely; oil, global trade, armed conflicts, terrorism, and HIV and AIDS. These suggestions have led to a “conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa (Walter 2004).

As a consequence such security initiatives like AFRICOM though more about addressing American security requirements than redressing Africa’s developmental challenges, have largely featured Kenya as one of the target host nation. (Gilbert Uzodike and Isike,2009: 26). In addressing the humanitarian crisis and the HIV and Aids in the Horn region, a considerable number of charitable and religious based non-governmental organization, from Britain and US have set operational bases in the region. For instance the United States has an established military base at Camp Lemmonier in Djibouti. Kenya is home to the Centre for Disease Control, The Walter Reed project the largest operation outside the United States and
one of four countries targeted by USAID to receive significant financial funding to fight the HIV and Aids pandemic (Barkan and Cooke 2001).

More so the University of Nairobi has been conducting collaborative research on clinical trials for Aids vaccine with Oxford University, one of the world renowned and leading British University. Given increased activity by major western humanitarian organizations and Kenya being the headquarter of many Western investments and organisation operating in Kenya the threat of terrorism continues to harbor its national security interests. Besides the territorial issues from Somali in the north, and Uganda, the army mutiny of 1964, and the attempted coup under President Moi in 1982, the terrorist attacks at Jewish owned Norfolk hotel in 1980 where sixteen people became the country’s first encounters with terrorists.

Kenya’s vulnerability to Islamic terror-ists operating under the Al-Qaeda banner was demonstrated again in 1998 when a car bomb blew up the U.S. Embassy in downtown Nairobi, killing over 200 people, injuring over 5,000 mostly Kenyans. Again in 2002, suicide bombers killed 15 people in the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala near Mombasa, and also reportedly was the attempt to shoot a surface-to-air missile at an Israeli commercial airliner taking off at Mombasa airport on 28th November 2002 (McGregor, 2009).
These terror attacks of 1998 and 2002, according to a United Nations report were prepared by a Somalia-based Al Shabab, an Al-Qaeda–linked group in neighbouring Somalia (Hared 2005). Kenya has closed its border with Somalia on a number of occasions. Other states, such as the UK and the US, have also taken the position that the shared border increases the threat of terrorism in Kenya not only as a result of the instability in Somalia but also on the basis that Somalia may provide a base and potential shelter for Al-Qaeda operatives and increased Indian ocean piracy (McGregor, 2009).

Bearing in mind that the Horn of Africa sea route is critical and shorter in nautical miles for ships transporting oil from the Arab world to Europe and Africa, Somali pirates have increasingly curtailed not only the perceived Western shipping interests, but also Kenya’s maritime trade and port. These terror attacks also affected Kenya’s tourism industry, which forms the bedrock of its economic interests. Following these attacks Kenya reinforced efforts to counter the threat of terrorism and manage future attacks.

After the 1998 bombing, the internal security docket created the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and more so within the Kenya military, a new counter terrorism centre was established at Embakasi to run counter terrorist programmes and education, the sharing of intelligence to the Kenya military and the greater horn of Africa region with the assistance of the British military. The centre is now the only one
of its kind in the region and this has enhanced Kenya’s national security policy and the management of the threat of terrorism. (www.mod.go.ke/modsite/dsc.htm accessed in Nov 2004). It’s worth noting that no single issue has dominated the international political arena in recent years as much as the global so-called ‘War on Terror’. The UK’s role in creating legitimacy for this ‘war’ and encouraging the belief that it would provide greater global security, has been hugely significant. Under pressure to cooperate in the global war on terror, the Kenyan government has had to carefully balance its response to external forces with the need to manage complex domestic and regional political strains and tensions.

These developments, therefore, indicate that Kenya’s leverage in the region has been raised in comparison to other East African states because of the military relations with Britain as has been demonstrated previously. Notable benefits include as highlighted the setting up of the Counter terrorism Centre being set up, an anti-land mine training centre at Embakasi and the British Army Peace Support Training Centre at the Karen Defence College.

Thus regionally, Kenya has gained the stability actor and hegemony in the greater Horn of Africa region while Britain’s global military posture is well- pronounced in the East Africa region in comparison with other European powers. For Britain their military presence in Kenya’s was and is of value to their economic interests and that Kenya presence works for Britain global presence.
4:4 The Kenya Military and Security Sector

The military sector in Kenya consists of the army, the air force and the navy. The Kenya Air Force (KAF) was established in June 1964 and it descended from the former British Royal Air Force station at Eastleigh in Nairobi, which was used as a staging post for the British Middle East Command during World War II. The primary roles of the KAF are to establish supremacy in the defence of Kenyan air space, provide aid to civil authority and support the army and the navy during operations.

Like the Kenya Army, the air force participates in peace support operations. As with the army and air force, the Kenya Navy is an offshoot of the colonial administration, having descended from the Royal East African Navy (REAN) (Wuyi, et al. 103; 2006). The REAN served the four former British East African colonies—Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar—with its headquarters in Mombasa, Kenya. The navy has two bases, in Mtongwe (Mombasa) and Manda (near Lamu). Like the other services, the navy contributes officers and men to UN peacekeeping missions in addition to its primary role of defending the country.

The General Service Unit is technically a unit of the police force, but for specific tactical, bureaucratic and, especially, historical reasons it is classified as a separate force. It was established in 1948 (before independence) as an emergency company, the Regular Police Reserve, to deal specifically with insurgency in the
country and was re-designated in 1953 as an independent unit that was fully equipped to deal with the Mau Mau insurgency. The GSU is still an independent unit headed by a commandant and with strength of over 5000 men. It is a highly trained paramilitary force, reputed to be capable and firm in dealing with matters of internal security (such as anti-riot operations), and has been deployed mainly to deal with the Shifta insurgency (in joint operations with the other security forces) in the North-Eastern Province and other areas of the country in the recent past (Wuyi, et al. 2006;104).

By 2005, the regular armed forces totalled 24,120 active personnel; the navy, 1,620 (including 120 marines); and the air force totalled 2,500, the Kenya army had strength of 20,000 personnel, had four battalions: air defense artillery, airborne, independent infantry, and independent air cavalry. During this period, the army had 78 battle tanks, 92 reconnaissance vehicles, 62 armored personnel carriers, 48 pieces of towed artillery, 62 mortars, 54 antitank guided weapons, 80 recoilless launchers, and 94 air defense guns. The navy had four offshore patrol craft, two amphibious crafts, and one support crafts. The air force had 9 combat aircrafts, 34 attack helicopters, 30 transport aircraft, 17 transport helicopters, 25 training aircraft, and various missiles(Wuyi, et al, 2006).

Between 1989 and 2002, Kenya participated in 20 United Nations peacekeeping operations worldwide, contributing military observers, staff officers, police moni

Regionally Kenya remains a stability actor in the inter-state relations, and security predicaments largely facing the Greater Horn of Africa region. By having military relations and joint military trainings then Kenya’s leverage and military prominence in the Horn and East African region has in essence become well- pronounced.

Kenya is, however concerned by the presence of heavily mined areas within the territories of some of its regional neighbours. A long-term response is in the form of the International Mine Action Training Centre, a joint British-Kenyan military project inaugurated on 17 February, 2005 in Embakasi to specialize in training and equipping the Kenyan and regional militaries with the skills in mine clearance and explosive ordinance disposal (EOD). The International Mine Action Training Centre established in Nairobi, Kenya receives significant technical and financial assistance from Britain, which as a partner to the project is fully committed to the success of the project. The IMATC has since established itself as an important
training institution for support to mine action in the region. Countries that have benefited include Nigeria, Somaliland, Sudan and Uganda, as well as other senior military and mine action officials from Sub-Saharan Africa. Trainees include military personnel, military and civilian police and civilians. Equipment provided to each group of trainees includes mine detectors, personal protective equipment, demining tools and simple survey equipments. All these skills and knowledge gained at the centre have enhanced the various militaries in the region on preparedness and demining (Accessed from http://www.triad.co.ke/5611.htm).

The British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) has continued to provide support for broad spectrum of military training to their Kenya counterparts. General training exercises have recently been expanded to include selected units of the Kenyan armed forces training alongside their British counterparts. This initiative is part of British efforts to support and increase Kenya’s ability to meet its rapid deployment commitments to the East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), a collective East African regional security initiative aimed at improving the East African armies militaries preparedness and abilities to deploy effectively on multinational operations.

In addition to this general training, BATUK with British Army soldiers and Kenyan counterparts have carried out over 100 community projects in Kenya(http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx). Remarka-
bly in all these joint training exercises, the British military hardware and equipments are demonstrated and marketed to the Kenyan armed forces since the country does not develop or manufacture any military hardware.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to evaluate the impacts of the Kenya-British military relations on Kenya’s national security interests. The chapter has shown that Kenya-British military relations have also impacted on the national security and safety of Kenyans in their own country. This study notes that the military bases and facilities stationed in foreign territory usually acquire a symbolic value far beyond their actual utility simply because the armed forces are organs of their home state and in the service of their state. For instance the study observes that the British military while in Kenya is on her majesty’s service (OHMS) and not under the Kenya (host) command.

The study has discussed the major threats to Kenya’s national security and also shown the national security interests With the emergence of non-state actors like terrorism as the global threat to peace has become one of the biggest challenges of the 21st century in the global quest for peace. Kenya though acting realistically in its relations with Britain, has fallen victim of several terrorist attacks in the independence period notable being the 1998 bomb blasts of the US embassy in downtown Nairobi that left several of its citizen’s dead and many injured. The two ter-
terrorist attacks on Kenya in 1998 and 2002 have had many negative economic, social, political and geopolitical effects on the country. Economically these effects included the decline of the country’s tourism industry and the attendant loss of jobs and foreign exchange, a growing tension between Muslims and Christians, radicalization of the country’s Muslims, with a sharp rise in anti-western sentiments within the Muslim and general population, the push for passage of unpopular anti-terrorist measures that threaten Kenya’s ‘human, civil and political rights besides eroding the country’s sovereignty, and rising tension between Kenya and the West.

Internationally the study notes the there has been a remarkable shift within the military and strategic thinking on the future and need for stationing of foreign armed forces abroad and Kenya as a host nation has not been an exception. The study has traced this development from the deterrent strategy of communism spread during the Cold War and decolonization period as earlier espoused by the study to current wave of stationing for rapid deployment of military forces for humanitarian interventions in disaster management and to counter the so called third world security predicaments. As a matter of fact the study has highlighted that Kenya now hosts, a Centre for Counter Terrorism Training, a Centre for Anti-landmine Training, (IMATC) and a Peacekeeping Support-Training Centre too, all under the aegis of the British military presence in Kenya. These institutions
largely serve under the guidance of the British military in Kenya and are however seen as symbolizing British military commitments to Kenya.

These developments have continued to raise Kenya’s national Security posture and profile and more so the hegemony in the region as Nairobi has become a regional operational hub for these defence and security training centers bringing in considerable revenue to the Kenyan economy as more and more bilateral assistance flows. In this case, Britain and its allies have continued to contribute to Kenya’s economic development and more so Kenya’s internal security and military preparedness as the country geostrategic location remains important to their economic interest and continued access to the greater Horn of Africa region.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5:1 Introduction

This thesis has endeavored to trace the evolution of Kenya–Britain military relations from the year 1963 to the year 2005. By tracing this form of interdependence, the study has evaluated the impacts of this relationship on Kenya as the host nation in the realist prism pertaining to Kenya’s foreign policy behaviour and practice, as well as Kenya’s pursuit of the national security interests.

The thesis has attempted to show that there were various national and international factors at play within the three independence period regimes of Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki that facilitated and characterized Kenya’s military relations with its former colonial master. By Kenya continuing to sustain these relations with the once ‘enemy’ military, this study has shown that military relations by their very symbolic nature and mostly synonymous associated with the national security posture of a country, largely influences the trajectory of states foreign relations both in policy making and practice, and Kenya is no exception.

The legacy and continuity has been discussed by the study within the independence period from 1963 to 2005 and the same has been characterized by the British military’s continued access to Kenyan hinterlands for military training within
the study period. These relations have also been demonstrated by the fact that Kenya-British military relations continue to be largely based upon three main institutions, namely; the British Army Peace Support Team (BAPST), International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) and The British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) all of whom have shaped Kenya’s relations regionally and internationally. BAPST’s mission is to coordinate UK military assistance to armed forces in Eastern Africa in order to contribute to security sector reform and to increase peacekeeping capacity.

The IMATC is a joint British and Kenyan military venture aimed at alleviating the suffering caused by landmines and explosive remnants of war by providing mine action training while BATUK is a small permanent administrative military camp that provides logistic support to visiting British army units. More so these facilities are seen as symbolizing British global and regional military commitments to Kenya. Regional initiatives include collaborative security initiatives and developments like AFRICOM, EASBRIG, ACOTA have been mentioned by the study but are mostly initiated by the US and Britain and primarily centred upon the need for the collective security.

In conclusion, this study notes that since Britain and US are members of NATO alliance, then the above sustained campaigns for collective security frameworks for the East Africa region can as well be described as the landmarks for laying
foundations of entry of NATO into East Africa region. As a consequence Britain continues to pursue relentlessly and collectively this commitment by sustaining military relations with its greatest partner and ally in the East Africa and the greater Horn of Africa region.

Since NATO continues to envisage a continued sphere of responsibility on the part of the ex-colonial powers, the individual military agreements and SOFFA covering bases, training facilities and arming of local troops can then be viewed as part of an intercontinental or global expansionist agenda by NATO.

5.2 CONCLUSION

Overall, this thesis has developed and added a broadened knowledge on the colonial legacy in Kenya-British Military relations which has been a neglected area of study. Analysis from chapter two has shown that the rationale and evolution of Kenya–Britain Military relations can be attributed to the colonial control of Kenya, the coming in of the British after the scramble for Africa and subsequent colonialization of Africa.

The colonial control of Kenya meant that the British would protect their strategic interests in the East Africa region as well as the coastline and deter other European rivals from its East African strategic interests. Britain despite the withdrawal from empire and a shift of British defence strategy from the traditional empire
and commonwealth areas of interest to an emphasis on Western Europe and the Atlantic, still continues to pursue military relations with Kenya and in the East Africa region.

Chapter three has espoused on Kenya–British military and their impacts on the foreign policy relations during independence period. It has enabled further understanding on Kenya’s conduct and process of foreign policy decision making within the three eras of President Kenyatta, President Moi and President Kibaki all of whom at any one given time as the study has shown, served and pursued the national interest realistically. The chapter has revealed that Britain was able to bargain on behalf of the white minority settler population, the protection of their investments in the country especially in the immediate independence and transition period.

Second, Britain was able to quell any imagined spread of communism through the policy of containment in the region especially given the fact that Kenya’s decolonization experience had revolved around the Mau Mau clamor for land which was central in the communism discourse of the time.

Third, the post-independence leadership was able to offer internal security to already fragile new state especially in relations to the tensions on territorial borders within the East Africa region. Economically it has illustrated that the British have benefited through the arms sale and equipment to Kenya in terms of security as
-istance. It follows then that, for Kenya, the British government has in effect to ‘pay rent’ in order to retain access to these facilities. In spite of neo-colonialism sentiments respective independence regimes, on the other hand have wrested the initiative from Britain by ensuring that agreements on British military training and stationing are subject to renewal at regular intervals.

In conclusion, however, this study notes that there is need to evaluate the Kenya-British military relations since military base agreements provide for an important but partial delegation of sovereignty that is exclusively based on the host state consent and only becomes valid as long as such consent exists. Military base agreements are by their very nature different from other international agreements and treaties in that they by necessity require the continuous consent of the territorial host state.

Interviews conducted by the study at the local level, especially on the civil-military relations informed that the stationing of British military as a foreign armed force has in essence meant that Kenya has not gained independence as envisaged but continues to serve the interest of the British, its former colonizer.

As highlighted previously the negotiations on the extension of the leases of the trainings for the British military in Kenya not only sharpened national sensibilities with respect to such matters as jurisdiction over human rights crimes, but more so
on the British military personnel and sovereign control of the designated areas of training in the years 2001 to 2005. Ultimately the feelings from the study regarding the whole arrangement pointed that the relations have not been beneficial locally and to the country at large.

Nevertheless, by focusing on military relations with Britain the study revisited the contemporary issue of sovereignty; and posed if indeed Kenya has delegated temporary sovereignty to Britain in areas where military trainings are conducted, especially in the wake of human rights and rape allegations in Samburu and Archers post areas. Though from findings, this study did acknowledge that the Kenyan police did not have the jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrators of rape inspite of the overwhelming evidence given to the Kenyan authorities, this development put into doubt the current content of the Status of foreign forces agreement (SOFFA) signed between Kenya and Britain.

This study however informs that although a state cannot rid itself all treaties, it can denounce a specific group of treaties those of which material content, have become unequal and this is provided for by the modern international law. This study pursues this argument given the fact that some of the treaties and agreements may have been entered while Kenya was still a colony or as a quid pro quo for independence. Given this case then Kenya as the host nation, has the opportunity under the international law to denounce what treaty it feels is of no benefits
as the host nation. In summary, this thesis concludes that the colonial legacy influences Kenya–British military relations continue to determine and shape Kenya’s foreign policy and its pursuit of the national interest. Within the study period, the observation on subsequent leadership shows an encompassment in its core values, the sustenance of sovereignty and the guarantee of Kenya territorial integrity at one level and the insurance of its economic interests at another level.

5.3 Recommendations

From the foregoing findings, the following recommendations are suggested:

- The study was deeply concerned by what the researcher observes as the lack of standards existing between the Kenya-Britain Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), and hoping that future agreements meet international standards of objectivity and fairness and account for extenuating circumstances. The study acknowledges the fact that these documents are very classified documents and therefore as a result it is not entirely possible to have a picture of the relationship from both sides.

- Concurrently, the study recognizes that the British military bases in Kenya whilst essential to the wider national and international interests, their presence has created significant and often adverse effects on the communities and societies within which they are located, including inter
-alia, environmental damage, human rights violations, economic distortion, social dislocation, judicial disputes, and regional tensions, degradation of bilateral and multilateral relations between Kenya and other states.

• Overtime, the Kenya government should carry out an environmental assessment impact on the development costs of British military trainings in Kenya and provide an informed appraisal of the same to help in making informed decisions on the future sustainability of the trainings onto Kenya’s environment.

• The study recommends that Kenya should adopt and explore the global guidelines under the name of the International Military Contract Agreement (IMCA), which will include: types of military bases, the length of the contract to make them reviewable and renewable; the location of the base; respect of the national sovereignty; specifics such as taxes, social programs, and joint operative actions; ratification of the agreement by states involved; and a dispute settlement mechanism in case one of the parties violates the agreement.

• British Military should be educated on local customs, the cultural norms, and traditions of host communities, local populations should be integrated into the orientation process for foreign military personnel and Kenya should establish clear boundaries regarding the off-duty behaviour of
foreign military personnel and ensure it is respectful of local culture; including the establishment of cultural information centre’s to help personnel become educated on the local culture, including issues such as language, customs, religion, food, and potentially sensitive issues.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Dougherty, J (1990) *Contending Theories of International Relations:*


Shaw & Aluko (1984) Political Economy of African Foreign Policy:


Cambridge University Press.


THESES AND DESERTATIONS


PHD Thesis 1971

Olewe N. (1977) *The dependent nations in international interactions: emerging patterns of regional and global co-operation of The East- African States*

Ph.D Thesis in International Relations, University of Carolina, Chapel Hill.


**JOURNAL/ARTICLES**


145
The military and politics in Africa from engagement to democratic and constitutional control. Ashgate Publishing Company.


Sprance, W.R (2008) The New Tournament of Shadows: The Strategic Implications Of China’s Activity In Sub-Saharan Africa and Africom’s role in


**NEWSPAPERS AND MEDIA REPORTS**


Amnesty International Reports (July, 2003)

Daily Nation September 18, 2005,

“UK Condemns Kenya Bomb Attack” BBC News (28 November 2002)

“Kenyans Close Border with Somalia” BBC News (3 January 2007)

‘Kenya Closes Somalia Border’ The Times Online (4 January 2007)

“Kenya, UK row over army training fields” Daily Nation November 14, 2005

‘Army ready to abandon Kenya as training ground” Daily Telegraph December 6, 2005”

Sunday Nation November 20, 2005.

Daily Nation December 2, 2005.

“Steep Rise in US Military Aid” The Nation (Nairobi) (9 September 2007)

“Kenya set to have first foreign policy document” Sunday Nation May 2, 2010
Crilly, Rob *Chinese Seek Resources, Profits in Africa* in *USA Today*. 21 June 2005


“House Team Dismisses Revised Anti-Terrorism Bill” The East African Standard (6June 2006)

**INTERNET SOURCES: WEBSITES ACCESSED**

Hansard reports on Kenya accessed from: www.publications.parliament.uk


East Africa Standby Brigade retrieved from <http://www.easbrig.org>


APPENDICES I

Interview guide

Dear Sir/Madam

The researcher is conducting a research for Master of Arts thesis entitled *The Colonial Legacy in Kenya-British Military Relations. A Case Study Research of Kathendini and Archers Post Training areas in Kirinyaga and Samburu Districts. 1963-2005*. The interview guide will be to help the researcher in obtaining your views on the impacts of the military trainings on your locality and population. Your cooperation will be highly appreciated. Kindly respond to the questions as deemed appropriate. I guarantee total confidentiality of your response and the use for no other purposes except for this academic research.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

A: General Information

(i) Name ……………………………… (ii) Age…………. (iii) Sex …….  

(iv) Locality…………………………(v) Occupation………………

(vi) Marital status…………………….(vii) Religious affiliations …………..
General Questions

1. What has been the impact of the Kenya-British military relations at both Kathendini and Archers post areas?

Under this broad question the following specific question were posed.

1. How long have you lived/stayed in the training areas?
2. What has been the nature of activities conducted by the military personnel?
3. Have the communities benefited from the presence of the foreign military trainings in this area both at personal and community level?
4. What have been the general impacts of joint military trainings in these two areas?

2. How has Kenya and or Britain Benefited Through the Existing Military Relations?

Under this broad question which was be directed to the UK-Kenya relations desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the British high commissioner offices in Nairobi, the following specific questions were posed.
1. Does Kenya have a military policy in place? If so has it been influenced by the British military?

2. What has been Kenya military development strategy if any since independence? i.e. civil-military relations in general.

3. How has Kenyan military personnel gained by having military relations with Britain? e.g. specialized professional trainings, equipments?

4. Has Kenya been ranked as the fourth largest trade partner in the list of UK’s market of its arms trade? In terms of arms sale to Kenya, what is Britain’s and Kenya bilateral trade relations index since 1963?

5. Have the Kenya-British military relations impacted upon Kenya’s foreign policy and military relations with other states? What is Kenya’s position on the Middle East conflict?

6. How has Britain/British military personnel gained through military relations with Kenya?
APPENDICES II – LIST OF INFORMANTS

Aphaxard Okumu-55, OI: March 2006, Nairobi
Allex Waiganjo- OI: April 2007, Nairobi
Alice Waihenya-OI: April 2007, Nairobi
Anthony Okullu-OI: June 2007 Nairobi
Eunice Mwaura-45, OI: June 2007, Nairobi
Edward Njogu 62 years- OI: 2007 Kathendini, Kirinyaga
Fredrick Gitari Chomba -78, OI: June 2006, Kirinyaga
Fabian Lolosoli- 50, OI: 2007, Archers post
Francis Kariuki –65, OI: June 2006, Nairobi
Francis Mwangi- 29, OI: 2007, Nanyuki town
Florence Wawira- OI: May 2006 Kathendini Kirinyaga
George Muriithi- OI: June 2006, Kathendini Kirinyaga
Harrison Njega-OI: June 2007Kiadumu,Kathedini
Jacob Njogu- OI: May 2006, Kianyaga, Kirinyaga
James Chege –70, OI: July 2007, Kathendini Kirinyaga
Jared Wambogo - OI: April 2006 Kathendini Kirinyaga
John Mugo 48, - OI: 2006 Kathendini
Kenneth Njiru 68, OI: April 2007, Kathendini
Late Martin Shikuku- OI: 2008, Nairobi.
Lawrence Kiage-OI 2008, Kiandumu,Kathendini

Late General Kassam- 80, OI: March 2007, Kianyaga, Kirinyaga
Lydia Wanjiku -50 OI: June 2007, Kathendini village
Loise wambugu- OI: June 2007, Kathendini village
Martin Gichobi Mbogo -52 OI: 2007 Kathendini Area

Magdalene Wairimu – 47 OI: 2006, Kathendini

Mathew Kaikai- OI: March 2007 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi.

Mary Muthee- OI: May 2006 Kathendini Kirinyaga
Moses Leitore, - OI: 2007, Maralal, Dol Dol

Ole Kaunga, OI: 2007, Maralal town

Ole Turasha, OI: 2006, Maralal town

Purity Sadera, OI: 2007, Archers post

Pauline Siamanta, 66, OI: 2007, Archers Post

Peter Muthike,- OI: 2006 Kathendini,Kirinyaga

Paul Lesurmat - OI: 2007 Dol Dol

Paul Otieno- OI: May 2006, Nairobi

Paul Kiura 60- OI: 2006 Kathendini area

Paul Murandi-OI August 2007 Kirinyaga

Peter Njagi Murimi 45, OI: April 2007, Kathendini

Pius Murage- Kamwana, OI 2006,Kirinyaga
Robert Muriuki 79- OI: 2006 Kathendini
Rebecca Waweru- 38, OI: 2007, Nanyuki town
Rtd. Major Chege-, OI July 2007, Nairobi
Rtd. Colonel Kariuki Muchiri – OI: July 2007, Nairobi
Rtd Colonel Muthungu- Nairobi OI: August 2007
Simon Lekolol - OI: 2007, Archers Post
Senior Sergeant Muchira- OI July 2007, Kirinyaga,
Robert Mokaya Mogaka - OI: March 2007 Min. of Foreign Affairs,
Rose - OI: March 2007 Min. of Foreign Affairs Nairobi.
Paul Muthike OI: May 2006, Kathendini Kirinyaga
Winfred Musyoka OI: Kamwana, Kirinyaga
Wambui Kamaina. OI: May 2006 Kathendini Kirinyaga
Wanjau Mbogo 80 - OI: April 2007, Kathendini, Kirinyaga
Wanjiku Ndungu- OI: May 2006, Kathendini Kirinyaga
Wamucii Karimi - OI: May 2006 Kathendini Kirinyaga
Figure I: MAP OF KATHENDINI TRAINING AREA

Source: Kirinyaga District Development Plan 2002
Figure II: MAP OF ARCHERS POST TRAINING AREA

Source: Laikipia District Development Plan 2002
Figure III: MAP OF BRITISH ARMY TRAINING FACILITIES

Source: Nation Media House Libarary 2005