INFLUENCE OF INTERFAITH MEDIATION CENTRE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT IN BAUCHI STATE NIGERIA: 1960-2015

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been submitted to any other institution for examination purposes. Any quotation has been referenced accordingly.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents Malam Saleh Mai Goro Gumau and late Fatima Saleh (Nanna) who taught me that the best kind of knowledge is one which is acquired for its own sake. It is also dedicated to my siblings who always reminded me that even the largest task can be accomplished when I take one step at a time. You have been a great source of motivation and inspiration. Your kindness and selflessness cannot be forgotten.

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ABSTRACT

Conflict among social groups is one of the major challenges affecting peaceful coexistence in the world. In Africa, particularly Nigeria, conflicts are associated with religion, ethnicity, and post-election violence which result in adverse effects on people and their livelihood. Nigeria has witnessed conflicts like Kaduna crisis, Jos crisis, and Bauchi State crisis. Bauchi State has experienced conflicts between herdsmen and farmers as compared to other states in Nigeria. The prevalence of conflict in Bauchi State has caused a public outcry. The conflicts have disrupted the local economy in general and agricultural production in particular. The resultant effects are high rate of crime, hunger, poverty and corruption among other sufferings. Therefore, these crises have adversely affected human security and economic development in Bauchi State. In line with that, this study investigated the influence of the Interfaith Mediation Centre in the management of conflict in Bauchi State, Nigeria with specific focus on the factors that led to the establishment of IMC, the activities of IMC in Management of conflict between herdsmen and farmers, and the role of IMC in post electoral conflict management in Bauchi State, Nigeria. The study was guided by the peace building theory by John Paul Lederach. Lederach argues that conflict societies are divided into three levels of actors: the top level, middle level and grass root level of leaderships. He assumed that it is the middle level of actors that influences the other actors in promoting or mediating peace within the conflict zone. This study adopted a descriptive research design based on semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. The researcher used purposive sampling technique to select the respondents from the Interfaith Mediation Centre, Christians Muslims Peace Movement officials operating in Bauchi, stakeholders, community leaders, Imams and Church leaders. Both primary and secondary sources of data were used to extract data. The data obtained from the field was subjected to thematic content analysis through interpretation and transcription in line with the objectives of the study. The study findings revealed that the Interfaith Mediation Centre has demonstrated its readiness towards fostering mediation, reconciliation and dialogue between community members of different faiths in Bauchi State, Nigeria. The findings also indicated that the Interfaith Mediation Centre promotes voter's sensitisation as well as media involvement towards managing electoral violence. The study is important as it enriches the historiography of conflict management not only in Bauchi State but also in other states across Nigeria and beyond. Therefore, the study concluded that interfaith mediation centre has been effective in mitigating Violence conflict in Bauchi State. Thus, the study recommends that interfaith mediation centre should be strengthened financially to carry out its functions hitch-free; report on dialogue should be utilized.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Conflict: The term 'conflict' refers to disagreement between two parties.

Conflict Management: Conflict management is considered to be an effort put in place by the participating parties in mediating conflicts.

Conflict Transformation: refers to an effort to produce change from destructive to constructive atmosphere where harmony of peaceful coexistence is achieved within a conflict zone.

Dialogue: An exchange of ideas or opinions on a particular issues especially political or religious issue, with a view to reaching an amicable agreement.

Ethno Religious Conflict: Conflict among two ethnic groups or religions within a particular society or communities.

Inter-Communal Conflict: Disagreement between opposing parties within a particular community or state.

Interfaith: In this study, interfaith refers to cooperative, constructive and positive interaction between people of different religious and spiritual beliefs within a particular community or society for the purpose of resolving conflicts.

Mediation: In this study, mediation is referred to an effort describing mediators' behaviour specifically in terms of role and tactics that seek to achieve in conflict management.

Negotiation: In this study, negotiation is a bargaining process between two or more parties seeking to come on a common ground and reach an agreement to settle a matter of mutual concern or resolve a conflict within a community at large.

Non-Governmental Organisation: in this study Non-governmental organisations involved private groups or individuals in mediating conflicting parties to achieve peaceful coexistences.

Peace Building: In this study peace building is the ability to create a structure of peace that is based on justice, equity, and cooperation within the conflict zone. Peace building involves strategic actions aimed at changing the situation of conflict to peaceful relationship and social change in the society.

Political Violence: Violence perpetrated by people in order to achieve political goals. It can also be described as politically motivated violence by non-state actors against a state.

Reconciliation: A process in which two or more peoples or groups become friendly again after they quarrelled within the conflict zone.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACN	Action Congress of Nigeria
AFAN	All Farmers Association of Nigeria
ANPP	All Nigerian People Party
APC	All Progressive Congress
CEPAN	Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CMPM	Christian Muslim Peace Movement
CMMRC	Conflict Mitigation Management Regional Council
CON	Commonwealth of Nations
CPAN	Community Peace Action Network
CPC	Congress for Progressive Change
CPCC	Community Peace Coordination Centre
CPOs	Community Peace Observers
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DPO	Division Police Officer
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERS	Electoral Reform Committee
EWS	Early Warning System
EWER	Early Warning and Early response
FBOs	Faith-Based Organisations
FCS	Fellowship of Christian Students
FOMWAN	Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria
FGD	Focus Group Discussion

GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GIDPP	Global Internally Displaced Person Project
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IMC	Interfaith Mediation Centre
INEC	Independence National Electoral Commission
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IPL	International Peace League
IRI	International Republic Institute
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
JAC	Join Action Committee
JAPC	Join Action Plan Committee
JNI	Jama'atul Nasrul Islam
KII	Key Informants
LGA	Local Government Area
MACBAN	Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria
MCDF	Muslim Christian Dialogue Forum
MSS	Muslims Students Society
NACOMYO	National Council for Muslim Youth Organisation
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NCNC	National Council of Nigerian Citizens
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NEPU	Northern Element Progressive Union
NEVR	Nigeria Electoral Violence Report

NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
NHRC	National Human Right Commission
NIPSS	National Institute for Policy of Strategic Studies
NIREC	Nigeria inter-Religious Council
NNDP	Nigeria National Democratic Party
NPB	Network for Peace Builders
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NPC	National Peace Observers
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
PDP	People Democratic Party
PCP	Public Conversion Projects
PLAC	Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre
SCG	Search for Common Ground
SDP	Social Democracy Party
SMC	Supreme Military Council
SMS	Short Message Services
TMG	Transition Monitoring Group
TOT	Training of Trainers
TUC	Trade Union Congress
UMASS	University of Massachusetts Boston
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programs
UNICEF	United Nations International Children Emergency Fund

UPF	Universal Peace Federation
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance
US	United States
USAID	United State Agency for International Development
USIP	United State Institute for Peace
YCAN	Youth Christians Association of Nigeria
YFWP	Youth Federation for World Peace
WOWICAN	Women Wing of Christian Association of Nigeria
WWC	Women Wing Can

GLOSSARY

Eid Fitr	Muslim festival marking the end of the fast of Ramadan
Fadama	Riverine and valley bottom
Fatwar	Preaching
Fulbe	Fulani ethnic group
Hakimi	Village Head
Hausa	Ethnic group
Iftar	Breaking of Fast
Imam	Islamic Leader
Labi	Cattle Routes
Ruga	Fulani Encampment
Maiunguwa	Community Head
Malam	Teacher
Pidgin	Local Variant of English
Sara- Suka	A Group of Gangsters
ZauranSulhu	Mediation Tent

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the background to the study, the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions and premises. It also covers the justification and significance of the study as well as the scope and limitations. The chapter further reviews the study topic-related literature and presents the theoretical framework that guided the study. The chapter concludes with the details of the methodologies that were applied in the study.

1.1 Background to the Study

Globally, The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) within the area of inter-religious dialogue encourage open exchange and interaction between different groups of people, cultural and religious backgrounds, with the aims of creating a peaceful society (UNESCO, Final Declaration, 2003). Moreover, the inter-religious mediation groups played a leading role in conflict resolution and building on past efforts to mobilize political and religious leaders to increase dialogue across religious divisions. They use their resources to establish peace forces, fostering favourable environments for negotiations and strengthening weak peace processes.

Faith-Based Organizations have a unique position in being able to access and mobilize faith communities. Through sermons and preaching, they can reach out to a large number of people with relative ease. The religious actors have access to both grassroots communities and high-level leaders in promoting peace. Moreover, religious actors mobilize international and local communities in mediating conflict parties (Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009).

Evans-Kent and Bleiker (2003) argue that the role of Faith-Based Organisations (FBO) in promoting the peace process in Herzegovina and Bosnia achieved a vital development even though many challenges were faced in the process of managing the conflict among conflicting parties. Religious organisations have been noted to have played a role as intermediary in negotiating local and sectional violence in managing the conflict in East Asia countries (Bercovitchet. al, 2009).

Faith-based organisations in former Yugoslavia were faced with serious challenges in terms of autonomy from their mother churches (Sterland & Beauclerk, 2008). They primarily provided a public relations function for the church, by dispersing relief items and providing food and shelter, without contributing overly much to peace building. The Interreligious Coordinating Council in Israel brings more than sixty faith-based organisations together to facilitate mediation and other sacred texts, which can promote greater understanding (Flanigan, 2013).

Caritas Nepal carried out inter-faith reconciliation through community projects, including providing the building materials for Hindus and Muslims to construct houses together to promote the culture of peace (Owen & King, 2013). In African countries such as Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan religious interfaith groups play an important role in managing violent conflicts (Haynes, 2007). Particularly, Protestant and Catholic religious communities have been involved in several conflict management processes (Smock, 2006).

In Jos, Nigeria, after violence in 2001, many organizations participated or established seminars for peace building and dialogue. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) organized meetings between Christians and Muslims, participated in

inter-faith seminars and built a dialogue with Muslim counterparts (Best & Rakodi, 2011). The Islamic organization Jamatul Nasril Islam led Christian-Muslim dialogue and participated in all the peace committees organized by the government (Best & Rakodi, 2011).

The Heinrich Boll Foundation also organized workshops in Kaduna after the outbreak of the Sharia crises in that area. They have programmes that encourage partnership across the religious divide by supporting economic empowerment activities of inter-religious women's groups within conflict communities. Apart from their peace initiatives, they have also participated as resource persons in different parts of the Northern region, building a network of religions to achieve peace. They were also facilitators on forgiveness and reconciliation between and among religious groups (Omotosho, 2014).

There are several longstanding inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic disputes among various communities across Ghana. In the Volta Region alone, four main conflict areas have been identified. They are the Nkonya/Alavanyo, Nkwanta, Peki/Tsito and Abutia Kpota conflicts (Dzodi, 2004). In the Northern Region, there are longstanding often violent inter-ethnic conflicts between the Gonja and the Konkomba and between Dagombas and Konkomba. Land-use conflicts have been a source of violence between Fulani herdsmen and local farmers in the Northern parts of Ghana. While essentially it has always been about land use, this class of conflict is manifested as an ethnic conflict between locals and migrants.

 In the Central Region, there are also disturbances arising from the activities of itinerant hunters accused of destroying crops by local farmers. Conflicts over other

resources have often been generated by decisions related to decentralisation while religious conflicts are not on the scale of other countries in the West African sub-region; there are longstanding religious conflicts, involving intra- and inter-ethnic rivalries that periodically break into violence. There have been violent incidences among Muslims, especially in the Northern, Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo regions. In 1996, a religious clash between Kotokoli and Dagomba at the Akim Oda Zongo resulted in six deaths, ten houses and destruction of property worth millions of cedis (Dzodzi, 2004).

A violent conflict engulfed Kenya after a dispute over the results of the December 2007 presidential elections. The dispute between the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki, and the opposition led by Raila Odinga, triggered violence and a political crisis in which over 1, 100 people were killed and over half a million others were displaced (Kanyinga, 2008). By January 2008, urban riots in Kisumu and Nairobi gradually died down and the violence was transferred to other areas where different ethnic communities cohabited; Nakuru town and its suburbs, then the Naivasha horticultural belt and finally the north-western suburb of Nairobi and the large coffee plantations in Central Province.

In urban centres, the violence affected small traders especially the Kikuyu, while in the rural areas its target was small "outsider" landowners. First, the violence was accompanied by looting and secondly, it involved destroying homes of "outsiders", who in some cases had been residents since the 1960s (Jerome, 2008). On 15th January 2008, 650,000 people were classified as internally displaced and received at

police posts, schools, show grounds and stadia while 6,000 others, three-quarters of which were Kikuyus, fled to Uganda for refuge.

Religious actors play vital roles in conflict management: they serve as educators; negotiators; intermediaries and mediators (Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). Haynes (2009) digests the main contributions of Faith-Based Organisations to conflict management which include effective peace sensitization to communities affected by conflict, emotional and spiritual support to war-affected communities; negotiation between conflicting parties; and reconciliation.

The ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria emphasize the role of the state as the regulator of competition among the diverse ethnic groups as well as the guarantor of security (Osaghae, 2007:171). The inability of the state to effectively perform its core functions of providing or guaranteeing security for the people as well as acting as a regulator has led to a weakening of its bargaining strength and capacity concerning the ethnic and religious groups in society, which poses a serious challenge to national security (Kwaja, 2008).

Religious tension in different parts of the country has threatened the survival of the Nigerian state, and the federal government is slow in stemming the religious violence that engulfs the country. When a government fails its people, they turn elsewhere to protect themselves and their futures (Omotosho, 2014). Between February-May 2000 over 1,000 people died in rioting over the introduction of Sharia in Kaduna State alone. On 28 February 2000, hundreds of ethnic Hausa were killed in reprisal attacks in Aba, Abia State, Nigeria (Igbokwe, 2000).

In 2001, over 2,000 people were killed and thousands displaced in religious violence that spread across the Middle-Belt states of Benue, Plateau, Taraba, and Nasarawa (Christian Solidarity Worldwide 2012). The outbreak of a religious crisis in the town of Jos, the capital of Plateau State and a city surrounded by beautiful hills, created pandemonium in the Middle Belt geo-political zone. The ironic thing is that Plateau State calls itself 'The Home of Peace and Tourism' in Nigeria (Kwaja 2008; & Counted 2009).

The outbreak of conflicts between Ethno-religious groups and its persistence over time has affected the socio-economic and political life of the people in Bauchi State. Recent study has indicated that the Bauchi state is notorious as far as conflicts are concerned in Nigeria. According to Adamu (2016), social conflict and its flashpoints in Bauchi State have manifested itself in various conflict forms such as ethno religious, communal, sectarian and political conflicts among others. Socio-economic and political conflict is the worst and endemic resulting in a devastating impact on state and society.

From the above discussion, it can be divulged that even though there have been some studies on Interfaith Mediation Centres impact on conflict management in Northern part of Nigeria, a comprehensive investigation was important to be undertaken in Bauchi State. This owes to the limited literature that exists on Bauchi that has often been on the limelight when it comes to incidences of conflicts outbreak. Thus, a systematic and serious investigation into the matter is useful in fully understanding the work of the Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC) in the process of dealing with conflict within the intended area of study.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The prevalence of conflict in Bauchi State, Nigeria has caused a public outcry. Bauchi State has witnessed many ethno religious conflicts, crises over Sharia implementation, farmers and herdsmen crisis, electoral violence and the existence of non-state armed groups (Habu, 2012). Conflicts (Religious, economic and political) are rampant among heterogeneous states of Nigeria Bauchi State is among the most diverse states in the country. In attempts of the government to mitigate the ever reoccurring crises, many initiatives have been experimented. Among the several measures attempted to solve the problems is the establishment of the Interfaith Mediation Centre. However, studies are required to examine how effective is the interfaith Mediation Centre in solving conflicts in Nigeria in general and Bauchi State in particular.

The conflicts have disrupted the local economy, market access, labour, transportation services, reduced agricultural production, caused hunger, and environmental degradation, and surges in crime, greater insecurity, and the high unemployment rate among youths, poverty and corruption in the State. These crises have eroded human security and economic development in Bauchi state.

Studies have been conducted on the role of interfaith mediation centre in mitigating conflicts in Nigeria (i.e. Adamu, 2016; Ahmed, 2007; Omotosh, 2014; Smock, 2006). However, none of such studies was conducted in Bauchi State. This study, therefore, sought to fill the knowledge gap on the factors that led to the establishment of Interfaith Mediation Centre, activities of Interfaith Mediation Centre in managing conflict between farmers and herdsmen and the role of Interfaith

Mediation Centre in managing electoral violence in Bauchi State, Nigeria from a historical perspective.

1.3 Research Objectives

The objectives of this research were:

i. To examine the factors that led to the establishment of Interfaith Mediation Centre up to 1995.

ii. To examine the activities of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the management of conflict between Herdsmen and Farmers in Bauchi State, Nigeria from 1996 to 2009

iii. To investigate the role of Interfaith Mediation Centre in conflict management in the electoral process in Bauchi State, Nigeria 2007-2015

1.4 Research Questions

This study sought to answer the following questions:

i. What factors led to the establishment of Interfaith Mediation Centre in Bauchi State, Nigeria up to 1995?

ii. How did the Interfaith Mediation Centre activity help in the management of conflict between Herdsmen and Farmers in Bauchi State, Nigeria from 1996 to2009?

iii. What was the role of Interfaith Mediation Centre in managing electoral conflict in Bauchi State, Nigeria from2007 to 2015?

1.5 Research Premises

This study was tested based on the following premises:

i.   That state security failure did not lead to the establishment of Interfaith Mediation Centre in Bauchi State, Nigeria in1995

ii.   The Interfaith Mediation Centre did not play an important role in the management of conflict between Herdsmen and Farmers in Bauchi State, Nigeria from 1996 to 2009

iii.   The Interfaith Mediation Centre did not play any significant role in electoral conflict in Bauchi State, Nigeria from 2007-2015

1.6 Justification and Significance of the Study

Religious conflict continues to plague many states in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. This study is a useful addition in this debate because the Interfaith Mediation Centre is an important non-governmental organisation in promoting peace building and conflict management in Northern Nigeria. It is also recognised as an agent of the peace process and has contributed greatly to conflict transformation using different approaches in conflict resolution (Adamu, 2016). However, there is little knowledge on the influence of IMC on the management of conflict in Bauchi State, Nigeria. It also assists in creating awareness at the grass-root level to reduce conflict within the affected communities. Bauchi State was chosen since it is one of the most affected by ethno religious conflicts, political violence, the conflict between pastoralist and farmers as well as land dispute all these conflicts brought damages and destruction of lives and properties in the areas (Adamu, 2016). This has brought a lot of setbacks in the human security and economic development of Bauchi State.

This study is justified as it is an addition to the existing knowledge in the literature of conflict management. To this end, it will aid scholars and students who wish to engage in academic enquiries from similar thematic paradigms. The findings of the study should also be important inputs to policymaking in Bauchi State in particular and Nigeria in general. In this regard, it will aid other faith-based organisations or institutional policy initiative in the area of conflict management. The period of study (1960 to 2015) is significant in the history of conflict in Nigeria: 1960 was the year Nigeria got independent and since then there was a series of conflicts reaching nadir in 2015.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The study focused on the role of the Interfaith Mediation Centre in the management of conflict in Bauchi State, Nigeria. Thus, it is important because this particular area has recorded and manifested continuous conflict and increasing third-party intervention. This study focused on the Interfaith Mediation Centre to address the issues of conflict in the area of study from 1960 to 2015.

1.8 Limitation of the Study

Several challenges were experienced in undertaking the research. Firstly, the availability of the study respondents particularly from the target population was a problem. Some of the respondents did not give the researcher time for the interview. Therefore, the researcher contacted respondents through visits and telephone calls to collect information. Secondly, language barrier was also a limitation in this study because most of the informants in the rural areas speak their regional language ''Hausa''. The researcher, however, addressed this limitation by translating the

research questionnaire from the English language to Hausa. The language barrier was also delimited through the use of an interpreter.

1.9 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

1.9.1 Introduction

This section reviews relevant literature on the influence of the Interfaith Mediation Centre in the management of conflict in Bauchi State, Nigeria 1960-2015. This was done in order to justify the need of this study. It also considers the theoretical framework appropriate for the interpretation of the study. The literature review adopted the thematic style of organisation based on the political conflict, economic conflict, social conflict and faith-based organisations.

1.9.2 Political Conflict

Globally, in 1960s civilians accounted for sixty-three per cent of recorded war deaths, 1980s seventy-four per cent, and in the 1990s the figure increased. The massive killings of civilian populations are due, in large part, to the fact that present-day wars are fought largely within and not between countries as villages and streets have become battlefields (Armed Conflict Report, 1993). The arguments have seen the armed conflicts today disrupted such as market economy, high level of poverty, corruption; destroy crops, places of worship, schools and among others. Report by Armed Conflict (1993) shows that in Asia and Europe armed conflicts within States are political conflicts involving citizens fighting for internal change. Some are secessionist movements, generally spearheaded by a group of people, more often than not a minority within a community, who take up arms to fight for the establishment of either an autonomous entity within an existing state or an entirely new and independent state of their own.

However, such conflicts have been relatively uncommon in Africa, although issues related to ethnic identity are an important factor in African politics (Williams & Ayers; 2000). In this account, many complex factors lead to armed conflicts within States. Some conditions that increase the probability of war include the inability of Governments to provide basic good governance and protection for their populations.

The argument has seen that weak Governments have little capacity to stop the eruption and spread of violence that better organized and more legitimate Governments could have prevented (Kwaja, 2008). Another study (Williams & Ayers; 2000) shows that armed conflicts can also be seen as the struggle for power by a section of the elite that has been excluded from the exercise of power in authoritarian systems of one-party rule.

Cristobal (2000) has observed that in the last few decades in Latin America, political violence has deteriorated to the highest level. For instance, over 120,000 people died as a result of political violence. Another scholar argued that in Guatemala between 1965 and 1994, almost 65,000 in El Salvador between 1973 and 1992, over 40,000 in Colombia 1990 and 1991 more than 25,000 people were killed as a result of post-election violence (Allen, 1999: 5). Christina (2011) in her study on political violence and inequality in Latin America during cold war reports thousands of people have been forcefully displaced and most of them are victims from the rural area.

Similarly (Charles, 2000), has pointed out that from the time when African nations got independence in the 1960s, most of them experienced various degrees of political conflict, rooted in both internal and external factors. In particular, sub-Saharan Africa was ranked within the ten most affected countries in the world

between the 1970s and 1999 in terms of political conflict. By 1997, more than 10 million people in Africa were internally displaced particularly in Sudan, Angola, the DRC, Kenya and Congo. For example, the clashes that took place in Kenya between 1991 and 1995 were based on ethnic instigated politics (Kanyinga, 2008), influenced by common ideology, particularly among different political leaders (Habu, 2012).

In the case of Somalia Afyare (2006) has argued that the people have suffered from prolonged oppression and violence at the hands of their fellow Somalis. They have lived in difficult and harsh conditions under both democratic and military regimes. During the democratic era (1960-1969), independence and newly established state institutions failed to meet people's expectations. Poverty increased and security deteriorated. Moreover, corruption, nepotism and cronyism characterised state institutions. The Somali civil war had multiple and complex causes including political, economic, cultural and psychological. Various external and internal actors have played different roles during the various stages of the conflict.

Several studies have been conducted with the view to comprehending the Kenya case as one of the most violent conflicts in Africa with over 2,500 people killed between 1997 to 2003 (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013, pp. 1). Another group of scholars argued that some parts of Kenya experienced low levels of violence which have become unremarkable to many citizens (Scotts-Villers et al., 2014, p.2; Gibbons, 2014, p.4).

Moreover, this research has corroborated with the above study by Dowd and Raleigh (2013)Kenya's post-election violence occurred in 2007 whereby more than a 1000 people died and over 260,000 higher people were forced to flee their homes

(Dercon & Gutiérrez, 2010). Furthermore, research indicates that the 2007-2008 post-election violence led to the death of more than 100 people and displacement of many others (Cox et al., 2014, p.1; Halakhe, 2013, p. 7-8).

It emphasized power consolidation rather than sharing of power into an authoritative political party. The challenges of the civil war struggle resulted in a decision-making process and leadership in Ethiopian government caused many people to lose their lives while others were displaced (Lyons, 2019).

According to David (2015) in 1994 Rwanda experienced a genocide which resulted in the death of over 500,000 citizens in less than four months. One of the political factors was the recruitment of a large number of youths to the army and later turn to locally organised militia which associated with a radicalised faction of the government. The second factor was the country at war, fighting against any form of army which mostly are refugees from outside the country. David (2015) also argued that DRC security personnel and other armed groups killed more than 5,000 thousands of citizens in the past decades. More than 2.5 million civilians are displaced from their original homes. Five per cent of Congolese have fled into Angola, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and other neighbouring countries. The recent violence is linked to the DRC political crisis.

In this account, Nigeria experiences political conflicts due to manipulation by the political elite. The incapability of the Nigerian government to address the political conflict based on their parties' interest hinders the socio-economic and political development of the country (Jev, 2014). According to Olukorede (2002), since the 1960s, Nigeria has witnessed various degrees of political conflict. Therefore,

research on ethno religious violence and democracy in Nigeria in 1983 witnessed post-election violence following the declaration of the victory of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in Oyo and Ondo States, many people lost their lives and enormous destruction of property was recorded (Alemika & Okoye; 2011). Furthermore, Adeleke (2012) observed that between 1999 and 2012 more than 7,000 people lost their lives as a result of political clashes across the country.

In the Northern region, political violence was witnessed when Muslims attacked the Igbos during and after the Nigerian Civil War 1967 to 1970 (Egwu 2001; Babangida, 2002). The arguments have seen the rising incidences of ethno religious violence traced to the civil rule in Nigeria (Takaya 2010; Williams and Falola 2015). However, Counted (2009) argued that Nigeria's politicians engaged in using religion as a tool for achieving their political aims and also contributed to the problem of conflict.

Although several studies have been conducted on political conflicts globally at large, and Nigeria in particular (Williams & Ayers; 2000, Charles, 2000, Egwu; 2001, David; 2002, Olukorede; 2002, Babangida; 2002, Afyare, 2006, Dercon & Gutierrez; 2010, Takaya; 2010, Christina, 2011, Alemika; 2011, Githigaro; 2012, Adeleke; 2012, Halakhe; 2013, Dowd & Raleigh; 2013, Scotts-Villers et, al. 2014, Gibbons; 2014, Cox et, al. 2014, Jev; 2014, Williams& Fulola; 2015; Lyons, 2019) none of these studies, however, focuses on the role of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the management of electoral violence in Bauchi State, Nigeria.

1.9.3 Economic Conflict

Universally, energy security can be affected by regional disputes, instability, terrorism and cyber threats, and more positively by technological developments. Moreover, advanced economies have made a slow though meaningful recovery from the global economic crisis. But progress has been uneven and vulnerabilities remain, particularly in the Europe area and Japan (Schafer, 2018). While Russia's actions in Ukraine and continuing instability in the Middle East, North and West Africa illustrate the scope for political disputes adversely to affect global markets and regional growth prospects (William, 2019).

Schafer (2018) argued that the economic cost of violence for the ten most affected countries ranges between 30 and 68 per cent of GDP. It was noted that conflicts cost an estimated $13.6 trillion every year and pose a significant threat to the 2030 agenda. Conflicts and widespread violence have complex socio-cultural, economic, and political dimensions that operate through power networks which transcend conventional conceptual boundaries (Social Science Research Council, 2018).

Countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, South Sudan, Somalia, and the Central African Republic have the highest levels of armed conflict, high levels of interpersonal violence or both the conflict-affected countries suffer from higher costs in the form of deaths and injuries from conflict or terrorism, population displacement and GDP losses. On the other hand, countries with high levels of interpersonal violence, such as El Salvador and Lesotho, are in the ten most affected countries because of costs associated with higher levels of homicide and violent crime. Cyprus is an exception in that the majority of its economic cost is related to the internal displacement of its population (Mclntosh & Burkley; 2015).

Armed Conflict Report (1993) revealed that countries afflicted by war typically also suffer from inequalities among social groups rather than poverty that seem to be a critical factor, although poor countries have been far more likely to be involved in armed conflicts than rich ones. Schafer (2018) also argued that ethnicity, religion, national identity or economic class, inequality tends to be reflected in unequal access to political power that too often forecloses paths to peaceful change.

In the case of the Middle East and North Africa, Mclntosh and Burkley (2015) have argued that the economic impact of violence in the regions particularly in Iraq, Syria, and Libya between 2011 and 2016 amounted to $1.79 trillion, the fourth-highest globally. The overall, economic impacts of violence since 2008 have increased by eighteen per cent. Moreover, the economic conflicts witnessed in developing countries such as Balkans have caused the loss of lives and property while others were displaced (Hellstrom, 2001; Niemella *et. al.,* 2005).

Due to internal conflicts in African countries between 1950 and 1995 more than 14.5 million people lost their lives with over ninety per cent having low-income (Stewart *et al*., 2001). Furthermore, another research found that poverty tends to be a familiar cause of economic conflict (Martins, 2014).

Studies by Williams and Ayers (2000) revealed that economic decline and mismanagement are also associated with violent conflicts, not least because the politics of a shrinking economy are inherently prone to conflicts as compared to those of economic growth. In some instances, the impact of radical market-oriented economic reforms and structural adjustment imposed without compensating social policies has been seen to undermine political stability.

United Nations (2002) noted that wars have separated millions of children from their families. In 1994, the war in Rwanda left 100,000 children without families. In 1995, twenty per cent of children in Angola were separated from families and relatives, according to a UNICEF study.

In Cambodia, a country where half the population is under 15 years old, the war deprived children of adult caregivers. As a result, problems of delinquency, child prostitution, drug abuse and other crimes are rampant. Displaced children are also most likely to be abused, raped, tortured, exploited and drafted as child soldiers (Armed Conflict Report, 1998).

Thebaud and Batterburry (2001) observed that Fulani herdsmen have tolerated a great percentage of violence in most of African countries. The finding of this study corroborated with the above research which revealed that herdsmen are moving from one place to another to ensure food security for their cows and other animals (Berger, 2003; and Ifatimehin, 2008).

Haro and Doyo (2005) observed that herdsmen caused conflicts over the destruction of crops by the farmers. Furthermore, Gbehe (2007: 146) also argued that in Nigeria the major cause of conflict between herdsmen and farmers specifically in Benue, Nassarawa, Bauchi, Kaduna and other states across the country are over anti-grazing land and destruction of farmlands.

Farmers continuously graze on their sites since the conflict between the two conflicting parties are inevitable due to lack of alternative of either retreating or surrendering (Kawu, 2016). However, in North Central Region, over 900 people across Benue, Kogi and Plateau States were killed by suspected pastoralists. In 2015,

over 280 people died as a result of one attack by the Fulani herders in Benue state alone (Akinwotu, 2016; Punch, 2016).

In April 2010, Berom region in the Plateau State experienced several attacks by some suspected Fulani herdsmen. The attackers targeted homes of some officials in Kura Jenta, while no lives were lost, 5 houses and 8 vehicles were destroyed. In May 2010, Berom attackers murdered Fulani herdsmen at Tusung village of Barkin Ladi Local Government where, more than 2000 people lost their lives and thousands of properties across the area (Gofwen, 2004).

Subair and Adesanmi (2003) have argued that the Niger Delta region conflicts escalate to high levels due to engagement of youth militias, armed gangs, cultist and robbers. Most of them engaged in bloody conflict for the smuggling of oil. They stole over 9,000 barrels per day which valued the cost of USD 2. 5 million.

Other studies have shown that Graduate unemployment among the youths and abject poverty lead youths to participate in violence when interest groups mobilize them (Aminu, 2004 and Sara, 2014). Research also finds that failure to establish economic outlets such as industries in Tafawa Balewa Local Government areas and the high unemployment rate among youths is one of the reasons for conflicts and violence in the area. Furthermore, the denial of scholarships for further studies both national and international in some cases is also responsible for conflict in the area (Best, 2007).

Numerous studies have been conducted to comprehend the scale of economic conflicts across the globe and, Nigeria in particular (Williams & Ayers, 2000, Hellstrom; 2001, Stewart et, al. 2001, Thebaud & Batterburry; 2001, United Nations; 2002, Macartan; 2003, Gofwen; 2004, Aminu; 2004, Haro & Doyo, 2005,

Niemella et, al. 2005, Gbehe; 2007, Best, 2007; Sarah, 2014, Schefer; 2018, social science research council, 2018; Williams, 2019; Mclntosh & Burkley; 2019). None of these studies, however, covered the activities by the Interfaith Mediation Centre in managing economic conflict between farmers and Herdsmen in Bauchi state, Nigeria.

1.9.4 Social Conflict

According to Samuel, while countries like Tanzania, Switzerland, India, Belgium and the United States of America have taken advantage of their multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural diversity, it has remained a divisive factor in Nigeria. In recent years, armed conflicts with religious overtones in countries like the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Nigeria and Somalia have been on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. One possible explanation of this rise is religious discrimination (Raphael, 2015). Bauchi State is one of the conflict-prone areas in terms of social conflict such as ethno religious conflict. However, there is little knowledge of social conflict particularly within the area of study. Therefore, this study endeavoured to partake in sealing the knowledge gap.

Omotosho (2014) argued that in 1980, disturbance in the Zaria Kaduna State of Nigeria broke out mainly affecting Christians where property belonging to them was destroyed while other people were displaced. Again, in 1980s riots by Maitatsine sect caused the death of more than 4,200 with extensive destruction of property across Kano State which later spread to many cities in the Northern Nigeria (Mu'azzam, 2000). In 1982, Muslim protestors in Kano State burnt down churches and destroyed properties worth of millions of Naira.

Gofwen (2004) in his study revealed that the demonstration by Muslims within the University of Ibadan Oyo State in 1986 led to arson attack on more than 50 churches. Moreover, clashes between Muslims and Christians at the College of Education, Kafanchan caused the loss of many lives through burning of some Muslims by Christians in 1987. Religious violence spearheaded by Malam Yahaya Yakubu leader of the Shi'ite fundamentalist sect in Katsina cost many lives and property (Anyanwu, 2010).

Between the year 1992 and 2000, more than 5,000 people died as a result of clashes in some parts of Northern Nigeria over the anti-sharia crisis. On 28 February 2000, over 1,000 Hausa people were attacked in Abia state of Nigeria (Igbokwe, 2000). Moreover, in 2000 over 3,000 people were killed and many others were displaced in ethno religious conflict across the Central Region of Nigeria (Yusuf, 2008; Polgreen, 2008). On a broader scale, Wuye (2014) noted that since the returned to civilian rule in 1999, more than 13,400 people have been killed in communal conflicts. Kaduna and Plateau States are among the worst when political sharia controversies started in 2000. The conflict in Kaduna between 2000 and 2002 was caused by tension between Muslims and Christians upon implementation of Sharia and Miss World beauties Contest, claiming more than 1,200 lives.

In northern Nigeria, more than 185 people were killed as a result of the 2006 Riots over the publication of the sketch of Prophet Mohammed by Danish cartoonist (Hill & Asthana, 2006). The ethno-religious conflict between Muslims and Christian's groups in Nigeria caused more than 2000 people to lose their lives while others were displaced (Kukah, 2015; Mason and Talbot; 2000).

In Bauchi State, religious violence unleashed by the Kala-Kato sect in 1999 resulted in the death of 40 people dead, about 20 suspected members of the sect arrested and over 900 people were internally within the State (Gofwen, 2004; 65: 67). While in 2001, conflict in Bauchi State claimed the lives of more than 250 people and destruction of properties particularly in the city of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area. The conflict was caused by attacks on Muslims within Tafawa Balewa, south of Bauchi City. Demonstration against Sharia implementation which turned out to be a bloody conflict reportedly claimed 200 lives (IRIN, 2014).

Conflict elsewhere in Bauchi State was witnessed in Bauchi Makama New-extension led to the death of over 200 people, 300 houses were burnt and more than 1,500 people were displaced (Gofwen, 2004). Kuka (2010) also argued that clashes between members of Boko Haram and police as well as army personnel resulted in more than 20 members of the sect dead. The preceding showed several studies have been conducted in Bauchi State.

However, none focus on the managing religious conflict as well as causes of religious crisis but none of the studies covered the factors of conflicts that led to the establishment of IMC within the study area.

Although studies have been conducted on ethno-religious conflict across Nigeria and beyond such as (Igbowka; 2000), (Mason & Talbot, 2000), (Mu'azzam; 2000), (Gofwen; 2004), (Hill & Asthana, 2006), (IRIN; 2006), (Yusuf; 2008), (Polgreen; 2008), (Anyanwu; 2010), (Kukah; 2010), (Wuye; 2014), (Raphael; 2015), and (Adamu, 2016), none of these aforementioned studies focussed on the role of interfaith mediation centre in the management of conflicts within the study area.

1.9.5 Faith based Organisations in the Management of Conflict

Globally, religious actors play an important role in peace education in bringing people together for conflict management. They have a legitimate position from which to sermon and teach, including educating about others' religious beliefs and in preaching tolerance within the communities (Flanigan, 2013). Therefore, some FBOs have experienced success in their peace building efforts because they are rooted in faith teachings. Interfaith dialogue has been embraced by governments and organizations as a key tool for facilitating peace building in situations where conflict has some inter-religious element.

The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone was made up of mixed-faith people from the communities in conflict, which allowed them to discuss with leaders from all warring parties (Flanigan, 2013). In other cases, actors from outside the community, or from other faiths, have been successful. FBOs may use religious mediation strategies to help parties reach an agreement. These could include prayers, meditation, religious rituals, religious vocabulary, values and myths (Bercovitch & Kadayifci Orellana, 2009).

While other scholars revealed that within Muslim communities, Faith Based Organisations have successfully used traditional conflict resolution methods in promoting peace (Abu-Nimer & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008).The activities of inter-religious groups in resolving the disagreement and violent clashes among various religious groupings in the country reveal the capacity of religious communities to educate their members on the root causes of religious intolerance and other related conflicts (Princen, 1992).

More so, the inter-religious dialogue facilitates peaceful coexistence and also serves as effective advocates for the prevention of religious conflict locally and regionally. They play a central role in mediation and negotiation among religious fundamentalists and lead their communities in the reconciliation and healing required transforming their divergent views and disagreements into a true and lasting peace (Smock, 2007). On the other hand, religious organizations are rich sources of peace services. They function as a powerful warrant for social tolerance, democratic pluralism, and constructive conflict management. They are peace-builders and peacemakers. Inter-faith religious organizations contribute to peace-building by empowering the weak, influencing the moral-political climate, developing cooperation and providing humanitarian aid (Omotosho, 2014).

Macartan (2003) argued that the strategic policies adopted by the faith-based organisations that aim to promote peaceful electoral conducts in developing countries are likely to act as representatives for conflict management. For instance, the Human Rights Watch (2018) revealed that the Catholic Church leaders in promoting peaceful electoral conducts in Congo have signed a political agreement in 2016. The agreement called for 2017 general election measures to ease political tension in the country.

Peace and Development Network (NGOs) played a critical role during the political clashes among different ethnic groups in Kenya by intervening with relief assistance. While NCCK also involved in negotiating between the conflicting parties to address many societal problems that required special strategies of resolving them rather than leaving them until their explosion (Barasa, 2016). Concerning long-term

programs, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) intervened in terms of curing and reconciliation following the post-election violence in 2007 (Githigaro, 2012).

Faith-based organisations adopt a strategy for managing ageing conflict between farmers and pastoralists across the North Central part of Nigeria (Nwgavi, 2013). There is a long process of peace building among farmers and herders in providing maximum support between various communities affected by conflict and also facilitate the process of mediation (Baca, 2015; Yusuf, 2008). While Tsejeard (2005) observed that most of the faith-based organisations' actors used different strategies for adopting peace process within the conflict zone by mobilising their actors for peace through reconciliation, facilitating and mediating between the opposing parties (Kwaja, 2009).

Many international and local faith-based organisations in Nigeria operate towards providing peace and mediation between the divergent religious groups. For example, in Kaduna and Plateau States, the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), which comprise of both Christian and Muslim clerics are involved in conflict resolution. The Interfaith Mediation Centre of Muslim Christian Dialogue Forum (MCDF), Nigeria and the International Peace League (IPL) are among groups working across religious and ethnic boundaries to develop a dialogue between the conflicting parties (Ahmed, 2007; Berlin Declaration on Inter-religious Dialogue, 2008).

Other mediation groups include the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, the Christian Association of Nigeria and Jamaâ'atu Nasril Islam. These groups are involved as conflict management actors in encouraging peace process and peace

education aimed at promoting dialogue between religious groups (Paden 2008; Yusuf, 2008). Consequently, the interfaith organisations have played a vital role in managing conflict and mobilising political elites and religious clerics to uphold peace dialogues across the divergent ethno-religious groups (Omotosho, 2014).Other researchers like (Sulaiman, Ojo, 2012; Ruby & Shah, 2007) have also identified the Nigeria Christian Association as one of the major faith-based organisations which encourages negotiation and managing electoral conflict situations. They play the role of mediators between the opposing parties and also provide peace education schemes within the conflict zone.

Reporting further the efforts of mediation groups, Wuye (2014) argues that the faith-based organizations served as peace builders between the conflicting parties and also ensure peace by addressing political violence between parties within the Northern part of Nigeria. Christian Muslims Peace Movement is working with other faith-based organisations such as Youth Federation for World Peace, Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria (CEPAN), and Universal Peace Federation (UPF) to promote peace and religious tolerance among the Muslims and Christian groups within the conflict zones (CMPM, 2000).

The activities of inter-religious groups in resolving disagreements and violent clashes among various religious groupings in the country reveal the capacity of religious communities to educate their members on the root causes of religious intolerance and conflict (Princen 1992). However, Smock (2007) observed that the inter-religious dialogue facilitates peaceful coexistence and also serves as effective advocates for the prevention of religious conflict locally and regionally. They play a

central role in mediation and negotiation among religious fundamentalists and lead their communities in the reconciliation and healing required in transforming their divergent views and disagreements into true and lasting peace.

Although studies have been conducted on faith-based organisations across the globe and Nigeria in particular (for instance, Pricen; 1992, CMPM; 2000, Ruby & Shah, 2007, Smock; 2007 Bercovitch & Kadayifei- Orellana; 2008, Abu-nimer & Kadayifei-Orellana; 2008, Yusuf, 2008; Hayward; 2012, Sulaiman & Ojo, 2012 Flanigan; 2013, Nwgari; 2013, Omotosho; 2014, Baca; 2015, Barasa, 2016; HRW, 2018) they have not covered the role of interfaith mediation centre in the management of conflict in Bauchi state, Nigeria.

1.9.6 Gaps in Reviewed Literature

There is a growing body of literature concerning the influence of religious organisations in conflict resolution and conflict management in some parts of the world. Specifically, Charles (2016) focused on traditional mechanisms of managing conflict and methods used by local communities between Tiv and Igbo. On the other hand, Omotosho (2014) deals with managing religious conflicts in Nigeria and the inter-religious mediation peace strategy. Kwaja (2008) focuses on methods for peace-building to manage ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. Paul (2015) focuses on faith-based organisations and conflicts resolution in Nigeria: the case of the Christian Association of Nigeria.

The afore-mentioned literature is relevant to the current study. It forms the background in which the current study was established. It has numerous contributions as far as conflict management is concerned not only in Nigeria but also

across the world. The above studies, however, are more general since they focus on entire Nigeria and barely addressed problems in specific regions. It is worthwhile noting that states in Nigeria are not homogenous and the above studies failed to address region-specific problems such as the role of IMC in managing conflicts in Bauchi State. Thus, this research focused on the role of IMC in managing conflict within the area of study from a historical perspective. The study examined the factors that led to the establishment of IMC, activities of IMC in the management of conflict between herdsmen and farmers and lastly investigated the role of IMC in conflict management in the electoral process in Bauchi State, Nigeria.

1.10 Theoretical Framework

Studies on conflict management have adopted some theories. These theories include Theory of Transformative Mediation, Ripeness Theory, Human Needs Theory, and Cooperative Model etc. Nevertheless, these theories were not appropriate for this study. The reasons are as follows: John Burtons' (1990) Human Needs Theory identified solving the basic needs of the conflicting parties' means of achieving peace and avoiding conflict. His theory argues that a solution to a conflict has a direct link to improving social needs. Therefore, accommodating needs of conflicting parties is essential towards resolving conflict within the society. Human needs theory has little application to the current study because the conflicts in Bauchi State have been known to revolve around altruistic values among communities to the extent that people put their religious abstract before their survival.

The Ripeness Theory of conflict by William Zartman (2000) shows that decision-makers serve as intermediaries to negotiation or mediation in a severe conflict which

reached its apex and the parties try to defend one another. Ripeness theory has little application to this study owing to its subjective nature. The theory is limited owing to the tendency of the parties involved conflicting parties to negotiate or use a mediator to resolve their differences. The transformative theory is weak as far as its application to this study is concerned. This owes to its inability to provide a solution to an immediate problem.

This study, therefore, adopted Peace building theory postulated by Lederach. This theory provides mechanism through which conflict management deals with conflict via third-party intervention. In essence, peace building is more or less a combination of the above-mentioned theories that complement each other's to yield a better outcome.

1.10.1 Peace Building Theory

Lederach (1997) divided the conflicting societies into three levels of actors: the top-level deals with governmental responsibility in protecting the lives and properties of the people at all levels. The primary responsibility of the government (politicians) is to take the lead in the preservation of peace, negotiation, mediation, order and security within the conflict zones.

He also argues that it is the middle level of leaders that hold humanitarian actors in focusing problem-solving workshops, training in conflict resolution and providing peace commission within the conflict zones. The middle level of actors influences the other actors in promoting peace. The third level of actors (grass-root) focuses on local leaders who became relevant in providing psychological work, prejudice

reduction and grassroots training in promoting the culture of peace within the conflict zone.

Additionally, top-down approach in the management of conflict plays a vital role to local actors with strategic plans that set in a motion of participatory leaderships where each actor has a role that he or she may agree to play. The peace building theory emphasises that the top-down level of leaderships and peace-building method allows peacemakers to play the intermediate role in terms of peace-building within the conflict zones. Accordingly, the theory also anticipates that top-level, middle-range level and grassroots level leaders play a vital role in the management of conflict. Peace building theory consists of reconciliation, mediation, peace process timing, workshops in terms of problems solving, management of conflict training workshops among others (Lederach, 1997).

Peace building theory guided this study to investigate the role of the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre in the management of conflict in Bauchi State, Nigeria. The theory concentrates on what role, the politicians, IMC actors and community leaders play in the management of conflict within Bauchi State, Nigeria.

The finding of this study lent support to the peace building theory as indicated in objective one the middle level of actors (Interfaith Mediation Centre) organised problems solving workshops, training the youths and women in promoting the culture of peace in Bauchi State. Interfaith Mediation Centre also worked with politicians and local leaders in addressing the conflict between Muslims and Christians in the state.

Another key finding of objective two as predicted by peace building theory explained that politicians, humanitarian actors (IMC) and local leaders played a significant role in addressing the unending conflict between farmers and herdsmen in the state. This theory relates to the findings of the study based on three levels. The first level consists of political and religious leaders who are always in the position of negotiation and mediating the conflicting parties. The religious and politicians as indicated in objective three played a vital role in promoting peaceful electoral conducts in Bauchi State.

1.11 Research Methodology

1.11.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the research methodology that was used to conduct this research. It comprises the research design, location of the study, target population, sample procedures and sample size, pilot study, validity and reliability, data collection procedures, data analysis procedure and data management and ethical considerations.

1.11.2 Research Design

This research adopted a descriptive research design. The descriptive research approach is suitable to this topic of investigation because, qualitative research is about description, explanations, narration and interpretation content which tends to assess the quality of things using words and descriptions. Thus, qualitative methods can guide this research through oral interviews and focus groups discussions to understand values, opinion, experiences and feelings of individuals and groups within Bauchi State (Adamu, 2016).

Descriptive research design is the method that generally emphasized narration and explanations rather than measurement in the collection and analysis of data. It is generally inductive and interpretive in nature (Bryman, 2012; Creswell & Miller, 2000).Descriptive design guided this research through interviews to understand values, opinion, experiences and feelings of individuals and groups in the society.

1.11.3 Study Variables

The study variables were in three fold: independent, dependent and intervening variables.

1.11.3.1 Independent Variable

The independent variable of this research is the Interfaith Mediation Centre to measure the effect of conflicts.

1.11.3.2 Dependent variables

The dependent variable is conflict management sub-dependent variables (dialogue, mediation, negotiation among others) are expected to be influenced by the independent variable.

1.11.3.3 Intervening Variables

Intervening variables are elements that could have an influence over the study. They are, thus, any factors that have the tendency to affect the dependent variables apart from the independent variable. This study, therefore, found government and community leaders to be of influence on conflict management in addition to the IMC.

1.11.4 Study Locale

Bauchi State was ideal for this study due to the fact that it has witnessed ethno-religious crisis, post-election violence and insurgency. These crises have adverse affected the lives and property of the people. Based on this, the Interfaith Mediation Centre was established for conflict management. Bauchi is a State in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. It was created in 1976 when the former North-Eastern State was broken up by the military administration of General Murtala Ramat Mohammed. The State originally included the area of Gombe State, which became a distinct State in 1996.

The present Bauchi State is made – up of twenty multi ethnic Local Government Councils, with two dominant religions of Christianity and Islam. The state has about fifty five (55) ethnic groups; among them: Hausa, Fulani, Gerawa, Sayawa, Jarawa, Bolawa, Kare-Kare, Zulawa, Bijim, Bankalawa, Barebari, Sangawa, Limirawa and Ngas among others. Bauchi State covers a total land area of 49,259.01 square kilometres representing about 5.3% of Nigeria's total land mass(Yalwa, 2016). The economic activities of the people revolve around farming. Thus, nomadic farming and cultivation of crops such as groundnuts, beans, rice, corn, cotton and millet are the major occupation of the people in most of the rural areas.

Figure 1.1 Map of Bauchi State in Nigeria (2019)
Source: https:// smarttraveller.gov.au/countries/africa/west/pages/nigeria.aspx

1.11.5 Target Population

Bauchi State population has increased seven-fold since 1960, from about a million people to close to 6.8 million in 2015. In 2017, the population of Bauchi State is estimated to be close to 7.3 million. The Bauchi State Government recognizes the need to improve access to vital resources, such as education, healthcare, and employment opportunities, greater investment in family planning in the state is critical to help curb the potentially negative consequences of rapid population growth. Bauchi State population has grown at a rapid pace over the past several decades and will continue to do so. At the current growth rate of about 3.6 percent per year, the population of Bauchi will double in about 19 years. Population projections estimate that the state's population will grow almost four times larger by 2050, to over 26 million people (Health policy Report, 2017).

Bauchi State is located in the North East of Nigeria and has a total population of 4,643,066 as of 2006 census (NPC, 2008). The southern part of the State is predominantly Christians while the north is heavily Muslims.

Research population consists of the total number of elements (persons or objects) living in a geographical location and other characteristics as defined by the sampling criteria established by the researcher (Indrayan, 2008). For the purpose of this research, the population of the study is geographically confined to Imams, Church leaders, Interfaith Mediation Centres officials, Christians Muslims Peace Movement officials, community leaders and Government officials with a total population of one thousand five hundred and fifty-four (1,554) who were purposively selected as the target audience (National Population Commission, 2008).

1.11.6 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

The primary purpose of sampling is the selection of suitable populations (or 'elements') so that the focus of the study can be appropriately researched. In qualitative research, effective sample selection process is very important because inappropriate procedures may hamper the findings and outcomes of a study (Violeta & Dean; 2013).

Purposive (purposeful) sampling is commonly used sampling strategy, in that participants are recruited according to pre-selected criteria relevant to a particular research question. Sometimes referred to as 'judgment sampling', purposive sampling is designed to provide information-rich cases for in-depth study (Violeta & Dean; 2013). A purposive sampling technique was employed in selecting the respondents. It entails selecting the sample according to judgemental criterion set out by the researcher to select respondent who would be suitable for the study based on the established criteria (Kanupriya, 2016). According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) a ten to thirty percent of the available population is adequate for a study. A sample size of five percent from each targeted population was selected to represent the study respondents. The sample size for this study comprised of seventy-six (76) selected number of respondents.

Table 1.1: Sample element

Population	Target population	Sample Size 20%
Interfaith mediation centre officials	207	10
Local NGOs officials CMPM	42	2
Government officials	63	3
Church leaders	128	6
Imams	504	25
Communities leaders (chiefs)	201	10
Stakeholders residing in Bauchi	409	20
Total	**1, 554**	**76**

Source: using Mugenda Mugenda (2003) five percent sample size with little modification by the researcher (2020).

1.11.7 Methods of Data Collection

The main sources of data collection were primary and secondary sources. Semi-structured interview for oral, focus group discussions and document analysis were used as methods of data collection.

Oral interviews were used on government officials, Interfaith Mediation Centre Officials, local NGO for Christians Muslims Peace Movement officials, community leaders, pastors, and Imams, women and youth leaders. Data from the interviews were used to register the opinions of IMC involvement in conflict management in Bauchi State, Nigeria 1960-2015. The researcher was the moderator of the interviews while the research assistant on the other hand, recorded the comments of each participant against each interview question.

The researcher conducted an FGD with IMC officials and peace building initiative stakeholders on matters of the activities of IMC in ethno-religious conflicts and peace building. Therefore, 20 participants of IMC and Peace building initiatives officials in Bauchi State served in the focus group interview. During the focus group discussion participants were coordinated for the conduct of the interviews. The

respondents were asked to respond to interviews questions designed for focus group discussion. The focus group discussion was conducted while participants attending workshops organised by IMC within multipurpose hall in Bauchi State. The interviews lasted for two days where comments and opinions of the respondents were gathered for transcription.

The final method of data collection is secondary literature which comprises relevant published and unpublished texts, reports obtained from IMC office, governments and other sources during the field work.

1.11.8 Validity and Reliability

Validity deals with accuracy of the data collection instruments by collecting the intended information (Creswell, 2013). Reliability on the other hand refers to data collection instruments to show consistency by yielding the same results when used to collect data in different times on the same or different subjects (Creswell, 2013). In this case, different research instruments were piloting to ensure reliability of the research findings. This study aimed at attaining reliability which helped the researcher to explain the similarities and differences in the key findings. To achieve validity in this study, the research questions were aligned with the study objectives. A pilot study was conducted to measure the interview questions or guide. Five (5) people from the study locale or sample size were selected for piloting.

1.11.9 Data Collection Procedures

This study obtained data from seven different purposively selected sources while conducting field work. The selection of the respondents was based on specific period of 1995-2015 and the information they gave serve as reliable source of data. Data

was collected using audio recordings and the interview schedules for respondents. After familiarisation visit by the researcher, a date was set for the actual data collection process. For the purpose of effective data collection audio recorder was used to record the interview session. The researcher interviewed the study participants to get in-depth information on the management of conflict. The interview schedules can be seen in Appendix I to IV.

1.11.10 Data Analysis

The data collected was analysed based on the research objectives. The data was then subjected to chronological and thematic content analysis. Recorded data was transcribed, categorized in line with the objectives of the research.

1.11.11 Data Management and Ethical Consideration

In this study, the researcher followed the research rules and regulation as well as ethical standards. The researcher collected the letter of introduction from the Graduate School of Kenyatta University which was used during data collection. The researcher sought the consent of the respondents before collecting the data. The researcher informed the respondents the purpose of the study thereby. The researcher sought for the consent before data was collected. The researcher also assured that he would keep their identity anonymous. The approval letters can be seen in appendix vii, viii and ix respectively.

CHAPTER TWO: FACTORS THAT LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERFAITH MEDIATION CENTRE IN 1995

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a background to the factors that led to the establishment of Interfaith Mediation Centre up to 1995, political conflicts 1960s, ethno-religious conflict in 1980s, ethnic conflict in 1991, political conflict in 1995, role of religious leaders in managing conflicts, origin and development of IMC, Interfaith Mediation Centre sources of fund, objectives of IMC, organisational development of IMC, Interfaith Mediation Centre organisational structure, IMC and IMC activities in peace building and summary.

2.1.1 Political Conflict in 1960s

Anber (1967) observed that the Federation of Nigeria formally achieved its independence from Britain and joined the Commonwealth of Nations (CON) on October 1, 1960. On October 1, 1960, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, founder of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), was appointed as prime minister (head of government) of the Federation of Nigeria. Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), was appointed as Governor-General (representative of Queen Elizabeth II, the Nigerian Head of State) on November 16, 1960. President Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe dissolved the House of Representatives on December 8, 1964 (Anber, 1967).

One of the respondents revealed;

> "The1966 conflict in Bauchi Stat was as result of assassination of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The conflict claimed lives of many people and others were displaced" (Chief Yusuf, O.I, 10/01/2019).

The result of this study corresponds with the work of Dudley (1973) who notes that Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was deposed and killed in a military coup led by Major General Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi on January 15, 1966. Premier Minister Samuel Akintola of the Western and Ahmadu Bello of the Northern Regions were also deposed and killed during the military coup on January 15, 1966 (Woronoff, 1970).Another respondent added that;

> "As a result of assassination of prime minister of Nigeria by the Igbo military officers led to many Igbo people residing within the State to be killed"(Imam Muhammad, O.I, 30/01/2019).

The above findings are supported by John (2000) who states that *Supreme Military Council* (SMC) headed by General Aguyi-Ironsi, a member of the predominantly Christian Igbo ethnic group, took control of the government and suspended the constitution on January 16, 1966. Consequently, 50 individuals were killed during the military coup. The coup brought about political violence which led to the Nigerian Civil War 1966-1970. The aftermath of this coup caused the death of about 100,000 people and also displaced 400,000 Easterners for a few months. The civil war of 1967 also worsened the situation as it left the Eastern region in a state of warfare with the Federal Government under the leadership of Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon from the North.

2.1.2 Ethno-Religious Conflicts in 1970s and 1980s

Egwu (2001) in his work which covers decades of the genesis and causes of violent ethnic and religious conflicts traces the beginning of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria to the 1980s. He argues "the boundary between religious and ethnicity-motivated violence becomes difficult to draw during conflicts". He argues further that economic reasons are the primary cause of these violent conflicts that became more frequent from the 1980s.An oral interviewee stated that;

> "Since the 1970s and 1980s, ethno-religious conflicts have been reoccurring in Bauchi state of Nigeria. I personally witnessed the Maitatsine and Kala Kato crises in 1980"(Chief Sunusi O.I, 1/02/2019)

The outcome of this study corroborated with the work of Boer (1995) who reported that immediate cause of these ethno-religious conflicts was the plan by the Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS) of the College of Education, Kafanchan to hold a weeklong of religious activities marking the end of its annual week of activities. The FCS had invited Rev. Abubakar Bako, a Muslim convert to Christianity was the Guest Speaker at the occasion. The speaker in the course of his sermon was said to have quoted from Quranic passages in comparison to the Bible. This did not go down well with the Muslim students who felt he was preaching hearsay. Having accused him of denigrating Islam and Prophet Mohammed in his "misinterpretations," they decided that he deserved to be punished (Boer, 1995 & Hussaini, 1993).

Besides, according to Toure (1995), the destruction spread beyond Kafanchan to Kaduna, Zaria and Katsina and Bauchi threatened the stability of the entire country.

Beyond the College, it exploded into a full scale ethno-religious violent confrontation between Muslims (largely Hausa) and the Christians (predominantly non-Hausa). In the process, many lives were lost; churches, mosques, hotels, bars and other property were destroyed.

These sentiments were echoed yet with another respondent who asserted;

> "The marginalisation, discrimination and mutual mistrust among Muslims and Christians in the state are the main factors that influence ethno religious conflict. Each side of the divide believes it has been marginalised by the other" (Chief Salisu, KII, 19/01/2019).

The finding of this study shows that there is an agreement with the empirical literature by Albert (1995) who revealed that between April 26 and 28, 1995 in Bauchi City more than 4, 177 people were lost and many churches were destroyed as a result of conflict between Muslims and Christians. The disturbances between Christians/Muslims were reported in the newspapers particularly within neighbouring towns of Ningi where the district police officer, late Superintendent of police Yakubu Sara and five other policemen were killed, the police station and the barracks were burnt down. Many houses, shops and properties were destroyed (Bulus, 1991).

2.1.3 Ethnic Conflict in 1991

The conflict in Tafawa Balewa ensued in 1992 between the two dominant ethnic communities; the Fulani and Sayawa communities (Boer, 1995). With a similar was an eye witness who stated;

> "The 1991 violent conflict broke out due to misunderstanding between Fulani Muslim and Sayawa Christian within Tafawa Balewa market place. A Christian Sayawa butcher man had sold pork to a Fulani Muslim. This is was uncouth for because the Muslims are forbidden from eating pork. When it was discovered, the Muslims became furious and sparked riot between the two ethic communities. Many people were killed and properties worth millions were destroyed as it spread to the nearest village of Bonunu but government intervened and mediated the conflict between the two groups" (Youth leader Madaki, O.I, 14/01/2019).

The findings of this study show that there are similarities with the empirical review of this study. The outcome of this study corresponds with the work of Boer (1995) who notes that the genesis of the 1991 crises in Tafawa Balewa as a result of a misunderstanding between a Christian Sayawa meat seller and a Muslim Fulani youth. The meat seller sold pork meat to the Fulani youth Muslim faithful which was later discovered to be against the Fulani youth religion. This brought a heavy misconception between the two parties which later became a crisis. The conflict spread into many villages in the State. Other Christian meat seller came to his rescue, but they, in turn, were overcome by a crowd of Muslims. When the seller refused to take the meat back, the customer attacked him. The conflict escalated and moved to towns, after four days, over two hundred (200) people were killed and even more were injured. Thousands of Christians took refuge in neighbouring states especially Plateau State (Boer, 1995).

In addition, another respondent stated;

> "I think that there was more to the cause of the conflict than a mere selling of pork meat to a Muslim. To me, the issue is pure hatred among different ethnic groups in Bauchi state"(Imam Muhammad O.I, 20/02/2019).

The result of this study corresponded with the work of Human Rights Watch report (1995)as it shows that the clash between different ethnic groups in Nigeria caused more than 10,000 deaths while over half a million others were internally displaced.

2.1.4 Political Conflict in 1995

July 1, 1995, marked a turning point in the history of conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State. This crisis which started in the form of road blockage by some Sayawa women in protest against the proposed reception in honour of the newly appointed commissioner for information, later developed into an armed conflict which claimed several lives and destruction of properties (Bagudu, 2003). These crises had historical origin since Sayawa struggle for pre-independence when the Navy Capt. Adisa Raji took over the mantle of Government from Col. Chris Abutu Garba in early 1995, the Bauchi State Government decided to carry out a cabinet reshuffle in which the Commissioner for Education, Mr J.K Manzo, from Sayawa ethnic group from Bogoro in the former Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area, was dropped and Mr Ibrahim Musa, a Hausa man representing the same Local Government area, was appointed (Bagudu, 2003).One of the community leaders from Tafawa Balewa stated that;

> "Political discrimination in Bauchi state is the root cause of these conflicts. Tafawa Balewa is dominated by Christians, yet the local government appointed a Muslim to be the local government representative, a move that triggered violence in protest" (Chief Daniel, KII, 20/01/2019).

The empirical study revealed that conflict started in the form of the mounting of a roadblock by some Sayawa women in protest against the state cabinet reshuffle in which a Sayawa (Christian) man was replaced by a Muslim man. The protest was

against a proposed reception in honour of the newly appointed (Muslim) Commissioner (Otite, 1999). This seemingly political issue developed into unprecedented violent conflicts between Muslims and Christians and claimed several lives and property (Dauda, 1995).

2.2 The Role of Religious Leaders in Managing Conflicts in Bauchi State

It is undeniable that leaders have a role to play in society to maintain peace and stability. In assessing their influence in conflicting communities in Bauchi State an Imam of central Mosque of Bauchi City stated;

> "We always condemn every act of disunity in our communities. For instance, during the 1991 crisis, we summoned our Muslims fellows to embrace the culture of peace in our five daily prayers. Our prophet teaches the doctrine of forgiveness among the people even to the non-Muslims" (Imam Ibrahim, O.I, 11/01/2019).

The above findings are supported by Yusuf (2008) who noted that religious leaders have played and continue to play a prominent role in helping to initiate dialogue between warring parties, in providing emotional and spiritual support to communities affected by conflict, and in facilitating the process of reconciliation. The co-executive director of IMC Christian Affairs added;

> "Interfaith Mediation Centre activities of peace building in Northern Nigeria play a vital role in managing conflict in Tafawa Balewa of Bauchi State. The religious leaders in this organization make use of biblical and Qur'an teachings to implore their congregants to embrace the culture of peace and tolerance in Bauchi State" (Pastor Wuye, KII, 20/01/2019).

The result of this study corroborated with the work of Paffenholz (2014) who found that other interreligious groups in Northern Nigeria are instrumental in peace making and conflict transformation; their activities need integrative effort with stakeholders to ensure a shift towards sustainable peace in the country. Religious leaders are rich sources of peace services. They function as a powerful warrant for social tolerance, democratic pluralism, and constructive conflict management. Another Christian church leader revealed that;

> "While many conflicts occur in Tafawa Balewa, we always have a sitting with Pastors and Imams to find solutions to ethno-religious conflict. For our fellow Christians we use some Biblical scriptures to instil the act of forgiveness and this helps promote peace within and between communities and the society at large"(Pastor Bukar, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The above research finding confirms that in addressing peace-building challenges, the religious leaders use scriptural texts that promote peace, and collaborate, partner or network, with other peace practitioners and institutions. Furthermore, they undertake peacemaking initiatives that establish frameworks for achieving peace at both high policy and community levels (Omotosho, 2014).Another respondent revealed that;

> "In the event of a conflict, we always resolve it through peaceful approach of the religious leaders by engaging all the warring parties into dialogue to resolve the conflict" (Imam Ibrahim, 21/01/2019).

The findings of this study show that there are similarities with the empirical review of this study. The outcome of this study corresponds with the work of Omotosho

(2014) who found that inter-religious mediation groups played a leading role in conflict resolution and building on past efforts to mobilise political and religious leaders to increase dialogue across religious divisions. They use their resources to establish peace forces, fostering favourable environments for negotiations and strengthening weak peace processes.

2.3 Origin and Development of Interfaith Mediation Centre

Shedding light on the origin of the IMC, the co-executive director of IMC Christian Affairs echoed the preceding one by asserting:

> "IMC was created in 1995 with the aim of addressing the issue of intractable violence ethno-religious that involve our state and nation but our primary aim at that time was to stop the killing in northern Nigeria. The mission of IMC was to create peaceful societies through strategic engagement and mediation in Nigeria and beyond" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The findings of this study showed that there is agreement with the empirical literature by Adamu (2016) who revealed that the two arch-enemies Pastor James Movel Wuye a militant Christian activist and Imam Muhammad Nurayn Ashafa a radical Islamist who was actively involved in the conflict from 1960 to 1992.Wuye was a Christian youth leader who volunteered and led a reprisal attack. He lost his right arm during one of the battles against Ashafa militant group in Kaduna. The incident led to his increasing vengeance and deep hatred for Muslims in general and Ashafa in particular. Ashafa on the other hand, lost his relatives and followers during their clashes with a Christian group led by Pastor Wuye.

The co-executive director of IMC Islamic affairs added that;

> "Coincidentally, we met in 1995 whereby through intermediaries, we talked and finally decided to bury the hatchet and embrace peace as well as to work together to bring an end to violent conflict through interreligious initiatives" (Imam Ashafa, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The finding of this study corresponds with the work of Smock (2006) who revealed that their experience and active involvement in violent ethno-religious conflict of 1995 motivated them to work together against ethnic violence and religious conflict. Another official member of the IMC stated that;

> "The Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC) was established in May, 1995 as non-profit organization with the sole aim of ending violent conflict between Muslims and Christians across Northern Nigeria" (Pastor Charles, O.I, 23/01/2019).

The result of this study corroborated with the IMC report (1995) which views that the organisation work collectively in conflict management and peace-building within northern Nigeria States and beyond. As a voluntary organisation, the IMC's goal is mainly to achieve peaceful coexistence through interfaith dialogue. Another member from IMC added that;

> "IMC works with all stakeholders to promote mutual trust and tolerance between Christian and Muslim communities at all levels of interaction" (Imam Ahmad, O.I, 21/01/2019).

From the above findings, it can be established that IMC maintains relationships with a broad range of actors and has served as an instrument to establish peace in most

troubled places where it has intervened. It is affiliated with the Nigeria Supreme

Council of Islamic Affairs, Christian Association of Nigeria, Jama'atu Nasril Islam,

Conflict Management Stakeholders Network, non-state actors, and West African

Civil Society Forum (Wuye, 2014).

2.3.1 Interfaith Mediation Centre Sources of Fund

The co-executive director IMC Christian Affairs noted that;

> "The organisation relies mainly on assistance and
> sponsorships received from both local and international
> donors who are willing to support any engagement for
> sustainable peace" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Another official of IMC explained further;

> "IMC has a couple of individuals who supported some of our
> engagements. During the initial stages of our mission, the
> British high commission was supporting until when the
> USAID came in quite strongly" (Imam Ahmed, O.I,
> 21/01/2019).

The above findings are supported by IMC archive (1995) which noted that financial

model is action-based. The financial support is mobilised locally and/or

internationally to implement the project. The main sources for financial support of

IMC activities are state governments, intergovernmental organisations and others

international donor agencies. IMC has received support from the European Union,

Christian Aid United Kingdom, French Embassy, UNICEF, International

Republican Institute (IRI), UNDP, and several other local/international donor

organizations.

Echoing the preceding respondent, another interjected that;

> "IMC has been supported by various stakeholders, one that gave us five-year grant was the USAID, for what they called ''tolerance project''. The project was to address the issues of deepening the understanding of religions in order to build trust. Another aim was to look at how IMC can setup an effective early warning and early response system within the northern Nigeria and beyond"(Pastor Charles, O.I, 23/01/2019).

Another respondent added that;

> "The IMC funds donations help the organisation in running its initiatives geared towards preventing the recurrence of violence and encouraging trust among Muslims and Christians" (Imam Ashafa, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Similarly, Smock (2006) revealed that Kaduna and Plateau states government supported the IMC with funds over a period of time.

2.3.2 Objectives of Interfaith Mediation Centre

As stipulated in its vision, the centre aims to achieve a number of objectives including: to resolve ethno-religious issues, to promote peace and cohesion between and among different religions. The above was reinforced by the co-executive director of IMC Islamic Affair who revealed that;

> "IMC addresses issues of ethno-religious concern and worked with stakeholders within that system. It also addresses hate speeches inserting summons and pronouncement by religious/community leaders and the government" (Imam Ashafa, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The findings of this study corresponds with the work of Adamu (2016) which revealed that IMC position is set to address followings: to promote peaceful coexistence among all the interfaith groups and different tribes within the State as

well as country at large, to promote religious teachings of peace dialogue, to prevent

the recurrence of violent conflict and to increase the level of trust as well as

tolerance between Christians and Muslims communities. Another IMC official

remarked that;

> "IMC uses various platforms to detect early warning and identify early response to build bridge across faiths and traditional institutions and government. IMC has been active as well as experienced in training different groups of people across Bauchi State and Country at large. This helps us to ensure harmonious coexistence and peaceful societies towards sustainable development through the use of instruments of dialogues, direct intervention, town hall, focus group discussion, through sport and through various forms of advocacy to bring about the harmony to realize our vision" (Imam Ahmed, O.I, 21/01/2019).

The findings of this study corroborated with the IMC report which revealed that

through strategic engagement, it gives capacity to state and non-state actors to

address conflict related issues and prevent them from escalating. It endeavours to

use interactive mediation system to discuss contemporary issues within the society

and through that, address causes of conflict and also through that system, give

further capacity to look out and to take the situation in to their hands, working with

them to get solutions to the prevailing challenges (IMC Report, 1995). An oral

interviewee also revealed that;

> "IMC reduces ethno-religious violence by addressing and responding to the growing communal violence and extremism in the Northeast Regions and Bauchi State in particular. These include: targeting its conflict mitigation and management training to the various stakeholders and groups in the communities including clerics, government officials, traditional leaders, civil society organizations, and women and youth leaders"(Imam Ashafa, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Similarly, Adamu (2016) noted that interventions to prevent and resolve conflicts require holistic systems that address the roots of conflicts before they escalate; create new understandings that address grievances once violence erupts; and work to prevent a new escalation of the conflict once stability is restored. IMC employs this holistic approach in order to work at the deeper drivers of conflict as well as seeking to manage the immediate outbreak of hostilities.

2.3.3 Organizational Development of IMC

The co-executive director of IMC Christian Affairs stated as follows;

> "The goal of the IMC project is to increase political stability and ensure development in Northeast, Northwest, and North-Central Nigeria by reducing lawlessness and radicalism; mitigating extremism; and increasing the legitimacy and capacity of governance structures to defend religious freedom. In the first year, the project was implemented in three states: Bauchi, Borno, and Plateau. Additional programming began in Kaduna, Kano, and Sokoto in the second year. In an effort to build and enhance IMC's capacity, the project engaged the services of the University of Massachusetts, Boston (UMASS) and the Public Conversations Project (PCP)" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Moreover, Adamu (2016) maintained that the Kaduna Peace Declaration of religious leaders is the first intervention facilitated by IMC to ensure peace agreement between leaders of the two dominant religions in Kaduna. The peace agreement arranged by IMC brought 22 signatories from religious leaders and one signatory from the government signed by the Deputy Governor of Kaduna state on behalf of the Governor to mark the event. After the signing of the peace agreement, the officials of IMC ensured the agreement work effectively over the years because of the opportunity and space created for Muslim and Christian leaders to work for sustainable peace. The declaration was a commitment to ending violence and

bloodshed. In the end, a peace declaration emerged indicating the readiness of prominent religious leaders including Pastor Wuye and Imam Ashafa to put an end to violence and bloodshed in Kaduna.

Similarly, Muhammad and James (2006) revealed that peace declaration also presents seven articles guiding the peace agreement which points to (1) Muslims and Christians of all tribes to respect each other's religion including freedom of worship and respect for places of worship (2) work with all communities for peace per religious teaching (3) the need to condemn all forms of violence and encourage mutual respect and mutual coexistence with one another (4) promote peace for the state (5) have respect for law and accept reforms (6) agree to work with security forces in peacekeeping and, (7) to agree to establish a permanent joint committee to implement the peace agreement and to pave way for dialogue between religious leaders to restore respect and confidence in living together.

Another chief Imam central Mosque Bonunu expressed himself as follows;

> "We are glad that Bauchi State embraced the idea or concept of mediation also known as (*Zauran Sulhu*); the room for negotiation was formed in one of our conferences and we are happy today that the Bauchi State Government use the system to address the issues of conflict in the State" (Imam Salisu, O.I, 23/01/2019).

In similar version, IMC also gathered key leaders in Yelwa-shandam, in the southern part of Plateau State, and mediated joint acceptance of a Peace Affirmation that continues to be upheld. In addition, they have helped mediate between Jama'atul Nasrul Islam and Christians Association of Nigeria (Wuye, 2014).

2.3.4 IMC Organisational Structure

An oral interviewee revealed that;

> "Senior IMC leadership is composed of two persons, a Christian pastor and a Muslim imam. Two secondary persons are responsible for elements of the IMC program and other initiatives. This is a cumbersome way for senior leadership to operate" (Imam Ashafa, O.I, 20/01/2019).

In a collaborated empirical study Wuye (2014) noted that the senior leadership has had a long-standing working and personal relationship that serves IMC's operations and interests outside the program. IMC has a Board of Trustees composed of eight distinguished persons in Nigeria and who meet about twice yearly. IMC's Board of Directors is a group of six persons (including the senior pastor and imam, senior or retired bureaucrats, and religious leaders) which is more engaged and meets to affirm decisions taken by the 'Big Four (4)'. Neither the Trustees nor the Board of Directors impact day-to-day IMC work due to the nature of top management and organizational and leadership skills developed over time. The actual management of the IMC program is not a focus of the leadership.

Giving insight on the above, another respondent articulated;

> "IMC have a Secretariat of 14 people (7 Muslims and 7 Christians) situated in Kaduna metropolis with joint deputyships, coordinators, and program managers. Each position is having both Muslim and Christian representatives with equal representation. Imam Muhammad Nuraiyn Ashafa and Pastor James Movel Wuye are the Co-Executive Directors of the IMC who exchange a portfolio of responsibilities and enjoy an equitable division of labour" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019)".

In essence, the nature of IMC as an NGO symbolises participation of both the Muslims and Christians, Imams and Pastors and religious youth leaders (representing both religions) in the programming and implementation of the activities of the Centre. Other positions available in the Centre comprise of coordinator good governance and grass root participatory budgeting system, and coordinator pastoralist-farmers conflict responsible for coordinating peace talk. The Centre also has support staff such as clerical staff, secretaries and drivers (IMC Report, 1995).

Echoing the same sentiment as the preceding respondent, another interviewee stated;

> "In Bauchi branch, the groups include Christian Muslims Peace Movement (CMPM), Federation of Muslims Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), and Women Wing Can (WWC), among others. It is through this medium that opposing groups of differentiated beliefs and identities often dialogue and come up with common ground seeking to prevent and manage conflict. The forum serves as a structure to imbibe the culture of mutual trust, respect, tolerance and community dialogue. Within the structure an avenue is created for community's continuous learning for management of emerging conflict issues"(Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The result of this study corroborated with the IMC report (1999) which revealed that under its Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum, IMC has more than one hundred (100) officials from various sections of Northern Nigeria such as civil society groups, youths, women leaders other NGOs and religious leaders.

The Theory of peace building is applicable in this chapter because it helps the IMC in bringing people closer to their course of actions in promoting understanding, reconciliation and basis for peace building efforts.

2.3.5 IMC Activities in Peace Building

In assessing the role of IMC in peace building, one of the respondents remarked;

> "In early 1995, 88 women were selected from flashpoint and peaceful communities across the state to participate in training to equip them with mediation skills and the capacity to handle trauma cases and conflict situation. These women brought together 40 gangsters, all male youths from these warring communities to Jama'atu Nasril Islam central Mosques in Bauchi, for dialogue. Their intervention led to an agreement between the groups which resulted in the restoration of peaceful coexistence in the communities"(Pastor Wuye, KII, 20/01/2019).

In addition, they encouraged women in these communities as mothers to watch out for negative traits in the behaviour of their children in their homes to ensure that these young people do not bring the names of their families to disrepute. One of the youths from Karofin Madaki stated: *"Looking back it is incredible that these communities are now living peacefully. I pray that it will be sustained (IMC Report, 1995: pp 23)."*

Another respondent added;

> "IMC identified nine faith-based organisation (FBOs) including women faith-based organisations from Bauchi and trained them on conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue skills. The women participated from different denominations agreed to come together to carry out neighbourhood sensitization sessions where they met with youths, men and women to discuss the importance of peaceful existence and the need to freely engage in socio-economic activities for meaningful development"(Pastor Wuye, KII, 20/01/2019).

Similarly, Wuye (2014) revealed that these interactions between different faiths based organisations led to visits by Muslims women to their counterparts in Church, where they met and discuss issues. Christian women have also reciprocated by visiting Mosques where they also held meetings in an effort to promote peace. This had never happened in the past five years in Bauchi town. The Co-Executive Director of IMC Christian Affairs revealed that;

> "In Bauchi, we created baseline survey and identify flashpoint and recognise the ethics, norms and values of each community, how they can scale through, how they can achieve aim and objectives by forming youth groups, traditional rulers and religious leaders within their particular community and to get from the source" (Pastor Wuye, KII 20/01/2019).

Another chief Imam from Bauchi City revealed that peace education is the key to unite the State, communities and individuals, bringing closely together in many parts of the world (Imam Lawal, O.I, 21/01/2019). Another Church leader from Bauchi added that peace education is an important tool in promoting peace, social justice and cultural diversity. It also implies an active concept of peace through values, life skills and knowledge in the spirit of equality, understanding among individuals' groups and nations (Pastor Adams, O.I, 25/02/2019). Another Church leader from Bauchi City remarked as follows:

> "A culture of peace must take root in class room from the early age and must continue to be reflected in the curricula at secondary and tertiary schools"(Pastor Moses, O.I, 15/01/2019).

From the findings, it can be established that Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC) organized a two days meeting and refresher training for Conflict Management Mitigation Regional Council and Community Peace Observers and a one-day Monitoring visit across tolerance states of Bauchi, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau and Sokoto (Smock, 2006). Another Christians Muslims peace movement official revealed;

> "IMC established peace clubs in various secondary schools in promoting peace in Bauchi state" (Aminu, O.I, 22/01/2019).

In corroboration with the IMC report (1999), the Centre strengthened and established Peace Clubs in 14 Secondary Schools across the tolerance focal states. It aimed at catching the young students early enough to be peace ambassadors and equip them with rudimentary skills on anger management and effective communication for peace building.   A total number of 280 students aged between 15-17years from JSS1 to JSS3 across the six focal states participated and 28 teachers to serve as Patrons/Matrons for the Peace Clubs also participated.

The IMC gave sub-training to her members in response to conflict, so "we went to schools of Birmingham U.K, later to South Africa to centre for conflict resolution then within that period we came back and IMC started going round the country meeting young people of the National Council for Muslim Youths Organisation (NACOMYO) then Youth Wing Can in another word we called them Youth Christian Association of Nigeria".

In addition to the above statement the Co-executive Director of IMC Christian affairs added that;

> "Having returned to Nigeria from UK and South Africa respectively, we started direct engagement of our constituencies with the youths that setup the platform and the structure that transformed into the institution" (Pastor Wuye, KII, 20/01/2019).

Following the series of challenges in Bauchi State, some years back IMC carried out a case study of both Tafawa Balewa and the main city of Bauchi to ascertain the root causes of the problem (Pastor Charles, O.I, 23/01/2019). Having done that, IMC started using the structures that were on ground particularly the system of informal education. IMC used Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN) and Women Wing Can (WWC) to begin to look out how they can educate their people in basic understanding of peace education and peace mediation among young people (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019). He also added:

> "There were some youth who attended our programs and used their places of business to educate their friends who came there to buy something".

There was inter-communities dialogue between the young people in the community that front to violence in some communities in Bauchi town just the thin line separate one community that are predominantly Christian and the other that are predominantly Muslims. IMC was able to provide some basic skills to community members (IMC Report, 1995).

Another oral interviewee stated that;

''IMC organised iftar in Bauchi state between Muslims and Christians in promoting the culture of peace (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019)''.

Plate 1: Iftar in Bauchi state with IMC staff (IMC report, 2013).

Christians Host Muslims to Break their Fast (Iftar) in fostering peaceful coexistence and inclusiveness, IMC hosted selected Muslim and Christian leaders to break Ramadan fast in Bauchi state (IMC Report, 2013).

The peace building theory allows Interfaith Mediation Centre to play their intermediate role in terms of mediation, negotiation and promote dialogue between the Muslims and Christian in Bauchi State, Nigeria. In this case, IMC played a vital role in resolving the differences and embrace peaceful coexistence. The theory also focuses on problems solving workshops among various faith-based organisations in promoting sustainable peace in Bauchi State Nigeria.

2.4 Summary

In this chapter, we looked at the factors that led to the establishment of the Interfaith Mediation Centre up to 1995. The findings of this study revealed that IMC was created in 1995 to address ethno-religious and other violence. This is based on an empirical study by Adamu (2016) who revealed that the two enemies' pastor Wuye and Ashafa involved in the conflict for over 30 years which later inculcate the culture of peace in Kaduna state and beyond. In the chapter, the interfaith mediation centre sources of the fund were discussed. In so doing, it was established that the financial strength of the organisation relies mainly on assistance and sponsorships received from both local and international donors who are willing to support any engagement for sustainable peace.

Another finding of this study revealed that IMC and other religious leaders address conflict through a peaceful approach. The empirical literature supported by Omotosho (2014) who views that religious leaders played a leading role in conflict resolution and building efforts to increase dialogue across the divisions. IMC worked with Faith-Based Organisations in organising training for conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue skills.

Therefore IMC has created a space for conflict management, conflict mitigations, mediations, and set up early warning and earlier response systems in various communities in Bauchi State and Northern Nigeria at large. The Interfaith Mediation Centre has been able to function more fully and assist the government in preventing or managing conflict from escalation.

CHAPTER THREE: IMC AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT BETWEEN FARMERS AND HERDSMEN IN BAUCHI STATE, NIGERIA 1996-2009

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines a background on the role of Interfaith Mediation Centre in managing conflict between herdsmen and farmers from 1996 to 2009. It discusses the causes of conflict between farmers and herdsmen, IMC and its conflict management strategies.

3.2 Causes of Conflict between Farmers and Herdsmen in Bauchi State 1996-2009

Chief Imam from Central Mosque Bonunu revealed that;

> "It was noted that the two groups often clashed over land as each want to pursue their activities. While farmers want to cultivate crops for both subsistence and for sale, the herdsmen on the other side want to graze their animals for milk, meat and hides production for the same reason of food production and for commercial purposes" (Imam Muhammad, O.I, 30/01/2019).

The findings of this study shows that there is disagreement with the empirical study by Roger (2000) who observed that conflict between the two groups have been evident mostly in the past two decades, the causes of their conflict dates back to early as 1960 when the country attained its independence. This owes to the fact that the country inherited the boundaries that the British colonialists drew in the course of their administration. This limited the free movement of these two communities particularly the herdsmen whose economic activity entails moving from one place to another in search of pasture and water for their animals.

One of the Muslim youth leaders revealed that;

> "The first notable conflict between the Sayawa (farmers and the Fulani (herdsmen) took a wider dimension that left over forty-four villages and hamlets were burnt while several lives and properties were lost"(Idris, O.I, 11/01/2019).

Consequently, the State Government set up a special tribunal headed by Justice Ibrahim Zango to arrest those connected to the crises. However, the tribunal could not conclude its assignment due to legal and technical hitches in the edict which was challenged by the council of elders of the Zar people at the Federal High Court in Jos. The court stopped the proceedings of the tribunal and released the accused persons on bail (Albert, 1999).

In 1996, the Bauchi State particularly Tafawa Balewa Local Government Federal Government decided to organise a committee to bring out their recommendation for further actions. The committee headed by Hon. Justice O. Babalakin, made the following recommendations; rehabilitation of refugees, punishment to the perpetrators, rebuilding Tafawa Balewa Central Market as well as the creation of Sayawa (farmers) chiefdom, immediate dissolution of the Council and its executive. The Federal Government accepted its recommendations and directed implementation accordingly. However, the Bauchi State Government implemented all the recommendations but failed to implement the creation of the Sayawa (farmers) Chiefdom (Dadi, 1991).

Another community leader from Tafawa Balewa stated;

> "The major cause of conflict in Tafawa Balewa was leadership. The entire Zar communities (Sayawa chiefdom) were dominated by Christian farmers but government appointed a Hausa/Fulani (herdsmen) as the leader of the community and that marked the genesis of the escalating crisis. We appointed a local chief in order to handle the affairs of the communities" (Chief Yusuf, O.I, 10/01/2019).

Furthermore, this event led to a more intensified Sayawa farmers struggle and demand for self-government. The incidence also led to the formation of the justice Babalakin judicial commission of inquiry. In their submissions to the commission, the Sayawa farmers changed their demand for a district head to an autonomous chiefdom to be carved out of Bauchi Emirate Council. Among the recommendations of the commission was that of the Sayawa chiefdom which was approved by the Federal Government in a white paper released to the Bauchi State Government (Dadi, 1991).The former chairman of Christian Muslims Peace Movement Bauchi revealed;

> "Between 1996 and 2009 more than five (5) incidences of violent conflicts have been witnessed with losses of lives and properties. Herdsmen and farmers conflict remains a serious issue in Bauchi State, Nigeria despite inroads being made by numerous peace-building organizations working in several areas around the state particularly in Tafawa Balewa, Azare, and the City of Bauchi. These regions have had violent conflict and extremism in recent years" (Former chairman Aminu, O.I, 22/01/2019).

The delay in the implementation of this recommendation formed the major causes of the 1995 crises that completely changed the demand of the Sayawa farmers from independent chiefdom in Bauchi State to request for a merger with Plateau State.

As one of the recommendations on the judicial commission of enquiry of Justice Oputa Babalakin has lamented: the commission recommends that chiefdom be created for Sayawa farmers and the Bauchi State Government should look into all enabling laws to make this possible with minimum delay comments: Government accepted these recommendations and directed the Bauchi State Government to take appropriate action (Akin, 1996).

This is not to say, however, that the Government did not make some genuine efforts towards resolving the conflict under Governor Mohammad Dahiru Deba"s administration 1991-1993 and 1995 the Government called the elders from both parties to resolve the crisis (Akin, 1996). However, this effort could not yield any result due to non-cooperation of the Hausa/Fulani (herdsmen) group (Akin, 1996). In pursuance of the directives of the Federal Government, the Bauchi State Government set up this committee in 1992 to work out modalities and determine the area of jurisdiction for Sayawa (farmers) chiefdom. The Committee comprising five members called for a memorandum from citizens of Bauchi State. The committee finally submitted its reports in the early part of 1996 to the State Government. An oral interviewee revealed;

> "In Misau and Tafawa Balewa Local Government of Bauchi State, people were predominantly farmers who are always engaged in farming while herdsmen engaged in rearing animals" (youth leader Sunusi, O.I, 1/02/2019).

The result of this study corroborated with the work of Roger (2000) who noted that two groups survived in a peaceful and symbiotic relationship between herdsmen and farmers in exchange for grazing land. However, tensions have grown over the past

decades since 1960 with increasing violence flare-ups spreading throughout Central and Southern States. Incidents have occurred in at least 22 out of 36 States in Nigeria. Herdsmen migrating into the savannah and rain forest of the Central and Southern States are moving into regions where high population growth over the last four decades has heightened pressure on farmland, increasing the frequency of disputes over crop damage, water pollution, and cattle's theft (Crisis Report, 2005). A community leader from Bonunu added;

> "Furthermore, the nomadic Fulbe (Bororoje) are the cattle Fulani and roam the Sahel Savanna grazing cattle. It is on the basis of these that, many decided to settle in Bonunu areas for trading and grazing purposes and were allowed to occupy the urban and rural areas as well as market areas. While Sayawa people and other ethnic groups including the Jarawa moved to where there is abundant arable land for agricultural and grazing purposes. Some of the farm products they cultivate include: groundnut, onions, maize, millet, guinea corn, beans, cassava, potatoes, rice, (hungry rice) and many others for food and marketing purposes, while livestock reared to enhance their economic growth" (Chief Alkali, O.I, 10/01/2019).

The findings of this study show that there are agreements with the empirical study by Rashed (2006) who point out that the Fulani represent a significant component of the Nigerian economy. They constitute the major breeders of cattle, the main source of meat, the most available and cheap source of animal proteins consumed by Nigerians. The Fulani own over 90% per cent of the nation's livestock population which accounts for one-third of agricultural GDP and 3.2% per cent of the nation's GDP. The contribution of the Fulani to the local food chain and national food security cannot be overstressed. The Fulani, with their dominance in the Sahel region, is the best known and most numerous of all the pastoral groups in Nigeria.

The traditional and unique Fulani encampment (*ruga*) consisting of temporary structures made of stalks, closely-knit family members and livestock is the natural habitat of the orthodox Fulbe settlement (Fiki & Lee, 2005).

Moreover, around October to December when their farm produces available in the Local Government market areas, the flocks are kept around the homes and reared by younger children. These include goats and sheep, while they keep their cattle within the settlements known as *ruga* having been friendly with the Fulani man (Adamu, 2000 & Daniel; 2006).

As the State cannot regulate the mutual coexistence of its citizens in the harmonious sharing of the competed resources, the parties may have to resolve to struggle among themselves with no retreat, no surrender and for the survival of the fittest. The failure of the State, for example, to resolve the farmers/ herdsmen identity and the inherent struggles over resources can be adduced to have brought dangerous dimensions of economic and political elements in the Fulani pastoralists and farmers' conflicts (Fiki & Lee, 2005). Another respondent stated;

> "In the past ten years, our Christian husbands hardly went to Muslim farms and this is the same to the Muslim farmers for the fear of being attacked or killed"(Women leader Racheal, O.I, 13/01/2019).

Blench (2010:4), however, revealed that conflicts between pastoralists and farmers have existed since the beginnings of agriculture are increased or decreased depending on economic, environmental and other factors. For example, increases in the herd sizes, due to improved conditions of the cattle compelled the pastoralists to seek for more pastures beyond their limited range. Climate change has constituted a

great threat by putting great pressures on the land and thus provoking conflicts between them (Abbas, 2009). Since the 1960s therefore, there has been a marked expansion of cultivation of the *fadama* (riverine and valley-bottom) areas. This means that both the farmers and pastoralists have engaged in fierce struggles for access to such valuable lands which, more often than not, result in increased conflicts and violence (Blench, 2009&Iro, 2009).

3.3 IMC and the Management of Conflict between Herdsmen and Farmers in Bauchi State 1996-2009

As far as IMC in the management of conflict is concerned, one of oral interviewee noted;

> "IMC advises the government to establish conflict mediation, reconciliation and peace building mechanisms based on state and local government levels as well as within rural communities particularly the most affected area by conflict" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The findings of this study contradicts with the work of crisis report (2005) revealed that IMC in collaboration with government security agencies sustained campaigns against rustling and rural banditry; improve early warning systems; maintain operational readiness of local based police and other security units.

The Interfaith Mediation Centre officials and Government used so many approaches, methodology, strategies as well as sensitization advocacy by using both electronic and social media, public awareness and sometimes holding meetings, organised ourselves as a group to advocate for peace- making (FGD, 10/03/2019).

Another respondent stated the following;

> "IMC advises the government to establish grazing reserves in consenting states and improve livestock production and management in order to minimise contact and friction between herders and farmers (Imam Ahmed, KII, 21/01/2019).

The above findings are supported by Punch newspaper (2009) revealed that International partners are encouraging herder farmer dialogue through various local initiatives. For instance, the British council sponsored Nigeria reconciliation and establish project (NRSP) supporting the states towards inculcating peace and conflict management alliance in organising a dialogue between farmers and herders. Another newspaper added that;

> "Likewise, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored and hosted conferences on herder-farmers dialogue involving the all farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN), the interfaith mediation centre (IMC) and others" (Leadership newspaper, 2015).

Following revelations that foreign herders were involved in attacks on farming communities, the government would present proposals at the African union ''to compel member countries to take steps to prevent their herdsmen from grazing into neighbouring countries,'' warning there could be a major international crisis if we do not stop it now (Agatu, 2007). To that end, the Nigerian government should engage the Cameroon, Chad and Niger as well as ECOWAS commission to reach an agreement on how to collectively monitor and regulate international transhumance pastoralism per the relevant international instruments including the ECOWAS protocol. It should also strengthen regional cooperation in combating desertification

and mitigating the impact of climate change (Punch Newspaper, 2015).Vanguard Newspapers (2015) stated the following;

> "The myriad of security challenges confronting the country are rooted in internal and external factors. President Muhammad Buhari started this when he received security reports from the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, (NIPSS). He noted that the security challenges his administration faced in 2015 was threatening the lives and property of the country, adding that it was in a bid to finding a sustainable solution to the problem that necessitated the commissioning of NIPSS in having a holistic view of the country security problems".

The IMC advise Bauchi State Government to formulate and implement steps to address the grievances between the two parties and support local conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms from the interfaith groups, establishing and protecting grazing reserves that would make significant and immediate differences. Failure would spell greater danger for the country and other severe security challenges (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

IMC through CPAN Department sent out SMS blasts in English and Hausa languages addressing some of the issues stated above while calling for calm and discouraging people from taking laws into their hands (IMC Report, 2013).

Farmers/ herders clash in Kaduna and Plateau States witnessed cases of clashes. Communities like Attakar, Tachire, Mallamai, Pasokari, Kugo, UngwanAnjo and Godogodo chiefdoms all located in Southern Kaduna LGA recorded repeated cases of farmer's herders clash due to reported cases of reprisal attack by conflicting groups. Other states outside the focal States affected by this problem were Zamfara, Benue, Taraba, Adamawa, Kebbi and Katsina States (Blench, 2010).In 2009,

Nassarawa State has also suffered an increase in violence involving the herders and farmers militia. In 2009, over 260 people killed in several incidents mostly in the southern zone (Iro, 2009). Another newspaper added that;

> "Most of these killings followed the influx of herders retaliating against the anti-grazing law (Punch Newspapers, 2015)''.

Women leader from Tafawa Balewa revealed that;

> "IMC involved in mediating the farmers and herdsmen conflict in various places across Bauchi State. We call the leaders of both parties and ironing the problems for lasting solution" (women leader Blessing, O.I, 15/01/2019).

An oral interviewee indicated that another reason is that herdsmen live in a remote and rural area where by they only care about their cattle forgetting about those farmers who plant their farm product and at last they do not get anything so they mostly retaliate but we call the both parties together to let them understand they are important to each other (Imam Muhammad, O.I, 2/01/2019). On daily basis we are working with IMC officials and village head (Hakimi) toward inculcates the culture of peace between farmers and herdsmen in our various communities here in Bununu (Chief Waziri, O.I, 22/01/2019). Another respondent said:

> "Within Bauchi State any farmer in Tafawa Balewa and Boggoro would go directly to herdsmen places and plant their crops without any crises because we engaged in peace mediation between the two parties towards promoting lasting peace in the area" (Chief Alkali, O.I, 10/01/2019).

IMC was also involved in educating the farmers not to plant their crops within the herdsmen cattle route as well as the herdsmen do not graze on the farmers' farm in

order to destroy their crops (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019). An oral source revealed;

> "The role we play between farmers and herdsmen in managing the conflict is through calling the two parties in order to address their issues. Secondly, the Federal Government provided the roads for the herdsmen to allow their cattle to pass through, so if farmers try to plant their crops near or within the cattle road, we call the farmers to stop from planting because it will cause conflict" (Imam Haruna, O.I, 30/01/2019).

A participant articulated that as a leader one must allow herdsmen to move around since it was stated in the constitution that guaranteed free movement of citizen from one place to another. Some of the policies of the government brought lot of chaos. So, we need to think twice before making a policy that would generate tension in our State (FGD, 10/03/2019). An oral interviewee revealed that;

> "IMC try to educate farmers that when you are farming make sure you leave a little gap (road) where herdsmen can pass through so that they cannot destroy your crops" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Any person knows that farmers and herdsmen both live together one cannot do without the other. Farmers cannot survive without sharing some part of cows likewise there is no way a herder man can survive without crops (Chief Sadiq, O.I, 10/03/2019). Another respondent added that;

> "The role we play as traditional rulers in managing the farmers/ herdsmen clashes is that if we see any new herder in our community, we call them in to order and ask them to bring a clearance from the village head they left and came here. If the herders show their clearance with a duly sign then we can allow them to stay with us but any herder without any clearance would not be allowed to stay with us in our community" (Chief Salisu, O.I, 19/01/2019).

Another respondent noted that we are geared towards screening the bad eggs among the herdsmen in the community and that need the government implement this action or policy that any herders who will come to any community should identify themselves or show the evidence of permission to come to the community (Chief Turaki, O.I, 13/01/2019). One pastor noted that;

> "We worked with IMC to encourage peace coexistence; for instance in November 2009,we heard these episode happened to somebody harvested his farm product and kept it for a while for him to come and placed it near to my farm, while herdsmen brought their cows into the farm, they consumed everything" (Pastor Bukar, O.I, 20/01/2019).

From the pastor's remarks, it is evident that this forceful invasion of each other among the two groups is rampart. Sometimes in such cases, we as the IMC team, pick some scriptural and biblical verses and some chapters to encourage people with peaceful messages" (Pastor Moses, O.I, 14/01/2019). One of the government officials revealed;

> "The Government Agencies have worked positively with Interfaith Mediation Centre in various areas in order to manage and address the farmers and herdsmen clashes in Bauchi State" (Lawal, O.I, 21/01/2019).

Consequently, in Nigeria particularly 1999 have witnessed an alarming increase in the level of violent conflict and serious killings of people and massive destruction of properties have occurred as a result of farmer's and herders' clashes (GIDPP, 2005& Olukorede, 2002).

The Co-executive Director of IMC Christian Affairs revealed that;

> "Interfaith Mediation Centres in 1999 further opposed the social structure and posing a great challenge in an effort to maintain the unity between the two groups of farmers and herdsmen in Bauchi State" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

John (2005) asserts that within North East Bauchi State is one of the regions that are threatened by numerous violent conflicts between farmers and herdsmen over fear of domination, struggle of power and political representation in the State. The Chairman Christian Muslims Peace Movement and also Coordinator of IMC added that;

> "The IMC and Christian Muslims Peace Movement (NGO) in Bauchi worked hand in hand with State and Federal Government towards sensitization to inculcate the culture of peace between farmers and herdsmen across the State. For instance, IMC collaborated with other NGOs to organise national farmers/ herdsmen conference between Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria and All Farmers Association of Nigeria" (Aminu, O.I, 22/01/2019).

In fact, there is great improvement in the relationship between the Sayawa farmers and Hausa-Fulani herdsmen in the area. The displaced persons have returned back to their former settlements and businesses have resumed (Adamu, 2001). The Co-executive Director of IMC Christian Affairs added that:

> "We have heard occasions in Bauchi within the period of 2000 where youth farmers celebrated charismas and how herdsmen youth protected them and vice versa. There was a period where the Muslim herdsmen were having their prayer and the Christians youth farmers protected them; that gesture to me is a great success story" (Imam Ashafa, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The findings from the empirical study shows the disagreement by the work of Lewis(2003:142) who noted that another conflict between farmers and herdsmen in the State ensued causing massive killing with clear political overtones leading heightened security concerns. In a public speech, former Governor of Bauchi State Alhaji Ahmadu AdamuMua"azu (former Chairman of Peoples" Democratic Party) lamented that since 1999 Bauchi State has experienced a series of conflicts which turned into bloodshed between Hausa/ Fulani (herdsmen) and Sayawa (farmers). People have been killed and billions of Naira worth of public and private properties destroyed as well as thousands of individual internally displaced persons across the country. According to him, these conflicts have negative effects on the people across the country at large (Bauchi State Government, 2006). This is captured by the comments made by the former president of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjowho asserted;

> "Conflict between farmers and herdsmen across Nigeria and other violence have reached unprecedented levels and hundred have been killed with much more wounded or displaced from their homes on account of their ethnicity or religious identification. Schooling for children has been disrupted and interrupted; businesses have lost billions of Naira and property worth much more destroyed" (Obasanjo, 2004).

According to Omorogbe and Omohan (2005), only two major strategies of conflict management are employed by government to tackle the problems of conflict. The coercive method as the name suggests has to do with the deployment of troops to the areas of conflict with the objective of controlling the crisis. In Bauchi State and Nigeria at large, the method of managing the ethno-religious conflicts has taken many forms depending on the magnitude of the crisis (Omorogbe & Omohan, 2005).

However, an IMC official revealed:

> "In Bauchi state in particular, there was a businesswoman and she became a mediator. Young boys who are out of schools, young boys who are restive would come to her place to feed themselves and she uses that occasion to inculcate them with the culture of peace within the societies" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The Co-executive Director of IMC Christian Affairs added;

> "Both Ilelah and Makama new extension, are among the tolerant communities in Bauchi L.G.A, after attending the training on Alternative Dispute Resolution facilitated by IMC in Bauchi established a '' mediation tent'' known as *"Zauran Sulhu"* in local parlance. This is helping to solve issues within the community without resorting to the formal structures. This approach has gained wide acceptance with the State Government approving the establishment of similar conflict resolution mechanism in all the Local Government of the State" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

According to the participants in a focus group discussion held at Bauchi multipurpose hall, the reason behind the conflict between farmers and herdsmen from 1996 to 2009 in Bauchi state are based on farm products. The herdsmen had destroyed the farmers' farms in many places in Bauchi State. Nonetheless, as a result of the IMC mediation tent (*Zauran-Sulhu*) played an important role in managing the conflict between the farmers and herdsmen within the State (FGD, 10/03/2019).

Albert (2009) notes that the National and Local Governments have not been able to develop an effective, comprehensive strategy or clear policy towards conflict management, peace-building, reconciliation, or conflict prevention/mitigation between farmers and herdsmen in Nigeria (Albert, 1999). This inability to fast track

the conflict management strategies has immensely contributed to the present dire situation.

The conflict between farmers and pastoralists, ethno-religious as well as regional keeps on occurring in some parts of Northern Nigeria more than any part in the country. Such violent conflicts have become increasingly widespread bedeviling human development, human security, devastating effects on individual life, safety, freedom and stability of so many states such as Kaduna State, Plateau State, Borno State, Yobe State, Taraba State, Bauchi State, Kano State (Ray *et. al*, 2007). State and non-state actors have a role in conflict management. Kabiru*et al*., (2008) argued that traditional modes of conflict management by the community and religious leaders together with formal government institutions can play a critical role in resolving conflicts. The government played a positive role in conflict management through the police and the judiciary, through regulatory bodies such as tribunals and social welfare committees, and through its efforts at mediation and crisis management (Kwaja, 2009).

3.4 Positive Indicators in the management of Conflict between Farmers and Herdsmen 1996-2009

An oral interviewee revealed that;

> "IMC engaged in training herdsmen and farmers and to us we see both of them as farmers, one is livestock farmer and the other one is crops farmers" (Pastor Samson, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Another respondent in FGD added that IMC has done a good work in mediating conflict between the livestock farmers and crops farmers in several places across

Bauchi State and other parts of Northern Nigeria. Moreover, IMC has done quite a lot of work in so many places across the country (FGD, 10/03/2019).

The respondents' assertions are backed by Wuye (2014) who established that IMC celebrated peace between the two groups; farmers and herdsmen in Sanga community of Kaduna State where they signed the peace treaties in 2000-2008. Sanga town remained peaceful in spite of the fighting across neighbouring communities within the southern part of Kaduna and for us that was the remarkable indication. Echoing the same sentiments as the preceding respondent another interviewee stated;

> "IMC worked in collaboration with government agencies, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association and All Farmers Association of Nigeria in promoting dialogue between the farmers and herdsmen" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Revelation by the respondent coincides with the findings of IMC report (2013) observed that IMC in collaboration with Search for Common Ground, Mercy Corps, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), and All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN) successfully organized the National Farmers/Pastoralist conference from time to time in addressing the unending conflict between farmers and herdsmen in Northern Nigeria (IMC Report, 2013). Another official from IMC added;

> "The overall purpose of the forum between Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria and All Farmers Association of Nigeria was to seek community voices with regards to causes and find lasting solutions to unending conflict between farmers and pastoralists in the country. The following key presentations were made: Peace and conflict technology, Farmer-pastoralist conflict in Nigeria, Alternative dispute resolution and the art of forgiveness" (Imam Ahmed, O.I 21/01/2019).

IMC worked with the Joint Action Committee, MACBAN and AFAN to ensure that it meets and acts upon these recommendations, including engaging in interventions to stop escalating tensions between farmers and herdsmen (Wuye, 2014).

In essence, the peace building theory has been applied as it encompasses dialogue not only between the conflicting herders and farmers but also mediating groups. Peace building theory is appropriate in this chapter because IMC as humanitarian actors organised problems solving workshops and conferences for both the farmers and herdsmen in Bauchi State and beyond. IMC worked with MACBAN and AFAN in addressing the unending conflicts between the two groups. Lastly, IMC worked with the politicians and grassroots level of actors in promoting the culture of peace between the warring parties (farmers and herdsmen).

3.5 Challenges Facing the IMC in Managing Conflict 1996-2009

An oral interviewee revealed that;

> "Like other organizations, IMC is not exempted from hurdles that seem to affect its operation fully. For instance, the organisation lacks sustainability in terms of funding"(Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The result of this study corresponds with the work of IMC Report (1999) revealed the main challenge affecting the organisation was unable to undertake huge projects on peace despite the organisation having garnered different supports from other institutional funders such as the United State Institute for Peace (USIP) and United State Agency for International Development the demands surpass the supply of sponsorship that IMC receives.

Another notable challenge owes to the misunderstanding that revolves around the mission of IMC. More often than not, the organization has experienced backlash from the two dominant groups of farmers and herders who are dominantly Muslims and Christians. An oral interviewee stated that since 1996, IMC has faced some challenges, for instance, people misunderstand the reason why we are coming together. Some people have claimed that IMC is a fusion of religions, that we are trying to amalgamate the two religions calling it "CHRISLAM" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019). In addition to the above statement the pastor said the following;

> "Some people also misunderstood our mission as people who want to compromise our religious values by celebrating the other. In fact, initially, some young people issued a religious statement that we should not be listened to, that nobody should have anything to do with us particularly the Muslim young people. He added that similarly, few young people also in the Christian side were not comfortable with us working as an interfaith entity; some of them left the initial meeting of IMC (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Sustaining trained community members and regular meetings have proved difficult owing to lack of financial support to IMC/tolerance. Delay in release of monthly funds from USAID affects the execution of IMC activities (IMC Report, 2013). An oral source added that:

> "IMC has challenges of funding, since 1995, we were on that point sometime supporting ourselves by paying the rent for our offices" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 21/01/2019).

The former Chairman and Coordinator of IMC in Bauchi State revealed that the backlog of activities carried over from the first quarter owing to late receipt of funds invariably affected the implementation of some of the activities outlined for the second quarter and had to be moved to the third quarter to allow for proper planning

before implementation. The Women Interfaith Network is yet to implement any of their action plans, due to lack of funds and poor commitment by the members (former chairman of CMPM Aminu, O.I, 22/01/2019).

The Ramadan period affected our media dialogue program in Bauchi State because of series of programs which conflicted with the period of our media airtime forcing the media houses to defer the airing of our program until after Ramadan (IMC Report, 2013).

In essence, the peace building theory has been reflected as it encompasses dialogue not only between the conflicting herders and farmers but also mediating groups which in this case is IMC in resolving the differences and embrace peaceful coexistence. Moreover, peace building theory Put more efforts on capacity building and helped the IMC to work with other Faith-Based Organisations, MACBAN and AFAN in promoting peace between the farmers and herdsmen in Bauchi State and beyond.

3.6 Summary

In this chapter, the IMC and the management of conflict between farmers and herdsmen in Bauchi was discussed. The chapter examined the causes of conflict between farmers and herdsmen from 1996 to 2009. The chapter also examined the positive indicators adopted by the IMC in managing conflict between herdsmen and farmers and the challenges facing the IMC in the management of conflict in Bauchi State. The study findings revealed that farmers and herdsmen clashes occurred as a result of land as each side wants to pursue its activities (farmers want to cultivate crops for both subsistence and sale while herdsmen, on the other hand, want to graze

their animals for milk and other commercial purposes. The findings show that there is an agreement with the empirical literature by the work of Roger (2000) who noted that conflicts between the two groups' farmers and herdsmen have been occurring and reoccurring over a decade in Nigeria at large.

The study finding shows that IMC engaged in mediating farmers and herdsmen conflict in various places within Bauchi State. IMC has had occasions in Bauchi State where youth farmers celebrated charismas and how herdsmen youth protect them and vice versa in 2000. This study shows the similarities of cases in Kaduna and other parts of Northern Nigeria.

The study revealed that the IMC officials and interfaith groups play a vital role between farmers and herders in managing the conflict based on calling the two parties and addressed the issues. The positive indicators were also discussed.

Among the activities of the IMC entails engaging in training between farmers and herders. The challenges facing the IMC in managing conflict were discussed. The findings revealed that IMC lacks sustainability in terms of funding. The above finding has similar resonant with the IMC report (1999) which revealed that the main setback bedevilling the organisation is the inability to undertake huge projects on peace across Northern Nigeria and beyond.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF IMC IN MANAGING ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN BAUCHI STATE2007-2015

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the role of IMC in managing the electoral violence among the people of Bauchi State in Nigeria, which occurred specifically between the periods of 2007and 2015. In this chapter we discussed the 2007 electoral violence, 2011 electoral violence, 2015 electoral violence in Bauchi State, the role of IMC in managing the electoral violence and lastly the summary.

4.2 2007 Electoral Violence

Although there has been a series of electoral violence in 1960, this chapter focussed specifically from 2007 to 2015. In 2007 general elections was notable owing to the unprecedented strong rhetoric that President Olusegun Obasanjo demonstrated the citizens of Nigeria, African and the world at large that the 2007 elections would be a 'do-or-die affair' (Nwolise, 2007:165). Subsequently, the 2007 general elections brought high fraudulent malpractices. The election, both federal and state generally lacked essential transparency. It was marked with irregularities in terms of elections procedures and election results were tampered with within collation centres in favour of ruling party PDP. These were followed by violence across the State and the country at large (Adebayo, 2007:207). In Bauchi State, many people were killed as a result of clashes between the supporters of Alhaji Nadada of PDP and IsahYuguda of ANPP Governorship aspirants (TMG Report, 2015).

Ezirim and Mbah supporting the above statement argued:

> "The electoral and post-election violence that exploded in all levels of elections later turned into religious ones; two Governorship aspirants were murdered. The violence escalated in April 2007 elections as campaigns of different parties across the country were interrupted with clashes between thugs of political parties, political killings, bombings and armed clashes in the country"(Ezirim and Mbah, 2014: p10).

The major challenges facing Nigeria is how to choose a leader from different levels of authority through free, fair and credible elections. The former President of Nigeria Alhaji Musa Yar'Adua lamented, thus:

> "… Electoral reform is based on the trust that elections are the very vital in the process of liberal democracy henceforth. Elections must be free and fair and should be transparent in the eyes of Nigerian citizens and the world in general" (Olasunkannmi, 2010).

Free and credible fair elections must be categorised based on right of information, assembly protection of any forms of discrimination, intimidation and the presence of wide range of fundamental human rights (Laden, 2007).Another respondent revealed:

> "As local chiefs, we advised the government to promote peace and stability in Nigeria irrespective of political parties, tribe and religious beliefs, and that people should desist from any attitude of inflammatory speeches that could engender violence" (Chief Lawal, O.I, 21/01/2019).

An oral interviewee added that partisan attitude should be avoided by the electoral officials, monitoring groups, security operatives, observers as well as the media.

More often than not, the youths are blamed for allowing themselves to be used by desperate politicians to cause conflict during election (Pastor Moses, O.I, 15/01/2019).

The 2007 general election process was described as election rigging and election malpractice which led to wide condemnation from both domestic and international observers (Ezirim, 2014). Another oral interviewee revealed that;

> "In Bauchi State during 2007 post-election violence many people were killed while and many others displaced" (Chief Abubakar, KII, 1/02/2019).

The above findings are supported by the work of empirical pieces of literature European Union observers (2007) described the 2007 presidential election which brought Umar Yar'adua to power as among the worst they had witnessed anywhere across the world (EUB, 2007). Moreover, another finding also revealed that election did not take place in many states, yet the Independent Electoral Commission declared the ruling party (PDP) with high voter turnouts (Transition Monitoring Group, 2007).

The National Democratic Institute (2007) also upheld that the People Democratic Party (PDP) won the elections at all levels in a landslide. But the elections were based on the intimidation of the electorate in many polling stations across the country. Ballot papers were diverted to various government officials' offices and houses to be filled out with fabricated results.

An oral respondent stated that;

> "Immediately after the Independent National Electoral Commission declared Yar'adu as the president of Nigeria, youths in Bauchi launched a peaceful demonstration which later turned into violence. Many people lost their lives and properties worth of millions of naira was destroyed" (youth leader Tanko, FGD, 23/01/2019).

Moreover, the findings confirmed the position of other researchers such as Adamu and Chika who stated in their separate studies that Bauchi witnessed politically related cases of attacks and kidnap and a resurgence of thug activities particularly in the state capital (Adamu, 2016). In Azare, Jama'are, Toro Local Government Areas of Bauchi State thugs overwhelmed the collation centre and destroyed some of the election materials, cars were broken in 2007 as a result of the clash of supporters of rival candidates (Chika, 2011).

The above findings of this study corroborated with the work of Human Rights Watch whose estimates showed that more than 300 people were killed in 2007 post-election violence across the country (HRW, 2011). The day after the electoral commission declared Umar Musa Yar'adua as President of Nigeria in April 2007, the supporters of Muhammad Buhari launched demonstration later turned to violence in various States of Northern Nigeria, houses, vehicles and properties of the ruling party were burned (HRW, 2011).In statistical terms, the NDI observers reported that more than 250 people were killed shortly after post-election violence (National Democratic Institute, 2007; 26).

4.3 2011 Electoral Violence

The release of 2011 Presidential election results by the Independence National Electoral Commission (INEC) which produced President Goodluck Jonathan of the

PDP as the winner led to sectarian violence in some Northern parts of Nigeria. Some

of the affected States were Bauchi, Yobe, Maiduguri, and Kaduna among others

(Ezirim, 2014). The post-election violence entailed the destruction of property,

shooting, killings, arson, wanton destruction of property, and committed by the

officials and the support of different political parties (Adoke, 2011). The gravity of

the violence was clearly captured by Umeagbalasi (2011) thus:

> On the April 9th, 2011 rescheduled NASS poll, led to 39 lives
> being lost. On April16, 2011 presidential poll; at least 10 lives
> were lost in the earth-shaking post-election violence engulfed
> over half of the 19 Northern Nigerian States including Kano,
> Kaduna, Sokoto, Bauchi, Adamawa, Nigeria, and Taraba.
> Violence which started in the evening of the presidential
> poll's day claimed at least 250 to 300 lives, with destruction
> of public and private properties including churches, palaces,
> mosques, residences and vehicles valued at over 7 Billion
> Naira (Umeagbalasi, 2011: p25).

The empirical study also revealed that it is very vital to note that the Nigerian

general elections of 2011 can be regarded as the most deadly with all form of actions

that constituted electoral violence. The violence that erupted after the 2011 election

was organized in some areas of Bauchi, Adamawa, Yobe and the Borno States,

suggesting the influence and involvement of other organizations like Boko Haram

and Kala Kato (Lewis, 2011). The 2011 post-election violence started in Bauchi and

Gombe states and quickly spread to other parts of Northern Nigeria such as Kano,

Adamawa, Niger, and Kaduna States (Orji and Ugodi, 2012).

The findings confirmed the positions of other scholars such as Nwakanwa,

Umeagbalasi, Laden and Alemika who stated in their separate studies revealed that

among the victims of the targeted violence in the North were members of the

National Youth Service Corps who acted as election workers and volunteers. Public and Private properties worth over 2.3 Billion Naira (15 Million US Dollars) including over 500 vehicles and tricycles in Bauchi State were lost to vandalism and arson in connection with the election violence (Umeagbalasi, 2011). Violence has become part of the political culture in Nigeria such that all elections are virtually violence-ridden (Laden, 2007). One of the major causes of 2011 electoral violence in Nigeria was corruption. Alemika (2011), explained further:

> "The perception and reality of Nigerian politicians turn electioneering and elections into warfare (corruption) in which ethnic violence, religious and other forms of primordial sentiments and prejudices are employed" (Alemika, 2011: p12).

An electoral abuse was another leading cause of violence in Nigeria's election. The possibilities of electoral abuse are endless, ranging from the dissemination of scurrilous rumours about candidates, and deliberately false campaign propaganda, stuffing the ballot box with fraudulent returns, dishonest counting or report of the vote (Laden, 2007). The ad-hoc staff is not permanent of the electoral commission, and because they are not permanent staff, they are easily influenced into electoral malpractices (Olasunkani, 2010), all these negative attitudes of the ad-hoc staff appeared in the 2011 general elections. The high rate of unemployment, poverty and illiteracy among youth played a vital role in causing violence in the State (Orji & Ugodi, 2012) politicians used many of these unemployed youths to cause confusion and violence during and after the election] (Adele, 2012).

Another pastor added;

> "The ruling party used most of the Independent National Electoral Commission ad-hoc staff to manipulate the election result" ((Pastor Bukar, O.I, 20/02/2019).

The escalation of electoral violence in Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro Local Governments were motivated by political elites for their own advantage (NEVR, 2011). The electoral violence across the city of Bauchi and other parts in the State on Monday April 18, 2011 following the declaration of the presidential election results of Saturday April 16, 2011. Most of the supporters of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) who were below the age of 18 years opposed the electoral officers and the PDP manipulated and denied their party victory across the country (NEVR, 2011). Another youth leader from Bauchi City added that;

> "The CPC supporters opposed the victory of the incumbent party that was the genesis of the violence within Tafawa Balewa which later spread to many villages and cities in Bauchi State" (Youth leader, O.I, 14/01/2019).

Echoing the preceding respondent, another respondent interjected;

> "Absolutely we experience such post-election violence and there was a time when one candidate of the political party lost his seat from the State House of Assembly and our youths went directly to his poultry farm and took all his fowls and destroyed everything. So, our elders union went ahead and stopped all these crises" (Pastor Moses, O.I, 15/01/2019).

The research finding confirms that across Bauchi State, over 50 people including ten Corps Members who served as electoral ad-hoc staff were killed, more than 70 churches were burnt down and several houses and property worth millions of naira

were destroyed. More than four (4) police stations located in Itas, Jama'are, Giade, Dambam and Misau were also burnt down and a policewoman lost her life in the hands of protesting supporters during the 2011 general election. Over 4,500 people were displaced following the mayhem unleashed on the residents of Bauchi who were mainly supporters of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) (Sabiu et al, 2011:53).

More so, four (4) Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) offices were burnt in Bauchi, Dambam, Misau and Jama'are LGAs while over 450 laptops used for the voter's registration exercise were looted by the protesting youths (NEVR, 2011). One interviewee noted;

> "Youth burnt Independent National Electoral Commission offices and government properties as a result of 2011 post-election violence across Jama'are and the city of Bauchi" (Chief, Sunusi, O.I, 1/02/2019).

Plate 2: Violence erupted in different parts of Bauchi State after the presidential election 2011.

Source: Post-election violence (2011).http://www.hrw.org

An oral interviewee also added;

> "Within Bauchi State more than five (5) Corps Members were killed as a result of post-election violence". (Chief Daniel, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The respondents' assertions are backed by the report that on April 17th 2011 in Giade, a rural town in Northern Bauchi State, rioters attacked Corp Members who were from Southern Nigeria (NEVR, 2011). On a fateful day, the Corps Members ran to the local Police Station to seek refuge but the rioters stormed the Police Station, killed the Police Officer on duty, burned down the police station, raped two of the female corps members, and then hacked them to death with machetes along with five male youth Corps Members. In total, rioters killed ten youth Corps Members in the State.

An oral interviewee added that;

> "Within Bauchi State more than five (5) Corps Members were killed as a result of post-election violence (Chief Daniel, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The finding of this study shows that there is an agreement with the empirical literature that one student from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi was killed by hired political thugs. In Katagum Local Government, more than 32 Christians were killed by Hausa thugs including 10 Corps Members, more than 72 Churches, Mosques and markets were burnt in the State over the election violence (Transitional Monitoring Group, 2015).

Moreover, the outcome of this study agrees with the work of Human Rights Watch (2014) on the view that in Azare one of the cities in Bauchi State that detainees were severely beaten by soldiers and Police and one of the detainees' hands was reportedly broken, while another detainee was hospitalized as a result of the beatings. Bauchi State ranks highest in terms of political violence in the North-East Zone. According to the Transitional Monitoring Group (2015), violent conflict occurred in Katagum, Bauchi, Misau, Danbam, and Alkaleri were the LGAs most heavily affected by the 2011 post-election violence. In Giade Local Government the convoy of the gubernatorial candidate of the ACN, Senator Baba Tela attacked while seven persons were injured by some thugs sponsored by PDP supporters.

Plate 3: The side view of demolished Mosque
Source: Researcher (2020).

Plate 4: The side view of demolished house
Source: Researcher (2020).

The above photos findings correspond with the work of Machiel (2011) which revealed that Muslims, Christians, politicians and traditional rulers who supported the PDP candidate suffered severe damages. In Bauchi State, places of worship like churches and mosques and houses were burnt, along with properties belonging to members of ruling party PDP (Machiel, 2011).

4.4 2015 Electoral Violence

International Crisis Group (2014) projected that the general election of 2015 would be more contentious than usual due to certain irregularities, sensitive political rivalry and high level of human insecurity in the country. The group further indicated three factors instrumental in the report signalling the possibilities of more outbreak of violence. First, similar to what had happened in 2011 which resulted in violent conflict after the general election that ushered in the incumbent government, secondly, the tension within and between the two major political parties, APC (the

strong opposition party) and PDP (the ruling party). Then thirdly, the competing claim to the presidency was between northern candidate Muhammadu Buhari and the incumbent President of Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan from the Niger Delta, it was also a political competition along religious lines. An oral interviewee indicated;

> "Before the declaration of Muhammad Buhari as the winner, youth started burning some campaign offices of the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan in Bauchi" (Youth leader Madaki, O.I, 14/01/2019).

However, another respondent revealed;

> "After the declaration of Muhammad Buhari as winner people remained calm. Youth started jubilation without any violence" (Imam Kamalu, O.I, 16/01/2019).

The findings of this study show that there are similarities with the literature review of this study. The outcome of this study corresponds with the work of Akiyemi (2015) who observed that 2015 post-election was based on rigging and irregularities, many politicians were assassinated and others kidnapped. Campaign offices and cars of perceived opponents were burnt, while some campaign convoys were stoned including that of President Goodluck Jonathan in Bauchi, Katsina, among others State.

4.5 Role of the IMC in Managing the Electoral Violence 2007-2015

One of the respondents revealed that;

> "IMC also organized interfaith conflict transformation and trust-building workshops where flashpoint and peace model communities were invited to interact with one another. In Bauchi State before the 2007 general election, for instance, about 15 flashpoint communities and about 10 peace model communities were invited, with 40 participants in attendance" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The result of this study lends credence to the IMC Report (2007) which revealed that 2007, IMC had at least two trained youth leaders in each of Nigeria's 36 states, had trained a total of almost 10,000 people, and maintained a membership of over 10,000 youth and clergy. Another IMC Report (2013) added that in 2007 IMC conducted more than 80 media dialogue sessions on television and radio stations across the Northern States. Some of the sessions were broadcasted live and had averagely 15 callers and numerous text messages per session. The workshop further strengthened the role of the peace model in communities, networked peace ambassadors, and made the flashpoint communities appreciate peaceful coexistence.

Another respondent added;

> "In order to ensure conflict free elections in Bauchi State, IMC created a situation room in Bauchi City and other parts of the State where reports from the Rapid Response Teams of the focal area and target communities were received and analysed during the elections" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Similarly, Wuye (2014) revealed that a community-based structure known as Community Peace Observers was instrumental to violence prevention in the IMC tolerance target States. IMC, however, has worked to change the negative perceptions against the political opponent towards one another. Working with Community Peace Observers (CPOs) and CMMRCs from target communities, election conflict issues requiring urgent attention were immediately dispatched to relevant INEC staff and Security Agencies for action. This helped greatly in ensuring peaceful elections in all target communities.

Moreover, another empirical study revealed that IMC focused particularly on women included a series of workshops held in Jos following the post-election violence in November 2008. In February 2009, IMC held a first-of-its-kind roundtable workshop for Muslim women in Jos. Thirty women attended representing the religious, political and business communities in promoting peace within the Plateau State (Chloe & Berwind, 2009).One of the community leaders remarked;

> "We also advised the politicians to encourage the supporters to invite the spirit to support electoral empire irrespective of who emerges the winner and by doing this, it will help the supporters to take the result in good faith without engaging in any violent acts" (Chief Abubakar, O.I, 1/02/2019).

Consequently, the above finding corroborated with the finding of Abimbola (2012) which revealed that President Musa Yar'adua decided to form a committee known as the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) headed by Justice Mohammed Uwais to find out a transparent system that would ensure free and credible fair elections that would strengthen democracy in Nigeria. More so, the committee made far-reaching recommendations on Electoral Act and constitutional amendments to eliminate electoral fraud reduce violence and enhance the credibility of Nigeria's elections. President Yar'adua was ready to deliver his promises of the restoration of the rule of law and guarantee sanity in the electoral system before his death in 2010 (NEVR, 2011).In an interview with one of the respondents, he revealed that;

> "IMC officials worked with Independence Electoral Commission (INEC) during election process as election observers toward promoting peace.IMC had support from the National Democratic Institution to give them some basic skills on how to observe the election as well as how to manage the electoral violence" (Pastor Wuye, KII, 20/01/2019).

Another respondent added;

> "Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) guidelines should be strict in order to ensure sanity in the system. The media must educate the electorate and discourage the youth on hate speech that would possibly generate tension in the country" (Imam Muhammad, KII, 20/01/ 2019).

Similarly, IMC Report (2007) revealed that as of 2010, IMC has provided over 100 faith based trainings in conflict prevention and resolution for youth, women, tribal and religious leaders, political parties, government officials, electoral staff and others throughout Nigeria. In 2008, twenty (20) people led a workshop in Kaduna for influential participants from Nigeria's six geo-political zones in an attempt to prevent an electoral crisis. Some believe that this effort helped significantly to reduce violence during elections.

Similarly, an oral interviewee stated;

> "IMC worked with government to give the security personnel adequate support in dealing with the youth during and after election toward promoting peaceful electoral conducts in the State" (Youth leader Tanko, O.I, 23/01/2019).

Smock (2006) adds that IMC also provided trauma counselling, humanitarian services, election violence management, media advocacy (and growing cooperation), support for neighbourhood peace associations, and consultancy for various government agencies. IMC has acted as an in-house advisor for the Federal Government, assisted a number of state agencies to develop conflict management systems, set up community early warning/early response structures to liaise with government security agencies, established community peace road maps that can facilitate alternative processes to intractable legal litigations, and trained staff from the Office of the Bureau for Religious Affairs in the Kaduna State Government.

One of the oral interviewee revealed;

> "In 2011, IMC organized a Training of Trainers (TOT) workshop in Bauchi for Interfaith Women Core Mediators in respect of sensitizing women before the election. A total of 53 women across the six intervention areas were selected and trained on mediation and trauma counselling skills. They were expected to serve as resource persons for future trainings on mediation and trauma for women in the target areas across the State" (Imam Ahmed, O.I, 21/01/2019).

In a FGD, a senior pastor stated;

> "Participants were drawn from various faith-based women's organizations including Federation of Muslims Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), Women Wing of Christian Association of Nigeria (WOWICAN), Christian Muslim Peace Forum, and Women for Peace" (Pastor Wuye, FGD, 20/01/2019).

To strengthen this finding, an empirical study by Onwe (2015) had established that President Goodluck Jonathan on May 11th 2011 appointed a 22-member panel to investigate the causes and extent of the election violence. More than 500 people were arrested and charged but police and state prosecutors in the past have rarely followed through with criminal investigations and effective prosecutions. The former chairman of Christians Muslims Peace Movement revealed;

> "Government should call the Muslims and Christian leaders as well as the leaders of the political parties to sit-down and discuss the major ways of addressing the issue of electoral violence in the State" (Former chairman Aminu, O.I, 22/01/2019).

In another FGD with local chiefs, one of them said;

> "The only way we can manage violence is through advising the government to conduct free and fair election but if the electoral official refuse to announce the accurate result the reverse is the case" (Chief Sunusi, FGD 1/02/2019).

Another chief interrupted by saying that the Elder Forum used different strategies in bringing lasting peaceful coexistence in our communities of Bauchi City, Azare, Tafawa Balewa, Boggoro and Bonunu. Any person who was very stubborn would be taken to the Police Station for the Security Officers to take a draconian measure against him (Chief Daniel, FGD 20/01/2019). Another youth leader from Bauchi City noted;

> "We also call the attention of parents concerning their children in order to address them not to engage in any political malice during and after electioneering period" (youth leader Madaki, O.I, 14/01/2019).

More so, during election period we write our Friday prayers summons in Hausa and sometimes in English to address our Muslim youths about the danger of conflict, the Muslim should live in peace that is what we always call our youth to embrace the culture of peace (Imam Ibrahim, KII, 11/01/2019). Another pastor added;

> "As a cleric within Bauchi State when election period approaches, a lot of people cause confusion so as Christian and the men of God, we now intervene through our various community leaders we join hand together with them and create awareness and used some biblical verses that teach about peace and reconciliation that's why we have seen progress. In addition to us as Christian, what we use to manage electoral violence, we call both the two parties together and discuss the peaceful election process in our communities" (Pastor Bukar, KII, 20/02/2019).

Another Participant revealed that IMC worked with Pastors and Imams standing side by side in a polling unit, they created an atmosphere of peace and harmony (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

One Pastor remarked that;

> "As pastors we cautioned the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) that they should announce the election results as soon as they trickle inand ask the voters to accept any result in good faith as that is the only way we can prevent the violence from occurrence that emanate from delays and ultimate suspicion. That is another way we educate voters; through teaching and creating awareness through meetings" (Pastor Samson, O.I, 14/01/2019).

The above findings are supported by Ezirim (2014) who noted that violent conflicts made Nigerians call on the Federal Government to look into the killings and bring the perpetrators to book. Consequently, the Presidency set up a Presidential Committee of Inquiry to investigate the remote and immediate causes of the violence and recommend ways of averting future political violence in the State. President Jonathan in the process commissioned a 22-man panel of inquiry headed by Sheikh Ahmed Lemu to probe the post-election violence. Other members of the panel were Rev. Father Idowu Feron, Alhaji Muhammadu Danmadami, Chief Ajibola Ogunshola, Mrs Lateefat Okunnu, M.B. Wali, Dr. (Mrs) Timiebi Koripamo-Agary, President of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), Comrade Peter Esele, Alhaji Muhammed Ibrahim, Prof. Femi Odekunle, Ambassador Ralph Uwuechue, Alhaji Bukar Usman, Sheik Adam Idoko, Retired Maj General Muhammed Said, Barrister P.C. Okorie, Arc. Shamsu Ahmed, Maj General L.P. Ngubane, Alhaji Sani Maikudi, Rear Admiral Hotou and a serving member of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). This was aimed at seeking peaceful means of resolving the electoral violence in the country.

Another interviewee revealed the following;

> "One of the major reasons why government relocated the local government headquarter of Tafawa Balewa to Bonunu was to manage the existing conflict in the area. The former Governor of Bauchi State lamented over the serious killing of people and loss of properties in the affected communities" (Government official Daniel, KII, 20/01/2019).

From the above findings it can be established that responding to recurrent election violence in Tafawa/Balewa, the Bauchi State Government finally in 2012 approved the relocation of the headquarters of Tafawa Balewa LGA from Tafawa Balewa town to Bununu another town in the Local Government Area to reduce the tension. The action has direct link to unending violence in Tafawa Balewa LGA in Bauchi State of Northern Nigeria (IRIN, 2014).

However, another oral interviewee interjected by saying;

> "Tafawa Balewa is a mixed community housing both the Hausas (Muslims) and Sayawas (Christians). The crisis of January 2011 resulted to Muslims fleeing to Bonunu, and some to Dass and some to Burgel. The Local Government Headquarter was also moved from Tafawa Balewa to Bonunu which irked the Christian of Tafawa Balewa with majority of the civil servants from Tafawa Balewa refusing to report to Bonunu for work" (Former chairman of CMPM Aminu, O.I, 22/01/2019).

In their preliminary proceeding in 2012, 2012, Bauchi State House Assembly decided to relocate the headquarters of Christian dominated Local Government to Bununu, a Muslim village next to Tafawa Balewa town. A Christian representative in the Assembly protested this decision and was immediately suspended. The High Court of Bauchi State resolved in her favour but the case was appealed by her

opponents to the Federal Supreme Court. In the meantime, her suspension remains

(CAN, 2015).

Table 4.1 Interfaith Mediation Centre Interventions Reconciled Warring Communities of Bonunu and Tafawa/Balewa

S/N	Date	Nature of the Conflict	IMC Interventions
1	January 2011	Post-election violence between Hausa (Muslims and Sayawas (Christians) in Tafawa Balewa Local Government of Bauchi State Over 200 people were killed, more than 50 houses were burnt as well as over 2000 people were displaced and fled to Dass, Bargel, Bonunu, Jos and Bauchi City.	Efforts were made to reconcile the two communities by Interfaith Mediation Centre. The venue of the meeting became a challenge between Tafawa Balewa and Bonunu all were rejected by the Christians and Muslims. After several consultations behind the scene, Das Local Government was suggested and both the parties agreed to attend. In the meeting, participants from the two warring parties were trained on peaceful coexistence and a peace committee with membership from the two communities established. After the training the committee went to work by visiting religious and traditional leaders in Bonunu and Tafawa Balewa who organised meetings where the committee shared IMC training and need for the restoration of peaceful coexistence between the two communities.

Source: Adapted from IMC Report (2013) with additional and modification by the researcher (2019).

An oral interviewee revealed;

> "In 2015, IMC organized workshops for youth groups in Bauchi. Members were drawn from Kagadama, Tsakani, and Lushi communities in Bauchi Town. More than 40 youths attended the workshops on inter- and intra- community negotiation and peace building coupled with training on peaceful coexistence, peace education, conflict mitigation, and community mobilization. The youth learned to draw on their new skills, and mobilized themselves and formed a group called Interfaith Youth for Peace in Bauchi. Members were made up of different youth groups drawn from the conflict neighbourhoods. The members organized a football match for peace with over 500 youths in attendance. The Governor of Bauchi was also present and he encouraged them on their initiative" (Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019).

Still in 2015, IMC has engaged senior religious and traditional leaders through television and radio dialogues to address prevailing core electoral violence issues towards peace building and coexistence within the state. The media activity started in 2013 in northern Nigeria. IMC through the media dialogue has been able to strengthen understanding and better relationship across the political opponent through the media dialogue program, using the Radio and Television stations in Kaduna and other States, IMC was able to reach about 3.1 million listeners/viewers (USAID, 2015).

Another respondent remarked that;

> "IMC has achieved their activities through the use of local religious resource persons, media sensitization to shun hate speech during and after election and embrace peaceful coexistence in Bauchi State at large. IMC has also accomplished their activities by advising the government of Bauchi State to adopt a mediation tent between the conflicting parties in the State" (Pastor Charles, O.I, 23/01/2019).

The result of this study corresponds with the IMC Report (2015) which revealed that hate speech phenomenon during election period which was the order of the day in Nigeria amongst the political opponent has declined as a result of the media dialogue. However, an oral interviewee revealed that;

> ''We promote youth sensitization in our Churches. We implored our youths not to engage in post-election violence and allow the government to do their roles" (Pastor Moses, O.I, 13/01/2019).

Moreover, another respondent asserted;

> "We called our youths and told them that a majority of political elites used them during and after election for their own political interests, we addressed the youths to avoid selling themselves because of money. We told them that the politicians secure their children's future by sending them abroad, therefore, the youths should avoid being used as puppets"(Imam Muhammad, O.I, 20/01/2019).

The findings of this study show that there are agreements with the empirical literature by Ezea (2015) who noted that to prevent the mayhem and catastrophe that may be expected as post-election violence, all the Presidential aspirants signed a peace accord for none violent poll in Abuja. The US Ambassador to Nigeria held similar meetings and signed Memorandum of Understanding for a peaceful poll with frontline Governorship Candidates in some States of the Federation (Ezea, 2015). Another respondent stated that; during the election, the Independent Electoral Commission sent their staff to various polling units before they started conducting the electioneering process; they consulted the traditional leaders and emphasized free and fair process to have a peaceful coexistence. This helped avoid the occurrence of conflict (Chief Abubakar, O.I, 1/02/2019).

The former chairman of Christian Muslims Peace Movement added;

> "IMC worked with other religious faith groups to manage the electoral violence in the country at large. IMC and government also promoted mediation tent as peace accord agreement across difference political parties' aspirants" (former chairman CMPM Aminu, O.I, 22/01/2019).

In corroboration with the above findings, Ezea (2015) also revealed that the fourteen (14) presidential candidates and their chairmen, as well as Chief Emeka Anyaoku, signed the Peace Accord Declaration. The undersigned Presidential Candidates of the Political Parties contesting the general election of 2015, desirous of taking proactive measures to prevent electoral violence before, during and after the elections, anxious about the maintenance of a peaceful environment for the 2015 general election. To commit ourselves to all the Political Parties' adherence to this peace accord, the national peace committee made up of respected statesmen and women, traditional and religious leaders, all the institutions of government including INEC and security agencies must act and be seen to act with impartiality.

Another respondent added;

> "IMC's activities have broadened. For instance, it facilitated the signing of some very significant peace accords"(Pastor Wuye, O.I, 20/01/2019)

From the above remarks, it was noted that the peace accord was created as mediation tent. Consequently, the National Peace Committee (NPC) with General Abdusalami Abubakar as Chairman and other eminent Nigerians as members was created. Despite this accord, there were still conflicts in different parts of the Country. President Jonathan had called Muhammadu Buhari to congratulate him on his victory at exactly 5:15 p.m. local time on Monday, March 30 (NEN, 2015). The phone call lasted for ten hours before the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) officially declaration of Buhari as the winner with a total of 15,424,921 votes against 12,853,162 for Jonathan (NEN, 2015). This historic call

coupled with the conceding of victory speech by President Jonathan after the announcement of election results, to a large extent stemmed the violence that would have erupted. These actions deepened political stability. Another oral source revealed;

> "Both the Federal and Bauchi State Governments played a vital role in managing the electoral violence because most of the incumbent leaders accepted the election results in good faith. During the election period, we went to our various polling units and stayed there until the casting of vote ended, this helped in preventing violence" (Imam Kamalu, O.I, 16/01/2019).

The issues of political violence are also endemic in our dear State but we try to sensitize people to live in peace during and after elections. The stakeholders mobilized youths through organising some symposium lectures during the election period. One of the major problems in our communities in Bauchi is our youths who turned political thugs due to their substance and drug abuse. In our course, we fight against drug addiction. We the stakeholders thank the government of Bauchi State for providing tight security before and after the election process in the State. This is a remarkable achievement (FGD, 10/03/2019).

Lederach theory of Peace Building is applied in this chapter to the top, middle and grassroots level of leaderships engaged in peace building activities such as local peace commission, community dialogue projects or trauma healing, problems solving workshops in mediating conflict between politicians within the election periods. Interfaith Mediation Centre has played a vital role in addressing electoral violence in Bauchi State.

4.6 Summary

The study finding revealed that more than 50 people were killed as a result of 2007 post-election violence in Bauchi State. The above findings of this study corroborated with the revelation of Human Rights Watch estimate that showed that more than 300 people were killed in 2007 post-election violence across the country (HRW, 2011).

The study finding also revealed that Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) supporters opposed the victory of the incumbent party PDP that was the genesis of the violence within Tafawa Balewa which later spread to many villages and cities in Bauchi State. In corroboration with the above finding the release of 2011 Presidential election results by the Independence National Electoral Commission (INEC) which produced President Dr Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP as the winner led to sectarian violence in some Northern parts of Nigeria. Some of the affected States were Bauchi, Yobe, Maiduguri, and Kaduna among others (Ezirim, 2014). The post-election violence entailed the destruction of property, shooting, killings, arson, wanton destruction of property, and committed by officials and support of different political parties (Adoke, 2011).

Another study found that to ensure conflict-free elections in Bauchi State, IMC created a situation room where reports from the Rapid Response Teams of the focal area and target communities were received and analyzed during the elections. The above findings are supported by the empirical study by Wuye (2014) who revealed that IMC created Community Peace Observers during the election to address the issues of electoral conflict and other violence within the target states. IMC brought all the political parties leaders together from target communities to ensure peaceful conducts.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a good summary of the key findings of the study and the conclusions derived from the findings as well as the recommendations that were suggested consequent to the findings. The summary provided here covers the previous chapters and conclusions are given based on the study premises outlined in chapter one. In the recommendations, the areas that we felt are not fully studied concerning this study, were suggested for further research.

5.2 Summary

This study explored the influence of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the management of conflict in Bauchi State, Nigeria. This established the followings as the factors that led to the establishment of the Interfaith Mediation Centre, activities of interfaith mediation centre in the management of farmers and herdsmen conflict and the role of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the management of electoral process. The study thus, met its objectives.

5.2.1 Factors that led to the establishment of Interfaith Mediation Centre

Based on the study findings, since 1960s political, ethno-religious and farmers/ herdsmen conflicts have been reoccurring in Bauchi State Nigeria. Among these conflicts includes: Maitatsine crisis, Fulani and Sayawa that resulted in the death of many people and others were displaced. The outcome of this study corresponds with the work of Egwu (1980) who suggested that "the boundary between religious and

ethnicity-motivated violence becomes difficult to draw during conflicts". He argues further that economic reasons are the primary causes of these violent conflicts that became more frequent from the 1980s.

The above data presented shows that factors that led to the establishment of IMC have contributed to the management of conflict in Bauchi State. The IMC was created to address the issues of ethno-religious and other violence. Finding with regards to the activities of IMC revealed that peace building shows that the centre identified other faith-based organisations and trained them on conflict mitigation, mediation and dialogue skills. Moreover, Interfaith Mediation Centre worked with stakeholders in promoting mutual trust and tolerance among Christians and Muslims at all levels of interaction. The study findings corroboration with the work of Sulaiman and Ojo (2012) who stated that faith-based organisations like Christians Association of Nigeria CAN and Jama'atul Nasirul Islam encouraged interfaith in mediating conflict and also played an important role in promoting peace making scheme among the two conflicting parties.

5.2.2 Activities of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the Management of Conflict between Farmers and Herdsmen

The findings of this study revealed that IMC has played a vital role in mediating conflict between the livestock farmers and crops farmers in several places across Bauchi State and other parts of Northern Nigeria. Moreover, IMC has done quite a lot of work in so many places across the country. The above findings are supported by Punch Newspaper (2009) which revealed that the British Council in collaboration with Nigeria Reconciliation Project encouraged herders' farmers' dialogue through various local initiatives. Likewise, the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) sponsored and hosted conferences on herder-farmers dialogue involving all Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN), the Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC) and others (Leadership newspaper, 2015).

A notable challenge however, owes to the misunderstanding that revolves around the mission of IMC. More often than not, the organization has experienced backlash from the two dominant groups of farmers and herders who are predominantly Christians and Muslims, respectively. The finding of this study also revealed that IMC has faced some challenges, for instance, people misunderstand the reason where we are coming together. Some people have claimed that IMC is a fusion of religions that we are trying to amalgamate the two religions calling it "CHRISLAM''. However, in corroboration with the study findings, IMC Report (2013) showed that delay in the release of monthly funds from USAID affects the execution of IMC activities across Northern Nigeria.

5.2.3 Role of Interfaith Mediation Centre in Conflict Management in the Electoral Process

The findings of this study revealed that IMC organized interfaith conflict transformation and trust-building workshops on peace model across various communities. In Bauchi State before the 2007 general election, for instance, about 15 flashpoint communities and about 10 peace model communities were invited, with 40 participants in attendance. The result of this study echoes the IMC Report (2007) that IMC had at least two trained youth leaders in each of Nigeria's 36 States, had trained a total of almost 10,000 people, and maintained a membership of over 10,000 youth and clergy. Another IMC Report (2013) added that in 2007 IMC

conducted more than 80 media dialogue sessions on television and radio stations across the Northern States.

Another finding revealed that one of the major reasons why the government relocated the Local Government Headquarter of Tafawa Balewa to Bonunu was to manage the existing conflict in the area. The former Governor of Bauchi State lamented over the serious killing and loss of properties in the affected communities. From the above findings it can be established that responding to recurrent election violence in Tafawa/Balewa, the Bauchi State Government finally in 2012 approved the relocation of the Headquarters of Tafawa Balewa LGA from Tafawa Balewa town to Bununu another town in the Local Government Area to reduce the tension. The action has a direct link to unending violence in Tafawa Balewa LGA in Bauchi State of Northern Nigeria (IRIN, 2014).

Lastly, the study findings also revealed that IMC has facilitated the signing of some very significant peace accords before the 2015 general election. IMC worked with other religious faith groups to manage the electoral violence in the country at large. IMC and government also promote mediation tent as peace accord agreement across different political parties' aspirants. The empirical study by Ezea (2015) supports the above findings that the fourteen (14) presidential candidates and their chairmen, as well as Chief Emeka Anyaoku, signed the peace accord declaration.

5.3 Conclusion

Chapter one of this document sets the background to conceptualize this study. The background demonstrated the causes of conflict and the establishment of Interfaith Mediation Centre, and that state security failure was seen to be the cause of the

establishment of IMC. In the same chapter, the research objectives, questions and premises that guided this study were clearly outlined.

The limitation section indicated that tracing some key informants for the study was typically a difficult exercise. Participants suggested ultimate interest to work in harmony with one another to promote peace among their interfaith groups. Therefore, the chapter demonstrates that the use of IMC, community and religious leaders are assurance to the respondents that the study was only for academic purposes which enabled the researchers to collect data from them.

A review of literature was also given in this chapter together with the theoretical framework. The literature review demonstrated that there were several gaps that needed a serious scholarly attention as far as IMC was concerned. From the review it was established that IMC was only studied alongside other interfaith groups and no localised investigations has been done in the current study area as far as the origin of IMC was concerned. Moreover, the theoretical framework that guided this study was given in the same chapter. This study sought to examine the role of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the management of conflict in Bauchi state, Nigeria 1960-2015. Bauchi State was chosen because it has experienced prevalence of conflicts over time. The research was conceived on the basis of oral interviews, reports, newspapers, secondary literatures and focus group discussions with the respondents. This study presents the following conclusions.

5.3.1 Factors that led to the establishment of Interfaith Mediation Centre

In chapter two, factors that led to the establishment of IMC were discussed. The origin of IMC was discussed and it was noted that in May 1995 IMC was

established as a non-governmental organisation with the main aim of ending the violent conflict between Christians and Muslims. Another finding revealed that IMC made important efforts in promoting peaceful coexistence and inculcated the culture of peace among warring parties by using religious scriptures. In correspondence to the above findings, IMC has participated involved in conflict management in Nigeria. IMC actors are increasingly playing an active and effective role in conflict management across Northern Nigeria (USIP, 2008 & Sampson, 1997).

In this chapter, the second premises to this study indicating that state security failure did not lead to the establishment of interfaith mediation centre was proved to be true. It was noted that both Wuye and Ashafa decided to stop their fighting and embraced the culture of peace through interreligious initiatives. By so doing, IMC played a significant role in reducing conflict within a conflict zone.

5.3.2 Activities of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the Management of Conflict between Farmers and Herdsmen

In chapter three, the causes of conflicts between farmers and herdsmen were discussed. The findings revealed that farmers and herdsmen conflict remained a serious issue in Bauchi State despite inroads being made by peace building organisations. The study also found that there was a clash between farmers and herdsmen in Tafawa Balewa of Bauchi State where it was suspected that herdsmen intruded into the farm and destroyed his crops with their cattle and when the farmers questioned for his crops damage the herdsmen became violent. Amaza (2016) reports that out of reported 389 incidents of herdsmen and farmers conflicts from 1997 to 2009, 379 occurred in the middle belt.

The findings of this study also revealed that IMC encourages herders-farmers dialogue through various local initiatives in promoting peace within the state and country at large. The above findings are supported by USAID Report (2015) that IMC has facilitated conflict mediation between farmers and herdsmen in Sanga of Kaduna and Plateau States. IMC worked with Search for Common Ground on conflict mitigation through capacity building of various Faith-Based Organisations, local Leaders AFAN and MACBAN in addressing the conflict between farmers and herdsmen (Jinelle, 2014).

The fifth premise to this study, that the Interfaith Mediation Centre was the most important factor in the management of conflict between farmers and herdsmen was proved to be true. IMC improved early warning and early response systems towards minimised conflict between farmers and herdsmen. IMC adopted a strategy for promoting a lasting solution to the unending conflict between farmers and herdsmen in the state.

The peace building theory that guided this study demonstrated that IMC influences top-down actors in the management of conflict. The theory precepts were in the application as the top, middle and grassroots actors facilitated peace process within the conflict zones was achieved in Bauchi State.

5.3.3 Role of Interfaith Mediation Centre in Conflict Management in the Electoral Process

Chapter four sought to interrogate the role of IMC in conflict management in the electoral process. It was established that the IMC gained mediation approach through wide acceptance from Bauchi State Government approving the establishment of a similar conflict resolution mechanism in all the Local

Government Areas. Hate speech during election process amongst the political opponents has declined as a result of the media dialogue. Another finding revealed that IMC brought all the political parties leaders together in promoting peaceful electoral conducts in the State.

The above findings are supported by the work of Smock (2006) who noted that IMC provides trauma counselling, election violence management, media support for neighbourhood peace associations, and consultancy for various government agencies in addressing the electoral violence in Northern Nigeria. IMC engaged ineffective governance uses some scripture from the Bible and Quran to address electoral violence as well as worked to change the negative perceptions against the political opponent towards one another (Wuye, 2014).

The third premise of this study indicates that IMC played a significant role in the electoral conflict was also proved to be true. IMC was vigilant during the conducts of the election. The presence of its officials at polling units enhanced the credibility of the election results. IMC also gave voters sensitization toward managing the electoral violence.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings, this study made the following recommendations:

5.4.1 Factors that led to the establishment of Interfaith Mediation Centre

The government should provide peaceful measures among the religious faith groups while involving both community and religious leaders with the aim of managing conflict between Muslims and Christians in the country at large. The government should be responsible for building peace through good governance and

administration. IMC should continue to sustain its efforts in educating the electorate and discourage hate speech that could generate tension in the State and beyond. IMC should continue promoting media dialogue across the State and country large and lastly, Interfaith Mediation Centre should be strengthened financially to carryout it functions hitch-free.

5.4.2 Activities of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the Management of Conflict between Farmers and Herdsmen

The government should establish grazing reserves to curb conflict between farmers and herdsmen in the state and the country at large. Federal Government should work with neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger to regulate herdsmen movement across borders. Authorities at all levels should involve farmers/ herdsmen unions and community affected with relevant stakeholders to carry out campaign advocacy and sensitization to educate them on the importance of peace building within the society at large. The government should create water dams to the herdsmen; this would bring a lasting solution to the conflict. The government should create cattle routes to manage conflict between farmers and herdsmen. IMC should sustain its efforts in organising workshops and conferences to find lasting solutions to the unending conflict between farmers and herdsmen in the country.

5.4.3 Role of Interfaith Mediation Centre in Conflict Management in the Electoral Process

Independence National Electoral Commission guidelines should be strictly followed to ensure sanity in the system. Government and IMC faith based groups should continue to sustain its efforts in educating the electorate and discourage hate speech that could generate tension in the State and the country at large.

5.5 Recommendations for further Research

Study should be conducted to examine the role of tradition institutions in managing conflict between cattle rustlers and pastoralist in Bauchi State. Further study can be done on mixed methods in order to explore in-depth explanations. It is also suggested that a study on the other Faith-Based Organisations are possible areas of future study. A lot need to be studied especially on the thesis, project, seminars, conferences and workshops dimension.

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Respondent	Place	Date
Rifkatu Samson	Tafawa Balewa	12/01/2019
Pastor Samson Bukar	Tafawa Balewa	20/01/2019
Sabo Madaki	Tafawa Balewa	14/01/2019
Alkali Yusuf	Bonunu	10/01/2019
Moses Lucky	Tafawa Balewa	13/01/2019
Salisu Muhammad	Bonunu	19/01/2019
Luka Hakuri	Bauchi city	14/01/2019
Imam Haruna Muhammad	Bonunu	30/01/2019
Pastor James MovelWuye	Kaduna	20/01/2019
Imam NuraynAshafa	Kaduna	20/01/2019
Imam Ibrahim Ahmad	Kaduna	21/01/2019
Pastor Charles David	Kaduna	23/01/2019
Mr Peter Adams	Bauchi	25/02/2019
Aminu Sidi	Bauchi	22/01/2019
Abubakar Lawal	Bauchi	21/01/2019
Racheal Bala	Bauchi	13/01/2019
SalisuBabanTanko	Bauchi	23/01/2019
Yusuf Bello	Bauchi	24/01/2019
Muhammad Abubakar	Bauchi	10/01/2019
Salisu Yusuf	Bauchi	19/01/2019
Samson Moses	Tafawa Balewa	14/01/2019
Pastor Stephen Moses	Bauchi city	15/01/2019
Kamalu Muhammad	Bauchi	16/01/2019
Imam Nura Muhammad	Bauchi	1/02/2019
Imam Muhammad Yusuf	Tafawa Balewa	20/02/2019
Sambo Turaki	Bauchi	13/01/2019
Ridwanu Waziri	Bauchi	22/01/2019
Daudu Daniel	Tafawa Balewa	20/01/2019
Muhammad Muhammad	Tafawa Balewa	2/01/2019
Sunusi Abubakar	Bauchi	1/02/2019
David James	Tafawa Balewa	3/02/2019
Daniel Bless	Tafawa Balewa	15/01/2019
Imam Ibrahim Idris	Bauchi	11/01/2019
Sadiq Muhammad	Bauchi	10/03/2019
Bulus Thomas	Bauchi	11/03/2019

b. Focus Group Discussion

Participants	Place	Date
Fatima Garba	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
RidwanuAdamu	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Muhammad Ali	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Kabiru Sani	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Lawal Abubakar	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Musa Abdulkadir	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Daniel Dauda	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Pastor Moses	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Pastor Bukar	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Imam Sani Garba	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Imam Ibrahim	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Salisu Baba	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Madaki Umar	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Abdul'azizAdamu	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Ibrahim Danladi	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Abubakar Sale	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Anas Musa	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Ruth Daniel	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Ezikel Danladi	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE INTERFAITH MEDIATION CENTRE OFFICIALS

Bio-data information

Name …………………………..

Age…………………………….

Place of work or Residence………………………….

1. What factors do you think informed the establishment of interfaith mediation centre?

2. What are the objectives of your centre?

3. Where do you source funds for establishing your organisation? Please give details.

4. How did you achieve your organisational development?

5. Did you have organisation structure?

6. What role did you play in peace building activities?

7. What are your challenges facing the activities of interfaith mediation centre in the management of conflict between

8. What role do you play in managing the electoral violence in Bauchi state from 2007-2015?

9. Do you have any success stories? If yes give details of your achievement

10. Are there any positive outcomes that indicate the effectiveness of interfaith mediation centre in resolving conflict between farmers and Herdsmen?

11. What are the causes of conflict between farmers and herdsmen?

APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS /RELIGIOUS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS

Bio-data information

Name …………………………..

Age…………………………….

Place of work or Residence………………………….

1. What are the causes of conflict in Bauchi state?

2. Give any successful conflict management by the interfaith mediation centre? Please give details in your view.

3. What role do you played in managing ethno-religious conflict in Bauchi state from 1995?

4. What kind of role did you play in managing the electoral violence between 2007 to 2015?

5. What kind of strategy have you apply in resolving conflict between farmers and Herdsmen from 1996-2009?

APPENDIX III: LOCAL NGO (CMPM) OFFICIALS RESIDING IN BAUCHI STATE

Bio-data information

Name …………………………..

Age…………………………….

Place of work or Residence………………………….

1. How did you work with interfaith mediation centre in managing conflicts in Bauchi state? Please give details.

1. What kind of activities did you engage in managing conflicts? Explain in details.

2. How did you work with interfaith mediation centre in managing electoral violence in Bauchi state?

3. What kind of intervention strategy do you played in resolving conflict between farmers and Herdsmen from 2008-2015?

4. If there any successful management of conflict between farmers and Herdsmen in Bauchi state?

APPENDIX IV: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION FOR STAKEHOLDERS RESIDING IN BAUCHI STATE

Bio-data information

Name …………………………..

Age…………………………….

Place of work or Residence………………………….

1. What are the major causes of conflict in Bauchi state?

2. What kind of activities did you engage in managing conflicts? Please explain in detail.

3. How did you engage in managing electoral violence in Bauchi state? please give details

4. What kind of intervention strategy do you think is effective in managing electoral violence in Bauchi state?

5. What role did you play in managing conflict between herdsmen and farmers?

6. How do you address the conflict between herdsmen and farmers?

7. What are the major's causes of conflict between herdsmen and farmers in Bauchi state?

APPENDIX V: MAP OF BAUCHI

Map of Bauchi State in Nigeria (2019)

Source: https:// smarttraveller.gov.au/countries/africa/west/pages/nigeria.aspx

APPENDIX VI: APPOVAL LETTER

KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: kubps@yahoo.com
dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke
Website: www.ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 810901 Ext. 57530

Internal Memo

FROM: Dean, Graduate School

DATE: 26th October, 2018

TO: Mr. Musa Saleh
C/o Department of History, Archaeology
& Political Studies
KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

REF: C50F/33277/14

SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF RESEARCH PROPOSAL

This is to inform you that Graduate School Board at its meeting of 11th October, 2018 approved your Research Proposal for the M.A. Degree, Entitled "Influence of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the Management of Conflict in Bauchi State Nigeria, 1995-2015".

You may now proceed with your Data collection, subject to clearance with the Director General, National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation.

As you embark on your data collection, please note that you will be required to submit to Graduate School completed supervision Tracking Forms per semester. The form has been developed to replace the progress Report Forms. The Supervision Tracking Forms are available at the University's Website under Graduate School webpage downloads.

Thank you.

REUBEN MURIUKI
FOR: DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

c.c.   Chairman, Department of History, Archaeology & Political Studies

Supervisors:

1. Dr. Felix Kiruthu
C/o Department of History, Archaeology & Political Studies
KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

2. Dr. Julius Nabende
C/o Department of History, Archaeology & Political Studies
KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

RM/cao

APPENDIX VII: AUTHORIZATION LETTER

KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: kubps@yahoo.com
dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke
Website: www.ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 8710901 Ext. 57530

Our Ref: C50F/33277/14

Date: 26th October, 2018

Director General, National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation,
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FOR MR. MUSA SALEH REG. NO. C50F/33277/14

I write to introduce Mr. Saleh who is a Postgraduate Student of this University. He is registered for a M.A. degree programme in the **Department of History, Archaeology & Political Studies in the School of Humanities & Social Sciences.**

Mr. Saleh intends to conduct research for a M.A Degree thesis entitled **"Influence of Interfaith Mediation Centre in the Management of Conflict in Bauchi State Nigeria, 1995-2015".**

Any assistance given will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

PROF. PAUL OKEMBO
DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

RM/cao

APPENDIX VIII: INTRODUCTION LETTER

INTERFAITH MEDIATION CENTRE

MEDIATION HOUSE

No. 12 Constitution /Abubakar Kigo Road Kaduna - Nigeria
Tel: +234 803 303 9716, +234 803 450 2964, +234 803 692 2405
Email: imckaduna@gmail.com, Website: www.imc-nigeria.org

21 January, 2019

The Dean
Kenyatta University
Graduate School
P.O. Box 43844, 00100
Nairobi, Kenya

Dear Sir,

RE RESEARCH ENTITLED 'INFLUENCE OF INTERFAITH MEDIATION CENTRE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT IN BAUCHI STATE NIGERIA, 1995-2015' BY MR. MUSA SALEH REG. NO C50F/33277/14

The above subject matter refers. This serves to formally confirm that Mr. Saleh was in our Centre today and has interviewed me Pastor Dr. James Movel Wuye, the Co Executive Director of the Centre. It is also noteworthy that he has been provided with data as our contributions towards facilitating the completion of his research work.

Please accept our esteemed regards and do not hesitate to reach us if there is anything not immediately clear that you may wish to clarify.

Sincerely,

PASTOR DR. JAMES MOVEL WUYE
Co-Executive Director
+234 803 303 9716

APPENDIX IX: LIST OF RESPONDENTS

Respondent	Place	Date
Rifkatu Samson	Tafawa Balewa	12/01/2019
Pastor Samson Bukar	Tafawa Balewa	20/01/2019
Sabo Madaki	Tafawa Balewa	14/01/2019
Alkali Yusuf	Bonunu	10/01/2019
Moses Lucky	Tafawa Balewa	13/01/2019
Salisu Muhammad	Bonunu	19/01/2019
Luka Hakuri	Bauchi city	14/01/2019
Imam Haruna Muhammad	Bonunu	30/01/2019
Pastor James MovelWuye	Kaduna	20/01/2019
Imam NuraynAshafa	Kaduna	20/01/2019
Imam Ibrahim Ahmad	Kaduna	21/01/2019
Pastor Charles David	Kaduna	23/01/2019
Mr Peter Adams	Bauchi	25/02/2019
Aminu Sidi	Bauchi	22/01/2019
Abubakar Lawal	Bauchi	21/01/2019
Racheal Bala	Bauchi	13/01/2019
SalisuBabanTanko	Bauchi	23/01/2019
Yusuf Bello	Bauchi	24/01/2019
Muhammad Abubakar	Bauchi	10/01/2019
Salisu Yusuf	Bauchi	19/01/2019
Samson Moses	Tafawa Balewa	14/01/2019
Pastor Stephen Moses	Bauchi city	15/01/2019
Kamalu Muhammad	Bauchi	16/01/2019
Imam Nura Muhammad	Bauchi	1/02/2019
Imam Muhammad Yusuf	Tafawa Balewa	20/02/2019
Sambo Turaki	Bauchi	13/01/2019
Ridwanu Waziri	Bauchi	22/01/2019
Daudu Daniel	Tafawa Balewa	20/01/2019
Muhammad Muhammad	Tafawa Balewa	2/01/2019
Sunusi Abubakar	Bauchi	1/02/2019
David James	Tafawa Balewa	3/02/2019
Daniel Bless	Tafawa Balewa	15/01/2019
Imam Ibrahim Idris	Bauchi	11/01/2019
Sadiq Muhammad	Bauchi	10/03/2019
Bulus Thomas	Bauchi	11/03/2019

APPENDIX X: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

Participants	Place	Date
Fatima Garba	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
RidwanuAdamu	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Muhammad Ali	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Kabiru Sani	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Lawal Abubakar	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Musa Abdulkadir	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Daniel Dauda	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Pastor Moses	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Pastor Bukar	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Imam Sani Garba	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Imam Ibrahim	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Salisu Baba	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Madaki Umar	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Abdul'azizAdamu	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Ibrahim Danladi	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Abubakar Sale	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Anas Musa	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Ruth Daniel	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019
Ezikel Danladi	Bauchi Metropolis, Bauchi state	10/03/2019