THE CHALLENGES FACING THE EASTERN AFRICAN COMMUNITY IN CONFLICT INTERVENTION: A STUDY OF EASTERN AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (EASF) AS REGIONAL SECURITY MECHANISM

LIGAWA WILLIAM OLUOCH

C50/NKU/PT/22755/2012

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS (PEACE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT) OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

MARCH 2015
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my dear family for their love and moral support during the entire period I was committed.
DECLARATION

I confirm that this research thesis is my original work and has not been presented in any other university/ institution for certification. The thesis has been complemented by referenced works duly acknowledged. Where text, data, graphics, pictures or tables have been borrowed from other works-including the internet, the sources are correctly referred in accordance with anti-plagiarism regulations.

Signature …………………………..…… Date ………………………………..

Ligawa William Oluoch (C50/NKU/PT/22755/2012)

SUPERVISORS

We confirm that the work reported in this thesis was carried out by the candidate under our supervision has been submitted with our approval as university supervisors.

Signature …………………………..…… Date ………………………………..

Dr. G. Maroko

Department of History, Archeology & Political Studies

Signature …………………………..…… Date ………………………………..

Dr. Danson P. L. Esese

Department of History, Archeology & Political Studies
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to earnestly express my humble gratitude to Kenyatta University for providing a good learning environment and academic facilities that enabled me compile this work. Special thanks go to the teaching staff at the Department of History, Archeology and Political Studies, for the course work taught, that proved beneficial in informing this thesis. I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my supervisors; Dr. Maroko and Dr. Esese for their support, freedom and confidence that they gave me, and all their hard work in reading the draft version of my thesis and helping me edit it. An honorable mention goes to LT. Col. Bernard Korir of EASFCOM Nairobi, for his useful insights and provision of specific literature materials on Eastern African Standby Force (EASF), which were reviewed in this work.

I am greatly indebted to my classmates and friends who gave me moral support throughout the thesis writing process. My sincere and heartfelt thanks to my family who were always a source of encouragement. I would also like to thank all those who I have not mentioned but in one way or another contributed to the completion of this work. Above all, I am grateful to the Almighty God for His enormous care and protection.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication........................................................................................................................................i

Declaration........................................................................................................................................ii

Acknowledgement..............................................................................................................................iii

Table of contents .................................................................................................................................iv

List of tables ..........................................................................................................................................vii

Operational definition of terms...........................................................................................................ix

List of abbreviations & acronyms ........................................................................................................xi

Abstract .............................................................................................................................................xiv

**Chapter one** ....................................................................................................................................1

Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................1

1.0 Background of the study ..................................................................................................................1

1.1 Fading interest on Africa’s violent conflict ....................................................................................1

1.2 Statement of the problem ...............................................................................................................7

1.3 Research objectives .......................................................................................................................8

1.4 Research questions .........................................................................................................................8

1.5 Research assumption ......................................................................................................................9

1.6 Significance of the study ...............................................................................................................9

1.7 Scope of the study ..........................................................................................................................9

1.8 Limitations of the study ...............................................................................................................10

**Chapter two** ..................................................................................................................................11
Literature review ........................................................................................................... 11

2.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 11

2.1 Challenges of past operations.................................................................................. 11

2.2 The common defense strategy .................................................................................. 15

2.3 Mission scenarios .................................................................................................... 19

2.4 Capability gaps at the au that affects EASF ............................................................... 20

2.5 Responsibility to protect .......................................................................................... 21

2.6 Humanitarian intervention ....................................................................................... 26

2.7 Military intervention ............................................................................................... 28

2.8 Theoretical framework ............................................................................................. 32

Chapter three ................................................................................................................. 34

Research methodology ................................................................................................... 34

3.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 34

3.1 Research design ....................................................................................................... 34

3.2 Variables & categories ............................................................................................ 34

3.3 Study site ................................................................................................................ 35

3.4 Target population .................................................................................................... 35

3.5 Sample size ............................................................................................................. 36

3.6 Pilot study ............................................................................................................... 38

3.7 Data collection and analysis .................................................................................... 39

3.8 Ethical considerations .............................................................................................. 40
Chapter four .................................................................41

Capability gaps ................................................................. 41

4.0 Introduction ................................................................. 41

4.1 Capability gaps of the force ........................................... 41

Chapter five ................................................................. 56

Contemporary security threats and logistical constraints ................. 56

5.0 Introduction ................................................................. 56

5.1 Contemporary security threats ....................................... 56

5.2 Logistical constraints .................................................. 59

Chapter six ................................................................. 64

Summary, conclusions and recommendations ................................... 64

6.0 Introduction ................................................................. 64

6.1 Summary ................................................................. 64

6.2 Conclusions ................................................................. 66

6.3 Recommendations ..................................................... 68

6.4 Suggestion for further research ........................................ 70

References ................................................................. 71

Appendix i: introduction letter ............................................. 77

Appendix ii: consent form .................................................. 79

Appendix iii: questionnaire .................................................. 81

Appendix iv: interview guide ................................................ 82
Appendix v: budget .................................................................83
Appendix vi: time frame ..........................................................84
Appendix vii: map of regions of EASF ........................................85
Appendix viii: map of Karen .....................................................86
Appendix ix: map of Embakasi ..................................................87
LIST OF TABLES

2.1 EASF mission scenario .................................................................20

3.1 Target population ......................................................................36

3.2 Summary of the sample ..............................................................37

3.3 Interviewee profile ...................................................................38

4.1 Political support by the member states ........................................42

4.2 The bureaucratic systems ..........................................................45

4.3 Military component ..................................................................47

4.4 Intervention trilemma .................................................................50

4.5 Civilian component .................................................................51

4.6 Joint training exercises ..............................................................52

4.7 Satisfaction with the command structure .....................................54

5.1 Early warning systems ..............................................................59

5.2 Logistic support .................................................................60
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Belligerents:** These are the militia groups which are engaged in criminal acts leading to abuse of basic human rights against the civilians.

**Complex humanitarian emergency:** This is a situation that is occasioned by gross violation of human rights leading to collapse of public support delivery system.

**Conflict:** A situation with at least two identifiable groups in conscious opposition to each other as they pursue incompatible goals.

**Contingent:** This is a combat troop contributed by a particular country.

**Durable peace:** This is the type of peace that allows the government to run its daily functions and the citizens too can go on with their normal lives.

**Failed states:** These are states whose governments are too weak to offer basic public services e.g. social security and thus cannot discharge their constitutional rights anymore.

**Fibua:** This is fighting that is conducted within built up areas especially major towns and cities.

**Follow-on forces:** These are the forces that are supposed to reinforce the initially deployed troops especially when the task at hand is overwhelming.

**Intervention trilemma:** A situation in which the command leadership has to strike a balance in protecting the civilians, protecting own force and destruction of the insurgents while at the same time accomplishing the mission.

**Interoperability:** The ability of different national armies being able to operate in a joint exercise or mission.

**Level I, II & III Hospitals:** In peacekeeping missions, hospitals are graded from Level I (lowest) to III (highest) based on the extent to which there are facilities available to
conduct surgical operations and provide onsite post operation care and recovery for patients.

**Mandate:** This is a military assigned duty that should be accomplished by the troops at host country.

**Military intervention:** The threat or use of force across state borders by a state aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.

**Missions:** These are military assignments that are meant to neutralize the belligerents thus ending the hostilities.

**Mission scenarios:** Guidelines under which EASF is supposed to operate.

**Peace support operations:** These are military operations that are conducted in an area undergoing violent armed conflicts. It’s geared towards making the armed groups submit to ceasefire agreement.

**Sub-Region:** Refers to the Eastern Africa countries.

**Support Arm:** Refers to fighting units with long range weapons like an artillery brigade.

**Theatre of operations:** Refers to the battlefield where the actions take place.
# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASFCOM</td>
<td>EASF Coordinating Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Communities of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Communities of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWT</td>
<td>Just War Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPEX</td>
<td>Map Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARC</td>
<td>Northern Africa Regional Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Economic Partnership for African Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Economic Partnership for African Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEV</td>
<td>Post Election Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANELEM</td>
<td>Planning Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Regional Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSF</td>
<td>Regional Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office for AMISOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
ABSTRACT

The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) is a regional security body for the Great Lakes Region. The force is mandated with the tasks of conflict intervention in the region, through preventive diplomacy and peace support operations in the conflict zones. The study assessed the challenges hindering the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) from executing the intervention missions in the region. As regional force it is also supposed to augment the efforts of other agencies such as the UN and the international community. These agencies have not been able to carry out successful peace support operations in the Great Lakes Region due to a diversity of factors. There are still violent conflicts in the region despite the presence of ongoing peace support operations. Durable peace has become too elusive for the region. Recent studies indicate that the regional security mechanisms are best suited to deal with such local security challenges affecting the region. Despite the platform, they have not been able to achieve their mandate. Guided by the underpinnings of theory of Just War, the research examined the challenges affecting the EASF in managing the violent conflicts emanating from the sub-region. A descriptive survey method was adopted. Random sampling and purposive sampling were used to select population for sampling from Kenya Rapid Deployment Capability (KRDC) based at Embakasi and Eastern Africa Standby Force coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM) headquartered at Karen respectively. The two study sites are located within Nairobi County. Questionnaires and interviews were administered to the sampled group of KRDC and EASFCOM respectively. The study yielded both qualitative and quantitative data. As such, the study employed descriptive statistical tools to analyse quantitative data obtained. Qualitative data were analyzed through qualitative techniques. Qualitative data were drawn from open-ended questions in the questionnaire and interview guide to present the findings. This involved a critical assessment of each response and examining it using thematic interpretation in accordance with the objectives of the study. The findings were then presented in narrative excerpts within the report. Data gathered in the study were summarized to establish fundamental results. Conclusions and recommendations were drawn from the processed data.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background of the study

Insecurity has seen many alliances and security bodies formed for peace and stability in the 20th century (Williams, 2008: 310). The Warsaw Pact was formed by the former Soviet Union and its allies in 1965 to protect its members from any external threat and to ensure peace and prosperity within the region. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the organization lost its significance. In Western Europe, Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed in 1949. It is the regional security mechanism which ensures peace and austerity within the region. It has had various peace support operations and military interventions in Bosnia, Haiti and Yugoslavia.

In Africa, the call for the establishment of a continent wide military force began well ahead of the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Already in 1961 the Casablanca group led by Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, called for the establishment of an African High Command primarily to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the newly independent African States (Legum 1963: 189). However, the majority of the states that established the OAU in 1963 rejected the idea of a continental military force and established, instead, a defence organ called the Defence Commission. The OAU Defence Commission was established as one of the specialized commissions of the OAU with the general aim of coordinating defence policies of OAU member states and looking into the future possibility of establishing an Africa-wide security system (OAU 1963: Article XX). The Defence Commission held its first meeting in November 1963 in Accra, Ghana, where it came under the influence of Kwame Nkrumah, the ardent supporter of the establishment of an African High Command. Kwame Nkrumah, once again, proposed an African High Command empowered not only to defend African States but also to intervene in intra-state and inter-state conflicts in Africa (Amate 1986: 172).
In May 2001, African States replaced the OAU with a new regional organization, the African Union (AU). A year later, member states of the AU agreed to establish the African Standby Force for the purpose of, *inter alia*, military intervention inside AU member states against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. ASF structure is divided into the five Regions of Africa (North, East, Central, West and Southern).

The five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – serve as the building blocks of the African Standby Force (ASF). Each area has a Regional Standby force that makes up the ASF and EASF is the Eastern Africa’s Standby Force for conflict management.

The EASF was formed following the Decision of the Summit of the African Union held on 6th – 8th July, 2004, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was established as a regional mechanism to provide capability for rapid deployment of forces to carry out preventive deployment, rapid intervention, peace support and stability operations, and peace enforcement. It is one of the building blocks of the ASF. Its membership comprises of the following countries: Kenya, Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius, Burundi, Uganda, Seychelles, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Comoros Islands.

**1.0.1 The Debut of Regional Security Mechanism**

A recurrent issue identified by researchers in African conflicts has been the lack of interest by the international community to ensure successful peace support operations. A historical journey through these conflicts captures scholarly reflections on the lack of
full commitment in African conflicts, including Williams (2008: 315), Festus (2008: 50), Omorogbe (2011: 43) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1997: 20). They all concur that the indifference in African conflicts is what saw the need to dissect the numerous security problems into regional concerns perhaps best justified by the horror caused by the 1994 Rwandan genocide as the rest of the world watched with indifference. Unfortunately, the African countries too lacked the mechanisms to deal with the conflicts emanating from the region. They have been bogged down by many problems in their quest to maintain peace and security across the continent.

According to Docking (2001: 34) the “lack of political will” shown by Western countries is the major hindrance of deployment and success of the UN in Africa. Western countries are reluctant to participate because few foreign leaders will risk the loss of soldiers in poorly understood (African) countries where they do not have perceived economic or strategic interests. They no longer wish to spend billions on costly military interventions each time conflict erupts in Africa. On the other hand, the Africans left on their own to handle these conflicts have not been able to do so efficiently. Vines (2013: 99) argues that the African countries lack the mechanisms to handle these violent conflicts. Furthermore, the regional security mechanisms have not been able to deliver on their mandates. These military undertakings require huge amounts of money for the operations to realize any gains and the source has to be reliable. Funds, too, are needed to buy modern communication equipment, weapons, and utility and attack aircrafts. Moreover, the personnel have to be clothed and paid.

When war broke out in Darfur in 2003, the Sudanese militia (Janjaweed), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Army were immediately embroiled in a vicious fight. Nearly over 70,000 innocent Sudanese civilians lost their lives with thousands being displaced (Weil, 2001: 80). The government of Sudan was accused of committing genocide. In response to prevent more deaths, the AU deployed African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to keep peace.
AMIS was ill-equipped and so the area remains volatile to date despite the presence of the peacekeeping force. To support the force, Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had to provide the force with logistics, airlift and support their training (Ngoma, 2005: 20). Compared to other UN peace support operations elsewhere, the African peace support operations are marred with lots of problems ranging from the logistics to the infrastructural requirements necessary to launch these operations. Holizgrefe (2006: 40) agree that AMIS failed to accomplish its objectives, to halt the large-scale killings and displacement of the civilian population in Darfur. The mission had to transit from AMIS to an AU/UN Hybrid Mission known as UN Assistance Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) so that it could be more effective.

Agwai (2012: 170) notes that despite the presence of UNAMID, the insurgent attacks increased. The attacks escalated because the UNAMID personnel were under-resourced in terms of equipment, personnel and other logistics. This endangered the lives of the soldiers. The operation too lost its credibility since so many soldiers lost their lives to the enemy fire. Therefore, the civilians could not depend on those vulnerable soldiers for protection. The situation created a lot of complexities for the command elements.

Such inadequacies make the mission vulnerable to threats and attacks. For example, the lack of utility helicopters meant that peacekeepers had to travel along dangerous and unfamiliar routes by road making them vulnerable to attacks and ambush by rebel groups. These attacks against UNAMID peacekeepers affected their ability to perform some of the functions of protecting civilians. It also affected the creation of conditions that would allow delivery of humanitarian aid and voluntary return of IDPs and ensuring durable peace, security and stability in Darfur.

It is apparent that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is also suffering from the same fate as UNAMID (Williams, 2012: 630). The troop contributing
countries have been unable to sustain their troops in Somalia and as a result the UN is slowly taking over the mission from the AU under the umbrella of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). But even then little few have been made so far. Could these shortcomings be mirrored with the EASF as the Eastern African Region battle with the challenges of conflict resolution that threatens to disrupt peace and security of the region?

1.1 The fading interest of the international community in Africa`s violent conflicts

The overwhelming effects of the above mentioned conflicts can be attributed to lack of commitment by the mediating party in conflict intervention. For the Rwandan case, The Human Rights Watch (1999:10) reports that massacres and violent effects of the conflict took place as nearly everybody watched in a disinterested gaze. The peace keeping force that was deployed by the UN had no clear mandate. Besides that, they were ill equipped hence they could not contain the violence. Conflict intervention in such cases could either be through preventive diplomacy or peace operations in conflict zones. Several studies have summarized reasons for the lack of interest in conflict intervention by intercontinental bodies. They are the need for African solutions to African problems, the view of the Western intervention by the African nations as an attempt at recolonization (the case of Somalia), and Foreign troops suffering casualties in the battle field (Omorogbe, 2011: 60). The absence of a force in managing peace in the continent is what triggered the thought of having regional security arrangements.

This therefore called for a body that could prevent the outbreak of conflict or manage the conflict to avoid its escalation. Barry & Woever (2003: 23) note that the relational dynamics of security demonstrate that no nation’s security is self-contained. Dysfunctional, failing, and collapsed states can produce spillover effects on neighboring countries, threatening regional peace and security. These problems transcend national borders and are the main security challenge of our time. Terrorism, for example, cannot
be addressed bilaterally if a neighboring nation allows the harboring of terrorists, or if ungoverned spaces traverse national boundaries. Regional approaches address these issues more effectively.

The security threats, balkanization and marginalization have led to the calls for unity and collective solidarity as the *dues ex machina* for the maintenance of continental peace, security and development (David, 2006: 25). There are deaths, maimings, forced displacement of people and underdevelopment within the affected areas. For example, there were nearly 100,000 “Maries” in 1994 Rwandan genocide—children who faced an unimaginable death. This horror was repeated time and time again over the course of 13 weeks, when approximately 800,000 people were massacred in Rwanda’s genocide. By August 1994, three million Rwandans had been internally displaced, and more than two million had fled to neighboring countries—out of a total pre-war population of approximately seven million. Women and children suffered most from the aftermath of the genocide, with an estimated 47,000 children orphaned, and up to 500,000 women raped (Williams, 2009: 514). Unimaginably, this occurred as the international community watched with a fixed, if not disinterested eye. After the Rwanda genocide, the United Nations released a report which concluded that a small outside force—perhaps as few as 5,000 soldiers—could have intervened and stopped the slaughter in its early stages (Human Rights Watch Report, 1999: 55).

The Rwandan genocide in 1994 was an example of the failure of the UNSC, international community and the Africans to respond timely and effectively to mass atrocities in the continent. African countries therefore took note of the finding by the UN’s Panel on UN Peace Operation that the United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) had not been planned, deployed or instructed in a way that would have enabled it to stop the genocide. The UNAMIR was also a victim of lack of
political will by the Security Council and other member states (Human Rights Watch Report, 1999: 20)

The Africans as well as the international community didn’t adopt conflict intervention roles to end the genocide. After the Rwanda genocide, the United Nations released a report which concluded that a small outside force—perhaps as few as 5,000 soldiers—could have intervened and stopped the slaughter in its early stages. The failure of the UN, Africa and the international community to act is one of the most shocking instances of indifference in history.

Earlier discussion explains how the peace support operations have not been handled properly. Agwai (2012: 169), Birikorang (2009: 80), and Ngoma (2005: 30) posit that dissecting the security concern to a regional problem will impact positively on the overall security of the continent. It will solve the problems that swamp the operations of the various missions mounted by the AU, the UN or the hybrid ones. It is in this vein that the EASF was established as a regional mechanism to provide capability for rapid deployment of forces to carry out preventive deployment, rapid intervention, peace support and stability operations, and peace enforcement. The study focused on the challenges of the EASF that hinders it from being an appropriate tool to address the Eastern Africa’s security shortcomings.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The Great Lakes Region has been marred by a wave of violent conflicts especially in the Post-Cold War era. Contemporary studies indicate that the UN and the international community have not been able to handle these violent conflicts effectively. Consequently these peace support operations have not yielded the anticipated durable peace in nearly all the affected countries. It has been postulated that African regional
security organizations are best positioned to effectively offer solution to such operations. However, most of the security experts argue that these regional mechanisms are unable to deliver on their mandates due to a diversity of factors (Vines, 2013: 100). The local, regional, and other interested peace practitioners cannot afford to keep standing almost aloof as thousands of innocent lives are lost in these senseless armed conflicts. It is in this context that the proposed study intended to investigate the challenges hindering the EASF from executing intervention missions thereby giving the recommendations on how to make the force relatively more effective as a strategy of preventing future violent conflicts.

1.3 Research Objectives

Main objective

The overall objective of the study is to investigate the challenges hindering the EASF from effectively executing intervention missions within the sub-region.

Specific objectives

1. To identify the capability gaps hindering the EASF from achieving its mandates.

2. To examine the logistical constraints facing the EASF and how they can be resolved.

3. To examine the contemporary security threats emanating from the Eastern African region.

1.4 Research Questions

1. What are the capability gaps hindering the EASF from achieving its mandates?

2. What are the logistical constraints that the force suffers from and how can they be resolved?
3. What are the contemporary security threats emanating from the Eastern African region?

1.5 Research assumption

The study is based on the assumption that successful conflict intervention is best achieved with localized common defense structures. These structures are defined by shared threat perceptions and effective security relationships amongst the member states.

1.6 Significance of the study

The Eastern African region has been marred with unending wave of violent conflicts. These consortiums of vicious conflicts are denying the region development opportunities. The findings would be informative to the member states in assessing whether the Force can hold the frontlines and deal with conflict situations decisively. It should also help the EASFCOM and the AU in making policies that would contribute towards making the peace support operations relatively more effective.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The study has been conducted at the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM) in Karen, Kenya. This is the headquarters of the force and where the planning elements (PLANEL) are located. It was also conducted at the Kenya Rapid Deployment Capability (KRDC) which is located in Embakasi. This is where the quick reaction force (QRF) is situated. The study focuses on investigating the challenges hindering the EASF from effectively executing the intervention missions. It looks at the capability gaps and the logistical constraints that dog the efficiency of the force. It also analyses the contemporary security threats that the force should deal with
to ensure peace and stability within the region. It covers the period beginning from 1990 to the 2014. This is because most of the violent intrastate conflicts in the region intensified in the Post-Cold War era leading to loss of innocent lives and destruction of property.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

Some officers gave out biased information to favour their respective states during the study. To overcome this, the researcher used his experience and expertise to select the correct information needed for the study. In addition, some officers were unwilling to divulge information for fear of victimization. The researcher assured them of confidentiality and anonymity of the data collected.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The chapter delves into the literature and past studies done on the EASF in regional conflict interventions. It examines past peace support operations, the mission scenarios, humanitarian and military interventions, and the principle of responsibility to protect. It also analyzes the capability gaps at the AU’s conflict management that directly affect the effectiveness of the EASF. It summarizes the theoretical framework that assesses the justification of intervention missions and how such tasks ought to be conducted.

2.1 The challenges of past peace support operations

A number of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have been launched in the post-cold war period in the Great Lakes Region. Most of these operations did not meet their objectives (Murithi, 2005: 14). The UNAMIR and UNAMIS in Rwanda and Darfur respectively were unable to fulfill their mandates. Instead wanton destruction of property and loss of lives took place while PSOs were ongoing. The involvement of the international community in PSOs in Somalia in the early 1990s led to a widespread realization of the problematic nature of PSOs. The Somalia civil war broke into a full scale war with the ousting of Said Barre in 1991. Many efforts mounted by the UN and the international community proved futile (Williams, 2009: 517).

2.1.1 Challenges of Somalia Peace Support Operations

Following the eruption and escalation of the civil war in Somali in 1991, the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) strived to abate the suffering that was caused as a result of the high-intensity conflict. Of the Somali population of 4.5 million people, over half were in severe danger of starvation and malnutrition-related disease, mostly in the drought-stricken rural areas. Another 1.5 million were judged at moderate risk of
malnutrition. Three hundred thousand people died outright in the early months of 1992 and another million fled the country as refugees (Williams, 2008: 320). The UN was engaged in Somalia from early in 1991 when the civil strife began. UN personnel were withdrawn on several occasions during sporadic flare-ups of violence.

Despite the UN's efforts, all over Somalia the ceasefire was ignored, fighting continued, and continued to increase, putting the relief operations at great risk. The main parties to the ceasefire, General Mohamed Farrah Aidid and "President" Ali Mahdi Muhammad, once again showing the difficult and troubled relations between the warlords, proved to be difficult negotiating partners and continually frustrated attempts to move the peacekeepers and supplies. The Security Council endorsed sending of another 3,000 troops to the region to protect relief efforts. However, most of these troops were never sent (Ristke, 2008: 30). The situation in Somalia continued to get worse. Factions in Somalia were splintering into smaller factions and splintering again. Agreements for food distribution with one party were worthless when the stores had to be shipped through the territory of another.

Some elements were actively opposing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) intervention. Troops were shot at, aid ships attacked and prevented from docking, cargo aircraft were fired upon and aid agencies, public and private, were subject to threats, robbery and extortion. Meanwhile, hundreds, if not thousands of poverty stricken refugees were starving to death every day.

Hope. Both missions aimed at providing the security essential for the distribution of humanitarian relief. The successor of both missions (UNOSOM-II) began in May 1993. UNOSOM-II was a Chapter VII Peace Enforcement operation with the additional aim of providing a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. During this mission, the difficulties of PSOs became abundantly clear, and major problems were revealed at three levels: political, strategic and operational (Ristke, 2008: 15). These three factors i.e. the political, strategic and the operational levels have to be harmonized for any kind of operation to be successful. For example at the operational level, there must be funds to allow for the build up of the necessary infrastructures. For the EASF to operate smoothly and build its credibility, these factors have to be streamlined so that the force is not thrown into confusion during the operations.

According to the Turkish UNOSOM-II commander, the mandate was neither clear nor attainable. The tasks allocated to the mission in the mandate were multidimensional, including political, military and humanitarian goals. By the time the Turkish commander assumed responsibility, fewer than 30% of the UN personnel were in place to achieve these goals. At the same time, the mandate was in some sense too restrictive (Ristke, 2008: 34). The military was well aware of the importance of criminal activities which were taking place for the (re-)armament of Somali clans. However, the commanders of UNOSOM-II lacked the mandate to combat these criminal activities and were not allowed to fight organised crime. If EASF has to deploy, the mandate has to be clear. The mandate should be strong enough to allow the soldiers to return the belligerents’ fire. It should give them the freedom of protecting the civilians, to protect themselves and to accomplish any mission given.

The dilemma and complications that arose in Somalia are still a reality in today’s peace support operations. Some of the issues have been resolved. UNOSOM-II experienced different (national) procedures, understandings and equipment that rendered the interoperability of the mission problematic. The EASF has to develop a standard common doctrine of training for the member states. Williams (2012: 603), stresses that
interoperability of the equipment at the mission area is quite paramount for the overall success of the operation.

Practitioners, officials and analysts in the field have developed the understanding that PSOs have a multifaceted character, comprising goals including security, economic development, human rights, gender mainstreaming, and rehabilitation (Ngoma, 2005: 20). The need to link security and development has been frequently stressed. In addition, the force should therefore develop such a link amongst the military, the police and the civilian components.

Peace support operations, on the other hand, pose intervention trilemma issue. There are three objectives to be achieved in case of military interventions: protection of the civilians, destruction of the belligerents and force protection. The commander has to make sure that the belligerents are destroyed while he ensures that the rights of the civilians are not violated. In addition, he should ensure that his force is protected from the enemy fire. This is the intervention trilemma that faces most of the peace operations in conducting counterinsurgency. Williams (2008: 311) gives the example of Western governments suffering significant casualties while engaged in peace operations in Africa, resulting in their strong unwillingness to deploy troops to peace operations. However, the objective in conflict intervention should reflect a three pronged approach.

In the ongoing peace support operations in Somalia, the EASF deployed a contingent in Mogadishu. However, the impact of the force is yet to be realized. The guns are still blazing within the environs of Mogadishu town with key government (Somalia) officials hold up in fortified buildings (Williams, 2008: 310). The force still suffers from the problems that have been experienced by other security urgencies in the past. The troops need a clear mandate with modern equipment. Somalia is a vast area with rugged terrains which calls for deployment of at least over 6000 infantry soldiers. This force should be augmented by the support arms like the air cavalry and artillery
brigades. EASF does not have such a quantum of force. It relies on the member states for the troops pledged (.. ibid).

2.2 The common defense strategy

The past two to three decades have witnessed a range of international actors struggling to maintain what the UN Charter refers to as “international peace and security” on the African continent. Now, in the twenty-first century, security challenges in Africa have become so serious that dealing with just a portion of the continent’s armed conflicts has accounted for approximately two thirds of the UN Security Council’s activities and has involved nearly three quarters of all its active peacekeepers (Williams, 2008: 328).

Most of the African states are marred with conflicts; some are currently experiencing violent conflict while many more face the threat of violent conflict. In the sub-Saharan Africa, over the last 50 years shows that about 30 countries—some 65 per cent of the total—have experienced armed conflict since independence. The number of conflicts increased in the first three decades of independence and spiked after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s (Reno, 2011: 27). These included the long wars in Sudan, Mozambique, Somalia and Angola and also regional conflict such as that seen in the Horn of Africa.

Straus (2009: 185) notes that about 64 per cent of these African internal conflicts lasted five years or less, while some 22 per cent lasted eleven years or more. These conflicts have resulted in massive deaths and caused a lot of suffering. According to the African Development Report 2008/2009 (2008: 67), for instance, the conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo has claimed more than five million lives to date. The vast majority through preventable and treatable diseases such as malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea, and malnutrition.
In Kenya, in early 2008, disputed presidential elections triggered inter-communal conflicts that culminated into the killing of hundreds of people and displacing many more. In Chad, intense fighting between rebels and government forces in and around the capital, N’Djamena, claimed several lives in 2008. In Sudan, the conflict in Darfur has already claimed some 200,000 lives (Vines, 2013: 99). Between 1997 and 2002, about half of the world’s violent conflicts took place in Africa. Civil conflict has been the most type of common conflict in Africa in the recent years. There have also been conflicts between non-state actors, such as Niger Delta in Nigeria. Fortunately, wars between sovereign states have nearly ceased. However, tension remains high between some neighboring countries e.g. between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Reno, 2011: 23).

Violent conflict has exacted a heavy toll in terms of human suffering and lost development opportunities in Africa. Between 1990 and 1995, Africa accounted for about half of the world’s battle deaths (Davies, 2008: 530). However, in situations of conflict far more people die from diseases, starvation, malnutrition and breakdown of health services than from battle. Thus, war deaths which capture these indirect causes of death and also include battle deaths tend to be much high. Conflicts lead to loss of income, destruction of infrastructure, and human and financial capital flight. Davies stresses that capital flight continues even during the post-conflict period. Neighboring countries also bear substantial costs through conflict spillovers, pre-emptive defense expenditures, and catering for refugees.

The peoples of the African continent have suffered a lot from the unending wars and the effects. Children have been the worst hit by these conflicts. This is further echoed by Bachman (2012: 15) when she says that children are dropping out of childhood and therefore we must envision a society free of conflict where children can grow up as children and not weapons of war. They are recruited as child soldiers, they act as
porters, messengers and are also used as human shields. The young girls are sexually exploited and married off at tender age to the soldiers.

Systematic rape has been deployed as a modern weapon in the warfare by the armed groups. Women are systematically raped and they go through forced abortions as well as forced pregnancies. They are neither spared of heinous acts such mutilations and amputations like witnessed during Liberia’s civil war. They are also forced into marriages. Davies (2009: 50) says wars and conflicts often leave women in situations where they can hardly make ends meet. They have no resources at all against these acts of violence. Due to the collapse of public support system, women and girls are forced to prostitute themselves in order to earn living and this violates the dignity of the victims as enshrined in the 1949 Universal Declarations of Human Rights.

Men too are harassed sexually, as well as being killed during the civil strife. Conflict therefore leaves very devastating effects to the people. This therefore calls for a body that can prevent the outbreak of conflict or manage the conflict to avoid its escalation. In the Sudanese conflict, the UN issued a number of threats and passed a series of resolutions. But these were rendered ineffective by the defiance of the Sudanese governments, and the maneuvering of Arab countries and of China, Sudan's main oil-trading partner and supplier of arms (Sakaingi, 2009: 40).

As a compromise, the UN passed a resolution in 2007 that provided for the creation of the so-called "hybrid force," or a mixture of UN and African Union troops, to which the Sudan government agreed (ibid). However, the deployment of these troops has been hampered by a lack of funds, complicated logistics, and the foot-dragging of the Sudanese government. Weiss & Collins (1996: 17) opinionate that combination of these factors leads to deeply fractured societies and “humanitarian dilemmas.” Such dilemmas would confront serious challenges if the regional security mechanism were to
The force to intervene must have strong political backings from the member states.

The idea of a continental force is supported by Festus, (2008: 34), who says that its power in the continental security should not be underestimated. When Omorogbe (2011: 59) points out to the failures by the UN in specific conflict interventions in Africa, one clearly sees the need for African forces to solve their problems. Williams (2008: 322) relates the establishment of such a force to the basic tenet that African governments bear the primary responsibility for conflicts and hence should take the lead in responding to them. This would form a common platform from which the resources can be mobilized to conduct the much needed peace support operations.

He (Williams) however argues that this approach does not offer a sound basis on which to maintain peace in the continent. He cites three negative consequences of the “African Solutions to African Problems” logic; undermining the authority of the UN; providing a convenient excuse for powerful western states that wished to avoid sending their own soldiers to peace operations in Africa; it would help African autocrats fend off international criticism of their policies. How do these challenges affect the operations at EASF?

Touray (2005: 643) explains that the place for common defense in the continent in dealing with conflicts through preventive diplomacy and rapid interventions. Interventions call for other states to participate in the pacification processes. If there is an emerging consensus in theory (and that is open to debate), many questions remain in practice. Humanitarian aid workers define their role as non-political and impartial, seeking to minimize violence and treat all sides equally. Militaries, on the other hand, take sides and look for enemies (Vines, 2013: 98). The EASF as the sub-region’s standby force for conflict intervention is expected to carry out any intervention missions
mandated to it by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). The force is supposed to carry its mission diligently thus ending conflict in that particular region.

According to the Constitutive Act 2000 (AU 2004c:3), the multidimensional force can switch from peace enforcement to peace keeping so that they can help in the post-conflict reconstruction of the affected nation. This force can therefore be deployed in different conflict scenarios as stipulated by the ASF’s deployments and any other functions as mandated by the PSC or the Assembly. It is kind of a task that will require abundant resources if such missions are to be executed.

2.3 The Mission Scenarios
Contemporary peace support operations are mandated to assist countries with the implementation of a ceasefire and/or Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), aimed at managing the changeover from a state of conflict to a future state of sustainable peace. The EASF is expected to be Eastern Africa’s peacekeeping capacity, and will undertake PSOs with complex mandates that cover the political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions.

The EASF’s achievement will be an accomplishment of the AU’s mandate to maintain peace and security, and prevent future conflicts on the continent. It will also serve as part of an African solution to some of Africa’s most serious challenges and crises. Based on the mandate of the EASF, the EASF Policy provides 6 scenarios for the EASF (African Union 2004c: 3), as illustrated in Table 2.1
Table 2.1: EASF Mission Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission Scenario 1</td>
<td>AU/Regional military advice to a political mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Scenario 2</td>
<td>AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Scenario 3</td>
<td>Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Scenario 4</td>
<td>AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Scenario 5</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force for multidimensional peacekeeping mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Scenario 6</td>
<td>AU intervention mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (African Union 2004c:3)

The mandate of military intervention of the EASF under Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act is shown under ‘mission scenario 6’ as outlined above. The time for deployment for the EASF contingents in the above scenarios is 30 days for scenarios 1 to 4, 90 days for scenario 5 and 14 days for scenario 6, all beginning from the decisions of the AU Assembly and the Peace and Security Council to carry out the operations (African Union 2004c: 6-7). The relatively smallest period of deployment (14 days) is provided in case of military intervention under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The fourteen days’ deployment is with a robust military force meaning 2,500 troops (1,000 within fourteen days, and a further 1,500 within the following fortnight) on the ground within thirty days (Culliers, 2008: 17). This is very logical taking into consideration that the stakes involved are high. However, deployment within the 14 days time period under Article 4(h) presupposes a high logistical and structural capability.

2.4 Capability Gaps at the AU that directly affect the EASF.

Effective capabilities to manage armed conflict require more than just the technical assets associated with peacekeeping operations and sanctions regimes. It also involves other important political, bureaucratic, and infrastructural dimensions. As Bachman
(2012: 18) for example stresses lack of clarity in assumptions largely explains the discrepancies and lack of coherence in donor support. As long as all assumptions remain potentially valid, and none has clear authority over the others, each donor remains free to ‘pick and choose’ among the components of the ASF that best match its national preferences or habits. For instance, French and American interests are in the tactical military fields, the French are much invested in tactical and operational military formation, and Germany, Canada, and Italy concentrate on police training – each of them in countries, or with organizations, of their immediate interest and choice.

ASF is burdened by the lack of political, conceptual, and financial ownership on the side of the recipients, who are also its main stakeholders (Festus, 2008: 23). The result is at best an ambiguous partnership, and at worst a waste of human resources, financial means and political capital. If these problems are not addressed at the AU level then it shows that ASF is a foreign-mastered project and doesn’t fit to be called, ‘African solution to African problems.’ This could have tripling effects to its building blocks- the regional security mechanisms.

2.5 Responsibility to protect
Onford (2009: 54) reiterates that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) seeks to bring an end to gross and systematic violations of human rights. It proposes the authorization of ‘action taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective’. In the past, it was difficult for the intervening forces to protect the civilians who were facing grave human rights violation. However, under this umbrella, the stronger nations should not attack the weaker ones for their personal interests.

Under the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the EASF should be able to carry out its mandate. The primary responsibility was on each state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. There is also a responsibility on the international community to use diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter to help to protect populations (Massingham, 2009: 870). When peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, then the international community can intervene.

The responsibility includes three elements: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. Under these elements the intervening force should be able to carry out post conflict reconstruction (Onford, 2009: 64). The peace building process has to be as diligently as possible to bring the country to its feet again. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes is a crucial part (although last resort measure) of the responsibility to react.

The R2P is premised on the understanding that international order is best maintained by non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. However, it also challenges this principle in so far as it recognizes that to respect sovereignty all the time is to risk being complicit in humanitarian tragedies sometimes (Massingham, 2009: 900). That is, the R2P adopts a view of sovereignty which emphasizes as its defining characteristic the capacity to provide protection, rather than territorial control. Onford (2009: 54) reinforces that the principle strengthens human security rather than regime protection. Thus the despotic leaders who are meting acts of terrorism on their citizens can be stopped by invoking this principle. Weiss (2004: 32) describes the R2P as adding a fourth characteristic, namely ‘respect for human rights’, to the three Peace of Westphalia characteristics of a sovereign state – territory, authority and population.

The force under the right intentions with the right authority can intervene to alleviate further human sufferings in the affected nation. There should be reasonable chances of success so that the force does not waste human and financial capital. Moreover, any
intervention failure by the EASF can make it lose its credibility. Under this principle, interventions have been carried out in the past. In 2011, for instance, NATO intervened in Libya to prevent further killings of the civilians. It should be understood that the phrase ‘responsibility to protect’ creates expectations. Massingham (2009: 850) warns against the use of the phrase, in particular by humanitarian organizations without the resources or mandate to actually provide protection.

The modern international system is founded on the premise that sovereign states have a right to non-intervention, to be free from unwanted external involvement in their internal affairs (Weil, 2001: 80). Yet repeated humanitarian interventions since 1991 have confronted the idea of sovereign immunity in the name of protecting civilians from harm. This human security perspective on the use of force, grounded in the belief that the rights of people, not states, are the bedrock of a just and secure world, has found its voice in the concept that states have a responsibility to protect civilians within their jurisdiction.

The painful events at Darfur in Sudan are a case in point. Since 2003 tens of thousands of people have been killed and hundreds of thousands have been driven from their homes by government-backed militia (Saikangi, 2009: 17). Advocates for intervention decry the loss of human life; they do not argue for intervention to protect the sovereignty of a state or to address a threat to international peace and security. Many governments and the United Nations (UN) have echoed the concern, with the United States going so far as to officially accuse the Sudanese Government of genocide (The White House, 2004: 3). It is the first time in history that one government has accused another of ongoing genocide. At the same time, responses to the mass killing in Sudan have been wholly inadequate to protect civilians, as they were during the violence in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and many other places of violent conflict.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan intensified the debate over humanitarian intervention following the military operation in Kosovo in 1999—a controversial case of intervention to protect civilians that was not endorsed by the UN Security Council. His challenge to governments to agree on guidelines for the use of force led to the publication in 2001, by an independent commission, of ´The Responsibility to Protect,´ which emphasized that a duty inherent in state sovereignty is to safeguard the lives and livelihoods of civilians (Weil, 2001: 100). If that duty is not upheld, the commission argued, other governments, authorized by the UN, have the right to act, including using military force as a last resort.

The concept of states’ responsibility to protect civilians drew sharp reactions from many governments, particularly in Asia and Latin America, which saw in it the legitimating of military intervention by strong states against weak ones. Their criticisms appeared to be borne out in 2003 when the USA tried to justify its invasion of Iraq in humanitarian terms after its initial justification—that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction—was proved false. Human rights organizations, however, forced the US Administration of President George W. Bush to back away from the claim when they exposed its absurdity, with reference to the conditions for legitimate humanitarian intervention laid out in The Responsibility to Protect (Weil, 2001: 115).

Despite the misgivings of many countries, human security as a justification for military intervention under certain circumstances has gained widespread acceptance. The UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change endorsed ´the emerging norm that there is an international responsibility to protect [civilians] . . . in the event of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent´ (United nations, 2004: 2). Annan carried forward this endorsement in his report to the UN General Assembly, ´In larger freedom´ (United Nations, 2005: 1). Surprisingly, the General Assembly, at the September 2005 World Summit, endorsed the concept of the sovereign responsibility to protect civilians,
including by using force as a last resort against states that do not live up to that responsibility (UN General Assembly Resolution 59/314, 2005).

If there is an emerging consensus in theory (and that is open to debate), many questions remain unanswered. Under what conditions should outsiders intervene militarily? Should the intervention force be a UN force, as in Haiti, or a coalition of like-minded states, as in Kosovo? Should the interveners be combat troops or peacekeepers? How much force is appropriate and at whom should it be directed? Humanitarian aid workers define their role as non-political and impartial, seeking to minimize violence and treat all sides equally (Weil, 2001: 80). Militaries, on the other hand, take sides and look for enemies. When should intervention happen?

Preventive military action is difficult to justify on humanitarian grounds, given the potential destructiveness of a military operation, yet delayed action almost invariably means large-scale loss of life in crises. When soldiers and aid workers interact, how can humanitarian organizations avoid being seen as parties to the conflict? The fundamental cause of success and failure across all the cases was the interaction of military strategy with humanitarian objectives and the demands of the situation on the ground. When strategy, objectives and demands were aligned, success was far more likely than when one or more pieces were incongruent (Massingham, 2009: 888). Intervening governments have a great deal of control over the outcome of a humanitarian intervention if they understand what they are up against and have the political will to pay a price in soldiers’ lives to save strangers.

The EASF as the sub-region’s standby force for conflict intervention is expected to carry out any intervention missions mandated to it by the AU PSC. The force is supposed to carry its mission diligently thus ending conflict in that particular region. The multidimensional force can switch from peace enforcement to peace keeping so that they can help in the post-conflict reconstruction of the affected nation. This force
can therefore be deployed in different conflict scenarios as stipulated by the ASF’s deployments and any other functions as mandated by the PSC or the Assembly.

2.6 Humanitarian intervention
EASF should facilitate humanitarian intervention by creating safe corridors for the humanitarian agencies to pass through to reach the vulnerable populace. However, the controversy of humanitarian intervention lies in the fact that the sovereignty of the targeted state is being violated by whomever is intervening, even though it is on humanitarian grounds. To emphasize this point further, Holsti (1995: 45) argues that the international system is predicated on the principle that each state is autonomous and therefore independent. This means that each country “has the right in its internal affairs to be free from acts of coercion committed or assisted by other states. This rule is basic to the possibility of international law” (Massingham, 2009: 842). Similarly, the concept of sovereignty grants state autonomy and the right to self-determination. This would also carry with it full legislative powers and rights to make laws and execute them (Weil, 2001: 111) Therefore, all states are equal and enjoy sovereign rights.

The UN Charter argues that all states are equal before international law irrespective of comparable size and wealth. This principle of the sovereign equality of states has been enshrined in Article 2.1 of the UN Charter. It entails the country’s sole right to make laws within its territory. States are prevented from intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If that duty is violated, the victim state has the further right to defend its territorial integrity and political independence (United Nations, 2000: 5).

Legitimate humanitarian intervention is not morally limited, where the use of force is intended to stop the slaughter of human beings by states, which hide behind sovereignty and the concept of the norm of non-intervention in carrying out such actions. Massingham (2009: 860) argues that humanitarian intervention is associated with justifiable means of using force for the purpose of protecting the people within another
state from the treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereignty is presumed to act with reason.

The concept of humanitarian intervention also includes the assistance provided by International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) to local NGOs. This entails the provision of aid by foreign donors, especially from the Western countries in cases of both man-made and natural disasters. However, this humanitarian assistance has also been expanded to include categories of victims produced by political crisis (Nathan, 2009: 15). These crises include intrastate conflicts with gross human rights violations resulting in huge numbers of refugees and the displacement of people within the state.

Since the concept of humanitarian intervention has universal application, it is influenced by several factors such as culture, religion, ethics and law. In fact in 1998 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 43/131 which acknowledged the rights of citizens to international humanitarian assistance and the role of NGOs in humanitarian crisis (Paris, 1999). Several other UN Resolutions were adopted, including Resolution 45/100 in 1990, which obliges states to establish corridors of peace to allow humanitarian assistance, and Resolution 46/182 in 1991, which obliges governments to accept humanitarian assistance relating to humanitarian actions. Nevertheless, this moral imperative without the UN mandate is often abused by intervening states. This gave rise to the selective application of humanitarian intervention by states in cases that they perceive deserve this principle.

The major limitation of this selective application without the UN mandate has been inconsistency of policy and abuse of the principle. This stems from the fact that because states will be governed by what they judge to be their national interest, they intervene only when they deem this to be at stake (Nathan, 2009: 15). Since selective application of humanitarian intervention is susceptible to abuse, it is important to seek the UN mandate before intervention is conducted. Besides that, the major limitation of selective
application of humanitarian intervention has been its lack of uniformity in a plethora of cases demanding different responses.

2.7 Military intervention

The conflicts in Great Lakes region are marked by intense brutality and disregard for the rules of war. In these violent conflicts, EASF is expected to play the lead role in conflict intervention in the region. Roberts (1999: 50) adds that the distinction between the civilians and combatants are fading. In Darfur, 2003, the clashes left 300,000 civilians dead and displaced more than 2 million people (Sakianga, 2009: 23). The scale of the destruction outraged the international community prompting the US government to describe it as genocide. As a result, President Al Bashir was indicted by the ICC for genocide and crimes against humanity. Both the U.S. and European governments were not willing to intervene militarily and could not develop a coherent policy towards Sudan.

These internal conflicts violate human rights. Like in the Kenyan PEV2007/2008, innocent people died, some were maimed, and a number of women and girls were raped. Nearly over 500,000 people were displaced ( Davies, 2008: 50). Moreover, so many people lost their livelihoods. Only well-focused efforts that address the root causes such abuses can stop such violations. This requires addressing issues of structural violence and more important, justice. The Darfur crisis is highlighted by Traub (2004: 18) who notes that the absence of response contemplates the possibility that humanitarianism might become an unaffordable luxury as the west confronts its own vulnerability post 9/11. The Africans too need a platform for launching the interventions missions prevent the escalations of these violent conflicts. In the Great Lakes region, EASF offers the best alternative for conflict intervention.
Davies (2008: 525) advises that failures within the key institutions are a recipe for conflict. Justice is the foundation for sustainable peace. Concerned parties whether political or civil, who do not confront justice issues jeopardize efforts for conflict resolution and reduce the chances for attaining the sustainable peace. Therefore, to stop the escalation of the violence and to avert further humanitarian crises, military interventions become very handy especially if it’s composed of a multidisciplinary contingent.

Military intervention for human protection purposes takes place in a hostile environment, where the political order is contested and the national government does not have the capacity or the will to respond to the basic needs of people for safety, shelter, food, water and medical services. In some cases the government itself is responsible for creating the humanitarian crisis in its effort to defeat rebels or impose demographic changes through killing and forced displacement.

Politicians call these situations crises or wars; humanitarian workers call them complex emergencies; soldiers used to call them military operations other than war and now refer to them as peace operations (Durward, 2006: 3). In cases where parties to the conflict have reached a (provisional) negotiated settlement, diplomats and military officers refer to peacekeeping. A political crisis with humanitarian consequences—some armed elements within a country are very likely to be hostile to the delivery of aid or the protection of civilians because the intervention gets in the way of their political objectives (Williams, 2008: 309).

2.7.1 The development of the concept of military intervention

In the aftermath of the devastating Westphalia wars in Europe (1618-1648), military intervention in intrastate conflicts was seen as violating the fundamental norm of the Westphalian treaties, which state that “war is not waged against a sovereign state which has not itself militarily attacked another sovereign state” (Nathan, 2009: 15). As notes
Banta (2008: 65), these interventions were seen as contrary to international rules. More fundamentally, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has strong roots in the moral war theory of Just War (*bellum justum*).

In the development of the Just War theory, St. Augustine (354-430BC) argued that “the justness of action could be judged without evaluating the driving intention, so also with the state action of going to war” (Likoti, 2006: 54). War must be waged by a competent authority and there must be a just cause for that war, so that those who were invaded must deserve to have been attacked. Therefore Just cause for war could be found in self-defence; restoration of peace; assistance of neighbours against attack and, most notably, defence of the poor and the oppressed. Massingham (2009: 870) says the defence of innocent people, no matter where in the world, would be a just cause. This line of argument anticipated the findings of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which identified six criteria for military intervention that conform to the UN Charter and the Security Council Articles. These were: just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.

In applying his concept of natural law in the sphere of international law, Brownlie (1963: 78) states that if a tyrant practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human social connexion is not cut off in such a case. It would not follow that others may not take up arms for them. The state’s sovereignty exists only as long as it does not violate the rights of its citizens, but once it pursues practices that outrage other human beings beyond the state, other countries have a legitimate right to intervene. This intervention will therefore be just. Cilliers (2008: 17) argues sovereignty does not legitimize violation of human rights and denial of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, intervention was only accepted by the international community when it was based on humanitarian grounds. During the early part of the 19th century at least in four instances, European countries cited humanitarian claims to influence the Balkan policy in such a manner that would have required these countries to use force in the Greek war for independence (1821-
During the Lebanon/Syria conflict in 1860-1861; in the Bulgarian agitation of 1876-1878 and in response to the Armenian massacres (1894-1917). While full scale military intervention did not take place in all these cases, the evolution and policy influence of humanitarian claim was set. (Barry & Woever, 2003: 35).

The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his 2000 report to the Millennium Assembly, challenged the international community to try to forge consensus, once and for all, around the basic questions of principle and the process involved: when should intervention occur, under whose authority, and how. It was in this spirit that the Canadian government established The Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (United Nations, 2000: 3). Both reports establish a conceptual framework upon which humanitarian intervention may take place and defines boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate interventions. Both reports therefore, form the basis of how interventions should be perceived as both legitimate and illegitimate by the international community.

The report among other issues argues that, the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention” has been one of the most controversial foreign policy issues of the last decade—both when intervention has happened, as in Kosovo, and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda (Cutts, 1998: 58). The report central theme is the idea of “The Responsibility to Protect.” Sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe - from mass murder and rape, from starvation - but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. The supplementary volume of the Commission’s report is itself an important contribution to the ongoing debate on how the international community should respond to massive. It is clear that the notion of state sovereignty coexisted with intervention since its inception. The UN Charter also embraced this tradition in 1945. Military intervention during the 19th and 20th centuries was regarded as the last option when all peaceful measures were not successful.
Cutts (1998: 23) argues that one of the major challenges facing modern society since the end of the Second World War has been the pervasive problem of both intra and interstate conflicts. He argues further that all of the 30 major armed conflicts fought in the world in 1995 were intrastate wars.

Since the Second World War, the interventionist environment has refused to fade away. The record of unauthorised military intervention in intrastate conflicts appears to be far from over. More countries have become involved in intrastate conflicts than ever before. From 1945 to 1989, the world witnessed around 269 interventions (Holsti, 1995: 65). All were conducted without UNSC resolution. They were unilateral and hence illegitimate in terms of international law. EASF should therefore be able to work in line with the concept of military intervention if it’s to realize any gains.

2.8 Theoretical Framework
The theory informs the researcher in understanding the spheres in which the force should operate in the quest of accomplishing the missions and guidelines in launching for any complex operation especially the mission scenario six.

2.5.1 Just War Theory in Military Interventions
The military usually doesn’t have standing theories. This is because war is marred with fog and uncertainties. In rare occasions does the first plan materialize under the enemy fire. More often than not, the military commander is forced to switch to the contingency plan. The operational theatre is very fluid, unlike other disciplines that follow specific rules to produce known results. The outcomes are dependent on circumstances, affected by unforeseen and incalculable events, and always requiring application through the general genius. However, during the military engagements, the civilian populace must be protected so that their rights are not violated during the process. This is where the Just War Theory (JWT) comes in. It was coined by Michael Walzer and has since then been furthered by other scholars like Richard Orend. These two are prominent just war theorists.
The JWT seeks a complete theory of warfare in which ‘the foundational (human rights of) security, subsistence, liberty, equality and recognition’ (Orend, 2006:3) are upheld by choosing war only when it is the lesser of two evils (Evans, 2005: 5). Out of this search has grown an acknowledgement by many of the most prominent just war scholars—especially in light of myriad post-war difficulties of recent conflicts and the ever more entrenched norm of humanitarian intervention—of a necessary third pillar to the traditional just war canon of *jus ad bellum* (justice of war, or just cause), and *jus in bello* (justice in war, or just means) (Orend, 2002: 32). This third pillar, *jus post bellum* (justice after war, or just peace) is most desperately needed with wars if EASF is to be engaged in any, where treaties or legal prosecutions between parties are clearly not enough, and the comprehensive construction of the post-war environment is the very goal of war in the first place. Jus post bellum is intended to extend the moral insights of JWT—which are drawn out from the maxim that because there are moral values at stake in war, it is sometimes morally permissible and even necessary to fight a war (Orend 2007: 78).

Banta (2008: 45) notes that the theory is not some defined calculus, but a heuristic tool which is meant to guide one’s thinking on war. The theory has been employed as a lens through which humanitarian concerns are addressed whenever decisive forces are faced with the intervention trilemma in war crisis. When war hostilities have ceased, EASF should be able to conduct disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs to the belligerents. In the post conflict reconstruction, the peace building should be done holistically encompassing all the actors who were involved in the conflict. Since the force is multidisciplinary contingents, the civilians should be able to offer the much needed expertise in the building of various infrastructures to keep the nation on its recovery track while the military is keeping the fragile peace.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction
The chapter provides the operational framework within which data was collected and analyzed. It further looks at the variables and the sample size. It summarizes with ethical consideration.

3.1 Research Design
The studying of challenges facing the EASF in execution of its peace operations occasioned the requirement to examine the context of conflicts within the region. The examination stemmed from the research problem’s need to identify the convenience of the regional security constitutions in intervening conflict situations. Random and purposive samplings were applied to select respondents for the study. The method for the study was also envisaged to test the Just War Theory. Just war theory has been employed by scholars in peace and conflict field when conducting their studies. Taking the example of Banta (2008: 60), who did a qualitative study on the US invasion of Iraqi in 2003, the scholar in pre and post conflict situations used the theory to assess the duties the US had towards the displacement of Iraqis. His critique of the US action towards the displacement using the JWT concluded an unjust cause and willful ignorance in Iraq. The review of EASF’s challenges was based on its ability to conduct PSOs, anchored on the three facets of the JWT; *jus ad bellum* (justice of war, or just cause), and *jus in bello* (justice in war, or just means) and *jus post bellum* (justice after war, or just peace)

3.2 Variables
In order to investigate the relationship between EASF and its conflict intervention preparedness, the dependent variable is the operational success of the EASF while the independent variables are the capability gaps, the contemporary threat trends and the
logistical constraints. For successful intervention, the force needs to have sound tactics, strategies in execution of its operations and political will from the member states. The intervening variables that influenced the operations are local support from the local populace that can be achieved through proper civil-military relations and ensuring that personnel’s morale is well taken care of by looking into their welfare including good remunerations. They should also be equipped with relevant specialized equipment coupled with the necessary training.

3.3 Study Site
The study was conducted at two sites namely; the EASF Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM) Headquarters which is located at Karen in Nairobi and at Kenya Rapid Deployment Capability (KRDC) which is situated at Embakasi. The RDC is a teeth arm that responds to the crises before the main body is fully deployed in theatre of operations. This force is mandated with stabilizing the situation so that humanitarian aid can be offered. It creates safe corridors for the civilian components of the force. Currently, the EASF’s RDC is based in Embakasi.

3.4 Target population
The target population for the study focused on the KRDC’s personnel and the EASFCOM staff. The KRDC has a population of 250 personnel whereas the EASFCOM has 35 staff offers. Tesch (1990: 8), states a population is a group of individuals, objects or items from which samples are taken for measurement. It is the larger group from which the sample is taken. However, a study cannot be conducted of the entire population, so a tentative sample size was proposed for the research. A table of target population is shown on table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1: Target Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of Coordinating Mechanism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee of Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Department</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Department</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Department</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Department</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Department</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRDC</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Target Population</strong></td>
<td><strong>285</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5 Sample Size

A sample is a unit within an entire population. A sample size is a finite part of a statistical population whose properties are studied to gain information about the whole (Webster, 1985: 26). Kothari (2009: 54) also emphasizes that a sample size of between 10% and 20% of the population is considered adequate for a detailed or in-depth study. Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009; 54) argue that 10% to 20% is acceptable in descriptive research but indicate that the higher the sample the better. The sample for the study was obtained from a population of about 250 KRDC personnel and 35 EASFCOM staff. An appropriate sample was cut out of the 250 from the KRDC, through random sampling. Therefore 50 respondents from KRDC were selected for the study. Purposive sampling was employed for selecting the informants for interviewing from the EASFCOM headquarters which had a population of 35 personnel. The sampling method was informed by the fact that headquarter has key leadership of the mechanism. 7 personnel formed the part of the population selected for sampling. Tables of summary of the sample and interviewee profile are shown below in table 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.
Table 3.2: Summary of the Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Category</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of Coordinating Mechanism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee of Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Department</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Department</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Department</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Department</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Department</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRDC</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sample</strong></td>
<td><strong>285</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3: Interviewee profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Position held</th>
<th>Organization category</th>
<th>CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Category:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EASFCOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Committee of East Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff</td>
<td>CD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Staff officer</td>
<td>Political department</td>
<td>PD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Staff officer</td>
<td>Finance department</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Staff officer</td>
<td>Liaison department</td>
<td>LSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Administrative department</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Litigation officer</td>
<td>Legal department</td>
<td>LGD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6 Pilot Study

The researcher conducted a pilot study by administering the questionnaire amongst ten respondents from the non sampled group. The purpose of piloting the research was first to establish whether the questionnaire would provide the data needed for the study, second, to assess and identify the problems that the respondents would encounter in completing the questionnaire. And check the clarity of the questionnaire to the respondents. The corrections that arose from the pilot study were included in the final draft of the questionnaire to increase the validity and reliability of the study. The step ensured that the questionnaire yielded correct information relevant to the research objectives. It also made the data reliable with regards to accuracy and precision in measurement.
3.7 Data Collection and analysis

The data collection methods involved a literature search, questionnaire survey, and interview schedules. Both primary and secondary data sources were employed. The secondary data was obtained from the published and unpublished books and project reports, magazines, and journals on regional security regimes and peace operations. Other relevant materials in the library as well as Internet also formed part of the secondary data. Previous research done on security architecture of continental and regional security organs formed major part of the secondary data.

The primary data collection was done through administering of questionnaires to target respondents and filling the interview schedules. The researcher asked the interviewees questions pertaining to the survey and collected the desired information. In addition, questionnaire surveys were administered to the KRDC personnel. They were requested to fill in the questionnaires and return the forms for analysis. The questionnaire contained open ended questions.

The study yielded both qualitative and quantitative data. As such, the study employed descriptive statistical tools to analyse quantitative data obtained. Qualitative data were analyzed through qualitative techniques. Analysis was done based on descriptive statistics. Qualitative data were drawn from open-ended questions in the questionnaire and interview guide to present the findings. This involved a critical assessment of each response and examining it using thematic interpretation in accordance with the objectives of the study. The findings were then presented in narrative excerpts within the report. Narrative and interpretive reports as well as citations were written down to depict the situation as it is on the ground. The data gathered in this study were summarized so as to establish the fundamental results.
3.9 Ethical Considerations

Research studies at times present a number of ethical and moral dilemmas which must be identified and addressed prior to carrying out any research study in order to protect all participants from potential harm. The study only commenced once approval to conduct the research had been obtained from the relevant authorities, starting at the University level. Also, the researcher acknowledged all the pieces of literature cited in the study, to avoid cases of plagiarism. The findings and results were presented as that of actual facts stated in the questionnaires. All participants’ experiences and perceptions have been discussed as captured in the interviews, no false information or accusations have been included in the report.

The researcher ensured privacy and respecting the autonomy of the respondents. Prior to collecting information from the respondents, individual consent was sought. All information collected was treated with utmost confidentiality. The researcher carefully kept records of all research activities comprising of the correspondences with the University, data collection procedures as well as the research design. The researcher strived to avoid bias data collection, expert testimonies and data analysis. The researcher endeavored to be honest in the research. The methods, procedures and results presented in this research are not fabricated but are a true picture of what was collected from the field.

The research findings, analysis and discussions are presented in chapters four and five. The findings are based on the variables that influence the success of peace support operations. It further gives the mitigation factors to these problems that bedevil the efficiency of the force. Chapter six provides a summary of the thesis and gives recommendations based on the findings of the research. It also suggests areas for further research.
CHAPTER FOUR
CAPABILITY GAPS OF THE FORCE

4.0 Introduction
The chapter details findings, analysis and interpretation on data collected on the capability gaps of the force. The analysis focuses on how the gaps affect the efficiency of the force. It also delves on how these flaws can be resolved to ensure relatively more effective future peace support operations.

4.1 Capability gaps of the force
These are the faultlines and weaknesses within the administrative systems of the force. They are likely to affect the operations of the force. These factors should be looked into so as to allow smooth operations of the force. The capability gaps aspects such as competing regional political goals, weak bureaucratic systems, military flaws, command and control gaps, and military training gaps are likely to jeopardize the peace support operations. A brief review of these aspects continues below.

4.1.1 Competing regional political goals
The political support from the member states is relatively poor as shown in table 4.1. Amongst the respondents, 80.3% feel that the EASF does not get the necessary political support it should from the members. However, the 19.7% feels that the political support the force is getting from her members is enough.
This is the most important dimension of conflict management is the political piece (Omoroghbe, 2011: 40). The EASF’s effectiveness results from the sum of its members cooperation. Important political enablers that affect the conflict management capabilities of the force include: widespread agreement on what EASFCOM peace support operations can (or cannot) be expected to achieve; unity within the member states in support of those objectives; sustained high-level political engagement to support special envoys, committees, and panels as well as peacekeepers in the field; and genuine cooperation from host-state authorities.

The force should not be allocated tasks that it cannot be able to perform. The missions should be realistic in nature. Thus, the task given should reflect the availability of resources assigned for that particular task. The objectives to be accomplished at the host state should have the full support of the member states. This would ease the movement of military hardware and personnel and avoids the possibility of diplomatic hitches. Peace support operations rely so much on timings that any amount of time lost could mean life or death to the vulnerable population.

The situation is normally complicated when the host country does not want to cooperate with the intervening force. The information gathering becomes tedious. The information collected is processed to produce intelligence that can be acted upon. When the citizens of the host country are cooperative and appreciate the fact that the interveners have

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Support</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
come to help them and is not an occupational force, the task is then made much easier. The pacification processes eventually takes little time leaving room for peace building to commence so that the civilians can resume their normal lives as they struggle to rebuild their nation. The host country therefore has the responsibility of cooperating with the peace enforcers to save on the resources and time.

There is rivalry for regional hegemony as advanced by Vines (2013: 97) in the previous chapter. There is competition amongst the member states as to which country becomes the lead nation. This explains why the planning elements are based in Nairobi, Kenya, whereas, the logistic elements are based in Ethiopia which is a landlocked country. It becomes too costly for the organization to transport its cargo to Addis Ababa. Moreover, it would be difficult shipping logistical items to the host country. The fight for supremacy therefore undermines the institutional build-up. In addition to that, the membership of Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea result in a largely dysfunctional organization, contested international recognition, and internal political and military conflict.

PD postulated that:

When war broke out in Southern Sudan in Dec 2013 between President Kiir and his Deputy President Dr, Riek, Uganda rushed to Sudan to reinforce the Juba troops to curtail Juba Massacre. Kampala did not seek the approval of the EASF while deploying her troops. From that action it was apparent that Uganda is fighting for a lead role within the region. The battle for supremacy is destroying the unity of purpose within the mechanism. It also saw the construction of the logistics base at Adis ababa knowing too well that Ethiopia is a landlocked nation. They ought to have chosen a country with ease access to sea routes ports. On the other hand, some member states have dual membership. Tanzania is a member of both SADC Standby Force and EASF at the same. This limits the member state`s full commitment to the mechanism
with regards to contribution of assessed funds to the Peace fund kitty and the troops pledged.

In confronting an armed conflict, it is particularly important that there be strong and united members support for a viable peace process, the force generation phase of the peace operations, the conduct of the operation, as well as an exit strategy. During the crucial start up/planning phase, powerful Eastern African leaders, and not merely commission officials, must champion the mission and play a proactive role in generating the required forces. Early and sustained high-level political engagement makes it more likely that the required technical capabilities will be allocated and maintained during the mission’s life cycle.

Based on the principles of just war theory, the constitution of the force should be justifiable with regards to the commitment by the member states. The commitment shows that the force is legitimate. The legitimacy is quite essential especially when the troops are deployed in a theatre of war. The force was deployed for pacification in Mogadishu yet it did not have the sufficient amount of troops required. The member states should show political commitment to the mechanism for it to achieve its mandates.

4.1.2 Weak Bureaucratic Systems
Effective peace support operations initiatives require efficient management and strong bureaucratic structures both at Karen and in the field to provide strategic vision and to support senior mission leadership teams. At present, however, the EASF still lacks the institutional capacity and human resources to conduct effective peacemaking initiatives and complex peace operations. From the data findings, 65.4% feel that the Force has weak bureaucratic systems as shown in table 4.2
Table 4.2: The Bureaucratic Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaucratic System</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Weak</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EASFCOM suffers from weak bureaucratic processes and management systems poor information technologies; inadequate physical infrastructure; a lack of professional and motivated personnel; weak reputation, presence, and reach; and inadequate sources of funds. The force lacks hi-tech equipments for information gathering and collection. As a result the force’s early warning mechanism is very poor. It`s not able to efficiently monitor the volatile situation of its member states. With poor pay packages, the institutions becomes a transit camp for the professionals. They leave the institution after gathering the relevant work experience for the high-end organizations. As observed by CD that these civilians are very important for the institutional growth. But the rate at which they exit the force is quite alarming especially after acquiring relevant work experience. The EASF should consider giving them relatively good pay packages. This is bad for the growth of its various departments since the personnel with the know-how are not there to provide the expertise needed. Intervention missions would pose particular institutional challenges to the force at each stage of a mission’s life cycle (i.e., planning, deployment, operations, and withdrawal). In the field, teams of qualified senior leaders, including the special representative, force commander, police commissioner and chief administrator are difficult to assemble and retain.

The EASF’s conflict management initiatives critically need adequate facilities, systems, and infrastructure to sustain peace support operations and mediation efforts in the field. For peace operations, for example, safe and secure accommodation facilities are
crucial—as are the provision of Level II/Level III hospitals. Similarly, and back at the EASFCOM’s headquarters, capacity for planning, force generation, and logistical support remains very small, especially when compared to that of national militaries and other international organizations attempting to conduct similar types of operations. Finally, high staff turnover and the absence of a lessons learned unit means that the EASF has little institutional memory regarding conflict management.

### 4.1.3 Poorly Equipped Military Component

EASF consistently struggles to marshal the requisite military personnel and range of military assets needed for complex peace operations. Among the assets in highest demand in difficult the theatres of the region such as Sudan and Somalia are helicopters i.e. utility and attack helis, armored personnel carriers, communications and intelligence equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles, night vision goggles, and, in the case of troops in Mogadishu, battle tanks (CD). The findings of the data show a weak military component as shown in table 4.3 below. 67% of the respondents are of the opinion that the Force has a weak military component. Williams (2012: 603) also points out that troops also lacks a sophisticated mortar radar system, which could have helped it reduce levels of civilian casualties. JWT talks of reasonable chances of success in a just war. Without these equipments, despite the level of training of the soldiers, they cannot beat the contemporary insurgency. The modern militia groups are more equipped than even some national armies. Troops should not be taken to a theatre of war with no adequate military hardware. The defeat could be eminent causing more complications to already a complex humanitarian situation.
Table 4.3: Military Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Component</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the absence of the necessary capabilities, such an approach brings a high level of risk, not only of failure but also of raising people’s expectations that cannot be fulfilled. Worse still, it undermines the credibility of peace support operations and weakens the organization that is responsible. As for military personnel, the EASFCOM’s greatest deficits are specialists with niche skills including medicine, engineering, and intelligence gathering. To fill these gaps, the mechanism relies on external donors (the friends of EASF) to provide funding, training, and equipment directly to troop contributing countries—hence bypassing the EASFCOM systems.

The force is supposed to draw the soldiers from the member states for robust deployment in mission scenario six-AU intervention mission. This poses grave danger since the member states are supposed to set aside a battalion plus for the deployment however in the respective countries the member states have got no standing force set aside to be deployed by the EASF (Muruithi, 2012: 662). If EASF is to deploy at a short notice then generating a relatively sufficient strength from members would be difficult and it would require a lot of time. The brigade that is stationed at Addis Ababa should be having the fighting units, however, it has a strength of only four officers and no soldiers. This poses a big challenge if the force is supposed to deploy for a particular mission as was pointed by the informant below.
LSD pointed out:

Initiating a contingent to be deployed in Juba 2013 to halt the massacres was impossible. Nearly all the members had their defence forces committed at that time. The force should ideally have a standing army like her counterparts, NATO. This eases the command complications since the troops are under the EASF’s for all purposes; be it administrative issues or command flow. The troops lack modern equipment. They need modern communication equipment which should be able to cover long distances. Troop carrying vehicles, utility helicopters as well as attack helicopters. Without this equipment, fighting the contemporary insurgency becomes nearly difficult.

The rapid deployment capabilities (RDC) that are supposed to be deployed in mission scenario six pending the deployment of the main body, are nearly not in existence. And the ones that are there are ill equipped with no numbers of the soldiers required. The RDCs should have atleast 2500 personnel (Muruithi, 2005: 7). Most of the RDCs are at their rudimentary stages with Kenya and Rwanda having nearly established RDCs. These capabilities are supposed to be on rosters. They should be well equipped with permanently stationed troops.

On the other hand, in the art of actual fighting, the striking of a delicate balance so as to prevent collateral damage and also to protect own force from the enemy fire while destroying the enemy becomes a difficult tasks. At tactical levels, the commander is concerned with actual destruction of the belligerents if he is to ensure protection of civilians. At this lower echelon, the troops are to attrite the belligerents so that they lose the cohesion and will to fight. Therefore, they can be subdued into ceasefire agreement. This balance poses the intervention trilemma.

Fighting insurgency requires a lot of control of the troops as it happens with most of the military interventions. The war in itself is asymmetrical meaning these are ragtag armies which don’t abide by the international conventions. And they are synonymous
with guerilla warfare. The force is supposed to implement the mandate while faced with three challenges; protection of the civilians, force protection and destruction of the belligerents. The force should be able to neutralize the belligerents while keeping the collateral damage as low as possible so that the rights of the citizens are not violated.

A state must forgo one factor if it is to succeed in accomplishing the mission. If a force is excessively controlled then it won’t be able to eliminate the insurgent groups and it will also cause high civilian casualties. The force is prompted to deploy long range weapons which more often than not don’t have the perfect precision hence resulting into unwanted civilian deaths. This will not be in light with the commander’s wish of winning the hearts and minds of the locals so as to gain their support. No sane general would want his force to face non-civilian cooperation. In the destruction of the opposing forces, the commander has to expose his troops to the enemy fire. The troops have to conduct intensive patrols whether on foot or by troop carrying vehicles and aerial surveillances. They have to man key installations and structures. This leads to the troops’ exposure to the belligerents’ fire. So in execution of the mission scenario six, the commander must know how to balance these three factors in the pursuit of the mission.

The Just War Theory demands that the force should not deploy excessive firepower in neutralizing the opposing forces. The firepower should be commensurate to the intended target. Despite the force being caught at the crossroads, it should be committed to professionalism. The destruction of the belligerents should not lead to deaths of civilians. They should be able to conduct reconnaissance before hand, gather information and intelligence, and deploy their surveillance assets so that targeting is done with highest levels of accuracy. These will minimize the percentage of civilian casualties. On the other hand, the soldiers too have got their rights. The task or the mission should be realistic and there should be relatively enough resources to allow the troops to accomplish task. The force should have enough trained manpower so that relief operations are conducted. This is to ensure that the troops are not burdened with
one task for ages, they should be rotated. The soldiers are able to get rest and replenish their stocks of ammunition and food. Therefore, the commander should strike a balance amongst the three prongs as further shown on figure 4.4.

**Figure 4.4 Intervention Trilemma**

![Figure 4.4 Intervention Trilemma](image)

### 4.1.4 Weak Civilian Component

While military assets are critical, multidimensional peace operations also require civilian capabilities. *Here the EASF suffers from a shortage of experts in the rule of law and security institutions such as police, justice, and corrections officers as well as expert trainers to build local capacity in these areas (AD)*. The qualitative role of civilians in peace operations has changed exponentially and, as a result, the number of civilian functions has also increased considerably. The table 4.5 shows that the 75% of the respondents feel that the force has a weak civilian component.
Table 4.5: Civilian Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Component</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The civilian components do human rights monitoring, support the establishment of human rights commissions and to ensure that new constitutions and laws are in line with international standards. They support the electoral processes – such as voter education, voter registration and training, mentoring and support to local independent electoral commissions. They offer support for the restoration of state authority or the establishment of state services where these did not exist before, especially in the context of the rule of law (RoL). They support various aspects of security sector reform (SSR), particularly, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

Peace support operations also typically include a public information unit with print, radio and sometimes television capabilities, as well as specialised units dealing with child protection, gender, HIV/ AIDs, protection of civilians (POC) and sexual exploitation and abuse. Therefore the civilians’ component plays a vital role towards restoration of the falling government. The EASF should therefore strengthen the civilian component to bring these experts on board as noted by AD, these experts are very important in the post conflict reconstruction. They are charged with observing that various function of the government start running back. The Jus post bellum demands for the post conflict reconstruction. The militia groups should be demobilized and reintegrated into the society. The normal functions of a government should be restored and these pieces of work can only be done by the civilian experts.
4.1.5 Military Training Gaps

The training should be done collectively with all the elements of the multidimensional force. Unfortunately this rarely happens. The various forces drawn from the member states should be training together to enhance and foster togetherness. The joint training should be frequent so that the personnel get to accustom themselves with the training doctrines and the weapons. However, from the research findings, joint trainings are rarely conducted as shown on table 4.6

Table 4.6: Joint Training Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Exercises</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the various elements are integrated and carry on with their training together it eases the command and control during the actual deployment. The equipment can only be tested during the training sessions. Different national militaries own different type of equipment, more so weapons. The interoperability of these weapons can only be checked at this juncture. The force needs to synchronize and harmonize the type of equipment that member states should arm their personnel with. Having weapons that other members cannot operate can cause fratricide thus endangering the lives of the soldiers and the bystanders.
Training of military and civilian personnel of the EASF is based on the guidelines prepared by the AU Commission. Member states who contribute contingents to the sub-regional force are expected to harmonise the training of designated force with standards that are provided at continental and sub-regional levels. All the designated training centres are required to follow the standard of training procedures developed by the AU Commission in training the contingents.

LGD illustrated that:

The standard training guidelines include training in doctrine and in humanitarian law and international human rights law for the civilian and military personnel of the ASF. In this regard it is worth pointing out that even though the aim of military intervention is not war per se, it is most likely to happen in a combat situation. The EASF military forces are bound by the rules of international humanitarian law. Even though ASF forces are not ‘State’ forces in the strict sense of the word, their involvement inside a member state of the AU is governed by the rules applicable to international armed conflicts because the EASF forces are considered to be third parties inside a state.

The EASF military forces are bound by the obligations under the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention. The obligations include the respect for the sovereignty of the occupied territory, the duty to restore and ensure public order, the duty to limit the occupation and the duty to allow access to international humanitarian organizations. This is further reinforced by the Just War Theory as discussed in chapter three. It minimizes the losses occasioned by the brutality of wars.

4.1.6 Command and Control Gaps

The command structure is likely to be influenced by external forces. This is due to the fact that the troops are not fully under the command of the EASF. The troop contributing country still dictates where her troops are to be deployed within the EASF. This weakens the command structure of the force as further shown by the research
findings on table 4.7. The 73.8% of the respondents were not happy with the command structure.

Table 4.7: Satisfaction with the command structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command task</th>
<th>General structure</th>
<th>Downward flow of orders</th>
<th>Upward flow of feedback</th>
<th>Control by the leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% said No</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% said Yes</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the RDCs deploy to create entry points for the follow up forces, they are supposed to be self-sustaining for a period of three months before the troop contributing country is reimbursed. Sustaining fighting troops in the field that long while they are being funded by their respective countries can be really challenging financially. These soldiers require food, special clothing, weapons, ammunitions and transport. Furthermore, the personnel are supposed to be put under special pay. The RDC deployed at that time is most likely to further their country’s interests.

Capability for an effective EASF is that it must be constituted of war-fighters. Far too often, intervening forces are deployed to a Chapter VII environment with Chapter VI authority—and the results are inevitable—soldiers legally helpless to counter the bloody and humiliating events of Sierra Leone in 2001, and Somalia in 1993. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force the EASF contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers. This means that the mandate should specify an operation’s authority to use force.

LGD said that, *command and control is further complicated by the fact that the troop contributing countries sign an MoU with the EASF on where their troops are to be deployed. This limits the authority which the force has over the troops.* If the force has to reassign a specific contingent to a new area of operation then it has to make an
official request to that particular troop contributing country. This normally involves a lot of diplomatic chains and protocols which might take relatively long time before it is effected. In peace support operations, every moment counts and it could mean life or death to citizens of the host nation. The force should be able to exercise full authority over its troops if it has to spring into action after a timely decision making.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY THREATS AND LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS

5.0 Introduction
The chapter details findings, analysis and interpretation on data collected on the contemporary security threat trends. The analysis, also, focuses on the logistical constraints affecting the operational phases of the mechanism. It also delves on how these two variables affect the force hence proposing on the measures to be taken to mitigate the factors.

5.1 Contemporary Security Threats
There have been various security threats within the Eastern African region. These threats need to be addressed if the region has to experience durable peace. The common threats to regional peace and security includes: toppling the governments, displacing populations, humanitarian disasters, diseases, the massacre of civilians and climate change. However, there has been an emergence of new threats particularly terrorism and piracy in the wider Horn of Africa. These new threats need to be addressed by the EASFCOM. In the post 9/11 beginning from 2001- the US twin tower bombings, there have been increase in the activities of the terrorists within Eastern Africa. In the recent past, Al Shabaab (a terror group based in Somalia) has been conducting terror activities majorly in Kenya. In 2011, they intensified their terror activities. This has threatened the tourism sector which is a major foreign exchange earner. This prompted the Kenya`s military incursion into Somalia so that it could create a buffer zone.

CD noted that:
There is also need to solve the piracy activities in the Somalia waters. It makes the waters unsafe thus denying the region foreign income. The
EASF needs to heighten surveillance and counter-piracy activities. There are claims that part of the proceeds from piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Eden serve to finance extremist groups. Al-Shabaab preferred being paid cash for letting pirates use their ports, the organization (Al-Shabaab) is open to being compensated through the acquisition of weapons. Pirates in turn, need Al-Shabaab to provide protection for captured ships and crews until ransoms could be extracted.

The Eastern African community is the most vulnerable to terrorism of all regions in sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly all countries in Eastern Africa have been victims of terrorist acts. These acts have either been carried out by and against a country’s nationals for a domestic cause or they have focused on extra-national or extra-regional targets, such as Western targets located in the region. Examples include: the 1980 terrorist attacks on the Norfolk Hotel in Kenya, the August 1998 simultaneous attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; the November 2002 simultaneous attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, on another Paradise Hotel and on an Israel-bound aircraft at take-off from the Mombasa International Airport, Kenya; the July 2010 attacks during the World Cup finals in Kampala, Uganda and the December 2010 bombing of a Kampala-bound bus in Nairobi (Reno, 2011: 4). Local communities in the region have borne the burden of the loss of life and property as well as other economic damage from these attacks.

The counterterrorism policy should be focused on terrorism within the region. These include a range of overt, covert, and clandestine programs to counter the transnational terrorist threat in this region. These efforts contribute to the Global War on Terror. Al Shabaab employs extremist intimidation and terror tactics designed to instill fear in the general population. Its so-called religious police mete out severe punishment, including floggings, amputations, stoning, and beheadings, for violations of its strict interpretation of Islamic law. LSD revealed that, *Al Shabaab has conducted kidnappings, shootings, and targeted political assassinations, not only on the troops deployed in Somalia but*
also of journalists, civil society activists, and aid workers. Al Shabaab’s use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers are a new dimension in the context of Somali conflict, tactics of urban warfare that have been successfully used by terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere.

The Eastern African Region is vulnerable to terrorism because countries in the region experience: conflicts, weak governance, collapsed state institutions; porous borders allowing extensive and uncontrolled movement of people and illegal weapons; increased extremist religious ideology and radicalisation of vulnerable groups (PD). These factors generally coincide with poor socio-economic conditions and create fertile ground for the existence of terrorism. Unfortunately, the Al Shabaab wing is growing quickly due to radicalization of the young Muslim communities in Eastern Africa. Boredom, idleness, and thrill-seeking impulses among youth may also be push factors for extremism, and, when combined with feelings of marginalization and frustrated expectations stemming from a lack of job opportunities in many East African countries, may make some Muslim youth more susceptible to recruitment by groups like Al Shabaab.

Climate change has gained attention as a potential source of conflict within the sub-region. Effects of climate change are indeed the latest in a series of environmental triggers of human conflict along with those of more traditional variety such as drought, desertification, land degradation, failing water supplies, deforestations and depletion of fisheries (Emeka, 1999: 74). The climatic changes threaten water and food security, the allocation of resources and coastal populations. This was witnessed in Kenya in 2012 when there were clashes in Tana River District. There were clashes between the Pokomo ethnic group who are predominantly farmers and the Orma ethnic group who are largely pastoralists.

The region gets erratic rains so the little water resources and the small fertile strip of land are at the epicentre of the conflict. The conflict left at least more than fifty-two
people dead and displaced more 35,000 individuals. These are threats that could increase forced migration, raise tension and trigger conflict. Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability. The situation is further aggravated by the low adaptive capacity of the continent (Omoroghbe, 2011: 57).

5.1.1 Weak Early Warning Systems.
The mechanism lacks strong systems put into place to keep track on these contemporary security threats that threaten to destabilize the region. 70% of the respondents believe that the force has no reliable systems in place for early warnings whereas 30% think that the systems are efficient. This is further shown on table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1: Early warning systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistics Support</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When tracks of these conflicts are monitored they can be arrested before they sprawl out of hand. The department of Early Warning Systems should be created. Informant 4 noted that, *if this system were in place, many deaths would have been averted in the region. Juba massacre of 2013 would have been prevented. The EASF would have sent special envoys at the initial stages to broker a peace agreement within the warring factions.* Ethnic tensions can be monitored in countries with history of civil wars so that any minute signs can be dealt with to ensure durable peace prevails.

5.2 Logistical Constraints
The heart of humanitarian and peace support operations lies in the ability to conduct operational logistics to sustain the assigned forces. The sub-region’s austere environment presents difficult logistic challenges. The research findings show that 85.1% of the respondents felt that the Force has a major logistical challenge as shown on table 4.8. Limited transportation infrastructure requires that airlift be present to augment ground and sea transportation assets in response to crises and conflict situations. The EASF and its member states have near to non-airlift capability thus will have to rely on external assistance for deployment and sustainment of the forces.

**Table 5.2: Logistics Support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistics Support</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The identification of broad sustainability, logistical support, and funding requirements are key components for the deployment of any peace operations including military intervention under mission scenario. *The problem of logistics is not only that of outdated communication and operational equipment but also the ability of the force to maintain modern logistical infrastructure and supply system (FD).* The standardization of logistical equipment among the contingents of the EASF in as much as possible is a very important element of successful operation. However, due to different development capacities of Member State Defence Forces, equipment standardization will not be possible across the whole spectrum of EASF military equipment. One kind of solution to bridge the gap that may exist between the different EASF member states` defence forces is the early identification and standardization of areas where interoperability between contingents is crucial to the success of the EASF.
EASF contingents under scenario 6 are expected to be self-sustainable for 90 days. In this regard, the Peace and Security Council may invite members contributing contingents for the EASF intervention mission to bear the cost of transportation and maintenance of their contingents for the first three months (AU, 2004). The AU is expected to refund the expenses incurred for the three months within a period of six months and to continue financing the intervention mission. However, taking into consideration the economic power of most member states, the issue of sustainability of the EASF in the initial period of deployment may become a problem for many states contributing contingents thereby affecting the performance of the force. Moreover, the lack of a policy of reimbursement on the side of the AU might push member states away from contributing contingents to the EASF.

CD explained that:

The apprehension of member states of the AU on the lack of reimbursement for their forces that have participated in AU led operations was clear in the case of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). While AMIS suffered from lack of personnel, many member states of the AU suddenly declared their intention to send contingents to Darfur upon the announcement of the involvement of the UN in the administration of the new AU-UN hybrid mission to Darfur. As a first step towards a solution, the EASF Policy should urge for the development of EASFCOM level reimbursement policy of costs incurred by the member states who contribute contingents of the EASF.

This too was witnessed with the case of AMISOM launched in 2007 it took four-and-a-half years before more than two member states contributed seriously to this operation, and then it was Kenya rushing headlong into a campaign to protect its international reputation as a stable state, and its tourism industry (Agwai, 2012; 170). The fact that Kenyan troops are now attached to AMISOM is largely a result of the sobering costs of a longer than expected military campaign. The lack of operational logistics and the
resulting inadequate operational reach would hinder the EASF from becoming a fully operational force.

*Sustainability, reimbursement and logistics all point to the issue of funding which is hardly met by the member states* (AD). The issue of funding is the most crucial problem that may affect the whole EASF system both at its establishment and deployment levels. Funding under the EASF is needed for pre-deployment activities such as training, communication, logistical interoperability, deployment and post deployment activities such as transportation and remuneration.

There has been donor supports from the ‘friends of the EASF’. There have been both bilateral donors like Canada and multilateral donors like NATO. However, these supports have been clouded by a lot of incoherence. The lack of clarity in the assumptions underpinning the EASF largely explains the discrepancies and lack of coherence in donor support. *As long as all assumptions remain potentially valid, and none has clear authority over the others, each donor remains free to ‘pick and choose’ among the components of the EASF that best matches its national or institutional preferences or habits* (FD). This makes donor coordination even more vital, but such coordination remains ever a challenge as donor coordination is time and effort consuming—each donor is motivated by its own national or institutional interests, there is a degree of competition among donors, primarily for reasons of political visibility on the international scene and before home constituents.

Donor coordination from the AU/RECs themselves remains subject to two constraints, first, with less coordinated donors, African institutions have more leeway to request overlapping funding and second, neither the AU nor the RECs have the capacity to coordinate donors – they are mostly overwhelmed by the number and variety of donor approaches. The consequence is gaps, overlaps and, in the case of military training or equipment, problems of inter-operability in the field (Reno, 2011: 43).
The most pressing problem that may cripple the whole EASF system is the absence of sustainable funding system. Funding is very crucial for all activities ranging from management, training to deployment of the EASF. The EASF cannot depend on voluntary contributions from donors. Neither can it be dependent upon unreliable sources that fail to materialize. The effort to establish a sustainable system of funding the force should be a top priority to the EASFCOM. However, the primary responsibility to provide the EASF with predictable and sustainable source of funding rests on the shoulder of its member states.

The failure of member states to pay assessed contributions to the regular budget of the mechanism has a negative impact on the capability of the force. The member states should back up their declaration to establish the EASF with actual and long lasting financial commitment. More importantly member states should provide the financial means to run the EASF based on the logic that investment in the maintenance of peace and security in the sub-region amounts to buying security for their efforts on development and better life for their citizens. The implementation of military intervention under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act against the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes ultimately depends on a well-financed and developed EASF system. And the sub-region security concept will lose momentum if the EASF cannot deploy or sustain its troops.

EASF is the only regional security organisation under the APSA, which is not integrated in a Regional Economic Community (REC), neither IGAD nor EAC. Instead, it is based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the signing states. This makes it easier to allow non-active members to join, but it might imply a lack of commitment as well as overlapping of interests with other regional actors and with the AU. This fact even makes contribution to the EASF’s central funding system hard. Instead, there appears to be competition between the mechanism and the RECs. In the deployment of AMISOM observers, there was struggle between the EASF and IGAD as to who initiated the process of deploying the military observers in Somalia.
CHAPTER SIX  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter outlines the summary of the research findings. It details the conclusions and recommendations made from the analysis of data. It also gives suggestion for further research.

6.1 Summary of the findings

The force faces political challenges from the member states. The lead nation concept has not been refined. There is competition amongst member states as to who takes the lead. This struggle has been manifested clearly when the logistic base of the force was taken to Addis Ababa whereas the planning elements are stationed in Nairobi, Kenya. This poses many challenges because a logistic base should not be situated in a country that is landlocked. It increases the cost of transportation of materiel thus eating deeper into EASF’s pocket. There are elements of animosity amongst some member states. Ethiopia and Eritrea have border conflicts, Somalia and Ethiopia also have issues to settle against each other. This hampers the political commitment amongst the member states.

The civilian component of the EASF suffers from the resulting lack of attention, particularly with regard to training. This may be because the civilian component, with its security sector reform (SSR) experts, election support, administrative training, justice sector reform, support for parliamentary work, has the potential to play a political role and ultimately might challenge African leaders’ foundations of power. They also lack motivation. The EASF is poorly staffed with low morale. This has seen high staff turnover which is bad for the institution since it loses the most experienced
staff. The force should therefore motivate her employees by paying them relatively competitive rates.

The training should be made more practical. The components should be trained together, however, this does not happen. The force should have its force at a centralized place for training. The doctrine should be harmonized for unity and standardization so that the troops train from the same level platform. In fact the military has a famous phrase, “if you don’t rehearse it, don’t expect it.” This is true to its last word. The training also helps in testing their combat readiness. The troops might land or get deployed in the mission areas only to find themselves not ready for the tasks because they lack the necessary training.

The training should cover the aircraft’s operations. Significant training and resources must be dedicated to crew training, mission command, aircraft maintenance, aerial port operations, airfield operations, ground and seaport integrations, and logistics management. Funding and resourcing for this training must be long term and established in a program of record.

The command, control and communication can only be tested through conducting mock exercises. This way the gaps can be identified and reinforced. Currently, the force should identify the EASF’s command language since not all member states speak the same language. This would rule out the language barriers. On the other hand, to avoid the troop contributing countries from interfering with the command of the force, EASFCOM should make sure that the troops do not depend on their countries for logistical support or if there is, it should be minimal.

The donor support needs to be managed through institutional building. Partners simultaneously suffer from, and contribute to this state of affairs. Whilst coordination efforts are undertaken, partners support too often still responds to national or institutional interests, and each partner uses the leeway created by the conceptual
ambiguities of the EASF to press its own priorities. Also, the overwhelming role of non-African partners in the conceptual maturation of the EASF, and the impact of their funding decisions, exacerbate the confusion about the true direction of its development. The EASF is burdened by the lack of political, conceptual, and financial ownership. The result is at best an ambiguous partnership between all stakeholders and external partners involved, and at worst a waste of human resources, financial means and political capital.

Only if EASF member states make a conscious effort to increase their political, conceptual and especially, financial, stake in the mechanism will they be able to credibly demonstrate that it is not an entirely European-mastered project. This may in turn provide a real step towards common African policymaking. Multilevel governance depends on the ability and willingness to share a common vision and to pool and delegate power towards its implementation. Whilst the ability can be enhanced through external support, the willingness requires proactive ownership by member states.

6.2 Conclusions of the study
Conflicts have caused untold destruction across the region. Therefore, formation of the regional security organization came at the most opportune time. If the diversity of factors affecting the operations of EASF are addressed, it should be able to resolve the consortium of conflicts that threaten to destabilize the region. The region should not rely on the international community to resolve her violent conflicts.

6.2.1 Material support
The force needs heavy logistics to launch any peace support operations. The operational logistics should be availed by having a reliable source of funding. The member states should make commitments to the peace fund’s contribution. Moreover, forces pledged should be committed to the mechanism and should be available for deployment at any time and or within the shortest notice possible. The force should have modern equipment with the necessary technology. Currently, it has outdated communication equipment. It should also invest in utility and attack helicopters. This
will ease transportation of personnel and military hardware to the required theatre of operation.

Special military gears are needed like armored jackets to protect the troops against the snipers’ fire. The armored personnel carriers (APCs), attack helicopters and radar systems are very crucial for the operations. The utility aircrafts for transport, unmanned aerial vehicles and drones are necessary for the success of any of the EASF’s operations. These facilities and activities require extensive funding coupled with heavy training.

Peace support operation is a very risky affair as seen in the previous discussions. The soldiers themselves risk losing their lives. This calls for a special allowances for the troops committed in such a noble duty. Sometimes the intervention missions take longer than the actual expected time. This increases the cost even further. Securing the entry points might not require very many troops but there must be the main body that should be at least of not less than 6,000 personnel.

The nature of terrain in most African nations is not friendly. In the sub-region, most of the member states are landlocked. The road networks are poor whereas the roads are in deplorable conditions; most of them are dilapidated. They are almost impassable during rainy seasons. Therefore, strategic airlift will be very handy in transporting the troops and their equipment. The force needs at least 5 C130 Hercules (transport planes) for transport.

The sixth mission scenario is an uphill task for the force. This is the intervention mission which falls under chapter VII of the UN Charter. It authorizes the use of force by the peace enforcers to use the necessary power to protect the civilians, mandate and themselves. Intervention mission requires a robust deployment as discussed in chapter two within a period of 14 days. The force deployed should be at least of 2500 personnel. This kind of operation presupposes heavy logistical backing. The troops will be
operating in a hostile environment and more often than not, to bring the belligerents to cessation of hostilities one should be having a superior firepower. EASFCOM should and must equip the troops with special gears and equipment as earlier discussed.

6.2.2 Political support

For the force to execute the intervention mission under mission scenario six, it needs a lot of commitment from the member states. It must engage in a lot of capacity building with the relevant policy frameworks. There should be improved political and diplomatic ties amongst the member states. From the experience of Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda, the force needs to build the capacity to carry out the intervention mission to alleviate the humanitarian crises.

EASF at the moment doesn’t have a standing force meaning when there is pending crises, it activates the pledged forces from the member states. The troop contributing countries have to sustain their forces in the field for duration of 90 days. Furthermore, the EASF or even the AU does not have a clear policy on reimbursement. This will make it very hard for the member states to commit their troops since they also have different national interests back at home. It is even more unfortunate that most of the member states have intrastate tensions. Most of their forces are tied back at home making it hard to avail the pledged troop. Therefore the members should be able to contribute permanent troops to the force so that during the times of operations the troops are under the Head of the Mission both for command and administration. This will enhance unity of purpose.

6.3 Recommendations

6.3.1 Recommendations for continued norms of practice

A continued partnership is recommended with other donors and the friends’ of the EASF. Yet, care must be taken that EASF advisors continue only to have an advisory function so that the organisation’s regional ownership is not at risk of being
compromised. It should have the member states’ ownership. The members should also pay their assessed contribution.

The force should foster good relationship and communication with other regional bodies. It should strengthen communication between EASF and AU, as well as between EASF and organizations of regional economic cooperation (RECs). This could have implications for the solidification of initiatives supported through EASF. The force should not only sign MoUs with the RECs but should work towards the integration. Improved communication with the RECs in the region (IGAD, EAC, and COMESA) is very vital.

EASF should enhance information management capabilities. Information management is a crucial but often neglected aspect of dealing with armed conflict. Without it, early warning efforts are doomed to failure; mediation initiatives are unlikely to consistently generate the desired effects; and peace operations cannot be expected to succeed. The Force’s dire lack of capabilities and limited human resources to gather and analyze information relevant to conflict management should be addressed. Priority areas for action should include bolstering the EASFCOM secretariat, enhancing the EASF’s ability to collect early-warning information, and developing the organization’s capacity for institutional learning. For institutional memory, EASF should improve and strengthen the lessons learned and the documentation process. This would help in enhancing the efficacy of the early warning systems. Without the ability to evaluate missions, produce lessons learned studies, and generate recommendations for reforming existing practices and systems, the force will never be able to conduct its own peace operations effectively.

6.3.2 Recommendations for policy implementation
The force is operating on a weak legal framework. Currently, there is only an MoU and a policy framework. There is no binding arrangement between member states for force deployment. However, every year the member states should renew their troops pledged.
The legal framework should therefore be strengthened. The EASF’s brigade should have a standing force rather than troops being in their respective countries pending any deployment. Most of these troops pledged are usually committed in their countries and would take relatively long time before they are ready if they were to be deployed by the EASF. Hence, the members should commit the pledged troops to the EASF. Command and control of these troops should exclusively remain with the mechanism.

The member states should enhance regional cooperation through trade affairs thus promoting good political and diplomatic ties within the region. This is because interstate tensions dog the efficiency of the force. The regional economic integration should be hastened so as to increase trade affairs amongst the member states.

The member states should show more political support to the force. It strengthens its institutional build up. This will give the Head of the Mission, Head of Police and the special envoys easy time in coordinating the peace support operations in the field. The unity amongst the member states and high–political engagements is very crucial in facilitating the peace support processes.

6.4 Suggestion for Further Research

Further research needs to be done on the impact of civilian component in a multidimensional peace support operation.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX I: Introduction Letter

Kenyatta University,
P. O. BOX 43844-00100,
Nairobi, Kenya.
October, 2013.

The Respondent,
EASFCOM,
P. O. BOX 1444-0502,
Karen, Kenya.

RE: Request for voluntary participation in research

Dear Respondent,

I, the researcher, Mr. William Oluoch Ligawa is a student at Kenyatta University pursuing Masters of Arts degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. I’m interested in carrying out a study of EASF as a model for sub-region standing force for conflict intervention in Eastern Africa. Your response will be of great value to the research findings.

I am contacting you to request for voluntary participation in my research. The questionnaire is estimated to take 15 minutes to complete. Any information you give will be treated with a lot of confidence.

Should you wish to get an electric copy of the research findings, please indicate your email address in the space provided at the end of the questionnaire. If you have any questions please contact me on 0713 316 205 or email me at ligawawilson@gmail.com.

Thank you very much for your attention, consideration as you sign your informed consent to participate in this research study.
Sincerely,

Ligawa W. Oluoch.
APPENDIX II: CONSENT FORM

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:

(I) Are you a fluent English speaker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

HAVE YOU:

(I) read the information contained in the introductory letter given to you explaining about the study?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(II) had any opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study with the researcher?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(III) received satisfactory answers to all your questions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(IV) have you spoken to the researcher concerning any of your fears concerning the study?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

DO YOU UNDERSTAND

.............that you are free to withdraw from the study and free to withdraw your data from any future analysis and/or publication

- At any given time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Without having to give any reason for withdrawing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

I hereby fully and freely consent to participate in a study entitled;

The challenges facing the Eastern African Community in conflict intervention: a study of Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) as the regional security mechanism.

I understand the nature and the purpose of these procedures involved communicated to me on a separate information sheet.

- I understand that a numerical code will replace my name so that my data can remain confidential

- I allow the researcher from Kenyatta University to record and process the data provided during the course of this study unless I state otherwise. I understand this information will be used only for the
purpose (s) set out in the information sheet, and my consent is condition upon the researcher complying with his duties and obligations.

Signature: _______________________ Date: ____________________________

Name (BLOCK letters): _______________________________________________
APPENDIX III: QUESTIONNAIRE

1. a. Does the force offer relatively sufficient training for its personnel?
   b. If no, how should it be improved?

2. How do military gaps affect the effectiveness of the force in a theatre of war?

3. a. In your opinion, is the force capable of handling any relatively large scale hostilities?
   b. If no, why?

4. (i) Does the force have infrastructural capacity to execute the mission scenario six?
   (iii) If no, why?

5. What would you say of the command and control structure of the force?

6. What are your regional security threat perceptions?

7. What are the logistical challenges currently affecting the force?
APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. a. Does the force have adequate airlift strategic capability?

..........................................................

b. If not, how does the lack of the airlift capacity affect the force`s operations?

..........................................................................................................................

........

2. a. How does the force raise its funds?

..........................................................................................................................

b. Is the donor aid from EASF`s partner friends coordinated?..........................

c. If there is no coordination of the aid, how should the issue be approached?

...........

3. How does the force handle the problem of interoperability of equipment from the member states? ......................

4. a. Is there competition for lead role amongst the member states? ......................

b. If so, how does the EASF handle this crisis? .................................

5. The Horn Africa is known for its volatility, how is the force handling the conflicts within this region? ..........................

6. Does the animosity between some member states affect the efficiency of the force? ..............................
## APPENDIX V: BUDGET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>PRICE PER UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL (Ksh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stationery</td>
<td></td>
<td>20000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photocopying</td>
<td>2 Ksh per copy</td>
<td>17000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typing</td>
<td>50 Ksh per page</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing expenses</td>
<td>40 Ksh per page</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher’s per diem</td>
<td></td>
<td>20000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport from Nairobi to the study Area</td>
<td></td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant text books and internet services</td>
<td></td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binding</td>
<td></td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhead expenses</td>
<td>10% of Ksh 107000</td>
<td>10700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>117700</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX VI: TIME FRAME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2013 – Oct 2013</td>
<td>Proposal writing</td>
<td>Three months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2013</td>
<td>Proposal presentation</td>
<td>Seven days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2013 – Feb 2014</td>
<td>Piloting questionnaires data collection</td>
<td>Three months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2014- April 2014</td>
<td>Data entry, analysis and report writing</td>
<td>Thirty days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>Presentation of thesis report</td>
<td>Fourteen days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII: MAP OF REGIONS OF EASF

1. Sudan
2. Ethiopia
3. Eritrea
4. Djibouti
5. Somalia
6. Kenya
7. Uganda
8. Rwanda
9. Tanzania
10. Comoros
11. Seychelles
12. Madagascar
13. Mauritius

SOURCE: GOOGLE MAP 2014
APPENDIX VIII: MAP OF KAREN

SOURCE: GOOGLE MAP 2014
APPENDIX IX: MAP OF EMBAKASI

SOURCE: GOOGLE MAP 2014