

**EVOLUTION AND ACTIVITIES OF JESHI LA EMBAKASI MOVEMENT IN
KENYA; 1992-2010.**

BY

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DECLARATION

This project is my original work, and it has not been presented for a degree in any other university or institution of higher learning.

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DEDICATION

This work I dedicate to my late mum, my husband, my children and my sisters for the support and encouragement they have given me throughout this research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

I wish to thank God for the gift of life, energy and good health that has enabled me to pursue this academic work up to this point.

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CONTENTS

DECLARATION	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
CONTENTS	v
ABSTRACT	viii
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	ix
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS	x
CHAPTER ONE	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.0 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Background to the study.....	1
1.2 Statement of the problem.....	5
1.3 Research Objectives	6
1.4 Research Questions	6
1.5 Research Premises.....	6
1.6 Justification and significance of the study.....	7
1.7 Scope and limitations of the study	8
1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	9
1.8.1 Introduction.....	9
1.8.2 Review of related literature	9
1.8.3 Theoretical framework	14
1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	16
1.9.1 Introduction.....	16
1.9.2 Research Design.....	16
1.9.3 Study Area	16
1.9.4 Target Population	17
1.9.5 Sampling Techniques	17
1.9.6 Research Instruments	17

1.9.7 Data Collection Procedures	18
1.9.8 Reliability and validity of the research instruments	18
1.9.9 Data Analysis and Presentation	18
1.9.10 Ethical consideration	18
CHAPTER TWO	19
2.0 VIGILANTE GROUPS IN KENYA; CONCEPTUAL ISSUES.	19
2.1 Introduction.....	19
2.2 Conceptualization of the term vigilantism.....	19
2.3 Emergence and Character of Vigilante Groups in Kenya	22
2.4 Vigilante Groups in Kenya	24
2.5 Conclusion	31
CHAPTER THREE	32
3.0 EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF JESHI LA EMBAKASI MOVEMENT IN KENYA ;1992-2010.	32
3.1 Introduction.....	32
3.2 The composition of Jeshi la Embakasi in the 1992-1997.....	32
3.3 Emergence and Evolution of Jeshi la Embakasi; 1992-1993	35
3.4 Drivers of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement; 1992.	37
3.5 Activities of Jeshi la Embakasi	39
3.5.1 Political participation	39
3.5.2 Jeshi la Embakasi in ‘business’; 2002-2005	43
3.5.3 Land Grabbing; 2004-2005	45
3.5.4 Illegal handling of Drugs.	47
3.6 Leadership and hierarchy in Jeshi La Embakasi 1998-2005.....	49
3.7 Conclusion	51
CHAPTER FOUR	51
4.0 CHANGE IN THE ORGNANIZATION OF JESHI LA EMBAKASI MOVEMENT; 2006-2010.....	51
4.1 Introduction.....	51
4.2 Changing tactics and techniques of Jeshi la Embakasi	52
4.2.1 Entry of women and children into Jeshi la Embakasi.....	52
4.2.2 Change of Guard; From Youth to Elders.	53
4.2.3 Use of Teenage Criminals.....	54
4.2.4 Boda boda escapees	55

4.3 Increased use of weapons in Nairobi 2005-2007	56
4.4 Jeshi la Embakasi in the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence in Nairobi slums	59
4.5 Kidnapping	60
4.6 Conclusion	61
CHAPTER FIVE	64
5.1 Introduction	64
5.2 Summary and Conclusions	64
5.3 Recommendations	67
REFERENCES	68
PRIMARY SOURCES	68
SECONDARY SOURCES	71
APPENDICES	87
A1: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE EX MEMBERS AND MEMBERS OF JESHI LA EMBAKASI	87
A2: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE COUNTY ADMINISTRATORS AND SECURITY OFFICERS	88
A3: MAP OF EMBAKASI NORTH CONSTITUENCY: STUDY AREA.	89
A4. RESEARCH PERMIT	90

ABSTRACT

The study was undertaken to investigate the evolution and activities of Jeshi la Embakasi in the period 1992-2010. This study sought to achieve the following research objectives; To examine the background history of vigilante groups in Kenya 1992-2010, To investigate the origin and activities of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Kenya 1992-2010 and to interrogate the change in the organization of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement 1992-2010.

The study was guided by the Rational Choice theory and made use of qualitative research design. The study was carried out in Nairobi County and more specifically in Embakasi North. The study targeted both male and female aged 18 years old and above and who were knowledgeable on Jeshi la Embakasi. Both snowballing and purposive sampling techniques were used in the selection of the sample population. In some instances, the researcher randomly selected participants. Both primary and secondary data were used in the study. Primary data was obtained from direct interaction with the participants in the field through interviews and focus group discussions. Secondary data was obtained from books, articles in journals, reports, theses and dissertations. Data collected was analyzed thematically and periodically and then presented in form of narration followed by first hand quotations from the primary respondents. The findings include: Embakasi group emergence; the group was formed with the sole purpose of providing political protection to their founder. The study's conclusion was that, vigilante groups are formed due to the failure of the state in providing sufficient security to its people as well as by existence of malicious groups with ill-motivated interests.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

DRC -----	Democratic Republic of Congo
FGD -----	Focus Group Discussions
IRIN -----	Integrated Regional Information Networking
KANU -----	Kenya African National Unity
KHRC -----	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KHRW -----	Kenya Human Rights Watch
KII -----	Key Informant Interview
KPU -----	--Kenya People's Party
KYW -----	KANU Youth Wingers
LRA -----	Lord's Resistance Army
MRC -----	Mombasa Republican Council
NARC -----	National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
O.I -----	Oral Interview
SLDF -----	Sabaot Land Defense Forces
TRAC -----	Terror Research and Analysis Consortium

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Political violence Refers to the act of violence that is perpetrated by either the government or other persons with the aim of achieving political goals. It may include acts of killing, eviction, lynching, property destruction that are politically motivated.

Militia movement A group of individuals who regard themselves as security wings in the region where they operate. However, on the side of the government they are illegally constituted and can be politically connected or hired to unleash violence to the presupposed enemies.

Vigilante A person who tries in an unofficial way to prevent crime or to catch and punish someone who has committed a crime. They are community groupings with the collective use or threat of extra-legal violence in response to an alleged criminal act.

Gang A group of people or individuals who engage in criminal activity and identify themselves with a common name or sign.

Militia An army composed of ordinary citizens who are organized in a paramilitary formation and have set rules and regulations but they are not part of the professional soldiers or regular army.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter outlines the background to the study, the statement of the problem, the research objectives, questions and premises. In addition, it contains the justification and significance of the study as well as the scope and limitations of the study.

1.1 Background to the study

In the 21st century, there has been an increase in the evolution of militias, vigilantes and militias across the world. It is significant to note that, the government regards these groups as militias, which are illegally constituted. On the other hand, these groups regard themselves as security wings in their regions of operation. To the public, these groups are either criminal militias or security providers depending on the individual and the reasons for the discussion. Such branding and labeling is normally laden with negative and biased meaning. Accordingly, in this study these groups are referred to as vigilante movements. Many of these movements comprise of the youth aged between 14-20 years (Hoover, 1999).

Decker and Van Winkle (1996) attribute the formation of these movements to both pull and push forces. The reports articulate that both sociocultural, economic and political factors push the youths to these groups. It is significant to note that, although many of these movements emerge under same conditions, they have different organizational structure depending on the primary objective of the group and these structure changes over time. (Cardie 2002).

In Mexico, Vanda (2016) gives the rise of vigilante groups a political approach. He gives an example of drug cartel militias that rose due to the president declaration of war on drug cartels in the country. The movement's persistence in their activities is blamed on the government failure of providing necessary resources to enhance state presence especially in the rural areas. Echoing similar views, Pedrero (2015) observes that since 2006, Mexico has experienced high levels of homicide attributed to militia activities due to political and economic repressions of the youth.

In Asia, Robinson, (2001) notes that militias in the continent mainly originated in response to pro-independence provocation in late 1998. Furthermore, the act of violence among these militias was just an expression of their traditional cultural patterns. Today, Jaffrelot & Gayer, (2009) note that proliferation of militia in Asia is as a result of ethno-religious conflicts, class wars, linguistic dimensions among others.

Scholars such as Quamruzzaman (2015) note that, these groups have changed their tactics of operation over time. For instance, Islamist militia groups use suicide bombing as a tactic to achieve what they want and as a supreme form of Jihad which is allowed by the Islamic jurisprudence.

Wendy (2015) notes that militias are an integral part of the normative political landscape in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. The author points out that in Central African Republic, militias rose due to political repression and that they undermine and obstruct institutional structures through questioning defensive abilities and legitimacy of the existing government. However as time changed they mutated into terrorizing even the innocent people. Further, he observes that militias operate as auxiliaries of government to create insecurity with a notion that all men are a masculine part initiated into violence. These views are also echoed by

Arieff (2014) who note that civilians are often at risk due to militias such as the LRA in Central African Republic, and that disarmament of militias should be considered in order to protect civilians. Arieff (2014) further points out that, these movements are flexible and can mutate into any form depending on the task to be accomplished.

In DRC, Kelly (2010) points out that, there are over twenty armed groups operating in a landscape of motivations and alliances placing the country in some parts a state of unrest politically, economically, and socially. The author notes that the emergence of these groups are informed by political exclusion coupled by individual factors. On his part, Raleigh & Moody (2016) note that militias in DRC continue to carry out high fatality attacks on civilians and protest events especially during months of elections. There has also been an increasing trend in the emergence of political militia groups in Tripoli since 2015. An example of such a militia is the Bab al-Tajoura Brigade. The authors further note that militia violence indicates the desire of these armed groups to be included in settlements. Bradfield, (2013) notes that there are several factors that make the youth be mobilized in these groups one such primary factor is, forceful recruitment into the militia system. He further notes that, there exist other factors which drive them these groups, these include societal factors and personal factors such as lack of self-esteem. Moreover, political bodies do use strategies of recruiting marginalized young people to maintain their power structure or even win elections (Chikara, 2013).

In South Sudan, Pinaud (2016) notes that there are several militias that are used for political purposes. Such include the Mathiang Anyoor group created for the loyalty of Malang and Kirr. However, as time went by, the group came to be referred to as Gel Beny meaning rescue the president. Read Time Analysis of political violence across Africa, (2016) asserts that South Sudan most recently, over half of the battles it has had involves political and ethnic militias with

most violence reported occurring at the hands of the militias. The report further indicates that though unidentified armed groups are the most active of these groups, only two of the groups that is Pakam communal militia and the Rup Ndika ethnic militia have taken part actively in the recent months. Groups such as David Yau and militia Lord's Resistance Army are responsible for the war crimes and crimes against humanity in South Sudan all based on political grounds.

In Uganda, Omoch (2010) notes that militias have tacit protection due to their political connection. Militias are trained and used to crash against any political opponent of the elites involved (Admin, 2015). Senior police officers are said to train youths, give them guns to terrorize people. Such groups include 3k, brigade, Bamboo youth Brigade, and Black mamba among others. Kweka (2016) asserts that although the armed forces and the police are completely under the command of the president, he seems not fully satisfied. Accordingly, the police have trained youths and armed them terming them as crime preventers. These youths have always been used to suppress the opposition as witnessed in elections that are marred with violence and rigging (Biryabarema, 2015; Kweka, 2016)

Kenya has had its share of vigilante groups. Oloo (2010) notes that such groups originated from the KANU youth wing of 1960. This group was used to suppress the opposition. According to the Kenya Human Rights, Commission (KHRC) (2008) there over 40 groups in Kenya, which include among other Mungiki, Jeshi la Embakasi, Sabaot Land Defense Forces (SLDF) and Jeshi La Mzee. The rise of these groups is informed by lack of political- economic inclusions and marginalizations. (Katumanga, 2005; Kegoro, 2009). However, Wamue (2002) notes that accumulation of wealth by a few elites triggered the rise of such movements. However, Mwangi and Ndeda (2010) note that these groups have changed over time such that the way they are today is not the same way they were in the time they were formed. Waki report (2008) and

KHRC (2010), highlights that the activities of these movements were greatly felt during the electioneering period and more specifically during the 2007/2008 post-election violence.

According to the Kenya national parliamentary report (2002), Jeshi la Embakasi was a debate of discussion in Kenyan parliament in 2000. Studying the post-election violence in Kenya, the Waki report mentioned Jeshi la Embakasi alongside other groups as among the groups that participated in perpetuating violence. Reporting on illegal groups in Kenya, Muthegi (2003) notes that Jeshi la Embakasi is based in Nairobi and has been used for political hire to intimidate the political opponents of its clients. Accordingly, in 2010, the movement was listed among the outlawed 33 groups under the prevention of Organized Crime Act (Mukinda, 2010; Obedha, 2013)

Several scholars have studied militia groups in Kenya, however none has studied Jeshi la Embakasi in details and hence scanty information exists about the group. This study seeks to fill this knowledge gap by studying the evolution and growth of Jeshi la Embakasi since 1992-2010.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Jeshi la Embakasi Movement is a group that emerged in 1992 during the introduction of multiparty democracy in Kenya. The group was formed to protect the late Hon. David Mwenje, the then MP for Embakasi Constituency. The group has since metamorphosed and is involved in politics, land grabbing, kidnapping, illicit drugs, among other activities. Thus, the need to examine this movement and the changes it has undergone over time. The study begins by examining the history of vigilante groups in Kenya 1992-2010. The study proceeds to investigate the origin and activities of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Kenya 1992-2010 and finally the changes in the organization of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement 1992-2010.

1.3 Research Objectives

This study sought to achieve the following research objectives;

- a. To examine the factors that led to the formation of vigilante groups in Kenya.
- b. To investigate the activities of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Kenya 1992-2007.
- c. To interrogate the changes of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Kenya 2008-2010.

1.4 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following questions,

- a. What factors led to the formation of vigilante groups in Kenya?
- b. What were the activities of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in the period 1992-2007?
- c. To what extent has the Jeshi la Embakasi changed in the period 2008-2010?

1.5 Research Premises

The study assumed that;

- a. Vigilante groups were first formed to provide security due to failure of the government to provide sufficient security to its people in the period.
- b. Jeshi la Embakasi was formed by politicians who wanted to protect their political interests.
- c. That Jeshi la Embakasi has evolved into a criminal group for hire by the highest bidder in the period 2006-2010.

1.6 Justification and significance of the study

Many studies done on militias and in Kenya have focused on the activities carried out by the movements in general. Such studies include works of; Kegoro (2009), Waki (2008), KHRC (2010), Wafula (2008), Wamue (2002) among others. Very few scholars have studied each group individually. In addition, most studies have been carried on Mungiki and Taliban with many aspects of these groups focusing on elections. Accordingly, other groups such as Jeshi la Embakasi are only studied alongside other groups and their history is yet to be studied. This study was therefore necessitated by the fact that it seeks to study Jeshi la Embakasi individually, its internal organization and the changing trends in the movement since 1992 up to 2010. As such levels, it was possible to bring out some aspects of the movement that may have been overlooked by employing a general study of these movements.

The year 1992 was chosen to begin this study because this was the time the first Jeshi la Embakasi came into Kenyan limelight during the 1992 general elections violence. On the other, 2010 was chosen on the basis that, the year was marked by the enactment of the Prevention of Organized Crime Act and that drastic changes were expected in the groups.

Findings from this study are of help to policy makers in their policymaking and implementation processes as far as these groups are concerned. It can help the security stakeholders in the provision of security and ensuring safe urban centers in Kenya. It may also help them in understanding the organization of these groups and find a solution to them. To the academicians, the findings will add knowledge to the already existing literature on militias and politics not only in Kenya but also globally.

1.7 Scope and limitations of the study

The study focused on the evolution of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Nairobi County in the period 1992-2010. The period 1992-2010 marked a major shift in the Movement. However, where necessary the researcher stretched beyond this period and geographical limit to gather information deemed enrich the study.

The study focused on the Jeshi la Embakasi Movement only. Any other group mentioned herein was in relation to the Jeshi la Embakasi. The study was delimited to the operations and organization of the movement. Moreover, it was limited to Embakasi constituency in Nairobi County.

Some of the challenges faced by the researcher were that due to the sensitivity of the topic under the study, some of the respondents were not be willing to give information. Additionally, militia issues are very sensitive in nature thus; the researcher encountered difficulties in obtaining some information. However, this was delimited through assuring the respondents that this study was only meant for academic purposes. Moreover, the researcher made use of an insider in collecting quite sensitive data and in tracing respondents.

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.8.1 Introduction

This section contains the review of the already existing works on militias and political violence and the theoretical framework in which the study will be based on. The chapter is organized into literature review and theoretical review

1.8.2 Review of related literature

There are several works of scholars on militias, which are relevant to the proposed study. Such works include; Oloo (2010), Dowd (2012), Wafula (2008), Katumanga (2015), Obi (2009), Omoch (2010), Kegoro (2009) among others.

Omoch (2010) studies the nexus between proliferations of vigilantes and militias in Uganda in relation to the political underpinning of government. He notes that the current vigilantes in Uganda are politically sponsored and are political instruments in orchestrating violence. These militias have tacit protection and approval due to their political connection. Since 1989, vigilantes have been used to maintain a semi authoritarian regime in the nations. This is through intimidation, coercion, and violence in favor of the regime. This work sheds light on the current study but the author has not studied the internal organization of the militias and the trends the

militias have gone through over time. This is the gap that this study fills by studying Jeshi la Embakasi in Kenya.

Shuaibu and Salleh (2015) studying the evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria, notes that this group emerged at around 2002 as a local Islamic group. The author further notes that Boko Haram insurgency has pitted neighbor against neighbor and has affected very many Nigerians. Furthermore, this insurgency has escalated due to high rates of poverty, illiteracy, misinterpretation of religion and unemployment. In addition, Boko Haram recruits its new members through kidnapping children then radicalizing them to become members of the group. The work of this author is relevant to the current study as far as evolution, changing trends and the recruitment of its members is concerned. However, the work was carried out in Nigeria while the proposed study will be in Kenya thus; this study fills the geographical gap and more specifically looking at Jeshi la Embakasi.

Kegoro (2009) studies the rise of militias in political violence in Kenya's 2007 post-election violence. He notes that groups such as *Chinkororo*, which he majorly focuses on actively, participated in 2007 post-election violence. The author notes that these groups not only killed the presupposed opponents but also destroyed property, burnt houses, blocked roads and evicted individuals. The work of this author is relevant to the current proposed study on evolution and growth of militias in Kenya. However, the work was carried out in Kenya thus aspects of generalization while the current study narrows down to Embakasi and incorporates the internal organization of militias and their transformations over time with a special eye on Jeshi la Embakasi.

Althaus & Dudley (2014) note that there is a growing rise in vigilantism in Mexico that places Mexico's security in a dilemma. According to this author, the history of militias in Mexico can be traced to the rise of citizen's self-defense groups in western Mexico. These militias have been associated with rise of hyper-violence in Mexico, putting the government in a dilemma of resolving the constant rise in militias. At some point, the government proposed a plan of incorporating them into the security system but later arrested a leader of one of the militias thus sparking more violence as the militias felt betrayed. However, the militias according to the author can be destroyed by a functional alliance between the community and the government within a clear legal framework. This work sheds light to the proposed study as far as rise of militias is concerned. However, the above authors have not looked at the organizational structure and the changing trends of this militia groups under the study, which was the aim of the study but more specifically on Jeshi la Embakasi in Kenya.

KHRC (2005) identifies several groups that operate in Kenya's political arena. Such include; Mungiki, Jeshi la Mzee, Jeshi la darajani, Bhakungu, Jeshi la Embakasi among others. KHRC notes that these are organized along ethnic identities and during elections; politicians use them for political activities including unleashing violence. The above work focuses on different groups thus aspect of generalizations might have occurred and the reports looks at the organization from an ethnic angle. This study deviates from the reviewed work by focusing on one group, which is the Jeshi la Embakasi through studying the evolution of the group, organization structure of the group, and the changing trends in the group.

Studying Islamist militias and rebel groups across Africa, (Dowd, 2012) notes that violent Islamist activity in Africa have increased recently due to political conflict. This is mainly due to the expansion of these criminal militias in specific countries which are prone to fragility like

Somalia but also intensification of Islamist activity in new countries in Africa. The author further notes that differences and similarities of this Islamist groups have revealed different strategies, objectives and modalities of violence on the continent. The ideas of this author inform this study on some of the trends of the criminal groups in Africa. Although this study was carried out in Africa, it did not duly center its efforts in Kenya and in particular, Jeshi la Embakasi which the current proposed study is wholly committed and engulfed in.

Wafula (2008) studies post-election violence in Kenya and notes that the rise of militias in politics is a major concern in Kenya's elections. He further notes that these movements are usually hired by politicians to advance their political goals thus many of them become inseparable from the politics. The author informs this study on the factors that necessitate the rise of the militias in Kenya. However, the current study deviate from this study since he does not look at the changing trends and the evolution of this militia groups in Kenya, which is the major focus of this study and more specifically on the Jeshi la Embakasi militia group.

Katumanga (2015) notes that most militias emerge due to power struggle and economic exclusions. The author further notes that many of these are politically sponsored and have political membership. This agrees with Wafula, (2008) who articulates that criminal groups are usually hired by politicians to advance their political goals. Their ideas inform this study on aspects concerning some of the factors that necessitate the growth of criminal militias. However, this study deviates from the current study on aspects concerning the changing trends and the organization structure of criminal militias particularly Jeshi la Embakasi, a gap that it fills.

Adenrele (2012) studying Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria notes that marginalization and imbalanced distribution of resources made some radicalized scholars to preach against the

government and the democratic setting which gave birth to the present Boko Haram insurgency. The author informs this study as far as giving the factors that led to the birth of the present day Boko Haram. However, this study deviates from the current study on the aspects concerning the organizational structure of the group and also the changing trends of criminal groups and more particularly on Jeshi la Embakasi.

Studying militias in Kenya, Oloo (2010) notes that movements are formed to intimidate political opponents in Kenya's political arena. The author also notes that their origin can be traced from the KANU youth winger of 1960s that was formed to intimidate the government political opponents. He further notes that Jeshi la Embakasi and the Baghdad boys are among the groups that are associated with the opposition in Kenya. The ideas of this author inform this study on the factors that necessitate the rise of Jeshi la Embakasi in Kenya. However, the current study deviates from his study since he does not look at the changing trends and the organization structure of this criminal militia and the organization of Jeshi la Embakasi.

Jenkins (2009) notes that in the United States, militia movements comprise of radical paramilitary groups who view themselves as defenders of traditional freedoms against the government. The author further notes that, these militia groups are not a new phenomenon. From the historical times, movements such as shirt and fascist existed in the 1930s. In the 1960s and 1970s, new militia groups were founded despite law prohibiting their formation. New private militias trained and armed themselves and adopted anti-government policies. Furthermore, by the 1990s, the militia movements had increased in terms of membership by stalking affairs of other groups and this has been the trend even in the 21st century. The author informs this study as far as the evolution and recruitment of members into militia groups is concerned. However, the

current study deviates from his ideals by looking at the organizational structures of these militias with close reference to Jeshi la Embakasi.

Pecaro (2014) points out that in Latin America, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is among the oldest rebel alliance in the world. This group is centered in Amazon rain forest and has been associated with kidnapping. The author further asserts that FARC has a large membership of about 10,000 members. The author further notes that another militia group in Colombia is the National Liberation Army (NLA) which is considered a terrorist group by Colombian government. The author informs this study as far as evolution and growth of militia groups is concerned. However, this study deviates from the proposed study on matters concerning the organizational structure and the changing trends of this militia groups which the current study will also looked at. Furthermore, this study was carried out in Kenya while his study was in Colombia.

The literature reviewed above revealed that a lot has been done on security movements not only in Kenya but also globally. However, there were several gaps that the reviewed identified that needed an immediate and serious scholarly attention. Many of the existing works mentioned most of these groups without critical examinations of their organization and stratification. In Kenya, many scholars studied Mungiki and Taliban with a few studying Jeshi la Embakasi. Jeshi la Embakasi has only been mentioned alongside the studied groups. Additionally, scholars have not given the changing trends in Jeshi la Embakasi since its formation. This study made use of data from related disciplines and fields in filling the gaps eminent in this study by examining the evolution and growth of Jeshi la Embakasi in Nairobi County in the period 1992-2010.

1.8.3 Theoretical framework

There are several theories that can be used to explain the evolution and growth of security groups and movements. Such include the Exchange theory and the rational choice theory.

The Rational choice theory was proposed by George Homas. In the 1970s other theorists like Blau, Coleman and Cook expanded George's frame work and developed a more formal version of rational choice. Rational Choice theory holds that human beings base their actions on rational controls. They act with rationality when they make choices and that their choices point at optimization of their pleasure. According to this theory, there are three actors in the society. The rational actors choose to commit crimes which can be prevented by severe penalties, the predestined actors cannot control their urge thus driven by the environment to commit crimes. The victimized actor is the victim of unbalanced society (Coleman and Fararo, 1992). In the case of this study, the theory will be used to explain why the Jeshi la Embakasi members choose to come together as a movement discussing the merits and demerits that they acquire from such a group. However, the theory cannot be used to explain the existence of certain social phenomenon such as mutuality, altruism and trust. Boudon (2009

Given the weakness of the above theory, the study made use of exchange theory to compensate for its weaknesses. Its proponents include; Homans (1961); Blau (1964); and Emerson (1976).The theory posits that particular interactions among actors are not based on the desire for goals with benefits. Activities that social actors re-engage in are altruistic. In this way, interactions based on coercion are not considered in this theory. Exchange theory recognizes that once a table relationship between the social actors has been established a vital mechanism emerges which decreases the mutual trust among the social actors, but at the same time manages to perpetuate the exchange relationship. Rules also emerge that guides the relationship and the nature of the exchange. Homans (1961) and Blau (1964) surface an imperative that, the dictates

made on social actors may serve to make them abandon the exchange relationship and interact on basis other than cost and benefit. At complex levels, the interactions are no longer reciprocal between social actors but are more part of a complex set of related activities which constitutes a process. Emerson, (1976). The theory was to explain the organization of Jeshi la Embakasi and the factors that are infirming the hanging trends in the group.

1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.9.1 Introduction

This section contains the methodology that the researcher aimed to adopt in achieving the main objective. This chapter is organized into the following sections: Research design, target population, sample size and sampling procedures, research instruments, data collection procedures and analysis.

1.9.2 Research Design

This study made use of descriptive research design to achieve its objectives. This is because this is a qualitative study. The design was significant because it allows for the collection of in-depth data through the ascertaining of feelings, opinions and attitudes.

1.9.3 Study Area

The study was carried out in Nairobi County and more specifically in Embakasi North. Embakasi North has a population of 181,388 people and covers an area of 5.5 Sq KMs. the county covers

such areas with many people living in slums marked with militias. The region is cosmopolitan in nature accommodating people of different nationalities, races, ethnic groups and social classes.

1.9.4 Target Population

This study targeted Kenyans aged 18 years and above in the city of Nairobi county who are knowledgeable about Jeshi la Embakasi. The study also targeted county administrators, security officers, political analysts and civil society members. This is because they possess vital information on Jeshi la Embakasi in Kenya as far as their activities and operations are concerned. Additionally, the study targeted members and Ex-members of Jeshi la Embakasi because they possessed vital information on the internal organization of the group and the changes it has undergone over time.

1.9.5 Sampling Techniques

This study adopted two main sampling techniques to adequately cover its entire population in a representative manner. Purposive sampling was used to select individuals who the researcher considered to have important information to this study. Such included the county administrators, civil society members, and political analysts. Snowballing sampling was used to trace respondents such as members and Ex-members of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement.

1.9.6 Research Instruments

The research instruments employed in this study included the use of question guides, questionnaires, key informants, oral interviews and focus group discussions. The question guide provided an opportunity to ask for information in details on matters that were under

investigation. There were two trained research assistant who collected information through question guides. Notebooks and pens were used to capture data.

1.9.7 Data Collection Procedures

Prior to collection of data, the researcher obtained a research permit from NACOSTI. After securing it, she proceeded to the county government of Nairobi to seek for authorization at the county level. The researcher then booked appointments with the respondents and explained to them the purpose of the study. While the interviews and focus group discussion were on, the researcher took important notes.

1.9.8 Reliability and validity of the research instruments

To ensure reliability of the research instruments the researcher made use of triangulation method because it allows for the comparison of data from different instruments. The researcher then explained the differences and similarities in the findings. To ensure validity research instruments were sent to responsive departments to ascertain their accuracy.

1.9.9 Data Analysis and Presentation

Data analysis begun with the transcription of tape-recorded data and then arranged thematically and periodically. Secondary data was subjected to textual critical analysis to avoid biasness. Analyzed data was presented in form of narrations followed by first hand quotation from the primary respondents.

1.9.10 Ethical consideration

For research ethics, all respondents were on voluntary basis. The anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents were ensured by ensuring that their identity was only disclosed upon their consent.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 VIGILANTE GROUPS IN KENYA; CONCEPTUAL ISSUES.

2.1 Introduction.

Vigilante groups have been existing in Kenya since 1950's when the Mau Mau who were fighting for independence were described as militia groups by the then colonial government. Today we have several militia groups as we shall see in this Chapter. This Chapter will focus on the conceptualization of the term vigilante, the emergence and character of vigilante groups in Kenya and examining few examples of vigilante groups in Kenya.

2.2 Conceptualization of the term vigilantism.

There is no single definition of the term vigilante or vigilantism by scholars it is a rather amorphous concept to most people. Detractors have branded such groups as diverse anti-abortionists, opponents of the disfavored political groups, or state militias among many other names used to refer to vigilante groups. The true vigilantism encompasses a wide spectrum of

actions making it a rather challenging term to define. Various scholars have come up with definitions of the term vigilante. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines a "vigilante" as a member of a volunteer committee or group organized to suppress and punish crime when the legal processes are inadequate. (Hine 1998)

Burrows defines a vigilante as a member of an organized committee; established members of a community, proceeding for a finite time and with certain goals, the members claim to act as a last resort due to the failure of the established law enforcement system. The members work for the perseverance and betterment of the existing system. Under this definition, the preceding examples like state militias and anti-abortionists do not qualify as true vigilantes because of their desire to alter the existing system.

Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974) introduced a new approach to defining "vigilantes" by categorizing vigilantism into crime control vigilantes, regime control vigilantes, and social control vigilante. Rosenbaum and Sederberg (Rosenbaum and Sederberg) define crime control vigilante as a member of organized community group against alleged perpetrators and perpetrators who are viewed as having escaped justice due to the inefficiency of existing law enforcement system, corruption or leniency on the part of the government (Johnston, 1996). Crime vigilantism is the type of vigilantism that is common and usually associates with vigilantes. A crime control vigilante at times referred to as "a law-abiding hero and a law-breaking villain" (Johnston, 1996). Social vigilantes are concerned with issues that are seen as a threat to social values, and the targeted groups or individuals need not to have committed crime.

According to Les Johnston, a vigilante group comprises of private citizens who voluntarily become a member of an organized community group that involves in vigilantism (Harris, 1997,

Onyango O.I 2018, Moraro O.I 2017). The vigilantes plan and premeditates acquires a form of 'autonomous citizenship' constituting a social movement, use or threaten to use force, arise when transgression or potential transgression threatens an established order, and they aim at controlling crime and other social infractions.

Nel bases the definition of Vigilante from its Spanish origin of the word "vigilante" meaning "watchful." Also, basing the definition in the Latin root of the adjective "vigilantem" which means "watchful, anxious or careful." Early vigilante groups were also referred to as "regulators" and "moderators" (Moses, 1997). Mary Nel defines vigilantism as a necessary group phenomenon that entails private and state agents carrying out a broad spectrum of acts that aim at regulating or moderating the society from unacceptable behavior or practices such as robbers, repeat offenders and perpetrators of other criminal acts. The perpetrators are viewed as having escaped justice because the existing law enforcement system has not reached them is inefficient or the perpetrators managed to outdo the system by proving their innocence (Moses, 1997). Nel describes the term 'vigilante' positive connotations. The existence of vigilantes in a community implies that proper and legal criminal punishment are either non-existent, inefficient, or insufficient and the vigilantes normally see the government as ineffective in enforcing the law hence they justify their actions as fulfilling the wishes and desires of their communities.

Eduardo Moncada defines vigilante groups as organized community groupings with the collective use or threat of extra-legal violence in response to an alleged criminal act (Moncada, 2016). He says that the definition of vigilante group's changes based on the role of the state of in vigilantism, functions of the vigilante group and the reason for its establishment.

In general, (Okombo 2010) notes that, vigilantes have been particularly active among minority communities when surrounded by a dominant ethnic community perceived as a political opponent. For instance, the Borana community exists alongside the Mungiki and Taliban, primarily to protect Somali/Borana interests. There are no single vigilante patrols in Luo-dominated sections of Kibera, while the Mungiki have extended their operations in Kibera's Laini Saba, which is Kikuyu-dominated. In Korogocho, The same is the case in Kawangware, where the Bakongo vigilante co-exists with Mungiki and Luyia vigilantes to safeguard the security of the Congolese population in Congo ward.

2.3 Emergence and Character of Vigilante Groups in Kenya

In Kenya, the name for a group of youth organized to do something outrageous shifts from militia to vigilante, and back, depending on when you are assessing it and who is paying you at the time (Owaahh 2016).

The history of militias in Kenya can be traced back to the war waged by the Mau Mau against the British in the 1950s. The Mau Mau was an armed group of Africans predominantly Kikuyus that rose up in protest against white rule. Among the grievances that led to this revolt were land scarcity, forced labour and meager wages. The movement was however, suppressed after a state of emergency was declared. Although the movement was eventually subdued, its contribution towards accelerating the pace to independence was immense (Elkins 2000)

In post-independence Kenya, the phenomenon of the militia group has its roots in the creation of a youth wing by the former ruling party, KANU. The KANU regime first used its youth wing to

harass the first opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union, which existed for only one year after the attainment of independence. However, youth-wingers were used more forcefully after a split in KANU saw the formation of the Kenya People's Union (KPU). KANU on various occasions deployed the members of its youth wing to intimidate and harass KPU supporters. The presence of these youth-wingers persisted even after the proscription of the KPU in 1969. Thereafter, all elections during the one party era witnessed violence meted out by youth wingers, with prominent politicians hiring them to harass and disrupt their "opponents" rallies. According to Wamwere,(2008) the opening of political space in the early 1990s intensified electoral competition to a high level hitherto unknown in Kenya's history. As the demand for Jeshi la embakasi increased among key political contenders, unemployed slum youth found a source of income. Whereas Jeshi in regions outside Nairobi had a high sense of ethnic consciousness demonstrated in their commitment to work without pay, the Nairobi lot were fairly amorphous, ethnically mixed and primarily driven by monetary gains. A politician could, for instance, readily mobilize 100 youths drawn from different ethnic groups within thirty minutes to foment violence against an opponent provided the terms of engagement were acceptable. The recruitment was done by an agent who would remit a down-payment to the group leaders before the assignment and pay the balance thereafter (Okombo 2010).

By 1992, political thugs in Nairobi received between Sh100 and Sh300 each for activities such as disrupting political rallies or circulating threat leaflets, and between Sh300 and Sh500 for assignments deemed more challenging such as beating or killing opponents with crude weapons, petrol-bombing party offices, burning 'opponents' homes, etc. Depending on the nature of the assignment, the group leader or mobilizer earned more. The Jeshi also benefited from free food, alcohol, cigarettes and drugs. Some politicians who developed intimate relations with group

leaders would even pay their rent or secure government employment for them. Most were initially recruited from among criminal militias who terrorized the estates and the ‘matatu’ touts. Later, the university student community provided a fertile ground for recruits. Owing to the amorphous nature of political hugging at this time, a militia member could raise as much as Sh600 per day by participating in two or more violence missions in a day, attempting return for many a broke student (Okombo 2010)

In 1997, these groups were being trained and armed in the Coast province (Kaya Bombo) and recruited, trained and organised in the Shimba hills, Kaya Waa and the Similani caves in the Kwale district, at the instigation of prominent politicians and with the support of the government and the military. They were subsequently deployed to foment ethnic violence in the run-up to the 1997 elections at the Coast (Mazrui, 2001)

Nonetheless, the genesis of the current groups in Kenya can be traced to Kenya’s return to multi-party politics in 1991. Violence variously christened “ethnic clashes or land clashes” which erupted in many parts of the country. Between 1991 and 1996, over 1,500 people died and almost 300,000 displaced in the Rift Valley and Western provinces. (Mazrui, 2001)

Mungiki dabbled in politics and backed KANU in 2002, specifically Uhuru Kenyatta, now Fourth President of the Republic, as the presidential candidate. They were furnished with ten military land rovers ostensibly because they had important places to be. The first real attempt to break up the group in 2003 was a raid that ended up being two full days of clashes with the police in Mathare slums and other places. 50 people had died in Nairobi in 2002 during clashes pitting ‘matatu’ owners against the sect (Owaahh 2016)

2.4 Vigilante Groups in Kenya

Thairu (2018) notes that villagers of Ng'enda ward, Gatundu South have formed vigilante groups which they used to protect themselves and their livestock. They argued that the government had failed to provide them and their livestock with security. Thairu further observed that two other theft attempts were thwarted by members of the public in a span of two days.

Mwaura (2013) noted that a militia of youths believed to number at least six raided a plot in Mwembe Legeza area of Kisauni and raped two school girls including their mother before they fled away with household items. He further argued that the same group was involved in various robbery activities as Kisauni police boss Joseph Wanjohi the previous day told the Star that the police were on the verge of unmasking the terrorizing militia and would soon arrest its members some of whom are suspected to be vigilante.

Militias gain political angles, or political militia become militias, vigilantes are used by politicians and businessmen, generally, everyone sleeps with everyone, and the fact that we have not been killed by one group or the other, or its splinter groups, or the strayed bullets by now is a total surprise and a proof that if there is indeed a God, then He or She must be in confusion. At least one of these was the result of a senior civil servants fertile imagination (Owaahh 2016)

Kemboi (2017) observed that in Likoni, Mombasa county residents have vowed to form a special vigilante group to protect them against attacks and harassment from knives wielding criminal militias. The residents said that, the vigilante group has worked before and the area was calm as insecurity cases decreased. The popular vigilante group “Dubbed Funga file” and “Forty brothers” were formed to fight the criminals but they later turned out to be criminals themselves, according to one of the resident.

Vincenzo, R. (2006) locates urban violence in the logic of fast migration patterns. Groups excluded from the mainstream society, he contends, tend to stick together for protection. And that these groups stick together along familiar lines, mainly ethnic. This explains the ethnocentric nature of urban violence.

Masese and Mwenzwa, (2012) Community policing approach ensures use of the community members who understand the local crime maps can be a very rewarding strategy given that identification of criminals and crime black spots is made easy.

Owaahh (2016) argues that the SunguSungu had existed before 2002 at least as vigilantes, but finally morphed into brutal militias over the years. They gained infamy for lynching suspected criminals and burning suspected witches. Residents of villages and estates still contribute to finance the operations of the Sungu Sungu as volunteer patrols, to torch witches and commit extrajudicial and targeted killings on their behalf. Sungu Sungu among Abagusii is both admired and distasted in equal measures. It is admired for its role in eliminating various vices in the community which the government and its agencies are unable and on the other hand distasted for its cruelty, disrespect of human rights, extortion, killings and political violence(Masese and Mwenzwa, 2012)

Owaahh, (2016) the Amachuma were a curious addition to the government ban on criminal militias because they are not a militia, and they do not even exist. Amachuma might be from the slang ekegusii word for metal -richuma- that loosely translates to village tough. Amachuma is the plural for richuma and is not really a militia, but a specific cadre of youth, like saying unemployed youth. So, the government has banned unemployment and juvenile delinquents?

In conclusion, it is clear that understanding the emergence and evolution of Sungu Sungu vigilante group among the Gusii cannot be done in a vacuum. Instead the ineffectiveness of state agencies to control crime can be argued to be the genesis of Sungu Sungu, however, the social, economic and political changes the community had undergone since colonial times has continued to lay fertile grounds for its blossoming. (Masese and Mwenzwa, 2012)

Owaahh(2016), asserts that, as the divisive Mungiki permeated through Nairobi slums, members of the Luo tribe living in Nairobi slums formed their own defensive vigilante militias. Known as “The Taliban” the militia obviously morphed beyond its initial intent. Other than choosing a name that carries connotations of Islamists who oppose women receiving education, the Taliban are often referred to as a Christian group. To confuse the deities, they viewed the Mungiki as moral savages more so for the act of forcibly circumcising people than for killing Kenyans for sport. Daniels (2009) indicated that Inter-militia fighting and clashes have occurred in Nairobi, with fighting in 2006 between Mungiki and an ethnic Luo militia called Taliban causing several deaths and displacing at least 9,000 in a dispute over control of a lucrative illicit brew market in Mathare.

Susanne, (2011) observed that Luo Taliban, among others; militias connected to politicians and the police; militias that over time have become independent of the forces that initially supported them; and new vigilante groups.

The Taliban began as an offshoot of the Baghdad Boys, the original grouping that was the Luo tribes answer to the Mungiki. The Baghdad Boys of Kisumu emerged in the early 1990s around the same time as the Gulf War, which might explain the choice of name. They were used widely in the 1992 and 1997 elections. The group later disbanded into several factions, with Taliban

being the biggest and most influential. Other splinter militias include ChinaSquadNyalenda Base, the Chief Squad, Nyamasaria Massive, Kenda Kenda, Kondele Bagdad for Peace (Who do we sue for misleading the public?), Karamojong Boys, Saba Saba, Artur Margaryan (because...why not), Kebago and American Marines.

Owaahh (2016) interrogates the Mungiki Vigilante group and notes that the Mungiki are highly structured. The national overall structure is broken down into a defined cell structure, each divided into five platoons of 10 people each. Even with this, the actual hierarchy remains largely unknown outside the group and of course, the complicit police. Mungiki emerged in the 1980s as something of a gang that combined criminal vigilante activities with cultural preservation. In the 1990s, the group moved most of its operations into Nairobi, gradually taking over the running of protectionist rings and racketeering in slums, middle-class suburbs and most importantly, running 'matatu' and bus terminals.

Perhaps the most underplayed yet one of the most significant conflicts in Kenya's history is the Shifta War. Recorded in most books and etched in memory as the Shifta menace, this seeming success of the government propaganda machine overlooks an important militia called the NFLDM. The irredentist militia began in the pre-colonial era, and its exact history has not been well covered. The Kenya government first considered the NFLDM a serious threat in 1966 after they used a landmine which killed two officers and wrecked the vehicle (a police Land Rover). The NFLDM had, however, been at war with Kenya for four years by then (Mũturi 2015)

Since almost zero information is known of the NFLDM organizational structure, the only possible information can be gleaned from the government's reaction. The NFLDM operated in

small guerilla militias of 10-30 people. This allowed them to be highly efficient and effective, often escaping before the Kenyan military could mount a response (Owaahh 2016).

The government's reaction to the group's activities was brutal, and was borrowed, almost in intricate detail, from Operation Anvil, the military strategy during the State of Emergency in the 1950s. In fact, declaring a State of Emergency was the first thing the government did. The North Eastern Province (NEP) was closed off to the rest of Kenya hence the lack of evidence of the atrocities committed by both sides.

With the emergence of extremist Islamist governments in Somalia, the violence quickly returned, and as of 2013, involves various largely unknown militia against security forces. The massacres happen almost daily, and the government swears it will not stop until all of NEP is cleared of its common wish to join the motherland. Okay, it does not swear that aloud, but it has used the NEP for human target practice before (Owaahh 2016).

Ombati (2013) notes that the "40 Brothers" a militia carrying out its criminal activities in Nairobi was mugging and robbing pedestrians of their money and valuables. Ombati further observed that the group was operating in 10s while performing their criminal activities. He opined that those who were arrested were bailed thus becoming a problem for the police to deal with crimes

A Kaya Bombo rider is a group of riders who attack a strategic village and hold it as they fight the government resistance and take peoples life. On the August 13th, 1997, a group of about 200 raiders carrying traditional weapons and covered by foreigners having guns assaulted a police post, a police station and fundamentally whatever else at the Likoni Ferry station that had a representation of Moi in it. They killed 6 officers and stole in excess of 40 guns. They at that

point went on a violent rampage executing unpredictably, or so it appeared at first. They focused on the territory groups, the clans that would vote the other route, in the December elections. They later withdrew to the Kaya Bombo woods, consequently the name, when security powers arrived the following morning. The guerrilla assaults did not end, not even after decisions finished in December; they proceeded with December of 1998. The police got themselves outmatched by a gathering that was apparently organized, viable, and some other descriptive word you can use to depict a fruitful local army. They had numerous opportunities to practice as coast politicians jarred for power (Owaahh, 2013.)

The report examines in detail the outbreak of political violence on the Kenyan coast in the mid 1997 as a case study of both the orchestration of violence as a political tool and the devastating impact of small arms on the human rights at that time, the country was gearing up for election and calls for constitutional reforms were increasing, putting the ruling party on the defensive. Against this political backdrop, well organized and well-armed irregular paramilitary forces known as, raiders carried out a series of dangerous and deadly attacks on non-indigenous residents around Mombasa, coast province. The coast raiders targeted members of ethnic communities that had voted disproportionately against the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party in the 1992 election, causing KANU to lose two of four parliamentary seats in one district one year (Joost and Ernst, 2002).

According to Mwadzayo, who did not want his real identity revealed, gave an insight into how a group that came to be known as the Kaya Bombo raiders was formed. He said youths were recruited mainly by elders, who told them to be prepared to take arms to defend themselves against exploitation by people from upcountry. The oath was supposed to bind them to the cause that they had set to fight for. In 1994, vigilante groups were formed to beef up security. Every

time they sat and chatted, they talked about the perceived exploitation by upcountry people. In course of ensuring security, thieves were arrested, some of whom were from upcountry. This fueled animosity among the youth from both camps. This was the cause; they believed the oath took them farther. The man said to have administered the oath inside sacred shrines such as Kaya Bombo was named as Swaleh Salim bin Alfani (Daily Nation 2014).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the conceptualization of the term vigilante, the back-ground history of vigilante groups in Kenya and examining few examples of vigilante groups in Kenya. Rational Choice theory was used to explain the work. It was argued that those who joined the vigilante groups did so because of the accrued benefits. The chapter concluded vigilante groups are formed due to the failure of state in providing sufficient security to its people as well as by groups who have self-interest.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 EVOLUTION AND GROWTH OF JESHI LA EMBAKASI MOVEMENT IN KENYA; 1992-2010.

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter looked at the vigilante groups in Kenya. In this section the emergence of Jeshi la Embakasi is interrogated and discussed in details. The researcher attempted to do this by investigating; the composition of Jeshi la Embakasi 1992-1997, the emergence and evolution of the name Jeshi la Embakasi; 1992-1993, drivers of the emergence of Jeshi la Embakasi in 1992-1997, activities of Jeshi la Embakasi, Leadership and hierarchy in Jeshi La Embakasi 1998-2005.

3.2 The composition of Jeshi la Embakasi in the 1992-1997

Mwangangi (2018) noted that Jeshi la Embakasi did not have a specific line-up but had supporters from various parts of Embakasi constituency. The respondent noted that Mr David

Mwenje the MP for Embakasi made friendship with the youth of the entire village. For instance, if he was going to Dandora, there was someone there who mobilized the youth in that particular area. When Hon. David Mwenje went to Dandora, he called on a youth leader who mobilized the youth and when he arrived there he gave them money. About 100 youth were mobilized to welcome him and provide security to him. He further argued that the group was given about one hundred thousand shillings which they divided amongst themselves. The money was handed to their group leader who divided to them after the rally.

The respondent further confirmed that, the youth were paid because during that particular day they did not go to their job but they worked for David Mwenje. He too insinuated that during such political rallies clashes were very common, because the youth could not allow anyone with a contrary opinion. The informant further noted that the group was mostly composed of young men, although there were also a few ladies (Mwangangi O.I 2018). According to Amondi (2017), most of the activities that the groups engaged in were violent in nature and thus needed strong heart without emotions. He explained that women would not be used to disrupt political rallies for instance or to kill a political opponent since they tend to be motherly and with mercy.

Lahey, et.al, (1999) notes that boys are preferred for criminal militias due to masculinity aspects that render them more fearless as compared to their girls counterparts who are quite emotional and fearful to carry out some tasks unless under drug use. In a nutshell Jeshi la Embakasi was a male dominated political movement at the time of its formation.

Scholars such as Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012), Olang and Okoth (2010) have pointed out that most of the Vigilante related movements that emerged in the early 1990s in Kenya were ethnic in nature. In a focus group discussion at Ruai it was revealed that in the 1990s and more

specifically following the 1992 political ethnic clashes almost each ethnic group in Kenya had its own ethno regional militia (FGD, 2017). Their ideas agree with Oloo (2010) and Wamue (2001) who gives militias formation in Kenya an ethnic approach. For instance Mungiki was associated with the Gikuyu of central Kenya (Wamue, 2002), Sabaot land defense forces was linked to Mt. Elgon region (Oloo, 2010) while Taliban was associated with the Luo (Okoth and Olang, 2010).

Onyambu (2017), a retired general officer interviewed at Umoja noted that in as much as Jeshi in regions outside Nairobi had a high sense of ethnic consciousness demonstrated in their commitment to work without pay, the Nairobi lot was fairly amorphous, ethnically mixed and primarily driven by monetary gains. He noted that:

We all came from diverse communities as far as ethnicity was concerned. For as our major focus were not our ethnic groups but making money. We were almost 70 of us from different ethnic groups (Onyambu, O, I, 2017)

The remarks above are a demonstration that no single ethnic group in Kenya had a monopoly or exclusive membership in the movement, their common target is money. In view of these Ombendha (2013) notes that, a politician could for instance, readily mobilize 100 youths drawn from diverse ethnic groups within thirty minutes to instigate violence against an opponent provided the terms of engagement were acceptable.

From the findings it was noted that most members of Jeshi la Embakasi joined the group due to poverty, peer pressure, and overcrowding in the slums. Furthermore, other individuals were recruited to this militia since they did not have a stable source of income. As such, the young men and women carried out criminal activities in order to support their families through criminal activities such as looting, carjacking and armed robbery. A mother interviewed remarked that;

It is so sad that my son was killed even before he could help us rise from poverty I was only informed that he was a member of Jeshi la Embakasi and that he had been gunned down as he eloped with a car that he and his friends had hijacked. (Muthoni, O.I, 2017).

The above is a clear indication that the crimes these militias carried out were meant to help their families despite having other politically entrenched roles.

3.3 Emergence and Evolution of Jeshi la Embakasi; 1992-1993

Machuma,(O.I 2017) revealed that it is difficult to trace the exact date since most of this movement emerged among a multiplicity of factors. However from the discussion one specific aspect of Jeshi la Embakasi group emerged; the group was formed with the sole purpose of providing political protection to their founder. With regard to this, the group was termed as a private political movement whose major focus was on the political landscape and situation of the time.

In the eve of 1990s, the wave of democratization had hit the African continent (Young, 1999) and Kenya was not an exception. Mwaura, (O.I., 2017)) pointed out that in Kenya there was the need for political pluralism and the establishment of the multiparty state. He noted that those who had been politically intimidated joined hands in agitating for political space in Kenya. This agrees with Throup and Hornsby (1998) who noted that in the late 1980s and early 1990, anti

KANU politicians stood to agitate for the introduction of multiparty politics in the county. With the pressure from both internal and external forces to expand the political space in Kenya the KANU regime hired the Jeshi and the provincial administrators to do a dirty job.

Kivoi a man who has lived in Mukuru over 30 years noted that:

Instead of offering security to the citizens, the movement turned against the citizens and used violence to win the support of the masses (Kivoi, O.I, 2017),

Due to this, Jeshi element gained currency only with the introduction of multiparty politics leading to several incidents of ethnic and political violence with clear defined chains of demand and supply (Kivoi, O.I, 2017)

With heightened pressure from both outside and within, in 1992 section 2A of the Kenyan constitution was repealed and multiparty politics was introduced. It is against this background that Jeshi la Embakasi emerged (Waweru, O.I., 2017), Kivoi, (O.I, 2017) Mwaura, (O.I., 2017)

David Mwenje represented Embakasi constituency from 1988 to 1991 when he lost the seat at the advent of multi-partyism to Ford Asili's Henry Ruhiu. Mwenje later recaptured the seat in the 1997 on a DP ticket and successfully retained it in 2002 on Narc ticket. He briefly served as an assistant minister for cooperatives after the 2005 referendum. He was unsuccessful in retaining his seat in the controversial December 2007. (Kenyan Blogs, 2008)

From the findings it was revealed that basically, Jeshi la Embakasi literally refers to an army of Embakasi which operates in Nairobi. To this end, the group was a private army based in Embakasi that was formed with the sole purpose of political protection for their political god father. Wanyoike (O.I, 2017) also a key informant noted that at its formation the group members

were majorly men aged between 40 -50 years old. However he explained that in spite of their years, they were still regarded as youths.

3.4 Drivers of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement; 1992.

The emergence of vigilante groups is associated with several diverse factors that range from individual, social, economic and political aspects of an individual life or of the society and the rise of Jeshi la Embakasi is not an exception. Hadergon (2008) notes that in as much as individual factors can lead to the formation of militias and vigilantes in the society, the social condition such as unemployment and state security failure play a key role in propagating the germination of these individual factors to militia problems in the society.

For the case of the emergence of Jeshi la Embakasi respondents to this study offered two major factors;

Moi's government was characterized by dictatorship and repression. Waweru (O.I 2017) revealed that with the violence perpetuated by the KYW and other pro- KANU mercenaries, the Opposition had no option other than to come up with their private wings for their protection. With regard to this David Mwenje came up with Jeshi la Embakasi. This conquers with the Muthegi (2003) who notes that David Mwenje was the founder of Jeshi la Embakasi who used it in Nairobi to intimidate his actual and supposed political enemies. Kivoi (O.I 201)7, Wanga (O.I, 2017) and Wanyoike (O.I 2017) observed that David Mwenje was and is still remembered to be the most violent politician who held a parliamentary seat in Nairobi and more specifically in Embakasi constituency. Wanga (O.I, 2017) also indicated that as the years passed, Mwenje acquired a violent reputation and is known to use strong language and force to sort out his political differences.

According to Waweru (O.I., 2017) the vigilante emerged out of the desire by the politician in Embakasi to be god fathers. This agrees with Katumanga and Kagwanja (2012) who notes that in the early 1990s militiaster-ism had become a political expression of a regime cycle where politicians acted as God fathers to vigilantes who in turn gave them protection.

The second factor for the emergence of the Jeshi la Embakasi was the unemployment level among the youths. Heidhues, &Obare, (2011) who notes that with the structural adjustment programs (SAP), several sectors of the economy suffered. The authors specifically points out to the expenditure cuts, public support for infrastructure, education, social services, as well as for research and extension sectors. Moreover, it is noted that the urban ghettos and rural areas, with their high proportion of poor people who were intensively affected. In view of this, Okoth and Olang (2010) notes that Within Nairobi, the social effects of increased rural-urban migration began to emerge towards the end of 1980s. Unemployment problems led to the expansion of informal settlements to accommodate low-income population.

Muthoni (O.I 2017) revealed that with the economic and political exploitation from the government, the public had lost trust in the government. Anassi (2004) notes that during the Moi's regime, both economic exploitation and political corruption grew to taller heights to the extents that, the common citizens lost trust in his regime. Accordingly, there was a gap imbalance between the socially accepted levels of life and the means that were available to achieve them. With this regard, jobless and the unemployed fell pray of the power hungry politicians who had to use any means to attain their political power, status and protection.

Amondi (O.I 2017) observed that most of the people who were employed or recruited into Jeshi la Embakasi were jobless men who had no means of survival thus would do a dirty job in

exchange for money. In support of these view, Mutsostso and Kinyanjui (2002) contend that not only are the majority of the slum inhabitants unemployed, but the informal settlements provide an ideal retreat for criminals. With time, the slum dwellers have developed survival tactics, which include criminality in exchange of money to which Jeshi la Embakasi Members were not an exception in the 1990s.

Despite the fact that the two above factors were the major reasons for the emergence of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Nairobi, in a focus group discussion (FGD) in Mwiki participants noted the origin of the group was informed by a combination of several factors whose major motivator was the Jeshi culture that had penetrated the Kenyan politics in the early 1990s (FGD, 2017).

Having discussed the factors that informed the emergence of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement it will be significant to discuss its organization and composition at the time of its formation. With regard to this, we proceed to ask the question what was the composition and organization of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement at the time of its formation?

3.5 Activities of Jeshi la Embakasi

3.5.1 Political participation

As mentioned in the previous chapter the major reason for the formation of Jeshi la Embakasi was for political protection of its founder and a former member of parliament known as David Mwenje. Wanyoike (O.I., 2017) noted that through the group, Mwenje was able to intimidate his real and perceived political enemies. For instance in 2000, he used force to sort out his political differences with fellow Member of Parliament Otieno Kajwang. David Mwenje, Embakasi MP and Otieno Kajwang', Mbita MP exchanged blows at the members' lobbying in parliament. The day after, Mr Mwenje addressed journalists, took off his shirt and showed the shoulder Mr

Kajwang had bit him. In that particular day, about 100 followers from the Mukuru, Dandora and Soweto slums congregated on the surroundings of Parliament to hunt down Mr Kajwang (Martin, O.I 2017), Muiruri (2008). This agrees with Mathenge (2003) who contends that David Mwenje used Jeshi la Embakasi to deal with his perceived political enemies.

Mwangangi (O.I., 2017) noted that Jeshi la Embakasi were paid to disrupt political rallies. He said that there as a case when Ferdinard Waititu wanted to contest to be a member of parliament for Embakasi, and just when he was in “a meet the people tour” at Komarock, the youth were quickly mobilized hence interrupted the rallies which resulted to a crush of two rival groups. The young people were instructed not to allow anyone who is not their MP to hold rallies within Embakasi constituency by David Mwenje who was the then MP for Embakasi.

A key informant interview with a close affiliate of the group in Kayole revealed that members of Jeshi la Embakasi were hired by politicians during campaigns and some acted as body guards to the politicians (Mbogo O.I., 2017). The Kenya National Assembly Official record (2002) indicates that Jeshi la Embakasi was being sponsored by some politicians from opposition party whose name was David Mwenje. Echoing similar views, Murunga and Nasongo (2007) point out that multi-party politics in Kenya embroidered youth wings which reconstituted themselves into vigilante groups that had political patronage and support to unleash violence to the presupposed political rivals. The above authors indicate that the vigilante groups were associated with political figures with Jeshi la Embakasi being linked to David Mwenje. Most of these groups started as political support groups of politicians but later on turned out to be criminal militias. Wambilyanga (2009) point out that even as power was being transited from KANU to NARC in 2002 goons were hired by politicians to offer services to ‘waheshimiwa’ as the politicians did not want to damage the titles they held in the political realm.

Further, Mbogua(O.I., 2017) a former member of Jeshi la Embakasi indicated that Jeshi la Embakasi have often been used as disruptors of political rallies, burning homes of opponents, bombing through use of petrol bombs and killing of opponents. In return the militia members are paid in monetary ways or given basic necessities such as food, drugs, alcohol and cigarettes. This remark agrees with Gumbihand Ombati (2013) who point out that members of Jeshi la Embakasi at the eve and during the NARC regime were hired by politicians during campaign periods to act as bodyguards. It was also noted that some top senior militia members benefited by their house rent being paid by the politicians they worked for. Some were even promised employment by the politicians as long as they did the jobs given to them by the politicians (Moraa,O.I., 2017). This agrees with Okombo and Sana (2010) who contend that militia members in Nairobi are paid by politicians to disrupt political rallies and circulate leaflets threatening opponents. Additionally, the hired militia members could also kill opponents and apart from monetary values they could be paid by being given food, alcohol, cigarettes among other things. Therefore, as respondents pointed out, the members act as supporters, defenders and messengers of politicians who they referred to as their ‘elders’ (Muriithi,O.I., 2017).

Another respondent Michira (O.I. 2017) at Dandora noted that Jeshi la Embakasi could be hired by politicians for around two hundred and fifty Kenyan shillings especially in matters pertaining to land disputes in Nairobi. He further indicated that Jeshi la Embakasi was mainly involved in the invasion of acres of land that stretched between Umoja 2, Kayole and Komarock estate in Nairobi. Abrahamsen (2013) articulate that driven by the need to survive in Nairobi, youths engage in criminal militia activities.

The militias could be hired by politicians at a fee to attack political opponents. The authors adds that, some militias such as Jeshi la Embakasi were used to create chaos in land disputes in

Embakasi. Ainara (2012) further observe that members of Jeshi la Embakasi could be hired by politicians for about two hundred and fifty shillings for each youth with an aim of unleashing violence to opponents. Therefore, militias earn a living of controlling the masses, and the politicians get power and prestige in return.

During the electioneering period like in 2002, it was revealed that the group members from time of multi-party politics in Kenya were hired as security to secure buildings structures like party offices and homes from destruction in areas like Huruma, Dandora, and Kariobangi among other areas from vigilante groups that were financed by political opponents. My respondent noted that politicians in Nairobi hire young physically fit members who are daring and bold enough to inflict pain (Salim, O.I., 2017). For instance, business persons always hired their services to prevent burning and looting of their premises when violence associated with elections erupts (Mueni, O.I, 2017). Similar views are echoed by Muriuki (2002) who points out that individuals such as business people hire the services of militia members in order to be provided for security at a small fee of about two thousand Kenyan shillings.

A resident in Dandora noted that often in the crimes associated with politics, findings indicated that the police officers cover up for the crime through being given bribes by the members (Bosibori, O.I. 2017). Additionally, it was noted that some police officers end up killing the militia members in order to acquire their wealth such as money and in the end close the files of the suspects to avoid more follow up from their fellow officers (Kivoi, O.I., 2017). In an oral interview with a business man in Umoja it was revealed that the police force has become weak and characterized by impunity.

In addition to disrupting the meeting and political rallies of the opponents, an oral source that did not want to be disclosed revealed that Jeshi la Embakasi members played role in the mobilization of the masses to attend David Mwenje's political rallies. This agrees with IRIN (2010) which notes that in 2002, vigilantes including Jeshi la Embakasi were sued to mobilize people to attend political rallies of their godfathers.

In a nutshell, politically, Jeshi la Embakasi played a role in the disrupting the political rallies and meetings, unleashing violence to the opponents and mobilizing the people to attend rallies. In addition they acted as bodyguards to their political godfathers.

3.5.2 Jeshi la Embakasi in business; 2002-2005

Apart from politics, Jeshi la Embakasi in the period 1998-2005 changed and entered the world of business. Wanga, (O.I., 2017) narrated an ordeal where he was attacked by someone whom he identified but upon arrest the person was released the following day issuing threats against him. The man had no choice other than to hire the services of militia members in Jeshi la Embakasi to offer him protection. His lamentations agree with Achene (2015) who point out that militias have been pin pointed of cooperating with security agent officers in their criminal activities and acting as informers for the officers.

It was noted that politicians give funds and solicit support from militia members. She explained that business people give them material support, finances, bailing out arrested members as well, as providing the militia members with fire arms and provision of legal aid (Muthoni, O.I., 2017). Therefore, through these business people, the vigilante members are able to support and feed for their families through the earnings they get from their bosses. The above remarks agree with Okombo & Sana (2010) point out that often, hard economic situations such as lack of

employment lead youths to engage in criminal militia activities in order to earn a living. Echoing similar remarks, National Crime Research Centre (2012) articulate that, the militia members have benefited from crime with some owning public transport vehicles, car wash, rentals, with money from business men who want to suppress their rivals and some from stealing, extortion among other means.

Maina,(O.I, 2017) A member of Jeshi la Embakasi noted that the members are often driven by monetary gains and by extortion, stealing from the public, robbery, blackmailing, selling stolen goods so as to survive in slums such as Dandora. He remarked that;

Having been born and brought up in the slums, life is very difficult. It was not my wish to be a criminal but circumstances are forcing us. Some of us do not even know our parents so from an early age we learn to fend for ourselves in whichever means available (Maina, O.I, 2017).

Bosibori (O.I, 2017) indicated that mothers often chase away their teens from the houses arguing that they cannot live in the same house with grown up men who are able to fend for themselves. As a result, the young men move out of the houses and in return engage in militia crimes such as stealing in order to have a position in the society. The above finding concurs with Muriuki (2007) who asserts that some militia members engage in crime such as being hired to suppress business rivals so that they can be termed as conquerors among the peers and to prove to their parents that they can make it on their own.

From the above remarks, it is evident that hard economic times in the society drive young men and women to engage in crimes as militias in order to meet their daily needs.

3.5.3 Land Grabbing; 2004-2005

In Embakasi, land invasion is mainly experienced in private lands, electric power way leaves, road reserves and underdeveloped lands in areas like Njiru, Ruai, and Mihango. In a focus group discussion with members of public in Ruai respondents indicated that land grabbers in Embakasi mainly hired vigilante groups such as Jeshi la Embakasi to demolish property and displace people (Ruai residents, FGD, 2017). The same remarks were also echoed by Danson Muthegethi (a former member) of Jeshi la Embakasi in Umoja who notes that ruthless land grabbers usually hire militias in the area such as Jeshi la Embakasi to invade and sell private land with impunity and this practice is usually referred to in sheng as *mradi* (project) (Muthegethi O.I.2017).

The above revelation concurs with Mitaani (2010) idea who notes that militias in Nairobi such as Jeshi la Embakasi had been very active in land related conflict since the mid-1990s. Therefore; land grabbers have found it convenient to hire militias to demolish temporary structures and displace the occupants. Furthermore, the same militia groups were used to fence off and guard the grabbed land. Muriuki (2011) further points out that in situations where large population of people have suffered displacement, there were always temptations to organize a fight back operation between the residents and the militia groups leading to bloody confrontations.

Mwangangi (O.I., 2017) noted that;

Stone city was initially land that that was allocated by city council to the church for construction of a school, and youth started using it for drilling not knowing for it belongs to the church. He further noted that when Archbishop Ndinki MwanaWa Anzeki came to bless the field so that they could construct the school, they were chased away by the youth. Nzeki said that you cannot fight with God since field is for the church and you cannot fight the church. The group started dividing the land, no one could question even the allotment group could not question; but the church was

compensated a different piece of land at Komarock. The piece of land that they were given has disputes. The registered owner of the land was a former city planning director known as Kuria Gathoni. The land continues to be in disputes up to today. (Mwangangi O.I., 2017).

Mwangangi O.I., 2017) informed that Nasra was a group of people (wazee) who bought a shamba from Kiambu Dandora Housing Company 818 hectares. This group had not agreed on how to divide the land when Embakasi MP grabbed the land to his supporters. Mwangangi noted that the MP told his supporters to take the land and he also built his house there to show that he leads from the front. That is why they used to call him Baba because he gave them land. Whereas previously he used to get out lands from foreigners this time he made a mistake to grab from the Kiambu Dandora Company. He gave out land meant for construction of their own that;

Kiambu Dandora Housing Company employed their own security to protect the land. To prevent the people from construction, the government intervened and took government survey and because of that government security, they gave the government 15 hectares to build DC's office and hospital-it is where we hear today called Mama Lucy Kibaki Hospital (Mwangangi O.I., 2017)

It was revealed that the main reason for easy land grabbing by the vigilante members was because police officers were accused of colluding with members of Jeshi la Embakasi to displace people (Kivoi, O.I., 2017). These acts are often linked to actions whereby politicians fund such activities for their personal gains. This agrees with Muriuki (2011) who notes that police and politicians were accomplices in land invasions in East lands especially in areas like Njiru, Ruai, and Mihango.

3.5.4 Illegal handling of Drugs.

The study was also undertaken to establish whether the Jeshi La Embakasi was involved in illegal drug activities. Investigating the youth involvement in drug abuse is significant to the study as it has been indicated that drugs influences the young people recruitment into violent activities (The Standard 2016). In an oral interview with one of our informant, it was revealed that Jeshi la Embakasi were involved in trafficking drugs and more especially the light drugs like cannabis in Embakasi constituency (Muthegethi O.I.2017).The same remarks were echoed by a woman in Umoja in an oral interview who revealed that the drugs mainly trafficked are bhang and cocaine which are often abused by drug addicts in areas like Dandora and Mukuru Kwa Jenga. The members who are drug traffickers are able to feed their families from the proceeds they get (Anyango, O.I, 2017). This concurs with Schubert (2014) who points out that Jeshi la Embakasi were majorly involved in the drug trade. They were mainly hired to secure transportation of cannabis and cocaine and even provided security at the dens where the illicit goods were being consumed in Embakasi. The Schubert further points out more importantly that,Jeshi la Embakasi usually collaborates with the drug dealers and they were mainly isolated and limited to mainly light drugs. The reason for this is that consumption of light drugs like cannabis is more common in Embakasi constituency unlike the hard drugs (Schubert, 2014).

Njonjo (2011) points out that poverty and lack of opportunity have even led to outright competition among militias in Nairobi to work for drugs lords. However, when funding runs out, the militias turn into predatory militia which provide for itself through illegal activities in the area like robbery and extortion. This therefore shows that militias in Nairobi like Jeshi la Embakasi earn their living through drug trafficking (Ombati, 2013).

Kivoi, (O.I., 2017) pointed out that women and children were the major traffickers because they could not be easily suspected. This agrees with Mukinda, (2013) who points out that Jeshi la Embakasi use women and children in drug trafficking. This is because they are not the 'usual suspects' on the police watch. The author further points out those children convey drugs from one place to another for adult criminals especially in points where law enforcers are likely to detect the adults. Baraza (2017) points out that in the 21st century, criminal militias in Kenya have resulted into using children and women in drug trafficking since they are the least suspected making them evade arrest by the police or even suspicion from the general public.

Anyango (O.I, 2017) noted that women are used for spying and safe keeping of stolen loot, drug trafficking, as well as providing sexual services to the male members. She remarked that;

We disguise ourselves as prostitutes in different areas of Embakasi where we lure men whom we have been sent to spy on. This way we are able to get closer to the target and get information required (Anyango, O.I, 2017).

The above remarks agree with Haledon (2005) who notes that in militias, women are usually mainly used for drug trafficking, safe keeping of the stolen property and to provide sexual services to the male members of the militia group. The author further points out that a woman also act as prostitutes with an aim of getting closer to the target in order to spy on them. Ombati (2013) concurs with the above remarks pointing out that in the 21st century, militias are using women and children to commit crimes like for instance spying, drug trafficking and also providing sexual services to the other members of the militia group.

3.6 Leadership and hierarchy in Jeshi La Embakasi 1998-2005

The study was also undertaken to investigate leadership and hierarchy in Jeshi la Embakasi. It was noted that the group has distinct leadership right from the time it was formed. Jude (Kivoi, O.I., 2017) revealed that the movement has a political *godfather* at the top. This was the founder of the movement and was called David Mwenje. Muthegi (2003) affirms that David Mwenje was the founder of the Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Nairobi slums in the rallies of 1990s. The founder acted as the chief patron to the group and was the one who gave direction on what was supposed to be done and where. He remarked that;

Basically our political god father was the one who gave out the job. He was our employer and everything was done to please him. (Kivoi, O.I., 2017).

Below the godfather was an agent who linked the group to the founder, it was noted that the agent was basically responsible for the recruitment of new members to the group to do a diet job wherever there was need to (Mbogua O.I., 2017).He remarked that;

At the age of 21 years I was an agent to the group. My job was mainly mobilizing hundreds of youths into the group to disrupt the rallies and meetings of political opponents. Additionally I played a key role in, mobilizing the group to attend political rallies of the god father to demonstrate support and fame among the common man. (Mbogua O.I., 2017).

The remarks above agrees with Okoth and Olang (2010) who report that in militias the recruitment was done by an agent who would remit a down-payment to the group leaders before the assignment and pay the balance thereafter.

Within the group members leaders are selected to coordinate the response of these groups with regard to the tasks assigned by the patron or the political Godfather. According to Nyaanga (O.I

2017) Jeshi la Embakasi movement had a chairman who comes in position immediately after the agent. The work of the chair person is to control the activities of the group members and to report to the political godfather. The chairman was normally a very close person to the political godfather and was selected on trust and ability to coordinate activities. Moreover one had to demonstrate bravery and fearlessness to qualify as the chairman of the group.

Okoth (O.I., 2017) noted that none of the chairmen of the group has ever moved out of the Jeshi la Embakasi and survived. He further revealed that majority of them disappeared mysteriously only to be found dead after several days. Explaining the above, a senior detective officer who wanted to remain anonymous noted that it is hard for politicians who fund militias to leave the militia leaders roaming around freely after they cease to be members of the group. The fact that they have top dirty and illegal secrets of the godfather is enough for them to be assassinated by their once employers (Detective Officer, O.I, 2017. The ideas of the detective agree with Papa Christos (2005) who notes that “once one has joined a militia he can only leave it once dead.”

Below the chairman was the treasurer whose work was to keep the group money. This man was normally referred to be the *bank* because he is the one who kept the group money before being distributed among the militia (Kivoi O.I., 2017). Below him was a secretary who kept the record of all the members. In addition, the secretary ensured that all members were available during the meetings and took record of all the activities planned to be done by the group. He revealed that

It was just like any other Chama where the secretary has to take the minutes of the meetings, keep the record of membership and the events to be carried out (Kivoi O.I., 2017).

Other members formed the last portion of the Jeshi la Embakasi Movement. These were the majority and would be killed just in case they gave out the group secret. In a nutshell the

leadership structure of Jeshi la Embakasi was pyramidal in nature with power being concentrated at the top.

3.7 Conclusion

The chapter sought to trace the origin of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Nairobi County in the period 1992-2007. It was difficult to trace the exact date since most of the earlier connected movements emerged due to a multiplicity of factors, however, from the discussion one specific aspect of Jeshi la Embakasi group emerged; the group was formed with the sole purpose of providing political protection to their founder. With regard to this, the group was termed as a private political movement whose major focus was on the political landscape and situation of the time. The major activities of the group as at this time was basically political such as mobilizing crowds to attend the rallies of their godfathers, disrupting the political rallies and meetings of the opponents and vandalizing the homes and properties of the perceived political enemies.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 CHANGE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF JESHI LA EMBAKASI MOVEMENT; 2006-2010.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focused on the changes in the organization of Jeshi la Embakasi from 2006-2010. With the change in activities as discussed in the previous chapter, new trends in Jeshi La Embakasi emerged. The study therefore investigated; the changing tactics and techniques of Jeshi La Embakasi, Kidnapping, use of sophisticated weapons and involvement in post-election violence by Jeshi La Embakasi. The findings indicated that there is an increasingly entry of

women into the militia, use of teenage militias, use of motorcycles for criminal activities, elderly men luring victims among others as it will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

4.2 Changing tactics and techniques of Jeshi la Embakasi

4.2.1 Entry of women and children into Jeshi la Embakasi.

In an oral interview with a police officer in Mwiki who requested for anonymity, it was noted that there is an emerging trend of involvement of women and children as young as ten years in Jeshi la Embakasi. The women were not to be involved in carrying of weapons for their husbands in places like Dandora. On the other hand both children and women act as spies for the militias since they are not easily suspected. Children are being used for petty crimes such as stealing whereby they are forced to enter into premises where adults cannot easily access. Additionally, it was noted that females act as spies, ferry guns and even take part in the actual robberies (Police officer, O.I. 2017). This is a new trend since initially in the 1990s; involvement of women in militias such as Jeshi la Embakasi was minimal. Lahey et al (1999) contend that militias were patriarchal in nature with few women being in militia criminal activities.

In addition, it was revealed that there is a new trend of women using militias to silence their husbands. Njeri (O., 2017) an oral informant in Umoja established that women no longer have to deal with stress of their men having affairs. They instead hire militias who silence the parties involved through a thorough beating or even killing. Njeri remarked that;

Nowadays there is no need to worry about husbands who are giving you a hard time. You just have to part with a few thousands which you pay our young men in the slums and you have a peace of mind. Myself I once sent people to beat my husband so that he could stop seeing a

certain woman and threaten him that if he didn't stop he would face the bullet (Njeri, O.I. 2017)

The above remark is in tandem with Kimani (2017) postulation that there is a new trend of entry of women into crimes that has brought in the emergence of a tough, wise woman that is not easily cowed. It is noted that this new trend has made it difficult to combat crimes in cities like Nairobi. This is because women are not easily suspected and searching of their handbags is not allowed especially by male officers. People Daily (2017) reported that young girls are on the verge of joining militias in Nairobi County with the most dangerous criminal militias comprising of female members. Similar remarks are echoed by Ombati (2013) who contend that cases of women and children being recruited into militias are on the rise in Nairobi. The author observes that women and children act as distracters since they are not usually suspected so the police get confused in crime scenes. Further, children are used as spies, hide stolen loot, illegal gun traffickers, and prompting of victims so that they can act negatively and make adult male militia members to intervene and attack the victim.

4.2.2 Change of Guard; From Youth to Elders.

Primary data collected indicated that young men were used by politician at the advent of multiparty however, with time this changed. Okoth O.I. (2017) indicated that in the 1990s, militia members often comprised of men who were young and energetic. This is because by then multi-party politics were on the rise and the 'elders' sort the services of young men in order to win in political positions. However, (Okoth, O.I., 2017) pointed out that in the 21st century the situation is changing with old '*wazee*' being involved in the crimes directly or indirectly. He remarked that;

Nowadays there is a need to be more vigilant. The militias of today have really improved their tactics. They are using old men to disguise their activities and organize crimes. The old men mostly are used in the streets as beggars or lost individuals who in turn lead you to your prey (Okoth, O.I., 2017).

The above remarks agree with those of Sudi (2016) who articulates that in the 21st century militias are changing tactics from using the traditional ruffian youth to use of neatly dressed old men who lure victims to be attacked by the youth.

4.2.3 Use of Teenage Criminals

In order to examine the changing trend of the Jeshi la Embakasi the teenagers were also scrutinized. A Nation Reporter, (2017) points out that in the 21st century, Nairobi criminal militias were mainly using teens to conduct their activities like carjacking, muggings and shoplifting. Nyaanga (O.I., 2017) pointed out that;

In this century, Jeshi la Embakasi old school militias survived on extortion and creation of sense of insecurity in this constituency, however, this is not the case with the new militias which are mainly teenagers in high schools and primary schools, their crime are a way of showing bravado, buy flashy clothes, jewelry, get money for alcohol, partying and sex. Furthermore, they are impatient, in a rush to make money but they are equally vicious like the old militias (Nyaanga, O.I., 2017).

The above remarks show that the teenage militia stars in the Jeshi la Embakasi can be described as a reincarnated breed of amateur criminals thirsting for quick riches and good life no matter the price. Therefore, this change to the use of teenage criminals for the Jeshi la Embakasi has led to the killing of many teenagers in Embakasi constituency. This agrees with Ndung'u

(2017) assertion that teenagers were indoctrinated into the Jeshi la Embakasi militia groups while still in primary or even secondary schools because at that age the children are usually considered underage and not liable for prosecution. Furthermore, the author notes that the use of teens in crime was so that the militia group would be seen as a youth group because this legitimizes them and allows militia space to operate within the law.

In addition, Odhiambo et al (2013) notes that these teen militias operate in groups with each group having distinctive identity while going about their business of robbing and harming within specified territories. The author further notes that, these teen militias sometimes take time off to mingle and make acquaintance with each other during parties where they project deceptive images of children from well to-do families.

4.2.4 Boda boda escapees

Examining the changing trends of criminal activities among the Jeshi la Embakasi cannot be complete without evaluating their modes of transport. In the recent past, Embakasi constituency has had widespread reports of criminal activities involving the use of motorbikes unlike in the 1990s where criminal militias used to running as the only getaway solution after committing a crime. Both primary and secondary data indicated that due to technology, the *Boda boda* operations have increased in the area as another mode of transport in addition to the already existing 'matatus'. These *Boda bodas* have also acquired another use other than being mere means of transport from one point to another as they have been negatively used in perpetrating crime through provisions of faster and economical services when conducting criminal activities. (Wanga, O.I, 2017). This pairs up with Odhiambo et al (2013) who points out that militias in Embakasi were now using motorbikes as their getaway vehicles or attacking honest boda boda operators and robbing them their motorbikes.

A police officer in Umoja who requested for anonymity argued that motorbike operations in the area have really benefitted the residents but equally escalated crime where the criminals are able to escape after their illegal activities through the narrow pathways in the slums. This makes it difficult for the police officers to chase the criminals who don't have the motorbikes to maneuver the narrow paths (Police officer, O.I 2017). It was said that some of the Bodaboda operators in the area are also members of the Jeshi la Embakasi (Wanga, KII, 2017). They stage as opportunistic thugs who target appealing targets and even steal from the passengers. This concurs with Aronson (2010) who notes that the lack of regulation of the Boda boda industry, use of motorbikes to aid in escape for the militia groups during their illegal activities, given their speed and maneuverability through jam packed streets and narrow pathways in slums have made crime a particular difficult trend to control by the police officers. The author further notes that some of the Boda boda riders are opportunistic militias who target appealing targets as they watch out for individuals carrying expensive commodities such as laptop bags and jewelry so that they can steal from them.

4.3 Increased use of weapons in Nairobi 2005-2007

In order to understand the reasons behind the increased usage of weapons under the study period, one has to ask the following questions. What were the reasons behind the increased usage of weapons 2005-2007? What types of weapons were used during this period 2005-2007?

To answer the first question on what were the reasons behind the increased usage of weapons 2005-2007, the researcher investigated two events namely the collapse of NARC and the 2005

referendum. (Katumanga and Ngunyi, 2014) affirm that in the period 2005- 2007, the NARC coalition collapsed and was there after followed by the rejuvenation of ethnicity in Kenyan politics. This explains why there was need for weapons and militias as ethnic groups became suspicious of each other. Kivoi (O.I., 2017) noted that the climate led to political polity and the militia formation to protect the ethnic groups and political figures also increased since the climate of violence had been created in the nation. Additionally, the already existing militia movements including Jeshi la Embakasi revived their operation into criminality.

In the 2005 referendum, the results were more of an ethnic census and that they played a key role in accelerating the rise security movements for defense. In view of this Andersen and Tosteen (2006) note that the 2005 referendum confirmed that Kenyan politics was characterized by ethno political cleavages and political loyalism based on ethnicity and military. Accordingly, 2005-2007 was characterized by militia formation ready for defense. This agrees with Katumanga and Ngunyi (2014) who note that the period 2005-2007 was the period marked with the most militia activities in the history of Kenya only compared to the 1992-1997.

It is against this backdrop that the Jeshi la Embakasi Movement ventured to the selling of illegal arms in Kenya (Onyambu,O.I, 2017). He noted that the business was booming in that several groups needed arms in preparation for defense in case of any eventuality as it turned out to be in the 2007 post-election violence. Supporting these views another member noted that;

For us it was about money. We would even attack police officers. *Kwanza hao ndio tulikuwa tunataka sana kwa sababu wako Na bidhaa za kuuzwa yaani Bunduki* (by the way they were our target since they had goods for sale- arms)” (Muhoho, O.I., 2017).

The remarks above indicate that for Jeshi la Embakasi in the period 2005-2007, the business was flourishing as far as the selling of illegal arms was concerned.

The second question was on what types of weapons were used during this period 2005-2007? Primary data indicate that Jeshi la Embakasi in 1990s used simple weapons. These weapons included knives and machetes that were used to instill fear among the populace (Muhoho, O.I., 2017). This agrees with IRIN (2008) which indicates that in 2008, firearms were much less available in Kenya than in neighboring countries. As such, militias in Kenya used weapons such as machetes, poison arrows, clubs and spears. Another respondent who was a former member of Jeshi la Embakasi noted that weapons used in the 1990s depended on the seriousness of the situation being tackled by the group. For instance, when the militias were hired to kill a person or even burn houses they mainly used petrol bombs and *pangas* to complete the task. However, this changed since the militia groups were now using sophisticated weapons such as the AK 47 guns during their operations. The participant further pointed out that the militia during the day avoids carrying weapons which can be easily seen and identified for security reasons but during the night, anything goes (Getai, O.I, 2017). This agrees with Okwembah and Wabala (2009) who points out that, due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Kenya, illegal guns were now easily available across the country especially in the urban areas. The author further points out that even the prices for hiring these guns per hour was very cheap. For instance, to hire a gun like the AK 47 in Nairobi during this period was from 3,000 Kenya shillings up to 15, 000 shillings per hour. Whereas the price of each bullet went for about 500 shillings. Getai pointed out that:

In Embakasi constituency, it is very easy to hire a gun especially in Dandora where they are easily accessible. Furthermore, the guns

one buys are light and easy to carry the Wesson pistol. (Getai, O.I, 2017).

This agrees with a Nation reporter, (2017) who notes that in Embakasi constituency, the Jeshi la Embakasi mainly use guns such as the Ceska pistol, Smith and Wesson pistol and the AK 47 rifle which are very easy to obtain in Dandora and also very easy to carry. The author further notes that the G3 rifle is not popular among the militias because of its size but it was sometimes hired during major missions like killing people, guns exchange with the police or even bank robberies. Getai further remarked that;

Nowadays knives and machetes have been done away with. This digital generation possesses the knowledge of holding guns as young as at the age of ten years. However there are still a few who use knives in the slums whereby if you resist you are pierced severally in the stomach (Getai, O.I. 2017).

The above remark indicate that with technology advancement militias such as Jeshi la Embakasi are becoming more organized and even moving a notch higher to purchase sophisticated weapons. This agree with Kenya National Human Rights Commission (2014) which reveals that due to rising insecurity there exists proliferation of small arms and light weapons that have in turn led to emergence of militias and militias. People Daily (2017) observe that cases of women being involved in armed robbery in areas such Eastlands and Embakasi are on the rise with women being used to ferry weapons and some having great mastery in the use of fire arms. The paper indicated that young girls as young as sixteen years have been reported of exchanging bullets with police officer.

4.4 Jeshi la Embakasi in the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence in Nairobi slums

The study also interrogated whether Jeshi la Embakasi was involved the 2007 post-election violence elections in Kenya in which presidential results were disputed. Njehia an ex-member of Jeshi La Embakasi noted that they were among the groups who were attacking people in the various parts of the slums of Nairobi to be more specific in Kayole and Dandora. We attacked ethnic communities that were against the then President Mwai Kibaki (Njehia 2017). This corresponds with Waki (2008) and the KHRC (2010) who note that militias who unleashed violence to the pre-supposed enemies characterized the post-election violence. In addition, Okombo (2010) asserts that 2007/2008 war in Kenya was characterized by expulsions, massacres and outright militia warfare. Jeshi La Embakasi in this case not only participated in the violence but also sold the weapons that were used in the violence.

4.5 Kidnapping

Primary data indicated that when the members of Jeshi La Embakasi were not in the political duties as they depended on Mwenje for their daily bread, they turned to criminal activities. The primary data signaled that Jeshi la Embakasi is transforming from a political tool of propaganda that instills fear among victims and cause political mayhem to a militia that is involved in kidnapping individuals with an aim of extorting money from the family of the abductees (Police officer, O.I.2017). This accedes with Ombati's (2013) assertion that majority of militias in Nairobi are involved in drug trafficking, armed robbery, kidnapping for ransom among other crimes. Wanga, (KII, 2017) observed that in Kayole, cases of kidnapping have been on the rise with slum dwellers targeting rich families to extort money from them Nyaanga (O.I., 2017) noted that with increasingly difficult life in areas like Kayole the daring residents have to get money by all means. The man remarked that;

All that matters for us here as slum dwellers that are poverty stricken is getting money without choosing on the ways to get it. We don't fear prison life as life here is already difficult thus we have to do whatever it takes for us to survive. (Nyaanga, O.I. 2017).

Echoing similar remarks, Ombati (2013) assert that cases of kidnapping have escalated with statistics indicating that in Nairobi there are up to fourteen organized criminal militias involved in kidnappings. Among these militias is Jeshi la Embakasi that gets funds from extorting the public.

4.6 Conclusion

In the above chapter we looked at the emerging trends in Jeshi la Embakasi. It was revealed that there were increasingly new trends of entry of women into criminal militia activities such as ferrying weapons for male militia members in places like Dandora, acting as spies, taking part in the actual robbery, taking food to their husbands when they are on militia missions as well as posing as prostitutes in order to lure male targets. This indicates that the nature of militias is changing from a patriarchal setting of the militia to more inclusive one whereby women are key elements in the militia activities.

In addition to the above proposition, it was noted that there was a changing trend in as far as the weapons used are concerned. It was revealed that in the 1990s the militia members used weapons such as knives and machetes that would instill fear among the populace. Later, the militia members have moved a notch higher where they use sophisticated weapons such as AK47 guns and Wesson pistol due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nairobi County which are easily accessed and easily transported by women and children. The weapons are also

relatively cheap where some are even hired for about three thousand Kenyan shillings per hour and buying for about three thousand.

Furthermore, it was established that Jeshi la Embakasi is moving from being a primarily a political goon to committing other crimes such as kidnapping for ransom, robbery with violence, drug trafficking among other crimes. Also, it was noted that there has been an increasing use of teenage criminals who are indoctrinated while still as young as ten years and on the other hand elderly men who are neatly dressed are being used to lure victims and to teach the young generation of fighting techniques. It was also noted that there is widespread criminal activities by militias that involve the use of motorbikes unlike in the 1990s where they would attack and run on foot or use of cars for the lucky ones. Motorbikes were noted to be used because of speed, being able to maneuver jam parked streets and narrow pathways in the slums. This has made it difficult to follow up such crimes. It was revealed that some of the militias disguise themselves as Boda boda riders to target appealing targets as they watch out for individuals carrying commodities such as laptops.

In conclusion therefore, the above emerging trends have made it difficult for police officer to combat crimes in areas such as Dandora. This is because women are not often frisked by police officers, children are not easily suspected and the use of Boda bodas which enable the criminals to escape very fast before even the police arrives. Additionally, with the emerging trends of criminal activities such as kidnapping, some police officers are easily bribed making it extremely difficult for the security agencies to combat criminal militia crimes.

The period 2005-2007 after the referendum marked a shift in the activities of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement. With the emergence and re-emergence of the new and old militias in Kenya (due to

the political climate of the time), Jeshi la Embakasi embarked in selling arms and weapons. With regard to this, they began targeting security officers in order to have as many weapons as possible, both for sale and protection. Moreover in 2007/2008 post-election violence the movement along other groups participated in the unleashing of violence in the Nairobi slums.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

In the foregone chapter we have discussed the origin and evolution of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Nairobi County, Kenya in the period 1992-2010. This chapter discusses the summary, conclusions and the recommendations based on the research findings.

5.2 Summary and Conclusions

The primary aim of this study was to examine the origin and evolution of Jeshi la Embakasi movement in the period 1992-2010 in Nairobi County, Kenya. Nairobi County was very essential to this study since the county has recorded the highest number of militias especially in its slum areas such as Dandora Mwiki, Mukuru among others. In addition, it also sought to establish whether Jeshi la Embakasi Movement that is under this study is existing in Nairobi County and as well as affirming whether its activities are greatly felt.

In the first chapter, the background upon which this study was contextualised was discussed and it was noted that despite the fact that several studies have been globally carried out concerning militia movements, very little scholarly knowledge exists as far as Jeshi la Embakasi Movement is concerned. The study objectives, questions and premises were clearly outlined in the same chapter. Moreover, the justification and significance of the study coupled with the scope and the limitation of the study were outlined. In the limitations the researcher gave out the challenges that she encountered in the field. These included the sensitivity of the study that made the

respondents shy away from giving information. More so, there was a difficulty in tracing the insiders who had first-hand information as far as the study was concerned.

A review of the already existing scholarly works security movements was given in the same chapter. The review identified several gaps that this study sought to fill. In addition, the theoretical framework that guided this study was given in the same chapter. Moreover, the research methodology provided an explanation to every aspect of the methodology offered.

The last part of the chapter offered the demographic characteristics of the respondents' rights forms, their gender, ethnicity, age and occupation. This helped the researcher in collecting more in-depth data as far as Jeshi la Embakasi is concerned.

In chapter two the term vigilante was conceptualized. The back ground history of vigilante groups in Kenya was examined and a few vigilante groups in Kenya were interrogated. The theory of Rational Choice was used to explain the work. The theory was emphatic those who joined the vigilante groups did so because of the accrued benefits. The chapter noted that vigilante groups are formed due to the failure of state in providing sufficient security to its people as well as by groups who have self-interest.

In chapter Three the study examined the origin and activities of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in Nairobi County. It was noted that the history of militias in Kenya can be traced back to the 1960s with the formation of the KYW. Moreover, it was revealed that the political oppression of the opposition and the democratization wave for multiparty politics in the 1990s offered a breeding ground for the Jeshi culture, the background against which the Jeshi la Embakasi Movement emerged.

It was noted that Jeshi la Embakasi was founded by David Mwenje, a once MP of Embakasi with the sole aim of protecting himself against political opponents and at the same time oppressing his political rivals. Poverty and unemployment among the youths in Nairobi slums also motivated the emergence of the group. At the time of its formation the group was typically men dominated and was multi-ethnic in nature. Their major activities rotated around politics of the day.

Chapter four of this study examined the changing trends in the organization of Jeshi la Embakasi Movement in the period 2005-2010. It was evident that in the period 2005-2007, the group embarked on the selling of illegal rams in Nairobi and its surrounding as political tension grew in the country following the 2005 referendum outcomes.

The findings also indicated that in this period the Movement expanded its activities into not only attacking but also kidnapping for ransom. The findings moreover, reveal that the organization of the group changed and became gendered. There was entry of youthful women and girls into the group with many of the being street girls and social misfits in the society aged 15 years and above. Moreover, children entered the group and would be used to open the doors and blackmail the targeted individuals for robbery. The findings revealed that at this time the police also entered the group and used it for robbery. In a way, the movement became a curtain for the police officers who wanted to steal from the common man and go unknown. Furthermore, the group came up with anew mechanism of running away whenever they were under attack or tracking using motorbikes.

With the death of their patron the movement became a criminal that would be hired by the highest bidder in any sector of life. Including women who wanted their male partners be silenced or be taught a life lesson.

In this chapter the third premise that Jeshi la Embakasi evolved into a criminal militia for hire by the highest bidder was proved as true. However, in 2010, the group was banned alongside 33 others with the enactment of the prevention of organised crime act. However this did not put the group to an end as it resurfaced and its activities are still felt in Embakasi region. The major reasons for such survival of the group despite the ban included use of technology to recruit their members, the entry of teenagers and women into the group and the collaboration with some corrupt or retired or fired police officers to rob the innocent people.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the above findings the study came up with the following policy recommendations;

Based on the findings that vigilante groups are formed due to the failure of state in providing sufficient security to its people as well as by groups who have self-interest, the study recommends that the government could enact laws on increase of the security force in the country to provide for security ratio which is equivalent to citizen population ratio.

Based on the findings that Jeshi la Embakasi was founded by David Mwenje, a former MP of Embakasi with the sole aim of protecting himself against political opponents and at the same time to oppress his political rivals, the study recommends for adoption of a policy framework where all political leaders both in government and opposition are provided with state security.

Based on the findings that with the death of their patron the movement became a criminal gang that would be hired by the highest bidder in any sector of life including women who wanted their male partners abated or be taught life lessons, the study recommends a policy framework for integrating those who have been involved in criminal activities into the society.

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These are transcriptions made by the researcher in the study site in December 2015 and January 2016. The materials focus discussion groups and individual narratives. They are organized according to the individuals providing the information.

A) Focus Group Discussions

PARTICIPANT	PLACE	DATE
Business men (15)	Mwiki	17/7/2017
Members of public (45)	Ruai	22/6/2017

B) Oral interviews

S/No	Participant	Occupation	Place	Age	Date
1.	Machuma, H.	Former politician	Mukuru	52	12/06/2017
2.	Onyambu, M	Resident	Umoja	32	16/06/2017
3.	Muthegethi, D.	Businessman	Mukuru	38	10/06/2017

4.	Salim, A.	Rresident	Mwiki	43	09/06/2017
5.	Moraa, E.	Rresident	Komarock	38	08/06/2017
6.	Mwaura, P.	Politician	Kayole	45	2/06/2017
7.	Mbogua, G	Business man	Dandora	65	22/06/2017
8.	Waweuru, D.	Business man	Nairobi	55	20/06/2017
9.	Bosibori, G.	Former politician	Umoja	56	13/06/2017
10.	Kivoi, D.	Business man	Mukuru	40	12/06/2017
11.	Michira, G.	Nurse	Umoja	45	10/06/2017
12.	Muthoni, J.	shopekeeper	Mukuru kwa Njenga	32	10/06/2017
13.	Amondi, L.	Business man	Dandora	43	12/06/2017
14.	Anyango, J.	Vegetable seller	Kariobangi south	30	05/06/2017
15.	Nyaanga, S.	Business man	Mukuru kwa Njenga	35	5/06/2017
16.	Okoth, G.	Vegetable	Embakasi	27	9/06/2017

		seller			
17.	Njeri , M.	Teacher	Umoja	56	12/06/2017
18.	Getai, A.	Militia member	Komarock	23	10/06/2017
19.	Muhoho, M.	Militia member	Kayole	20	08/06/2017
20.	Police Officer	Police	Umoja	35	18/06/2017
21.	Detective officer	Detective officer	Dandora	40	16/06/2017
22.	Maina	Resident	Umoja	36	16/06/2017
23.	Onyango	Resident	Dandora	48	16/06/2017
24.	Wanyoike J.	Resident	Dandora	64	9/06/2017
25.	Wanga M.	Resident	Savvana	50	9/06/2017
26.	Mbogo, G.	Resident	Ruai	42	9/06/2017
27.	Mwangangi S.	Resident	Kayole	60	9/06/2017

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
APPENDICES**A1: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE EX MEMBERS AND MEMBERS OF JESHI LA
EMBAKASI**

1. What factors do you think triggered the rise of *the group*?
2. What age is preferred for recruitment and why?
3. How is the movements organized? Does it have a set structure? How do you raise your finances?
4. Are their specific training grounds for *the group*? If yes, give details please.
5. What was your experience in the movements?
6. Do women participate in the movements? Give details please.
7. Do you have their specific set of rules and rituals?
8. What is your area of operation?
9. Do you have any political connection?
10. Which kind of weapons do you use and how do you get them
11. Are there changes that the movement has undergone? Give details please
12. What is your opinion concerning the outlawing of *Jeshi la Embakasi* by the government?

A2: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE COUNTY ADMINISTRATORS AND SECURITY OFFICERS

1. What is your perception concerning *Jeshi la Embakasi*?
2. What factors do you think informed the emergency of *Jeshi la Embakasi*?
3. What can you comment about their training grounds or recruitment?
4. What can you comment about *Jeshi la Embakasi* and political violence?
5. What can you comment about the weapons used by the group members?
6. If the group is still operational, what factors do you think informs such tenacity?
7. Where do you see political violence in Kenya in the future in terms of such movements?

A3: MAP OF EMBAKASI NORTH CONSTITUENCY: STUDY AREA.



A4. RESEARCH PERMIT



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

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NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref No. **NACOSTI/P/17/24567/17652**

Date: **29th June, 2017**

Jacinta Mumo Nganu
Kenyatta University
P.O. Box 43844-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“Evolution and growth of Jeshi la Embakasi movement in Kenya 1992 to 2010,”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for the period ending **19th June, 2018.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.

GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Nairobi County.

The County Director of Education
Nairobi County.


**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MS. JACINTA MUMO NGANU
of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 0-519
NAIROBI, has been permitted to conduct
research in Nairobi County**


**Permit No : NACOSTI/P/17/24567/17652
Date Of Issue : 29th June, 2017
Fee Recieved : ksh1000**

**on the topic: EVOLUTION AND GROWTH
OF JESHI LA EMBAKASI MOVEMENT IN
KENYA 1992 TO 2010**

**for the period ending:
19th June, 2018**




.....
**Applicant's
Signature**


.....
**PD Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation**