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SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, ARCHEOLOGY & POLITICAL STUDIES

THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN ELECTORAL VIOLENCE; A CASE OF 2007/08 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN NAKURU MUNICIPALITY OF NAKURU COUNTY - KENYA

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DECLARATION

“This Thesis is my original work and it has not been presented for a degree in any other university.”

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to Carol whose adamant confidence has been my fountain of inspiration and to my twins Cyril and Lavender whose charm is ineffable. It is the support, patience and prayers of my family that gave me the strength and power to move forward in my pursuit for knowledge.
Thanks are due to Dr Susan Mwangi and Dr Kakai who worked tirelessly to make this study possible. Many thanks are also due to all people who gave whatever form of assistance during this study. Of particular attention are my research assistants Rhodah Nyasani and Justus Kimeli for their profound assistance.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CIPEV. Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence.

CRA. Commission for Revenue Allocation.

DO. District Officer.

ECK. Electoral Commission of Kenya

ID. Identification Card.

IFES. International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

KAG. Kenya Assemblies of God.

NARC. National Rainbow Coalition

NCIC. National Cohesion and Integration Commission

ODM. Orange Democratic Movement

PC. Provincial Commissioner

USA. United States of America

GEMA. Gikuyu Embu Meru Association

KAMATUSA. Kalenjin Maasai Tugen Samburu

NLP. National Land policy

NGO. Non Governmental Organization
ABSTRACT


Ethnicity in electoral violence has been witnessed in many parts of the world from Europe to Asia and the rest of the African region. Ethnic wars are therefore a social problem that affects most societies of the world. In Kenya ethnic violence has been a recurrent feature in general elections and particularly with the re-introduction of multi party democracy in 1991. The same violence was witnessed in 1997 and 2002. This research examined this violence from the perspective of ethnicity with special reference to Nakuru municipality in Nukuru County. The research also interrogated the factors that led to ethnic violence in Kenya since 1991 and assessed the impacts of ethnicity on ethnic relations in Nakuru municipality. To achieve this, the researcher employed a descriptive survey design. The research used cluster, purposive and simple random sampling method to select 400 respondents. The sample size was attained by selecting 40 respondents from each of the ten major estates (clusters) in Nakuru municipality. This work of research was guided by the Relative Deprivation Theory postulated by Robert Merton. This theoretical framework provides a view of social change and movement according to which people take actions for social change to acquire something they believe they should have access to. This push for social change manifests itself in form of ethnic violence during electoral processes. Questionnaires and interview schedules were used to collect data. Data collection instruments were piloted to test their reliability. Once data was collected descriptive statistics such as percentages were used to analyze the data. Qualitative data mainly from interviews was subjected to content validity during analysis. Presentation of data is in the form of tables, graphs and pie charts.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

General Election - Refers to the presidential and parliamentary and civic elections conducted in this country after every five years.

Electoral Violence – Refers to random or organized acts to undermine, delay or otherwise influence an electoral process through threats, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, destruction of property or assassination.

Ethnicity- Association based on common racial and cultural traits.

Community - A group of people in society who share a language, and cultural practices

Ethnic Group - A collection of people bound by language, cultural practices, norms and beliefs.

Relative Subordination- The feeling of the deprived ethnic group when it compares itself with the non-deprived ethnic group.

Relative Superiority- The feeling of the non-deprived group when it compares itself with the deprived group in society.

Ethnic Identity- Believe in and propagation of ethnic traits for individual and group gain.

Province. The old administrative unit that comprised of a number of districts and run by a provincial commissioner who reported directly to the head of state.

Majimbo. A federal system of government based on regions complete with a government to oversee devolved services.

Poverty. A state of being unable to raise reasonable earning to meet basic needs for oneself and family.

Class. Social strata in society
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Ethnicity has received a lot of attention globally from many scholars. Ethnic wars all over the world have led to deaths, destruction of property and massive displacement of people from their homes to as far as seeking residence in other countries as refugees. However, it is in Africa that ethnic wars have had the greatest impact in terms of loss of lives, property and displacements of people. Okwudiba (1998) observed that ethnic wars in Africa are more severe than other parts of the world. This is attributed to the fact that colonial incursions exploited and compounded inter-ethnic relations through segmentation of ethnic groups to their advantage.

The brutal ethnic killings in Rwanda stand out on the African continent as the epitome of ethnic animosity and the genocide is an example of how ethnic wars can threaten human lives and coexistence in society. The ethnic conflict in Rwanda was perpetuated by the two major communities which are the Hutus and Tustis. Howard and Astri (1999), trace the divide between Hutus and Tutsis to the Belgian colonizers. The Belgians introduced separate identification (ID) cards for the ethnic groups. When Belgian rule ended, most of the power and land were in the hands of the Tutsi while the Hutu were regarded as forced labourers called the ‘akasi’. The period of colonialism created an imbalance between the two ethnic identities that came to hate each other over time through systematized inequality and a struggle for power. The ethnic hatred exploded into the Rwandan genocide in which over one million citizens are estimated to have lost their lives (Howard & Astri, 1999). Ethnic violence has been reported in other countries like Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa.
According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (ERCHO, 2005), fighting has always erupted between the Somali and Oromo ethnic groups competing for political positions in West Harerge. Another country on this continent that has experienced ethnic animosity is South Africa.

Bardhan (1997) posits that Apartheid South Africa was a worse form of ethnic hatred experienced on the African continent. The implementation of the policy of apartheid, later referred to as "separate development" placed all South Africans into three categories: Bantu (Black African), white, and/or Coloured (of mixed race). A fourth category, Asian (Indians and Pakistanis), was added later. Apartheid assigned races to different residential and business sections in urban areas, and restricted nonwhite residence to specific areas. Apartheid laws further restricted the already limited right of Black Africans to own land, entrenching the white minority's control of over 80 percent of South African land (Tylor, 2004). This was the breeding ground for ethnic wars that played out during the struggle for independence (ibid).

Kenya, with more than forty ethnic groups has not been an exception to such ethnic hostilities. Minor cases of ethnic disputes existed in Kenya during the pre-colonial period. However, ethnicity became entrenched following the colonial policy of divide and rule which led to some communities waging war against other communities they considered outsiders in specific areas. Bruce (1998), argues that ethnic conflicts in Kenya became a major problem with the advent of multi-party politics in 1991. An important aspect of most ethnic related conflicts in Kenya is that they mainly emerge during, before or after electioneering periods. The 1991-92, 97-98, 2007-08 election violence were no exceptions.

The electoral process of 1992-93 and that of 1997-98 were marred with ethnic violence. This violence was instigated by political actors and politically connected gangs. This was meant to
alter the presumed voting patterns and flush out those presumed to be harbouring opposition votes. Most of this violence occurred during the pre-election period and it was highly concentrated in parts of Rift valley (Kagwanja, 2003). On the other hand the violence also revolved around the issue of land in Rift Valley where immigrant settlers are viewed as outsiders and therefore unwanted in the region. The impact of this electoral violence ranged from physical personal injuries, forcible displacement of people, destruction of property, loss of jobs, deaths and entrenching roots of ethnicity. However, a major incidence of ethnic-related violence was to occur in 2007 - 2008 after the general elections. Its causes, magnitude and impacts have been discussed in various books, journals and news papers. Before delving deep into the violence, let us first interrogate the roots of ethnicity in Kenya.

As earlier observed, the roots of ethnicity in Kenya were deeply planted by the colonial government which propagated ethnic animosity in its policy of divide and rule. The Kikuyu ethnic group that was fighting for land and freedom was segregated from the rest of Kenyans and placed in detention camps. According to Bruce (1998), the strategic logic of political control in the colonial state rested on a particular application of divide and rule- which was a practice of fragmenting and isolating African political activity in administrative units thereby inhibiting the spread of opposition. This arrangement was ethnically defined within the tribal context. The structures and practices of the colonial state and its classification of people encouraged Africans to think ethnically. The roots of ethnicity were therefore planted during the colonial period and continued after independence (ibid).

Ethnic hostilities flared up a few years after the assassination of Tom Mboya which was related to the struggle for political control of Kenya between Oginga Odinga and the first president Mzee Jomo Kenyatta (Throup, 1998). The same struggle for ethnic supremacy also thrived during the Nyayo era with Kalenjins striving to consolidate their hold onto power.
The re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1991 raised the levels of ethnic animosity to dangerous heights. Ethnic violence was reported in 1992, 19997, 2002 and the election of 2007.

Kagwanja, (ibid), posits that the government described the violence in most cases as ethnically motivated clashes that erupted spontaneously as a result of multi-party politics. The 2002 general elections were declared free, fair and the most peaceful elections that Kenya has had in recent years (Kagwanja, 2003). The reduction in ethnically motivated violence in 2002 was attributed to the fact that the two major presidential candidates emanated from the same ethnic community unlike the previous multi-party elections where aspirants came from different ethnic communities, thus fanning ethnic struggles that led to ethnic violence (Kagwanja, 2003). Resource allocation from the colonial period has also contributed to ethnic struggles in this country.

According to Lofchie (1994), resource allocation in post-independence Kenya has been designed to favour specific ethnic groups that are allied to the successive incumbent chief executive. Lofchie has, for example, given an account of how ethnic considerations influenced the award of rights to use foreign exchange quotas during the era of foreign exchange controls under Kenyatta and Moi regimes. Indeed, as a result of their influence within the Kenyatta government, the members of the Kikuyu community grew so much in economic strength relative to other ethnic and regional groups, leading to ethnic polarization under the Kenyatta regime (ibid). Their economic power base was coffee and tea, both of which were promoted by the Kenyatta government as a matter of national priority with total disregard to other economic activities by other ethnic groups in the country. When Kenyatta passed on in 1978, the political power balance shifted radically (ibid).
With the shift from Kenyatta to Moi regime in 1978, the power balance base of the government shifted to Kalenjin ethnic group. Former president Moi diverted the state resources meant for tea and coffee improvement into wheat production. This move by Moi was widely criticized because Kenya seemed to be a very inefficient producer of wheat and the country was losing foreign exchange earned by Coffee and Tea besides destroying the economic activity of the ethnic communities in central Kenya (Lofchie, 1994). This created resentment amongst the central Kenya ethnic groups against former president Moi and his ethnic Kalenjin group. Hence, far from saving hard currency by growing wheat, Kenya was in fact squandering scarce foreign exchange earnings to subsidize a small group of ethnically and politically correct, well-connected individuals in Rift Valley thus creating ethnic animosity in Kenya (ibid).

The Kibaki administration under the NARC Government did not escape from ethnic bigotry as posited by Murunga and Nasongo (2006). Indeed, ethnic mistrust has been cited as one of the major reasons that led to both the rejection of the draft new constitution in November 2005 and the eruption of the post-election violence following the December 2007 elections. When ethnic struggles are not adequately addressed, they tend to have adverse effects on inter-ethnic relations in society (Oyugi, 1997). Since re-introduction of political pluralism in Kenya, ethnic suspicions, hostility and witch-hunting have culminated into massacres, destruction of property, socio-economic uncertainty and insecurity (The Jurist 1996). The new democratic opening in multi-party governance generated a vicious struggle for political power, capital accumulation and cutthroat rivalry between ethnic groups for dominance and control of strategic resources of the nation (Human Rights Watch, 1993).

Ojuka (1975) asserts that in countries like Kenya, the politician is virtually at the command of everything. Acquisition of political office or having close links with politicians is an
almost indispensable means to individual wealth. This raises the expectations of ethnic followers who look forward to benefit from the political position to be acquired. Therefore ethnicity is used as a mobilizing strategy in pursuit of political power and supporters expect all kinds of favours like jobs, cash handouts and school fees and even land (ibid). The Kenyan print media has also highlighted the devastating effects of ethnicity in governance.

According to Musau (2007), ethnicity is based on the idea that it is our ‘time to eat’ and it cannot be wished away. This means that once a leader assumes office; his followers particularly from his ethnic community believe it is their opportune moment to benefit through allocation of state resources and key appointments to public offices in government. Most political parties in Kenya are regional and they draw their majority following from a particular ethnic community whose members share belief systems, values and cultural practices like circumcision rites, norms, mores, tools and implements. These create ethnic divisions during general elections because some ethnic communities loathe being led by a person from some other ethnic groups which they believe are culturally inferior (ibid). This creates tension between ethnic communities that erupts during an electoral process.

Maupeu et al (2005), argue that Kenya has had to grapple with violence every time the country goes for general elections and this problem is not just peculiar to Kenya. The 1992 elections in Kenya saw the open use of violence in killing, intimidation and displacement of communities perceived as ‘outsiders’. The people of Kenya have suffered heavily due to election violence and this has affected their livelihoods in terms of investment decisions, choice of areas of residence, among other social aspects of society (ibid).

The 2007-08 electoral violence was unique in that it had the greatest impact compared to the previous ethnic violence. Furthermore this ethnic violence occurred after the electoral process and not before or during the election as was the case in previous elections. In the post
December 2007 election period, violence was unprecedented (Makinda, 2008). In less than a few weeks an estimated 664,000 Kenyans were displaced of which 350,000 found shelter in 118 temporary tented camps. More than 78,000 houses were burned and the government estimated that about 1,300 people were killed. PeaceNet, a Kenyan civil rights organization believes that with the exception of police killings, 90 percent of those who died were killed by ethnic gangs. The post election violence was a huge blow to the country’s overall security, economy and democratic gains (Makinda, 2008).

For fear of loss of property members of some ethnic groups have had to relocate their businesses to areas they deem safer and also moved their residential homes elsewhere for fear of violence that is ethnically motivated in this country. This exposed the migrant ethnic groups to physical, social and psychological challenges. The 2007/08 post election violence saw Nakuru town being placed under curfew for the purpose of addressing the ethnic violence in the town. This curfew came after 80 people were ethnically targeted and killed in Nakuru town when violence broke out (Omondi & Kamau, 2008). The Provincial Commissioner (PC) imposed the curfew on Nakuru to check the spread of violence from the surrounding areas of Likia, Mauche and Subukia to the town centre (ibid).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Political, economic, and humanitarian crises that seemed ethnically motivated erupted in Kenya after the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was declared winner of the presidential election held on December 27, 2007. Supporters of Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) alleged electoral manipulation. This was widely confirmed by international observers as having been perpetrated by both parties in the election (CIPEV, 2009).
Targeted ethnic violence escalated and at first it was directed mainly against Kikuyu ethnic group which is the community of which Kibaki is a member and particularly those living outside their traditional settlement areas, especially in the Rift Valley. This violence peaked with the killing of over 30 unarmed civilians in a church near Eldoret on New Year’s Day. Twenty eight people are believed to have died at the Kenya Assemblies of God (KAG) church when youths from a particular ethnic group protesting against the results of the elections set a church ablaze (Koross, 2009). Retaliatory attacks were staged in places like Naivasha where certain ethnic groups were pulled from buses and hacked to death while others were set ablaze in their houses (Maina & Muliro, 2008). Ethnic communities rose against each other despite the fact that they had co-existed and the violence continued sporadically for several months, particularly in the Rift Valley. Most people were forced to flee their homes in parts of Rift Valley like Naivasha, Nakuru, Eldoret and Molo as machete-wielding ethnic gangs roamed the streets in early 2008 (Amnesty International USA, 2008).

With the coalition agreement the electoral violence ceased, but the underlying triggers, extent and consequences of electoral violence in Kenya have still to be fully addressed according to the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence report (CIPEV, 2009). This study sought to interrogate the element of ethnicity in the 2007/08 post election violence in Nakuru Municipality, Kenya.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The study was anchored on the following specific objectives:–

i. To interrogate the factors that led to ethnic conflicts in 2007/08 general elections in Nakuru Municipality

ii. To assess the role of ethnicity in electoral violence

iii. To assess the impact of ethnicity on ethnic relations in Nakuru municipality
iv. To examine what needs to be done in terms of policy formulation to address ethnic-based violence in elections in Nakuru County.

1.4 Research Questions

In order to realize the above stated objectives this study was guided by the following research questions:-

i. What factors led to ethnic conflict during the 2007/8 general election in Nakuru Municipality?

ii. What was the role of ethnicity in the electoral violence?

iii. What was the impact of electoral violence on ethnic relations in Nakuru municipality?

iv. What needs to be done in terms of policy formulation to address ethnic conflicts during general elections in Nakuru Municipality?

1.5 Research Premises

This study was premised on the following assumptions;

(i) There were a variety of factors responsible for post electoral ethnic violence in Nakuru Municipality.

(ii) Ethnicity played a role in ethnic violence in Nakuru Municipality during general elections.

(iii) Electoral violence has an impact on ethnic relations among the communities in Nakuru Municipality.

(iv) Policies have to be formulated to address ethnicity in electoral violence in Nakuru County.
1.6 Justification and Significance of the Study

It is the desire of every country to organize elections that are free from ethnic violence because ethnic violence destroys lives and property, causes massive displacement of people and destroys the social fabric of society by creating mistrust between ethnic communities. The problem also creates voter apathy where some people shun participation in electoral process. By so doing they fail to exercise their constitutional right of voting. Peaceful co-existence of ethnic groups is vital to attainment of lasting harmony, economic and political development in society. Ethnic differences should not destroy the social fabric of society at the expense of peaceful co-existence. This calls for research work to inform solutions to this social problem by providing an empirical view of the social problem. This was the purpose of this study. The study intended to contribute to the growing literature on ethnicity in electoral violence.

This study is of critical value to the policy makers and those charged with the responsibility of developing structures to preside over elections that are free of ethnic wars in this country. The timing of this study was significant given that the country was heading to another general election early 2013. The location of Nakuru municipality was equally significant because it is the headquarters of the former Rift Valley that previously reported the highest incidents of ethnic violence. The general public will benefit from this study particularly so when its recommendations are incorporated into development of mitigating measures. When ethnic violence is minimized from the election process, the country will relay the image of a democratic society in the International system and we shall have made a significant growth as a democracy in Africa and the world.
1.7 Scope and limitations

This study was conducted on the cosmopolitan population that resides in Nakuru municipality which was the centre of violence in Nakuru County because this population was exposed to the violence. The study covered the post electoral violence that broke out in Kenya after the last general election of December 2007/8 (see appendix 3 p.103. map of Kenya). The study did not cover any other violence that was not ethnically motivated and related to electoral process like cattle rustling conflicts or conflicts over resources like water and grazing land for pastoral communities despite the fact that these are also weighty academic issues. The focus of this study was on the ethnic violence that took place in Nakuru municipality and not the violence that was experienced in other parts of Kenya. The participants in this study were drawn from the ethnic groups who resided in Nakuru municipality then and still so residing in the municipality (see appendix 2, p. 102, map of the Municipality).

Generalizations of these findings are only limited to ethnic violence that emanates from an electoral process. Ethnic violence is an emotive topic and most people particularly victims were not willing to engage in the study or decide to engage in it subjectively while controlled by their emotions of bitterness. The researcher stressed issues of confidentiality to respondents in order to get full disclosure.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Review of related Literature

The struggles for elective positions and electoral violence are made highly complicated by ethnicity (Gray, 1991). Ethnic tensions erupt into full blown violence during electoral processes resulting in massive loss of lives, property and displacements of people. This in turn plants the roots for ethnicity which was the basis of this study. According to Jonyo (2003, p. 156), ethnicity can be conceptualized in two ways: as an organizational form and as a process. As an organizational form, ethnic groups are regarded generally as social collectivities whose members not only share such objective characteristics as language, core-territory, ancestral myths, culture, religion and/or political organization, but also have some subjective consciousness or perception of common descent or identity (Ibid). On the other hand as a process, ethnicity can be seen at two levels: intra-group and inter-group relations. Jonyo refers to these two levels of ethnicity as "moral ethnicity" and "political tribalism", respectively (Jonyo, 2003).

Moral ethnicity is where a distinct group applies its distinctiveness in mutual socio-economic obligation and support, whereas political tribalism entails rivalry and competition among different ethnic groups over access to state resources. While Jonyo (2003) focused on moral ethnicity, this study focused on how ethnicity was used for mobilization to engage in ethnic violence during electoral processes.

Fisher (2001) defines electoral violence as the random or organized acts that seek to undermine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process. While Fisher (2001) discussed
electoral violence from the general perspective, this study discusses electoral violence from the specific perspective of ethnicity. Fisher (ibid), argued that the expression of electoral violence can occur at four intervals in an election chronology. These intervals are discussed below.

First is the identity - based ethnic violence which can occur during the registration process when ethnic groups who have been displaced from their homes and their documents lost or destroyed are denied voter registration on the basis of failing to prove their identity. The second expression of electoral violence is in campaign violence which can occur as rivals seek to disrupt the campaigns of opponents, intimidate voters and candidates. A survey of the events of electoral violence by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) from 2001 suggests that conflict among political rivals appears to have been the most common form of ethnic wars in elections across the world (Fisher, 2001). Unlike this report that focused on conflicts among political rivals, this study specifically focused on political rivalry that takes the form of opposing ethnic groups.

The third expression of electoral violence is in balloting violence which can occur on Election Day when political rivalries are played out at the polling station. This kind of violence is prevalent in Kenya where some voters are intimidated with threats to their lives and as a result opt not to visit polling stations to cast their votes (ibid). The outbreak of violence in polling stations is a very common feature in elections across Kenya (Makinda, 2008). This argument by Makinda (2008), only addresses political followers in general engaging in violence on the balloting day. This study discussed political followers that are of one ethnic identity and how they fuel ethnicity to alter voting patterns.
According to Throup & Hornsby (1998), ethnic clashes in Kenyan electoral processes heightened with the introduction of multi-party politics. Electoral violence in Kenya was also linked to the calls for the introduction of 'majimbo' system of government. Ethnic violence erupted in 1991 after a rally in Tinderet addressing the 'majimbo' debate Throup (1998). While Throup & Hornsby linked general political activity and calls for 'majimbo' to ethnic violence, this study focused on ethnicity and how it flares up during general elections. In Kenya, ethnicity, development and economic prosperity are closely related. Thus the economic importance of political victory cannot be overstressed (ibid).

The long term survival of an ethnic group depends on political victory in electoral process. Bruce (1998) affirms that the demarcation of ethnic differences takes on political importance and legitimizes claims to rights and resources thereby providing ethnic groups with meaning and organized channels for pursuing ethnically defined interests. Ethnic identities in this context can be manipulated and invested in political competition. This study focused on the ethnic animosity that propels an ethnic group to fight for political survival through ethnically motivated electoral violence.

Previous studies on electoral violence in Kenya have focused on the incidence and the dynamics of the 2007/8 electoral violence. This study focused on the element of ethnicity during an electoral process and its link to violence. Ohito and Obonyo (2010) argue that, people living in urban areas and in areas which had suffered land disputes before the election had a higher likelihood of being victims of ethnic violence again thus the choice of Nakuru municipality as a study site. The 2007/8 post ethnic violence was the worst to be witnessed in this country.
According to Calas (2007), the post electoral ethnic violence in the urban areas of Kisumu and Nairobi died gradually by the end of January 2008. The violence was transferred to other areas where different ethnic communities cohabited. Most of this violence was politically instigated and perpetuated by political ethnic gangs. In the western parts of Rift Valley, ethnic warriors triggered violence. These militias attacked towns, schools and churches where their targets took refuge. While Calas (2007) focused on the geography of the 2007/8 post election violence, this study has specifically addressed the aspect of ethnicity in the reported electoral violence.

Kanyinga (2003), observes that politics are at the core of ethnicity in this country. The transition from single party rule to multi-partyism had its own costs. The political elite from the former President Moi’s Kalenjin ethnic community saw demands and pressure for transition to multi-party politics as implying the end of Moi’s leadership. They were convinced that the numerically large ethnic groups, notably the Kikuyu and the Luo, were again using their numeric strength to hound the Kalenjin out of political control. They consequently re-packaged the land question in the form of demands for federalism (Majimbo). They advocated the creation of federal states. This meant of course that the ethnic Kikuyu and the Luo squatters who had settled in the Rift Valley during the colonial period and much later through the government re-settlement efforts would have to be evicted back to Central and Nyanza regions respectively.

According to Githongo (2006), the system of rule in post independent Kenya is a manifestation of ethno-elitism. This means that a pattern of competing ethnic elites rotating over time has been established thus making a mockery of equal opportunity. The quest for political control in this country is therefore a zero-sum game in which the gain of one ethnic group inevitably entails the loss of another ethnic group. This study addressed how the
acquisition of political control is used to extend favors to ethnic followers of the office holder thus entrenching ethnicity. Githongo (ibid) affirms that the Moi government and his Kalenjin ethnic group were the chief beneficiary in terms of public service appointments and economic prosperity. In addition, public expenditure in terms of investments in roads, water and education shifted from central Kenya to Rift Valley which is majorly inhabited by the Kalenjin ethnic group. Githongo discusses the shift in ethnic political control with change in political leadership. This study looked at how the shift in political control entrenched ethnicity that flared up during electoral processes.

2.2 Overview of electoral violence in Africa

Proliferation of electoral conflicts in Africa especially prior, during and after elections has become an issue of scholarly concern. Scholars have observed that these conflicts are ethnically motivated. The same scholars have also observed that ethnicity is a creation of the colonial legacy which demarcated boundaries without due regard to indigenous communities. By doing this they sowed seeds of discord which were later to be perfected by many African governments (Okwudiba, 1998).

The politics of Kenya is the most important area to be considered when analyzing ethnic conflict in Kenya and Africa at large. Kenya has experienced electoral violence in 92, 97 and 2007. Elections in Kenya seem to be synonymous with electoral violence. According to Throup and Hornsby (1998), since the 1991 constitutional reforms, there has been a clear correlation between elections and violence. The government deployed two strategies for using “ethnic cleansing” for political gain. Prior to the elections in 1992 systematic attacks against the Kikuyu community in the larger Rift Valley was meant to create a kikuyu exodus
from the area. By doing this, the Kikuyu who supported the opposition then were displaced on Election Day to stop them from voting. Second, the ethnic cleansing after elections was intended to punish Kikuyus who did not vote for President Moi and his KANU party.

According to Oyugi (1998) and Anyang-Nyongo (1993), ethnic conflicts result from the competition over scarce resources amongst members of unequal ethnic groups. They blame communal conflicts on state actors and policies, which promote or perpetuate economic, social and political inequalities among ethnic groups. According to these authors, the moment each ethnic group mobilizes itself to access state power and resources, they invariably heightens ethnic consciousness and possibilities of ethnic conflicts. Kakai (2000) provides historical and contemporary information on the nature of conflicts between ethnic groups.

Aseka (1989) and Gecaga (2001) have documented how colonial manipulation led to ethnic crystallization especially with the establishment of the state system. The basic argument is that the colonial and post-independence systems emphasized exclusion, competition and authoritarianism in mediating and managing inter-ethnic relations. According to Aseka (1989), the colonial state was the mid-wife of the power struggles between various groups, especially between the African peasantry and the settlers and later intra and inter-clan rivalries and factional politics, which gave birth to ethnic interpellations that drew from common historical origins, common dialect and kinship ties. He explores and analyzes situations in the colonial economy that gave root to the development of ethnic leanings. The conclusion is that the advent of colonialism undermined local economies in the course of the interaction of pre-colonial systems of production and capitalist modes of production bringing into being a stunted political economy. For Gecaga (2001), ethnic conflicts are due to disaffection over uneven distribution of resources appropriated in the colonial era among communities inhabiting Central, Rift Valley and Western provinces. These tensions were
aggravated during the post-independence period due to politicized ethnicity. For her, ethnic conflicts are also informed by intolerance and pure criminality.

There was a recurrence of violence before and after the 1997 election. In August of 1997, four months before the election, there was ethnic fighting in the Mombasa region, “The attacks began in mid-August with gangs of 200-500 people armed with guns, clubs, machetes and bows and arrows attacking villagers. Kikuyu, Luos, and Luhya were the main targets of the attacks, just as they were in the Rift Valley in 1992 (Throup & Hornsby 1998).

The elections of 2002 were greatly significant and a defining moment for Kenya because the incumbent president had to leave office on completion of his two terms as stipulated by constitutional reforms of 1991. The third head of state had to assume office and this had serious repercussions on the ethnic balance in Kenyan politics. A number of scenarios were possible and available to the establishment. Scenario one held that Moi will groom a politician within his political party Kenya African National Unity (KANU), to become his successor and then Moi will maintain a strong influence on politics, though he will not officially be a member of the government. Scenario two held that if Moi’s health failed or if he was forced from office by the declining economic situation, leadership would land in the hands of KANU hardliners (Mungai, 2004). Electoral violence is not limited to Kenya. Most countries in Africa have also experienced violence in their electoral processes and it is of scholarly interest to conduct an overview of these conflicts.

Most electoral processes all over Africa have a great impact on the distributive and redistributive capacity of the state (Omotola, 2008). An electoral process comes with daunting challenges including the transitional contexts that degenerate into electoral violence (Adekanye, 2001).
As a concept, electoral violence basically has to do with ‘all forms of organized acts or threats – physical, psychological, and structural – aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after an election with a view to determining, delaying, or otherwise influencing an electoral process (Nwolise, 2007). By implication, this means that electoral violence is multidimensional, having physical, psychological and structural dimensions. The physical elements include assassination of political opponents, arson, looting, shooting, kidnapping and hostage taking, forceful disruption of campaign rallies, armed raids on voting and collating centres, including snatching of ballot papers and boxes at gun point. The psychological dimension relates to official and unofficial actions that create fear in the people, which may be a product of physical violence. These include threats to opposition forces by security agents or through phone calls and text messages. The structural dimension of electoral violence seems much more pronounced, being a product of structural imbalance, including coercion of citizens by government to register or vote, unequal opportunities for political parties and candidates, abuse of power of incumbency, falsification of election results, as well as the politicization of security and electoral officials (Nwolise 2007). Physical, psychological and structural forms of electoral violence are rampant on the African continent.

It is also evident that electoral violence, like an election itself, is not restricted to Election Day alone. It can happen before, during and after the elections. Pre-election violence may include acts or threats against electoral stakeholders during voters’ registration or electioneering campaigns. Election Day violence includes the snatching of ballot papers or boxes, assaults on opposition agents or parties, and harassment or intimidation by security agents. In the aftermath of an election, electoral violence may take the form of violent protests against electoral rigging, whether real or imagined, and of the state’s deploying its instruments of oppression in response to the protest, thereby further fuelling the violence.
Electoral violence is a form, perhaps the most deadly form, of electoral fraud, which has been defined as ‘clandestine efforts to shape election results’ (Lehoucq 2003). This can be perpetrated both by the incumbent power holder to avoid defeat and by opposition elements seeking to wrest political power from the governing party. In most cases, electoral violence is targeted at electoral stakeholders such as voters, candidates, party agents, election workers, media and monitors; electoral information such as registration data, vote results, ballots; campaign materials, for example, vehicles and public address systems; electoral facilities such as polling and counting stations; and electoral events, including campaign rallies (Höglund 2006).

The problem of electoral violence in Africa cannot be fully understood without situating it within the political history of the continent. The colonial African state offers a useful point of entry. For, it was under it that some form of electoral politics was introduced to Africa. As a result of its narrow political base, political discourses about democracy and good governance were essentially elite-driven, while the people occupied a very marginal space, if any (Ake 2000). It was not surprising that electoral violence reared its ugly head shortly after the attainment of political independence by most African States in the decade of the 1960s. Rather than transform the colonial state, including its narrow democratic base to accommodate popular nationalist aspirations for the new state, the new elite of power in Africa opted to inherit the colonial state into the independent state (Ake 2000). The attempt to contain attendant popular discontent and protests by the state, including the recourse to a one-party state, represents further closure of the democratic space.

As the state began assuming a more central position over power and other resources, forces of identity, particularly ethnicity and religion, became appealing. Sooner rather than later, these forces became the main drivers of politics in most countries in Africa. The Nigerian
experience is particularly illustrative of this tendency. Beginning from the 1964–65 general elections, violence has been a major feature of electoral politics in the country. The election presented the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and its allies the opportunity to challenge and possibly neutralize the stronghold of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). The NPC had dominated politics at the federal level since independence in 1960 and saw the 1964 election as another chance to consolidate its position. By implication, every actor in the election had serious points to prove, which contributed to the volatility of the political environment (Osaghae, 1998).

The attendant violence, including arson, looting, killing, wanton destruction of properties and the total collapse of public order especially in the western region, was unprecedented and contributed in no small measure to the collapse of the first republic (Akinwumi, 2004). Close to nineteen States of the first republic were still largely driven by ethno-religious forces, where each party maintained its stronghold in a given regional/ethnic domain. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), obviously NPC’s successor, controlled the federal government between 1979 and 1983. In the 1983 elections, it wanted to extend its reach to other regions, either by hook or by crook. The attempt to achieve this underscored the massive rigging of the 1983 elections, which resulted in an unprecedented outbreak of electoral violence in the south-west, where the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) held sway. In the then Oyo and Ondo States, two UPN states declared for the NPN, the attendant violence was unprecedented. It was so fierce that Ondo state was returned to UPN shortly afterwards. As it turned out, however, this was a belated response and it was not enough to stop the military from seizing power on 31 December 1983 – predominantly, but not only, on account of the violence and attendant contradictions (Osaghae, 1998).
The Nigerian experience represents just one among several others in Africa. In East Africa – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – electoral violence has been a major feature of politics in the post-independence era. In Kenya KANU initiated a constitutional engineering process that gave rise to a new constitution in 1969, which transferred all constitutional powers to the presidency and completely erased the political checks and balances inherent in the independence constitution of 1963. While elections have been held regularly, it has been a one party show, until when multiparty politics was ushered in through a long struggle in 1992. Attendant electoral violence has manifested in the form of assassinations, attempted assassinations, confinement, battering, arson, looting, political thuggery, destruction and damage of property, among others. The trend has not been different in Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Laakso 2007:230–249).

Africa’s ‘new’ democracies have been seriously violated in many ways (Aremu and Omotola 2007). Recent manifestations of electoral violence include physical, psychological and structural dimensions, all with the central motive of influencing the electoral process in favour of the perpetrators of the violence. The timing also reveals that this violence cuts across all stages of the electoral process – before, during and after the elections. In most instances, the main actors have been the state, represented by the ruling party, security agents and electoral officials, and opposition forces.

Physical dimensions of electoral violence in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe include political assassinations, riots, assaults, arson, looting, bombing and hijacking of electoral materials at gun point. In Nigeria, for example, the issue of political assassination has been a major issue since 1999. Some of those that have been assassinated include top party chieftains, candidates aspiring to elective offices of high stake and those already in elected/appointed political offices. Notable figures here include Funsho Williams, a gubernatorial aspirant under the
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Lagos State who was assassinated in (July 2006), and Dr Ayo Daramola, also a PDP gubernatorial candidate in Ekiti State who was assassinated in (August 2006).

The conduct of the election itself in most African countries witnessed many more cases of physical violence – most notably the open display and use of dangerous weapons such as guns, axes and cutlasses to perpetrate electoral fraud. In the process, many innocent people were killed. The 2007 elections in Nigeria, therefore, presented an opportunity to revert to the old order, which the Action Congress (AC) seriously worked for. But this was not to be so – as a result of the abuse of power of incumbency to alter the people’s will. The violent response was spontaneous, including the burning of houses, killing, looting and general breakdown of law and order in Ondo, Ekiti, Osun and Oyo states as the most volatile.

These physical dimensions of violence also manifested in the Kenyan elections of 1992, 1997 and 2002. Most notable ones include battering, assassinations, arson, destruction, looting and damage of properties, torture, unlawful arrest and detention, rape and disruption of public meetings and campaign rallies. At the psychological level, the situation does not seem better. The most glaring manifestation of this strand of electoral violence in Nigeria was the infamous declaration by President Obasanjo that for him and the PDP, the 2007 election was 'a do or die' affair (Omotola 2007). This statement, more than anything else, seemed to bolster the resolve of the PDP to go any length to win at all costs, to create fear in the mind of the opposition and electorate, and make them more circumspect about their roles during the elections. The resultant criminalization of politics through violence further served to heighten fear in the populace.
How then do we explain the prevalence of electoral violence in Africa’s new democracies? The first thesis we want to propose is that the context of the democratization process has important ramifications for recent electoral violence. Here one is tempted to suggest that there is a political culture of violence in most parts of Africa. This culture of violence in their most recent manifestations seems to be a product of what I call military cum authoritarian overhang shadowing the democratization process. Nigeria, for example was under the strong grip of the military for an uninterrupted sixteen years prior to 1999. In the process, ‘military politicians’ built and consolidated their military industrial complexes that saw them dominating some of the commanding heights of the national economy. Their stupendous wealth seems to confer an advantage on them over and above their civilian counterparts in the new struggle for power (Adekanye 2000).

The attendant dominance of the retired officials at all levels, without a corresponding reorientation of values and sufficient time lag to adjust to civil life, meant they came into the democratic job with a military ethos and mindset. While Kenya and Zimbabwe did not go through the pains of military rule, both also had a history of a culture of electoral violence beginning with the anti-colonial struggle. Beyond this, Kenya is particularly notorious for its unofficial one-party rule under the hegemony of KANU, with little or no space for opposition until recently when the ‘third wave’ compelled the re-introduction of multi-partyism. Also in Zimbabwe, the situation seems worse with Robert Mugabe in power for close to three decades now. The consolidation of power in both settings had largely been predicated on the use of force. Consequently, the prevalence of electoral violence in Africa’s new democracies may be a product of a culture of violence inherited from the departing military cum authoritarian regimes, whose main actors, coincidentally, remain dominant in the current dispensation.
Closely related to the above is the form and character of the state and the nature of contestation for power (Osaghae 1989). Essentially, the African state is a law and order state, predicated upon the use of force to enforce its decisions. Moreover, the state in Africa it totalistic, having dominion over the society in every facet of life. Capturing political power therefore translates to capturing all other things. The increasing centralization of power in the presidents at the national level and political leaders at other levels of governance tends to heighten political stakes. The result is the unhealthy rivalry and competition for political dominance, resulting to electoral violence. Nothing illustrates this better than the abuse of power of incumbency in an effort to remain in power at all costs, and if all else fail, to impose a surrogate that will continue to defer to the ‘good’ judgment of the benefactor. This was the case with Obasanjo’s Nigeria with respect to the third term agenda that sought to elongate his tenure beyond constitutional limits of two terms of four years each. When it failed, he imposed Umaru Yar’Adua, a development at the root of the violent nature of the 2007 elections.

The weakness of the economic foundation of democracy provides another lens through which we can x-ray electoral violence in Africa. Democracy requires some level of economic development, particularly with respect to income and poverty levels. When the poverty level is higher than a standard threshold at $2 a day for the poverty line and $1 for absolute poverty, democracy may be at risk from threats of electoral violence (Okonjo et al. 2003).

The weak institutionalization of some key architecture of democratic politics also helps to explain electoral violence in Africa. Some of the most notable institutional architectures of democracy are political parties, electoral management bodies and the judiciary. Ideally,
political parties are to be erected on a specific political ideology that will serve as its organizing and mobilizational anchorage. In the absence of one, other tools of mobilization, particularly forces of identity such as ethnicity and religion, become appealing. Given the ease of manipulation and transformation of these forces, they stand the risk of falling prey to corruption and violence which is witnessed across Africa. The glaring ideological barrenness of most parties in Africa and the attendant decadence of political parties, which manifest in the gross absence of internal party democracy and the heavy reliance on negative mobilization to win elections, underlie electoral violence in Africa (Omotola, 2007).

The contradictions of electoral justice in Africa represent another factor responsible for electoral violence in Africa. In most African states, the electoral laws spell out the procedures and conditions of seeking electoral redress in courts. In Nigeria, for example, the burden of proof lies with the litigant, and a major requirement is that it must be proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the alleged irregularity was 'substantial' to warrant nullification of the elections (Omotola 2007). These are near impossible conditions for obvious reasons. For one thing, the cost of electoral prosecution is dear and those outside government may not be able to afford it. For another, the declared winner of the contested election is already sworn-in, with full paraphernalia of office while the legal tussle lasts. This already tilts the electoral justice landscape in favour of the winner, who not only has access to state resources, but also takes full advantage of them to prosecute a personal case.

Even in situations where protracted violence compels the 'winner' to agree to negotiate power sharing agreements with the opposition, the incentive to engage in electoral fraud and violence abounds. It may send the wrong signal that the opposition groups are nothing but selfish power-mongers who will accept any kind of power brokerage at the elite level,
without actually fighting for the overall benefit of the populace (Omotola 2007). This tendency represents another incentive to be involved in electoral fraud and violence.

Electoral violence has also been reported in other countries in Africa like Ghana. Despite Ghana’s recurrent electoral violence, actions were taken in 2008 by the government and civil society to offer some insights to reversing this history. Three months before the December 2008 general elections, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development trained and deployed electoral violence observers to 26 constituencies that were considered likely to experience violence (Huglund, 2009).

Following Kenya’s 1992 and 2007 elections, where more than 1,000 people died and several hundred thousand were displaced on each occasion, commissions were established to investigate the violence. These commissions have not resulted in punishing the perpetrators, though many were named (Boone 2009). Ethiopia treated the electoral violence following the 2005 parliamentary elections as a criminal matter. Approximately 30,000 suspected opposition supporters were arrested and charged with an assortment of crimes, including subverting the constitution. Yet other countries have treated incidents of electoral violence as episodic phenomena, leaving them largely unaddressed by the national government. This occurred following the 2000 postelection violence in Côte d’Ivoire (Boone, 2009).

Employing a more robust response, some countries develop a political agreement between opposition groups and the government in a bid to resolve the underlying causes of violence and maladministration of the election. Kenya, Zimbabwe, Togo, and Zanzibar have each adopted such agreements. Kenya and Zimbabwe’s postelection political agreements have received a great deal of attention and are more robust than those of Togo and Zanzibar.
However, in light of the attention they have received, important considerations for policymakers are the implications for democratization efforts and the message it sends about the use of violence, when losing political parties are incorporated in a government of national unity in order to keep the peace (Huglund, 2009). To begin to understand the nature, causes and the impact of the 2007 post election violence, the next chapter presents data on the conflict in the Rift valley.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

Various theoretical frameworks exist to explain conflict in society. The Conflict Theory emphasizes the social political and material inequality of social groups in society. As illustrated by Karl Marx (1818-1883), this theory draws attention to power differentials like class conflict and contrasts dominant ideologies. Conflict theory is based on the dialectical materialistic account of social life. Marx posits that capitalism produces internal tensions leading to its own destruction. Karl Marx calls the existing social arrangement in society as the thesis. This arrangement produces its opposite called antithesis and at this point a qualitatively different social form called synthesis emerges. Although this perspective addresses conflicts in society on the basis of class and labour relations, it does not specifically focus on why people coalesce as an ethnic group driven by ethnicity to engage in violence. Another theoretical framework that focuses on group behaviour is the Relative Deprivation Theory by Robert Merton (1957). This research was anchored on this perspective.

This theoretical framework provides a view of social change and movement according to which people take actions for social change to acquire something (for instance opportunities, status, wealth or political control) that other people posses, which they should have access to. When a deprived ethnic group compares itself with another non-deprived ethnic group, the
result is relative deprivation. This theoretical framework explains why ethnic groups coalesce and form ethnic gangs to fight for political control which they need to access opportunities in employment, wealth creation and social status in society. The theory stratifies ethnic communities as the deprived and the non-deprived. Inequality breeds violence (Muller 1985). The gap between the expected and the achieved welfare of individuals generates discontent and increases the propensity for collective violence (Snyder 1978). Therefore ethnic divisions aggregate existing frustrations caused by inequality.

Relative deprivation therefore refers to the discontent that ethnic groups feel when they compare themselves with other ethnic groups and realize they have less of what they believe themselves to be entitled to than those around them. It is a conscious experience of negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities that describes feelings of economic, social and political deprivation in society. This leads to social movements and other forms of collective action like ethnic violence and riots that are perpetuated by ethnic gangs.

In a country where the belief in popular control of government is so deeply ingrained, people feel compelled to sell their causes to the public, and are frequently judged winners or losers by their standings in the polls and most of times these results in violence in the society. These groups that coalesce around a particular ethnic political aspirant become a readily available force to be manipulated and deployed in defense of ethnic elites. These groups are also used to mete electoral violence against supporters of other aspirants. In Kenya these groups are represented by ethnic gangs like ‘Mungiki’, ‘Amachuma’ and ‘Bagdad boys’ whose composition is ethnically selected and are used by politicians to mete out violence on competitors. This theory was found useful in this study because it sheds light on how deprivation of certain ethnic groups influences them to seek electoral positions and how
political power is used to benefit an ethnic group thus fueling ethnicity. The ethnic wars that arise out of relative deprivation can be conceptualized as follows;

2.4 Conceptual Framework of Relative deprivation Theory.

This conceptual framework can be explained as follows; when a deprived ethnic group compares itself with a non-deprived ethnic group they feel relative subordination. On the other hand when a non-deprived ethnic group compares itself with a deprived ethnic group they feel relative superiority. The deprived ethnic group has a high propensity to engage in ethnic violence to try and correct the economic, political and social deprivation they are exposed to. The non-deprived ethnic group also has a high propensity to engage in ethnic conflicts to protect the privileged access to opportunities, wealth and status.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

The researcher in this study found it appropriate to use a descriptive survey design. This design was appropriate due to its ability to report things the way they are. The descriptive survey design basically focuses on observation, description and documentation of a situation as it naturally occurs. The descriptive survey design was therefore preferred because it avails information about population variables to facilitate the study.

3.2 Variables of Analysis

This study looked at ethnicity as one of the factors that perpetuate electoral violence in Kenya. The more people believe their ethnic group to be superior and above other ethnic communities the more they are likely to engage in ethnic violence to protect and pursue political control for their ethnic group. Ethnicity in this particular study was an independent variable and electoral violence was the dependent variable. Ethnicity was an independent variable in the sense that the more people believe in it, the more likely they are to engage in ethnic violence to protect it at all costs.

3.3 Site of the Study

This study was carried out in Nakuru municipality in Kenya (see appendix 2 p. 102 and appendix 3 p. 103). This municipality was ideal because it is cosmopolitan and it experienced a high intensity of electoral violence being the epicenter of Nakuru County. Nakuru municipality is located in Rift Valley province which is the largest province in Kenya. The administrative system of provinces has been changed with the promulgation of the new
constitution. Under this new political arrangement the municipality is situated in Nakuru County. The site of study has over ten estates which are cosmopolitan and the major ethnic communities located in these estates are Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, Kisii and Kamba. These are incidentally the major communities that participated in the post election violence of 2007/2008. This study focused on the ethnicity within these communities and its role in the post election violence.

3.4 Study Population

This study was conducted on all the four major ethnic communities that reside in Nakuru municipality. These four major ethnic communities are represented in the estates of the municipality. The target population is over 100,000 according to the Kenya Bureau of statistics census projections (2010). The study was conducted on only those who are over 18 years of age because they can recollect and comprehend the events better.

3.5 Sampling Techniques

Simple random sampling and purposive sampling techniques were employed by the researcher during the study to select respondents from the clusters that form the study population. All the chiefs and DOs in each cluster were interviewed for they were directly in touch with the violence in their areas of jurisdiction. The researcher also used simple random sampling to select respondents from each cluster under study since this technique provides equal chances for selection to every element of the population. This reduced the degree of biasness in the selection process. The municipality has ten major estates that witnessed electoral violence. These are: Shabaab, Langalanga, London, Pipeline, Mariakani, Free Area, Kwa Rhoda, Lanet, Kiamunyi and Race course which formed sample clusters in the population of study. According to Morgan and Krejcie (1970) a minimum sample size of 385 is required when the population under study is over 100,000. Nakuru municipality falls in
this category and for the purpose of this study a sample size of 400 was used. In order to attain a representative sample, 40 respondents were picked from each cluster making a sample size of 400. These 40 respondents from every cluster were picked through simple random sampling method while the provincial administration was sampled purposively. Similarly all those to be interviewed were selected purposively as the case for administrators.

3.6 Research Instruments

For the purpose of obtaining concrete data this research was conducted using questionnaires (see appendix 1, p. 94-101), interviews conducted with the aid of interview schedules and focused discussion groups. A questionnaire has the ability to collect a large amount of information in a reasonably quick space of time. The researcher will rely on questionnaires to collect information from the sample population quickly and in a short span of time. On the other hand Orodho (2004) argues that the interview method of collecting data involves presentation of oral-verbal stimuli and reply in terms of oral-verbal responses. The researcher carried out personal interview of key informants like chiefs and District Officers (DOs) who participated in quelling the violence through purposive sampling.

The questionnaire was divided into three sections. Section one collected general information of respondents while section two sought information on trends of violence and perceptions of ethnicity. Section three addressed the structures and policy measures to mitigate electoral violence. Questionnaires came in handy in reaching the widest number of the chosen sample for study. Both unstructured and structured questions were used in the design of the questionnaire. Structured questions allowed greater depths of response and they stimulated the respondents to think about their feelings and motives while considering the best assessment of the situation. Structured questions were easier to analyze thus helped in arriving at proper presentation of data.
3.7 **Validity and reliability**

Validity is the appropriateness, usefulness and the meaningfulness of the inferences made by the researcher in the data collected. According to Orodho (2004), validity is the degree of success with a technique or an instrument in measuring what it claims to measure. For the purpose of testing validity of instruments, questionnaires were first scrutinized and approved by the university supervisor. Reliability is the measure of consistency by which an instrument yields data after repeated trials (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). This was attained through several pilot surveys at intervals and a comparison between them made from all the attempts.

3.8 **Pilot Study**

A pilot study for this research work was conducted to establish the suitability of the questionnaire prior to the main research work. This piloting was conducted in Eldoret municipality with five respondents being selected from each estate randomly for interviews and filling of questionnaires. This assisted the researcher to identify ambiguous questions and make necessary changes for the final study in Nakuru municipality.

3.9 **Data collection procedures.**

The researcher first inducted the three research assistants on how to facilitate the data collection and the importance of the study to society. The three research assistants were drawn from the ethnic communities of Luo, Kikuyu and Kalenjin for the purpose of handling respondents who may not be conversant with English and Kiswahili. The researcher and the research assistants then administered the questionnaires to the respondents and clarified any areas that were not clear and where more time was needed. The researcher and research assistants will use drop and pick method to administer the questionnaires.
Three research assistants were used after undergoing a process of induction on the important elements of research and ethics. The languages used during the interview were English, Kiswahili and the ethnic language of the respondents. These questionnaires were distributed by the researcher and through the use of research assistants. Interviews were particularly used to capture information from key informants like chiefs, business owners and managers of entertainment spots to capture the ethnic spread of the clientele with a view of capturing how ethnic solidarity was build for the purpose of deliberating on harnessing ethnicity. Discussion groups were conducted amongst the peers of the researcher to capture the views of the peers with regard to the role of ethnicity in election violence.

3.10 Data Analysis

Editing of data was first done to identify and eliminate errors made by the researcher and research assistants especially during the interview. Coding of data was then conducted to translate question response into specific categories. Data was both qualitative and quantitative. Descriptive statistics such as percentages have been used to indicate the distribution of responses. Qualitative data was analyzed by use of content analysis. Presentation of data was by use of graphs, tables and pie charts. Analysis of data in research requires closely related operations like categorizing data, tabulation and drawing statistical inferences thus the researcher conducted all these operations. The collection of data, its presentation and analysis was solely done by the researcher.

3.11 Data Management and Ethical Considerations.

The privacy of the respondents is important in research thus ethical issues were anticipated in this study. The researcher first sought authority from relevant offices to conduct this study. The direct consent of the respondents was sought by the researcher for the participants to fill in the questionnaire. Respondents were made aware of the purpose of the study and its
benefit to society because they have a right to information enshrined in the bill of rights under the constitution. The data collected from this study was professionally handled and has not been used against any person in any way whatsoever. The recommendations and conclusions that are scientifically discerned from this study shall be shared with the public for improving the society which is the ultimate objective of any piece of research.
CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS

Introduction.

This chapter analyzes the data gathered through questionnaires, interviews and focused discussion groups conducted during the research process. The data was analyzed and presented through pie charts and tables and this was done by looking at the background information analysis, factors behind the 2007/8 electoral violence, pattern of electoral violence, land disputes, politics of state control, economic deprivation and class conflicts.

4.1 Analysis of Background Information

One of the elements analyzed under the background information was the age distribution of the respondents. This age distribution is presented as indicated below.

4.1.1 Age distribution of respondents

![Figure 1](image-url)
The study requested the respondents to indicate their age category and from the findings, 60.5% of the respondents were aged between 28 to 37 years, 25.7% of the respondents indicated they were aged between 18 to 27 years, 7.5% of the respondents indicated were aged between 38 to 47 years, whereas 6.3% of the respondents indicated that they were aged above 51 years. This is an indication that respondents were well distributed in terms of their age.

4.2 Gender of the respondent

The gender of the respondents was another element under the background information that this study sought from the respondents. As such respondents were asked to indicate their gender as they participated in the study. The study found that majority of the respondents were male. As depicted by the graph above, 70.6% were males whereas 29.4% of the respondents were females, this is an indication that both genders were involved in this study and thus the finding of the study did not suffer from gender bias. Men were more willing to talk about the electoral violence compared to women and this could be another area of study to ascertain...
hoe electoral violence impacted on both gender during the 2007/8 post election violence in Nakuru County.

Another key element gathered from the background information of the respondents was their marital status.

4.3 Respondent Marital Status

![Marital status of respondents](image)

Figure 3. Marital status of respondents

The study sought to establish the marital status of the respondents and therefore requested the respondents to indicate their marital status. The study established that majority of the respondents as shown by 66.8% were married men and women, 26.5% of the respondents were single, whereas 6.7% of the respondent were divorcees, this is an indication that majority of the respondents involved in this study were mature family men and women.

The other element of the background information analyzed by this study was the religion of the respondents. Nakuru County is cosmopolitan and the inhabitants are highly religious. An analysis of the respondents revealed that majority of the respondents in Nakuru country are
Christians. Three different religions emerged during this study; these are Christianity, Muslim and Hindu.

5.14 Distribution of respondent by religion

![Graph showing distribution by religion](image)

From the findings 91.9% of the respondents indicated that they were Christians, 7.5% of the respondents indicated that they were Muslims, whereas 0.6% of the respondents indicated that they were Hindus, this implies that majority of the respondents featured in this study were Christians. Given that majority of the respondents were Christians, it therefore follows that majority of the people affected by the 2007/8 post election violence were also Christians.
The level of education by the respondents was also a key focus by the study.

4.5 Respondent Level of Education

![Bar Chart]

Figure 5. Respondent level of education

The study requested the respondents to indicate their highest level of education. From the data gathered, it was established that 40.5% of the respondent indicated their highest level of educations as secondary, 38.4% of the respondent indicated their highest level of education as college diploma/certificate, 16.9% of the respondents indicated their highest level of education as university, whereas 4.2% of the respondents indicated their highest level of education as primary. This is an indication that most of the respondents who participated in this study had secondary level education. This explains why the response on the question guides and participation in the focused discussion group was well attended. The background information also sought to gather data on the employment status of the respondents as indicated in the diagram below.
4.6 Respondent Employment Status

![Employment status of respondents](image)

Figure 6. Employment status of respondents

The data gathered during this study revealed that 70.6% of the respondents were employed, 15.9% of the respondent were business men/women, 7.3% of the respondents indicated they were casual labourers while 6.2% of the respondents indicated that they were students. The respondents were therefore well distributed in their employment status.

4.7 Factors behind Electoral Violence

A variety of factors have been associated with ethnic violence in Kenya. This study, as established by a majority of the respondents, established the factors discussed below to have been at the center of electoral violence in Nakuru Municipality. The 2007 post-election violence in Kenya rooted in the inter-ethnic resentments between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu and was triggered by results of the December 2007 elections. For one, the Kalenjin believed that the Kikuyu have marginalized them for far too long by dominating the major sectors of the Kenyan economy at the expense of the Kalenjin and the rest of the other ethnic
groups in Kenya. The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV 2008) identified a number of factors that formed the foundation of inter-ethnic resentments leading to the electoral violence.

As illustrated in the (CIPEV 2008) report, these factors included; personalization of presidential power, deliberate weakening of public institutions, land and inequality and unemployment. Majority of the respondents in this study identified the same factors of land disputes, struggle for control of state power, unequal access to economic opportunities as the main contributing elements to the 2007/8 post election violence. These findings are in line with the findings of the CIPEV. Hence, although the trigger factor of the violence was the disputed election results, other deep-seated causes that exacerbated the violence. Earlier researchers into ethnic conflicts in Kenya like Kagwanja (1998) had already warned that the situation in Kenya was deteriorating and the potential for conflict was increasing. He affirmed that unequal access by groups to land, employment, and state benefits has been exacerbated by rapid population growth and the economic stagnation to which Kenya had become prone since the early 1980s. Majority of the respondents in this study concurred with Kagwanja (1998), when they traced back the roots of ethnic conflicts to the activities of the state since independence.

It is not that Kenya lacked relative deprivation prior to the electoral violence of 2007/8. Every society is subject to some degree of inequality; it is when individuals feel that the source or manifestation of inequality is unjust or particularly devastating that the impetus for violence can arise. Sporadic outbursts of violence throughout the 1990s demonstrated growing ethno-economic tensions and increasing likelihood for a major outbreak of ethnic strife. Before I discuss the factors behind the electoral violence, it is important to mention the pattern that this electoral violence has taken over time in Kenya.
4.7.1 The pattern of Electoral Violence

Immediately following the multiparty election of 1992, Kenya became engulfed in ethnic clashes (African Watch 1993). There was a pattern to the violence that is described in Africa Watch's report “State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya”: The report illustrated that in most cases, hundreds of Kalenjin “warriors,” as they became known, were prone to attacking farms and targeting non-Kalenjin houses. The attackers were often identically dressed in an informal uniform of shorts and t-shirts (sometimes red, sometimes black) and always armed with traditional bows and arrows as well as pangas (machetes). Sometimes, the warriors would have their faces marked in the traditional manner with clay. The warriors would loot, kill, and burn houses, leaving death and destruction in their wake. The government commissioned a parliamentary commission in 1992 to investigate ethnic conflicts in Kenya. This commission was established following the 1992 ethnic clashes and at the end of its sittings the commission came up with the Kiliku parliamentary report. The report, commissioned by the government in response to public pressure, unexpectedly verified that the ethnic clashes, far from being spontaneous, had been orchestrated by mostly politicians close to the president. This is supported by the findings of this study that struggle for political control is at the centre of electoral violence in Kenya.

Electoral violence had become a norm since the introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya and any impending election brought with it the pattern of electoral violence and the trend replicated itself in the electoral violence of 2007/8. According to Klass (2013), in the Annual meeting paper – ASA, forms of political violence in Kenya range from urban riots and large scale displacement campaigns to the inter-ethnic village raids. Klass (2013) postulated that the riots and protests are heightened towards, during and after elections.
Majority of the respondents in this study concurred with Klass to the extent that the electoral violence increased towards, during and climaxed after elections but slightly differed with findings by Klass (2008) with regard to the ethnic violence being limited to urban riots. The electoral violence of 2007/8 was also widespread in rural settings.

The recurrent electoral violence of 1992 and 1997 multi-party general elections drew wide national and international attention and watered the roots of ethnic animosity that had already been established in this country. The 2007/8 electoral violence shares many features with the earlier incidents. First, the circumstances of all the electoral violence were linked to elections. Therefore electoral violence in Kenya had taken a pattern of a 5-year life cycle with elections serving as the incubators as observed by Otieno, (2008). This created a perception in the minds of many Kenyans that any general election in this country will automatically be accompanied by electoral violence particularly in parts of Rift Valley. Therefore many people in the violence prone areas were expecting the electoral violence but it happened on a scale that was least expected (Oral interview with the Chief in Langalanga on 12th November 2012). The 2007 violence cycle was ignited by the disputed re-election of former President Kibaki whose election results were hotly disputed by the opposition party (ODM). The opposition claimed the election was manipulated and thus began a chain of violent reaction from ODM supporters against the Kikuyus and PNU supporters. When Kenyans in Nakuru municipality went into these elections they were pre-disposed to violence because they had been accustomed to it after every five years but the magnitude was overwhelming (focused discussion group in Whitehouse estate on 23rd October 2012).
4.7.2 Land Disputes

The issue of land ownership in Kenya’s fertile Rift Valley is another divisive factor that fuels the tensions between ethnic groups living in the area. Prior to colonialism, the pastoral Kalenjin and Maasai inhabited the Rift Valley area of Kenya. However, in 1915, British colonialists forced pastoral groups off the land, so they could develop the area agriculturally by planting cash crops like tea and coffee. The colonialists coerced thousands of Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo (all experienced farmers) to move to the Rift Valley to work on the farms. Over the first 20 years of the 20th century the traditional inhabitants of the Rift Valley, the Kalenjin and Maasai, were forcefully displaced from their homelands by the colonial administration. Soon, thousands of non-native Rift Valley dwellers with agricultural experience, like Kikuyu, settled in the Rift Valley. (Lendau et al 2009).

This shift in ownership of Kenya’s most fertile land is a key element of the ethnic tension between these groups. Majority of the respondents in this study clearly pointed out land as one of the major elements fueling electoral violence. Deprivation of land rights over a period of time has laid ground for ethnic conflicts in Kenya. Additionally, political control and rights have shaped the relationships among Kenya’s ethnic groups. Since independence in 1963 there have been four presidents of Kenya – Jomo Kenyatta (1964-78), Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002), Mwai Kibaki (2002-2012 and Uhuru Kenyatta (2012-present). Kenyatta was a Kikuyu and though he chose a Kalenjin, Daniel Moi, as his vice-president, he showed favoritism to his ethnic group. Similarly, Moi increasingly favored the Kalenjin during his presidency (Barman 1998).

The dispossessed and deprived communities continued to exist on the fringe of the economic arrangements even to this day. For example, much of the organized violence at Rift Valley
stemmed from the land dispute because Rift Valley was occupied by pastoralists, while the central highlands were occupied by the Kikuyu and other communities involved in agricultural activities Landau et al (2009). Further, the allocation of land by the authorities after independence was disproportionate and marginalized certain ethnic groups. The Kalenjin in particular felt that they had been schemed out in the land redistribution exercise and reacted violently displacing the Kikuyu in the process. The Kalenjin were of the view that the Kikuyu were allocated some of the fertile lands originally belonging to the Kalenjin. In search for redress, the Kalenjin then promised to return to the majimbo constitution in order to uproot the Kikuyu and reclaim their ancestral lands.

More intrinsically, Kenya’s land problem has been politically oriented and exploited for a long time and it again fuelled the 2007 post-election violence because of the competing inter-ethnic interests and claim to land that could not be accommodated or resolved by the political elites. It has been argued that since 1990s ‘certain leaders have exploited ethnic grievances over perceived historical injustices’ in Kenya and the 2007 incident was just another consequence of such machinations (Bayne, 2008). It has also been argued that a struggle over land has always been the characteristic of Kenya political life (Landau et al 2009). The land dispute also reflected in the 1992 and the 1997 violence, this indicates that the quest for land control is central to the political life of Kenya. As established by earlier researchers, those who participated in electoral violence had been made to believe that they were fighting for a just cause of reclaiming lost land (Bayne 2008). The way to access this deprived resource was to acquire political control by driving out those perceived not to be indigenous people (Landau et al 2009).
Other researchers like Bates (1989) trace Kenya's land disputes far back to pre-colonial era when powerful communities acquired the land of the less-privileged through conquests. It was a period like the state of nature as described by Thomas Hobbes - the Leviathan; the powerful groups dominated the weaker ones and appropriated their resources particularly grazing lands. The colonial masters aggravated the land problem by annexing from native Africans in parts of the country. Bates (1989) argues that during colonialism, the Kikuyu were forced to migrate out of their ancestral areas as a result of displacement by the white settlers and in return they settled in the Rift Valley. After independence, the Kikuyu remained in the Rift Valley thus settling there permanently.

Besides this, in pre-colonial times, land was communally owned and traditional rights and obligations ensured direct access to land by all the people in the community. Colonialism dismantled these relationships. Colonial authorities made assumptions that all land to which private ownership could not be established by documentary evidence was ownerless (Okoth Ogendo 1999). The colonial government went ahead and parceled out huge junk of land, including some of the most fertile land in Kenya, and earmarked them for cultivation by Europeans. These areas came to be known as the white highlands. Indigenous ethnic communities who had occupied these areas were relegated to reserves and all land not in their occupation was declared crown land. This resulted in overpopulation in the reserves and, as a result, significant numbers of people migrated to the Rift Valley province as squatters and to provide labour on settler farms. This migration to provide labour happened across communities including Kiukuyu, Luo, Luhya and even Kisii.

While creating white highlands, the colonialists limited access to land rights. When independence was won, and power was seized by a conservative fraction of Kenya's rural society, the first order of business was to settle issues of investment and private property,
including land rights. The Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu of the Rift Valley regarded the settler farms as their ancestral land and set out to protect it from squatters and migrants. It is important to note that many of the migrants individually or collectively through groups, bought land from white settlers and settled in areas outside their ancestral homes, in the Rift Valley (Lofchie, 1994). The land issue was never fully addressed. These unaddressed issues of land become the rallying call for ethnic mobilization during elections. This is supported by the findings of this study where vigilantes organized around ethnic identify were to engage in electoral violence and protect their ethnic group from attacks perpetuated by gangs from other ethnic groups. The sampled population in this study pointed out issues of land ownership as being a critical factor that is always exploited by politicians to mobilize ethnic followers to engage in electoral violence in the name of pursuing community land rights (oral interview with residents of London Estate on 28th November 2012).

The system adopted for land allocation in Rift Valley created perceived injustices and deprivations which manifested themselves in recurring cycles of violence throughout the country after every five years. The violence in the Rift Valley stemmed from the land dispute because Rift Valley was initially inhabited by pastoralists, while the central highlands were inhabited by mostly the Kikuyu and other communities who were agriculturalists. After independence land allocation procedure was disproportionate and marginalized certain ethnic groups. The Kalenjin reacted violently displacing many Kikuyus in the process. To remedy this situation, the Kalenjin advocated for a return to the majimbo constitution of 1963 in order to displace the immigrants from Rift Valley (Landau et al 2009). The disputes over land in Kenya have been politically oriented and exploited for a long time and contributed to the 2007/8 post-election violence due to competing inter-ethnic interests. This study found out that a struggle over land has always been the characteristic of Kenya political life (Landau et
The land dispute also reflected in the 1992 and the 1997 violence, this indicates that the quest for land control is central to the political life of Kenya.

The government established settlement schemes to re-settle landless squatters few years after independence. The settlement schemes thus provided fertile ground for ethnic animosities.

Land reform policies in Kenya have been based on free-market models emphasizing individual freeholder rights over customary tenure in the belief that this would encourage investments in farm productivity, and that land markets would emerge that would transfer land to more efficient farmers and provide farmers with collateral for raising credit. A clear understanding of the dynamics of land ownership in Kenya calls for a view of how land is categorized in Kenya. Kenya’s land is categorized as government land, freehold land, or trust land. Government land refers to all land that was vested in the crown during the colonial period. On independence, the land became vested in the government of Kenya. This process therefore dispossessed some communities of land that was previously under their use (Jonyo, 2003).

The Rift Valley is an expansive area covering about 40 percent of Kenya’s land mass, including some of Kenya’s most productive land. One of the objectives of the violence was to redistribute agricultural land by expropriating one ethnic group’s land and giving it to another (Calas, 2007). It was common, in political rallies that preceded the clashes as established by the majority of the respondents in this study, to hear the calls for the eviction of “outsiders” from the Rift Valley. From this study it is evident that land appropriation was indeed a motivating factor behind the electoral violence of 2007/08 in Nakuru Municipality. Given the importance and depth of land grievances, a widely held view is that land grievances were used for political mobilization. While it is the case that successful displacement of outsiders would make land available to members of the ethnic group
initiating the violence, there are no guarantees that those involved in the conflict would benefit themselves (Calas, 2007). Thus, the clashes involved serious collective action problems.

4.7.3 Politics of state control

In Kenya, belonging to the superior and government-favoured ethnic group gives one an edge over the less privileged tribes in accessing the political resources of the country. Political inequalities were some of the major causes of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. It was generally perceived that Kikuyu had been enjoying more of the political resources of Kenya before and after independence at the expense of other regions (Stewart, 2008). The attempt to correct the political imbalances in these arrangements between Kikuyu, the Kalenjin and the Luo resulted in violence. Since political dominance of one group over others often results in violence because of feelings of marginalization by the less-privileged group, Kenya had at all material time been a time bomb waiting to explode and had only had, what may at best be described as a lull or an uneasy peace

The politics of Kenya is the most important area to be considered when monitoring and forecasting ethnic conflict. According to (African Watch, 1993), since the 1991 constitutional reform there has been a clear correlation between elections and violence. The African Watch reported that the government had two strategies for using “ethnic cleansing” for political gain. First, violent attacks on large numbers of the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley prior to elections in 1991 and 1997 were intended to create a Kikuyu exodus from this area. By doing this, the Kikuyu (who supported the Opposition then) were to be displaced on Election Day and thus could not vote. Second, the ethnic cleansing after elections was intended to punish Kikuyus who did not vote for President Moi and his KANU party (Throup and Hornsby, 1998).
The scale of violence was much more widespread around the 1991 election, but there was a recurrence of violence before and after the 1997 election. In August of 1997, four months before the election, there was ethnic fighting in the Mombasa region, “The attacks began in mid-August with gangs of 200-500 people armed with guns, clubs, machetes and bows and arrows attacking villagers. Kikuyu, Luos, and Luhya were the main targets of the attacks, just as they were in the Rift Valley in 1992 (Calas 2007). Majority of the respondents in this study identified the same weapons being used during electoral violence and the same strategy of displacing ethnic groups so that they do not vote because of their political inclinations were at play during the electoral violence of 2007/08.

The struggle for political control also plays a pivotal role in electoral violence. Land and inter-ethnic hostilities, singularly or together, could not have led to the kind of atrocities witnessed in the Rift Valley and other parts of Kenya after the elections of 2007/8. The central rationale of the violence appears to have been to maintain the political status quo in the region during the run up to the general elections (African Watch report 1993). The main motivation behind the violence was to influence voting in favour of the incumbent or the preferred political leaders. This was done so that the political powerhouses could consolidate political power. Most electoral violence not only in Kenya but across Africa is defined by the reluctance of the incumbents to relinquish power. They would always want to cling on to power at all costs including fanning violence in order to retain political power. Electoral violence in Africa is mostly attributed to the failure of political institutions to accommodate diverse political interests (Murunga and Nasongo 2006). Before the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992, post independence Kenya was characterized by one-party rule and excessive centralization of power.
In such a scenario, the leader and group who capture the state power have control of an enormous amount of resources and thus can reward supporters, provide for group members, and create barriers to entry into political. Electoral violence in the Rift Valley was part of such a strategy. With the introduction of multiple parties, the ruling elite faced its biggest real challenge to monolithic power and access to state resources (African Watch 1993). This study found a high correlation between electoral violence and political change. The elites try to protect political control by use of violence against ethnic groups associated with the opposition. In Kenya, as in many Sub-Saharan African countries, the state control over the economy is so entrenched and the premium for controlling political power is so high that political parties and ethnic groups are willing to pay whatever it costs to acquire or have meaningful access to the state. This includes mobilization of followers to mete out violence on perceived non supporters. Most respondents in this study expressed their perceptions of accessing favours when their political leaders acquire political dominance.

The electioneering process is very costly in all elections across the world. Most staunch businessmen and women would align themselves with political parties to bankroll the election campaign with a view of being rewarded when their candidates are declared winners. These rewards come in form of contracts and appointments to key state positions. Therefore, defeat in a political competition would have an impact on financial fortunes. Given such expectations, it would appear rational for political entrepreneurs to resort to extreme measures to maintain the status quo (Calas 2007). This study established that politicians acquired a political advantage through the physical displacement of a hostile community vote and that the pro-government elite emerged as the ultimate beneficiaries of the violence (Oral interview with business people in Central Business District on 03rd December 2012). Figure 1.0 below demonstrates how followers of political elites in Nakuru Municipality believed
political incitement that was coupled with ethnicity played a role in the electoral violence of 2007/8.

Figure 7. Perceptions of ethnic incitement as a factor in electoral violence.

Out of the 40 respondents sampled from every cluster of this study, politics and political incitement that is anchored on ethnicity was established as the major cause of electoral violence in Nakuru Municipality. Politicians invoke ethnic stereotypes to fuel ethnic sentiments that lead to ethnic clashes during the electioneering process. This incitement takes various forms like labeling the ethnic group as unintelligent, low class or favoured and privileged in society thus entrenching feeling of deprivation as postulated by Robert Merton in the Relative Deprivation Theory.

Political parties are by and large ethnic groupings because they displayed a clear ethnic character in 2007/08, with the ODM being the party of the Luo, Kalenjin and Luhya. On the
other hand (PNU) being the party for the Central Kenya and Upper Eastern inhabitants (Atanda 2011). Violence was aimed at disrupting the registration of voters before the elections and preventing thousands of those opposed to the ruling elite in the conflict areas from voting and thus ensuring a favorable outcome for the dominant party. Violence was designed to instill such anxiety as to cause a sufficient number of people to abandon their homes, thereby giving the ruling elite a head start in elections. The fear of numbers in politics was thus terrifying thus political competition was a credible explanation of ethnic violence. The most compelling argument for the ethnic clashes is political expediency. Political elites sought to create instability in some regions primarily to win the presidency.

4.7.4 Economic Deprivation

Before the promulgation of the new constitution in August 2010 that created devolution, in Kenya, belonging to the superior and government-favoured ethnic groups gave one an edge over the less privileged ethnic groups in accessing the economic resources of the country. Economic inequalities were one of the major causes of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. It was generally perceived that Kikuyu had been enjoying more of the economic and political resources of Kenya before and after independence at the expense of other ethnic groups (Stewart, 2009). The attempt to correct the economic imbalances in these arrangements between Kikuyu, the Kalenjin and the Luo resulted in violence in earlier elections of 1992 and 1997. Since economic dominance of one group over others often results in violence because of feelings of marginalization and relative deprivation by the less-privileged group, Kenya had at all material time been a time bomb waiting to explode.
The Kikuyu were the first to embrace capitalism and were able to exploit the opportunities created by the independence government. They were the leading beneficiaries of small holder credit schemes and held the majority of senior civil service jobs as a result of their education opportunities (Leys 1975). Politicians exploited sentiments of economic discrimination or dominance of one ethnic group by another. It should also be noted that, besides being at the forefront of the independence struggle, the ethnic communities targeted in the violence were the ones most involved in the market economy because other communities felt economically deprived. Research findings indicate that ethnic violence was primarily being engineered by incumbents to influence the voting patterns in key and strategic areas. Once the incumbents achieved their goals, the conflict was no longer necessary. Warring groups in the 2007/8 general election could identify with each other in terms of economic marginalization of ethnic groups as supported by relative deprivation theory postulated by Merton.

Economic inequality is one of the major concerns in political economics. It is widely accepted that an inequitable distribution of resources and wealth will provoke violent rebellion. Cramer (2005) says that in order to understand the link from inequality to ethnic violence, it is important to study factors that produce and underpin inequality within ethnic groups and how they might relate to ethnic violence. Greed and grievances are motivations for ethnic violence in society. The concept of grievance is also related to the theory of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation focuses on the frustration engendered by current deprivation relative not necessarily to others within a polity, but to what people perceive as justifiable. Even with a fairly even distribution of goods, assets and even opportunities, an ethnic group could still be marked by frustration among the people if their perceptions would ask for more wealth. Relative deprivation often results from vertical (class) or horizontal (regional or communal) inequality. The theory of relative deprivation links inequality to
grievance. The ethnic electoral violence of 2007/8 was largely based on the communal element of Relative Deprivation.

According to Nafziger and Auvinen (2002), vertical inequality is reduced to income, assets or land ownership. The concept of horizontal inequality, however, takes a broader view and tries to assess heterogeneous distribution of various traits. Horizontal inequality denotes the inequality between ethnic or religious groups, or regions in a country. Stewart (2009) distinguishes four kinds of horizontal inequality as follows; Economic horizontal inequalities which include inequalities in access to and ownership of assets. In addition, they comprise inequalities in income levels and employment opportunities, which depend on such assets and the general conditions of the economy. Secondly, is the social horizontal inequalities which comprise inequalities in access to a range of services, such as education, health care and housing, as well as in educational and health status.

Thirdly are the political horizontal inequalities which include inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and power among groups, including control over the presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the bureaucracy, local and regional governments, the army and the police. They also encompass inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically and to express their needs. Finally, are the cultural horizontal inequalities which include disparities in the recognition and standing of different groups' languages, customs, norms and practices. These are the inequalities that were greatly suffered by ethnic groups in Nakuru. These same inequalities were greatly exploited by scheming politicians to rally their ethnic group followers to engage in electoral violence. A large number of the respondents in this study indicated that key businesses in the county are controlled by one ethnic community as indicated below.
4.7.5 Community controlling business in the County

Figure 8. Control of business by communities

Stewart (2000) suggests that there are often mutual differences of economic nature between groups that cause the mobilization of members of a group for violence. Every category of horizontal inequality comprises several elements, more or less relevant in creating grievance. Inequality in terms of income might be of greater importance in creating grievance as it directly leads to disadvantages in the affected group and most likely also to lead to more radical and violent reactions. Political inequalities also often lead to economic or social inequalities as politicians favour their own constituencies, which especially in ethnically divided societies belong to their own ethnic group or affiliated groups. Biased distribution of government jobs, infrastructure, education or health is common with the group in power discriminating in its favour. Furthermore, the distribution of public assets and services also affects inequalities in private assets as state resources help fostering success in private accumulation (Stewart 2000). In this context education plays an important role as a means of favouring one group over another. First, it is often easy to direct it to certain groups, be it ethnic or religious groups or a certain region. Second, education also leads to economic inequalities as better educated people have better access to jobs and are generally more
successful. The less successful groups suffer Relative Deprivation in society as postulated by Robert Merton and established by the findings of this study.

Horizontal inequalities create grievances among a certain ethnic group thus forming a "collective grievance", which is a motivational mechanism, emerging collectively in a disadvantaged ethnic group. Another indicator of economic inequality established by this research in Nakuru Municipality is poverty. Poverty was depicted in this municipality by massive unemployment, availability of illicit brews, poor housing and a disorganized social environment with lack of access to social amenities like drainage among others.

With regard to poverty as an independent contributing factor to the outbreak of ethnic violence in electoral processes one needs to take the predominant structural characteristics of resource allocation and wealth accumulation within ethnic communities into account (Newman, 2004). Once group identity and poverty are linked, or a perception of discriminatory treatment can be discerned, the propensity towards violence against other groups becomes apparent. In general terms poverty can be labeled as a possible mobilising factor on condition that it overlaps with group identity as established by this study. When poverty is conceived as the end result of a conscious political process by which specific groups are marginalized or deprived of their resource base its mobilising capacity increases manifold.

Newman (2004) also established, through vast works of research that economic stratification of society occurs when the ruling class occupying the advantaged positions in society exploit those in the weaker strata of society by controlling prices of essential basic commodities. This leads to a situation where those in the lesser strata of society are perpetually dependant on those in the higher strata. This creates resentment as poverty levels rise in the lower strata
laying the foundation for rebellion and violence. As established by Newman (2004), this study also established the presence of this resentment in society which is exploited by politicians to galvanize communities along ethnic lines and plant seeds of ethnic animosity that manifests itself in form of electoral violence.

4.7.6 Impunity and the media.

Impunity characterizes the political life of most African countries (Landau et al 2009; Ellis, 1994). Since the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1992, impunity has been prevalent in the case of Kenya just as many other African countries experiencing political transition from authoritarian regimes to multi-party democracy. Impunity has characterized the political scene of Kenya since the emergence of multi-party democracy in the 1990s and this has encouraged violence during elections. The inability of the government to hold the perpetrators of the 1990s violence accountable under the regime of president Moi has bred a culture of impunity in Kenya's political history (CIPEV, 2009). This has encouraged some politicians to incite their followers to violence and manipulate electoral process without ever being prosecuted. Hence a recurring cycle of violence has become a permanent feature of Kenya's electioneering. Indigenous and vernacular media houses were accused by reports like the CIPEV report of having fuelled the ethnic tensions by encouraging violent acts especially at the height of the violence. It is on this basis that Sang of Kass fm found himself at the International Criminal Court (ICC) having been accused of crimes against humanity perpetrated out of the pronouncements from the radio station.

4.7.7 Class war

The concept of class refers to the social stratification in which people are grouped into a set of hierarchical social categories defined as upper, middle and lower classes. This social stratification is largely defined by ones relationship to the factor of production. The
magnitude of vandalism that occurred during 2007/8 electoral violence could be described as class war in Kenya. In a society where the gap between the rich and the poor is very wide like Kenya, situations of chaos and anarchy often present people with an opportunity to unleash their economic and social grievances to the rest of the people in the community particularly the high class in society. Unemployment, illiteracy, and impoverishment drove many youth to crime and violence (Obonyo, 2008). The active participation of youth in the violence could be a reflection of the harsh socio-economic conditions of many youths in Kenya. They were thus amenable to incitement to violence by unscrupulous politicians and perpetrated violent acts of vandalism and looting in urban areas. The figure below illustrates the composition of the people who participated in the electoral violence Figure 9. The youths' participation in electoral violence.
Source; Figures from data collected during research

An observation of figure 2 above clearly indicates that the ethnic gangs that perpetrated electoral violence in the election of 2007/8 were largely composed of the youth in society.

The photo above was shared by a respondent that was privileged to capture the photo at the peak of the violence. The unemployed youth are easily manipulated by political elites and in a situation of total chaos they can easily direct their violence to other members in society who hold higher social strata in society as established by this research. Towards the peak of the conflict the gangs the attacks took the dimension of class consciousness. Such situation can easily degenerate into a class war as the youths target the rich regardless of the ethnic inclinations. One respondent in the cluster of London shared with the researchers a photo of the gang composed of youths which he took at the peak of the post election violence in Nakuru County. The gangs were composed of young people and they were used to commit heinous crimes against other residents in the county.
4.7.8 Ethnicity in Electoral Violence

Defining ethnicity, while extremely difficult, is essential to understanding the nature of ethnic conflict. Most generally, it is described as an association based on common racial or cultural traits. Giddens et al (2007), notes that conflicts around the world are increasingly based on ethnic divisions. A tiny proportion of wars are fought between states. The vast majority are civil wars with ethnic dimensions. Ethnic conflicts attract international attention. International war crimes tribunals have been convened to investigate and try those responsible for ethnic cleansing in countries like Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The electoral violence of 2007/8 in Kenya attracted the attention of the international community too leading to the intervention of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to try those suspected to be behind the violence.

As observed by Giddens et al (2007), this study also confirmed that the electoral violence that culminated into the worst conflict in the history of Kenya was perpetuated on ethnic lines.

Ethnic marginalization plays a key role in the outbreak of electoral violence in Kenya particularly so when it is amplified by the political elites aspiring for political power. In order to grasp the role of ethnicity in Kenyan electioneering process this study got an overview of ethnicity through research interviews. The Kenyan population consists of over 38 million people, representing over 42 different ethnic groups. The largest group, Kikuyu, comprises seventeen per cent of the population. During the colonial era, British administrators capitalized on a complex network of tribal relations to amass land and centralize power drawing political districts that somewhat mirrored ethnic boundaries. Although political
conflicts in Kenya were as a result of ethnic cleavages and long standing inter-ethnic animosities, such polarization was not altogether common. Typically co-existence between various ethnic groups was the norm with a significant portion of the Kenyan population residing in ethnically integrated urban communities (Murunga and Nasongo, 2006).

The practice of ethnic patronage is an increasingly popular tool by which politicians mobilized ethnic groups. The practice became especially common under the presidency of Daniel arap Moi and the transition to a multi-party system in the early 1990s. In recent years, the country's elite have connected ethnic identities to land politics and economic factors while inciting followers to engage in hate speech and violence. For example, violence between pastoral communities in the Rift Valley adopted an ethnic dimension in “highly politicized claims to land” (Kangwanja, 1998). In other areas like the Tana River District, minor disputes over grazing rights and cattle raids between Pokomo agriculturalists and the semi nomadic Ormo communities resulted in casualties that are tied to 2013 elections. Although land disputes or economic disparities were underlying factors, political elites convinced the population that ethnic divisions were to blame for their grievances. The census of 2009 produced the ethnic distribution of Kenya as shown below.
Table 1.0 Ethnic distribution of Kenya in 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY ETHNIC GROUPS</th>
<th>% OF POPULATION</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER (2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6,622,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5,338,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>4,967,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4,044,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3,893,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyan Somali</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2,385,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meru</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1,658,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9,073,372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kenya Bureau of Statistics. 2009 Census
Table 2.0 Ethnic Affiliations of Key Political Leaders in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Leader</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mwai Kibaki</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>PNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raila Odinga</td>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>ODM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalonzo Musyoka</td>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>ODM Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uhuru Kenyatta</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>Stepped Down for Kibaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Ruto</td>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>ODM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that the compositions of these parties are a reflection of entrenched ethnicity in Kenya. The leaders of these political parties command ethnic followings. The alliances of political parties were in essence alliances of ethnic groupings to wrestle political power for the purpose of sharing among themselves the political and government positions. This was to be done at the expense of other ethnic groups thus leading to Relative Deprivation in society which was the defining framework of the electoral violence.

Kenya is ethnically diverse with over 42 distinct ethnic groups with a strong ethnic identification. Collier (2001) observes that the ethnicity and kin groups are the most powerful levels of social identity. Collective action problems are solved through ethnic identification, which can have negative implications for those who do not belong to the collectivity. Electoral violence was organized along ethnic lines; therefore ethnic clashes in Nakuru Municipality were as the result of “ethnic hatred” amongst ethnic communities, resentment and mistrust amongst ethnic communities. Immediately after Independence fears of ethnic
ascendancies, power-hungry ethnic political elites, undemocratic processes and institutions, which are all hallmarks of today's Kenya, begun to play out. The 2007 election fiasco exposed the deliberate stoking of ethnic tensions. This factor was one of the major causes of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya (Stewart, 2009). What began as a reaction to a fraudulent election soon transformed into ethnic violence because of perceived discrimination, injustices and inequality in the allocation of resources among the different ethnic groups.

Like is the case in many African countries for instance Burundi and Rwanda this factor is a simmering danger. The 'demonization of the other' in Kenya often led to vengeful violence between ethnic groups especially the Kalenjin and Kikuyu. Just like the dispute between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi respectively, politicians in Kenya politicized the existing differences between the ethnic groups rather than emphasizing the areas of common interests as unifying factors between groups to foster harmonious co-existence. It has been argued that "ethnic loyalty and coherence has been a central feature to Kenyan politics since independence. Control of the state is core to political competition because it means access to and disposal of resources, and patronage through which ethnic elites can remain in power" (Kamungi, 2001)

This is evidenced in the differences between different ethnic groups where the Gikuyu Embu and Meru Association (GEMA) occupied the most productive areas of the country during the Kenyatta regime while the Kalenjin Maasai Turkana Samburu Association (KAMATUSA) occupied the less productive area. Also, the Kalenjin ethnic group consolidated themselves in power during the reign of Arap Moi. Kenyans were made to grow accustomed to a fact of their national life - that some ethnic groups were superior to others and thus should be
entitled to better social, economic and political benefits in the national equation (Calas, 2007). The resulting inequity and injustice, frustration and animosity are what have haunted Kenya every five years in the form of electoral violence as demonstrated by this study. Kenya is an excellent case study in the myriad difficulties that multi-ethnic states face during the processes of development and democratization. To understand the Kenyan ethnic violence of the 2007/8, it is necessary to analyze Kenya’s diverse ethnic makeup, as well as a brief history from colonization through modern times.

Figure 3.0 Ethnic groups of Kenya as reflected in the 2009 census.

![Figure 3.0](image)


Figure 3.0 above illustrates that the Kikuyu ethnic group is the most common ethnic group in Kenya. While the Kikuyu are the majority in Kenya (22%), they have been increasingly victimized by the minority Kalenjin, who make up 12% of the population. It is an oversimplification to say that the ethnic violence has been one ethnic group victimizing another. Nonetheless, armed Kalenjin attacking, displacing, or killing the Kikuyu make up
the majority of the ethnic violence in Kenya. Electoral violence that erupts after every five years borrows heavily from the first two leaders of this country and some key events that contributed to ethnic animosity in this country as captured by discussion groups conducted for the purpose of this study.

Table 3. An historical overview of key events that contributed to the ethnic violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>British colonialists disallowed Africans from owning land in the Rift Valley. This created the “White Highlands” for colonial cash crops while displacing thousands of nomadic Africans like the Kalenjin and the Maasai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-56</td>
<td>This time is known as the Mau Mau Insurrection which was a Kikuyu civil war and an attack on the colonial administration. 13,000 Africans were killed by the British while suppressing the uprising.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Kenya became independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Republic of Kenya declared and Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, became president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin, became vice president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>President Kenyatta dies and Daniel Moi is sworn in as president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Throughout the 1980s Moi tightened his grip on power and began committing human rights violations by detaining opponents and banning newspapers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Constitutional reform passed allowing for multi-partyism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>A multi-party election was held under Moi rule. Moi won with 36% of the vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Another multi-party election was held under Moi regime and Moi is re-elected for a final term with 40% of the vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>General election contested by Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki. Results are contested by Raila Amolo Odinga.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above gives an outline of some important events that need to be considered when assessing the nature of the electoral violence in Kenya. When colonialists created the modern states of Africa, ethnic groups were included or excluded by arbitrary boundary lines that did not consider traditional ethno-geographic spaces. Kenya’s ethnicity has pre-colonial origins in ethnically homogeneous geographical spaces and occasional ethnic conflicts (Landau et al, 2009). It also has roots in a colonial policy of divide and rule, through ethnically defined administrative jurisdictions. The arbitrary boundaries drawn by colonial administrations and
the attempt to unify multi-ethnic areas into a single modern state were both significant forces that have antagonized Kenyan ethnic relations.

The issue of land ownership in Kenya’s fertile Rift Valley is a very divisive factor that fuels the tensions between ethnic groups living in the area. Prior to colonialism, the pastoral Kalenjin and Maasai inhabited the Rift Valley area of Kenya. However, the British colonialists forced pastoral groups off the land, so they could develop the area agriculturally by planting cash crops like tea and coffee. The colonialists coerced thousands of the Kikuyu, the Kisii, the Luhya, and the Luo to move to the Rift Valley to work on the farms. Soon, thousands of non-native Rift Valley dwellers with agricultural experience, like Kikuyu, settled in the Rift Valley. This shift in ownership of Kenya’s most fertile land is a key element of the ethnic electoral violence in Kenya (Obonyo, 2008)

Political power and rights have shaped the relationships among Kenya’s ethnic groups. Under the country’s first president Jomo Kenyatta, much of the Kalenjin land was taken by agriculturalists, mainly the Kikuyu, and the Kalenjin suffered great poverty and social disorganization. After 1992 there was a shift in ethnic favoritism by Moi. This political favoritism is a primary reason why democratization in multi-ethnic states, that have no history of a central government, often leads to conflict (Lofchie, 1994). Ethnic groups that have traditionally ruled themselves and occupied their historical lands are often unwilling to cooperate with a central government that is headed by someone from a different ethnic group. In Kenya, political favoritism has proven to be unavoidable, so Kenyans invariably support the political candidate of their own ethnic group in such a way that each of the main opposition parties is organized, largely along ethnic lines. Moi argued that Kenya’s multi-ethnic nature was not ready for democracy and that multi-partyism would cause unrest and
civil violence between ethnicities. Immediately following the multiparty election of 1992, Kenya became engulfed in ethnic clashes.

If indeed the government instigated the ethnic clashes between Kikuyu and Kalenjin, it changes the entire nature of the conflict. This fact brings into the picture the idea of ethnic manipulation by political elites. In Kenya a political elite representative fills in the missing links in the follower’s fragmented understanding of political opportunity and broadens their sense of grievance. The findings of this study further pointed to the fact that ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley were the desire of the Kalenjin to displace Kikuyus who they felt were wrongfully occupying traditional Kalenjin land.

4.8 Impact of Electoral violence on Ethnic relations in Nakuru county.

The consequences of 2007 Kenya post-election violence cannot be overemphasized. However, the magnitude of internally displaced persons who are a direct consequence of the violence is far larger than those of the 1990s (Kamugi, 2008). These Internally Displaced persons living in squalid conditions are relatives and friends of the rest of Kenyans in this country.

4.8.1 Ethnic animosity due to Displacement of Communities

The violence left hundreds of thousands of people displaced or uprooted from their home or place of habitual residence. Due to the ethnic dimension of the violence, persons of certain ethnic groups fearing attacks or reprisals were forced to flee thus culminating in massive removal of people. For instance, the Kalenjin attack on Kikuyus and PNU supporters in the Rift Valley and other places forced members of the attacked group to move. This kind of displacement also occurred in the violent clashes of the 1990s and not all the displaced
persons have been able return (Bayne, 2008). IDP camps are still present in most parts of Rift Valley and Central part of Kenya.

This has destroyed ethnic relations in the larger rift valley and the entire Kenya since those languishing in IDP camps are family members of some other Kenyans in this country. This population displacement has generated a lot of ethnic animosity in this country and most people are forced to consider which part of the municipality they choose to settle. This is illustrated by the findings tabulated in the table below.

Table 4. Respondents who expressed caution in site selection for settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estate</th>
<th>Number of Respondents who expressed caution on choosing where to stay.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Langalanga</td>
<td>37 Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>32 Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabaab</td>
<td>29 Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>33 Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwa Rhoda</td>
<td>38 Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umoja (Lanet)</td>
<td>36 Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Area</td>
<td>35 Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiamunyi</td>
<td>26 Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racecourse</td>
<td>25 Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariakani</td>
<td>30 Respondents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Majority of the respondents expressed concerns in choice of the area for settlement within the estates of the Municipality. This is an indication that some estates are classified by the respondents as unsafe for particular ethnic groupings. This is based on the fact that those particular ethnic groupings were targeted for electoral violence in those particular estates. An analysis of these responses indicates a high rate of cautiousness in estates that have the highest number of slum dwellers like Kwa Rhoda and Langalanga. This could be attributed to the fact that these two estates experienced vicious electoral violence thus they were the most affected.

Other than being cautious in choosing which estate of the town is safe for particular ethnic groupings most respondents indicated that many people who felt unsafe in particular estates of the Municipality actually relocated to other parts of the town. This relocation was captured as indicated in the table below.

Table 5. Cases of people who relocated from their areas of residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estate</th>
<th>No. of respondents who reported that people relocated from estates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Langalanga</td>
<td>29 relocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>13 relocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabaab</td>
<td>14 relocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>06 relocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwa Rhoda</td>
<td>23 relocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umoja (Lanet)</td>
<td>21 relocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Area</td>
<td>09 relocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiamunyi</td>
<td>07 relocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racecourse</td>
<td>05 relocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariakani</td>
<td>17 relocations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From these statistics, it is evident that the electoral violence of 2007/8 greatly affected ethnic relations. Ethnic mistrust heightened because neighbours who had lived peacefully turned against each other despite the fact that the communities had co-existed peacefully for many years. The turn of events created a lot of fear and mistrust to the level where people with certain level of ethnic backgrounds were forced to relocate from certain estates for fear of recurrent attacks. Electoral violence was high in slum areas forcing most people to flee from these particular areas.

The violence was vicious in these slum areas because due to the social strata they hold in society they felt exposed to great deprivation by the establishment. This deprivation makes them susceptible to political manipulation on the basis of their relative deprivation as postulated by Robert Merton.

4.8.2 Mistrust due to Destruction of Community Development Projects

There cannot be meaningful development where insecurity is the order of the day. As observed by Atanda (2008), chaos, anarchy, insecurity and the widespread nature of violence the world over, has had a debilitating effect on the economies. Likewise, Nakuru Municipality which depends heavily on its trade industry suffered as a result of the electoral violence. It is inconceivable that business would thrive in an atmosphere of violence and insecurity. The financial loss is evidence of the price the Kenyan economy has to pay in terms of development. The research findings attest to the fact that most business men and women in Nakuru Municipality relocated their businesses from certain areas that they thought were not safe to their ethnic community. In Lanet for instance, grocery stalls belonging the Luo and the Luhya were completely destroyed while the owners were driven out of Lanet. This destruction was perpetuated by gangs of the Kikuyu youth who were contacting retaliatory attacks. The western part of Nakuru is greatly preferred by non-Kikuyu residents
and businessmen compared to other parts of the Municipality. The same goes to choice of residential areas in this municipality. The inhabitants of this municipality carefully choose their areas of residence as a result of the 2007/8 electoral violence. Those who had already constructed houses in areas that are no longer safe and were lucky enough to escape the destruction no longer trust their neighbours. The same applies to community development projects and businesses set up community-based organizations. Most are contemplating relocation to safer areas. This electoral violence therefore heightened the level of ethnic mistrust amongst the communities in this municipality.

4.8.3 Organized Ethnic Militarization of society:

Another effect of the 2007/8 electoral violence is that a lot of firearms were surreptitiously released into the society and with the end of the crisis these arms could have found their way into the hands of unscrupulous persons who might engage in criminal activities. An increase in crime-wave was immediately reported as a result of the proliferation of these firearms and other dangerous weapons. This raised new security challenges for the Municipality and the Kenyan nation at large. What most people went through during the 2007/8 electoral violence taught them a lesson to prepare because most people were suggesting that the violence got them unawares. This preparation for violence during future elections leads to militarization of society in anticipation of violence and heightens ethnic hatred and animosity.

Deprivation may sow the seeds for ethnic conflict, but it does not independently drive individuals to violent means. As explained by Bardham (1996), failed economic policies often provide the context of despair and desperation which encourages the channeling of frustrations on ethnic lines. Ethnicity thus provides the mechanism for groups and political leaders to mobilize in pursuit of their common interests when the actual source of turmoil is
relative deprivation in society. There are several factors that affect the degree to which ethnicity is used for mobilization and militarization of society. This is what is defined by Gurr (1993) as the extent to which group members are prepared to commit their energies and resources to collective action on behalf of their common interests. Political elites in society capitalize on the despair within their communities to mobilize their people and assist them to acquire arms with the belief that they need the arms to protect themselves from aggression threats posed by other ethnic groups. This leads to the formation of vigilantes by warring communities within Nakuru municipality to keep watch over the security of their ethnic groups as confirmed by the findings of this study. The degree of ethnic diversity and the prowess of political leaders are two especially important elements of the mobilization process. The combination of a strong sense of group identity and common interests underpins powerful political movements and sustained conflict whenever it can be organized and focused by group leaders who give plausible expression to minority peoples’ grievances and aspirations. (Keen 1993)

4.8.4 Increased poverty and crime

Although crime, poverty, prostitution and other forms of social malaise had been a part of the Kenyan society like most African societies (Giddens, 2007), but there was a surge in the number of beggars, thieves, prostitutes and other destitute people as a result of the 2007/8 electoral violence. The electoral ethnic violence increased the economic strains on citizens’ welfare and the impact of this will be felt in years to come (Mukinda, 2008). Most Kenyans who were well established in their homes and businesses suffered huge losses as a result of electoral violence. Most of them could not even meet the basic needs of their families because their poverty thereby depended on handouts for survival unlike where they fended for themselves before the out break of electoral violence.
Human rights violations also accompanied the electoral violence of 2007/8 in Nakuru Municipality. People who were exposed to violations like gang rape suffered psychologically and these painful experiences can only be treated by professional psychological counselors. In the absence of such help the victims may live in a state hopelessness and thus engage in criminal activities. The strain theory by Robert Merton postulates that society has set standards and definitions of success that it expects of all people to attain and yet it does not provide equal access to the means to acquire those standards (Giddens, 2007). To remain relevant in the eyes of the society some people will resort to unorthodox means including crime to meet their needs and achieve success in society. Most of the people who lost their property during the ethnic violence most likely to used crime as a safety valve to a decent living. The photo on the right was shared by a respondent in Lanet.

4.9 Measures in place to address electoral violence

4.9.1 Decentralization of power and resources

The new constitution enshrined separation of powers in all the arms of government. These arms of government are The Executive, The Judiciary and the National Assembly and the Senate. The Executive is the arm of Government headed by the President. The new Constitution identifies the Executive composed of: the President, the Deputy President, The Attorney General and the Cabinet Secretaries. It retains the powers of the President as Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Kenya Defense Forces. Under the new Constitution, the President chairs cabinet meetings, directs and coordinates functions
of government ministries and departments. Unlike in the old Constitution, the President is required to seek the approval of parliament when appointing Cabinet Secretaries, the Attorney-General, and the Secretary to the Cabinet, Principal Secretaries, high commissioners, ambassadors, and diplomatic and consular representatives. This constitutional requirement provides a safeguard against impunity where these positions were initially used to reward ethnic sycophants at the expense of other merited personalities from other ethnic communities (Atanda, 2008).

This requirement strengthens the role of parliament in the appointment process of key positions that have political bearing and also checks the powers of the President. The new Constitution provides that the President and Cabinet Secretaries will not hold any other state office. This implies that both the President and Cabinet Secretaries will not be Members of the Parliament. This provision seeks to separate the roles of parliament and the executive, and enhances the role of parliament to check the executive. Under the old Constitution, the President and Cabinet Secretaries were also Members of Parliament. The new Constitution sets the number of cabinet secretaries to between 14 and 22. This is in contrast to the old constitution that did not limit the number of cabinet ministers which enabled the appointment of a bloated cabinet to reward ethnic loyalists thus creating a government of exclusion. The new Constitution further requires that appointments of cabinet secretaries be done to reflect ethnic and regional diversity (The Constitution of Kenya of August 2010)

The Constitution further provides for a majority president by requiring a winning presidential candidate to secure more than half of the total votes cast in an election and at least 25% of the votes cast in a majority of the counties. This contrasts with the old constitution that only requires a winning presidential candidate to attain a simple majority and at least 25% of the votes cast in at least 5 provinces. This provision lays the ground for
the election of the most popular president across the country. The new Constitution establishes the office of a Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) who is responsible for instituting, undertaking, taking over and discontinuing criminal proceedings. This function had traditionally been the responsibility of the Attorney-General who is also an ex-officio member of the National Assembly and cabinet. This has managed to decentralize power and ensure proper vetting of appointees to these positions to reflect the diversity of Kenya and ensure meritocracy.

Therefore the President must be the preferred candidate for majority of all voters who have cast their votes. This provision prevents the possibility of a minority president who could be subjected to dissenting views that could lead to a rejection of results and subsequent electoral violence. The President-elect cannot be sworn in before resolution of petition challenging the election. The powers of President are limited and additional checks for transparency introduced through the requirement to have parliament approve key appointments. The president elect cannot appoint judges; constitutional and public officer holders nominate or dismiss ministers and ambassadors during transition to new president. This curbs impunity of rewarding chief campaigners. Outgoing president cannot seek to reward friends or supporters, or destabilize incoming government by appointing his/her cronies during transition period between two governments (The Constitution of Kenya of August 2010).

Regional and ethnic diversity in the national executive promotes national cohesion. Devolution has also established county governments and the county assemblies whose structure has empowered the people to chart their own course in the path of development. The county under the county government headed by the governor receives a share of the national government resources regardless of how the people in the county voted during elections. These resources together with the equalization fund have devolved funds closer to the
people. The sweeping changes and checks brought by the new constitution if well implemented will check the excesses of the executive and mitigate ethnic grievances (The Constitution of Kenya of August 2010).

4.9.2 Reform of institutions

After the December 2007 post-election violence where more than one thousand three hundred people lost their life, an agreement was made amongst the feuding political parties to revise Kenya’s constitution, specifically to reduce the authoritarian powers of the president, and on August 4, 2010, a strong majority of Kenyans rallied behind a new constitution, designed to do just that. Over 67 percent of the voting population approved the new constitution, whose implementation is expected to produce a fairer system of governance and finally establish and protect multi-party democracy in Kenya. In order to effectively pursue the reform process, the Kenyan government created the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) in January 2011. The CIC is responsible for advocating for and tracking the passage of constitutional legislation in Parliament. The CIC releases quarterly reports tracking the progress of legislation.

Commission Bill All these bills have been drafted into law thus creating key institutions that will ensure equal access to opportunities and equal distribution of the resources of this country. The commissioners to all these constitutional bodies are vetted through parliament and the final appointment is structured to reflect the diversity of the Kenyan ethnic communities.

4.9.3 Peace Initiatives/Sensitization of communities


It is apparent that each of these organizations has deep, long-term commitments to justice, peace, and stability in Kenya. The commitments are lived out by work that is innovative, courageous, and responsive to the needs of various communities and cultures. The analysis of the causes and effects of various conflicts within Kenya has become deeper and more complex as these groups penetrate deeper into society. In the early days, analysis tended to be
fairly narrow: perpetrators versus victims, or government versus opposition politics, without a lot of discussion about historical processes and community realities (Bayne, 2008). That has changed, so that much of the discussion does not focus on right or wrong, perpetrators or victims, but on the cultural, economic, religious, and political realities in which individuals and communities find themselves today. The groups in general are quite sure of their roles and the future of their work. The groups are self-confident that Kenyans are now in charge of the peace-building agenda for Kenya. The groups have in large part turned their focus to communities. Much of the work has focused on the village, urban neighborhood, and small community level, with work on the district, and national levels growing out of understandings learned within the communities. Some of the groups have begun work with local politicians, members of parliament, and government administrators in the peace processes, growing out of their work within the groups (Otieno, 2008).

Work on the district, provincial, national, and international levels has been done by several of the groups. However, this work seems firmly rooted in the learnings, understandings, and realities of the community-based work that remains the heart of the work of these local and national peace groups. The political changes toward democratization in Kenya have opened up spaces for the development of civil society, including peace organizations. Although the democratization process in Kenya has been less than perfect, it has allowed the growth of civil society work like that of the peace groups. The overt violence of the early 2007/8 made a deep impression on Kenyans psyches, in that the long-simmering, underground ethnic conflicts could no longer be ignored. The Kenyan understanding of themselves as a peaceful people was shaken. This too provided space for discussion and action thus the willingness to work with a variety of peace-building organizations (Landau et al, 2009).
4.9.4 Resettlement of IDPS

The government has organized a number of policy papers on IDP resettlement for implementation. The policy was almost entirely drafted and driven by the civil society and other international organizations. This means that it mainly reflects interests that might not be "nationalistic" or considered of national interest (Kamugi, 2008). The government lacked (and to a great extent), still lacks the technical expertise to not only draft such a policy but more importantly the expertise and also the political will to implement it. The fact that it was mainly drafted by the NGOs, civil society and other UN agencies might make it hard for the government to own the policy even though the government has been involved in the latter stages of its formulation. The second major weakness of the Draft IDP policy is the manner in which IDPs have been conceptualized by the government, which is different from the approach the policy takes, which might cause significant problems in implementation (Refugee Review Tribunal, 2008). The Government's approach to displacement has been as part of disaster management and hence all aspects of displacements have been handled as aspects of disaster management. As an aspect of disaster management, government's actions on IDPs have therefore tended to be reactive (and in many cases the government acts to provide them with make shift accommodation, blankets, and food.

Many of the actions by the government on IDPs and other aspects of displacement have bordered on mere public relations exercises. The governments approach to IDPs contrasts much with the approach of the civil society and the other major drivers of the policy. Unlike the government that has traditionally looked at displacement as an aspect of disaster management (and hence a problem of a short term nature and with a short term solution), the civil society and the other major non-governmental drivers of the policy view displacement in general, and IDPs in participation, as a governance problem. To the civil society, the problem
of IDPs is a problem that has resulted from poor governance structures and systems and hence it can be addressed in advance, requires a long-term solution, needs a proactive approach to it and it needs to be understood in all its phases and complexities.

This approach contrasts much with the government approach, which by assuming that IDPs are part of disaster management also assumes that the problem does not require a long-term mechanism to address. However the government has embarked on the process to resettle IDPs (Kamugi, 2008).

4.9.5 Land reforms

As earlier observed land disputes are at the core of electoral violence in this country. On 27th August 2010, Kenya's new constitution was promulgated. This set in place a process of implementation through the enactment of different legislations and setting up of new institutional frameworks as envisaged in the new constitutional dispensation. For the land sector, far reaching legal and institutional reforms are envisaged in Chapter 5 of the constitution. The Chapter on Land and Environment also lays out broad principles through which land and the environment shall be managed. These broad principles are expounded in the National Land Policy (NLP) which informed the Constitutional provisions. In essence the constitution requires that among other principles, land be managed in an equitable, non-discriminatory, efficient, productive and sustainable manner. The constitution further requires that security of land tenure be enhanced and that community-based dispute resolution mechanisms be applied in resolving land conflicts. The need for land reforms in Kenya arose from a long history of inefficient and ineffective land administration and governance system (The constitution of Kenya 2010).
Over the years, Kenya’s land sector has faced various challenges that arose from a highly centralized and an inefficient institutional framework, a complex and outdated legal framework and lack of a coherent land policy framework. These challenges led to insecurity of tenure, excessive fragmentation and degradation, disparities in distribution, historical injustices in land distribution, environmental degradation, proliferation of urban informal settlements and landlessness among others. These challenges are at the centre of electoral violence in Nakuru Municipality and the country as a whole. To address these challenges, the country has put in place a legal and policy framework that will guide the land reform process in the country. The entrenchment of land issues in the new constitution and the adoption of the National Land Policy have set the stage for the process of comprehensive land reforms to take place. Once the land reforms have been fully implemented, it is expected that Kenya’s land administration system will be informed by the principles of equity, non-discrimination, efficiency, productivity and sustainability among others and this will help address underlying issues for electoral violence in Kenya (Land development and Governance Institute, 2011).

4.9.6 Citizen Participation in the Land Reform Process

Land reforms cannot bear fruit in mitigating ethnic grievances if the citizens who engage in electoral violence are not engaged in the process of reforms. The land reforms are by design and intent targeted at delivering efficient and effective land administration and governance systems to the citizens of the country (Land Development and Governance Institute, 2011). This can be largely attributed to the robust debate on the chapter of the constitution on Land and environment in the run-up to the referendum (The Constitution of Kenya 2010).

The focused discussion groups revealed that an overwhelming majority of citizens view the proposed land reforms as very important. They are to a large extent of the unanimous view
that the current system of land management and governance does not meet their needs. The majority of Kenyans are generally aware of the reform process as proposed in chapter five of the constitution and in the National Land Policy. Kenyans are unhappy with the performance of the majority of the land reform institutions. In particular the performance of the Ministry of Lands, Parliament and the State Law Office is viewed as unsatisfactory. The land reform process in Kenya is bound to continue to face challenges due to diverse entrenched interests by stakeholder groups that are in conflict (Land Development and Governance Institute, 2011). It is clearly evident that some actors are overtly set to slow down, dilute and where possible sabotage the reform process.

4.9.7 Summary

This chapter of data analysis has examined the factors that were behind electoral violence in Kenya with a focus on the 2007/08 electoral violence. The factors discussed under this chapter include, land disputes, politics of state control, economic deprivation where certain ethnic groups feel left out on economic development and impunity. The chapter also discussed the impact of ethnicity on ethnic relations in Nakuru municipality. Land grievances formed the major factor behind electoral violence in this Municipality. The chapter also examined the existing measures to curb electoral violence in Nakuru Municipality. Decentralization of power and resources through devolution has increased the participation of people in the decision making process on how they should be governed at the country level. The leadership of the county is more accessible and accountable to the people than the central government. The on going reforms in institutions like the Judiciary and police are all geared towards making these institutions more acceptable and accountable to the people. Following the electoral violence, a number of peace initiatives increased there
activities in this municipality and many other parts of the country. These peace initiatives by non-governmental organizations are working round the clock to ensure that communities live harmoniously together as they used to before this violence. Resettlement of the internally displace people has been another contentious issue. This resettlement process has been spearheaded by the government since the last general election. Although the government authorities believe they have resettled all the affected people, some quarters of this country has Kenyans who claim not to have been resettled today.
CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Recommendations

Based on the data gathered, analyzed and presented by this research, the study makes the following recommendations.

5.1.1 Build Unifying Institutional Structures.

In Nakuru municipality, electoral violence can be mitigated by unifying institutional structures. This can be realized through investment in common user social amenities like the establishment of boxing clubs to together our youth across all ethnic groups to unite through sports. Another aspect of unifying institutional structures that the country can invest in is the construction of market stalls and distribute across all the ethnic groups so the business minded people across the ethnic groups can do business together. This will give them an opportunity to relate on a day to day basis and as a result help develop the ethnic relations destroyed during the electoral violence. It is important that such a process should be managed well because if the process of distributing such stalls could ethnically biased, it could as well be counter-productive be deepening ethnic resentment. A study conducted by CIPEV also came up with some recommendations on how we can build institutional structures at the national level to address electoral violence.

According to CIPEV, at the core of ethnic conflicts is the relationship between ethnic groups and the state in the search for security, identity, and recognition. How the state negotiates these interests and needs will determine the level of identity conflicts. A comprehensive legal system that protects minorities from the abuse of state power, respects their rights, and ensures that their grievances are taken seriously will reduce opportunities for ethnic
mobilization. Among other things, this requires equitable access to civil service jobs and the various services the state provides. Key among these state functions is minority participation within the leadership and ranks of the security sector. The military can be a unifying institution, building bonds between ethnic groups, helping to forge a national identity for all ethnicities, providing youth an opportunity to travel and live throughout the nation, and allowing minorities to advance to positions of leadership through merit (CIPEV 2009).

Diversity in the security sector also has tangible benefits as ethnically representative police forces are linked with lower levels of conflict in diverse societies. Our institutions need to be structured in such a way their composition and operations are a unifying factor that recognizes the ethnic diversity of Kenya. When this is accomplished at the national level, the benefits have a ripple down effect to all the counties including Nakuru.

5.1.2 Reinforcing Positive Social Norms.

Over the medium to long term, defusing the potency of ethnicity for political ends requires reorienting cultural norms. Social marketing campaigns that promote national unity, intergroup cooperation, and "strength through diversity" themes can help frame the ethnic narrative in a positive light, thereby making it more difficult for divisive politicians to play on differences to mobilize support (Oyugi, 2013). In Nakuru Municipality, such a communications strategy would be complemented by a county-wide, ethnic-group -level outreach campaign implemented by civil society organizations that targets youth, reinforcing messages of "one county, one people," tolerance for other groups, and non-violent conflict resolution. Every ethnic group in the municipality through their elected leaders and elders should organize routine meetings to address emerging issues of division before they could lead to conflict among ethnic groups. The leadership of Nakuru Municipality should enact laws to criminalize ethnic incitement. These laws then need to be enforced and the county
authority to stipulate penalties including fines and bans from holding public office. The symbolism generated from a few highly publicized cases would go far toward shifting these norms.

5.1.3 Early Response

The leadership of the respective ethnic groups and elders, need to respond immediately to any reports or signs of ethnic divisions in Nakuru municipality. Any situation that is likely to explode into an ethnic conflict needs to be managed as an early response. This response should be managed objectively by focusing on the root cause of the discontent and develop a mechanism to address it. As pointed out by CIPEV, a key approach to prevent and quell ethnic tensions is to address these issues sooner rather than later. Tamping down these tensions is more feasible—and less costly in social and financial terms before intergroup divisions have been mobilized and violence ensues which, in turn, sets off a new and more polarized cycle of grievance, fear, distrust, and retaliation. It also underscores the importance of county government officials taking every group's expressed struggle seriously for example, claims of discrimination, or denial of rights and responding immediately. This, of course, presupposes that the county government is competent and willing to deal with these conflicts and is not a party to the grievance in the first place. Belief that there is a systematic means by which one's grievances can be fairly addressed reduces the likelihood that individuals will feel the need to take corrective measures into their own hands by virtue of feeling collectively deprived.
5.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, no one particular factor can be the sole cause of electoral. This study established that a myriad of factors play a role in post electoral violence and these factors are closely related. For instance, when an ethnic group in society feel economically deprived, a section of politicians in the same society will use this deprivation as a mobilizing factor to rally communities along ethnic lines. Therefore ethnicity becomes a major factor in electoral violence as it is brought out during the struggle for political leadership.

When electoral violence breaks out and people lose property and lives the psychological wounds take time to heal. It damages ethnic relations particularly so because those who engage in these brutal acts are people known to the victims and people they have lived with in the same society for so long. It makes communities look at each other with a lot of mistrust and suspicion. This takes a lot of initiatives to restore relations so that ethnic groups can relate harmoniously again. There are a number of initiatives to address the recurrent electoral violence in Nakuru municipality and the country at large. These NGOs include, Action Aid, Catholic relief Services among others. All these initiatives exist to restore positive ethnic relations and mitigate future ethnic conflicts that come with an electoral process.

This study was anchored on the Relative deprivation Theory as postulated by Robert Merton (1957). Those ethnic groups that feel relatively deprived suffer Ethnic Subordination in society. They feel deprived economically, socially and politically by those in positions of control of resources, opportunities and privileges. On the other hand, those ethnic groups that feel Non – deprived in that they are tightly in control of the social, political and economic structures of society. Such ethnic groups will do all it takes to protect the opportunities they have, the status, the privileges and maintain their feeling of relative superiority. Such ethnic group will ensure it does not drift into the bracket of the deprived. The resultant of the
struggle between these two ethnic grouping is the recurrent electoral violence. This study like any other work of research experienced its own challenges. The major challenge experienced during this study is emotive nature of the topic. Inquiries on the violence elicited bad memories in most respondents because of the brutality they witnessed. This made it difficult to get responses. However this was overcome by patience and explanations that information was meant to understand the events and help come up with structures to prevent re-occurrence.

Lastly, when addressing ethnic electoral violence as a nation, we need to shift our perspectives on how we think about mitigation strategies. Rather than accepting identity conflict as an inevitable feature of Kenya’s highly diverse ethnic landscape, a number of preventive policy interventions can be pursued.
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Appendix 1

Questionnaire

Interview Schedule

Welcome to this session. The purpose of this interview is to sincerely seek information for the course I am undertaking to establish the truth on certain security matters of which you are an important person. Any information you give out will be treated with uttermost confidentiality.

Instructions

i. Any information offered will be used only for the study purpose.

ii. The questions are in three parts.

PART ONE: - Questions that deals with personal information.

PART TWO: Deals with knowledge on the 2007/2008 Post election violence in Nakuru Municipality

PART THREE: Deals with aspects of ethnic power in post election violence.

iii. Tick (✓) or insert your response in the space provided.

PART ONE: SOCIO –DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. AGE

   (a) 18-27

   (b) 28-37

   (c) 38-47

   (d) 47 and above

2. SEX

   (a) Male

   (b) Female
3. Martial status
   (a) Single
   (b) Married
   (c) Separated
   (d) Others (Specify) ....................................................

4. Religion
   (a) Christian
   (b) Muslim
   (c) Hindu
   (d) Others (Specify) ....................................................

5. Level of Education
   (a) Primary
   (b) Secondary
   (c) College
   (d) University

6. Employment status
   (a) Employed
   (b) Business
   (c) Casual
   (d) Others (Specify) ....................................................
PART TWO: LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE ON 2007/2008 POST ELECTION VIOLENCE

7. Did you witness the violence of 2007/2008?
   (a) YES [ ]
   (B) NO [ ]

8. If yes, where were you?
   (a) In Nakuru? [ ]
   (b) In Kisumu? [ ]
   (c) In Nairobi? [ ]
   (d) Other specify.................................

9. Was the violence perpetrated by people in groups or individuals?
   (a) In groups [ ]
   (b) Individuals [ ]
   (c) Both individuals and groups [ ]
   (d) Other (specify).................................

10. If they were groups, which major ethnic communities could have participated in the violence?


11. How would you know that the gang members originated from one ethnic group?


12. Were the groups targeting victims randomly or they were carefully selecting their targets?
   (a) Carefully selected targets
   (b) Attacked targets randomly

13. How was the violence quelled?
   (a) Police intervention
   (b) Military Intervention
   (c) Police and Military intervention
   (d) Other means (Clarify)

14. What weapons were the fighters wielding?
   a. Pistols
   b. Guns
   c. Machetes and Clubs
   d. Bows and Arrows

15. What do you suggest is the cause(s) of this post election violence?
   a. Political incitement
   b. Power struggles
   c. Ethnicity factors
   d. other factors (Clarify)

PART THREE: Trends of violence and perceptions of Ethnicity in Electoral Violence.

16. (a) Would you be comfortable living with a neighbor from another community who perpetrated violence?
    (a) Yes
    (b) No

17. If no, why?
(a) He/ She cannot be trusted
(b) Can turn on me
(c) Person is an enemy
(d) Others Specify…………………………

18. Would you engage in violence to protect and preserve your cultural practices?

(a) Yes
(b) No
(c) Sometimes
(d) Other (specify) ………………………

19. As a member of an ethnic community in Kenya, do you believe elected positions are important to your community?

Yes
No

20. What do you stand to gain when members from your community hold elective positions?

(i) ___________________________________________
(ii) ___________________________________________
(iii) ___________________________________________
(iv) ___________________________________________
(v) ___________________________________________
21. Are you satisfied with the level of development in the area inhabited by your community?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]

22. Do you know of anybody who has relocated his residence from any part of this municipality because he/she feels the area is insecure for members of his community?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]

23. Would you be free to live anywhere in this municipality?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]

24. Are there parts of this municipality that are preferred by business investors from a particular ethnic community over other areas?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]

25. In your opinion, is there fairness in resource distribution in this country?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]

26. Do you believe members of a particular community should come together to fight for equal allocation of resources and representation in governance?  
Yes [ ]
27. Why do you think so in question 26 above?


28. Is there any community that controls business in this municipality?
Yes
No

29. As a member of an ethnic community what would you do to access key employment opportunities both in government and private sector?


30. Where did the violence start in this municipality and how did it spread?


31. Can electoral violence be reduced if political leadership is rotated amongst communities?
Yes
No

32. Suggest measures to address re-occurrence of violence and reconciliation amongst ethnic communities
33. What measures are already in place?
Geographical map of Kenya
The Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Higher Education, Science & Technology,
P.O. Box 30040,
NAIROBI

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FOR MR. INGOYI EVANS AMUKAKA - REG. NO. C50/NKU/PT/24552/10

I write to introduce Mr. Ingoyi Evans Amukaka who is a Postgraduate Student of this University. He is registered for an M.A. degree programme in the Department of History, Archaeology and Political Studies in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences.

Mr. Ingoyi intends to conduct research for a thesis project entitled, "The Role of Ethnicity in Electoral Violence: A Case Study of 2007/08 Post-Election Violence in Nakuru Municipality, Kenya."

Any assistance given will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,  

18 FEB 2013  

MRS. LUCY N. MBAGA  
FOR: DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

LNMM/fwk
Evans Amukaka Ingoyi  
Kenyatta University  
P.O. Box 43844-00100  
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research "The role of ethnicity in electoral violence: A case of 2007/8 Electoral Violence in Nakuru Municipality," I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in Nakuru County for a period ending 31st March, 2015.

You are advised to report to the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nakuru County before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are required to submit two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf of the research report/thesis to our office.

Signature

DR. S. K. LANGAT, OGW  
FOR: SECRETARY/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioner  
Nakuru County.

The County Director of Education  
Nakuru County.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT
MR EVANS AMUKA AMUGI
of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 67/777-206
Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct
research in Nakuru County
on the topic:
THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY
IN ELECTIONAL VIOLENCE: A CASE OF
2007/8 ELECTIONAL VIOLENCE IN
NAKURU MUNICIPALITY
for the period ending 31st March 2015

[Signature]
Applicant

[Signature]
National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation

Date Of Issue: 15th December 2014
Fee Received: Ksh. 1,000

Permit No.: NACOSTI/P/24/6303/4073