CROSS-CULTURAL LANGUAGE AS A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR RECONCILING WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

BY

STEPHEN OMONDI OWINO

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
DECLARATION

I declare that this is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in any other university.

Stephen Omondi Owino

(Candidate)

This thesis has been submitted with our approval as the University Supervisors.

Prof. Wambari K

Dr. Gichure C. K

Date 22/08/2002

Date 26/08/02

Date 28/08/02
DEDICATION
To Mum and Dad
With Love
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Kenyatta University for offering me a university scholarship as well as graduate assistantship in order to complete my Masters of Arts (M.A) course.

I am equally grateful to my supervisors, Prof. Wambari, K. and Dr. Gichure, Christine. Their patience, encouragement and guidance made it possible for me to bring this work to reality.

I am also indebted to my family members and many friends who gave me both moral and material support in the course work. I am particularly grateful to my friends Ogango Martin and Susan Mwangi who spent long hours into the night with me in typing and proofreading this work.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 CLARIFICATION OF TERMS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 THE THESIS OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 SCOPE AND LIMITATION</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11 METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0 LANGUAGE MEANING AND COMMUNICATION IN THE TRACTATUS</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 TRACTARIAN ONTOLOGY</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 LANGUAGE</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.0. Names</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1. Elementary Propositions</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2. Non-Elementary Propositions</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3. Language:</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 MEANING</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 THE TRACTATUS AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM ON MEANING</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 COMMUNICATION</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 CRITICAL REMARKS ON CHAPTER TWO</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 CONCLUSION</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER THREE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.0 LANGUAGE, MEANING AND COMMUNICATION IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 CRITIQUE OF THE TRACTARIAN ONTOLOGY</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 LANGUAGE</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 Language-games versus Tractarian Representationism</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WE GET AN ILLUMINATING REMARK IN WITTGENSTEIN (1980, PAR.630)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 Family Resemblances</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 MEANING</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1 Attack on the Picture-Theory of Meaning</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2 The Pragmatic, Use-theory of meaning</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 COMMUNICATION</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1 Communication: Performing of Speech Acts</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2 Multilateral View of Communication</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 CRITICAL REMARKS ON CHAPTER THREE</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.1 On Language</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.2 On meaning</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 CONCLUSION</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER FOUR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.0 LOGIC AND CULTURAL CONTEXT IN A LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 IMPACT OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 THE LOGICAL STATUS OF SYNTAX</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 CULTURAL CONDITIONING OF SEMANTICAL INTERPRETATION IN A LANGUAGE</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5 TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE GRAMMAR’S ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATION OF SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS .................................................. 117
  4.5.1 The Syntactic Component .................................................. 119
  4.5.2 The Semantic Component ................................................. 122
  4.5.3 Syntactic and Semantics ................................................. 126

4.6 SYNTHESIS OF WITTGENSTEIN’S THEORIES IN FUNCTION OF THE DYNAMICS OF CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATIONS ....................... 127
  4.6.1 On language ...................................................................... 128
  4.6.2 On meaning ................................................................. 130
  4.6.3 On communication ....................................................... 134

4.7 CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 135

CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................. 137
  5.0 GENERAL CONCLUSION ........................................................... 137
  5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 137
  5.2 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY .................................................... 137
  5.3 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ...................................................... 140
  5.4 ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE STUDY ........................................... 143
  5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY ..................................... 145

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................... 146
The study is primarily an attempt to reconcile Ludwig Wittgenstein’s major works namely, the *Tractatus – Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. It is contented in the study that contrary to the common perception that the two works are contradictory, they are actually complementary. Therefore, it is only when they are considered together that we can have a complete grasp of Wittgenstein’s thought.

The study has focused on the concepts of language, meaning and communication as can be unfolded in both works. The *Tractatus* holds that language is a rule-guided system. These rules can be rewritten in logical language. Hence, language is conceived of as rigorous, logical and determinate. On meaning, the *Tractatus*, holds that language functions primarily to picture or represent the world. Hence, meaning is the picturing or the representational relationship between language and the world. This implies that language is meaningful only in the proportion that it represents the world. Otherwise in any other function, it is meaningless. Lastly, on communication, consistent with its theory of language and meaning, the *Tractatus* upholds that linguistic communication has got only an informative role.

But in apparent opposition to the *Tractatus* the philosophical Investigations holds that language is an open textured and flexible phenomenon which makes it possible for us to express new experiences and to perform a multiplicity of functions that transcends the mere genre of reporting about the world. On meaning, the investigations maintains that fundamentally, it (meaning) is how words are used in accordance with custom rules. In
VIII

this sense, even the picturing function is conditioned and guided by customary linguistic rules and not by the isomorphic structures of language and the world. On communication, it holds that the simple role of factual information is insufficient as an explanation of linguistic communication. Instead, communication involves a complex body of shared background information between speakers and listeners or writers and readers. This establishes communication as an interactive and multilateral activity.

The study applies the theoretical framework of philosophy of linguistic as proposed by Katz (1985). This theory brings the linguistic insights of Transformational generative grammar as formulated by Chomsky to bear on philosophy. English as a cross-cultural language used in cross-cultural communication media is used in the study as an instance for evaluating the relevance of the arguments.

In the light of this framework, the study establishes that the Tractatus and the Investigations are not contradictory. They are complimentary hence reconcilable in principle. The study notes that the weaknesses of the arguments of the Tractatus are made up for by the arguments of the Investigations and vice versa. It is also noted that the philosophical insights of both works have proofs in theoretical linguistic as well.

Finally, the study recommends that since the two works are better understood when looked at compromising a single system, effort should be made to unify Wittgenstein’s thought in other areas of philosophy. This would enable us to come to a more complete grasp of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

The following key terms are going to feature frequently in my study:

**Language**: Refers to and will be used in the general sense of a system of communication through which humankind exchanges ideas and feelings. It generally consists of words and sentences in natural languages. But besides the natural languages we have artificial languages which are systems of signs and symbols together with their rules for forming intelligible communications, for example, the symbolic systems invented for technical use in computers, secret codes, mathematics, symbolic logic, etc. In some instances, the term “language” will be used in this latter sense.

**Meaning**: Refers to the various aspects of our understanding of words and sentences and consequently it involves our ability to endow words and sentences with a symbolic function.

**Communication**: It is understood in the ordinary and common sense of an act of imparting or conveying one’s meaning, messages and information to others. This might be at personal level or at a mass level.

**Cross-Cultural Language**: Refers to any natural language which is used for education, business, communication, etc. In places which are beyond the native speakers’ boundaries and commonly referred to as language of wider communication or LWC.
Metalanguage: A language that is used to talk about another language referred to as the "object language". For example, if a work on Kiswahili is written in English, English is the metalanguage.

Syntax: With reference to a natural language, is a system of rules governing the construction of sentences of the given natural language. On the other hand, with reference to the formal or artificial language, it is a specification of the vocabulary of the language together with the rules for the construction of acceptable combinations of the items in the vocabulary.

Semantics: Is a general theory of meanings attached to words and sentences. With references to the formal languages, it is the interpretation of the formal language.

Speech Acts: These are the acts performed while speaking such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, referring, predating, etc. There are three categories of speech acts namely: locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act.

**Locutionary Act:** This performs merely the act of saying something. It just involves uttering of a sentence.

**Illocutionary Act:** In saying something we perform an act for example statements, warnings, promises etc.

**Perlocutionary Act:** By saying something we cause some effects in the hearer for example, fright or embarrassment.
Atomic Proposition: Is a logically simple proposition which has no logical operator like and, or, if...then. For example, John is sick.

Molecular Proposition: Is a complex proposition which is composed of two or more atomic propositions by means of a logical operator/s. For example, John is sick and tired.

Truth-function: Is a relation in which the truth or falsity of a molecular proposition depends on the truth or falsity of its constituent rhetoric propositions.

Verification: It is a principle of meaningfulness which holds that the meaning of a proposition consists in whatever observations or experiences to show whether or not it is true.

Reconcile: To bring facts or ideas into harmony or compatibility when they appear to conflict by making them or proving that they (ideas or facts) are in fact consistent.
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The current moment of history sees world-wide communication rendered both instantaneous and interactive. This has been possible because of the development of space satellites and the recent computer development which has produced the internet. Thus the expression “our world is becoming a global village” has become common parlance of our age and it is an echoing of this technological advance in the field of communication which has greatly increased the range and scope of the mass media.

Going hand in hand with this globalization is the massive inflow of information, great diversity of opinions and intercultural conflicts. There is a great concern to achieve an efficient, relatively error-free flow of information. But in attempting to meet this goal, there are problems of language and meaning to be grappled with. For instance, a space cast that covers more than a million square miles is certain to be received in many areas where different languages are used. So the questions arise: what languages should be used to effect communication in such a context? Ought there be a universal second language learnt by everybody? How can the media succeed in conveying the exact and the intended meaning to its audience in such a transcultural context if “meaning” is to a great extent culturally conditioned? These are pertinent questions which still stand in need of answers. In this context, philosophy is also challenged to respond and provide for clarity and answers. I think that the contemporary brand of philosophy, commonly referred to as Analytical Philosophy, because of its concern with language, meaning and clarification of concepts, has some valuable insights to offer with regard to the practical questions of language, meaning and communication which are generated by today’s communication technology.
According to Scruton (1995, pp. 268-ff.), Analytical Philosophy is a heterogeneous philosophical movement of the twentieth century. Within it, three main trends are identified, namely: Logical Atomism, Logical Positivism and Ordinary-Language Philosophy. But a common feature to all of them is the concern with the analysis of language and the conception of the generic task of philosophy as being the clarification of concepts.

The main proponents of Logical Atomism were Bertrand Russell and the "early" Wittgenstein. They held broadly that our languages have a basic uniform structure which represents the basic structure of the world. And so through a detailed analysis of the structure of our languages, we can ultimately arrive at a clear understanding of the basic structure of the world. This is a form of metaphysics. The function of philosophy is, therefore, the analysis of language which eventually unveils its basic structure.

The proponents of Logical Positivism were Moritz Schlick, Rudolph Carnap, Herbert Feigl Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn, Freidrich Waismann and A. J. Aver. They were mostly influenced by the development of mathematical logic and the advance of positive (or empirical) sciences. They dismissed any form of metaphysics, upto and including the metaphysics of Logical Atomism as being meaningless. They held that philosophy does not give any true knowledge but it merely clarifies the meaning of statements, by showing some to be scientific, some to be mathematical and some to be non-sensical. According to them, the only significant statement is either a statement of formal logic which includes mathematical statements or a statement of science. All the other statements are considered non-cognitive and are just motivational.
Finally we have the Ordinary-Language Philosophy whose main proponents were the “later” Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle and John Austin. They held that the function of philosophy is to simply indicate the meaning of terms, particularly the problematic philosophical terms, by describing how they were used by ordinary speakers. They, therefore, abandoned the enterprise of fashioning a formal language free from errors and ambiguities which the Logical Atomists and the Logical Positivists advocated for. Of all these analytic philosophers, Wittgenstein is an appropriate choice for a case study because his thoughts had considerable bearings on the three analytic trends.

Frege and Russell enormously influenced and shaped the thinking of Wittgenstein. He endorsed their works but on several aspects, he attacked them too. It is their orientation in philosophy which created in Wittgenstein the concern with the nature of language which was later to be his main philosophical preoccupation throughout his life. His early contacts with Russell and Frege formed his early thinking and culminated in his philosophy of logical atomism expounded in his major work, the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*. He wrote it during the first World War and finished it in 1918, even though it came to be published in 1922.

With the publication of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein thought that the problem of philosophy had finally been solved by him and in consistent move, he abandoned active philosophy. He, therefore, went to a Teachers’ Training College in Vienna in 1919 and later worked as a teacher in remote Austrian villages from 1920-1929 when he again took up philosophy. This period as a school teacher marked the transition of Wittgenstein from his “early” philosophy to the “later” philosophy. He did have occasional visits and discussions with some notable logical positivists, like Freidrich Waismann. Wittgenstein.
mainly taught arithmetic and language or grammar to his pupils. A blend of these two, namely, discussions with some philosophers and experience as a grammar teacher was greatly instrumental in changing his earlier view of language and adopt a new version.

Bartley W. (1975, pp. 76-77), points out that this is a period in which the Austrian school-reform movement was in force and advocating for change in teaching techniques. This movement attacked the old drill-school method of learning by rote which was being used to instruct pupils. Wittgenstein was sympathetic to the movement. The main principles of the school-reform programme were “self-activity” and integrated instruction and Wittgenstein’s way of implementing these principles in his school radically reshaped his views on language.

In 1926, he left teaching and went back to Cambridge University to take up philosophy again. His *Tractatus* had become a classic there and so he was awarded a doctorate degree at Cambridge by virtue of the *Tractatus*. In this second phase, Wittgenstein wrote the *Philosophical Investigations* which was published posthumously in 1953. It expounded a new doctrine of language and attacked his earlier view that ordinary language can be translated into the rigorous formal language of logic which accurately pictures the relations of objects in the world. Instead he expounded the view that ordinary language is in order just the way it is. All that is required is a sensitivity to the various contexts in which words are ordinary used, hence, the meaning of terms can be established only from their usage in ordinary language. These two major works have inspired diverse and elaborate schools of thought which are often opposed to one another. My study attempts to reconcile these major works of Wittgenstein on the basis of English as a cross-cultural language which is in use in the mass media today.
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Through an exhaustive inquiry into how the cross-cultural languages function in today's media, how they affect meaning and at the same time effect relatively successful communication, we can assess the relevance or irrelevance of theories involving these very concepts of language, meaning and communication. In case of conflicting theories, we can finally judge whether they are completely incompatible or whether they can be reconciled. In this study a closer scrutiny of the cross-cultural languages and in particular English used to enhance communication between peoples of diverse cultural backgrounds would be ideal because it would provide us with insights into the connection and interplay between logic and cultural context of a people in communication. These were the foundational concepts of the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* respectively. The *Tractatus* held an essentialistic view of language according to which all languages have basic structure which can be expressed in the notation of logical calculus after a complete reductive analysis. This essential logical structure of language is a picture of the structure of the world. Language is, therefore, only meaningful if it is a picture of facts in the world.

The *Philosophical Investigations* on the other hand held that language has no essential feature. Instead it has many and diverse functions which are determined by the various contexts in which the language is used. Meaning is hence the use of a language in a given context. The issue of the study is, therefore, to assess if the cross-cultural languages used in modern-day mass media can serve as a basis to reconcile the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*.
1.4 OBJECTIVES

The focus of this study is the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. His thoughts fall within the broader framework of analytical philosophy. This is a highly diverse and dynamic philosophical movement. This heterogeneity within analytical philosophy explains the importance of case studies. It also justifies the isolation of a particular formulation or philosopher and an examination of what he uniquely has to offer. Therefore, the primary and general purpose of the study is to understand the thoughts of Wittgenstein narrowed down to the themes of language, meaning and communication in his two principle works namely, the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*.

The study attempts to achieve the following objectives:

a. To unfold and reconstruct the highly condensed, overlapping and aphoristic works of Wittgenstein, what his theories are regarding language, meaning and communication.

b. To critically examine and attempt to reconcile these themes from the perspective of the cross-cultural languages used in today’s international media.

In this respect, the study tries to show:

(i) the interconnection that exists between *Logic* and *cultural context* in a language. (These are the respective foundational concepts of the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*).

(ii) the practical implications of Wittgenstein’s thought for modern communications.

---

1 In the subsequent pages, they will be referred to as simply the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* or in case of references, they will be abbreviated as T.L.P. and PI respectively.
1.5 THE THESIS OF THE STUDY

The question of language, meaning and communication is a major problem facing the technological world today. And yet for practical purposes, the use of some cross-cultural languages in communication has been to an extent successful. It is precisely to the use of these languages that Wittgenstein's philosophy can be put to test today. So, the thesis of the study is that the cross-cultural languages used in the media today may serve as the basis for reconciling contrasting view of Wittgenstein.

1.6 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

In carrying out the study, I have made three fundamental assumptions:

a. That both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* have true but different conceptions of language, meaning and communication which are complementary to each other and therefore we can not dispense with either of them.

b. That modern communication technology is fast advancing without any clear and commensurate philosophical foundation. So a study of philosophical theory on the major concepts of communication can provide the needed critical discourse.

c. That modern communication technology brings into use some cross-cultural languages, the elements of which can be used to reconcile the thoughts of Wittgenstein.

1.7 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Language, meaning and communication is a timely field of investigation demanded by the global expanse of communication today. This is, therefore, a credible area of study, so too is the philosopher selected.
Wittgenstein is a pre-eminent representative of the analytic philosophy. Logical Atomism started by Bertrand Russell, had its most careful and complete statement in the *Tractatus* of Wittgenstein. Logical Positivism had many doctrines similar to Wittgenstein's and actually drew a lot from his *Tractatus*, so much so that some scholars have always identified him as a Logical Positivist. However, I contend that there were substantial differences between Wittgenstein and Logical Positivist especially in their theories of meaning. Lastly, the ordinary-language philosophy had its groundwork in the doctrines expounded in the *Investigations*. Therefore, I think Wittgenstein merits a large measure of scrutiny with regard to analytic philosophy.

On the one hand, there is a constantly expanding body of reputable studies in the field of analytic philosophy and precisely on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Still a lacuna remains; there is no work to my knowledge that attempts to situate Wittgenstein's theories of language, meaning and communication within the context of the worldwide communication in which we are today. The study is, therefore, a contribution to this end.

1.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are several theories that can inform a study of language, meaning and communication. Such theories are Logical Atomism, Logical Positivism, Ordinary-Language Philosophy and a more recent one in the course of development called the philosophy of linguistics. The first three were briefly discussed in the background to the study.
Logical Atomism as expounded in Russell (1956) is the theory which holds that ordinary language can be systematically misleading by its apparent grammatical structure. It lacks precision and clarity as it is often ambiguous. For that matter, it is ill-suited for the expression of philosophical concepts. But through the application of the formal symbolism of logic, we can achieve clarity, precision and disambiguity, hence reformulate philosophical problems so that their solutions can become apparent. This is only achievable through the logical analysis of ordinary language which mainly aims at revealing its underlying logical form. For example, we take two sentences, the flower is red and also that the book is red. Their common logical form is $x \text{ is } R$ which is written as $Rx$ in the formal symbolism. The inadequacy of ordinary language according to Logical Atomism leads among other things, to bad metaphysics. For example, Russell in his famous theory of description held that the subject - predicate structure of ordinary sentences has often misled us into positing the existence of all kinds of entities which are apparently denoted by the subject - terms of propositions. For instance, to say that the golden mountain exists. The phrase the golden mountain functions as the grammatical subject of the sentence and it appears that we can say something about it. So it must denote an entity of some sort. Yet in reality it does not denote any existing reality. In this way, the true reality is misconstrued by supposing that certain things exist which actually do not exist. It is only through full logical analysis of ordinary propositions that we can display their true logical form and thereby produce a true metaphysics (where a true metaphysics in Logical Atomism means a description of the essential structure and relation of things).

Logical Positivism as expounded in Ayer (1971) is the other theory. It held that ordinarily, only scientific propositions have any cognitive import. Any other type of
The Logical Positivists hence elaborated a principle of verification according to which propositions can be evaluated to determine their meaningfulness or meaninglessness. The principle stated that the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification which must always rest on empirical observation. This principle was rigorously applied by the Positivists to dismiss all metaphysics, religion, ethics and aesthetics as meaningless and merely motivational in content. The only meaningful statements are scientific statements and logico-mathematical statements. But like the Logical Atomists, Logical Positivists also held that ordinary language is inadequate and imprecise. So it cannot be used to express adequately the meaningful scientific propositions. As such, they endeavoured to create an artificial logical language which would be used to precisely and unambiguously express scientific statements.

The third theory is the ordinary-language philosophy. Its general spirit as expressed in Wittgenstein (1978) is “anti-essentialism”. Essentialism is the view that the reason for regarding a group of distinct things as belonging to the same kind is that they have a distinguishing set of features shared by all and only members of that group. For example, if rationality is taken to be the essence or the distinguishing feature of mankind, then we can define man and only man as a rational being. With regards to language and meaning, both Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism upheld an essentialistic theory, as we have seen according to which all language has a single logical “skeleton” which functions to state facts.

But Ordinary-Language Philosophy opposes this essentialism and insists that there is no essential feature in virtue of which a language is meaningful. Partly a language may
consist of names of objects and statements of facts but this is not the essential or defining feature of a language. This theory recognizes and gives prominence to the fact that language has many functions besides simply representing objects and that language always functions in a context. For that matter language has as many purposes and meanings as there are contexts in which they are used.

The Philosophy of Linguistics is a recent theory and it has been proposed and expounded by Katz (1966). This framework is largely based on the linguistic theory of Transformational Generative Grammar of Noam Chomsky in his work, *Syntactic Structures* (1957). Chomsky argues that a language is an infinite set of well-formed sentences. This infinite range is due to what he (Chomsky) called the *creativity of language*. This is the capacity to produce new sentences which are in turn immediately understood by the hearers and yet these sentences bear no resemblance to any sentence which has been uttered before. The theory of Transformational Generative Grammar is hence advanced by Chomsky to account for this infinity and creativity in human language. It holds that any given language is a rule-governed system. They are these rules that govern the grammaticality or well-formedness and meaningfulness of any uttered sentence in the given language. It is on the basis of these rules that we can generate and even determine the meaning of new sentences which we have never uttered or heard before. But this is usually an unconscious process.

A generative grammar is, therefore, an explicit exposition of the finite set of rules and symbols by means of which we can generate only the well-formed sentences of a language, the number of which is infinite. It is analogous to a deductive calculus in logic in which by a set of rules of formation we can derive an infinite set of theorems. But a
Generative Grammar does not stop at the level of grammar and well-formedness of sentences. It extends to include the question of meaning and interpretation of the well-formed sentences. To illustrate this we can take, for example, the popular sentence which was coined by Chomsky himself. “The colourless green ideas are sleeping furiously”.

We can understand this sentence because it is grammatically correct, but attempts to interpret it would lead to incoherence.

For that matter, Chomsky’s theory is an inquiry into the interrelationship between the structural rules of a language and the interpretation of the sentences generated from these rules. Its issue is, in other words, the relation between syntax and semantics. In any given language, Chomsky upheld that there are three integral components namely: the phonetic component, the semantic component and the syntactic component. The syntactic component provides the deep structure of a language, the knowledge of which determines the competence of a speaker. (Competence here refers to what a speaker knows implicitly). This deep structure generates the surface structure of the language at the phonetic and semantic levels. These two levels form the basis of linguistic performance. (Performance refers to what a speaker actually does).

Katz, adopted this approach to avoid and resolve some of the difficulties of Logical Positivism and Ordinary-Language Philosophy by emphasizing that the import of empirical linguistics could help to resolve some philosophical problems which they encountered. But when Chomsky put forward his theory of generative grammar, the semantic aspect was not highly detailed. This is precisely because, he held that the syntactic rules for generating correct grammatical sentences were autonomous and
independent of semantics. So he was of the view that syntactical or grammatical rules could be established and formalised without any recourse to semantic notions.

Nevertheless, it was always recognized that there exists inherent connections between syntax and semantics and even Chomsky in his earliest work, Syntactic Structures (1957) believed so. He held that even if syntactical rules be independent of the meaning, they must at the same time provide the basis for intuitions about the meaning relationships.

Successive generative grammarians have therefore attempted to develop the semantic aspect of a generative grammar. The first attempt in this line was to integrate syntax and semantics within the Chomskyan framework in a linguistic theory. Katz and Fodor (1963) did this and later clarified the idea in Katz and Postal (1964). Chomsky himself took it over and developed it in Chomsky (1965). For Katz and Fodor, a semantic component makes an integral part of a linguistic theory and without it, a linguistic theory is incomplete. They upheld that the semantic component plays purely an interpretative role of operating on the output of the syntactic component. The deep structure generated by the syntactic component contains in it all the structural information that is required for semantic interpretation. The semantic component then operates on it to give the semantic interpretations. For that matter in addition to the Chomskyan grammar, they added a lexicon which provided the semantic information for the words used and a set of projection rules whose function it was to associate with every semantically well-formed sentence at least one semantic representation. The meanings of the words in the lexicon are systematically expressed in the form of semantic features or markers like physical object/abstract object, male/female, human/non-human distinctions.
For example, if we say, the man hit the colourful ball. The grammatical relations between words here are such that man is the subject, hit is the verb and ball is the object modified by the adjective colourful. But semantically, colourful ball has two possible meanings, that is, colourful round object - with the semantic marker, physical object, - and a colourful dance - with the semantic marker, abstract object. If we look at hit, however, we would have a semantic restriction that it can only take as its object a word with a physical object semantic marker. This means that the only possible meaning here is the man hit the colourful round object.

For Katz and Fodor therefore, we require both the syntax and semantics in order to have an adequate linguistic theory. In the perspective of our study, this theory of Philosophy of Linguistics will be the appropriate conceptual framework because it will enable us to bring the insights of empirical linguistics to bear on the philosophical works of Wittgenstein. Secondly, it is a theory which will help us avoid the vicious circle of seeing and judging Wittgenstein through his own eyes, as it were. Precisely because Wittgenstein influenced the other frameworks very much, it would be inappropriate to evaluate and synthesize him using these same approaches. Thirdly, this theory is very relevant to our work because it inquires into the connection between syntax and semantics. The more reason why Katz’s framework is appropriate is because he is among the leading generative grammarians who laboured to develop the semantic theory in generativism. And these two were the main concerns of the Tractatus and the Investigations respectively.
1.9 SCOPE AND LIMITATION

The study is centred on the two major works of Wittgenstein namely: the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. Other works of Wittgenstein and the commentaries are studied with the aim of enhancing full understanding of these works.

Besides these works, our analysis of the cross-cultural language involves only the analysis of English as one such language. The major limitation of the study consists in the fact that, not much if any, of its kind has been written. Therefore, anyone who is interested in any comparative study to evaluate it may not easily find any.

1.10 LITERATURE REVIEW

In general, philosophical usage of “analysis” is opposed to “synthesis”, “analytic” is opposed to “synthetic” and corresponding to this also is “simple” in opposition to “complex”. An analytic philosopher usually is one who tries to elucidate a complex philosophical problem, for example, the nature of knowledge, by reducing it to its elements and their modes of combination. On the other hand, a synthetic philosopher assumes certain simple elements and primitive propositions and from them together with certain rules deduces the complex to be explained. Our concern, however, is with analytic philosophy.

Analytic approach in philosophy predates the 20th century Analytic Philosophy by many centuries. Hence, in a broad sense, the term “Philosophical Analysis” can be extended to include the method of earlier philosophers also. But in the narrow and restricted sense, the phrase “Analytic Philosophy” or “Philosophical Analysis” was introduced as a
technical, philosophical term to refer particularly to the works of the late 19th and early 20th century philosophers of that bent. For example, G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Rudolph Carnap, Ludwig Wittgenstein, etc. It is now extended to include the works of any philosopher which resemble or show the influence of these models. These analysts had a unique and an exclusive concern with the analysis of language and its application to the evaluation and clarification of philosophical and scientific discourses. This was their distinctive characteristic.

However, there are conceptions of language in the preceding periods in philosophy which dominated the history of thought and influenced even the 20th century analytic philosophers. So, despite the peripheral considerations given to language by earlier philosophers, it is still informative to inquire into what they held about language.

Hobbes Thomas (1994), in the fourth chapter which deals with speech, maintained that the general use of speech or language is to facilitate or mediate in the transfer of mental discourse from one individual to another. Language, therefore, serves the purpose of translating our thoughts into verbal sounds which can then be perceived and understood by the hearer.

Locke John (1959), held the same view as Hobbes that language encodes ideas for communication purposes. He wrote:

"Each man uses the articulate sounds, which we call words, 'as a sign of internal conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind' whereby they might be made known to others and the thought of men's minds be conveyed from one to another." (Locke 1959: 3).

But further on Locke sees a much more positive function of language and that is its potential of revealing to us the structure of the world. Words in a language typically
correspond to ideas in the mind with definable words corresponding to complex ideas and indefinable words corresponding to un-analysable ideas or simple ideas. The concatenation of the words into significant sentences represents the arrangements of ideas into judgements by the mind. And since, according to Locke, ideas come to us directly through the senses and are representatives of the objects in the world, a careful investigation into our language has the potential of guiding us into the nature and structure of ideas and thoughts, and proximately leads us to the nature and structure of what these ideas and thoughts represent.

Harris (1981), referred to this conception of language as a vehicle of communicating ideas from one mind to another as “Telementational” conception of language and said that it can be traced back into the ancient times in the philosophy of Aristotle.

Descartes, R. (1975), in a series of principles regarding the source of human errors identified language as one of the sources of our errors. He maintained that error occurs because we attach our thoughts to words which do not express them with accuracy and then commit our thoughts to memory in these words. Afterwards we find it easy to recall the words than the things signified by them and fail to distinguish the things from the words we use to express the things. On this account, the majority attend to words rather than to things and thus very frequently “assent to terms without attaching to them any meaning”. For that matter, Descartes felt that we ought to give a closer attention to language so as to avoid its danger of obscuring our thoughts and hence our clear perception of reality.
Leibnitz (1966) proposed the idea of having a universal characteristic. This was supposed to be an ideal philosophical language composed of characters which would precisely express the content of an encyclopaedic knowledge of reality.

Rutherford (1995) indicated that Leibnitz himself in developing his plan for a universal philosophical writing was acting in concert with a widespread 17th century movement. Rutherford suggests that this movement was a result of the existence of a strong contemporary need both for some variety of a universal language capable of bridging the gulf between disparate linguistic groups in the service of peace and commerce, and for languages or symbolism that might be useful in rendering more rigorous the process of logical and mathematical reasoning, as well as advancing the pace of scientific discoveries.

Frege (1972) distrusts natural language as being vague, ambiguous and indeed logically incoherent. It is, therefore, deficient when it comes to protecting human thought from error. Instead it obscures the underlying forms of thought and the metaphysical structure of reality. It, therefore, calls for invention of precise and a logically coherent language.

Russell (1937) also subscribed to the idea that there is a correspondence between language, thought and reality. He held that there is a correspondence between propositional structure and ontological structure of reality. As such any complete analysis of complex propositions in our language will yield into the simple propositions or the "atomic proposition" which will be the exact representation of ontological atomic facts.
Russell (1956) in his essay *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* also insisted that relation of facts should not be reduced only to predicates and hence make propositions only in the subject - predicate form. Such a predictive reduction of facts and consequently proposition can only lead us either to monadism of Leibnitz or monism of the Hegelians. He, therefore, underscored the fact that propositions and facts are relational in a much more vast sense that transcends the limits of subject - predicate relation. The subject - predicate is a "monadic relation", but besides it there are dyadic relations, triadic relations, tetradic relations and other polyadic relation ad infinitum. But all are atomic, meaning that they cannot be reduced any more into simpler proposition. The atomic propositions combine to form complex propositions by means of the logical operators or logical constants of negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional and biconditional. Such propositions can be reduced by analysis into their constituent atomic propositions.

Further on in the same essay, Russell upheld that our logical difficulties and paradoxes come from the inadequacies of our language and not from facts. Facts as such are neither true nor false. They are simply facts. Truth or falsity comes only at the linguistic level. Thus, it is the proposition stating the facts and which make up our language which might be true or false depending on what may be the case or not of the fact. For Russell, therefore, our language is not well adapted or exact enough to precisely represent the facts. There is need, therefore, to reform our language through logical analysis and eventually through the creation of logically perfect language. Such a logically perfect language "will be completely analytical and will show at glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied". It is a language, which will then eliminate all logical contradictions and ambiguities from our language.
Wittgenstein (1974), also maintained the theory of correspondence between language, thought and reality. Both language and the world have parallel structures with each level of structure in language matching a level of structure in the world. As such names which are simple elements in a language correspond to objects which are the simple elements in the world, elementary propositions correspond to states of affairs, propositions correspond to facts and the language which is “the totality of propositions” corresponds to the world which is a “totality of facts”. According to Wittgenstein, all languages have a single essence, and this essence is describable in terms of predicate logic as was invented and developed by Frege and Russell. For example, if it is a fact that “Socrates taught Plato” then no matter what language in which this fact is expressed, in the final analysis, we can still represent it in predicate logic thus \( Tsp \) where \( T = \text{Taught} \), \( s = \text{Socrates} \) and \( p = \text{Plato} \). It just depends on the symbols we agree to use. The parallel structures of language and the world connect by a means of a picturing relationship. Thus, meaning or sense attaches to what we say and communicate (and therefore think) only if what we say is a picture of fact. This was his famous picture theory meaning.

Wittgenstein also upheld that logical form of statements in ordinary or natural language is commonly distorted and obscured. But he did not see the solution to this distortion in creating a logically perfect language in which the logical form is preserved. Instead, for him, since all languages are one language, with respect to the logical conditions they must satisfy, it is these conditions that must be analysed and exposed through philosophical analysis. The result is not going to be a logically perfect language, but rather the logical form of ordinary language will be exhibited and hence render the ordinary language accurate and exact.
Wittgenstein (1978), rejected the view that our language is passed on in a prepacked structure parallel to the structure of the world. He “repudiates” the *Tractatus’ definition of language as a picture of the world. Language lacks a definition. It is made up of many language-games that have nothing in common to qualify them as languages or language.

So, the word “language” is a name of a class of an indefinite number of language-games in which a peoples “form of life” plays a crucial role.

Wittgenstein (1978), also proposes a new theory of meaning. The meaning of a word is its *use* in a given context and language-game. Its meaning is not the object it names as the *Tractatus* maintained. For Wittgenstein here, a word is not a name. It can be used as a name but as well, it can be used in numerous other ways. So he said “do not ask for the meaning, ask for the use”. He, therefore, abandoned the representational view of language of the *Tractatus* and adopted the pragmatic view of language.

These opposing views of Wittgenstein in his two major works have inspired and influenced alot of innumerable works and researches on various topics which they addressed. One of the raging debates which has emerged from these researches and works is on the question of continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought. On the other hand there are those who feel that there is no continuity between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*.

Hartnack (1986), maintained in unambiguous way that there is absolutely no continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought. Since Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* came to reject the notion of logical structure of both language and the world and yet this was the very bedrock of the *Tractatus*, it follows that he completely abandoned its theory and propounded a
radically new one, which was based not on an illusory notion of logical structure of language and of the world but on the notion of the “form or life” of a people. He wrote:

“No unbroken line leads from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations; there is no logical sequence between the two books, but rather a logical gap. The thought of the later work is a negation of the thought of the earlier.” (P.62)

G. H. Von Wright, in the Biographical sketch in Malcolm (1967), insists that the earlier Wittgenstein followed the path of Russell and Frege and, therefore, maintained a philosophical tradition which can be traced to many years before him (Wittgenstein). Instead the Investigations is an absolutely original work both in content and approach with no precedents or precursors. He remarked:

“It will probably remain a matter of future debate to what extent there is continuity between the “earlier” Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the Wittgenstein of the Investigations... the young Wittgenstein had learnt from Frege and Russell. His problems were in part theirs, the later Wittgenstein, I should say, has no ancestors in the history of thought. His work signals a radical departure from previously existing paths of philosophy.” (P.15)

Wright Von G. H. (1982), reaffirms his earlier position that the Tractatus belongs to a definite tradition extending back beyond Frege and Russell and at least to Leibnitz. But instead the “later philosophy” or the Investigations is opposed to both the aims and methods of traditional philosophy.

On the other hand, however, there are those who are of the opinion that there is a continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought. Fann (1969), upholds that the idea of discontinuity in Wittgenstein’s thought is radically mistaken. He insists that even if Wittgenstein in the Investigations criticises his own views in the Tractatus, he (Wittgenstein) nevertheless, says that the Tractatus was not all wrong. According to him, the important continuity between the two works is due to the fact that in both books, Wittgenstein conceived of philosophical problems as arising from our misunderstanding of the logic of language.
and to the fact that philosophy is not a science but rather an activity of elucidation and classification.

Winch (1969), in the *Introduction* criticised the customary academic distinction of an earlier and a later Wittgenstein. This distinction, he termed "disastrously mistaken". He finds continuity and unity on Wittgenstein’s philosophy precisely in the fact that in both works Wittgenstein deals with problems about the nature of logic in language to reality. This means that both the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* spring from the same fountain, their problem is one and the same.

Kenny, (1973), entitled the last chapter of this book, *The Continuity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy*. Herein, Kenny maintains that Wittgenstein held some sort of a modified picture theory in the *Investigations*, thereby continuing the picture theory of the *Tractatus*. And in a much later study by the same author entitled *The Legacy of Wittgenstein*, Kenny (1982), was devoted to stressing the continuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy particularly on the basis of his conception of the nature of philosophy being that it is an activity and not a theory, just like Fann did. Moreover, Kenny sees the initial wish of Wittgenstein expressed in his preface to the *Investigations*, that is, to have his work, the *Investigations* printed together with the *Tractatus* as implying a link and continuity between his works. This is because, he thought, Wittgenstein felt that his problem in the *Investigations* grew out of the problem of the *Tractatus*.

It is to this debate that I intend to make a contribution by attempting to reconcile Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* and hence demonstrate that they are harmonious and complimentary.
Schramm Wilbur, in his essay, *Some Possible Social Effects of Space Communication* in UNESCO (1968) suggested that nations should agree on one or two or a few languages which might be taught as second languages throughout the world and which will serve as “vehicles for the world’s people to talk to one another”. Yet, some people do object to such an enterprise by claiming that it has little chance of success.

Ranganathan (1989), contends that language is inextricably linked to culture and, hence, “meaning” as such is also inextricably conditioned by culture. Therefore, an adoption of second universal language out of one of the natural languages will deny the non-native speakers, the richness of meaning in the language.

But despite all these proposals and objections, one thing remains clear that modern communication technology has brought into use some particular natural languages which extend far beyond the boundaries of their native speakers. We are, therefore, in an era of cross-cultural communication. The languages which are used are usually the languages used by the people from the main communication centres like French in France, English in USA and the UK, etc. And the use of these cross-cultural languages have been to a great extent, instrumental in effecting successful global communication.

**1.11 METHODOLOGY**

The study is carried out through the consultation of written sources, especially library sources. It involves a critical survey of both the primary works written by Wittgenstein and the secondary works or commentaries on Wittgenstein. It follows an expository-evaluative approach. As such it uses a three-fold method: descriptive, analytic and synthetic.
Descriptive: This method is applied to distinctly present the respective theories of language, meaning and communication in the works of Wittgenstein. Since our objective is to reconcile the two works of Wittgenstein, this method is used only to lay the groundwork as it were. It is therefore applied to expose the above-said theories of Wittgenstein as they can possibly be unfolded from his works and commentaries. It is expository in nature.

Analytic: This method aids in the examination of philosophical material. It involves two intellectual activities, practically inseparable but analytically distinguishable.

(a) A rational reconstruction of the arguments of Wittgenstein by identifying the arguments he adduces on language, meaning and communication. This requires a piecemeal consideration of the actual argumentative procedures used by Wittgenstein to construct theories about these concepts in his two works.

Certainly the result of a rational reconstruction of ideas is conjectural since some of the components used in his argumentation are ambiguous and we can never at times figure out their exact meanings and applications, and, secondly, the historical dimension might play a big role in shifting the senses of the words, in conditioning his intentions and omissions. But in doing the reconstruction we may overlook some of these factors as superseded and irrelevant yet they had an enormous influence on the thinker. This might therefore warrant also a textual criticism to determine such historical factors.

(b) It also involves philosophical criticism. This is a task of logically demonstrating the strengths and limitations of the thinker’s own reasoning. This is done on the basis of the reconstructed conjecture and/or discovered lacunae. The criticism is purely qualitative.
and not quantitative. In the study it enables us to determine the strengths and limitations or consistencies and inconsistencies in the arguments of Wittgenstein with regard to these concepts of language, meaning and communication.

Synthetic: This method is applied to assess and synthesize Wittgenstein's thought in the light of Chomsky's linguistic theory. English, as a cross-cultural language used in the media will be used as a concrete example in which to verify and find evidence for the general doctrines of both Chomsky and Wittgenstein. The cross-cultural aspect of English is of crucial importance in order to help us finally discern the connection between logic and cultural context in a linguistic communication.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LANGUAGE MEANING AND COMMUNICATION IN THE TRACTATUS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein directs his attention to many subjects: for example, logic, ethics, religion, psychology and epistemology. However, the focus of his attention is language. A central concern of Tractatus is an inquiry into the status of propositions. In this chapter, I will expose what Wittgenstein in the Tractatus held to be the nature of language, meaning and communication. I will conclude the chapter by some critical evaluation of the theories of the Tractatus. But before we can fully understand the Tractarian theories on language, meaning and communication it is imperative first to direct our attention to the ontology of the Tractatus. This ontology formed the basis on which the whole of the Tractarian system was built.

2.2 Tractarian Ontology

In T.L.P 1-1.1, Wittgenstein declared that “the world is all that is the case: the world is the totality of facts not of things.” The successive propositions are elaboration on these opening propositions. The world has a particular structure, which can be unravelled through an analytic approach. It is made of facts. Facts are the obtaining states of affairs, which are in their turn determined by the objects. A fact is not a thing but it is what is the case after arrangement of things in a particular situation. To illustrate this difference we take as an example a sentence like the book is on the table. If this statement is true then it expresses a fact. On the other hand the book and the table are the things2 as it were. But

2 Things or objects in the Tractatus are simple and unalterable elements as we shall see further on. But for the sake of illustration we have assumed the simplicity of such objects like books and tables.
that the book is on the table i.e. the arrangement of the things, such that it is the case that the book is on the table, is the fact.

A state of affairs as stated in T.L.P. 2. 01 is “a combination of objects (things)”. It refers to both the actual and possible combinations of objects/ or things. For example, going back to our instance above, it would be a state of affairs that the book is actually on the table, therefore a fact or still if it (the book) could just possibly be on the table but it actually is not. Likewise, if a cup instead of the book could be on the table then it is also a possible state of affair. We can then conclude from these two that all facts are states of affair but not the converse, that is, that not all states of affairs are facts. Facts are the obtaining states of affairs. So once we are given the totality of states of affairs therein included is also the totality of facts, which is as it were, a subset of the totality of states of affairs.

What determines state of affairs are the objects or things. Objects are understood in the Tractatus as the simple, irreducible substance of the world. Each object intrinsically contains all its possibilities of entering into a state of affairs. In T.L.P 2.0123, Wittgenstein states, “every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.” This means that it pertains to the nature of objects that they can enter into a certain range of combination or arrangements. Indeed, an actual combination of objects in a fact is just but one out of a range of possible combinations. It is important to realize that the objects, which Wittgenstein described are purely logical constructs and are not the individual objects of our sensations. T.L.P 2.02-2.021 describes the Tractarian objects as simples, which make up the substance of the world. Further on in T.L.P 2.0271 he adds: “objects are what are unalterable and subsistent: their configuration is what is changing.
and unstable .. , We know quite well know that physical objects like chair, table, cup, book etc. are composite and alterable and for that matter cannot be an object in the sense of Tractatus. Wittgenstein (1969 p 25) states the nature of objects thus:

*We do not infer the existence of simple objects from the existence of particular simple objects, but rather know them by description as it were- as the end-product of analysis, by means of process that leads to them.*

The Tractarian objects or things thus viewed are analogous to the traditional views of atomism as was formulated by Democritus in the fourth century B.C., which were understood to be the smallest indivisible units of the physical reality. The atoms supposedly moved freely in a void and it is their combination and separation, which caused the integration and disintegration of matter.

According to this atomistic ontology, therefore, the world is arises from a purely combinatorial nature of objects. Objects combine to form facts out of the possible states of affairs, which can be realized from their internal structure or forms. The totality of obtained facts -all that is the case- in its turn makes up the world. The world hence is viewed as ultimately constituted of and reducible to the atom-like objects. It was on this ontological atomism that Wittgenstein built his linguistic theory of logical atomism.

2.3 Language

T.L.P 4.001 gives what in essence is the Tractarian definition of a language: *"the totality of propositions is a language."* In the Tractatus, language is held to have a parallel structure with the ontological structure of the world above-exposed. As such, each level of structure in language is neatly matched by Wittgenstein to a corresponding level of structure in the world. It is in this perspective that the definition of a language to which we have made allusion above should be interpreted.
In this scheme, an object is the correlate of a name/or a primitive sign: a state of affairs corresponds to an elementary proposition; a fact is the correlate of a (non-elementary) proposition. Here below is an illustrative table of the parallel levels of structure between language and the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propositions</td>
<td>Facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary propositions</td>
<td>States of affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names</td>
<td>Objects/or things</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given this parallel structure between language and the world, the foregoing analysis of the ontological levels of the world can be extended and applied to their linguistic correlates. Therefore before we can comprehensively understand the Tractarian theory of language, we have to focus our attention on its elements namely, names, elementary propositions and propositions.

### 2.3.0. Names:

In some propositions in the *Tractatus*, names are referred to as primitive signs. Names stand for objects in the world. For that matter, just like the objects are simple, names are not analyzable any further. T. L. P. 3.26 states that "a name cannot be dissected any further by means of definitions: it is a primitive." Names can, therefore, be understood only by an acquaintance with their references. A complete reductive analysis of any language would end with these primitive signs which cannot be further analysed. It is the correspondence to objects that makes signs or words, names. But since we noted that objects in the
Tractatus’ viewpoint are logical and not physical objects. The objects for which names stand are therefore the objects of thought. The objects are the simple references of thought like things, properties or relations. And it is precisely because objects are simple references of thought, that names can be said to be representatives of objects in the world. This indirect mode of representation warranted the dual nomenclature of names and/or primitive signs. Fogelin (1976: pp.25-26) suggested that this dual nomenclature reflects two sides of the significance of names:

“As simple signs, they are signs that admit of no further analysis via other signs. They are rock-bottom on the side of the language. As names, they represent things. Furthermore, this rock-bottom level of language is locked into the rock-bottom level of the world.”

At this level it is of importance to remark that names in the sense of the Tractatus are not ordinary names as used in the ordinary speech. For example a name like Socrates is not a simple name. Such a name is merely a contraction of complex expressions or symbols like the teacher of Plato who drank hemlock. And being complex it stands in need of analysis. Wittgenstein refers to such contracted names as symbols or expressions and he insists that they have sense, which can be true or false whereas names or primitive signs cannot be true or false. Anscombe (1971, p.37) observes, “the true names of the Tractatus will be, not physically simple signs, but one lacking the sort of complexity that the name ‘Wittgenstein’ has”. Names build up into elementary propositions to depict possible states of affairs.

2.3.1. Elementary Propositions:

These are the linguistic correlates of the ontological states of affairs. Just as states of affairs consist of a concatenation of objects, so, too, an elementary proposition is made up of nothing more than a combination of names. T.L.P 4.21-4.22 states that, “the simplest
kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts, the existence of states of affairs.
Elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation of names.

As such, an elementary proposition is analogously a function of the names constituting it, just as a mathematical function is a function of its argument. When they are true, they depict the essential nature of material properties in the world. Their simple structures reflect the articulation of objects in a situation. Any one concatenation of names in an elementary proposition is just but one of all possible concatenation of the same names just like the states of affairs are just single out of many possible arrangements of objects. The elementary propositions make up the bedrock of all material propositions. The names in them simply hang together, that is, they are syntactically arranged on the device of immediate combination as is stated in T.L.P 4.221: "It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions, which consists of names in immediate combination."

From the Tractatus, the elementary propositions can be said to posses two main features, namely, they are affirmative and are logically independent of each other. They are affirmative because they assert states of affairs. They hence can be false but not negative. The reason why we cannot have negative elementary proposition is that really whether we assert positive or negative facts, we are actually asserting things the way they are. So even if we assert a fact in the negative, it can fail to be that way and hence this assertion turns out to be false. Negation as an operation presupposes an affirmation, it reverses the sense of a proposition. T.L.P 5.5151 candidly puts it thus:

"... why should it not be possible to express a negative proposition by means of a negative fact? (E.g. suppose that 'a' does not stand in a certain relation to 'b': then this might be used to say that a [!]b was not the case.)"
But really even in this case the negative proposition is constructed by the indirect use of the positive. Secondly, the elementary proposition is logically independent of each other. This results from their correlates, the states of affairs, which are independent of each other. This means, “one elementary proposition can not be deduced from one another.” If they were not logically independent then it would be conceivable that from assertion of the colour of an object we could make a priori deductions about its shape or duration.

But once again, elementary propositions, just like names out of which they are constituted are known only on logical grounds. What they are, cannot be anticipated in advance. It is only “the application of logic which (sic) decides what elementary propositions are.” T.L.P 5.5562 states, “If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary propositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their unanalyzed form must know it.”

So even though Wittgenstein failed to give examples of objects and atomic states of affairs, he still felt that they must somehow exist as the necessary correlates in the world for the names and the elementary propositions of a fully analyzed language.

2.3.2. Non-Elementary Propositions:

These form the bulk of propositions or sentences in ordinary language. They are formed from elementary propositions by means of the logical operations of conjunction, disjunction, conditional, negation and bi-conditional. Their ontological correlates are the facts in the world. Because non-elementary propositions are compounded from elementary propositions they are said to be truth-functional of elementary propositions. This means that their truth-value depends on the truth-value assigned to their constituent elementary propositions. For example to say John is sick and tired is equivalent to a
conjunction of presumably two elementary propositions, i.e., assuming the simplicity of the name John, and the qualities, sick and tired. The conjunction being \textit{John is sick} and \textit{John is tired}. The truth or falsity of this compound proposition is dependent on the truth or falsity of the constituents namely: \textit{John is sick} and \textit{John is tired}. It is only true when both constituents are true otherwise it is false.

In this scheme a conjunction is true if the conjuncts are true otherwise it is false, a disjunction is false if both conjuncts are false, otherwise its true, a conditional is false only if the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, otherwise its true and a bi-conditional is true if and only if both sentences of the equivalence are having matching truth values, i.e. either both are true or both are false. In the \textit{Tractatus} a proposition is identified with thought. It is merely thought expressed in perceptible words, which words are either graphic or phonetic. In T.L.P 3.11-3.12, Wittgenstein states: \textit{"We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written etc) as a projection of a possible situation... I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign." }

A proposition in itself contains the form of a situation, which it expresses, but not the content, which is the actual situation or fact. This form is what determines the sense of a proposition and warrants the assertion in T. L. P 3.14 that \textit{"a proposition itself is a fact."} It is a fact precisely because its elements or words are articulated in a determinate way and not haphazardly put together to depict the structural form of a word. The thesis which Wittgenstein is advancing here is that it is thought that captures the relation of things in facts or situations and projects their perceived arrangement in propositions which can be perceived by the sense of sight or hearing. It is thought which imparts the logical structure
of the world to the proposition. And it is this shared logical structure or form between propositions and the world that makes the proposition into a fact, too.

Unfortunately, the perceptible expressions in ordinary language do obscure this logical structure, hence the necessity for logical analysis of propositions to unveil their underlying logical structure.

We have to note that even though compound propositions are facts by virtue of their form, the actual facts are not molecular or composite. It is thought which unites the facts by means of the logical connections discussed above and hence projects them in the complex propositions. The totality of these propositions is what makes up language.

2.3.3. Language:

In the Tractarian system, language is the totality of assertive propositions. Only the propositions, which are capable of being true or false, make up language. The correlate of language in the world is the totality of facts, which is the world itself. In a way, the nature of language and how it relates to the world became the main preoccupation of Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language, he maintained that there are two categories of propositions or sentences, that is, the meaningless or nonsensical utterances that do not qualify as propositions and the meaningful propositions. The meaningless sentences said nothing about facts or the world and, therefore, should simply be ignored. They lack any informative content. Meaningful propositions alone state facts and have a precise logical structure, which though hidden by the grammatical appearances of the sentences can be made evident through a detailed logical analysis.
Just as we have seen in the foregoing analysis of the components of language, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein held that every meaningful proposition is either a truth-functional composite or instead an elementary proposition itself. Only these depict situations in the world and hence have an informative content. Their totality is a complete picturing of the world and constitutes language. This means that from the insights into the workings of language we can grasp the deeper dynamics and structure of the world. This view of language as projective of the world led Wittgenstein to a negative conclusion that only the propositions of natural science can yield a meaningful language. All the other propositions be they of philosophy, religion, etc, are meaningless and nonsensical because they are neither truth-functional nor atomic statements of facts.

As a consequence of this view of language as depicting the structure of the world, the *Tractatus* takes the depth-logical structure of language, which makes it possible for language to depict the ontological structure of the world as the defining feature of all language. Since the world is objectively *out there*, all languages, which adequately picture it, must essentially and structurally be the same. Therefore, irrespective of the geographical and cultural diversities, all language is definable in logical terms, which would show that they are all the same. What happens in any language is that we arbitrarily attach names to objects and once this is done, we can then use these names with versatility to express various situations. This is what determines the individual natural languages like, English, French, Kikuyu, Luo, Kiswahili, etc. They arise when people arbitrarily attach names to objects and then build the languages out of these simple names by articulating them to express the various facts of the world. So in TLP 4.025, Wittgenstein wrote:
"When translating one language into another, we do not proceed by translating each proposition of the one into a proposition of the other, but merely translating the constituents of propositions."

Therefore, notwithstanding the “superficial” differences of words and structures, in particular individual languages, it should be possible to reduce all of them to the essential basic logical structure. This structure is expressible in terms of symbolic or notational logic. In doing this the symbols of logic would be arbitrarily chosen, too, but nevertheless assumed neutral and universally understood by everybody.

To illustrate this we can use as an example, a relational proposition expressed in different individual languages and subsequently translated into the symbolism of logic.

\[ J \text{ loves } M \]

John loves Mary: English

Johanna anapenda Maria: Kiswahili

Jean aime Marie: French

Joao ama Maria: Portuguese

John ohero Maria: Luo

Let us now take “j” to stand for John and “m” to stand for Mary and “L” to stand for the relation, loves irrespective of the variations in the individual languages. We can then express all the above sentences simply as \( Ljm \) in terms of predicate logic. Hence the Tractatus supported an essentialist view of language, which takes all language as definitely one language, and their essence lies in their basic logical structure. TLP 5.6-5.61 underscores the primacy of logic by remarking that it marks the limit of both language and the world. This basic, defining logical structure was termed by Wittgenstein as the logico-syntax, which means that all language is syntactically the same.
2.4 Meaning

This is a concept, which is extensively treated of in the *Tractatus*. It is closely linked to the concept of language, which we have just seen above in that, language is the medium through which meaning is transmitted. Central to this concept of meaning in the *Tractatus* is the famous picture-theory of meaning.

We saw that language is projective of the structure of the world. The theory of meaning in the Tractarian theory of meaning lies in this representational connection between language and the world. As such, the picture-theory of meaning is an extension of the discussion on language and it puts forward a further explanation of the dynamics of representation between language and the world.

But the analogy of a picture as applied in the *Tractatus* should not be taken in the narrow and the naturalistic sense as a photograph or a portrait is a picture of a person. Instead a picture is taken in a very broad sense to include a gramophone record, the musical score, the sound-waves producing the musical sounds in a symphony, the hieroglyphic script, etc. (cf. T.L.P 4.014 – 4.0141). In this broad sense a picture can be a false representation of what it pictures. Therefore, a proposition being a picture in the broad sense can be false. In order to understand well the details of the picture-theory of meaning, we have to make a fundamental distinction between pictorial relationship and pictorial form.

### 2.4.1. Pictorial Relationship:

This refers to the correlation between the elements of the picture with the objects in the world, which they represent. With the notion of pictorial relationship, Wittgenstein is attempting to show the connection between language and the world. The correlation is
established at the level of names and objects. Names and the logical operators are the elements of propositions. Whereas logical operators have no references, names have objects for their references. This connection between names and objects, however, is not inherent and necessary but merely arbitrary.

Wittgenstein (1969, p.25), in discussing the projective potential of general statements, affirmed that this arbitrary correlation of sign and objects signified is itself "a condition of the possibility of propositions." But since the assigning of names to objects is arbitrary, we have a situation wherein certain combinations of names may fail to have any meaning. And when this occurs, it is not because of anything illegitimate in the name itself but rather because we are mistaken about the applicable convention on the particular name or names. An example to illustrate this point can be readily found in T.L.P 5.473 where Wittgenstein says we can not say sensibly that Socrates is identical, because the word identical has no adjectival meaning, i.e., there is no property called identical. Hence he says, "the proposition is nonsensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination and not because the symbol in itself, would be illegitimate."

In the pictorial relationship there is also an element of immediacy of correlation between names and objects. So the object for which a name stands can be understood only if it is known before hand. Wittgenstein employs the analogy of a graduated measure to express this immediacy in T.L.P 2.1512-ff. A proposition which contains the names is comparable to a measure and the names are the graduating lines which actually touch the object that is to be measured. A proportion without names will therefore be like a measure or ruler without graduating lines.
Conclusively we can say that, with this notion of pictorial relationship, Wittgenstein establishes meaning as reference. The correlation between names and objects forms an integral part of the picturing relationship. This means that at the deep level of picturing, meaning is the reference and congruence between names and objects and by extension between language and the world.

2.4.2. Pictorial Form:

This refers to the way the elements of the picture are related to one another such that they are representational of how things or objects are related in reality. With the notion of pictorial relationship we have seen how Wittgenstein attempted to show the external possibility of a picture and took names to be the linking element of language to reality.

With the notion of pictorial form he explores the internal possibility of a picture to depict the situation it purports to represent. In particular, the notion of pictorial form demands an investigation into the ways in which words stand to one another in a proposition.

For a picture to be a representation of what it pictures, there must be some shared characteristics between the picture and what it represents. In the case of a proposition in a language, it is the pictorial form, which is shared or rather in common with reality. T.L.P 2.151 defines pictorial forms as "the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture." As such there is an isomorphism of structure between the proposition and the situation depicted. As an illustration we take an example of a spatial form. If in a situation it is a fact that the fork is to left of a knife, then, we realize that in our assertion, the word "fork" is really to the left of the word "knife" and this coincides with the fact depicted. This is a reflection of a spatial pictorial form. In T.L.P 2.171 we find that, "a picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial
picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc.

Our example above is illustrative of what pictorial form is all about but certainly the analogy limps when pressed further. For instance, when the same proposition is uttered verbally instead of written down the word *fork* comes before the word *knife* and this temporal succession will have nothing in common with the spatial case we have. It would then be a case of a temporal relationship used to represent a spatial relationship. This shows that even though representation takes place by virtue of shared forms, these forms have no empirical characteristics. The shared forms are essentially logical forms. And this implies that the world ontologically has a logical structure, which is common with the logical structure of the picturing positions. It is this logical structure, which forms the internal possibility of a proposition to picture. The correspondence of the two structures, i.e., of language and the world, is the guarantee of the truth or falsity of propositions. The capacity to be true or false is the *sense* of a proposition. After such a review of the notions of pictorial relationship and pictorial form, we can now focus on the general picture-theory of meaning.

2.4.3. Picture-Theory of Meaning

The *Tractatus* presents a detailed theory of meaning under the figure of a picture. The view of *Tractatus* falls within what has been broadly referred to traditionally as the referential theory of meaning. The elementary proposition is the primary bearer of meaning. Since their proper elements after a complete analysis are names, which have an immediate relationship with objects in the world, they (elementary propositions) are the most appropriate for picturing facts made out of arrangements of these objects. Nonetheless, non-elementary propositions, which are built on elementary propositions.
picture what is the case and what is not the case concurrently. It is only that these propositions do not picture facts in an immediate way. It is in their deep structures that language and world would meet in an immediate and perfectly congruent way and we can arrive at this level only through a reductive logical analysis. To say that a proposition pictures also what is not the case means that negation is part of the essence of a significant proposition. T.L.P 4.0621 states: “it is important that the signs ‘p’ and ‘¬p’ can say the same thing. For it shows that nothing corresponds in reality to the sign ‘¬’ ... the propositions ‘p’, and ‘¬p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality.” Negation merely reverses the sense of the proposition.

In essence, the picture-theory with the two foregoing notions of pictorial relationship and pictorial forms holds meaning to be constituted of reference and sense. Reference refers to what a name or a proposition stands for, i.e., the object or state of affairs. Sense on the other hand, refers to the truth or falsity of an expression. For that reason, a name has a reference but no sense, since it cannot be true or false. A proposition instead can be either true or false, so it has a sense. Anselm (1967 p.71) argues that according to Wittgenstein in the Tractarian period, a name has a reference but no sense and a proposition has a sense but no reference.

But however it is taken, the fundamental idea in the Tractatus is that meaning consists of both sense and reference. The co-ordination of sense and reference, that is in other words, of pictorial form and pictorial relationship is necessary for meaning to be possible and achievable.

For a language therefore to be meaningful, its propositions must be able to represent how its references could be standing in reality. The pictorial form of representation has to
correspond to the form of reality and as such makes it possible for the things which the propositional elements stand for to be related in exactly the way the propositions shows them to be.

Thus Bogen (1972, p.41) has identified two conditions that the Tractarian picture ought to meet in order to be an adequate picture of reality:

a) The circumstance that even if the proposition is false, the objects correlated with its names are elements to be found in reality as constituents of positive and negative facts.

b) The circumstance that the syntactical rules, which govern the arrangements of names in elementary propositions prevent configuration of names, which do not correspond to possible configurations of objects and hence to possible facts.

These two conditions respectively correspond to the conditions we have established of reference and sense. The overall implication of this theory of meaning is that the objective world as the ultimate guarantor of references and consequently of sense, is the basis of meaning. And since it is supposedly a datum to every observer, the meaning of propositions, just like language, is universal, objective and unconditioned by culture or linguistic diversities. So in order to determine the meaning of any proposition, all we have to do “is take a look at reality.”

2.5 THE TRACTATUS AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM ON MEANING

The Tractatus and the logical positivists agree on several points that it is easy to take the Tractarian theory of meaning to be a logical positivist doctrine. For example both the Tractatus and logical positivism held that a genuine and meaningful proposition is a
truth-function of its elementary constituent propositions and that logical tautologies and contradictions are devoid of factual content.

However there is a remarkable difference between Tractatus and logical positivism. The latter rejected the doctrine of the picture theory of meaning of the Tractatus according to which a genuine proposition is the one that truly pictures the world. The logical positivists instead upheld the doctrine or principle of verification according to which a genuine meaningful proposition is one that is reducible to a report of what is immediately given in experience or what can be so given, that is, what is empirically verifiable. The verification principle of the logical positivists can therefore be stated as the meaning of a statement is its method of verification.

Admittedly, there are some propositions of the Tractatus that easily would pass as upholding the verification principle, for example, T.L.P 4.024: “To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true or yet another, where a proposition lies against reality as a ruler.” Yet these pronouncements can still not be taken as explicitly propounding the verification principle. Indeed, further comments by Wittgenstein in the same sections negate such a conclusion. For example the assertion in T.L.P 4.024 – 4.025 that a “proposition is understood by anyone who understands its constituents.” Not that you must know how to verify what it states as the positivists would hold. For that matter even such Tractarian positions which tend to lend themselves to a positivistic interpretation when read in isolation do not really propound verification, particularly when read in the context of the whole.
Another remarkable difference between the Tractarian theory of meaning and the logical positivists is regarding the doctrine of simple objects. In the *Tractatus*, simple objects are not the data of sensation but rather logical constructions. This is opposed to the empirical demands of the logical positivists. To the positivists, in accordance with their principle of verification, the empirical knowledge of the references of words is what guarantees the construction of the senses of the propositions stating the states of affairs.

So we can really conclude that the picture theory of meaning of the *Tractatus* is not a verificational theory of meaning. And this constitutes the fundamental difference between the *Tractatus* and logical positivism.

### 2.6 Communication

The *Tractatus* does not explicitly address the concept of communication as it does the concept of language and meaning. This is attributable to the fact that his primary concern by then was with the logical structure of language rather than its communicative function. This conditioned him to give communication a peripheral treatment in this work. However, we can still unfold what communication is understood to be in the *Tractatus* through close scrutiny of its relative concepts of language and meaning, which we have seen above. Besides, we should pay attention to the illuminating criticisms of the *Tractatus* in the *Blue and Brown books* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. The Tractarian theory of communication is closely tied to its theory of language. We saw that language has its essence residing in its capacity to represent reality. Propositions tell us how things are if they are true. These propositions are in themselves perceptible expressions of thought. In this framework, communication has the major role to play and that is, transmit the thoughts from one mind to the other mind about facts in reality.
Another remarkable difference between the Tractarian theory of meaning and the logical positivists is regarding the doctrine of simple objects. In the *Tractatus*, simple objects are not the data of sensation but rather logical constructions. This is opposed to the empirical demands of the logical positivists. To the positivists, in accordance with their principle of verification, the empirical knowledge of the references of words is what guarantees the construction of the senses of the propositions stating the states of affairs.

So we can really conclude that the picture theory of meaning of the *Tractatus* is not a verificational theory of meaning. And this constitutes the fundamental difference between the *Tractatus* and logical positivism.

2.6 Communication

The *Tractatus* does not explicitly address the concept of communication as it does the concept of language and meaning. This is attributable to the fact that his primary concern by then was with the logical structure of language rather than its communicative function. This conditioned him to give communication a peripheral treatment in this work. However, we can still unfold what communication is understood to be in the *Tractatus* through close scrutiny of its relative concepts of language and meaning, which we have seen above. Besides, we should pay attention to the illuminating criticisms of the *Tractatus* in the *Blue and Brown books* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. The Tractarian theory of communication is closely tied to its theory of language. We saw that language has its essence residing in its capacity to represent reality. Propositions tell us how things are if they are true. These propositions are in themselves perceptible expressions of thought. In this framework, communication has the major role to play and that is, transmit the thoughts from one mind to the other mind about facts in reality.
sentences, which project the structure of the world. Consequently, as we communicate, we purposely intend to project this structure to others who in response can determine the truth or falsity of our thoughts/assertions by taking a look at reality. This means that communication has the sole purpose of informing the listener or reader. So when we communicate we merely inform our listeners of the situation in the world, as perceived in our thoughts.

In connection with the picture theory of meaning, it is only the pictorial form or the sense, which is transmitted in any process of linguistic communication. The pictorial relationship, which is the content of the proposition is not transmitted but it remains objective to be used by the listener as the index of sense. T.L.P 4.027-4.03 states thus:

"It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us. A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense."

This view of communication, which limits its function to the transmission of facts, demands a greater attention to objectivity and precision in our communication process. Indeed in the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein declared that "the whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we can not talk about we must pass over in silence." The demand for objectivity and precision in factual communication, though desirable leads us to a restricted view of communication. We can call this view the communicative unilateralism.

2.6.2. Communicative Unilateralism of the Tractatus

Menger, (1994, P. 106) upheld that communication of ideas starts at the stage where the process of defining words and proving sentences terminates. Since every oral or written communication of ideas is conveyed in sentences, which are in turn made up of words, he
observed that the tendency is always to ascertain the validity of communication by
defining all words and proving all sentences. Such a process would lead to an infinite
regress which is impossible, because words are defined in terms of other words and
sentences proved from other sentences. So we need to have primitive words beyond
which we do not analyse to avoid an infinite regress.

In the *Tractatus* we can distil the undefined terms or primitives as the world, fact,
thing/object logical space, existence, case etc. With these terms communication begins so
as to avoid an eternal regress of a reductive analysis. Out of these terms, Wittgenstein
developed the propositions of the *Tractatus*, which he admitted had no informative
content but were merely elucidatory. In T.L.P 6.54, he recognizes the propositions of the
*Tractatus* as nonsensical, that is, without sense and hence having no communicative
value. The reasoning behind this conclusion is the basis of communicative unilateralism
in the *Tractatus*.

The only sensible and meaningful propositions are the assertive propositions of facts.
Communication as a consequent of this is only reasonable and complete when it is
informative of the external facts in the world. Indeed the *Tractatus* in some propositions
asserts that only empirical or natural science can inform us of facts in the world. This is a
reflection of the times of Wittgenstein when the spirit of scientism pervaded all realms of
knowledge. Scientism emphasizes and underscores natural science as the prime and surest
source of our knowledge of the external world, which knowledge is the valid one. For this
matter communication, be it interpersonal or mass, can take place only when the one
informed of the facts in the world, that is, the scientist shares information about the world
with the rest who are presumably less informed and hence are just passively receiving the
information. Such is a linear, unilateral, one-way act or process with the only possible exception of scientists talking among themselves.

Later in the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein recognized and criticized such communicative unilateralism of the *Tractatus*. This view as he alleged is narrow and hence fails to capture the whole spectrum of the reality of linguistic communication which involves not only declarative propositions but extends to include commands, interrogations, promises etc. So in PI,3, he admitted that the *Tractatus* does describe a system of communication but only that it is not the totality of communication. He asserted that:

"Augustine we might say does describe a system of communication, only not every thing that we call language is this system.........it is appropriate only for this narrowly described region."

By attacking the supposed passage of St. Augustine with which he opened the *Investigations*, he was attacking his own views in the *Tractatus*, which conceived of linguistic communication in a similarly narrow and linear way as St. Augustine had done.

2.7 CRITICAL REMARKS ON CHAPTER TWO

The following remarks are aimed at pointing out the flaws or the inconsistencies in Wittgenstein’s arguments we have so far seen concerning language, meaning and communication in the *Tractatus*. We will try to identify them (inconsistencies) and give their implications for the foregoing theories.

2.7.1. On language

As we have seen above, the parallel structures of language and the world are fundamental in order to grasp Wittgenstein’s theory of language. However, when subjected to serious philosophical scrutiny these structures fail to correlate as the *Tractatus* presupposed. The inconsistencies are identifiable in the ontology of the *Tractatus*, the problem of negation,
the problem of non-elementary propositions and the linguistic essentialism of the
Tractatus.

The Tractarian ontology manifests an internal inconsistency in its two principal tenets
namely that the world is all that is the case, the world is the totality of facts, not of things.
(Cf. T.L. P. 1-1.1) On the other hand further on, Wittgenstein upholds that objects or
things are unalterable substances that make up the world. These statements though
apparently contradictory are actually not contradictory when they are interpreted in the
framework of analysis. The objects, with all their possibilities cannot be perceived by us
except in their obtaining relations. We can only perceive objects as being in states of
affairs as Wittgenstein contended. Therefore even though objects are logically the
fundamental building blocks of reality, what we can perceive are not the objects
themselves but rather the facts of which they are constituents. The objects can therefore
only be known through a logical analysis of facts.

But the very conception of what an object is supposed to be in the Tractatus is what poses
the first problem. The objects themselves are extremely abstract entities that we would
doubt if they are actually existent. The failure of the Tractatus to furnish us with an
instance of an object is attributable to this fact of their highly abstract form. This is hard
to reconcile with the other point that facts, which are made up of the highly abstract
objects, are perceptible in experience. We fail to grasp how Wittgenstein makes the
transition from purely abstract logical objects to construct physically concrete facts. The
transition is not justifiable. It therefore weakens the reverse operation of analysis. We
cannot be justified in arriving at the simple objects by mere analysis of concrete or the
possible states of affairs.
The conception of a fact as subsistent is equally not convincing. The assertion that the
world is made up of facts and not of things, prompts us to inquire deeper into what a fact
is. What we do observe as making up the world are physical objects standing in relation
to one another and at the same time possessing internal qualities like colour, texture,
shape etc. Facts are supposed to be the combination of the objects in reality. The objects
making up the facts can be located in space and time. But a fact in itself cannot be so
located. What Wittgenstein referred to as a fact is properly analogous to Kant's
categories, like space and time, which are lacking existence in reality, but are nevertheless
mental structures of perception. And if this be the case then we see that objects making up
facts belong to a different order from the order of facts. Facts are not physical entities and
hence to suppose that physical objects create facts is vacuous and inconsistent. Objects
are not the constituents or elements of facts. A fact turns out to be merely a way of stating
that things are thus-and-so. We cannot point to a fact as we would point to a cup or a
house. Instead we can only point out a fact by showing how the objects stand out.

Closely bound to the foregoing criticism on the doctrine of facts is the problem of
negation. The *Tractatus* held that the elementary propositions are basically assertive in
character. They are basically used to state what is the case in reality. Negation as such
turns out to be merely an operation, which reverses the sense of any given proposition so
as to state what is not the case. Negation therefore presupposes its affirmation. It reveals
to us what is characteristic of a proposition, namely that it can state what is the case or
what is not the case. But this contradicts itself because it severs the proposition from its
original presupposed ontological foundations. The paradox here is, *are there negative*
facts corresponding to the negative propositions? Hacker, (1997, p.31) clearly expresses this puzzle thus:

"... If what one thinks is identical with what is the case if one's thought is true, how can one be thinking anything at all if one's thought is false? For if what one thinks is not the case, the state of affairs in question does not exist. Yet one thinks something for all that."

On the account of this observation, we realize that negative propositions, which form an integral part of our language has no direct correlate in the world as Wittgenstein had presupposed. This casts a shadow of doubt to the total conception of parallel structures between language and the world, which would make it possible for language to depict the world.

The next inconsistency, which we can detect in the *Tractatus*, is in the doctrine of non-elementary propositions. The problem of non-elementary propositions poses to us logical inconsistency at two levels namely: the ontological level and the logical level. Even though, Wittgenstein upheld that the basic sensible unit of a language is the elementary proposition, he acknowledged that the bulk of our ordinary language is made up of non-elementary or complex propositions. And these propositions are descriptive of facts. The puzzling question arises then at this point: *are there complex facts to which complex non-elementary propositions refer?* Facts can only be elementary or atomic. As such then, non-elementary propositions have no direct correlates in the world. Hence the foregoing criticism of the doctrine of negation would be equally relevant to the doctrine of non-elementary propositions at the ontological level.

Logically, the *Tractatus* upheld that the truth-value of the non-elementary propositions is a function of the truth-value of their constituent elementary propositions.
This is to be undeniably true when we consider non-elementary propositions with a limited range of constituent propositions. In such cases we can determine the truth-value of the non-elementary proposition. But we are faced with a difficulty when we are confronted with general propositions with an unlimited range of constituent propositions. For example, *all men are mortal* is supposedly a result of a conjunction of, “John is mortal”, “Jeniffer is mortal”, “Mwaniki is mortal”, etc. But it is impossible to investigate all these cases (past, present and future) and determine their truth-values. Hence, going by the definition of truth-functions it is questionable if such general propositions are truth-functions. Their status is not clearly defined in the *Tractatus*.

Lastly, we can detect an inconsistency in the essentialist conclusion of the *Tractatus* about language. This holds that there is a universal logical structure, common to all languages. This makes it possible for them to depict facts. This conception is grounded on the view and assumption that the essential function of propositions is to describe states of affairs and facts and nothing more. As such, for all the natural languages to speak of the world, they must of necessity be alike in their underlying logico-syntactical structures, which supposedly correspond to logico-ontological structures of the world. This conclusion is unwarranted because it erroneously restricts the role of language only to factual descriptions, while it is our common knowledge that language use transcends the genre of mere description of facts. It extends to include the expressive functions, ceremonial functions, aesthetic functions, etc. These functions do not have any common form with the descriptive function of language. Therefore, the *Tractatus*’ conception of the nature of language is not exhaustive at all.
Again, such a universalistic conception of language is falsified by the overwhelming evidence that diverse linguistic families of the world have radical differences that defy any essentialist characterization. Their grammatical structures, for example, Bantu and Nilotic linguistic families, are removed from each other so much so that our attempts to crystallize from them a common underlying logical syntax would be fruitless. Hacker (1997, p. 80) has echoed this point:

“Far from the logical syntax of any possible language having to mirror the logical structure of the world, the rules of a language are autonomous. They owe no homage to reality. They do not reflect metaphysical possibilities, determined by the essential nature of objects represented, but rather themselves determine logical possibilities – that is, what it makes sense to say. ... Different languages may be constituted of different rules, constrained only by human interests and needs, human discriminatory capacities, shared abilities and reactive propensities...”

In other words, they are cultural factors and not the logical structures of the world that determine the grammatical rules in our languages and by extension determine the possible logical inferences we can make about our world. It is then that we can abstract a given logical inference in one language and formalize it in the formal language of logic.

2.7.2. On meaning

The Tractarian theory of meaning is essentially expressed in the picture-theory of meaning. But in the light of the above demonstration of lack of correspondence between language and reality, the whole edifice of the picture-theory also collapses. The picture-theory presupposes an isomorphism of structure of language and reality. Only then would it be possible for language to depict the true form of structure of the world or reality and communicate it, (the world). The doctrine of the picture-theory presented as consisting of two aspects namely: the pictorial relationship and the pictorial form, is therefore weakened as described below.
The concept of pictorial relationship refers to the correlation between the linguistic elements, namely, names and propositions and the ontological elements, like objects and facts. This is the aspect then of the picture-theory that is entirely assailed by the observation that there is no actual isomorphism of structures of the world and language. It is true, for instance that by ostensive definitions, names can be connected to objects (both physical and conceptual), but still, even the objects so defined are not the meanings of the words or names. We have examples of fictitious entities, general terms, historical or past events and people, who cannot be defined ostensively, yet intuitively, we hold them as meaningful. Thus, pictorial relationship that establishes meaning as inherently referring to the world – that is the referential theory of meaning – is only applicable to a minimal number of cases like the case of proper names. And even in this case the connection between the name and its object is not an intrinsic one but rather a connection that is arbitrarily and conventionally established. For example a proper name, “John” referring to an individual is arbitrarily given to the person by the parents and the rest of the community accepts it as his name. And the name would not loose meaning at the demise of the individual.

The other concept of pictorial form is also weakened by the same lack of isomorphism of structure. Pictorial form is the way the elements of a picture, which in our case is language, relate to each other so as to depict how the elements of the pictured relate to each other. It presupposes a form common to both language and reality. Wittgenstein referred to this shared form as the logical form. It is inherent in the structure of reality and can be explicitly displayed by language when it is rigorously analyzed. But by denying that there is a correspondence of structures of language and reality, we equally minimize the possibility of a shared logical form between language and reality. Hence the claim
underlying the concept of pictorial form that a proposition, precisely an elementary proposition, consists of names combined in such a way that they reflect how objects which they name, are combined in reality, becomes untenable.

Thus the idea of logical form has nothing to do with the logical form of reality. It can simply be conceived of as the grammar of language and its expressions determined by the rules for their use. It is just the grammar and the context, which determine the combinatorial possibilities of words and license the employment of the possible and actual combinations.

2.7.3. On communication

In communicating, we convey our thoughts to others and communication would be said to have taken place when our intended meanings are so perceived by our hearers. In the *Tractatus*, our communication basically involves the transmission of *sense* from the speaker to the listener. *Sense*, in the Tractarian conception is a function of pictorial form.

It is the capacity of an expression to be true or false depending on what the case may be. The form reports about the reality. But given the above weakness of the idea of a pictorial or logical form, which depicts the logico-metaphysical form of reality, we can assert that communication, for it to be possible, must go well beyond the mere reporting of facts. In communication of thoughts and intentions, attention should be given not merely to facts but equally to the grammar of the language used itself, the cultural norms, physical contexts, moral sensitivities, etc of the listeners and speakers. These are factors that determine the perception of ideas and intentions for listening or talking. Hence even the acts of reporting itself require and involve some more background activities that do not report.
The *Tractatus* thus overlooked the fact that ordinarily in communicating we perform several different acts of which reporting is just one. Such acts can be warning, entertaining, convincing, threatening, etc. Its conception of communication as involving only reporting of facts is therefore narrow and falls far short of the complete range of what communication ordinarily involves.

### 2.8 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have attempted to unravel what Wittgenstein held to be the nature of language, meaning and communication in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein dealt with concepts in an overlapping manner in his work. My purpose was to unfold and reconstruct as clearly as possible from his overlapping scheme and technical jargon what his theories are of these concepts. I have relatively achieved this purpose, but still, the treatment of one concept extended to have bearing on the treatment of the other concepts. So achieving complete and clear-cut distinction of concepts and their accompanying theories was not possible.

In the exposition we have come to see that the Tractarian theories of language, meaning and communication are fundamentally based on the ontological conception of the world, which in its turn is closely tied to modern logic. Urmson (1956, p.6) observed that:

> "Many metaphysical systems, which endeavor to give a general account of the world, are clearly modeled on some less-flying discipline. Thus it is in general clear, however obscure the details, that the Pythagoreans tried to give an account of the world in terms of their geometry: it is tempting to see Locke's metaphysics as a general application of atomistic mechanics... The shortest account of logical atomism that can be given is that the world has the structure of Russell's mathematical logic."

So, language, along with its related concepts of meaning and communication must be logical at their deepest levels. Upon analysis this logical structure is laid bare. The
Tractatus has the merit of having focused sharply the attention of philosophy to the nature of language, investigating into the logical connection between language and reality and having given the most complete articulation of logical atomism.

However, the last section of this chapter has offered some criticism to highlight the inconsistencies and weaknesses of the Tractatus as it regards language, meaning and communication. As we move on to the next chapter, we will attempt to show how the other work of Wittgenstein, the Investigations made up for the weak points of the Tractatus.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 LANGUAGE, MEANING AND COMMUNICATION IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is an exposition of Wittgenstein’s theories of language, meaning and communication in his work, the *Philosophical Investigations*. This work made major attacks on the *Tractatus*, the subject of the preceding chapter. In order to shade more light into its theories, I will be making occasional references to the *Tractatus* throughout the chapter so as to draw from its illuminating contrast to the *Investigations*.

The chapter begins with what I have referred to as the critique of the Tractarian ontology. This will be a preamble to the new orientation in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It will then be followed by sections on language, meaning and communication respectively. Finally, there will be a concluding section, which will critically evaluate, recapitulate, and show the relationship of these concepts as can be drawn from the *Investigations*.

3.2 Critique of the Tractarian Ontology

In the preceding chapter we saw, that the *Tractatus* founded its linguistic theory on some ontological presuppositions according to which the external physical world is understood to be composed of and, hence, divisible into facts. The facts in their turn can be reduced into simple things or objects and their attributes. Objects concatenate into facts. Our human language has a corresponding structure to this ontological structure of the world. As such, our language can be a clear representation of facts in reality. The task of philosophical analysis in the *Tractatus* was, accordingly, to enable us unveil the ideal
form of our language which otherwise is ordinarily vague and fails to precisely picture facts to us. This is because names are not precisely and exactly assigned to their objects and so even the sentences formed from the names fail to correspond to the way facts are put together from the names. The fully analysed language, in its ideal form on the other hand, ought to have the power to clearly represent facts since the names in it and consequently the sentences built from them would be precisely defined and would have clear referents.

But in the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein gave up the ontological presuppositions of the *Tractatus*. There is now no reality in itself objectively given to us that is merely pictured by our language; pictured in such a way that the structure of language has to accommodate itself to the said structure of the world/or reality. Instead it is the contention of Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* that the world is first revealed to us through the description and mediation of language. So it is only in the interpretation of, and in, language that the world is given to us.

According to Hacker (1997, p.103), the *Investigations*’ denial of the Tractarian ontology is based in four tenets discussed here below. First, Wittgenstein refutes the idea that objects or things and their attributes are given to us independently of language. Such an idea would imply that humanity conventionally assigns names to such entities when they are confronted with them (objects) as data, and only then do the objects and the attributes become the meanings of their linguistic expressions. This requires that we start from the ontological structures and then attach isomorphic linguistic structures to them, precisely as the *Tractatus* did.
But, contrary to such a proposition, the *Investigations* suggests that the ontological structures, objects, and attributes are just but projections of the linguistic structure which are given before hand, in which we describe and speak about the world.

Second, a consequent of the first tenet, means that if there are no entities given independently of language, then there is equally no objective world built up out of such entities as is purported by the atomistic principles of the *Tractatus*. The world as we perceive it is articulated first and foremost in the linguistic description. Such an articulation depends on the particular linguistic forms available for description. In PI, 90 we find the remark:

"... ... Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one - such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expressions in different regions of language. - Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another: this may be called 'analysis' of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart."

The idea that the world is articulated in the linguistic form already present in the language undermines the notion of purifying the ordinary language of its irregularities and hence unveiling its ideal form. The concept "ideal form" of language was definable in the *Tractatus* on the basis that it was supposed to be a picture of the structure of reality in and of itself. But now the structure of the world is none other than the very structure of our language in which we describe it.

Third, the enterprise of fashioning the ideal language on the model of a logical calculus is abandoned. Wittgenstein no longer visualizes a language with a real logical structure with its real meanings hidden behind the inexact and vague formulations of ordinary language.
Consequently in the *Investigations* the focus shifts from ideal language to ordinary language. He puts an emphasis on the *Investigations* of how words are used in ordinary, daily discourse. In PI, 124, when he describes the new task of philosophy, he makes clear this point in saying that: “*Philosophy may not interfere with the actual use of language. It can in the end only describe it. For, it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves anything as it is.*”

Fourth, the new view of the world being put into order by language runs counter to earlier Tractarian demand for precision of meanings of linguistic expressions. The idea that there is an absolute exactitude in the meanings of words that can be attained at the completion of an analysis of language is given up. Exactness of meanings is never absolute but rather relative to and sufficient only for, a given context. There is no true sense of a sentence to be determined by logical analysis and correspondence to reality. In PI, 98 we find the remark:

> “On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language “is in order as it is.” That is to say we are not striving after an ideal, as if our vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us. On the other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be a perfect order even in the most vague sentence.”

Kenny (1975,p.104) similarly observes that in a much earlier work, *Remarks on Logical Form*, a paper written by Wittgenstein to the joint session of Aristotelian society and the Mind Association, (Wittgenstein) was abandoning one of the central doctrines of the *Tractatus*. In this paper, the doctrine of independence of elementary propositions was modified. In the *Tractatus*, this doctrine had been elaborated to underscore the exactness and precision of such propositions in representing definite and independent states of affairs. But later in the said paper, as Kenny observes, Wittgenstein considers statements of degree, that is to say, statements concerning properties which admit of gradation, for
example about the length of an interval, the pitch of a musical note, the brightness of a
colour etc. One would not be able to say with absolute exactness what a statement like he
sings high pitches without straining means. Such statements nullify the doctrine of the
independence of the elementary propositions. For us to understand such statements we
have to consider the contexts in which they are uttered so as to determine the limitations
of their degrees of application.

These are the tenets, which constitute the *Investigations*' critique of the Tractarian
ontology. It is against the background of this critique that we can now chart the radical
departure of the *Investigations* from the standard Tractarian philosophical orientation. It
had an enormous influence in the subsequent philosophy of Wittgenstein and hence it
must always be borne in mind for a proper construction of later theories and more so of
the theories subject to our study, namely, language, meaning and communication.

3.3 LANGUAGE

3.3.1 Language-games versus Tractarian Representationism

It was the basic characteristic of the *Tractatus* and the tradition to which it belonged to
see the function of language as uniquely lying in its representational or pictorial function.
Accordingly, the *Tractatus* identified the meaning of expressions with their descriptive
content. It exclusively insisted that only declarative discourse was meaningful because its
sentences could be either true or false depending on what is the case in reality. Such
statements had the potential of representing reality. For that matter, the *Tractatus* did not
inquire into how language is used apart from assertions. Such an exclusive acceptance of
declarative statements as alone constituting language and a summary dismissal of all the
rest of the statements as nonsense is what I refer to here as the *Tractarian
representationism*. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein pursues a criticism of the
Tractarian representationism. He recognized the multiplicity of the functions of language
and expounded it in the imagery of language-games.

Language, the *Investigations* contends, is one among many of the natural human activities
like walking, building homes, ploughing etc. It is only that it is an activity that takes place
even in the performance of other activities and it takes place even in quite diverse
contexts of situations. It permeates our lives so much that we often fail to grasp its full
extent. Therefore, for us to appreciate its full potential, we have to see and analyze it
against the background of the various contexts in which it is used. It is always part of a
*form of life*. But since it can be part of various forms of life, its functions are as varied as
are the forms of life and so has to be defined anew for each form of life.

Wittgenstein does not offer any precise definition of what a *form of life* is. This is fairly
compatible with the anti-essentialist attitude of the *Investigations*. Nevertheless, from his
application of the phrase, *form of life*, throughout the work it can be construed to be referring to
the totality of a community’s way of life. This is understandable as comprising their daily
activities, social activities, behavioural patterns, belief systems, economic activities, etc. for
example, sports, religion, methods of acquiring food, system of government, religious beliefs and
practices, initiation rites etc.

Stern (1995, p.27) echoes a similar construction of *form of life* in the brief remark:

“In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein came to see that our use of language depends
on a background of common behaviour and shared practices, on forms of life.”
To illustrate further the notion of *form of life* we can imagine the hypothetical cases of different modes of life namely; a strict pastoralist life, strict agrarian life and strict industrial life. These modes of life are entirely different and equally different would be the activities surrounding them. For instance, their law courts would arbitrate in cases involving cattle rustling, disputes in pastureland; access to arable land; industrial workers and industrial employers, respectively. Likewise, their jokes, moral codes and obligations, education system, the expected rewards from their respected deities, etc would be attuned to the respective mode of life. In this example, each mode of life together with all the activities that go along with it, makes up a *form of life*.

We get an illuminating remark in Wittgenstein (1980, par. 630) thus:

> "The fact that we act in such-and-such ways e.g. punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so, give orders, render accounts, describe colours, take an interest in others' feelings. What has to be accepted, the given-it might be said-are facts of living [forms of life]."

In the light of this notion of *form of life*, Wittgenstein establishes our language as being part of a *form of life*. Language is just but one of the myriad activities that make up a *form of life*. The only uniqueness with it (language) is that it is always applied in performing other activities in a *form of life*. It permeates our *forms of life* so much that we become unconscious of it or we find it so difficult to isolate it and consider it separately from other activities. In PI 23, Wittgenstein remarks; "the speaking of language is part of an activity or a form of life."

It is therefore imperative that our language be attuned to our cultures, history, psychology etc, if it has to effectively be used in performing the activities inherent in our *forms of life*. This reveals that a *form of life* is multidimensional hence language too, being founded on the said form of life, is multidimensional. It is recognized as multifarious in character and
lacking any essential, defining characteristic. And so the analogy of games as lacking any clear distinctive feature that would characterize all that we call games as a game was elaborated in the *Investigations* to illustrate the character of language. It is developed in PI, 66, that if we should think of all that we call games for example, card games, ball games, board games etc, we would not be able to identify any single characteristic by virtue of which we call all of them games. Instead what we find is “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.” For example, we would notice that some games are competitive, while some are not, some others involve rule-guided skill while others are played just randomly. Some need many players, while some require only one person etc. It is this “feature” of games, of lacking an overall defining feature, which Wittgenstein believed they compare with language.

In language, the many possible functions it can perform are the comparatives of the various kinds of games. There is nothing common to all of them to qualify them as one and the same activity. There are lists of the possible functions of language in PI, 1 and PI, 23. They are activities like telling jokes, asking questions, giving orders, giving thanks, solving riddles, pleading, reporting an event, forming and testing hypothesis etc. The list is by no means exhaustive and besides, it is not fixed once and for all. It is open-textured such that “new types of language and new language-games come into existence and others become obsolete and get forgotten”. Thus language is both creative and progressive.

But the manner of comparing and speaking of language as games ought not to be taken too literally. It is hard to draw a sharp distinction between a language-game and a
language. In the spirit of PI 23, we can draw a distinction that a language-game refers to the single, specific activities accomplished by uttering words. For example, telling a joke, solving a riddle, informing, prosecuting, cheering, insults etc. These are different language-games. Language instead is the totality of the language-games (in principle). Practically, the possible language-games are countless, with others becoming obsolete and new others coming to be. Hence, a language is open-textured and dynamic in character. Therefore, on the analogy of games we might say that a language corresponds to the concept of games while the language-games correspond to the particular types of games like football, cricket, boxing, horse-racing etc.

Inasmuch as we realize that there are many language-games in function of the various contexts, we can not overlook the fact that we normally use the same language e.g. English in all action contexts in which English is the language in use and not different languages detached from each other. This implies that the words and language forms must be invariant within certain limits even in the different contexts. This is accounted for by recognizing that language-games, besides their functions are also rule-governed. Each language-game has got its unique system of rules relative to its context. We can grasp this easily by making reference to the grammatical layout of different languages like English, French, and Swahili. Their rules of construction are quite different. Yet, Wittgenstein suggests that such different system of rules exist even within one and the same language for the different language-games in it. He does not give any example of such systems of rules. (Cf. Wittgenstein (1958, p. 81).

To take an example of English, we can say that there are different systems of rules for English used in a science congress, proceedings in a court of law, parliamentary debates,
a family at table, political rallies, lecture in a university class etc. In the same way, there are different rule-systems for people of diverse geographical differences using the same language, for example, English in Australia, England, U.S.A, Kenya, and Nigeria etc. This might suggest that in every new situation and activity we must always lay down new rules or learn new rules from scratch every time we move from one language-game to another one. But this is not the case ordinarily because our language can be used in varied contexts and in new contexts as well. It is so because even though each language-game in its particular context has its own system of rules, the distinct systems become blurred at the borderline of the language-games. Such overlapping of the rules at borderline is what facilitates transition from one language-game to another and equally makes it possible for us to use the existing system of rules to apply to and express novel situations never before known to us. Wittgenstein used the expression *family resemblances* to refer to the similarities and relationships between the language-games.

### 3.3.2 Family Resemblances

The analogy of *family resemblances* is introduced explicitly to pursue further the criticism of the traditional conception of definition of language already began by the doctrine of language-games. In PI, 66-67 he wrote:

"Consider, for example, the proceedings that we call "games"... what is common? Don't say: "there must be something common or they would not be called 'games'- but look and see whether there is anything common to all. -For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that..." I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances" between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament etc overlap and criss-cross in the same way."
Below is a table illustrative of an imaginary family with the traits of the members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Complexion</th>
<th>Height</th>
<th>Temperament</th>
<th>Nose shape</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Tall</td>
<td>Quick-tempered</td>
<td>Flat</td>
<td>Intelligent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>Dark</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Humorous</td>
<td>Sharp</td>
<td>Intelligent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Humorous</td>
<td>Flat</td>
<td>Intelligent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daughter</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Unique</td>
<td>Flat</td>
<td>Intelligent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This analogy also implicitly constitutes a new philosophical principle that governs the definition of terms. It is this implicit aspect that we are going to focus on presently.

*Family resemblances* is discussed in some works previous to the *Investigations*. For example, Wittgenstein (1974a, pp.11-ff) approaches family resemblances from a psychological point of view. Whenever we understand a word, he observes, there seem always to be a mental occurrence, which accompanies it. For instance, the concept-word “car” is accompanied by a mental occurrence or image of a car. And so the general conclusion usually drawn in what is essential to understand a word is some unconscious mental occurrence, which can only be investigated so as to fully comprehend it. And once fully comprehended, it is believed that that which is comprehended is the common characteristic, which can be applied to all the exemplars of the word. Wittgenstein then applies this principle to a range of human dispositions and capacities such as understandings, believing, knowing, wishing, intending, expecting etc. But the conclusion, on the contrary, is that the exemplars of these dispositions do not have some property in common but just some related features between neighbouring members. And
these features may completely not be shared with other exemplars under the same concept-word.

However, it is in the *Investigations* where remarks of *family resemblance* are clearly focused on the discussion of the nature of language. Explicitly, this imagery denies that there is any necessary and sufficient ground on which we would define strictly the term language and ascribe all its exemplars to it. Yet, the lack of a strictly defining feature does not mean that we never have a full understanding of the general term, *language*.

Implicitly then there is a criterion we use to fully understand what *language* means. It is no longer some underlying standard characteristic under which the particular instances of language must be subsumed but rather something obvious and which takes only *a look and see* criterion. And so at any instance of language, I should instantly detect that it is so without much inquiry into its essence. This is a result of a long process of association, value, interest and historical conditioning and not of the presence of universals or essence. It is, as it were that the family resemblances that make us call all the instances of language-games as "language" are a result of the common genetic pool of the heterogeneous process of drilling, conditioning, institutionalization and socio-cultural inculcation. In PI, 65 we find that:

"... *Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, -but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships that we call them all language.*"

These two analogies of *language-games* and *family resemblances* illustrated the nature of language as is understood in the *Investigations* and which Wittgenstein was reluctant to elaborate in a systematic theory. The conclusion of their application to the theory of
language had far-reaching implications also for the theory of meaning in the *Investigations*.

3.4 Meaning

3.4.1 Attack on the Picture-Theory of Meaning

The representational picture-theory of meaning in the *Tractatus* came under attack in the very early section of the *Investigations* and the attack was intermittently pursued throughout the work. We can briefly recapitulate its doctrine here. It held that our language is a picture or a depiction of reality. It (language) is built up from individual words which combine to make sentences and the sentences in their totality is what language is. Language is therefore analyzable into constituents, the propositions or sentences, which are further analyzable into their constituent words. It means then that language is ultimately analyzable into words.

A meaningful language in the framework of the picture-theory is one which the words of have objects or concepts or even propositions assigned to them as their meanings, that is, what they stand for. As such, alongside meaningful words, there are always antecedently existing objective, (concrete or abstract), entities that the said words stand for. The words are then concatenated into sentences to picture the arrangement of the entities in reality. A sentence or proposition is hence meaningful only in the measure it pictures states of affairs or facts in reality.

In the *Investigations*, this theory of meaning is criticized and eventually abandoned. The criticism is akin to the critique of the Tractarian ontology. It primarily involves a denial of the idea that a word stands for an object which is its meaning. Such a notion of meaning as a relation between a name and the object named is illicit. It is seemingly natural to take
the case of proper names as the standard indicator that a name means what it stands for. In PI, 2, 18 and 15, we have a fictitious language-game between a builder and his apprentice. The language consists presumably only of proper names the utterance of which are commands to the apprentice to bring the object to the builder. The vocabulary includes the signs “slab”, “pillar”, “brick”, “columns”, “hammer”, “nails” etc. so when the builder shouts “slab” the apprentice passes to him the required shape of stone. Colour-words like “red” might be added to this language-game and so when “red slab” is ordered for, the apprentice brings a slab of that colour. It could further be expanded to include conventions on word order, functions of numerals, etc.

The functioning of such a language-game convincingly argues for the case that words are meaningful only in so far as they have the referents for which they stand. But when pressed further, the argument is shown to be erroneous. For instance, if it were the case that the word “slab” stands for the stone, slab, which is hence its meaning, then it would imply that if all the slabs were broken or stolen then the word “slab” would cease to have meaning because the meaning has been broken or stolen. Wittgenstein gave many counter-examples to show that the view of names or words standing for things is wrong.

A typical one is in PI, 40:

“Let us first discuss this point of the argument. That a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it. It is important to note that the word "meaning" is used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that "corresponds" to the word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N.N dies, one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. is dead."

The oddity of such suggestions indicates to us that the view that meaning is the relation between a name and the object named is erroneous. And by denying that meaning of
names or words reside in the objects they stand for. Wittgenstein by extension was rejecting the whole of picture-theory of meaning in which the whole language was built up from *names*. Therefore in place of the picture-theory of meaning, he developed a new theory of meaning, which we will refer to as the *pragmatic use-theory of meaning*.

**3.4.2 The Pragmatic, Use-theory of meaning**

The idea of *use* as meaning marks the *Investigations*’ theory of meaning. It was the antithesis of picture-theory of meaning and advances the view that meaning is determined by the social activities of the speakers and listeners of a language as opposed to the view that meaning is some abstract logical form. Wittgenstein declared his break with the position earlier held in the *Tractatus* in PI, 10-12, thus:

“... *We must make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please.*”

And much later in PI, 43, he declared his new position in the following remark:

“... *For a large class of cases in which the word “meaning” is used* -even if not for all cases of its *use* - the word can be defined as follows: the *meaning of a word is its use in the language.*”

This formulation, *meaning is use* is deceptively simple and so in this section I am going to give the details of this formulation in a manner that goes deeper than a superficial account of the formulation. But just before we can look at it exhaustively, I begin by briefly indicating what *use* is not and yet what it can be easily taken to mean. First, *use* in the *Investigations*, does not refer to the set of instances of a word or phrase such that if we were to get how the word *door* is used by x, then we have to enumerate all the instances and occasions in which x used the word. Secondly it is not a behavioural use, for example, if I am having a headache and I say, *call for me a doctor* who responds to the call and get my headache cured. A behaviourist would say that, I used the expression
"call for me the doctor" to cure my headache. This way of understanding takes the meaning of linguistic use as nothing more than stimulus-response mechanism. In the *Investigations*, *use* is referring to the manner of being used. The said manner of use is definable in terms of two complementary notions of *rules of use* and *custom*.

There is no gainsaying that every language is rule-bound. For example, a competent speaker of English will quickly understand the expression, *I arrived yesterday morning* and the same words in haphazard order would have no sense like, *Morning arrived yesterday I*. The former expression is meaningful because the rules allow for such an arrangement of words according to their roles, i.e., subject-verb-object-adjective but not the latter in which we have the order: adjective-verb-object-subject. Accordingly, Wittgenstein holds that it is the rule that determines the manner of being used of a word and hence guarantees the meaning of expressions in a language-game.

The theme of a language as a system of projection rules was the centre of the Tractarian theory of meaning. To speak of a meaningful language meant in the *Tractatus*, a manipulation of a calculus whose logico-syntactic rules made it possible for words, which would otherwise be merely marks and sounds-into-map-like projections of reality. Precisely, they were the rules of language that rendered the correlation between sentences and reality non-arbitrary. It is therefore paradoxical that Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* should maintain the view of meaning as rule-bound, a view he had set forth to correct.

However, a close scrutiny of *use* as rule-bound would reveal to us remarkable differences and modifications of the earlier view of the *Tractatus*. Linguistic rules of use are no longer viewed as fast and hard, but rather as custom-guided and alterable. In order for us
to clearly perceive this difference, we have to take note of a fundamental distinction
Wittgenstein made in PI, 54, 82 and in Wittgenstein (1958, P.13) between what one might
call “a process being in accordance with a rule” and “a process involving a rule.”

Any kind of activity is in accordance with a rule if it keeps the regularities expressed by
the rule. But it involves a rule if the actor actually uses a rule to guide and assess their
actions. The examples to illustrate this distinction might be the rules of courtesy and the
architectural plan of construction. Supposing that in a given culture, it is customary to
bow heads in greeting each other. Acting so would be in accordance with the rule since it
is the regular way. Any other way of greeting e.g. shaking hands would be irregular and
going against the rule. It is not involving a rule because; bowing the head is not guided
and assessed by the rule itself. Instead, a constructor, following the architect’s plan to
guide and assess his work can be appropriately said to involve a rule.

This distinction when applied to a linguistic theory would mean that in speaking
meaningfully we employ a process which is in accordance with the rules and not
involving the rules. To say that a linguistic activity involves the rule would mean that we
know and consciously apply the relevant rules to cases, which fall under them. But this is
not ordinarily the case. Most people would speak fluently without minding about the
rules. They speak in accordance with the rules, but they cannot give any discursive
account of the rules. A linguistic process involving the rules might apply to a scientific
linguist performing his duty, for example, of determining the syntactico- semantic
structure of an unknown language.
The difficulty, however, in acting and particularly, in speaking in accordance with the rules is that no rule taken in itself can really determine its correct application. In this consists the demise of the fast and hard stance of the rules previously maintained in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein observes this with an example in PI, 85:

"A rule stands like a signpost... but where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite direction? - and if they were not a single signpost, but a chain of adjacent ones... ... is there only one way of interpreting them?"

His implicit answer to this is in the negative. Moreover he notes in PI, 86-87, that the application of each rule is almost always governed by some other rules and there is no limit, in principle, to the number of rules whose addition to the existent ones might become necessary. And so, the contention of Wittgenstein here is that rules, inclusive of linguistic rules do not determine their own interpretation and application. In other words, they cannot tell us how they (rules) are to be understood and even if we suppose that they do still they do not guarantee that we understand them properly.

If meaning of words and expressions in a language is nothing more than the rule-bound use of words and expressions and at the same time, we are reminded that rules do not have necessarily one and one correct understanding established by the rules themselves, then we can have different meanings to the same words in the same context as a function of the various alternative understandings and applications of the rules. But how do we account for the regularities, which are exhibited in speaking in accordance with the rule?

The explanation resides in something else outside the locus of rules. It is our second notion of custom. It is what explains how a rule can actually govern a regular linguistic practice if it is itself open to various understandings and hence irregularities in practice.
Whenever there are conflicting interpretations of one and the same word or expression because of the different interpretations of the rules governing their uses, there is no way of resolving the conflict except by an appeal to custom. In PI, 185, we have an example in which a pupil is trained to continue a given mathematical series of numbers according to the rules of “+n” such that:

“at the order “+1” he writes down the series of natural numbers... let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 1000. Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000 and he writes, 1000, 1004, and 1008, 1012. We say to him look what you’ve done!” he doesn’t understand. We say: “you were meant to add two; look how you began the series!” He answers: yes, isn’t it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it.”... Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: “But I went on in the same way.”... It would now be of no use to say “but can’t you see...” Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from fingertip to wrist, not from wrist to fingertip.”

The pupil believes that he is applying the rule correctly and we believe that he is applying the rule incorrectly. This conflict cannot be resolved on the basis of the rule itself. There is no absolute standard by which to settle the dispute. Yet we still know for certain that the pupil is wrong. It is only on the basis of the custom, or what Wittgenstein in PI, 189 referred to as the “natural historical facts.”

The custom in itself is neither true nor false. It is natural and only consists of the regular responses to the rule and consequently to the use of words. This regularity is established by training, by actions of the society in accepting any alternative response to the established one. Hence the correctness of assessing the correctness of rules depends on the consistency of the customs, which constitutes our ways of applying the rules.
These two notions of *rules of use* and *customs* are therefore at the core of the *Investigations* theory of meaning. In practice they are inseparable.

And to recapitulate the foregoing section we can say that meaning which is identified with use is rule-bound and is ultimately determined by the custom of the people. Meaning is no longer seen as the correspondence of language to reality, regulated by fast and hard rules of logical syntax. It is the pragmatic consistency with the customary regularities, which constitutes the true test of meaning. Meaning is bound to the customary behaviour of the people and not bound to reality.

This account of meaning has one major consequence. It leads us to the conclusion of inherent relativity of meaning in function of the different customs of different people. That is a conclusion, which diametrically opposes the Tractarian demand for utmost objectivity in meaning.

### 3.4.3 Relativity of Meaning

If the meaning of words in a language-game is determined by the customary patterns of the speakers of the given language, then meaning is relative to a given custom and it is hardly objective. Customs are diverse from place to place so meaning attached to same words and phrases from place to place are also different. The conclusion of relatively of meaning is compatible with the theory of language on the analysis of language-games and family resemblance. Different language-games imply different language set-ups. And so even in a large linguistic community, like English, the different practices say for example, for the legal fraternity, the poor in shanty towns, legislators, academic fraternity, sports club, Americans, Kenyans etc, determine the meaning they attach to their expressions and
words, even though they may be using the same language, English. Thus a sports committee might determine that on 26th June 1999 action will kick off at exactly 2.00 p.m., referring to the next scheduled football match, whereas a lawyer in a court of law might say we are bringing this action against the permanent secretary. Action in both sentences might be having the general sense of an activity taking place, but its concretization in the particular contexts would refer to different almost unrelated activities, i.e. football match and court proceedings or suit. And so if we were to imagine a fictitious lawyer, whose entire life has been in the legal environment without any external influences upon him then we can suppose that on listening to the sports committee's declaration, he would understand an entirely different thing.

Ordinarily, we all tend to be involved in different linguistic contexts at different times in our day-to-day life. And yet as we move from one language-game to the other, we are never conscious of the rules or customs as such. Instead, Wittgenstein introduces the idea of the purpose we wish to accomplish at any given moment in the language-game. For example, the case of the builder and his apprentice, the purpose of shouting, slab is to call for slab and not to describe it or anything else. By the same token to say I am thirsty might mean let's go for a drink; it is time to go and rest in different contexts.

The pragmatic use-theory of meaning has even further relativistic implications when we consider the Investigations' critique of the Tractarian ontology. It is our language that plays a crucial part in bringing the order into the world of our experience. Since the world is given to us only through an interpretation in language, then they are the linguistic apparatus we use that actually provide us with the forms of such an interpretation. In PI, 102 we read:

"The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background-hidden in the medium of the
Thus different languages and language-games represent different ways of shaping the world. For example, different languages like Kiswahili and English have very different apparatus of dividing the world. Kiswahili divides and classifies the objects and people into classes whereas English divides and classifies into gender, i.e. masculine, feminine or neuter. For instance, the following four examples reveal a difference in the possessive case.

*The man beat his wife.*

*The lady beat her husband.*

*Bwana alipiga bibi yake.*

*Bibi alipiga bwana yake.*

In the above cases the possessives in the English statements are different because the subjects belong to different genders, i.e., masculine and feminine, respectively. Instead, in the Kiswahili statements, the possessive is similar because, *bwana* and *bibi* the subjects belong to the same class, namely, M-WA class.

This means that if two people, one with a Kiswahili cast of mind and the other with an English cast make a statement of fact -which is supposedly objective- their views of the fact that will be different and certainly so are the meanings they intend to pass across. In a short remark in PI, 373, Wittgenstein wrote: *grammar tells what kind of object anything is.*

Therefore the picture we make of the world is a fruit of a whole cultural accomplishment, which determines the forms and meanings with which we describe it. So even the
descriptive statements of facts are relative on the linguistic forms and apparatus through which we see the facts. This echoes Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of radical translation according to which there are culturally no universal meaning and hence behaviour is the determining criterion of meaning within a language. Therefore, it is impossible to translate or even compare theoretical concepts between radically different languages. (Quine, 1964)

But we should guard against the conclusion that the relativism of meaning in the *Investigations* implies scepticism. A sceptic position would be that if meaning as use is inherently relative to customs and the linguistic world-view, then it is only one world-view and customary set-up which is the correct one, but only that we cannot know which one. Instead, the position Wittgenstein settles for is that all the languages, language-games together with their accompanying ontologies or world-views are just but representations that are all possible and compatible with different experiences. And so these world-views can stand alongside each other without our being able to say, as the sceptics would, that the correctness of the one excludes the others being correct. I can compare the worldviews in Wittgenstein's position with the different discipline in the university. Mathematics, Physics, Philosophy, Sociology, Home economics, Music etc are representations of true academic disciplines without being prejudicial to the status of each other. They all represent a search for a single truth.

This relativism requires that when individuals of different languages and language-games interact, dialogue should carefully take place to facilitate good comprehension of each other's background and hence their meanings and perception of terms. It should not be
the case of imposing one’s world-view to the other as the only correct one. This leads us to our next sub-topic, communication.

3.5 Communication

3.5.1 Communication: Performing of Speech Acts
The terminology, speech act is not Wittgenstein’s. It was introduced into philosophy by Austin in his work, How to Do Things With Words. But in this section we are going to apply it in its broad outlines, if not in its details as developed by Austin to reconstruct Wittgenstein’s theory of communication in the Investigations.

Speech acts are the acts performed by speaking. And the three kinds of speech acts are locutionary acts, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. Locutionary acts are the ones performed by uttering expressions and words. It is the utterance per se. This act has no communicative value. Illocutionary act is performed when in speaking we actualise the activities such as reporting, promising, threatening, requesting, ordering etc. Perlocutionary act is describable as the effect which by saying something, i.e. in executing an illocutionary act, the speaker has on the hearer. The effect could be intended or not intended by the speaker. For example, irritating, intimidating, persuading, impressing, embarrassing, etc. These last two acts have communicative value.

Communication can take place when a speaker not merely utters something, but rather expressly intends to convey a message or meaning to a hearer. And so a successful communication is realized only when the hearer recognizes the exact meaning a speaker intends to convey. But how can a hearer recognize a speaker’s communicative intentions?

The answer to this fundamental question constitutes the main difference between the Investigations’ theory of communication and the Tractatus.
Briefly, the *Tractatus* held that in communication, a speaker perceives of a factual situation in the external world, and then he encodes it linguistically then transmits it to the hearer. The language in which the fact is encoded is a picture of the fact. And so the speaker simply decodes it, understands it and then looks at reality to ascertain the truth of the message. This requires that the referents of names or words used be as clearly spelt out as possible so that the sense of the propositions used be equally clearly figured out by the hearer. In this framework, only declarative statements of facts have communicative value, any other kind of statement is nonsensical and hence lacks communicative as well as cognitive value.

But the demand of the Tractarian model of communication that names or words be clearly defined is never met ordinary in communicating. According to Akrnajian et al. (1991, p.313), there are five major facts about ordinary communication that fail to satisfy this demand and hence render the model weak. First, ordinarily, many of the expressions that we use are characteristically *ambiguous* and so it is imperative for the hearer to determine which of the possible meanings of an expression was intended by the speaker to be operative on that occasion. Second, we often speak *non-literally*, that is, by using words yet expressly not meaning what they usually mean like in the case of irony, sarcasm, and figures of speech. Third we sometimes speak *indirectly*. For example, when I say, *it is raining*, with the intention to ask the one next door to close it. Fourth, some expressions, which are used on some occasions, are purely *ritual or institutional expressions* and so they do not at all communicate. These could be like the religious formulae of baptism, The routine questioning to find a defendant guilty etc. Lastly is the question of the communicative intention, what the speaker intends to convey is never always determined.
by the meaning of the expression. So for instance, when I say, *it is dark already* it might be an order for him to carry his spotlight. But if he does not realize my intention in making the statement, even though it is a fact and he has ascertained it but does not carry his spotlight, then the communication between us has failed.

To overcome these weaknesses of the Tractarian theory of communication, Wittgenstein proposes a new theory of communication. The basic realization of the wide range of the possible uses of language is constitutive of this new theory. In communicating, we perform various acts, illocutionary and perlocutionary alike. We command, state facts, make promises, ask questions, make jokes, persuade, insight etc hence the statement of facts itself becomes just a part of the spectrum of speech acts. The previous distinction between declarative propositions and non-declaratives of the *Tractatus* becomes superfluous. In this sense the *Investigations* gives a view that adequately accounts for the full richness of human communication. But the fundamental question revolves again on how a hearer would detect the communicative intentions of the speaker. How does the hearer determine the right speech act being performed by the speaker for effective communication to take place?

The *Investigations*’ suggestion is that more than just a common language and the conventionalised meanings of its expressions is required to enable a hearer to recognize the speaker’s intentions on the basis of the speaker’s utterances alone. There must be shared system of beliefs and inferences between the speaker and the hearer, which is operational for them to have any successful communication. It is the shared background information between the speaker and the hearer.
To understand this, we can consider Wittgenstein’s critique of ostensive definitions, that is, defining a word by pointing at its referents. So if we teach a child or a foreigner the meaning of “cup” we only have to point at the cup and say to him, *this is a cup.* This is representational theory of language and meaning in its simplest formulation. Yet, Wittgenstein contends that even in such ostensive definitions and communications, a whole background information is required for it to be clearly understood. In PI, 30-31 he remarks: “One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing’s name. We may say: only someone who already knows how to do something with it can significantly ask a name.”

The point behind these remarks is not to deny the obvious fact that we have learnt the meaning usually by being told what it signifies. It is rather to underscore the fact that, we usually possess beforehand, an elaborate corpus of linguistic skills. These skills settle the question of meaning when applied in the context of ostensive definition. Placed in the broader perspective of communication, even the very activity of assigning meanings to words through ostentation itself presupposes a previously established linguistic and customary framework. It is what validates and gives meaning to the act of pointing itself.

This is the crucial point of the critique of ostentation, which has a bearing on the theory of communication. A speaker is able to communicate to a hearer because of the shared background beliefs, inferences and information. It is on the basis of this background information that the hearer would be able to grasp the communication intentions of the speaker, the speech act he is performing and hence understand his meaning. Therefore, considering the contextual appropriateness of every utterance the hearer can disambiguate the utterances, understand the non-literal utterances, figure out the indirect utterances etc.
and thus overcome the problem with the Tractarian model of communication. PI. 242, states “if language is to be a means of communication, there must be agreement not only in the definitions but also ... in judgments.”

Going back to the linguistic theory of languages as games, we find that each language-game represents a complete system of communication. It furnishes everyone belonging to it with a bulk of accumulated, shared knowledge necessary for them to communicate effectively in that language-game. This analysis reveals to us the rich potential of linguistic communication such that, despite the variations of intentionality of speakers that may be determined by various factors, language is nevertheless capable of expressing more or less all the purposes of its users. The richness of the language-games and their accompanying communicative powers equally impose a duty on us of carefully discerning the body of shared knowledge whenever we are communicating across different language-games. This leads us to the conclusion that communication is a multilateral activity.

3.5.2 Multilateral View of Communication
The basic realization that there exists a vast background information, knowledge and belief systems in our language-games, which facilitate communication between the speaker and hearer, calls for a new thinking on communication. It marks one of the novelties of the Investigations as opposed to the Tractatus. It means that in any communicative process both the speaker and the hearer are active participants drawing from a common pool of knowledge. The said knowledge is not necessarily a systematic discursive knowledge, but it is an active and practical knowledge drawn from a people’s history, experiences and customs. Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986, p.14) captured this reality in a clear manner:
“Communication between human beings is also the basis and process of evolving culture... There is a gradual accumulation of values which in time become almost self-evident truths governing their conception of what is right and wrong, good and bad, beautiful and ugly, courageous and cowardly, generous and mean in their internal and external relations. Over a period of time this becomes a way of life distinguishable from other ways of life.”

All this stands in sharp contrast to the view of communication as a unilateral process in which those who have the knowledge of facts monopolize knowledge and impart it on passive hearers. It has a lot of implications particularly for one who comes from one linguistic background wanting to communicate with others in another linguistic context. It is imperative on him to closely study the bulk of the practical knowledge his new audience is likely to use to interpret what he says. It would create a major communication breakdown if he were to come and impose his knowledge on the new audience.

An example of where such kind of dialogue and discernment can be got is our modern context. In our times, the shrinking of the world through advanced communication, interdependent economies, increasing urbanization of much of the world population, means that more and more often communication runs across or involves highly heterogeneous communities. This situation has occasioned the widespread use of some particular languages to enhance communication. This is what we have termed as the cross-cultural communication and the language used is the cross-cultural language, for example English. The different segments of the wide cross-cultural linguistic community have got different systems of beliefs and inferences because they belong to different language-games. In such a context, for successful communication to take place, a great deal of discernment for both the speaker and hearer to understand the background system operational in their figuring out of each others utterances should be done. It is only then
that a relatively effective communication can be expected to take place in this modern context.

The point of communicative multilateralism is that, it comes to terms with the intricate involvement of language and human life. Each and every person in his particular context is involved in it and this influences his communicative dispositions.

3.6 Critical Remarks on Chapter Three

The *Philosophical Investigations* attacks and go beyond the limits of the *Tractatus* in many areas. Throughout this chapter we have endeavoured to demonstrate the contrast between the doctrines of the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* concerning language, meaning and communication. In this section, however we are going to show that the *Investigations* too, manifest some unacceptable conclusions regarding particularly the theories of language and meaning.

3.6.1 On Language

As we have seen above, in the chapter, the *Investigations* theory of language makes an elaborate use of analogies of games and family resemblance. Wittgenstein here compares language analogously to games, which lack any feature common to all of them but have mere similarities, which overlap and criss-cross from one game to the other like the features of family members. The analogy is by no means aimed at trivializing the importance of language but rather to demonstrate that it is indefinable. It underscores the contention that language lacks an essence by virtue of which we should call it language. This anti-essentialist spirit of Wittgenstein has the merit of recognizing that language is a multifarious, dynamic and a progressive structure which can reach out to express any field of human experience and not a static, fixed and rigid system of rules which can be
formalized once and for all. However, anti-essentialism when urged to the extreme, as
Wittgenstein does, results in absurd implications.

First, it results into an asystematic attitude towards a study of language. This obstructs the
construction of an organized theory about language. We are intuitively inclined to accept
that any substantial knowledge about any subject ought to be structured and well
organized into a coherent system. But the anti-essentialism of the *Investigations* rejects
such a systematic theorizing about language, by implication. This potentially has the
danger of leading us to a kind of skepticism, which we may conveniently call *linguistic
skepticism* whereby we would contend that language being indefinable cannot be known
(language) and is unknowable.

Secondly, if we uphold the conclusion pointed above then we can sceptically refute the
whole theory of the *Investigations* about language as uncertain. Moreover, the
*Investigations* manifests an internal contradiction, when, it denies that language has any
essence and still it goes ahead to define language by description, as consisting, as it were,
of language-games. It defeats the thesis that language is indefinable.

**3.6.2 On Meaning**

Wittgenstein maintained that meaning is *use*. The immediate danger with this formulation
is that Wittgenstein failed to determine the sense in which he was applying the term *use*.
*Use* has many possible meanings; hence the formulation lends itself to various
interpretations. As we saw in the chapter, *use* can be understood as the number of
instances in which a word is used. It can also be understood as a mere activity in the
stimulus-response-nexus. But we saw that these two constructions are refutable if the text
is studied further. Instead the apparently correct construction of the doctrine of meaning
as use is that use is applied as that which is in accordance with the rules. However, the introduction of the notion of the rules and rule-following in language led Wittgenstein to a course of infinite regress in the chain of rules. Since a rule cannot guarantee that it would be followed, it rests upon preceding rules to validate a given rule and to provide for its interpretation. This is a process that can continue infinitely.

In order to avoid such an infinite regress, Wittgenstein introduced the idea of customs of a community as providing the basis for linguistic rules. This is equally unsatisfactory because, customs, just like rules develop and are a network that can infinitely regress to preceding customs. Hence the notion of customs still leaves us on the very course of infinite regress.

Besides the problem of infinite regress, we are faced with the puzzle of whether it is the rule that creates customs or if it is the custom that creates the rule. Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* seems to suggest, the latter. But we have cases, which point to the former. For example, a case of military recruits who are taught the rules of how to respond to different commands of their superiors. It is only later, after mastering the rules, that the new recruits internalize the relevant customs. This puzzle portrays Wittgenstein as having arbitrarily established customs as the basis for rule following, hence meaning.

The third criticism is akin to the criticism on language. On realizing that “use” of language is linked to rule following, Wittgenstein ought to have formalized or made explicit the said rules. The *Investigations* fell short of this explication of the supposed rules underlying a meaningful language.
3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has been focused on the *Philosophical Investigations* theories of language, meaning and communication. In the attempt to clearly reconstruct the said theories from this particular work of Wittgenstein, I have frequently had to recall and recapitulate the Tractarian stance with regard to these theories.

In regard to this chapter then we have seen that language is a natural, open-ended, human activity. It can reach and express all our experiences in the various contexts. For that matter it lacks one single definition by means of which we can characterize it as *language*.

Meaning in its turn is relative on the uses a language is put to. Precisely, it is relative on the particular language-games. This means that meaning and language are only seperable in theory, but in practice they are inseparable. Meaning analogously is immanent to language just as we might say that movement is immanent to walking.

Finally, with regards to communication theory, Wittgenstein holds that in communication we perform diverse speech acts and not merely making reports about the world or inner thoughts and feelings. And in order to determine which of the acts is being performed in communicating, there is a presupposed shared linguistic knowledge and inferential systems, which speakers and hearers have at their disposal.

At the end, the chapter tries to show some flaws inherent in the *Investigations*. These, together with the contrasts between *Investigations* and the *Tractatus*, alluded to
throughout the chapter, usher us into the following chapter, which will explore the possibility of reconciling the two works of Wittgenstein.
4.0 LOGIC AND CULTURAL CONTEXT IN A LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we are going to pursue the possibility of reconciling Wittgenstein's works namely: The *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, with regards to their respective doctrines on language, meaning and communication which we have seen in the foregoing chapters. To do this we are going to determine fundamentally the connection between logic and culture or cultural context. These two concepts were at the very foundations of the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* respectively.

As such, the chapter will chart out the broad outlines of the impact of cultural diversity on cross-cultural communications: inquire into the logical status of syntax, survey the cultural conditioning of semantical interpretation in a language. Then it will bring in the particular contribution of transformational generative grammarians' analysis and integration of syntax and semantics. Finally, the chapter will apply the results of the above to theories of Wittgenstein, as they are discernible in a cross-cultural context of communication. The chapter will close with a general conclusion, which will be evaluative of the synthesizing function of the chapter.

4.2 Impact of Cultural Diversity in Cross-Cultural Communication

Cross-cultural communication by means of cross-cultural languages has been a phenomenon down the ages in areas of trade and daily interactions of people living along the boundaries of two or more distinct communities. However, this fact has become more
pronounced in our time due to advanced information technology, urbanization and interdependent economies. Our study focuses principally on English usage as a cross-cultural medium of communication between the diverse cultures. A vast diversity of cultures is represented under the concept of *Anglophones*, that is, those who speak in English in their daily lives or for official purposes or in both. These cultures manifest varying degrees of similarities and differences. They can broadly be divided into the native speakers and non-native speakers. Australia, England, North America, Ireland and New Zealand are the native-speaking countries of English. The rest of the Anglophones are non-native speaking countries. These include English-speaking Africa, for example, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, some Asian countries like India and in the Caribbeans like Jamaica.

The latter group has adopted English as a second language to be used in education, diplomacy and official functions and even in facilitating daily interactions between people of different tongues. The non-native speakers are hence bilingual or multilingual and more heterogeneous than the former. The diverse cultures falling into these groups determine the behaviour patterns of the people and have enormous bearing on the cross-cultural communication that deserves a closer attention.

Culture and acculturation or the process of acquiring new culture, has been studied from a number of perspectives. In this section, however we will limit ourselves only to the perspective of language-culture. Dummet, C. S et al., (1981 p.57) have identified six of the most basic features of any language-culture:
First, that no language is translatable word-for-word into another language. Even the languages so similar to each other in structure and vocabulary by virtue of belonging to the same linguistic family cannot be easily translated into each other word-for-word. They argue that all languages in fact have idiomatic expressions of their own which carry connotations that transcend the meanings of the separate words themselves. These meanings would be compromised by even the most accurate translation.

Secondly, that intonation patterns in each language differ from the others and they carry meanings too. Hence we find some languages, which are highly accented and spoken with vigour and others, are spoken plainly and softly. These intonation patterns are constitutive of language itself.

Thirdly, that each language-culture also employs gestures and body movements. This phenomenon might be termed as the non-verbal communication system. This system conveys meanings alongside the verbal system. They ordinarily complement each other, yet they are not the same for all languages.

Fourthly, languages use different grammatical elements to describe all parts of the physical world. Fifthly, all languages have taboo topics such that an integral part of knowing any language calls for knowing what one can and cannot say to whom and on what occasions. Lastly, in interpersonal relationships, the terms for addressing people vary considerably among language-cultures, for example when to use titles, or the first name instead. We will adopt this classification and try to see how the features of language-cultures influence cross-cultural communication.
The observation that languages cannot be precisely translated into one another with their complete expressive power poses an obstacle to effective cross-cultural communication. Most non-native speakers of English learn or acquire English on the paradigms of their first languages. It is a fact of language that it is constituted of a system (which is formalisable) of sounds, words and syntactic structures. But there is also an aspect of it that transcends the mere phonetic, lexical and syntactic system of a language and reaches the deeper levels of human interactions. As such every native speaker of any language internalises specific social experiences of his own culture. These experiences inhere in statements that manifest their communicative significance through interpretation of, for example, jokes, proverbs, idiomatic expressions, etc. These acquired intra-cultural experiences play a significant role when one learns and uses English in an intercultural context.

We can illustrate this point by the example of a rural Kenyan, whose life still centers on extended and hierarchical family system. In his mother tongue, he develops an elaborate ritual for welcoming a visitor at home. He would want to find out where the visitor is coming from; conditions of the weather, about the visitor’s family members back at home. All these would precede even the introduction of his name. In English instead, the welcoming process is compressed into a Hallo, good morning, which is a mere greeting and a wish for a good morning to the person. To the native speaker of English, greeting is apparently just a formal ritual. What matters most is what follows after the greeting. To that Kenyan, learning and speaking English would mean not only compressing his greeting time, but also knowing that it is not all that important to a native speaker. This is a much slower process. The most likely result when our two hypothetical individuals meet is that the efforts of the Kenyan to formulate his welcoming ritual from the mother
tongue to English would be seen by native speakers as circumlocutious and superfluous. On the other hand, the Kenyan would feel ignored (by or a bother to) the native speaker who takes little time welcoming him. This case could be true of other speech acts like congratulating, bidding farewell, excusing oneself, apologizing, expressing anger or happiness, thanking, etc.

Trudgill, P. (1983, p.178), echoed the same observation by noting that attempts to model the second language on the first native language lead to disparities of the lingua-franca (i.e. the common language) which might even hinder communication completely. There is a tendency of the non-native speakers of English to indigenise the English by eliminating irregularities in the English verbs, noun-classes, avoidance of complex syntactic structures and use a restricted range of circumstances like trade, school, entertainment etc. Which leads to variations of the cross-cultural language.

So the background social experiences of the speakers bear enormously on their interpretation and construction of sentences. The natives bring in their own specific social experiences normally expressed in their native languages and which might lack a precise effect when expressed in English. Therefore to enhance cross-cultural communication in such circumstances, attention should be paid to the influencing background social experiences of the speakers.

The impact of language intonations, non-verbal gestures or body movements can be considered together. Generally, some languages are highly intonated; this means that they use a wide variety of tones and pitches whereas some are monotonous, that is, having a single tone. The intonations do carry implicit meanings in them, hence they create
particular effects. For example, in Luo, a smooth running piece of conversation might break into low tones (almost a whisper level). The low tone has the meaning of *don't tell anybody this or it is a secret, don't let it out*. Any person unfamiliar with this tonal behavior and goes ahead to tell the same story elsewhere would have caused a breach of trust with the Luo-speaker. Now if a Luo brings such a tonal feature into English and speaks to someone to whom such an intonation has no meaning, there is certainly going to be a communication breakdown between them.

The effect of intonations is not limited only to the spoken language, it can also influence written communication negatively. In the case where the intonations have semantic imports, they may be handicapped when put in writing because the writing system does not graphically record such tonal features. For that matter, when written, the importance of the elements such as pitch, rhythm, rhymes, stress, pauses, resonance, etc. is minimized and hence their emotional and semantic dimension is lost. Therefore intonation patterns, whether written or spoken, being a part of a language-culture can often be an obstacle to communication. Their introduction or neglect in speaking or writing in English in cross-cultural communication can actually break the communication down.

More importantly is the aspect of body language, which tends to accompany verbal communication. In most cases, they complement each other – that is verbal and gestural language. Just like intonations, gestures and movements carry meaning and are not usually the same in all languages. The awareness of this fact of body language has created sensitivity to the non-verbal aspects of human interaction. This is evidenced by the huge number of books on body language. For example, Birdwhistell (1974, p 112) concluded
that an average American speaks for only 10-11 minutes a day, and that more than 65% of the social meaning of a typical two-persons exchange is carried by non-verbal cues.

The body movements with communicative contents are varied and elaborate. They include postures, facial expressions, eye contact, gestures, distancing or proxemics between the interacting individuals etc. They are used to express equally varied meanings, for example, respect, attention, agreement, humility, disagreements, congratulations, etc.

We can take the case of eye contact as an illustrating example. Birdwhistell (ibid, p.102) observed that Peruvians consider it insulting to avoid eye contact while talking. The Englishman maintains a steady gaze to signal that he is listening. To this we might add that to some African communities, for example, the Luos consider a steady gaze and direct eye-to-eye contact (particularly from a younger person) as disrespectful and discourteous.

A gesture also in one culture might be positive and yet the same gesture in another culture would be derogative. For example, hypothetically, in one culture, to demonstrate the height of a person, people use the arm extended horizontally. Yet in another culture there might be a differentiation in gestural vocabulary, such that the horizontally extended arm demonstrates only the height of animals and they reserve the vertically extended arm to demonstrate the height of human beings. Therefore, gestures and other elements of body-language, due to their subtleties and frequent usage in ordinary communication can affect negatively, the communication between peoples from different cultures.
The other factor is that of the use of grammatical parts or structure of a language to describe the physical world. This factor might also hinder effective communication across cultures. Kagame, A. (1956, p.40), asserted that language is primarily a taxonomic tool and its effectiveness as a medium for communication depends on the precision of its classification. We can hold that it is true, that a language both in its grammar and vocabulary usually reflect a world-view of its speakers. It reflects how they group objects and their qualities even though the speakers themselves are seldom conscious of this fact.

For example, we noted earlier (cf. Chapter Three, p.16) that Kiswahili is a highly classificative language in which words are grouped into the classes to which their referents belong. And this seems to be the case with other Bantu languages. On the other hand, English and the other many European languages divide objects into gender. A noun like chair in Kiswahili will belong to a class of inanimates of the Kl-VI category, in English it is neuter and in French it is feminine. In this case gender and class are the classification factors of these languages.

At the level of vocabulary is where this factor of language as descriptive of the physical world (natural environment) becomes more prominent. The vocabulary can indicate the geographical factors that a community is subjected to. For example, the Eskimos have seven words to distinguish the different states of snow, falling snow, fluffy snow, wet snow, snow on the ground, etc. while certain African communities in the equatorial zone have virtually no words at all for snow. Equally regarding qualities as color, different cultures divide the color spectrum differently, some more finely and some more loosely and this reflects how they discriminate colors. A further example even at the level of verb forms has been provided by Whorf, B. (1956) while studying the Hopi language. He observed that in Hopi language to express the phrase he is running one has to choose
from a wide range of verbal forms which indicate the speaker’s precise knowledge of the runners state, for example, forms to indicate that:

I know he is running at this very moment.
I know that he is running at this moment even though I cannot see him.
I saw him running and I presume that still he is running.
I am told that he is running.
I know that he runs at this moment.

These culture-specific world views expressible in language can be a hindrance to cross-cultural communication, either when the cross-cultural language is insufficient in expressing certain aspects of a world-view or introduces new aspects like color names, names of fruits and trees etc. which are unknown in some regions.

Lastly, taboo topics and interpersonal relationships also determine a language-culture of a people and can also influence an intercultural communication. Both of these factors determine what one can say, to whom it can be said and when it can be said. They prescribe the type of conversations one can partake of and the terms and titles one can use. In interpersonal relationships each language-culture determines, for example, when a person can be addressed by his family name, when it is disrespectful to use his/her name and instead use his title. The subtlety of these factors can lead to a communication breakdown across cultures. They create different sensitivities to the same words, topics, titles, etc. For example, some words would be offensive in other cultures because they are taboo terms and in others, they raise no feeling, some topics too would make others uncomfortable and others not inhibited at all.

These six factors, which are deeply ingrained in any language-culture, come to play every time we speak even though it is mostly unconsciously. They all have the potential of obstructing a successful communication in a cross-cultural context. This is more so the
case, when we think of cross-cultural communication in the media, both print and electronic in which the targeted audience is usually very diverse culturally. Hence any single transmission can lend itself to different interpretations, perceptions and reactions. Yet there is a constant preoccupation and hope to achieve a high measure of objectivity in the communication media running across different cultures. It is my contention that what guarantees objectivity in reporting is the logical inferences which can be drawn from the language used, that is, the cross cultural-language. The said logical inferences should be possible to draw on the basis of the syntax of the language. Therefore in the following section, we will inquire into the logical status of syntax in general.

4.3 The Logical Status of Syntax

There is an obvious link between language and logic because every speaker or writer of any language is conscious of certain basic logical controls to which his thoughts and expressions must submit, for example, consistency, avoiding fallacies and coherence. Conformity to the demands of consistency lends definiteness to words and utterances. In the proportion that these demands are violated, words and utterances become unreliable and uninformative. Philosophers have attempted to account for this relationship between logic and language at syntactical level of language.

Lyons, J. (1968, p.4) observed that the early works on grammar which has come to be known among linguists as “traditional grammar” had its origins among and dates back to the ancient Greeks.

“For the Greeks, grammar was first a part of philosophy. That is to say, it was a part of their general inquiry into the nature of the world around them and of their own social institutions.”
For example, Plato in the dialogue *Cratylus* was the first to explicitly make the grammatical distinction between nouns and verbs. He defined "nouns" as terms that could function as subjects of predication in sentences and "verbs" as terms that could express the action or quality predicted of the subjects. This distinction was a take-off on the ontological distinction between a substance and its qualities.

As such, these major distinctions or classes of grammar, that is, nouns and verbs were identified on logical grounds. They act as constituents of a proposition, which proposition in its turn corresponds to ontological reality. This implies that grammar or specifically, syntax of a natural language is subordinate to logic, since logic is the foundation of grammar and also because the principles of logic are taken to be of universal validity.

Grammar in this tradition of philosophy was nothing more than a philosophical theory of parts of speech and their characteristic *modes of signifying*. It was assumed that the modes of signifying of the parts of speech necessarily coincided with the modes of being and thought. Hence the grammar of a language was thought of merely as a product of reason. So the different languages of men are but varieties of a more general logical and rational system. This contention leads to a conclusion that syntax or grammar is substantially the same in all languages despite the accidental differences in the languages. So whoever grasps the grammar of one language knows it (grammar) in all the others as far as its substance is concerned.

Such a conclusion was reinforced by an analysis of both Greek and Latin, which manifested similar syntactic structures. They were the two languages known to the ancients and they erroneously extended their conclusion that any language should be
exactly or appropriately like Greek and Latin in their syntax. This was compounded with the assumption that language should be a means of representing the logic of being (reality) and thought, which logic is presumably alike to all human beings.

Accordingly, the traditional logic was developed systematically in terms of the subject–predicate model of the grammatical structure of declarative sentences of natural languages. The logical sentences therefore did not interfere with the basic subject–predicate structure of their original sentences. For example, an original sentence like all men die would be regimented into the logical sentence. every man is mortal. Such regimentation preserves the original subject-predicate structure and at the same time facilitates the syllogistic process.

It therefore means that in the early tradition of philosophy, there was no real distinction between the logical structure of a language and its natural syntactical structure. Logical form implicitly corresponds to certain elementary standard grammatical or syntactical structures in natural languages.

But at the turn of 20th century, a new view of the relation between logic and syntax came into existence with the formulation of the modern symbolic logic (cf. Hacker, 1997, pp 1-ff). Modern logic is formed in opposition to traditional logic modelled on subject-predicate structure. The modern logicians like Frege, Russell, and Whitehead realized the inadequacy of traditional logic to reckon arguments based on extensional relations, for example, conjunction, disjunction and conditionals. Besides, the old logic could not adequately provide for arguments requiring principles of quantification. Quantification makes it possible to show that inner logical structure of non-compound statements is also important for validity.
So in its formulation, modern logic did away with the subject-predicate structure of natural language and replaced it with a structure of function and arguments. With this shift, one of the pervasive problems came to the fore, that is, that sentences in their traditional taxonomic grammar do not always reveal their true conceptual or logical structure. For example, two sentences of similar structure like, *John exists* and the *golden mountain exists*. Syntactically, both sentences are alike and analysable into subject-predicate model. However, *John exists* is quite concrete but the second is logically nonsensical because the golden mountain is not existent.

Besides the above case of fictitious entities, we also have the case of structurally ambiguous sentences. For example, in Chomsky (1972, p.124) we get an instance of an ambiguous sentence, “what disturbed John was being disregarded by everyone.” In one interpretation, John can be the subject of disregard, meaning that, what causes John a lot of concern is of less interest to everyone and in the other interpretation, John can be the object of disregard, in that, what worries him (John) most is the fact that everyone disregards him. A traditional grammatical analysis of such an ambiguous sentence would reveal only one syntactical structure yet logically it has two distinct sentences.

Another development of remarkable importance was that of comparative linguistics. It discovered the existence of various language-families different from the Greco-Roman and Indo-European families. These included according to Lyons (1968, pp.21-22), the Bantu, the Semitic (e.g. Hebrew and Arabic), Finno-Ugrian (Finnish and Hungarian), Sino-Tibetan (Chinese and Tibetan), Altaic (Turkish, etc) and the American-Indian languages. These linguistics families have radically different syntactical structures and so
if logical structures were to depend on their grammars, then we would be having equally
divergent systems of logic.

The above factors have prompted later philosophers e.g. Frege (1972) and Russell (1956)
to draw a dividing line between logic and syntax. The syntax of natural language is
considered to be deceptive, superficial and hence intrinsically misleading. Katz
(1972, p.112) observed:

"Most philosophers have therefore thought that a philosophical theory of
grammar is needed to exhibit the conceptual relations unmarked in
grammatical analysis. They conclude that there is no correspondence
between logical form and syntactical structure of language. The artificial
syntax of modern logic is therefore radically at variance with the syntax of
natural languages."

As such, a sentence like, every man is mortal is radically transformed by modern logic to
everything is such that, if it is a man then, it is mortal.

This is formalisable as \((\forall x) [Hx \to Mx]\) where \(\forall\) is the universal quantifier translatable
as for all..., \(H\) stands for man and \(M\) stands for mortal and \(x\) is a variable. These two
sentences belong to two different languages. The first belongs to the natural syntax and
the second belong to a logical syntax. The major question at this point would then be that
if logical syntax is entirely separated from natural syntax, then from where does the
former receive its authority?

We must pursue a third way which would avoid the pitfalls of the two alternatives seen
above of either identifying logic with syntax or separating them entirely. We can
recognize the fact that there is a connection between logical syntax and natural syntax.
Logical syntax employs logical constants of conjunction, disjunction, conditional.
negation, etc., which in turn derive their meaning from the rules of natural language.

Black, (1968, p.106), asserted that:

"the somewhat mysterious sense of necessity we recognize upon being presented with the conclusion of a valid argument arises from our prior commitment to speaking our own language correctly... what has been traditionally called grammar concerns the licenses and constraints upon the combination of words within single sentences, while ... logic concerns the linkages between groups of sentences and their components."

Hence the rules of logic and the rules of grammar both constitute the language they help to define. This observation, however, needs some qualification to avoid the likely conclusion that logic is in effect identical to grammar. We have to note that in as much as logic is connected to grammar, (logic) usually involves only a part of grammar, that is, the declarative sentences capable of being true or false in terms of predicative and extensional relations, whereas grammar involves linguistic structure in its entirety.

Yet the authority of logic resides in its universal application and principles. How can we justify our natural intuition that logic, as an inferential procedure should be universal for all languages despite the diverse syntactical structures of different languages?

The plausible explanation is that logic and logical syntax provide a general framework within which the logical forms or conceptual content of sentences in the various natural languages can be constructed and understood. The connection between natural syntax and logical syntax, which we noted above, is not limiting logic to syntax, such that we would be having many logical systems corresponding to the various syntactic structures of languages. Instead the connection makes it possible for the inferential procedures in any natural language to be formalized into the general categories of logic. Analogically, we
can compare this to mathematics in which different languages can still construct their numerical systems, operations and computations within the framework of the standard mathematics.

Thus I would conclude that grammar, though relative from language to language and determinant of the logical forms of particular sentences does not imply differences in thought. Therefore inferences, which can be drawn from any language, should generally be compliant and consistent with the general logical principles. Hence no language shall be seen to be more logical than any other.

So far, we have been considering logic and syntax ideally or formally without any explicit reference to meaning. However, syntax and logic are formal branches of a language, which always need a theory of meaning for their interpretations. In the following section, therefore, we will shift our focus on semantics with a particular attention on how culture conditions semantics.

4.4 Cultural Conditioning of Semantical Interpretation in a Language

Semantics or the study of meaning has been the concern of many philosophers and linguists. But there is little agreement among them as to the scope of semantics. Some take a broad view of semantics. In this view semantics include two major aspects namely: the descriptive meaning and the expressive meaning or non-descriptive meaning. The latter can be subdivided further into emotive or affective meaning and social meaning.

A descriptive meaning is propositional in character, i.e., it communicates factual information and hence can be either true or false. Expressive on the contrary, is non-
propositional and hence does not have any truth-value. The emotive meanings express the feelings, attitudes, beliefs and even the personality of the individuals; whereas the social meanings establish and maintain social roles and relations for example greetings, apologies, ritual expressions, etc. Expressive meanings are to a large extent socially controlled by the socio-cultural norms and categorization. For example, some exclamations are acceptable according to the sexes, age, etc. addressing another person being determined by age and sex is a common instance of a social conditioning of expressive meaning.

In this section however, I will adopt a narrow approach to semantics and limit my focus on the descriptive meaning because descriptive semantics form the backbone of logical discourse and hence is more relevant for our purpose of reconciling Wittgenstein’s work and secondly because the socio-cultural conditioning of descriptive meaning is not as obvious and extensive as in the case of expressive semantics.

As was pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, different languages and linguistic families have different apparatus of dividing and classifying the world of experience, for example, according to gender, classes or events etc. Hence our world-views are dependent to an extent on our linguistic forms. We organize the objects of our experience with the aid of language. Whorf (1956, p.214), formulated a principle of relativity which holds that; “All observers are not led by same physical evidence to the picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or in some way can be calibrated.” This relativistic position is commonly referred to as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis taking on the names of Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf (the former’s pupil) who were its chief proponents.
Evidence for this position can really be found in the codability of things in varying degrees, both in words and expressions of different communities. For example, as we earlier observed, the Eskimo has several names or words for designating the different states of snow. A Luo living along lake Victoria has several names or words to designate the different types of fish. The reason is that these distinctions are of great importance in the execution of the daily activities of these people.

Thus a statement like *it is snowing* may have no meaning at all to a tropical African who lacks a code for snow. Likewise, a statement like *fish is delicious* would be a statement about undifferentiated species of water animals to Akamba but to a Luo it is a statement about a highly differentiated species.

In the same way, concepts like matter, honours, sin, right, time, kinship etc are culture-bound and are coded in varying degrees, meaning that our concepts are to great extent dependent for their understanding upon socially transmitted knowledge and hence vary from culture to culture. Thus declarative utterances made out of these concepts do not merely state information but conceals also a culture-bound world-view and a way of life of the people. This is so because the language of any group of people fits into their daily activities and is thus an inseparable part of the group.

It is therefore imperative that in order to understand the descriptive utterances about the external world attention must be paid to the context in which they are uttered or the context of the addressees of the information. Lyons (1988 p.337) described the concept of context thus:
“Context...is a theoretical construct, in the postulation of which the Linguist abstracts from the actual situation and establishes as contextual all the factors which, by virtue of their influence upon the participants in the language-event, systematically determine the form, the appropriateness or the meaning of utterances.”

The concept of context can be further clarified when we take an example of a descriptive utterance which contains indexical like now, here, here, then, this etc; that is, the personal pronouns, possessive pronouns, pronouns indicative of time and place. For example, I am going to Mombasa now has to be interpreted in consideration of the spatio-temporal locations of both the speaker and the hearer, in other words, it has to be contextualised to determine who “I” refers to and when now refers to.

Hence the general analysis of meaning ought to incorporate the notion of context and since language operates as part of the patterns of life-culture we can say that the broad context for semantic interpretation of a given language is the cultural set-up of the speakers and hearers. The context of culture for a language is the extrapolation as it were, of the spatio-temporal locations of the speaker and hearer of the utterance in the above example.

However, an extreme commitment to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis by holding that meaning is entirely influenced by cultural context, might lead us to some unacceptable philosophical absurdities. The first is one can be referred to as linguistic determinism. This implies that our language determines our thoughts and our perceptions of facts because our thinking and perception supposedly is carried out only in terms of the categories and distinctions already in our language. Given too that our languages are structurally diverse, with each linguistic family having its own unique apparatus of categorization, it implies that each linguistic community thinks and perceives differently.
from the other people from different linguistic communities. And the differences in their thoughts and perceptions are in the proportion their respective languages differ from each other.

Second absurdity is that of *semantic relativism*. Since our language, as we observed, is context-bound and the context is the culture; our assertions about the world of our experience are equally culture-bound. This means that semantics or meaning is as diverse as the cultures of people are and it is dependent on these cultures. The philosophical consequence of these two implications of the Sapir-whorf hypothesis is scepticism to any objectivity in communication between different cultures. Any hope to attain any objectivity in cross-cultural communication is illusory.

But the extreme version of this hypothesis along with its accompanying implications of linguistic determinism and semantic relativism can be disproved by two practical realities. First is the fact of bi-lingualism or multi-lingualism. A person who is a bilingual or even an interpreter would be said to be operating within two different and perhaps irreconcilable world-views in the case of unrelated languages every time he switches from one language to the other. But as Lyons (1992, p.305) observed that this is in “conflict with the evident fact that bilingual and interpreters do not manifest any obvious symptoms of operating with radically incompatible world-views and often claim to be able to say the same thing in either language.”

The second fact is the possibility of translation of different languages into one another. It is recognized that the vocabularies of languages are non-isomorphic, to a greater or lesser degree that is, there is no neat one-to-one correspondence in meanings of words in different languages. Some things for instance are highly more codable in one language
than in the others. Yet some concepts though equally codable in different languages, have
got varying ranges of application, for example, the concept *brother* in most African
languages has a wide range than it has in English. It extends in African languages to
include cousins on both paternal and maternal lineages and the step-brothers and even
step-cousins (in some). Whereas in English, its range is restricted to a male sibling of the
same mother and father.

Admittedly, these factors make translations from one language to another rather difficult.
Yet in spite of this, we still obtain very fair translation and understanding of other
languages. The most fitting example is the Bible, which has been translated into almost
all the written languages of the world.

Thus, the two realities, namely, bilingualism and translatability of languages compel us to
adopt a moderate version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Hence, even though descriptive
meaning is evidently culture-bound, it is not irredeemably so. There is an extent to which
human language is context-free. This is why we can talk about experiences without
actually living them and of objects and events not physically present at the time and place
of speaking as it is in the case of historical discourse and scientific prediction. So, even
though culture conditions the meanings we attach to our linguistic expressions and hence
our perception of reality and thought, we can still maintain that the different world-views
can be mapped onto one another and we can then hope to attain relative objectivity in
communicating across the cultures. We can admit of a deeper level of language in which
concepts like time, space, matter, number, order, motion, etc. have the same meaning but
only come to differ at their superficial actual expressions of the individual natural
languages.
Thus we can admit also of a culture-independent aspect of meaning which is entirely based just on the impressions that the physical world objectively imposes on us. So a descriptive statement such as *it is raining*, to the extent that we agree on the facts of rain, would transcend the diversification of cultures and be held to be true or false by everyone disregarding the particular cultural attitudes and behaviour towards rain.

It is this qualified version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that can escape the philosophical absurdities associated with the extreme version and thus establish the possibility of people of diverse cultures using a common language like English to have a fairly objective information about the world.

4.5 Transformational Generative Grammar's analysis and integration of Syntax and Semantics

The Transformational theory in its original formulation in Chomsky (1957) conceived of grammar as solely concerned with the syntactic rules of generating all and only the well-formed sentences of a language. Syntax in this early version was seen as autonomous and entirely independent of the semantic interpretations attached to the generated sentences. Thus, a transformational theory of grammar was exclusively a theory of syntax.

But in its revised later formulations especially elaborated in Chomsky (1965), the transformational theory was expanded in scope to include syntax, semantic and phonology. For example, Chomsky (ibid., pp.15-16) defines the integrated generative grammar as:

"A system of rules that can iterate to generate an indefinitely large number of structures. This system of rules can be analysed into the three major components of a generative grammar: the syntactic, phonological and semantic components."
It is this later formulation of the transformational theory of grammar, which will be the focus of this section. It will investigate and reconstruct how syntax and semantics are integrated in this theory.

Briefly, a generative grammar is an explicit representation of the finite set of rules by means of which a speaker of a given language can generate an infinite set of the potential and actual well-formed sentences and not the ungrammatical ones. A transformational generative grammar is merely a further development and specification of a generative grammar that makes it (the generative grammar) more powerful and efficient to represent the rules of the language. In order to clearly grasp the notion of transformation, as it is employed in this theory, we need to draw a distinction between the surface structure and deep structure of sentences; two examples can be used to illustrate the distinction.

Example one: \textit{John is eager to leave} and \textit{John is easy to leave}.

These two sentences in their surface structures display a structural similarity analysable into subject and predicate yet, in their deep structures, the first sentence has “John” as the subject of the verb “to leave” write in the second sentence, “John” is the object of the same verb.

Example two: \textit{the shooting of the hunters was awful}.

This is a case of a sentence with structural ambiguity. The surface structures are derived from the deep structures by means of rules, which transform them from deep to surface structures. These rules are the ones referred to as the transformational rules. Lyons (1991, p.248) summarizes this observation thus, \textit{“any grammar that claims to assign to each sentence that it generates both a deep structure and surface-structure analysis and systematically to relate the two analyses is a transformational grammar.”}
4.5.1 The Syntactic Component

Chomsky (1965, p. 16) defines the syntactic component as a specification of an infinite set of abstract formal objects, each of which incorporates all information relevant to a single interpretation of a particular sentence. The syntactic component generates the deep structure and the transformational rules operates on this structure in order to map it on to the surface structure which comprises both actual and possible utterances.

Two set of rules, namely the base rules and the transformational rules make up the syntactic component. The base rules are made up of phrase-structure rules and the lexicon.

Below are the phrase-structure rules taken from Chomsky (1965).

1. (Sentence) \( \rightarrow \) NP (noun-phrase) + VP (verb-phrase)
2. VP \( \rightarrow \) Verb + NP
3. NP \( \rightarrow \) NP singular
   \( \rightarrow \) NP plural
4. NP singular \( \rightarrow \) D (article) + N (noun) + 0 (Deletion rule)
5. NP plural \( \rightarrow \) D + N + S
6. Verb \( \rightarrow \) Aux (Auxiliary) + V (Verb)
7. Aux \( \rightarrow \) Tense (Modal) (have + en) (be + ing)

Below is a sample Lexicon

\[
\begin{align*}
D &= \{ \text{the} \} \\
N &= \{ \text{man, ball} \ldots \} \\
V &= \{ \text{hit, take, walk, read,} \ldots \}
\end{align*}
\]
Modal = \{will, can, may, shall, must\}

The phrase-structure rules are rewriting rules which involve rewriting symbols into other symbols. For example, in $1; \text{S} \rightarrow \text{NP} + \text{VP}$ should be read as \textit{rewrite S as NP + VP}.

As such what the phrase-structure rules generate are referred to as the \textit{preterminal string}, for example NP + VP. This stands in need of another operation for rewriting symbols into actual words. The lexicon provides for this operation. It provides the primary lexical information about words, which can be appropriately applied to the preterminal strings to generate the \textit{terminal strings} or actual sentences.

This coordination of the phrase-structure rules and the lexicon can be clearly represented in the form of a tree-diagram called a \textit{phrase-marker}. Thus using the phrase-structure rules and our sample lexicon, we can produce the \textit{phrase-marker} below:

![Phrase-marker diagram]

The other aspect of the syntactic component is the transformational rules. Unlike the base rules we have seen above, which operate on single symbols, the transformational rules
operate on strings of symbols. As such, they apply generally to the terminal strings
generated by the base rules.

For example, in our example, the man hit the ball when subjected to passive, imperative,
interrogative and nominalization transformations would become respectively:

1. The ball has been hit by the man – passive
2. Hit the ball – imperative
3. Has the man hit the ball? – Interrogative
4. The ball’s being hit by the man – Nominalization
5. The man’s hitting of the ball – Nominalization.

For the purpose of illustration, we can take the passive and imperative cases.

The base-rule generated string is:

NP1 ______V _______NP2

The man _____hit _______the ball

This is the structural description (SD) and after transformation it undergoes a structural
change (SC).

a) Passive transformation

SD: NP1 ______V _______NP2

The man ______hit______the ball

SC: NP2 ______Aux+ be + en____v____by + NP1^3

The ball _______has + been ______hit______by the man

^3 The “+” sign here means that (be+en) are forming parts of the auxiliary “has” and “by” is part of NP1.
b) Imperative transformation

SD: NP1 V NP2

The__man__hit__the ball

SC: (deletion) V NP2

Hit___ the ball.

In this way the transformational rules generate the surface structure of sentences which when subjected to phonological component, give rise to the actual utterances. The base rules generate the deep structure of sentences which is operated on by the semantic interpretation of the sentences. Hence, the syntactic component provides the structural information for both the semantic and phonological interpretation.

4.5.2 The Semantic Component

The semantic component in the framework of generative grammar was proposed and expanded by Katz and Fodor (1963). Like the grammar or syntax as is above shown, the semantic component is an explicit exposition of the recursive rules by means of which a fluent speaker of any given natural language can compose and also understand the meanings of an infinite number of sentences in his language.

These recursive semantic rules are supposed to apply to the sentences whose structures are already generated by the phrase-structure rules and transformational rules, this means that the output of the syntactic component. The latter then operates on the generated sentences to provide a semantic interpretation.
In Katz and Fodor (1963, pp. 171-172), it is observed that in order for one to understand sentences in a language, one has first to know the meanings of the lexical items, that is, the individual words which are the elementary components of the sentences. Secondly, one combines the individual words into sentences. This combinatorial nature of meaning was clearly stated in Katz (1969, p. 432) thus:

“The meaning the rules fix for a sentence must be a compositional function of the antecedently known meanings (sic) of the lexical items appearing in it… such rules must explicate the compositional function, which determines how he (the speaker) utilizes the meanings of the lexical items in a sentence to understand what that sentence means.”

Hence, the semantic component in a grammar consists of two fundamental parts which operate on the two main elements of meaning, namely, the lexical items and the sentences. The two parts are technically referred to as the dictionary and the projection rules respectively corresponding to the lexical items and the sentences.

A dictionary provides meaning for each of the lexical items of the language rules while projection rules are a finite set of rules which assign a semantic interpretation to each terminal string generated by the syntactic component.

Katz and Fodor (1964, p. 12) detailed how a dictionary can be represented. It should consist of lexical item; syntactic marker which indicates the syntactic category the lexical item belongs to, for example, noun, adjective, verb etc. Then, it (dictionary) has semantic markers conventionally marked by round brackets. They are used to draw distinctions of meaning between sets of words, for example, concrete/abstract, young/old, male/female etc. It also consists of semantic distinguishers/conventionally marked by square brackets. These distinguish between the senses of the lexical item. Finally, it consists of the
selection rules marked by angle brackets. They state the conditions under which the words can combine with other words; for example, they indicate which verbs require direct object, which kind of adjectives combine with abstract nouns.

To illustrate these components of a dictionary, we can represent a dictionary entry of the word *colourful* in form of a tree diagram.

```
Bachelor
   |
   Noun
   /\   /
(Human Being) (Education)
     /     /
   [An unmarried male adult] [The first university degree]

{Male subject or object in a sentence} {Male or female subject or object in a sentence}
```

Thus, a dictionary gives us the meaning of the lexical items. But this is not sufficient to account for semantic interpretation of sentences. Hence we use projection rules to account for the combination of the individual words or dictionary meaning to yield complete sentences.

Briefly, there are two types of projection rules. The type one projection rules apply to the combination of the individual words into sentences. It precedes upwards the tree diagram of the phrase structure. It starts by combining the words at the lower level of the tree.
which are dominated by a common node. These units progressively combine into larger units until the final node of the complete sentence is reached. We can refer to our phrase marker for illustration of this procedure.

Assuming then that we have dictionary entries for the terminal string, we can proceed by combining *The + man* because they are immediately dominated by NP node. *Man + hit* cannot combine because they belong to different nodes. Thus the process will be as follows:

Step 1: The + man
the + ball

Step 2: hit + the ball

Step 3: The man + hit the ball = S

Type two projection rules are operational at the transformational stage. For example if we have the above sentence *The man hit the ball* as the source sentence and apply the passive transformation to it, it becomes *the ball has been hit by the man*. This transformed sentence is still related to the source sentence semantically. They are the type two
projection rules that make us have the correct semantic interpretation of the transformed sentences.

4.5.3 Syntactic and Semantics

From the above descriptions of the syntactic and semantic components we can now pursue an integrated approach to the two components. At the syntactic level, we established that the lexicon is the element that provides the information about words which can be applied to generate sentences in the phrase-structure. At the semantic level, it is the dictionary which provides a meaning for each lexical item of a language. This apparent contradiction is what appears to me as the very point at which the two components can be integrated to form a coherent and harmonious theory of language. Greene, J. (1972, p.72) expressed the same idea by suggesting that the dictionary element, (semantic component) can be assimilated into the lexicon, (syntactic component). Thus the lexicon would cease to be a mere list of words, as it appears to be in the description of the syntactic component. Instead it (the lexicon) should contain all the information about any particular word which includes contextual, semantic and phonological features of a word.

In this way, the base rules of the syntactic component would insert all the necessary and relevant *semantic* information into the deep structures of sentences. This then provides the input to the semantic component which in applying or consisting of the projection rules would produce semantic interpretation of the sentences. Hence, the semantic component becomes purely interpretative of the syntactic component. Such integration of syntax and semantics marks the underlying speakers knowledge of form and meaning of a language, which is known as linguistic competence. The actual articulation of a language marks the linguistic performance of a speaker.
From the description of the transformational generative grammar’s theory, we can now attempt to draw some relevant philosophical conclusions which can serve to reconcile Wittgenstein’s theories of language, meaning and communications, exposed in chapters two and three.

4.6 Synthesis of Wittgenstein’s Theories in function of the dynamics of Cross-Cultural Communications

From the critical remarks on the proceeding chapters, we can realize that there was a radical departure from the doctrines of the *Tractatus* by the *Investigations*. Moreover, the criticisms reveal that each of these works had some unacceptable flaws and contradictions in their arguments. However, it is my contention in this section, that despite the differences between the works, they are reconcilable I would seek to demonstrate that the works complement each other such that each one taken separately can only give us a partial view, but taken together is when we get a comprehensive grasp of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

I would seek to do this on three levels coincident with the three concepts under study namely, language, meaning and communication. In order to this, I will make the following assumptions

a) That the weaknesses in either work can be made up for by the strengths of other

b) That the transformational generative grammar’s analysis and synthesis of syntax and semantics provides an appropriate and relevant theory for reconciling Wittgenstein’s works.

c) That cross-cultural linguistic communication provides a concrete, practical plane for evaluating the validity and relevance of Wittgenstein’s philosophical doctrines.
4.6.1 On language

The *Tractatus* viewed language as the totality of propositions which are descriptive of states of affairs in the world. Language was contended here to be having a parallel structure to that of reality. Unfortunately in its ordinary form, language is complex and obscures the very structure of the world it is supposed to reflect. For us then to realize the hidden, underlying structure, we need to carry out a reductive analysis upon language. The result of this analysis is a fundamental logical structure which is the shared form between language and the world. This conception of language establishes it as total, fixed logical system with the sole function of depicting the structure of the world.

The *Investigations* instead conceived of language as a phenomenon that has no single defining essence. It compared language to the concept of game, which represents an indefinite array of activities. This position has the merit of recognizing linguistic fecundity and open-texturedness which gives it the capacity to express all human experiences.

The transformational generative grammar developed a theory of language, which accommodates the insights of both works regarding language as will be demonstrated below. It conceived of language as a system of fixed, finite set of rules, which are recursive. Therefore any grammar should not recommend what is to be the correct way of speaking, but rather should only make explicit the already existing rules that guide the speaking of any language.

This accommodates the Tractarian concern with the formal structure of language. At the same time the theory overcomes the Tractarian weakness of identifying the formal structure of language with a universal, single logical structure. The generative grammar
admits of a plurality of linguistic structures. Moreover, the grammar accounts for the Tractarian caution that the ordinary structure or usage of language can obscure its underlying logical structure. The grammar proposes a distinction between surface and deep structure of sentences. For example, the surface-structure of an ambiguous sentence is one but the deep-structure phrase-markers would reveal that there are two distinct sentences in it. Hacker (1997, p.270) has noted that:

“Chomsky’s conception of the deep structure of language bears analogies to the Tractatus conception of the hidden forms of the logical syntax of all possible languages.”

Then the generative grammarians’ conception that rules of a language are recursive offers a plausible account for the *Investigations*’ concern with the creativity and capacity of language to express all the human experiences. It is the recursive character of the rules that makes it possible for speakers to formulate and understand sentences which they have never heard before.

Besides, the recursive character of the rules, there is also the doctrine of the transformational rules which make it possible to transform the base component into declaratives, interrogatives, passives, imperatives, ironies etc. This bears analogies and relevance to the *Investigations*’ contention that language serves many purposes besides just depicting the structure of the world as the *Tractatus* upheld. Practically, we can find a confirming evidence of these theories in a situation of cross-cultural communication. We take, English as a case of a cross-cultural language in cross-cultural communication. The speakers of English divide into native speakers and non-native speakers. The former are the ones who speak English as their first and natural language while the latter category adopts it as a second language. At the initial stages, it is a tedious task, but after acquiring
competence or the mastery of the rules, they get to communicate by means of it with considerable ease.

The possibility of learning the rules suggest that it is a finite set, otherwise, if it were an infinite set of rules, it would be humanly speaking, an impossible undertaking.

After grasping these rules, the non-natives can then use them to construct sentences, which communicate their own unique experiences and knowledge. This is the level of linguistic performance. Katz, J. (1966, p.98) expressed the idea thus:

"Learning foreign language too involves acquisition of the rules that the natives acquire naturally and being able to apply them recursively to produce and understand novel sentences of the foreign language the way a native would. Not merely understanding and producing the sentences whose meaning we were previously taught."

We therefore can hold that at the level of the language, the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* can be reconciled by noting that their respective insights into the formal structure and creativity of language are tenable. The separation of the two works would therefore only give us partial and unsatisfactory views of language.

4.6.2 On meaning

The *Tractatus* held a picture-theory of meaning according to which, language is projective of the structure of the world. The picturing relationship as it were, is possible because of a presumed isomorphism of structure or form between language and the world.

In relation to this picture-theory, Wittgenstein made a distinction between pictorial relationship and pictorial form. The pictorial relationship establishes the relationship between language and the world whereas pictorial forms explore the inner structure of language that makes it possible to be the picture of the world.
However, the Tractarian concern with unveiling the logical syntax of language reveals that its primary concern was the pictorial form rather than pictorial relationship. It was concerned with the analysis of sentences and their internal inferential relations. In other words, the *Tractatus* focused on sense rather than reference.

On the other hand, the *Investigations* propounded a pragmatic theory of meaning according to which meaning is equated to use of words according to the socially determined rules. However, it fell short of formalization of the said rules on the ground that they are constantly changing. This reveals that its primary concern was with the study of how words are used in concrete interpersonal relations and daily activities of people.

The two approaches to meaning appear to be incompatible in practice because of the methods and purpose of both works. The *Tractatus* employs or rather recommends a rigorous logical analysis of sentences so as to reveal their form which is representative of the world. While the *Investigations* recommends a description of the usage of words in ordinary language so as to avoid misuse of them hence creating confusion and pseudo-sciences.

But in principle, the two works are compatible particularly in the framework of transformational generative grammar. As we saw in the proceeding section, the dictionary in the semantic component can be conveniently incorporated into the lexicon in the syntactic component. We can therefore treat them, i.e. dictionary and lexicon as identical at this stage. The dictionary or lexicon consists of the lexical items with details of their
syntactic categorization, semantic distinctions, the various senses of the words and conditions under which the words can combine with others.

Greene, J. (1972, p. 62) has noted, “The lexicon is not merely a list of words but rather everything about a word that is relevant to its use in a language.” This is quite consistent with the spirit of the Investigations. When applied practically, the Investigations’ demand for elucidation of the usage of terms would result in a “lexicon” comparable to the one required by the transformational generative grammar. By paying attention to factors such as contexts, intentions of speakers and permissible grammatical combinations, the elaborate details of a dictionary or lexicon can be developed.

But besides the lexicon, the transformational generative grammar has another device of combining the individual lexicon items into whole sentences. These are the projection rules. This establishes the meaning of well-formed sentence as a compositional function of the meanings of the lexical items or words in the lexicon. This has close affinity with the Tractarian theory of meaning, which is centred at the sentential stage rather than the lexical stage.

The generative grammar’s view that sentential meaning is a compositional function of the lexicon meanings is consistent with the analytical approach of the *Tractatus*. As we pointed above that Tractatus is primarily focusing on sense rather than reference, (and sense is only a property of sentences), it means that sentences have a priority over names, which have references, for the purpose of logical analysis. Names may be assigned to their referents arbitrarily but in the Tractarian system, we arrive at them only by functional decomposition of sentences. Furthermore the generative grammar identified
two types of projection rules of the semantic component. Type one rules combine individual words into sentences. It is the most applicable to the Tractatus, which linked meaning exclusively to the declarative sentences. But the type two rules which operate at the transformational does provide an explanation for the fact that we are able to understand as meaningful also the non-declarative sentences like questions, commands, wishes, ironies, etc. This helps us guard against the criticism of the Investigations that the Tractatus only considered one of the many functions of language that is declarative.

In cross-cultural communication just like the case of language, we find the non-natives learning the vocabulary of the cross-cultural language plus its details of application and then mastering the finite set of the projection rules. These rules too are recursive and hence can be used to interpret and attach meanings even to the novel sentences. This means that each community can choose out of the vocabulary the relevant lexical items by which they express their own experiences and describe their world and be understood by the others who correctly interpret what they mean.

So, too, at this level of meaning, we realize that the Investigations and Tractatus are, in principle, reconcilable. Their insights into the nature of meaning compliment each other and can be well integrated in the framework of transformational generative grammar. The Investigations’ method and results would provide the input, as it were, for the Tractatus’ analysis and at the same time it would make up for the much neglected reference aspect of meaning in the Tractatus.
4.6.3 On communication

The *Tractatus* view of language as projective of the structure of reality in its essence and meaning as residing only in the declarative statements committed it, as we observed, to a unilateral view of communication. This view implicitly holds that only those with an adequate information about the world can make sensible communication, while the rest passively receive the information. And in the spirit of *Tractatus*, only the scientists can have the information about reality hence can inform the rest. The only possibility of a sensible interactive communication can then be only between scientists themselves.

Instead the *Investigations* is critical of this view. It does admit that declarative statements are only a part of the communicative potential of language as language can be used in communicating wishes, curiosities, jokes, insults and so on, which transcend the genre of mere assertions.

And to overcome the communicative unilateralism of the *Tractatus*, the *Investigations* contends that all human communication is interactive because for any communication to take place, there must be a shared background information between the speaker and hearer. This requirement is in fact necessary even for descriptive utterances. This implies that both the speaker and hearer are actively involved and posses a working knowledge that renders communication possible. Hacker (1997, p.125) has observed that:

"*training and later, teaching underpin the master of a language, and these presuppose shared reactive and behavioural propensities within a linguistic community.*"

The transformational generative grammar does not have a formulated theory of communication. But in Katz, J. (1966, p.104) we find the same idea expressed that a successful linguistic communication is a congruence of speakers' and hearers' thoughts
and ideas that result from verbal exchanges. This is possible because the speakers and hearers possess essentially the same system of rules. As he states: "Communication can take place because a speaker encodes a message using the same linguistic rules that his hearer uses to decode it." So the generative grammar suggests that there is indeed some shared rules or information for communication to take place. However, the theory does not offer a thoroughgoing apparatus of contextual analysis that would reveal to us the entire extent of the background beliefs, inferences and information that make communication possible.

In cross-cultural communication where we have people or communities with diverse backgrounds, which are sometimes far removed from each other, we notice that more often than not, there are communication breakdowns because of different judgments and reactions to the same information. This factor confirms the *Investigations*’ caution that we pay attention to the background information or the language-game as Wittgenstein refers to it, if we are to effectively communicate across cultures. This demands a careful contextual analysis to determine and display this influencing shared information of communities.

We can say therefore that, as regards communication, the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* are reconcilable. The *Investigations* subsumes, as it were, the Tractarian doctrine and transcends its limitations of communicative unilateralism by constructing an interactive view of communication.
This chapter had the primary purpose of reconciling the conflicting views of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. In order to do this, the chapter has explored the connection between logic and culture, which are foundational concepts of the works respectively. It has then studied the cultural conditioning of semantics especially as it can occur in a cross-cultural context.

Then, the theory of transformational generative grammar has been broadly described especially as it treats of syntax and semantics. Its analysis and synthesis of these components have then been applied to accommodate and reconcile the insights of both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. In this endeavour, the chapter has attempted to draw the relevance and applicability of the generative theory to bear on Wittgenstein’s theories of language, meaning and communication. Equally, facts of cross-cultural communication have been made allusion to, so as to provide a practical evidence or test for the theories.

The general conclusion of this endeavour is that the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* are reconcilable.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 GENERAL CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this study was to pursue the possibility of reconciling two of Wittgenstein’s works, namely; the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Philosophy of Linguistics proposed by J. Katz, provided the theoretical framework for the study. This trend of analytic philosophy applies the linguistic theory of Chomskian generative grammar to philosophy of language. English, as an instance of a cross-cultural medium of communication was used in the study to assess and appraise the theories of Wittgenstein.

This chapter, as the conclusive one of the study, has the purpose of giving a general appraisal of the study. It will include an overview of the preceding chapters, report on the findings of the study in relation to the set objectives and finally it will offer some recommendations for further research.

5.2 Overview of the study

Chapter one gave a detailed introduction to the study. It spelt out the problem under investigation in the study and put forward the thesis that cross-cultural communication can be a possible basis for reconciling Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Chapter two was a detailed reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s theories of language, meaning and communication in the *Tractatus*. It was therein argued that language is a
human phenomenon by means of which we picture our world. The structure of language is representative of the structure of reality. And given that reality is objective to every observer, the *Tractatus* contended that the differences between the natural languages were attributable to accidental facts of vocabulary. Otherwise, all language was fundamentally the same. This universal character of all human natural language is expressible in the form of the logical calculus. Such a logical form is supposedly universal in all natural languages and at the same time, it is what is shared between language and reality which makes it possible for language to depict reality.

Meaning was also conceived by the *Tractatus* to be consisting of the depicting character of language. Our language is only meaningful when it represents reality. Anything short of this picturing function is not language at all. It is simply meaningless.

Consistent with the above conceptions of language and meaning, the *Tractatus* held that communication has only an informative or reporting function. Only when we use language to assert or deny anything about the world can we be said to be communicating. Otherwise, we are just uttering nonsensical words and phrases.

Chapter three, on the other hand, gave a detailed reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s theories of language, meaning and communication in the *Philosophical Investigations*. On language, contrary to the view of the *Tractatus*, it was contended that language is an indefinable reality. Wittgenstein introduced the analogy of the concept of “game” to show that just as it is impossible to give a defining characteristic of all that we call games, we cannot give a single defining feature of all that we call language. The merit of this insight
is that it offers an account for the natural fecundity of human language. It can be used to express novel experiences, imaginary, past motives as well as factual experiences.

On meaning the *Investigations* held that it is not something established a priori, that is, the isomorphic form of language and reality. Instead it is the ordinary usage of words and expressions in accordance with the rules set by the cultural context that determines the meaning of language. Hence, the assertion that *meaning is use*.

On communication the *Investigations* expanded the *Tractatus* view and established that communication is naturally an interactive activity that transcends the genre of reporting only. It goes further to include other non-informative functions like, joking, lying, poetry, wishing, commanding, etc. Furthermore, for communication to effectively take place, the *Investigations* contends that all those involved must be actively possessing a common informational background. This is a view which runs afoul of the Tractarian position that communication is realized only in executing an informative function, a view that would admit only a unilateral perception of communication.

The two chapters showed the two works of Wittgenstein as apparently opposed to each other. Besides this observation, the chapters were subjected to some critical appraisals which revealed that they both had some flaws.

Chapter four was therefore, an attempt to reconcile the two works. It basically pursued the connection between logic and culture. These were the foundational concepts of the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* respectively. The two concepts were mapped into their corresponding linguistic concepts of syntax and semantics. This was to serve the purpose
of letting us apply the theoretical framework informing the study easily. This framework was an attempt to apply the insights of empirical linguistics to philosophy.

5.3 Findings of the Study

This section attempts to give an overview of the study by giving a summary of the findings of the chapters in relation to the assumptions that guided the study. This aids us to evaluate the extent to which the study confirmed or rejected the assumptions.

The first assumption of the study was that both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* have true but different conceptions of language, meaning and communication, which are complementary to each other, and, therefore, we cannot dispense with either of them. In line with this assumption, chapter two of the study, attempted to reconstruct the Tractarian theory of language, meaning and communication. Despite the inherent flaws of the arguments of the *Tractatus* regarding these concepts as revealed by critical remarks on page 17 of chapter two, some arguments emerge as the strong points of the *Tractatus*.

**On Language**: The *Tractatus* had the following strengths in its argument

a) That language is a rule-guided system of words by means of which we picture the world. This means that language is a formal system of rules which can be rewritten in logical language.

b) That language is a creative system in which new propositions can constantly be created out of the elementary propositions in order to express new facts.

c) That there is a relation between language, thought and reality. This draws attention to the significance of philosophical analysis of language so as to understand epistemological and ontological problems.
d) It draws a distinction between logical structure and grammatical structure on language. This underscores a philosophical need or concern for clarity in linguistic expression.

**On Meaning:** The *Tractatus* broadens the view that meaning of a word or a sentence is its reference by noting that reference has the double-sense of pictorial relationship and pictorial form. Pictorial relationship describes the connection between words or sentences to the objects or facts respectively. This establishes the meaning as the content of language. Pictorial form on the other hand describes the relationship between words in a sentence that makes it possible for propositions to picture facts in the world. This establishes meaning also as the form of language. Therefore, according to *Tractatus* meaning as reference has both material and formal aspects.

**On Communication:** The *Tractatus* contends that language has got an informative role in communication. This means that language as a communicative tool gives information about states of affairs. As such it recognizes the necessity for accuracy and objectivity in linguistic communication. Another achievement of the *Tractatus* theory of communication is of a logical nature. It is the recognition that only assertive propositions have truth-value. However, it commits the error of identifying the communicative value of language with the assertive role of propositions.

Chapter three delineates the theory of language, meaning and communication in the *Investigations*. Principally, it corrects the flaws of the *Tractatus* but the critical remarks on page two (chapter three) reveals inherent flaws in it too. However, we are concerned here with identifying the strengths in its arguments.
On language:

a) It recognizes language as having a multifarious and open-textured character. This makes it possible for language to express new experiences easily.

b) It recognizes the multiplicity of the functions of language that transcends the mere genre of reporting or of stating states of affairs. This would include all non-assertive sentences, for example, questions, commands, wishes, etc.

On Meaning:

a) The *Investigations* recognizes that meaning transcends the mere function of picturing states of affairs. It makes reference to use of words as constitutive of meaning. This demands that philosophy pays attention to elucidate the meaning of words and sentences in their ordinary usage.

b) It recognizes culture as conditioning meaning and therefore syntax alone as insufficient to warrant meaning in language. Therefore it propagates a pragmatic theory of meaning.

On Communication:

It expands the concept of communication by recognizing that there has to be shared background information for effective communication to take place. This establishes communication as an interactive and multilateral activity.

The second assumption of the study was that modern communication technology is fast advancing without any clear and commensurate philosophical foundations.
Therefore, a study of philosophical theory on the major concepts of communication can provide the needed critical discourse. The study has not positively confirmed this assumption but rather negatively by failing to identify any concrete philosophical theory on communication. As such it is the contention of the study that it makes a contribution towards filling this lacuna.

The third assumption of the study was that modern communication technology brings into use some cross-cultural languages, the elements of which we might use to reconcile the thought of Wittgenstein.

Chapter four has attempted to apply the theory of transformational generative grammar and operationalize it with a cross-cultural language to reconcile Wittgenstein’s thought. The contention of the chapter is that the two works under study are merely apparently contradictory but actually complementary. This has been shown by indicating that the strengths of the one are the weaknesses of the other and vice versa.

5.4 Achievements of the Study

At this point we give an appraisal of the achievement of the study in relation to the objectives set in chapter one.

The first objective of the study was to unfold and reconstruct Wittgenstein’s theory of language, meaning and communication from his major works, the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. In order to achieve this objective, the descriptive method was predominantly used to reconstruct these theories in chapters Two and
Three. Therefore, the study has achieved its first objective of giving a descriptive reconstruction of Wittgenstein's theories of language, meaning and communication in the two works.

The second objective of the study was to critically examine and attempt to reconcile the above-mentioned works from the perspective of cross-cultural linguistic communication used in today's media. This objective was subdivided into two:

i) To show the interconnection between logic and culture in a linguistic communication.

ii) To show the practical implications of Wittgenstein's thought for modern communications. The analytic method was applied to pursue the consistencies and inconsistencies in chapters two and three. These were given in the critical remarks on both chapters.

The synthetic method was used, particularly in chapter four, to reconcile the works of Wittgenstein. In doing this, reference was made to cross-cultural medium of communication to provide a practical basis for evaluating Wittgenstein's theories.

As such, the first subset of our second objective was achieved in chapter four when we applied the theoretical framework to reconcile the two works. It established that the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* complement each other. The shortcomings of the *Tractatus* revealed by the critical remarks on Chapter Two compensated by the *Investigations* and, conversely, the shortcomings of the *Investigations* as noted by the critical remarks on Chapter Three are revealed to be the strengths of the *Tractatus*.

The theory of generative grammar showed that the philosophical insights of both works could have proof as well in theoretical linguistics. However, the second subset
of the second objective was not achieved by the study. This was chiefly due to insufficient time and coupled with the importance of the issue makes this objective merit a study of its own.

5.5 Recommendations of the Study

Having seen the findings and the achievements of the study, the following recommendations can be made pursuant to the study:

1) Since Wittgenstein’s works have been shown to be theoretically reconcilable, interested researchers can now pursue the possibility of practically rendering Wittgenstein’s thought as a single, complete system in other areas, too, such as ethics, logic, epistemology, etc.

2) Since the second subset of the second objective was not achieved, further research can be done to determine the practical implications of Wittgenstein’s thought to modern communications.

3) Researchers should attempt to relate the philosophy of Wittgenstein to other linguistic theories for example, pragmatics, so as to explore its further potentials.

4) Practical ways of enhancing interactive communication for more effective communication in today’s media should be pursued or rather developed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Black, M. (1968), *The Labyrinth of Language*, Penguin books


Chomsky, N. (1957), *Syntactic Structures*

Chomsky, N. 1965), *Aspects of the Theory of Syntactic*


Greene, J. (1972), Language and Mind.


Katz and Fodor (1964), *An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Description*


