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NOVEMBER 2012
DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree in any other university.

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DEDICATION

To my parents, Salome Wanjiru and James Muiru, my brothers and sisters as well was my dear wife, Sharon Chemutai.
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<tr>
<td>CIPEV</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESSRIA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASS</td>
<td>Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Frequency Modulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORD</td>
<td>Forum for the Restoration of Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEMA</td>
<td>Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMATUSA</td>
<td>Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<td>KLFA</td>
<td>Kenya Land and Freedom Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNA</td>
<td>Kenya National Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNCHR</td>
<td>Kenya National Commission of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Kalenjin Political Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCK</td>
<td>National Council of Churches in Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDDP</td>
<td>Nakuru District Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OXFAM</td>
<td>Oxford Committee for Famine Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEV</td>
<td>Post Election Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>Party of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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DEFINITION OF TERMS

Conflict  A disagreement between individuals or ethnic groups. It can be open or latent.

Ethnic  A community of people who assume that they have a common identity based on kinship ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness, a shared history and a shared language. Notions of ethnicity become pronounced when they are used to distinguish one social group from another within a specific territory.

Ethnic Violence  Bodily or psychological harm directed against an individual or group of persons on the basis of perceived ethnic differences.

Modernization  The process of adopting Western European values such as education, Christianity and individualism and discarding African ideas and cultures that emphasize on life in the community at the expense of individual pursuit of his or her own private goals.
ABSTRACT

This study investigates the social, cultural and economic impact of ethnic violence in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya in the period 1969 – 2008. The Division is inhabited by several ethnic groups although the Agikuyu, the Kipsigis (a sub-group of the larger Kalenjin) and the Abagusii are the most populous. Since the introduction of multipartism in 1991, their political and cultural differences have been exploited by politicians; the result has been ethnic based violence that has led to social, cultural and economic transformations that are worth investigating.

After providing some historical background to the study, an analysis of the causes of violence in the period the period 1992 – 2008 is made. The literature reviewed showed that although there is much literature on ethnic violence at the international, regional and national levels, little effort has been made to interrogate the social, cultural and economic consequences of the violence in specific areas such as Molo Division. This gap justifies the proposed study.

The study is guided by four objectives: to analyze the causes of violence in the area of study, to investigate the social, cultural and economic ramifications of the violence, to critique current peace building efforts and suggest potential strategies that can lead to a de-escalation of conflicts in the Division. The study is predicated on four fundamental premises. First, ethnic violence in the area has always been politically motivated. Besides slowing down the economic growth of the Division, it also assumes that the violence has adversely affected the socio-cultural aspects of the local communities. Finally, there exist avenues for inter-ethnic cooperation that can be used to build sustainable peace in the area.

The study employs an integrated approach that utilizes several concepts derived from conflict and postcolonial theories to analyze data. From conflict theories, the power relations tradition has been used to explain the role of politicians in fomenting conflicts. On the other hand, the struggle for scarce resources such as land and employment opportunities in the public service has been analyzed using the concept of competitive struggle developed by classical economists. Variants of conflict theory such as Coser Lewis’ conflict functionalism and Randall Collins’ analytic conflict theory have also been used in data analysis.

On the other hand, the concepts of allocation and transfer, derived from Achille Mbembe (2001) have been used to interrogate the crisis of the postcolonial subspace of Molo Division.

In this study, the period 1969-2008 is taken as a postcolonial regime in Kenya’s history. Ethnic violence in this period is considered as a manifestation of the various struggles and
contestations formerly colonized people engage in in an attempt to confront political, cultural, economic and social forms of domination.

The study argues that ethnic violence has led to deaths, family breakdown as well as a general increase in the social distance between ethnic groups. Similarly, communities have been compelled to devise survival strategies to cope with conflict situations. Moreover, violence led to cessation of joint inter-ethnic initiation ceremonies, interfered with the religious practices of the Ogiek and led to a relaxation of the rigid rules that govern relations between the In-Laws. At the economic level, the study demonstrates that there has been immense destruction of resources due to the violence, slowed the economic growth of Molo Division and disrupted trade and agriculture.

In terms of methodology, the study employs oral interviews, focus group discussions, archival and library research to collect data. The study finishes by critiquing current approaches to peace in the area and argues that strategies such as memorialization, restitution and reconciliation can complement existing peace initiatives in the Division.
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preamble

This chapter provides an overview of the study which focuses on ‘The social, cultural and economic impact of ethnic violence in Molo Division. The chapter contains the following sections; the context of the problem which attempts to historically contextualize the topic under investigation, literature review that explores some of the works and researches done on ethnic violence at the global, regional and local levels. The statement of the problem points out what the study seeks to investigate. Other sections in this chapter include the objectives of the study, research premises, significance and justification of the study as well as its scope and limitations. Moreover, the chapter discusses the various theoretical strands that will be appropriated in the interpretation of data as well as the research methodology the study adopts. The chapter finalizes by highlighting the challenges encountered during research.

1.2 Context of the Problem

Various writers among them Fukui, Markakis (1994), and Wanjala, (2000) have observed that ethnicity is a potent force in Africa’s political processes. While acknowledging that ethnicity or ‘tribalism’ is a fairly recent phenomenon, all are in agreement that pre-colonial African societies interacted in various ways. Citing from the example of the Luo, Agikuyu and the Luhya, Kakai (2008) notes that almost all present day Kenyan ethnic categories derive their existence from a socio-cultural
melting pot in which members from one dominant category assimilated those from minor groups. For instance, the Agikuyu assimilated the Gumba and the Athi.

However, the colonial period ‘tribalized’ Africans in a variety of ways. Firstly, Europeans had to make sense of the societies they now ruled. Ignoring the existing kinship communities, colonial rulers attempted to mould reality to their own administrative requirements. In the construction of its hegemony, the colonial state soon acquired a compulsion to classify. The task of the ruler was to identify, rationalize, and streamline ethnic cartography.

In the Kenyan situation, colonial administration created native reserves to settle each of the ethnic groups whose land had been expropriated. It is these native reserves that led to the formal construction of ethno-regional identities and divisions that dominated the decolonization process and which continue to animate Kenyan politics. These Reserves became the home areas to which Kenyans are supposedly identified with or belonged to.

Deliberate efforts were made by the colonial state to ensure that Africans working on the same settler farm could not develop an identity that transcended their respective ethnic backgrounds. Policies such as the establishment of settler residential homes between different African groups such as the Kipsigis and the Abagusii (in Sotik), creation of separate residential areas for Africans working in the same farms and the introduction of the kipande (identification card) were meant to achieve the objective of divide and rule. By keeping interactions among Africans at a minimum, such
policies rigidified ethnic consciousness in colonial Kenya (Wanjala, 2000; Kakai, 2008).

The popular nationalism of the 1950s seems to have concealed these ethnic differences but beneath the popular struggle was the hard question of land. The peasants’ rebellion that was christened Mau Mau had *ithaka na wiath**i* (land and freedom) as its main objectives (KNA KA/6/16). Besides planning to defeat *Mau Mau* militarily, the colonial government also sought to address the land issue as another way to contain Kikuyu nationalism. Consequently, the Swynnerton Plan (1954) was implemented. The Plan involved changing the system of land tenure through land consolidation and registration of individual freeholds so as to improve commodity production in the reserves.

The Plan implied a complete change in the basis of the economy and the elimination of the idea that everyone must, or can, have some land. It envisaged a landed and a landless class. Accordingly, it was hoped that the poorer, smaller holdings would be sold and incorporated in larger farming units that would make large scale agriculture possible. The landless would have to depend entirely on wage employment for their upkeep. The aim was to gradually introduce a social security system for wage earners to replace the social security of land (Jones, 1966).

The idea (of individualized land) was foreign to most Kenya peoples (Maxon, 1986). Moreover, the Plan had various economic and political consequences which continue to unfold in the political landscape (Wanjala, 2000). Disputes regarding rights and ownership claims arose as former tenants and those who lost their land in Central Province moved into Rift Valley. According to Sorrenson (1967: 234-250), the Plan
must be seen as a reaction to the Mau mau revolt and the problem of land in the densely populated central province.

In retracing the history of ethnic conflict especially between the Agikuyu and the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley, historians and policy analysts contend that land alienation during the colonial period is responsible for the current land related conflicts in the region. By 1914, many of the Agikuyu who lost their land in Central Province had migrated to the White Highlands where they lived and worked as squatters. There were squatters from other ethnic groups whose land had similarly been appropriated by the colonial administration. Such groups included the Abagusii, Akamba, Nandi, Kipsigis, Marakwet and Tugen (Kanogo, 1987).

By the early 1960s, relations between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin grew tense. Within Nakuru district, District officers at Molo and Njoro received large numbers of applications, from farmers for native arms permits for their employees, all Kalenjin. The requests were made after the return of Jomo Kenyatta to Gatundu (his rural home) from prison in August 1961 (Rutten, 2001: 552). This implies that the Kalenjin were prepared to fight the Kikuyu incase Kenyatta would wish to disregard their claims to land in the Rift Valley. In Mau Narok, the situation was the same as the Maasai opposed Kikuyu settlement in the area (KNA/DC/NKU/2/1/2- Sep. 1961).

A third factor that strained ethnic relations in the period 1960-63 was the activities of the Regional and Constituences Boundaries Commission which began its activities in Nakuru in August 1962. The commission received views on boundaries from varied interest groups such as political parties. The KANU Laikipia branch
wanted the regional boundaries to follow the existing provincial boundaries to ‘prevent tribal clashes in the future’. These sentiments were echoed by the Kalenjin Political Alliance of Daniel Arap Moi. The Nakuru district commissioner noted that ethnic tension was such that you only needed to strike a match and war would break out between ethnic groups (KNA/DC/NKU/2/1/2-Sep.1962).

In the last three years of British rule in Kenya, the colonial government began the land settlement schemes in 1961, an arrangement that gave more land to Africans. Haberson (1973) noted that the schemes had short-term objectives: to facilitate the transfer of power to the new African Government and to increase the chances of political stability after independence.

Kanogo, (1987) aptly described the entire process of decolonization as the ‘Europeanization of the transfer of land and power in Kenya’. The colonial government advanced the new African government a loan of United States 100 million dollars under the Settler Transfer Fund to buy farms for squatters. This programme was known as the Million Acres Settlement Programme. The resettlement provided grounds for inter-ethnic conflict. The contested issue was the amount of land apportioned to the Agikuyu in the eastern part of the Rift Valley. The Agikuyu had been given about 40% of the land meant for resettlement (Wanjala, 2000).

The implementation of the ressetlement policy created the perception that land buying companies from Central Province were favored (Akiwumi, 1999). The Maasai and the Kalenjin resented the manner in which members of other ethnic groups had
been settled on land they considered to have belonged to their fore-fathers (Kakai, 2000).

At independence in 1963, the land question had not been solved but internal contradictions within the two main political parties, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU).

(KADU) helped to ease the matter (Wanjala, 2000). Within KANU, there appeared a schism on how to avail land to landless Africans. One group, led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia advocated for the nyakua (seizure) of settlers land by the government. The land would then be subdivided to needy Africans.

The other group, led by President Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya advocated for a willing seller (settler) willing buyer (Africans) policy. On the other hand, Kalenjin and Luhya leaders within KADU differed on the future of Trans-Nzoia district. Luhya leaders such as Masinde Muliro wanted the district to be part of Western Province, an area dominated by the Abaluhya ethnic group. Kalenjin leadership within KADU wanted the district to be part of the Rift Valley, inhabited mostly by the Kalenjin ethnic group.

President Jomo Kenyatta and his group were able to take advantage of the situation; the radical group of Oginga Odinga was systematically pushed out of the government while moderates within KADU, such as Daniel Moi were co-opted into the government. President Kenyatta and his group of moderate KANU group were now able to pursue their land policy with minimal opposition.

However, there were some voices within the Kalenjin leadership that were still concerned with Agikuyu penetration of Nandi land. In 1969, the fiery Tinderet
member of parliament, Jean Marie Seroney convened a meeting at Nandi Hills to address the issue (KNA KA/ 11/9). The resultant Nandi Hills Declaration laid unequivocal claim to all land in Nandi for the community, and resolved to oppose further settlement of the Agikuyu in the district. The Declaration is seen by many critical observers as a turning point in ethnic relations between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley.

The quest for pluralism in 1990-1991 reactivated the land controversies of the early 1960s. The majimbo (regionalism) debate was revived by leaders in KANU who opposed the calls for multi-party democracy. Such leaders included William Ole Ntimama, Noor Abdi Ogle and Henry Kosgei (Branch, 2011). Majimbo (regionalism) was first advanced at the Second Lancaster constitutional conference in England and called for the division of the country into semi independent ethnic states (Maupeu, 2002:70). Most of those who were calling for multi-partyism were politicians from Central, Nyanza and Western provinces while those who were against it were mainly drawn from the Rift Valley. President Daniel Arap Moi, a Tugen, one of the subgroups that constitute the Kalenjin, came from the Rift Valley.

Therefore, KANU politicians in the province thought that the call for multiparty democracy was a ploy aimed at removing President Moi from power. Political elites from Central, Nyanza and Western provinces who pushed for pluralism were those who had been denied political participation within the ruling party, KANU. Indeed, some of them had been harassed, detained or rigged out in KANU elections because they were considered as dissidents or anti-Moi. The party had replaced them with pro-Moi politicians (Branch, 2011: 177-178).
The veiled threat in the call for *majimbo* was that communities not ‘indigenous’ to the Rift Valley would have to go back to their home areas if multi-partyism was introduced. The consequence was that land issues and ethnicity were politicized. Just before the 1992 General Election, land clashes erupted in the Rift Valley. Other regions also experienced violence. For instance, in Sondu (Nyanza province), the Kipsigis and the Luo engaged in violent confrontations while in Bungoma (Western Province), the Sabaot fought against the Bukusu and the Teso (Akiwumi, 1999:23-24).

It is important to note that the Kipsigis and the Sabaot were perceived to be supporters of KANU and President Daniel Arap Moi. On the other hand, the Luo, Bukusu and the Teso were considered to be inclined towards politicians who were calling for multi-party democracy. The use of violence was repeated in 1997. By this time, it was clear that the violence had an ethnic dimension; it was not just land clashes but also ethnic based violence.

There was a general consensus among observers that in Molo Division and the larger Nakuru County, the violence was politically instigated. Three waves of violence affected the County; the First wave (1992-1993) mainly in Molo and Olenguruone Divisions as they then were, the Second wave covered the period 1997-1998 and affected mainly Njoro, Mauche and Lare locations and to some extent Nakuru town. The Third wave began in early January 2008 following the controversial Presidential poll results.
1.3 Statement of the Problem

Even though ethnic based violence has affected Molo Division since 1992, studies done tend to focus more on the causes of the violence. The fundamental social, cultural and economic transformation brought about by ethnic violence on affected populations has eluded scholarly attention. This study addresses this hiatus by investigating the social, cultural and economic impacts of ethnic violence in the Division in the period 1969-2008.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

i) To analyze the causes of violence in Molo Division with specific reference to the period 1969-2008.

ii) To investigate the social impact of ethnic violence in Molo Division.

iii) To interrogate the cultural consequences of ethnic violence in the study area.

iv) To examine the economic impact of ethnic violence in Molo Division.

iv) To explore peace building and reconciliation strategies that can be adopted to ensure inter-ethnic harmony in the study locale.

1.5 Research Premises

The study revolves around four fundamental assumptions:

1. Ethnic violence in Molo Division has always been politically motivated.

2. Ethnic conflicts in Molo division have had an adverse effect on the social and cultural aspects of the local communities.

3. Ethnic violence has slowed down the economic growth of Molo Division.
4. In spite of the violence, there are avenues for inter-ethnic cooperation that can be used to build sustainable peace in the area.

1.6 Justification and Significance of the Study

Although there exists much literature on ethnic violence in Molo Division of Nakuru County in Kenya, the social, cultural and economic consequences of the violence has evaded scholarly attention. Some of the literature reviewed casually mentions the consequences. Furthermore, existing literature focuses more on the political ramifications of the violence and therefore, fundamental consequences of the violence on the victims have been ignored altogether. Yet, the electoral process connected with violence in the area occurs every election year, that is, after every five years. It is therefore imperative to interrogate the cultural, social and economic transformations that the victims go through in the interlude between elections. Moreover, no study has engaged the tenets of conflict and postcolonial theories in order to understand the ramifications of ethnic violence in the area of study.

The current study illustrates the importance of doing this. In this regard, the study represents an opportunity for government policy makers, academicians, community workers and residents in the area of study to address the issues raised in the findings so as to devise genuine mechanisms for peace building in Molo Division. Undoubtedly, ethnic conflicts in Kenya have led to much suffering among affected populations, undermined national cohesion and infringed upon fundamental civil liberties of the victims. Moreover, the economic effects of the violence have been felt not only in Molo but also in the whole country. It is for these reasons that this study is both timely and urgent.
1.7 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study restricts itself to the social, cultural and economic impact of ethnic violence in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya in the period 1969-2008. As such, other possible consequences of the violence in the area are not covered in this study. Similarly, other areas affected by inter-ethnic violence in Kenya are beyond the scope of this study.

The year 1969 is taken to be the entry point for this study because it was in late July 1969, that the Member of Parliament for Tinderet, Jean Marie Seroney, chaired a meeting of elders of the Nandi sub-group of the Kalenjin at Kapng’etuny. The entire Nandi district was declared to belong under God to the Nandi people; and every non-Nandi, whether an individual, a firm or a corporation farming in the district or in the Tinderet area was a temporary tenant at will of the Nandi.

Further, the meeting resolved that no land transaction in the district involving non-Nandi was to be recognized as having validity whatsoever. Consequently, every non-Nandi was called upon either to surrender his alternative ethnic allegiance or ‘to remove himself and his effects from the district without any delay, lest he incurs the undying wrath of the Nandi people (Branch, 2011: 87).

The Nandi Hills declaration is seen to have set the stage for the ethnic violence that occurred in Molo Division and other multiethnic parts of the Rift Valley in the period 1992 to 2008. On the other hand, the year 2008 is taken as the exit point for the study because of the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act on February 28, 2008. The Accord, mediated by former Secretary General of the United Nations
Organization, Koffi Annan, ended two months of ethnic violence not only in Molo Division but in other regions of Kenya.

The violence followed the controversial presidential results that declared the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki as the winner; even though his main opponent Raila Odinga had led the tallying until the last few hours to the announcement. The Accord created a coalition government with Mwai Kibaki as the President and Raila Odinga as the Prime Minister. The accord made a raft of recommendations. One of them was collectively referred to as The “Agenda Four”. These were issues that were to be addressed if Kenya was to avoid violence in future. Some items on Agenda Four, such as youth unemployment and historical land injustices were particularly relevant to the study locale. Essentially, the Accord ended ethnic violence in Molo Division between the Agikuyu and the Abagusii on one hand and the Kipsigis and the Ogiek on the other.

The study covers four locations of Molo Division; Turi, Njoro, Elburgon, and Molo Town. These locations were selected because of their multi ethnic representation.

1.8 Literature Review

The body of literature on ethnic conflicts in Africa and the world in general has grown tremendously especially after the end of the Cold War in 1990. However, in the Kenyan context, literature on the social, cultural and economic ramifications of such violence on affected populations in specific areas such as Molo Division remains scanty. This indicates that there is an academic gap that needs to be addressed. The literature reviewed in this section highlights issues such as the use of ethnic
stereotypes in conflict areas, the role played by politicians in causing ethnic violence and the place of territoriality in conflicts. All these are crucial to this study.

With regard to the genesis of inter-ethnic suspicions in the larger Nakuru County, Furedi, (1989) demonstrates that land issues were not given sufficient attention in the negotiations for Kenya’s independence from Britain. The former White Highlands in the Rift Valley attracted the attention of both Africans and settlers. Among the Africans, the Maasai and the Kalenjin were apprehensive of massive migration of larger ethnic groups like the Agikuyu into the Rift Valley - a region they considered to have been taken away from them by the British. Furedi notes that tensions over land in Nakuru County led to ethnic clashes in Nakuru Town in January 1961.

Besides providing such insights into inter-ethnic relations just before independence, the work by Furedi enriches our study because he mentions that due to these tensions over land, a radical group of ex Mau Mau fighters known as the Kenya Land and Freedom Army emerged in Nakuru. The KLFA, or ‘guards of the land’ (thigari cia bururi) as it was known, was an exclusive Kikuyu organization. Its avowed aim was to ensure that land did not pass over to the ‘wrong hands’ such as the loyalists who had fought alongside the British, the settlers or any other group that would prevent Kikuyu residence in the Rift Valley. Most importantly, it is noted that the KLFA had operational cells in Molo, Turi, Njoro and Elburgon. These are some of the areas that have been affected by ethnic violence since 1992. Accordingly, they are covered in the current study.
Tishkov and Rupesinghe (1996) explore conflict and conflict resolution approaches in the Horn of Africa, former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, India, the Basque region of Spain among other areas. They argue that historically disputed territories can bring about conflicts between ethnic groups. The authors also note that uneven development within a country can create tensions between ethnic groups especially if there are perceptions that one of the groups is favoured by the state. Another core argument contained in this work is that political elites have been found to play a critical role in inter-ethnic conflicts. The idea of historically contested areas, uneven development as well as the role of political elites will be useful in understanding the causes of violence in the area of study.

Focusing on the role of elites in ethnic conflicts, Adedeji (1999) observes that a conflict started by elites can engulf entire ethnic groups. This occurs because elites, especially the political class frame their personal interests and ambitions in ethnic terms. Hence, a personal struggle for power is disguised as an ethnic struggle for survival in a hostile political space. The work also points out that stereotypes and ethnic labels are manufactured so as to dehumanize and expel unwanted ethnic groups from certain areas. These myths are reinforced by the notions of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.

This study acknowledges that in the study locale, the notions of settler-indigenous have led to forced expulsions of populations regarded as immigrants (settlers). Moreover, in specific conflict moments, stereotypes such as *madoadoa* (spots), *sangara* (weeds) and *nyamu cia ruguru* (animals from the West) are oftenly used to describe ‘enemy’ ethnic groups.
Concerning the Rwandese genocide of 1994, Mamdani (1996) connects the Hutu-Tutsi conflict with the administrative policies of Belgium colonialism. The gist of his argument is that the colonial policy of divide and rule has continued to haunt the postcolonial states in Africa. This study establishes that ethnic violence in Molo Division has its roots in the alienation of African land for white settlement and subsequent land redistribution in the first few years of independence.

While analyzing the “impact of Inter-Ethnic Post Election Conflict Trauma on Academic Performance among secondary school students in Mt. Elgon District, Kenya,” Nasongo and Muola (2008) found out that in the six schools sampled in their study, 98% of the students recorded a negative performance. They recommended that trauma counseling be entrenched in schools located in areas that experience ethnic violence quite oftenly. Although the research was restricted to the education aspect only, it is useful in interrogating other consequences of ethnic violence on the schooling of pupils in Molo Division.

Koigi (2008) looks at the role of negative ethnicity in fanning ethnic violence. He blames this on the way politics has been organized in postcolonial Kenya; along ethnic lines. He views ethnic conflicts as a struggle between political elites camouflaged as an ethnic struggle for resources. This study investigates the extent to which negative ethnicity has contributed to violence in Molo. However, Koigi’s work does not address itself specifically to the social, cultural and economic impact of violence in Molo Division.
Branch (2011) argues that ethnic intolerance in Kenya increased after the public announcement of the assassination of Thomas Joseph Mboya, a Luo and an influential minister for Development and Economic Planning on July 5 1969. As a sign of increased intolerance, on July 17 1969, a group of armed Kalenjin youths from Turbo in the Rift Valley beat up two of their Kikuyu counterparts. In other parts of the Rift Valley such as Londiani (in Kericho County), Kikuyu farmers were harassed by Kalenjin youths. They were forced to seek refuge in the compounds of local administration officials in order to protect themselves from attack by the Kipsigis, a sub-tribe of the Kalenjin.

Branch’s work is important to this study for two main reasons. First, it sheds light on ethnic relations in the Rift Valley province especially in the period 1963-1969. The author shows that the Kalenjin resented the way land they considered traditionally ‘theirs’ was sold out to migrant ethnic groups such as the Agikuyu, Luo, and the Abagusii.

Branch also contextualizes the year 1969 as a turning point in ethnic relations in the Rift Valley province. The author demonstrates that the majimbo (ethnic regionalism) debate was revived in 1990 to ensure that President Daniel Arap Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) remained in power. This would be achieved by using violence against ethnic groups in the Rift Valley that were likely to vote for the opposition in the elections of 1992. Such ethnic groups included the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and the Kisii. Moreover, the work does acknowledge that in the ethnic violence that occurred in August 1993, over one hundred people lost their lives while 15,000 fled their homes in Molo Division alone.
However, Branch’s work, as insightful as it is, dwells more on Kenya’s political processes since independence. While acknowledging the contribution of the work, this research sought to examine the local processes that have led to ethnic conflicts in Molo Division, Nakuru County. The literature reviewed indicates that there exist plenty of studies on the topic under consideration. However, there are some gaps which the review has identified and which require scholarly attention.

A fundamental observation from reviewed works is that the existing literature dwells much on ethnic conflicts at the national level while local level conflicts have been ignored. In this regard, generalized statements about Molo have been made. Little research has been done to interrogate the social, cultural and economic effects of violence in the area. This study used the numerous sources in related fields to harness relevant data in order to address this gap. Besides the failure by scholars to seriously address the question of ethnic violence in Molo Division, none has utilized the conflict and postcolonial theoretical frameworks to interrogate its causes and more importantly, the social, cultural, and economic impacts of the violence. This too is a lacuna that this study sought to fill.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

In the 1950s and early 1960s, modernization theory was developed by a number of social scientists, particularly a group of American scholars such as Talcot Parsons. Much of this interest in modernization was prompted by the process of decolonization in Asian and African countries. This theory of socio-economic development rested on the idea of modern society as the goal of development. Modernization theorists were keen to show that sustained development was possible under the western wing (rather
than the Soviet Union). Academics reflected this interest by examining the socio-economic conditions conducive to modernization (Ayres, 1995:109).

In constructing their accounts of development, theorists drew on the tradition-modernity distinction of classical sociologists. Like Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, these theorists placed emphasis on the values and norms that operate in these two types of society and their economic systems. Development depended on ‘traditional,’ ‘primitive’ values being displaced by modern ones.

A ‘traditional’ society has three crucial features: people are oriented to the past and they lack the cultural ability to adjust to the new circumstances. The kinship system is the decisive reference point for all social practices, being the primary means by which economic, political and legal relationships are controlled. A person’s position in the kinship and hence in the society is ascribed, not achieved. One’s position only changes as one move up the family hierarchy. Moreover, members of the traditional society have an emotional, superstitious and fatalistic approach to the world: ‘what will be, will be; things have always been this way’.

In contrast, modern society is made up of completely opposite characteristics: people may still have traditions but they are not slaves to them and they can change any that seem to get in the way of continued cultural progress. Secondly, kinship has very little role in a modern society because of the need for geographical and social mobility which weakens family ties. This means that one’s position in the economy and polity is earned through hardwork and high achievement-motivation. Unlike the traditional society, members of the modern society are not fatalistic but forward looking and
innovative, ready to overcome the obstacles they find in their pathway, especially in business affairs.

Proponents of this theory such as Rostow (1960) and Myrdal (1968) recommended that development in Africa would only be achieved through the simultaneous transfer of Western political, social and cultural structures together with the diffusion of the economic and technological complex from the West (Hoogvelt, 1978). Therefore, African countries could not make meaningful progress in their social, political and economic fields until it embraced the values of Western modernity, science and rationalism.

In less than two decades after independence, new African states came to realize that the modernization theory presented a development framework toward modern statehood that was conceived within the Western mould of thinking (Omenya, 2010). Critics of this theory also faulted the principal terms of the theory— the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ as being too vague to be of use as classifications of distinct societies. The two terms do not appreciate the great variety of societies that have and do exist; instead the ‘traditional’ label is offered as a blanket term to cover a range of pre-industrial societies that have entirely different socio-economic and political structures such as feudal, tribal and bureaucratic empires. A much more careful historical analysis is required of these distinct pre-industrial forms in order to have any hope of understanding the subsequent processes of social change they underwent (Ayres, 1995:115).
Modernization theory was also discredited because it entirely ignored the impact of colonialism on Third World Countries. Hoogvelt (1976:18) observed that the domination, exploitation, imperialism and colonialism were completely ignored. In this regard, African countries had to come to terms with the irrelevance of modernization to the African conditions because it had overlooked the African reality and achievements (Kisiang’ani, 2003).

Marxist, neo-Marxist and dependency paradigms analysed development and underdevelopment in the context of the international capitalist system. According to Karl Marx (1818-1883), social and economic conditions within a society determine its development. Every individual belongs to a certain economic group within the society. Such a group is called a class. The system of classes that a given culture has is completely determined by the economic means and conditions of production in that culture. Classes are determined by the means of production, and the class a person falls into will depend upon where he/she stands, relative to the means of production. Since the means of production themselves follow the pattern of history, that is the dialectic, every such means will generate its own opposition and this will lead to a conflict. The conflict itself will bring about new relations between the people and the means of production.

Unlike other theorists who focus on how people understand themselves in terms of religion, nationality or personal life, Marx believed that the mode of production naturally divides social life into antagonistic classes and groups determined by relations to the mode of production. In all but the most primitive societies, an exploited class performs much of the productive labor; and a ruling class controls or
owns the forces of production, decides how much of the economic surplus will be distributed, and/or controls the process of production. Class actions shape the overall development of social life. Hence, ‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles (Marx and Engels, 1954:13). Therefore, classical Marxism looked at society in terms of economic class consciousness only. All other forms of consciousness as racism, religion and ethnicity were regarded as false.

On their part, neo-Marxist thinkers were against African dependence on foreign capital, which did not invest its surplus in the underdeveloped countries (Rodney, 1976). Development for Third World countries would therefore demand the elimination of foreign penetration, which supports the status quo, and the creation of a socialist context of development (Chilcote & Edelstein 1974: 28). Critics of neo-Marxism pointed out that just like its predecessor (Marxism), this school of thought was fixated with economic determinism. Yet economic determinism could not explain all the aspects of humanity (Kisiang’ani, 2003).

Paul Baran (1957) who led other theoreticians of neo-Marxism provided the first major analysis of the effects of imperialism from the point of view of the less developed countries. For Baran, underdevelopment is no an original state of affairs but is a product of a particular historical process. In this process, developed countries became so by exploiting and colonizing the less developed countries and that independent industrialization was blocked by an alliance between local (comprador) elites and the metropolitan states (Ayres, 1995:101).
In his analysis, Andre Gunder Frank (1967) was of the view that underdevelopment was part of the process of development itself. There were several other versions of neo-colonialism but the gist of the argument was that capitalism was the impediment to development. Revolutionary national liberation was therefore crucial to the development of formerly colonized nations (Ayres, 1995:101).

The inadequacies of modernization, Marxist and neo-Marxist theories in explaining Third World underdevelopment led to the emergence of new schools of thought, notably the postmodern and postcolonial theories in the early 1980s (Kisiang’ani, 2003). Postmodernism is a tool for critiquing modernity from the European point of view while postcolonialism is an instrument of interrogating modernity from the point of view of the colonized. Postcolonialism is a counter discourse of formerly colonized others against the cultural hegemony of the West.

Antonio Gramsci (1992) developed the concept of the subaltern to refer to groups of people who are outside the established structures of political representation. Postcolonial theorists have found this concept useful in describing the poor conditions of colonial subjects who have been permanently consigned to the periphery in the enigmatic power games initiated and controlled by the West (Kisiang’ani, 2003).

While acknowledging the contribution made by various theories discussed above, our study will be guided by an integrated approach that borrows key concepts derived from both conflict and postcolonial theories. The foundations of conflict theory were laid by ancient philosophers and statesmen. For instance, in his work, _Arthasastra_, written in the Third century B.C, Kautilya noted that once conflict was accepted as a central
fact of society, a rich intellectual tradition was available for its interpretation. In classical Greece, a number of thinkers such as Heraclitus perceived conflict as a primary, perhaps, the primary social fact. On his part, Polybius considered conflict as the fundamental fact in the evolution of political institutions.

In the medieval Arabic world, Ibn Khaldun developed a conflict theory of society based on the assumption that the struggles between the nomad (pastoralist) and the tiller (farmer) were critical to the evolution of civilization. The idea of the centrality of conflicts was adopted by Niccolo Machiavelli, who found the origin of the state and its key institutions in the same place. These ideas were expanded by Jean Bodin, who became the harbinger of modern theories of sovereignty. They were also transmitted to Thomas Hobbes, who developed them into a materialistic rationalism.

Modern conflict theory was pulled out of its rationalistic context and turned into an empirical investigation by David Hume and Adam Ferguson. In treating conflict as an empirical fact, Hume laid the foundations for the political party. Ferguson turned these ideas into a general account of political institutions and government, conceived as arising out of struggle.

The idea of universal competition taken from modern conflict theory became central to classical economics. Competition, in turn, was transformed from the central law of economic behavior by Thomas Malthus into a general competition to survive. It became the basis of his population theories. From this point, conflict theory entered the domain of biology, where, in the works of Darwin, it became the foundation for a
reconstruction of biological science. There are two distinct traditions of conflict theory in the classical works:

i) The power relations tradition of political philosophy. Machiavelli, Bodin and Thomas Hobbes have analysed conflicts in the polity in terms of power relationships and have treated the state as the central object of analysis.

ii) The tradition of competitive struggle in classical economics. Adam Smith, Robert Malthus and other economists who came after them placed economic competition at the centre of their inquiry.

Evidently, Karl Marx used the two traditions in his study of conflicts in the society. Wright Mills, Ralf Darendorf, Irving Louis, Lewis Coser, Herbert Marcuse, Randall Collins and Andre Gunder Frank are among the noted conflict theorists of contemporary times.

The theory has been found appropriate in the analysis of racial conflicts, class wars, strikes, student power movements, revolutions and peasant uprisings. The underlying assumptions of conflict theory may be summarized as follows:

i. There are seeds of conflict embedded in every social structure.

ii. The social universe and its component elements are in a state of flux.

iii. Change is ubiquitous not only in time but also in space, that is to say, every part of society is constantly changing.

Although conflict is inherent in the social structure, it is not always violent or manifest. Social conflict can be latent, regulated or momentarily constrained. This means that in any given social structure, there is a continuum ranging from violent
upheavals like wars and revolutions to parliamentary debates and more subtle, hidden conflicts or competition between interest groups.

Conflicts cannot be eliminated altogether, only their expressions in specific contexts can be resolved.

Francis Abraham (1985) argues that conflict theories have several major propositions. First, society is not a system in equilibrium but a nebulous structure of imperfectly coordinated elements which are held together by the coercion of some elements and the subjection of others. Secondly, change and conflict are continuous and normal features of human society. Society is a stage populated with living, struggling and competing actors and that the social universe is the setting within which the conflicts of life are acted out. Moreover, the inherent predilections to change in society vary in scope, nature, intensity and degree of velocity; they may be latent or manifest, gradual or destructive. He also postulates that conflicts arise out of incompatibility of interests between groups, differential distribution of rewards and the lack of value consensus.

Dahrendorf summarized the essential elements of conflict theory as follows:

i. Every society is subjected at every moment to change; therefore, social change is ubiquitous.

ii. Every society experiences at every moment social conflict; social conflict is ubiquitous.

iii. Every moment in a society contributes to its change.

iv. Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others.
Some scholars have argued that there is no single conflict theory but various strands of conflict theory (Abraham, 1981: 105). These variants are: the Frankfurt school and critical theory, the new or radical sociology, dialectic sociology, conflict functionalism, analytic conflict theory and the formal conflict theory (Abraham, 1981: 128).

The Frankfurt school is so called because of its association with the Institute for Social Science Research in Frankfurt, Germany, which was established in 1923 by a group of young neo-Marxists to undertake an independent study of Marxism. The most prominent members of the institute were Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Eric Fromm, Leo Lowenthal and Franz Neumann. Essentially, Frankfurt theoreticians draw heavily on the theories of Friedrich Hegel and the early and more Hegelian works of Marx.

They also employ conventional sociological analysis of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim. Above all, they attempt to tie together psychoanalysis and Marxism by synthesizing the Marxist theory of social structure and change and the Freudian theory of individual motivation and personality. In their efforts to develop their critical theory, they conducted extensive studies of authoritarianism, alienation, mass culture and various social movements (Abraham, 1981: 128, 129).

The new radical sociology emerged as a reaction against the philosophy of self-interest that permeates American society. Radicalism supports the weak against the strong, the oppressed against the oppressor. According to Horowitz, to be radical is to deny the cannons of self-interest: a white fighting for blacks, an Arab defending the
Jew, a Catholic condemning a papal injunction or a landlord advocating for land reforms are examples of radical behavior (Abraham, 1981:131,132). This variant of conflict theory focuses on negative aspects of social structure such as poverty, racism, exploitation and powerlessness. Proponents of this school of thought included Wright Mills and Irvin Louis Horowitz.

Randall Collins has undertaken one of the most thoroughgoing analyses of modern complex organizations and other social arrangements such as state and stratification in a conflict perspective. He argues that conflict theory is a scientific tradition from which we may draw a consistent network of casual generalizations of considerable empirical power. He analyses a wide range of social phenomenon on the basis of a general assumption of conflicting interests of the parties involved, their social location, available resources and options.

According to Collins’ analytic conflict theory, human beings are sociable but conflict-prone (Abraham, 1981:134). The primary basis of conflict is violent coercion which is always a potential resource and a zero-sum sort. In every society, there is a differential distribution of desirables such as wealth, power, prestige and other valued goods. The system of inequality brings divisions in the society. There is a continuing competition between groups or social strata for a greater share of the desirables. Collins observes that each individual pursues his own interests and that there are many situations, notably where power is involved, in which those interests are inherently antagonistic (Collins, 1975: 60, 89).
In summary, conflict inevitably arises from unequal distribution of desirables such as wealth, power, prestige and other goods. Individuals strive to maximize their share of the scarce resources. In constructing his conflict model, Collins introduces a number of other variables: the resources people bring to the struggle, their social position, the groups to which they belong and their numerical strength.

Conflict functionalism is primarily concerned with how conflict prevents the ossification of the social system by exerting pressure for innovation and creativity. Lewis Coser, a proponent of this school of thought focuses on the positive functions of social conflict. According to him, conflict allows the expression of hostility and the mending of strained relationships. It leads to the elimination of specific sources of conflict between parties and enables redress of grievances through the establishment of new norms or the affirmation of old ones.

Critics have pointed out that the attempt to reduce the multiplicity of social conflicts to a common principle (what may be termed the fallacy of the binary model) is one of the most fundamental drawbacks of conflict analysis. Most conflict theorists have a dualistic view of social reality in relation to a single principle. For instance, Marx emphasis was on property while John Stuart Mill emphasis was on power. Such analyses assumes that conflicts and contradictions in the social universe always polarizes into two polar opposites- bourgeois and proletariat, the rulers and the ruled, the elite and the masses. Yet, as pointed out by Abraham, (1981), reality is quite different. Social conflicts manifest themselves in a variety of ways and numerous interest groups and any attempt to reduce them to a common principle or a dualistic conception may prove to be too simplistic.
Conflict theories have also been faulted for equating conflict with change. Conflict theoreticians tend to assume that change flows necessarily from conflict, of classes, of interests, of values; implying that without conflict, change cannot occur. This is a negation of historical reality because it is possible for societies to remain unchanged even after going through periods of conflicts. Related, too, is the conflict theorist’s failure to distinguish between positive and negative conflicts, or forms of conflict and their varied repercussions for different elements of society. Yet, conflict can contribute as much to social integration and stability as to disintegration and change; it may disrupt or restore equilibrium.

Despite these criticisms, this study will utilize some of the concepts derived from conflict theory in the analysis of its data. The concept of power relationships will be used to explain how politicians used the majimbo (ethnic federalism) to retain political power. Randall Collin’s idea on the role of the differential distribution of desirables will also be used as a theoretical tool of interpreting data. In this study, land and wealth will be treated as some of the desirables that have triggered conflict in Molo Division. Further, this study will seek to examine the extent to which social, political and economic inequalities in the area of study have created the conditions for violence in the study locale.

The concept of cultural invasion will also enrich the process of data interpretation. Variously referred to as boundary exchanges, cultural frontiers, westernization and modernization, cultural invasion operates in a myriad of ways—technological innovation, mass media, disruption of traditions among other ways (Abraham, 1985: 109). Specifically, this concept will be used as an analytical tool in understanding the
reaction of the forest dwelling Ogiek in the face of the threat posed to their traditional lifestyles by their agricultural neighbors-the Agikuyu, the Abagusii and the Kipsigis.

The idea of competitive struggle will also be a crucial analytical tool with which to analyze how the struggle for scarce resources such as land and job opportunities in the public service has impacted on ethnic relations in the period under consideration.

Postcolonial theory deals with the reading and writing of literature in previously or currently colonized countries. It also entails the critical destabilization of the intellectual and linguistic, social and economic theories that support the Western ways of thinking, of perceiving, understanding and knowing the world. It aims at producing alternative conversations to the dominant “Us-and-Them” discourse, between the colonist and the colonized. This theory holds that the decolonized world is filled with contradictions, half-finished processes, confusions and hybridities (Bhabha, 1994). Postcolonial studies recognize that many of the intellectual, cultural and religious assumptions that underlie the logic of colonialism remain active in contemporary society. In many ways, therefore, postcolonialism signifies an attempt by the formerly colonized peoples to re-evaluate, re-discover and reconstruct their own histories and cultures (Mbembe, 2001).

Notable postcolonial theorists include Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Achille Mbembe. Edward Said theoretically developed Orientalism and the Other to conceptually describe Western misrepresentations of non-Western cultures. Orientalism was used in Western intellectual discourse to study “The Orient”- and extended it to describe a binary social relation of the world into “Orient” and
“Occident,” the East and the West. Said argued that power and knowledge are an inseparable binary intellectual relation; therefore, the Occidental claim to knowledge of the Orient gave the West the power to name peoples, places and cultures and thus to control them.

In his work, *On the Postcolony*, (Mbembe, 2001) interrogates the emergence of the colonial and the postcolonial state. He argues that the historicity of African societies is rooted in a multiplicity of times, trajectories and rationalities that cannot be conceptualized using social theories and forms of knowledge that emanate from Europe. According to him, a proper study of the postcolony should embrace a number of relationships and a configuration of events that are often visible and perceptible, sometimes diffuse and “hydra-headed.” Moreover, the postcolony is characterized by discontinuities and reversals that interpenetrate and envelope one another. In an attempt to explain the consequences of ethnic violence, this study will utilize two key concepts derived from Mbembe—*allocations* and *transfers*.

Within the postcolony, allocation is granted in two forms; the salary and appropriation of public resources to create allegiances. A salary is a remuneration obtained for work done or service performed. Since enjoyment of a salary went beyond the single individual who earned it, it became an essential cog in the dynamic of relations between state and society. It acted as a resource the state could use to buy obedience from the citizens. The means of livelihood of the salaried workers was not designed to reward a process of converting energy into wealth, but were helping shape a particular figure of submission and domination (Mbembe, 2001). The concept of the salary will be used to interrogate how youth unemployment, which essentially negates any
attachment between the unemployed individual(s) and the state have contributed to ethnic violence in Molo Division. On the other hand, state allocation of resources such as land has exacerbated conflicts in the area of study.

The concept of transfer is used to refer to the complex system of reciprocity and obligations that bind members of a single household or even a single community. The most widespread form of transfer in the postcolony is the communal social tie through which individuals remit significant portions of their incomes to their families, friends and the wider rural community to assist in raising funds for school fees, burials or following requests for help (Mbembe, 2001). Such transfer rests on arrangements and customary rules that ultimately define the modalities of legitimate subjection and social control within the framework of clientele relations, kiship or the wider society. For the purposes of the current study, the concept of transfer will be used to explain how in the period under study, the sacking of civil servants such as cabinet ministers was perceived to be a hostile act against an entire ethnic group. In this study, Molo Division is treated as a subspace within the larger space of the Kenyan postcolony.

**1.10 METHODOLOGY**

**1.10.1 Research Design**

To carry out the interviews, a purposive sampling procedure was employed. In this method, the researcher selected people to participate in the interviews for a specific reason. Ten elderly respondents who were conversant with inter-ethnic relations and interactions at independence were interviewed. The choice of key informants was based on the information provided by other oral informants during the interview. Two teachers and two doctors (to capture the impact of violence on the education and
health sectors) based in Naivasha Town, Naivasha (a town in the Central Rift Valley region) received many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) especially in the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence. Many displaced pupils were accommodated in several schools within the town. Most of the students came from the refugee camp set up in the town’s stadium. Three retired councillors for Turi South Ward were also interviewed bringing the total of those interviewed to seventeen.

Recognising that some victims of violence have migrated to other areas since the First Wave of violence in 1992, the researcher obtained information from this category of victims. Two focus groups of six persons each were organized at Mutonyora location, Magumu Division, Nyandarua County in Central Province. This is an area where several Agikuyu victims of violence migrated to in the period 1992-2008.

A similar number of focus groups were also organized at Kamara location, Kuresoi constituency. Kamara location is approximately fifteen kilometres west of Molo Town. Some of the Kalenjin victims of violence displaced from other parts of Molo Division in the period 1992-2008 settled in the location. Special attention was paid to the relevance of the data to the social, cultural and economic aspects of the violence.

1.10.2 Study Locale

Molo Division borders the Mau Forest. The name is derived from a Maasai name for a curse. It is alleged that a group of the Maasai decided to settle there contrary to the wishes of their kinsmen. During the colonial period, the area was part of the White Highlands. After Kenya’s independence in 1963, people from different ethnic groups moved into the area. Majority of them were attracted by the fertile soils for the
The Division is mainly inhabited by the Kipsigis, Ogiek, Agikuyu and the Abagusii. The Akiwumi’s Commission noted that this ethnic diversity had been a source of tension and ethnic conflict pitting the Kalenjin (Kipsigis and the Ogiek) on the one hand and the Kikuyu and the Kisii on the other. According to the 2009 census, the Division has a population of 542,103 people.

The Division was until 2005 part of the larger Nakuru County. Before 1995, it included the current Olenguruone and Kuresoi Divisions. The Division has been affected by three waves of ethnic violence: 1992, 1997 and 2008. The Commission of Inquiry on the causes of ethnic clashes led by Justice Akilano Akiwumi (1999) noted that in Nakuru County, Molo and Olenguruone Divisions were the most affected by the 1992-1993 clashes. Indeed, Molo Division was among the few areas declared security operation zones under the Preservation of Public Security Act by President Daniel Arap Moi on September 2, 1993 (Akiwumi, 1999:133). This study was done in selected locations of the Division namely; Turi, Njoro, Elburgon and Molo Town (See page 25). According to the Kenya Land Alliance Report (2009), Turi, Kapsita (within Elburgon) and Mukinyai alone received a total of 2231 returnees after the 2007-2008 ethnic violence.
1.10.3 A MAP SHOWING TURI, MUKINYAI, NJORO AND ELBURGON LOCATIONS OF MOLO DIVISION, NAKURU COUNTY, KENYA.

Source: Molo District Office, Molo.
1.10.4 Research Instrument

An open ended questionnaire (see Appendix 1) with a set of 25 questions was administered to respondents. A total of 105 respondents filled and returned the questionnaires. The questionnaire had two parts; part A was meant for respondents in Molo Division while part B was used as a guideline to keep on track focus group discussions organized for respondents who, at various times in the period 1992-2008 have relocated from Molo to areas such as Kamara in Kuresoi and Mutonyora in Nyandarua, Central Province.

Bearing in mind the history of Molo Division, a study on ethnic relations in the area is quite sensitive. It was therefore imperative to work with research guides known to the residents in the locations where the study was done. In this regard, four research guides were hired by the researcher. This not only saved on time but also created a good rapport with the respondents who ended up giving crucial information. As situations demanded, the researcher interpreted the questionnaire to the respondents. In total, information was obtained from 148 respondents.

1.10.5 Data Collection

First and foremost, this study has derived its data from library research. Data was collected from local libraries including the Post Modern Library at Kenyatta University, the Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library of the University of Nairobi and the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Library, (FASS) Egerton University.

The primary data was derived from the Kenya National Archives (KNA) and government reports related to the subject under inquiry. Oral interviews were used so as to obtain important oral history on inter-ethnic relations in Molo Division. We were
lucky to find elderly respondents who were conversant with patterns of ethnic relations that had a bearing on the period under consideration.

Data was also derived from observations and hand written notes made available to the researcher by some respondents. The information collected was classified as relating to either the social or economic aspect of the study. This process helped in reducing the data into patterns, categories and schema.

In terms of gender, 59 out of the 148 (39.8%) respondents were females. Once informants had been identified, they assisted the researcher to identify others through snowballing. The table below shows the ethnic composition of the respondents.

**Table 1.1: Ethnic Representation of Respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP</th>
<th>NO. OF RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kipsigis</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogiek</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maasai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>148</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above figures include those respondents from Kamara and Mutonyora Locations.
1.10.6 Data analysis and Presentation

The historical method was used in analyzing and interpreting data. The use of this method leads us to knowledge that is uniquely historical. This method involves the analysis and explanation of harnessed data both historically and logically (Omenya, 2010). Past events, experiences and developments are subjected to a critical process of investigation. Evidence is weighed very carefully and the validity of sources is established. It is only after this rigorous process that an interpretation is made.

To minimize the impact of subjectivity, sources were subjected to historical criticism so as to bring about a corroboration of the different data. With the exception of a few instances, most of the data was presented in a qualitative form, which is descriptive in nature. Overall, the data was edited and analysed within the conflict and postcolonial theoretical frameworks.

1.10.7 Challenges Encountered During Research

This section discusses some of the challenges that we encountered during research and how we mediated around them in our quest to bring this work to fruition.

First and foremost was the challenge of ethnic suspicions. The area of study is inhabited by the Kikuyu, the Kisii, the Ogiek and the Kipsigis sub ethnic groups of the Kalenjin. Since the 1992 violence, the Kipsigis and the Ogiek have fought against the Kikuyu and the Kisii. Ethnic violence between these two groups have left many people dead, others have been maimed and injured while houses have been burnt and livestock stolen. Thousands have also been displaced. This has created deep feelings of ethnic consciousness among residents of this area. To overcome this challenge, we
incorporated the help of four village elders who took us to various homesteads and shopping centers to meet targeted respondents. This made our work much easier.

The fact that this study was done at a time when the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, (ICC) Luis Moreno Ocampo was preparing to make public the names of high ranking government officials suspected to have masterminded the 2007-2008 post election violence turned out to be a hindrance to our progress. The anticipation of his announcement raised ethnic tensions in this area. Some of the respondents bluntly asked us ‘have you been sent by Ocampo?’

Closely related to the ICC process were the activities of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The Commission had begun recording statements from victims of ethnic violence as part of its wider mandate of unearthing human rights abuses and historical injustices in Kenya since 1963. Some respondents thought that we were part of the Commission’s staff sent to record statements. Like in the previous misconception about the ICC, some requested us to reveal whether we had been sent by the ICC or the TJRC. It was not easy convincing potential informants that ours was ordinary academic research.

Of all the challenges we faced, none was too difficult to surmount than the emotional price that our respondents paid in the course of our discussions. Some of them broke down in tears as they recounted their experiences during and after the violence. Sometimes we felt guilty for interrogating their wounded lives.

Most of the victims lead very miserable lives: their housing conditions are very poor and in general, desperation and hopelessness is cruelly manifest. This is best captured
by Kamande Kabiru who said, ‘tuikaraga o uguo mandeng’eng’a’ (we live a miserable life).

Translation also posed a problem to us. Some of the respondents, especially elderly Ogiek, could only speak in their mother tongue. Though our guides did a superb job, some words were difficult to translate, for instance, ‘kipsinendet’ is a tree whose branches were hanged by non Kalenjins on their gates at Kapsita and Mau Summit area so as to spare them from attacks during the 2008 post election violence. Yet, we were unable to find a Kiswahili or English name for this tree. In spite of these challenges, we were able to complete our fieldwork in thirty days.

1.10.8 Conclusion

In this introductory chapter, an outline of the main features of the research project has been made. It has been argued that conflicts are inherent in every society and therefore it is critical to analyze them within the conflict theoretical framework. It has also been pointed out there is need to shift the focus of attention on ethnic violence, from the political perspective to an analysis of its social, cultural and economic implications. The literature reviewed has demonstrated that there is need to interrogate local narratives on ethnic conflicts. Accordingly, the scope of our study focuses on Molo Division in the period 1969-2008. In the next chapter, we examine the causes of ethnic violence in the area of study.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 THE CAUSES OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN MOLO DIVISION

2.1 Introduction.

This chapter discusses the causes of ethnic violence in Molo Division in the period 1992 - 2008. They can broadly be classified into five: politics, economics, and perceived historical injustices over land, negative ethnicity and socio-cultural factors. Informants were able to discern that the various phases of the violence (1992-1993, 1997-1998 and 2007-2008) had different causes, with some of the causes assuming a greater role than the others. In the analysis of the causes of ethnic violence, the concepts of power relations, cultural invasion and competitive struggle in classical economics as applied in conflict theories will be helpful in the interpretation of data. Similarly, the two concepts of Transfers and Allocations used by Mbembe (2001) to account for the decomposition of postcolonial African states will be used. In this regard, Molo Division will be considered as a space within the Kenyan postcolony.

This section demonstrates that there are certain key events in the period 1945 – 1969 that are critical in understanding contemporary ethnic conflicts in the Division. These events are: the 1947 Olenguruone crisis, the 1952- 1956 Maumau insurgency, the formation of country wide political parties with emphasis on the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), activities of the Regional Boundaries Commission and the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA) in the period 1960-1962, the resettlement process as well as the assassination of Tom Mboya, the Minister for Economic Planning and Development in July 1969. The chapter notes that the various ethnic groups that reside in Molo
share a history of injustices that is rooted in the colonial and post-colonial Kenyan state.

2.2 Ethnic Relations before 1969.

2.2.1 The Olenguruone Crisis of 1947

The making of modern Kenya, beginning in 1895 when the territory became part of the British East African Protectorate, entailed an elaborate process of land alienation to pave way for the construction of the railway line linking Mombasa and Uganda. Land was needed for putting up of the administrative offices of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). The company belonged to Sir William Mackinon, a Scottish businessman who had successfully applied for a royal charter in September 1888. It was mandated to pacify African communities in the region, end slave trade, develop transport, communication, health, establish public order and exploit natural resources for the benefit of Britain. The company established trading posts in areas like Kibwezi, Dagoretti, Naivasha, Eldama Ravine and Mumias. The granting of the royal charter marked the beginning of formal colonial period in Kenya (Ochieng, 1989: 8).

Through various legislations such as the Crown Land Ordinance of 1915 and the Native Registration Ordinance, African land was also expropriated on a very large scale so as to attract White settlers to come and take up farming in Kenya to make the protectorate economically independent of Britain.
Elkins (2005:12) notes that although all indigenous groups were affected by land alienation, none experienced a transformation as intense as the Kikuyu. Loss of land was particularly devastating to the Kikuyu as their population began to recover from its earlier losses, following the introduction of western medicine and subsequent mortality. With their expanding population and practice of settled farming, they were affected more by the consequent overcrowding and depletion of resources in the Reserves. Other agricultural groups who lost their land to the settlers included the Kamba of Machakos.

A good deal of land in the coastal belt was also alienated to Europeans, who used it for sisal, rubber plantations and grazing. The pressures of colonial capitalism turned some pastoral groups into agricultural peasants. For example, the Nandi and the Kipsigis lost some of their best lands to European settlement than peoples of other regions in Kenya (Ochieng, 1989).

The consequence of land alienation was that many Africans were rendered landless (Kanogo, 1987: 10). Lonsdale (in Ochieng, 1989) points out that for instance, the number of resident settlers rose from 600 in 1905 to 2,000 in 1907. These groups of landless Africans such as the Nandi, Kipsigis, Marakwet, Keiyo and the Tugen became squatters in Nakuru County in the period 1905-1918 (ibid. p. 27). In the course of time, the prosperity and numerical increase of the Kikuyu squatter aroused the fears of the pastoral ethnic groups such as the Maasai and the Kalenjin, the settlers and the provincial administration.
However, the relative prosperity of the squatters was severely eroded in the inter-war period. They were increasingly threatened by the settlers’ decision to reduce squatter population, cultivation and grazing (ibid. p.62). After the Second World War, the colonial government introduced a series of measures that angered Kikuyu squatters at Olenguruone settlement scheme. The scheme consisted of 52000 acres of Maasai land which had been purchased by the government in 1939 to provide land for squatters who, because of the greater measure of control exercised under the 1937 Resident Native Labourers Ordinance (RNLO), might have to leave European lands. These included squatters declared redundant, as well as those who might choose not to contract as squatters under the provisions of the new Ordinance, which they considered very restricting.

Most of the settlers in Olenguruone were Kikuyu who had formerly been resident in various parts of the Maasai Reserve. Like other Kikuyu settled in various parts of the colony, the Kikuyu of Olenguruone had aroused suspicion and dislike among their hosts. Considering themselves as land holders who had lost their land at Kiambu through land alienation, the Kikuyu wanted the government to acknowledge their legal entitlement to the scheme, a position that the government rejected.

The government demanded that of the eight acres of land granted to each settler, not more than two and a half acres could be brought under effective cultivation at any one time. Land was not to be used continuously for more than four years after which it was to rest under planted grass for not more than three years at a time. Maize, the staple crop of the Kikuyu was forbidden while compulsory terracing and cross contour planting to avoid erosion was to be observed. Matters were made worse for
the Kikuyu when the colonial government introduced a new system of land inheritance—instead of sharing a dividing a piece of land among the sons of the homestead, the new system provided that the eldest son of the wife would be the beneficiary.

The government also refused to double the acreage in proportion to the number of wives a man had. Moreover, newly married sons of plot owners were sent away from the scheme (Kanogo, 1987: 115, 116). Throup, (1988: 122) argues that Olenguruone was totally unsuitable for peasant cultivators like the Kikuyu. The four main valleys of the scheme had extremely steep slopes that were covered with dense bamboo and trees making any cultivation or movement extremely difficult. The rainy season between April – October was marked by hailstorms which damaged the crops. Frost was also common in the area. This combination of factors provoked the Kikuyu. They turned to oathing as a way of cementing their unity against the British (ibid. p. 120).

In the stand off that ensued, the squatters were forcibly taken to the dry Yatta scheme in Eastern province. However, not all Kikuyu refused to comply with the demands of the colonial government. Mwangi, (O.I, 2010) pointed out that his father was one of the nine Kikuyu who were allowed to remain in Olenguruone after they complied with the soil conservation measures (kuhanda nyeki, planting grass as a way of controlling soil erosion) proposed by the government.

Respondents claimed that the Olenguruone crisis fractured ethnic relations between the Kikuyu and the Kipsigis (a sub-ethnic group of the Kalenjin). Kipsigis men were conscripted by the colonial administration to assist in the eviction of the Kikuyu in

2.2.2 The Legacy of Mau Mau on Inter-Ethnic Relations

The armed struggle waged by Africans in Kenya against the British in the period 1952-1956 has been referred to as the Mau mau. The name was first used in 1948 and was formally outlawed in 1950; it was never used by the movement itself. It has been speculated (and most clearly asserted by Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, author of Mau Mau Detainee) that Mau Mau was a childhood anagram for 'Uma Uma' meaning 'Get out! Get out!' which police once heard shouted by a look-out when they had been raiding an oath taking ceremony (Kyle, 1999: 48). It is not an expression in either Kikuyu or Swahili.

The demobilization of African soldiers after the Second World War (1945), the worsening social and economic conditions of the African squatters as well as colonial oppression have been widely elaborated by varied scholars as the causes of the Mau Mau (Furedi, 1989; Kanogo; 1987; Kershaw; 1989). However, land remained a core cause of the rebellion as African communities, especially the Kikuyu attempted to recover the lands they had lost during the last decade of the 19th century.

In the period 1952-1956, the Mau Mau engaged the British soldiers and African loyalists in a guerilla war whose clarion call was ithaka na wiyathi (land and freedom).
2.2.3 Formation of KANU and KADU

After the military defeat of the movement, the colonial government allowed the formation of political parties that had a national appeal. Consequently, on 14th May 1960, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was formed after a two day conference of political leaders at Kiambu. Jomo Kenyatta was elected president (although he was still in jail for allegedly Mau Mau activities), James Gichuru was elected acting president while Oginga Odinga was elected vice president (Kyle, 1999: 116).

Kyle, (1999) observes that Ngala and Moi had been elected Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer of KANU respectively in absentia (They were abroad when KANU elections were held). However, on return to the country, they declined to take the positions after they realized their ethnic groups were critical of the new party. Both the Mijikenda (Ngala’s ethnic group) and the Kalenjin (Moi’s ethnic group) feared that KANU would perpetuate Kikuyu – Luo domination after independence. Commenting on the predicament of Daniel Arap Moi at the time, Kyle (1999: 118) avers that:

Moi was more inclined to go along with KANU, but when he saw to what extent the combination of Gichuru, Odinga and Mboya at the top was poison to all the Kalenjin… he took part in meetings at Eldoret on 21st May and Chepkorio on 11th June 1960 of the Kalenjin Political Alliance, which brought together all the Kalenjin sub groups… on 25th June, representatives of the KPA met at Ngong with six other ethnic organizations to form KADU so as to challenge what they considered the danger of Kikuyu-Luo dictatorship.

To the leadership of KADU, the only way to avoid the domination of the Kikuyu and the Luo was by enshrining regional governments in the constitution that would govern Kenya after independence. In the first and second constitutional conferences held in Lancaster in 1961 and 1962 respectively, KADU consistently demanded that
regionalism (*majimbo*) be the foundation upon which independent Kenya would be
built. Under the KADU plan, Kenya would be a federal state with six regions and the
federal territory of Nairobi (ibid. p.146). The regional governments would have
independent legislative powers and their own revenue, each being the effective
administrative and executive authority for the region. According to John Konchellah,
one of KADUs leaders, *majimbo* meant that ethnic minorities such as the Maasai, the
Mijikenda and the Kalenjin (the Kalenjins are currently the third largest, after the
Kikuyu and the Luhya) would be the ones in control of their own lands (1963, 1;
KNA MAC/KEN/36/7).

In contrast, KANU envisaged the infant nation-state as dominated by a centralized
government responsible for implementing development policy (Branch, 2011: 2).
Perceiving it as a policy designed to limit the power of the central government that it
would most certainly control, KANU contested the emphasis given to regionalism
during the Lancaster conferences. Unwilling to delay the independence date further,
the party agreed, in Oginga Odinga’s words “to accept a constitution we did not want,
on the understanding that ‘once we had the government we could change the
constitution” (Odinga, 1967: 229).

In a nutshell, the formation of KANU and KADU created ethnic divisions. In Nakuru
County, in 1961, ethnic tensions were so high to the extent that some residents carried
two party membership cards; one for KANU and the other for KADU to avoid attacks
from either of the party’s supporters (Gachigua, O.I, 2010). KANU was largely
supported by the Kikuyu, Luo and the Kamba while the Kalenjin supported KADU
and was fairly active in Nakuru, Londiani, Molo and Subukia (Furedi, 1989: 18).
2.2.4 Activities of the Regional Boundaries Commission

Another factor that increased ethnic tensions in Nakuru was the work of the Regional Boundaries Commission. As a consequence of the federal proposal advocated by KADU and reluctantly accepted by KANU, the Commission began its activities in Nakuru in 1962. Its task was to look into the details of delineating the future areas of the Regions. The hearings of the Commission greatly heightened ethnic tensions and spilled over to the independence period as the leaders of the different ethnic groups attempted to assign coveted areas of the Regions within their spheres of influence (ibid.177-8). In Nakuru County as a whole, the Kikuyu were the majority, with substantial pockets of non- Kikuyu living in Rongai, Subukia, Eldama Ravine and Nakuru town.

In the rural areas, KADU was fairly weak and did not constitute a remarkable political force. Ethnic clashes occurred in Nakuru town in January 1961 between the Luo, Kikuyu on one hand and the Kalenjin on the other (ibid.p.178). Conflicts over boundaries were also witnessed in other parts of Kenya (9 September 1963; KNA KA/6/28; 13 December 1963; KNA DO/ER/2/2/14/10; 30 April 1964 KNA VQ/10/12).

2.2.5 The activities of the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA)

The future of the White Highlands remained a contested issue as Kenya moved towards independence as European settlers, African businessmen and the landless Africans struggled for its control. The landless Kikuyu founded the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA) whose sole objective was to get free land for the ex-squatters. The KLFA was run by ex- Mau Mau detainee. The group administered oath
to farm labourers in Molo, Ravine, Njoro and other areas. The 1961 annual Report for Nakuru District noted that

The year (1961) was one of the most doleful in the history of Nakuru. The political scene became more and more confused and unstable… underground activities continued among the Kikuyu and the operations of KLFA caused some anxiety who (sic) are determined to stick to the extremist methods and policies derived during the Mau Mau emergency and to do everything possible to place themselves in power at independence.

The group was ready to use violence if the aim of getting land was frustrated by KADU or any other group (Kanogo, 1987: 166). The fact that KLFA was an exclusively Kikuyu grouping further soured ethnic relations in the cosmopolitan Nakuru County. The Kalenjin were especially annoyed by Kikuyu oathing, they began to stock pile weapons in preparation to fight the Kikuyu and the Luo after independence (Nakuru District Annual Report, 1961 p. 4).

After independence, Kikuyu ex-quatters and the KLFA realized that there would be no massive free distribution of land. Accordingly, they approached their national leaders, especially Jomo Kenyatta, the Prime Minister, for help in buying land in the White Highlands. Due to financial constraints, they formed co-operative societies or limited companies that bought large farms, which were later subdivided and shared out among the various members in parcels of 2 to 3 acres. In this way, many co-operative societies and companies, most of which were exclusively Kikuyu, sprang up in many parts of the Rift Valley. In Nakuru County, such societies played a big role in acquiring land for several thousand landless Kikuyu (Kanogo, 1987: 175: Akiwumi: 1999: 54). In Molo Division societies that acquired land in this way included Turi Farmers Company Ltd, Sagaitim Company Ltd, Mukorombosi, MilimaTatu, Ngwataniro (Kikuyu for co-operation) among others. There has been a perception,
especially among the Kalenjins, that the Kikuyu were favored by President Kenyatta’s government in the acquisition of land in the area at the expense of the indigenous ethnic groups, that is, the Kalenjin. These perceptions have been a source of conflicts between the two groups in the period 1969 – 2008.

2.2.6 The assassination of Tom Mboya

The assassination of Thomas Joseph Mboya, the Minister for Economic Development and Planning on 5th July 1969 is said to have increased ethnic intolerance particularly in areas of the Rift Valley where the Kikuyu had been settled in large numbers after independence. For instance, on 17th July 1969, a group of armed Kalenjin youths from Turbo beat up two of their Kikuyu counterparts. Local Nandi (a sub group of the Kalenjin) at Turbo were also accused of burning down Kikuyu homes and beating Kikuyu settlers (18 July 1969; KNA KA/6/52). Although a Luo, Mboya had endeared himself to Kenyans across ethnic groups as a patriot who had transcended ethnic loyalties. Matters were made worse by the suspicions that President Kenyatta’s close Kikuyu ministers were involved in the murder. Branch, (2011: 80) notes that

As more and more of his (Mboya’s) supporters turned up at the hospital (Nairobi Hospital) the crowd became overwhelmingly Luo in composition, and proceeded to shout anti-government and anti-Kikuyu slogans at bystanders. A kikuyu priest called to administer the last rites was forcibly removed from the hospital ward by the angry mourners. When Mboya’s body was taken to his Nairobi home, a number of Kikuyu who tried to pay their last respects were beaten up.

In Nandi Hills, Nandi County, the presence of the Kikuyu in the area had always been resented by the Kalenjin. In late July 1969, the local Member of Parliament, Jean Marie Seroney, chaired a meeting of elders of the Nandi sub group at Kapng’etuny. The resolutions of that meeting, which were given the name Nandi Hills Declaration declared that every non-Nandi, whether an individual or a firm is a temporary tenant
at will of the Nandi. Further, the meeting resolved that no land transactions in the County would be recognized as having any validity whatsoever. Every non – Nandi was called upon to renounce his alternative ethnic allegiance or to move out of the area (27 July 1969; KNA KA/11/9).

It is therefore within the context of the above events that contemporary ethnic violence in Molo Division ought to be understood. With this background in mind, we now turn to a discussion on the causes of ethnic violence in the period 1992-2008.


Many respondents were of the view that politics (*siasa*) was the major cause of the 1992-1993 violence in Molo Division (Gachiga, Murang’ai, Chumo, O.I, 2010). They argued that there was no any rational way one could explain why, having lived together with members of other ethnic groups for more than four decades, communities would turn against each other. However, data collected indicated that there were low level inter-personal conflicts and disputes emanating from cattle theft and land boundaries. The clamour for multipartyism appears to have been a turning point in ethnic relations in the area. This view seems to concur with evidence from secondary sources. For instance, Kagwanja, (2001: 72) argues that President Daniel Arap Moi’s regime ended single party rule and embraced a multi-party system solely because of unrelenting domestic and international pressure. Accordingly, it sponsored ethnic violence as a tool of informal repression in a bid to derail multi-partyism and hold on to power.
Politicians opposed to pluralism, mainly drawn from the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), re-ignited the calls for *Majimbo* (ethnic federalism) to counter those activists calling for pluralism. Branch, (2011: 197) argues that as talk of multipartyism gathered pace, an older (but just as fraught) discussion resurfaced. As a subject of national political debate, *majimboism* had been moribund since shortly after the absorption of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) by KANU in 1964 (KNA/DC/NKU/2/1/2 Dec.1962; KNA/DC/ NKU/2/4/2 – 1960:1-2,8). It was re-ignited by Noor Abdi Ogle, a member of parliament from Wajir. During a speech in parliament in July 1991, Ogle explicitly connected implementation of *majimboism* with the survival of KANU and the one-party system.

*Majimbo* was not federalism in the real sense of the word, but an arrangement in which each community would be required to return to its ancestral district or province and if for any reason they would be reluctant or unwilling to do so, they would be forced to do so (Akiwumi, 1999: 78). The politicians, who were mainly drawn from the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and the Samburu (KAMATUSA) ethnic groups, organized meetings where they preached in favour of the *Majimbo* reform. They matched this doctrine with the eviction of all those who opposed and refused to accept the Rift Valley as a ‘KANU zone.’

The consequence of the *majimbo* debate in the Rift Valley was that it created conflict solidarity and conflict ideology within the KAMATUSA group. Sherif, (1936) has demonstrated how free communication on a given issue creates a common culture by ‘averaging’ the beliefs, values, and expectations that the individual members bring into the group. In a group setting, individual perceptions converge to a common
mean, with much less variation between them. When members in a group face a
dangerous opponent, they need to develop a conflict ideology. A device routinely
used to this end is the mass rally in which the opponent is portrayed as an enemy who
poses a threat to every member of the group. For members of a group to create and
adopt conflict ideology, two conditions must be met: the individual members must be
convinced that conflict is necessary, and they must meet in small groups to elevate
their private beliefs into a binding group ideology.

In Molo Division, as elsewhere in the country, in their struggle to remain in power,
KANU politicians especially from the Rift Valley succeeded in portraying the Kikuyu
and the Abagusii as enemies of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and the Samburu.
*Majimbo* became a major theme of discussion among the locals. The common view
was skewed toward the opinions of the politicians who advocated for expulsion of
those who supported the calls for multipartyism. Consequently, Kikuyu, Abagusii,
Luhyia and Luo communities living or bordering the Rift Valley became targets of
Kalenjin and Maasai warrior’s violence (Gecaga, 2007).

From the beginning of 1992, this policy was put into practice, the first massacres
started in Molo region, against Kikuyu peasants, in Bungoma and Trans Nzoia
regions (against the Luhya) as well as in Kericho and in Uasin Gishu (against the
Agikuyu and the Luo) (Maupeu, 2005: 39). Political rallies that were held in
September 1991 at Kapsabet, Kericho and Narok heightened ethnic tensions
(Akiwumi, 1999: 49) in the country. This was because *majimbo* was deliberately
distorted to suggest that each community would be required to return to its ancestral
province, by force if need be. In one of the rallies, Willy Kamuren, the then Baringo
North KANU member of parliament is reported to have said that:

“... Kalenjin were not tribalistic but only rejected people bent on causing chaos... let them (non Kalenjin and opposition supporters) keep quiet or else we are ready for introduction of Majimboism whereby every person will be required to go back to his motherland” (Akiwumi, 1999: 49).

It is this conceptualization of federalism that has led to mass displacement of 'unwanted' communities in several parts of Kenya since 1992. What made the majimbo debate so emotive in Molo Division was the intended impression it created: a settler – indigenous binarism. The term indigenous is derived from the French word indigene which means a “son or daughter of the soil,” not someone who has settled as a result of immigration or conquest (Mbembe, 2001: 28). Molo is inhabited by people from different ethnic groups. Most of them migrated into the area from other provinces such as Nyanza, Western and Central. This binary construct is easily discernible even in informal settings. For instance, some Kalenjin and Maasai politicians have over the years referred to groups outside the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu communities especially the Agikuyu and the Abagusii as ‘madoadoa’ (spots, foreigners or settlers) (CIPEV, 2008 : 41, 94).

But what role did politics play in the 1992 violence in Molo? Having repealed Section 2A of the Kenyan constitution in December, 1991, the country was scheduled to hold elections in 1992. From the Majimbo debate of 1991, KANU had achieved one objective which was key to its re-election strategy: it had provoked a mass reaction in support of President Moi among the Kalenjin, even among the Nandi and Kipsigis (major Kalenjin sub-ethnic groups), who might have easily trooped to the then nascent FORD which was rapidly gaining momentum. This had been achieved largely because the majimbo proponents had portrayed multi-partyism as a disguised
attempt by non-Kalenjins to dislodge from office a Kalenjin as president of Kenya (Maupeu, 2005: 39). Having secured Kalenjin support by the end of 1991, it was time for KANU to play her second and most dangerous card: to scatter the opposition vote through state sponsored ethnic violence. Commenting on the 1992 Violence, political analyst Peter Kagwanja notes that:

KANU MPs and other politicians allied to the party mostly from the Rift Valley Province, began to call for the forceful removal of other ethnic groups from the province as they were viewed as opposition adherents . . . they called for majimbo system of government . . . in order to protect their regional interests from outsiders (quoted from Maupeu, 2002: 69).

Consequently, when ethnic violence broke out in Molo on 14th March 1992, it was just part of a wider scheme that had began in far away Miteitei, a farm in Tinderet division, Nandi County where the Nandi were up against the Kikuyu, the Kamba, the Luhya, the Kisii and the Luo (Akiwumi, 1999 : 59). Respondents recalled they were forced to sing "KANU YAJENGA NCHI", (KANU builds the Nation) (Njeri Murang’ai, O.I,2010) and to wave the one finger salute which symbolized support for the then ruling party KANU and an endorsement of KANUs candidate, president Daniel Arap Moi.

In some desperate attempts to save themselves from being attacked, non-Kalenjins held cockerels with their hands- a cockerel is a symbol of KANU and it is common to hear people refer to KANU as the cockerel’s party (Gakero, O.I, 2010). Moreover, non Kalenjins especially the Kikuyu were told to go and ask for land from Kenneth Matiba and Mwai Kibaki, both Kikuyu politicians who were running for presidency in that year’s election. Indeed, the threat posed by these two Kikuyu politicians was so real that in spite of the serious anomalies of the 1992 General Election, they managed to be the second and third best presidential candidates respectively after
KANUs candidate, President Daniel Arap Moi (Cowen and Laakso, 2002: 141).

A respondent, Kabui (O.I, 2010) claimed that sometimes in early 1992, at a public rally, they were forced to buy KANU membership cards by the area District Officer (D.O), which were sold at 10 shillings. When they hesitated, the D.O requested that those who had no money to raise their hands so that he could buy for them. Only a handful of old women responded and in the embarrassment that followed, the D.O left in a huff and left the KANU cards in the hands of one Patrick Ng’ang’a, a KANU supporter.

The meeting had been called to persuade people to stay in KANU, however, there were veiled threats, too. A prominent KANU politician is reported to have said that anybody who flashed the two fingers FORD salute would have his fingers cut off (Kamotho, O.I, 2010). Letio (O.I, 2010) recalled that in the meeting mentioned above, in response to the threats, a Kikuyu elder said: “We (Kikuyu) also have young men who can fight.” Some speakers begged the District Officer (D.O) to be allowed to address their people in mother tongue. In one specific incident, a Kikuyu elder said “Kiriti gitigunaga muni”, a Gikuyu proverb which implies that those who break virgin land hardly benefit from the harvests. In the context, the proverb meant that though the Kikuyu had stood by KANU during and after the struggle for independence, KANU had turned its back on them and was now determined to fight them (Ng’ang’a, O.I, 2010).
Gakinya, Muhuni (O.I, 2010), identified three main aims of the 1992 violence in Molo. First, to confirm the 'prediction' made by President Moi that multi-partyism would bring ethnic animosity and chaos, a view echoed by Branch (2011: 199) who argue that by using ethnic violence, the (KANU) government wanted to discredit the whole notion of democracy.

The second aim was to displace potential opposition supporters so that they would be unable to register as voters. This would in turn make them ineligible to vote in the General Election of that year. The third aim was to displace the non-Kalenjin ethnic groups from Molo so that the majimbo agenda could succeed. Were these aims realized?

A careful analysis of the year 1992 in general and the General Election of that year in particular would perhaps reveal that only the second aim was ‘achieved’. The presidential and parliamentary results of Molo Constituency gave Kenneth Matiba's FORD-Asili a commanding lead; Matiba got 55,000 votes while incumbent Moi of KANU had 36,000 votes. At the parliamentary level, the results were as shown in the table below:

**TABLE 2.1: 1992 Parliamentary Election Results For Molo Constituency.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>% of Valid Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Njenga Mungai</td>
<td>Ford Asili</td>
<td>57,637</td>
<td>60.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kebenei</td>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>33,016</td>
<td>34.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Kihiu</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>5,081</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Valid Votes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>95734</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In spite of the fact that many opposition voters were unable to cast their votes having been displaced eight months earlier, the opposition candidate, Njenga Mungai won with a margin of 24621 votes. Bearing in mind that the final presidential tally showed that Matiba was less than 600,000 votes away from President Moi, the eventual winner, it is clear that KANUs defeat, both at the parliamentary and presidential levels would have been bigger. The strategy of denying opposition candidates absolute election victory in Molo and other areas that were seen to be sympathetic to the opposition had worked.

There were other areas where opposition supporters had been displaced from their homes and were unable to vote. Such areas included Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Bomet and in Nyanza and Western Provinces. The final presidential results for the first four candidates were as follows:

**TABLE 2.2: 1992 Presidential Results.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Garnered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Arap Moi</td>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>1,927,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Matiba</td>
<td>FORD-Asili</td>
<td>1,354,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwai Kibaki</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>1,035,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oginga Odinga</td>
<td>FORD-Kenya</td>
<td>903,886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: N.C.C.K., 1993: 49*

There were other candidates such as Chibule Wa Tsuma, George Anyona, Harun Mwau and Mukaru Ng’ang’a. Their combined votes were 44,622.
Regarding the attempt to push the *majimbo* agenda, evicted residents went back to their farms after the elections. Moreover, President Moi resettled hundreds of internally displaced persons at Kapsita after the 1997 General Election.

In a nutshell, both primary and secondary sources indicate that the struggle for power was the main factor behind ethnic violence in Molo Division in 1992. At the national level, the overall strategy was to ensure that President Moi recaptured the presidency. At the local Divisional/constituency level, the aim was to ensure that a KANU candidate won the parliamentary seat. However, a critical analysis would lead to the conclusion that the perpetuation of Moi’s regime was the overarching goal of the violence. As noted by Daniel Branch, (2011: 199):

> For individual MPs and candidates in the Rift Valley, the strategy (of using violence) was appealing, since they could rid their constituencies of likely opposition supporters.

Even though a victory for KANUs parliamentary candidate in Molo constituency was obviously remote (Kinyanjui, O.I, 2010), Branch argues that

> For the President, violence offered a way of pushing out supporters of rival (presidential) candidates from entire provinces. . . . it was mandatory for presidential candidates to garner at least 25% of the votes cast in five of the eight provinces. If likely opposition supporters were expelled from the Rift Valley in large numbers, it would be much harder for any of Moi’s rivals to reach that benchmark (Ibid. p.199).

The final results at the provincial level showed that President Moi was the only candidate who was able to meet the constitutional benchmark of 25% of the votes cast in at least five provinces implying that the strategy of disenfranchising opposition supporters in the Division had worked (Throup and Hornsby, 1998). The struggle for political power at the parliamentary and presidential level was therefore at the centre
of the violence.

2.4 The 1997 – 98 Ethnic Violence.

This sub-section discusses the causes of the 1997-98 violence that occurred just before and after the 1997 General Election. A few remarks are worth making from the onset of this discussion. First, this violence was neither as coordinated nor widespread as that of 1992. It mainly affected areas such as Njoro, Likia, Mauche and Kamwaura while other parts like Mukinyai and Turi were slightly affected (Koech, Kinyanjui, O.I, 2010). There are possible reasons for this scenario. At the local level, President Moi and KANU had succeeded in influencing the pro-establishment Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), into hiving off a new constituency- Kuresoi, from Molo constituency.

The aim here was twofold: to ensure that KANU got an extra parliamentary seat and also to make sure that the Kalenjin population, hitherto overwhelmed by non-Kalenjin voters in the 1992 election, was represented in parliament (Kinyanjui, O.I, 2010; United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 251, 2009: 8). As shown in Table 3.1, Joseph Kebenei, a Kalenjin with his powerbase at Kuresoi had lost to Njenga Mungai, of FORD-Asili, a Kikuyu whose powerbase was at Elburgon, a predominantly Kikuyu zone.

However, in the 1997 Election, Moses Cheboi, a Kalenjin, was elected the Member of Parliament for Kuresoi on a KANU ticket. The results showed that the strategy of carving out Kuresoi constituency, gerrymandered to have a majority Kalenjin population had worked for the ruling party, KANU.
At the national level, the stakes were not as high for Moi and KANU as compared to 1992 (Cowen and Laakso, 2002: 128). By 1997, opposition parties had gone through self-destructive processes, making them unable to seriously challenge President Moi and his party KANU (Cowen and Laakso, 2002: 143; Branch, 2011: 227,228).

Secondly, President Moi was by then preoccupied with his succession strategy: the constitution barred him from contesting after his second term, 1997-2002. He realized that further violence might leave his Kalenjin ethnic group in a precarious situation once he was out of office (Kinyanjui, O.I, 2010). Consequently, just before the 1997 General Election, he began to woo Mr. Njenga Mungai, the fiery Ford – Asili Member of Parliament for Molo, back to KANU. In return for his defection to KANU, President Moi ordered the resettlement of about three hundred Kikuyu families displaced from Olenguruone and other parts of Molo in the 1992 violence. They were resettled at Kapsita, a settlement scheme hived off from Mariashoni forest, near Elburgon. On this scheme, about two hundred and sixty one Ogiek families displaced from Lare (Njoro) were also resettled (Kimaiyo, 2004: 98).

President Moi’s conciliatory approach was also evident on the national political scene. Prior to the 1997 election, he had begun to look for a suitable heir to the presidency. He had engineered the rise of Uhuru Kenyatta, son to Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, to the post of Thika district KANU chairman, later; he prevailed upon him to vie for the Gatundu parliamentary seat on a KANU ticket in 1997, which he lost to the little known Moses Muihia of the Democratic Party (DP). Events of later years would reveal that President Moi was grooming Uhuru Kenyatta for the presidency
On 14 October 2002, Uhuru Kenyatta was endorsed as KANU’s presidential candidate for December’s election. This ignited a rebellion from other presidential hopefuls who had hoped for a fair competitive process of choosing KANU’s flag bearer. On the very day that Uhuru Kenyatta was endorsed as KANU’s presidential candidate, a breakaway group of KANU led by Raila Odinga, the Rainbow Coalition joined the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK), led by Mwai Kibaki, Kijana Wamalwa and Charity Ngilu to form the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) whose candidate, Mwai Kibaki, defeated Uhuru Kenyatta in the 27th December 2002 presidential elections (Maupeu, 2005: 123).

This observation might help in explaining the absence of ethnic violence in Molo ahead of the 2002 election (Kosgei, Malakwen, O.I, 2010). As previously noted, violence occurred whenever a Kalenjin and a Kikuyu candidate faced off in the election, both at the local (parliamentary and civic) and national (presidential) levels. At the local level, the creation of Kuresoi constituency had helped ease the matter. At the national level, the Kalenjin had no candidate, Moi had told them to vote for Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu. Indeed, senior Kalenjin leaders such as Henry Kosgei and William Ruto campaigned for Uhuru Kenyatta. In particular, William Ruto: ‘Played on and encouraged Kalenjin fears of retribution and isolation in the wake of President Moi’s retirement. A pact with the Agikuyu would protect the Kalenjin after 2002 if (Uhuru) Kenyatta won the Election’ (Branch, 2011: 247).
It was a dilemma, for the choice was between two Kikuyu’s; Uhuru Kenyatta of KANU and Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC).

Respondents such as Borok, Lamai and Timaiyu, (O.I, 2010) argued that the small scale violence that occurred in 1997-1998 was caused by state condoned allocation of large chunks of the Mau forest land to well connected government officials who rented the land to the agrarian Abagusii and Agikuyu, who cleared the land using fire.

The two ethnic groups also engaged in charcoal burning also became common in the area. The presence of some areas referred to as Witemere in areas like Turi, Elburgon and Njoro seems to support this view. Witemere is a Gikuyu term that means free land for clearing. It is free in the sense that one’s ability is the only limitation to the amount of land one can cultivate. State allocation of privileges in the Kenyan postcolony has been adopted by postindependent governments to win or sustain political support. Accordingly, it has become a form of regulating political affairs based largely on private appropriation of public resources to create allegiances.

The Ogiek have consistently opposed this state sponsored dispossession of their forest land because they depend on forest resources such as hunting and bee keeping for food. The depletion of forests meant that their survival was endangered. For instance, on 18th November 1995, about three hundred Ogiek held a peaceful demonstration along Njoro - Nakuru road. The demonstrators were violently dispersed by the Administration Police (Kimaiyo, 2004: 46). The predicament of the Ogiek is captured in the following quotation:

Since 1993, the Kenya Government has systematically carved out huge parts of Mau forest for settlement by other communities. This has caused constant conflict between the Ogiek who see the destruction of the forests and the alienation of their lands as a continued threat to their existence (Kimaiyo,
The other communities referred to are the non Ogieks, including the Kalenjin subgroups such as the Kipsigis. After failing to secure the support of the state in protecting their land, the Ogiek began to carry out sporadic attacks against the non-Ogieks. However, their aim was very modest; to keep off the agrarian communities from their immediate territory. This observation is important because there has been a misconception that the Ogiek have the same interests on land. Research findings for this study suggested that indeed, the Ogiek have consistently opposed the Kipsigis subgroup of the Kalenjin on land issues in Molo Division. Kimaiyo, (2004) has demonstrated that the Moi administration constantly harassed the Ogiek of Molo for their refusal to merge their identity with the larger Kalenjin group.

Nyolei, (O.I, 2010) revealed that while the Agikuyu and the Abagusii were being forcibly removed from their homes in rural Molo by Kalenjin warriors, another population transfer was being carried out by the KANU government; the previously closed schools within the Ogiek ancestral land were re-opened. This was done in preparation for the more than forty thousand people from selected Kalenjin districts who were to be settled in Molo forests (Kimaiyo, 2004: 88). A logical outcome of state allocation was the creation of a general regime of privileges and impunity which operated to the advantage of the leaders (politicians). This political order ensured that the instigators of violence were not prosecuted and at the same time those who carried out the actual violence against supporters of the opposition were rewarded. It is not within the scope of this study to delve deeply into how the system of rewarding perpetrators operated. However, there is evidence that indeed, such a system operated in the period 1992-2008 (Akiwumi, 1999; CIPEV, 2008).

To legitimize such allocations, ministers in charge of Environment and Natural
Resources issued Gazette Notices so as to alter forest boundaries and eventually hand them over to private ownership. This practice was accelerated in the period 1998 – 2002. For instance, in the Legal Notice No. 142 (Cap. 385), dated 8th October 2001, N.K Ngala, Minister for Environment and Natural Resources delineated 35,301.01 hectares of forest land, 7 kilometres south of Njoro Township. His predecessor, F.M Nyenze, had on 30th January 2001 issued a 28 days notice of his intention to invoke a cessation of forest order on 901/62 hectares, situated 8 kilometres west of Elburgon Township. The incoming Kalenjin sub groups were supposed to provide additional votes and a political base for KANU in Molo constituency (Sawe, O.I. 2010). This observation is also made by Kimaiyo, (2004: 26) where he notes that;

The year 1996 saw the creation of numerous polling stations within the targeted settlement scheme . . . youths as young as 14 years were given identity cards and five acres of land. These polling stations were used to rig votes in favour of the ruling party’s presidential candidate [Moi]... in the 1997 elections at Kiptororo ward, a total of 23,618 persons from Kericho were ferried to vote. They also voted in Kericho. This act saw the voting duration extended to two days, an order which came from above.

The same strategy of forcibly removing potential opposition voters was applied in other areas such as coast province: Wa Bara (up country people such as the Luo and the Kikuyu) were violently attacked by self styled Wa Pwani (coast) militia (CIPEV, 2008: 221,222).

Besides the Ogiek land factor, politics also played a big role in the 1997 – 98 violence. In Molo Division, spoiling the opposition vote by forcibly transferring perceived opposition sympathizers remained crucial to KANUs re-election strategy. Njoro, Molo and Elburgon electoral zones had voted for opposition candidates (Kenneth Matiba of Ford-Asili and Mwai Kibaki of the Democratic Party) in the 1992 General Election. As the 1997 General Election approached, it was clear that these
areas, inhabited by the Kikuyu and the Kisii would vote for the opposition, a situation that would negatively affect KANUs performance in the area.

The post election violence that occurred in Njoro and other parts of the country was meant to harass and intimidate opposition supporters (Rutten, 2001, 536). Before the announcement of the final election results, it became clear that President Moi was heading for a renewal of his term (Rutten, 2001: 536). Opposition presidential candidates, Mwai Kibaki, Raila Odinga and Charity Ngilu rejected the results and demanded a repeat of elections within 21 days (ibid. p. 536) President Moi was sworn in on 6th January 1998.

In Njoro, tensions began to build up when Mwai Kibaki vowed not to accept that President Moi had won fairly. He went ahead to file a petition challenging Moi’s re-election (Ibid. 537). At a public rally in Narok town on 17th January, cabinet ministers Kipkalya Kones and William Ole Ntimama warned of possible violence if Kibaki refused to abandon the petition. Other KANU ministers such as Henry Kosgey argued that the petition was an attack against the entire Kalenjin community and warned of bloodshed nationwide (Ibid.537). It is within this context that violence broke out in Njoro on the night of 25 – 26 January 1998.

Kipsigis and Ndorobo (Ogiek) raiders attacked the Kikuyu in, Mutukanio farm, Kihingo and Stoo Mbili trading centres along the Njoro – Mau Narok road killing three people, injured many others and torched houses belonging to the Kikuyu (Kimaru, O.I, 2010; Rutten, 2001). In retaliation, the Kikuyu attacked the Kalenjin at Naishi and Lare (Rutten, 2001: 577). The retaliation followed the threat by the MP
elect for Molo, Mr Kihika Kimani that the Kikuyu had been pushed to the wall and would therefore defend themselves. In the period 25th – 27th January, the number of people killed in Njoro rose to twenty five (Daily Nation 28th January 1998).

The protracted violence in Njoro and other parts of the Rift Valley province such as Laikipia made senior Kikuyu politicians from Central province such as Njenga Karume, Ngengi Muigai and Isaiah Mathenge lead a delegation of eighteen other GEMA elders to meet President Moi at State House on May 24 1993. The meeting was also attended by cabinet ministers Francis Lotodo, Kipkalya Kones and William Ole Ntimama and a group of sixty elders from the Kalenjin, Maasai and Pokot communities. The GEMA leaders were said to have expressed their deep concern about the continuing clashes. Karume and Mathenge reportedly said that the GEMA group informed the President that their patience was running out because of the insecurity its members (the Kikuyu) were being subjected to in the Rift Valley (The Daily Nation, 25 May 1993: 1).

In a nutshell, politics seem to have been the main motive behind the 1997-98 violence in parts of Molo Division although the Ogiek were also concerned with the penetration of their land and way of life by the Kikuyu and the Abagusii.


The 2007-2008 violence was the most widespread, most organized violence to have affected Molo Division since 1992. It also took the longest time to ease.

The purging of many prominent Kalenjins from the civil service after Kibaki took
over power from President Moi in 2003 was cited to have been a cause of the violence (Koech, O.I, 2010). Moi, a Kalenjin had been President for 24 years. In this period, he had appointed many members of his ethnic group to influential positions in the civil service and in the military (Oyugi, 1994). This trend was not unique to Moi; his predecessor, the late President Jomo Kenyatta had set that precedence— he had appointed many members of his Kikuyu ethnic group to such positions. Kenyatta’s rule has been described as a “Gatundu government” (Gatundu, the rural home of President Kenyatta, is a small town in Kiambu County) and the era of “Kikuyu ascendancy” (Branch, 2011: 98).

It was argued that the sacking created bitterness whose impact trickled down to the ordinary Kalenjin. On the other hand, the cabinet unveiled by the new president— Mwai Kibaki reflected a resurgence of Kikuyu domination (The Sunday Nation, October 28 2012). Being the most populous ethnic group, coupled with perceptions of being economically better off as compared to other ethnic groups, the convergence of political and economic power elicited hostility. In Kenya’s political processes, ethnicity and politics are intertwined. What connects the two is the concept of transfers enunciated by Mbembe.

The most common form of transfer in both the colonial and the postcolonial is the communal social tie. This is a complex system of reciprocity and obligations binding members of a single household, even a single community (Mbembe, 2001:46). Such obligations and reciprocity governed relations within a vast field of regulated interactions, for instance, between a craftperson and his/her apprentice. It is in this context that a significant fraction of incomes from salaried civil servants goes to
assist dependants in the rural areas. The philosophy that underpins this kind of a ‘social tax’ began with the principle that every individual was and is indebted to a collective heritage without which he cannot achieve anything in life (Mbembe, 2001). The social debt was, as it were, prior to individual existence and applied to each individual in accordance with what fate had reserved him/her. Not to pay it amounted to splitting the community and threatening its chances of growth. It is within this context that an ethnic group’s attachment to its leaders should be appreciated. The assumption that their rise and fall from political power significantly affects the fortunes of the entire ethnic group cannot be overemphasized. At the time of writing this thesis, Dr. Sally Kosgei, a Kalenjin, and former Permanent Secretary in President Moi’s government, in an attempt to make the Kalenjin reconsider the proposed alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, has invoked the humiliation she and twenty other Kalenjin leaders were subjected to by President Kibaki in 2003 (The Sunday Standard, November 4, 2012; The Daily Nation, November 6, 2012).

The General Election of the year 2007 thus presented the Kalenjin political elite with an opportunity to get back to power. This was to be achieved through the political party known as the Orange Democratic Movement which was led by Raila Odinga. As one of the desirables in conflict theories, political power confers upon its wielders certain entitlements. Besides the appropriation of public resources for private use, holders of positions of authority such as cabinet ministers and members of parliament are entitled to housing, cars, furniture, domestic help, entertainment and travel allowances at the expense of public money. Such privileges have made the struggle for political power in every subspace within the Kenyan postcolony very intense. At the local level, ODM was popular among the Kalenjin because it promised
Ugatuzi (devolution of power and resources to the jimbos (regions) in case it won the Election. Essentially, the rise of ODM to power would reverse the political and economic domination of the Rift Valley by the settler communities, notably the Kikuyu and the Abagusii.

Political analysts of Kenya’s political processes have demonstrated that Kenya’s presidents, on ascending to power, purge senior civil servants of the previous regime and to a large extent, replace them with persons from their ethnic groups. This has led to a fierce struggle among ethnic groups for the control of the state. It is this ethnicization of the state that has led to the idea of “It is Our Turn to Eat” which was ably elaborated by Michera Wrong (2009). Simply put, “It is Our Turn to Eat” is a common political parlance used by Kenyan ethnic groups to mean that time has come for a member of their community to be president and therefore as expected, distribute national resources to their advantage. Cowen and Kanyinga (2002: 128-171), makes the same point in their analysis of the “Politics of Communality and Locality” in Kenya.

During elections in Kenya, it has been observed that underdevelopment within the ranks of ethnic groups is attributed to lack of access to political power. For instance, Elijah Mwangale, a former minister in KANU’s government is reported to have said that, “Kuvwami kimnyandu-leadership is wealth” (Musambayi Katumanga, in Maupeu, 2005: 197-277). With such an attitude towards political leadership, a General Election in Kenya provides an opportunity for enigmatic ethnic power struggles. A loss in the election implies that the entire ethnic group will be excluded from enjoying state largesse and patronage until a friendlier regime comes to power. Consequently, elections create anxiety not only for individual candidates but also for
their ethnic groups.

It is worth noting that the fear of political and economic marginalization resulting from election results is also common within the same ethnic group. For instance, after the 2002 Election, some politicians from Kiambu County (Central Province) beseeched the new president (Kibaki) not to neglect the County as it was misled into voting for Uhuru Kenyatta (KANU’s presidential candidate) and KANU parliamentary candidates. Both Uhuru and Mwai Kibaki are Kikuyu, although Kibaki comes from Nyeri County while Uhuru comes from Kiambu County in the same province. The experience of Kenya’s postcolonial administrations shows that regions that do not support the government of the day have always suffered a backlash when appointments are made in the civil service. Commenting specifically on the 2002 elections results, Joseph Kariuki noted that:

The outcome of the elections and the distribution of appointments by the president (Kibaki) alleviated exclusion fears. In a country where people had been socialized to believe that voting would be rewarded, the distribution of cabinet positions in the Central Province was seen as a reward for loyalty to Kibaki. Each of the counties that voted for Kibaki and NARC candidates got an appointment—Martha Karua, Kirinyaga; Chris Murungaru, Nyeri; John Michuki, Murang’a and Amos Kimunya, Nyandarua (Joseph Kariuki in Maupeu, 2005:124).

In Molo Division, as in other regions, supporters of both the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU) expected their presidential candidate to win (Wanyama, O.I, 2010) and therefore benefit from state resources and appointments. In such a situation, it was difficult for either side to contemplate a defeat. The outbreak of violence was not altogether surprising, in its analysis, the National Security and Intelligence Services (NSIS) had indicated that in case of a Kibaki (PNU candidate) win, there was likely to be spontaneous explosion of ethnic
clashes in hotspot areas (such as Molo) (CIPEV, 2008: 494).

In the Election, President Mwai Kibaki, the incumbent was declared the winner under
controversial circumstances. Raila Odinga, the opposition candidate had been leading
in the results until the last hours of vote tallying. The confusion that followed led to
the outbreak of the Post Election Violence (PEV) as the supporters of Raila Odinga
protested against the Election results. Violence rocked major towns in Kenya such as
Eldoret, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nairobi and Nakuru immediately President Mwai Kibaki
was sworn in.

Initially, the violence was directed against perceived supporters of Kibaki’s Party of
National Unity (PNU). There were perceptions that the Agikuyu and the Abagusii in
Molo Division had voted for PNU. Consequently, they were attacked by Kalenjin
warriors. The Agikuyu and the Abagusii formed militias to counter the Kalenjin
warriors (CIPEV, 2008: 89). What began as legitimate protest against Election
anomalies eventually took the dimension of an ethnic conflict. In Molo Division,
vioence erupted in Kapsita, Mukinyai, Turi, Molo and Elburgon Towns immediately
President Kibaki was sworn in on the evening of December 30 2007.

Respondents indicated that smoke and screams were all over as youths carried out
attacks and counter attacks burning houses, killed people and stole or maimed
livestock belonging to ‘enemy’ ethnic groups (Kapror, Sitakwa, Tabsabei, O.I, 2010).
The magnitude of the violence was greater in areas like Sagaitim, Saptet, Mukinyai
and Segut where the the Agikuyu and the Abagusii were immediate neighbors to the
Ogiek and the Kipsigis (Wanyama, O.I, 2010). The Agikuyu and the Abagusii were
perceived to have voted for President Mwai Kibaki while the Kipsigis and the Ogiek were assumed to have voted for the opposition candidate, Raila Odinga. The perceptions of immigrant communities voting in line with voters in their ancestral regions had caused considerable tensions in every Election since 1992 (CIPEV, 2008: 83). Their right to vote candidates of their choice was seen to undermine local Kalenjin interests, especially, the communal desire to access state resources through the presidency. As noted earlier, this is a desire inherent in Kenya’s ethnic groups. In democracies, an election legitimizes the exercise of power. In the study locale, the Abagusii and the Kikuyu are a majority and as such, their combined vote disadvantages the Kalenjin in the civic, parliamentary and presidential elections. As observed by Bartos (2002: 31) power inequality can lead to conflict because it implies domination. Being a “zero-sum” commodity, if one party gains it, the other must lose it. Thus when the less powerful party seeks to increase its power potential, the more powerful group will resist these efforts.

Besides politics, respondents across the ethnic divide pointed out that land is a contested issue in Molo division (Lamai, O.I, 2010). This view is in harmony with views expressed by other observers. Although many Kalenjins were unhappy with the election outcome, the presidential election outcome presented them with an opportunity to right some of the historical wrongs committed against them as a community. Indeed, some have argued that in the Rift Valley province, the 2007-08 violence had little or nothing to do with the disputed presidential election. This could be so because, unlike Nyanza and Central provinces, Rift Valley had no presidential candidate in the ethnic sense of the word (the main candidates were Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, Raila Odinga, a Luo and Kalonzo Musyoka, a Kamba).
According to Ng’ang’a, the province had a large swathe of its population strongly attached to a form of federalism. Since the 1990s, this section had been supporting calls for majimbo in the hope of altering land ownership patterns across ethnic lines, what sparked the violence in the cosmopolitan parts of the province was the land question, or what is referred to as a historical injustice with roots in colonialism (The Saturday Nation, February 9 2008:11). Kipchumba Some, a regular commentator with the Nation newspaper argues that the government’s land policies since independence were partly to blame for the 2007-08 violence. According to him, people from Central province (the Kikuyu) alongside the Kisii became new settlers in Uasin Gishu and other parts of the Rift Valley (The Saturday Nation, February 9 2008).

The Kenyatta presidency is perceived to have funded or abetted massive Kikuyu penetration of the Rift Valley. This has created resentment among the ethnic groups who consider themselves as indigenous in the province (Gecaga, 2007). Bearing in mind the rise in population in Molo, between 1969 and 2007, conflicts involving land were likely to occur. Increased population had put pressure on available land, forcing some of the indigenous people to seek ways of recovering land they claim was irregularly allocated to non–indigenous communities (The Saturday Nation, February 9 2008: 7).

Both the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin attach much importance to land. The father subdivides the land to his sons who in turn do the same to their boys when they come of age. Yet, land is static and therefore sooner or later, there comes the realization that some will have nothing to inherit. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence obtained evidence to the effect that on February 28, 2008, there was a
meeting in Kuresoi during which local Kalenjin leaders discussed how to purchase Kikuyu farms cheaply from the Kikuyu who had left (CIPEV, 2008: 90). Conflicts over land between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu in the area have a long history. For instance, the Annual Report for Nakuru District, 1961:4 had noted that:

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\text{Inter-tribal tensions increased markedly as the year wore on. The Kalenjin make no secret of the fact that they are stock piling native arms against the inevitable day, probably after independence, when they will have to fight the Kikuyu and perhaps the Luo for control of their own areas, including the upper and middle Rift Valley.}
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The campaigns leading to the 2007 General Election had prepared the ground for violence in the post election period. The \textit{Ugatuzi (federalism)} policy advocated by the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) had heightened the expectations of the Kalenjin that their land grievances would be addressed once the ODM won the election and formed the government. At the same time, an ODM regime would deter further encroachment on Kalenjin areas by foreigners, the \textit{madoadoa}. On the other hand, the agrarian Kikuyu and the Abagusii feared that an ODM win would result to forcible removal from their land in Molo (Kamoe’ng, O.I, 2010).

While \textit{ugatuzi} might have meant devolution of political and economic power to the regions, ordinary citizens in Molo Division interpreted in a manner that suggested ethnic federalism and expulsion of the perceived non indigenous Agikuyu and the Abagusii. This, compounded with the fact that many prominent Kalenjin politicians such as William Ruto and Henry Kosgey aggressively campaigned for the ODM, polarized the residents. The national leadership of the Orange Party did little effort to disabuse residents in the area of their notions of \textit{ugatuzi}.

These expectations and the fears, created an atmosphere of mistrust and deep inter-ethnic resentments as the election approached. Politicians running on the Party of
National Unity (PNU) at the civic and parliamentary level were supported by the Agikuyu and the Abagusii were seen as people who would protect the two ethnic groups while those running on an ODM ticket were seen as would be implementers of Ugatuzi after an ODM victory (Mokoro, O.I, 2010; Koech, O.I, 2010).

Land is both an economic and cultural asset. In many Kenyan communities, there is a strong emotional attachment to land. Kimaiyo, (2004: 17) expressed the unique position of land in the daily lives of many ethnic groups in the following terms:

.. .the relationship with land is not merely a question of possession and production but a material and spiritual element, which they should fully enjoy as well as means to preserve their cultural heritage and pass it on to future generations.

Some noted that the Kalenjin warriors who raided and fought other ethnic militias were actually driven by the single desire to get land. In the period 2005-2007, it was alleged that Kalenjin political elites had warned ‘their’ people that unless they were careful, they would become squatters in their own land. This was taken seriously, by a people who, historically, hate any form of servitude (Kosgei, O.I, 2010).

Ironically, this research did not find any evidence that those who engaged in the actual fighting actually got any parcel of land after the violence. Although some did indeed took possession of livestock and harvested the crops left behind by fleeing owners; this was not restricted to people from a different ethnic group alone; there were many cases where the displaced people had their property confiscated and crops harvested by persons from their ethnic groups. What is clearly evident is that territorial attachments and people’s willingness to fight for territory appear to have much less to do with the material value of land and much more to do with the
symbolic role it plays in constituting people’s identities and providing a sense of security and belonging. Walter, (2006: 294) correctly argues that:

Measuring the value of land strictly in terms of its tangible assets and making these assets the basis of a settlement is unlikely to bring long-term peace. To date, policy makers have tended to focus disproportionately on issues related to border lengths and placement, and the distribution of natural resources, rather than dealing with the deep psychological bonds that may exist among individuals at the local level. Such psychological bonds have huge impacts on nationalism and violence.

As a territory, the four major ethnic groups (the Abagusii, Agikuyu, Ogiek and the Kipsigis) consider Molo Division as their homeland. Goemans (2006:27) argues that a ‘homeland’ has to be commonly defended by those who share similar obligations for its protection because it defines ‘them.’ They sacrifice their blood for its defence and recovery because it clearly distinguishes ‘them’ from ‘others.’ Such deep commitment to land and territory were so strong during the Post Election Violence (2007-08) that in areas like Turi, Chandera and Njoro, after suffering heavy casualties in the hands of Kalenjin militias in the first few weeks of the violence, the Kikuyu organized counter attacks that appeared to not only stop further attacks but also led to the retreat of the militia. These counter attacks were based on an ideology that was coded ‘ruguru gutuura’, that is, we, the Kikuyu are in the Rift Valley to stay” (Ng’oi, O.I, 2010).

As much as land issues have been politicized, data collected strongly suggests that tensions over land had been simmering in the area since 1971, the period when many residents bought land, laying the foundation for ethnically mixed farms such as Sagaitim, Saptet and Sirikwa (also known as Nyakinyua). These conflicts were latent and in some cases, the ownership of such mixed farms was contested in court. A good example is that of Sagaitim Farm in Turi Location whose case in court delayed its
adjudication. Institutional failure to solve such cases has led to the use of violence by those who feel aggrieved and frustrated by court processes.

Besides politics and controversies on land, some respondents indicated that there were economic reasons behind the 2007-08 violence. Kimaru and Mokono, (O.I, 2010) talked of the many immigrants that traversed Molo Division and adjacent areas in search of jobs especially when the Teacher’s Service Commission (TSC) advertised vacancies to be filled by qualified but unemployed teachers. From 1998, the Kenyan government stopped employing teachers directly once they graduated from colleges and universities. However from 2002, the government began to replace those teachers who had either died or retired. On average, not more than 7,500 teachers were recruited each year in the period 2001-2008 (see for instance, Sunday Nation, July 15, 2007: 1). This made competition for the few vacancies available very stiff. Some of the unemployed youth, both educated and uneducated agreed to join militias and organized gangs (CIPEV, 2008: 25).

The TSC recruitment procedures required that those who graduated earlier be given the first priority. At the same time, the TSC code of regulations provided that a qualified teacher could be employed anywhere in the country. Many prospective teachers moved into the Rift Valley, from Kenya’s most populous provinces such as Central, Nyanza, Eastern and Western. This disadvantaged the local graduates from the area (Kosgei, Njora, O.I, 2010). The violence was therefore aimed at not only chasing away those who had been employed there but also to deter future migrations into the area by job seekers.
This view was corroborated by Maiyo, (O.I, 2010) a secondary school teacher who was recruited by the Teacher’s Service Commission (TSC) in July 2007 and subsequently posted to teach in Nandi Hills. She claimed that in the run-up to that year’s election, a teacher employed by the Board of Governors said that once the Orange Democratic Movement party took power in December, then all foreigners would leave the area and would be replaced by Kalenjin teachers. Such sentiments indicated the thinking within certain groups at the grassroots.

This could be so because after the Post-Election Violence of 2008, many non-Kalenjin teachers sought transfers from Molo Division on the basis of insecurity. What was unfolding in Molo was not an isolated case, even in other provinces, there was pressure for schools to recruit ‘a son or a daughter of the soil’, an euphemism that meant that graduates from other ethnic groups were not welcome to teach in schools dominated by other ethnic groups (Lanyasunya, O.I, 2010). It was therefore clear to the researcher that competition for scarce job opportunities in the Teacher’s Service Commission and the Public Service in general contributed to ethnic conflicts in 2007. The question of unemployment among many youths in the Division cannot be ignored.

Securing a job in the public service or the Teachers Service Commission guarantees an individual a regular salary. Within the postcolony, there exists a special relationship between the salary and the constitution of political subjects (Mbembe, 2001:45). The enjoyment of a salary goes beyond the individual who earns it, for it benefits many others in form of communal obligations. The salary is an essential cog in the dynamic of relations between state and society. It acts as a resource that the
state can use to buy obedience and gratitude and break the population to habits of discipline. It lies at the heart of a political exchange by which the state creates debts on society. This means that the salary can actually help the postcolonial state shape a particular system of submission and domination because any salaried worker is necessarily a dependant (ibid).

It is not a coincidence that the creation of job opportunities for the youth was one of the key recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV, 2008) and the Koffi Annan led committee that negotiated the political settlement of the crisis that followed the 2007 disputed presidential elections.

Negative ethnicity was also cited as having contributed to ethnic violence. Olengoywo (O.I, 2010), argued that though a Maasai, he had been displaced on several occasions because he is married to Agnes Njeri, a Kikuyu. He recalled that months before the 2007 violence, he was approached by some ‘elders’, who advised him to send away his Kikuyu wife, in return, they would give him another, a Kipsigis. He told them that marrying a Kipsigis would not help; because being a Maasai, he would still have married outside his ethnic group. On rejecting the offer, he was told to brace for the consequences. Ng’ang’a, (O.I, 2010), a KANU activist also wondered how he became a victim of ethnic violence if the issue was about politics: he was, and still is, a committed KANU member. To such respondents, politics was merely an excuse, not a cause of the violence. Politicians, in their effort to win votes waged a propaganda war that demonized other ethnic groups.
Some members of the Agikuyu used the terms *Nyamu cia Ruguru* (animals from the West, Rift Valley) and *Nduriri* (heathen, backward) to refer to the Kalenjin, Luo and the Luhya. The Kalenjin used the terms *Sangara* (wild weed) and *Bunyot* (enemy) to refer to the Agikuyu and the Abagusii in the Rift Valley. While some of these terms are used in ordinary discourse, they become dangerous when they are used in specific historical contexts, especially during elections.

Scholars who have researched on ethnic wars and genocide in other parts of the world have shown that such labels are aimed at dehumanizing the other group and therefore justifying their cruel treatment, displacement and annihilation. In the Rwandese genocide in 1994, members of the minority ethnic group, the Tutsi were labeled *Inyenze* (cockroach) by Hutu extremists (Mamdani, 1996; 2010). This implied that just like the cockroach, they were a nuisance that had to be eliminated.

Vernacular radio stations such as Kameme, Inooro and Bahasha FM (that broadcasts in Gikuyu language), KASS FM (that broadcasts in Kalenjin) and their call- in breakfast shows became avenues for negative ethnicity. The breakfast shows were programmes that discussed political issues every morning during the campaign period. The public was invited to participate by making calls to the studio. No editing was done to the content before it was aired live to other listeners, no matter how offensive the language of the caller might have been.

Bearing in mind that these were basically radio stations with an audience of specific ethnic groups, there was no limit to which the callers could not go in incitement against imagined ethnic enemies. It is not coincidental that in its findings, the
Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence pointed out that:

Many (witnesses) recalled with horror, fear and disgust the negative and inflammatory role of vernacular radio stations . . . they singled out Kass FM (broadcasts in Kalenjin) as having contributed to a climate of hate, negative ethnicity, and having incited violence in the Rift Valley . . . the vernacular music and negative ethnicity also came from Kikuyu FM stations including Kameme, Inooro (and) Coro (CIPEV, 2008: 297).

The rapid depletion of forests in Molo Division in the 1990s was also pointed out as a cause of ethnic conflict in the area. The Ogieks, a community that has held on to traditional methods of survival such as hunting, gathering and bee keeping resented the way the agricultural activities of the Agikuyu and the Abagusii destroyed forests within Molo. The Ogieks day to day life was affected in a fundamental way. The natural ecosystem from which the Ogiek obtained their food came under threat. With the depletion of sources of food, the Ogiek began to steal cattle from their neighbors, which fanned ethnic hostilities (Kimaru, Lamai, O.I, 2010). Kimaiyo Arap Towett, a long time crusader for the rights of the Ogieks wrote that:

The very existence of the Ogiek as a distinct people has come under concerted threat due to excision of large chunks of land from their forest homes and settlement by purported squatters . . . in total disregard of Ogiek identity, culture and way of life (Kimaiyo, 2004: 4).

It can therefore be intimated that underneath the political and economic causes of the conflict in Molo, there has always been a hidden cultural side to the conflict. The Acholi of Uganda have faced a similar predicament. It is in the light of such threats to minority groups that the making of guerilla movements like the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda ought to be understood. Mamdani (2010: 332) aptly captures the predicament of such groups:

Everything Acholi is dying . . . an entire society is being systematically destroyed – physically, culturally, socially and economically – in full view of the international community.
An analysis of this argument would be in order. Many non-Ogiek recalled that prior
to the forest evictions of 1988, the government was very committed in conservation
of forests in Molo. Women remembered with nostalgia days when they used to pay
five shillings for them to be allowed by forest department at Elburgon to fetch
firewood from the forests. They were not allowed to enter the forests with anything
like a panga (machette) or an axe, lest they cut any standing tree. Any one caught
with a panga had her ticket withdrawn and the machete confiscated by the forest
guards (Mbuka, Muraguri, O.I, 2010). There were watchtowers at various places in the
forests which were used by guards to report any outbreak of fire in the forests.

However, from 1990, the department of forestry in the area ceased to exercise due
care in the protection of forests. Loggers in the timber industry at Elburgon, Turi and
Molo now had an unrestricted access to the forests setting in motion an
unprecedented destruction of these forests (Kimaiyo, 2004: 97; Tesot, O.I, 2010). We
were able to confirm the presence of watchtowers in the course of our field work,
there is a place the Kikuyu call gathuguu, a Kikuyu corruption of the Kiswahili word
Kisuguu. This means a highpoint or watch tower. We were also able to trace two
retired forest guards, one nicknamed mwananchi (his real name is Muraguri
Mwangi), and another man identified as Johana Mbuka who corroborated this
evidence.

The situation was made worse by the ethnic violence of 1992. The displacement of
Kikuyus from Chepakundi in Olenguruone made them landless and homeless. In
1997-8, President Moi directed the hiving off of Mariashoni forest on the outskirts of
Elburgon town so that about 5000 families from Chepakundi could be resettled
(Murang’ai, Ng’oi, Kositany, O.I, 2010). Each family was given five acres; this
settlement was given the name Kapsita A. Similarly, another group was resettled at Kapsita B, on the outskirts of Molo town, which was initially part of Molo forest. To compound matters, the 1997 violence at Mauche in Njoro had displaced about 200 Ogiek families. This group was also resettled at Kapsita A. The Ogiek from Njoro joined their kinsmen who had lived in this area for close to three decades (Akiwumi, 1999: 147).

The depletion of forests fundamentally altered the livelihood of the Ogiek. As game meat and honey became scarce they were exposed to hunger. They adopted several strategies, one of which was cattle raiding at night (Sawe, Kinyanjui, O.I, 2010). Most of them also attempted, without much success, to take up farming of maize and potatoes. In the course of the field work, at a place known as Saptet and Tinga juu, we came across some small plots of land with wilted maize stalks. A casual observation revealed that the Ogiek were really struggling to take up farming.

Some Ogiek women began to engage in commercial sex as a means of survival (Kimaiyo 2004: 97). The poor Ogiek men who had nothing to offer their spouses were abandoned as those Agikuyu, Abagusii and Kipsigis men with money took their wives (Tiony O.I, 2010). It is important to note that besides engaging in farming, logging and charcoal burning were very common in the period under study. Loggers used power saws to split wood for sale. In the process, some made much money. Kinyanjui (O.I, 2010), a former councilor revealed that he had bought two power saws for his sons to engage in the business. Deep in the forests, with the allurement of money, it was not difficult to concur with the idea that cases of illicit sex between the loggers and Ogiek women might have been common. To hit back, the Ogiek would
sometimes attack the loggers and take away the power saws (Kinyanjui O.I, 2010). Tiony, (O.I, 2010) argued that such cases of infidelity embittered Ogiek men.

Young Ogiek men were also engaged in selling timber off-cuts and building materials to their Bantu neighbors. Women engaged in gathering wild fruits and trading them in return for maize flour from their neighbors. During dry spells, they begged for food items especially in Sagaitim village where the Ogiek interact freely with the Agikuyu and the Abagusii (Letio, O.I, 2010).

2.6 Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter has analyzed the causes of ethnic violence in Molo Division. It has been argued that in the period 1992-2007, politics played a central role in the conflict. The majimbo debate, which was meant to counter the calls for multipartyism, led to violence and forced expulsion of perceived opposition supporters from the area. This was especially so in 1992. The low level violence experienced in 1997-98 was, just like the 1992-93 one, aimed at disenfranchising opposition supporters. It was also caused by the depletion of forests which further endangered the survival of the forest dwelling Ogiek. A combination of factors was responsible for the 2007-08 violence. They included, negative ethnicity, as disseminated through the media and the use of derogatory names and competition for scarce job opportunities in the Teachers Service Commission and the public service. Moreover, misconceptions about the Ugatuzi campaign created fear, uncertainty and doubt among the residents that eventually gave in to ethnic violence when the disputed presidential results were announced on December 30 2007.
From this discussion, it is evident that the political organization of space has a profound impact at the local and micro levels of daily behavior and practices. Land constitutes an important component of our understanding of our individual, group, and national identities because it has a symbolic dimension which determines attachment to particular places, attachments which are thought consciously-through political and territorial socialization. Treating Molo as a postcolonial space, the concepts of the indigene – settler and the two types of state allocations, that is, transfers and salary as explained by Achille Mbembe (2001) have been used as theoretical tools to interrogate the causes of violence in the area of study. The power tradition, derived from conflict theories have been used to demonstrate how the struggle for power within Molo Division led to the development of a conflict ideology and conflict solidarity that preceded the outbreak of actual violence in the 1992 – 2008 period. In this regard, the qualities that make power desirable, for instance, the enjoyment of various privileges and immunities have been highlighted. The next chapter explores the social consequences of violence in the area of study.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN MOLO DIVISION

3.1 Introduction.

This chapter analyzes the social impact of ethnic violence in Molo. Whenever violent conflicts occur, groups, communities and individuals are affected in various ways. As noted by Barasa (1992), the social consequences of the violence cannot be quantified (Barasa, 1992). Research findings revealed that in many cases, affected populations devised survival strategies to cope with conflict situations. Two propositions derived from conflict theories will be used to explain the social consequences of violence. One, that conflict and change are inherent in the social world as order and permanence. Two, every individual, group, organization, or other unit in society represents a force whose action stimulates many counterforces. When force meets counterforce, a new product or relationship emerges from the interaction (Bartos, 2002).

3.2 Social Consequences of Ethnic Violence.

3.2.1 Deaths

The most obvious outcome of ethnic conflicts in this area has been deaths directly resulting from injuries sustained during attacks. In the four locations where the research was done, 24 out of the 120 respondents had lost a nuclear family member in the conflict, especially in 1992 and 2008. 100% of the respondents had witnessed the killing of people they knew; close relatives, neighbors and friends. Many recounted the scenes very vividly. The impact of such experiences was evident in the tone of their voice; some of them broke down in tears as they relived the scenes of the.
murder. An example is Muthoni, (O.I, 2010) whose blind husband was hacked to death by the attackers. She narrated that:

When we heard screams and saw houses on fire, we knew that violence had begun. My home was near Segemia where the violence began. I told my children to run towards the shopping centre as I struggled to run behind them with my blind husband. By then, many people were overtaking us . . . the attackers were pursuing us, eventually, my husband advised me to leave him lest both of us be killed . . . he told me to take care of the children in case he doesn’t make it. After a few minutes I heard him scream and beg for mercy . . . On arrival at the shopping centre, I heard that he had been killed.

In another incident, a Kalenjin man was forcibly taken out of his car as he took his daughter to St. Mary Mount Secondary School in late January 2008. He was killed by a mob of Kikuyu militia as his daughter watched and begged for mercy. The incident occurred next to the Molo Post Office (Borok, Mwangi O.I, 2010). It does appear that during the conflict, the Kalenjin who ventured to go to towns dominated by the Kikuyu did so at a great personal risk to their lives (CIPEV, 2008: 103). It was not within the scope of this study to interrogate the emotional impact of such cruel incidents on the surviving family members. However, the impact cannot be underestimated.

Most of the deaths were as a result of ordinary citizens attacking others on the basis of their ethnic background. Other deaths were caused by security forces (Borok, O.I, 2010; CIPEV, 2008: 90). In Molo District Hospital, the district public health officer, Njoroge (O.I, 2010) confirmed that on average, the hospital mortuary received 15 corpses on a daily basis in January 2008. The hospital also received about 30 injured patients daily in January 2008. Most of the injured had barbed arrow heads stuck in their bodies.
Besides deaths directly resulting from the violence, some elderly people were said to have succumbed to ‘early’ deaths in circumstances that related to the violence. There were specific examples of such deaths as some of the deceased were parents or close relatives of the respondents.

The experience of violence, that demands rapid and unexpected movements, sometimes even at night must have impacted heavily on the elderly. Many of them could not comprehend what was happening. For example, Thuo (O.I, 2010) gave an example of his deceased father (he died on October 20 1992), Jeremiah Mungai, who kept on asking him “which Mau Mau is this that is fighting people?” By then, they were living in Sagaitim village, Turi Location. The old man could not comprehend what was happening. He could only link the violence with the Mau Mau rebellion which had occurred in the period 1952 – 1956. Coincidentally, his wife, Esther Wangu died on February 14 1998, during the Second wave of the violence in the area. The graves of the two are still visible and lie side by side.

The burning of houses, including those of the aged during the violence must have created a very disturbing sense of wretchedness among them, having to witness all the labors of their lives come to ruin. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence noted that ‘violent and sudden displacement from a place one considers their home is often the worst form of loss entailing, as it does, a sense of loss of self” (CIPEV, 2008: 275). It is therefore not difficult to appreciate the theory that some elderly victims of the violence succumbed to early death. Feltham, (2003) noted that people who lose property during conflicts become traumatized because of grief and
shock. This can lead to organ shutdown which if not corrected can have serious health consequences and ultimately, death.

Young people have not escaped the despair resulting from the violence. During data collection, we noted that in some homesteads, there were recently filled graves. Upon enquiry, we were told of incidents where persons aged between 20-40 years had committed suicide. One of the deceased, Joseph Ndicho had been left by his mother to look after their farm. The mother had relocated to Kiambu County in Central Province, the province considered to be the ancestral home of the Agikuyu.

Neighbors said that they were shocked by his death, though he had seemed withdrawn weeks prior to his death. It was not until he ended his own life by taking Ridomil, a pesticide used in the control of potato blight that people realized he had been having problems with his wife of four years. His mother, whom we interviewed, regretted that had she been in Molo, her son would not have taken his life. The point here is that due to the violence, young people have been left on their own, without moral support in times of marital and other problems. Having been displaced severally and their property looted or destroyed, many young men feel that they have nothing to be proud of as “men”. This has made them feel humiliated. Some actually thought that their spouses undermined them because of their poverty (Mwaura, O.I, 2010).

Another young man, a Kikuyu married to a Kalenjin lady, Irene (we were unable to establish her surname, even after prodding her mother in-law, who related to us this information), just before the 2008 violence burnt his own house after the wife deserted him. He temporarily went mad and even threatened to kill his parents. He
was arrested and incarcerated for six months (Nduta, O.I, 2010). Upon his release, the parents took him to his brother’s home at Oloitoktok as a way of rehabilitating him.

Having witnessed violence, research findings indicated that some of the victims have become violent. This was not a unique phenomenon, during the Algerian war of independenc, Frantz Fannon (1965) had observed that after prolonged conflicts, some perpetrators and victims of violence are likely to suffer from psychosomatic disorders. In his own words: “We know very well that it is not necessary to be wounded by a bullet in order to suffer from the fact of war in body as well as in mind” (Fannon, 1965: 235). A critical analysis of ethnic conflict reveals that the inter-ethnic feuds opened up a myriad of other conflicts at individual and family levels, the cumulative effects of years of conflict seems to have affected the mental well being of a number of victims. The emotional disorders spilled over to the family level. In his analysis of social conflict, Lewis Coser observed that conflicts that involve groups that are very close tend to destroy the very fabric of the relationship (Coser, 1956). Many respondents could easily connect their social problems to inter-ethnic violence.

3.2.2 The Establishment of Two Homes

The establishment of ‘two homes’ among many victims has been another consequence of ethnic violence in Molo Division. This has been one of the survival strategies employed by many families so as to handle conflict moments. 125 (85%) of respondents revealed that they ‘now’ own two homes. The ‘now’ is contrasted with the period before the First Wave of ethnic violence (1992). One home is at Molo and the other is at Nyandarua, Keringet, and Kisii depending on the ethnicity of respondents. The latter home is considered safer, the family seeks refuge here when
they anticipate outbreak of violence especially just before elections. It is where one of the spouses and some children live. The latter home depends on the former one for food. On a monthly or quarterly basis, the head of the household ferries potatoes, maize and charcoal from Molo to this second home (Mokono, Wahira, Chebet, O.I, 2010).

Many families also rented houses in urban centres within the Division. Such houses were operated as second homes especially in conflictual moments. Eventually, the rural home came to assume a lesser role even in times of peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence (Kinyanjui, Koech, O.I, 2010). This, among other factors, might have led to an increase in the population of several urban centres within the Division. For instance, the Nakuru District Statistics Office, 2001 indicated that Molo Town Council recorded a population growth rate of 21.5% between 1989 and 1999 while Naivasha and Nakuru municipality within the same County recorded growth rates of 15.3% and 3.5% respectively. The establishment of two homes attests to the innovation and creativity that can be brought about by conflicts. According to conflict functionalists, such ingenuity is good for the society because it prevents the ossification of the social system (Abraham, 1981: 135). As a counterforce, the establishment of two homes reflected a conscious effort to avoid armed confrontation in conflictual moments which is a way of deescalating conflicts.

3.2.3 Impact on Education

The dropping out of school among many children has been another consequence of ethnic violence. In every home we visited, there was a case of one or more children who stopped schooling due to the violence. From 1992, many families were evicted
from their homes and consequently, many pupils could no longer access their schools. They sought refuge at Elburgon and Molo towns as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In such circumstances, and at a time when Free Primary Education (FPE) had not been introduced by the government, it was hard for pupils to transfer to new schools (Kibunei, Timaiyu, O.I, 2010).

Many school going children also dropped from school because some schools such as Mutate at Kapsita, Jogoo and Mau Summit near Molo town were burned or looted in the course of the violence. Others such as Sagaitim, Chandera primary and secondary schools were converted into refugee camps during the Post-Election Violence in 2008. Under such conditions, many schools in the area did not re-open for the first term (Mokoro, Mesgen, O.I, 2010).

This was not a new development. The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) noted that as a result of the clashes in Molo, over 55 primary schools with a population of about 16500 pupils had not re-opened for second term in 1992 due to insecurity (NCCK: 1993). The Report further noted that the Standard Eight pupils who were due to sit for their Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) fled their homes in 1993 because of insecurity caused by the violence. This had become a common trend in the subsequent conflicts of 1997 and 2008. This affected the transition of students from the primary to the secondary level. Moreover, some students had their academic certificates lost or burnt during the conflict, thus making it hard for them to pursue higher education (Thuo, O.I, 2010).
As noted by Barasa (1992), the clashes have also prevented many primary and high school graduates from pursuing higher education because of financial constraints. Moreover, many non Kalenjin teachers were forced to transfer to other schools in safer areas such as Naivasha and Nakuru while Kalenjin teachers transferred from Molo, Elburgon and Njoro areas to Bomet, Nandi, Kericho and Uasin Gishu Counties. This undoubtedly compromised the quality of education in the area (Mokono, O.I, 2010).

Children dropped out of school because it became difficult for the parents to discipline their children, for that is best done in the privacy of the home. The violence had destroyed such privacy. Consequently, parents lost hold of their children and most of them became truants. This was especially common in situations where families sought refuge in Molo and Elburgon towns (Njuguna, O.I, 2010). Alternatively, it has been noted by studies done elsewhere that among spontaneously settled refugees in urban areas, the sheer necessity and desperation to survive may radically modify parental attitudes to children; petty theft by kids becomes a means of augmenting family resources and is, therefore, rewarded rather than admonished (Allen, T and Mursink, H. 1994: 43). The rapid increase in the number of street children in Molo, Elburgon and Njoro towns was pointed out as an indicator of increased incidents of truancy in the period 1992-2008.

Even for those children who were able to continue with their education, their performance was greatly compromised (The *Daily Nation*, December 28 2011: 3). This was due to several factors. Respondents argued that forced transfer of schools, sometimes in the middle of the year, change of teachers, and lack of a place to call
home, lack of school uniforms, shoes and trauma as a result of violence were some of the challenges that demotivated such pupils. Besides losing their text and exercise books, displaced students often went hungry and fell sick because of food insecurity and poor living conditions in the makeshift camps and schools (Barasa 1992).

In many areas where they sought refuge, some of these children were ostracized by fellow pupils and teachers. In schools where they got temporary admissions, they were seen as an informal school within the formal one (Ayuka, O.I, 2010). They were collectively referred to as ‘the IDP students’ thus denying them the individual attention every pupil is entitled to. This compromised their academic progress (Lanyasunya, O.I, 2010). Other researches on the impact of violence on children’s education confirm that pupils exposed to traumatic events suffer from academic struggles and adjustment. A study done by Nasongo and Muola on the impact of Post Election Violence on the academic performance in selected schools within Mt. Elgon District, Kenya, found out that five out of the six sampled schools registered a negative performance index in the Form Four Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (K.C.S.E) of the year 2008.

### 3.2.4 Early and Late Marriages

Closely linked to dropping out of school is the challenge of early and late marriages. Girls who dropped out of school ended up marrying off early. There were several reasons advanced by respondents as to why girls married early. Violence scattered family members, some stayed for months before reunion. In instances where parents were momentarily separated from their children, their daughters became exposed to sex and adult lifestyles quite early. Secondly, life in the refugee camps made it
practically impossible for parents to share the same tent with their daughters, many of whom were adolescents. The exposure and the lure of a better life by men in urban areas where most of the refugee camps were located, ensnared many girls to early marriages (Nyagitheri, O.I, 2010).

This contrasted with the predicament of boys who dropped out of school: they married late. Sitakwa, Njoroge (O.I, 2010) argued that having gone through multiple displacements, it was not easy to find the necessary social and financial stability needed for one to settle down. A substantial number of such young people have had their houses burnt severally between 1992 and 2008. In some situations, many houses, especially at Sagaitim and Kapsita locations, had their iron sheets stolen by the attackers and criminals who took advantage of the volatile situation. This frustrated many young men who put up poor houses using bamboos, tree barks and tents given to them by the Red Cross for roofing.

Culturally, a young man, after initiation, is given a piece of land by the father to put up his house and then prepare for marriage responsibilities. It therefore follows that the burning of such a house has far reaching consequences on a young man’s plans for marriage because owning a house is a sign that one is ready for marriage (Kabiru, O.I, 2010). Affected by the three Waves of violence since 1992, Otoigo, Kabui, O.I, 2010) married ‘late’, at age 40 and 43 respectively. Evidently, young people adjusted to the new circumstances by making decisions that radically transformed their youthhood, in most cases, for the worse.
3.2.5 Increase in Social Distance

Conflicts have the potential to increase the social distance between contending groups (Abraham, 1981: 136) Social distance is used here to refer to the willingness of members from different ethnic groups to live together as neighbors, to work in the same offices as colleagues and generally to be concerned about the welfare of an individual who is from a different ethnic group. In this study, parameters used to determine social distance included; persistence of inter-ethnic marriages, homogeneity or heterogeneity of ethnic groups in churches, schools, shopping centers and patterns of settlement in residential areas (both rural and urban).

A study done by Rutten (2001: 545) found out that in Njoro and the surrounding area, there was so much tension in the months of January and February 1998, to the extent that people mistrusted and feared members of other ethnicity. During this period, Kalenjin and Kikuyu travelling along the Njoro – Mau Narok road had to use separate matatus (public transport vehicles). The violence followed the General Election done a few weeks earlier.

As noted earlier, ethnic conflicts greatly strained mixed marriages. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that in some isolated cases, some spouses in such unions were killed. Also, in some circumstances, in-laws pressurized spouses to withdraw from such marriages. In some incidents, children from mixed marriages were also attacked, further increasing social distance. Chelang’a, (O.I, 2010) formerly of Mukinyai Location in Molo but who has now moved to Magumu in Nyandarua County, Central Province, aptly captured this scenario:
I am married to a Kikuyu; we came from Sachang’wan, during the 2008 violence my father was cut with a machete several times as he tried to plead with the attackers not to burn his daughter’s (my) house.

Another indicator of the widened social distance between ethnic groups in Molo Division was the experience at Sachang’wan in 2008. We were informed that for the better part of 2008, there were ‘two Sachang’wans’: Sachang’wan Central (for the Kikuyu and the Abagusii), and Sachang’wan Rift Valley (for the Kalenjin). Knowing the difference was a matter of life and death (Wakaba, O.I, 2010). Sachang’wan Central was within Sachang’wan police station. The informant cited above recalled an incident where he was forced to call his aunt, moments after alighting at the ‘wrong Sachang’wan, when he realized that young men were pursuing him with the intention to attack (The aunt is married to a Kalenjin). The aunt arrived with two police officers and reprimanded him for ‘being reckless.’

Similarly, members of the Kalenjin ethnic group were lynched and killed by Kikuyu mobs in Molo and Elburgon towns. Mwangi, (O.I, 2010) recalled an incident in April 1992 when an elderly Kalenjin man was killed in a telephone booth as he tried to call the police to come and rescue him from a Kikuyu mob that was fast closing on him. During conflictual moments, Molo and Elburgon towns became no-go zones for the Kalenjins (Wainaina, Koech, O.I, 2010).

Most of the respondents interviewed (80 out of 148) expressed reservations on the possibility of inter-ethnic marriages involving their children. Some showed great displeasure when we hypothesized on such a possibility. This displeasure was mostly among elderly respondents while those between 30-40 years appeared to be more accommodating. We also discerned that most respondents with strong religious
attachment (the born again), showed less objection to such unions. It was quite telling to realize that potential Kikuyu- Kalenjin marriages were opposed the most. This is not surprising bearing in mind that these two ethnic groups have had a relatively longer history of conflict.

However, there were several paradoxes in the debate on social distance (especially on intermarriage) between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin; respondents from both groups had no problem if their son married from the other group, however, they were uncomfortable ‘to give their daughter’ to the other side. Another notable paradox was that though greatly opposed, a Kalenjin- Kikuyu wedding, done openly in church or traditionally (Koito, among the Nandi), is received with considerable excitement (Mungai, Wanjiru, O.I, 2010). Due to the perceptions of animosity between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, such unions are considered peculiar.

It was discernable that even for those who vehemently opposed inter-ethnic marriages, they finally shrugged their shoulders and ended with the cliché, ‘love is strong; I cannot swear that my children cannot marry a Kikuyu’ (or a Kalenjin as the case may be). To illustrate that inter-ethnic marriages have persisted in spite of two decades of intermittent ethnic violence in Molo Division, Mungai Thuo of Mutonyora village, Nyandarua South District revealed that though he had always cautioned his sons against inter-ethnic unions “to my surprise, I now have athoni (in-laws) among the Kisii and the Nandi”.
During field research, we came across 12 inter-ethnic couples, while some of our respondents easily recalled others. The following table shows the ethnic identity of seven couples interviewed during the fieldwork.

**Table 3.1 Ethnic identities of some couples in inter-ethnic marriages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Husband</th>
<th>Ethnic Identity</th>
<th>Name of Wife</th>
<th>Ethnic Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kabui</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>Maureen Jelagat</td>
<td>Tugen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulumbi Kioko</td>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>Ruth Songok</td>
<td>Nandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musamali Wanjala</td>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td>Hellen Chepkirui</td>
<td>Kipsigis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rufai Abengi</td>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td>Ann Chebet</td>
<td>Nandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Mokono</td>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>Pauline Chebet</td>
<td>Nandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Mwangi</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>Dinah Jerop</td>
<td>Nandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Kung’u</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>Damaris Mwale</td>
<td>Kisii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NB: The Tugen, Nandi, Kipsigis are sub-ethnic groups of the larger Kalenjin.**

Oral interviews and marriage certificates showed that the first four marriages mentioned above were formalized in the period 2006-2009 while the last three in the list were formalized in the period 1993-2000. There were other inter-ethnic marriages involving the Kikuyu and the Kisii, especially at Sagaitim Location (2). However, we established that the number of Kikuyu – Kalenjin unions was higher (7). This can be attributed to the longer period of interaction the two ethnic groups have had in the area of study. Oral sources indicated that most of the multi-ethnic farms in the area were first inhabited by the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin in the period 1971-1975. The Abagusii came to the area in the late 1980’s (Mokoro, Mender, O.I, 2010).
As an indicator of widened social distance between ethnic groups, although separated by a seasonal stream, there appeared to be a big psychological barrier between the residents of Kapsita and Segut. The latter is actually a combination of several villages within Kapsita, exclusively dominated by the Ogiek. To an outsider, there is only one Kapsita but on careful observation, the other Kapsita (Segut), comes out very distinctly. A Kapsita inhabited by the Ogiek where not many non-Ogiek venture into, although those who drink Maiyek, a traditional Ogiek brew feel at ease in the place. To avoid contact that would be necessitated by fetching water from the common stream, residents who live on either side of the stream dug boreholes in their homesteads.

Tabutany, Mbuita, (O.I, 2010) indicated that they were not concerned at all what happens on the ‘other side’, the area where members of other ethnic groups live. The intense conflicts in the area, (Kapsita and Molo in general) have threatened the very roots of their relationship and greatly impeded avenues for inter-ethnic cooperation.

A pattern of ethnic homogeneity in many schools and churches seem to be emerging in Molo Division. Otoigo, (O.I, 2010) a Seventh Day Adventist church elder at Sagaitim village, Elburgon Location, confided that sometime in 2010, an Ogiek elder challenged him:

If you people really believe in God, why do you fear coming to Tinga Juu (where the Ogiek live) and preach to us? Don’t we need salvation? Are our souls not worth saving?

Koech, (O.I, 2010) explained that ethnic militias made surprise attacks on Sundays when people were in churches. The confusion that ensued, bearing in mind the ethnically mixed nature of churches created mistrust among worshippers. It was hard
for many victims to believe that fellow believers from other ethnic groups were totally oblivious of such imminent attacks.

Letio (O.I, 2010) cited an incident in 1992 where a Kipsigis was killed at Managu Farm, near Sagaitim while begging for mercy in the very presence of his church pastor. Mokono, (O.I, 2010) recalled a time in the 2008 Violence that a church elder told a member of an ‘enemy’ ethnic group, “hakuna undugu wakati wa vita” (there is no brotherhood in war). In the light of such sentiments, the place of foreign religions such as Christianity and Islam in replacing traditional loyalties based on ethnicity should be interrogated.

However, there were incidents where members from warring ethnic groups warned their neighbors from other groups of attacks. In most cases, they used coded language. In Mukinyai, Kapsita and Kuresoi, calls were made with the message “Shetani amesimama tena” (the Devil has begun his work). Recipients of such calls understood that they had to seek refuge as fast as possible (Nyawira, Njora, Kosgei O.I, 2010). Kamoeng (O.I, 2010) a church elder at Lelechuet, Elburgon, was of the view that the burning of churches, some of which hosted refugees running away from the violence appeared to have impacted negatively on churches with mixed ethnic groups.

Similarly, few Kalenjin parents took their children to public day secondary schools in Molo and Elburgon towns, even after they had been offered admission. They preferred schools in Kalenjin dominated zones such as Olenguruone and Keringet. However, they were more comfortable taking them to well established boarding schools such as Molo Academy, Mary Mount Secondary (both in Molo town) and
Michinda Secondary in Elburgon (Ngugi, Tiony, O.I, 2010). Parents and guardians in other parts of the country also avoided sending their children to schools in areas affected by the Post Election Violence. The following two quotations, illustrate the reluctance with which parents received the admission of their children to areas considered violent prone:

My boy has secured a place in Form One at Kagumo High School (in Nyeri County, exclusively inhabited by the Agikuyu ethnic group) but…I would rather look for another school in Kericho" , a County dominated by the Kalenjin (The Daily Nation January 17, 2012: 17).

Another parent refused whose son had been admitted to Litein High School (in Kericho County) declined to take up the offer arguing that:

“My child cannot go to school within the area because what I witnessed during the violence is still fresh in my mind” ibid.

The situation is similar in rural Kapsita where at the time of data collection, the Ogiek were already requesting that they be built a school for their children, so that they avoid having to go to Mutate primary school, a school that had been burnt during the 2008 violence (Nyolei, O.I, 2010). The school has since been reconstructed through the Post Election Violence emergency fund kitty, a fund specifically allocated by the Ministry of Finance to schools affected by the Post Election Violence. However, it is important to note that what was responsible for this state of affairs was fear rather than actual violence.

It was surprising to the researcher when his guide showed much reluctance to take him to some areas due to fear and suspicion. Much of the mistrust emanates from the fact that most of the victims of the violence could at times pinpoint who looted their property or torched their houses. In some cases, they could even see their looted iron
sheets used to roof their ‘enemies’ houses. Stolen household items such as Television sets, sofa sets as well as utensils could also be found in the homes of the neighbors (Wakaba O.I, 2010). Such incidents contributed to an increase in social distance between ethnic groups.

The government’s efforts to assist the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) inadvertently widened the rift between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin. The latter perceived these efforts as benefiting the Kikuyu only, while they too were affected by the violence. These perceptions were not groundless, for the media (both print and electronic) largely covered Kikuyu victims of the violence to the extent that the term ‘IDP has come to be synonymous with the Kikuyu’ (Tegelei, O.I, 2010).

During data collection for this research, the theme of victimization and neglect within the Kalenjin community was evident. Paradoxically, the Agikuyu also felt betrayed by ‘their’ government (President Mwai Kibaki is a Kikuyu) (Mungai, O.I, 2010).

Besides increasing the social distance between ethnic groups, violence in the area also increased the social distance among members of the same ethnic groups. Many of the victims who moved to other areas like Rongai, Kamara (near Mau Summit, Kuresoi) and Mutonyora (in Central Province) had not been able to integrate with the local population (Koech, Letio, Ndung’u, O.I, 2010).

At Mutonyora, victims were marooned on every side by wealthy large land owners most of them absentee landlords who were given the land by Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first President (Thige, O.I, 2010). At Kamara, homes of Kalenjins evicted from parts of Molo especially after the 2007 Post Election Violence have fewer or no cows at all
while their houses are roofed with burnt iron sheets they salvaged from their former homes (Kosgei, O.I, 2010). The failure of the Internally Displaced Persons to integrate with host communities has been noted by other researchers. Thus,

New ethnically homogenous and unsustainable settlements can increase the potential for violent conflicts between the displaced and host communities, even if the two groups share cultural identities, as the newcomer’s needs for water, firewood, and other resources create environmental and social damages that spill over to the host community (USIP, Special Report No.251, 2009:3).

Indeed, Waruiru and Mokono, (O.I, 2010) confirmed that when they were first resettled at Kapsita, they were not received well by residents of the surrounding villages such as Sagaitim and Mukorombosi, yet they are of the same ethnic group.

3.2.6 Marital Infidelity

In some cases, wives abandoned their husbands when they were unable to meet their financial and family obligations. Ndung’u (O.I, 2010) revealed that his wife, a former Kenya Assemblies of God women’s leader, left him for another man when they took refuge in Elburgon town in 1992. He married a second wife in 2006. This was corroborated by the researcher’s guide who happened to have known the couple for several years. Unfortunately for him, the second wife, having been brought up in Elburgon town, refused to come and settle in rural Kapsita. Instances of marital infidelity and the break down of families also affected the Ogiek (Chumo, Tiony O.I, 2010). Kimaiyo (2004: 97) had noted that:

There was booming of business (due to logging) and for the first time in the Ogiek history, commercial sex was witnessed. Sexually Transmitted Diseases flourished and divorce and broken marriages become (sic) the norm. It is a new culture indeed, a cultural matrix transformation in the Ogiek history. The poor Ogiek men had nothing to offer to their spouses. . . The love of money took the lead as young ladies opted to be married by newcomers. Temporary marriages resulted to temporary wives and husbands.
Tim Allen and Hubert Morsink’s study (1994: 43) on the war in Uganda in the early 1980s noted that “out of sheer desperation and because of a total lack of other viable options, many refugee women are forced to resort to prostitution… and marginalizing activities”.

**3.2.7 Family Discord**

At the family level, the violence created discord especially in situations where victims were forced to stay with relatives. Many respondents narrated tales of humiliation and contempt in the hands of relatives. Having fled to such places empty handed, sometimes without sufficient clothing, food items and utensils, they were forced to depend on their hosts for their survival (Kihohia, O.I, 2010). What started as a sympathetic welcome by the host families turned into desperation as their resources were beyond their limits (The *Saturday Nation*, February 9 2008: 27).

Wamaitha (O.I, 2010) a respondent who took her family to Tetu, Nyeri recalled an incident where a relative derided her: *‘Even if your house was burnt, were banks also burnt?’* the relative could not see how she had failed to save some money in the bank for such an emergency. Such remarks fractured relations between members of the extended family.

The respondents talked of the mistreatment their children went through. In some cases they were sent to work in the *shamba* (farm) while children of the host family remained at home. They became *‘ngombo’* (slaves). Often, their food was rationed (food is not as plenty in some parts of Kikuyu land as in Molo). They also lacked basic necessities with no one to turn to now that their parents were far. In this
situation, parallel families emerged, where the eldest brother or sister assumed the role of household heads (Ngotho, O.I, 2010).

These informal household heads gave the younger siblings guidance and even disciplined them as situations demanded. While working in their relative’s farm, these informal families would have sit-downs, some sort of get-together, to review the situation and chart the way forward (Mungai, O.I, 2010). It is difficult to capture the emotional burden such children endured. The preponderance of such households was still evident at the time of this research. There were quite a number of homes entirely in the hands of the eldest brother or sister; especially at Kapsita where a number of parents were said to have relocated to towns within Molo or to other places outside Nakuru County. In this regard, findings for this study indicated that ethnic violence has led to diffusion of power within the institution of the family. The larger conflict at the ethnic level created multiple conflicts within families. The way such conflicts were negotiated brought about new values that redefined the relations between family members.

On a positive note, some respondents talked of the generosity they experienced while they lived with their extended family members in Central Province and elsewhere. Their relatives helped them get schools for their children, provided all their needs until the situation in Molo returned to normalcy (Muthoni, Chepkorir, Ochiri, O.I, 2010; Saturday Nation, 9th February 2008).
3.2.8 Humiliation as a Result of Displacement

Ethnic violence in Molo has also created extreme feelings of humiliation. Many respondents said that they have suffered multiple displacements, their houses have been burnt and their property looted (Muranga’i, Marus, O.I, 2010). Unsure of what the future held for them, many of them put up ramshackle structures to serve as their homes. Nelson Ngotho (O.I, 2010) aptly captured their predicament:

I lost my 2.5 acres at Moi’s bridge in 1986. I moved to Naissut Forest (Njoro) up to 1997 when I was displaced again. I have done casual labor on other people’s farm to buy this 40 by 80 ft plot. I am now 70 years with eight children (four from my deceased wife). What will these children inherit from me?

His words were echoed by Kamami (O.I, 2010) who posed, ‘my father was like a squatter at Olenguruone and I am like a squatter here, what will my children be called?’ Another source of humiliation was that in 1992 and 2008, men and boys were forced to put on women’s clothes to avoid being killed by ethnic militias. Male respondents conceded that their image of being protectors of the family was deconstructed, because this happened in the presence of their children (Kaka, O.I, 2010).

The misery and wretchedness of many victims of ethnic violence is poorly documented. However, some articles, written by researchers in this area provide some insight into their conditions (see The Daily Nation, December 28 2011; July 24 2012 DN 2). What is clear is that meaninglessness and powerlessness dominate the perceptions of many victims of ethnic violence. Having lost faith in national institutions, they are unsure of what they ought to believe in for their security. Moreover, multiple displacements and dispossessions have led to frustration among
victims of violence which has in turn increased hostilities between the ethnic groups in conflicts (Bartos, 2002: 73).

3.2.9 Disruption of Inter-Ethnic Social Activities

Periodic displacements of victims, both young and old, disoriented their patterns of friendships. Social relations such as communion in churches and mosques have been fractured as places of worship have been burnt or attacked in the course of the violence. Churches, mosques and schools are important agents of socialization. They create trust among individuals and communities and play a big role in defining an individual’s identity and sense of self worth. The burning of churches and schools has led to sudden separation of faithfuls from different ethnic groups. At the same time, it created feelings of betrayal among worshippers from different ethnic backgrounds (CIPEV, 2008: 275, Chelanga, Mwaura, O.I, 2010). For those who moved into refugee camps set up in towns, they experienced a breakdown of traditional family life and values common in the rural settings.

3.3 Conclusion.

This discussion has shown that ethnic violence in Molo Division has had far reaching social repercussions. Many children were forced to drop out of school. In many cases, couples have been forced to live away from each other. Some of the affected have had their spouses and children killed in the course of the violence. The section has argued that the conflict in Molo has led to fundamental transformations in the way victims organize their lives. In an attempt to mitigate the impacts of violence, they have devised survival strategies such as establishing two homes so that they can have a refuge whenever they anticipate an outbreak of violence. The chapter has attempted to
discuss the consequences by postulating that conflict and change are inherent in every society and that every individual, group or other unit in the society represents a force whose action stimulates many counterforces. The encounter between a force and a counterforce leads to the development of new relationships, new values and new patterns of inter-ethnic and inter-personal engagements.

It has been demonstrated, albeit briefly, that women have achieved some degree of autonomy and authority as a result of their changing roles in the decision making process in their families. This chapter has also demonstrated that victims of ethnic violence in the area have been subjected to psychological and emotional trauma. On a positive note, it has been pointed out that although ethnic violence has led to an increase in social distance between ethnic groups, inter-ethnic marriages have persisted. The chapter that follows will interrogate the cultural consequences of ethnic violence.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine the cultural ramifications of ethnic violence in the area of study. Culture is a shared system of meaning people use to make sense of the world, it is a historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols by means of which people communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge and attitudes towards life (Ross, 2007: 18). As a shared system of meaning that people use to make sense of the world, culture plays an important part in the formation of group identity. Lebaron and Pillay (2006) demonstrates that culture and conflict interact in three fundamental ways; culture assigns meanings to conflict which in turn stimulates cultural changes and continuity by shaping the cultural lenses through which people interpret what the conflict is all about. They also argue that being intertwined, culture and conflict are constantly shaping and reshaping each other in an evolving interactive process (Lebaron and Pillay 2006: 85, 93).

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Culture frames the outer boundaries of our mind’s vision, so that the cultural outsider’s terrain that lies beyond our horizon is difficult to recognize. Culture tells us subtly why we do what we do, rendering us unfamiliar with the lives of cultural outsiders. We tend to equate this unfamiliarity with strangeness, polarizing relationships between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Culture also carries shared memories and expectations across historical and geographic areas by means of symbols that touch our hearts and minds. . . Culture frames the universe of our conflict behavior by presenting us with the parameters within which “all possible options” are considered in coping with the conflict at hand.

In this discussion, we shall analyse how violence has impacted on selected cultural expressions and institutions unique to the various ethnic groups that reside in Molo Division. The changes occasioned by violence on patterns and regularity of initiation
ceremonies, customs regarding the relations between in-laws and renaming of villages in postconflict periods. We argue that in the course of the violence, individuals were able to appropriate important cultural symbols belonging to ‘enemy’ ethnic groups and by so doing spared themselves and their property from attacks and destruction. It is also demonstrated that some aspects of culture were adjusted to accommodate conflict situations.

The concept of cultural invasion will be used to inform the discussion in this chapter. Derived from conflict theories, the concept is useful in interrogating changes that are brought about by cross cultural interactions. Variously interpreted as boundary exchanges, cultural frontiers, westernization, and the like, cultural invasion operates in a myriad of ways such as technological innovation, mass media, disruption of traditions and new political movements (Abraham, 1981). Bhabha, (1994) argues that it is important to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences because such ‘spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood – singular or communal- that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself.

4.2 Impact on Initiation Ceremonies

Prior to the First wave of violence in Molo in 1992, it was common for the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin to hold joint circumcision ceremonies for boys (Gachigua, Koech, O.I, 2010) (the Abagusii were not included because they initiate their boys at quite an early age, 9-11 years, unlike the other two groups whose boys are circumcised at the age of 16-19 years, Mokoro, O.I, 2010). Boys from various ethnic groups grazed and
hunted together in the forests. These activities created friendships that transcended ethnic differences (Tabutany, O.I, 2010). The outbreak of violence in 1992 created mistrust and as such, joint initiation ceremonies were discontinued. Mwangi and Kosgei, (O.I, 2010) could not recall any joint initiation in Sagaitim and Mau Summit respectively since 1991.

Besides the discontinuation of joint initiations, families and communities developed new strategies so as to cope with the new realities of ethnic conflict. For instance, families neighboring their supposedly ethnic enemies avoided keeping their newly circumcised sons within their homesteads. Wherever possible, the boys underwent initiation away from home, in a safe place and only returned after the healing period was over (about 1-2 months). Such steps were meant to protect them from danger at a time they were most vulnerable (traditional circumcision in both groups greatly impedes movement and technically confines the initiate to his bed for more than two weeks).

Other respondents also indicated that many families avoided initiating their sons during times of much political activity. They particularly avoided the months of December of every election year. This strategy, just like the previous one, was meant to leave room for rapid and unexpected movements just incase the electoral processes at the national and Divisional level went out of control (Kinyanjui, Lamai, O.I, 2010).

The desire to conceal society’s secrets from outsiders also contributed to the collapse of common initiation among the locals in Molo. Among the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, it is only circumcised men who can wage war against communal enemies. Indeed, to
use the words ‘circumcised’ and ‘a man’ consecutively in Kikuyu language is tautological; the use of one necessarily implies the other. Circumcision then, is not just a rite of passage; it is a process by which the military capital of an ethnic group is enhanced.

As already intimated, ethnic militias have played a big role in the conflict in Molo in the period under investigation. The lack of confidence in the state to provide security has led to the emergence of local based processes of ensuring security. Harir and Tvedt, (1994:199) argue that ethnic military organizations were common among African societies and existed both in ‘state’ and ‘stateless’ societies long before European conquest. The main task of these military organizations was to defend a man’s cattle and women. Mazrui (1977: 2) locates the military organizations within what refers to as the Warrior tradition. He explains it thus:

That sub-system of values and institutionalized expectations which define the military role of the individual in the defence of his society, the material criteria of adulthood and the symbolic obligations of manhood in time of political and military stress. At one level, the warrior tradition is a major link between the individual and society. At another level, it links each household with the wider community.

Ethnic based vigilante and militia groups were embraced as alternative routes to secure communal security. While the Kalenjin had their warriors, the Kimnyige, the Agikuyu and the Abagusii embraced the proscribed Mungiki sect members, a group that is detested by both groups in times of peace. The sect’s insistence on a return to traditional Kikuyu customs such as female circumcision made it abhorred by a majority of the Agikuyu. It was surprising to realize that during violence, even the Abagusii referred to Mungiki as ‘our boys’ (Mokoro, O.I, 2010).
For the Kalenjin warriors, the circumcision ceremony and subsequent period of seclusion from the society is laden with military meaning. In the period of isolation, which takes two months, the young men (tairisiek) live together in makeshift shelters (menjet) away from their homes. While in the bush, the tairisiek use arrows to hunt small animals like hares and birds. Bird’s feathers are used to don the caps of the initiates. They also put on cowhides as their clothes and paint their faces, a practice known as kagomargei tarusiek, to disguise their identity. After the seclusion period is over, the initiates, referred to as kipkeleloik are readmitted to the society through an elaborate pass out ceremony during which the initiate with the highest number of bird’s feathers on his cap is positioned first in the queue (Kosgei, O.I, 2010). Whether intended or not intended, these are symbols of the military function of the youth that play a big role in mobilization for arms and warriors in times of ethnic conflicts.

4.3 Renaming of Places after Conflict Periods

In the period 1992-2008, this study established that a number of villages in Molo have changed names. Naming is a tool of domination and an expression of cultural hegemony especially in a multiethnic area like Molo. On the other hand, renaming of areas previously occupied by a hostile group is a powerful tool of resistance and reasserting group identity. For instance, in the period 1996-2001, the current Kapsita location was known by the Kikuyu name Witemere. The name was coined by local Kikuyu in the neighbouring villages of Sagaitim and Mukorombosi. Interestingly, both the Kikuyu and the Ogiek who reside in the scheme found the word offensive, because it implied that they were given the land by President Moi for free, yet they had lost their land at Olenguruone and Njoro in 1992 and 1997 respectively. Currently, the Location is known by the name Kapsita, with the Ogiek insisting that it
should be *Kapseita*, after a similar Ogiek village in Ndoinet in South Western Mau Forest.

The case of *chogocho*, still in Kapsita further illustrates the undercurrents of ethnic conflicts as expressed through the process of renaming. A Kikuyu name, *chogocho* was renamed *seguton* by the Ogiek after the 2007-8 violence. Similarly, *Nyakinyua*, a village located 10 kilometres to the west of Molo town, reverted back to the Kipsigis name *Sirikwa* that had gradually fallen into disuse for many years. Some informants indicated that the farm had been given out by President Kenyatta in the early 1970’s to a group of Kikuyu women, known as *Nyakinyua*. The group entertained the president through their songs and dances in many of his public meetings.

Besides violence, changing patterns of land ownership have also led to the adoption of new names. As discussed in chapter three, the exodus of the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin from Sagaitim village in the period 1992-2008 was counterbalanced by an influx of the Abagusii. As their numbers increased, the Kikuyu in the neighboring villages such as Mukorombosi and Ngwataniro began to refer to Sagaitim as *Keroka*, after one of the traditional Abagusii ancestral areas, in Nyamira County. It can be argued that renaming was a symbolic way of redressing perceived historical injustices.

4.4 Erosion of Men’s Traditional Authority

Closely linked to conditioned family separation was the erosion of a man’s traditional authority in many households. This was occasioned by the fact that ethnic violence had thrown upon many women responsibilities traditionally reserved for men.
In situations where a family had two homes as discussed earlier, one was headed by the wife. Many male respondents revealed that their wives had come to assume unprecedented autonomy, sometimes making unilateral decisions on issues like selling family livestock and engaging in small scale business, without consulting them. In some cases, such decisions created conflicts (Mwaura, O.I, 2010). Mureithi, Gichuki and Ogello (O.I, 2010) acknowledged that their wives had become ‘headstrong’, ‘stiff-necked’ and ‘easily irritable.’ To avoid exacerbating the conflict, many husbands reluctantly ceded some of their authority (Sosi, O.I, 2010).

From the available data, it can be deduced that ethnic violence opened up new avenues for conflicts over gender roles within the family institution. The rapid changes brought about by the dynamics of violence demanded the adoption of new values. Among the victims of violence, there was a general observation that the roles of men, women and even children were radically transformed by the violence.

The fact that some women lost their husbands and adult males in their families during violence led to the emergence of many female headed households in the area of study. This was not a unique phenomenon; while studying the impact of war in the Luwero Triangle in Uganda, Allen and Morsink (1994) had observed that:

Perhaps, the single most important impact upon women refugees, and especially those who become heads of households; is the change in family values, expectations and responsibilities. . . they gain new powers of determination regarding the allocation of resources. Their traditional roles as mothers are transformed by the need to survive (Allen and Morsink, 1994: 43).

This was especially common in Kapsita Location. A majority of residents in this area came from Olenguruone and Njoro. The Kikuyu from Olenguruone suffered heavy casualties in the 1992 ethnic violence. This was because there was only one road that
connected Olenguruone and Elburgon town, the nearest town they could seek for refuge. Yet the two towns are approximately sixty kilometres apart. On either side of the road connecting the two towns was a forest where militias were said to hide. This study established that many of the men who made it to Elburgon camouflaged as women (by wearing women’s clothes) (Kamami, Kamotho, O.I, 2010). Mbuita, Njama and Chumo (O.I, 2010) were examples of respondents whose husbands were killed in the conflict, making them the sole providers of material and emotional stability for their children.

Similarly, a substantial number of the Ogiek women who came from Njoro after the 1997 violence lost their husbands during the conflict (Sang, Kositany O.I, 2010). Njoro was predominantly occupied by the Kikuyu. Tiony (O.I, 2010) noted that they were moved from Njoro to Kapsita because the government had realized that they were too vulnerable to attacks by the Kikuyu of Njoro whenever violence broke out. Kapsita borders Ndoinet forest to the west and therefore, incase of outbreak of violence, the Ogiek of Kapsita could easily join their kinsmen at Ndoinet.

The fact that some women were able to independently make choices on where to direct their labor and acquire property such as livestock and develop small businesses gave them power to make decisions on how to use or dispose the products of their labor even in situations where their husbands preferred otherwise.

4.5 Culture and the Conduct of Warfare

In the course of gathering data, it became clear that culture provided guidance on how an ‘ethnic enemy’ would be treated. A respondent, Kamande (O.I, 2010), revealed
that at the height of the conflict in Kuresoi, they were surrounded by Kalenjin warriors armed with arrows, they were advised by a Kalenjin woman to pick a handful of grass and put it in the mouth. When the warriors closed in on them ready to attack, without any explanation whatsoever, they ceased singing war songs and allowed the group of men, women and children a safe passage. This was not an isolated case, several respondents across Molo Division as well as those evicted from Chepakundi (Olenguruone) and the North Rift confirmed such experiences.

In another incident, a respondent, (Nyagitheri, O.I, 2010) recalled that during the power sharing negotiations between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, there came a time when the negotiations seemed headed for collapse, thus raising fears of renewed ethnic violence not only in Molo but also in other parts of the country. In the prevailing atmosphere of fear, non-Kalenjin residents of villages such as Nyakinyua, Kapsita and Sagaitim used to hang a ‘sotet ‘(Kalenjin name for a milk gourd), on their gates or upon their doors at night. Having done that, they would go to bed and sleep comfortably (Mokono, Waruiru, O.I, 2010).

In another remarkable incident, a respondent, Nyawira (O.I, 2010) said that when her house was burnt at Kuresoi during the 2008 violence, everything was razed to the ground, save for the ndarama (a beating drum made from cow hide and used in churches during worship services). She had left the drum in the house but she found it outside. Apparently, the attackers ransacked the house, looted, took the drum outside before setting the house on fire.

It is important to attempt an explanation for such incidents. ‘Sotet’ is used by the
Kalenjin to make fermented milk, ‘mursik’, which is highly symbolic in the community in two ways; firstly, the serving of mursik at the end of marriage negotiations (Koito) signifies that the bride and the bridegroom’s parties have reached a consensus on dowry. When the bride’s family accepts the bride price offered by the bridegroom, the representative of the bride’s side, usually an uncle invites married women from the maternal side of the bride to serve mursik to the bridegroom and his representatives. This marks the beginning of a covenant between the two sides (Kosgei, O.I, 2010).

Secondly, mursik is a product of the cow (teta), and cows are highly valued among the Kalenjin. They are a symbol of life and blessings (Letio O.I, 2010). Therefore, attacking a homestead whose residents have owned the ‘sotet’ and the ‘teta’ would be unacceptable even in a time of war. The same can be said of the warrior’s behavior not to burn a ‘drum’ alongside the house; burning it would be the same as burning a cow, a taboo in Kalenjin culture. It is worth noting that during the period of seclusion that follows the circumcision ceremony, the initiates (tairisiek) put on cowhides (mutap teta, singular, muiywek ab tuga, plural) as their clothings (Letio, O.I, 2010).

After the seclusion period is over and the initiates are readmitted to society, they become available for use in the defence of the community in conflict moments. Logically, it is unexpected that a Kalenjin young man would burn the very item that provided warmth during the initiation period. The emotional connection between a Kalenjin young man and cows is just too deep to be wished away, even in periods of hostilities. On the other hand, grass provides fodder for cows and therefore Kalenjin warriors would not attack a group of people who fell back on such an important
cultural symbol (Kosgei, O.I, 2010).

**4. 6 Adjustments regarding the relations between In-Laws**

Among the Agikuyu, cultural considerations forbid too much interactions among in-laws. The proverb ‘*uthoni nduranga ranganguo*’ (do not get used to your in-laws) discourages too much familiarity with the in-laws. Many could not recall, in recent history, a situation where a man took his family to his *athoní*, (in-laws). They pointed out that the last time it happened on a large scale was during the emergency, when, for fear of screening (*Kuhungwo mahuri*) and deportation to British concentration camps, a man would do so.

Similarly, among the Kalenjin, the proverb ‘*metebi eng kapyukoi ku yo imi kapchepto*’ (do not stay in the in-laws home as though you are in your daughters house) implies that a person was not encouraged to frequent his in-laws. Yet during the violence, many men took their families to stay with their mother in law (Lelei, O.I, 2010).

The above examples illustrate that culture is dynamic. It not only provides guidelines on what to do in times of peace but also regulates community and individual behavior in times of conflict. By taking advantage of cultural provisions, communities devised survival tactics in conflictual moments without which they would have been overwhelmed by the magnitude of the crises.
4.7 Disruption of Family Values

The traditionally accepted norm among the ethnic groups that live in Molo was that after puberty, boys lived in their own huts separate from their parents. However, the burning of houses during conflicts and subsequent migrations to other areas compelled members of a family to share a room, contrary to common customs. As families relocated to towns, they could not afford to rent houses for such adolescents especially in the first few months of displacements. Victims who sought asylum in refugee camps were forced to live with their children who were in late teenage. The result was that many of the teenagers were exposed to intimate moments between their parents and the large adult population within the camps. The proliferation of prostitution especially after the 2007-08 violence was attributed to the presence of many Internally Displaced Persons in Elburgon and Molo Towns. Lebaron and Pillay, (2006: 99) posits that intensive protracted violence and forced movements of people have a significant impact on culture.

Similarly, the Ogiek’s way of life was fundamentally altered by the agricultural activities of the Abagusii and the Kikuyu. As the forests from which they obtained their food were depleted, they began to try other activities such as farming. Their women began to engage in commercial sex with their Bantu neighbors. This threatened their previously compact family institution. Indeed, Ogiek informants indicated that the frustrations brought about by the new trend (their women engaging in prostitution with their neighbors) was one of the reasons for their sporadic attacks against their neighbors. Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (2000: 65, 66) explained the dislocation that cultures are exposed to when a people’s institutions and values are subordinated to another culture. They noted that “many post – colonial texts
acknowledge the psychological and personal dislocations that result from this cultural denigration”. It has been argued that the cumulative effects of environmental crisis, sexual revolution, new value orientations, disruption of traditions and the break-up of the normative structure can lead to a conflict of values and individual identity crisis (Abraham, 1981).

4.8 Impact on Religious Beliefs

As noted in the discussion on the causes of ethnic violence (chapter two), the need to reclaim sacred sites was at the centre of Ogiek resistance to the Abagusii and the Agikuyu who had unknowingly desecrated them. A group that has largely survived the ravages of Christianity and Islam, the Ogiek have retained traditional ways of worship. Occasionally, they visit the graves of their departed leaders. These graves are sacred sites that are crucial to the perpetuation of their identity. They are imbued with a deep emotional significance that connects them with other Ogiek groups across time and space.

Ethnic contestations have opened new cultural frontiers for interactions. In this regard, the Ogiek have been exposed to other religious beliefs. Although there was no evidence from the field work confirming large scale conversions to Christianity, a majority of the respondents at Kapsita and Tinga Juu were not oblivious to the presence of several churches around them. Indeed, there are several churches within Kapsita; St Stephen Catholic Church and the Seventh Day Adventist Church are the most notable.
4.9 The Rise of Mungiki

Ethnic violence in Molo has played a great role in the formation and growth of the *Mungiki*. The term is derived from the Kikuyu word *muíngi*, meaning masses of people. In a previous section, we discussed how vigilante groups have been involved in ethnic conflicts. Upon circumcision, Kalenjin initiates automatically become warriors for the community (Kosgei, O.I, 2010). Among the Agikuyu in Molo, the rise of Mungiki in the period 1992-2008 has been phenomenal. The Kikuyu who were displaced in Molo, Olenguruone, Laikipia and elsewhere in the 1992 and 1997 were mobilized by leaders who sought to defend Kikuyu interests such as land in the Rift Valley (Olengoywo, O.I, 2010). Such leaders included Ndura Waruinge and Maina Njenga (Gecaga, 2007). The group was formed in 1995 by Maina Njenga who claimed to have had a vision in which *Ngai* (God) commanded him to liberate the Agikuyu from all forms of oppression. The group aimed at the restoration of the Kikuyu culture as the first step towards liberation. Essentially, the group was opposed to Western customs such as the wearing of trousers among women. It also insists on female circumcision and a return to traditional beliefs and customs. Viewed within this context, it is a form of resistance against modernity and foreign religious ideologies. It is a way of understanding the chaotic and unpredictable situation that Kikuyu victims of violence have gone through in the Rift Valley and elsewhere.

*Mungiki* is guided by the principles of cultural self-determination, self-pride and self-reliance. It utilizes traditional methods such as prayers, songs, prophetic utterances, and oathing and initiation rights to confront the forces of neo-colonialism. There are cleansing (purification) ceremonies (*gutherio*) that cleanse individuals contaminated by Western values before they are readmitted to Kikuyu purity (Gecaga, 2007).
In specific areas of Molo Division such as Kapsita, Elburgon, Mukinyai and Mukorombosi, many Kikuyu young men were forced to join \textit{Njama} (Warriors, in \textit{Mungiki} language) so as to defend their land from attacks by the Kalenjin. In many cases, fleeing young Kikuyu men were intercepted, beaten and forced to take an oath by those who had already joined the group Kinyanjui, (O.I, 2010). There were those who joined Mungiki voluntarily. For many young men displaced by the violence, the group’s agenda to reclaim and restore Kikuyu glory and prominence, a claim backed by ancient prophecies of a Kikuyu seer, Mugo wa Kibiru, coupled with the economic hardships they were exposed to by the violence, \textit{Mungiki} offered a grand hope that Christianity and the state had failed to give them. A fundamental realization made by this study is that the group’s activities were strongest in areas which had been affected the hardest by the ethnic violence. Being an exclusively Kikuyu group, \textit{Mungiki’s} growth has further rigidified ethnic identities in the area.

4.10 Conclusion

This discussion has attempted to investigate the cultural consequences of ethnic violence in Molo Division, it has been pointed out that violence has led to a gradual empowerment of women by placing upon them new challenges and responsibilities brought about by conflict. The renaming of some places after violence has been examined as a form of resistance against perceived cultural domination. Cessation of joint initiation ceremonies and the appropriation of cultural symbols to avoid attacks have all been highlighted to demonstrate the cultural impact of violence.

It has been shown that in its dynamism, culture not only provides traditional conventions on the conduct warfare but also gives guidance on how to respond to
conflict situations within the context of African traditions. The survival tactics adopted by displaced communities were sanctioned by traditions that might have forbidden the same in peaceful circumstances. We have argued that violence has contributed to the phenomenal rise of the *Mungiki* among the Kikuyu living in the study locale. Overall, this chapter has used the concepts of competitive struggle for resources, the struggle for political power among politicians and the concept of cultural invasion to interrogate its data. The theoretical tool of postcolonialism has been used to show that the rise of *Mungiki* is a form of resistance against the dominant ideology of Christianity. The chapter that follows focuses on the social consequences of ethnic violence in the area of study.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN MOLO DIVISION

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we debate the economic impact of violence. We argue that ethnic violence has led to destruction of property, increased cattle theft and general crime in the area. The chapter also reveals that there has been loss of income for many individuals and families, changed the pattern of land ownership and created dependency among many victims. From the available data, every wave of ethnic violence in the area of study was accompanied by destruction and dispossessions. In explaining the findings, the theoretical tool of ‘the violence of economics’ will be used. Borrowed from Mbembe’s work, ‘On Postcolony,’ the concept will be applied to achieve two objectives: to analyze the economic consequences of ethnic violence and to illuminate our understanding of the economic and political processes that helped shape ethnic and other forms of violence in African postcolonial states in the 1990s. To set the stage for an analysis of the consequences, it is in order to briefly explain what we mean by ‘the violence of economics.’

African societies, and their capacity for self-government and self-determination, are challenged by two sorts of threats. On the one hand, there are threats of internal dissolution. These arise from external pressure, not only in the form of debt and the constraints associated with its repayment, but also of internal wars. On the other, there are the risks of a general loss of control of both public and private violence. This uncontrolled violence is sparked by worsening inequalities and corruption (Mbembe, 2001:67).
The financial stranglehold and the fiscal crisis in Africa has exacerbated conflicts over the distribution of means of livelihood and privileges such as state allocation of money for infrastructure, jobs and favors. Helped by these conflicts, there have been contradictory conceptions of what the political community should be or what should be the articulation between various sorts of citizenship within a single political space, such as ethnicity and nation, *indigenous* and immigrants (Mbembe, 2001:76). The hegemony of state administration has thus partly broken down leading to fierce contestations over access to and control of available resources, hence the term, ‘the violence of economics.’

5.2 Economic Impacts of Violence (1992 – 2008)

5.2.1 Destruction of Property

With the exception of ten respondents, all the other informants indicated that they had lost much property in the period 1992-2008. Many of the victims have had their houses burnt on several occasions. Ngure (O.I, 2010), lost a house estimated at 100,000 shillings at Kapsita during the 2008 Post-Election Violence. That was his third home to be destroyed since 1992.

With every new wave of the conflict, victims of violence were forced to begin all over again: for example, to build new houses, to re-stock their animals and to buy household items such as utensils and furniture. Juliana, (O.I, 2010), who relocated from Molo to Mutonyora in Nyandarua County said that:

We rescued nothing from Soweto (Sachangw’an, Molo). My house at Mukinyai was razed down. . . I moved to Kiptangwany where we have a shamba and a house. Again, I was displaced and my house burnt.
Many of those who had invested in business in the rural areas suffered heavy losses as most of the centers were burnt during the violence. Saint Stephen’s at Kapsita, Upper Sagaitim, Muchorwe, Mau Summit, Jogoo and Mutate centers were all burnt during the violence. The ruins of some of the destroyed buildings were still visible when this research was being done. Many of the business premises such as shops and food Kiosks were first vandalized before being set on fire (Ngure, Jerop, O.I, 2010; The Daily Nation, July 24 2012 DN 2

A number of respondents also lost personal and household possessions such as academic certificates, title deeds, birth certificates, photo albums, bicycles, radio sets, television sets, sofa sets, utensils and clothings. Molo area is conducive for dairy farming. As such, sheep, cows and donkeys were common in almost every homestead (Kosgei, O.I, 2010). The sudden and unexpected attacks during violence meant that those with cattle were unable to move with them. In the ensuing confusion, they were compelled to abandon them. In situations where some of the victims of violence were able to move with them, they sold them cheaply once they got to towns such as Elburgon and Molo.

5.2.2 Disruption of Agricultural Activities

Molo Division has fertile soils and therefore suitable for agriculture. The various ethnic communities who settled here were driven by the desire to earn a living through farming. The Division is also known for dairy farming (Akiwumi, 1999: 147). One of the long term economic repercussions of the violence was that land that was previously used for farming and dairy keeping was abandoned by the owners because of insecurity. In the process of data collection, we observed that there was too
much land lying fallow. On enquiry, we were informed that most of the owners relocated to other places such as Nakuru, Nyandarua, Keringet, Kuresoi, and Uasin Gishu (Ogello, Wanjiru, O.I, 2010). The Akiwumi Commission had also noted that too many farms in Molo were lying idle because of the conflict (Akiwumi, 1999: 137). In time, some of the abandoned farms were used as grazing pastures (Akiwumi, 1999: 123).

Even in situations where some farmers went back to their farms, the size of acreage under cultivation reduced drastically, in many cases, by more that 50%. For example, Kapsita residents have at least five acres of land, but most of them had 2 to 3 acres under effective utilization at the time of this study. This had been occasioned by several factors: one, the violence disrupted family labor patterns as several members of a family relocated to the ‘second home’ discussed in the previous chapter. Secondly, farming tools such as Jembes, hoes, ox-drawn ploughs and tractors were destroyed, stolen or lost during the violence. It was not easy to buy some of these tools. Finally, many of them were still apprehensive of the future and were therefore reluctant to commit too much of their labor in the area (Ndung’u, O.I, 2010).

Disruption of agricultural activities led to poor yields and consequently low income to a majority of farmers. Due to insecurity, many residents got to their farms around 9am and left at around 3 pm (5-6 hours of labor), and would then go back to spend the night in nearby towns and shopping centers where they had rented houses. This had been the routine of many since the 2008 Post-Election Violence. Previously, most of them could work on their farms for 8 – 10 hours (Muturi, Mender O.I, 2010). Much time was therefore wasted as they moved to and from their farms. Barasa (1992) had
observed that in the areas where ethnic violence had occurred, there was a decline in production as many farmers had ran away due to insecurity. The impact of violence on agriculture was noted by Kanyinga who commented that:

> the agricultural sector, on which 80% of Kenyans depends, is one of the most vulnerable to disruptions caused by politics... agriculture is sensitive to what politicians say... The tone of campaigns determines what level of investment the farmer will put in or whether he will pack and go and return after the elections (The *Sunday Nation*, October 16 2011).

Granaries were also burnt during the violence leading to food shortages in affected families. Many were forced to either buy food items or depend on well wishers for their upkeep. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in its 1993 Report observed that the victims of the clashes in the Rift Valley Province alone needed 7,200 tons of cereals and 1,080 tons of pulses and other food items in emergency aid for that particular year (The *Daily Nation*, May 14, 23, 1993).

The problem of food shortage also affected families that moved to Mutonyora location, Nyandarua County on the border between Rift Valley and Central Provinces. Their 40 by 80 ft plots of land were too small for farming. The high cost of renting land in the area complicated their efforts to ensure there was enough food for their families. An acre of land is rented at 12000 Shs. compared to 3000 Shs in Molo (Sosi, O.I, 2010).

**5.2.3 Increase in Cases of Livestock Theft**

Violence in Molo has led to an increase in livestock theft. Many farmers in areas like Mukinyai, Sagaitim and Kapsita abandoned dairy farming as keeping cows attracted cattle thieves. Cases of livestock theft were both inter and intra-ethnic. A study done in 2009 in Kuresoi noted that:
Many youths at Kuresoi enhanced cattle rustling for the people of their community. The major difference with the clash against the Kikuyu is that, when taking away the cattle of their community they can’t kill or burn the houses. . . Who would have dreamed (sic) that after postelection violence Kipsigis youths would turn against their community? (USIP, Special Report No.251, 2009: 10).

A reader of the Nation newspaper complained that cattle theft had become so rampant in Elburgon that residents spent sleepless nights watching over their animals (The *Daily Nation*, September 27, 2011). There were instances where young men conspired with others to steal their parent’s livestock. This was occasioned by the collapse of logging, charcoal burning and several other economic activities common to the youth. The proliferation of livestock theft can also be understood within the context of the collapse of inter – ethnic and intra –ethnic trade that was common in the pre- 1992 period during which the locals sold surplus produce and bought whatever goods they needed. This observation buttresses Collins’ argument that individual interest, the goal of personal aggrandizement lie at the heart of conflicts (Collins, 1975: 60, 89).

As an indicator of the decline in livestock farming, in the locations where this research was done, not a single cattle dip was found to be operational. Yet, the Nakuru County Development Plan (1984-1988) had noted that Molo Division had the highest number of cattle dips (219) in the district, followed by Naivasha (209), Bahati (117), and Olenguruone (4) respectively.

As a result, milk yields declined in the period 1992-2008. Prior to 1992, many families delivered milk to a variety of milk processing companies such as the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) and the Spin-Knit Limited. This kind of ‘forced de-stocking’ led to a decline in milk production (Letio, O.I, 2010).
The amount of income from the sale of milk was of course higher for those with more cows. For example, Murang’ai, (O.I, 2010) had 10 grade cows from which she delivered to the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) 60 litres every day. This translated to 23400 shillings in a month, a substantial amount of money in the rural area where basic food items are cheap.

The overall consequence of such violence induced destocking had been noted by the Nakuru County Development Plan in its projection for the period 2002-2008. The Plan had observed that:

\[
\text{The land clashes has also played a big role in the current state of poverty by creating tension, insecurity, forced migration, and time wastage which would have been otherwise directed towards productive activities (NDDP, 2002-2008:23).}
\]

5.2.4 Disruption of Trade

The cultivation of crops like maize, carrots, cabbages, kales and peas was also affected by the violence. Several factors contributed to this situation. There was disruption of links to the markets for this produce. Cosmopolitan market centres such as Muchorwe, Turi, Mukinyai and Keringet ceased to provide a large pool of customers on market days (Mender, Wangui, O.I, 2010). The lack of markets for their agricultural products made many people to abandon farming. The Kipsigis were no longer free to take livestock, mursik (fermented milk) and sotet (gourds) to Molo and Elburgon markets, areas dominated by the Agikuyu and the Abagusii.

5.2.5 Changing Patterns of Land Ownership

Ethnic violence greatly affected land ownership in Molo Division. For instance, some Kalenjins who left Sagaitim Farm in the 1992 violence lost their land completely. One
of the officials of Sagaitim Farm, Elijah Kinyanjui, availed to us the Farm’s membership register of 1992. We corroborated the registers with records at Molo District Land Office. We noted that before the tribal clashes of 1992, the farm had 386 members. The ethnic composition of the farm had fundamentally been altered by the violence as shown in the table that follows on the next page.

TABLE 4.1: Ethnic Composition of Sagaitim Farm, Turi Location.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>No.of Members in 1992</th>
<th>% of The Total Membership</th>
<th>No.of Members in 2008</th>
<th>% of The Total Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>386</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>306</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Membership registers of 1992 and 2008 availed by the Farm’s Secretary, Mr. Elijah Kinyanjui.

As shown in the table, at the time of data collection, not a single Kalenjin lived in Sagaitim. The ethnic violence of 1992 forced them to move to other areas such as Keringet, Kuresoi and Kamara near Mau Summit (Letio, Kinyanjui, O.I, 2010). Others had relocated to Uasin Gishu and Trans- Nzoia Counties (Kosgei, O.I, 2010). It is worth noting that Sagaitim Farm is in Turi Location, an area where the Agikuyu are the majority, followed by the Abagusii. Informants indicated that houses
belonging to the Kalenjin were burnt during the 1992 violence, forcing them to flee the area (Kinyanjui, O.I, 2010).

Many Kikuyu migrated to Kikuyu dominated areas of Nakuru County such as Dundori and Subukia (Thuo, O.I, 2010), while others moved to Counties such as Nyandarua in Central Province. Hence, the decline reflected in the above table. The number of the Kisii had increased. As the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin disposed of their land, in most cases at low prices, the Kisii, due to land scarcity in Gusii bought off the land (Ochenge, O.I, 2010). We noted that Kikuyu residents in neighboring farms such as Mukorombosi casually refer to Sagaitim as Keroka. Keroka is a town in Nyamira County, one of the traditional Counties of the Abagusii.

In the absence of some land owners, strangers moved in to occupy the empty land in some parts of Molo such as Jogoo, Kamwaura, Kapsita and Nyakinyua. The new comers grazed and harvested produce that had been left by the owners (Kihohia, Soi, O.I, 2010). In some places like Kabira Mbu, politicians brought members of their ethnic groups to settle in the land previously occupied by the displaced (Muthoni, O.I, 2010). This deliberate removal of people from their land on the basis of their ethnicity has been described by Michael Neocosmos as the discourse of exclusion that replaced ‘foreign natives’ (white colonialists) with ‘native foreigners’ (Africans unwanted by fellow Africans in certain contested territories) (Neocosmos, 2010: 61). In this case, communities whose ancestral homes are outside the Rift Valley province were perceived as settler communities.
Ethnic violence also created new avenues for land grabbing within Molo Division. Influential individuals in government were said to have grabbed big junks of land whenever the government resettled evictees. In an insightful paragraph, Kimaiyo (2004: 95, 97) observed that at Mariashoni forest in Elburgon:

The administration police and forest guards were used to guard the surveying exercise twenty four hours with relief food being in constant supply. The allotment forms and cards were sold in the restaurant and hotels and at other times in the street at the cost of as little as two thousand shillings per parcel of land. A local District Officer . . . made a big kill in the Ogilgei Hotel, Nakuru. Today, he boasts of a one storey building in Njoro town . . . the Ising’eti area of Mariashoni location was invaded by one thousand seven hundred senior government officials and prominent personalities. . . Members of the prisons forces used the prisoners to provide labour in their farms.

The information on land grabbing by prominent personalities was corroborated by many informants at Kapsita A and B. A local District Officer, a Mr Peter Kingola was said to have been one of the beneficiaries. A former Member of Parliament for Molo constituency and several retired chiefs also acquired land that had been set aside for resettlement of the internally displaced. The beneficiaries of land grabbing later put up residential and commercial houses which they rented. A casual observation as one moves from Elburgon to Molo town seem to confirm these claims. Recent buildings dot the left side of the Elburgon – Randi and Michatha – Molo sections of the road.

In the resettlement exercise, genuine victims were allocated land in the interior of the former forests while the wealthy and politically connected allocated themselves land close to urban areas (Kanja, O.I, 2010). In this way, it can be argued that the conflict has led to two contradictory processeses: pauperization of the victims and accumulation by a few who have in turn invested in Elburgon, Molo and Njoro Towns.
5.2.6 Loss of Income from Rental Houses

A number of residents had constructed rental houses. When such houses were burnt during violence, the owners lost a vital source of income (Mokono, Ngure, O.I, 2010). Even in situations where the rental houses were not destroyed, there were no people to rent them as potential customers had fled the area due to the violence (Murang’ai, O.I, 2010).

Many young men also lost the means of earning an income. Previously, they would engage in logging and splitting building materials such as timber and timber off cuts which they would later sell in the villages. With the destruction of forests, they had to go too far into the forests to find such materials, which exposed them to attacks by rival ethnic gangs or ordinary criminals. There were several incidents of such attacks which at times led to death. In some cases, the tools they used, such as machettes and power saws were confisicated. Without any income, some turned to criminal behavior such as stealing of cattle (Kinyanjui, O.I, 2010).

The fact that some of the youth have lost the means of earning an income made them vulnerable to manipulation by politicians in the area. The Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence noted unemployment among the youth as one of causes of the proliferation of violence in Kenya since the 1990s (CIPEV, 2008: 35, 37).

5.2.7 Dependency

Loss of income compelled many victims to depend on other family members and well wishers for support. Dependency was high among those who moved from Molo. At the time of research, victims at Mutonyora were still relying on the Government and The Red Cross for food items. In some cases, such assistance does not reach them in
time (Kariuki, O.I, 2010). Consequently, they were forced to rely on other family members in formal employment for basic needs, medical care and school fees (Thuo, Koech, O.I, 2010). Such unplanned for expenditures have strained the provider.

Having been displaced from rural areas, most of the refugees did not have any other skills besides farming to make them cope in the areas they sought asylum. Those who had no land but eked a living from business prior to the eviction seemed to have been affected more; without land, the government did not give them financial support during the resettlement exercise (Operation Rudi Nyumbani). It is this group of Internally Displaced Persons that remained in refugee camps long after the others had gone back to their farms or acquired new ones.

5.2.8 Increase in Crime

The violence also led to an increase in crime levels in towns, as many people who took refuge in towns were deprived of honest means of earning income. This has particularly been so in the slums where a majority of those displaced live. Residential areas such as Mutirithia and Casino in Molo, Kasarani in Elburgon have registered many incidents of crime in a month as compared to the pre 1992 period.

Violent robberies have been on the increase. Wanyama (O.I, 2010), a police officer based at Molo Police Station confirmed that incidents of both petty and violent crimes increased after the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence. These incidents can be attributed to the fact that a substantial number of Internally Displaced Persons who had been hosted in schools and churches did not go back to their farms inspite of the government’s initiative dubbed Operation Rudi Nyumbani. Unsure of their security in
the areas they had come from, they remained in towns and turned to crime for survival (Mwangi, O.I, 2010).

5.2.9 Financial Implications in Dealing with Injuries and Psychiatric Disorders

Besides death, some victims suffered physical injuries during violence. Chege, (O.I, 2010) limps as he walks after he was attacked in the 1992 violence. Njoroge, (O.I, 2010) a public health officer at Molo District Hospital revealed that in the course of the 2008 conflict, all medical personnel on leave were recalled while off duties were rescheduled or altogether scrapped. The number of casualties brought to the hospital on a daily basis was too high. Some had deep cuts while others had arrow heads stuck in their bodies. With only two public hospitals that is, Molo and Elburgon Nyayo Ward, it was not possible to handle the injuries in time. Some were referred to the Rift Valley Provincial Hospital in Nakuru. The burden of paying such medical bills fell on relatives.

In some situations, the patients were released by the hospital when it became obvious that they were unable to pay the medical bill (Kaario, O.I, 2010). The inability to meet the cost of medication was confirmed by Kamami, (O.I, 2010), he availed to us a waiver authority form dated 19/05/10 and a permit for burial dated 20/05/10 issued by the Rift Valley Provincial Hospital. The hospital waived an amount totalling to thirty seven thousand two hundred and ninety shillings (37290) after he was unable to pay the amount for his wife’s treatment. The officer granting the waiver indicated that ‘the husband is very desperate and cannot afford to raise the money’. The wife, Mary Wanjiru, passed on 13/05/10 and was buried at Kapsita, Elburgon. It is worth noting that the couple had previously been displaced in the 1992 violence.
One of the most striking characteristic left behind by the three waves of ethnic violence discussed so far is that quite a number of respondents, both in Molo and those that left Molo for safer areas such as Mutonyora, were able to discern the link between the violence and psychiatric disorders in some of their relatives. While acknowledging that such conditions are beyond the scope of this study, it is important to make some few remarks. Mbuthia, (O.I, 2010) narrated that:

My brother-in-law became insane after the violence of 1992. In January 1995, he visited us (at Mutonyora) but on his way back (to Molo), he got lost due to his mental illness. We have never seen him again.

A similar experience was narrated to us by Kabiru, (O.I, 2010) at Kapsita in Molo who claimed that due to the violence they lost ‘turiko’ (memory). For a woman whose husband (Samuel Kabiru) was killed in 1992 and her daughter of two and a half years was shot with an arrow and later hospitalized at Nakuru, the magnitude of such events must have weighed heavily upon her.

The connection between violence and mental disorders had been noted by other researchers. For instance, a study done on the mental health of internally displaced persons in parts of Uasin Gishu County found that the IDPs had significantly higher prevalence rates of depression compared to a control group of people who did not experience displacement. The study found out that the commonest traumatic events associated with these disorders were the sudden death of a loved one, and witnessing the killing or serious injury of another person (The Daily Nation, June 17 2012).

There were other cases where those who moved to areas with a different climate developed some health challenges. For instance, Mutonyora location, bordering the
Aberdare ranges is extremely cold. Many, especially the elderly suffered from chest related complications and Rheumatoid Arthritis (Thuo, O.I, 2010). The information was corroborated by Joyce Nyamumbo, (O.I, 2010) a nurse at Naivasha District Hospital who confirmed that a number of Arthritis patients who sought treatment at the hospital in the year 2008 had settled at Mutonyora after the 2007-2008 post election violence.

5.3 Conclusion
The preceding discussion has highlighted some of the economic impacts of ethnic violence in the study area. It appears that conflict arose out of the perceptions that ‘indigenous’ groups felt overtaken economically by a majority of outsiders, hence the total destruction of properties belonging to enemy ethnic groups. The desertion of farms by fleeing owners have created pockets of areas within Molo Division that are uninhabited, forming gaps and intermediate spaces where state presence is virtually absent.

Some politicians, provincial administrators such as District Officers and chiefs acquired some of the land designated for the resettlement of the displaced. This was especially common in the former Mariashoni, Bararget, Nessuit and Molo forests. The discussion in this chapter shows that an illegitimate process of transfer of property such as land and livestock went hand in hand with ethnic violence. Some individuals have profited from the violence, especially by acquiring land left by fleeing victims. Cases of strangers moving in to occupy or harvest food crops and aggrandize the livestock of victims were common. Violence disrupted the local economy, which depended on inter-ethnic cooperation for market access, labor, and transportation
services. The displacement of farmers and business people worsened the prospects for local economic recovery. Moreover, the fact that many people began to depend on relief food for survival played a great role in undercutting local economies by creating a dependency syndrome.
CHAPTER SIX

6.0 PEACE BUILDING INITIATIVES IN MOLO

6.1 Introduction.

The preceding chapters have demonstrated that ethnic violence has deeply divided the ethnic groups that reside in Molo. Moreover, the wretchedness that has been imposed upon the victims by the violence in the period 1992-2008 demands that measures be put in place to mitigate the consequences of the conflict. In this chapter, we shall attempt to critique the existing peace building initiatives and suggest strategies that can be adopted to secure enduring peace in the area.

In this discussion, we define peace building as actions and approaches to prevent, reduce, transform and help people recover from violence in all its forms including structural violence. To guide the debate, this section will analyze peacebuilding processes in the light of four crucial parameters: How have victims of ethnic violence been treated since 1992? Have they received meaningful support to rebuild their lives? Have they been able to return to their homes? How successful has been the process of re-integration? Basically, the chapter analysis both state and community based peace initiatives in the area and shows that to a large extent, the approaches adopted by the various peace agencies in the area have not succeeded in securing enduring peace among the various ethnic groups.

6.2 State sponsored peace initiatives

After every wave of violence, the government established police posts manned by the Administration Police (AP) in several parts of the Division so as to keep peace in the area. Such a state sponsored peace process had inherent weaknesses. One, victims and
residents of the area were categorical that the state was an accomplice of the violence, implying that they could not trust the same state to maintain peace. In the light of evidence obtained from the Akiwumi (1999: 132) and CIPEV (2008: 91) reports, such fears were not misplaced. Two, the state failed to appreciate the fact violence had engendered conditions that would make the conflict self-reproducing. For instance, the creation of many unemployed youths who moved to Elburgon, Molo and Njoro towns made them easy targets for recruitment into ethnic militias. On the same note, the destitution that followed displacements and dispossessions created deep feelings of resentment and bitterness among the locals. Furthermore, the fact that no attempt was made by the state to identify and bring perpetrators of the violence to justice has cast doubts on the credibility of any state sponsored peace initiative.

When the coalition government was formed after the 2007-08 violence, the government, through the president’s office, attempted to take over humanitarian relief and reconstruction from international agencies and the Kenya Red Cross. Consequently, the Ministry of State for Special Programmes was given the responsibility of assisting the Internally Displaced Persons. The ministry launched a poorly conceived, organized, and timed *Operation Rudi Nyumbani* (Return Home) and the related operations *Tujenge Pamoja* (Build Together) and *Ujirani Mwema* (Good Neighborliness) using the provincial administration to manage them. The administration police could not properly support the exceptionally challenging resettlement and peacebuilding tasks and at the same time deal with broader security concerns (USIP, 2010: 7). This implied that inadequate peacebuilding took place.
There were no proper plans to develop transparent registers nor was there a place where victims could check on the whereabouts of lost loved ones. Instead, the government ordered the provincial administration to dismantle refugee camps without adequately preparing the ground for their proper reception and re-integration with the communities in the areas they had been evicted from. To help displaced families re-start their lives, the government gave them ten thousands shillings each through a process that was characterized by corruption.

Many victims of the 2007-08 violence in the areas where this study was done did not get the money, even after making much effort. A number of government officials and a people masquerading as IDPs appropriated the money meant for the victims. In a survey done by the Kenya Land Alliance, it was found out that the majority of the 2,746 displaced people interviewed did not receive start-up capital of 10,000 or 25,000 shillings. In one location of Kuresoi, a chief had allocated compensation to his supporters, including young people involved in the violence (Kenya Land Alliance, *Land Data Survey Report*, 2009:9).

The government has also used the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) to reconcile ethnic groups living in the larger Nakuru County. An independent constitutional commission, NCIC brought together more than one hundred elders mainly drawn from the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. The commission engaged elders from the elders separately where the elders highlighted injustices meted on their respective communities since the colonial period. After a year of such meetings, a joint eight-point peace plan was developed and a peace accord signed on 13 May 2012.
Among the resolutions made by the elders, on behalf of their communities, was a promise to respect each other’s culture, traditions and freedoms enshrined in the constitution. They also pledged to develop and support a dispute resolution mechanism, avoid derogatory statements, condemn violence and put to task politicians who preach hatred (The Sunday Nation, 29 April 2012). It remains to be seen whether any gains have been made by the commission towards peace and reconciliation in the County. Evidently, the failure to include youths and elders from the village level may hamper the success of the commission’s efforts. Yet, it is the youths who do the actual fighting while the elders are known to ‘bless’ them before they go to war against other ethnic groups (USIP, 2009: 11). With such challenges, government sponsored resettlement and peace initiatives have ended in failure.

6.3 Community Based Peace Strategies.

At the community level, no efforts have been made to ensure inter-ethnic harmony in the four locations where this study was done. However, in other parts of the larger Molo such as Kuresoi and Likia, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru and the provincial administration police involved the residents in electing elders and youth from every ethnic group in the area to oversee peace meetings and reconciliation. The committees have achieved some significant results especially in the Likia zone, near Njoro. A collaborative effort by Muslim, Christian and Hindu leaders, the Likia and Beyond Peace and Conflict Resolution Council has been active in peacebuilding activities (USIP, 2009:9).

Notable among community based peace initiatives is the campaign by Carol Teachers Training College choir. The choir was established after the 2007-08 violence. At the height of the violence in 2008, some youths attempted to burn down the college,
which is located at Rongai, East of Molo Division. After the situation returned to normalcy, the choir began outreach programmes to create an awareness on the importance of ethnic harmony.

As a way of engaging the youth in meaningful activities, the college started elementary computer lessons for youths in the area. The choir organized periodic peace caravans in Molo, Kuresoi, Njoro, Kericho and other areas to preach ethnic harmony. The group goes to churches, market places, schools and other public places to perform skits, poems, songs and dances that emphasize on peace (The Daily Nation, January 30, 2012).

Inspite of these efforts, the general situation in Molo Division reveals that more effort needs to be made to secure enduring peace in Molo Division. The fact that some of the displaced still live in refugee camps attests to the failure of the peace processes. The following section discusses some approaches that can be used to achieve this end.

6.4.1 Memorialization

Memorialization refers to the process of creating a memorial for purposes of perpetuating the memory of a person, group of persons, incident, event or era. Given that memory is significant to the writing of history, lineage and group identity, memory is often contested and can be itself a source of conflict. However, memory, as perpetuated through processes such as memorialization seen in national monuments and commemorative celebrations can assist survivors of human rights violations, through symbolic reparations, to begin the process of healing; and assist the previous divided society in processes of reconciliation.
The purposes of memorialization initiatives include truth-telling; seeking justice; building a culture of democracy; commemorating previously marginalized histories and heritage; and recognizing victims and survivors of human rights violations. Memorialization can take a variety of forms, for instance, renaming of public facilities, plaques, exhibitions, museums and monuments. It is sometimes categorized within the transitional justice discourse as forming a subcomponent within the area of reparations (i.e. symbolic reparations).

Memorialization has been applied in Chile, South Africa and Rwanda (Kenya Human Rights Commission, Transitional Justice in Kenya: A Tool Kit for Training and Engagement, 2009:58). Besides state-level support for memorialization, in the above mentioned countries, survivor groups initiated and participated in various memory projects which included designing and sustaining memorials and sites of memory, including former torture centres, recording names and details of those who died or were victimized during a conflict, and organized events on key historical dates. The fact that survivors, states and truth commissions recognize the significance of memorialization further highlights the positive potential of memorialization within post-conflict societies.

After three waves of violence, it may not be practically possible to bring perpetrators to retributive justice. Perhaps, time has come for residents in Molo Division as well as policy makers to give the concept of memorialization a chance. Admittedly, there are several obstacles to the successful implementation of memorialization initiatives. They include: inadequate information, the lack of empirical information on and around memorialization as a process within transitional justice may result in ad-hoc,
uncoordinated and unmonitored memorialization efforts that may serve only the needs of specific groups.

Secondly, for any memorialization initiative to achieve its objective as a peace-building mechanism there needs to be some level of consultation by the initiators or sponsors of the project with the community that they seek to empower through the project. In this regard, a top-down approach to memorialization should be avoided. The ethnic groups that have been in conflict needs to own the initiative for peace-building in the area to succeed. It is encouraging to note that at the time of writing this thesis, members of the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, Kisii and the Turkana ethnic groups have come together to reconstruct the Kenya Assemblies of God (KAG) church at Kiambaa in Eldoret that was set on fire on 1st January 2008, during the post-election violence. Seventeen people were burnt to death, eleven died on the way to the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital in Eldoret while fifty four were treated and discharged (CIPEV, 2008: 48).

Previously a predominantly Kikuyu congregation, the church has been renamed Kiambaa Unity and Reconciliation Church so as to reflect the need for inter-ethnic cooperation and harmony in the post-conflict period. The church has been instrumental in peace initiatives in the greater Uasin Gishu County (The Daily Nation, 24 October 2012).

Politicization of memorialization is another potential challenge, it is important to note that many memorialization initiatives are government funded and often become tools
to further political agendas and consolidate the power of the ruling faction. The effect is usually a memorial that is distasteful or offensive.

Finally, given that most initiatives are built with an aim of ensuring permanence and spanning generations, memorialization often run the risk of becoming irrelevant to future generations which may not understand or appreciate its context and value. This is especially the case where there are no educational programmes aimed at reinforcing the significance of the memorials to future generations (ibid, p.59).

To overcome such pitfalls, there are guidelines that if followed, would secure a workable memorialization initiative in Molo Division. Foremost, it should be very clear both to the victims and the state that, memorialization does not negate nor substitute for other forms of financial compensation. There should be consultation processes that focus on community empowerment strategies that seek to assist in developing the community. Any new initiative should aim to enhance and support local capacities and initiatives by facilitating a process that results in a shared vision among the residents. To avoid the harmful politicization of memorialization, independent funding agencies and civil society should support local initiatives that aim to provide the varied, critical narratives of the past. Ongoing reflection and evaluation can also ensure that memorials engage different generations thereby contributing to learning from the past and non-repetition of mistakes.

A good example of an event that can be memorialized to foster inter-ethnic is the Sachangw’an Accident. On the evening of January 31, 2009 an oil tanker overturned and burst into flames and burnt to death more than 130 villagers who had rushed to
siphon the oil at Sachang’wan town centre, 40 kilometers from Nakuru town on the Nakuru-Eldoret highway. Torn apart by inter-ethnic violence since 1992, the incident temporarily provided an opportunity for inter-ethnic co-operation. According to an informant, this tragedy helped to forge inter-ethnic harmony in the following way:

During the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence, every ethnic group buried its own people. But in this tragedy, many families in the Mukinyai- Kibunja-Sachang’wan area lost a member while others lost several members. Since it was practically impossible for many families to handle the pain and the logistics of interring their dead, the elders and church leaders came together and agreed that we should bury our dead in an organized manner. We could bury a Kisii today, a Kikuyu tomorrow and a Kalenjin the following day. For the first time in many months, we were free to walk into our neighbor’s homesteads and they could also come to our homes. We mourned together, we wept together. . . the speeches made during the funerals were very solemn, all of us regretted our past animosity, for the first time since 1992, my bitterness was gone, we had been combatants for a long time, we now shared in the same fate, we were united in grief (Wakaba, O.I, 2010).

With the support of the government, such a date, marked every year, would prove critical in enhancing inter-ethnic harmony in the area.

Another way in which the tragedy united the various communities was the fact that since many of the victims of the fire tragedy had been burnt beyond recognition, families whose members were missing accepted the government’s proposal to inter the remains in a mass grave at the scene of the accident. A tombstone bearing the names of the deceased was erected at the scene after the highly publicized ceremony attended by high ranking government officials who included the president, the prime minister and the vice-president. Residents in the area have continued to commemorate the accident in the subsequent years. However, the state has not taken a leading role in these annual memorials (The Standard, February 1, 2012). Yet, it has been observed that the proper creation and promotion of memorials is a pivotal component of
reconciliation as this is the terrain in which divisive identities and myths are created, contested and destroyed.

6.4.2 Reconciliation

Reconciliation can also be used to bring inter-ethnic harmony. Truth telling, that means, a full accounting of the past, including the identities of both victims and perpetrators is necessary for reconciliation. To build reconciliation, individuals and institutions need to acknowledge their own role in the conflicts of the past, accepting and learning from it in a constructive way so as to guarantee non-repetition. Religious leaders can be useful agents of reconciliation. It has been noted that churches and mosques can emphasize the re-discovering of a new conscience in individuals and society through moral reflection, repentance, confession and rebirth. For reconciliation to succeed, the residents of Molo Division must actively initiate the process. The Kiambaa experience mentioned above provides some insights:

Those interviewed (by the Daily Nation journalist) say that whereas they recognize the chief mediator Koffi Annan’s role in midwifing the peace process, (at the national level) the peaceful coexistence realized at the grassroots has largely been due to the residents’ efforts. One, they argue, must own the reconciliation drive for the initiative to be meaningful (The Daily Nation, 24 October 2012).

6.4.3 Restitution and restoration of land rights.

Many victims lost their lands and also their documents such as title deeds which were either burnt or misplaced. This was especially so in Sagaitim, Lare and Mau Summit areas of Molo. It is imperative for the government to facilitate their replacement so that the victims who lost land can recover their land. In situations where it is impossible for victims to go back to their former lands, the state can compensate the
victims in accordance with the current market rates for land. This will enable the affected to reconstruct their lives.

In areas like Mukinyai and Kapsita victims of violence have been embittered by the fact that they could identify iron sheets, bicycles, television sets and cattle stolen from them in the course of the violence. Voluntary surrender of such property to their owners would go a long way in restoring raptured ethnic and personal relationships. The success of restitution would be determined by the effectiveness of reconciliation.

6.4.4 Significant cultural and attitudinal change.

To overcome negative ethnicity, there is need for residents in Molo to change how they relate to, and direct their attitudes towards one another. The culture of suspicion, fear, mistrust and violence need to be broken down and opportunities and space opened up in which people can hear and be heard. Similarly, the cultural basis of violence ought to be dealt with. It was in the appreciation of this fact that the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK), Gender Equity Network and Genesis Art Creation organized a joint initiation ceremony comprising of the Kalenjin, Kikuyu and the Abagusii in Molo and Kuresoi constituencies in December 2012. The initiates were first trained on peace building (http://m.news24.com/kenya, March 3 2012). If sustained, such an approach will in the long run prove vital. Circumcision ceremonies are important avenues for confronting violence; a young man had confided that:

It is during the circumcision ceremony that youths are trained on how they can develop to be real warriors and how they can exterminate other communities (their enemies). During this rite of passage from childhood to adulthood they are taught that if they can kill there would be no either spiritual or emotional impact has they would be purified later after killing (USIP, 2009:11).
6.4.5 Creation of job opportunities for the youth

Although unemployment is not unique to Molo Division alone, two decades of intermittent ethnic conflicts in the area has compounded the challenges faced by youth in Molo. As discussed in chapter, many of them were unable to pursue education to higher levels, making them unable to compete against their contemporaries in other parts of the country. Moreover, as noted by CIPEV, (2008: 35, 36) many of them moved into towns. Desperation has made them available for hire by politicians bent on using violence to win elections. Besides, they have become easy recruits by ethnic militias and vigilante groups. The government should devise ways of economically empowering the youth such as building of roads, planting trees to restore the forests that have disappeared in the course of the conflict as well as assisting the youth get funds through the youth enterprise fund.

6.4.6 Profiling of all victims of ethnic violence

In an effort to resettle and build houses for victims of violence, the government has engendered feelings of victimization and marginalization among the Kalenjin. A journalist with the Standard newspaper noted that: “the government’s efforts to resettle one community while ignoring another was causing disquiet, threatening fragile peace. . .Residents (Kalenjin) were unhappy because they were viewed as aggressors who never suffered from the violence… if your neighbor gets something and you get nothing, you ask yourself why” (The Standard, July 15, 2011). To eliminate such perceptions, it would be prudent for the government to profile all victims and compensate them.
6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to highlight and critique some of the peace initiatives that have been operational in Molo in the period 1992-2008. Government supported and community based approaches to peace have been interrogated. A key observation that has been made is that there is lack of coordination between the government and non-state actors in the processes which has in turn jeopardized the prospects for sustainable peace. It has also been argued that there are mechanisms such as memorialization, restitution and restoration of land rights that can be adopted to further the agenda for peace in the area.
CHAPTER SEVEN

7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study sought to examine the social, cultural and economic consequences of ethnic violence in Molo Division in the period 1969-2008. In this regard, Chapter two addressed the first objective of the study, namely, to find out the causes of ethnic violence in Molo Division in the period 1969 - 2008. To put the chapter in perspective, the Olenguruone crisis of 1947, the Mau mau rebellion, the formation of KADU and KANU in 1960, the activities of the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA) as well as the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969 were identified and discussed as key events that set the stage for ethnic intolerance in Kenya and the area of study in particular. The research findings revealed that a combination of factors were responsible for the three waves of violence i.e 1992-1993, 1997-1998 and 2007-2008. It has been pointed out that negative ethnicity; controversies over land, cultural factors and politicization of ethnicity to win elections are some of the factors responsible for violence. The discussion contained in this chapter confirmed the first premise which indicated that ethnic violence in Molo Division has always been politically motivated. This view is supported by the fact that ethnic violence occurred simultaneously with the reintroduction of multi party politics in 1991.

Chapter Three explored the issues raised by the second objective, that is, the social consequences of ethnic violence. Direct and indirect deaths resulting from violence, displacements, creation of widows, widowers and orphans have been the most obvious outcome of the conflict. Feelings of hopelessness, destitution, disruption of education, late and early marriages, break up of inter ethnic families have also been discussed as consequences of the violence. The chapter has also pointed out that there
has been an increase in the social distance among members of the various ethnic
groups that live in Molo Division.

The second premise stated that ethnic conflicts in Molo Division have had an adverse
effect on the socio-cultural aspects of the local communities. For instance, the
depletion of forests has adversely affected the Ogiek in a very fundamental manner
because the forests have always provided them with food and offered them sacred
places where initiation ceremonies are carried out. Their displacement in times of
ethnic violence has forced them to abandon some of these sacred grounds. The
resettlement of the agricultural Bantu, who cleared and burnt forests as they broke
virgin land, destroyed the natural ecosystem from which they obtained their food. The
Ogiek who live near the Agikuyu and the Abagusii at Kapsita in Elburgon were
forced to take their young men for circumcision to their relatives in areas like
Ndoinet, which is still forested. Similarly, victims of violence have been compelled to
live with their In – Laws during conflict periods, contrary to culturally accepted
norms that discourage too much interactions between In – Laws. It is also noted that
violence led to the collapse of joint inter-ethnic initiation ceremonies and disrupted
family values. In the light of such findings, the premise that ethnic conflicts in Molo
have had adverse effects on the social cultural aspects of the local communities was
positively confirmed.

In tandem with the third objective of the study, Chapter Four investigated the
economic impact of ethnic violence. While conceding that it is difficult to compute
the real value of losses incurred by the victims, it is demonstrated that diversion of
resources, creation of dependency, destruction of houses and business enterprises as
well as disruption of agricultural activities has brought huge economic losses to many individuals and families. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that the climate of fear, uncertainty and doubt created by the violence have made many potential investors hesitate to invest in rural Molo.

Further, it has been shown that the treatment of injuries and psychiatric disorders imposed financial burdens upon the relatives of the victims. Fundamentally, ethnic violence has destroyed patterns of inter ethnic trade in the area by making some markets unsafe for certain ethnic groups. The result has been to impoverish many families. The chapter notes that with the collapse of legitimate means of earning incomes, incidents of criminality such as cattle theft have proliferated. From the data collected, it was clear that there has been a diversion of resources from Molo to areas considered safer by the victims—areas such as Nakuru town, Nyandarua, (for the Kikuyu) Keringet and Uasin Gishu (for the Kalenjin).

Most of the victims substantially reduced their farming activities, which in turn led to a decline in their incomes. Similarly, pyrethrum farming, which earned the growers a lot of income, collapsed in the early 1990s, even though other factors besides ethnic violence might have led to its collapse. As discussed elsewhere, the keeping of livestock in the area faces a big threat from cattle rustlers who on several occasions wounded and even killed some of those who had livestock. Consequently, many farmers gave up keeping any livestock. The overall result of such violence imposed destocking was a reduction in the income of many people in the area. The researcher therefore confirmed the premise that ethnic violence in Molo Division has slowed
down the economic growth of Molo Division in general, and that of the victims in particular.

Consistent with the fourth aim of the study, Chapter five critiques peace building strategies that have been used in the area since 1992. It has been pointed out that efforts to build sustainable peace in the area have failed to grasp the fundamental issues that cause the violence. The Chapter has also faulted government efforts for its top down approach to peace making and argued that the re-intergration of displaced people, reconstitution of raptured social relationships, memorialization, cultural and attitudinal change, creation of job opportunities for the youth, reconciliation, restitution and restoration of land rights are crucial to securing peace in the area.

Fourth premise stated that in spite of the violence, social relations such as inter-ethnic marriages have persisted. Although many respondents strongly indicated that they would be uncomfortable if their son or daughter were to marry from an ethnic group they have been in conflict with, we found out that this has not translated into the reality on the ground. We did not find any evidence to the effect that inter-ethnic marriages have been on the decline since 1992. It even appeared that there has been an increase in the frequency of such marriages. We could not tell whether this apparent ‘increase’ is real or due to the publicity given to such ‘unexpected’ unions (in the light of perceived hostilities between the conflicting ethnic groups). During the process of data collection, we came across several inter-ethnic marriages all contracted at various times in the period 1992-2008. The fact that we easily found these couples confirmed that inspite of violence, inter-ethnic marriages in Molo Division have persisted.
This study notes that the social, cultural and economic consequences of ethnic violence in Molo Division are many and varied. They cannot be restricted to the ones discussed in this study alone. Overall, this study has utilized conflict and postcolonial theories in the interpretation of its data. Through the concept of competitive struggle for power, we have shown that politicians manipulated ethnicity so as to win or retain political power.

We have attempted to demonstrate that the struggle for political power was central to conflicts in the area of study. Randall Collins analytic conflict formulations that place differential distribution of desirables such as power and wealth have also been used in data analysis. Using this paradigm, the study noted that under the guise of ethnic violence, individuals sought to accumulate property such as land and livestock. The concept of cultural invasion was also used to interrogate the cultural consequences of ethnic violence in the study area. The postcolonial abstractions of allocation and transfer, derived from Achille Mbembe (2001) were appropriated to analyse data. In this regard, Molo Division was considered as a space within the Kenyan postcolony.

Undoubtedly, ethnic violence in Molo Division has had very tragic consequences, not only for the areas and individuals affected but also for the country at large. In a country that still grapples with food insecurity, the government ought to move with speed to secure every inch of land that is arable, such as Molo Division so as to boost food production. It is unfortunate that due to violence, many people in the area have been compelled to rely on relief food.
Findings in this study show that the state failed in its responsibility to protect its own citizens. The government should therefore offer monetary compensation to victims of ethnic violence who have lost their property since 1992. On the same note, thousands of young people have been denied a decent chance in life when they were forced to drop out of school because of the violence. Perhaps, the government should profile such young people and sponsor them through technical institutions and polytechnics where they can learn courses like tailoring, masonry and carpentry.

Communities that have fought in inter-ethnic warfare need to engage each other in peace building efforts. Peace must come from below, from the grassroots. It is encouraging to note that at the time of writing this thesis, members of the Agikuyu and Kalenjin communities in some parts of the North Rift have come together to build houses for those displaced during the 2008 Post Election Violence.

The fact that this study has established that politicians have played a central role in ethnic conflicts in Molo Division implies that politicians (wanasiasa) need to refrain from inciting communities against each other.

Those who incite ought to be disqualified from seeking or holding any political and public office in Kenya. It is encouraging to note that the National Cohesion and Intergration Commission (NCIC) and the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions have already instituted criminal proceedings against some politicians for hate speech and incitement.
Having been accused of playing a big role in the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence, the media houses ought to maintain professional standards and refuse to be manipulated by politicians. Indeed, the media houses can help expose politicians and individuals who try to win elections by appealing to primordial ethnic loyalties.

Finally, perceived historical injustices revolving around land issues ought to be redressed. This is particularly imperative for the Ogiek because of their peculiar lifestyle. The proposed National Land Commission ought to move with speed and streamline land controversies that have haunted areas like Molo Division for many years.

7.1 Suggestions for Further Research.

This study confined itself to investigating the social, cultural and economic impact of ethnic violence in Molo Division. Yet, in the course of research, it was evident that there are psychiatric cases that are directly associated with the violence. It was also notable that there are differences in the way the violence has impacted on men; many men were said to have died due to stress caused by the violence as compared to women. Similarly, even during interview schedules, male respondents appeared more hurt, more subdued. Interested researchers can consider interrogating the gender dimension of ethnic violence in the area.

One of the observations made during research is that there is a relationship between ethnic violence and environmental degradation; forests have disappeared in the course of the conflict. It is worth investigating the environmental impact of ethnic violence in Molo Division.
Findings of this study show that ethnic violence has altered the lives of individuals and entire communities such as the Ogiek. They have been forced to seek alternative ways of survival. Prospective researchers would be interested to do further research on the “Changing Livelihood Patterns and Implications to Inter-Ethnic Relations”. All these are areas that researchers can investigate.
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The Standard

APPENDIX 1

A SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE GUIDELINE / STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction
The aim of this Questionnaire is to collect data on the social, cultural and economic consequences of ethnic violence in Molo Division, Nakuru County. The information provided is for academic purpose with the ultimate aim of linking it to policy formulation. Any information will be strictly confidential. There are no wrong or right answers. Please use the spaces provided to fill information.

NAME__________________
AGE__________________
SEX__________________
LOCATION______________
OCCUPATION____________
MARITAL STATUS________

PART A
1 For how long have you been a resident of Molo Division?

b) Please explain how you related with people from other ethnic groups before the introduction of multi-party politics in 1991.

c) In your opinion, what have been the causes of ethnic violence in this area since 1992?

d) How has the violence affected you personally? For example,
   i) Have you lost a family member due to the violence? If yes, how many?
   ii) Have you gone through long periods of separation from your spouse due to circumstances directly related to the violence? If so, what has been the effect of this separation?
   iii) How has the violence affected your children e.g. their schooling, their perception of members of other ethnic groups?
   iv) Have you gone through momentary displacement in times of conflict? If so, have you been forced by circumstances to seek refuge in a relative’s home?
   v) Are there specific cultural norms that were adjusted to accommodate conflict situations? For example the rules that define relations between in-laws? If so, give examples.
   vi) What has been your experience while staying with relatives?

2. i) Do you think the violence has increased the social distance between ethnic groups?

   ii) Do you know of any mixed marriages that have been affected by the violence? If so, how?

   iii) How would you take your son’s/daughter’s suggestion to marry from the ethnic group you has been in conflict with since 1992?

   iv) What has been the role of vigilante groups in the conflict?

   v) Do you think such groups offer alternative security in the absence of state security?

3. i) Do you own a piece of land in Molo? If yes, what is its size?

   ii) Prior to 1991, how did you utilize your land?

      a) Dairy farming

      b) Crop production
c) Both a) and b)
d) Any other

iii) In your estimation, what was your monthly income from the economic activities named above?

iv) Do you still have access to your land?

iv) If yes, how much of it is under effective cultivation?

v) What is your monthly income from farming activities currently?

vi) How has the violence affected your farming activities?

vii) What are the overall economic effects of the violence on your family?

PART B: FOR RESPONDENTS AT MUTONYORA LOCATION (NYANDARUA SOUTH DISTRICT)

1 When did you move from Molo area?

a) What reasons made you move? Please tick where applicable.
   i) Due to earlier ethnic violence of 1992 and 1997
   ii) The Post Election Violence of 2008
   iii) Other reasons, (please specify)

b) Did you live in your own house, or was it rented?
   i) Own house
   ii) Rented

c) Do you now live in your own house, or is it rented?
   i) Own house
   ii) Rented

d) Did you own land in Molo?
   i) Yes
   ii) No

e) If yes, how many hectares?
   i) Less than 5
   ii) Between 5 and 10
   iii) More than 10

f) Is it currently under cultivation? What acreage?
   i) What is your monthly income from that farm?
   ii) How has the violence affected your farming activities?

2. Besides farming, had you invested in other activities such as business?

   a) i) If so, what was your monthly income, on average?
   b) i) Is the business still on?
c) If no, what happened?
   i) Vandalized
   ii) Burnt
   iii) Vandalized and then burnt.

d) Approximate the total loss you incurred from c) above in Kenya shillings.

e) How has the violence affected you and your family economically?

f) Do you have plans to go back to Molo and re-invest in your farm/business?

3 In what other ways has the violence affected you economically? Please comment freely.

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**APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INFORMANTS**

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Glossary

**Kiswahili**

Madooa – ‘Spots’, used to refer to ethnic groups considered outsiders in the Rift Valley.
Majimbo – Ethnic regions, singular, jimbo.
Matatu- Public transport vehicles.
Shamba- farm
Siasa – Politics.
Ugatuzi- Devolution of political and economic power to the County level.
Wanasiasa – Politicians, plural. Singular, Mwanasiasa.

**Kalenjin**

Bunyot – Enemy, Kalenjin
Cheplang’et- Leopard, in this thesis, the word was used by Kalenjins to refer to settler communities in the Rift Valley, that is, the non – Kamatusa ethnic groups.
Kipkeleloik – Young men who have just come out of the seclusion period after initiation.
Koito – Traditional marriage negotiations where dowry is discussed and the bride and bridegroom’s family are formally introduced to one another.
Maiyek – Traditional alcoholic brew.
Mursik – Fermented milk, usually stored in a Sotet.
Muitap teta – cow hide, plural, muiywek ab tuga.
Sangara – Weeds, used by Kalenjin politicians to refer to non – Kalenjin ethnic groups living in Kalenjin areas.
Sotet – Milk gourd.
Tairisiek – Circumcised young men while still in the seclusion period.
Teta – Cow.

**Kikuyu**

Athoni – In-laws
Mungiki- multitude, a sect that advocates for return to traditional Kikuyu practices such as female circumcision.
Ndarama – Beating drum, made from a cow hide.
Nduriri- non Kikuyu ethnic groups, especially those found in the Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza Provinces. A quite offensive term, has the same connotations as the words Heathen, Gentile.
Turiko – Ability to remember, memory.