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C50/10413/08

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS (HISTORY), OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

JANUARY, 2013
DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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DEDICATION

It is with immense joy and gratitude that I salute everyone that has in a way contributed to the completion of this thesis. My parents Peter Ondere and late mother Mrs. Mary Shiroya Nyaranga; Uncle Richard Obare Indakwa; brothers Wycliffe, Justus and Harrison, the late Moses, Patrick and sister Christine. It is because of you that I have come this far. Finally, to my wife Sudat, our son Rahim and daughter Trizer Shiroya.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis has drawn a lot of support from people and institutions. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr. Samson Moenga Omwoyo and Dr. Peter Wafula Wekesa. This is because of their valuable advice and patience throughout the period of writing this thesis. You made this for me a life and academic transforming experience. Sharing ideas was a uniquely fulfilling experience.

Second, I would also like to express my sincere and special gratitude to Kenyatta University and the Department of History, Archaeology and Political Studies for awarding me a scholarship to pursue my Master of Arts degree. I am indebted to all members of staff of the department who nurtured and developed my intellectual abilities and inspired me both materially and morally. Special mention here is made of Dr. G.R. Murunga, Dr. P.W. Kakai and Dr. E. Kisiangani who offered to read my raw work and availed to me the relevant literature. To my classmates Linda Kajuju, Viola Sugut and Leonard Ireri, thanks a lot for your moral support, encouragement and the shared academic experiences throughout the programme.

Third, I am deeply indebted to the staff of several libraries, agencies, boards and the civil servants of the Government of Kenya (GoK). All these were supportive and helpful during my research. They include librarians at the Moi Library of Kenyatta University, the Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library of the University of Nairobi, the British Institute of East Africa Library and the Kenya National Archives. Similarly, all Non-Governmental
Organization’s Coordination Board staff, United Nations Humans Settlement Agency’s personnel and all the informants whom I encountered in the field deserve special gratitude. In particular, I would like to thank Mr. Sekoh Nyandiero and Douglas O. Owino of the NGOs Coordination Board and Hellen Nyabera of UN-HABITAT for their considerable assistance.

I also extend my special appreciation to my entire family for their support, encouragement and love they offered me. To my uncle Richard Obare Indakwa, thank you for believing in me. Your warm hospitality, love, understanding and financial support have been an asset to me and for that I will be forever grateful. To my brother Thomas Onono and Harrison Indakwa, thank you for your moral support. To my treasured wife Sudat Wanjiru Hussein, our daughter Trizer Ayuma Nyaranga and son Rahim Inzaghi Ondere, my thanks are inexpressible. Your patience, understanding and encouragement made this thesis feasible. Thank you for being there even when the difficulties seemed insurmountable.

Finally, I would like to thank my research assistants; Maureen Wanjiru, Victor Andere Ambole and Steve Juma for helping me navigate Kibera to collect data and of course the interviewees for responding to our questions. There are also other valuable contributions from individuals and to them, I too owe a debt of gratitude.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ................................................................................................................ II
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................. III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................... IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................. VI
LIST OF TABLES, GRAPHS, FIGURES AND CHARTS .............................................. VIII
DEFINITION OF TERMS ............................................................................................. IX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ....................................................... VIII
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. XIII

CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................ 1
   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ................. 1
   1.2 Statement of the Problem .............................................................................. 4
   1.3 Objectives of the Study ................................................................................ 5
   1.4 Research Premises ........................................................................................ 5
   1.5 Justifications and Significance of the Study .................................................. 5
   1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study ............................................................... 8
   1.7 Review of Related Literature ...................................................................... 9
   1.8 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................... 28
   1.9 Research Methodology ................................................................................ 36
   1.9.1 Area of Study .......................................................................................... 39

CHAPTER TWO ........................................................................................................ 43
   EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF KIBERA UPTO 1963 .............................. 43
   2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 43
   2.2 Migrations, Settlement and Early History of Kibera prior to 1963 ............ 44
   2.3 The Political, Social and Economic Organizations of Kibera prior to 1963 .... 54
   2.4 The Colonial State and Development in Kibera prior to 1963 ...................... 68
   2.5 Summary ....................................................................................................... 81
CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................................. 83

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 83
3.2 Kenya’s Urban Policy after Independence and its Impact on Livelihoods in Kibera ......................................................................................................................... 84
3.3 The Growth of Nairobi in Post Independent Kenya ............................................... 95
3.4 The State’s Programmes on Housing and Poverty Reduction .............................. 97
3.4.1 Programmes on Health and Sanitation .............................................................. 101
3.5 Other Private Employment Partners in Kibera from 1963 to 1978. ....................... 103
3.6 Summary .................................................................................................................. 107

CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................. 109

4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 109
4.2 Background of UN-HABITAT ............................................................................. 110
4.3.1 Programmes on Housing and Poverty Reduction ........................................... 119
4.3.2 Programmes on Health and Sanitation ............................................................ 125
4.4 UN-HABITAT Relations with Other Development Partners in Kibera since 1978 ..................................................................................................................... 131
4.4.1 Kibera Residents .............................................................................................. 135
4.4.2 The State ........................................................................................................... 137
4.4.3 Other Non-state Actors .................................................................................... 140
4.5 UN-HABITAT Development Realities in Kibera since 1978 ............................... 142
4.6 Summary .................................................................................................................. 148

CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................................. 150

Conclusion and Recommendations ............................................................................. 150

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 161

APPENDIX I: QUESTION GUIDELINE FOR THE PEOPLE OF KIBERA .......... 181
APPENDIX II: QUESTION GUIDELINE FOR UN-HABITAT PERSONNEL .......... 183
APPENDIX III: QUESTION GUIDELINE FOR NGOS COORDINATION BOARDS .......... 184
APPENDIX IV: OTHER DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS AND RESPONDENTS ..... 185
APPENDIX V: LIST OF RESPONDENTS/INFORMANTS ...................................... 186
LIST OF TABLES, GRAPHS, FIGURES AND CHARTS

FIGURE 1.1 KENYA; ECONOMIC GROWTH AND URBANIZATION, 1960-2005. ................................................................. 16

FIGURE 1.2 AFRICA; ECONOMIC GROWTH AND URBANIZATION, 1960-2005 ................................................................. 17

FIGURE 1.3 LIBERIA; ECONOMIC GROWTH AND URBANIZATION, 1960-2005 ................................................................. 18

MAP 1: LOCATION OF KIBERA SLUM......................................................... 42


Table 4.2: Average Annual Rate of Change of Urban Population .................. 112
DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Aid** - According to Morton (1975), aid is defined as resources primarily intended to assist economic development, transferred on concessional terms. It follows that aid involves voluntary transfer of resources from one country to another, partly with the objective of benefitting the recipient country. It is given in form of financial grants or loans or in form of materials, labour or expertise.

**Development** - Rodney (1976) defines development as that which implies creativity, skills and material well being understood in the context of the society under study. It is the process of change towards the enhancement of people’s social economic welfare and the average individual scope for self fulfillment. However, in this present study, not all changes constitute development. Indicators such as literacy levels, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the Gross National Product (GNP) and levels of employment are used to measure socio-economic development. The economic aspect of development involves the increase in the standard of living of a nation’s population with sustained growth from simple low incomes economy to a modern high-income economy.

**Exploitation** - is to make unethical use of something for one’s own advantage or profit. The latter is gained through full monopolistic trade (Lenin 1972: 62).
Non State Actors- these essentially connote legally constituted organizations created by natural or legal persons with no participation or representation of any government. In the case in which the organizations are funded totally or partially by the government, the former maintain their nongovernmental status and exclude government representatives from membership in the organizations.

Transformation- refers to quantitative change in form, shape or appearance. In relation to this study, it involves the process that improves the social, economic and political well being of a population.

Underdevelopment- According to Rodney (1976), the term means low levels of development in comparative terms. Further, it makes sense only as a means of comparing levels of development. The latter can be measured using indices such as politics, education, infrastructure, production, health services and employment.

Urban- According to Murunga (1998), urban is the autonym of the rural. However, this study notes that not every form of city growth is an urbanization process. It treats the process of urbanization as both a product and a tool for development. Urbanization here means a dynamic process involving the emergence, growth and transformation in the nature and functions of a settlement (Mumford, 1961).
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAK                        Action Aid Kenya
AMREF                      African Medical Research Foundation
ATR                        Africa Traditional Religion
CCN                        City Council of Nairobi
CHRE                       Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
CK                         Carolina for Kibera
CODESRIA                   Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa
CSUD                       Centre for Sustainable Urban Development
GDP                        Gross Domestic Product
GNP                        Gross National Product
GoK                        Government of Kenya
HWK                        Hope Worldwide Kenya
ILO                        International Labour Organization
IMF                        International Monetary Fund
KCYP                       Kibera Community Youth Programme
KENSUP                     Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme
KERUDO                     Kenya Evangelical Rural and Urban Development Outreach
KIWSWMP                    Kibera Integrated Water, Sanitation and Waste Management Project
KNA                        Kenya National Archives
KNH                        Kenyatta National Hospital
KWAHO                      Kenya Water for Health Organization
NCCK                       National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGOs  Non–Governmental Organization
SHAFCO  Shinning Hope for Community
SNGOs  Non Governmental Organizations in the South
SAPS  Structural Adjustment Programs
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO  United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme
UN- HABITIAT  United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children Fund
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USD  United States Dollars
WB  World Bank
WFP  World Food Programme
WHO  World Health Organization
WVK  World Vision Kenya
WWI  World War One
WWII  World War Two
ABSTRACT

This study examines the role of non-state actors in transforming urban livelihoods. It uses the case of UN-HABITAT to demonstrate the transformation of Kibera slum between 1963 and 2003. Within the framework of dependency and underdevelopment theory, the study explores the role of external factors in development of urban centers in developing countries. It points out that aid has in one way or another contributed to underdevelopment in the developing countries’ urban centers. The study further demonstrates the weaknesses of the theory in explaining the role of the state and other local forces in urban development. It begins by taking an in-depth analysis of the role of the state in Africa after independence. It examines how the years of the early 1960s saw the barriers of colonialism thoroughly cast down. After 1963, Kenya set its development agenda as a priority. However, independence did not effect a major ideological break with the colonial state. Instead, the independent state expanded colonial administrative and economic infrastructures. The study outlines an informed reflection on Africa’s current deep disappointments with the nation state which has led to increased poverty and dependence on aid. It traces and assesses the emergence and growth of Kibera. In the first decade of independence, Nairobi, just like other cities elsewhere in Africa witnessed the emergence and growth of urban informal settlements. This challenge was adequately explained by taking into account the long term goals of African nationalism which included complete Africanization of the political and socio-economic settings. The study examined how the Kenyan state failed to perform its dominant role of urban development because of lack of funds, expertise, poor governance and technology. This was the genesis of non-state actors in the transformation of Kenya’s urban spaces. The study examined the role of UN-HABITAT as a non state actor in the transformation of livelihoods in Kibera. It evaluated some development programs of the UN-HABITAT in Kibera such as housing, poverty reduction, health and sanitation. The study demonstrated how non state actors collaborated with other development stakeholders to achieve their developmental objectives. The non-state actors pursued political agenda aimed at benefiting from the prevailing circumstances. It demonstrated that while external factors and international considerations are critical to urban development, domestic and local forces also play an important role in shaping the outcome. Using an integrated approach, the study demonstrates how the lives of the urban poor in Kibera can be transformed and how best internal and external forces can bring about change. The study relied on primary and secondary sources of data. The former was collected through oral interviews while written materials were scrutinized and sieved to minimize subjectivity. In analyzing the data collected, the study employed both qualitative and quantitative approaches for the purposes of accuracy, uniformity and logical historical work.
CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Introduction

Development can be defined as that which implies creativity, skills and material well being understood in the context of the society under study (Rodney, 1976:10). This definition is opposed to the view that social-economic and political developments were either absent, underdeveloped or underutilized in Africa before the advent of Europeans. European imperialists argued that upon their arrival on the continent, the underdeveloped sectors were given impetus for growth. However, many studies have proved wrong the assumptions given that social, economic and political spheres of Africans had long developed before the arrival of the colonialists (Rodney 1976 and Cohen 1981). In fact, many of the pathologies of modern states in Africa are traceable to the process of colonialism. Olukoshi (2003) points out that most of the African boundaries on African maps were arbitrary drawn on the African map regardless of existing ethno-cultural, geographical and ecological realities of Africa.

It follows that the major hindrances to state consolidation have turned out to be the cost of devolving power, nature of national boundaries and the design of state systems. Similarly, the fact that neo-colonialism exists in Africa today implies that colonialism never ended and decolonization is not yet complete. For instance, since Kenya’s independence in 1963, the rural Kenyans and their urban counterparts have been artificially bound together in a country whose boundaries were decided by outsiders and where more than forty-two ethnic groups divided by thirteen vernacular languages and by
competing and conflicting customs co-exist but its rulers sought to exploit rather than unite (Morton, 1998: 30). According to Ochieng’ and Ogot (1995), decolonization is a much wider concept than the mere transfer of power. The authors observe that African leaders did not effect an ideological and structural break with the colonial state. Instead, they extended the former colonial administrative and economic infrastructures hence the current phenomenon of underdevelopment and dependence in Africa. At independence, Kenya was made up of a host of different ethno-cultural groups and nations that were having different historical traditions and cultures which created the problem of nation-state building.

The process of urbanization is also to blame for increased levels of poverty. Urban centers created by colonialists strictly served military and economic interests rather than to duplicate power infrastructures (Herbst, 2000: 19). Mombasa and Nairobi, for instance, emerged as the sole major urban centers because of their strategic locations as trading and transportation nodes (Sujor and Weaver, 1976: 290). These sentiments are echoed by Hake (1977) who points out that prior to 1899, the site where Nairobi is currently located was a meeting place for the Kikuyu and Massai traders. The function of other smaller towns was a form of network of administrative centers. Occasionally, they coincided with the sites of traditional markets but more often than not, their location was to be explained by the railway, access to cash crop producing areas or topography and climate. The medium sized towns were primarily service centers for the white highlands rather than the central places of the densely populated areas. All these gave primacy to political and fiscal needs of the colonizers only. In regard to the above, Wang’ombe (1995) points out
that the unprecedented expansion of urban centers in the developing world has led to the emergence and growth of informal settlements. Kibera emerged during colonialism due to the phenomenal expansion of Nairobi. The latter was characterized by extreme levels of poverty, inadequate health and social services, degraded and unclean environments lacking drainage, water supply and waste disposal. In the light of the above, development has become more crucial hence the entry of non-state actors.

There are many urban informal settlements in Nairobi, a city which according to Carman (1976) was reluctantly accepted as the official capital of the British East Africa Protectorate in 1907 as it faced severe plague attacks and persistent malaria. This study focuses on Kibera, being one of the oldest informal urban settlements in Nairobi. The 2009 Kenyan Census put Kibera’s population at 170,070 (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). It was established in 1912 by the British colonial government. Initially, Kibera was a military reserve but later turned out as a resettlement for the Nubian soldiers and their families in 1918. Since then, the slum has continued to create more issues and challenges of development such as high levels of poverty, inadequate housing and health facilities and degraded sanitation as a result of rural - urban migrations and pressure on existing resources. The state (GoK) has been overwhelmed by the challenges thus non-state actors are stepping in to transform livelihoods of the urban poor.

This study focused on UN-HABITAT, a UN agency for human settlements. It is mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the main goal of providing adequate shelter for all. The
impact of UN-HABITAT in the world has been wide and varied. For instance, a city like Singapore has been tremendously transformed through the UN-HABITAT participatory urban planning management and governance (UN-HABITAT, 2008). However, in Kenya and Nairobi’s Kibera slum in particular, this has not been the case. This study provides a frame of reference for evaluating the role of non-state actors in the transformation of livelihoods in Kibera using the case of UN-HABITAT from 1963-2003. This is in the belief that underdevelopment is not an original condition of Africa. Similarly, underdevelopment and development are two sides of the same coin.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This study investigates the role of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of livelihoods in Kibera. Due to inadequacies of the programs of the Kenyan state in the settlement since 1963, UN-HABITAT as a non-state actor has come in to aid in various activities such as provision of housing and poverty reduction.

The present study addresses the following pertinent questions: What led to the emergence and growth of Kibera up to 1963? What programs were initiated by the state in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera from 1963 to 1978? Lastly, how has the UN-HABITAT transformed Kibera from 1978-2003?
1.3 Objectives of the Study

This study set out to achieve the following objectives;

1. To trace the emergence and growth of Kibera up to 1963.
2. To analyze the Kenyan state’s programs in Kibera from 1963 to 1978.
3. To investigate the role of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of Kibera from 1978 to 2003.

1.4 Research Premises

The study is premised on the assumptions that;

1. The emergence and growth of Kibera as an African urban informal settlement owes much to the colonial period.
2. The independent Kenyan governments’ response to the plight of the poor was characterized by the setting up of various programs since 1963 up to 1978
3. The UN-HABITAT has been a major stakeholder in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera from 1978 to 2003.

1.5 Justifications and Significance of the Study

This study contributes greatly to Kenya’s historiography. It provides insights into the whole question of the role of non-state actors in the process of development. Many studies on urban transformation dwell on demography, structures and behaviours. These are evident in Niang’ (2001) and Vass (2003) on the impact of HIV/AIDS on the labour force in Africa. Others that have been done have a general orientation either focusing at a national level, for instance Gugler (1988) or continental level, in the case of Curtin
(1985), almost at the exclusion of pertinent issues such as health, poverty and sanitation at the local level. While these studies are significant, there has been need to research on issues of concern that affect the day to day lives of the poor in urban informal settlements. The present study gives a historical perspective of the role of non-state actors in the transformation of urban livelihoods by narrowing down to focus on UN-HABITAT due to the agency’s development initiatives in Kibera. Other studies on related topics are Euro-centric, for instance, Gitelson (1975) argues that the greater the level of dependency as measured by foreign investment, the higher the level of urban development. From Marxist perspectives, the assumption has limitations. This study provides a more detailed account on UN-HABITAT’s role in transforming lives of the poor in Kibera in relation to the author’s assumption.

The ever changing relations between non-state actors and the international community are a reflection of the situation in the 1980s, when the civil society played a pivotal role in the return of multiparty politics in Kenya. Non-state actors were believed to be independent hence the right channels for funds to reach the target group, in this case the urban poor (Njuguna, 1989: 07). However, Kenya’s performance more than twenty years after independence was not impressive. Ochieng’ and Ogot (1995) argue that it was because top executive positions in the civil service were filled up by economically under-developed Africans while a number of top clerical and lower executive cadres were to remain for several years in the hands of the foreigners. Political strife, poverty, hunger and several limitations on civil liberties grew in intensity, for instance professionals and academicians being rounded up by security agencies (ibid). Kenyans were faced with
poverty and unemployment. This occurred during the Presidency of the late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978). Unlike the administration of President Mwai Kibaki and Raila Amollo Odinga (2002-2007), Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi who was President from 1978 to 2002 was a bitterly outspoken critic of the financing of non-state actors by the Western governments. He accused the major donors to Kenya, especially Norwegians and Americans, of dumping billions of shillings into political non-state actors and repeatedly vowed to crack them down. Consequently, Ochieng’ and Ogot (1995) observe that it was during Daniel Arap Moi’s Presidency that Kenya’s economy was beset with economic problems. Morton (1998) echoes the sentiments by arguing that Daniel Arap Moi was one of Africa’s longest serving and most controversial leaders and survived a coup attempt, tribal unrest and several economic upheavals. At that period in time, the government’s response was to adjust to the economics of structural adjustment. The latter led to increased public debts and encouraged foreign investments. In the light of the above, the present study analyses the state’s programs in Kibera since 1963. This was because it was a time when the GoK had embarked on improving the lives of the people.

The perceived failures of Moi’s regime saw non-state actors and the entire civil society fraternity re-emerge as leading advocates of reform. Consequently, development partners’ warm relations with the state and the recruitment of key civil society actors in President Mwai Kibaki’s administration (2002-2007) questioned the credibility of non-state actors. The study examines the role of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of Kibera given that the agency had initiated development programs in the settlement.
Kibera was selected for this study because of several reasons. Though the settlement is not a homogenous entity it compromises of a large number of the urban poor in Nairobi. Moreover, the target population is cosmopolitan and has a variety of religious affiliations. The study demonstrates how political, ethnic and religious diversity has affected the process of urban development, other than the primacy of economy in change. The study spans between 1963 and 2003. The year 1963 was significant because it is the time Kenya achieved independence. Much was anticipated with regard to development particularly in the urban settings. Since then, foreign aid emerged as a major tool in the neo-colonial project in Kenya, (Ochieng’ and Ojuka, 1975: 239). Kenya’s economy was dominated by European and American donors, itself a consequence of colonial history. Shivji (2006) observes that thousands of non-state actors have continued to emerge but the aid they have provided has been detrimental to the process of development. Since 1963, there has also been change of regimes, that is, the late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta’s administration to Daniel Arap Moi’s era (1978-2002), ushering in President Mwai Kibaki’s government (2003-2007). All these laid the basis for this study in examining the patterns of change in as far as the role of non-state actors in the transformation of urban livelihoods is concerned.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The scope of the present study was restricted to UN-HABITAT in Kibera. The title indicates and establishes the scope and geographical limitations as well as the time frame. However, where necessary an examination of periods before 1963 and after 2003 was sought as the historical evolution of Kibera was probed. In reference to non-state actors
established in recent times, of significance to the study was Carolina for Kibera (CK) and The Kenya Slum Upgrading Program (KENSUP) which initiated major programs with the aim of transforming the lives of the poor in Kibera. Although the settlement was treated as the focal point of the study, other factors within and outside Nairobi that contributed to its evolution were traced. Similarly, issues and challenges of development dealt with herein include poverty, housing, health and sanitation. However, they were not rigidly adhered to as other causes to unsustainable urban development such as unemployment, insecurity, and decline in agricultural production have been examined.

Some issues, such as tribalism, hostilities, financial constraints, limited time, and status quo arose during the research. However, they did not influence the entire outcome of the study. For instance, more money was outsourced and the help of research assistants sought to solve the problems of financial constraints and limited time respectively. Similarly, neutrality was observed and politicizing the research problem during data collection avoided.

1.7 Review of Related Literature

There are abundant studies on the state, urbanization and non-state actors in Africa. Literature on the formation and role of the state in Africa is also enormous. Similarly, literature on urbanization in Africa and non-state actors in general is relatively substantial. Studies on the role of non-state actors in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kenya do not focus on worldwide agencies. Perhaps, no study has been carried out on the role of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of urban livelihoods in
Kibera. The present study reviewed literature on the state, the process of urbanization and non-state actors in Africa to authenticate the contention.

The State

Looking at the pitfalls of national consciousness, Fanon (1963) points out that in Africa the tribe is preferred to the state. National consciousness has turned out to be an empty shell, crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been (Fanon, 1963: 149). The author attributes this to the mutilation of the colonized by the colonizers and intellectual laziness of the nationalists in Africa. He further notes that the national middle class who took over power at the end of the colonial era was underdeveloped economically and lacked innovativeness. To him, such a pre-occupation implied that they neither had economic power nor were they engaged in production or invention. He concludes that the single party system in Africa is the modern form of dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. In the light of the above, the latter does not exist in Africa, as it is not a replica of Europe but its caricature. According to the author, Africans should not allow the bourgeoisie to find conditions necessary for existence and growth. The author suggests that people should be given political education, that is, governments must ‘govern with the people and for the people’ (Fanon, 1963: 180). Fanon’s work was of immediate relevance to the present study in that it provided insights into the role of the state in development. Similarly, this work aided the study in locating the place of the civil society in the process of development. Frantz Fanon contends that the civil society should work together with the state to transform livelihoods. The observations made by the author in general contexts
were invaluable to the present study as the state’s programs in Kibera from 1963 to 1978 were being analyzed.

Berman (1990) analyses the modern state in Africa. The author’s conclusion was invaluable to the present study as he specifically discusses pertinent details of the state that are discernable in Kenya. Berman observes that the modern state in Kenya was created by European powers staffed by administrative cadres who carried with the implementation of colonial policies. According to him, however, Marxist scholars have constructed regional theories of the state detached from systematic analysis of the contradiction and crises of capitalism. The author asserts that the state contributes to the cohesion and maintenance of the social formation. Similarly, persistence of the system is an indicator that the state is performing its necessary functions. The colonial state secured an end and purpose given in the system itself. It follows that economic and political functions of the state should be separated and an explanation given as to why the state becomes increasingly involved in diverse domains of social existence (Berman, 1990: 15).

Davidson (1992) systematically addresses the problem of the state in Africa. The author traces the pathologies of modern states in Africa to the process of colonialism. The years of 1960s saw the barriers of colonialism thoroughly cast down (Davidson, 1992: 197). For instance, Kenya under colonial rule had health systems that were hospital based, providing high technology services to urban elites. The WHO (1981) Report observes that in the post independent period, the GoK attempted to rectify the situation by
pursuing equity objectives in terms of providing healthcare for all. However, Davidson notes that this did not last for long as it was replaced by disappointments and disillusionments. The hesitation on the part of politicians offered opportunities for official corruption. Davidson (1992) echoes the sentiments, pointing out examples such as the miseries of civil war in Nigeria (1967-70) and the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in Ghana, (1966). Similarly, politicians gained and reproduced the support of local leaders, allocating them state resources over which they (these politicians) had influence and control (Davidson, 1992: 207). The author concludes that the modern state in Africa is not liberal and protective of its citizens but simply constricting and exploitative. According to Davidson, the key to progress can be found in devolving executive power to a multiplicity of local representative bodies. He further notes that a new capitalist class should be nurtured in Africa. Davidson’s views seem similar to those of Chege (2004). In Chege’s essay on the Handicaps of Political Science, ‘accountability must remain a democratic issue rather than being redefined as performance’. The authors concur on issues of corruption and accountability. Their conclusion is that the state its subjects should be held accountable for the use of resources available. The works were invaluable in the analysis of the state’s and UN- HABITAT’s programs in Kibera.

Olukoshi (2001) asserts that it is the prolonged military rule in Africa that has generated deep seated political instability. Though he attributes it to the colonialists, the author affirms that Africans are too part of the problem hence solutions lie with them. He observes that the West perhaps assumed that colonial rule would last forever and when the African revolution came, they took everything and sabotaged what they could not
take with them. This was followed with cold war which has induced civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa. Africans were divided on ideological differences of Europe which in turn created classes in the society. Consequently, African leaders time and again have been confronted with the problem of how to devolve power in sparsely settled territories. In places where there are high population densities, ecological conditions have made it impossible to control the state. Governments have not been able to provide adequate infrastructure and services for the entire population because of the pressure exerted on the available resources. Geographical factors have also aggravated the cost of expanding power. Olukoshi outlines detailed insights as to why there must be links between cities and towns which are the core political areas of the surrounding territories. To him, we need to make extensive investments in infrastructure and integrate the peripheral areas into the overall economy. The author concludes that the viability of our state depend on our leaders successfully meeting the challenges posed by their particular environments. In spite of the generation orientation of the failure of the state in Africa, Olukoshi’s work was relevant to the present study.

According to Mkandawire and Soludo (1999), the emphasis is not on whether external or internal factors are the cause of failed states of Africa. The authors affirm that it is primarily the responsibility of Africans to devise and implement the necessary policy changes. Further, what happens to an economy depends greatly on the point of departure. In the light of the above, the authors observe that most African countries have preserved a major legacy for colonialism (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 08). To them, policy fundamentals in Africa must address issues of equity, economic growth, stability and
political legitimacy. If only Africans took the above issues seriously and the international community listened, then the long and costly learning curve could be minimized. This implies that the international community should not interfere in internal matters of African states while the later should seek local solutions to their problems. It follows that the political system in Africa must be taxed heavily. To the authors, this can only be sustained through a sense of shared vision and common purpose. Further, they observe that measures adapted to deliberately accelerate development in other regions of the world are inappropriate for Africa. Despite the deep rooted general assumption in this work that African leaders have not effected changes since the 1960’s, it was invaluable to the present study. It provided detailed insights into the impact of external and internal factors in the transformation of urban livelihoods in developing countries.

Urbanization

Addressing the question of urbanization in the Third World, Gugler (1988) observes that it is a country’s population growth that leads people to migrate to find employment in urban markets. The latter, in Africa, is characterized by demand for housing and unemployment. On the other hand, rapid population growth takes place without capital-intensive agriculture—meaning without raising agricultural productivity. In a nutshell, the author concludes that urbanization in Africa is a consequence of poverty. Similarly, it does not coincide with industrialization, as it was the case in Europe. For instance, in Lagos (Nigeria), the population grew from 0.3 million in 1950 to 13.4 million in 2004 without significant development (Davis, 2006: 138). This implies that generally, urbanization is strongly linked to the development process as it is an inevitable outcome
of the former. People’s socio-economic welfare and the average individual scope of self-fulfillment should be made possible. This is well illustrated by World Bank (2007) empirical evidence that clearly demonstrates that as a country becomes more urban its per capita income also tends to rise (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below).

However, in Liberia as shown in Figure 1.3 below, a country ravaged by civil war has experienced a decline in per capita income while its population was becoming more urban; indicating that internal conflicts (which in this particular case drove thousands of rural people to seek the security of towns and cities) have serious consequences on economic growth. On the other hand, Gugler argues that feminine perspectives on the continent have played a role in underdevelopment as they determine what economic roles women should not do. Though Gugler’s interest is in Africa, he does not specifically focus on the plight of the poor women in towns. Nevertheless, his analysis was conceptually important to our present study, as it provided insights into the origin of the poor in Kibera.
Source: UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects, 2007 Revision – World Bank, World Development Indicators
FIGURE 1.2 AFRICA; ECONOMIC GROWTH AND URBANIZATION, 1960-2005

Source: UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects, 2007 Revision – World Bank, World Development Indicators
FIGURE 1.3 LIBERIA; ECONOMIC GROWTH AND URBANIZATION, 1960-2005.

Source: UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects, 2007 Revision – World Bank, World Development Indicators
Wang’ombe (1995) argues that a majority of urban population in Africa live in slums in absolute poverty. In 1990, only one third of Africa’s population was urban. According to the UN-HABITAT (2008), it is expected to reach the half-way mark by 2025, 41 per cent in Eastern Africa and 66 per cent in Southern Africa. To Wang’ombe, the above is due to the unprecedented expansion of urban settlements. In Kenya, urban expansion has often been characterized by informality, illegality and unplanned settlements. In regard to this, Wang’ombe’s study was of significance to the present study as it provided insights into the question of how issues and challenges such as unemployment, insecurity, poor housing among others emerge and how they can be tackled to ensure adequate urban settlements.

Kiruthu (1997) gives a systematic analysis of the creation of urbanization and Africa labour force in Nyeri Township. He argues that colonial penetration was accompanied by appropriation of African labour. African laborers were forced to settle in Nyeri Township and provide labour to Europeans. This resulted in wage earning and crowding hence diseases. In relation to the above, Murunga (1998) points out that the exceedingly powerful presence of the British colonialists in Mumias led to the establishment of the colonial state in Buluhya. These works were of immediate relevance to the present study as they provided a background to the process of colonialism urbanization in Kenya.
Non State Actors

Looking specifically at non-state actors, Njuguna (1989) observes that what is known about them is often clouded by what is believed about them. First, non-state actors have the self-perception of being non-political, non-academic, and non-governmental and not for profit. Second, their main objective since their inception was to change the world and make it a better place for the poor, the marginalized and urban destitute. The author gives a systematic analysis of what non-state actors exactly are. In doing so, he questions their role in the South. To him, cities and towns in the Third World have been crippled industrially by the IMF and WB policies. Njuguna argues that development theorists in the North have lifted aid to such lofty heights and made it a major vehicle of economic development in the South. This work was relevant to the present study as it provided insights into the role of non-state actors in the South. Nevertheless, the author does not examine any particular non-state actor in the south to authenticate his contention. The present study examined the role of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera.

Clark (1990) argues that a non-state actor, for instance an NGO, typically starts a program in a particular country to respond to a specific need. In the light of this, non-state actors are up to a specific need, and no longer the carers of the society (Clark, 1990: 76). Their transformation agendas are always swept away when they (non-state actors) are asked by the mainstream development agencies (IMF and WB) to help the former improve design rather than design the projects themselves. Generally, the coercive power wielded by these financial institutions, collectively owned by the taxpayers of the world,
is not directly connected to the magnitude of the loans they have granted to Third World countries. On the other hand, Clark points out that there are non-state actors which are often understandably reluctant to be involved in official aid projects. According to him, non-state actors need to learn, improve their research and evaluation capacity both to their programs and to the micro context. Second, they should be weary of conditional ties which are intended to serve the interest of commercial banks in getting Third World countries to pay their debts. This is because the former do not produce growth and employment rather they produce misery and unemployment which make resources available to service the external debts. Exploitation of Third World countries by the developed nations is done through the IMF and WB. All these summed up, it follows that the long term development needs of the developing countries are not seriously considered.

Clark further concludes that non-state actors from the North are supposed to assist their Southern partners by mounting campaigns in their home countries to persuade the official aid agencies to change their policies so as to support sustainable development. On the other hand authority should be delegated to non-state actors to evolve policy and project design so that the former is not just as a sub-contractor. Third, recruitment, training and apprenticeship of the non-state actors discourse should be done locally. The author asserts that to maximize their impact, non-state actors must be aware of the need for change. The latter is in the way non-state actors think and plan, work and relate to others. It is significant to note that the author’s criticism is of the non-state actors from the North. He systematically analyses what non-state actors from the North and South do,
even though it is too general. The present study sought to fill the knowledge gap by specifically examining UN-HABITAT’s role in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera.

Edward and Hulme (1992) focus on how to enhance the effectiveness of the work of non-state actors in order to increase their impact. The authors observe that in the urban areas, most buildings are not healthy and structurally safe especially in slums. This is because perhaps, they are made outside any legal building and planning regulations. To them, urban dwellers’ right to participate in planning, execution, maintenance and control of projects should be supported. Non-state actors should support the poor to develop their own strategies, making best use of their scarce resources to obtain housing, basic services and infrastructure. Where there are no communities’ organizations, development partners working in such areas have to get involved in establishing some (Edwards and Hulme 1992: 173). Further, the authors assert that non-state actors’ failures are almost inevitable when outsiders try to impose their points of view. This work provided insights on how to enhance non-state actor’s effectiveness even though it is too general as it does not examine any specific development partner.

Hancock (1991) criticizes multilateral official aid agencies such as the IMF and WB and bilateral agencies such as USAID, which are financed involuntarily by taxpayers. According to the author, the agencies do not allow taxpayers to have a say in how their money is spent. In this case, the agencies are not directly accountable to the public. Hancock further asserts that overseas development has been elevated above political
debate in the West. This implies that it has become the least questioned form of state spending. The willingness of the IMF and WB to grant what amounts to, in most cases borrowed loans to a country in the South, signals to the global financial corporations that the country is ‘financially healthy’. In other words, the country’s economic policies have the institutions’ ‘seal of approval’. Without that signal, countries owing huge external debts to global financial institutions cannot operate in the global financial market, meaning that ‘they must pay cash for everything they need from the global market’ (Davis 2006: 141). The IMF and WB operate as debt collectors for commercial banks. In his view, Hancock questions how aid provided by the NNGOs and SNGOs is spent. Though he admits that aid must be given when people are suffering, the author concludes that aid is not help as it has always been perceived. To him, aid can only become help if only the poor are properly served rather than the rich. The author gives statistical data on specific non-state actors which give a general picture of their spending. This work was of immediate relevance to the present study as we sought to investigate the role of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera.

Clayton (1996) studied non-state actors, civil society and the state. According to him, to the ordinary citizens, the presumption that rights and benefits of non-state actors trickle down from men to women or that women automatically gain from measures benefiting men are no longer tenable. What follows is that non-state actors have perhaps failed not only to give a lead to governments, but also to attend to their own responsibilities to bring out internal democracy and justice. He concludes that the presumption that non-governmental makes for immediate sainthood is false. To him, the latter perpetuates bias,
ignorance, inequality and injustice. This implies that non-state actors set themselves targets and the expectations of those that finance them that are complex and too demanding. Claytons work provided valuable reference material to the present study. In support of the above sentiments, Turnham (2000) observes that community participation and empowerment is an important component of any suitable development strategy. Support of governments, NGOs and other external sources of support should be secondary to the communities own inputs and scaled so as not to threaten the ability of the community to take ownership and maintain the initiatives (Turnham, 2000: 82).

Olukoshi (2005) discussed the changing patterns of politics in Africa. He observes that domestic, local and national level considerations are critical to the definition of the process of change. To him, external factors and international actors play a significant, even at some conjunctures, determinant role in shaping the outcomes. The author outlines the following as external determinants of development in Africa. First, he cites the demise of the last vestiges of colonial rule and institutionalized racism such as in South Africa during the 1994 national elections. Second, the changing nature of inter-state relations where armed conflicts, most notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone ended the principle of non-interference. Third, the increased UN role in African governance, for instance, the pushing for establishment of International War Crime Tribunals to discourage impunity in Africa. In the light of the above, Olukoshi argues that the SAPs played a significant role in the weakening of African states. Other experiments apart from the SAPs included the UN efforts under the Substantial New Programmes of Action (SNAP) adopted in 1981 for the least developed countries. The SAPs delegitimized the
state as an actor in political economy through a series of retrenchment measures. Further, it served to fuel brain drain. The present study investigated the role of non-state actors in determining development in Africa.

Odinga (1990) studied the history of health services in Nairobi, 1899-1963. The work provided invaluable reference materials to this study given that it partly dealt with the role of non-state actors in transforming livelihoods. The author analyzed the colonial government’s health policies during the 64 years of colonial rule. She argues that the World Health Organization Preamble of 1947 stated that “……the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, and political belief, economic or social condition…” (Odinga, 1990: 54). It is in respect with the report that the author sought to examine what health services the colonial government provided to Nairobi residents prior to 1963. She argues that the colonial health policy was spelt out in the objectives of the health services as follows; “…..health services were meant to care for the Europeans and especially those who were in government employment. After they had been taken care of, the government preoccupied itself with the health of Asians and Africans in colonial employment….,” (ibid). In the light of the above, the author concluded that the poor health services to Africans in the colonial period were due to Europeans’ segregationist policies. On the other hand, she demonstrates how the native Africans coped with the situation. Hence the work was invaluable to this study as it provided insights into the health problems faced by Africans in Nairobi and how various state institutions and non-state actors responded.
Kamilamba and Alvarez (2005) critically analyze the role of non-state actors in development in the South. To them, the WB and IMF see NNGOs and SNGOs in the South as efficient agents in fighting poverty. However, these non-state actors have turned into instruments at the service of governments, facilitating the privatization of certain roles that the state should play. Further, non-state actors depoliticize several demands of the non-conformist sectors in the South. Just like Njuguna (1989) and Shivji (2006), the authors question whether non-state actors are in any really sense non-governmental, non-political and not for profit. Kamilamba and Alvarez argue that several non-state actors have existed for decades already and their impact in reality is in the best of the cases, insignificant. Further, non-state actors such as NNGOs are part of the culture from which they are born. This implies that those elements implicit in their culture turn into universalized values. In this context, they (NNGOs and SNGOs) become generators of conflicts in the South, for example, the case of ‘food for work’ in India. For humanitarian non-state actors, the authors contend that they have always worked on the solutions of populations’ immediate needs. Such inclinations make governments to pay no attention to their duties. Similarly, it leads the populations to leave aside their pressure on the governments and be content with what non-state actors can give them. This work was invaluable in the analysis of the relations of UN-HABITAT with other development partners in Kibera.
Kimathi (2003) provided valuable reference materials to the present study. The author systematically examines the role of United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) in dealing with refugees in Kenya. This work gives a comprehensive account of the role of UNCHR. She examines activities and programs the UNCHR has embarked on whether by itself or jointly with other non-state actors to alleviate the suffering of refugees and seek long term solutions to their problems. Similarly, the author has established how the UNCHR has responded to various needs of the refugees and how effective their services have been. Kimathi observes that the UNCHR draws on the expertise of other UN organizations such as UNICEF, WFP, WHO, ILO, UNESCO among others.

The foregoing literature review indicates the existence of various gaps in the production of historical knowledge that needs to be bridged. Most of the works reviewed have a general orientation and therefore do not adequately explore and contribute to the understanding of the role of non-state actors in the transformation of urban livelihoods. Studies based on non-state actors do not target our area of interest, particularly the urban poor. There are other works which despite focusing on the modern state in Africa and the process of urbanization almost exclude the Kenyan scenario, hence the need for the present study.
1.8 Theoretical Framework.

Colonialism introduced in Africa some elements of capitalism. However the former didn’t transform the continent into a capitalist society compared to that of Europe. For instance, modern sanitation, piped water and medical services were foreign at the end of colonialism as they were at the beginning (Rodney, 1976: 226). European intellectual imperialism used modernization theory as a justification of the exploitative capitalist system in Africa. Modernization theorists held the view that prior to the arrival of Europeans in Africa, there was no development on the continent. They identified variables which contributed to progress and development of certain societies and sought to explain the details of social evolution. According to them, a break with traditional customs was a prerequisite for economic progress. These scholars argue that through transfer of aid, technology and expertise the underdeveloped nations develop. However, this theory has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Many studies have shown that social, political and economic spheres had long developed in Africa before the arrival of Europeans. According to Rodney (1976), development can only be well understood in the context of the society under study. It follows that the modernization theory’s indices of measuring development and its categorization of Africa as poor and undeveloped are wrong. The dissatisfaction with this theory led scholars to offer an alternative explanation for processes of historical changes in Africa.

The dependency and underdevelopment theory which was derived from the Marxist reflections of the Latin American experience was adopted. The present study employed this theory in the analyses of the role of non-state actors in the transformation of urban
livelihood in Kibera. The theory refers to relationships between the developed and developing economies and regions. Spearheaded by Paul Baran who developed it from the Marxian analysis, the theory emerged as a reaction to liberal free trade theories in the 1950s. Andre Gunder Frank subsequently sought to examine fresh relations between the North and South using the neo-Marxist parameters of Baran (1955). Similarly, Theotonio dos Santos described a ‘new dependency’ which focused on both the internal and external relations of less developed countries of periphery, derived from a Marxian analysis. The theory became popular in the 1960s and 1970s as a criticism of the modernization theory which was increasingly falling out of favour due to continued widespread poverty in much of the world.

The theory holds the view that colonialism was essentially exploitative and sought to explain the continuing predicament of underdevelopment in terms of the international capitalist environment. The American sociologist, Immanuel Wallerstein refined the Marxist aspects of the theory and called it the ‘world system theory’. Leading advocates like Paul Baran, Walden Bello, Ernest Feder, Andre Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso stressed the unequal and socially imbalanced nature of development in regions that are highly dependent on investment from highly developed countries. In Africa, scholars in this school of thought include Walter Rodney and Samir Amin among others. The theory is predicated on the notion that resources flow from a ‘periphery’ of poor and undeveloped nations to a ‘core’ of wealthy nations, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. The theory postulates that the poor are impoverished and the rich enriched by the way the poor countries are incorporated into the ‘world system’. In the
African context, the theory emphasizes that it is the colonial domination that produced relationships between the developed and the developing world that were inherently unequal.

Some of the premises of this theory include the following. First, poor countries provide market to wealthy nations by allowing their people to buy manufactured and obsolete goods. This in turn permits wealthy nations to enjoy higher standards of living. Second, developed nations actively perpetuate a state of dependence by involving politics, finance, economics and all aspects of human resource development including recruitment and training of workers. Lastly, wealthy nations actively counter attempts by dependent nations to resist their influences by means of economic sanctions. All the above is what a Nobel Prize economist, Joseph Stiglitz once called ‘market fundamentalism’- total reliance on the global market, with local governments of the developing world doing virtually nothing.

Proponents of the dependency and underdevelopment theory question the origin of the dependency syndrome and underdevelopment in Africa. They contend that the concept of underdevelopment is not an original condition of Africa; rather it is a product of the historical processes of the European expansion of capitalism that led to the development of the West at the expense of Africa. Joseph Stiglitz who was also senior Vice-president of the WB (1997-2000), pointed out that the governing institutions of the global financial market have forced contradictory policies on Third World Countries. The second contention of the proponents of this theory is that economic development and
underdevelopment are not simply different stages in the same linear march towards progress. Further, the theory of ‘comparative advantage’ break down when capital is highly mobile as it is under the conditions of globalization. It follows that the inflow of capital from the developed countries has always been the prerequisite for the establishment of economic dependence. The inflow takes various forms. First, the loans are granted on onerous terms. Second, investments place a given country in the power of investors. Third, there is almost total technological subordination of the dependent country to the developed country. As a consequence of the above, a country’s foreign trade is controlled by the international monopolies and in extreme cases there is use of force as an economic weapon in support of other forms of exploitation (Samir, 1976).

Nevertheless, dependency and underdevelopment theory has limitations. With the economic growth of India and some East Asian economies, the theory lost some of its influence. Critics argue that the promulgation of the theory has led to official corruption, lack of competition, sustainability and domestic opportunity costs. The latter implies that higher prices caused by tariffs and restrictions on imports force people either to forgo these goods altogether or buy them at higher prices, forgoing other goods. It follows that the theory has been flawed by an overemphasis on economic factors and in some versions a necessitating logic based on the idea of a ‘surplus drain’. This refers to the extraction and appropriation of profits from the poor to rich and powerful nations. Further, the theory gives prominence to the role of external factors in development. In this respect, it overlooks local forces, for instance the underemployment of resources and capacity which include under-utilization and labor unemployment. Secondly, the economic
successes of Mexico and Brazil, (exporters of raw materials) that turned to import substitution industrialization forced a re-evaluation of the core premises of dependency and underdevelopment theory. In regard to this, development is possible in African countries if their domestic or indigenous bourgeoisies are up to their job. Kenya for instance, is seen as a peace maker of indigenous capitalist development in Africa (Morton, 1998). The country’s Indian community composes of an exceptionally effective indigenous capitalist class. In the light of the above, dependency and underdevelopment theorist are too idealistic. They overlook the possibility of internal factors hindering development while overstating the role of external factors. This underestimates the principle of *metropolis-periphery axis*- which states that ‘a metropolis exploiting the periphery can be exploited by another metropolis that is even more developed’ (Nyang’oro, 1989).

Despite the limitations, the theory was of great significance to the present study. It offered compelling explanations to the continuing predicament of underdevelopment and low living standards in Kibera. Further, it enabled us understand the role played by the UN-HABITAT in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera. Taking the basic tenets of Marxism as our point of departure, the present study used concepts such as uneven development, exploitation, *peripherilization*, class struggle and underdevelopment to explain the relations and links between the poor people in Kibera and non- state actors. The study noted that the Marxist notion of class struggle has been the prime mover of historical change in Kibera. The study initiated dialogue between
dependency paradigms and Marxist approaches of class analysis to demonstrate how the people of Kibera have been short changed over time by the GoK and UN-HABITAT.

The study established that after gaining independence, the GoK embarked on rapid programs to transform urban livelihoods in Kenya. In Nairobi, people living in informal settlements lacked basic needs such as housing, health and sanitation services. This was worsened by rural-urban migrations in search for jobs. With a large labor market that was either creative or innovative, employers paid wages that could hardly sustain urban dwellers. Consequently, this resulted into prostitution, insecurity, degraded health and sanitation services and informal entrepreneurships as means of livelihoods. The study assessed the livelihoods of the poor people of Kibera in the light of changes in their material conditions. It demonstrates how the relations at the time were based on the exploitation of ‘man by man’ hence characterized by irreconcilable class struggles. The relations of production were antagonistic. This implies that means of production were concentrated in the hands of a small group of people who used it to compel the poor job seekers to produce wealth for them. In the light of the above, the theory proved rich in providing empirical hypothesis for the present study.

The years of the early 1980s were characterized by an escalation of problems such as poverty, conflicts, internal displacements and general degeneration of the social-economic and political system hence the entry point of non-state actors. The GoK was supportive of the latter. The policy decision was taken in view of the fact that non-state actors were largely seen as instruments to supplement development programs initiated by
the state. In some cases, non-state actors assumed functions which had been abandoned by the state. Similarly, the new wave of people’s organizations was in search for a new basis of facilitating their struggles for participating in the decision making process. In Kibera, the state’s initiatives failed because it did not engage all the stake holders and the community in particular. The present study noted that the state initiatives involved displacements, affordability, cost recovery and replicability.

This study postulates that UN-HABITAT has positively and negatively affected the livelihoods of the poor in Kibera. In partnership with Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), Kibera Integrated Water, Sanitation and Waste Management Project (KIWSWMP), Carolina for Kibera (CK), Shinning Hope for Community (SHOFCO), World Bank (WB), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Kenya Water for Health Organization (KWAHO), Oxfam, Kenya (OK) and Center for Sustainable Urban Development (CSUD) among others, UN-HABITAT has helped initiate a variety of programmes. The present study illustrates how the programmes were set to improve the living standards of the poor in Kibera. On the other hand, the study demonstrates how UN-HABITAT has turned into an instrument at the service of the GoK and governments of the West. In regard to this, the study establishes the sustainability of the projects and how short-term they are. Similarly, the inhabitants of Kibera have been sidelined from the entire process of decision making on issues that directly affect them, hence the development projects are not up to the standard while at the same time consuming a lot of funds.
In the light of the above, this study contends that the basic factor in the process of development is economic. This is adequately demonstrated in the mode of production in Kibera which consist of forces of production and the relations of production. However, even though the intricacies of the role of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera are adequately captured, the theory employed here is imbued with African visions, expectations and intents. It’s variant of criminalizing NGOs and aid in general delegitimizes historical change.

This study further demonstrates how the economy of Kibera has been changing since the early sixties. In regard to this, the economic base of the super structure in the society is perpetually changing. However, according to Frantz and Marek (1968), a base that is liable to change as the structure is being raised upon is hardly a base. Hence, the present study has adequately illustrated that other than economic, social and political factors, other indices have probably contributed to uneven development and peripheralization of Kibera. Similarly, even though there are class struggles in Kibera, it has not been much polarized and antagonistic as anticipated. The poor have invented their own ways for survival. Lastly, the review established that the dependency and underdevelopment theory underestimates the casual significance of ideas and political processes by stressing the primacy of the economy in change. Both political and ideological changes have been necessary in producing certain changes in Kibera. However as we already noted, the present study does not disregard the primacy of economy in change. In Kibera, there are changes which the study discusses as strictly a result of economy. Similarly, there are situations where changes have occurred yet they were not preceded by significant
economic changes. The present study establishes that for change to occur there is always an interaction between the economic, social and political factors. Ethnic and religious pressure too brings about conflict. As it shall be illustrated, tribalism and religious affiliation in Kibera have affected development.

1.9 Research Methodology

This study relied on two complementary sources; primary and secondary sources of data. These sources were categorized into oral and written. Secondary sources provided a general background on the role of non-state actors in the transformation of urban livelihoods. Secondary evidence used in this study, theoretically and conceptually provided a framework for the research. They included written sources; books, journals, magazines, articles, unpublished thesis, seminar papers, periodicals, among others. These were derived from libraries –Kenyatta University’s Moi library, University of Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library, Institute of Development Studies Library, the Macmillan Library of the Nairobi City Council, the Kenya National Library Services, the UN-HABITAT Library, the NGOs Co-ordination Board Resource Centre and the British Council Library. The written materials from the libraries constituted important secondary data for the study. The data collected was scrutinized and sieved to minimize any subjectivity.

Primary written documents were gathered from the Kenya National Archives and the UN-HABITAT Library. These included Native Affairs Reports, Colonial Government Publications Reports, and confidential reports, Government of Kenya Publications and
Reports, and UN-HABITAT Publications and Reports. Primary data sources were first hand records from participants and observers that have been passed down to posterity. The use of oral data as a primary source involved carrying out interviews in Kibera, UN headquarters in Nairobi and GoK offices to establish the role of UN- HABITAT in transforming livelihoods in Kibera.

**Target Population**

Purposive sampling and snow- balling were the procedures used to select respondents. Before conducting the interviews, a purposive random sampling procedure was employed in drawing up a temporary list of prospective informants. Though the method is subjective (Murunga, 1998: 30), it was the most ideal for this historical research. The list of interviewees from Kibera was compiled on the basis of information yielding from both the libraries and archival research. Consequently, the list was altered by insertion of other informants mentioned by the interviewees or withdrawal of names of the deceased, migrants and retirees. This involved snowballing as a sampling procedure. There were four categories of informants; the inhabitants of Kibera, leaders and participants in the non-state actors development initiatives, GoK officials including NGOs Co-ordination Board Personnel and UN-HABITAT Personnel. The criteria for the choice of informants included age, level of education, status quo, and designation held in an organization/government, mention by documentary sources and mention by other oral informants. An elderly person respected on the basis of being able to recall certain issues of people’s history was also considered criteria for choosing informants. Question guidelines for the categories of interviewees facilitated the conduct of interviews (see
appendix I, II, III IV). The eight villages of Kibera were sampled to ensure that data collected was a representation of the entire settlement. This was made possible by equitably getting population samples from across all the eight villages.

**Research Design**

The formulated questions were not treated rigidly but as flexible guides to the material required. Given that the field research was based on a relatively wide geographical and populated area (Kibera), it was necessary to carefully select and employ research assistants in the process of collecting data. The information obtained from oral interviews was collaborated and correlated with other data for validity and reliability. It was from this data that the basis of analyzing and interpreting the role of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera was formed. The data collected was qualitatively analyzed. Using a qualitative approach, data was analyzed inductively from the participants’ perspectives. Focus was on in-depth study and description of events, aspects of people’s everyday life and contexts. This called for collection and analysis of non-numerical data, interviews and discursive sources of information. Similarly, it involved editing for the purposes of accuracy and uniformity. Further, observations were employed in measuring the transformation that has occurred in Kibera since 1963 for instance the housing units, health centres, schools among other amenities. The research involved careful, logical and critical examination of the data collected to produce plausible historical work.
1.9.1 Area of Study

Nairobi, ‘The Green City in the Sun’, as it is sometimes referred (Johan 2009) is 689 square kilometers (268 square miles), located 80 kilometers south of the equator, and at some 1660 to 1800 meters above the sea level and enjoys a tropical climate (Olumwullah, 1986). It is the political and administrative capital of the Republic of Kenya and the largest metropolitan area in East Africa (Werlin, 1974: 37). Nairobi’s history dates back to 1899 when it was established as a convenient railway camp en route to Uganda another 300 miles to the northwest. The UN-HABITAT Report (2009) approximated Nairobi to have a population density of 5746 persons per square kilometer, an annual population growth rate of 4-5 percent and an average household of six with a human development index of 0.541. The city’s strategic location has made it an important regional hub for commerce, industry, tourism and communication. Nairobi was established in 1899 and its mild climate and the permanent supply of abundant fresh water by the Nairobi River promoted rapid settlement by Europeans during the 20th century and it was granted city status in 1950 (Morgan,1967: 100).

This study focuses on the vast Kibera slum which is approximately seven kilometers from the Central Business District (CBD) of Nairobi to the south-west direction. It is part of Lang’ata constituency located south –west of the city centre. The 2009 Census showed great discrepancy whereby Nairobi’s population was put at 3,138,369 million people while that of Kibera was 170,070 people (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, 2010). It was concluded that quite often there was no consensus on what the actual figure of the population of Kibera might have been. The figures varied depending on who was
publishing it and for what aim. For instance, the inflated figures were not challenged, perhaps because they were useful to various actors. Probably the development actors used them to solicit more donor funds. Kibera residents are averagely the poorest in Kenya’s urban population, many as tenants with no rights of land ownership. This was based on the people’s standard of living, for instance, accessibility to water, health services and adequate housing. The study established that people had to walk a distance of two kilometers to find piped water; the privately owned hospitals had no laboratory services; and the single room shacks leaked during rainy seasons and were extremely hot during the day.

The informal settlement is divided by visible (infrastructure, housing units and social amenities) and invisible borders (hunger and unemployment), splitting the developed and underdeveloped, and the poor and the rich, characterized by various forms of wealth/poverty, inequality/equality and formality/informality. It follows that those on the ‘lower side’ of the divide are excluded from the benefits of urban expansion and prosperity, that is, they are denied the ‘urban advantage’. The most visible measurable form of inclusion or exclusion in Kibera is economic, though social, political and cultural factors also count.

The study also noted that Kibera is cosmopolitan and the residents adhere to different faiths. The Nubians, who are mostly Muslims, add up to fifteen percent of the entire population. Other shack owners are mostly Kikuyu who are absentee landlords. Majority of the tenants include the Luos and Luhyas. Most frequently, tensions are witnessed in
Kibera particularly among the landlords and tenants, mostly those without jobs. Further, Kibera is divided into villages namely; Soweto-East, Soweto-West, Lindi, Gatakwer, Kisumu-ndogo, Laini-Saba, Siranga, Undugu, Makina, Kambi-muru, Raila, Kichinjio and Mashimoni. Lastly, it was established that the vast slum receives much media attention as one of the most densely populated slums in Africa.
CHAPTER TWO

EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF KIBERA UPTO 1963

2.1 Introduction

The roles assumed by Nairobi were based on the centrality of the town and various destinations thus emerging as the capital center of the European colonial economy in Kenya (Olumwullah, 1986: 110). Similarly, Nairobi’s growth as a whole was determined by the imperial priorities that were basically concerned with administration, development of transport, provision of commercial facilities and amenities for the wealthy minority (Zwanenberg, 1972: 09). This chapter asserts that the emergence and growth of Kibera as an informal settlement was connected to the phenomenal growth of Nairobi. Lonsdale (1992) argued that colonial urban policy in Kenya was aimed at entrenching urban privileges for whites since the city was thought of or perceived as the white man’s peculiar creation. Africans could only be temporal residents of the town, “…. coming in only to minister to the white man’s needs as labourers and retiring to their homes...” (Rich, 1978: 37). As a result, urban populations rose over the years amidst rapid economic development, notwithstanding the variations in the economic growth of individuals’ economies (Dimitrion, 1990: 63). This led to inadequate housing, health and sanitation services and increased levels of poverty in the peripheries of Nairobi including Kibera.

The chapter focused on the migration, settlement and early history of Kibera prior to 1963. The political, social and economic organizations of the early inhabitants of Kibera were also examined. This is because, to fully understand the evolution of any given
settlement, one cannot ignore the political, social and economic aspects. Similarly, it is because of the view that had there been adequate planning, the settlement would have had adequate housing, health and sanitation services (Kiarie, O.I, 2010).

In European settler conception, racial segregation was an important means of attaining social control and its application largely centered on native Africans. In this respect, it was noted that by denying Africans access to land and other resources, the Protectorate’s policies induced them (native Africans) to leave the reserves to look for employment in the city center as wage laborers. (Wolff, 1974: 99). The study observed that directly or indirectly, such policies undermined the development of Nairobi’s environs. As an appreciation, the Africans were given a place to settle. Kibera originated as a settlement in the forests outside Nairobi when the Nubian soldiers returning from service in the WWI were awarded plots in reward for their war efforts. This chapter therefore, serves as a background for the later chapters in which the role of non-state actors (UN-HABITAT in particular) in the transformation of urban livelihoods is analyzed.

2.2 Migrations, Settlement and Early History of Kibera prior to 1963

Prior to 1963, what is presently referred to as ‘Kibera’ was a jungle and forested area. The name Kibera evolved from ‘Kibra’ coined by the Nubians, meaning ‘a bushy place’ (Abdallah, O. I. 2010). The British colonial government decided to resettle the Nubians and their families on this land near the current Kenyatta National Hospital. These Nubians were people who had served in the British army in various capacities during the WWI (1914 – 1918). In Nairobi, Kibera was a location, understood as an unofficial
settlement on the margins of the town, left or reserved for African occupation (Kiarie, O.I, 2010).

Mc Gregor (1968) and Mc Vigar (1990) argue that before the arrival of Nubians and even Europeans, there were native Africans living at the present day Nairobi. Kibera started as a military reserve where demobilized Nubian soldiers of the King’s African Riffles and the British colonial army were allowed to settle. Similarly, due to lack of accommodation for African workers in Nairobi, many other Africans were interested in living there as well. As a result, the settlement had many ‘illegal’ inhabitants by the year 1940. It was the innovativeness, local environment and adaptation determined the people’s modes of production and productive forces in Kibera. This urbanization was premature in the sense that Kibera’s growth and Nairobi at large did not coincide with a number of factors as witnessed elsewhere in the world (Rambanapasi, 1993; Conquery-Vidroviteh, 1991; Gugler and Flanagan, 1978). For instance, development of infrastructure, drainage, and housing units. The residential make up of Nairobi encouraged interactions among native Africans. However, this took place outside the framework of collective action that benefited principally from town’s spatial organization.

The Nubians comprised of an ethnic group that had long developed from an ‘Islamized’ mix of Sudanese, Uganda and the Congolese people (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). Subsequently, it was noted many of them were former (slaves) soldiers of the Egyptian army in Southern Sudan. They brought with them thousands of wives, children, servants and slaves when they were recruited to serve in Uganda in the early 1890s (Hassan, O.I.,
This varied group of people ‘melted together’ to form a collective military identity, distinct language (*Kinubi*), own food and religion (Johan, 2009). This is common in Makina, believed to be the heart of the Nubian community and has the largest concentration of Nubians in the settlement. As the name Nubia suggests in *kinubi* language, it means ‘*gathering*’.

The colonial government did not issue title deeds (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). Instead, they condoned the questionable land allocation deals. The Nubians otherwise thought as the ‘fifth generation foreigners’ (Hamza, O.I., 2010) were not considered to be legal citizens. Demobilized *Nubi* soldiers and their families settled all over East Africa in the so called ‘*Nubian settlements*’ (Johan, 2009). The latter were established close to garrison towns and military barracks. Some Nubians settled in Naivasha formerly referred to as ‘*Neipasha*’ meaning Deputy General and was named after Nubian Commander Selim Bey who died there in 1890 (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). In Nairobi, Kibera started to develop as an uncontrolled area and only became an issue of concern when (in Throup’s words), “African discontent or crime threatened to spill over into the European business area or suburbs” (Throup, 1988: 174). It follows that from the onset, the settlers in Nairobi generally conceived Kibera as a nuisance as it posed two dangers – crime and sanitation (Murunga, 2006: 94).

Whenever they went on a tour of duty, the Nubian soldiers had the habit of taking women with them, even by force if they had to (as it was the case in Southern Sudan and Uganda) (Hassan, Abdallah, and Mohammed, O.I., 2010). It is well documented (Johan,
2009), and many of the informants agreed that many Somali, Turkana and other women were brought back to Kibera where they were to become ‘Nubi’. By learning, women were to dress like Nubian women traditional dress called *gurbaba* and learn the ‘Nubi’ language and so on.

The Nubians have been living in Kibera ever since 1918, amidst rapid population increase and economic growth over the years. Most of them have known no other home other than Kibera. This explains why there are traces of Nubians scattered all over Kenya as squatters for instance in Naivasha. Their migrations have been attributed to inadequate space in Kibera and search for ‘greener pastures’ (Abdallah, O.I., 2010).

After resettling the Nubian soldiers, the colonial government did not control the growth of the settlement. The Nubians lacked basic human needs such as shelter, food, health services and so on (Hassan, O.I., 2010). With no formal education, they were exploited by the colonial government as unskilled labourers in factories, the household and occasionally engaged in offices as messengers, clerks and cleaners (Mohammed, O. I., 2010). Subsequently, some Europeans were often forced “to be colour blind if only in order to benefit from the services they could only access from the native Africans” (Murunga, 2006: 36). Nubians were only employed if the settlers were in dire need of labour. This in a way landed the African men in ‘better job positions’. Nonetheless, the wages earned could hardly sustain them leave alone cater for their basic human needs.
AFRICAN WAGES IN NAIROBI BY 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Wages in Shillings</th>
<th>Number of African Employees Per Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – 10/=</td>
<td>1786 (which included 1506 employees under the age of 16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 20/=</td>
<td>15,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 – 40/=</td>
<td>9,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 – 80/=</td>
<td>1,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 – 120/=</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121 – 140/=</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200/= Upwards</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The underprivileged women and young people in particular, were exposed to various types of inequalities including lack of basic needs and services such as nutrition, health care as well as civic and political freedoms, decent employment opportunities, planning, policy and decision making (Medina, O.I., 2010).

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, other Kenyan ethnic groups started migrating to Kibera. It was noted that the colonial government was starting to lose control over shanty towns (Ngugi, O.I., 2010). In the 1950s, it was generally a post WWII affair deriving largely from the arrival into Nairobi of mostly Kikuyu squatters who had been dispossessed off land in the white highlands following the ‘second colonial occupation’ (Hyde, 1950: 237). No doubt these immigrants swelled the numbers in Kibera and other
‘African locations’ against a background of inadequate provision of resources and services thereby exerting more pressure and exercising further stress on the meager facilities.

Other immigrants came from Kenya’s largest ethnic groups namely; the Luo, Kamba, Luyia and Kisii. No doubt all these people had no one common ancestry. Some were Nilotes, Cushites while others were Bantus. It was because of their varied identities that they lost their traditions and got assimilated into a new way of life. However, some held onto their old traditions (Abdallah, O. I., 2010). Examples of these include the practice of Islam among Nubians, *Legio Maria* among the Luo and *Dini ya Musambwa* among the Luyia.

According to Sall (2000), most of the immigrants, if not all could not fit into what he referred to as ‘human capital’. The latter means labour that is skilled in production, which can operate sophisticated machinery, create new ideas and new methods in economic activity. Instead, it was an ‘underdeveloped population’ and was looking for ‘decent employment’ to transform their living standards. Nevertheless, just as the Nubians, the immigrants were contracted as unskilled labourers. In the rural areas, most of their productive land had been alienated and because of various forms of inequalities in the urban areas, these ‘new immigrants’ were forced to seek refuge in Kibera. Pumwani being one of the African settlements in Nairobi (1920) was largely populated hence Kibera was the only other option left. Though the living conditions were not favourable,
Kibera was ‘better of’ compared to other native reserves in relation to the walking distance to the city center or suburbs (work places) like the Industrial Area.

Lonsdale (1968) argues that scholars have used the notion of the dual city variously to describe the layout of settlement in colonial towns. In Nairobi, as in many other towns, this dualism entailed the development of a ‘garden city’ in the European area and ‘slum’ conditions in the African areas including Kibera. Dualism was as a result of unequal distribution of urban services, itself an outcome of the dominance of Europeans, especially white settlers in the Municipal Council of Nairobi (MCN) and later, the Nairobi City Council (NCC) that was charged with the responsibility of town management (Murunga, 2006: 202). The settlers planned for a permanent non-African population and a temporary African population in Nairobi. They could not “accept that Africans had any right to a permanent place in the city” rather Africans were “merely temporary residents in the towns leaving their families in the rural areas to which they would periodically return and eventually retire” (Van Zwanenberg, 1957: 268, and Herbert and Werlin, 1974: 49 respectively).

Both the Nubians and other native African immigrants had their own ways of meeting their livelihoods’ needs back in their areas of origin. However, given the situation they found themselves in, these two groups resorted to other means of making a living. They set up various business enterprises that were unplanned and illegal. The poor planning and the illegality of the entrepreneurship in Kibera were as a result of the negligence of the colonial administration (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). The ‘African side of town’, that is,
Kibera was “by intent unplanned, uncontrolled and insanitary”…… and…… “its presence was either frowned upon as an eyesore to the town or simply ignored as a distant relic in the town” (Murunga, 2006: 204-205). It follows that what went on in Kibera prior to 1963 was of less concern to the colonial administration. Throup (1988) rightly points out that neglect was interpreted as a logical consequent of an ‘inherent’ insanitary and criminal orientation of the urbanized native Africans, many of them being considered ‘undesirables’ or ‘redundant natives’ who did not deserve municipal services or attention unless such neglect threatened the well being of settlers (Ibid, 1988: 1974).

Relations among the people of Kibera were not always cordial (Luseno, O.I., 2010). There were and are always contending groups, that is, classes, races, ethno-religious grounds and nations among others. For instance, the Nubians were strict Islamic adherents while the rest of the ethnic groups were largely Christians. Some were viewed as a ‘threat’ in terms of property ownership and business prowess (Kiarie, O.I., 2010). In such a case, the colonial administration used what might be called ‘negative ethnicity’ instead of tribalism in the form of custom and culture. As a result, the natives’ structure of interdependence within the settlement and between Kibera and other native reserves was completely destroyed (Luseno, O.I., 2010). For instance, it was not until the Lancaster House Conference in 1960 that the colonial administration allowed Africans to politically organize nationally (Mboya 1963). This was the reason why most Nubians were found in Makina and Lindi while the other migrants settled at Laini saba, Mashimoni and Siranga (Luseno, Kiarie and Abdallah, O.I., 2010). Other ethnic groups such as the Luyia, Luo and Kamba settled in Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Soweto, Kianda
and Undungu. In the process, Nubians were displaced as it is evident in the change of the names of the villages. *Laini Sabah* which meant ‘a firing range’ was changed to Laini Saba; *Kathirther* which meant ‘plenty of blessings was changed to Gatwekera, among others. Most of these immigrants stamped their authority in a number of villages by building houses. This was because, for many, their residential houses were the most valuable possessions as they could also generate rental income or be places of work.

On the eve of independence, Kibera was almost fully occupied. The international political climate after the WWII had prepared ‘fertile ground in which the seeds of nationalism were sown and in turn accelerated the rate of decolonization’ (Wafula, 2000: 242). Moreover, the convergence of both international and local nationalist forces made reality of independence feasible. However, the major challenges to the inhabitants were access to secure shelter, adequate health, sanitation services and decent employment.

As mentioned earlier, Nairobi as a whole was faced with serious planning problems. The most enduring of these problems were in the town’s sanitary and public health condition. These were all blamed on native Africans and Asians (Odhiambo, O.I., 2010). The two groups were perceived as the combined embodiment of ‘squalor, disease and crime’ and their whole habits, way of life and deeds fouled the whole town. (Ferudi, 1977: 387). This made Africans to be restricted in native reserves, including Kibera. Murunga (2006) points out that segregation was primarily designed to control people especially Africans and Asians. However, unlike the later the natives were not just a sanitary problem but
also criminals and undesirables whose presence was a problem to a town designed primarily for white settlement.

Control over African urban dwellers was more importantly an overall long term strategy of ‘preserving racial purity’, of affirming European cultural identity among the displaced colonial population and of protecting Europeans from noise, clutter and pestilence of local settlements (Spear, 2000: 110). In the light of the foregoing discussion, Wafula (2000: 242-243) asserted that African opposition was aimed not at rectifying the socio-economic and political injustices experienced but overthrowing the whole system. The outbreak of Mau Mau and the declaration of the State of Emergency finally shattered the power hitherto held by the white settlers and forced the colonial administration to integrate native Africans in the colonial economic and political system (Kanogo, 1987). It was in this respect that the state became more willing to listen to African grievances (Odhiambo, O.I., 2010).

According to Hall and Midgley (2004), Kenya under colonial rule had health systems that were hospital based, providing high technology services to the ‘urban elite’ only. The natives were completely ignored as far as medical care was concerned. As a matter of fact, housing, food and clothing were always important determinants of health (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). On the other hand, health was one of the most important assets the poor had in their pursuit of sustainable livelihoods. Basic services also played a vital role in environmental sustainability. It was in this respect that untreated human waste deterred
economic investment (Hall and Midgley, 2004). Kibera lacked all the necessary basic services that could boost economic growth.

Underdevelopment in Kibera was orchestrated by interplay of factors including the role of the colonial government and migrations and settlements in the slum. The subtext of the settler argument was that epidemics could not be eliminated (Azania XXXVI-XXXVII, 2002: 119). Why then did the administration focus on plague alone? Pneumonia, dysentery, respiratory diseases, malaria and sleeping sickness and not plague were the most dangerous diseases, that is, if dangerous was measured in terms of mortality (KNA/DC/I/I/I). It follows that plague just made the goal of socially controlling the natives easily attainable. This is just but one illustration of the sense in which segregationist policies flowed in part from radicalized concerns about diseases.

2.3 The Political, Social and Economic Organizations of Kibera prior to 1963

In the preceding section, migrations, settlements and early history of Kibera were discussed. This section, examines how the people of Kibera were organized politically, socially and economically. This is because, to understand development, people’s political, social and economic organizations cannot be overlooked.

The Political Economy of Kibera prior to 1963

According to Lonsdale (1968), the period from 1899 to 1906 constitute the formative years of Nairobi. These years were characterized by indecision and chaos as a new administration began to identify and implement its policy. At the time, the primary goal
was to establish a working administration in Nairobi and to consolidate control over what Lonsdale describes as the ‘overlapping patchwork of hunting cultivating and herding people’ in the countryside (Lonsdale, 1992: 23). It is not prudent here to explore exhaustively the political organization of Nairobi prior to 1963 as this subject has been covered in various chapters elsewhere (Anderson 1991; Atieno – Odhiambo 1974; Murunga 2006; Odinga 1990 and Ross 1968). An attempt is made here to show how Kibera was incorporated in the politics of Nairobi prior to 1963.

Political economy can be understood in the context of a social science dealing with policies and economic processes, their interactions and influence on social institutions (Nesbeit, 1979: 64). For example, Boahen (1994: 60) pointed out that the political economy of colonialism was characterized by the neglect of industrialization and manufacturing and the refusal to process locally produced raw materials. Africa was only a source of labour, raw materials and market for the imported manufactured goods (Crawder, 1984: 193).

Europeans’ politics in Nairobi, Kenya, like politics anywhere else, was interest-based (Odhiambo, O.I., 2010). Europeans’ key intention was to acquire, expand and defend their positions of dominance. Such dominance could be achieved through a process of spatial ordering designed to contain and control natives’ urban population. The present study established that in the 1880s, the political organization of Kibera and Nairobi for that matter was not complex as such. However, with the arrival of Europeans, the political structures of the native Africans were transformed (Kariuki, O.I., 2010).
Subsequently, the process of urbanization had both positive and negative effects on the people’s politics. For instance, infrastructure of roads, railways and harbours in every colony was provided “….obviously to facilitate movement not only of raw materials, manufactured goods and heavy machinery especially in the mining industry but also of troops and the police” (Boahen, 1994: 60). This was evident in the East Africa Protectorate whereby the end of the WWII, the famous Uganda Railway opened up the Kenyan highlands and reached the Gulf of Lake Victoria (Roberts, 1986: 80).

Among the earliest African political groups was the East African Association, founded in 1920, comprising largely of office messengers and domestic servants. This organization was against the Nairobi by-laws associated with the ‘pass system’ requiring Africans to carry ‘Kipande’ or identity card. There was also the native village council formed in 1923 in Pangani and Pumwani areas to champion for African interests. The formation of these political groups involved Africans from all over Nairobi, including Kibera. The Nairobi African Advisory Council established in 1926 were formed to discuss matters affecting Africans in urban areas and exercise influence in the enactment of policy and the African’s cry for better living standards (Werlin, 1974: 85).

The Africans involvement in politics was sparked by the Europeans segregationist policies. Murunga (2006) observed that by 1926, the discontent among domestic as well as other African employees through subterranean was much more in evidence. There were reports in the local European press complaining about the difficulty of getting disciplined domestic servants. In the East African Standard, for instance, there was
illuminating correspondence about natives who, it was alleged, were becoming openly rude (EAS 9/1/1/1926: 4).

The years after the WWI revolutionary (Berman, 1990; Ferudi, 1989; Kanogo, 1987 and Ochieng, 1977). While the settlers advance towards white supremacy seemed possible due to their entrenched role during the war, there was also a new surge in African nationalism in addition to a heightened Asian struggle against white dominance. These factors combined to challenge white dominance (Berman, 1990: 130).

The people of Kibera constituted one political unit just as the rest of Nairobi (Ibrahim, O.I., 2010). In this case, a political unit constituted a group of people which submitted persistently and in an ‘organized’ manner to leadership for the purpose of maintaining itself as a unit (Wagner, 1949: 200). However, there was no intimate relationship between the colonizers and the colonized, as the victorious conquerors imposed its law on the conquered. This is evident whereas the political alignment that came up were surpassed by the colonial administration (Odhiambo, O.I., 2010). It implied that like all Africans in Nairobi, the people of Kibera politically submitted to the British colonial government. Even though the native Africans in Kibera were either directly or indirectly related to one another politically, the administration coercively forced them to adhere to their (colonial) law.
Further, during colonialism there was a *laissez-faire* administrative approach in implementation of important decisions relating to the native Africans (Ngumba, O.I., 2010). The latter were not given authority or power to manage political affairs. It was the British who became custodians of modernity because theirs was a race born to rule (Murunga, 1998: 113). This philosophy was implemented in a colonial framework by Fredrick Lugard’s philosophy of indirect rule. Here, the Africans were put under native authority of which the custodians were the customary chiefs, headmen and village elders while the constitutional operationalization was rested in the British Crown. Some Africans in Kibera were left, in *juridical limbo* (Mamdani, 1996: 09). Racism was the glaring reality that defined Nairobi’s political relations. Through the policy of indirect, the urban neglect of native Africans was accepted. The colonial policy followed these liberal mappings of modernization.

Some Africans were involved in explicating and justifying the poetics of the white man’s burden (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). This was done through use of the native authority to pursue the interests of the British at the expense of the fellow natives. The appointment of chiefs, headmen and village elders was against the natives’ wishes, leading masses to retaliate. From the natives’ perspective, the general pre-requisite for obtaining leadership was age, the elders’ wisdom, gentleness and free from greed and jealousy (Kiarie, O.I., 2010). However, this was not the case in the colonial period as opinions of the settlers, seniors and the colonial administration carried more weight on who was to be elected as an African leader. A Crown Lands Ordinance passed in 1915 and implemented in 1917 by the Chief Native Commissioner, John Ainsworth, instructed all District Commissioners to
report to the governor all chiefs and headmen who were not ‘helpful’ in providing easy labour for the whites to be removed from office (Morton, 1998; 48). The British philosophy that applied in Nairobi and Kibera in particular prior to 1963 accorded supremacy to hierarchies based on race. The criterion was essentially the level of civilization each race was assumed to have attained. In western perception, the ladder of progress pitched the Europeans at the apex while Africans were merely at the rudimentary stages of civilization (Murunga, 1998: 113).

Nairobi assumed its political role as an administrative center when the colonial government officially moved their office from Machakos to Nairobi (Segall 1974). It grew as both center for government administration and commerce. As a result, Nairobi’s administrative functions extended beyond its economic sphere of influence and covered the whole area of the mainland territories. After relocation, the political authority of Nairobi and Kenya as a whole became formalized, differentiated and centralized. The colonial government used its limited personnel and finances to ensure a high degree of political and social cohesion in Nairobi. For instance, there were formal and informal judicial systems (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). The former dealt with serious cases which threatened the general peace of the colonial administration while the latter solved disputes which were minor in nature.

In a nutshell, the colonial administration in Nairobi created a set of institutions to serve in maintaining their own authority (Aseka, 1989: 18). Chiefs, assumed in British rule to have customary powers and authority were necessary in order to establish control over
the conquered groups (Lonsdale, 1964). Consequently, the British philosophy of force had been clearly stated by Sir Arthur Hardinge in different forums (Murunga 1998:107). For instance, in advising the foreign office he stated for you to have peace in Africa “….. you must first teach obedience, and the only tutor who impressed the lesson properly is the sword….” (Mungeam, 1966: 20).

Shortly before independence, rapid and numerous changes took place in the political arena in Nairobi. For instance, on 3rd July 1962, Charles Rubia was elected as the first African Mayor (Hake, 1977). On the contrary, before the changes, the characteristic of the political scenario was the foreign political influence. The later emanated from the British colonies such as the application of the Indian Civil Code, the Indian Evidence Act and the currency (Indian rupee). In this case, Kenya may have been ruled from London, but the colonialist had some justification for the claim that the East African Protectorate was being governed as if it were a province of India (Hake, 1977: 26).

A totally new orientation in Nairobi’s political scene occurred when Sir Charles Elliot began to encourage settlers from South Africa to come to Nairobi. Odinga (1990) pointed out that the British East Africa was affiliated to the British South Africa Customs Union, thus, Elliot’s encouragement was justified. Similarly, receiving a share of influence in terms of ideology and policy directives based on the South African model was a clear indicator of the affiliation (Simpson, 1913). Initially, the need to make the colony profitable and self-sustaining had been made explicit by the foreign office in London (Wolff, 1974: 17). To make it self-reliant, the productive capacity of the so called white
highlands was urgently emphasized. The colonial state embarked on an aggressive campaign of inviting white settlers to Kenya (Ibid: 51). This was done by ensuring that land was made available to Europeans through confiscation, expulsion and resettlement of the indigenous people in reserves that were not productive for example in Kenya where treaties were used and in Uganda laws being passed to declare productive land as crown land (Rowland 1979: 56). It was concluded that all the above denied the people of Nairobi and Kibera for that matter, their right to govern themselves as they were not involved in the process of decision making.

**Social Organization of Kibera upto 1963**

Prior to 1963, social practices such as religion, eating habits and dressing were associated to specific ethnic groups. The social life of the people of Kibera involved adjusting to and surmounting the trials, travails and tribulations of colonial urban life (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). From the very on set, the British policy of indirect rule was faulty for imposing chiefs, headmen and community elders with enormous powers but who had no authority over the communities they ruled (Mamdani 1996). In Kibera, all ethnic groups did not have authority to decide on their social aspects of life. (Ibid, O.I., 2010). However, it was noted the colonial administration sometimes initiated negotiations where force seemed inexpedient.

The people of Kibera practiced many religions. The most dominant religions were Islam and Christianity but there were communities which subscribed to African Traditional Religions (ATR). Majority of Nubians, if not all, were strict Muslim faithful. (Abdallah,
However, over time people from other ethnic groups and even many serving Nubi soldiers joined them (Muslims). They created in Kibera their own ‘tribal land’ where they lived isolated from the non-Muslim population. It is important to note that some Nubi immigrants to Kibera had already been converted to Christianity before their migrations (Ibid O.I., 2010).

The native Africans who practiced ATR performed rituals such as healing, cursing and divination, among others (Kiarie, Onyango, Wangari and Nyachio, O.I., 2010). All these were performed by ‘traditional priests’ from the respective ethnic groups. Some of the ‘traditional priests’ depended on their ancestral spirits whom they believed to wield immense powers over the living. It was noted that in some cases, the priests exercised considerable authority across the board even though each ethnic group had its own priest. In this regard, they (traditional priests) enjoyed a high social status among their fellow ethnic groups and even some settlers who were perplexed at their divine powers (Kariuki, O.I., 2010).

Western forms of health services were introduced to Kenya through the doctors who accompanied various expeditions, explorers, missionaries and later on the colonialists (Malone 1980: 03). However, this was meant for the white population and later on those natives who were to convert to Christianity. The colonial health policy was spelt out in the objectives of health services as follows…. “health services were meant to care for the Europeans and especially those who were in the government employment” (Odinga, 1990: 54). After they (Europeans) had been taken care of, the government concerned
itself with the health of the Asians and Africans in colonial government (Carman, 1976: 08). Further, it was noted that the administration emphasized curative medicine as opposed to preventive (Ferguson, 1979). This was because preventive services were viewed as costly, bearing in mind that they had to be paid for out of the profits from industry (Leys, 1924: 30). According to Zeleza (1989: 64), this made them extremely limited and thus only carried out to protect Europeans and to check on the spread of infectious diseases.

Though WWI formed a major landmark in the history of health services in Nairobi (Odinga, 1990: 80) and Kibera for that matter (Kariuki, O.I., 2010), the inter-war period (1919-1938) saw several changes occur. These culminated in the declaration of a new health policy that had the provision for all races and all aspects of medicine (Ibid, O.I., 2010). During this period, native Africans were cut off from contacts with the indigenous healer. Similarly, land alienation and its subsequent mechanization also interfered with the sources of African medicine. All these enhanced their (people of Kibera) dependence on Western forms of health services. Africans, however, secretly consulted the indigenous healers for medication.

Some members of the native Africans controlled their religious destiny but the spiritual power did not translate into actual power both politically and economically. In some cases, the A.T.R. adherents’ activities were curtailed either through the judicial systems or physical assault. Similarly, the missionaries through counselors persuaded the native Africans to convert to Christianity. The counselors were preferred as they were elderly.
men with intelligence, had the capacity to command respect and a comprehensive knowledge of the societal norms, rules and laws through intimate experience (Wangari, O.I., 2010) Subsequently, despite the colonial administrations restrictions on matters of religion, a section of native Africans codified their rules of conduct in the form of taboos and beliefs, religion notwithstanding. This implies that the people of Kibera were unified by the Supreme Being, God. Regardless of the ethnic group which an individual belonged to, each one of them was expected to observe the myths, taboos and beliefs fearlessly as they were the hallmark of one’s true personality (Odiambo, Kiarie, Irimu and Otike, among others, O.I., 2010). It was believed that all these would transform people’s lives.

Muslim Imams and Christian priests ensured that their followers were familiarized with what was expected of them. This was done through informal education which was at times disrupted by the colonialists. (Ibid, O.I., 2010). For Christian converts, the education was impacted by missionaries through reading the bible and teaching them some simple writing skills (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). Among the Nubians, all cases of divorce, homicide and witchcraft decisions were given by the Kadhis courts and Imams. For instance, the Kadhis officiated marriages while Imams oversaw other initiations and ceremonies and even performed rituals for cleansing Muslims (Abdallah, O.I., 2010).

Kibera was and is still a conglomeration of different ethnic groups with different origins each with its own languages, customs and traditions. (Ibid, O.I., 2010). For those who belonged to the same language group such as the Kikuyu, Luyia and Kamba among others had similarities in customs, traditions and use of words. Lwango-Luyingo and
Vansina in Hrbek (1993) rightly pointed out that the Bantu consist of over four hundred languages, all derived from the same proto-bantu. In Kibera, there were a number of Bantu speakers who’s their word meaning for people were the same in the root. For instance, words meaning ‘people’ for Agikuyu and Abaluyia are ‘andu’ and ‘abandu’, respectively (Kariuki and Ayuko, O.I., 2010). All derive from the form made up of the root ‘ntu’ and the prefix ‘ba’, denoting the plural (Hrbek 1993). How linguists employed various approaches in classifying the Bantu was not the concern but this study established that most ethnic groups belonging to the Bantu speaking group had similarities in their customs and traditions. No wonder Kiswahili, a Bantu language (see Greenberg, 1966; Guthrie, 1967; and Chiraghdin and Mnyampala, 1977 among others) was used as a ‘unifying’ factor in Kibera.

Though the Luo and Nubians speak different languages from those of the Bantu speakers, they too learnt and used Kiswahili to communicate to other ethnic groups. The Luo, however, used their mother tongue, ‘Dholuo’ in most cases while the Nubians used ‘Kinubi’ and Arabic language (Odhiambo and Abdallah, among others, O. I., 2010). The sharing of a common language (Kiswahili) ensured common and institutionalized forms of co-operation and interdependencies for instance, in marriage and trade. Further, language ensured a unified front against the colonial administration. It enabled urban dwellers in Kibera engaged in thriving trade and co-operation in politics (Odhiambo, O. I., 2010). Harmony arose out of the preponderance of commonality or mutuality of interests while acrimony was a product of conflicting interests (Wagner, 1941; 199). However, negative ethnicity resulted in ethnic groups occasionally isolating themselves
against each other. Culturally, the focus of allegiance was ‘tribe’ rather than the nation, a practice that was brought in by the Europeans with the intention of dividing Africans. No doubt frequent conflicts in Kibera became a common feature of relations between ethnic groups.

The inhabitants of Kibera did not share a common origin. In regard to this, the social organizations in the settlement was largely controlled and governed through informal channels. These included tribalism, religion, kinship systems, nepotism among others (Odhiambo O. I., 2010). There were no basic units of administration in Kibera. However, in the home, a man was the head of his family as the wife was in charge of her household. There existed an intricate relationship to give each other (husband and wife) autonomy without infringing on the other, for example, women decided what to cook (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). Nonetheless, the Nubi women were expected to be quiet and obedient and were largely confined to homesteads (Abddallah, O.I., 2010).

The Economic Organization of Kibera up to 1963

Prior to 1963, ethnic groups especially those with the same origin, lived in close proximity with each other and even shared basic human services and facilities including housing, health and sanitation (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). However, as the population increased, the available resources and facilities became inadequate. This was attributed to the segregationist policies of the colonial administration (Murunga, 2006). Although the Nubians were important British functionaries in Nairobi, the ideology of western liberalism relegated them to the status of lower citizens of the British Empire (Abdallah,
O. I., 2010). It is important to note here that even the Asians who came with the arrival of the railway mainly as traders were also categorized in the same hierarchy as lower citizens and Africans were ranked lowest in the British colonial hierarchy. Subsequent developments in urban policy left Europeans as the highest while the Indians came second and the rest of the races were ranked lowest (Murunga, 1998: 112).

With such segregation, depleted resources and overstretched facilities, many immigrants were forced to look for means of livelihoods within and outside the settlement. For the Nubians, Kibera’s proximity to an army barracks and town (Nairobi) created a huge market for the ‘Nubian gin’ (Johan, 2009). The Nubian women were at a clear advantage as they already lived in town and had easy access to the market for their product (Abubakar and Hussein, O.I., 2010). In addition, their fathers and husbands did not interfere with alcohol production or try to take over the business. As a result of their income, the Nubi women became the economic power in Kibera during the colonial period. This is because alcohol production played an important role in Nairobi. At times, it was used in barter in the exchange of goods such as food (Ibid, O.I.). In the light of the above, the study noted that amendments to the First Native Liquor Ordinances and Regulations aimed at prohibiting the manufacture, sale and consumption of what the colonial government called ‘native intoxicating liquors’. Consequently, these laws were only partly applied since in most parts of Nairobi, enforcement was non-existent (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). It was in 1921 that the municipal council of Nairobi totally forbade brewing of beer by Africans.
Most immigrants to Kibera, mostly men, left their women and children in the rural areas. As a result, they remarried to fulfill their conjugal needs (Odhiambo, O.I., 2010). Subsequently, those women who had managed to get to the urban areas could hardly secure employment and thus resorted to prostitution. People of the same origin, speaking the same and related languages and from the same ethnic group tended to do business together (Kiarie, O.I., 2010).

Another factor that determined economic relations was race. This involved doing business with people of the same race that is, basing on skin colour (Ibid, O.I., 2010). In cases when two races tended to be partners, it was largely at the expense of the native Africans. The latter sought employment as gardeners, cooks, unskilled industrial workers and clerks from the whites who in turn exploited them by paying low wages. The low wages could hardly sustain the people of Kibera as they had to pay ‘huge’ taxes, rent and cater for their own basic needs such as food and clothes. In a nutshell, there was discrimination among workers on grounds of race, colour, sex, belief, tribal association and even trade union affiliation. (Kyulu, O.I., 2010). In summary, the economy of Kibera was monetized and people paid more for goods and services.

2.4 The Colonial State and Development in Kibera prior to 1963

Raphael (1990) defines a state as an association designed primarily to maintain order and security, exercising universal jurisdiction within territorial boundaries by means of law backed by force and recognized as having sovereign authority. Consequently, the significant characteristic of a state is its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force
in the territory it is said to control (Herbst, 2000: 21). However, some scholars have questioned the origin of territorial nationalism (Himmelstrand, 1994) and confusion of politics with ideology (Davidson, 1992) in a state. It is with regard to the above that there seem to be hardly a binding definition of a state. Our explanation of the colonial state and development in Kibera prior to 1963 were derived from the above sentiments.

First and foremost, the point of departure was considering the colonial state as a state in any real sense. Berman (1990) argues that Marxist scholars did construct regional theories of the state that were detached from systematic analysis of the contradiction and crises of capitalism. It is instructive to note that the colonial state in Kenya acted to organize the unity of the capitalists’ class to achieve its political and ideological hegemony, while simultaneously seeking to disorganize and isolate the dominated classes. This implies that the colonial state contributed to the cohesion and maintenance of the social formation and the persistence of the system. In regard to this, the study noted that what happened in Kenya, Nairobi and Kibera in particular, prior to 1963 happened to secure an end and purpose given in the system itself. By the same logic, features of economic and social formations that contributed to the unity and continuity of the state were considered in this study as being part of the state or the political system.

From a Marxist point of departure, the colonial state was legitimized to play a role in the accumulation and legitimization of capitalist production. Further, the ability of the colonial state to act as the instrument of capitalism was influenced by and in turn influenced the changing balance of class relations in capitalist societies (Berman, 1990:
This study analyzed three institutions in Kibera namely; labour, land tenure and health sector. The later were significant because they were vital means of production at the time.

**Labour**

The colonial administration began to have an imprint on the future of Nairobi at the turn of the century. In Kibera there was (to use Berman’s words) ‘a reserve army waiting to be incorporated into the labour process’ being ‘stigmatized as a permanently redundant mass, an excessive burden that could not be included in the economy or the society (Berman, 1990). Europeans constituted the largest group of employers in Nairobi and it follows without dispute that they had the highest income. Second in hierarchy were the Asians, forming a contingent of business community (Parker, 1949: 10). Native Africans though numerically superior (Smith, 1984), were ranked lowest in terms of income. An analysis of the employment register by the Municipal Affairs Officers in 1939 revealed that there were approximately 2118 Africans in Nairobi and out of this number only 210 were described as tailors or cobblers, undertaking productive work (Odinga, 1990: 37) (see statistics on wages in chapter two) These statistics demonstrated how the colonial state neglected the Native Africans by not incorporating them into the labour force in the town. Their argument was that ‘African crime’ could spill over into the European business areas or suburbs (Throup, 1988: 114). This prompted one Report in 1911 to note that ‘…..up to the present time, Nairobi has not cared for natives’ wants….’ (Report of the East African Protectorate, 1911–12, 1913: 09). Instead, the colonial administration hoped that neglect would deter further native Africans’ migration to the town. On the
contrary, the colonial states’ assumption was far-fetched. According to Mc Vigar (1990), there was no doubt that there were Africans in Nairobi prior to the arrival of Europeans. The author describes early native Africans’ settlements in Nairobi that became Pangani, Mombasa, Kileleshwa and Maskini villages. ‘African locations’ was simply established to make way for European settlement (Huxley, 1935: 45).

To check the proliferating African participation in trade, taxes were introduced and implemented. Similarly, the Native Registration Ordinance was promulgated in 1915. The imposition of a hut tax in 1900 and a poll tax in 1910 ensured that fewer Africans who had decided to start up informal entrepreneurships and employment managed to engage in profitable commerce. All men of over sixteen years paid poll tax (van Zwanenberg, 1975). However, this carried a three month sentence for defaulters. The initial rate of three rupees was raised to five in 1915 and eight rupees in 1920 (ibid, 1975: 77).

The colonial state exploited native Africans’ labour and the Europeans thrived, on ‘cheap’ African labour (Kanogo, 1987). At the City Hall for instance, Mboya (1963) observes that African inspectors were paid only one fifth of the salary which a European inspector received for doing the same job. Some of these employees came from Kibera (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). As a form of intimidation, native Africans were to do their work in ‘Khaki’ uniforms while Europeans wore lounge suits. Further, the former were given the ‘green books’ to carry about in town which was later followed by the famous ‘pass books’ (Ibid; 30). These restrictions also affected the people of Kibera as they could not
engage into their day to day commercial activities, some of which required them to move from one place to another. When the WWI began in 1914, new demands were exerted on the colonies of the contending imperial nations. Such demands included labour requirements in the form of soldiers and support staff (Ibid, O.I.). There were also demands of necessities such as food in terms of money (Murunga, 1998: 132). Great manpower was needed to transport the necessary equipment to the battle ground. The war impacted on the Kenyan colonial state’s ability to satisfy local Europeans and native Africans obligations. The conduits for siphoning these resources out remained the urban recruitment centres, taking some forcefully (Murunga, 1998). There was an attendant social dislocation among families and ethnic groups in Kibera as people were forcibly recruited.

As independence approached, Kenya was ‘ill equipped’ to survive the ‘ruthless roulette of capitalism’ (Mboya 1963). The colonial administration only allowed the people of Kibera a system of production that was geared towards subsistence. This led to growth of the informal economy such as street vendors, prostitution and other informal entrepreneurs, itself the product of the survival strategies of the unemployed Kibera residents. The colonial administration failed completely in terms of providing for people’s basic needs like housing (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). This is perhaps why immediately after independence, the GoK embarked on a programme of building large scale public housing for urban dwellers. The health facilities that were in Kibera during the colonial period were not adequately equipped. Consequently, native Africans were not allowed to share the existing hospitals in town with the whites (Ibid; O.I.). The
colonial government was concerned mainly with health of its labour force to sustain productivity. (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). To counter this, the natives used traditional medicines to cure diseases. Nonetheless, the underutilization of the available health resources (indigenous medicine) and the changes that occurred in the rural areas also contributed to lack of enough health services. Subsequently, the conjecture that western health improved African health obscured the reality as the services were never adequately accessible. The latter applied to other basic human needs such as sanitation, education among others.

Migrant labour as opposed to permanent wage labour only suited the colonial policy on urban development because the policy permitted Africans in urban areas on temporary not permanent settlement. No doubt Kibera was and up to date is still categorized as government land. Similarly, it implies that the people who lived and have been living on the land for close to a century were and are to date squatters. (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). It was also noted that as more taxation forced an increasing number of Africans into wage labour, the more local productive activity was reduced. This was attributed to the limited supply of male labour in the rural areas. Under the 1915 Native Registration Ordinance, the ‘Kipande’ registration system was initiated, but its implementation did not occur until 1920. The notorious ‘Northey Circulars’ were issued owing to the labour requirements of the Ex-soldiers settler scheme in 1919 (Murunga 1998: 141). This increased political activity in Nairobi as native Africans attempted to cope with the new overt coercion of the colonial administration. As van Zwanenberg (1975: 09) rightly points out, Nairobi grew as an urban center designed to ‘service’ the rural economy and not as a center of
economic stimulus. Subsequently, as subsidiary centers grew up in the highlands, Nairobi became the center of supply (Walmsley, 1957: 20). All exports were collected and graded in Nairobi and imports passed through here to their destination (Kiarie, O.I., 2010). It is significant to note that though the colonial administration focused on agriculture, and apart from monetizing the economy, taxation and land alienation were used to extrovert the economy thereby checking the rise of native Africans into colonial hierarchy (Zeleza, 1989).

**Land Tenure**

The second aspect of the colonial state that this study emphasized was the land tenure policy. Land encapsulates many diverse elements of nature, order and ideology through which a sense of identity of the occupant is conveyed (Spear, 1996; 213). These elements make land a contested space as people seek to exploit it (Murunga 1998: 32). In regard to the above, it was noted that the colonial state (to used Berman’s words (1990) ‘lacked the pre-requisite of anything close to a system of land tenure. This implies that the state did not have clear policies on urban land use and ownership. The colonial state allowed the settlement (Kibera) to grow informally. It was noted that this was primarily because of the Nubians’ status as former servants of the British crown (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). Consequently, the economic base of the people of Kibera was by and large influenced by the prevailing political situation. The problems were exacerbated by the colonial policy of divide and rule (Morton, 1998). The latter ensured that the ethnic groups in the urban and Kibera in particular were suspicious of one another and as a result only a few benefited. The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 had declared all Native Africans’
‘unoccupied’ land as Crown Land (Okoth-Ogendo 1991: 08; and Berman 1990). The 1902 Ordinance laid down that no ‘native’ had any title to land, as his/her claim to land was only recognized as long as he occupied it (Ibid, 1991: 08). Together with the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915, which defined the boundaries of the ‘native reserves’, native Africans in Kibera found themselves confined in an area without an option of spread out.

The four thousand hectares settlement was government property and the native Africans were only temporal residents. All the inhabitants were either ‘squatters or tenants’. The few ‘landlords’ mainly Nubians ‘ownership’ because they had been resettled them there by the government. Given the underlying circumstances, the people of Kibera were not in a position to utilize the land productively. For instance, it was the peasant production in the rural outskirts of Nairobi that produced a potential base for the metropolitan capital (Ngugi, O.I., 2010).

However, it is important to emphasize here that the native Africans were discontented with the colonial state’s policies on land. This was when the activities of the colony were transferred from the foreign office to the colonial office, leading to the inception of total land alienation entailed in the 1920 declaration of Crown Colony thus re-defining the place of Africans further. Native Africans’ action was, of course, a deliberate challenge to the occupation of their land by alien settlers. Several informants noted that the native Africans in Nairobi’s African reserves frequently flouted boundary regulations in search of jobs (Abdallah, Kiarie, Kyulu, Odhiambo and Kariuki, among others, O.I., 2010).
As earlier discussed, the people of Kibera were engaged in various economic activities for their survival. However, in one way or another, it was noted that the colonial administration provided employment opportunities as a means through which to pay hut tax. No doubt the ‘need to make the colony profitable and self-sustaining had been made explicit’ (Wolff 1974). In response to settler demands, the hut tax was increased and poll tax imposed to increase the native Africans’ cost of living.

The above turned out to have a ‘neutral’ effect to native African urban dwellers in Kibera and Nairobi at large. This is because it prompted the rise in domestic production as much as it stimulated wage employment. On the other hand, migrant contract wage labour and squatting on estates undermined the colonial authority thus threatening the apparatus of state control. Thus, it may not be far-fetched to argue that the colonial administration was caught in between satisfying metropolitan needs and maintaining local production, all entailing political control. The colonial administration was thus forced to consciously avoid rigid rules and centralized controls (Berman 1990: 76). From the secretariat in London were guidelines of suggestions, more than definite instructions and persuasion rather than command (Ibid, 80). The administration achieved this by for instance, avoiding imposition of any uniform pattern of policy for urban dwellers in Kibera and other ‘African locations’ in Nairobi. As a result, the relationship between the colonial office and native African urban dwellers in Nairobi tended to be less one of direct command and more of a complex and often protracted process of bargaining and negotiating even though there were frequent disagreements. (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). As earlier mentioned, this was reflected in the administration’s policy of allowing the Nubi
women to produce and sell *Nubian gin*. The earnings made necessitated them to lead a relatively good life. (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). To maintain their economic business after the colonial administration stopped gin production through Native Liquor Ordinance amendments, *Nubi* women invested in rental businesses. It was also a habit of the administration in those days to allocate some land next to military forts or barracks for soldiers to cultivate and grow food for their families (*Ibid*, O.I., 2010) Retired and demobilized soldiers were given land to settle and being so inextricably tied to the military culture and life, they settled permanently with their families and dependants.

**Health Sector**

While examining health policy during the inter-war period (1919-1938), it was established that provision of health for all races and all aspects of medicine was not due to a humanitarian outlook on the part of those who controlled industry, rather it arose from their economic interest (Odinga, 1990: 142). On this, native Africans were not passive in their quest for better health services (*Ibid*, O.I., 2010). No doubt that during the WWII and thereafter up to 1963, Nairobi was endowed with exiguous health facilities which though rudimentary in nature, were better compared to the situation during the WWI. This was attributed to the arrangements that had been made to cope with war causalities as it had been anticipated. Kibera residents and native Africans in general benefited from this gesture by the colonial administration (for a full detailed analysis see Odinga, 1990: 167-172).
Natives’ Contribution to Evolution of Kibera

Having looked into some ways the colonial administration was involved in the evolution of Kibera, this study now focused on the contribution of the native Africans to the evolution of the same. Professor Sam Aluko (Nigerian economist) was quoted as saying that ‘the poor people cannot sleep because they are hungry and the rich cannot sleep because the poor people are awake,’ (Davis, 2006: 138). Prior to 1963 devastating poverty forced people to take desperate measures for survival. The natives’ contribution to the evolution of Kibera was by and large necessitated by the colonial state’s policies of administration. On the other hand, the present study noted that the high population growth in Kibera was the epicenter of the problem. The influx of many ethnic groups into the settlement for instance negatively impacted on gin production due to lack of space, and out of fear (by Nubi women) of exposing the ‘illegal alcohol’ to so many ‘strangers’. (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). As a result, prostitution and illegal trade (Magendo) were to be used as survival strategies by women as it required little investment in the way of capital and skill. Similarly, house ownership was the remedy as it was looked at as good investment for receiving clients for sex, drinking or rental (Ibid, O.I., 2010).

The Challenges and Experiences faced by the Natives during the Colonial Period

The concentration of poverty in the settlement created a reality in which the main source of conflict was class specific. Subsequently, the situation echoed the findings of the Brandst Commission of 1977, established to study and suggest solutions to the problems of North-South relations. This study established that initially (in 1918), the Nubi population was very small. According to Johan (2009), it was approximately a hundred
people who by 1920 had increased to around six thousand because of intermarriages. Many *Nubi* men served in the army in those first years and during the WWI. This was attributed to many veterans and younger *Nubi* men joining the army on their arrival in Nairobi. (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). In the subsequent years, there was large scale demobilization and the army gradually lost its appeal as an employer of the British colonial government (Johan, 2009). As a result, the younger generation increasingly looked for work in Nairobi town instead of joining King’s African rifles. Hyde (1950: 237) wrote that ‘……the colonial state was *minimalist* and its reach did not extend into the ‘workplace’ and living space of the African population’. Copper (1983) observed that such ‘*minimalist approach*’ to reproduction opened the way for native Africans inflections of the idea of a colonial town, by creating a labour force but not the kind that colonial capital wanted. Even though the *Nubi* were regarded by the colonial administration as a ‘*better class African*’ with a capacity above that of the ‘ordinary ‘African’ (ibid, 2009), the internment affected all Africans in Nairobi’s shanties against a background of inadequate resources and services. Nonetheless, it was easy for the *Nubi* to get a ‘decent job’ like working for the police or prisons (Hassan, O.I., 2010). This study concluded that the scenario led to ethnic conflict.

**Non State Actors in Kibera Prior to 1963**

Non-state actors are not a new phenomenon to Kenya before 1963. For instance, the women groups formed in the 1940s were the precursors of the present day ‘*Maendeleo ya Wanawake*’ organization. Between 1940 and 1950, the colonial administration in Kenya became concerned about the plight of the African woman hence the formation of the East
African Women’s League which was formalized in 1951 (East African Standard, 10th September 1951). This was because women were the most vulnerable. It was mostly religious/philanthropic and secular service provision organizations for instance, the War Veteran Association, that were allowed to operate and this happened after the WWII. During this time, professional bodies also emerged.

Towards the end of colonialism, there were local charitable organizations, largely through religious initiatives. They emerged because of the suffering of the people and as religious and ethnic groups. Among the Christians, there was the Young Men Christians Association. These organizations however were not vocal as anticipated. Even though their activities were curtailed by the colonial administration, they themselves lacked adequate administrative structures (Odhaimbo, O.I., 2010). There was also the indigenous ethnic welfare organizations involved in self-help group activities. However, it was revealed that these organizations in a way subverted native Africans individual initiative and self-reliance (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). As it was witnessed, the welfare schemes led to swelling of immigrants from the rural areas. Subsequently, given that the organizations were confined to urban areas, they lacked the rural backup. As earlier mentioned, tribalism was not used to express solidarity and common loyalties of the people who shared culture. Instead, the colonial state and ‘some native Africans’ set themselves the work of inventing tribes for the inhabitants of Kibera to belong to.
2.5 Summary

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to trace the emergence and growth of Kibera prior to 1963. It emerged that migrations and settlements largely contributed to the evolution of Kibera settlement. This formed a distinctive basis for examining the process of development in the settlement. The historical process through which Kibera grew and emerged largely contributed to its evolution. There were migrations and settlements which in the process led to the restructuring of the economic, social and political organizations of the people of Kibera. Consequently, through the process of interaction and assimilation, the population of Kibera came to comprise of the many other Kenya’s ethnic groups.

The study also discussed and demonstrated how the colonial state (as an external factor) contributed to the evolution of the settlement. It played its role in the accumulation and legitimization of capitalist production. Not only was the colonial state to blame for underdevelopment of Kibera but also the internal actors such as the native Africans. Though Kibera inhabitants had learnt that for them to survive and prosper they had to rely on their own collective efforts rather than on the benevolence or goodwill of the colonial state, their initiatives were unproductive. The *Nubi* first established themselves in small villages and then gradually spread out of the rest of Kibera with its ample space. On the other hand, *Nubi* women were involved in alcohol production as a source of income. However, with the advent of colonialism, the native Africans’ political, social and economic organizations were adversely interfered with. This was due to the penetration of merchant capital which started in urban areas.
In a nutshell, although the dependency and underdevelopment theory was preferred in this study, some of its propositions were disapproved. Foremost, the research premise stating that the emergence and growth of Kibera as an African urban informal settlement owes much to the colonial period was indeed confirmed. This was evident in the examination of the political, social and economic organizations of the settlement prior to 1963.

The colonial government on the other hand, had some positive indications on the evolution of Kibera. First, they ‘provided’ wage labour for native Africans. There was also the Liquor Regulation Law which prohibited consumption of liquor. In times of emergencies, the missionaries stepped in to help the needy native Africans. It was the identification of the modes of production or the social formations in terms of the manner in which the colonial state appropriated labour and the products of labour that make the contention of some propositions of the theory relevant. In summary, all the above factors, both internal and external contributed to the evolution of Kibera prior to 1963.
CHAPTER THREE

THE KENyan STATE’S PROGRAMMES IN KIBERA FROM 1963 TO 1978

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the Kenyan state’s programmes in Kibera. In the first decade of Kenya’s independence the population of Nairobi and Kibera in particular increased dramatically (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). This was due to relaxation on restrictions of African migrations that led to an increase in the migration rate to the city. For instance, according to Brett (1974), the 1969 census showed that 65 percent of Nairobi’s native Africans population was born outside Nairobi with a further 10 percent born outside Kenya. Subsequently, three fifths of all migrants to major towns between 1962 and 1969 went to Nairobi.

It was pertinent to investigate what the Kenyan state did to transform their (immigrants) livelihoods given that the majority were poor. The influx into Kibera created a growing rental business mainly operated by the Nubians. Around 1974, the doors to Kibera were thrown wide open (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). The local authorities allowed many people with money and connections in government to construct rental rooms. Similarly, there were civil servants (senior) and businessmen/women or those investing their pensions or savings in building rooms. However, during the first decade of independence, the ‘richer’ landlords did not live in Kibera. Construction continued throughout the 1970s until the settlement was more or less full. The state felt that it was its responsibility to transform people’s lives because the situation at hand would pose a crisis given that issues and
challenges of developments such as poverty, unemployment and insecurity were on the rise (Wang’ombe, 1995).

The chapter discusses independent Kenya and urban development with emphasis on Kibera. Evaluation of the state’s development programs from 1963 to 1978 is done here. Housing, poverty, health and sanitation have been highlighted as essential issues during this period in time. In this way, the chapter poses the underdevelopment problemat in more realistic terms. The emphasis is on local (internal) factors that undermine the process of development. At the same time, overtones of the dependency and underdevelopment theory are scrutinized to find durable solutions to the issues and challenges facing the urban poor in the Third World urban centres. As the study attempts to analyze the Kenyan state’s role in dealing with the plight of the urban poor in Kibera, this chapter also discusses the role of the native Africans as a stakeholder in the process of development.

3.2   Kenya’s Urban Policy after Independence and its Impact on Livelihoods in Kibera

Writing on ‘Decolonization and Independence in Kenya’, Ochieng’ and Ogot (1995) pointed out that the withdrawal of the colonialists from their colonies was first viewed as triumph of African nationalism. It was in this light that it was noted that Kenya gained independence through its nationalist initiatives (Wafula, 2000). However, after independence, the point of contention was whether the long term goals of nationalism
which included development and equal distribution of resources were achieved (*ibid* 1995: 74).

From the time Kenya gained independence, poverty made urban development difficult (Odhiambo, 2003). Urban poverty was a creation of both the colonial administration and native Africans (Kiarie, O.I., 2010) entrenched in the colonial land, labour and taxation policies. After independence, these policies received reformations and amendments amid an economic situation that was almost entirely influenced by Britain. By 1966, the new developments and reformations within Kenya’s urban policy had confirmed fears about the process of urbanization. Colonialism had just ended and the political elite were to take on the development agenda of Kenya’s urban spaces (Wang’ombe, 1995). The GoK was to clearly identify sources of economic growth both locally and internationally. However, at the international level, Kenya was to base its relations with the industrialized countries on their requirements which included the theory of *comparative advantage* (*Nyang’oro* 1989).

Due to population increase in the rural areas, people had to find employment and other services in urban labour markets (Ngugi, O.I., 2010). However, according to Wang’ombe (1995), the latter was already characterized by widespread unemployment, under-employment, demand for housing and health services that were already considered inadequate. Many residents in Nairobi’s Kibera settlement came from the peasantry and natural population growth (Brett, 1974). Similarly, research has shown that urban growth in Kenya was not only because of an unusually rapid increase in the urban population due
to rural-urban migration but also due to rapid increase in total population to which this proportion is applied (Gugler, 1988). It is in this light that it was noted that in the first decade of independence, the Kenyan state was *ill-prepared* to deal with issues and challenges that faced the poor in Kibera.

To start with, Nairobi’s challenge of urbanization was first marked out in the pattern of urban land allocation and use, constrictive land policy and Kenya’s *legal pluralism* (Gugler, 1988). During the war years, settlers cleverly exploited the weakness of British government to obtain several concessions aimed at consolidating their power against native Africans (Ogot, 1974: 265). For instance, the Crown Lands Ordinance provided extensive security of land tenure by extending leases of land from 99 to 999 years (Wafula, 2000). In summary, the ordinance provided easy terms of lease and the means of ensuring the continued exclusivity of the white highlands through the power of the governor’s *veto* over land transactions between members of different races (Maxon, 1989: 72). In Nairobi, as McGregor (1968) put it, “settlers like Ewart Grogan were given large land grants as many of them had taken up government nominations including nominations to the Land Board, the Legislative Council, so also did they begin to influence land policy in their favour”.

On attaining independence, the Kenyan state lacked enough land survey personnel (Kiarie, O.I., 2010). Similarly, the demand for quick land allotment in Nairobi by far outstripped the ability of the authorities available to adequately allocate plots and ensure their designated use (Murunga, 2006). The emerging class of African petty bourgeoisie
took advantage of the circumstances that prevailed at the time to grab plots in Nairobi. In Kibera, irregularity in land allotment and use was not an isolated problem rather, it was part of a larger problem relating to land use policy in general in the country as a whole. Towards the end of the 1960s, most of the land acquired on freehold in Kibera, was subdivided and resold at a profit by government officials (Abdallah, O.I., 2010).

Uncoordinated planning accounted for the settlement’s improper drainage system, poor road and street network and debilitated building (Abdullah, O.I., 2010). In some cases, other locations simply developed and rooted themselves in areas where the GoK would later on wish to put up to different uses. Subsequently, the GoK and township committee were unable to effectively control the use to which the Kibera plots were put and the change in ownership (Irimu, O.I., 2010) and also lacked legislations to ensure a level of spatial ordering of Kibera as an urban settlement. As it emerged, it is the legislations that could have facilitated the process by enabling authorities to make and carry out planning designs. As a result, important public infrastructure like drains and roads in Nairobi and Kibera in particular were constructed as a response to emerging challenges to town planning rather than as part of an envisioned or projected plan for the urban settlement. In Godwin Murunga’s words;

“........infrastructural development was reactive and hasty rather than deliberate and forward looking..... ’’ (Murunga, 2006: 174).
In 1962, it was estimated that only one Kenyan out of every twelve lived in urban centers (Brett, 1974). By the year 1999, the proportion of the urban population had increased to 34.5 percent which was close to 10 million people (UN-HABITAT, 2000). This implies that Kenya’s urban population had increased at an annual rate of twelve percent in subsequent years up to 1999. As demonstrated earlier, the phenomenon was attributed to the GoK allowing Nairobi (which was already a prime city) to grow unchecked simply as a way of maximizing Gross National product (GNP). It is important to emphasize here that investing in rural areas as the GoK did is unlikely the most effective means of slowing down the primacy of the city (Odhiambo, 2003). Other factors like political and social structures that marginalized the urban poor in Nairobi and Kibera could be probable explanations. Kenya was expected to urbanize at an average growth of 3.9 percent per year for the period of 2005-2010 (UN-HABITAT, 2005: 04). It was noted that this scenario was unlikely to fade away as it was estimated that by 2015, the level of urbanization in Kenya will be 44.5 percent which translates to about 16.5 million people. Subsequently, Kenya Vision 2030 noted that it will be 54 percent, an equivalent of 23.6 million. For the GoK to control the growth of towns and cities, it should consider town planning and enacting legislations for proper implementation of policies.

The independent Kenyan state was overwhelmed by the then accelerating process of urbanization (Wang’ombe, 1995). Subsequently, it encouraged or rather supported non-state actors’ efforts to transform people’s livelihoods. (Nyadiero, O.I., 2010). This policy decision was taken in view of the supplementary development programme of the public sector. However, most non-state actors and donors lacked the capacity to respond to
requests by the GoK or had no programmes to support the poor in Nairobi and Kibera in particular. As a result, the state started to borrow both locally and from the international community. Oral evidence (Kiarie, and Owino, O.I., 2010) concurred with Bethwell Ogot’s sentiments that in various circumstances, the GoK was unable to pay back loans it had borrowed to facilitate provision of better housing, adequate health and sanitation services to the urban population in Nairobi and Kibera in particular (Ogot, 1974). This was attributed to misappropriation and mismanagement of funds meant for the poor. Much of the borrowed capital was for instance, diverted to Nairobi’s city center where political and administrative authority was centered, creating disparities between concentration of resources in the former and the neglect that was the fate of the hinterlands/suburbs such as Kibera (Owino, O.I., 2010).

Niculescu (1998) argues that 1964 and 1972 was the period of the first two Kenya’s Development Plans. The First and Second Development Plans were concerned with the need to translate political independence into economic and social realities (Shepherd, 1992). The latter were propelled by the rise of African national movements, attainment of independence and an equally rapid growth in the number and scope of national development plans in other African countries (ibid, 1958). In this regard, true economic planning preceded independence. Kenya saw the national, social and economic planning as a logical historical development from the national independent effort, then to be channeled into the rapid improvement of standards of life and of economic capacity (Granville 1962). However, the very ambiguity of Kenya’s First Development Plan—irrespective of national social-political or economic ideology, of priority actually given to
urban development and economic achievement, and of detailed economic policies or their absence; raised questions as to the meaning of the term ‘plan’. In this respect, Sutton (1964) informed this study that even graver doubts were raised by frequent lack of meaningful economic goals, unless “one counts as such a shopping list of rather miscellaneous projects – and the frequent failure of plan projects and goals to correspond not only with actual results but often with subsequent state action”.

Kenya’s First Development Plan had competitive demands as far as development of Nairobi’s residential areas were concerned (Owino, O.I., 2010). Similarly, other challenges included inadequate effective involvement of citizens such as the poor in Kibera, prioritization in allocation of public resources- economic growth versus poverty reduction and inequality, sustainability of programmes, insufficient disaggregated data and poor linkage of policy, planning and budgeting at lower levels.

It was in the Second Development Plan (1970-1974) that the GoK was more committed to giving priority to rural development (Nyabera, O.I., 2010). This was in the context that, (as Godwin Murunga put it),

‘.........primarily, urban centers are a rural outgrowth and a number of actors operate not only to give rise to but also constantly transform a settlement into an urban one.........’.  
(Murunga, 1998: 01).
The GoK was determined to cut down the numbers from rural-urban migration to Nairobi, through investment to urbanize rural areas (Abdallah, M. O.I, 2010). Eighty five percent of Kenya’s population lived in rural areas in 1970 hence the state’s emphasises on poverty alleviation in the countryside (Gosh, 1984). This was done for instance, by the state ‘providing basic services for all Kenyans and creating income-earning opportunities’ (Owino, O.I., 2010). This should not however be misconstrued that Kibera was completely neglected by the GoK.

Spatial goals proposed in the Third Development Plan (1974-1978) and the Forth Development Plan (1979-1983) were dominated by the aims of slowing down the rate of Nairobi’s growth and of minimizing migration from rural regions (Ghosh, 1984: 288). This however was not the same as minimizing rural-urban migration. As part of the strategy, policy makers thought that the best way of handling the rural population surplus without accelerating Nairobi’s population growth (and of Kibera for that matter) would be to guide rural out-migrants to nearby towns and market centers located in or near rural regions. No doubt the emergence of centers such as Limuru, Ruiru and Kiambu whose growth was later on stunted by the fact that Nairobi assumed the role of a market place for its suburbs (Odinga, 1990: 37). It is in this light that it was concluded that the goals of a national urban development strategy are the same as efficiency growth, equity, stability, integration and quality of life. In this case, the GoK equated minimizing out-migration from rural areas to minimizing rural-urban migration. To a certain degree, rural per capita income became lower since remittances from urban migrants comprised a small
percent of rural income (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). Therefore, this out-migration from rural areas involved substantial losses.

**Emergence of Non-State Actors in Kibera**

In the 1970s and 1980s, there was escalation of poverty in Nairobi’s Kibera slum, conflicts, internal displacements and general generation of the socio-economic and political systems. Here, poverty was defined as the ratio of the combined number of unemployed and those working in the informal sector to the total labour force (Agnor, 1998). The rise of non-state actors was phenomenal at this period in time and appeared to be directly linked to poverty (Kiarie, O.I., 2010). The West, particularly development donors exerted pressure on the government to undergo simultaneous political and economic revolutions introducing multiparty democracy and liberalizing markets (Morton, 1998). Similarly, the IMF and WB prescribed that market forces that were to be used to address the worsening economic situation in Kenya. However, the SAPS were not successful; hence non-state actors were poised to fill the gap (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Non-state actors assumed functions which had been ‘abandoned’ by the state especially in the fields of social services (Owino, O.I. 2010 and Shivji, 2006).

There was also a new wave of people’s organizations in the search for a new basis for facilitating their struggle for participation in decision making. Organizations rebelled against marginalization and unequal distribution of resources (Abudallah, O.I., 2010). The NGOs operating in Kibera diversified their activities to cover environmental
programs, issues affecting disabled persons, women, children and challenges of health, food and nutrition and education.

The GoK’s support of the non-state actors’ activities led to the formation of the Kenya National Council of Social Services (Owino, O.I., 2010) The Council was formed in 1964 as a quasi-governmental institution under the Ministry of Culture and Social Services (Nyadiero, O.I., 2010). It was mandated to coordinate non-state actors’ activities and advice the government accordingly on the same. This it was felt would enable effective regulation and concurrently facilitate better understanding on non-state actors’ contribution to national development and urbanization in particular (ibid, O.I., 2010). However, the council failed to meet the expectations of both the GoK and NGO sector as there was absence of clear and efficient non-state actors’ administration over the years.

The problems of poverty, housing, health and sanitation continued to increase over the subsequent years as immigrants from across the country’s more than 40 ethnic groups moved to Nairobi’s Kibera slum seeking employment (Otike, O.I., 2010). Many people in Kibera could not afford the minimum cost of necessities needed to sustain human life. Kibera’s population continued to grow rapidly yet the settlement was not included in any of Nairobi’s infrastructure plans (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). Though NCC implemented slum clearance policies to demolish informal settlements in Nairobi, there was a subtle shift of policy in 1974 (the GoK removed certain building restrictions for the inhabitants of Nairobi thus allowing essentially ‘anyone’ to come to Kibera to build structures to rent to
the increasing number of tenants. (Kyulu, O.I., 2010). When combined with the trend of urbanization, this action significantly propelled Kibera’s population growth rate.

Kenya’s urban policies in the subsequent decades after independence were established at difficult times in the country’s political and economic history. For instance, there were urban policies that came at the time of political anxiety when there were attempts to overthrow the government of President Daniel Arap Moi through force, that is, the Fourth Development Plan (1979-1983). Similarly, reformers among them scholars and politicians had fled the country and the few that remained maintained a low profile in discussing the issues that affected the urban poor (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). Though policy matters were discussed, it was always in favour of the ruling class.

It was not until 1994 that the scale of the problem of poverty was first appreciated and began to impact on policy. Subsequently, policy research was too ‘sensitive’ an issue to pursue. There was ‘.......no reason to write a policy research paper for Kibera since policy makers ‘did not look at it.....’. (Onyango, O.I., 2010). This implied that the quality of policy materials on Kibera that policy makers had access to was limited. Nonetheless, researchers alerted policymakers on the availability of viable policy options for Kibera that required government attention to create a forum to discuss matters and raise public awareness on the issue of urbanization, but the state declined (Abdallah, O.I., 2010).
3.3 The Growth of Nairobi in Post Independent Kenya

The development of Nairobi started with the colonial administration (Olumwullah 1989). As the then District Engineer of the Railway put it;

"......there was an immense amount of work to be done in converting an absolutely bare 327 miles from the nearest place where even a nail could be purchased into a buy railway center. Roads and bridges had to be constructed; houses and workshops built and station quarters erected, a water supply laid on and a hundred and one other things done which go to the making of railway townships...”. (Patterson, 1951: 295).

After independence, the pace of urban development in Kenya and Nairobi in particular, remained low relative to the experience of other developing countries. This was as a result of measures or rather campaigns taken by countries on a special sense of urgency in the drive to reduce urban poverty, cut back on fuel, lessen air pollution, provide adequate housing and promote cleaner, safer greener cities where all felt they belonged, whether rich or poor. In this section, the study discusses and demonstrates the GoK’s role in the development of Kibera and Nairobi for that matter.

The settlement pattern in Nairobi persisted almost unchanged (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). The petty bourgeoisie continued to subjugate and segregate the urban poor from accessing housing, employment opportunities and even health services by paying them meager wages. Landless labourers migrated in large numbers to the city and many found themselves in Kibera. This, in one way or another exerted more pressure on the GoK to provide more services to the increasing number of the urban poor. On the contrary, it may not be far-fetched to argue that the immigrants benefited by getting closer to political, economic and administrative authority that were centralized in Nairobi. The latter too
benefited from the immigrant labor that was needed for construction and other unskilled jobs (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). For these reasons, Nairobi was larger than the nearest twenty towns combined (Odinga, 1990).

The GoK maintained the railway line that passed through the center of Kibera. It introduced more passenger trains and established railway stations along the line in Kibera to cater for transport needs (Kiaire, O.I., 2010). However, most Kibera residents used buses and ‘matatus’ to their destinations (Kariuki, Irimu and Okello, among others. O.I., 2010). Congestion in the buses and ‘matatu’ industry was to be blamed on the Kibera residents themselves. Similarly, problems such as carjacking, irresponsible driving and poor traffic laws enforcement were enhanced by the huge population from Kibera in the sense that the authorities were overwhelmed by the large numbers.

To tackle some of the issues and challenges mentioned above, the GoK opted for the Import Substitution strategy which benefited Nairobi as the dominant manufacturing center (Van Zwanenberg, 1972). The option adopted contributed both positively and negatively towards the evolution of the city and its settlements, particularly Kibera. Nairobi became an industrial location and the center to export oriented industries. This enhanced a dearth of the metropolitan labour pool including professionals, technical and skilled workers migrating into Nairobi (Luseno, O.I., 2010). To counter this, the GoK gave attention to export promotion since the main exports were agricultural products and the output of primary industries. Such a strategy was likely to increase the prospects of
controlling rural-urban migration. It gave priority to the agricultural sector and rural development.

3.4 The State’s Programmes on Housing and Poverty Reduction

Before colonialism, the problem of housing was not deeply rooted because native’s huts were not overcrowded and according to their customs, ‘only one adult human being occupied one hut…….’ (Owino, O.I., 2010). After the introduction of a hut tax of five rupees, it became common for more than one person to occupy a hut to avoid payment of more taxes (Beck, 1970: 26). Such a phenomenon was also witnessed in Kibera after independence as more immigrants with their families occupied one room (Abddallah, O.I., 2010). On one side of the track (railway) were the European higher income houses (bungalows), (which were inherited by the African petty bourgeoisie after 1963) and on the other side the houses of ‘other races’ (native Africans and the urban poor) of lower income (Carman, 1976).

Between 1963 and 1978, the GoK did not have adequate policies to cater for the housing problem in Kibera. Given that the privately built houses could not be owned by the poor, the latter resorted to constructing shacks (Otike, O.I, 2010). This was the trend from independence until 1978 when the GoK in collaboration with non-state actors embarked on the slum upgrading program. The City Council of Nairobi (CCN), under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing used the ‘misguided policy’ of bulldozing ‘illegal settlements’ buildings to check the expansion of Kibera (Kariuki, O.I., 2010). The government on the other hand, hired huge chunks of Kibera to establish middle class
estates like Ayany and Karanja, evicting many Nubians in the process. This is evident in the change of names of this places, for instance, Ayany Estate was formerly *Lomle* while Jamhuri and Karanja were referred to as *Sarang ’ombe* and *Salama*. Such action rendered people of Kibera homeless and loss of their investments.

Between 1963 and 1978, poverty persisted in Kibera and the larger parts of Nairobi because of various reasons. In the city, the GoK opted for relentless advances in labour saving technology and development of low-wage off-shore production (Gachocho, 1999). The latter wiped out many jobs that the people (of Kibera) with limited education and skills once held. The history of Industrial Area in Nairobi illustrates the point. In the early 1970s, Industrial Area attracted a large population from Kibera that was employed in everything from assembling automobiles to canning (Kiarie, O.I., 2010). Thousands of youths from the settlement unloaded trucks and collected recyclables waste (Kyulu, O.I., 2010). However, towards the late 1970s, the owners of the businesses (with the help of GoK) resorted to mechanization which sharply reduced both the need for labour and wage employment (ibid, 1999).

The GoK encouraged investment in industry to reduce poverty in Nairobi. This assumed significance in the first decade of independence. There was development of secondary import substitution industry which led Nairobi to become a major magnet for international finance capital (Olumwallah 1986: 110). It can therefore be safely stated that, just as Britain functioned as the center of the economic system in which East Africa was at the periphery, so Nairobi acted as a center for East African economy system and
other towns and cities in the region functioned as its periphery (Odinga, 1990: 37). Perhaps, by assuming the role of a market place for the surrounding areas, the growth of towns such as Ruiru and Limuru were stunted.

Income inequalities were higher in Nairobi’s Kibera slum. According to Abdallah (O. I., 2010), this was a major divisive social factor among the slum’s poor population. Just like housing, the GoK did not perhaps take adequate preventive measures to reduce levels of poverty in the settlement. Though the population comprised mostly of unskilled labourers, (Kiarie, O.I., 2010), this study argues that the GoK could have put in place mechanisms to appropriately use the manpower for their (the state and poor urban dwellers’) mutual benefit. This could be achieved by providing incentives to both local and international investors who in turn could employ the poor and pay them sustainable wages.

It was noted that since education is the pathway to economic self-sufficiency, the state could have helped built enough schools, recruit teachers and provide material supply (Nyabera, L. O.I., 2010). For instance, the popular Olympic Primary School which was built by the government enabled children to get knowledge and skills which in turn helped them to be creative and innovative (Oduor, O.I., 2010). It was observed that there were no facilities that provided tertiary education that were built by the state in Kibera between 1963 and 1978. Similarly, special attention was not given to the disabled whose major problem was and has always been inaccessibility to education opportunities. Lastly, this study faults the curriculum which could have focused on the adolescents to
offer a vision of youth development that result in positive outcomes and establishes clear standards and expectations for the young people.

The GoK declared several housing forms illegal (Olumwallah, 1986). This declaration affected Nairobi and Kibera in particular that it rendered it an ‘unauthorized’ settlement. Despite this, people continued to live in Kibera and by the early 1970s, landlords were renting out their properties to a significantly increased number of tenants than as was permitted by law (Abubakar, O.I., 2010). The urban dwellers who were highly impoverished could not afford to rent legal housing elsewhere in Nairobi hence finding the rates offered in Kibera to be comparatively affordable (Owino, O.I., 2010).

Many, if not most single parent families headed by females also suffered from limited earning capacity, meager public assistance and poor housing. (Nyachio, O.I., 2010). These conditions handicapped children in various aspects of their lives for instance education-wise, thus helping perpetuate poverty in the settlement. The Nubian community had a council of elders which was also the trustee of its land (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). The council claimed the whole of Kibera, indicating the extent of their land as over 1100 acres (Davis, 2006). Some Nubians informed this study that it was due to the state’s sanctioned allotments that their land area reduced to 780 acres (Abdullah and Hassan, O.I., 2010 and Johan, 2009). Just like the colonial period, in independent Kenya, the Nubians in Kibera had no land rights and identity as they were ‘otherwise thought as a stateless people’. They were denied Kenyan Identification Cards (IDs) hence were not able to vote and elect political leaders of their own (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). After the first
three decades of independence, they were still asked to get their great great parents’ certificates of birth for them to be issued with IDs. Without the latter, they could not be issued with passports and hence no PIN number (Personal Identification Number). Some had no access to clinical attention because of lack of IDs. Further, they could not attend university education and even open a bank account.

### 3.4.1 Programmes on Health and Sanitation

The network of health services and facilities in independent Kenya, Nairobi and Kibera in particular was still sparse (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). This was accompanied with shortage of paramedical manpower and weak institutional structures for diffusing health information and organization. To control population, the GoK started operating a series of national planning programs in 1967 but with very little success (Dimitrion, 1990). Women were introduced to the use of contraceptives. However, most informants in Kibera shared the same sentiments that ‘many couples did not develop a desire to limit family size…,’ perhaps due to their social and cultural practices (Atieno, Hussein, Ibrahim, Omala and Otike among others, O.I., 2010).

Health services especially the preventive branch were geared towards the well being of the Europeans. Murunga (2006: 82) contends that ‘at the center of segregationist town planning was European concerns about disease, sanitation and public health’. Immediately after independence, the GoK adopted the colonial health policy with minimal reforms. In most cases, it was to ensure that diseases didn’t become a threat to the economic priorities of the government (Otike, O.I., 2010). It was argued that by virtue
of urban people temporarily residing in Nairobi, there was no need to provide for their social needs.

In providing health and sanitation services to the slum dwellers in Kibera, the government performed dismally between 1963 and 1978 (Ochieng’ 1995). In the first decade of Kenya’s independence, the key health care issues that faced the government and policy makers included dealing with infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria (Onyango, O.I., 2010). The government was involved in developing intervention measures namely; prevention, treatment, cure and support for those infected. However, its efforts failed to address the fundamental issues such as health education. While the interventions went as far as ensuring that some health and sanitation were maintained in Kibera (Otike, O.I., 2010), they still fell short of creating capacities that would provide adequate solutions. Between 1963 and 1978, just like in the colonial period, the disruption of African social structure was done through missionary effort and the institution of legal sanctions. The 1910 Witchcraft Ordinance (which prohibited African medical practitioners form engaging in any form of medical care activity) was still in practice even after independence. This was ensured through instruments of cultural alienation such as education, religion and the legal system.

Between 1963 and 1978, there was the health burden of infectious diseases in Kibera, malnutrition and complications of child birth on one hand and non-communicable diseases on the other (Muriithi, O.I., 2010). In a nutshell, the GoK’s investment in health and sanitation programs in Kibera was very minimal, perhaps because of inadequate
resources. Nonetheless, it would be farfetched to claim that the state was completely to blame for the issues and challenges that faced the poor in Kibera from 1963 to 1978.

The implications of the foregoing discussion are clear, the magnitude and complexity of urban issues and challenges to development including poverty, housing and health grew unabated in subsequent years. According to Beatrice Wanjiru Kiarie, (O.I., 2010) in the early 1980s, Kibera became one of the heavily polluted human settlements in Nairobi (O.I., 2010). The informant asserted that the pollution was as a result of human waste, garbage, soot, dust and other wastes. The settlement was contaminated with human and animal waste, thanks to the open sewage system and the frequent use of what was referred to as ‘flying toilets’ (Waithera, O.I., 2010). The informant argued that lack of sanitation combined with poor nutrition among the residents accounted for many illnesses and diseases. It is in the light of the foregoing arguments that this study safely concludes that in one way or another the GoK and the residents of Kibera contributed to the evolution of the settlement in the period up to 1978.

3.5 Other Private Employment Partners in Kibera from 1963 to 1978.

Kibera was a microcosm of many of the world’s most vexing issues namely; poverty, poor health care, education, income earning, severe water shortage and poor sanitation. Similarly, in the first decade of independence the settlement faced an exploding youth population which represented over half the slum’s entire population (Omondi, I.O., 2010). According to Oxfam (2003), 37 percent of school going age children was not even in the educational system and 70 percent of the children attending school only had limited
access to informal school and community centers. Further, an approximate 80 percent of all youth in Kibera lacked formal employment while the UN (2000) Report estimated that 35-45 percent of the entire slum population was unemployed or underemployed.

First, there was the informal sector which provided employment to slum dwellers in Kibera. It was much more important than the modern private sector (Abdallah, O.I., 2010) and larger than the public sector. In respect to the development, it created employment opportunities for the poor in Kibera (Odhiambo, O.I., 2010). It helped to hold down unemployment rates in the settlement between 1963 and 1978. During this period, incomes were low due to the ease of entry for anyone wanting to work and the intensified competition among the entrepreneurs. The informal sector also offered a training ground for the Kibera residents but only a small minority of the indigenous entrepreneurs moved upwards to a larger and more permanent scale of operation (Nyachio, O.I., 2010). This was attributed to the state’s role in repressing the sector. This included forbidding work operations in homes, strict licensing, demolishing the slum where the informal sector thrived and forcing traders to use expensive facilities for instance open air markets and stores for storage of goods charged at a fee. The suppressed traders produced more services than goods, thus it catered largely for final demand and the latter, for its output was much localized.

Chandaria industries, as a private entity, also contributed to the development of Kibera. With a Paper Mill and a large industrial base combined with many commercial relationships in African countries, Chandaria provided market for recyclables in Nairobi
and its environs. This implies that markets for recyclables in Nairobi were better than in other East African countries. According to UNEP Publication (1991), 20 percent of the household wastes generated were recovered by either informal pickers in Nairobi (from Kibera) or the CCN employees. It is in this light that it was concluded that recycling of these household wastes provided informal employment and a means of livelihood to many slum dwellers in Kibera. Similarly, it reduced the CCN’s (GoK) waste management costs. Nairobi and its environs reported 60 to 70 percent collection coverage, with nearly 100 percent in the CBD and an overall 54 percent of generated waste being collected (ibid 1991: 78). This was quite an achievement for the private sector. However, it was established that the CCN tended to overlook the informal recovery and recycling of waste, thus making formalization and integration on informal waste recycling activities with the ‘formal solid waste management system’ difficult (Abdallah, O.I., 2010).

It would be naive to conclude that the above two were among the few development partners in Kibera between 1963 and 1978. On the contrary, it can be safely stated that there were no enough non-state actors that transformed the livelihoods of slum dwellers. This in a way reveals paucity of such factors and the gap that existed between many stakeholders in the process of urban development in Kibera. The many development partners that operate in Kibera were established later on in 1978 after democracy and political freedom. This study noted the following as of great significance to the people of Kibera, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (CHRE), CK, Centre for Sustainable Urban Development (CSUD), Kibera Community Youth Programme (KCYP), KWAHO and Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), among others. It is because of the
projects they (non-state actors) engaged in that the face of Kibera changed. Here we look at CK and the others will be dealt with in the next chapter because they partnered with UN-HABITAT in a number of projects.

Carolina for Kibera (CK) was founded in 2001 Rye Barcott to help prevent ethnic and religious violence in the slum through a community-based sports program. Since then, CK has been doing fairly well in respect to the development of the settlement. Its core projects; The Youth Sports Program, Tabitha Clinic, the Binti Pamoja Center and Taka ni Pato help address the many needs in the community. According to Ben Mshila, Chairman, Board of Trustees CK, Kenya, there is a high degree of collaboration of the four CK Programs but each is operationally and financially autonomous. Most notably, each program is led by people of Kibera. Mshila argued that oversight and governing is provided by an executive committee composed of leading members of the CK and a member of the CK Kenya Board of Trustees. The organization carries its dynamic, community-driven development by expanding the depth and breadth of its programs in the slum.
3.6 Summary

In this chapter, the Kenyan state’s programs in Kibera form 1963 to 1978 have been discussed. The indices used to measure the state’s role in transforming people’s lives in Kibera included housing, poverty, health and sanitation. Apart from the state, partners that were involved in the evolution of the settlement were highlighted.

After independence, the GoK inherited the colonial urban policy with minimal reformations and amendments. This was because the petty bourgeoisie who had political power were still subsumed in the way of governance by the colonial administration. Perhaps, it explains why the GoK resorted to the Import Substitution strategy. Thus, the terms of exchange were unequal and skewed in favour of the ruling class. Moreover, the GoK opted for export promotion as an alternative to the Import Substitution strategy with an aim of increasing prospects of controlling rural-urban migration. It was concluded that this was because urbanization process as defined by Mumford (1961), had yet to be felt in Nairobi and Kibera in particular at that period in time. This is evidenced in the statistics that in 1962, only one Kenyan out of every twelve lived in urban centers (see Gugler 1988 and Brett 1974). The GoK failed in planning and implementing adequate development strategies. The study attributed the failure to inheritance of colonial policies and lack of expertise. However, together with non-state actors, it came up with programs to transform people’s lives in Kibera and other urban areas.

There was increased population in Nairobi and Kibera in particular between 1963 and 1978. This was because of rural-urban migration where people were in search for
employment. It is this phenomenon that paved way for the government’s collaboration and support of non-state actors in its quest to transform slum dwellers’ lives. Despite the combined effort, it was noted that the problems of housing, poverty, health and sanitation persisted almost unchanged. Again, this study faulted that state for its repressive policies in Kibera. For instance, Kibera residents in the informal sector were not allowed to work from their homes, denied licenses to operate and worst of all, their houses were demolished. On the other hand, the non-state actors’ operations were also curtailed through financial constraints and sometimes laws and rules that were very rigid. The community in general lacked the creativity and innovativeness to bring about the desirable changes.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF UN-HABITAT IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF KIBERA
FROM 1978 TO 2003

4.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapters the study has striven to show how Kibera evolved. The foregoing discussion ascertains the contributions of the colonial government, the independent Kenyan state, native Africans among other non-state actors. Shivji (2006) argues that the entry point of non-state actors in transforming people’s lives emanated from the overwhelming role of the state. That is perhaps why the connection between the state and non-state actors was and has always been tilted towards the process of development. This chapter critically examines the UN-HABITAT’s role in the transformation of Kibera.

However, it would be inefficient to analyze the agency’s role without having its background knowledge. In this respect, a brief background of UN-HABITAT is provided. In evaluating UN-HABITAT’s development programs, emphasizes is placed on housing, poverty reduction, health and sanitation. This was because the indices have been commonly used measure people’s living standards in informal urban settlements in the world. Further, the chapter analyzed development realities in Kibera since UN-HABITAT’s inception and the issues and challenges that have engulfed Kibera since 1978. The chapter further discusses UN-HABITAT and other development partners in Kibera. This is in view of the assumption that there are a number of non-state actors
(local, national and international) that have been operating in Kibera even before UN-HABITAT was founded.

Ways in which the agency relates to other development partners are discussed. This is in view of the assumption that at the international level, the former is solely charged with the responsibility of developing the settlement while the latter play a critical role in realizing high living standards. Just like in the preceding chapters, the dependency and underdevelopment theory is employed to guide the analysis in this chapter, that is, whether the agency as an external factor determines development in Third World urban centres.

4.2 Background of UN-HABITAT

From its inception (1945), the United Nations Organization (UNO) recognized that people in urban centers in the Third World needed to have better urban living conditions (Nyabera, O.I., 2010). It was not until 1978 that UN-HABITAT was established solely to deal with issues and challenges of rapid urbanization. The table below shows the increase in urban population in the world from 1970 to 1990 and the projected growth in 2025.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>URBAN POPULATION (MILLIONS)</th>
<th>URBAN SHARE (%)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>2282</td>
<td>5187</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Developed Regions</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>1177</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia New Zealand</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR (former)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Developed Regions</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>1401</td>
<td>4011</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia*a</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>2556</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania*b</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** United Nations Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, 1993.
The table below on ‘Average Annual Rate of Change of Urban Population illustrates that the less developed regions had an increasing number of people living in urban centers.

Table 4.2: Average Annual Rate of Change of Urban Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Developed Regions</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Developed Regions</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


UN-HABITAT was formerly referred to United Nations Commission for Human Settlements (UNCHS). The session held in 1976 to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the first UN Conference on Human Settlements led to the creation of UN-HABITAT (UNESCO, 2008). Given the magnitude of the urban population and the important role the Chinese cities were playing in domestic and international arenas, UN-HABITAT intensified its cooperation (in 1996) with the latter in a range of areas (Habitat Debate, March 2004 Vol. 10. No.1).

From 1978 to 1997, the UN-HABITAT got meager support from the UNO as it had an unfocused mandate (UNESCO, 1999). Its roles were intertwined in UNO’s functions. It struggled almost single handedly among multilateral organizations and other agencies to
prevent and ameliorate problems stemming from massive urban growth especially within the cities of the developing world. Some of these organizations included United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Vision (WV), World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) among others. In response to global urbanization and shelter crisis, the UN General Assembly at a special session to review the Habitat Agenda in 2001 decided in its resolution A/56/206 to elevate UN-HABITAT (ibid, 2008). The latter was to be a fully-fledged programme of the UNO guided by a Governing Council to help policy makers and local communities get to grips with issues and challenges of urbanization and find workable lasting solutions (UN-HABITAT, 2008).

The UN-HABITAT used its expertise to identify emerging priorities for sustainable urban development, and to make the needed corrections. It was revealed that the agency’s mandate was further strengthened in January 2002 to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all.

The status of the Commission for Human Settlements and the UN’s Center for Human Settlements were transformed into the UN-HABITAT. It is important to emphasize that UN-HABITAT was placed squarely in the mainstream of the UN’s development agenda for poverty reduction and sustainable development. Also directly related to UN-HABITAT mandate was the UN-Millennium Declaration which recognized the dire circumstances experienced by the world’s urban poor. (Resolution adopted by the
General Assembly: 55/2, 2010). It articulated the commitment to improve the lives of at least a hundred million slum dwellers by the year 2002 (*ibid, Target II Millennium Development Goal No.7*). Under the UN Charter, UN-HABITAT had to establish committees under its umbrella body to oversee the many duties that have come up as a result of rapid urbanization.

### 4.3 Evaluation of UN-HABITAT Programs in Kibera

Evaluation is a means of assessing the process and outcomes of an activity (Clayton 1996). It looks at what and how it compares what was expected to happen with what really happened and focuses at how things were done. This implies that evaluation is part of the very first plans made. Although it is frequently overlooked, it is an integral part of the entire action plan right from the start (Daniel, O.I., 2010). This section focuses at evaluation of UN-HABITAT’s development programs in Kibera both as a process and outcome. In this regard, the evaluation process involved measuring how UN-HABITAT implemented and executed its role of transforming urban livelihoods in Kibera. Outcome evaluation on the other hand involved analyzing UN-HABITAT’s progress and how well it accomplished its goals.

Since inception of UN-HABITAT, many Kibera residents continued to live in low living standards and absolute poverty. It emerged that though the agency has been playing a role in transforming people’s lives in the settlement, its impact remains minimal (Daniel, Nicholas, Abdullah, Otike among others O.I., 2010). To reach such a conclusion this section interrogated three issues and challenges of development namely; housing,
poverty, health and sanitation. Both primary and secondary data aided this study in unmasking the challenges and issues of development in Kibera.

Housing or rather shelter is a very important aspect of human life (Wang’ombe 1995). According to Gugler (1998), access to secure shelter has traditionally been considered one of the most vital components of urban social policy. This is in the sense that any development effort must first be committed to addressing urban needs, particularly housing. However, it must not be construed that housing is more important than water supply, sanitation, health, education and urban transport. This is because, as it emerged, along with housing the other needs are closely related to urban poverty reduction. In the case of Kibera, housing has always been a major concern for the residents. Several respondents informed this study that just like elsewhere, housing determines health as a basic human need (Nyabera, Hussein, Owino, among others O.I., 2010).

It is in the light of above that the study engaged in a critical analysis of the role UN-HABITAT in transforming people’s lives in Kibera through housing. In their pursuit for sustainable livelihoods, Kibera residents have always considered health as an important asset (Abdallah O.I., 2010). However, prior to independence and throughout the post-independence period, the residents had very limited (if any) access to health services. For many of them, housing was the most valuable possession. In some cases, it generated rental income or was used as a place of work (Hamza O.I., 2010). It is in this light that the study concluded that though not significantly, inadequate housing in Kibera
contributed to the less tangible aspects of people’s well-being for instance privacy, insecurity and dignity.

Housing remains to be a major development issue and challenge in Kibera. As it shall be illustrated later, UN-HABITAT has been credited for its initiatives towards improved housing in Kibera. However, much still needs to be done. This study also used poverty as an index of development in Kibera. Just like in the rural areas, it was established that poverty is also an urban phenomenon in Nairobi and Kibera in particular and development efforts must be made to address it. The UN-HABITAT Urban Global Observatory Report (2000) observed that though it was assumed that Kenya’s poor population was predominantly rural dwellers, the ranks of the urban poor had grown rapidly in Nairobi. According to Biau (O.I., 2010), the latter was because UN-HABITAT policies to address urban poverty in Nairobi were incoherent. The respondent attributed the latter to the agency’s lack of an international fund for housing and cities (just like UNICEF), UN-HABITAT’s despotism (where only the boss decides) and clientelism (where the ED prioritizes the beneficiaries). Just like the GoK’s institutions of urban governance, UN-HABITAT has not been adequately prepared for the enormous and increased demands placed on it. Similarly, it is inadequately equipped to generate sufficient employment or even maintain the infrastructure put in place.

The SAPs that were introduced in the 1980s had a negative impact on the urban poor. As note earlier, the poor in Nairobi and Kibera in particular were more entrenched into cash economies. As a result, they suffered more from the lifting of subsidies, for instance on
basic food stuffs, housing and transport. Secondly, policies to downsize the public sector left many workers being laid off. This in turn increased the number of poor people in Nairobi. This present study established that poverty in Kibera was characterized by people’s livelihood systems, their vulnerability in relation to jobs and access to services, the environmental hazards they negotiate with- paying more for goods and services and living in almost monetized economy (Daniel, O.I., 2010). Wang’ombe (1995) concurs by arguing that the poorest were often found among the unemployed and the wage workers especially those within the informal sector. The poor from slums (including Kibera) worked in the streets of Nairobi as a survival strategy and necessity and thus they were what Gugler (1988) called an *unavoidable evil*. According to Odhiambo (2003), substantial urban policy not only limited the scope for mobilizing the revenue of urban authorities but more importantly also, it limited the effective demand for housing and other basic urban services due to low income. It is perhaps because of the latter that poverty in Kibera increased tremendously in the decades of 1980s and 1990s. (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). For the urban poor, whose main income generation was labour, participation in the labour market was crucial (*ibid*; 2003). However, whether participation in the labour market was important for poverty reduction depended on the level of labour income earned. Thus, it implies that participation in the labour force is not a guarantee for not being poor. (*Ibid* 2003: 15). In this regard, an examination of UN-HABITAT’s poverty eradication strategy in Kibera is worthy being done.
Lastly, the study focused on health and sanitation in Kibera. Similarly, key health care issues and challenges faced by policy makers particularly UN-HABITAT were addressed. It was noted that serious consequences resulted from the GoK moving away from the primary health care agenda set forth in WHO Alma, Alta Declaration of 1978 (The WHO 1981 Report). The latter emphasized health policy reforms favouring privatizing and the implementation of *vertical programmes* to tackle specific diseases (*ibid*; 1981 Report). This was because health key issues during the decade of the eighties were seen as rampant as they included dealing with infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS (Onyango O.I., 2010). WHO Report (1999) observed that developing countries were faced with what it termed as *a dual health burden*. On the one hand, this referred to the ‘*unfinished agenda*’ of infectious diseases, malnutrition and complication of childbirth and on the other, emerging epidemics of HIV/AIDS and non-communicable diseases. In this regard, Hall and Midgely (2004), argued that development partners must aim at freeing the poor from the abject and dehumanizing conditions and inadequate health facilities. In Kibera, infant mortality rates and maternal mortality rates were and are still high due to inaccessible healthcare (Hassan, O.I., 2010). It was noted that children died from preventable diseases because they lacked access to routine immunization services. Likewise, public health initiatives remained widespread in Kibera (Otike F. O.I., 2010). Resources are needed to tackle the rising threat of epidemics of non-communicable diseases and chronic conditions like cancer, diabetes, obesity and acute respiratory diseases and injuries. As indicated earlier, an increase in income for the poor results in a greater proportional increase in life expectancy. This implies that economic development should lead to improved health and sanitation (Odhiambo 2003).
In this regard, the study retrospectively assesses what UN-HABITAT has done to improve the health conditions of the Kibera residents up to 2003.

The families affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Kibera were pushed into poverty through loss of income, reduced ability of caregivers to work, medical expenses and even funeral expenses (Owino, O.I., 2010). Households used up their savings and in many cases had to sell off their assets. Hall and Midgely (2004) argued that in the developed countries, more resources have been diverted towards HIV/AIDS care and more beds occupied by HIV/AIDS patients. This implies that for the case of Kenya, the already scare healthcare resources have been diverted to the care of HIV/AIDS at the expense of other healthcare needs. As a result of the latter, there is a declining life expectancy of the poor in Kibera. As noted earlier, it is through the above that human capital as the ultimate resource for development was reduced.

4.3.1 Programmes on Housing and Poverty Reduction

In the previous section, it was demonstrated how and why housing, poverty, health and sanitation are issues and challenges that faced the poor in Kibera. It was noted that the latter have been facing the challenges posed by inadequate housing, poverty and inaccessibility to health care prior to independence throughout the post independent era. This section focuses on UN-HABITAT’s programmes or initiatives on housing aimed at reducing poverty in Kibera up to 2003. However, as it shall emerge, this study goes back and forth given that most if not all UN-HABITAT’s programmes on housing go beyond the time limit (2003). It was observed that since inception, UN-HABITAT has been at the
forefront in the battle against the fast growing urban poverty and the scourge of climate change that is caused by poorly planned urbanization (UN-HABITAT, 2008). It was observed that the latter threatens the lives and livelihoods of the people of Kibera hence urgency of the matter.

To start with UN-HABITAT has always concerned itself with the problem of housing world over because it is the agency mandated by UNO to deal with Urban Human Settlements. However, it was USAID which commissioned Matrix Development Consultants to prepare an inventory of informal settlements in Nairobi in 1993 (Gachocho 1999: 98). The objective was to provide accurate information on the location and characteristics of slums in Kenya. However, it was noted that the inventory was based on aerial photography hence the outcome of the study was perhaps not accurate (Owino, O.I., 2010). It is important to note that the publication of the inventory coincided with the aftermath of multiparty elections of 1992 and a new openness and by then willingness to dialogue was apparent in the Kenyan society as a whole (ibid: 112). However, given that Kibera had elected opposition leaders to both central and local governments, consultations (dialogue) on the challenge of housing had little effect as the central government was not prepared for such openness. (Kariuki, H. O.I., 2010). According to Mary Gachocho (1999), majority of house-owners had some form of quasi legal tenure through temporary occupation licenses or letters from chiefs on public land or agreements with land-owners on private land. The authorities (GOK) adopted a laissez faire approach whereby generally, they did not undertake demolitions but at the same time not instituting large scale improvement of the settlement (Daniel, B. O.I., 2010).
It was not until 2002 that UN-HABITAT established the United Nations Housing Rights Programme (UNHRP) (Daniel, O.I., 2010). The UNHRP was launched in April 2002 as a joint initiative by UN-HABITAT and the office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR). According to Daniel Biau, the substantive focus of the programme was grounded in the Habitat Agenda which stated that “within the overall context of the enabling approach, governments should take appropriate action in order to promote, protect and ensure the full and progressive realization of the right to adequate housing” (Paragraph 61 of the UN-HABITAT Istanbul Declaration, 1978). The development objective of the UNHRP was to assist states and other stakeholders with the implementation of their commitment of the Habitat Agenda. It was declared that “we (the heads of state or governments) reaffirm our commitment to the full and progressive realization of the right to adequate housing, as provided for in international instruments.” (Istanbul Declaration Paragraph 8; and the Habitat Agenda Paragraph 39).

The poor in Kibera benefited from UN-HABITAT initiatives in several ways. In the decade of 1990s and early 2000, UN-HABITAT in partnership with the GoK and other stakeholders initiated programmes to tackle the housing problems and reduce poverty in Kibera (UN-HABITAT, 2003). However, the latter was met with some pockets of resistance and anxiety among the residents. For instance, UN-HABITAT initiated an upgrade programme that was set to transform lives and livelihoods of the poor dubbed ‘The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme ‘(KENSUP), this arm of the Ministry of Housing invested USD eight million to construct fourteen blocks which were to have
seven hundred and seventy housing units. According to Gachocho (1999), the latter was to be started in 1999 and other targeted interventions were set to address infrastructure services, land tenure and employment issues, as well as the impact of HIV/AIDS. As indicated earlier, UN-HABITAT didn’t have an international fund for housing like other agencies such as FAO, UNESCO, WHO which were more independent. (Daniel, O.I., 2010). Despite the hurdle, the first phase of the project was completed in 2009.

In 2002, UN-HABITAT and KENSUP were able to map out the largest communities in Kibera through situation analysis, socio-economic and physical mapping (UN-HABITAT 2008). The two partners were also involved in capacity building of the NCC and communities in Kibera, providing other technical advice aimed at finding suitable slum upgrading models for replication and up scaling (ibid; 2008). In this regard, it was noted that UN-HABITAT has been constantly improving its focus and responsiveness to the aspirations of the poor people in Kibera. Through the Kibera Slum Upgrading Initiative, the agency collaborated with relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Lands, Ministry of Co-operatives, and Ministry of Gender, Sports and Culture (Owino, O.I., 2010). Through the Ministry of Youth Affairs, UN-HABITAT and the youth in Kibera collaborated to harness the youths’ energy through training and workshops. It was observed that the latter aimed at upgrading infrastructure in Kibera (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). The informant argued that a group of youths in partnership with UN-HABITAT trained young men in making low-cost stabilized soil blocks. The initiative was a UN-HABITAT project aimed at capitalizing on the intended huge building project. It was noted that most of the youths in Kibera initially contracted as
unskilled labourers were later on (2002) being trained as plumbers and electricians at the Don Bosco Catholic Church Training Facility (Owino, O.I., 2010). Some were contracted by the KENSUP as masons. Further, with trained electricians among themselves, cases of fire were drastically reduced. This was perhaps because initially, the illegal electricity connections were not done by professionals.

The long term movement scheme intended to rehouse the poor living in Kibera. According to Owino (O.I. 2010), the clearance of the project was expected to take between two and five years to complete. The entire project was planned to take nine years to re-settle all the residents. It was noted that the project had the backing of the UNO and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who was also the local Member of Parliament and was to cost USD 1.2 billion. According to Gachocho (1999) the new community was planned to include schools, markets, play grounds and other facilities. The first batch of people to leave Kibera was on 16th September 2009 and was rehoused in 300 newly constructed apartments with a monthly rent of around USD 10 (Otike, O.I., 2010).

UN-HABITAT also supported other groups of NGOs such as Jamii Bora Investment Group which came up with poverty friendly packages of investing (Hassan K. O.I., 2010). The respondent informant observed that the Jamii Bora fund allowed youths to get into groups of five, each member contributing USD 3 monthly. A month after joining the group, one was able to take a loan of USD 132 that was payable within a year at less than five percent interest. When the first loan was paid, the member could ask for USD 264 followed by a USD 396 loan. After going through three phases of loans, Hassan Kariuki
noted that, the member was eligible for a mortgage worth USD 6600. As it emerged, the program enabled many poor people in Kibera to set up business enterprises which in turn provided employment opportunities thus reducing poverty. However, the former did not provide opportunities for adequate housing given that the poor were not able to accumulate enough money to buy land. There was also the UN-HABITAT Maji na Ufanisi initiative. Formerly known as the Water Aid in Nairobi, Maji na Ufanisi established local branches in Kibera in 2000. They included Usafi Laini Saba and Soweto Usafi group which were given the responsibility to manage the Vacutug in Kibera. (Owino, O.I., 2010). The respondent informed this study that in 2004, the organizations started managing the projects independently. Other UN-HABITAT partners’ projects in Kibera included UN-HABITAT and GoK in -the Kibera Integrated Water, Sanitation and waste management; UN-HABITAT through its Water and Sanitation Trust Fund. The Water for African cities (UN-HABITAT’s programme) was the donor to the project of the GoK and Athi Water Services Board (which provided water for Kibera residents). The Cities Alliance was a joint UN-HABITAT -World Vision project which aimed at eradicating poverty. It emerged that UN-HABITAT had invested around USD 579,684 in constructing roads, water, drains and improvement of foot bridges in Kibera for the period stretching up to 2010 (UN-HABITAT 2011).

UN-HABITAT initiatives had always been met with some pockets of resistance and anxiety. Of importance was the challenging in court of the KENSUP programme. It was observed that the process was legally challenged in 2003 by more than eighty people and the High Court of Kenya stated that the GoK could not begin demolition work until the
case was finally heard (Daniel, O.I., 2010). Thus demolition was only to take place to homes of those people who left the settlement voluntarily. Kariuki and Abdallah (O.I., 2010) observed that the plaintiffs in the case were a mixture of middle-class landlords and some tenants who claimed that the land in Kibera was theirs and the government had no right to demolish their shacks (O.I., 2010). The urban Community who had been living on the land for nearly 100 years was disappointed with the scheme and argued that improving the houses they lived in was an alternative to what KENSUP proposed. The project also came under scrutiny from urban planners who asserted that it risked repeating the mistakes of previous schemes (which didn’t succeed because of poor planning) (Owino, O.I., 2010). This was evident on our visit to the houses built where it was revealed that poor families either shared two-roomed apartments with either one or two other families. Some were dissatisfied and moved back to the slum, given that they earned less than USD 2 per day. The informant also observed that there was controversy over the timings of the project with the first phase which was to re-house 7,500 people being delayed by five years; and one government official stating that “if the project continued at that pace, it would take more years that anticipated”.

4.3.2 Programmes on Health and Sanitation

Al Jazeera, BBC, Hillary Clinton, Barrack Obama and numerous other celebrities, big and small corporates have all visited Kibera to first hand witness the plight of slum dwellers (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). Their experiences have in one way or another justified sponsorship and NGOs’ funding running in millions of US dollars. In this regard, this section examines the UN-HABITAT projects/programs in health and sanitation. WHO
(1948) Report defined health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity (note that the definition has not been amended since 1948). According to Odinga (1998), the WHO preamble of 1947 stated that the enjoyment of the highest alterable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion and political belief, economic or social condition. Similarly, while acknowledging human rights to medical, the 1948, UN universal Declaration on Human Rights cited in Roemer (1977: 233) noted that “everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for health and well being of himself and his family including medicare and the right to security in the event of sickness”. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that even the poorest of the poor in Kibera are entitled to good health and sanitation. However, many if not all poor people in Kibera did not have access to adequate health (Abdallah M. O.I., 2010). Notably, all the problems related to health matters in Kibera are not recent but have origins in the colonial period.

In 1989, UN-HABITAT embarked on health and sanitation programmes to help the poor in Kibera get out of the hook of inaccessibility to quality health care, (UN-HABITAT 2000). This for instance, was enhanced by the Kenya Water for Health Organization (KWAHO) which was and is still involved in the facilitation of the implementation of water and sanitation activities in Kibera. It is important to note that KWAHO is a conglomeration of several NGOs and CBOs. Its objectives were to alleviate poverty and reduce suffering among the disadvantaged women and children and provision of hygiene education. According to Daniel (O.I., 2010), KWAHO’s initial impact in Kibera was
enabled through funding from UNICEF where they built 27 water kiosks most of which broke down and are in dire need of rehabilitation (Owino, O.I., 2010). It was revealed that UN-HABITAT extended its impact through KWAHO on the use of the ‘Vacutug’ (The exhauster van for emptying pit latrines). As discussed already, there was the one in Laini Saba and the other in Soweto village of Kibera. It is important to note that despite the effort by UN-HABITAT the objective has not been fully realized given that Kibera residents continue to live in pathetic health conditions.

Second, more and more of the urban poor population in Kibera have continued to experience hunger compared with those in other informal settlements in Nairobi (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). UN-HABITAT data on malnutrition in urban areas as measured by the incidence of underweight children showed significant differences in food security across socio-economic groups in Kenyan cities. (Fernandos da Cruz, 2005). As the rise in food prices in Nairobi combined with low incomes, the slum dwellers in Kibera could not afford to purchase adequate and quality amounts of food. Even where there was enough food, only the rich could afford (Odhiambo 2003) while the poor struggled to ensure at least one meal for their off springs.

This study echoed Otike’s sentiments that just like poverty, hunger in Kibera was and is still the outcome of an inequitable distribution of available resources (Otike, O.I., 2010). The conceptual definition of poverty in this case could be defined as what Baker (1995) called more subjective given that it included definitions such as vulnerability, entitlements and social exclusion. Further, it poverty is well understood by taking a
thorough analysis of the health scenarios. To counter poverty in the settlement, UN-HABITAT was involved in a number of ways perhaps because it was mostly the youths who were involved. This was evident in Anna Tibaijuka’s words that “.......young people, lest we forget, constitute the majority of the urban population in rapidly urbanizing countries. Often, they have no jobs and no voice. Any effective response to improve the living conditions of the urban poor and slum dwellers must deal, prima facie, with the challenges facing the youths.....” (Dr. Anna Tibaijuka, former UN Under Sec. Gen and Executive Director, UN-HABITAT- writing in the UN-HABITAT Report 2002). She went ahead and launched what was dubbed as the “The Youths Empowerment Programme”.

As a fundamental building block of a health system, UN-HABITAT provided health information to the poor in Kibera (UN-HABITAT 2008). These came in as reading materials, training and workshops. (Mbavia M. O.I., 2010). Similarly, UN-HABITAT partnered with the WHO to publish information on health matters (see Unmasking and Overcoming Health Inequities in Urban Settings, 2010). In the report, information and tools were provided to help governments and local leaders reduce health inequalities. Consequently, UN-HABITAT provided a link between the Ministries of Medical Services and Public Health and Sanitation. As a result, the gap between those who made health related decisions and those whose lives were directly affected by them, i.e., the poor, was bridged. Through this, UN-HABITAT emphasized on accurate health information as key to achieving better health outcomes.
However, this does not imply that the disproportionate suffering from health inequities in Nairobi and Kibera in particular had UN-HABITAT backed solutions. In fact, the (WHO/UN-HABITAT 2010) report summarizes that the factors influencing the health of urban settlements as follows; natural and built environment, social and economic environment, food security environment, quality services and health emergency management. Further, UN-HABITAT facilitated dialogue between individuals, the state and other non-state actors for instance, United States Aid Agency (USAID), World Vision (WV), and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) among others). In this case, it availed success stories, policy discussions and insights into the frontiers of urban development (UN-HABITAT 2008). It was observed that the state on its part had to be steadfast in its strong commitment to health, adopting new legislations responsible for inter-institutional cooperation and participation (Owino, O.I., 2010).

Overcrowding in Kibera was and is an additional health hazard. According to Biau (O.I., 2010), the concentration of people living in small, poorly ventilated living areas increased the risk of disease transmission and other health problems. Second, in Kibera the poor spent at least one third of their incomes for treatment of waterborne and water related diseases such as malaria, diarrhea and worm infections. This study contends that proper sanitation was also important for preventing infectious diseases (Hansen and Bhatia 2004; UN-HABITAT/WHO 2010). However, in Kibera there were no sewers the poor lacked access to sanitation that could significantly reduce their risk of illness. As demonstrated earlier, UN-HABITAT partnered with other agencies, CBOs, NGOs among other stakeholders to transform the health living conditions of the poor in Kibera. For
instance, UN-HABITAT together with KENSUP started the Kibera Soweto Resource Centre in 2002 (Hamza, O.I., 2010). The purpose of the project was to firstly get disabled children out of hiding, provide them with health facilities through physiotherapy and occupational therapy and expose them to education and social activities. Commendable is also the private sector for the privately owned Community Radio Station, *Pamoja F.M.* which educates poor on various development issues.

UN-HABITAT also played a significant role in major policy changes of health information institutions essential for meeting the population’s expectations for accessible, timely and reliable health (*ibid* 2010: 17). This in turn ensured transparency, good governance, investment and capacity building of the health sector. As a result, the funding from UN-HABITAT and other non-state actors, such as Action Aid Kenya (AAK) helped improve health and sanitation services in Kibera. (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). As it emerged, the latter was enabled by the condition that such funding was not restricted to a specific organization or other affiliations (UN-HABITAT 2004). This ensured that the poor were catered for without discrimination. In Kibera, the funds were generally diverted to support HIV/AIDS related programmes, community infrastructural development, family planning and provision of primary health care (UN-HABITAT 2005).

In a nutshell, this study concluded that since inception, UN-HABITAT has helped transform the lives and livelihoods of the poor in Kibera various ways. Nonetheless, it was noted that despite all the initiatives, there was inadequate up to data information on
health matters in Kibera. Similarly, the poor in Kibera still found it difficult to access adequate health care. Odhiambo (2003) noted that given the poor conditions of roads and infrastructure in Kibera, links to hospital (KNH) and other health facilities was a problem. Consequently, most of the healthcare staff in Kibera had workplaces not always equipped with the best tools to empower them to act quickly and effectively. In this case, the private sector which flourished in providing health services to the poor in Kibera had to invest in getting the best health professional manpower and equipment, something they didn’t.

4.4 UN-HABITAT Relations with Other Development Partners in Kibera since 1978

Partnership is a key subject of the UNO’s affairs. (United Nations, 2010). According to Biau (O.I., 2010), the former is guided by the noble ideal of universal solidarity through international cooperation, embedded in the UN-Charter. Since its inception, UN-HABITAT indeed defined itself in the Charter as a ‘center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of common ends’, (UN-HABITAT 2000), a function that the present study asserts cannot be achieved without partnership. Writing the report of the Commission on International Development of 1969, Lester Person argued that international partners evolved and were influenced by a changing global order. It was noted that in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the world became increasingly globalized with non-state actors getting more involved in international cooperation at every level, from local to the global. For instance, according to the NGOs Coordination Board (2002) Report, in Kenya studies indicated that the overall growth of non-state actors between 1977 and 1987 was about 100 percent. The growth for the period between 1974 and 1988 was
placed at 229 percent. Records at the NGOs Coordination Board indicated that as at August 2008, there were approximately 5,461 NGOs registered to operate in Kenya (Owino, O.I., 2010). Consequently, in 2003, it was the NGOs’ sector that was contributing fifty billion Kenya shillings annually to the economy. This phenomenon indicates how partnership is significant to sustainable development.

UN-HABITAT liaised with other non-state actors or development partners as either funders, or policy formulation experts. Similarly, they got involved in the process of development ranging from advancement of ideas and proposals on concrete activities such as delivery of aid and services (Daniel O.I., 2010). Even though this study found out that such moves were inconceivable before the 1990s, the informant (O.I., 2010) observed that Kofi Annan’s Global Compact Initiative was an exemplary breakthrough. This is because it engaged a number of non-state actors to promote corporate citizenship and universal values in respect to human rights, labour rights and the environment (UN-HABITAT 1995). UN-HABITAT and its partners’ indispensable contribution has always been widely recognized even if policy and decision making powers rests firmly in the hands of member states (Edwards and Hulme 1992).

According to the UN-HABITAT Report on ‘State of World’s Cities of 1998’, the agency was on the forefront in the mobilization of support and cultivation of ideas of a diverse network of actions such as civil society organizations, voluntary agencies, interest groups, private companies, foundations creative individuals and think tanks. This was illustrated in the previous section where some of the non-state actors that UN-HABITAT
partnered with to transform the livelihoods of the poor in Kibera were discussed. They included USAID, KENSUP, WVK, YEP, KWAHO, WB and AAK. There were other NGOs in the country and community based organizations in Kibera that UN-HABITAT partnered with. According to UN-HABITAT (2008), the NGOs and CBOs were only more credible if they had a project running in Kibera. For instance, KWAHO was chosen because of the many projects it had in the settlement (Abdallah, O. I. 2010). On the other hand, it emerged that UN-HABITAT and NGOs in Kibera did not ‘work’ with one another, rather they competed unfavourably. (Daniel, O.I., 2010). This implies that if one was better than the other, the latter tried to pull down the former. However in an endeavor to achieve its objective, UN-HABITAT continued to follow the wind of change, driven by an increasing pressure of urban agenda from world over. (UN-HABITAT, 2000). It was in this regard that it was argued that the city or town could neither be ignored nor sidelined and everyone was part of the solution. In Nairobi, UN-HABITAT worked with Kibera residents, the GoK, international and regional organizations, municipalities and various regional and the international and local authority groups. Others included parliamentarians, NGOs, CBOs, Women’s and Youths groups, trade unions, urban professionals, researchers and spiritual organizations, all were involved in transforming the livelihoods of the urban poor. The main reason for the long list was perhaps because the environmental agency of Kibera slum called for true and operative partnerships through a concerted approach to land, basic infrastructure, health and sanitation services and affordable housing (Nicholas, O.I., 2010).
In the UN General Assembly Resolution of 1978, partners are defined as collaborative and voluntary alliances between stakeholders sharing resource, expertise, risks and responsibilities, and committed to common tasks towards specific goals. In this regard, Agnor (1998) observes that UN-HABITAT, the GoK, Kibera residents and other stakeholders in transforming people’s lives and livelihoods, must share a common endeavour, take risks together and bring resources to the negotiating table. However, concerning the latter Hancock (1991) disagrees when he asserts that multilateral and/or bilateral agencies are financed involuntarily by tax payers hence they are absolutely denied a say in how the resources are spent. Shivji (1992) echoes Graham Hancock’s sentiments by observing that the neo-colonial state in Africa is essentially an organization of a ruling class as opposed to a national outfit. Whether the arguments are true or false is not the issue here but the fact of the matter is that information technology has enabled the UN-HABITAT to exchange knowledge with partners world over. As argued by Nicholas (O.I., 2010), this in the process enabled the agency to move the urban agenda from piecemeal approaches. UN-HABITAT realized that the problems facing Nairobi and Kibera in particular were interconnected and too big to be left to the GoK alone (UN-HABITAT 1998). Since its inception, the agency affirmed the interlinked nature of human settlement issues with the key issues of governance participation, democracy and civic involvement.

The foregoing discussion illustrates clearly that not all of the so-called UN-HABITAT Agenda Partners succeeded in getting a key role in the international arena and influencing policies significantly. On the other hand, it was observed that local authorities,
community-based organizations and individuals in Kibera have to some extent achieved what is today an indispensable role, complementary to the GoK. What raised some questions was their very slow pace of engagement in development issues (Owino, O.I., 2010). This study concluded that the issues and challenges of development in Kibera were a problem that partnerships among all stakeholders including UN-HABITAT. Below, we discuss the agency’s relations with the residents of Kibera. This is in view that the latter are mostly affected by the issues and challenges UN-HABITAT deals with.

4.4.1 Kibera Residents

It emerged that the relationship between UN-HABITAT as a development partner and Kibera residents was that of dependency. It was noted that Kibera residents relied too much on donors and especially UN-HABITAT to transform their livelihoods by providing adequate housing, employment, health and sanitation services (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). This implies that UN-HABITAT among other partners joined the ‘market place’ as aid contractors and government subsidized public service providers (Smillie et. al 1996; Uphoff 1995), thus compromising their autonomy and civic roots. In this regard, Hancock (1991) argues that instead of aid being increased, it should be stopped forthwith before more damage is done. However, this should not be misconstrued that or rather contrasted with the claim that UN-HABITAT has been involved in the development of the settlement since its inception (Otike, O.I., 2010). It was observed that lack of innovativeness and creativity among the Kibera residents was partly to blame for the high levels of poverty. On the other hand, UN-HABITAT and other stakeholders needed to fully involve Kibera residents in their formulation of policies up to the implementation
stage (Clark, 1990), something they did not. This perhaps could have eroded the strong perception of exploitation and injustice among the poor in Kibera.

It is important to note that through UN-HABITAT’s initiatives, Kibera has undergone some intensive slum upgrading process. Through funding and facilitation, the agency has been on the forefront in bringing together a contingent of non-state actors to transform the settlement. Notably, Maji na Ufanisi is one of the NGOs that UN-HABITAT supported to make inroads into the settlement in an attempt to facelift the housing and sanitary conditions of the poor. As indicated earlier, the NGO was successful in achieving the objectives but still more needs to be done. Other stakeholders included KWAHO, KENSUP, WB, GOK, CK, WVK, SHOFCO, UNICEF, UNDP and AAK among others. All these were discussed in previous sections and what emerged was that ‘free assembly’ of all stakeholders outside official structures should be unlimited (Clark 1990). The present study found out that the people of Kibera were able to achieve tangible outcomes in improving in their living conditions by themselves. For instance, the Kikuyu probably owned almost half the rooms in Kibera but in later on, i.e. mainly 2001 and 2007, many abandoned their property after violent clashes (often instigated by politicians) between tenants and landlords or different ethnic groups – Luo and Kikuyu (Johan 2009). Through seminars and workshops, UN-HABITAT united the poor in Kibera. In this respect, we argue that both UN-HABITAT and Kibera residents and other stakeholders had a vital role to play in transforming the entire settlement. This was achievable through formations of Community Based Organizations legally registered for instance to collect waste, recyclables and compatibles (Owino, O.I., 2010). Kibera
residents had to be involved in search of solutions for local problems (Clayton 1996). UN-HABITAT on other hand needed to lobby to influence those with access to much greater clout and resources (Clark 1990: 76). In a nutshell, all UN-HABITAT development programmes in settlement had a project holder-a Kibera based NGO which actually did the work at the local level. This implies that the project holder was to be directly responsible for ensuring that the projects initiated by UN-HABITAT were successfully implemented.

4.4.2 The State

It was noted that the state was one of the major stakeholders in the development process in Kenya. In Kibera, UN-HABITAT together with the Ministry of Housing and the CCN started the Slum-Upgrading activities in 2003. (Nicholas, O.I., 2010). KENSUP was as a result of a meeting in 2000 between the then president of Kenya (Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi) and Executive Director of UN-HABITAT (Dr. Anna Tibaijuka) at which the latter offered to spearhead a slum upgrading programme for Kenya starting with Nairobi’s largest slum, Kibera (UN-HABITAT, 2000). As illustrated earlier, the objective of the programme was to improve the overall livelihoods of people living and working in slums through targeted interventions to address shelter, infrastructure services, land tenure employment issues as well as the impact of HIV/AIDS in slum settlements (ibid; 2000).

It was argued that the state provided UN-HABITAT with the necessary machinery for the implementation of the agency’s policies and projects. (Owino, O.I., 2010). Where necessary, the GoK was forced to include some funds in its budgetary allocations for UN-
HABITAT. Though the state was on the forefront in the implementation of the slum upgrading program, the initiative was met with different reactions (UN-HABITAT 2005). For instance, the National Housing Cooperation was not able to complete the planned housing units within the stipulated timeframe. (Owino, O.I., 2010). Though the initiative by the state was worthy and a sigh for the poor, failure to complete the project on time was unwarranted. In this regard, the GoK was perhaps to revise and increase the slum upgrading to a number that took into account both existing and potential new slums. (Daniel, O.I., 2010) it was noted that if it was carefully planned and implemented, the initiative would improve the living conditions of the poor while providing adequate alternatives to prevent new slum formation. As demonstrated earlier, the GoK was to work in close collaboration with UN-HABITAT and other stakeholders to improve people’s lives in Kibera. It is worth mentioning that through the Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC), the GoK made electricity cheaper (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). It reduced the USD 26 application fee to USD 13 (Johan 2009). This enabled developers to put meter boxes on each of the constructed blocks in Kibera which in turn minimized pilferages.

On the other hand, UN-HABITAT focused on supporting GoK’s efforts in attaining the Millennium Development Goal on Water and Sanitation in urban areas and slum upgrading (UN-HABITAT 2000). Although UN-HABITAT beneficiaries in Kibera were the poor, its main audience policy makers at every level of the government with the power and authority to tackle poverty, pollution and energy wastage. For instance, the agency helped the city authority to focus on policy development and other donor driven
initiatives (UN-HABITAT, 2002). As a result, the CCN published a policy document on private sector involvement in solid management in 2001 to define a systematic approach and provide a framework of operation (Ibid; 2002). It further formulated a policy framework in 2002 to promote the private activities of non-state actors in compositing and recycling. All these were done in line with the UN-HABITAT’s vision of cities without slums that are livable places for all, and which do not pollute the environment or deplete natural resources (UN-HABITAT 2002).

Nonetheless, Kibera is still a place underserved by the state. (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). This is because the latter did not achieve much despite UN-HABITAT’s backing. As demonstrated earlier, Kenya had a constrictive land policy. For instance, the colonial administration owned large tracks of land that were later transferred to the GoK (Murunga, 2006). Instead of selling the land to developers thereby facilitating a housing market, politicians gave away parcels of the public land to private individuals in exchange of political support (Olumwullah 1986). Second, Kenya’s legal pluralism was a hindrance to development. In this regard, it was noted that some land was officially registered and administered by stationary laws, while other land was subject to traditional communal land rights and still other parcels were unregistered and subject to informal tenure rules just like the case in Kibera (Owin, O.I., 2010). This plurality made asserting tenure rights in Kibera and other parts of the country complicated. Consequently, it was asserted that in the nearly fifteen years of solid waste modernization since Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) began its waste management plan in 1996, the CCN, which was responsible for waste disposal, didn’t make it to the disposal upgrading
ladder. (Otike, O.I., 2010). In fact, the people who benefited from the initiative were the rich from the surrounding outskirts of Kibera while the poor were neglected. By the time of this research, the CCN relied entirely on the Dandora dumping site, situated in a former quarry some twenty five kilometers to the east of the city center for uncontrolled disposal of municipal waste (Johan, 2009). All these failures of the state and those earlier discussed hampered the relationship of the state and other development partners in Kibera including UN-HABITAT.

UN-HABITAT on the other hand limited its roles hence undermining the role of the state (Owino, O.I., 2010). This should not be misconstrued that since the dawn of rapid urbanization (with its many issues and challenges) with most of humanity living in cities, UN-HABITAT was overwhelmed in executing its mandate (UN-HABITAT 2008). It was observed that in the case of Kibera, the agency approved grants at times on suggestion of their field directors. (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). This study argues that such a trend does not in most cases give a practical reflection of the situation at the grassroots. Similarly, in cases where UN-HABITAT or the state had a partner NGO from the North or South respectively, the process of development always turned out to be a battle for supremacy at the expense of the urban destitute (Clark 1990).

4.4.3 Other Non-state Actors

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that in the whole world, Kenya’s city of Nairobi included, UN-HABITAT has worked with various non-state actors and organizations at every level, including most sectors of the government, civil society and the private sector.
This was with the intent of building, managing, planning and financing sustainable urban development (UN-HABITAT 2004). Apart from technical assistance, this study established that the agency partnered with the financial world; both private and public to transform the livelihoods of the poor in Kibera. However, Clayton (1996) observed that most of these institutions of the state and non-state actors were ‘weak and dysfunctional’. As a result, they (stakeholders) were exposed to undue influence or rather captured by vested domestic or foreign interests. According to Daniel, (O.I., 2010), UN-HABITAT was not an exception “as some countries liked it, other disliked it because they didn’t control it….they preferred WB, basically an American dominated organization…”.

For the case of NGOs in Kibera, political power and negative ethnicity played a significant role in shaping the relationship with UN-HABITAT (Hamza O.I., 2010). For instance, the dawn of multiparty politics in Kenya (1992) caused the Luo leader and Member of Parliament for much of Kibera (Raila Omollo Odinga) to be known for his ability to influence the masses (Johan 2009). It was noted that such phenomenon always had an impact on the decision the poor made when involved in policy planning and implementation. Daniel (O.I., 2010) argued that NGOs such as Shining Hope for Community (SHOFCO), CK, First Love Kenya (FLK), Kenya Evangelical Rural and Urban Development Outreach (KERUDO), including the Non-Governmental Organizations in the North (NNGOs) operating in Kibera were mostly tribal outfits. This study was also informed that occasionally, organizations and expertise to deal with specific issues lacked altogether (Hassan, O.I., 2010). This created space for essentially private vested interests to fill the void and act as substitute for institutions that would
otherwise prioritize the interests of the poor in Kibera. Oral evidence (Nyadiero, O.I., 2010) revealed that confrontations were witnessed between the poor and the rich resulting in developers being removed from Kibera. Similarly, there were sections where track records were not documented. In both cases, Sekoh Nyadiera argued that markets for land, basic services and labour in Kibera were skewed in favour of private interests, enabling them to claim more than their fair share of the benefits of the urban. In the process, the poor in Kibera were deprived of formal secure livelihoods that could lift them up and out of the dire socio-economic outcomes associated with the informal, insecure conditions in which they were ‘forced’ to live in.

4.5 UN-HABITAT Development Realities in Kibera since 1978.

To start with, this study acknowledges that UN-HABITAT has played quite a significant role in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera. This is not only because the later sits at the center of a modern city, Nairobi, but also because UN-HABITAT is headquartered here. This, perhaps why the Secretary General of UNO, Ban Ki-moon visited the settlement within a month of his election. The agency provides flagship publications which are widely acknowledged as premier works of reference on the built environment, city trends and urban issues. This is because of the combined impact of rapid urbanization, globalization and climate change that is increasingly shaping today’s development agenda. UN-HABITAT’s flagship publications have helped urban policy makers, planners and all other stakeholders to make wise decisions while implementing development agenda in Kibera. These publications contain proper data on city trends, which has helped make sound strategies and budget for them. For instance, in the UN-
HABITAT (2008) flagship Report, it is estimated that through upgrading or prevention of informal settlements, developing countries lifted an annual 22 million people out of slum conditions between the year 2000 and 2010. Kenya, as a developing country, has used such data to measure what happened in her target Kibera slum.

Through flagship publications, stakeholders have learnt on how to keep the environment clean. The present study observed that inadequate waste management in Kibera was directly linked to poor human health. The persistent accumulated heaps of garbage promoted a public monetary and with the help of UN-HABITAT, it resulted in diverse actions from not only the public but also from the civil and private sector actors. Though the progress made on the ground in Kibera was impressive, it did not reflect what one would necessarily expect to be a model of *global good practice*. However, this study noted that some projects show what can be achieved with very limited financial resources from the politicians, city administration and the poor in Kibera to identify housing, health and poverty reduction as priorities. For instance, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in Kibera were well placed to provide primary waste collection at a lower cost. In this regard, the present study advocated for local solutions to local problems.

With the help of AAK and WVK, UN-HABITAT helped fund various types of HIV/AIDS related programmes for instance advocacy, campaigning, drug abuse, human rights, non-discrimination, primary health care among others. This implies that development aid from UN-HABITAT and other non- state actors was vital to the well-being of the poor in Kibera. In this case, the non-state actors did not consider
retrospective funding. Nonetheless, the present study noted that UN-HABITAT and co-founders mostly considered projects which another agency was already part-funding. Though formal project approval by the home country government was not required, the project was to be in line with a particular issue, for instance, with the national HIV/AIDS policy. In this regard, the creativity and innovativeness of individuals and the Kibera community was limited. In some cases, a local NGO partner was required. Similarly, partnership with an NGO national office was a must and preference was sometimes given to religious organizations.

Aid provided by the UN-HABITAT in Kibera emerged as a major tool into the neo-colonial project. In this case, it was observed that it was the UN-HABITAT financiers who used the aid as a lever to safeguard their trading interests. According to Ojuka and Ochieng’ (1995), its essence was to help do the work which direct colonial administration could not do. The conditions attached to the aid provided were clearly and directly intended to serve the interests of those providing it. For instance for the construction or upgrade within Kibera, aid has always been used to buy goods and services from its provider. UN-HABITAT provided field expertise that is paid from the same funds. Similarly, the funds were made available to Kenya because its internal political arrangements, foreign alignments and treatment of foreign private investment were desirable or acceptable to the financiers and did not threaten their interests.
Lastly, this study observed that some factors that undermined UN-HABITAT development projects in Kibera were basically local. It was established that there was serious crime in the settlement *ie.*, building materials could not be left unattended for long at any time because they will be stolen. Oral evidence revealed that it was not uncommon for owners of storm damaged dwellings to have to camp on top of the remnants of their homes until repairs were made (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). They had to protect the raw materials from would-be thieves. The respondent also revealed that there lacked building foundations in Kibera. The ground in much of the settlement was and is still literally composed of refuse and rubbish. Dwellings were often constructed a top the unstable ground and therefore many structures collapsed whenever the slum experienced flooding, (which happens regularly). According to Lowder (1986), even well-constructed buildings were often damaged by the collapse of nearby poorly constructed ones. The third complicating factor was the unyielding topography and cramped sprawl of the settlement. During the research, it was noted that few houses had vehicle access and many were at the bottom of *sleep inclines* (Gatwekera village) which heightened the flooding risk. This means that any construction efforts were made more difficult and costly by the fact that all materials were to be brought in by hand.

Research by The Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) in 2002 revealed that Kibera was often home to thousands of women who were driven by in-laws out of their rural and urban homes and land after the death of their husbands. In two separate missions to Kenya as well as through research on women’s inheritance rights in sub-Saharan Africa, COHRE found out that family pressure, social stigma, physical threats
and often extreme violence directed at widows forced them to seek shelter elsewhere. UN-HABITAT (2002) concurred with the above sentiments by observing that property grabbing from widows whose husbands have died of HIV/AIDS was reportedly widespread and was one of the factors that pushed women to migrate to Kibera. Further, because of their low incomes, these women had few housing alternatives when or if they were evicted. Widows and children were particularly vulnerable to eviction because customary and traditional practices in Kibera overrode international commitments such as ‘the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (Nyabera, O.I., 2010). Moreover, single unmarried mothers in Kibera had the poorest choice in housing since many landlords/ladies were unwilling to rent houses to them, arguing that they were unreliable tenants.

This study also observed that a large concentration of women lived in Kibera in what could easily be described as the worst slum conditions ever experienced in the world (Abdallah, O.I., 2010). Although men in Kibera also suffered from the same problems associated with slum life, it was concluded that women bore the brunt of the problems brought about by issues and challenges of the rapid process of urbanization in Kenya. Subsequently, unequal power relations between the two sexes generally left women in Kibera at a disadvantage in areas such as access to land, property and other productive resources and securing remunerated work. Further, the burden of women’s domestic roles also placed them at more disadvantage when basic services like water and sanitation were inadequate. Owino (O.I., 2010) observed that like many women elsewhere, those in Kibera were and are still responsible for water collection and management of waste in the
home. This was evident during the research whereby long queues of women waiting with rows of yellow *jerricans* were a common sight (Hamza, O.I., 2010). According to Davis (2006), approximately eighty five percent of them drew water from private and community owned water *kiosks*. These challenges were inherent in most of Kibera’s villages.

Given that there were no sanitation facilities or if any, they were of poor quality or unreliable *i.e* going to the toilet at night or in the early morning was a security concern for the poor women in the settlement (Otike, F. O.I., 2010). This was perhaps because they had to venture down narrow, unlit alleys. The respondent argued that many would rather use plastic bags (the so called *flying toilets*) rather than brave the dark and inherent risk of rape or sexual harassment. Compared with men who were more likely to secure employment outside the slum, this study noted that women spent more time around the home and were more likely to take care of household waste. In doing so, they were exposed to environmental hazards such as breathing in harmful fumes from burning rubbish, which added to the health risks they already experienced by cooking indoors with charcoal, kerosene or firewood in absence of electricity or cheaper fuel (Kiarie, O.I., 2010). It follows that indoor air pollution was and is a quite overlooked killer (UN-HABITAT 2008: 43). According to an eye witness, this was because if women did not get sick themselves, their *unpaid labour* when caring for people with diarrhea- which was a leading killer of children under the age of five and malaria (Abdallah, O.I., 2010) both of them exacerbated by lack of improved sewerage (refer to Wang’ombe 1995) - took and has always taken time away from education or income generating activities.
4.6 Summary

Chapter four set out to discuss the role of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of Kibera. In summary this was the gist of the entire study. I first looked at the composition of UN-HABITAT and its functions. In the subsequent sections an evaluation of the agency’s development programs in Kibera was done, singling out its programs on housing, poverty reduction and health. Similarly, we illustrated UN-HABITAT relations with a number of development partners. These included Kibera residents, the state and what we referred to as ‘other non-state actors’. Lastly, an analysis of the development realities in the settlement was carried out.

It was concluded that the composition and functions of UN-HABITAT encompasses promoting socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all. At the time of the study, the agency was found to be in the mainstream of the UNs development agenda. Focusing on UN-HABITAT and development realities in Kibera, it emerged that the challenges facing the poor in Kibera were similar to what the agency exactly endeavored to eradicate. These challenges included insecure housing, high levels of poverty and inadequate health and sanitation services. It was also established that since its inception in 1978, UN-HABITAT has been coordinating with Kibera residents, the GoK and other non-state actors to transform livelihoods of the poor in Kibera. However, the relations not cordial mutually beneficiary in the sense that despite programs initiated, the poor in Kibera had nothing to be proud of. Poverty levels escalated as the population continued to rise. There were political tensions between ethnic tribes living in Kibera after the re-election of President Mwai Kibaki in
2007 making the settlement a hotbed of gang warfare (Opumbi, O.I., 2010). The present study attributed the phenomenon to lack of proper partnership and ‘outside’ influence on the entire process of urban development in Kenya. To justify the argument, the study examined the relations of development stakeholders. The evaluation carried out involved looking at the process and the outcome. It also emerged that there are local complicating factors that need to be addressed. Thus, the conclusion of this chapter was that the efforts to reduce the percentage of the poor in Kibera have been neither satisfactory nor adequate.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study set out to examine the role of non-state actors in the transformation of urban livelihoods, a case of UN-HABITAT in Kibera between 1963 and 2003. In chapter two an attempt was made to capture the genesis of issues and challenges of development in Kenya’s urban spaces. In this respect, an attempt was made to trace the emergence and growth of Kibera up to 1963. From the onset, it was emphasized that development implies creativity, skills and material well-being understood in the context of the society under study.

It is in the light of the above that it was argued that there were developed socio-economic and political structures in Kenya even before the arrival of Europeans. This was concluded after examining the political, social and economic organizations of Kibera settlement. Moreover, it is in the view of the fact it is the political and socio-economic systems under which people live that produce, reproduce and determine their living standards more than does nature. On the basis of this assumption, it is argued the political, social and economic changes that accompanied colonialism created favorable environment for underdevelopment of Kibera. It was demonstrated how the political machinery patterned the production and distribution of services, facilities and economic resources throughout the colonial period. Further, the second chapter emphasized the central role the unfair colonial policies especially on land, labour and taxation continued
to play in accentuating the economy of Kibera. Other factors that were particularly relevant including health and sanitation were also examined.

It was demonstrated how Kenya’s independence was just mere transfer of power. This is in the view that ideological and structural break with the colonial state was not effected. It was on the basis of this assumption that i concluded that policy changes were only made with the aim of supporting the expansion and accumulation needs of capitalism. As it was indicated, the acquired reformulations in the post-colonial era to improve the African bourgeoisie lot at the expense of the poor. In examining the problems that were faced by the native Africans in Kibera, the study focused on the evolution of the settlement. It is in this context that i located the entry point of non-state actors in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Nairobi’s Kibera slum.

Looking at the emergence and growth of Kibera up to 1963, the latter was ideal because Kenya attained its independence the same year. On the other hand the year could be viewed as the culmination of an epoch and the start of another, for instance, overthrowing of the colonial system and ushering in self governance. It is important to emphasize that several factors at the national and international level were central in explaining the developments after the WWII. Of particular relevance as we noted was the ever increasing discontent of the urban poor in Nairobi who like in other African towns and cities lacked adequate housing, health and sanitation services. It was revealed that Kibera as an urban settlement emerged at around 1918. From history, it grew as a result of the growth of Nairobi. It was concluded that the latter grew as one of the by-products of the
construction of the railway whose beginning was linked with the British desire to exploit East African territories. Since then, Kibera has grown unabated due to a number of reasons. First, it was people’s migrations particularly from the rural areas to Nairobi in search of employment. I also examined how the political and socio-economic structures of the immigrants contributed to the evolution of Kibera. In the process, the colonial state also played a role. This was through the administration’s apparatus such as law, religion and ordinances among others. The colonial state encouraged segregationist urban planning in Nairobi. This resulted into the native Africans being discriminated against in the provision of health services, housing and employment. It is in the light of the foregoing summary that the analysis in chapter three extrapolated the connections between different forms of both production and domination. This in essence has vindicated the fact that the fundamental human activity in society revolves around the production and appropriation of the products of labour. The colonial state in this panoply of relations acted as the ultimate unit of economic reproduction and accumulation for the dominant form of production. Second, it acted as the ultimate unit of political reproduction.

This study further investigated the Kenyan independent state development programs in Kibera from 1963 to 1978. This was done in chapter three where, first, Kenya’s urban policy after independence was examined. It was noted that though authorities acknowledged the importance of town planning, they were prone to talk as evidence of actions towards laying out a planned Kibera is minimal and conflicting. It is in this light that it was concluded that the state lacked adequate legislations that could facilitate
authorities to make and carry out planning designs. Further, the administration and township committees in Nairobi were unable to effectively control use of land in Kibera.

In chapter three, this study focused at urbanization in post independent Kenya. An evaluation of the state’s programs on housing and poverty reduction was done. It was noted that between 1963 and 1978, the state had no housing programs whatsoever for the people of Kibera. Further, it was revealed that even though the GoK attempted to invest in industry, poverty persisted. This was attributed, for instance to the GoK’s option of relentless advances in labour saving technology and development of low wage off-shore production. Concerning the state’s programs on health and sanitation, it was established that colonial health policies were adopted with minimal reforms. Whereas the policies encouraged the care of minority (the high social status), the disruption of the African traditional medical culture also took place.

Examining the development partners in Kibera between 1963 and 1978, it was noted that in the historical evolution of Nairobi, throughout the post-colonial era, the increasing role of the state continued to play in the people’s economic life was paramount. Like the colonial state’s role, the independent state’s role involved not only the spectrum of coercion and cooptation, but also in a range of supervisory and didactic activities which served to justify the existing class relations of production and so to gain at least the tacit consent of the masses. This section of chapter three has striven to show how historical processes among the Native Africans in Kibera in the post-colonial era have consistently been conceived as the result of struggles between social categories and groups. It was
also revealed that during this period there were very few non-state actors involved in the development of Kibera. The few that were present at that time did not transform people’s lives in as far as the provision of housing, health services and reduction of poverty was concerned. Moreover, it was established that information about these non-state actors that operated in Kibera between 1963 and 1978 was scanty.

It was chapter four that formed the gist of the study. From the onset, the agency’s role as outlined in the UN Charter was defined as ‘to identify the emerging priorities for sustainable urban development in the world’. Consequently, the agency was meant to study human settlement patterns and develop methods for controlled urban settlement in the developing countries. In this respect, it emerged that UN-HABITAT was to be non-political, non-governmental and not for profit organization.

In the light of the foregoing, an attempt was made to demonstrate the contribution of UN-HABITAT in transforming the livelihoods of the poor in Kibera. As it emerged, UN-HABITAT started to engage itself in development activities in Kibera towards the late 1990s. However, this is not to argue that there were no other development partners that contributed to the evolution of the settlement before the agency came in. It was noted that even before 1963, there were organizations that partnered with the colonial state to enhance the livelihoods of the native African women. After independence, the GoK, Kibera residents and several non-state actors came into play.
Some of the development partners that have been partnering with UN-HABITAT in Kibera between 1978 and 2003 were also examined. Subsequently, it emerged out that most of these partners came into existence in the mid 1990s and there is hardly much information about them. Some include, IWSWM, Maji na Ufanisi, KWAHO, CK, KENSUP among others. In the section, it was demonstrated how some of the organizations (with the help of UN-HABITAT) have transformed people’s lives in Kibera. I emphasized on the role of KENSUP, IWSWM and KWAHO and concluded that still more needs to be done particularly on provision of housing, health and sanitation services and poverty reduction. It is important to emphasize that there are over forty registered non-state actors operating in Kibera but most of them do not partner with UN-HABITAT yet they purport to tackle the same issues and challenges that are addressed by the former.

It was demonstrated that UN-HABITAT has been influenced in its quest for sustainable urbanization. For instance, the origin of the qualitative and quantitative inadequacy of housing, health and sanitation services that characterize independent Kenya was traced. This was evidenced in the presence of a large percentage of the poorest of the poor in Kibera yet UN-HABITAT and her development partners purport to have reduced the number of the poor. This conclusion was arrived at after a thorough evaluation of UN-HABITAT development programs in the settlement. These programs included housing, poverty reduction and provision of health and sanitation services. Lastly, chapter focused on UN-HABITAT relations with other development partners in Kibera. The latter included the GoK and Kibera residents themselves.
In problematizing the study, the dependency and underdevelopment theory was preferred. As we showed, the evolution of Kibera has been best explained by themes such as class struggle, uneven development, unequal exchange, underdevelopment, peripheralization, social conflicts and patterns of capital accumulation. Extensive use was made of these themes in whose profound transformative agenda is best explained with the dependency syndrome and the underdevelopment problematic. It is in this vein that we argued that before the arrival of Europeans, native Africans in Nairobi had well defined political, social and economic structures. In other words, it was colonialism that introduced in Nairobi and Kibera in particular, elements of capitalism which is a highly dynamic system whose logic of development was embedded in the policies and strategies of the colonial rule. This is to say that the former was exploitative and stressed on an unequal exchange and socially imbalanced development. In this respect, the study noted that underdevelopment is not an original condition of African. This was effected (to borrow Van Zwanenberg, 1975 words,) by the “monetary economy drawing a wider section of the population into the capitalist production system by selling their labour to employers for cash income”. In this way, the poor were impoverished and underdeveloped while the rich were enriched. Further, the inflow of capital from Britain was and has been always the prerequisite for the establishment of economic dependence of native Africans in Kibera and the country at large. Moreover, it was noted that as the Europeans were establishing various institutions and structures for the administration of their colony Kenya, they were also at the same time creating an economic system for the exploitation of natural resources of the former (Boahen 1994: 153). It should not however be misconstrued that it is the colonial administration that is entirely responsible for the
evolution of Kibera as it stands out today. As demonstrated in sections of chapters two and three, native Africans and GoK played a role too. It is in this light that we argued that local forces played an equally significant role in shaping Kibera into an informal urban settlement.

In analyzing the role played by the GoK to transform people’s lives in Kibera, this study criticized the dependency and underdevelopment theory. In section two of chapter three, we showed that the GoK lacked well defined urban policies and as a result, very little had been achieved by 1978. It is in this light that we assert that neo-colonialism is the worst form of imperialism. As Nkurumah (1965) argued, “it is because for those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress”. It was indicated that when Kenya got her independence in 1963, colonial apparatus were inherited with, if any, minimal changes. In this respect, we concluded that the Kenyan state acquired political independence without economic power. This is because ‘apart from political liberation, the struggle for independence also implied emancipation from economic exploitation and backwardness’, (Mafeje, 1978: 18), something that did not happen in Kenya. In chapter three, compelling explanations to the continued predicament of underdevelopment and low living standards in Nairobi and Kibera in particular were offered. Further, the chapter demonstrated that the advent of multinational corporations from the 1960s “produced prophetic visions of a new integrated world order that was not to be” (Mac bean, 1976: 187). On the contrary, we illustrated that far from the belief by the dependency and underdevelopment theorists that the origin of dependency syndrome is not in Africa, underdevelopment as in the case of
Kibera was to a some extent fashioned by its own special conditions which in many important respects were different from other urban settlements in Kenya.

An effort to explain the contribution of UN-HABITAT in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera was also made. By employing various axioms of the dependency and underdevelopment theory, it was established that the latter helped in questioning the central thesis of modernization theory. It is in this light that the study concurred with Arnold (1973: 14) that ‘poverty has become the single most important factor dividing the North and South hence the reason why almost all North-South dialogue concerns aid, terms of trade and the transfer of technology’. On the other hand, use of some of the propositions undermined the theoretical rigidity of dependency and underdevelopment. All these allowed us to conclude that UN-HABITAT and all other stakeholders in the process of development, including the GoK have a key role to play in the transformation of livelihoods in Kibera. This is in the light of the role UN-HABITAT, Kibera residents, NGOs and GoK among others, have played in the evolution of Kibera from 1963 up to 2003.

In a nutshell, Kibera emerged and grew as a result of both the native Africans and immigrants (colonialists and Nubians). An analysis of how Kibera evolved historically has been given. The colonial administration had established Kibera as a military reserve but later turned it into a resettlement for the demobilized Nubian soldiers and their families. The first research premise stating that the emergence and growth of Kibera as an African urban informal settlement owes much to the colonial period has been vindicated.
However, the second premise stating that the independent Kenyan government’s response to the plight of the poor was characterized by the setting up of various programs since 1963 has been disapproved. This is in the light of the evidence that between 1963 and 1978, there were hardly tangible government programs on poverty reduction, provision of housing, health and sanitation services. Research premise three stating that the UN-HABITAT has been a major stakeholder in the transformation of urban livelihood has also been vindicated in the light of the evidence that the agency had various development programs in Kibera during the period under study. Contrary to the findings, it was established that Kibera residents are among the poorest of the poor in Nairobi, a scenario that has persisted since the emergence of the settlement. This study recommends for partnership of all partners involved in transforming urban livelihoods. For any sustainable development to occur, all stakeholders must be wholly involved in finding local solutions to local problems. Urban historians have a role to play in explaining more adequately the way forward to rid Africa of urban informal settlement. This can be achieved by advocating for the rights of the marginalized communities such as the Nubians. People see the worst face of Kibera but they hardly get to know the Kibera of energetic youths and creative minds. This study recommends that avenues should be created to enhance creativity and innovativeness in Kibera. Organizations have distorted facts and figures about the slum problems to suit their funding need. For instance, before the 2009 National Census, Kibera population was estimated one million. This is three quarters more than what was found out. In respect to the study recommends that donors establish the truth on the ground before engaging non-state actors in development issues. The
government on the other hand should take into account how to relocate the inhabitants of Kibera before expansion plans of facilities.

This study recommends further research on the theoretical approaches that have been hitherto upheld for analyzing the situation in Kibera given that they have consistently failed. As it was illustrated earlier, the problems of urban development in Kenya revolve around the state and non-state actors’ actions hence as historians we have a responsibility to identify the problems bedeviling urban settlements and suggest solutions. This should also be experimented in Nairobi’s other informal settlements to establish the genesis of the many issues and challenges of urban development in Kenya and recommend long lasting solutions. On the part of non-state actors, much more still need to be done to ascertain the shifting cooperation, particularly the emerging south-south alliances as opposed to the traditional north-south cooperation.
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APPENDIX I

QUESTION GUIDELINE FOR THE PEOPLE OF KIBERA

General Information

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a) When did you come to Kibera?
b) Did you bring your family to Kibera?
c) Why did you come to Nairobi and Kibera in particular?
d) How did the name ‘Kibera’ come about?
e) How did the settlement begin?
f) Who were the early inhabitants of the present day Kibera?
g) What kinds of migrations were witnessed in Kibera prior to 1963?
   Did the colonial policies affect this?
h) How did the inhabitants co-habit socially, economically and politically?
i) When did Kibera come to be the ‘Kibera’ we know today? Explain.
j) Account for the change in population in the settlement
   How did it affect your livelihoods?
k) What did you do individually or communally to improve your livelihoods.
l) Were you engaged in paid employment? If YES, what kind of job did you do and how much were you paid? If NO, what did you do?
m) What problems and challenges did the people of Kibera generally encounter in their undertakings to improve their livelihoods?
n) How was the general cleanliness of Kibera? If pathetic, what measures were taken by either you or the colonial government to improve on the prevailing conditions?
o) Did you visit hospitals? If YES, which ones and if NO, what measures did you resort to curb diseases?

p) Were you treated at the same place with the other races that lived in Nairobi and its environs?

q) Were there any African doctors?

r) What were the effects of colonial policies on the lives of early inhabitants of the settlement?

s) Did education play any role in the development of Kibera?

t) What were the effects of the post war inflation on health services?

u) What was the colonial policy towards the provision of health services?
   How did the existing social structures among Africans in Kibera affect the development of health services?

v) Did the coming of independence bring about any changes in as far as your living standards are concerned?

v) How did you generally respond to these changes?
APPENDIX II

QUESTION GUIDELINE FOR UN-HABITAT PERSONNEL

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a) When did the UN-HABITAT start operating in Kenya?
b) Since then, what impact has the continuity in leadership had on UN-HABITAT’s role in the transformation of Kibera?
c) What are the objectives of UN-HABITAT? Outline them and state whether they have been achieved to any level.
d) What legal framework guide UN-HABITAT operations in Kenya, and who enacts these laws.
e) To whom is UN-HABITAT accountable?
f) Many evaluations of UN-HABITAT content themselves with financial assessment rather than a social cost-benefit approach; examine the accuracy of this statement in regard to its programs in Kibera from 1978 – 2003.
g) In what ways has UN-HABITAT sought to tackle poverty, housing and health and sanitation challenges in Kibera from 1978 to 2003?
h) How do you identify genuine and in-genuine cases of development?
i) What other development partners liaise with in their efforts to transform Kibera?
j) Does UN-HABITAT role harmonize or conflict the role of other development partners? Explain.
k) Who funds UN-HABITAT?
l) What is the budgetary allocation for UN-HABITAT, Kenya office for the period 1978 to 2003? How much has been utilized for development in Kibera?
m) What are the salary structures for UN-HABITAT personnel?
n) Does UN-HABITAT face shortage of funds? If yes, how does it impact on their programs and how do you offset it?
o) How and why have UN-HABITAT programs been changing?
p) What are the future prospects of UN-HABITAT in its efforts to transform Kibera?
APPENDIX III
QUESTION GUIDELINE FOR NGOs COORDINATION BOARD.

General Information

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a)  When and why was the NGOs Coordination Board formed?
b)  Have you achieved; your objectives? Explain.
c)  Since you came into existence, have you had change in leadership? If yes, why?
d)  What is the structure of the board and what is your workforce?
e)  What is the criterion for registration of NGOs operating in Kenya?
f)  How do you coordinate and facilitate the work of national and international NGOs operating in Kenya?
g)  How many NGOs both national and international operate in Kibera and what are their precise sectors and affiliations? How about the total number of NGOs in your register.
h)  To whom are NGOs operating in Kenya accountable?
i)  What is the criterion for analyzing and evaluating NGOs activities?
j)  To what extent do you believe that NGOs are non-political, non-governmental and not for profit?
k)  Account for the rising tide of non-state actors in Kenya.
l)  Who funds you and to whom are you accountable?
m)  Give an estimate figure of your annual budget. Is it adequate for the running of the Board’s day to day activities?
n)  Through harmonizing NGOs activities, what problems and challenges do you face?
o)  What are the strategies for efficient planning and coordination of NGO’s activities in Kenya?
p)  What is the code of conduct for regulation of NGOs and their activities in Kenya?
q)  What are the rules and procedures for auditing NGOs accounts?
r)  What are your future prospects?
s)  Do your role conflict that of the National NGOs Council
APPENDIX IV
OTHER DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS AND RESPONDENTS

Question Guideline

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a) What role has the state played in the transformation of urban livelihoods in Kibera from 1963 to 1978? What about other development partners? Specify.
b) Account for the rising tide of non-state actors in Kenya from 1963 to 2003?
c) What is the criterion for registration and evaluation of non-state actors in Kenya?
d) According to your own assessment, are development programs initiated in Kibera sustainable. Explain.
e) What measures has GoK taken to support development programs in Kibera?
f) To what extend do you believe that development partners are non-political, non-governmental and not for profit?
g) Identify the main concern for the state in its role in the transformation of Kibera.
h) Are the state’s programs in Kibera since 1963 to 1978 sustainable?
i) Who funds the state’s development programs in Kibera?
# APPENDIX V

**LIST OF RESPONDENTS/INFORMANTS (AGES ARE ESTIMATED).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RESIDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abubakar Faridah;</td>
<td>72 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
<td>Makina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abubakar Medina;</td>
<td>52 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
<td>Makina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdallah Mariam;</td>
<td>60 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
<td>Makina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Hussein;</td>
<td>66 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
<td>Makina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieng’ Okello Macrine;</td>
<td>68 Years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
<td>Gatwekera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieng’ Wendy</td>
<td>42 Years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
<td>Gatwekera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Hassan;</td>
<td>79 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
<td>Makina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajwang Collins;</td>
<td>58 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 12/5/2010,</td>
<td>Kisumu Ndogo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amina Ibrahim; (I.T. Assistant, UNDP)</td>
<td>Interviewed 1/6/2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atieno Jane;</td>
<td>53 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 5/5/2010,</td>
<td>Laini Saba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auclair Christine;</td>
<td>67 years UN-HABITAT employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayuko Jeniffer;</td>
<td>66 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
<td>Makina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biau Daniel;</td>
<td>69 years, UN-HABITAT Secretariat official, interviewed June 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fatuma Roba;</td>
<td>32 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
<td>Makina (Student)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamza Ahmed;</td>
<td>72 years, Interviewed June 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein Mariam;</td>
<td>74 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
<td>Makina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irimu Grace;</td>
<td>58 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
<td>Gatwekera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issa Abudul Faraj; Vice Chairman, Kenya Nubian council of Elders, Interviewed June 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kadiiri George;</td>
<td>52 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 7/5/2010,</td>
<td>Mashimoni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karanja Joseph;</td>
<td>43 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
<td>Soweto East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kariuki Hassan;</td>
<td>76 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
<td>Makina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiari Jackson;</td>
<td>42 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
<td>Soweto East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitemwa Peter;</td>
<td>70 years UN-HABITAT employee 2010</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korir Songoei; Executive Director, Center for Minority Rights and Development (CEMIRIDE) Interviewed June 2010</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyulu Joseph;</td>
<td>66 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
<td>Soweto East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Luseno Jacob;</td>
<td>48 years,</td>
<td>Interviewed 5/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Mbavia Maxwell;</td>
<td>46 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 12/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Moranga Nyachio;</td>
<td>40 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 13/5/2010,</td>
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<td>30.</td>
<td>Muchiri Karanja; (Journalist,Daily Nation Writer)</td>
<td>Interviewed June 2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Muriithi Arthur;</td>
<td>52 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 7/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Ngugi James;</td>
<td>74 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Ngumba Graham;</td>
<td>50 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Nicholas You;</td>
<td>56 years UN-HABITAT employee</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Nyabera Leah; UN-HABITAT</td>
<td>Interviewed 1/6/2010,</td>
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<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Ochieng’ Rodgers;</td>
<td>36 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 12/5/2010,</td>
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<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Odhiambo Austin;</td>
<td>47 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 12/5/2010,</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>Odhiambo Victor;</td>
<td>42 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 12/5/2010,</td>
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<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Oduor Benard;</td>
<td>42 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
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<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Omala Hillary;</td>
<td>42 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 7/5/2010,</td>
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<td>41.</td>
<td>Omondi Jonathan;</td>
<td>37 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Onyango Samwel;</td>
<td>40 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Opumbi Justus Boaz;</td>
<td>38 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 5/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Otike Fredrick;</td>
<td>46 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
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<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>Owino Douglas; Projects Officer (NGOs Board)</td>
<td>8/6/2010,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Salim Mohamed;</td>
<td>56 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Sekoh Nyadiero; (Cooperate Affairs Manager) – NGOs Board</td>
<td>8/6/2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Sheikh Ibrahim;</td>
<td>48 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 6/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>Waithera Mary;</td>
<td>47 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 7/5/2010,</td>
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<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>Wangari Ruth;</td>
<td>39 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>Wanjiru Anne</td>
<td>42 years</td>
<td>Interviewed 11/5/2010,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>Zakia Yusuf; Chair, Interfaith Women for Peace and Development, Kibera,</td>
<td>Interviewed June 2010</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>