Christians and the 2010 constitution referendum in Kenya: A search for explanations from a retrospective study

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Abstract
Religion has co-existed with the politics since times immemorial and the issue of how they influence one another is of perennial interest. Kenya is indeed no exception in this regard and in the politically repressive 1980s, it was only the voices of the mostly Christian clergy that could be heard in the fearful silence. Thus the Christian church came to be closely associated with the fight for political freedom and democratization. However, all that came into serious question in 2010 when a referendum that was held to approve a new constitution was conducted. During that year the most notable opposition to the proposed constitution came from the Christian clergy. What caused this turn-around? It is this question that prompted this retrospective search for explanations from the data gathered from a study of some 870 undergraduate students in universities in Kenya that was conducted in 1999. How could the change in political standpoint of the clergy be explained? Did it have something to do with the political attitudes engendered by membership in these churches? The findings suggest that although Christianity influences political attitudes to some extent, such influence is not overwhelming and what was witnessed in the referendum may therefore be due to influences emanating from other than the attitudes and orientations nurtured by professing Christianity as a faith.

Introduction
The referendum on the adoption of a new constitution in Kenya was held on 4 August 2010 and although it was given approval by nearly 70 per cent of all the people who voted, a significant proportion of thirty odd per cent voted against it and some of the most prominent leaders on this opposing side were a section of the Christian clergy. The general feeling among the 70 per cent of the people who voted for the new constitution as well as many non-Kenyan observers was that the adoption of the new constitution was a necessary step in the consolidation of democracy in Kenya. Given that in the 1980s and the 1990s, a section of the Christian clergy was at the forefront of the sustained campaign for a new constitution, this opposition marked an about turn. Indeed some members of the clergy such as Alexander Kipsan’g Muge, the Anglican Church of Kenya Bishop for Eldoret Diocese, ended up paying the ultimate price in this struggle when he lost his life in 1990 in a road accident that many people believe was an execution. That the clergy would now be at the forefront of attempting to block the new constitution alongside an “unedifying bunch of politicians” (Branch, 2010) raises a series of questions not least of which is why the change of heart for the Christian clergy?

Branch (2010) argues that the opposition of Kenya’s Christian clergy to the new constitution may partly be rooted in “a new and disturbing hostility to Islam”. Apart from their opposition to abortion under
any and all circumstances, the other major plank on the churches’ platform of opposition to the constitution was the inclusion of the Kadhi’s courts in the document, courts whose jurisdiction is limited to Muslims. However, it is only fair to note that not all Christian clergy were opposed to the adoption of the new constitution. Reverend Timothy Njoya, Archbishop David Gitari, and Father Ambrose Kimutai stand out as members of the clergy who stood in opposition to their colleagues as were some leaders of individual independent churches.

According to Lovin (1992, p 521), religion and church membership give “individuals their most comprehensive ideas about reality and the meaning of events”. Indeed, it is this very line of thinking that led Max Weber to his famous thesis on the Protestant work ethic. Evidence from more recent research in Europe and America show that although the impact of religion on politics may have been weakened in those areas, religion still matters in politics (Geissbuhler, 1999; Barneo & Schwarz, 1988; Castles, 1994; Jelen, 1993; Lovin, 1992). It has been shown that people who go to church more often think and act politically in different ways from those who seldom or never go to church (Geissbuhler, 2002). Could it therefore be the case in Kenya that the churches’ leadership were possessed of conservative and undemocratic attitudes and orientations that led them to campaign against the new and more democratic constitution? It is the preoccupation with this question that prompted this retrospective study.

**Background to the problem**

It has long been known that religion, as one of the basic social institutions, plays its role in political socialization alongside other socialization agents such as the school and the family. According to Fraser, Nelsen and Guth (1997), there is general agreement among scholars that religious cleavage was an important factor in the early formation of European political parties (Lane & Errson, 1991; Rose, 1974; Allardt and Rokkan, 1970; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) and studies carried out in America and Europe strongly give credence to this assertion (Geissbuhler, 1999; Barneo & Schwarz, 1988; Castles, 1994; Jelen, 1993; Lovin, 1992). In spite of the agreement that the influence of religion is waning in the West generally, these findings support the view that the influence of religion in shaping political attitudes in these countries is far from over. The political activities of the Christian clergy in Kenya before the referendum clearly leave no doubt that they are out to influence politics in no small measure and their reasons for attempting to do this are quite clear; the membership of number of these churches is growing by the day.

According to Oduah (2010), researchers say they have found the most religious place on Earth. This place is between the southern border of the Sahara and the tip of South Africa. More than three-quarters of the people living in 17 out of 19 countries in this region rate religion as “very important”. Results from a 10-country survey (Pew Forum, 2010) found that Christian renewalists (Pentecostals and Charismatics) are prevalent in three countries, namely, Brazil, Guatemala and Kenya and membership in the renewalist movement approaches or exceeds 50 per cent of the population in these countries. They were also reported to show strong support for political engagement. In nine out of the 10 countries at least one-half of these renewalists said that religious groups should express their views on day-to-day sacred and political questions. Indeed, these findings on the extent of church membership seems to be corroborated in Kenya by the results of the 2009 census that found that Christian churches accounted for up to 82 per cent of the population. These are shown in Table 1 below.
Beginning from Lovin’s (1992) assertion on the important role of religion in shaping political attitudes we may suggest that an upbringing that is based on a religious background should lead to different attitudinal and orientational outcomes from a secular upbringing (Geissbuhler, 2002). As Geissbuhler notes, should this supposition be correct we should expect to find differences in the political attitudes of people who are members of churches and those who are not. And this leads to two important questions for this study. First, given the fact that Kenyans are so obviously “religious” and that the adoption of a new constitution had for many decades past provided a rallying point for both the Christian clergy and for their followers, what led to the abrupt about-face of the clergy? Second, given the enormous nominal following of these churches on the one hand and the outcome of the referendum on the other, what caused the parting of ways between the clergy and their congregations?

Table 1: Distribution of the Kenyan population among Christian churches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Numbers in Millions</th>
<th>Percentage of Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>9,010,684</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>18,307,466</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian churches</td>
<td>4,559,584</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>31,877,734</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Kenya Education Guide, 2010)

Statement of the problem

Several surveys reveal that Kenyans are very religious and in the last national population census no less than 80 per cent of Kenyans declared that they were Christians. In the run-up to the referendum on the adoption of a new constitution the clergy sought to translate this large nominal religious following into political muscle. Initially they attempted to do so by influencing the content of the constitution but when these attempts failed, they sought no less than to use this following to reject the constitution in its entirety. Considering that many observers agree that it is a democratic constitution that offers much of what Kenyans have so long sought, this attempt by the Christian clergy to influence Kenyans to vote against it raises fundamental questions about the influence of religion, and more particularly, of the influence of Christianity, on Kenya’s politics. To the extent that such influence frustrates democracy and democratization, it could only be viewed as being detrimental to Kenya’s long-term political interests and aspirations. This retrospective study of students’ political attitudes and orientations was therefore intended to assess the possible nature of this influence.

Purpose of the study

This study is based on an analysis of the data that were originally collected in 1999 to examine the political attitudes and orientations of university undergraduate students across six universities in Kenya. It has been prompted by what appeared to have been suggested by the opposition of the mainstream Christian churches – the Catholics, the Protestants and the Evangelicals – to the new constitution. The purpose of this study was to find out the extent to which attending a Christian university affected one’s political attitudes and
orientations as opposed to attending a secular university. The purpose was to determine in what way, if any, the various Christian religions influenced the socialization of political attitudes and orientations.

According to Rokeach (1968, pp 450, 454), attitudes can be described as a type of subsystem of beliefs that are acquired through the “principles of learning”. They are learned as part of the process of growing up and tend to remain fairly stable during a person’s life (Sears and Funk, 1999, p 1). In this study religion and church membership are considered to be important in shaping individuals’ political attitudes and after Lovin (1992), are important to individuals in helping them to interpret reality.

Although the data of the present study did not distinguish atheists as a category, still some of the prepositions Geissbuhler makes concerning Christians may be useful here. Geissbuhler (2010) discusses and advances three theses that seek to distinguish between atheists and theists. His first thesis is that Christians are more to the political right. They tend to accept hierarchy and tradition and other value systems linked to conservatism and the political right. Geissbuhler’s second thesis is that Christians tend to be less open to discussion and political debate. This is because they “are integrated into a relatively stringent system of thought that does not leave a lot of room for interpretation and debate”. The third thesis is that Christians have an obligation to accept a “higher” authority, namely God and an often hierarchical church organization too. This probably makes them more compliant to administrative fiat.

**Objectives of the study**

Accordingly, the study had three major objectives:

1. To determine whether Christianity influenced political attitudes and orientations towards democracy;
2. To determine whether attending a Christian-sponsored university conferred political attitudes and orientations that were significantly different from those acquired by attending a secular university; and
3. To analyse the implications of the foregoing to Kenya’s political future.

**Significance of the study**

To the extent that these objectives are achieved the study may prove to be significant in the following ways:

1. It may be useful in determining the extent to which Christianity affects political socialization; an area so far not paid much attention to in Africa in general and in Kenya in particular.
2. Proceeding from this, it may afford the opportunity to assess the impact of such religious socialization in the shaping of political attitudes.
3. It may facilitate better understanding amongst policy makers on how best to engage the Christian churches in bringing about desirable political and social change.

**Hypothesis**

The study set out to explore the hypotheses that political attitudes and orientations of students attending Christian universities are significantly different from those attitudes and orientations of students attending secular universities. The following null hypothesis was tested:

There is no significant difference between the political attitudes and orientations of those students attending Christian universities and those attending secular universities.
Responses of students across six universities comprising three Christian universities (University of Eastern Africa, Baraton; Catholic University of East Africa (CUEA); and Daystar University) on the one hand and three secular universities on the other hand (Kenyatta University (KU); Maseno University and Egerton University) were analysed and compared.

Limitations of the study

The study had one (although not necessarily critical) limitation in that in the original data the religious affiliation of the informants was not captured. However, the assumptions of the test of the research hypothesis are based on fairly firm foundations. The Christian universities may not necessarily demand that one be a member of their denomination to be admitted as a student. Nonetheless, one would expect that a sizeable number of the student population in such a university would comprise of those who profess the faith. In addition, these universities, to a greater or lesser extent, impose certain religious strictures on students’ lifestyle that reflect the philosophy of the religion and may include religious observance. Even in cases where such observances may not be compulsory, it may be fair to assume that the larger proportion of students in such a university would be observers. Further, the respective religious philosophies of these universities inevitably inform their educational mission and therefore inform their pedagogy.

It is not the claim here that students in secular universities do not belong to religions. To the contrary, evidence of campus life in the secular universities show ample evidence of student religious activity. The only difference they may have to the Christian universities is that the observance of religion is purely voluntary and the rules for living are not necessarily informed by any particular religious creed. It is on these grounds that the comparison was made despite the limitation of not having collected the information on religious affiliation in the original study.

Research methodology

The study adopted a cross-sectional survey design and was quantitative in approach. It was carried out on the campuses of the six universities already mentioned above.

Population

The universities undergraduate students in Kenya comprised the population for the study. The universities were chosen for the original study for several reasons some that remain relevant to the present purpose. The first is that being tertiary institutions, they logically represent the ultimate confluence of the socialization effects of the formal education system with the other primary agents of the same process, especially religion. The second reason is what may be described as the country’s demographic profile. There is every reason to believe that the main age groups represented in the universities are, or very soon will be, the significant group in active politics in Kenya, especially as voters. In any case, their political attitudes and orientations cannot be taken lightly. Almost certainly and to a great extent, it is this group perhaps more than any other, whose attitudes and orientations will determine the character of democracy as far as its future development in Kenya is concerned.

Sampling

Samples were drawn from the six universities. The target was to have 150 informants from each university to give a total of 900 informants for the whole study. In the 1998/99 academic year when the sampling for the study was done, the three secular universities selected for the study accounted for some 49.2 per cent of the total enrolment of undergraduates in all the secular universities. The three Christian universities accounted for more than 70 per cent of the total undergraduate enrolment in private universities.
The total number of the undergraduate student population in the six universities numbered 23,845 students in all. Given this population, this sample size was calculated to be more than adequate for testing the hypothesis.

It was assumed that given the similarities among the general population of university undergraduates and the fairly large sample size for the study, a convenience sample of classes across the universities depending on their size and availability would be as good as random samples chose any other way. It was further assumed that such a sample would adequately capture the categories of the independent variables of the study. The rationale for using this procedure to procure samples that are then treated as random samples is well grounded in research (Dunn, 1964, p 12; Remmington & Schork, 1970, p 93; Armitage, 1971, p 99; Colton, 1974, pp 4-7; Daniel, 1978, p 3). The rationale in this case is that university undergraduate students are a fairly homogenous group in terms of the critical path they follow through the education system to get to the university. As such, any sample, provided that it is not too small, could be considered to be representative of any random sample of the population of undergraduate students in Kenya. The study also took into account the continuous nature of the socialization process by stratifying the various samples to reflect the four years of undergraduate education. This aspect gave the study its developmental or cross-comparative perspective.

The final study sample consisted of 879 informants. Of these, 47.2 per cent were males while 52.3 per cent were females. Four informants did not indicate their sex. In terms of the distribution across the six universities, CUEA accounted for 17.6 per cent of the sample, Daystar for 18 per cent, Egerton for 18.3 per cent, KU for 17 per cent, Maseno for 14 per cent and Baraton for 15.1 per cent. This information is presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Distribution of the sample across the universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Number of Informants</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CUEA (Catholic)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daystar (Evangelical)</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egerton (Secular)</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyatta (Secular)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maseno (Secular)</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baraton (Seventh Day Adventist)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to the year of study, 360 students or 41 per cent were in their third year, 239 students or 27.2 per cent in their first year, and 174 students or 19.8 per cent in their second year. Fourth year students comprised 101 students or 11.5 per cent of the informants while three students did not indicate their year of study. Fourth year students were remarkably fewer in the sample because of the increasing specialization as students progress through the university and hence the relatively smaller classes of fourth year students.

Selection of data collection instruments

A self-administered questionnaire comprised the sole tool of data collection for this study. Although the questionnaire contained both open-ended and closed-ended questions only three attitude scales were
actually used for the study. These attitude scales were of the Likert type. These attitude scales were adapted or borrowed from Shaw and Wright (1967) and Robinson and Shaver (1975). The instruments were duly piloted and their reliability established. The questionnaire yielded a correlation coefficient (r) of 0.85. This was subsequently followed by a factor analysis to isolate the various attitude dimensions of the various scales. A total of three scales were used namely, the Family Ideology Scale, the University’s Social-Political Environment Scale, and the Authoritarianism Scale. Following is a brief description and discussion of each one.

**The Family Ideology Scale**

This scale was developed by Levinson and Huffman (Shaw & Wright, 1967, pp 66-69) and is entitled *The Traditional Family Ideology (TFI) Scale* and was used in its abbreviated form for this study. According to Shaw and Wright, the 12-item abbreviated form of the original 58-item scale has proved to be just as reliable and valid as the longer version. For this study it was further abbreviated to 11 items.

It is a multi-dimensional scale and the domain strata identified in the original form as it was developed by Levinson and Huffman were: Parent-child relationships; husband-wife roles and relationships; general male-female relationships; concepts of masculinity and femininity; and general values and aims. However, the factor analysis carried out for this study identified four strata of attitude domains that were labelled as follows:

- Pre-eminence of male authority
- Behavioural norms for offspring
- Family personality attributes; and
- Parental morality socialization.

**The University’s Socio-Political Environment Scale**

This scale was developed by the Academic Freedom Committee, Illinois Division of the American Civil Rights Union, and published by Psychometric Affiliates in 1954 (Shaw & Wright, 1967, pp 145-147). Its proper title is the *Academic Freedom Survey*. The original scale had 23 items and covered various aspects of school life and various groups in the school including teachers and other general issues. This was further reduced to 12 items without loss of reliability. For this study, three further items were eliminated either because they seemed redundant or inapplicable in the Kenyan context.

In its original form it was conceived to have three strata of attitude domains namely the political system environment of the institution; the academic life; and the university administration-students relationships. From the factor analysis carried out for this study, three attitude domains emerged and were labelled as follows:

- Students’ political freedom
- Students’ access to university resources and facilities; and
- Students’ academic freedom.

**The Authoritarianism Scale**

This scale is adapted from a Likert-type scale designed by Edwards (1941, pp 579-582) to measure pro-fascist attitudes. The items were collected from a variety of sources including studies of Stagner and Gundlach and writings of Childs, Mann and Kolnai (Robinson & Shaver, 1975, p 367). For this study only seven items were selected from the original 22 items due to their relevance to the Kenyan situation.

As
originally developed it was conceived to have three strata of attitude domains namely considerations of strength and weakness; dominance and subservience; and supremacy and inferiority. From the factor analysis done for this study three attitude domains were once again identified and labelled as follows:

- Restrictions on women’s rights
- Limitations on civil rights; and
- Low achievement motivation.

Analysis

The data of the study were analysed using the one-way chi square ("goodness of fit") in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). A significant chi square indicates that across all the categories of the variable, the frequencies are distributed in a manner that is significantly different from that described by the null hypothesis.

The Findings

Out of the total 10 attitude dimensions, there proved to be significant differences between the students in the Christian universities and students in the secular universities in three dimensions. These are presented and discussed in turn below.

**Family personality attributes**

Students in Christian universities tended to have more democratic attitudes with regard to the dimension family personality attributes than their counterparts in secular universities. This is shown in Table 3.

**Table 3: Comparing students in Christian and secular universities on the attitude dimension of family personality attributes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>44.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>63.9</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>55.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>36.1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 9.74 \text{ (2 df, p < .05)} \]

If Geissbuhler is right that Christians are more to the political right than atheists then at least as far as this particular attitude dimension is concerned, the Christians were really in the secular universities! However, since this study did not specifically set out to study the attitudes of atheists, it may not be justified to conclude that those students who were in the Christian universities were atheists; indeed we know that they most likely were not. Nonetheless, this raises an interesting question. If we are not looking at atheists in the Christian universities, then what are we looking at? There are two possibilities. The first possibility is that the students who were in the secular universities were pronounceably more traditional in their family
ideology than the Catholics, Protestants and Evangelicals who predominated in the Christian universities, hence this outcome. The second possibility is that most of the students in the secular universities belonged to the “other Christian” (essentially Evangelicals) category of the 2009 census and in effect express attitudes of the Evangelicals in this group, who may possibly be less liberal in this regard than their Catholic and Protestant counterparts. Any of these explanations may be a possibility although this finding seems to call for a deeper investigation. Based on the evidence, however, those students in Christian universities, contrary to expectations, had a more liberal family ideology with respect to the dimension of family personality attributes than their counterparts in the secular universities.

Students’ academic freedom

With regard to academic freedom it was apparent, once again, that those students in the Christian universities perceived more of it than their counterparts in secular universities (Table 4). However, this goes against what is known about the Christian universities. Even a casual examination of the rules governing the Christian institutions reveals than in many respects they are less liberal that their secular counterparts. As such the explanation must lie

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>234 (52.9)</td>
<td>90 (20.4)</td>
<td>118 (26.7)</td>
<td>442 (50.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>276 (63.7)</td>
<td>62 (14.3)</td>
<td>95 (21.9)</td>
<td>433 (49.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>510 (58.3)</td>
<td>152 (17.4)</td>
<td>2.3 (24.3)</td>
<td>875 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 11.00$ (2 df, p < .01)

elsewhere and the most likely reason would be the fairly common gap that often exists between perception and objective reality. This may then lend support to Geissbuhler’s second hypothesis that Christians are more “integrated into a relatively stringent system of thought that does not leave a lot of room for interpretation and debate”. In effect this means that because they lived under a less liberal regime of rules, they had become conditioned to this situation to the extent that they were in a way content and unable or unwilling to contemplate the possibilities of greater academic freedom. Certainly in circumstances where possibilities for greater freedom are limited, it may be less stressful to become content in the knowledge that it is not a lifelong condition.
Further, the dimension of academic freedom in which the students in the Christian universities perceived greater democracy related to issues to do with admission, the award of bursaries, having their views considered in matters to do with the curricula, living conditions, fairness in disciplinary matters and in self-expression. This dimension, unlike the other dimensions of the scale has a particularly inward-looking individual element rather than being directed towards engagement with the student body as a whole. In other words, this attitude dimension primarily taps into the issues of relevance to the individual as a person in the socio-political environment of the university rather than of the individual as a member of the student body. In practice, it is a reflection of the Protestant ethic that translates into an attitude that God only helps those who help themselves or that the individual is the creator of his or her own salvation (Weber, 2002).

Low achievement motivation

Finally, with regard to the place of will power in achieving success, students in secular universities had a more liberal attitude than their counterparts in the Christian universities. In other words, more than their counterparts in the secular universities, the students in the Christian universities were more likely to attribute individual success to possession of “will power”. This is presented in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\chi^2 = 11.17 \ (2 \text{ df}, p < .01)\]

Max Weber’s thesis on the Protestant ethic argues that Calvinists identify true faith by a type of conduct that serves to increase the glory of God. This conduct depends much on individual will power (Weber, 2000). The individual is thus obliged to draw from the power within the self in order to work for the glory of God and the certainty of salvation. Thus, logically, we should expect that this ethic would be more apparent among the Protestants than among the Catholics. However, since the denomination variable was not captured in data collection it is not possible to state this in any definite fashion. This leaves one possibility. As the sample of the universities show there were two universities with a Protestant background as compared to only one Catholic university. This may have very well resulted in the Protestant ethic dominating the attitudes of the sample of the Christian universities thus leading to the appearance of this ethic that attributes “success” to will power as the ethic demands. This in turn may have meant that the sample of secular universities that may not have had such a high concentration of Protestants effectively diluted this ethic to give voice to a more liberal view of factors that contribute towards individual success.
The foregoing seems to lead to the simple conclusion that indeed, there are significant differences between some political attitudes of students in Christian universities and those in secular universities. However, given that no significant differences emerged in seven out of the 10 attitude dimensions in which they were compared, it would seem justified to conclude that the weight of evidence seems to be on the side of more similarities rather than differences in the socialization of political attitudes and orientations between the students in the Christian universities and the ones in the secular universities.

Summary
Although the cause of the differences in the first dimension discussed: family personality attributes, could not be readily discerned, the differences in the two other dimensions namely, students’ academic freedom and low achievement motivation seem to be attributable to what Max Weber (2002) described as the attitudes of Calvinists in his Protestant ethic. The Calvinist notion of work is that of a duty that benefits both the individual and society as a whole and it is through the former that the latter is realized. In all these the tendency is to emphasise the importance of exercising individual will and focusing on personal conduct as the way to grace and this might well be the explanation of the emphasis of the students in the Christian universities focusing on academic freedoms that are concerned with individual welfare rather than on the issues that are concerned with the wider student body. This may also be the reason why in the third attitude dimension those students in the Christian universities, more than their counterparts in the secular universities, believed in the importance of exercising will power to ensure individual success.

Conclusion
This being a preliminary study, it may not be appropriate to make any firm conclusions. However, based on the evidence that emerged from the study the following tentative conclusions appear to be in order.

With regard to the first objective of whether being Christian influenced political attitudes and orientations towards democracy in one way or the other, it seems only fair to say that although some evidence emerged to suggest that this was the case, such evidence was not overwhelming. Thus, whatever led to the about-face of the Christian clergy with regard to the referendum, it appears that it had little or nothing to do with the attitudinal or orientational outcomes of being a Christian. Second, in relation to the objective of whether attending a Christian university conferred political attitudes and orientations that were significantly different from those acquired by those attending secular universities, there was evidence that this was indeed the case although, once again, such evidence was not overwhelming.

With reference to the third objective the findings of this study suggest that by and large the students’ political attitudes and orientations were not primarily shaped by their religious affiliations and therefore a fairly coherent division could be placed between the secular and sacred aspects of life. Thus, on the issue of what all these may portend for Kenya’s political future and democracy, it would seem to suggest that religion’s influence on political attitudes and orientations go only so far and no further and this seems to have been the message communicated by the results of the referendum. This may well indicate that at least for the time being, Kenya’s nascent democracy is not under serious threat from Christianity.

It would therefore seem that the opposition that Kenyans witnessed among the Christian clergy to the new constitution was motivated by factors other than their religious affiliation per se and their subsequent misreading of their followers’ intentions in the referendum is perhaps adequate evidence of this. According to Gibson (2009), decades of social science research show that those professing religious affiliation and

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beliefs tend to be less tolerant of opposing political views. That is to say that religion seems to act more as a breeding ground for condemning those with opposing political views. The steadfastness and tenacity of their campaign against the new constitution bears witness to this as well as their consistent and deliberate misrepresentation of the implications of the provisions on abortion and the Kadhi’s courts. The evidence according to Gibson is that religionists are loath to tolerate those they perceive as threatening them. Thus, the question as to whether the reasons they gave are adequate to account for their failure to read the moods of their flock must remain moot.

Nonetheless, the fact that the flock decidedly parted way with their shepherds would seem to show quite clearly that most Kenyans would like to observe a separation between the sacred and the secular. If it was at all a gamble by the clergy that they would carry their congregations along, then it was a poor gamble. As Reverend Njoya acerbically remarked on Easter Sunday 4 April 2010: “If the church campaigns for a “no” vote and fails to garner support among Kenyans, that will be the end of its responsibility for the Kenyan society. It will have caused its own abortion”!! For the time being therefore, whatever the extent of the influence of religion, it does not appear to permeate very deeply into the political arena.

References


