

**AMISOM TROOPS' INFLUENCE ON PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS IN
DHOBLEY DISTRICT, CENTAL REGION, SOMALIA**

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DECLARATION

Declaration by Candidate

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for examination in any other University or any other institution of higher learning.

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Declaration by the University Supervisor

I confirm that the work in this project was done by the candidate under my supervision as the University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my valued family; my wife Jane Hana, sons Winter and Patton and daughter-Ashley-Ina, whose patience and support in every aspect of my life have led to the successful completion of this research project.

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OPERATIONAL DEFINATION OF KEY TERMS

Peace Keeping-A technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements.

Peace Enforcement- Application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international agreements.

Peace Making-Include measures to address conflicts in the progress and involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.

Peace Building- This is a nonviolent ways of solving the cultural and structural conditions precipitates a violent destructive conflict.

Command and Control-The authority given to military officer to prioritize, harmonise, coordinate and issue instructions to each and every individual contributing towards stabilisation of Somalia. These individuals include all civilians and military personnel of all organisations, NGOs, UN agencies and contractors.

Mission Resource Support- All types of support needed by civilian and military personnel working towards stabilization of Somalia. The support include; Finance, Personnel, equipment, air assets, sea assets, electronic assets, media assets, demining equipments and jammers.

AMISOM Mandate. Duties given to civilian and military personnel supporting stabilization efforts in Somalia by African Union or United Nations.

Mission mandate gaps- Important duties that are not given to either civilian or military personnel to perform by African Union or United Nations yet they are critical towards stabilization efforts.

Capacity gaps- Lack of capability, weaknesses, shortfalls, inadequacy, in experience.

Private - Lowest rank in the military.

Junior Commander- A military person assigned to command less a few soldiers.

Middle level commander- A military person assigned to command slightly bigger number of soldiers compared to those of a junior commander.

Senior Commander- A military person assigned to command slightly bigger number of soldiers compared to those of a middle level commander.

Mission geopolitical environment - Security, Political, Economic, Social interests pursued by other countries that influence achievement of AMISOM mandate in Somalia.

Liberated areas- Areas captured from Al-Shabaab, some occupied by AMISOM and SNA troops and others not yet occupied by AMISOM or SNA.

Al-Shabaab- Militant group operating in Somalia. Group fighting to overthrow existing Somalia Government. Group fighting AMISOM troops and Somalia National Army.

IED- Improvised explosive device planted by Al Shabaab targeting AMISOM troops, Somalia National Army or Non -Muslims within the territory of Somalia and neighboring locations and countries.

Terrorism- Means and methods employed by terrorist to inflict fear to their targets.

Geopolitical Environment- Interests of Somalia friendly countries in that impede achievement of AMISOM mandate.

Mission creep- Gradual broadening of the original objectives of a mission or organization causing the project spiral out of control, slows down the process expansion of intervention beyond its original scope, focus and goals.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMES

| | | |
|--------|---|--|
| AU | - | African Union |
| AMISOM | - | African Union Mission In Somalia |
| AO | - | Area of Operations |
| AOR | - | Area of Operational Responsibility |
| AS | - | Al Shabaab |
| ASF | - | African Standby Force |
| CIMIC | - | Civil-Military Co-operation |
| EOD | - | Explosive Ordnance Device |
| FC | - | Force Commander |
| KDF | - | Kenya Defence Forces |
| SNA | - | Somalia National Army |
| SOFA | - | Status of Force Agreement |
| SOMA | - | Status of Mission Agreement |
| MRE | - | Meal Ready to Eat |
| NGO | - | Non Governmental Organization |
| NCC | - | National Contingent Commander |
| EAC | - | East Africa Community |
| IGAD | - | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| IDP | - | Internally Displaced people |
| IED | - | Improvised Explosive Device |
| UN | - | United Nations |
| USA | - | United States of America |
| UXO | - | Unexploded Bombs/Unexploded Ordnance |

| | | |
|--------|---|--|
| PSTD | - | Post Stress Traumatic Disorder |
| UNAMIR | - | United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda |
| DMZ | - | De-Militarized Zone |
| DRC | - | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| DDR | - | Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration |
| SSR | - | Security Sector Reform |
| ROL | - | Rule of Law |
| TCC | - | Troop Contributing Country |
| PSO | - | Peace Support Operation |
| PKO | - | Peace Keeping Operation |
| SC | - | Security Council |
| USA | - | United States of America |
| UK | - | United Kingdom |
| P5 | - | Permanent five (US, UK, France, Russia, China) |
| SRSR | - | Special Representative to Secretary General |
| UNSOA | - | United Nations Support Office for AMISOM |
| TFG | - | Transitional Federal Government of Somalia |
| UNOSOM | - | United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| PhD | - | Doctor of Philosophy |
| SQ KMS | - | Square Kilometers |

ABSTRACT

Capacity gaps' influencing the outcome of peacekeeping operations has been an issue in all the conflicts. Although gaps influencing the outcome of peacekeeping operations involving inter-state conflicts and intra-state conflicts where resources are the common denominator have been examined, capacity gaps influencing peacekeeping in intra-state conflicts where jihadist terror ideology is a major factor in the conflict remains shadowed in an enigmatic environment. More importantly, complexities compounding the capabilities of prosecuting military peacekeeping missions and the capacity gaps ensuing thereon remain unexamined. This study was to examine the peace keeping operations influencing peace and stability in Dhobley District, Central Region, Somalia. The study sought to achieve three objectives; first, to examine the effectiveness of command and control AMISOM troops, second, to assess the relevance of missions mandate and thirdly to evaluate the adequacy of mission resources support. Cosmopolitan theory was used to explain the sources of capacity gaps and to develop the conceptual framework. The study used the case of peacekeeping in Somalia as the focal point of analysis. Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources then analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software version 24.0 and presented in tables with a brief description thereafter. This aided in establishing the recurrent themes within the under study. The derivative of this analytical process, i.e., the patterns, themes and categories of analysis that came from the data were then interpreted by the researcher based on objectives of the study. The findings revealed that commanders faced challenges of command and control of AMISOM troops and thus did not offer appropriate direction to the accomplishment of the mission. On missions' mandate, the findings revealed that the missions' mandate was not aligned to the realities of the conflict on the ground, and that it was not clear to AMISOM troops. Concerning mission resource support it was evident that the number of AMISOM troops was inadequate to accomplish the mission, the finances allocated for the Mission in Somalia was not enough and the equipment's used for fighting were not sufficient. The study concluded that an effective central command and control structure is vital for mission success, achievement of the mission objectives is the most common way for people to measure if the mission was successful or not and also adequate mission resources, including staff, equipment and finances must be present and readily available for a mission to be a success. The study recommended that leadership of Peace Keeping missions should always offer appropriate direction to the accomplishment of a mission; Peacekeeping missions should have clear and achievable goals; and Peacekeeping missions, resources in terms of personnel, finances or equipment's should always be made available in adequate amounts.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Chapter one of the study provides information on the background, research problem, research objectives, research questions, justification and significance of the study. It also highlights on assumptions, scope and limitations of the study.

1.1 Background of the Study

Peace keeping operations have become the most important means for the international community to intervene in conflict-ridden areas. Their primary aim is creating political change in these areas by reducing the level of violence and addressing the deep roots of structural violence to end the conflict. Since the end of the cold war, most conflicts around the world have been intrastate ones that occur in weakened and failed states where political systems no longer function by exercising effective sovereignty and can no longer ensure a monopoly over the organized use of force. These are often states where local politics takes place under the patronage or backing of different militias serving a diversity of interests including economic ones. In such situations conflict often escalates and local violence travels across state borders to endanger regional or even global stability and security. In such contexts, change implies transforming local social and political orders.

The complexity and risk of intrastate conflicts and their potential to become interlocking conflicts, defined as having geo-strategic meaning—such as Somalia, Iraq, or the Balkans—very often bring about the involvement of peace keeping operations (Fisher, 2019). Somalia is the host nation for African Union Mission in Somalia

(AMISOM) peace support operations. It is an East African Country which occupies the most part of the Horn of Africa. Out of the six regions of Somalia, the central and southern areas are partially occupied by a terrorist organization “Al-Shabaab” while the Northern provinces are centers of piracy. Past attempts of the international community to bring the country out of poverty, chaos and anarchy were not successful. Today, the level of interest shown by the regional and global powers to resolve the Somali conflict is disputable. According to Williams, 2019, it is believed that regional powers such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibout, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda are in Somalia pursuing their geopolitical goals disguised as fight against Al Shabaab.

Rivera, 2017, opines that the impact of the dispute between the Gulf Nations is being felt in Somalia. Powerful Gulf countries have emerged to actively encourage divisions in Somalia which have been a gift to Al Shabaab at a time when many were turning against the group. Al shabaab has been able to conduct successful operations against these troops. They have been able to overrun their military camps forcing the AMISOM troops to collapse and abandon their defensive positions. The efforts to sow instability in Somalia in pursuit of narrow geopolitical goals have led some countries to undertake activities that undermine the work of AMISOM. A number of forces, both from Somalia and outside the region are working very hard to sow chaos and prolong the suffering of Somalis and people within the region.

Although AMISOM has been conducting peace support operations in Somalia for the last eleven years, the success of its initial mandate is questionable. Most parts of the country remains unstable making it difficult for the conduct of humanitarian activities. Al shabaab is still controlling large swathes of land and collecting taxes. The United Nations has not been able to take over the mission from AU due to the fragile security

situation. Most of the specific tasks given to AMISOM during its inception such as facilitation of repatriation of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and protection of AMISOM personnel, installations and their equipment are yet to be achieved (Fisher, 2019). The outcome of AMISOM, is dependent on certain capabilities. From those increased Al Shabaab activities in Somalia, it seems that the troops have not been conducting peace keeping operations effectively. The study focused on why the assurance of AMISOM troops on peace and security in Somalia remains uncertain due to capability gaps.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

AMISOM operations started in the 2007, before then, USA, UN, Ethiopia and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had intervened in the same conflict starting from 1992 without success. Noting the previous efforts and their failed outcome, AMISOM has been mandated to bring peace and stability in the war torn country. But the mission has not been overly successful. Being an intra-state conflict, the complexities compounding the capabilities of prosecuting military peacekeeping missions and the capacity gaps ensuing thereon remain unexamined.

Consequently, the terror group has been able to seize some of the tightly held towns and centres from the troops. The armed militia group is gaining momentum against the troops' combined efforts to pacify Somalia and degrade their (alshabaab) capability. Peace keeping operations have not been able to achieve their mandates and as a result, durable peace remains elusive in most parts of the host countries. It is in this context that the study evaluated the effectiveness of AMISOM troops influence towards peace and stability in Dhobley District in Somalia.

1.3 General and Specific Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of this study was to examine the effectiveness of AMISOM troops influence on peacekeeping operations in Dhobley District, Central Region, Somalia.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

This research was guided by the following specific objectives;

- i. To examine the effectiveness of command and control within the AMISOM troops stationed in Dhobely District Central region, Somalia.
- ii. To assess the relevance of missions mandate of the AMISOM troops.
- iii. To evaluate the adequacy of mission resources support of the AMISOM troops in Dhobley District, Central region, Somalia.

1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions were developed from specific objectives outlined above:

- i. Is command and control effective enough to ensure peace keeping operations meet its objectives within Dhobley District, Central Region, Somalia?
- ii. Is the mission mandate in line with the conflict dynamics within Dhobley District, Central region, Somalia?
- iii. Is the mission resource support adequate for the peace keeping operations in Dhobley District, Central region, Somalia?

1.5 Significance of the Study

Despite the fact that a number of studies analyse actions of peace keeping operations (Larry, 2005, on UN peace building in Kosovo; Williams, 2017 on US intervention in Somalia; and Lise, 2008, on unilateral(Rwanda's) intervention in DRC rows), very few, if any take the perspective of peace keeping actions coordinated by regional blocs. Thus the current crisis in Somalia with troops drawn from within the regional bloc provides a fertile ground for an inquiry on influences of mounted interventions on durable peace. Such an inquiry will further provide a practical basis to advance insights on African Solutions (AfSol) mantra advocated for by Young (2010) (Williams, 2017) who explains that Africa is best suited to handle its own conflicts, given that no one else understands better Africa's terrain, demographics and region at large.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study focused on operations of the peace keeping troops. The study covered AMISOM Peacekeepers at Dhobley District, Central Region Somalia. The main areas of research were to find out the sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps in relation to the mandate of the mission, resources and command and control. Data was collected from peacekeepers that were deployed in Dhobley only. The researcher took one year to conduct research.

1.7 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

1.7.1 Limitations of the Study

The use of both primary and secondary data poses limitations inherent to the source. For example, desk top research is characterized by inaccuracies of data collected. It is a challenge to ascertain if data from desk top is true or not and mostly expresses

feelings, emotions and biases associated with sources. Desk top research involves use of electricity power to run computers. As such, electricity power outages affect smooth retrieval of data unless a power back up is availed. Study of conflict situations have potential weakness that may be beyond researcher's ability to intervene such as the nature of self-report, sample size and instruments, the threats to internal validity that may be impossible to avoid or minimize, also focuses on sampling procedure and sample. Factors affecting sample in relation to the population.

1.7.2 Delimitations of the Study

The research was limited to Dhobley area in Somalia. Dhobley is part of southern Somalia nearest to the Kenya Somali boarder. It houses the command and control center of troops operating in sector south.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the existing relevant literature on capacity gaps facing peacekeeping missions from peace and conflict management perspectives. It examines the sources of capacity gaps that influence the outcome of peacekeeping mission which could be either a success or failure of peacekeeping mission. It commences with the examination of the sources of capacity gaps in peacekeeping missions from global, regional and local perspective. The chapter also discusses theories that have been used to help in explaining the nature and source of peacekeeping capacity gaps. The chapter further presents conceptual frame work and finally concludes with the analysis of identified gaps in the reviewed literature

2.1 Capacity Gaps Facing UN Peacekeeping Missions

Capacity gaps have been one of the weakest points of most of the peace keeping operations (Fisher, 2019). Before examining sources of capacity gaps influencing AMISOM peace keeping operation in Somalia in particular under the perspective of Peace and Conflict Management, it is important to first understand what capacity gaps influence the outcome of Peace keeping missions in general. Globally, the outcomes of UN peace keeping missions are normally influenced by capacity gaps inherent in each mission. Extensive researches to examine the sources of capacity gaps that influence the outcome of a peace keeping mission have identified several gaps as the sources of success or failure. Studies have concluded that most peacekeeping missions have been influenced by the gaps in regard to the resources, command and control capabilities, clarity and strength of the mission mandate, interests of Security

Council and competence of personnel(Rivera, 2017; Williams 2017 and Richmond 2007) .

One of the most important aspects of any peacekeeping operation is its mandate. Mandate of any UN mission outlines the objectives of the peace keeping operation. The achievement of those objectives is the most common way for people to measure if the mission was successful or not, so it is extremely important to have clear goals. However, several mandates suffer from certain inadequacies, such as having unclear or unattainable goals (Jett, 1999; Howard, 2008 & Sitkowski, 2006). In terms of clarity, Jett (1999) says failed mandates are often too vague. For example vagueness is cited as a criticism of the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) mandate in Somalia (1993-1995). When the UN conducted assessment of the Somalia peacekeeping mission, it concluded that the mandate was “vague...and was open to myriad interpretations” (Jett, 1999, 40).In this case, there was no clear direction of the mission to follow because several different actors had different interpretations of the goals of the same mandate.

Getting a perfect mandate is not easy, due to the interests of the members of Security Council which determine the objectives to be accomplished through the mandate (Jett, 1999). As a result of these interests, mandates are constantly redefined and enlarged. A changing mandate is difficult to accomplish due to change in goals to be achieved. The scope of the mandate, which is the “relevance of the mandate to the realities of the conflict” (Sitkowski, 2006, 23) is also absolutely essential in determining the fate of a mission. When the mandate is unrealistic, problems can arise. Jett, 1999, says that for example in the UN mission in Bosnia (1992-1995), the experts had projected that

34000 soldiers were needed to protect safe haven the mission had put up but the mandate authorised only 7000 troops.

In the case of AMISOM, the initial mandate was issued vide resolution 1744(Res 2007). The mandate has been changing ever since. The goals have been changing too. 12 years down the line, the objectives set out in the initial mandate have never been achieved. For example, the mission has not yet evolved into UN operation, there is lack of free movement of personnel; goods and services; there is limited safe passage and protection, provision of humanitarian assistance is curtailed, there is limited protection of peacekeepers, facilities, installations, equipment and there is limited security and freedom of movement of peacekeepers (Hancock, 2007).

Generally, the interest of Security Council gives UN missions the direction to take. They are very important if the mission has to succeed (Sitkowski, 2006). The political will of United States of America, United Kingdom, China, Russia and France is critical for the success of UN missions (Howard, 11, 2008). During the cold war period, UN was unable to establish peacekeeping missions in conflict areas due to suspicions and mistrust amongst the Permanent Five (P5) members of the Security Council. The suspicions and mistrust coupled with internal conflicts and competition amongst the P5 can render missions problematic. It is argued that it does not matter if a mission mandate allows the use of force under chapter VII or not, what matters is the common interest of the P5 members. Where these interests are lacking, the problem at hand is forgotten precipitating power struggle, mistrust and suspicion (Matheson, 2006).

Lack of political will is also evidenced in mission mandates. Politics of the SC usually result in “delayed, weak, ambiguous, or unrealistic mandates and/or inadequate means of peacekeeping missions” (Sitkowski, 2006). When the permanent members of Security Council put their interest first, the objective to bring peace to a region is interfered with; the resulting mission will not be adequately equipped to handle the conflict on the ground. The analysis of the role of SC interests in the outcome of a peacekeeping mission indicates that moderate levels of SC interest....are necessary but not sufficient conditions for success” (Howard (2008).

Command and control is the authority vested in an individual to issue orders and directives to soldiers and civilians working in a multidimensional UN peacekeeping mission. It thus means my entities come under the command and control of the head of the mission in a multidimensional peacekeeping mission. Many scholars have argued that an effective central command and control structure is vital for success, because during several of the failed missions of the 1990s, “planning remained divided between several departments” with “little systematic cooperation” and coordination between all of those involved in the mission (Bellamy et al. 2004). Because there are several actors involved in the planning and execution of a peacekeeping mission, it is critical to have effective command and control capabilities in place at the start of the mission. This means that both “vertical and horizontal integration throughout the intervening organization” is needed. (Gordon et al. 2001). Vertical integration refers to the relationships within the hierarchy of the organization, while horizontal integration refers to coordination among the varying non-hierarchical divisions of the mission.

Vertical integration is important in the relationships between the Security Council and various bodies of the mission, including the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) and the force commanders (Gordon et al. 2001). One of the largest problems with vertical integration is that there is no direct link between influence and accountability within headquarters and those carrying out the mandated mission. For example, on the bottom level of the hierarchy there are the force commanders who are assumed to be in charge of, and therefore responsible for, the actions and decisions of their troops. However, this is not often the case. Although the force commanders are held accountable for the actions of the troops under their command, they commonly “find they have not been given sufficient control over the troops assigned to them,” mainly because the troop-donating countries do not wish to relinquish control of their troops to the UN (Gordon, et al., 2001). It is extremely difficult to establish a cohesive UN force, because each individual country supplying the troops has its own political agenda. If the agenda of a troop-supplying country does not match with that of the UN, force commanders from that country bypass UN institutions and go by the instructions given from their national government (Gordon, et al. 2001).

The line of accountability therefore blurs because while the troops are accountable to the UN force commanders, they are acting under the influence of their own country’s agenda. Despite being “clearly subordinate to the wishes of the Security Council,” and having “little real influence over policy formulation in the Security Council,” the SRSG acts as the “executive director of the mission” (Gordon et al. 2001). This means that the SRSG is held accountable for the field operations that are taking place, but he has no say in the formulation of those measures that are being carried out. As Gordon

states, it is naive to believe the SRSG can resolve problems “generated by an inappropriate and under-resourced mandate” (Gordon, et al. 2001) when he in no way influenced the mandate and cannot be sure what the intentions of the SC were when it was written. This disconnect in influence and accountability means there is not a clear unity of purpose between those making the policy for the mission and those carrying it out.

Horizontal integration is the other aspect of command and control that must be present for a mission to be successful. This applies to cooperation among the various UN agencies involved in the mission, and also to coordination among the “multitude of political, humanitarian and military organizations” that are involved in the mission (Gordon et al. 2001). The main problem of absence of horizontal integration is “a reduction in unity of purpose,” because the various segments of a mission are not working together towards a common goal. (Gordon et al., 2001). It is hard to have effective horizontal integration because when there are several different actors, including governments, various UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s), working together in a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, there is not a central source of accountability. Without one main source that maintains control over several UN bodies, nobody is playing by the same rules or being held to the same standards. Again, this reduces the unity of the mission and hinders its ability to be successful.

When there are effective command and control capabilities in place, the peacekeepers would be able to make the mandate appropriate to the situation on the ground.

The equipment issued to peacekeepers during their deployment has also been argued to be key in determining the success of a mission. It is noted that adequate resources,

including staff, equipment and finances must be present and readily available for a mission to be a success (Kriesberg, 2007). Troops must be issued with the equipment suitable for the task on the ground (Berdal et al. 2007). Funding for the UN equipment mostly comes from the major powers (USA, UK, France) (Sadler and Shimisu, 2002). Peace Keeping operations are quite expensive, (for example, the mission in Somalia cost \$1.6 billion) and while the UN is anxious to become involved in international conflicts, there is always more than one conflict going on (Williams, 2017). Since there several missions to fund, the UN could have trouble funding all its mission (Berdal et al., 2007). Even when funds are not being spread too thin, it is still possible that a mission will not receive adequate funding, resulting in the absence of “even basic equipment” (Bellamy et al., 2004). This problem is generally tied to the interests of member states, because if the members, especially the P5, do not have a direct interest in the matter at hand, they will be less willing to provide funds for the mission (Berdal et al., 2004, 2007). A lack of funds also impacts third world countries because although they supply most of the troops, they are not receiving much financial compensation from first world countries. This is especially true with regards to the US, which is considered “the primary debtor state,” because when the US does not pay its peacekeeping assessments, the burden of the debt spreads to third world countries (Gordon et al. 2001). As a result, those troop-contributing countries lose their enthusiasm for the peacekeeping mission (Jett, 199).

Low funding can also jeopardize the command and control capabilities, because the mission becomes understaffed (Gordon et al. 2001). Resources, both physical and monetary, are therefore critical to a mission’s success because the troops must be adequately equipped and the missions adequately staffed. Furthermore, who provides

the funds and resources can hugely influence the course of the mission. There can be a heavy regional influence, (usually Western, since they provide the bulk of the funding) in the mandate goals and in some cases, it is possible that the goals of those Western countries may not be line with what is best for the country undergoing the intention.

The competence of all personnel involved in peacekeeping mission determines the outcome of peacekeeping missions. The Special Representative to Secretary General, military commanders and soldiers must possess the knowledge, skills and abilities required to perform their specific duties. In particular, the selection of SRSG is a fundamental step in ensuring mission success because he is the leader of the peace keeping operation. Apart from the SRSG, the troops need to be adequately trained. Commonly, most troops sent to a peacekeeping mission are from third-world countries, because the UN pays the government of those countries, who are then allowed to decide how much money to pay the troops (Jett, 1999). The fact that contributed troops come from several different countries is also a problem, because there is no uniform equipment, doctrine or training among them (Bellamy, et al. 2004). There is also the issue of peacekeepers causing problems during mission, because the UN “lacks the authority to discipline those who serve in its name” (Jett, 1999). This links back to command and control capabilities because the troops are not accountable to one central command.

The cardinal rules of peacekeeping are three; Peacekeepers may only intervene in situation in which the government of the host country gives consent; the peacekeepers must maintain impartiality in the conflict; and the use of force can only occur in situations requiring self-defence. While it is true that traditional peacekeeping would

have required adherence to these rules, the nature of current intrastate conflicts has led many scholars to argue that it is actually necessary for some of these rules to be broken in order for a mission to succeed (Matheson (2006) and Jett (1999)). Jett states that “while the rules may have been true in classical peacekeeping efforts in interstate conflicts, there is reason to doubt these assumptions in today’s intrastate wars”. Matheson also points to the shortcomings associated with each rule, finally reaching the conclusion that in today’s wars, it is indeed sometimes necessary to break these rules.

Traditional peacekeeping rules may stand on the way in the current intra-state conflicts and thus breaking them is necessary. On one hand, if peacekeepers were to enter a country, displaying both clear favouritism to one party and a willingness to use a heavy amount of force to achieve their goals, they would not generate lasting, if any, peace. Rather, they would fuel the conflict by strengthening one part, while greatly angering and offending the other. On the other hand, it is also true that there are instances when the rules associated with impartiality and the use of force cannot be strictly followed because of unique situational factors in the conflict. Therefore, because it is sometimes deemed necessary to break the rules of impartiality and use of force for the purpose of achieving peace, the breaking of these rules cannot be used to predict the outcome of a mission.

However, the rule of consent is very important and necessary for all parties to the conflict to agree to host peacekeeping mission. This is because the agreement of warring parties enables PKO to operate without much interference thus enabling the achievement of the mission objectives and determines the outcome of the mission (Lise Howard (2008)). Howard draws a distinction between initial consent and

continued consent by saying, “if consent diminishes after the mission begins, it must be re-created in order for the operation to succeed”.

Matheson (2006) addresses the issue of governments withdrawing their consent for a mission, and notes that when peacekeeping mission were deployed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the government hosting the mission retained the power to revoke its consent at any point and require the peacekeepers to leave. This was true with the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), the mission deployed to the Sinai in 1956. In this case, after initially giving its consent, the Egyptian government withdrew it and ordered the peacekeepers to leave, after which war immediately resumed (Matheson, 2006). In order to avoid giving governments that option, many UN peacekeeping missions are now deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Because these missions technically are then considered peace enforcement missions, they are protected “from any withdrawal of consent or restrictions on the forces’ activities” (Matheson, 2006) by the host country. Therefore, Chapter VII missions can both be deployed without a country’s consent, and can also legally forbid a government to revoke its consent if it was initially given, therefore allowing the mission to carry on fulfilling its mandate to the end.

Impartiality, as previously mentioned, is one rule that sometimes must be broken. In 1990, impartiality was taken to mean that “the (peacekeeping) operations must not in any way favour one party against another” but this meaning has since changed (Matheson, 2006). In 2000, being impartial referred to “adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of the mandate that rooted in these Charter principles,” meaning legally, missions under Chapter VII have no requirement to “avoid taking sides” (Matheson, 2006, 124). This is because Chapter VII missions are

authorised to “impose peace by force,” and when force is allowed to be used against parties in a conflict, it becomes harder to remain impartial (Fortna, 2004), Howard (2008). In other words, when peacekeepers use force against one of the sides in a conflict, they are breaching their role as an impartial third party (Berdal et al 2007) believes this is sometimes necessary given the fact that most of the conflicts UN peacekeepers become involved in are not humanitarian disasters, and it is necessary for the peacekeepers take sides against those who are creating the atrocities. He states that “it is increasingly argued that in humanitarian catastrophes, it is inappropriate to rely on the traditional peacekeeping doctrine of impartiality”. Therefore, although impartiality would be present in an ideal situation, it may not always contribute the success of a peacekeeping force, and is therefore not a good measure to use when accounting for a mission’s success or failure.

Last is the rule of peacekeepers only being allowed to use force in self-defence. After the Cold War, when the conflicts peacekeepers were confronted with had escalated in violence, the Security Council expanded the circumstances under which force can be used (Matheson, 2006). Increasingly, post Cold War mandates have contained phrasing authorizing peacekeepers to “take all necessary measures” to accomplish their objectives, meaning force can be used, when necessary, to both defend the troops and the provisions of the mandate (Matheson, 2006). Therefore, the theory behind this rule is the same as that behind impartiality: a more traditional situation would allow the peacekeepers to remain lightly armed and unable to use force, but the realities of conflicts in the post-Cold War era rarely make such an option viable. However, just because many missions under Chapter VII were allowed to use force does not mean that it was always effective. Matheson, 2006, notes that for the use of force to produce

results, it must be accompanied by “adequate resources and command, a strong and clear mandate, and robust rules of engagement”. For these reasons, it is not believed that using force in more instances than self-defence would cause a mission to be unsuccessful; variables such as resources, command, and the clarity and strength of the mandate play a more vital role in affecting the mission’s outcome.

In analysing each of these rules, it becomes clear that the one concerning consent of a country to deploy a mission is the most important. It is believed the status of initial consent is the best indicator of a mission outcome, and if it is not met, the mission can be predicted to be unlikely to succeed. At the same time, “continued consent,” meaning that consent is maintained throughout the duration of the mission, also acts as a good predictor of the overall success of a mission. With this point there is a caveat, however, because although it is believed it is important for the mission success, it is also believed that if consent does dwindle, the host country cannot be allowed to order the peacekeepers to leave, because that would result in utter failure. The mission should therefore be able to stay and complete its mandate to the best of its abilities before leaving. Although impartiality and limited use of force are good rules of thumb to follow when possible, the breaking of these rules cannot ultimately be used to predict mission success or failure because the nature of violent intrastate conflicts create circumstances when it is sometimes necessary to break them to achieve mandate goals.

2.2 Summary and Gap Identification

Based on the above discussion, it is true that the outcome of peace keeping operations all over the world including AMISOM is influenced by capacity gaps inherent in the mission. The capacity gaps found in most peace keeping operations arise from

mandate, interests of Security Council, command and control capabilities, resources, and rules of peacekeeping. For example, vagueness is cited as criticism of the UNOSOM mandate in Somalia (1993-1995). Due to frequent redefining of mission objectives and goals, missions take longer than anticipated to achieve the expected outcome. Whereas it is easy to identify parties to the conflict in inter-state peace support operations, it is difficult to identify them in Somalia conflict because Somalia conflict is intra-state driven by the ideology of global terrorism. Security Council politics have also been frequently cited as being crucial to a mission's success. When some members of Security Council are not interested in a mission, they will not give enough resources support. When the national interests of the P5 interfere with their objective to bring peace to a region, the resulting mission will not be adequately equipped to handle the conflict on the ground. It has been argued that command and control structures are vital for success, because during failed missions of the 90s, planning remained divided between several departments. How the peacekeepers are equipped during their deployment has also been argued to be key in determining the success of a mission. It is true that adequate resources, including staff, equipment, and finances must be present and readily available for a mission to be a success. On competence of personnel, it is argued that everybody serving in a mission (SRSG, Troops, and civilian staff) must be well trained and masters of their job. The fact that contributed troops come from several different countries is also a problem, because there is no uniform equipment, doctrine or training among them. On the rules of peacekeeping, it is argued that the three cardinal rules were applicable to traditional peacekeeping involving inter-state conflicts and thus for intra-state conflicts, these rules must be broken for the mission to succeed.

The presence of AMISOM troops for over a decade now, durable peace and stability remains elusive in the war torn country. The Al shabaab militants are still controlling large remote areas. They are manning roadblocks and collecting taxes from charcoal burning. There is no enough literature explaining why the peace keepers are unable to achieve their objectives. It was under this context that the study evaluated the effectiveness of AMISOM troops for the peace keeping mission.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

The assumptions, principles and rules of procedure devised to analyze, predict or explain the capacity gaps in peacekeeping include realism theory and cosmopolitan theory.

2.3.1 Theory of Realism

The theory helps in explaining the nature of interaction between Somalia and other states and specifically those countries helping in the stabilization of Somalia through AMISOM.

Classical realism is a theory of international relations established in the post-World War II era that seeks to explain international politics as a result of human nature. The theory is associated with thinkers such as Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Modern thinkers associated with classical realism are Carl von Clausewitz, Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr. The six principles according to Hans Morgenthau are; Politics is governed by Objective laws which have roots in Human Nature. It is as such necessary to understand these laws and build a rational theory of international politics. "These laws cannot be refuted and challenged. Taking these as the basis, we can formulate a rational theory of International Politics; Political Realism believes that international politics operates on the basis of certain

objective laws." The other principle; national interest are defined in terms of national power. This principle holds that nations always define and act for securing their national interests by means of power. Interest is always dynamic; Political realism believes in the universal validity of the concept of interest defined in terms of power. The policies and actions of a nation are always governed by national interest. The idea of national interest is the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.

The fourth principle; Abstract Moral Principles cannot be applied to Politics. Political realism realizes the importance of moral principles but holds that in their abstract and universal formulations these cannot be applied to state actions. The moral significance of political action is undisputed but the universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states, unless these are analyzed in the light of specific conditions of time and space. Moral principles do not determine policies and actions of states. These are simply a source of some influence. Difference between Moral Aspirations of a Nation and the Universal Moral Principles. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral principles that govern the universe. It refuses to accept that the national interests and policies of any particular nation reflect universally applied moral principles. The sixth principle; Autonomy of International Politics. Morgenthau Political Realism accepts the autonomy of international politics as a discipline. On the basis of the above five principles, it is ascertained by Morgenthau that there exists a real and profound difference between political realism and other approaches and theories. Political realism has its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude towards political matters. It maintains the autonomy of the political sphere.

Critics of the theory states that although Morgenthau supports safeguarding national interest defined in terms of power, he evades analysis of the process by which national interests are formulated. He is more concerned with its protection than analyzing its nature and scope.

Realist theory primarily offers a study of conflictual aspect of international relations and has no tools to analyze the aspect of co-operation that have become more than evident in the establishment of Supranational agencies. Morgenthau concepts of human nature have built-in-bias and are unscientific. Men are rational, creatures having multifaceted attributes, all of which cannot be cruxes under quest for power (Barash, 1997). Complete neglect of values is tantamount to claims of universal brotherhood and fraternity on which nations are interacting with one another. It must be observed that national interests are designed to be hospitable not only to state and its territory but also its citizens. Scholars like Robert Thicker and Kenneth Waltz see contradiction in Realist theory. Despite claiming to neglect value in study of international politics, Morgenthau himself elevates power to be an ultimate value. Stanley Holftmann accuses Morgenthau of engaging in "power monism." Rather, he points out that power is one complement of complex relations which Morgenthau does not examine. Dr. Mohinder Kumar finds inconsistencies in Morgenthau's Realist Theory. Morgenthau accepts power struggle, conflict, contradiction and discords as natural parts of International Politics. Raymond Aron accuses Morgenthau of neglecting the relation between ideologies and politics. The realist theory fails to offer a comprehensive theory of International Relations. It is partial in the sense that it offers explanation of power relations among nations. According to Prof. Mohinder Kumar "it does not make the distinction between

rational interest and interpretation of national interest. It does not make a distinction between the nature of reality and the interpretation of reality. The failure to do so emanate from the fact that the realist's theory ignores the fact that we can know only a part and not the whole of reality." Nevertheless, seen in the context of its time, it is pioneering contribution in the field of International relations theory. It gave impetus to new theorization on the idea of international relations and helped in ushering an era of scientism from idealism.

2.3.2 Cosmopolitan Theory

The philosophical roots of the theory can be traced back to Diogenes of Sinope (412 BC) the founding father of the Cynic movement in Ancient Greece. Emmanuel Kant is among the modern cosmopolitan thinkers through his 1795 *essay perpetual peace*, he advocated for the cosmopolitan law/right as a guiding principle to protect people from war. The theory postulates that the maintenance of truly stable international peace and security requires a particular way of understanding, organizing and conducting peace keeping operations involving international terrorism, transnational crime, and the proliferation small arms and light weapons, human rights violations and violent conflicts. Peacekeeping missions in such situations should comprise specially trained military and civilian personnel capable of protecting civilians from harm and implementing the full range of the UN human security agenda. The deployment of military forces on cosmopolitan peace operations and other non-traditional security tasks requires them to expand their existing repertoire of functions, capabilities and skills. With the analysis of the three variables; resources, mandate and command as independent variable and capacity gaps as the dependent variable, the study has developed the conceptual framework shown in figure 2.1

2.4 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework is a figure showing the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The kind of leadership offered by the troops is likely to influence the outcome of peace keeping mission. As espoused by Fisher, 2017, vague and unclear mandate weaken the objectives of the peace keeping operations. It limits the freedom of operations so as achieve the desired outcomes.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Researcher, 2019

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter contains detailed description of the location of study, research design, sample size, sampling techniques, instruments and procedures for data collection, data analysis and interpretation. It also highlights the ethical considerations which will be adhered to during the study (Crotty, 1998).

3.1 Research Design


According to Francis et al, 2000, a descriptive survey design determines and reports findings the way they occur naturally with respect to one or more variables. With the aim of examining peace keeping operations, the requirement to examine the context of conflicts within the country is predestined. This examination stems from the research problem's need to evaluate and provide solutions to peace keeping operation gaps. The method for this study was also envisaged to test the cosmopolitan theory and theory of realism. Theory of realism has been employed by scholars in peace and conflict field when conducting their studies, taking the example of Hempson, 2011, who did a qualitative study on the challenges affecting the UN peace keeping operations in the post-cold war era. The methodology of this research is also based on the cosmopolitan theory which substantiates the choice of a case study to accomplish the research.

3.2 The Study Area

The study was conducted in Dhobley location, Afmadhow district, Central region of Somalia. Dhobley is a small town within Afmadhow district in central region of Somalia. It covers an approximate area of 1200 SqKms. It is 18 kilometers from

Kenya Somalia border. AMISOM Force Headquarters in Mogadishu selected Doble as the location of the headquarters of all AMISOM peacekeepers operating in Central region of Somalia. Officially, it is known as AMISOM sector 2 Headquarters. The sector headquarter is the seat of senior commander, his deputy commander and all other senior staff officers. The sector commander commands, controls, directs and administers all the troops in central region of Somalia. He is responsible for all AMISOM operations within the region. All troops in central region depend on him for the provision of capabilities for the successful conduct of operations. The peacekeepers in the region are mandated to conduct peace support operations, stabilize the country, and create the necessary conditions for the conduct of the humanitarian activities and an eventual handover of the mission to UN peacekeeping operation.

Location of study area



Source: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping © 1998Europa Technologies Ltd.

3.3 Target population

Target Population refers to the entire group of individuals to which the researcher is interested in generalizing the conclusions. In this research, the target population referred to all the soldiers who were deployed for AMISOM peacekeeping operation during the period of data collection. This also included the staff.

3.3.1 Study Population

Kumar, 2011, defines study population as the bigger group or resident of a community about whom the study is concerned while the sample as a subgroup of the

population which is the focus of the enquiry and is selected carefully to represent the study population.

An approximate number totaling 3,050 peacekeepers operated in central region of had been deployed at Dhobley District. Out of that number, 305 peacekeepers were selected as the study population.

3.4 Sampling Techniques

The study employed mixed sampling techniques approach. The strategy combined both stratified simple random and purposeful and snowball sampling approaches. Convenience sampling was used in selection of commanders and leaders at all levels. The first level of sample involved private soldiers, second level involved junior commanders, the third level involved mid- level commanders while the fourth sample involved senior commanders.

The following formula was used to determine the sample size, $n = \frac{z^2pq}{d^2}$ where;

n= the sample size if the population is greater than 10,000

Z=the standard normal deviate at the required confidence level

P= the proportion in the population estimated to have characteristics being measured

Q= the level of statistical significance set.

3.5 Sample Size

Table 3.1: Sample size distribution

| Category | Target population | Sample size |
|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| Private soldiers | 2600 | 260 |
| Junior Commanders | 300 | 30 |
| Mid-level Commanders | 140 | 14 |
| Senior Commanders | 10 | 1 |
| Total | 3050 | 305 |

3.6 Instruments of Data Collection

The instruments for primary data collection were questionnaires and interview guides. According to Rasmussen & Erick, 2002, interview guides and questionnaires are useful for getting in depth understanding of the issues under investigation rather than measuring those issues. Interview guides were used to collect data from the commanders while the questionnaire was used to gather data from the private soldiers

3.7 Pre-Testing Research Data Collection Instruments

Instrument of data collection namely the questionnaire should be pre-tested before adopted for data collection on the study. According to Saunders et al, 2009, pilot testing refines the questionnaire to ensure that respondents encounter no problems in answering the questions. To ensure correctness and accuracy, pilot studies ranging from 1% to 10% of the sample should constitute the pilot test size (Arain, Campbell, Cooper & Lancaster, 2010). 10% of the respondents were used in the pilot study. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) pointed out 10 % of the sample size as an appropriate representative of the whole population.

3.7.1 Validity of research Instrument

To a large extent the validity of the findings depends upon the quality of raw data which depends on the research instruments used. If the instruments are valid and reliable, the findings should be valid and reliable (Kothari, 2009). In enhancing the reliability, the researcher designed instruments with simple, unambiguous, logical and comprehensive questions. Different instruments such as questionnaires and interview guide were used to collect data depending on the nature and type of data that were required.

3.7.2 Reliability of research Instrument

Kipkebut, 2010, describes data reliability as a measure of internal consistency of the research instruments. A research instrument is reliable if it produces the same results whenever it is repeatedly used to measure trait or concept from the same respondents and the extent to which measures are free from errors (McMillan, 2001; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). Reliability analysis was carried out for all the variables in this study. Reliability was measured by the value of Cronbach's Alpha (α) which aimed to achieve a level of greater than 0.7 for the items of the variables to be accepted as reliable. Cronbach's alpha coefficient which ranges between 0 and 1 is used to measure the reliability. Higher alpha coefficient values mean that scales are more reliable. As a rule of thumb, acceptable alpha should be at least 0.70 or above.

3.8 Data Collection Procedures

The researcher looked for authorization to direct research from Kenyatta University. In addition to the authorization and the letter of introduction from the university, the researcher visited the defense office department and updated the commanders of the

intended research, its purpose and timelines. All the questionnaires were administered by the research assistants on a face to face basis.

3.9 Data Analysis

The collected data was analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative data analysis approaches. Quantitative approach was descriptive where simple frequencies, percentages, mean and standard deviation was used and also inferential where Pearson's Product Moment correlation and multiple regression models was used to determine the nature of the relationship between the variables. Data was presented in tables. The quantitative data was derived from the questionnaires. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 24) was used to run descriptive and inferential analysis. On the other hand, qualitative data analysis approach was used to analyze data which was collected using interview guide from the commanders. The following steps were employed in the analysis: recording of data, with prior consent from the respondents. The recorded data was transcribed. The second step involved grouping the responses according to their respective themes. The themes basically fall under respective research areas which were informed by research objectives.

The multiple regression model was assumed to hold under the equation;

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \epsilon$$

Where;

y = Peacekeeping Capacity gap

β_0 = Constant

X_1 = Command and Control

X_2 = Mission mandate

X_3 = Mission resource support

b_1 to b_3 , are the coefficients of the variables determine by the model

e = the estimated error of the regression model

3.10 Ethical Considerations

All the ethical guidance for research was adhered to. This included observing confidentiality and anonymity of participants, seeking for institutional approval, compliance with laws and standards, avoidance of plagiarism, allowing respondents to make informed consent by participants, allowing participants freedom to withdraw at any stage, protection from mental and physical harm.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on research findings and data analysis on sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps, a case of AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central Region, Somalia. The first section puts into perspective the response rate. The subsequent part covers demographic information of respondents. The third and fourth part present results of descriptive and inferential statistics respectively. The results are accompanied by pertinent interpretations and discussions.

4.2 Response Rate

The study sample comprised of three hundred and five AMISOM troops in Doble, Central Region Somalia. A total of three hundred and five (305) questionnaires were distributed to the study sample. Out of three hundred and five questionnaires, one hundred and ninety eight (198) were completed and returned translating to a response rate of 64.9% as indicated in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Response rate

| Designation | No of Questionnaires Issued | No. Returned | % |
|----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Private soldiers | 260 | 179 | 58.7 |
| Junior commanders | 30 | 12 | 3.9 |
| Mid-Level commanders | 14 | 6 | 2.0 |
| Senior commanders | 1 | 1 | 0.3 |
| Total | 305 | 198 | 64.9% |

Source: Research Data (2019)

The results revealed that one hundred and seventy nine (179) of the respondents were private soldiers, twelve (12) junior commanders, six (6) mid-level commanders and

one (1) senior commander. This translated to 64.9% response rate of the study sample. Kothari, 2014; Babbie, 2002; Mugenda and Mugenda, 2009 indicated that a 50% response rate is considered average, 60-70% is considered adequate while anything above 70% is considered as an excellent response rate. The 64.9% response rate of this study was thus considered sufficient for analysis. Most of the respondents who did not return their questionnaires claimed that they misplaced questionnaires while others were not willing to respond to the questions.

4.2.1 Reliability Results

Thirty questionnaires were piloted by issuing to the private soldiers and commanders who were not included in the final study sample. To determine its reliability, raw data was entered as it appeared in the questionnaire and the Cronbach's Alpha scores were as presented.

Table 4.2: Reliability Test Results

| Study Constructs | Items | Coefficient |
|----------------------------|--------------|--------------------|
| Command and Control | 9 | 0.750 |
| Mission Mandate | 10 | 0.773 |
| Mission resource support | 12 | 0.754 |
| Peacekeeping capacity gaps | 6 | 0.896 |

Source: Research Data (2019)

Cronbach's alpha values for all the constructs' measurement scales were above 0.7 as recommended by Kurpius and Stafford (2006) as illustrated; command and control (0.750), mission mandate (0.773), mission resource support (0.754) and peacekeeping capacity gaps (0.896). All the items tested for reliability posted a score above the recommended 0.7 an indication that there was internal consistency in the questions.

4.3 Respondents Background Information

This section presents general information of the respondents including gender, age, education level, number of years worked in the military services and number of peace keeping missions participated. The results to this effect are exhibited in Table 4.3, Table 4.4, Table 4.5, Table 4.6 and Table 4.7

Gender of the Respondents

Gender analysis was undertaken and the results were as described in Table 4.3

Table 4.3: Gender distribution of Respondents

| Gender | Frequency | Percent |
|---------------|------------------|----------------|
| Male | 169 | 94.6 |
| Female | 10 | 5.4 |
| Total | 179 | 100 |

Source: Research Data (2019)

The results on gender analysis indicate that, of the total respondents from the AMISOM troops in Dhobley, 94.6% were male and 5.4% were female. This clearly shows a very high number of male in the peacekeeping mission in Somalia. When recruiting soldiers, more male are always considered for recruitment and this is due to the nature of the job. The results implied that most of the soldiers sent in peacekeeping missions are usually male.

Age of the respondents

The age distribution of the respondents were examined and the outcome was as presented in Table 4.4

Table 4.4: Age distribution of the Respondents

| Age Bracket | Frequency | Percent |
|--------------------|------------------|----------------|
| 18-25 years | 54 | 30.2 |
| 26-35 years | 45 | 25.2 |
| 36-45 years | 35 | 19.5 |
| 46-55 years | 31 | 17.5 |
| Above 55 years | 14 | 7.6 |
| Total | 179 | 100 |

From the analysis it was evident that a majority making up 30.2% of the respondents were aged between 18 – 25 years followed by those who were aged between 26-35 years represented by 25.2%. Those who were aged between 36-45 years accounted for 19.5%, those aged 46-55 years were 17.5% while those above 55 years made up 7.6%. Taking together the percentage of the respondents who were aged between 18-25 years and 26-35 years, it was evident that majority (55.4%) of the respondents were below 35 years of age. This showed that majority of the AMISOM troops were young soldiers who were energetic to combat the militant groups in Somalia. The results implied that to ensure effective peacekeeping mission there is need to consider deployment of young soldiers.

Academic Qualification

The study also sought to find out from the respondents their highest level of academic education. The findings of the results are in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: Distribution of Respondents by Academic Qualifications

| Highest Qualification | Frequency | Percentage |
|------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| High School | 122 | 68.4 |
| Diploma | 37 | 20.8 |
| Bachelor's Degree | 15 | 8.1 |
| Post Graduate | 5 | 2.7 |
| Total | 179 | 100.0 |

Source: Research Data (2019)

The study as shown in Table 4.5 established that most (68.4%) of the AMISOM private soldiers possessed high school education. A very small number (2.7%) of these private soldiers were found to have post-graduate qualifications. Those who had diplomas were 20.8% while those who had bachelor’s degree were 8.1%. The results implied that most of the study participants had general knowledge to read and understand the questions in the questionnaire concerning peacekeeping capacity gaps.

Number of Years Worked in Military Service

The respondents were asked to indicate the number of years worked in the military service. The responses were as illustrated in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Number of years worked

| Period | Frequency | Percent |
|---------------|------------------|----------------|
| 1-5 years | 17 | 9.3 |
| 5-10 years | 31 | 17.3 |
| 10-15 years | 58 | 32.2 |
| 15-20 years | 40 | 22.3 |
| Over 20 years | 33 | 18.9 |
| Total | 179 | 100 |

Source: Research Data (2019)

Out of the respondents, 9.3% indicated to have a working experience of 1-5 years, 17.3% 5-10 years, 32.2% 10-15 years, 22.3% 15-20 years and 18.9% more than 20 years. This signifies that a considerable percentage of the respondents (54.5%) have an experience of between 10 to 20 years of military service. Thus, the information obtained from the respondents was reliable based on their experience on the job. The number of years worked in addition represented diversity of skills in peacekeeping missions.

Number of Peacekeeping mission participated

Table 4.7 shows the results of the number of Peacekeeping mission the AMISOM troops have participated

Table 4.7: Number of Peacekeeping mission participated

| Number | Frequency | Percentage |
|---------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Only 1 | 48 | 26.8 |
| 2-3 | 123 | 68.5 |
| 3-5 | 8 | 4.7 |
| Total | 179 | 100.0 |

Source: Research Data (2019)

As illustrated in Table 4.7, it was revealed that majority (68.5%) of the AMISOM troops had participated in either two or three peacekeeping missions, 26.8% had participated in only 1 peacekeeping mission while 4.7% % had participated in 3 to 5 missions. Basing on majority respondents, this implied that majority of the participants had experience in peacekeeping missions and thus were reliable in giving out information concerning peacekeeping capacity gaps.

4.4 Sources of Peacekeeping Capacity Gaps

This section covers the descriptive analysis of the research objectives. This highlights command and control, mission mandate and mission resource support if they are sources of capacity gap to AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central region, Somalia.

Table 4.8: Command and Control

| Statements | 5 % | 4 % | 3 % | 2 % | 1 % | Mean | St. Dev |
|---|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|----------------|
| The leadership of AMISOM commanders offer appropriate direction to the accomplishment of a mission | 14.3 | 1.6 | 20.6 | 38.9 | 24.6 | 2.42 | 1.124 |
| The decisions made by the AMISOM senior commanders are accomplished by the junior commanders and the troops on the ground | 17.5 | 25.4 | 35.7 | 11.9 | 9.5 | 3.02 | 1.173 |
| AMISOM commanders in Doble have the command authority over all peacekeepers in Doble | 7.9 | 46.0 | 23.8 | 15.9 | 6.3 | 3.33 | 1.043 |
| There is cooperation amongst contingent commanders and amongst various agencies on the ground | 19.0 | 11.9 | 6.3 | 28.6 | 34.1 | 2.53 | 1.127 |
| Command and control of AMISOM is affected by political figures in leadership roles | 32.5 | 31.0 | 16.7 | 15.9 | 3.2 | 3.74 | 1.170 |
| The commanders have sufficient abilities and knowledge to command and control AMISOM troops assigned to them | 4.8 | 30.2 | 45.2 | 11.1 | 8.7 | 3.11 | 0.973 |
| There is unity of command and control of the AMISOM troops | 32.0 | 14.3 | 3.2 | 39.2 | 49.2 | 1.92 | 1.177 |
| The commands issued by the commanders are clear and understandable | 11.1 | 15.1 | 31.7 | 35.7 | 6.3 | 2.44 | 1.187 |
| The AMISOM juniors always follow and obey the commands of their leaders | 15.1 | 37.3 | 19.8 | 19.8 | 7.9 | 3.34 | 1.170 |

Source: Research Data (2019)

Results from Table 4.8 shows that the leadership of AMISOM commanders does not offer appropriate direction to the accomplishment of a mission (mean=2.42). This view was supported by majority of participants (38.9%) who disagreed with the statement while 24.6% strongly disagreed. When asked whether the decisions made

by the AMISOM senior commanders are accomplished by the junior commanders and the troops on the ground, most of the participants neither agreed nor disagreed (mean=3.029). In particular, the participants (35.7%) were neutral on the statement.

As to whether AMISOM commanders in Dhobley have the command authority over all peacekeepers in the area, majority 46% of the participants agreed. Based on the mean index, it is easier to see that, AMISOM commanders in Dhobley had the command authority over all peacekeepers in Dhobley (mean =3.33). Regarding whether there is cooperation amongst contingent commanders and amongst various agencies on the ground, majority (34.1%) of the participants strongly disagreed while 28.6% disagreed. This was supported by the mean index of 2.53.

One senior commander noted that:

The problem here is that there is lack of cooperation amongst the TCCs. Each contingent wants to work in isolation. There should be intelligence sharing and combined unity of effort. This seems to be lacking as there is competition and suspicion amongst the contingents.

This view is further corroborated by Williams, 2017, who advises that the contingents should be working and cooperating with one another. This is key in defeating the militant group. Based on intelligence networks of the TCCs, they are able to preempt the militant's activities thus denying them freedom of action. Peace keeping operations are geared towards peace and stability of the host country. As envisaged by cosmopolitan theory, the Somalis should be protected from the predatory violence. The federal Government of Somalia (FGS) should be able to carry out its mandate. The peace keeping mission has a critical role in helping the FGS to establish a functional government.

It was noted that command and control of AMISOM is affected by political figures in leadership roles (mean=3.74). This was backed by majority (32.5%) of the respondents who strongly agreed and another 31% who agreed to the statement. In addition, it was established that most of the respondents were non-committal to the statement whether the commanders have sufficient abilities and knowledge to command and control AMISOM troops assigned to them (mean=3.11). In perspective of this, majority (45.2%) of the participants were neutral however there was also a small significant percentage 30.2% who agreed with the statement.

When the respondents were further asked whether there is unity of command and control of the AMISOM troops, majority (49.2%) strongly disagreed with the statement while another 39.2% disagreed. Concerning if the commands issued by the commanders are clear and understandable, the results showed that the commands issued by the commanders were not clear and understandable (mean=2.44). This view was supported by majority of participants (35.7%) who disagreed with the statement. However there were another significant percentage of the respondents 31.7% who were neutral.

Finally, it was noted that the AMISOM juniors always follow and obey the commands of their leaders (mean =3.34) as supported by 37.3% of the respondents who agreed and 15.1% who strongly agreed. Most of the variations were low and therefore did not affect the mean values substantially.

These findings indicated that command and control was a source of peacekeeping capacity gaps experienced by AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central Region, Somalia. The results of the interview guide that was answered by commanders on how is

command and control the source of capacity gap to AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central Region Somalia showed that there was no elaborate structure of command and control of the AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central Region Somalia. Moreover, some commanders were of the view that there was no unity of command and control of AMISOM troops. This contributes to peacekeeping capacity gaps.

An effective central command and control structure is vital for success, because during of the failed missions of the UNOSOM I and II, “planning remained divided between several departments” with “little systematic cooperation” and coordination between all of those involved in the mission (Bellamy et al. 2004). Because there are several actors involved in the planning and execution of a peacekeeping mission, it is critical to have effective command and control capabilities in place at the start of the mission. This means that both “vertical and horizontal integration throughout the intervening organization” is needed. (Gordon et al. 2001). When there are effective command and control capabilities in place, the peacekeepers would be able to make the mandate appropriate to the situation on the ground.

Table 4.9: Mission Mandate

| Statements | 5 % | 4 % | 3 % | 2 % | 1 % | Mean | St. Dev |
|---|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|----------------|
| The missions mandate of AMISOM is clear to all the soldiers and their commanders | 20.3 | 21.2 | 1.8 | 36.9 | 19.8 | 2.85 | 0.819 |
| The mission mandate is aligned to the realities of the conflict on the ground | 8.3 | 8.3 | 3.7 | 16.1 | 63.6 | 1.82 | 0.814 |
| The mission mandate keeps on changing | 54.1 | 17.3 | 0 | 13.4 | 15.2 | 3.51 | 1.053 |
| AMISOM troops have been able to reduce Al Shabaab threat and other Armed groups | 18.0 | 10.0 | 30.0 | 15.7 | 26.3 | 2.78 | 0.885 |
| AMISOM has enabled the gradual handing over security responsibilities to the Somali security forces contingent | 3.7 | 11.5 | 0 | 36.4 | 48.4 | 1.86 | 1.101 |
| AMISOM has secured key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabab, in particular those essential to improving humanitarian situation | 18.0 | 15.7 | 29.0 | 20.7 | 16.6 | 2.94 | 0.831 |
| AMISOM conducts joint operations with the Somali security forces and also contribute to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the FGS | 17.5 | 19.8 | 34.1 | 20.3 | 8.3 | 2.81 | 1.252 |
| AMISOM troops engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local population to allow for longer term stabilization by the UN country team and other actors. | 4.9 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 68.8 | 21.2 | 2.38 | 1.031 |
| AMISOM has offered appropriate protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of Government and security for key infrastructure | 0 | 33.3 | 23.3 | 43.0 | 0 | 2.86 | 0.937 |
| AMISOM has ensured the security and freedom of movement of its personnel as well as of UN personnel carrying out functions mandated by the security council | 6.7 | 20.0 | 30.0 | 36.7 | 6.7 | 2.83 | 1.062 |

Source: Research Data (2019)

In line with the descriptive results shown in Table 4.9, the study revealed that majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement that the missions' mandate of AMISOM is clear to all the soldiers and their commanders (mean =2.85). This view was backed by 56.7% of the respondents who when combined either disagreed or strongly disagreed.

In the same breath, majority were of opinion that the mission mandate was not aligned to the realities of the conflict on the ground (mean = 1.82). In this regard, 63.6% strongly disagreed with the statement. Majority respondents agreed with the statement that the mission mandate keeps on changing (mean =3.51) as supported by 54.1% of the respondents who agreed with the statement while 17.1% agreed with the statement.

Regarding whether AMISOM troops have been able to reduce Al Shabaab threat and other Armed groups, majority 30% were neutral however there was a significant percentage 26.3% who strongly disagreed with the statement. This was supported by a mean index of 2.78.

It is noticeable that majority strongly disagreed with the statement that AMISOM has enabled the gradual handing over security responsibilities to the Somali security forces contingent (mean= 1.86). Forty eight percent (48%) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement while 36.4% disagreed.

Regarding whether AMISOM has secured key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabab, in particular those essential to improving humanitarian situation, majority of the participants were neutral (mean = 2.94) with 29% of the respondents responding neutral. On the same note, majority of the respondents 34.1%

were neutral to the statement that AMISOM conducts joint operations with the Somali security forces and also contribute to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the FGS. This was backed by a mean index of 2.81.

When asked whether AMISOM troops did engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local population to allow for longer term stabilization by the UN country team and other actors, Majority (68.8%) disagreed with the statement. This was supported by a mean index of 2.38.

One private soldier pointed out that:

The AMISOM troops have done little to win the hearts and minds of the locals. The troops should engage the locals through various activities such as offering medical assistance to the locals, engaging them in sporting activities, help them rebuild the primary schools and other facilities on the need basis.

This view is supported by Fisher, 2019, who points out that success of the peace keeping operations lies with the locals. Therefore, the troops need to seek acceptance from the locals. For the good of FGS, troops should work together with the locals. As reinforced by the theory of realism, this is in line with national interest of Somalia.

It was further noticed that AMISOM has not offered appropriate protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of Government and security for key infrastructure (mean=2.86). This was supported by majority 43.3% of the respondents who disagreed with the statement.

On the last item of the variable it was noticed that majority 36.7% of the respondents were of indifferent opinion on the statement that AMISOM has ensured the security and freedom of movement of its personnel as well as of UN personnel carrying out functions mandated by the security council (mean=2.83) as supported by majority 36.7 % who disagreed with the statement.

Most of the variations were low and therefore did not affect the mean values substantially. These findings indicated that the mission mandate of AMISOM was not achieved and therefore it can be concluded that mission mandate was a source of peacekeeping capacity gaps in Doble, central region, Somalia

The findings of the interview guide on how is the mission mandate the source of capacity gap to AMISOM troops in Doble revealed that the mission mandate of the AMISOM is not clear and is not aligned to the realities of the conflict on the ground. Moreover, the mission mandate did not spell out criteria for distinguishing militia from innocent civilians. This makes different actors of the mission have different interpretations of the goals of the same mandate thus creating capacity gap.

One of the most important aspects of any peacekeeping operation is its mandate. Mandate of any UN mission outlines the objectives of the peace keeping operation. The achievement of those objectives is the most common way for people to measure if the mission was successful or not, so it is extremely important to have clear goals.

Table 4.10: Mission Resources Support

| Statements | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Mean | St. Dev |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| The number of AMISOM troops is adequate to accomplish the mission | 3.9 | 6.9 | 2.8 | 5.5 | 80.9 | 1.18 | 1.106 |
| The finances allocated for the Mission in Somalia is enough | 22.6 | 19.6 | 3.9 | 20.7 | 33.2 | 2.78 | 1.124 |
| The state of missions airlift capability is satisfactory | 0 | 10.3 | 30.4 | 50.2 | 9.1 | 2.40 | 0.814 |
| The logistical support is reliable and steady | 5.4 | 16.4 | 7.9 | 26.1 | 44.3 | 2.13 | 1.035 |
| Each of the AMISOM soldier have a proper personal weapon | 0 | 6.7 | 30.0 | 56.7 | 6.7 | 2.36 | 0.718 |
| AMISOM uses up to date military technology for its combat mission | 4.3 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 26.4 | 62.1 | 1.61 | 0.98 |
| The troop carrying vehicles are adequate and serviceable | 3.2 | 3.2 | 8.2 | 27.1 | 58.2 | 1.66 | 0.741 |
| AMISOM has better communication facilities that facilitates clear information in the operation field | 6.9 | 9.7 | 5.5 | 17.7 | 60.2 | 1.36 | 0.82 |
| AMISOM have equipment's that enable them fight Al shabaab at night | 9.2 | 10.9 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 74.4 | 1.48 | 1.051 |
| There are adequate munitions for all weapon types | 0 | 13.3 | 33.3 | 46.7 | 6.7 | 2.53 | 1.142 |
| The medical care provided to the AMISOM troops is satisfactory | 3.3 | 16.7 | 36.7 | 40.0 | 3.3 | 2.76 | 0.898 |
| AMISOM has an excellent intelligence architecture | 12.4 | 9.8 | 4.5 | 62.4 | 10.9 | 2.21 | 0.994 |

Source: Research Data (2019)

The study as shown in Table 4.10 established that majority (80.9%) of the respondents strongly disagreed that the number of AMISOM troops is adequate to accomplish the mission. Based on the mean index of 1.18, it is therefore easier to

deduce that most of the respondents felt that the number of AMISOM troops is inadequate to accomplish the mission.

With regard to whether the finances allocated for the Mission in Somalia is enough, (33.2%) of the respondents strongly disagreed while 20.7% disagreed. In accordance with the mean index of 2.78, it is therefore easier to derive that the finances allocated for the Mission in Somalia is not enough.

In general, when the respondents were asked to indicate whether the state of missions airlift capability is satisfactory, majority disagreed (mean = 2.40). In particular, (50.2%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement. Majority (44.3%) of the respondents disagreed that the logistical support is reliable and steady. On whether each of the AMISOM soldier have a proper personal weapon, majority 56.7% disagreed with the statement. This meant clearly meant that each of the AMISOM soldier did not have a proper personal weapon (Mean=2.36).

It was further established from the results that the AMISOM does not use up to date military technology for its combat mission (mean= 1.61). In particular, (62.1%) of the respondents strongly disagreed that the AMISOM uses up to date military technology for its combat mission.

Most of the respondents were of the opinion that the troop carrying vehicles are inadequate and not serviceable (mean =1.66). Specifically, 58.2% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. Similarly, AMISOM does not have better communication facilities that facilitates clear information in the operation field (mean =1.36). This view was supported by 60.2% who strongly disagreed with the statement.

One middle level commander rejoined:

AMISOM troops are inadequately equipped. Some militants have more superior weapons than the AMISOM troops. Currently, we don't have attack helis, there are no enough armoured personnel carriers (APCs), powerful machine guns nor Mine Clearance Vehicles. There are no utility aircrafts. These pose a lot of challenges to troops.

The respondent's view corresponds with Rivera, 2017, who points out that troops lack sophisticated mortar radar system, which could have helped it reduce levels of civilian casualties. When troops lack basic equipment such as APCs, then soldier become too vulnerable to IED attacks and ambushes. Despite the level of training of the soldiers, they cannot beat the contemporary insurgency without such kind of equipment.. The modern militia groups are more equipped than even some national armies.

Additionally, the participants were of the view that AMISOM have no equipment's that can enable them fight Al Shabaab at night (mean=1.48) as supported by majority 74.3% of the respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement that with the resources it has, AMISOM is capable of fighting at night.

Moreover, there are no adequate munitions for all weapon types (mean = 2.53) as supported by 46.7% of the respondents who disagreed to the statement. However, there was significant percentage 33.3% who were neutral to the statement. Majority of the respondents also held that the medical care provided to the AMISOM troops was not satisfactory (mean = 2.76). This was supported by 40% of the respondents who disagreed to the statement.

On whether AMISOM has excellent intelligence architecture, majority of the respondents were of different opinion (mean= 2.21) as supported by 62.4% of the

respondents who disagreed to the statement. Most of the variations were low and therefore did not affect the mean values substantially.

These findings indicated that AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central Region, Somalia did not have adequate mission resource support to combat the Al Shabaab and other militant groups in the region. The data indicated mission resource support is a source of peacekeeping capacity gap to AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central Region, Somalia

The findings agree with that of Fisher, 2019, who found out that AMISOM the mission lacks enough resource support to carry out its mandate. The equipment issued to peacekeepers during the deployment is key in determining the success of a mission. It is noted that adequate resources, including staff, equipment and finances must be present and readily available for a mission to be a success (Matheson, 2006). Troops must be issued with the equipment suitable for the task on the ground. However it is noted that peacekeeping operations are quite expensive, (for example, the mission in Somalia cost \$1.6 billion). Low funding can also jeopardize the command and control capabilities, because the mission becomes understaffed (Gordon et al. 2001). Resources, both physical and monetary, are therefore critical to a mission's success because the troops must be adequately equipped and the missions adequately staffed.

Table 4.11: Peacekeeping Capacity Gaps

| Statements | 5 % | 4 % | 3 % | 2 % | 1 % | Mean | STD |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|------------|
| The African Mission in Somali is losing direction | 18.0 | 15.7 | 29.0 | 16.6 | 20.7 | 2.94 | 1.151 |
| There is persistent Al Shaabab pressure | 36.6 | 53.5 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 1.4 | 4.19 | 0.892 |
| There is continuing instability in Somalia | 32.0 | 52.1 | 5.6 | 7.1 | 2.8 | 4.04 | 0.901 |
| There is continuous increase in the flow of guns in Somalia | 18.1 | 15.3 | 44.2 | 10.3 | 12.1 | 2.72 | 1.174 |
| Smuggling of goods is still experienced in the borders between Kenya and Somalia | 32.4 | 53.3 | 6.0 | 7.0 | 0 | 4.14 | 1.015 |
| Al Shabaab and other militants groups are able to operate between the borders of Kenya and Somalia | 29.6 | 42.3 | 2.8 | 23.9 | 1.4 | 3.75 | 1.243 |

Source: Research Data (2019)

The study, according to the results illustrated in Table 4.11, found that majority of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed that the African Mission in Somali is losing direction (mean= 2.94) as supported by majority 29% of the respondents who were neutral to the statement.

The respondents were of the opinion that there is persistent Al Shaabab pressure (mean= 4.19). This is supported by 90.4% of the respondents who either agreed or strongly agreed. The respondents were in agreement on the statement that “There is continuing instability in Somalia” (mean= 4.04) as supported by 84.1% of the respondents.

Further findings established that Al Shabaab and other militants groups are still able to operate between the borders of Kenya and Somalia (mean=3.75) as supported by as

supported by 71.9% of the combined respondent who either agreed or strongly agreed. Generally the peacekeeping mission in Doble, central region, Somalia according to the results in Table 4.11 has capacity gaps.

The results of the interview guide on what measures can be put in place to enhance peacekeeping capacity in Somalia showed that majority of the commanders were of the view that there should be drafting of a clear and achievable mandate; there should be deployment of peacekeepers from neutral countries with no interest in Somalia and there should be training of peacekeepers on command and control in irregular wars/terror war. The commanders were also of the view that there should be resourcing of troops with adequate fighting equipment's and the number of troop's increased.

4.5 Inferential Statistics Findings

The study sought to establish the relationship between sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps (that is, command and control, mission mandate and mission resource support) and peacekeeping capacity gaps in Doble, central region, Somalia. In addition, the study analyzed the influence of the mentioned sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps. Both Pearson's correlation and multiple regression analyses were conducted to this effect.

4.5.1 Results of Correlation Analysis

The results of Pearson's correlation analysis illustrated the relationship between predictor variables (sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps) and the dependent variable (peacekeeping capacity gaps). The pertinent results are as shown in Tables 4.12 to 4.14.

Table 4.12: Relationship between Command and Control and Peacekeeping Capacity Gaps

| | | Peacekeeping capacity gaps |
|--|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Command and control | Pearson Correlation | .415** |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .022 |
| | N | 179 |
| **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). | | |

Source: Research Data (2019)

The study revealed (Table 4.12) that there was a positive, moderate and statistically significant relationship between command and control and peacekeeping capacity gaps ($r = 0.415$; $p < 0.05$). The results were interpreted to imply that as the command and control were effective, peacekeeping capacity improved. A decrease in effective command and control was bound to occasion peacekeeping capacity gaps. In this respect, it is advisable for AMISOM leadership to provide better and effective command and control strategies in order for them to have a successful mission.

Table 4.13: Relationship between Mission Mandated and Peacekeeping Capacity Gaps

| | | Peacekeeping capacity gaps |
|--|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Mission mandate | Pearson Correlation | .427** |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .018 |
| | N | 179 |
| **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). | | |

Source: Research Data (2019)

As shown in Table 4.13, the study established that there existed a positive, moderate, and statistically significant relationship between mission mandate and peacekeeping capacity gaps in Doble, central region, Somalia ($r = 0.427$; $p < 0.05$). The results were

interpreted to mean as mission mandated are clear and supported by all the stakeholders, peacekeeping capacity improves moderately, and the reverse was equally true. In order to improve peacekeeping capacity mission mandate should be clear and understandable to all the stakeholders.

Table 4.14: Relationship between Mission resource support and Peacekeeping Capacity Gaps

| | | Peacekeeping capacity gap |
|--|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| Mission resources support | Pearson Correlation | .607** |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .001 |
| | N | 179 |
| **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). | | |

Source: Research Data (2019)

The results as shown in Table 4.14 revealed that the relationship between mission resource support and peacekeeping capacity gaps was positive, strong and statistically significant ($r = -0.607$; $p < 0.05$). The results implied that as the mission resources support increased, the higher the chances of reducing peacekeeping capacity gaps in Dhobley, central region, Somalia. In this regard, it is evident that in order to enhance peacekeeping capacity, there is need to provide enough resources in terms of number of troops, better equipment and adequate funding.

4.5.2 Results of Regression Analysis

The study examined the sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps, a case of AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central Region, Somalia. As shown in Table 4.15, the general relationship (R) between the aforesaid sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps and peacekeeping capacity gaps was determined. In addition, the study analyzed the

coefficient of determination (R^2) with the view of establishing the extent to which the predictor variables explained variation in peacekeeping capacity gaps

Table 4.15: Model Summary

| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|---|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 | .781 ^a | .609 | .585 | .1004 |
| a. Predictors: (Constant), Command and control, mission mandate, mission resource support | | | | |

Source: Research Data (2019)

As shown in Table 4.15, it was established that there existed a positive and strong relationship between the sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps (Command and control, mission mandate, mission resource support) and peacekeeping capacity gaps ($R = 0.781$). The results indicated in Table 4.16 shows that the aforesaid relationship was found to be statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). In addition, it was revealed that the aforesaid determinants could explain 58.5% variance in peacekeeping capacity gaps in Dhobley, Central Region, Somalia ($R = 0.585$).

Table 4.16: Analysis of Variance

| Model | | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
|--|------------|----------------|-----|-------------|--------|-------------------|
| 1 | Regression | 0.7899 | 3 | 0.2633 | 26.069 | .000 ^a |
| | Residual | 1.7696 | 175 | .0101 | | |
| | Total | 2.5595 | 178 | | | |
| a. Predictors: (Constant), command and control, mission mandate, mission resources support | | | | | | |
| b. Dependent Variable: Peacekeeping capacity gaps | | | | | | |

Source: Research Data (2019)

The results of analysis of variance depicted in Table 4.16 illustrate that the regression model shown below was statistically significant ($F = 26.069$; $p < 0.05$). The results

justified the suitability of the model in examining the sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps.

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon$$

Where;

y = Peacekeeping Capacity gap

β_0 = Constant

X_1 = Command and Control

X_2 = Mission mandate

X_3 = Mission resource support

b_1 to b_3 , are the coefficients of the variables

e = the estimated error of the regression model

Table 4.17: Regression Coefficients

| Model | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------|------|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| 1 (Constant) | .346 | .100 | | .532 | .431 |
| Command and Control | .181 | .085 | .249 | 2.120 | .039 |
| Mission mandate | .226 | .103 | .252 | 2.199 | .033 |
| Mission resources | .316 | .090 | .423 | 3.517 | .001 |

a. Dependent Variable: Peacekeeping capacity gaps

Source: Research Data (2019)

The results of regression analysis shown in Table 4.17 were used to interpret the regression model as illustrated hereunder.

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon$$

$$Y = 0.346 + 0.181X_1 + 0.226X_2 + 0.316X_3$$

It was revealed that for peacekeeping capacity gaps to increase by one unit, then there should be an effect of 0.181 unit, 0.226 unit, and 0.316 unit changes in command and control, mission mandate and mission resources support respectively while holding other factors which were not part of this study constant ($\beta_0 = 0.346$). According to the results, it is evident that mission resource support contributes highly as a source of peacekeeping capacity gaps followed by mission mandate and lastly is command and control. It is thus imperative for the leadership of AMISOM to put more emphasis on mission resource support such as increasing the number of troops and investing heavily in up to date military technology in order to be successful in the mission.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, a summary of findings resulting from both descriptive and inferential analyses is presented. The conclusions drawn and recommendations thereof are also presented in the chapter. The summary, conclusions and recommendations are in line with the study objectives.

5.2 Summary of Findings

This section contains the summary of findings presented and discussed in the preceding chapter. The purpose of this study was to evaluate AMISOM troops influence on peace keeping in Dhobley District, Central Region, Somalia. It specifically sought to examine effectiveness of command and control of AMISOM troops in Dhobely; assess the relevance of mission mandate and evaluate the adequacy of mission resource support for the AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central region, Somalia. The summary is presented in terms of the objectives of the study.

Regarding the first objective of the study on the effectiveness of command and control on AMISOM troops in Dhobley, Central region, Somalia, the findings revealed that the leadership of AMISOM commanders did not offer appropriate direction to the accomplishment of the mission. There was no cooperation amongst contingent commanders and amongst various agencies on the ground. The study further established that there was no unity of command and control of the AMISOM troops and also the command and control of AMISOM was affected by political figures in leadership role.

On the relevance of mission mandate for the peacekeeping operations, the findings revealed that the missions' mandate of AMISOM is not clear to all the soldiers and their commanders. It was found out that the mission mandate was not aligned to the realities of the conflict on the ground. Also noticeable is that AMISOM has not enabled the gradual handing over security responsibilities to the Somali security forces contingent and further to this AMISOM has not completely secured key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabab, in particular those essential to improving humanitarian situation. The mission mandate of AMISOM keeps on changing too frequently. It was also established that AMISOM has not offered appropriate protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of Government and security for key infrastructure and it has not ensured the security and freedom of movement of its personnel as well as of UN personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council.

Concerning the adequacy of mission resource support it was evident that the number of AMISOM troops was inadequate to accomplish the mission, the finances allocated for the Mission in Somalia is not enough and the logistical support is not reliable and steady. The study also found that AMISOM does not use up to date military technology for its combat mission. Further to this, it was found that AMISOM has no better communication facilities that would facilitate clear information in the operation field and also lacked equipment's that could enable them fight at night. Moreover, they lack adequate munitions for all weapon types. The findings also revealed that AMISOM did not have excellent intelligence architecture.

5.3 Conclusions of the Study

The study made several conclusions pertinent to sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps to AMISOM troops in Somalia.

The study concluded that an effective central command and control structure is vital for mission success. When there are effective command and control capabilities in place, the peacekeepers would be able to accomplish tasks given.

In respect to mission mandate, the study concluded that the achievement of the mission objectives is the most common way for people to measure if the mission was successful or not, and so it is extremely important to have clear goals. The study also concluded that different interpretations by different actors may lead to losing direction of the mission.

The study concluded that adequate mission resources, including staff, equipment and finances must be present and readily available for a mission to be a success.

5.4 Recommendations of the Study

The study made several recommendations emanating from the conclusions drawn from the study findings. With respect to command and control, the study recommended that leadership of the military should always offer appropriate direction to the accomplishment of a mission. In the same breadth, it is advisable for military leaders to increase their skills and knowledge on counter terrorism so as to have proper command and control of their troops.

It is recommended that, all the stakeholders of peacekeeping missions should have clear goals of a peace keeping mission before they start an operation. All the actors

should have a similar interpretation of the problem on the ground in order to steer the mission on the right direction.

Finally, the study recommends that in any peacekeeping mission, resources either in terms of personnel, finances or equipment's should always be made available in adequate amounts. This will facilitate the operation and thus the mission mandate will be achieved.

5.5 Recommendation for Further Research

The purpose of this study was to examine the AMISOM troops influence on peace keeping operations in Dhobley District, Central Region, Somalia. The following area is, therefore, recommended for further research; the role of leadership in enhancing peacekeeping capacity.

5.5.1 Recommendation for Policy formulation

The African Union should come up with a policy requiring participation of stake holders including all troop contributing countries from the beginning to the end of the planning process. Thereafter come up with a committee whose membership includes stake holders and Troop Contributing countries tasked with reviewing the mission progress and making necessary recommendations.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Letter to the Respondent.

Joel Muriungi

Kenyatta University

Nakuru campus

Dear respondent,

I am Joel Muriungi, a student of Kenyatta University, Nakuru campus pursuing a Master of Arts degree in peace and conflict management undertaking this research project “Assessing the sources of Peacekeeping capacity gaps: a case of AMISOM troops in Doble, Central region, Somalia”.

All information given will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will be used for academic purposes only. Any help will be fully appreciated. Thank you in advance.

Yours faithfully

Joel Muriungi

Appendix II: Questionnaire

The questions below are for the purpose of examining the sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps, a case of AMISOM troops in Doble Central Region, Somalia. Your view as reflected in this survey is essential to this investigation and will be held in privacy. Hence, you are requested to fill this survey in the most free and legit way that could be available.

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Kindly state your gender?

Male Female

2. In what age bracket do you belong?

18-25years 26-35 years
36-45 years 46-55 years
Over 55 years

3. What is your highest academic qualification?

Postgraduate Bachelor's Degree
Diploma High school

4. How many years have you served in the military?

1-5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years
15-20 ears Over 20 years

5. How many peacekeeping missions have you participated in?

Only 1 2-3 4-5

Kindly state the missions which you have participated in?

SECTION B: COMMAND AND CONTROL

This sub section has statement related to command and control in relation to peace keeping capacity gaps. Please respond to the following statements by ticking in the appropriate column. The different columns indicate Strongly Agree (SA); Agree (A); Neutral (N); Disagree (D); and Strongly Disagree (SD) represented by 5,4,3,2 and 1 respectively.

| Statements | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| The leadership of AMISOM commanders offer appropriate direction to the accomplishment of a mission | | | | | |
| The decisions made by the AMISOM senior commanders are accomplished by the junior commanders and the troops on the ground | | | | | |
| AMISOM commanders in Doble have the command authority over all peacekeepers in Doble | | | | | |
| There is cooperation amongst contingent commanders and amongst various agencies on the ground | | | | | |
| Command and control of AMISOM is affected by political figures in leadership roles | | | | | |
| The commanders have sufficient abilities and knowledge to command and control AMISOM troops assigned to them | | | | | |
| There is unity of command and control of the AMISOM troops | | | | | |
| The commands issued by the commanders are clear and understandable | | | | | |
| The AMISOM juniors always follow and obey the commands of their leaders | | | | | |

SECTION C: MISSION MANDATE

This sub section has statement related to mission mandate in relation to peace keeping capacity gaps. Please respond to the following statements by ticking in the appropriate column. The different columns indicate Strongly Agree (SA); Agree (A); Neutral (N); Disagree (D); and Strongly Disagree (SD) represented by 5,4,3,2 and 1 respectively.

| Statements | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| The missions mandate of AMISOM is clear to all the soldiers and their commanders | | | | | |
| The mission mandate is aligned to the realities of the conflict on the ground | | | | | |
| The mission mandate keeps on changing | | | | | |
| AMISOM troops have been able to reduce Al Shabaab threat and other Armed groups | | | | | |
| AMISOM has enabled the gradual handing over security responsibilities to the Somali security forces contingent | | | | | |
| AMISOM has secured key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabab, in particular those essential to improving humanitarian situation | | | | | |
| AMISOM conducts joint operations with the Somali security forces and also contribute to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the FGS | | | | | |
| AMISOM troops engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local population to allow for longer term stabilization by the UN country team and other actors. | | | | | |
| AMISOM has offered appropriate protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of Government and security for key infrastructure | | | | | |
| AMISOM has ensured the security and freedom of movement of its personnel as well as of UN personnel carrying out functions mandated by the security council | | | | | |

SECTION D: MISSION RESOURCE SUPPORT

This sub section has statement related to mission resource support in relation to peace keeping capacity gaps. Please respond to the following statements by ticking in the appropriate column. The different columns indicate Strongly Agree (SA); Agree (A); Neutral (N); Disagree (D); and Strongly Disagree (SD) represented by 5,4,3,2 and 1 respectively.

| Statements | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| The number of AMISOM troops is adequate to accomplish the mission | | | | | |
| The finances allocated for the Mission in Somalia is enough | | | | | |
| The state of missions airlift capability is satisfactory | | | | | |
| The logistical support is reliable and steady | | | | | |
| Each of the AMISOM soldier have a proper personal weapon | | | | | |
| The AMISOM uses up to date military technology for its combat mission | | | | | |
| The troop carrying vehicles are adequate and serviceable | | | | | |
| AMISOM has better communication facilities that facilitates clear information in the operation field | | | | | |
| With the resources it has, AMISOM is capable of fighting at night | | | | | |
| There are adequate munitions for all weapon types | | | | | |
| The medical care provided to the AMISOM troops is satisfactory | | | | | |
| AMISOM has an excellent intelligence architecture | | | | | |

SECTION E: PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY GAPS

The statement below relates to the peacekeeping capacity gaps. Please respond to the following statements by ticking in the appropriate column. The different columns indicate Strongly Agree (SA); Agree (A); Neutral (N); Disagree (D); and Strongly Disagree (SD) represented by 5,4,3,2 and 1 respectively.

| Statements | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| The African Mission in Somali is losing direction | | | | | |
| There is persistent Al Shaabab pressure | | | | | |
| There is continuing instability in Somalia | | | | | |
| There is continuous increase in the flow of guns in Somalia | | | | | |
| Smuggling of goods is still experienced in the borders between Kenya and Somalia | | | | | |
| Al Shabaab and other militants groups are able to operate between the borders of Kenya and Somalia | | | | | |

Thank you for your time and Cooperation

Appendix III: Interview Guide for Commanders

This interview guide is to collect data for purely academic purposes. The study seeks to find out the **Sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps, a case of AMISOM troops in Doble, Central Region, Somalia**. All information will be treated with strict confidence.

Sources of peacekeeping capacity gaps

1. How is command and control the source of capacity gap to AMISOM troops in Doble, Central region Somalia?

2. How is the mission mandate the source of capacity gap to AMISOM troops in Doble, Central region Somalia?

3. How is the mission resource support the source of capacity gap to AMISOM troops in Doble, Central region Somalia?

4. What are the measures that can be put in place to enhance peacekeeping capacity in Somalia Region?

Thank you for your cooperation

Appendix IV: Authorization letter from NACOSTI

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