CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF RADICALIZATION OF YOUTH POPULATION IN GARISSA COUNTY, KENYA

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REG: C50/27638/2013

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DECEMBER 2020
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented in any university for any award.

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DATE: 11/1/2020

Dr. Thomas N. Kibutu
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DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to my family for their endless love, support and encouragement. You have made me stronger, better and more fulfilled than I could have ever imagined. I dedicate this work and give special thanks to you all.
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First and foremost, praises and thanks to the Allah, the Almighty, for His showers of blessings throughout my research work to complete the research successfully.

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al Qaida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Document and Content Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Court Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKV</td>
<td><em>Kazi Kwa Vijana</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>NACOSTI</td>
<td>National Council of Science, Technology and Innovation</td>
</tr>
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<td>NCIC</td>
<td>National Cohesion and Integration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Scientists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refuges</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Definition of Key Terms and Concepts</strong></td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Historical Injustices</strong></td>
<td>Acts in the past that deprive a group of people their rightful share in the political and Socio-economic space in a country.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Court Unions:</strong></td>
<td>A group of united Sharia courts that rivaled the Somali warlords and the administration to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia between 2004 and 2012.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Jihadist beliefs:</strong></td>
<td>Refers to the struggle or effort of a Muslim in a holy war to live and defend the Islam faith as well as possible Muslim religion doctrines with force if necessary.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Militia Movement:</strong></td>
<td>Is a right-wing extremist system or cooperation consisting of armed and radicalized groups that involved in extreme military activities that are against contemporary justice and fairness.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Radicalization:</strong></td>
<td>The ideological process of adopting oneself or inculcating in others a commitment not only to a system of radical beliefs but also to their imposition on compulsory use of violence to impose their beliefs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Somalia refugees:</strong></td>
<td>A Somali citizen who has been forced to leave their country in order to escape civil wars, persecution or political disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrorism:</strong></td>
<td>The unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians in the pursuit of political,</td>
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social and economic gains.

**Youth conflict:** The participation of youths in conflict and in armed hostilities facilitated through extremism ideas, trade of small arms, radicalization and psycho-social factors

**Youth radicalization:** A process by which a youth or a group of youths adopts excessive extreme political, social or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice.
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ABSTRACT

Terror attacks and youth radicalization activities have been globally experienced in the recent past. The horrifying effects of youth radicalization and terrorism have been felt in USA and Europe especially in France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Netherlands. In Africa, countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, Libya, Kenya and Somalia have also experienced terror attacks due youth radicalization process. This research aimed at analyzing the causes and consequences of youth radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya. The following specific objectives guided this study: to establish the factors that influence youths in engaging radicalization, to determine the relationship between radicalization process and the global Islamic jihadist beliefs, to determine the socio-economic effects of radicalization process among the youths and to evaluate the government’s involvement and engagement in addressing the youth radicalization problem. The study adopted Mengisteab’s (2011) ethnic hierarchy model. The study used a qualitative and quantitative research approach with a target population of 841,353 citizens living in Garissa County and a sample size of 150 persons comprising 120 youths, 10 elders, 10 religious leaders and 10 government administrators was selected. The purposive sampling technique was used to select participants in the study. Data was collected using both closed and open ended questionnaires, interview schedules and focus group discussions. The qualitative data was organized in terms of content and themes then analyzed thematically by drawing meanings and inferences across each research question while quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics using SPSS version 20 software. The research revealed that historical injustices in the region, cultural and ethnicity differences, peer influence, foreign influence, political injustices and dominances of one clan over the other, corruption in the government, unfair government policies, non-equity in terms of job opportunities and distribution of economic resources influenced the youths in engaging in youth radicalization. The study also found that there was no relationship between youth radicalization and Islamic jihadist beliefs. The research established that youth radicalization led to decline in enrolment of students in the learning institutions depriving the youths of their education rights, and loss of lives. Youth radicalization was also found to propel intertribal conflicts resulting to poor community interactions and political instability. Government involvement in youth de-radicalization was noted in sensitisation programmes, beefing up security in the region and empowering the youths. The study concluded that youth radicalization led to decline in enrolment of learners in schools depriving the youths of their education rights. The study also concluded that youth radicalization activities led to insecure economic environment, destruction of properties, business closure and economic sabotage. The study recommends that both national and Garissa County governments should provide the youths with quality and specialized education and training that empower the youths to be self reliant. The study also recommends the need to check on the spread of falsified prophesies and teachings of Islam especially the use of Jihad as the spiritual fight against evil or as a practice of upholding the moral teachings of Quran. Finally, the study recommends that both the national and county governments should offer more attractive programmes in de-radicalizing trainings, youth development programmes and rehabilitation programmes.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Terror attacks and youth radicalization activities have been on the increase globally in the recent past. Youth radicalization has resulted into terror attacks in form of arson, vehicle rampage attacks, bomb threats, suicide attacks, bombings, spree shooting, stabbings, hijackings, kidnapings and beheadings (Christmann, 2012). The global prevalence rates of youth radicalization and terrorism activities have been found to be positively correlated (Getos, 2009). Examples of horrifying effects of youth radicalization and terrorism include the September 11, 2001 USA attack by Al-Qaeda members who used two planes to crash and destroy the World Trade Center and its environs in New York City, and the Pentagon. In this attack, the Al-Qaeda terrorist group led by Osama Bin Laden claimed responsibility (American Broadcasting Channel, 2015).

Youth radicalization activities have also been experienced in Europe especially in France, United Kingdom, Germany and Netherlands. For instance, in France, from January 7–9, 2015, a series of attacks by the ISIS in and around Paris killed 17 people and left 22 other people injured. In the Middle East, radicalized groups like ISIS, ISIL, Taliban and others have ruthlessly killed, injured and wounded innocent people (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2015). In countries like Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon series of terror attacks due to radicalization effects have been felt. For instance, in January 5, 2015, a car having explosives drove up to European police-training organization, in Kabul-Afghanistan and detonated killing many policemen and injuring others. The Taliban terror group claimed responsibility for this attack (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2015).
In Africa, nations like Egypt, Nigeria, Cameroon, Tunisia, Libya, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan have experienced terror attacks due to well orchestrated radicalization programmes (Christmann, 2012). For instance, in Egypt, on January 29, 2015 there was an attack in Sinai killing 44 and wounding several. In Tunisia, on March 18, 2015, militants linked to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attacked the Bardo National Museum of Tunisia with guns killing 21 people and injuring around 50 (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2015).

Other acts of terrorism cited by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in Africa include attacks in Libya on March 25, 2015 by an ISIL affiliate, the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries in Libya that carried out suicide bombings in the city of Benghazi killing twelve people and wounding 25. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram, a retrogressive terrorist group, traverses its activities across the country’s borders with Cameroon.

Abdikadir (2015) states that, in Somalia, youth radicalization and terrorism activities have been habitual since early 2007 actuated mostly by the Al-Shabaab terror group. However, the history of Al-Shabaab terror group and current youth radicalization in the Kenya and Somalia can be traced back to early 1990’s when the Republic of Somalia faced trajectories of civil war and political upheavals particularly in the central part of Somalia. These two major factors lead to the collapse of the Government of the Republic of Somalia in 1990 followed by the overthrow of the then President, Mohamed Siyad Barre (Institute for Security Studies, 2014; Lewis, 2003). This resulted to political instability in Somalia which has prevailed for a long time spanning for 25 years due to different political activism and political conflicts in the country which have undergone several
metamorphosis stages (Lindley, 2011). The metamorphosis that the conflict in the Somalia and Kenya has undergone involves three phases: evolution, refugee situation and political displacements (Onuoha, 2014).

First, in the early 1990’s, there was a major displacement crisis in Somalia which was activated by post cold war leading to the ouster of Mohamed Siyad Barre from leadership of the country. The displacements were also aggravated by internal civil wars, social and cultural altercations induced by primordialism and patrilinearity within ethnic groups (Lewis, 2003). After the ouster of the then president and the outbreak of civil wars, the state of Somalia collapsed leading to massive displacements, emergence of warlords, start of militia activities and proliferation of armed gangs in the country (Lindley, 2011).

The second phase of youth conflict and radicalization in the Kenya and Somalia is categorized as the quieter period between the years 1996 and 2006 (Yasin, 2014; Lindley, 2011). This phase was characterized by limited return of Somalia refugees from Kenya and Ethiopia to their country of origin, protracted political displacements, and limited unity among the indigenous people of Somalia as well as integration of business community. Sharia courts and Islamic Court Unions were also established to counter the warlords who were well coordinated by and connected to the US Government (Karacasulu, 2015).

The third and current phase of youth conflict and radicalization in Kenya and Somalia stretches from 2006 to 2018. This phase involved removal of the Islamic Court Unions (ICU) and the installation of Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This move aggravated the ICU militia wing (Al Shabaab) which became rebellious, more active and took an anti-Transitional Federal Government stance. The third
phase is actually a transformation of the Al Shabaab group into global warlords characterized by terrorism, militia gangs, radicalization of the youth and fresh political displacements (UNESCO, 2015).

The recent youth radicalization and terrorism activities in Somali and Kenya have been predominantly associated with Al-Shabaab. For instance, on March 27, 2015, the attack on Makka al-Mukarama hotel which killed more than 20 and wounded more than 28 persons was linked to the Al-Shabaab group. The same Al-Shabaab radicalized group, on April 2 2015, killed more than 148 people (most of them students) and injured several others in Garissa University in North-eastern Kenya. The same group, Al-Shabaab, in January 15 2016, in the El Adde, Gedo region of Somalia, attacked an African Union-Kenyan Army base in El-Adde, Gedo region killing more than 63 Kenya Defense Forces officers (Abdikadir, 2015).

The youth radicalization has brought fear syndrome in some parts of cities and among the security agencies. The grimmer consequences such as deaths of innocent people and destruction of property worth millions has been one of results of youth radicalization. There has been continuous recruitment and training of youths all over the world to join radicalized and terror groups which deprives communities with youths leading to lack of man power hence no economic activities like farming and livestock rearing and this has led to high levels of poverty in arid and semi-arid regions (Zaman and Mohammadi, 2014)

Youth radicalization has deprived the youths of their education rights, loss of lives, decline in number of students in the learning institutions, deterioration of school enrolment, fear of terror attacks among residents, psychological unease, and hatred and misunderstanding among families, clans and tribes. It has also led destruction of
property and closure of businesses, economic sabotage through blackmails, hijacking and terrorism, obstruction of economic development, scrambling for economic resources, lack of business growth and eventual business decline and loss of manpower (UNESCO, 2015).

Against this background of war and political conflict in the Somalia, especially the genesis of Al-Shabaab terrorist group which has significantly attracted the youth in Kenya and Somali into their ranks and activities, this study sought to research on the process of youth radicalization, its relationship with Islamic beliefs, other factors influencing it and its effects among the youth in North-eastern Kenya.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The youths are getting involved in terrorism and other militia gang activities through radicalization, religion is also claimed to be at the centre of propagating the radicalization process (Berman, 2009; Onuoha, 2014 and Christmann 2012). The issues relating to radicalization are of great global concern and often deprive a country’s youth of its economic viability and overstretch a country’s security organs in safeguarding their citizens from terrorist activities. Immediate concern is the reality that insecurity issues involving Al Shabaab in North Eastern region of Kenya has led to high mortalities of innocent citizens in Kenya and Somalia (Abdikadir, 2015 and McCauley, 2008). The deaths of both security personnel and members of the terror gangs has been linked to the involvement of youths in Kenya and its neighbouring countries.

In view of this, the international agencies like United Nations, the African Union and countries neighboring Somalia have been actively involved in curbing youth involvement in armed conflicts. Interventions like armed decimation of the
militia groups by AMISON, guidance and counseling of the youths, and sensitization
of the youths on the effects of terror activities by governmental and
nongovernmental institutions have been continuously ongoing with little evidence
of reversing the trend. Instead, youth recruitment and radicalization has adopted
less mundane approaches to outwit the authorities. This research sought to find the
causes of youth radicalization and the resulting socio-economic consequences on the
population of youths in Garissa County, Kenya and the government involvement in
averting this crisis.

1.3 The Main Objective
The main objective of the study was to analyze the causes of youth radicalization
and the socio-economic consequences of youth radicalization on people’s livelihoods
in Garissa County, Kenya.

1.4 Specific Objectives
The specific objectives in the research were:

i. To identify the factors that influence youths in joining youth
radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya.

ii. To determine the influence of global Islamic beliefs on youth
radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya.

iii. To establish the socio-economic effects of youth radicalization on
peoples’ livelihoods in Garissa County, Kenya.

iv. To evaluate the government’s involvement programmes towards
addressing the youth radicalization problem.

1.5 Research Questions
The following were the research questions:
a) What factors influence youths in Garissa County, Kenya to join radicalization process and the terror and militia groups?

b) What is the influence of the global Islamic beliefs on youth radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya?

c) What are the socio-economic effects of youth radicalization on peoples’ livelihoods in Garissa County, Kenya?

d) To what extent are the government’s involvement programmes effective towards addressing the youth radicalization problem?

1.6 Significance of the Study

The research helped in identifying the reasons why the youths are joining terror and militia groups through radicalization process. In doing so, the research unearthed the causes of radicalization and this information may be useful in the policy making processes in the formulation of strategies and mechanisms for reducing the rates of youth radicalization. The research also provided data that the security organs and religious groups could use to ascertain whether there is any link between the radicalization process and the international jihadist ideals and how this could be utilized to reverse the effects of radicalization in the Kenya.

The study found the socio-economic effects of youth radicalization like; lack of man power, slowdown of economic activities like farming and livestock rearing, high levels of poverty in arid and semi-arid regions, the deprivation of the youths of their education rights, loss of lives, decline in number of students in the learning institutions, deterioration of school enrolment and fear of terror attacks among residents. Some of the socio-economic effects of youth radicalization that can be pivotal in policy making processes within Garissa County and the National Government.
The study also assessed factors that influence the initiation of youths to the radicalization process as well as identifying the socio-economic effects of radicalization on the youth in Kenya. This may guide the policy makers and relevant government agencies in carrying out situational analysis about the youth and conflict in the Kenya and Somalia. Finally, the research may offer some insights and implications for any future policy approaches towards the issue of youth radicalization and youth involvement in terrorism and militia groups.

1.7 Justification of the Study

Youth radicalization has remained a great challenge towards ensuring national security, youth empowerment through provision of education, lagged economic growth and poverty increase among the youths. The youths in Garissa County form over 50% of the population (KNBS, 2015). The interests and future of Kenyan youths is pertinent towards achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals like; no poverty, quality education, decent work and economic growth as well as peace and justice strong institutions. The social and economic pillar of vision 2030 as well as the national economic policy on youths can be achieved through this study.

Garissa County is one of the worst hit counties in Kenya in terms of terror attacks, militia operations and youth radicalization (NCEC Report, 2015). Besides, Garissa County is in the North Eastern region of Kenya which is bordering Somali where youth conflict and radicalization is believed to have emanated from. It was a location where reported cases of unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians in the pursuit of political, social and economic gains were highly experienced in Kenya (UNESCO, 2015). Therefore, the study found justification in
these perspectives to analyze the causes and consequences of involvement of youths in radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya.

1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study specifically aimed to establish: the causes of youth radicalization, the influence of global Islamic beliefs on youth radicalization and the socioeconomic effects of youth radicalization in Garissa County Kenya. The study was narrowed to youths because they were most vulnerable group of radicalization and terror activities. Youth radicalization being a sensitive security issue and fear of the key informers of being victimized, the study was faced with a challenge and limitation of collecting data especially from interviews with those already affected. However, the researcher ensured that the data collected was as correct as possible and use of the locality natives to gather the information required. The researcher also used governments security agents like County Commissioner, Assistant County Commissioners, Area Chief and police officers to gather key information concerning youth radicalization through scheduled interviews.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The chapter consists of the following subsections: causes and factors of youth radicalization, the global Islamic beliefs and their influence on youth radicalization and socio-economic effects of youth radicalization in Kenya. The last part of the chapter gives both theoretical and conceptual framework of the study.

2.2 Causes and Factors that Influence Youth Radicalization

Youth radicalization is a phenomenon experienced globally and its effects have been associated with terror attacks and militia operations which threaten national securities. International terror groups like Al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Shabaab and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) have targeted youths in their operations (Wise, 2011). In Africa, Al-Shabaab based in Somali and Boko Haram based in Nigeria have also aimed at the youths in radicalizing them and preparing them for terror activities in East and Western Africa respectively (Berman, 2014).

In Eastern Africa, the overthrow of the government of President Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 was the probable cause of the development of the Al-Shabaab group in Somalia since there has been no government in Somalia for over 20 years (Wise, 2011; Berman, 2014). The political displacements and the setting up of the refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya to ameliorate the problem of displaced persons from Somalia that followed the collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime also contributed to the growth of youth radicalization among the Al-Shabaab (Onuoha, 2014).
Lindley (2011) cites that the problem of internal civil wars in the Horn of Africa led to the rise of a radicalized group of youth militia with a moderate Islamic organization attaining power in Somalia and afterwards the organization (Al Shabaab) became fully radicalized as an active popular Islamist guerilla movement. The Al-Shabaab group also gained goodwill because they were providing government services and hence had ease of recruiting the youths (Wise, 2011). The Al-Shabaab’s radicalization process also traces its establishment to foreign interventions like the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops in December 2006 which prompted the group to recruit thousands of nationalistic volunteers who were molded to suit the group’s operational strategy leading to the adaption of guerilla tactics as a means of resistance (Samuel & Wilson, 2014).

Zaman & Mohammadi (2014) noted that the youth joined the radicalized and terror groups because of their aligning interests with the Al Qaida (AQ). Since 2008, the cordial relationship between Al-Shabaab and the AQ has helped the Al-Shabaab gain legitimacy and resources. The relationship between Al Shabaab and Al Qaida enables Al Shabaab to portray Somalia as a front in a global war against the West (Lindley, 2011). Consequently, the operations of Al-Shabaab are being popularized by AQ core members as well as its operational strategy and training (Rudner, 2013). Advancement of communication and technologies such as the internet has equally played a significant role in supporting AQ inspired global youth radicalization which has boosted their funding from foreign donors (Christmann, 2012).

Social, economic and political groups with fundamentalist ideologies having expressions with higher level of unit entity and coherently bonded with shared opinions and purpose can easily lead followers into the youth radicalization
Christmann further argues that the modern social groups have got favorable technological advancements like internet, social media, electronic media, etc. that make it easier in spread of information and subsequent spread of radicalization.

Onuoha (2014) indicates that the existence of discriminatory views on grounds like ethnicity, religion, patrilinearity, social amenities and even in leadership has triggered the spread of youth radicalization. Situational and dispositional factors like the mass migration of people to common centres like refugee camps, urban centres, towns and cities have coalesced people from diverse backgrounds hence allowing swift movement of ideas faster across the country. This has also caused and increased the spread of radicalization (Christmann, 2012).

Bradbury (2010) indicates that youths are influenced into radicalization and terrorism because of their living conditions which are caused by the harsh environment including shortage of food, water, shelter, education and clothing make it easier for the recruits to entice the youths to the Al-shabaab training. In concurrence, Lindley (2011) says that promises of meeting the desire of the youths for adventure and attainment of their personal fulfillment and acceptance make them to fall prey to recruitment by the Al-Shabaab. All these factors put together provide ideal conditions for recruitment and socialization into radicalization and terrorism. The recruits are actually in a miserable state of affairs before being enlisted. Upon recruitment, they psychologically feel that they are going to attain their personal fulfillments.
2.3 The Influence of Global Islamic Beliefs on Youth Radicalization

In this section, the radicalization process of youths with respect to the global Islamic Jihadist’s beliefs is reviewed. Hendel (2015) note that when an individual or group adopts an extreme position in political, social, and religious issues that reject and undermine the status quo or contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice, it leads to radicalization. Youth radicalization may emanate from a broad social agreement within youths against progressive changes in a society (Duffy, 2015). Radicalization can be categorized as both violent and nonviolent, depending on the aftermath or consequences of the process. It is, however, noted that most literature on the radicalization process among the youth focuses on violent extremism (Hogan & Braddlock, 2013).

Several approaches induce youth radicalization: some ways are independent but mutually reinforcing as in the case of Jihad or Jihadist while others are materially self-driven (Habeck, 2010). The Jihadists (also referred to as fundamentalists) do attempt to justify war through some military action to defend their purported religious beliefs (Woodring, 2014). Furthermore, Jihadists compromise radicalization process to serve as a sociological and religious trap that makes youths to have no other means to satisfy their economical and spiritual needs (Berman, 2014).

It is also believed that terrorists and extremists misinterpret the teachings of Quran so as to gain political power rather than interpreting it in a spiritual sense (Hogan & Braddlock, 2013). Concerning the ISIS, Hogan and Braddlock state that the ISIS justifies its terrorist killings of people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, by proclaiming that they are preparing a political entity that they call a “Caliphate” for the glory of Allah. The ISIS terrorist group recruits are gruesome, dangerous and
youthful fighters from all over the world who are trained and radicalized for terror activities. The group is also involved in generating income through blackmail, kidnappings, illegal possession of oil wells and other means. It also entices youngsters to join their course of action by investing huge amounts of money in them (Berman, 2014).

That most Jihadists believe that they are the actual participants who could realize the objectives of the 'Holy War' is an oxymoron. By luring youths to join the Holy War, making them believe that they are fighting in the war for the course of God and brainwashing them to believe that they are victims of suppression and brutality in the hands of cruel enemies, the jihadists make their recruits believe that vengeance is part of Jihad to even things out (OSCE, 2014). Hence, it is not just for the Quran interpretation of spreading Islam globally that some Muslim youths turn into hardcore jihadists, it is more so for the prospect of a powerful authoritative life and life after death (Bradbury, 2010).

Some terror groups like Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in Africa teach their recruits that Jihad is one of seven compulsory pillars that a Muslim’s life is based on. They explain that Jihad is a holy war against non-believers with bad ethics, morals and values (Woodring, 2014). According to Bradbury, like all terror groups and militia gangs that wrongly interpret the Quran, jihadists do not present the meaning of Jihad as it is supposedly used hence teaching and radicalizing the Muslim youths in a wrong way.

From what others have already mentioned on Jihad being encouraged in Islam, the big question that the Arabic Discussion Board posted was whether Muslims are more susceptible to extremist and terrorist appeals (Woodring, 2014). Posts in the
discussion board suggest that Muslim youths who are lured and radicalized by jihadists have same naiveté as those who join the Marines or any branch of the National Military to justify their chosen profession as high minded patriotic and religious ideals. In both cases, they live to kill and to die; therefore, there is no doubt that Muslim youths are more susceptible than non-Muslim counterparts to become radicalized jihadists and terrorists (Borum, 2011).

Habeck (2010) describes that Muslim terrorists believe in their word and they do not have envy of liberal democracy or even the consumer society but religion and spiritual matters drive them particularly on exclusivist and triumphalism vision of Islam that characterize Jihadist beliefs as holy-war-like rather than on the basis of its orthodoxy. The latter is problematic, for while Jihadist beliefs are based on Muslim principles and traditions, what it has forged out of them is highly controversial, not least, because jihadists consider Muslims who disagree with them to be unbelievers – worthy of destruction alongside non-Muslims (Hogan & Braddock, 2013).

The U.S. Government policy on terror explains that Jihadists are people who are seminal clerical advocates for Jihad for the Muslim Brotherhood and the lead clerics for Al-Jazeera who are likely to be saviors that could de-radicalize the recruited youths. It also distinguishes between violent Jihadists and non-kinetic soft Jihadists who are taking different pathways to the same destination of imposing of *sharia* law wherever they can make it happen and to the creation of a Caliphate (OSCE, 2014).

### 2.4 Socio-Economic Effects of Radicalization on People’s Livelihoods

Youth radicalization is a serious problem worldwide. It is even prevalent in the more developed countries with advanced technology and military power like the United States. Particularly, there is a fear syndrome within nations all over the world
caused by radicalization in the horn of Africa (Zhi-Gang & Guo, 2015). The youthful recruits are involved in the use of civilians as human shields and targeting those they want to use explosives on. At the same time they use direct firearms on their targets. All these activities have created a fear syndrome worldwide (Lindley, 2011).

Zhi-Gang & Guo (2015) observed that the impact of the youth radicalization has been the consequences of hitting the target regions while Abdikadir (2015) adds grimmer consequences such as deaths of innocent people and destruction of property worth millions. For instance, when the terrorists attacked Kenya in 1998, 2013 and 2015, hundreds of innocent people died and property was destroyed.

According to Yasin (2014), consequences of youth radicalization have been the phenomenon of continuous recruitment and training that have been going on all over the world including the United States. Yasin also posits that many nations in the world have reported their youths being recruited and trained in Somalia and as a result this is an issue of big concern to planners all over the world. The government of the United States of America and the United Nations are at the moment spending millions of dollars to fight this phenomenon (Abdikadir, 2015). It is because of these that the international community came up with a transitional government under the aegis of AMISON drawing its military force from the neighboring states of Kenya, Uganda and Burundi.

Bradbury (2010) and Lindley (2011) postulate that because of the youth radicalization, there have been no economic activities like farming and livestock rearing; this has led to high levels of poverty in arid and semi-arid regions in the horn of Africa. For instance, the poverty levels in the North Eastern parts of Kenya
has been enhanced thus setting an ideal precedence for further recruitment of the youths into these groups. At the same time, school system in the affected areas has fallen apart thus increasing the illiteracy levels (Lindley, 2011).

The youth radicalization has brought fear syndrome in some parts of cities and among the security agencies. The grimmer consequences such as deaths of innocent people and destruction of property worth millions has been one of results of youth radicalization. There has been continuous recruitment and training of youths all over the world to join radicalized and terror groups which deprives communities with youths leading to lack of man power hence no economic activities like farming and livestock rearing and this has led to high levels of poverty in arid and semi-arid regions (Zaman and Mohammadi, 2014)

Youth radicalization has deprived the youths of their education rights, loss of lives, decline in number of students in the learning institutions, deterioration of school enrolment, fear of terror attacks among residents, psychological unease, and hatred and misunderstanding among families, clans and tribes. It has also led destruction of property and closure of businesses, economic sabotage through blackmails, hijacking and terrorism, obstruction of economic development, scrambling for economic resources, lack of business growth and eventual business decline and loss of manpower (UNESCO, 2015).

### 2.5 Research Gaps

Studies by Bradbury (2010) indicated that youths are influenced into radicalization and terrorism because of their living conditions while Lindley (2011) noted that promises of meeting the desire of the youths for adventure and attainment of their personal fulfillment and acceptance make them to fall prey to youth radicalization.
Christmann (2012) observed that situational and dispositional factors like the mass migration of people to common centres like refugee camps, urban centres, towns and cities have coalesced people from diverse backgrounds hence allowing swift spread of youth radicalization. Rudner (2013) cited that advancement of communication and technologies such as the internet has equally played a significant role in spread of youth radicalization. However, these studies have not addressed the factors that influence youths in Kenya especially in Garissa County to join radicalization process and the terror and militia groups.

The reviewed literature shows that; Hendel (2015) noted that when an individual or group adopts an extreme position in political, social, and religious issues that reject and undermine the contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice. Woodring (2014) found that Jihadist fundamentalists do attempt to justify war through some military action to defend their purported religious beliefs. Berman, (2014) argues that Jihadists compromise radicalization process to serve as a sociological and religious trap that makes youths to have no other means to satisfy their economical and spiritual needs. All this literature alludes that there are extreme fundamental social, political and economic, religious issues that cause youth radicalization. The review realized that the influence of the global Islamic beliefs on youth radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya has not been studied.

The literature also noted that; Zhi-Gang and Guo (2015) cited that there is fear syndrome within nations all over the world while Abdikadir (2015) observed socio-economic effects like; lack of man power, slowdown of economic activities like farming and livestock rearing. Yasin (2014) noted that youth radicalization led to high levels of poverty in arid and semi-arid regions, the deprivation of the youths of
their education rights and loss of lives are some of the socio-economic effects of youth radicalization that have been addressed in this study. The research sought to establish the specific socio-economic effects of youth radicalization on peoples’ livelihoods and the government’s involvement and engagement programmes that will effectively address the youth radicalization problem in Garissa County, Kenya.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

The study adopts the ethnic hierarchy theoretical model advanced by Mengisteab (2011). The ethnic hierarchy model considers a number of intricate and interwoven factors that engender youth affairs including youth conflict and radicalization. Mengisteab, isolates the core factors that dominate the conflict and radicalization of youths in the postcolonial era: contextual socio-economic factors, poor governance and leadership, ethnocratic and selfish cultural practices. The resultant ethnic hierarchy model thus cognizes the role of these core factors in promoting conflict and radicalization and thriving in governments with divisive leadership that embraces that promote transactional leadership ideologies rather than cultivating transformational leadership.

The Mengisteab’s ethnic hierarchy model suggests interventions for reducing the effects of conflict among the youth: better legal frameworks like new or amended constitutions, embracing transformational leadership and incorporating all the warfare communities in leadership in a manner that reduces tension among the communities.

The Mengisteab’s ethnic hierarchy model is an extension or a subset of realism theory which was preferred after the First World War because of its shared ideologies. According to Abdikadir (2015), realism theory emphasizes the constraints
of politics imposed by human nature demands and lack of international relations or governance. The realism theory recognizes that men are motivated by other desires which are linked to power and not necessarily internal governments. Such desires as contextual socio-economic factors, poor governance and leadership, ethnocratic and selfish cultural practices are also cited by Mengesteab (2011).

According to ethnic hierarchy model, youth conflict and radicalization are due to factors related to the nature of human demands emanating from different socio-economic backgrounds and accelerated by poor political goodwill which results into loss of life and property. This theoretical model lays a foundation of developing the conceptual framework of this study.

2.7 Conceptual Framework

Shields and Rangarjan (2013) observe that conceptual framework is an analytical tool that organizes and represents ideas and relationships on how the dependent variable and both independent variables and intervening variables link. It also gives the connection between the research objectives, study variables and how the data collected will be analyzed to generate information for making correct conclusions about the study.

In this study, the dependent variable is youth radicalization while its independent variables are the causes of youth radicalization which included; global Islamic beliefs, social factors and economic factors. The conceptual framework also indicates the intervening variables, which include; political influences, government policies and geographic attributes. The conceptual framework shows the relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables. For instance, on global Islamic beliefs Hendel (2015) noted that youths believed that by being radicalized, they were
defending their Islamic beliefs on jihads. The economic factors including poverty, lack of income, lack of employment, are also believed to be the economic causes of youth radicalization. The level of education, religion and ethnicity are also likely to contribute to youth radicalization as social factors.

Additionally, the conceptual framework also regards the influence of political factors, government policies and geographical factors on youth radicalization as intervening variables. On political factor as an intervening variable, youths are seen to be possessed with extreme political opinions, social ideals and aspirations that reject the government’s policies on security. Finally, the conceptual framework shows the consequences of youth radicalization which includes; wars, deaths, famine, poverty, piracy, out-migration, unemployment and hopelessness.
The above conceptual framework guided the study through framing the questionnaire to identify the factors that influence youths in joining youth radicalization as well as to establish the socio-economic effects of youth radicalization on peoples’ livelihoods. In data analysis the discussion of results was done in reference to the relationships highlighted in the conceptual framework.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the research design, research variables, study area, target population, sampling techniques and sample size, research instruments, pilot study, data collection procedures, data analysis and ethical considerations.

3.2 Research Design
This study used both qualitative and quantitative research approach. The approach was appropriate for the study because it enabled the researcher to gain insight into the factors that influence youth radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya. The research approach facilitated collection of both qualitative and quantitative data related to the causes and consequences of involvement of youths in radicalization in Garissa County. In particular, the views, attitudes and opinions from the population concerning the phenomenon of youth radicalization were sought. This research also gathered qualitative information from secondary data sources useful in elucidating the objectives of the study. The qualitative data yielded were analyzed as the basis of making inferences and drawing conclusions.

3.3 Research Variables
The dependent variable of the research was youth radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya. The independent variables were the factors that influence youth radicalization and resultant consequences. The independent variables were; social factors, economic factors and global Islamic beliefs. The intervening variables were political influence by elected members, government policies and geographic attributes like boundaries and regions.
3.4 Study Area

The study qualitatively obtained information about the youth radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya. It mainly focused on Garissa County, Kenya that was massively affected by the radicalization process, terror influence and involvement of militia gangs. Garissa County is located in North Eastern region of Kenya. It is found on the coordinates 0.1112°N 40.3142°E Garissa County is bordered by Wajir County to the north, Isiolo County on the north-west, Tana River County to the west, Lamu County to the south and on its east is the Republic of Somali.

Garissa County is mainly an arid and semi-arid area with most residents being of the Somali community. The major economic activities in the area are pastoralism, trade and farming for those near the River Tana. The map of the study locale is shown in Appendix I.

3.5 Target Population

A target population is defined as a complete set of individual, cases or objects with some common observable characteristics in a given area (Kothari, 2004). The target population of the study was all youth age 15 – 35 who are living in Garissa County, Kenya. Both government and non-government agencies like UNHCR do not have specific statistics about the affected population by youth radicalization. However, in this study, the target population included all the youths who were resident in Garissa County, Kenya at the time of the research. Garissa County had a population of 841,353 according to the Kenyan Population and Housing Census of 2019 and was projected to grow to 12,331,036 by the year 2030 according to the Kenya Health and Demographic Survey (2015) and population estimates by UNICEF (2014). In line with its main objective, the study covered Garissa County in Kenya with the youths being the key participants.
3.6 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

The target population is very large to be covered in terms of collecting data by using questionnaires and interviews. Therefore, the study involved sampling process to select a representative subset of the target population to enable data collection.

3.6.1 Sampling Procedure

This study used both stratified and purposive sampling procedures to select a sample that represented the entire population. According to Kothari & Garg (2014), a stratified sampling technique is used when the data required should be representative of the target population. The geographical factors, social status, economic activities and cultural backgrounds in the target population differ. Therefore, to ensure that these differences were adequately represented in the sample, stratified sampling was used. In addition, simple random sampling procedure was applied in selecting respondents from each stratum. According to Kothari & Garg (2014) through random sampling techniques, all individuals in the target population have an equal chance of being selected.

Purposive sampling was used to select the key resource persons of the study who include; elders, religious leaders and government administrators. Purposive sampling was deemed fit for this study because the researcher relied on his own judgment when choosing members of population to participate in the study. Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling method that researchers use when selecting a sample by their own judgment.
3.6.2 Sample Size

A sample refers to a sub-set of the target population that has been procedurally selected to represent it for the study. Sampling procedure is the method of identifying the individuals who will form the sample (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2013). A range of between 150-200 participants is deemed an appropriate sample size for a qualitative and quantitative research approach that will achieve the research objectives and making of generalizations that are analytical or logical in nature (Kothari, 2004). Therefore, the research used a sample size of 150 which comprised 120 youths, 10 elders, 10 religious leaders including Sheikhs and Imams as well as 10 administrators including County Commissioner, Deputy County Commissioners, Area Chiefs, and Police Officers representing about 10 percent of the government administrators in the county.

3.7 Research Instruments

Three research instruments were used to collect data in this research. Primary data was collected using, questionnaires and interview schedules. The questionnaires were mainly used in collecting data from the youths affected directly or indirectly by radicalization while the interview schedules were used to obtain data from elders, religious leaders and government administrators. The secondary data from documents, journals, books and electronic sources was obtained mainly through reviewing the relevant document. Data from the research instruments was organized before being analyzed and used in making valid conclusions.

3.7.1 Questionnaires

According to Orodho (2009), the questionnaires take less time, energy and cost to administer in a vast area while collecting data. The questionnaires also give respondents freedom to express their views and opinions as well as making
suggestions while maintaining their anonymity. The questionnaire in the study contained both open ended and closed questions. It gathered basic demographic information, the participants’ perceptions, attitudes and behavior related to youth radicalization. The questionnaire used the 5-point Likert scale and the Yes-No-Not Sure questions to identify the causes and consequences of youth radicalization. The questionnaire was administered by the researcher and assisted by trained data clerks. The questionnaire used in this study is contained in Appendix II.

3.7.2 Interview Schedule

Personal interviews targeting key informants were conducted. An interview schedule was considered appropriate because the research was able to get more information from respondents than it would by using a questionnaire. The interviews were specifically administered on elders, County Commissioner, Assistant County Commissioners, Garissa University administrator, Garissa University, Chief Security Officer, County Director of Education, Garissa Town area Chief and religious leaders who were also key informants in the study. The interview schedules were used to gather information on the influence of social and economic factors on youth radicalization. The interview schedules were also helpful in soliciting information about the socio-economic effects of radicalization process among the youths in Garissa County, Kenya. The interview schedule is attached as Appendix III.

3.7.3 Document and Content Analysis

Document and content analysis is usually instrumental in corroborating data on shared opinions, views, situations and phenomena about the findings of similar researches. For this study, the procedure was mainly applied in collating qualitative data about the government’s involvement and engagement programmes in addressing youth radicalization. The main documents used were government publications,
archival media information and UN publications.

### 3.8 Data Collection

The researcher used consents and authorization documents from Kenyatta University, the National Council of Science and Technology Innovation (NACOSTI) and the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination to formalize and engage in the process of data collection. The documents were also used to introduce the data clerks to the areas where the study took place. The researcher took the data clerks through the questionnaires and trained them on how to collect reliable and valid data. The research assistants were also instructed on how to ensure that anonymity and confidentiality of data.

### 3.9 Pilot Study

Piloting of the instruments was done prior to the actual data collection to check for validity and reliability of the instruments. Ten youths from one sub-location in Garissa County participated in the pilot study. This sub-location was excluded from the main data collection. To ensure validity and reliability of the instruments, the researcher involved peer review as well as discussion of the questionnaire with the supervisor.

#### 3.9.1 Reliability of the Instruments

Reliability is the extent to which a questionnaire, test, observation or any other measurement produces the same results on repeated trials (Orodho, 2009). The researcher made a pre-visit to the study area in order to familiarize with the location. The research used the test-retest method which involved administering the same scale or measure to the same group of respondents at two separate times. There was a time lapse of two weeks between the test and retest times. Correlation coefficient ($r$)
between the scores of the two questionnaires was calculated and found to be 0.87. Kerlinger (2000) recommends that a correlation coefficient of 0.7 and above is acceptable in showing that there is reliability in the research instrument.

3.9.2 Validity of the Instruments

Validity refers to the degree to which results obtained from analysis of data represents the actual phenomena under study (Adijah et al, 2011). A pilot study was taken by administering a questionnaire to respondents from one sub-location. Errors and ambiguity were rectified before the actual study. The researcher ensured that the questions in the questionnaire are framed in such a way that they bring out content validity.

3.10 Data Processing, Analysis and Presentation

The research mainly yielded qualitative data with some numerical data from the three research instruments. Qualitative data was organized in terms of content in line with the four study objectives. They were then analyzed thematically by drawing meanings and inferences across each research question. The numerical data mainly from the demographic attributes checked and edited, coded and entered into Statistical Package for Social Scientist (SPSS version 22) for analysis. Analysis of numerical data was done using frequency distribution tables, cross tabulations and graphical methods including pie charts, bar graphs and histograms. The qualitative data was collated into themes and generalizations guided by the research objectives and then meaningful conclusions drawn from them.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Anonymity was observed in all cases of the study. All the participants were asked to voluntarily provide verbal consent before participating in the research. The
research consent was obtained from Kenyatta University before seeking research permit from National Council of Science and Technology Innovation (NACOSTI) that allowed the research process to be done. Other consents involving security were obtained from Ministry of Interior Officials, the Garissa County Commissioner. The consent for data collection from Kenyatta University is attached in Appendix IV while the NACOSTI research permit is attached as Appendix V. The authorization to engage in data collection concerning youth radicalization in Garissa County from Ministry of Interior and National Coordination is attached as Appendix VI. Acknowledgements of participants and other literal sources of data were done at the end of the data collection process.
CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of data analysis and the findings of the study. It discusses the information gathered from the primary sources including questionnaires and interview schedules as well as from the secondary sources including document analysis. The information regarding socio-demographic factors of respondents was summarised using frequency distribution tables and graphical charts while the information concerning the study variables was analysed by content analysis leading to meaningful themes and generalization. The data analysis was guided by the research questions and the discussion of results were done in reference to the relationships highlighted in the conceptual framework and the ethnic hierarchical theory reviewed under the theoretical framework.

4.2 Socio-Demographic Data

The researcher sought for the socio-demographic information of the study respondents as well as their awareness on youth radicalization.

4.2.1 Socio-Demographic Data

The socio-demographic information sought for included age, gender, education level, occupation, religion, ethnicity and monthly income. The socio-demographic information was to give the researcher the background information about the respondents and the likely attributes of the target population. Out of 150 targeted respondents only 142 were interviewed, while other 8 respondents declined to be interviewed. Table 1 exemplifies the results of data analysis of socio-demographic factors of the respondents.
Table 1: Frequency Distribution of Socio-Demographic Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>18-20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21-25</td>
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<td>24.6</td>
<td>34.5</td>
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<td>26-30</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36.6</td>
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<td>21.1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36+</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Primary</td>
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<td>Incomplete</td>
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<td>19.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Primary</td>
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<td>31.7</td>
<td>50.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Secondary</td>
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<td>Tertiary colleges</td>
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<td></td>
<td>University</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Occupation</td>
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<td>Farming</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.6</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Borana</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income p.m.</td>
<td>0-5000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5001-10000</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10001-25000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25001-35000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35000+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled from own Fieldwork data*
Table 1 shows that 67.6% of the respondents who participated in the study were males while 32.4% were females. These results imply that there was no gender parity among the respondents. The results also show that majority of the study respondents were 26-30 years old with relative frequency of 36.6% followed by those aged 21-25 years with relative frequency of 24.6%. Those aged 31-35 years, 18-20 years and above 35 years old were the minority age groups with relative frequencies 21.1%, 9.9% and 7.7% respectively. The gender and age distribution form the basis of discussion of results involving peer influence on youth radicalization. The age of respondents exhibits normality property as displayed by the normal curve and histogram below.

Figure 2: Histogram Showing Age Distribution

Source: Compiled from own fieldwork data
The study also inquired about the respondents’ level of education. The results in Table 1 indicate that 31.7% of the respondents had primary school level of education, 26.8% had secondary school level of education while 19.0% of respondents had not completed primary school level of education. It was evident that the higher education levels: tertiary colleges (14.8%) and university (7.7%) were the minority levels while the lower levels of educations namely incomplete primary, primary and secondary education were the majority levels among the study participants as summarized in the bar graph below. These education attainments are slightly below than the national average education attainments which are 42.1% for Primary school complete and 28.2% for secondary school level (UNESCO institute of Statistics, 2015; KDHS, 2015). The study found that the majority of the population in Garissa County generally has lower educational attainments unlike the national education levels and this lays foundation on the establishing the influence of social factors on youth radicalization.

Figure 3: Bar graph Showing Level of Education Distribution

Source: Compiled from own Fieldwork data
The results in Table 1 also indicate that most of the participants in the study were of Muslim religion with a relative frequency of 81.7% while those who are of Christian faith and other religions were in the minor religious groups in the county with relative frequencies of 13.4% and 4.9% respectively. The distribution of religion is fundamental in analysis of the relationship between youth radicalization and Islamic Jihadist beliefs. The study also found that most of the study respondents were of Somali ethnicity with a relative frequency of 69.0% while the Kamba, Borana and “Others” ethnicities were minorities with relative frequencies of 10.6%, 7.0% and 13.4% respectively. The “Others” were Kikuyu (4.2%), Meru (3.5%), Luo (2.8%), Kisii (1.4%), and Embu (1.4%). The distribution of ethnicity in Garissa County was of assistance to establish how the genealogy and patrilinearity factors affected youth radicalization in the County. The pie chart below shows the distribution of religion among the study participants.

![Pie Chart Showing Religion Distribution](image)

**Figure 4: Pie Chart Showing Religion Distribution**

*Source: Compiled from own Fieldwork data*
Concerning the economic status, results indicated that the majority of the study participants were occupied in business (44.4%) and in pastoralist activities (21.1%). However, the minority among the study participants were office workers (18.3%), farmers (10.6%) and other menial jobs (5.6%). The results in Table 1 also shows that majority of study participants earned Ksh.5001-10000 per month (39.4%) followed by those earning Ksh.0-5000 per month (35.2%). The minority of the study participants earned higher monthly incomes: Ksh.10001-25000 per month (14.1%), Ksh.25001-35000 per month (7.7%) and above Ksh.35000 per month (3.5%). The bar graph below shows the distribution of economic status of the study participants in terms of occupation. These figures on economic status reveal that majority of Garissa County youths were living in poverty since they were earning less than Ksh.10000 per month. World Bank (2015) cites that the international poverty line is at $1.90 per day which is about Ksh.200 per day. The economic status of youths in Garissa County will help to explain the influence of economic factors on youth radicalization.

Figure 5: Bar Graph Showing Occupation Distribution

*Source: Compiled from own fieldwork data*
4.2.2 Awareness of Youth Radicalization

The research sought to investigate the youth radicalization process in Garissa County, Kenya. In doing so, the study analyzed whether the target population was aware of youth radicalization and the activities involved in youth radicalization.

Table 2: Frequency Distribution Showing Awareness of Youth Radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>attribute</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of youth radicalization</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in youth radicalization</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Aware</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled from own Fieldwork data*

The results in Table 2 indicate that 81.7% of the study respondents were aware while 10.6% were not aware of youth radicalization. The results also show that 7.7% of respondents did not respond that there was youth radicalization in Garissa County. Concerning the extent of involvement of youth in radicalization, 32.4% of the respondents indicated that youth radicalization had remained fairly constant in the last three years, 31.7% of respondents indicated that youth radicalization had increased in the last three years, 9.9% of respondents indicated that youth radicalization has decreased while 26.1% of respondents were not sure of the youth radicalization trends. Therefore, according to these results about 81.7% of the Garissa County
youths were aware of youth radicalization; about 32.4% and 31.7% concurred that youth radicalization was either constant or on increase respectively. These findings are in agreement with Abdikadir (2015) who concluded in his study that majority of the population of North Eastern region in Kenya was aware of youth radicalization and its activities in the region.

The study found that the youth radicalization involved recruitment activities, the Garissa County Executive Committee (CEC) member in charge of education observed that the radicalized groups were sensitizing and making youths in Garissa County to feel that they were deprived of their economic resources and making them feel that they were marginalized in their own motherland or country. The CEC member also said that recruiters were also involved in enlisting militia online and creating social media groups to spread youth radicalization agenda and purposes and communicate with their target audience. The recruitment activities were also geared towards formation of local and external recruiters, creation of ideologies and theories that propagate youth radicalization through deception and carrying out enrolment, and registration of new members.

According to the County Director of Education (CDE), the main recruitment activity involved in youth radicalization was brainwashing the youths with extremist ideologies based on human rights and misrepresentation of Islamic teachings that influenced them to join youth radicalization. They also suggested that peer influence among the youths helped in selling propaganda and ideas on the youth radicalization to others.

Another activity involved in youth radicalization as found in this study was categorized as training and learning activities. The Garissa University Administrator
noted that the radicalized groups were involved in initiation of radicalization activities within existing learning institutions. The Garissa University Administrator also said that youths who have joined the radicalized groups were introduced to military training, handling of various weapons like guns and explosives such as grenades and bombs. The youths were also trained on ideological extremism and self-defence tactics. The study found that the youth radicalization activities also included learning how to radicalize other youths by use of friends (peer influence), learning how to recruit other youths through enticement, forming sect leadership and using persuasive political strategies for spreading radicalization process.

Observations by the County Commissioner in charge of Internal Security in Garissa County agreed with those of the County Director of Education (CDE) that the main training and learning activity involved in youth radicalization is propagating extremism ideologies based on human rights and religious teachings that prepare them for active participation in the radicalization process.

On terrorism activities, the Assistant County Commissioner (ACC) in charge of internal security in Garissa County observed that the radicalized groups were involved in blackmailing of youths, arming the youths with weapons and facilities for terror attacks, involving the youths in clan militia operations, offering security and safeguarding their interest areas and bases, orchestrating killings and deaths in their revenge missions, and creating of extremism scenarios for retraction, defence and revenge missions. The study established that terrorism activities are the core business and operations of radicalized youths.

The Garissa Town Area Chief confided that the main catastrophic impacts of youth radicalization were terror attacks and seaway hijacks. The Chief also cited that the
presence of terror group cartels’ agents like ISIS, ISIL, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda were targeting the highly educated youths like doctors, engineers, lawyers and other specialized professionals to mastermind their terror and hijack activities. These findings were in agreement with the observations made by Adijah et al (2011) who concluded that violent extremism and radicalization were propagated by groups like Al Qaeda.

The Assistant Chief in charge of administration of Hulugho sub-location observed that radicalized groups were involved in economic and income generating activities for raising revenue for running their activities. The Assistant Chief observed that the youth radicalization’s economic activities included hijacking and blackmailing businesses, taking over of control of business properties and business premises, and setting up of businesses. In some areas, the radicalized groups developed self-controlled programmes for revenue collection through taxes, forced payments for the security services offered and collection of levies on goods and services they claim to protect.

Concerning the question on, “what were the economic and financial activities carried out by youth radicalization groups?” The Garissa Town Mosque’s Imam responded that, “the foreign groups like Al Shabaab, ISIS and ISIL provided economic activities including; funding youth radicalization activities, offering enticements, setting up social and political affiliations through offering financial obligations, participating in decision making in conflict creation and youth radicalization process. The Imam also observed that empowerment of already radicalized youths through capacity building and specialized training in universities and in military training academies”. This
observation was also made by Borum (2011) in how radicalization matures into violent extremism.

The County Commissioner of Garissa County concurred with his administrative staff that included the Senior Assistant County Commissioner (SACC), the Assistant County Commissioner (ACC), the Garissa town area Chief and the village elders that the main reason for youths joining youth radicalization was to be trained, get employed with terror groups hence secure an occupation and source of income. This meant that the radicalized groups had to seek for means and ways of raising funds to run their activities. Similar sentiments were echoed by the Garissa University Administrator. They also opined that some radicalized groups especially the Al-Shabaab have sought in the past fought to control the Somali government and the revenue collection process.

4.3 Causes of Youth Radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya

The research also sought to investigate the factors that influence youths in joining youth radicalization process in Garissa County, Kenya. In doing so, the study objectively analyzed the causes of youth radicalization in the county by first establishing the various factors influencing youth radicalization. Table 3 below presents data on the causes of youth radicalization in Garissa County.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Statement</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical injustices is related to youth radicalization</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and ethnicity differences influence youth radicalization</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrilinearity and genealogy factors are related to youth radicalization</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social differences have influence on youth radicalization</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic factors influence youth radicalization</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peer influence is related to youth radicalization</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign involvement in youth radicalization</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from own Fieldwork data

4.3.1 Historical Injustices Influence to Youth Radicalization

According to the results in the table above, 61.3% of the study participants agreed while 30.3% disagreed that historical injustices in the region has influenced the youths in joining youth radicalization. However, 8.5% of the respondents were not sure whether historical injustices in the region have influenced youth radicalization. Therefore, the study found that majority of the respondents agreed that historical injustices in the region influenced youth radicalization. Wilner and Dubouloz, (2010)
do concur with these findings that leadership genealogy and heritage significantly confound the problem of historical injustices

The study established the following historical injustices that influence youth radicalization. First, due to influence of tribalism and nepotism within clans and tribes living in Garissa County, some respondents felt that some families, clans and sub-tribes living in Garissa County were marginalized in terms of being in leadership, some felt that some families and clans in the region were well endowed with political power and economic opportunities hence they reigned over others both socially and economically. Abdikadir (2015) similarly observed that historical injustices within communities in North Eastern region of Kenya lead to marginalization in the region.

Secondly, majority of the youth respondents pointed out the leadership genealogy and heritage that led to imbalance of political and economic power in favour of one family, sub-clan or clan at the expense of others as another case of the historical injustices that would precipitate a revolt within the community resulting to youth radicalization. Thirdly, the study found that religious leaders in Garissa Town Mosque when interviewed cited that the haunting historical injustices committed against communities living in the North Eastern region (NEP) of Kenya including Garissa County especially the Wajir massacre in 1984 and Garissa massacre in 1980 that affected the Somali community. The Garissa Town area Chief observed that “when the youths in Garissa County are told of these massacres and when the massacres are ideologically constructed as actions against certain communities, the result provokes the youths in the region to fight against such atrocities through radicalization.”

Finally, some historical injustices against communities living in Garissa County
include continued intimidation and torture of some communities in living in the region by some government departments.

The Garissa County Commissioner observed that retaliations committed against institutions in Garissa County as well as the communities in the region lead to a feeling of recurrently andcollaterally being punished by the national government for not reporting and upholding security matters to the government. The human rights activists and religious leaders especially the SUPKEM cited historical injustice against the youths in the region in which the State sponsors actions to counter terror that in turn retrogressively lead to youth radicalize as a way of repulsing such oppression. They also suggested that in some regions, some families had experienced brutal punishment and killings of their members targeted for being thought to be associated with youth radicalization.

Finally, the study gathered information from the Garissa Town Human Rights Crusaders that in early the years of the 2000-2010 decade, there were some military recruitment and training activities in the NEP region in which some youths were recruited, trained and then sent to Somali to help in the establishment of Somali Government through a military back up. Later, the youths who were involved in this process in Somali were massacred and killed in the process of establishing the Somali government due to escalating conflicts and wars between the government and the extremist terror group, Al Shabaab. The information further also suggests that the remaining youths after such tribulations were never recognized and compensated by both Somali and Kenyan governments – in frustration; they ended up being compromised, radicalized and recruited by the Al Shabaab group. In this regard, the study found that historical injustices influenced youth radicalization which is in agreement with the findings of Rudner (2013).
4.3.2 The Influence of Cultural and Ethnic Differences on Youth Radicalization

Results in Table 3 show that 61.3% of the respondents concurred that cultural and ethnic differences had an influence on youth radicalization. On the other hand, 26.8% and 12.0% of the respondents either did not agree or were not sure respectively whether differences in culture and ethnicity influenced youth radicalization. In this regard, majority of the respondents agreed that the cultural and ethnicity factors influence youth radicalization. Concurrently, Habeck (2010) also concluded that cultural and heritage significantly confound the problem of historical injustices that would lead to youth radicalization.

The majority of the youth identified specific cultural and ethnicity factors that influence youth radicalization. They observed that differences in cultural values and beliefs of their society influence introduction and propagation of youth radicalization in some communities especially when some communities feel that they need a sense of security, belongingness or when they have a sense of denial. Other youths felt that differences between their cultural practices and ownership of community resources like land and cattle lead to disparities between communities and families hence fomenting youth aggression which end up as an indirect cause of youth radicalization.

Secondly, majority of the youths concurred with the Garissa County officers in charge of security that some ethnic groups and communities are more prone to youth radicalization than others due to their cultural and ethnical inclinations. For instance, the Garissa Assistant County Commissioner wondered “whether youth radicalization said to be immense in the North Eastern and Coastal regions of Kenya is related to common cultural and ethnic origins of the main indigenous communities in North Eastern and some parts of Coast.” The main tribes and ethnicities living in both North
Eastern and some parts of Coast are: Somali, Borana and Galla who belong to Cushitic group. Similar sentiments were alluded by Lindley (2011) who observed that cultural aspects like nepotism in Cushitic ethnicities lead to conflict in the horn of Africa.

The religious leaders of Garissa Town Mosque concurred with the Garissa town area Chief that tribalism influences youth radicalization since some tribes are thought to be better than others. Other study participants said that some cultural practices like taboos and abominations in the Somali community encourage and increase the spread of youth radicalization. For instance, spying on a tribesman is a taboo and abomination in some clans and families in the Garissa County. Consequently, absence of spying has actually allowed and propagated the spread of youth radicalization as a result of non-reporting of those involved to the community leaders and government authorities.

Finally, the youth also observed that; tribalism, clanism, cultural and ethnical affiliations as well as disparities between tribes, sub-tribes, clans, cultures and families that discriminately push youths from favoured backgrounds into employment and economic advantage while leaving other youths from other clans or families without an option except joining youth radicalization. In this regard, the study found that cultural factors influenced youth radicalization process.

4.3.3 Patrilinearity and Genealogy Factors Influence on Youth Radicalization

Table 3 results concerning patrilinearity and genealogy factors influence on youth radicalization show that 46.5%, 35.9% and 17.6% of the respondents either disagreed or were not sure or agreed respectively. These results indicate that majority of respondents (46.5%) did not think that patrilinearity and genealogy factors did
influence youth radicalization. The patrilinearity and genealogy factors that influenced youth radicalization explained by village elders of Balambala sub-location revolved around those that empowered one family or clan at the expense of others. For instance, the Balambala village elders said that some clans and families in Garissa County have been at the helm of both political and economical hierarchy leaving other clans and families in abject poverty and, as a result, the youths from the disadvantaged families end up engaging in activities that would earn them an income or offer them employment. This observation was in agreement with the findings of Lindley (2011).

4.3.4 Social Influences on Youth Radicalization

Concerning social influences on youth radicalization, results in Table 3 show that majority of the respondents (53.5%) disagreed that social differences influence youth radicalization in Garissa County. The other respondents: those who agreed and those that were not sure that social differences influence youth radicalization were 25.4% and 21.1% respectively.

Even though majority of youths disagreed that social differences influence youth radicalization, the minority of youths and the Garissa CDE and the Chief Education Officer agreed that social differences influence youth radicalization: The CDE said, “lack of proper education for children among the Somali community made some youths to feel that their social rights and opportunities were deprived”. The Chief Education Officer of Garissa County quoted that, “most youths lacked specialized education and training that would give them expertise and personal quality required to support themselves in economic growth hence they end up joining the terror and militia groups that only require basic education and non-specialization”. Mengeastab
(2011) also argued that lack of empowerment of youths may lead them into social and economic crimes therefore agreeing with these assertions.

Some youths suggested that low social class among the citizens in North Eastern region of Kenya made them easy targets for ideological propaganda among the youths and friends with whom they share their anticipations and stories and wrong ideas about youth radicalization. Other youths felt that lack of proper education coupled with lack of social amenities rendered the youths in the area to be idle and non-productive, and, as result, they would easily be swayed and influenced to join youth radicalization. Other youths cited the use of social media especially the formation of social groups in Whatsapp and Facebook media platforms in spreading youth radicalization. Concerning social influences on youth radicalization, the study found that lack of specialized education and training influenced the recruitment of youths into radicalization.

4.3.5 Political Factors Influencing Youth Radicalization

The Garissa Town Ijara Community leaders suggested that, “political injustices and dominance of one clan over the others as well as corruption in the government which perpetuated unfair government policies against some clans of Garissa County and North Eastern region as a whole lead to inequity in terms of job opportunities, distribution of economic resources, creation of wealth through infrastructural development and as a result the youth in the region felt marginalized and deprived of their human rights and this predisposes the youth to join youth radicalization”.

The Garissa Town activists group felt that the political affiliations in the region was biased in that some clans were more affiliated to the current national and local government denying other clans opportunities to grow in leadership and in politics.
The SUPKEM leaders cited that denial of democracy and human rights groups among the youth in the region as reasons why the youths were repulsive to the current regime by setting up terror and radicalized groups.

4.3.6 The Influence of Economic Factors on Youth Radicalization

According to Table 3, the majority of the study participants (73.2%) agreed while minority of the study participants (16.9%) disagreed that economic factors influence youth radicalization. It was also noted that 9.9% of the study participants were not sure whether economic factors influence youth radicalization. Of all the factors emergent in the study, the economic factor was the most cited cause of youth radicalization by those interviewed. These findings are in agreement with those of Osman (2014) who observed that youth unemployment lead youths to aggressiveness and extremism.

The study revealed the reasons why economic factors influence youth radicalization. Most of the youths cited unemployment among the youths coupled with lack of equal opportunities and general poverty in Garissa County among the youths. With this as the burning issue among the youths, they end up seeking for alternatives including youth radicalization wherein they were guaranteed jobs, income and at least making of a living. Kumssa and Jones (2014) in their study established that most youths were influenced to youth radicalization activities which are intertwined with false economic incentives,

The study concurred with Roz and Joanne (2010) and UNESCO (2016) who established that income disparity, inequality in resource allocation and unequal resource distribution among the youths generally influenced youth radicalization. However, the youths in Garissa felt to be more alienated and marginalized in
comparison to the other youths in the country. To address these said inequities in income, economic resources and economic justice, Kumssa and Jones (2014) agreed with the study that, the youths in the region felt that through radicalization they can achieve equity by fighting for their rights.

The Garissa Town Business Community leaders observed that the economic dominance by specific tribes or groups in the country has led to skewed economic development and non-proportionate infrastructural growth in the country leading to skewed job creation affecting some areas like; Garissa, Wajir and Mandera Counties. On the other hand, the study found and concurred with findings of Yasin (2014) that the Garissa County’s economic resources were exploited by the national government in terms of extraction of raw materials, collection of taxes, usage of the land in infrastructural development yet the returns were siphoned to other regions. These findings were in agreement with NCEC report (2015) which cited that poor infrastructural development in the region as a trigger of youth radicalization.

In economic dimensions, the Garissa town area Chief concurred with other studies like those of Onuoha (2014) that through economic and financial incentives given to recruits by the enlisters of the radicalized groups, youth radicalization was growing at an alarming rate. The study realized that the current government was insensitive to or suppressed youth empowerment and provision of means of resource exploitation through building of industries like dairy products, meat processing, tan processing and extraction of minerals among other ventures.

Lastly, Garissa Town Ijara Community leaders observed that the advancements in technology and availability of unlimited internet have led to the upsurge of social media groups and usage of internet to spread the activities of youth radicalization.
With telecommunication gadgets like smart phones, I-pads, laptops, computers and communication networks like Safaricom, Airtel and Telkom, the youths are able to access and connect with everybody in the world including radicalized groups. The study agrees with Samuel and Wilson (2014) and Woodring (2014) that the technological advancements offered to youth lures them into youth radicalization.

4.3.7 Peer Influence on Youth Radicalization

Concerning the factor whether peer influence is related to youth radicalization, results in Table 3 show that 64.1% of the respondents agreed while 27.5% disagreed that peer influence affected youth radicalization. The results also indicated that 8.5% of the respondents were not sure whether peer influence affected youth radicalization. The research also established the ways in which peer influence and youth radicalization were linked. As noted earlier under the social factors, among the youths, the use of social media especially the formation of social groups in Whatsapp and Facebook media platforms were found to increase the spread of youth radicalization. The Hulugho Community leaders cited that youths easily influenced one another especially in schools and other learning institutions when they would share their perceived tribulations, injustices, the success of other youths who have been radicalized and their anticipated exploits and fortunes. Such influences easily lure some youths into joining the youth radicalization programmes.

Peer influence in prisons was also adversely mentioned by the Hulugho Community leaders where they cited that, “most inmates are enticed and easily lured to join radicalized groups to make a living especially after leaving prisons”. They further observed that youth radicalization activities like recruitment, training and learning, ideological insinuations and planning for hijacks and blackmails are also said to be masterminded by inmates in prisons then conveyed to the bases of youth
radicalization. Samuel and Wilson (2014) in their study on how the internet has shaped international terrorism also realized that peer influence was detrimental in youth radicalization and terror activities.

4.3.8 Foreigners Influence on Youth Radicalization

Results in Table 3 also indicate that a majority of the respondents (66.9%) agreed while a minority of the respondents (23.2%) disagreed that foreigners had influence on youth radicalization. It was however noted that 9.9% of the respondents were not sure whether there was foreign influence on youth radicalization. Therefore, it can be concluded that majority of Garissa County people agreed that there is foreign influence on youth radicalization.

The majority of the youths also highlighted some ways in which youths are radicalized by foreigners. First, they fund youth radicalization activities. The foreign organizations like ISIS, Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab and ISIL provide funds that enable the indigenous terror and radicalized groups to run their activities. Secondly, the foreign organizations provide learning, training and capacity development on youth radicalization group leaders so as to extend their activities. As a result, this influences the propagation and spread of youth radicalization. Similarly, Samuel and Wilson (2014) cited that foreign organization reach out the youths through internet and offer them training on terror activities.

Thirdly, the Garissa County Commissioner of suggested that the youths can be radicalized by foreigners by being provided with technical assistance such as military training, fiscal support and supporting the local terror groups with weapons, armouries, logistical facilities and services. Fourthly, Garissa County ACC said that
foreign radicalized groups mastermind all terror activities but use locals to actuate their plans while others help in provision of incentives and promises.

Finally, some study respondents cited that foreign influence on youth radicalization by misleading the youths by giving them false teachings and false ideologies about the Quran. In this regard, the study concludes in agreement with OSCE (2014) that foreign organizations have a great influence on youth radicalization in aspects like financing, recruitment and training.

4.4 The Relationship between Youth Radicalization and Islamic Jihadist Beliefs

The research also sought to investigate the relationship between youth radicalization process and the global Islamic jihadist beliefs. In doing so, the study objectively sought to answer the research question: “Is there a relationship between radicalization process and the global Islamic jihadist beliefs that affect Garissa County, Kenya?”

The responses on the relationship between Islamic Jihadist beliefs and youth radicalization are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Frequency Distribution of Islamic Jihadist Beliefs with respect to Youth Radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Statement</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether there are Islamic fundamental beliefs on Jihad</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether Islamic fundamental beliefs influence politics of a nation</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether general Islamic fundamental beliefs influence youth radicalization</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from own fieldwork data
Results in Table 4 indicate that a majority of respondents (55.6%) agreed while a minority (28.9%) did not agree that there are Islamic fundamental beliefs on Jihad. The results also indicate that 15.5% were not sure of Islamic fundamental beliefs on Jihad. The respondents gave some opinions on jihad and Islamic fundamental beliefs on Jihad. Majority of the youths commonly explained Jihad as an Islamic belief in which a person lives in submission to the cause of their creator; or as sacrificing one’s life for God; or as willingness of an individual to die for the sake of God. These opinions concur with those of Abdalla (2007) who cites that Islamic teachings are for the benefit of restoring the relationship between the creator and his creation. The minority group of youths explained Jihad as fighting with non-muslims by protecting the religion of Islam; or a struggle or fight against non-Islamic beliefs or enemies of Islam; or the war between Muslims and non-Muslims. Menkhaus (2013) has contrary observations in his study that Jihad is not a fight between people of different faiths but rather voluntary submission of a person to serve God according to Islamic teachings.

Concerning whether Islamic fundamental beliefs influence politics of a nation, the majority of the respondents (59.2%) disagreed, the minority (16.2%) agreed while the remainder (24.6%) was not sure whether Islamic fundamental beliefs influence politics of a nation. Conversely, Christmann (2012) in her study on preventing religious radicalization and violent extremism did found that some fundamental Islamic beliefs influenced politics of most Arab countries in Asia and Africa.

Majority of the youths were of the opinion that Islamic fundamental beliefs influence politics suggested some ways in which this is possible. First, it is through the wrong interpretation of Islamic knowledge or provisions on governance which are in turn used by terror groups to terrorize people. Habeck (2010) and Wise (2011) similarly
observed that there is no provision in Islam calling for Islamic dominance in the world as misinterpreted by terrorists. Woodring (2014) also found that misinterpretation of Jihad beliefs influenced the radicalization of youths in many parts of the world. Secondly, the Garissa SUPKEM leaders felt that waging of war against non-Islamic practices would really influence politics of a region. Thirdly, when voting, the Muslim religious leaders advise their followers to vote for those who share with them the same beliefs.

The Garissa County ACC observed that youths were misled by some senior Islamic Sheikhs and Imams who support Jihadists that there will be a better after life. On contrary, other respondents observed that Islamic fundamental beliefs influence politics when appointing of officers in government where preference is given to a fellow Muslim in place of another religion, hence, there is discrimination based on religion. The Garissa County ACC in agreement with the findings of Hendel (2015) quoted that, “Islamic fundamental beliefs also influence politics as practiced when youths are disallowed in leadership and politics. The influence is also experienced when Sheikhs and Imams have an upper hand in advising their believers on who to elect in elective politics hence discriminating against the youth”. Finally, the study established that some Islamic teachings and fundamental beliefs provide ideologies upon which leadership practices are based on, hence, influencing the politics of a region, an observation that Hendel (2015) also affirms in his study.

On the influence of Islamic fundamental beliefs on youth radicalization, the results in Table 4 indicate that 52.1% of youths disagreed that general Islamic fundamental beliefs had influence on youth radicalization while 38.7% of youths agreed that the general Islamic fundamental beliefs have influence on youth radicalization. The research also found 9.2% of the youths to be unsure that general Islamic fundamental
beliefs had influence on youth radicalization. However, when asked about whether Islamic Jihad influences youth radicalization, majority of respondents (44.4%) agreed while 41.5% of youths did not agree that Islamic Jihad influence youth radicalization. The remaining 14.1% of youths were not sure that Islamic Jihad has influence on youth radicalization. These findings concur with the study of Berman (2009) who concluded that Islamic Jihad beliefs have no influence on youth radicalization realized similar results.

The youths further named and explained some of the Islamic fundamental beliefs including jihad that influence youth radicalization. First, some revealed that spiritual leaders give incentives to youths to join youth radicalization. Secondly, youths said that religious radicalization was conducted by false prophets and teachers of Islam religion. Habeck (2010) also alludes that false prophets and some religious leaders wrongly inform their followers on Islamic teachings leading to religious radicalization. Thirdly, they reported abuse of religion through extremism for gaining political expediency. Fourthly, youths reported that there are those who are always repulsive to any bad talk against Muslim fundamental beliefs or talking bad or filthily about the Quran and infighting between religious groups like Muslims against Christians, an observation also made by Menkhaus (2013).

The Garissa Town Mosque Imam in responding to whether Islamic fundamental beliefs including jihad influenced youth radicalization, pointed out that, “there were divisions among youths based on religious beliefs based on extremism which can result to youth radicalization”. In this regard the study agrees with Berman (2009) that Fundamental Islamic teachings have no influence on youth radicalization.
4.5 The Socio-Economic Effects of Youth Radicalization on People’s Livelihoods

This section presents the results and findings on the social, political and economic impacts of youth radicalization.

4.5.1 The Social Effects of Youth Radicalization

The study found that youth radicalization had various social impacts; for instance, some respondents indicated that radicalized groups’ agents used and involved youths in conflicts and war as well as in youth radicalization resulting to deprivation of the youths of their education rights, and loss of lives. Other respondents suggested that youth radicalization has led to continued recruitment of youths from schools, colleges and universities leading to decline in the number of students from Garissa County in the learning institutions. Concurrently, other respondents said that due to terror effects occasioned by youth radicalization, enrolment in schools had deteriorated.

Some youth respondents associated youth radicalization with fear of the unknown among citizens living whereby residents live in perpetual fear of terror attacks; hence, they are always psychologically unsettled. The Ijara Community leaders cited that youth radicalization would cause hatred and misunderstanding among families, clans and tribes in cases where some clans and families are pro-youth radicalization while others are anti-youth radicalization.

The study also found that youth radicalization led to extensive use of internet and social media in recruitment of youths, in turn, this lead to increased spread of youth radicalization, evolution of youth radicalization into a dynamic technological process, organized attacks and change of training locations. The Garissa Town Mosque religious leaders commented that, “parents are traumatized and affected psychologically once their children join youth radicalization”. The Hulugho
community leaders said that youth radicalization causes sensitive camouflaging and hiding of essential information concerning the whereabouts of the youth since the youths manage their own intelligence and shy away from security authorities. Lastly, youth radicalization has led to violation of cultural practices, traditional standards and religious beliefs.

From the interviews, the County Director of Education and the Chief Education Officers elucidated some social effects of youth radicalization. First, there were massive transfer and exodus of teachers (the CDE recoded 1300 teachers transferred) especially after the 2015 GUC attack. These massive exodus and transfers led understaffing of all schools in the county with some schools having only one TSC teacher. For instance, Hammpy primary school in Dadaab has more than 400 pupils served by only one TSC teacher. Secondly, there were massive retrenchments and mass movement of some university staff from the university especially after the departure of university students. This resulted to the decline in multi-diversity and multicultural integration in the GUC and Garissa town. The transfer of university students to other universities and campuses greatly affected their social cycles and integration.

Thirdly, the GUC Chief Security Officer observed that parallel university programmes at GUC declined following the withdrawal of most of the students in the programme. This eventually lowered learner enrolment leading to poor education standards in the University and Garissa County as a whole. Fourthly, The Garissa CDE quoted that, “problems were experienced in administration of Kenya National Examination Council (KNEC) examinations with some schools requiring more than 10 police officers to offer security in one examination centre instead of at least one
police officer as in other places”. The CDE also said that some examination centres lacked invigilators while, in others, students felt insecure hence getting traumatized. Finally, the monitoring of education programmes was greatly hampered especially in Dadaab, Huluqho and Fafi sub-Counties due to insecurity concerns. This resulted to employment of untrained teachers by Board of Managements (BoMs) to assist in learning institutions which also led to poor quality of education and parents paying more for teachers. Another result was higher levels of school drop outs, higher levels of illiteracy, increased levels of child labour and early marriages. Domestic violence was also said to be on the rise due to effects of youth radicalization.

Concerning other social impacts of youth radicalization, the Garissa Town Location Chief opined that, “youth radicalization propels inter-tribal conflicts resulting into increased tribalism, poor community interactions and political instability”. He also observed that youth radicalization led to the weakening political institutions in some communities and increased inter-regional conflicts.

“Youth radicalization was also immense with uprising of groups calling for reforms, weakening of the local administration, compromising of security by militia groups, uprising of anti-government programmes, fighting of administration and political leaders, and spreading of illegal arms” said the Garissa County ACC. All these weakened the political and administration structures of Garissa County. Abdikadir (2015) also noted that Security structures in North Eastern region was weakened by the uprising radicalized terror groups in the region.

The study also found from the Garissa Group of Activists that suspicion and wars were on the rise. Also noted were anti-corporate citizenry, disintegration of the communities, extremism for protection and extrajudicial killings. Another problem
realized was lack of leaders with practical skills and insights on tackling conflicts which also was counteractive.

Finally, from the interviews, the Garissa County Commissioner and his administrative officers observed that lack of peace, security and stability in the county, led to continued establishment of curfews that stifled economic development and business growth. The other effect was massive exodus of civil servants especially teachers, health and medical workers, and security officers from Garissa County. There was also loss of lives especially of security personnel, youths and university students. They also said that some civil servants shied away from administration duties and security duties due to the insecurity involved. This led to resignation of some civil servants as well as unwillingness and withdrawals from service. Lastly, the interviewees noted other political effects of youth radicalization as stalling of government projects, poor communication, insecurity, lack of government services and isolation of some communities led to stigmatization and discrimination of some communities. Concerning social impacts of youth radicalization the study is in agreement with UNHCR (2011) has detrimental social impacts especially in education of children.

4.5.2 The Economic Impacts of Youth Radicalization on People’s Livelihoods

Some youths felt that youth radicalization was a source of workforce wherein they could be employed in militia groups to provide services and earn an income. On the contrary, some respondents said that youth radicalization had led to loss of jobs due to an insecure economic environment. Others felt that youth radicalization would lead to terrorist activities that result in destruction of property and closure of businesses.
Some youth radicalization activities lead to economic sabotage through blackmalls, hijackings and terrorism thereby stagnating economic development. Other youth respondents revealed that youth radicalization would augment land conflicts, scramble for economic resources, lack of business growth and eventual business decline and loss of manpower. These findings are in agreement with Hogan and Braddlock (2013) who noted that youth radicalization slowed down economic activities of a region.

The study established that youth radicalization led to stalling of government projects, slower infrastructural development, poor communication and reduced government services due to insecurity resulting into great loss of economic opportunities that would develop Garissa County. The Garissa CDE argued that whenever a youth finishes school and he/she joins youth radicalization it would be seen as a loss of resources from a family as well as a depriving effect on social security of the aged and parents due to lack of youths to take care of them. The Garissa University Chief Security Officer cited that, “radicalization activities led to the closure of university for a period of more than 18 months which in turn prompted closure of some businesses near the university hence lowering performance of the economy in the region”. Similar sentiments were observed by Institute of Security Studies (2014).

The Garissa County Commissioner attributed a number of negative economic outcomes to radicalization activities in Garissa: transfer and exodus of teachers, massive retrenchments at Garissa University especially after departure of university students, moving out of some university staff and loss of life reduced the economic drivers and commodity consumers which lead to slowdown of both social and economic activities in the County. Other people interviewed suggested that some parents counted as a loss, the investment they put during the parenting of the children
who end up joining youth radicalization which leads to increased poverty and loss of lives. Therefore, the study agrees with UNHCR (2011) that youth radicalization has adverse economic impacts on the peoples livelihoods.

4.6 The Government’s Involvement Programmes in Youth De-radicalization

The government’s involvement in youth de-radicalization can be explained in three dimensions: sensitization on youth radicalization and its effects, beefing up security and empowerment of the youths.

4.6.1 Sensitization of Youth on Radicalization and its Effects

The Garissa County Commissioner noted the national government’s interventions in ensuring youth de-radicalization. Through carrying out systematic studies on social background on human groups focusing on the influence of social relationships on youth radicalization, the government has ensured social competence in the learners in the sense that it makes learners responsible future citizens. Through provision of training and proper education, the government is envisioned to curb youth radicalization. Through policy makers, the government is contributing positively on personalities by giving desirable qualities of a good citizen.

The Islam religious leaders opined that, “the government has offered de-radicalizing trainings, youth development programmes, sensitizations in Madrasas, mosques, churches and schools on the adverse effects of youth radicalization, creation of rehabilitation centres for those who have been de-radicalized, and preaching and giving knowledge through TVs and radio programmes towards reducing the rampant spread of youth radicalization”. Duffy (2015) agrees with this study that most governments including Kenya have legislated programmes that help in youth de-radicalization.
The Assistant County Commissioner said, “The national government through the County Commissioner’s office offered government programmes that sensitize youths and the whole community on the negativity of youth radicalization.” The GUC Administrator also added that, “the national government offers mentorship programmes on the need to respect human life and on business entrepreneurship coupled with tournaments and societal activities that promote peace, love and harmony, and enhancing security and stability in any society”. The government also offers peace meetings through partnership with NGOs in having programmes addressing youth radicalization namely the causes, effects and ways of ending the practice. There are also follow up meetings with university students offering them guidance and counselling especially after the 2015 GUC attack.

4.6.2 Beefing up Security in the Region

On security matters, Ijara Community leaders said that, “the government has established peace initiatives among communities through peace building, sensitization of the youth on peace, setting up of security policies like Nyumba Kumi initiatives, house-to-house campaigns, and having registers and tracking records”. The government involvement is seen also through warnings against youth radicalization and its dire consequences, giving amnesty and pardon to the already radicalized youths and provision of efficient anti radicalization programmes.

From the interviews, the Senior Assistant County Commissioner (SACC) and Assistant County Commissioner (ACC) pointed out some government programmes: Community Policing, Nyumba Kumi Initiative, Jua Jirani Yako programme that has register and tracking records of all members in a given village. The establishment of peace committees up to village level leading to volunteering information about youth
radicalization and security threats to the local administration was another government programme. All these programmes were found to be fruitful in security administration in Garissa County. These findings are in agreement with Institute for security studies (2014) which noted that security structures in any government should devolved until village level to enhance national security.

The SACC and ACC also indicated that the government was also involved in internalization of job opportunities, where the local community citizens were considered when assigning government administrators in the region. For instance, the government has designated representation of the local communities in the appointments of the Ministry of Internal Security, Regional Coordinator (RC), the County Commissioner (CC), some Deputy County Commissioners (DCCs), Regional Police Commander, Regional Administration Police Commandant in Northern Eastern region and Garissa County which has instilled confidence in the local people, making the community more confident, cooperative, proactive and feeling included when the region’s administration and security sectors are headed by their own people.

Finally, the Garissa Town Business Community leaders observed that government through Public Private Partnerships (PPP) has also sensitively guided, sensitized, counselled and economically boosted the youths. The Garissa County Commissioner said that, “government had introduced national policies on youth radicalization and counter terrorism activities including National Counter Terrorism Committee under National Intelligence Services (NIS), the National Commission on Integration and Cohesion (NCIC) and the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSCPBCM)”. Concerning how government beefs up security
the study agrees with Karacasula (2015) that various governments should have national security policy on youth radicalization and counter terrorism activities.

4.6.3 Empowerment of the Youths

The Senior Assistant County Commissioner cited that “the government is involved in developing youths in terms of capacity building, creating awareness of positive impacts of government programmes and employment of youths through National Youth Service (NYS) programmes like Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) in Garissa County.” World Bank (2016) observes that the government is also involved in job creation and giving out casual jobs to youths through online and internet based jobs as well as ensuring that youths are properly empowered in the learning institutions including youth polytechnics. Abdikadir (2015) suggested that empowerment of youths through education and training as well as job creation and offering them financial assistance will reduce youth involvement in radicalization.

The study established from Garissa Town Business Community leaders that Garissa County like other counties in the North Eastern region had the development agenda of youth empowerment projects to support the Government of Kenya efforts to increase access to youth employment programmes and improving the youth welfare. NCEC (2015) reports that capacity building programmes including seminars and workshops have been done in the North Eastern region and in the Dadaab refugee camps to empower youths with necessary knowledge and skills for their economic growth and development. UNESCO (2015) also cites several youth empowerment programmes like education and training, economic activities awareness, job creation, online platforms of employment as ways through which the Government of Kenya has empowered youths of the region.
The study found that World Bank had organized a three component youth empowerment program for marginalized regions including North Eastern Kenya where Garissa County is found. The first component includes; labour intensive works and social services programmes that improve the economic infrastructure and the social wellbeing of the region (World Bank, 2016). The second component includes the private sector internships programmes that will improve youth employability through empowering them with work experiences, instilling them with technical skills and training them to be self reliance. The study also realized that the world bank rolled out capacity building component and enabled policy development in conjunction with Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports to help in training in arts, sports and other psycho-motor activities. Roz and Joanne (2013) concurs with this study that youths can be empowered socially and economically through education and training, capacity building, sensitization programmes and through employment and job creation.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the summary of the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study. The results obtained from statistical analysis are discussed alongside the information reviewed from the content analysis. The discussion is guided by the study variables as analysed within the conceptual framework and in line with the ethnic hierarchical theory model. The research objectives were considered in this discussion.

5.2 Summary of Main Findings
This section presents the summary of the main findings of the study concerning; socio-demographic factors of respondents, causes of youth radicalization, relationship between radicalization process and Islamic jihadist beliefs, socio-economic effects of youth radicalization process and government’s involvement in youth de-radicalization and youth empowerment activities.

5.2.1 The Causes of Youth Radicalization
This study found that the majority of the study participants agreed that historical injustices in Garissa County had influence on the youths in joining youth radicalization. According to the findings, leadership genealogy and heritage led to empowerment of one family or one clan at the expense of others and such historical injustices would lead to a revolt within the community resulting to youth radicalization. Wilner and Dubouloz, (2010) and Habeck (2010) do concur and conclude that leadership genealogy and heritage significantly confound the problem of historical injustices.
The study also found other haunting historical injustices committed against communities living in the North Eastern region (NEP) of Kenya especially the Wajir massacre in 1984 and Garissa massacre in 1980 that affected the Somali community. The study also found that in early the years of the decade 2000-2010, there were some military recruitment and training activities in the NEP region where some youths were conscripted, trained and then sent to Somali to help in the establishment of Somali Government through military back up. Later, some of these youths became compromised, radicalized and joined the Al Shabaab group.

The study found majority of the respondents felt that cultural and ethnicity differences including norms and beliefs of a society, cultural practices and ownership of community resources like land and cattle would lead to inequalities between communities and families leading to youth aggression which could make them susceptible to youth radicalization. Habeck (2010) agrees with this study as far as the findings that youths from some ethnicities and tribes are more prone to youth radicalization than others due to their cultural and ethnical inclinations are concerned. The study found that more than half of the respondents disagreed that social differences influence youth radicalization in Garissa County. It was worth noting that as a result of lack of proper education with specialized skills and training that would support economic growth led youths to joining the terror and militia groups that require basic education and non-specialization.

The study found that majority of the participants agreed that economic factors influence youth radicalization. The study also established that unemployment among the youths, lack of equal opportunities and general poverty were the burning issues among the youths which make them end up seeking for alternatives like youth
radicalization where they were guaranteed jobs, income and at least a source of earning a living. The study also found that income disparity, inequality in resource allocation and injustices in resource distribution among the youths in the county make the youths to feel alienated and marginalized. These study findings are in agreement with those of Osman (2014).

The study found that more than two thirds of the respondents agreed that peer influence would influence youth radicalization. The research also realized that use of social media especially the formation of social groups through Whatsapp and Facebook media platforms increased the spread of youth radicalization. Otieno (2014) similarly found out that advancement in technology and increased access to unlimited internet, lead to formation of social media groups and usage of internet to spread the activities of youth radicalization.

The research found that majority of the respondents agreed that there is foreign influence on youth radicalization. The study realized that foreigners were involved in youth’s radicalization through; funding of youth radicalization activities, provision of learning, training and capacity development of youth radicalization group leaders. Osman (2014) realized that the youths can be radicalized by foreigners who provide technical assistance, training, financial support, weapons, armouries, logistical facilities and services. Similarly, in this study it was realized that foreign radicalized groups masterminded all terror activities but used locals to actuate their plans while others helped in provision of incentives and promises.
5.2.2 The Relationship between Radicalization Process and Islamic Jihadist Beliefs

This majority of the respondents disagreed that general Islamic fundamental beliefs had influence on youth radicalization. However, the study found that some purported spiritual leaders give incentives to youths to join youth radicalization while others promoted religious radicalization through falsified prophesies and teachings of Islam religion. Otieno (2014) and Pelton (2012) also concur with this study in the sense that the abuse of religion through extremism at the expense of gaining political expediency and infighting between Muslims and Christians were at the centre of fuelling youth radicalization. The study also found that youths were misled by some senior Islamic religious leaders like Sheikhs and Imams who support jihadist ideology that there will be a better after life.

5.2.3 The Socio-Economic Effects of Youth Radicalization on People’s Livelihoods

This study found a number of social impacts of youth radicalization included: deprivation of the youths of their education rights, loss of lives and decline in number of students in the learning institutions, deterioration of school enrolment, fear of terror attacks among residents, psychological unease, and hatred and misunderstanding among families, clans and tribes. Garissa County Government (2017) and Ministry of Education Garissa County (2017) in their reports similarly show that there were massive transfer and exodus of teachers, understaffing of all schools in the county, massive retrenchments and exodus of GU staff, decline in multi-diversity and multicultural integration at the GU and Garissa town, relocation of GU students to other universities and campuses, collapse of parallel university programmes at GU and a decline in the number of students at GU.
The study also found that some youths viewed youth radicalization as a source of gainful employment while some respondents felt that youth radicalization had led to the loss of jobs due to an insecure economic environment. The destruction of property and closure of businesses, economic sabotage through blackmalls, hijacking and terrorism, obstruction of economic development, scrambling for economic resources, lack of business growth and eventual business decline, and loss of manpower were some of the economic effects of youth radicalization realized. This was in agreement with findings of Osman (2014).

5.2.4 The Government’s Involvement in Youth De-radicalization

This study found that through provision of training and proper education the government envisions to curb youth radicalization. The government has notably provided the de-radicalizing trainings, youth development programmes, involvement of Madarasas, mosques, churches and schools in educating the youth on the adverse effects of youth radicalization and creation of rehabilitation centres for those who have been de-radicalized. The government has also provided interventions like capacity building, employment of youths through National Youth Service (NYS) programmes and Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) have also been geared towards curbing youth radicalization in the region.

Lastly, the government through Community Policing, Nyumba Kumi Initiative, Jua Jirani Yako programme have been other government involvement programmes towards reducing youth radicalization. The government’s inclusivity approach in which members of the local communities are considered in appointments of government administrators in the region has also led to instilling confidence in the local people and making them more cooperative, patriotic and feeling recognized. The
government also through national policies on youth radicalization and counter terrorism activities including National Counter Terrorism Committee under National Intelligence Services, the National Commission on Integration and Cohesion and the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management tried to stem the progress of youth radicalization.

5.3 The Conclusions of the Study

This study concludes that historical injustices like Garissa massacre in 1980, Wajir massacre in 1984, patrilinearity and leadership genealogy and heritage injustices, continued intimidation and torture of NEP communities, and military recruitment and training activities in the NEP region in support of Somali government had adversely influenced the youths into joining youth radicalization. Concerning cultural and ethnicity differences, the study concludes that some ethnicities and tribes are more prone to youth radicalization than others due to their cultural and ethnical inclinations. It was also worth noting that some cultural practices, taboos and abominations like spying a tribesman in the Somali community encourage and increase the spread of youth radicalization.

Concerning social differences, the study concluded that poor quality education, lack of social opportunities, lack specialized education and training would render the youths in joining the terror and militia groups that requires basic and non-specialized education. On economic factors, unemployment among the youths, lack of equal opportunities and general poverty were burning issues among the youths which made them end up seeking for alternatives like youth radicalization. Peer influence and foreign influence were other factors that led the youths into joining youth radicalization.
The study also concluded that the falsified prophesies and teachings of Islam religion against other religious beliefs, the wrong explanation of Jihad as the struggle or fight against non-Islamic beliefs or enemies of Islam as well as the description of Jihad as a pre-historical war between Islamic and Christianity divergent practices were found to indirectly influence youth radicalization.

The study also concluded that youth radicalization had both social and economic effects on people’s livelihoods. The massive migrations in form of transfers of civil servants, resignations, retrenchments and relocation and dropping out of students as well as low education standards in the county due to poor quality of education, low enrolments, dropouts and lack of qualified teaching staff in Garissa County were socio-economic effects of youth radicalization. The study also concluded that loss of jobs due to insecure economic environment, destruction of property, business closures, economic sabotage, obstruction of economic development, scrambling for economic resources, lack of business growth and eventual business decline and loss of manpower were some of the economic effects of youth radicalization.

Concerning the government involvement programmes, the study concluded that through a number of interventions: de-radicalizing trainings and proper education, youth development programmes, creation of rehabilitation centres, partnership with NGOs, follow up meetings, warnings against youth radicalization and giving amnesty and pardoning, the government was able to reduce and curb some activities on youth radicalization. The study also concluded that by offering employment of youths through the National Youth Service (NYS) programmes and Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV), the government was able to engage the youths in economic productivity thus cushioning them from enticements offered by recruiters of youth radicalization. The
study also noted that through security initiatives like Community Policing, Nyumba Kumi Initiative, Jua Jirani Yako programme, consideration of the local community citizens when assigning government administrators and through national policies on youth de-radicalization and counter terrorism activities the government was able to address emerging security issues due to youth radicalization.

5.4 Recommendations of the Study

This study recommends that poor quality education, lack of social opportunities, lack of specialized education and training that make the youths susceptible to join youth radicalization require to be keenly addressed by both national and county governments. The study suggests that both governments should invest more on the youths especially in providing them with quality and specialized education and training that would make the youths of the region marketable and self reliant. The study also recommends the need to check on the spread of falsified prophesies and teachings of Islam religion against other religious beliefs. Similarly, the study also suggests that awareness campaigns should be done to give the right explanation of Jihad as the spiritual fight against evil or as a practice of upholding the moral teachings of Quran.

Concerning the economic influence, the study recommends that economic development agenda should be steered in the region especially by county governments so as to create economic opportunities, employment opportunities and provide infrastructure that will enable beneficial exploitation of the economic resources in the county. The national government should also intensify security in the region to spur commercial activities and business growth. Finally, the study recommends that both the national and county governments should offer more
attractive programmes in de-radicalizing trainings, youth development programmes, rehabilitation programmes, and follow up meetings towards the youths who have been affected by radicalization.

5.5 Areas for Further Studies

This study suggests that there is need for further research on youth radicalization in terms of trends and activities in cyber based youth radicalization in Kenya especially in the Coastal region. The study also recommends further research on the psycho-social effects of youth radicalization and its influence on modern migration of persons within North Eastern and Coastal regions of Kenya. Finally, there is need for further research on influence of Covid-19 pandemic effects on youth radicalization and its impacts on people’s livelihoods in North Eastern and Coastal regions of Kenya.
REFERENCES


American Broadcasting Channel; ABCNews (2001). Al-Qaida in Somalia: Myth or Reality?


http://search.proquest.com/docview/1527109139?accountid=10246


APPENDICES

Appendix I: Map of Garissa County

Source: Society for International Development (SID)
Appendix II: Questionnaires for the Youths

Introduction
This study is aimed at analyzing the causes and consequences of involvement of youths in youth radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya. I will be grateful if you answer the questions below to help me achieve the objectives of this research. There is no right or wrong answer in these questions, only that I am interested in your personal experience and opinion. The confidentiality and anonymity of your information is guaranteed. If you agree to participate, please read the instructions below and proceed with answering the questions.

Instructions
Please respond to the questions as accurately and as honestly as possible. In cases where you are provided with options, tick (√) the most appropriate option which applies to you. In cases where you are asked an open question, provide the most appropriate answer(s) in the space provided.

SECTION A: Demographic data

1. What is your age bracket in years?
   15-20 [ ]  21-30 [ ]  31-40 [ ]  41-50 [ ]  51+ [ ]

2. What is your highest level of education that you attained?
   Primary incomplete [ ] Primary [ ] Secondary [ ] Tertiary college [ ]
   University [ ]

3. What is your sex?
   Male [ ]  Female [ ]

4. What is your religion?
   Christian [ ]  Muslim [ ]  Others [ ]

5. If “Others” in Question 4, please, state the religion
   _______________________________________________________________

What is you occupation or which economic activity are you normally engaged in?
   Office work [ ]  Business [ ]  Farming [ ]  Pastoralist [ ] Others [ ]

6. If “Others” in Question 6, please, state the religion
   _______________________________________________________________
7. What is your ethnicity?
_____________________________________________________________

8. Where were you born?
_____________________________________________________________

9. Where are you currently living?
_____________________________________________________________

10. Before you started living here, where did you originally come or migrate from?
_____________________________________________________________

11. Which languages do you speak or use in communicating?
English [   ]  Kiswahili [  ]  Somali [  ]  Arabic [  ]  Others [  ]

12. If “Others” in Question 12, please, state the religion
_____________________________________________________________

13. Are you proficient in speaking these languages?
Yes [   ]  No [   ]  Not Sure [   ]

14. What is your average level of income in Ksh. per month?
0-5000 [  ]  5001-15000 [  ]  15001-25000 [  ]  25001-35000 [  ]
35001-50000 [  ]  50000+ [   ]

15. Are you an urbanite or rural dweller?
Yes [   ]  No [   ]  Both [   ]

SECTION B: The reasons why youths join radicalization process and the terror and militia groups

1. Have you ever heard or experienced or witnessed youth radicalization and terror groups?
Yes [   ]  No [   ]
2. If yes, how are the youths involved in youth radicalization and terror groups?
_____________________________________________________________

3. What are the current trends involved in youth radicalization and terror groups?
_____________________________________________________________
4. In your own opinion, what do you perceive to be the causes of youth radicalization?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

5. What do you perceive to be the reasons for the youth involvement in terror groups?

________________________________________________________________________

SECTION C: The relationship between radicalization process and the global Islamic jihadist beliefs

1. What do you understand about Jihad?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

2. Are there Islamic fundamental beliefs on Jihad?
   Yes [    ]       No [    ]       Not Sure [    ]

3. If yes, please may you name some of these fundamental beliefs?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

4. AGAIN if yes in Question 2, please may you explain some of these fundamental beliefs?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

5. Do you think Islamic fundamental beliefs influence youth radicalization and terror groups?
   Yes [    ]       No [    ]       Not Sure [    ]

6. If yes, please explain how Islamic fundamental beliefs influence youth radicalization and terror groups?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
7. Do you think Islamic Jihad influence youth radicalization and terror groups?
   Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Sure [ ]
8. If yes, please explain how?
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

SECTION D: The influence of socio and economic factors on the youth radicalization process

1. Do you think Historical injustices are related to youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
   Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Sure [ ]
2. If yes, please explain how Historical injustices influence youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

3. Do you think cultural and ethnicity differences influence youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
   Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Sure [ ]
4. If yes, please explain how cultural and ethnicity differences influence youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

5. Do you think dispositional factors like patrilinearity and genealogy factors are related to youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
   Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Sure [ ]
6. If yes, please explain how patrilinearity and genealogy factors influence youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
7. Do you think social differences have influence on youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
   Yes [  ]   No [  ]   Not Sure [  ]
8. If yes, please may you explain how social differences influence youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
   _______________________________________________________________
   _______________________________________________________________
   _______________________________________________________________
9. Do you think economic factors influence youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
   Yes [  ]   No [  ]   Not Sure [  ]
10. If yes, please may you explain how economic factors influence youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
    _______________________________________________________________
    _______________________________________________________________
    _______________________________________________________________
11. Do you think peer influence is related to youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
    Yes [  ]   No [  ]   Not Sure [  ]
12. If yes, please may you explain how peer influence is related to youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
    _______________________________________________________________
    _______________________________________________________________
    _______________________________________________________________
13. Have you heard of foreign involvement in youth radicalization?
    Yes [  ]   No [  ]   Not Sure [  ]
14. If yes, please may you explain how foreigners are involved in youth radicalization activities?
    _______________________________________________________________
    _______________________________________________________________
    _______________________________________________________________
SECTION E: The socio-economic effects of youth radicalization process

1. How are youths involved in war and conflict?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

2. Is youth radicalization and terrorism groups immense or spatial in your area?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

3. How do you assess/describe the youth radicalization among the youths in your area?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

4. What are some of the social impacts of youth radicalization?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

5. What are some of the political impacts of youth radicalization?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

6. What are some of the economic impacts of youth radicalization?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

SECTION F: The government’s involvement/engagement programmes in youth de-radicalization

1. Have you heard of government involvement in youth radicalization?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
2. If yes, please may you name the areas that the government is involved in youth de-radicalization?

_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________

3. AGAIN if yes in Question 1, please may you explain how the government is involved in youth radicalization and terrorism groups?

_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________

4. In your own opinion, do you think the government’s involvement in de-radicalization has impacts?

_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________

5. If yes, please may you name the negative impacts of government involvements in youth de-radicalization?

_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________

6. AGAIN if yes in Question 4, please may you name the positive impacts of government’s involvement in youth de-radicalization?

_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________

7. Have policy makers and opinion leaders tried to get involved in youth radicalization and terror groups?

_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________

8. If yes, please name or explain the ways that they have been involved?

_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
Appendix III: Interview Schedule

1. In your own opinion, what do you think is the Governments’ position on the relationship between youth radicalization, terror groups and religion?

2. What is the Governments’ opinion on the relationship between youth radicalization and terrorism groups and patriarchal factors?

3. What is the Governments’ position on the relationship between youth radicalization and terrorism groups and genealogy?

4. What is the Governments’ position on the relationship between youth radicalization and terrorism groups and economic status?

5. What is the Governments’ position on the relationship between youth radicalization and terrorism groups and social class?

6. What is the Governments’ position on the relationship between youth radicalization and terrorism groups and culture?

7. What is the Governments’ position on the relationship between youth radicalization and terrorism groups and foreign involvement?

8. Do you think government’s involvement in conflict resolution and resettlement has succeeded or failed?

9. Please explain your response in Question 8 above.

10. In your own opinion, what do you think should be done by the government about youth radicalization and terrorism groups?
Appendix IV: Research Consent by Kenyatta University

KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke
Website: www.ku.ac.ke

Our Ref: C50/27638/2013

DATE: 27th September, 2017

Director General,
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation
P.O. Box 30623-00100,
NAIROBI

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FOR DAHIR MOHAMED BURALE – REG. NO. C50/27638/2013

I write to introduce Mr. Dahir Mohamed Burale who is a Postgraduate Student of this University. He is registered for M.A degree programme in the Department of Geography.

Mr. Burale intends to conduct research for an M.A Proposal entitled, “Causes and Consequences of Youth Radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya”.

Any assistance given will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

MRS. LUCY N. MBAABU
FOR: DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL
Appendix V: Research Permit by NACOSTI

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: 020 400 7000, 0713 788787; 075404245
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke

NACOSTI, Upper Kabete
Off Waiyaki Way
P.O. Box 50629-00100
NAIROBI-KEN

Ref: No NACOSTI/P/17/47829/19468

Date: 10th October, 2017

Dahir Mohamed Burale
Kenyatta University
P.O Box 43844-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on “Causes and consequences of youth radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya,” I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in Garissa County for the period ending 9th October, 2018.

You are advised to report to the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Garissa County before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit a copy of the final research report to the Commission within one year of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Garissa County.

The County Director of Education
Garissa County.
CONDITIONS

1. The License is valid for the proposed research, research site specified period.
2. Both the Licence and any rights thereunder are non-transferable.
3. Upon request of the Commission, the Licensee shall submit a progress report.
4. The Licensee shall report to the County Director of Education and County Governor in the area of research before commencement of the research.
5. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further permissions from relevant Government agencies.
6. This Licence does not give authority to transfer research materials.
7. The Licensee shall submit two (2) hard copies and upload a soft copy of their final report.
8. The Commission reserves the right to modify the conditions of this Licence including its cancellation without prior notice.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. DAHIR MOHAMED BURALE
of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 66329-800
Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct research in Garissa County

on the topic: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF YOUTH
RADICALIZATION IN GARISSA COUNTY, KENYA

for the period ending:
9th October, 2018

Applicant's Signature

Permit No: NACOSTI/P/17/47829/19468
Date Of Issue: 10th October, 2017
Fee Received: Ksh 1000

Director General
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation
Appendix VI: Research Authorization by Ministry of Interior and National Coordination

THE PRESIDENCY

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR & CO-ORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Telegram: “COUNTY” GARISSA.
Telephone: Garissa
cogacounty@gmail.com

OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER
P.O BOX 1-70100
GARISSA COUNTY

When replying please quote
REF.NO: CC/EDU/73/75

Dahir Mohamed Burale
Kenyatta University
P. O. Box 43844-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Refer to your letter Ref. No.NACOSTI/P/17/47829/19468 dated 10th October, 2017 from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation on application for authority to carry out research on "Causes and consequences of youth radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya" for the period ending 9th October, 2018.

I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake your research in Gariisa County.

Ruth N. Mbuli
For: County Commissioner
GARISSA COUNTY.

COUNTY COMMISSIONER GARISSA
P. O. Box 1-70100,
Email:xco.gariscounty@gmail.com

23 October, 2017
Appendix VII: Consent letter by the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND CO-ORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
STATE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND CITIZEN SERVICES

Telegrams: "COUNTY" GARISSA.
Telephones: Garissa
cegsacounty@gmail.com

When replying please quote

OFFICE OF THE
COUNTY COMMISSIONER
P.O BOX 1-70100
GARISSA

16th September 2020

Dahir Mohamed Barale
Kenyatta University
P.O Box 43844-00100
NAIROBI

RESEARCH (RESULT) CONSENT

Refer to our letter Ref No. CC/EDU/7/3/(75), dated 23rd October, 2017 for an authorization to carry out a research on “Causes and consequences of youth radicalization in Garissa County”.

We are pleased to inform you that you have been authorized and given the consent for your research outcome.

E.C. LELGO
For: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
GARISSA COUNTY

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Appendix VIII: Authorization letter by County Director of Education Garissa County

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
STATE DEPARTMENT OF EARLY LEARNING AND BASIC EDUCATION

DAHIR MOHAMED BURALE
KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Refer to your letter Ref. No. NACOST1/P/17/47829/19468 dated 25th October, 2017 from Director General/CDE on application for authority to carry out research on “Causes and consequences of youth radicalization, in Garissa county”, for the period ending 9th October, 2018.

We are pleased to inform you that you have been authorised and given consent for your research outcome.

KHALIF I. HASSAN
COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION
GARISSA.
Appendix IX: letter from Garissa University College

GARISSA UNIVERSITY
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

17th September, 2020

DAHIR MOHAMED BURALE
KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
P.O. BOX 43844-00100

RE: RESEARCH (RESULT) CONSENT

Referring to your letter from the Director General, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation Ref. NACOSTI/P/17/47829/19468 dated 10th October, 2017 and your letter from Garissa County Commissioner Ref. CC/EDU/73/ (75) dated 23rd October, 2017 on authorization to conduct research on “Causes and Consequences of Youth Radicalization in Garissa County, Kenya” for the period ending 9th October, 2018, I am pleased to inform you that you have been given consent for your research outcome.

Best regards,

[Signature]

DR. PETER MUINDU
(DIRECTOR: RESEARCH & POSTGRADUATE STUDIES)