CROSS BORDER CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE KIPSIGIS AND ABAGUSII OF KENYA, 1963-2002

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NOVEMBER, 2016
DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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DEDICATION

To the love of my life Caleb Onchong’a, our son Kaelle Okemwa, and the residents of Borabu-Sotik border.
A work of this magnitude accumulated numerous debts from many people who contributed in different ways to its success. My gratitude first goes to the Almighty God for the good health, strength and grace He has accorded me this far. I also appreciate Kenyatta University for according me the opportunity to carry out this research. I salute my supervisors Dr. Wafula Peter and Dr. Kakai Pius for the tireless effort they made in going through my work all the way to this point. I’m deeply indebted to them for their guidance and hard work of ensuring that I got the feedback on time and we worked as a team. May God bless them. It’s not possible to mention all those who helped me in the field during data collection. I greatly appreciate the effort and respect of the respondents for sparing their time for the interviews. This work could not be successful without them. My utmost appreciation goes to my late brother in-law Kelvin Omambia for his tireless effort of taking me around during the field study. May God rest his soul in peace. I appreciate the administration of Kiambogo Secondary School (Kiambu) where I was working for giving me adequate time from the tight schedule to carry out this work. I thank my brother Eric Omori for his financial and moral support. Finally, I thank my parents Omwenga and Juliah for their efforts in bringing me up to be a responsible person and inculcating in me the value of being a scholar. I thank my parents in-law Okemwa and Mokeira for their unwavering support and understanding they accorded me. Special thanks to my beloved husband Caleb Onchonga who always supported and encouraged me to press on. I thank him and our son Kaelle for providing a conducive family comfort, their untiring patience and unrelenting understanding during the years of undertaking this work. My gratitude goes to Mr. Antony Bojana for editing the final work.
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OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Conflict: For the purpose of this study, conflict is a disagreement between two opposing groups or individuals or an argument about something important. It is the incompatibility of goals. It can be latent or manifest.

Cross-border: This involves occurrences between two groups who share a common religion, culture, ancestry and language who have been geographically separated by real or artificial lines. In many instances, they are political boundaries that can separate countries, states, provinces, counties, cities and towns.

Ethnicity: This is a type of cultural collectivity, that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions. As self-defined communities, an ethnic group is distinguishable by a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, some elements of a common culture and the association with a specific homeland.

Inter-ethnic: For the purpose of this research, inter-ethnic refers to the relations between different groups of people that identify themselves primarily on the basis of their ethnicity and make collective claims to resources.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASTU: Anti Stock Theft Unit
FGM: Female Genital Mutilation
KANU: Kenya African National Union
NCIC: National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations
REA: Rural Electrification Authority
SDA: Seventh Day Adventist
TJRC: Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission
UNHCR: United Nations Human Rights Commission
ABSTRACT

This study acknowledges that communities in Kenya have cordially interacted with one another in various ways both in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence period. These cordial relations are sometimes interrupted by inter-ethnic conflicts that are either latent or manifest in nature. Most of these conflicts in Kenya are perpetrated by small militia groups which are consistently most active in the last and first quarters of each year following raiding patterns that tend to increase at the beginning of each rainy season. Some of the conflicts also tend to take place during the electioneering period. However, some communities have age-long conflicts dating back to the pre-colonial period which re-emerged in the post-independence period. These inter-ethnic conflicts may have many aspects including the economic, political, social, and cultural aspects. This research sought to examine the different aspects behind the cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya and their implications. This was done by investigating the relations between the Kipsigis and Abagusii along the Sotik- Borabu border. This research addressed three objectives: First, was to investigate the role played by politics in instigating the cross-border conflicts between the two communities under study. Second, was to analyze the role played by the social-economic factors in propagating the conflicts and lastly, was to assess the implications of the conflicts between the two communities under study. The study adopted Randall Collins’ analytic conflict theory which is based on differential distribution of resources; hence competition that leads to conflicts in the society. Stuart Kaufman’s symbolic/emotional choice theory was also adopted. Kaufman’s theory gives an explanation on how the security dilemma, group-mythologies that justify enmity with another group combined with elite and mass interaction within and between ethnic groups cause ethnic conflicts. The study was limited to the period between 1963 and 2002. The research was confined to Gelegele Location of Ndanai Division of Ndanai Constituency, Bomet County and Esise Location of Borabu Division of Borabu Constituency, Nyamira County. Other than sharing a border, the two locations have been selected because they have been in conflict with each other. Both primary and secondary data were used in this study. The research was qualitative in nature and the researcher used a descriptive research design. Purposive sampling and snowball sampling techniques were used to reach out to the informants. Interviews and questionnaires were employed as key research instruments. The targeted groups of respondents were educationists, public administrators, religious leaders, residents, Non-governmental organizations dealing with peace building along the border and business persons. The research came up with factors like exclusion politics, re-introduction of multiparty politics, incitement from politicians and failure of security forces as the political factors. Social-economically, factors like raiding, land and unemployment contributed to the conflicts. The conflicts also caused more negative effects than the positive ones on the Abagusii and Kipsigis. The results were then checked for any serious flaws and then thematically analyzed based on the objectives of the study and presented in the narrative form.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

Inter-ethnic conflicts are a major problem in the world today. In recent years, there has been an increasing number of intra-state conflicts especially in plural and multi-ethnic societies. Inter-ethnic conflicts can be either latent or manifest in nature. The latent forms are those that are non-violent *per se* even though, they may be destructive in nature or lead to sporadic violence, they are indeed grievances and underground vexations. This may be similar to what can be regarded as cold war in the international political arena. In this situation there is inherent hatred among ethnic groups and enclaves (Obioha, 1999).

Osaghae (1994) says that ethnic conflicts are not always violent. More usual or “normal” conflicts are non-violent and occur as part of a normal life. In most cases, they are underground or latent and may not be obvious to the observer. Manifest or violent conflicts, on the other hand, are those that represent only one extreme of the continuum. It is when channels of expression are closed or the government fails to respond or responds negatively that conflicts can take violent forms. The level of these struggles has sometimes become so high that they pose not only a threat to the unity and integrity of the state and society, but also threaten regional and even global peace and security. The inter-ethnic conflicts in the world in many cases are manifested in wars, cattle rustling and struggles over the scarce natural resources like land, water, and salt licks.
A research carried out by Asankanov (1996, p 116-123) on the Osh region of Central Asia on the ethnic conflict between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek ethnic groups, indicated that the ethnic conflict was compounded by several factors that ranged from political, social to economic. He notes that, there was a collusion of the *nomenklatura*, the militia and business sector who forgot about the elementary social conditions of the workers. There were also weak socio-cultural structures, a high birth rate, unemployment, poverty, housing problems and the spread of rumors among the two ethnic groups. All these problems aggravated the situation which led to an outbreak of war between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek.

Kenya has not been any different from other countries in the world. There have been several arguments on when the inter-ethnic conflicts between different ethnic communities in Kenya began. Some scholars like Ogula (2002) have the view that, the conflicts between different ethnic groups in Kenya were created in the pre-colonial period. Others like Touval (1961) have the view that they came into currency in the colonial period while scholars like Wekesa (2010) attribute the conflicts to the failed post-independence governments.

The Kipsigis are one of the nilotic groups of Kenya. They are part of the nine sub-ethnic groups of the Kalenjin group. They occupy the southern part of the Rift Valley. They are neighbours to the Gusii, Maasai, Luo and the Kikuyu (Mwanzi, 1977). The Abagusii/Gusii are a Bantu community and they form part of the western Bantu of Kenya.
They occupy the northern part of Nyanza. They are neighbours to the Kipsigis, Abakuria, Maasai and the Luo communities. The two communities under study have been involved in both latent and manifest conflicts for a long time. These conflicts between them have made the Borabu-Sotik border volatile whenever there is some form of tension between the Kipsigis and Abagusii ethnic groups. The Esise and Gelegele locations where the study was carried out have been marked with forms of hostility between the Abagusii and Kipsigis.

Although much has been written on inter-ethnic conflicts in the world and Kenya specifically, not much has been written on the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii of the Sotik- Borabu border. Scholars like Ochieng’ (1974) and Mwanzi (1977) have written much on the history of the Abagusii and Kipsigis respectively, but, they have not written much on the conflicts between the two communities. A few of the studies carried out along the Sotik –Borabu border share the idea that, the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii have much to do with politics of the region. Other studies like the Kiliku Report (1992) point to economic resources especially land. This is why the researcher went out to investigate what really caused the animosity between the Kipsigis and Abagusii and the extent to which these conflicts affected them.
1.2 Statement of the problem

It is evident that inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya are a threat to national security. From the various studies, it has been noted that the origins of conflicts are manifold, complex and usually encompass economic, political and social parameters. Conflicts between different ethnic groups have often generated a threat to the unity and integrity within the society and state. It has also threatened regional and even global peace and security. The Abagusii and the Kipsigis have been engaged in conflict against each other for a long time. Actually, the Abagusii especially of North Mugirango which includes those of Borabu share much in common with their neighbouring Kipsigis as some of the Kipsigis clans trace their origin to the Abagusii. The few studies including those of the government, Non-Government Organisations and individual researchers share the idea that: the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis are political based on resources like land and livestock.

The question is, how has politics propagated the inter-ethnic conflicts between these two communities? Is it only land and livestock that have contributed to the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis? This study sought to examine the political and social-economic factors that have caused cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya and the implications of these conflicts by investigating the relations between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border between 1963 and 2002.
1.3 Research questions

This study sought to answer the following questions:

i) How did politics fuel the cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border between 1963 and 2002?

ii) How did the social-economic factors promote the cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border between 1963 and 2002?

iii) What were the impacts of cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii of Borabu-Sotik border between 1963 and 2002?

1.4 Objectives of the study

In this research, the specific objectives were:

i) To investigate the contribution of politics in fuelling the cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii of Sotik-Borabu border between 1963 and 2002.

ii) To analyze the contribution of social-economic factors in promoting the cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii of the Sotik-Borabu border between 1963 and 2002.

iii) To assess the impacts of cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii of Sotik-Borabu border between 1963 and 2002.
1.5 Assumptions /premises

(i) The cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii along the Sotik- Borabu border between 1963 and 2002 were a product of politics.

(ii) The cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis along the Borabu-Sotik border between 1963 and 2002 were caused by underlying social-economic factors.

(iii) Due to the cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border between 1963 and 2002, there were a number of impacts both on the two communities and the country at large.

1.6 Justification and significance of the study

The researcher acknowledges the immense contribution of scholars who have written largely on ethnicity and inter and intra-ethnic relations. Notable scholars are like Osogo (1966), Were (1967), Kipkorir (1973), Muriuki (1974), Ochieng’ (1974), Ogot (1976), Mwanzi (1977), Matson (1983), Waller (1985, 1993) and Kakai (2000). Several reasons have been given to explain the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya. Goldsmith (2005) argues that ethnic conflicts in Kenya are caused by boundary or land disputes, political issues, leadership disputes, problems over livestock, ethnic differences, personal attitudes and jealousy, problems over water, crime, corruption, problems over personal properties, inheritance, poor communication and misunderstanding. The same reasons are given for the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii of the Sotik- Borabu border.
However, much explanation has not been given behind these reasons. This is why this study went an extra mile to find out which are the political and social-economic factors that have influenced the conflicts between the two communities under study and the implications of these conflicts. The research also tried to find out whether the reasons given for conflicts between different communities in the world are applicable among the two communities under study.

The Kipsigis and Abagusii share some form of a common history as seen in the various clans among the Kipsigis that have Gusii origin. This indicates that the two communities interacted with each other than through warfare. It is therefore expected that, the two ethnic groups should be co-existing peacefully; but this has never been the case. They have been in conflict with each other for a long period of time even though the conflicts are mostly latent in nature. The Esise and Gelegele locations were chosen for the study as much attention has not been given to them in terms of conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii. Most studies and NGO activities have been concentrated in Chepilat and Mwongori areas assuming that the border between the Abagusii and Kipsigis is the Sotik-Kisii road. The two locations have been in unending and unresolved conflicts for many years.

It was important to carry out this study because it is a critical factor at the core of Kenya’s two major problems of identity and unity. It was also of importance because by understanding the root causes and dynamics of the cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts
between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border, we will be in a position of finding viable ways of solving them. The results can also be used to address cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts both in Kenya and other countries. The study will also contribute to the body of knowledge on inter-ethnic conflicts.

The research findings will be helpful to academicians and researchers who may have interest in the cross-border relations. The findings will be of importance to the policy makers like the government to understand the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts and their implications on the society. By so doing, the correct measures can be taken to promote peace in the respective areas. The government commissions like the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) will use these findings to promote peace in the area under study. The findings will enable the residents of Borabu-Sotik border to learn to co-exist as the conflicts affect them negatively than they do positively.

1.7 Scope and limitations of the study

This study did not discuss all the issues related to the inter-ethnic conflicts. It rather focused on the political and social-economic factors that influenced the cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii. It also assessed the implications of these conflicts in Kenya using the results the researcher found from the Kipsigis and Abagusii of the Sotik-Borabu border. The research was also restricted to the period between 1963 and 2002. This period is basically the time when Kenya was led by the
Kenya African National Union (KANU). The year 1963 was chosen for the study because this is the year when Kenya attained her independence from the British colonialists. It is the same year that KANU formed the first African government in Kenya led by Jomo Kenyatta. The Kenyans including the Kipsigis and Abagusii had many expectations from the new African government.

The Kipsigis and Abagusii expected the newly formed government to iron out issues relating to land injustices that they had encountered under colonialism. This saw the creation of settlement schemes in the area under study in 1963. Those who had suffered massive land alienation especially the Kipsigis, expected to be given their land back. This never came to be as the schemes were open for purchase by interested ethnic groups especially from the larger Western Kenya region. This led to more hostility between the Abagusii who bought more land in the area under study and the Kipsigis who claimed the land belonged to them.

The larger part of President Jomo Kenyatta’s regime, Kenya was a de facto single party state and after his death in 1978, President Daniel Moi became President. President Moi also successfully made Kenya a de jure single party state in 1982 until the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992. The area under study was then marked with increased hostility between the Kipsigis and Abagusii after 1992 especially during the electioneering period. President Daniel Moi’s regime came to an end in 2002 when power was peacefully handed over to the National Rainbow Coalition led by Mwai Kibaki.
The study was restricted to the Sotik-Borabu cross-border conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii communities. This is because the two communities have been living in tension with and suspicion of one another. This study sought to interview target groups of people like public administrators, educationists, religious leaders, NGOs and the local residents. This study basically focused on three variables which were: politics, the social-economic factors that influenced the Kipsigis and Abagusii cross-border conflicts and the implications of these conflicts.

This research encountered some challenges in sampling, data collection and analysis. In sampling, the researcher found it difficult to identify a representative sample using the purposive sampling technique. This justified the adoption of the snowball sampling technique. In data collection, some places were difficult to access due to poor transport which was worsened with heavy rains. However, this did not deter the researcher from getting to the respondents for information. Some respondents were not ready to share some information during the oral interviews on the argument that their culture could not allow them to share community information to strangers. The researcher overcame this by using research assistants who were trusted by the respondents. Some of the respondents were not ready for the recording of the information by the researcher during the oral interviews. The researcher overcame this by taking field notes even though it was time consuming.
The study was also hindered by some respondents who failed to complete the questionnaires. However, this was overcome by using other data collection instruments like interviews. The likelihood of withholding information by some respondents was countered by giving the respondents a written assurance that data collected were to be used only for research purposes. The researcher also assured the respondents of strict confidentiality to be observed and upon request; the respondents could be provided with the data. During data analysis, it took the researcher a longer time than expected as information was scattered. However long it took, the researcher was able to come up with this qualitative work.

1.8 Literature Review

1.8.1 The contribution of politics on the Kipsigis-Abagusii conflict along the Sotik-Borabu border

In his attempt to explain the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in the horn of Africa, Assefa (1996) notes that, to a large extent, what has been called ethnic conflicts are elite-driven conflicts. The conflicts between elite groups who come from different ethnic backgrounds are manifested in ethnic conflicts more than people-to-people violence among the masses. The ethnic groups have their own prejudices and stereotypes about each other, but these attitudes have not normally turned into conflict at the people-to-people level unless manipulated and organized by political leaders. Elites find ethnic prejudices and stereotypes a fertile ground on which they can easily cultivate support for their political
and economic aspirations. Expressing their objectives in ethnic or nationality terms enables their engagement and gives them more legitimacy. The major beneficiaries of such aspirations might be the elites but the whole ethnic community becomes associated with these aims since they are pursued in the name of the entire group.

This is because, as Lake and Rothchild (1998) state, knowledge from elites diffuses to and mobilizes the group members to action through one of two distinct conduits. An elite can fill in the missing links in the members’ fragmented understanding of political opportunity and broaden their sense of grievance. These works were not addressing conflicts between specific communities. They were however important to this study in finding out whether the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii were elite driven. Were there prejudices or stereotypes among the Kipsigis and Abagusii that may have led conflicts between them?

Mafeje (1971) says that, politicization of ethnicity often takes place in a situation characterized by an inequitable structure of access. Such a structure gives rise to the emergence of an “in-group” and an “out-group” with the latter trying to break the structure of inequality as the former responds by building barriers to access that ensure continuation of its privileged position. At the centre of this scenario are the elites who feeling excluded or threatened with exclusion begin to invoke ethnic ideology in the hope of establishing a “reliable” base of support to fight what is purely personal and/or elite interests. Wallerstein (1979) supports this argument by asserting that, ethnic
consciousness and conflict occur when groups feel threatened with loss of previously acquired privilege or conversely, feel that it’s an opportune moment politically to overcome a long standing denial of privilege; that mechanisms and machinations through which these groups advance their aims are what actually cause ethnic tensions and conflicts. To him, the present manifestations of ethnicity in Africa are an elite and class phenomenon where one community’s elites feel excluded by another from control of economic and political power. They then indoctrinate members of their ethnicity to believe that this is a conspiracy by a whole community against another which should be violently resisted.

Although both the works of Mafeje and Wallerstein do not address any community in particular, this study used these works to address the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii along the Sotik – Borabu border.

In a research carried out by Mworia and Ndiku in 2012 among the Tharaka and the Tigania communities of Meru, they found that the conflict between the two communities is politically instigated. They say that, the clashes are attributed to political incitement, tribal tensions and polarizations. Kamungi (2001) says that aspirants to political office harp on the high value attached to land to woo a support base often deliberately or unwittingly inciting communities against each other over land ownership. Although Mworia and Ndiku’s work focused on the Tharaka and Tigania, this research focused on the Abagusii and the Kipsigis of the Sotik- Borabu border. The researcher utilized their
findings together with those of Kamungi to find out whether the conflicts between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis of Borabu-Sotik border were politically instigated. Were there resources used in inciting the Kipsigis and Abagusii against each other?

In a meeting held by the Partnership for Peace Divisional Community leaders in Borabu on 22nd February 2012, it was realized that the conflicts along the Sotik-Borabu border were politically instigated. The opinion leaders said that, in the past years, cattle-rustling was a dependent variable linked to the politics of the region. When the local residents of Borabu were in political alignment with the rest of the surrounding ethnic communities, the rate of cattle rustling reduced. The reverse was true when the residents were not politically aligned. In addition, the opinion leaders said that in taking reprisal, the young people were used as agents of violence. On the issue of land, politicians in the past incited the local residents of Borabu to move out and occupy land outside the scheme. This is because they have historical segments of the settlement taken from them by the neighbouring communities. This had sparked outrage and violence in several occasions.

This work assisted the researcher to ascertain whether these claims were true.

Decalo (1998) who notes that, since the onset of colonialism, power in Kenya has been associated with a particular ethnic group. Kenya was initially a protectorate and later a colony of the United Kingdom. From self-rule in 1963 until the death of the first president- Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, political and economic power was increasingly vested in his trusted circle of fellow Kikuyu. During the second presidential regime of Moi,
political power became concentrated in the hands of the Kalenjin elites. In all the different regimes, then and after, the ruling group sought to use state resources for the special benefit of its own community and its allies (Yieke, 2010).

The works of Mafeje, Wallerstein, Decalo and Yieke try to explain how the struggle for political power between different groups can lead to conflicts among them. The studies are however general; the reason why this study used their ideas to address the Kipsigis and Abagusii conflicts along the Sotik-Borabu border. To what extent did access to state resources by the two communities promote peace or hostility?

The wave of democratic political changes that started in the early 1990s appears to have led to the establishment of democracy in terms of multiparty politics. The emergence of political pluralism has engendered the polarization of particularistic groupings as political parties crystallize mostly on the basis of ethnic and regional interests rather than common ideology or political principles (Dreyton, 1995; Nzongola & Lee, 1997; Jonyo, 2002). This tendency does not guarantee unity and stability in a country. Moreover, state policies of non-accommodation and recalcitrance provide strong push factors for ethnic conflict (Osamba, 2001; Mwagiru, 2002).

Nyukuri (1997) argues that, the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya in the early 1990s had a number of far-reaching impacts, one of which was the eruption of ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western and the Coast regions. This was
partially a fulfillment of the then president Moi’s earlier prediction that a return of the country to a multiparty system would result in an outbreak of ethnic violence that would destroy the nation. In a research carried out by the Partnership for Peace in the Rift Valley in 2012, findings show that patronage politics, the political manipulation of ethnicity and sharp horizontal inequalities have reinforced an undercurrent of ethnic tension in the region leading to high levels of fear and mistrust between communities. Apollos(2010) argues that, since the emergence of multiparty politics in 1992, successive election years have been routinely characterized by sporadic political violence and ethnic conflicts. Elections have been seen not to be “free and fair” as a result of the need to manipulate and create political dominance in certain parts of the country.

These works were of importance to this study as they helped the researcher in finding out the contribution of political pluralism in the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border. However, the studies have not clearly explained how multiparty politics promoted conflicts between specific communities in Kenya. Even though Nyukuri (1997) notes that the re-introduction of multiparty politics had far-reaching impacts, he failed to discuss the various impacts. This research therefore sought to assess the various impacts of the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii. Have the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis along the Sotik- Borabu border been marked with sporadic violence during the electioneering period since 1992?
A close look at the historical and structural contexts of some of the major theatres of African civil wars and conflicts, all indicated that undemocratic governance was a major causal factor. An analysis of Somalia’s case by Jama (2000, p 45) argues that poor governance has been the root cause of the war situation that has prevailed in Somalia since 1991. Siyad Barre’s manipulation of clans created an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility that gradually weakened both traditional and national institutions. Similarly, in the case of Sierra Leone’s war, it has been that the root cause of the country’s war was Siaka Stevens’ personalized dictatorship. This exploited malleable political institutions for power and wealth using corruption and violence entrenching patrimonialism and disabling agencies of restraint and institutions for conflict management.

Nzomo (2002) holds that, whereas tensions are bound to arise in any society in the course of interaction between various competing social identities and beliefs, such tensions cannot degenerate into serious conflict. This can be so if the country’s existing governance institutions, policies and ideologies are not adequately responsive to the diverse social identities and instead tend to encourage social fragmentation rather than social cohesion. In such a situation, the democratic culture of tolerance of social differences and beliefs is also likely to be lacking. This kind of social context then becomes a fertile ground that can easily be exploited and ignited by the existing political leadership into a war that serves only the hegemonic elite interests. Nzomo continues to argue that, most of the civil wars and violent conflicts that have occurred in Africa during the second half of the 20th and now the 21st centuries have their roots in undemocratic
structures and processes of governance, unequal power and resource allocation which are politicized and expressed in socio-cultural terms. In this connection, political leaders whip up and politicize citizens’ ethnic, religious and racial diversities and use them as a means to justify and get mass endorsement and participation in self-service. They do this not only because of their love for the power but because of their love for personal wealth which often degenerates into greed.

Although Jama’s work focused on Somalia which is made up of different clans and Sierra Leone, the research focused on Kenya and more specifically on the Abagusu and the Kipsigis of Borabu-Sotik border. Jama and Nzomo’s works were of great importance to this study as they helped the researcher to find out how the government policies and ideologies encourage peace or conflicts in the area under study? What role did the political leaders play in promoting peace or conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii?

As Wamwere (2008) notes, conflict where bad governance is a major root cause in Kenya is eminent due to politics of exclusion. Development in Kenya was determined by ‘who is who’ in the political leadership and the political party the leader subscribes to. Those who were perceived to be opposition sympathizers or elected on opposition political party tickets to parliament had their areas neglected. Kisiero (1996), (as cited in Kakai, 2000), mentions that, there were tensions and frustrations between the Bukusu and the Sabaot communities in Kenya between 1979 and 1991. Throughout this period, very few Sabaots were recruited to such institutions like Teacher Training Colleges, Medical Training
Colleges and the Police College at Kiganjo as compared to those recruited from the Babukusu.

Wamwere’s work assisted the researcher in finding out whether the conflicts between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis of the Borabu-Sotik border were products of neglect. Though Wamwere’s work did not discuss the kind of neglection, the research looked at it in terms of political, economic and social development. Even though Kakai’s work is focusing on the Babukusu and Sabaot communities between 1979 and 1991, this study used his work to address the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii of Sotik- Borabu border between 1963 and 2002.

Public choice scholars have attributed ethnic conflicts in Africa to the failure of political institution to accommodate diverse interests. They argue that, the lack of political models to effectively deal with diversity in centralized states where competition for resources and power is prevalent leads to conflicts. Until 1991, post- independence Kenya was characterized by one party rule and excessive centralization of power. In such a scenario, the leader and the group who capture the state have control of enormous amount of resources. They can thus reward supporters, provide for group members, create barriers to entry into political and economic markets (Kimenyi & Ndung’u, 2005). As some political economists have argued, in Kenya as in many Sub-Saharan African countries, the state control over the economy is so entrenched. The premium for controlling political power is so high that political parties and ethnic groups are willing to pay whatever costs to
acquire or have meaningful access to the state (ICJ, 2000). Even though these works did not address any particular community, they were important to this study. They enabled the researcher to find out whether the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii along the Sotik – Borabu border were related to the failure of the political institutions. Were the policies accommodative of diversity or it was due to personalization of power by the political leaders.

1.8.2 The contribution of social-economic factors on the Kipsigis – Abagusii conflicts along the, Sotik - Borabu Border

Ochieng’, (1974, p 204-205) notes that, after the movement of the Abagusii from the Kano Plains to the highlands, they adopted the systems of communal cattle enclosures in which the entire livestock of village/clan were driven for the night to be protected by warriors. This was due to the increasing attacks from cattle raiding Kipsigis, Maasai, and Nandi. It is in these enclosures that the warriors who were aged between 16 and 35 years received their training where wrestling, hunting and military drills were part and parcel of life in these ‘villages’. Often, the cattle villages became extremely unruly and difficult to control. Most of the wars between the Gusii clans or between the Gusii and their immediate neighbours trace their origin to these cattle villages. Ochieng’ has tried to relate the cattle enclosures among the Gusii with the wars with their neighbours. However, he has not explained how they contributed to the wars. Did the military drills themselves lead to the wars? Were the wars organized from these cattle villages? This
research therefore sought to establish how the cattle enclosures among the Gusii contributed to the conflicts between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis.

Livestock plays a central part in most communities. Therefore, raiding other communities for livestock is part and parcel of most livestock keeping communities. As Pkalya and Adan (2005) note, cattle raiding was, however, regulated by certain checks such as the requirement that any given raid is to be sanctioned by the elders and that raiders observe certain universal norms. Raiding communities would inform each other of impending raids; as such, raids were more of a game than warfare. Elders monitored cattle raids to ensure no excesses were committed. Raiding was an attempt by a given group to increase their herd sizes. This was to ensure the survival of the whole community especially after serious losses to prolonged drought or livestock disease. This is true of the *esaosao* battle between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii in 1895.

The cultural and economic significance attached to cattle can be termed as the cause of cattle raids which may have led to conflicts between different African communities. Wealth and economic strength were thought to be primary in terms of the number of cattle a household possessed. The cattle were raised for milk, meat and hides. The cattle could be obtained by breeding, raids, through receipt of animals as dowry when a daughter married or through trade. Due to the importance of cattle, several measures were taken to protect this important resource (Maxon, 2006).
Most of the African communities placed a lot of importance to bride price. Livestock ownership was a prerequisite to the rites of passage as a young man had to have enough cattle not only to pay the bride price, but also, convince the bride’s family that he was worthy of her hand in marriage (Pkalya & Adan, 2005). The pressure put on young men of marriageable age to pay high bride price for their brides encouraged them to engage in raids so as to raise the required livestock (USAID, 2005).

Although the foregoing works have related livestock raiding to conflicts between various communities, they have not addressed a specific community. This study sought to establish the following among the Kipsigis and the Abagusii of the Sotik- Borabu border:

How were the raiding activities organized? Which measures were put in place to protect livestock from the perceived or potential raiders? Why was raiding done and how did that lead to conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis?

According to Abuso (1980), age-sets among the Abakuria played an important role in the armed conflict between the Abakuria and Maasai people. Age-sets were important both as military and as historical chronological records. As military units, they helped to organize efficient military training within the community. This means that, the Abakuria were always prepared for an attack from their enemies. The age-set system was equally important among the Embu of Central Kenya. Once a person joined an age-set, it legitimized his role in participating in raids on the neighboring people. Raids were organized very well and successful raids were rewarded while poor ones ended up in punishment to the warriors concerned (Saberwal, 1970).This means that, when one joined
an age-set, he became a warrior, hence, the duty of raiding from the neighboring communities. Raiding may have caused the conflicts between the Embu and their neighbors. Although these works addressed the Abakuria and Embu of Kenya, they were of importance to this study. They enabled the researcher to find out the contribution of the age-set system to the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii.

In the pre-colonial period, different communities had their own differences. However, the colonialists nurtured these differences carefully and deliberately. These were later exploited by the local political bourgeoisie in the post-independence period. Nnoli (1998) points out that, a contributory factor that has made ethnic conflicts more severe in Africa than in other parts of the world are the incursion and exploitation by the colonialists that compounded already strained inter-ethnic relations. Colonial powers utilized the segmentation of ethnic groups to their advantage. The colonialists posit that they ‘tried to make a nation-state out of a hotchpotch of antagonistic and uncivilized African peoples but failed in their pious mission’. The various tribes had age-long hatred for one another and as soon as the colonial power went, the natives descended into barbarism, maiming and killing each other (Avugma, 2000).

Asiwaju (1985) argues on the other hand that the Berlin conference and colonialism are not sufficient explanations for Africa’s border problems; but rather they are rooted as much in the current politics of influence and resources as in the failings of the colonial past. Arrous (1996) says that, African governments have failed to directly confront the
questions of conflicts, inter-community relations and cross-border co-operation. These are matters of political governance and policy. These assertions have been supported by Wekesa (2010) who says that Africa’s border problems need to be understood as symptoms of current problems, not just colonial legacies. That, border disputes have slowed the pace of international co-operation and integration, but they have also portrayed the extent to which border communities have been alienated and marginalized by the centralizing state in Africa. These works although not addressing a specific community, were important to this study. The researcher used them to find out the time when the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii began. Were they a creation of the pre-colonial, colonial or post-independence periods?

In the economic sense, resources are descriptively scarce in relation to demand. Relatively, competition for scarce resources may be considered as one of the patent sources of ethnic conflicts in Africa. This is perhaps the most popular explanation for ethnic conflicts worldwide (Osaghae, 1994). As Melson and Wolpe (1970) pointed out in the context of Africa, the integration of different groups through colonialism into a peripheral capitalist formation brought new and competitive notions of development and produced new ones among groups. In this regard, competition for public jobs, admission into public schools and distribution of state resources constitute a source of conflict. These works though general to Africa, they helped the researcher to find out whether the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis were caused by competition over scarce resources and the resources in question.
Levine (1979) notes that, land is so valuable among the Gusii that, a family with enough land is considered to be wealthy. Consequently, during an individual’s lifetime, an individual entirely depended on land for social well-being and economic sustenance. Nyanchoka (1984) says that, the Gusii people believe that their land cannot be inherited or sold out to any outsider because the spirits of those buried in that land will be displeased and will haunt the family and lineage forever. Ntabo (2006) says that, land among the Gusii is communally owned where the whole ethnic community collectively defended their territorial boundaries. The communal defense system was a result of a long identification of people with a certain geographical territory which was understood to belong to them as a group. The frequent conflicts between the Gusii and their immediate neighbours, the Maasai and Kipsigis are classic examples that show how the Gusii valued land. Although these works addressed the importance of land among the Abagusii only, they helped the researcher to find out how important land was among the Kipsigis. They also helped the researcher to find out whether the importance attached to land in either or both of the two communities under study led to conflicts between them.

The Kiliku Report (1992) traced the conflict between the Kipsigis, Maasai and Gusii to the post-colonial arrangement in relation to land. The splitting of the country into white highlands and native reserves was one of the practices of the colonial state. At independence, the white highlands, partly forming the border area between the Kipsigis and Gusii were apportioned between the Maasai, Kipsigis and Gusii communities. Under the facilitation of the Settlement Fund Trustees, members of the three communities
bought land that was formerly owned by the departing settlers. Members of the Gusii community who had a higher population density settled in the area in larger numbers than the Kipsigis and Maasai. The committee noted that the Gusii had initially moved into the area through settlement schemes but lately, they had done so, through direct purchases and leases. This report was of importance to this study as it addressed the two communities under study. The researcher used the work to find out the effects of colonialism on the land of the two communities under study. How did the post-colonial government deal with the issues related to the land that was left behind by the colonialists among the two communities under study? How did the issues related to land contribute to the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii?

1.8.3 The impacts of the Conflicts Between the Kispigis and Abagusii along the Borabu-Sotik border

In many instances, the effects are normally negative. In many studies carried out on inter-ethnic conflicts, they point out displacement of persons as the most common effect. For instance, UNHCR (January-June 2014) reported an estimated 5.5 million new forcibly displaced persons either within or outside their own country. Often the refugees tend to live with stigmatization or marginalization that tends to be associated with the status (Apollos, 2010). In a research carried out by Ruto, Adan and Masinde (ACLED, 2012) in Northern Kenya, they found that, a total of 164,457 people have been displaced by the inter-ethnic conflicts in the pastoralist North Frontier District of Kenya. 70% of the
displaced are women and children below 14 years. Adan and Pkalya (2005) note that, conflict related displacements also have an impact on water and sanitation. Displaced immigrant populations often lack access to safe water and sanitation which in turn increases susceptibility to diarrheal diseases.

The displacement of persons as voters also leads to negative social consequences. Fear, hatred, blame and anger are instilled among communities. This fear among ethnic communities, especially those who are affected by clashes is translated into bitterness and lack of mutual trust and confidence (Chelanga, Singo & Ndege, 2009). Although these works have not addressed any community in particular, this research will test the reliability of their findings among the Abagusii and Kipsigis. This study used the foregoing works to find out the conflicts between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis along the Borabu-Sotik border have ever led to displacement of persons of both community. If so, what were the challenges faced by the displaced persons?

Loss of lives is one of the most obvious and immediate consequences of armed conflict. In addition to displacement, many women have been widowed and children orphaned by the conflicts further increasing their vulnerability to poverty and human rights abuses. Though the works were relevant to the study, they did not clearly indicate when the conflicts led to the loss of lives. The study utilized these works to ascertain whether loss of lives occurred between the Kipsigis and Abagusii when the conflicts were latent or manifest.
War is known to interfere directly with food production by preventing farmers from planting and harvesting on time and reducing populations’ capacities in many other ways (Apollos, 2010). Food distribution in areas of armed conflict also faces frequent interruptions, due to logistical problems as encountered in the transportation of aid, lack of transport vehicles and refusal by government forces to permit convoys to pass through their territories. The objective of the latter is to stem any advances or gains, on the part of the opposition, through deliberate starvation and depopulation of the rebel-held territories (Giorgis, 1989). Although these works are more general in nature, the study applied them among the Abagusii and Kipsigis communities. The researcher utilized them to find out how the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii affected them agriculturally.

Education is one of the primary casualties of conflict. The closure of schools as teachers flee and pupils are withdrawn is often the first sign of impending trouble. In Samburu District (sub-county) for example, a total of 27 schools were closed in 1996/1997 during the infamous Baragoi and Nyiro divisions, when cattle rustlers took charge of the said divisions. Insecurity also tends to target girls education. In North Eastern Province, parents say that cases of girls being attacked raped and/or abducted as a reason for not sending girls to school (Adan & Pkalya, 2005). Although this work is addressing the Samburu sub-county and the North Eastern region, it was of importance to this study. The researcher used it to find out the extent to which the conflicts between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis along the Borabu- Sotik border have affected education in the region.
According to the Kiliku Report (1992, p 85-90), it can be deduced that, as a result of the 1992 inter-ethnic animosities, people lost their property as a result of being destroyed by being put on fire. There was also a drop in the supply of food and raw materials for the agro-based industries which necessitated costly imports of such items as sugar, maize and wheat. This in turn led to the hiking and fluctuation of prices of essential commodities in the clash-prone areas. Other people also took advantage of the situation and grabbed the land which had been left by the affected groups who fled the regions while some bought the lands at throw-away prices from the affected communities. Although this work was more general as it did not address a specific community, this study used it to address the conflicts along the Borabu- Sotik border between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis. The study also utilized the work to find out the extent to which property of the two communities was destroyed and the property that was destroyed.

1.9 Theoretical framework
This research was guided by the analytic conflict theory. The main proponent of this theory is Randall Collins (in Abraham, 1982, p133-135). The theory analyzes a wide range of social phenomena based on the general assumption of conflicting interests of the parties involved, their social location, available resources and options. Collins heavily draws his ideas from Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Goffman, Schutz and Mead. He has also incorporated the perspectives of phenomenology, interactionism and ethno-methodology. According to the analytic conflict theory, human beings are sociable
but conflict prone animals. The primary basis of conflict is violent coercion which is always a potential resource and zero-sum sort.

The system of inequality divides the society into rank hierarchies- graded levels of individuals with more or less resources available to them. There is a continuing competition between groups or social strata for a greater share of the desirables. Individuals strive to maximize their share of the scarce commodities. Those who possess a greater share of the goods, try to consolidate their position, maximize their interests and dominate the structural arrangements by various means, especially coercion. Collins introduces a number of other variables- the resources people bring to their struggle, their social position, the groups to which they belong and their numerical strength and the intensity of interpersonal attraction.

The views of Collins’s conflict theory came in handy to explain the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Gusii along the Sotik- Borabu border. To an extent these conflicts were products of unequal distribution of desirables like natural resources and power which may have led to the development of competition for these desirables. The competition may have degenerated into tension; hence conflict. Although the foregoing theory was important to this study, it only addressed issues that deal with competition over scarce resources. From the literature review, it was noted that there are other causes of inter-ethnic conflicts. This is where the ideas of Stuart Kaufman’s symbolic/emotional choice theory came in handy.
Kaufman offers a comprehensive explanation of how the security dilemma, combined with elite and mass interaction within and between ethnic groups operates in causing the onset of ethnic conflict. He argues that, ultimately, it’s the interaction between the elites, the masses and the structural dynamics of the security dilemma that leads to conflict. He views that human motivation is based on emotion rather than rational-cost benefit calculations. For him, ethnicity is historically and culturally rooted: it enables and simultaneously constrains the political instrumentalization of ethnic identities. According to Kaufman, the more the group’s myth-symbol complex emphasizes hostility towards a particular (actual or potential) adversary group, portraying it and its individual as enemy and or inferior, the greater is the probability of ethnic conflict. Thus, the symbols that define a group and to which its members respond, reflect both interest and value: a struggle for security, status and ultimately group survival is at the same time a struggle against hostile, evil or sub-human forces (Kaufman, 2001).

Kaufman identifies three pre-conditions for ethnic conflict to occur: first, there must be a group mythology that justifies hostility towards at least one other group. Second, a group must fear that, its very physical existence is threatened. Third, ethnic groups require opportunities to mobilize. These can manifest themselves in political space, for example, political freedom, state failure/regime collapse, support from a third party and/ or demographic concentration of a group within the state and/ or territorial base in a third often neighbouring country; also emphasizing the need to look beyond local and state-level environments to understand escalation towards violence. For the escalation of
violence to occur, which can be either elite or mass-led, three additional factors are necessary: mass hostility, chauvinist political mobilization and a security dilemma (Cordell & Wolff, 2009).

The treacherous leaders appeal to group myths and symbols that justify hostility to provoke ethnic conflict. Symbols and myths are important because they allow the elite to frame the conflict as a struggle against hostile and evil forces (Mirzayev, 2007). Kaufman’s emotional theory explained exactly the stereotypes and prejudices that the Kipsigis and the Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border had against each other which were used by the political elites to incite the locals against each other. The two communities regarded each other to be an enemy.

As Kakai (2000) notes, inter-ethnic relations presuppose ethnic consciousness which may be real or widespread. Sometimes, it could be employed by local individuals in order to maintain power positions for themselves. This therefore, gave the researcher an opportunity to assess the role played by politics, the importance attached to important resources like land and livestock and other factors in fuelling the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii communities along the Sotik-Borabu border between 1963 and 2002.
1.10 Research methodology

1.10.1 Research design

The study employed a qualitative research design which was descriptive in nature. This is because it could yield more information from the phenomenon under study. The study employed the use of questionnaires, interviews, government documents and archival data to obtain primary data while the secondary data were obtained from books, journals, theses, newspapers and the internet.

1.10.2 Site of study

The study was conducted in Gelegele Location of Ndanai Constituency of Bomet County and Esise Location of Borabu Constituency of Nyamira County. This is because these two locations share a common boundary- the Sotik–Borabu border which has been a battlefield for many years; hence, making it the most appropriate location of the study.
1.10.3 Map of Area of Study
1.10.4 Sampling techniques and sample size

This study targeted the people who have resided in Gelegele and Esise locations for at least fifteen years. It also targeted the County administrators, NGOs, religious leaders, educationists and residents. This is because these groups of people were considered to have the required information with regard to the study.

From the target population, the study selected the respondents using the purposive and snowball sampling techniques. Purposive sampling was used because, respondents were picked as they were informative and met many of the requirements set by the researcher. Snowball technique was used where some of the respondents were used in the research to identify more informants to be interviewed. These were later used to identify more informants. This chain went on until the required sample was attained.

During the field study, 41 people were interviewed and 33 filled the questionnaires. The research targeted the former public administrators, religious leaders, educationists, NGOs, business persons, residents and the elders from the two communities.

1.10.5 Research instruments

Primary data were collected using semi-structured interview schedules and questionnaires (refer to appendix I). Government documents and the Kenya National Archives were also resourceful in this study for primary data. All these sought to obtain data on the political and social-economic factors that led to the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Gusii
communities along the Sotik-Borabu border. It also sought to assess the implications of these conflicts between 1963 and 2002.

1.10.6 Data collection procedures

A pilot study was carried out to assess the appropriateness of the questions in the research instruments. The pilot study was carried out at Kamukunji and Koiyet villages which are in Esise and Gelegele locations respectively. The piloting was done personally by the researcher and where necessary, there was revision and restructuring of the questions to address the research objectives. Before carrying out the study, the researcher sought permission from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) to carry out the research (refer to Appendix 2 for a copy of the research permit). During the field research, respondents were carefully selected and measures put in place to ensure they were willing participants. An authorization letter (see Appendix 3 for a copy of the authorization letter) and the research permit were given to the respondents after an explanation on the nature of the study and the reasons why the study was being carried out. The questionnaires were issued to some former and current chiefs and assistant chiefs, religious leaders, NGOs, and educationists. The interview schedule was conducted in English, Kiswahili and the local languages through interpreters. Secondary sources like books, journals, internet and other relevant records were used in the study to gather information.
1.10.7 Data analysis
In this research, data were fully transcribed and typed by the researcher. First, the data were recorded and then grouped into major topics and sub-topics based on the similarities and differences in the responses. Then, the collected data were thematically analyzed by categorizing the related topics together. Both the secondary and primary sources of data were subjected to criticism to test the relevance and accuracy of the information that was identified as appropriate for this study.

1.10.8 Validity and reliability
To ensure validity of the findings, the researcher compared the findings from the interviews with those of the questionnaires. Where they coincided, it strengthened the analysis and where they did not, reference to secondary sources was made. The test-retest method was used to assess the reliability of the research instruments. The researcher also maintained the records of all interviews and questionnaires in order to ensure reliability of the analysis. After the analysis, the data were presented in the narrative form.

1.10.9 Data management and Ethical considerations
The researcher first of all sought permission from NACOSTI where a research permit was issued and an authorization was given to carry out the research in the area under study. More permission was sought from the offices of the deputy county commissioners of Bomet and Nyamira counties. In the field, the researcher first of all sought voluntary participation of the respondents. The researcher also assured the respondents that the
findings that they were to generate were to be used purely for academic purposes. The respondents were also assured of confidentiality where information recording was employed, only voice recording was involved. This made the respondents to develop confidence in answering the questions. The researcher also acknowledged the works of other relevant authors; hence, maintaining the right to disseminate research findings to interested stakeholders.

This chapter has provided the premise upon which this research was carried out. More details to what has been discussed in this chapter will be given more weight in the subsequent chapters and fill the identified gaps. The next chapter (chapter two) of this study discusses the contribution of politics to the Abagusii and Kipsigis conflicts along the Borabu-Sotik border. The chapter therefore will look at the first objective of this study.
CHAPTER TWO

THE CONTRIBUTION OF POLITICS ON THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE KIPSIGIS AND ABAGUSII OF THE SOTIK-BORABU BORDER

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will analyse the historical relations between the Kipsigis and Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border. This will enable the researcher to trace the relations between the two communities before 1963. It is through the historical analysis that we can ascertain whether the conflicts between them were created in the pre-colonial, colonial or post-independence period. Did the Kipsigis and Abagusii communities interact peacefully or they were always in conflict? When did the conflicts between them actually start?

Most studies on conflicts between different communities point to politics as the main cause of conflicts. The study carried out by Partnership for Peace (2012) along the Sotik-Borabu border also indicated that politics played a major role in the development of hostility between the Kipsigis and Abagusii of the region. The question is, how did politics instigate the conflicts between the two communities? Is it true that politics in itself could lead to outbreak of conflicts between the two communities under study? What are some of the political aspects that may have led to the conflicts? I believe that, politics in itself could not lead to conflicts without some underlying factors that may have provided a fertile ground for the conflicts to occur. Which are some of these underlying issues and how did they contribute to the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis? These are some of the questions that this chapter will clarify guided by Collins’ (in
Abraham, 1982) analytic conflict theory and Kaufman Stuart’s symbolic/emotional choice theory.

2.1 Historical background of the relations between the Kipsigis and Abagusii

The Kipsigis and Abagusii were not actually in manifest conflicts. Mostly, they were in latent conflicts which once in a while developed into manifest when precipitated by some issues as the researcher will discuss later in this and subsequent chapters. More often, the two communities under study were in conflicts. These conflicts were not created in the recent past, but rather, they existed since the pre-colonial period.

The bad relations between the two communities began during their migration around the 17th or 18th centuries. When the Kipsigis came across the Kisii at Kabianga, they started attacking them as enemies. In the culture of the Kipsigis, they do not speak to strangers; hence, the reason why they perceived them as enemies. The Abagusii were later driven out by the Kipsigis. That earlier, a first batch of the Kisii had left the area due to unfavourable climatic conditions which had led to the death of most of their people and animals; hence, the name ‘Kabianga’ which means *Ebinto biangire koba buya buna etakeire* (things are not good the way they are expected to be). Due to this, they moved and a faction of the Abagusii moved to the current West Mugirango where they were pursued by the Kipsigis. This was the focal point of a major clash between the Kipsigis and Abagusii. During the battle, the Abagusii attacked and overran the Kipsigis. The battle was named ‘esaosao’ due to the many deaths that led to the defeat of the Kipsigis.
The event still evokes bitter memories that have been the main cause of animosity between the rival sides (The People Sunday, 17th June, 2012).

As the Abagusii moved and settled at the South of Kericho, they found themselves between a rock and a hard place. They found out that, they were surrounded by the Kipsigis, Maasai, Luo and Abakuria. In the process of adjusting themselves to co-exist with their neighbours, colonialism made its way to the country. It never took long before the Abagusii and Kipsigis started feeling the heat of colonialism as the white settlers arrived in the Sotik highlands. As Kipsang’ (O.I, 2014) noted, the conflicts between the two communities worsened with the advent of colonialism. He noted that,

From the time before the colonialists came to Africa, the Abagusii and Kipsigis were traditional enemies to mean that, we had our own share of problems. Our relations worsened with colonialism as the colonial powers utilized the segmentation between the ethnic groups to their advantage. They divided us further by creating a buffer so that we could not interact and did not take measures to curb cattle raiding on the Abagusii by the Kipsigis.

The indirect rule administered by the British colonialists later turned out to be the ‘divide and rule’ strategy which polarized the various ethnic groups in Kenya. The colonialists argued that, they tried to make a nation- state out of a hotchpotch of antagonistic and uncivilized African people but they failed in their mission. This was because the ethnic groups had age long hatred for one another and as soon as the colonial power went, the natives descended into barbarism, maiming and killing each other (Avugma, 2000). This explains why the whites settled between the Abagusii and Kipsigis so as to act as a buffer. The two communities could not unite as they lived on opposite directions and the
Europeans at the centre. This in turn contributed to the subsequent incompatibility of these ethnic groups as actors of one nation-state called Kenya.

Rothchild (1997, p 8-9) argues that colonial powers promoted unity or disunity among ethnic groups depending on the security, economic and political gains to be made. The effect of encouraging these socially constructed identities was to create an incentive among elites to mobilize support along ethnic lines. The colonial powers used authoritarian rule where power was concentrated in the hands of the few whites. This system of “an economically privileged and politically powerful centre” became entrenched. The experiences from the colonial masters made the Africans learn that ethnic differences could be used to gain, keep power and wealth.

The differential distribution of power and wealth as Collins’ analytic conflict theory mentions creates a system of inequality which divides the society into graded levels of individuals with more or less resources available to them. The continuous competition between these levels for such desirables was what drew them into conflicts with each other as they strove to maximize their share of the scarce commodities. This situation was maintained by the political class in Kenya in the post-independence period. The political elites moved into the cocoons of their ethnic groups in the name of protecting such interests in order to popularize themselves among their communities. Others did so in the name of fighting for their communities for a share of such desirables like power and wealth.
Nyukuri (1995) argues that, at the dawn of independence, African leaders ascended to governmental structures which had been intended to preserve the colonial administrative legacy. These leaders were armed with the Western Constitution and ill-trained manpower to soldier on and make provisions for the enlarged nation-state, now encompassing diverse ethnic groups with variegated interests. As if this was not enough, Kenya, like most other African countries, inherited from the colonialists scarce national resources, inadequate infrastructure, inadequate human resource capacity, inadequate capital, inadequate education and health facilities, among others. The scramble for the scarce national resources and facilities intensified and ethnicity became the main vehicle through which the dominance and preservation of power as well as resources could be achieved. The ruling elites in post-colonial Kenya have often relied heavily on ethnicity to remain in leadership positions or settle a dispute with their perceived enemies.

The Kipsigis and Abagusii were in conflicts due to the scarce resources that the post-independence government of Kenya inherited from the British colonialists. The two communities under study were in conflict over resources like the social amenities and infrastructure. This was due to the differential distribution of such resources in the colonial period which were perfected in the post-independence era. The two communities were in competition over land. In the two communities, such a resource was communally owned, but the landholding system changed with colonialism. The British demarcated the land by having a boundary between them which was inherited by the post-
independent government. The boundary was to help the colonialists administer the two communities with ease—the reason why it was drawn along ethnic lines.

As much as colonialism contributed to further separation and hatred among the two ethnic communities, the post-independent government takes the larger blame in promoting the conflicts between the two communities. This is because, as Omwansa (O.I, 2015) observed, it only maintained the colonial boundaries and administrative structures but did not solve the problems that were created by colonialism like that of land. Thus, the government of Kenya failed to address issues to do with inter-community relations and cross-border co-operation. This assertion was in support of what Nzomo (2002) calls the existing governance institutions, policies and ideologies which are not adequately responsive to the diverse social identities and instead tend to encourage social fragmentation rather than social cohesion. This kind of social context then becomes a fertile ground that can be easily exploited and ignited by the existing political leadership into a war that serves only the hegemonic elite interests.

It should be noted that, the Abagusii and Kipsigis sometimes co-existed more especially in the post-independence period as illustrated in the economic, cultural and social activities across the border. The Kipsigis and the Abagusii co-operated in solving common problems that affected them. Okemwa (O.I, 2015) noted that,

During the famine of about 1890-1892 which was called *Nyamakongiro* among the Gusii, there was an acute shortage of food among both the Gusii and the Kipsigis. This forced us to co-operate with one another in order to survive. The Kipsigis sold some of their children to the Abagusii in exchange for food. The
same was done by the Gusii who exchanged them for grain, livestock and milk. The famine made the Abagusi to turn to *Amakongiro* for food and as a milk supplement; hence the name *Nyamakongiro*. *Amakongiro* (singular- *rikongiro*) are a type of drought resistant weed among the Gusii.

In the entire research, the researcher was not able to get respondents who were affected by the famine and sold to their neighbours. This is because many of them have long died or were still young by then but, the *Nyamakongiro* famine is preserved in the oral traditions of the two communities. This assertion supports the views of Ochieng’ (1974, p 218) that, during very bad famines like the famine of *Amakongiro* estimated at about 1890, the Gusii would barter their children, particularly male children whom they integrated into their military sets. Ochieng’ however differs on the idea of the Kipsigis bartering their children to the Abagusi. He notes that, the Gusii would have nothing to do with the Kipsigis, whom they regarded as wicked people.

The two communities also engaged in trade especially at Kamukunji, Ndanai, Ole Miriri and Centre markets. Kipruto (O.I,2014) noted that,

During the Kenyatta and Moi times, we co-existed with the Abagusii irrespective of some instances of animosity between us. From long time ago even before independence, we used to sell our items and even cattle to them in exchange for food during periods of famine more especially maize, beans and finger millet. We used to trade(we still trade) with them at Kamukunji, Centre, Ndanai and Ole Miriri markets. Our women went (and still go) with donkeys to Gusiiland to buy the cereals from house to house. Although sometimes they feared coming to Ndanai when there was tension between us or when we had initiated our boys.

Momanyi (O.I,2014) also supported this assertion by observing that,

In most instances there was co-existence between the Gusii and Kipsigis. We took our milk to KCC for weighing in Kipsigisland at a place called Centre. This was
because it became difficult and hectic for us to take milk to Kahawa shopping centre for weighing because it’s far. Our trading activities were concentrated in Ndanai and Centre markets which are in Kipsigisland.

This assertion has been supported by Omwoyo’s (2000) work which noted that, items such as pots, arrows, spears, pangas and swords were acquired from the Gusii in exchange for beads and other ornaments. Much of this barter trade took place in peace time. The Kipsigis land appears to have experienced periods of epidemics, drought and famine in the second half of the 19th century. In such situations, the Kipsigis people went to the Gusii for food. Such food was either purchased in exchange with livestock or other trade items. These assertions therefore indicate that, the two communities engaged in trading activities even from the pre-colonial period. Even though they co-existed peacefully in such an economic activity, it did not mean that they could not disagree on some issues. As illustrated, the trading activities were restricted to peaceful times as they could not engage in the same when there was fear and tension which is common in every society.

In farming activities, the two communities interacted cordially and peacefully. The fact that the Kipsigis economy is skewed towards livestock keeping, most of their land was uncultivated as it was left for grazing livestock. Due to the reducing livestock population, some of the Kipsigis started cultivating the land for food production while others leased it out to their neighbours- the Gusii. The Gusii sought for land to lease because of their growing population which rendered the available land inadequate. However, the Gusii could not purchase the land from the Kipsigis across the border for fear of losing it during
times of manifest conflicts. The idea of land leasing became more prevalent after 1990s due to decline of livestock among the Kipsigis. Due to the occasional conflicts between the two communities, it forced some Gusii to lease and even buy land among the Maasai in Trans-Mara (Ng’eny O.I, 2014). As Nyamweno (O.I, 2014) argued,

Sometimes, the Kipsigis women came to work on Gusii farms especially in weeding of finger millet and maize in exchange for food. This was mostly the grains. The Kipsigis men who owned tractors were also hired to till land for the Gusii at fair prices than their Gusii counterparts.

This co-operation between the two communities can be said to be of a symbiotic nature as both of them benefited for survival. This is because the farm produce from the land cultivated by the Gusii more especially the grains benefitted both communities. As illustrated earlier, the Kipsigis could get these grains through trade or by providing labour on Gusii farms in exchange for the grains.

The Abagusii and Kipsigis also interacted with each other in intermarriages. In the pre-colonial period, there were very few cases of intermarriages between the two communities. However with time, it became a common practice between them. Actually, according to Mwanzi (1977), the Kipsigis of Sotik are Kalenjinised Gusii partly through intermarriages. Some respondents who had married from their neighbouring community said that, the intermarriages had worked in favour of them. This was so because, in events of manifest conflicts between the two communities, their homesteads were spared as they belonged to both communities. This means that the intermarriages between the Abagusii and Kipsigis promoted more peace than conflict between them; hence, the need to be
encouraged. This could be so because, they were founded on love as people were not coerced to marry each other. The children who were born to these couples could identify themselves with both communities and this could enable them to be agents of peace in their families.

In the post-independent Kenya as noted by Ombuki (O.I, 2015), the two communities also interacted in religious activities. This was the case of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (SDA) which was a Gusii-dominated denomination. It established some Sabbath schools in Kipsigisland and a church along the border at Kamukunji after Ng’eny donated land for the same. Other than religious activities, the two communities had merry-go-rounds (chamas) especially among the small-scale business women. These brought the women from the two communities together as they visited each other in addition to the saving contributions they made.

From the foregoing discussions, it can be noted that, the Abagusii and Kipsigis have never been at peace with one another. They have however tried to co-exist in times of decreased animosity or threats. This historical background gives us a better understanding of the relations between the Kipsigis and Abagusii from the pre-colonial period to the post-independence period. From the study, many factors were identified to be behind these conflicts and the researcher categorized them into two. The remaining part of this chapter handles some of the political factors that contributed to the conflicts between the two communities. These included:
2.2 Politics of exclusion

One political factor that promoted animosity between the two communities was what could be termed as politics of exclusion. This is where one community is perceived to be given some privileges at the expense of the other.

As Chebet (O.I, 2014) observes, during the Kenyatta regime, the two communities were treated equally as none was favoured at the expense of the other. However, during the Moi regime, the situation changed as the Kipsigis were perceived to have got more privileges than the Gusii. When Moi took over power, the Kalenjin communities including the Kipsigis felt that it was their opportune moment to eat as the Kikuyu had done during the Kenyatta era. In the first term of Moi, most Kalenjins did not benefit much from the government in terms of appointments to state offices. This was attributed to the fact that most of them were not empowered with education. That meant that, the few who could benefit received material benefits like loans, food aid and farm inputs.

The president then embarked on the mission of empowering the Kalenjin communities with education through such strategies like, the quota system and bursaries for secondary and college students. This was to prepare them for white collar jobs in his administration which came to be after sometime. After some few years in presidency, Daniel Moi embarked on promoting Kalenjin hegemony in the government. This he did by appointing many Kalenjin to ministerial positions, government jobs especially in state corporations and recruitment into the armed forces. The Kipsigis region of Gelegele location was
declared a hardship area, a strategy that was adopted to legitimize the assistance given to the area from the government. This was in form of food aid, farm inputs and machinery and loans from the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC).

This assertion is in line with the work of Korwa & Munyae (2001) who note that, President Moi appointed Kalenjins in key posts in among others, Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Kenya Posts and Telecommunications (KPT), Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE), National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), Kenya Grain Growers Co-operative Union (KGCCU).

Mwebi (O.I, 2014) noted that:

We did not see or hear of any benefits given to the Kipsigis that were denied to the Abagusii or the vice versa during the Kenyatta regime. During the Kenyatta regime the community that benefited most was the Kikuyu and partly their cousins- the Ameru, Aembu and Akamba. In the Moi regime however, it was rampant as the Kipsigis and other Kalenjins were given many benefits like farm inputs, government jobs and other deliberate assistance. Their land just next to ours was declared to be a hardship area by the president so that, it could legitimize the state assistance offered to them. In our community, we received aid from the government in the 1980s when there was severe famine here and in 1992 and 1997 after the clashes when we were given food, blankets and farm inputs.

Omanga (O.I, 2015) also noted that,

People like us struggled to take our children for further studies in countries like India so that, they could get better jobs when they came back home. However, we were met with frustrations and hopelessness when they could not be employed by the government. This made us bitter and envious of our neighboring Kipsigis who were employed even with the basic primary education simply because the president was a Kalenjin who helped them get access to the government resources. In our location there was only one dispensary serving people from all the way
from Kahawa, Esise, Kebuse, Eronge and Manga that was poorly equipped but among the Kipsigis they had better equipped dispensaries where we sometimes went for medication like Abosi dispensary.

The inequitable distribution of resources to all Kenyans during the Moi regime has been observed by Korwa and Munyae (2001) who say that, in order to bolster his grip of power, Moi embarked on the gradual Kalenjinization of the public and private sectors from the 1980s. He began to “de-Kikuyunize” the civil service and the state owned enterprises previously dominated by the Kikuyu ethnic group during Kenyatta’s regime.

As Collins (in Abraham, 1982, p 133-135) observes in his analytic conflict theory, conflict is a product of unequal distribution of resources in the society which leads to competition for such resources. Those who have access to the resources struggle to protect the resources while those who do not have the access struggle to get them. In the process of these struggles, conflict becomes inevitable.

The theory fits into the situation in the area under study, because as the foregoing findings illustrate, there was a perceived differential distribution of resources between the two communities. The Gusii felt that the Kipsigis had more access to most resources especially economic and political power especially during the Moi regime than the Abagusii had. This may have made the relations between them sour. As the Kipsigis put efforts in protecting their privileges on one hand, the Abagusii on the other hand struggled to get access to some of those privileges accorded to their neighbours but denied to them. This competition may have led to bitterness and tension between the two communities.
At any rate, that does not negate the fact that, there were other Kipsigis men and women who did not benefit from the Moi government. It also does not mean that there were people from the Gusii community who benefitted from the KANU governments. This is so because, the quota system, bursaries, ministerial appointments and government jobs in state corporations and the armed forces were not a preserve of the Kalenjin only. The other communities including the Abagusii were also given such benefits. Some Gusii also benefitted from ministerial positions like Simeon Nyachae, Sam Ongeri and Zachary Onyonka. Nevertheless, whether one community disproportionately got more privileges than the other, the fact remains that there was competition over resources which could be either intra or inter-ethnic. As one group struggled to get access to the resources that they perceived to be denied to them but given to their neighbours, the privileged group also strove to protect their positions and privileges. This could be as a result of the threat the “out-group” posed to them of losing their privileges and positions; hence the need to protect them at all costs. This led to tension between the two groups in competition.

Makanda (2010) observes that, biases and prejudices in development priorities have by and large followed the influence of ethnic identities making it an institutionalized issue. Some ethnic groups are perceived to be privileged while others are underprivileged leading to the present atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion among regions and ethnic groups. It has made ethnic identity a form of social capital that can be used to influence or determine people’s social and economic prospects. This assertion has received the support of Shibru (2013) who argues that, there is a close interconnection between the ‘politics of
exclusion’ and violent ethnic conflicts. The direct reason for this is the exclusion from political power and rights. This means that where power holders favour their own ethnic group and discriminate others, it is likely for ethnic conflict to arise whenever there are favourable conditions for it.

Oucho (2002) notes that, the first two independent regimes in Kenya, perfected partisan politics and partisan division of the national cake. During the Kenyatta regime, the Kikuyu dominated the country’s political and economic life. This trend continued during the Moi regime for the Kalenjin community dominated the political and economic life of the country. Muhula (2009) supports this assertion by arguing that, historically, political patronage has reflected regional access to political power. The post-independent Kenyan constitution conferred vast powers on the president. These included the powers to allocate ministerial positions and make appointments to constitutionally protected offices. Successive regimes therefore entrenched their rule, assigned strategic administrative positions and directed political resources to supportive provinces (regions). Some of the powers that the president exercised may have promoted political patronage during the Kenyatta regime and copied in the Moi regime. These were summarized by Njonjo (1965) as; the power to appoint and dismiss the Deputy President, Cabinet secretaries and to nominate twelve Members of Parliament. To appoint the Chief Justice and other judges of the High court, control the police, civil service and the national government and to declare an emergency and detain people without trial.
These powers encouraged political patronage which reflected access of resources to regions. Those who supported the president were rewarded with some resources to their communities which may have led to bitterness among those perceived to be rebels to the government and their communities. The feeling of marginalization and exclusion by the government made such groups of people live with bitterness and resentment. These emotions could be easily ignited by insensitive influential people in those communities against those whom they perceived to be more privileged than them.

Murungi (2000, p165) argues that, at the root of ethnicity lies the question of economic security. Open ethnic conflicts arise between privileged ethnic groups who have benefited from a regime they seek to protect and perpetuate and the oppressed and economically deprived ethnic groups who seek to change the political system. This leads to permanent political tensions because each group feels that it can only win if the other group loses. These facts could be attributed to the perception on the part of the public that, given the power of the President and the political class everything flows not from laws but from the Presidential power and personal decisions. This also has led the public to believe a person from their own tribe must be in power, both to secure for them benefits and as a defensive strategy to keep off other ethnic groups, from taking over power, jobs, land and other entitlements (Waki Report, 2008,p 30).
2.3 Re-introduction of Multiparty Democracy

Multiparty democracy was also cited to be one of the political factors that caused conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis along the Sotik-Borabu border. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a political wave towards democratization in the world. This was also the case in Kenya as a number of stakeholders mounted pressure on the Moi government to introduce multiparty democracy in Kenya. This pressure was based on the human rights abuses which were perpetrated by the regime that existed then. This pressure resulted to the repealing of section 2A of the Kenyan constitution in 1991 which subsequently led to the 1992 multiparty general elections. Section 2A was inserted in the constitution in 1982, an amendment that was to make Kenya a de-jure one party state. Section 2A stated that, “There shall be in Kenya only one political party, the Kenya African National Union” (KNADS: 2001). After it was repealed in 1991 to introduce multiparty democracy, it came to be inserted in the constitution in 1997 as Section 1A which stated that, “The Republic of Kenya shall be a multi-party democratic state”(ibid).

As observed by Nyambegera (O.I, 2014),

Before the 1992 general elections, there was a lot of hatred and tension between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis which later developed into a serious war after the elections. As a community, Abagusii felt that we had not gained much from the Moi administration and we felt neglected and sidelined in terms of development. This made most of us to defect from KANU and join other political parties like FORD and DP. We were very confident to replace Moi as president mainly because we felt that the KANU regimes had marginalized our community. This on the other hand angered the Kipsigis against the Abagusii as they saw them to be betrayers for defecting from KANU.
As the move to political pluralism became increasingly probable, senior politicians in many political rallies issued inflammatory statements and utterances, asking for people to go back to their ancestral lands or they be forced out. The advent of the violent ethnic clashes closely followed these rallies (Human Rights Watch, 1993).

As Osamba (2001) notes, the Kalenjin vented their anger on other ethnic groups whom they viewed as supporters of the political opposition. As Obonyo (O.I, 2015) said, this was aimed at disenfranchising the Abagusii together with the other communities who were perceived to be sympathizers of pluralism. This then led to the eruption of ethnic clashes between the two communities along the border. This argument received support from Sang (O.I,2014) who had the view that,

The politicians and other government officials who supported KANU especially from Kipsigisland told the people that, those who supported multiparty politics were against KANU and Moi as a person. The aim behind this was to overthrow Moi from power. The Kipsigis felt threatened and began fighting the Abagusii who were living in Kipsigisland together with other communities not in support of KANU.

These arguments are based on Kaufman’s symbolic/emotional choice theory. Kaufman argues that, the more the group’s myth-symbol complex emphasizes hostility towards a particular (actual or potential) adversary group, portraying it and its individual as enemy and inferior, the greater is the probability of ethnic conflicts. The symbols that define a group and to which its members respond, reflect both interest and value: a struggle for security, status and ultimately group survival is at the same time a struggle against hostile, evil or sub-human forces. That, among the pre-conditions that justify ethnic conflicts, the group must fear that its very physical existence is threatened and ethnic groups require
opportunities for mobilization. These manifest themselves in the political space. For the escalation of violence to occur, which can be either elite or mass-led, there must be mass hostility, chauvinist political mobilization and a security dilemma.

As Murungi (2000) argues, the laissez-faire politics of a multi-party democracy has been used to deliberately exploit the cultural differences of ethnic groups and to fan tribal hatred for the selfish benefit of politicians. Kenyan intellectuals and opposition leaders adduced overwhelming evidence to show that ethnic clashes were an artificial creation of a few self-centred politicians. These were those who were opposed to political pluralism and development of democratic institutions and culture.

Mbatia et al (2010, p 191) support this view by observing that, the adoption of multiparty democracy heightened ethnic consciousness through elite mobilization and multiparty elections which eventually precipitated ethnic conflicts and violence. This has been precisely so, because party politics has been based on ethnic identities of party influential men and women. Many of the parties have lacked ideological leanings and democratic practices opting to follow the whims of their influential men and women who were often political chiefs of certain ethnic coalitions or communities. Evidently, party influential men and women amplified ethnic differences by often appealing to ethnic sensibilities during political campaigns and electioneering.
Kipyegon (O.I, 2014) notes that, in a meeting held at Siongiori in 1992 just before the general elections, some Kipsigis politicians asked them not to vote for any other political party except KANU. The politicians indicated that, there was need to resist pluralism as that could subject the Kipsigis to more injustices especially related to land. That, other ethnic groups could be settled in their land if Moi could not retain presidency.

This may have explained why most of the Kipsigis took every measure to ensure Moi retained the presidency. This resistance could be due to the land injustices they faced during the colonial period.

Nyukuri (1997, p 11) notes that, the misunderstanding of pluralism and majimboism (federalism) was also a source of ethnic conflicts in Kenya. The re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya in the early 1990s had far reaching consequences one of which was the eruption of ethnic clashes. This was partially a fulfillment of President Moi's earlier prediction that a return of his country to a multi-party system would result in an outbreak of tribal violence that would destroy the nation (Human Rights Watch/Africa November, 1993). It was also because of the misconception of pluralism and majimboism by leaders from the ruling party and opposition parties as well as the general public. The advent of pluralism in Kenya was misconceived as the advent for democracy as implied in some of the political slogans and ideologies propagated by the various pressure groups and political parties that were formed in the early, 1990s. The so called champions of these political parties and pressure groups never took enough time to explain to their
euphoric supporters the meaning and practice of pluralism, and hence the subsequent confusion, conflict as well as instability.

The re-introduction of pluralism in Kenyan politics ignited the pre-existing bad relations between the two communities that had been created in the pre-colonial period and perfected in the colonial and post-independence periods. The repealing of Section 2A of the Kenyan constitution in 1991 saw the formation of other political parties besides KANU. Little did people know that, this was to turn against them as most leaders of the new political parties drew membership from their ethnic groups. This meant that, Kenyans got divided along ethnic lines based on party affiliations. This was further compounded by the information the citizenry received from their political elites most of whom misunderstood the concept of pluralism. This eventually misguided the electorates; hence the eruption of inter-ethnic animosity and violence between the communities who were not in political alignment. This explained the inter-ethnic conflicts between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis during the electioneering periods of 1992 and 1997.

2.4 Incitement from politicians

In the traditions of the two communities, they had prejudices and stereotypes against each other which provided a fertile ground for incitement by politicians. Ombasa (O.I, 2015) noted that, most politicians incited the two communities against each other. They took advantage of the stereotypes and prejudices that existed between the two communities to ensure that the two communities were not united. The two communities considered each
other to be traditional enemies as the Kipsigis referred to the Abagusii as *gosobindet* to mean enemy while the Abagusii referred to the Kipsigis as *abaibi* to mean thieves. Politicians of the region especially during the election campaign periods openly referred to the other community by the name they had been branded by their community. This gave the people of their community the legitimacy to refer and believe that the statements from the politicians were true. Even though the two communities interacted in trade and other ways, deep down in their hearts they considered each other to be enemies. This belief was a fertile ground to be utilized by the politicians and at times it could provoke bitter emotions which led to war between the two communities.

The bitter emotions that arose between the two communities as a result of these prejudices and stereotypes are what Kaufman’s symbolic/emotional choice theory explains. Conflicts are caused by emotions and group mythologies that justify hostility against another group. The Gusii believed that the Kipsigis were thieves while the Kipsigis believed that the Gusii were enemies; hence the need to do away with them. This situation was worsened by the wrong information the communities received from the influential people including politicians from their communities. The politicians even went a notch higher to incite the two communities on the basis of the scarce resources that they were in competition over. Sang’ (O.I, 2015), singled out land and livestock as the major resources that were used for incitement. He said that,

A case in point was in 1992 when in a political rally at Siongiroi, some KANU politicians from the Kalenjin community told us to expel the Gusii and other communities living on our land. They told us that pluralism was like majimboism which meant that all communities were to go to their ancestral lands. We had been
made to believe that, the Gusii were staying on our land. That was even justified with the names of some places in Gusiiland that are Kipsigis names like Tinderet, Chepng’ombe and Lietego. This made us to take up arms to chase the Gusii from our land.

The incitement based on land led to conflicts between the two communities. Collins’ analytic conflict theory fits here in describing the competition over resources as a cause for conflicts. It was true that the two communities competed over resources more especially land. These conflicts could be avoided if some of the politicians could not have made their communities aware of the scarce resources between them. The insensitive politicians utilized the opportunities they got in the political space to express themselves. This was not because they cared so much about their communities but rather it was aimed at gaining political mileage. It was an opportunity to popularize themselves among the electorates so that they could get their support or endorsement to a political office. That meant that, it was all based on personal and selfish motives of some of the politicians. The misperceptions, prejudices, stereotypes and misinformation of the people by politicians may have led to bitter emotions which were utilized by the insensitive politicians.

As Soyinka (DNA, May 19, 2000) argues, African leaders drag their populations down the abyss as they seek to establish their own personal domination. They would rather set their countries on fire than give up power. This is true of what Oyeniyi (2011) calls ethnic consciousness which has been utilized by the emergent unpatriotic African leaders. These leaders bank on ethnic sentiments and arguments for their selfish ends. Ethnic
consciousness provides African leaders with platforms for their ideological and morally deficient political positions. To sustain their position, the ruling class confuses their various peoples with conflict-generating theories and explanations in the face of social and political questions facing them.

Obonyo (O.I, 2015) had the view that,

The politicians played a major role in the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis along the Borabu-Sotik border. On one hand, the Kipsigis politicians told their kinsmen how part of the Gusiiland belonged to them and on the other hand, the Gusii politicians told their kinsmen to defend their land. This worsened during the electioneering period when the politicians were marketing themselves to the voters.

This therefore meant that, the conflicts between the two communities were products of the underlying factors that the politicians took advantage of. The resources more especially land was and is still a thorny issue in the history of the two communities. The competition over this means of production in addition to the pre-existing prejudices and stereotypes were manipulated by some insensitive politicians to incite their electorates. This may have led to more animosity between the two communities which may have culminated into the occasional manifest conflicts.

Although the politicians were said to have incited the two communities against each other, there were other politicians who worked so hard to promote peace along the Borabu-Sotik border. These were people like the former MP for Sotik Hon. Antony Kimeto and the former MP for North Mugirango/Borabu Hon. Godfrey Masanya who tried to hold peace meetings with both ethnic groups. They also came up with a peace
building committee along the border that had members from the two communities, religious groups, the regional government and NGOs.

2.5 Failure of the security enforcement agencies

The police in many instances failed to contain the conflicts between the two communities in one way or the other. This was through failure to act or delayed action. Monda (O.I, 2014) had the view that,

Cattle raiding has been existing between the Kipsigis and Abagusii from the pre-colonial period. During President Kenyatta’s regime, it was not rampant as in President Moi’s time. During the Kenyatta regime, the few incidences of raiding were contained by the police officers.

As Kerina(O.I, 2014) observed,

The persistent cattle raids by the Kipsigis on the Gusii from the 1980s made us believe that the government supported the whole idea. This was because we knew and reported the culprits to the police but to our frustration, there was no action taken against them. The laxity of the police forced us to form gangs (which have since evolved to be vigilante groups) to maintain security in our villages by dealing with those who disrupted peace in our community. In the process, many raiders were killed which meant that, there were some Kipsigis who were involved. This led to many revenge attacks on the Gusii by the Kipsigis. In instances when the situation worsened, that was the time when the government could send in the Administration Police to the area and in most cases they were biased in the dispensation of their duties.

On the other hand, Soi (O.I, 2015) observed that, among the Kipsigis, they knew the people who were involved in the raiding activities. Due to their thirst for peace with their neighbours- the Gusii, they reported the culprits to the authorities but what they received
was hatred from their kinsmen and lack of action from the authorities. During the time of manifest conflicts with the Abagusii, they reported the planners and executors to the police and local administrators. They were arrested but then, released few days later on the premises of lack of evidence or a local politician had instructed the police to release them. This made the Kipsigis elders to revert to their traditional ways of punishing the culprits by use of curses.

In 1992 for instance, the government and the local administration attempted to play down the conflict by blaming the opposition and the mass media for sensational reporting (Kiliku Report, 1992). The government wanted to gain political mileage out of the clashes by using violence as a political tool. This to a greater extent explained why the same government was never involved in taking action against those suspected to be behind the skirmishes.

To promote peace among different communities in Kenya the provincial administration (currently referred to as the national government) strengthened the Chief’s Act. When the researcher approached Nyabamba, Onyancha and Soi (O.I, 2015) who were former chiefs, they had a similar opinion. They noted that, the Acts helped in maintaining good relations between the two communities. However, towards the end of president Moi’s regime, the laws received criticism especially from the Members of Parliament. This killed the spirit of the chiefs in promoting peace along the border as they relaxed in tracking of livestock when there was a raiding. This was because they were told by the
MPs that it was the duty of the police to track stolen livestock. In most cases, people suspected that the police were colluding with the raiders. This was because they took a long time to respond to distress screams and cries and sometimes could ask for money to fuel their vehicle before tracking the livestock.

The context presented by the two communities could be described as a security dilemma which Kaufman identifies to be one of the causes of conflicts in the symbolic/emotional choice theory. Due to fear and the existent stereotypes among the two communities, they were thrown into a dilemma on whom to report to about criminal activities. This was because, when they reported to the chiefs, they could be acted upon up to 1997 following the reform of the Chief’s Act. As Murungi (2000, p 120-121) states, the Chief’s Act traced its origin to the colonial period where it was referred to as the Native Authority Ordinance. It came to be renamed as the Chief’s Authority Act. Following the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) in 1997, the chiefs’ powers were reduced with the introduction of the code of conduct for chiefs under the new Section 20 of the Act. Section 20 (b) of the Chief’s Act required that the chiefs to hand over all suspects to the police as soon as possible.

After 1997, people were in serious dilemma after the chiefs and the people reported to the police who in most cases did not act appropriately. This confusion on who to report to may have led to the emergence of vigilante groups (especially among the Gusii) to protect their kinsmen and their livestock from raiders. Some scholars like Asiwaju (1985), Arrous
(1996), Ghani and Lokhart (2001) and Wekesa (2010) hold the view that, Africa’s problems of inter-community relations, cross-border co-operation and insecurity should be understood as symptoms of current problems of political governance and policy. As Ghani and Lockhart (2001) argue,

The failure to maintain basic order not only makes fear a constant of daily life, but also, provides a breeding ground for a small minority to perpetuate criminality and terror. To date African nations should therefore invest in state strengthening and building. Only the state can organize power so as to harness flows of information, people, money, force and decisions necessary to regulate human behaviors.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the first objective of this research. The objective was achieved by investigating the contribution of politics to the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis between 1963 and 2002. The chapter was guided by the analytic conflict theory which explained the conflicts as products of competition over scarce but important resources between the two communities. The chapter was also guided by the symbolic/emotional choice theory which explained the conflicts between the two communities as results of group mythologies that justified enmity. They could also be explained as products of security dilemma, fear and mass mobilization by influential people among the two communities including politicians. From the foregoing discussion, it could be concluded that a number of political factors could be blamed for the conflicts between the two communities. Even though politics was identified to be the major factor behind the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii, political incitement, exclusion politics, multiparty politics and failure of security agencies could not exist in an
unsupportive environment. These could only take place where the environment was fertile enough to support their growth. This meant that, they only took advantage of the pre-existing factors which the next chapter will discuss in detail.
CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL-ECONOMIC FACTORS ON THE KIPSIGIS-ABAGUSII CONFLICTS ALONG THE BORABU-SOTIK BORDER

3.1 Introduction
Apart from politics, there were other factors which played a crucial role in the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis during the period under study. This chapter discusses the social and economic factors that may have instigated the conflicts between the two communities. This is because as stated in the previous chapter, politics alone could not ignite conflicts between the two communities. There must have been other factors that pre-existed which provided a fertile ground for the growth of the seeds of chauvinist politics. The discussion in this chapter is based on the following: The contribution of some resources like livestock and land in the conflicts between the two communities and unemployment on the relations between the two communities. The discussion will be guided by both the analytic conflict theory and the symbolic/emotional choice theory as premised in the theoretical framework.

3.2 Livestock raiding
Raiding for cattle was identified to one of the main factor behind the conflicts between the Gusii and Kipsigis communities. Livestock play an important part in most of the African communities. Most African communities attach so much importance to livestock and more specifically cattle. This is so because economically, it is a source of food, provides skins which are used in and cloth making and for sale. It is also a source of
income; oxen are used in ploughing of land and their waste is used as manure on their farms. Livestock also have some cultural importance attached to them. These among other reasons give a brief background why the two communities reared livestock.

As Lang’at (O.I, 2014) observed,

Traditionally, the Kipsigis were pastoralists. Livestock was (and is) very important in our culture because one could not be a respectable man without cattle. We believed that, cattle were a gift from God to us. This therefore made those of us who were illiterate and held on our traditions to raid our neighboring communities of their livestock. This was because they believed that our neighbors like the Abagusii and Luo should practice cultivation and fishing respectively.

This traditional belief and the legitimization of raiding among the Kipsigis gave them the go-ahead of raiding their neighboring communities. As Matui (O.I, 2014) noted, in the Kipsigis culture, cattle raiding was institutionalized even before the advent of colonialism. The more livestock a man could raid from their neighboring communities, the more respect one could get. If one could carry out successful raids, he could be given some privileges like being the leader of warriors or joining the council of elders. This respect and privileges that accompanied successful raids encouraged most young men to engage in raiding as it legitimized the raiding.

These views concurred with those of Orchardson (1971) who argues that, among the Kipsigis, raiding of cattle was a past time sport and was in fact institutionalized. Cattle theft from outside the community was the objective of their active lives and a test of their military prowess. This therefore meant that, raiding among the Kipsigis had a cultural attachment, a reason that may have legalized raiding on their neighboring communities.
The institutionalization of raiding among the Kipsigis also legitimized the activity as other men went to raid their neighbors because it was acceptable by the society. One was to be a hero and virtuous man in the eyes of the society for carrying out a successful raid. The prestige associated with successful raids encouraged many men to raid their neighboring communities.

Raiding activities were however not restricted to the Kipsigis only in the pre-colonial period. It was also carried out by the Abagusii on their neighboring communities like the Kipsigis and Maasai. Among the Abagusii as Ombuki (O.I, 2015) noted, In the pre-colonial period, the Kipsigis and the Abagusii used to raid each other. The raiding was however a form of sport where we could inform each other prior so that we could prepare for the same. However, this sport changed in the colonial period when livestock raiding became commercialized as the Kipsigis started raiding on our community at night without prior information. This sometimes led to retaliatory raids which led into wars between the Abagusii and the Kipsigis. From that time up to date, more livestock raids have been carried out from Gusililand to Kipsigisland where some Gusii men have liaised with the Kipsigis raiders.

This assertion supports the work of Omwoyo (2000) which notes that, during the colonial period, all the raids that took place along the borders with the Kipsigis, the Kipsigis were being accused more often as instigators. But equally, the Kipsigis also suffered numerous raids from the Maasai, Gusii and the Luo though most of these raids were retaliatory in nature. Stock rustling which was formerly regarded rather as a sport associated with manhood, took an economic turn during the colonial period. The commercialization of livestock raids meant that the acquisition of wealth became the main object behind livestock raids. Livestock raids flourished with time and were even made complicated. It
was equally proved that, in a number of cases the Gusii not only made false identification of cattle but also stole amongst themselves and then sold to the Kipsigis. The Sotik settled area largely inhabited by the Kipsigis squatters acted as a “thieves’ paradise”.

The importance attached to livestock among the two communities has since time immemorial led to conflicts between them. This was because in many cases it led to raiding of livestock from each other. The competition over livestock (which appears to be an important resource) between the two communities could be explained by the analytic conflict theory. Livestock seemed to be a scarce but valuable resource among the two communities. This was due to the cultural and economic importance that was attached to livestock among the two communities. On one hand, the Kipsigis felt that livestock rearing was their preserve; hence the need to get the livestock from their neighbors in whichever manner. On the other hand, the Abagusii felt that, it was important for them to rear livestock for their cultural, economic and even nutritional value. The competition to raid and protect the livestock from raiders made the two communities to develop tension and hatred for each other.

As a result of the threats of raiding from their neighbours, the Abagusii put up various measures to protect their livestock like the construction of forts around their villages and cattle enclosures. Osero (O.I, 2015) noted that,

The Gusii livestock especially cattle from the entire village were driven to the *ebisarate* (cattle enclosures) in the evening. The youths could protect them for the entire night from being raided by our enemies more especially the Kipsigis. In the
cattle enclosures, the young men were given fighting skills in order to protect their livestock from the raiders.

This concurs with the work of Ochieng’ (1974, p 204-205) who notes that, the entire livestock of a village/ clan were driven into the cattle enclosures for the night to be protected by warriors. This was due to the increasing attacks from the cattle raiding Kipsigis, Maasai and Nandi. The warriors received their training where wrestling, hunting and military drills were part and parcel of life in these villages. The military drills given to the Gusii young men may have contributed to the conflicts between the two communities as they legalized fighting with neighbors in the name of protection.

In the post-colonial period, however, the pattern changed. During the Kenyatta regime, livestock raiding was not rampant. As Tabitha (O.I, 2015) noted,

In the Kenyatta era, there was more co-operation between the two communities as there was some form of unity in the country. Sometimes, the raids occurred but in most cases, there was peaceful co-existence as the provincial administration was very powerful by then. The few cases of cattle theft still indicated that the cattle were being taken from Gusililand to Kipsigisland. For instance, there was war between the two communities in 1974 when livestock were stolen from Manga area. The livestock were traced in Kipsigisland where the Gusii found one of the cows slaughtered. When the Abagusii tried to revenge against the Kipsigis by taking with them some of the Kipsigis livestock, war broke out between the two communities which lasted for two weeks.

During the Moi regime the problem of cattle rustling became more pronounced across the border which led to the outbreak of battles between the two communities. This made people to believe that, the government was in support of raiding or it never gave the issue the seriousness it deserved. As Kipsang’ (O.I, 2014) noted, some of the KANU leaders were even joking about the issue instead of condemning the vice. The leaders said that,
the livestock were still in Kenya and therefore, all the milk was taken to K.C.C to benefit the Kenyan children through the Maziwa ya Nyayo Initiative.

Ng’eny (O.I, 2014) also noted that,

Tracking of livestock was a duty of the public and the chiefs. However, with time that responsibility was shifted to the police officers. After the transfer of this noble duty from the chiefs to the police, it marked the onset of problems. In most instances, the livestock could not be traced which was rarely the case when it was done by the chiefs. This made most of the people to conclude that, either the police were colluding with the rustlers or it was a deliberate measure the government adopted to frustrate the efforts of the chiefs.

Raiding gradually became a lucrative business activity in the region. There was the rise of raiding cartels between the three communities in the region-the Abagusii, Kipsigis and Maasai. The Abagusii raiders could raid livestock from their fellow Gusii and hand them over to their Kipsigis counterparts who in turn handed them over to their Maasai counterparts who could sell the livestock. All the involved parties had to share the proceeds from this business and this encouraged many youths to engage in this business.

Additionally, in most cases, it proved difficult to track the livestock as the police took their time to respond to distress calls or tell the affected persons to fuel their vehicle for them to help in tracking the livestock. This behaviour has more often raised questions from the public on the motives behind it (Ombachi O.I, 2015).

In some cases, there were regulations that, the public could not track the livestock without being accompanied by a police officer(s). As a result, the residents were frustrated on one hand, while on the other hand, the rustlers took advantage of the many logistics that were
involved livestock tracking to continue with the vice. This was the case because it was (and it is) a problem in tracking the stolen livestock beyond Gorgor without the escort of the police or chiefs. From Gorgor, Tabarit to Mogondo, the places were very remote and the inhabitants were harsh to foreigners. In most instances, people gave up tracking the livestock beyond these areas as they assumed that they had crossed the Mara River into the Chepalungu forest which was very thick (Sang’ (O.I, 2015)

This situation led to more hostility and enmity between the two communities. This situation describes Kaufman’s symbolic/emotional choice theory where the security dilemma leads to conflict. The two communities of the region could not understand who was to protect their livestock from being raided; hence, the retaliatory raids. Additionally, the entrenched hostility in the traditions of the two communities made them to believe that, raiding each other was legitimate. This confusion and belief were strengthened more with the existing prejudices and stereotypes. As a result, they provided a fertile environment for elite and mass mobilization by some chauvinist local leaders who banked on the ethnic consciousness of the two communities.

The different policies that had been put in place to control livestock movement were implemented in a skewed manner. It was difficult for one to transport livestock in Gusiiland without a permit. In Kipsigisland, however, there was laxity in implementing these policies and this encouraged the raiders to get livestock from the Gusii community and transport them across Kipsigisland. This meant that, the implementation of such
policies was marred with corruption; a situation which supports the view that, there were officers who were benefitting from the raids.

The question that we may ask ourselves is why did these communities raid each other? Or what encouraged the raiding? The answer to this question is pegged not only to the economic importance of livestock, but also to the cultural importance attached to the livestock by the two communities. The economic importance of livestock in the two communities has been discussed in the introduction part of this chapter. Culturally, the two communities had different cultural practices which had an attachment to livestock as discussed below:

3.2.1 Initiation and age-set system

Both the Kipsigis and Abagusii practiced circumcision of both boys and girls in the pre-colonial, colonial and part of the post-colonial period. However, the initiation of girls has since stopped due to the health risks involved and the campaigns against the Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). Initiation of boys in these communities was very important and Soi (O.I, 2015) argued that, the Kipsigis boys were socialized to believe that, for a successful initiation ceremony, the potential initiates had to raid cattle from their neighbouring communities. Those who had successful raids were held in high esteem and considered to be heroes. The stolen livestock could be kept in the place where the initiates of the entire village were secluded which also served as a training ground for warfare tactics for the initiates. Here, the initiates could also be trained on how to raid and protect
their livestock from enemies. Some of the stolen cattle were slaughtered to provide meat and blood during the seclusion period and the remaining were shared out as presents to the initiates that were selected to be leaders of age-sets. The age-set leaders later became leaders of warriors.

The age-set system among the Kipsigis was very important as they formed the warrior class (morans). This, therefore, meant that they provided the constant military assistance required in the community. Like Saberwal (1970) argues, among the Embu once a person joined an age-set, it legitimized his role in participating in raiding on the neighbouring people. The initiation among the Kipsigis which eventually led to age-sets motivated some initiates to engage in raiding of their neighbouring communities. This was made easier with the institutionalization of raiding in their community; a factor that legalized the vice. Additionally, the prestige that accompanied successful raids encouraged them to engage in raiding even after initiation. This explained why most of the raids were prevalent during the initiation period of between November and December.

Among the Abagusii, circumcision of girls continued up to the period under study and for boys, it is still practiced to date. As Okemwa (O.I, 2015) noted,

Initiation was very important among the Abagusii as this was the time to pass our traditions and customs to our children when in seclusion. Boys were trained on various skills like fighting and making of some weapons which were aimed at training them on how to defend themselves, the community and their property from enemies. On the day of initiation, strong, courageous and circumcised men in the community escorted them into seclusion with heroic songs. In the songs they were told to be brave enough to defend their community against their traditional enemies. They were told in the songs that they had been prepared to
fight in Kipsigisland and Maasailand in order to protect their community and property from their traditional enemies.

To a greater extent the training legitimized the wars with their Kipsigis and the Maasai neighbours due to what Kaufman’s symbolic/emotional theory describes as the myth-symbol complex. The group-symbol complex among the Abagusii portrayed the Kipsigis and Maasai as enemies who needed to be dealt with at whichever cost. The songs sung to the initiates hardened them and made them to think that the society had bestowed upon them the responsibility of defending the community against external aggressors. Initiation in the two communities made the initiates to interpret it to mean that, it was legal to raid or to fight their neighbours. Initiation among the Kipsigis gave the initiates the right to raid their neighbours while among the Abagusii, it gave them the right to fight their neighbours in the name of protecting their livestock from being raided. This meant that, initiation rites attached some cultural importance to livestock especially among the Kipsigis which in turn led to raiding; hence, the conflicts between the two communities.

3.2.2 Marriage/Bride price

Payment of bride price is a common practice in most African communities since the pre-colonial times to date. The payment of bride price was one of the motivating factors towards cattle rustling which in turn caused conflicts between the two communities. Ng’eny (O.I, 2014) stated,

Among the Kipsigis, one was allowed to marry after initiation as one was considered to be a mature adult to take care of a family. One of the things a man was supposed to do was to pay bride price which was mostly in terms of livestock to the parents of the intended wife. During the time of our forefathers, it
was the duty of the man’s father to pay the dowry for his son but over time, the tradition has changed because bride price has since been commercialized. It did not matter how one acquired the livestock even if it meant taking from any other field bearing in mind that it was a taboo to raid from their fellow Kipsigis. The young men who wanted to marry were encouraged to pay bride price for themselves instead of depending on their fathers. If one could not raise the needed livestock, in most cases he resorted to raiding their Gusii neighbours or rearing sheep and goats which he could exchange for cattle. Those who paid their bride price using the successfully raided livestock earned respect among their peers. This was further supported by the institutionalization of raiding in the 19th Century where it was not illegal to raid our neighboring communities.

These findings therefore concur with those of USAID (2005) among the pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya which noted that, the pressure put on young men of marriageable age to pay bride price for their brides encouraged them to engage in raids in order to raise the required livestock. Among the Abagusii, on the other hand, it was the responsibility of the father to pay bride price for his sons until recently. The Abagusii have since commercialized the payment of bride price which proved difficult for the fathers to afford paying for their sons. The responsibility therefore shifted from the fathers to the sons to pay bride price for themselves (Ombuki O.I, 2015).

This indicated that, some of them may have engaged in the raiding cartels to get money to pay the bride price and for family upkeep. Among the two communities, livestock and more especially cattle, was a symbol of wealth. The more livestock one had, the richer he was and the more wives he could marry. The competition for wealth and prestige that was associated with livestock could be what encouraged the men from both ethnic groups to raid each other.
This explained Collins’ analytic conflict theory where he argues that, in every society, there is a differential distribution of desirables. The inequality divides the society into graded levels of individuals with more or less resources available to them. Individuals strive to maximize their share of the scarce commodities. Those with a greater share of the goods try to consolidate their position, maximize their interests and dominate the structural arrangements by various means, especially coercion. The society regarded people with large herds of livestock as wealthy and when such men wanted to marry, they had to prove to the parents in-law that he was worth to take their daughter. This meant that, the society expected such men to marry many wives, pay the bride price in large quantities and promptly. The prestige may have forced some of the men to engage in raids in order to maintain the herds and status they had earned themselves in the society. In the process of maintaining the status and prestige, such people may have instigated conflicts with their neighbouring communities whom they raided.

3.3 Land

Land holds a significant position in the social and economic wellbeing of most Kenyan communities. Culturally, among all the Kenyan communities, land is the channel for survival as it provides the means through which the subsistence needs are met whether among the pastoralists or cultivators. Land has also been used as a measure of wealth and a source of prestige in the society. Without land, one is considered as poor. Land also lays a foundation for identity and association with one’s kin which are established through
links with one’s lineage, clan and ethnic group members. It is also associated with continuity between generations (Mbithi & Barnes, 1975, p 78-79).

In the pre-colonial period, land was communally owned and traditional rights and obligations ensured direct access to all. For a long time in the history of this country, land has remained a thorny economic and political issue. Ogendo (1999) argues that, the land issue has its origin in the colonial history of Kenya, where the colonialists dreamt of making this part of Africa a white man's country. Colonialism disrupted the traditional communal ownership of land by assuming that all land to which private ownership could not be established by documentary evidence was ownerless. Mwangi and Njuguna (2005) say that, the colonial government parceled out more than seven million acres of land including some of the most fertile land in Kenya and earmarked them for cultivation by Europeans. These areas came to be known as the white highlands.

As Soi (O.I, 2015) said, the entire regions of Ndanai and Borabu constituencies were a thick forested area where the Kipsigis, Maasai and sometimes the Gusii came to graze their livestock. By the time the colonialists came, they took all this area from around Metamaywa to Sotik. The three communities were pushed further into the infertile areas. The Kipsigis were pushed to areas like Gorgor, Tabarit and Mogondo which were more often dry. When the Kipsigis came to the region to graze and water their livestock, the whites confiscated their livestock. This was supported by the views of Motari (O.I, 2014) who noted that,
In the pre-colonial times, the Abagusii came to this region which was known as Sotik to graze their livestock occasionally for fear of being raided by the Maasai and Kipsigis. The area was forested and during the dry seasons, we used to bring our livestock here for watering. The competition for grazing fields and watering points could sometimes lead to war between the three communities involved. However with the advent of colonialism, we were pushed further away as from Metamaywa and beyond where we became congested due to our high population. The same case applied for the Maasai and Kipsigis who were pushed into Trans-Mara and areas like Gorgor, respectively. This therefore meant that, this region became a white-man’s land.

These findings concur with the work of Nyukuri (1997) who notes that, as a result of the massive land alienation activities in the early period of colonialism, many of the hitherto cultivating populations were pushed into the `infertile' native reserves that were not conducive for arable farming. The displaced populations lived as farm labourers, casual workers, tenants as well as squatters. The process of land alienation was also extended to the pastoral ethnic groups like the Maasai, Samburu, Nandi, Pokot and other Kalenjin speaking communities.

By settling in the area under study, the Europeans separated the three communities the more; hence, worsened their pre-colonial rivalries. The Europeans created a buffer zone between the three communities for fear of the three communities re-uniting against them being a common enemy. The British utilized the divide and rule strategy in what was sweet-coated as indirect rule. They divided the two communities along ethnic lines for easy management and to discourage unity of the communities. On the other hand, they promoted separate development of separate ethnic groups; something akin to the apartheid policy they applied in South Africa.
From the research, Okemwa, (O.I, 2015) argued that, the European economy in the area under study was skewed towards animal production. As a result of massive land alienation among the Kipsigis, many of them became squatters on the European farms. This saw many Kipsigis working on the European farms due to their knowledge of livestock keeping. Going by the arguments of Rutto (2014), the Kipsigis may have squatted on the European farms due to serious land alienation in their community. This even led to the exiling a whole Talai / Laibon clan of the Kipsigis to the tsetse fly infested and unproductive Gwassi area. By working and squatting on European farms, could have given the Kipsigis the hope to regain their lost land.

Collins’s ideas on the analytic conflict theory came in handy to explain the causes of strained relations between the two communities. Collins argues that, individuals strive to maximize their share of scarce commodities. Those who possess a greater share of the goods, try to consolidate their position and maximize their interests and dominate the structural arrangements by various means. These come with the people’s social position, the groups to which they belong and their numerical strength and the intensity of interpersonal attraction. The two communities developed more strained relations between them due to privileges that one group received than the other. The Kipsigis struggled to protect their land and the opportunity to work on European farms. On the other hand, the Abagusii also struggled to get the same opportunities granted to the Kipsigis. However, little did they know that, these opportunities could be perceived as rights later and these led them to serious conflicts.
On the eve of independence, during the second 1962 Constitutional Conference, all Kenyan ethnic groups renounced their claims to the land which belonged to them in the pre-colonial Kenya but had been alienated to Europeans (Mwangi & Njuguna, 2005). In the area under study, Mitei (O.I, 2014) noted that, the Kipsigis and Abagusii developed serious enmity based on land. When the Whites went, the land that they left became the issue of contention as both the Kipsigis and Abagusii laid claim to it. The squatting Kipsigis claimed that the land had been left to them by the Whites. On the other hand, the Abagusii claimed that, it was no-man’s land; hence, the need to sub-divide it among them. As Nyukuri (1997) asserts, indeed the colonialists were afraid that if the land issue was not handled properly, it could degenerate to civil strife as numerous ethnic groups engaged in the scramble to recover their alienated pieces of land. The British administration, on the eve of independence, worked out a formula of handing over land to the indigenous ethnic groups in Kenya. The British government established a special grant that was aimed at facilitating the re-distribution of land, particularly in the former white highlands. The transfer on land took various forms, starting from small holdings to medium and large holdings.

From the archival records(KNA/D.P.DC KISII/1963-81), it was noted that, after the attainment of self- government and the setting up of the Regional Administration in June 1963, there was reorganization of Kisii District (sub-county). The district comprised twelve locations with sixty-eight sub- locations. The north Kisii divisional headquarter was at Nyamira while the south at Kisii. In the reorganization, the border affairs were
reasonably quiet except for the Kipsigis border where tension was highest and also varied with the amount of livestock stolen. The Regional Boundaries Commission divided North Central and West Sotik between the Kipsigis and Kisii. The new area added to the Kisii was named Borabu location. Going by this report, it explained how Borabu was created. This is the same Borabu which has evolved to be Borabu sub-county.

Sang’ (O.I, 2015) argued that, after gaining self-rule, the government declared the entire Sotik and Borabu regions to be settlement schemes which were open for purchase to the Kipsigis and Gusii based on one’s capability. The land was sub-divided into three categories-A, B and C. Category A was for cultivation, B was for mixed farming and C for pastoralist activities. The interested people who were either individuals or groups were given loans to pay for the land that they chose. In the long run, many Gusii purchased more land in the region than the Kipsigis. They formed land-buying groups due to poverty in the congested areas they had been pushed into by the colonialists. They therefore, bought land in the Borabu settlement scheme in groups so as to settle the excess population in the reserves. Most of the Kipsigis were adamant in purchasing the land on the assertion that they could not purchase their own land. The Kipsigis who were able to purchase the land mostly came from far places like Kericho. This explained why the Kipsigis from Gorgor, Tabarit and Mogondo were always against the Abagusii as they always raided their livestock in order to frustrate them so that they could leave the land.
Nyukuri, (1997) observed that, under the independence agreement with Britain, the Kenya government was to buy the land from the settlers. In fact, the British advanced a loan to Kenya to facilitate this purchase. That in turn meant that there was no free land for distribution. Land distribution in Kenya came to be on the basis of willing buyer- willing seller. Many of the migrant labourers in the white highlands bought land individually or collectively in the settlement schemes which mostly were outside their ancestral homelands. These claims support those of the Kiliku Report (1992) which noted that at independence, the white highlands, partly forming the border area between the Kipsigis and Gusii were apportioned between the Maasai, Kipsigis and Gusii communities. Under the facilitation of the Settlement Fund Trustees, members of the three communities bought land that was formerly owned by the departing settlers. Members of the Gusii community who had a higher population density settled in the area in larger numbers than the Kipsigis and Maasai.

During the Moi regime, the land issue was politicized and it came to the fore as a campaign tool. As Chelang’at (O.I, 2014) observed,

Local politicians in our community incited us against the Abagusii that they should move from our land. They told us that the land belonged to our community before independence as Borabu was part of Sotik. We were made to believe so because some places in Gusiland were named after Kipsigis names like Tindereti, Lietego (Raitigo), Chepng’ombe and Kijauri. This proved to us that it was truly our land that the Gusii were residing on; hence, the need to acquire it at whatever cost.

Ombasa (O.I, 2015) also noted that,

Ethnic sentiments based on land always found a fertile ground during the electioneering period when politicians incited the Kipsigis against the Gusii. They
always (and still do) believed that the Gusii could stay as from Metamaywa. The
tarmac road from Sotik to Keroka could have been the boundary between the two
ethnic groups. It was the political attachment given to land that led to the conflicts
between the two communities. This was because the politicians understood the
cultural and economic importance of land among the two communities. To
popularize themselves among the electorates, they used land as a campaign tool
not taking into consideration how the locals could react thereafter.

As Ntabo (2006) noted, land among the Abagusii was a very important resource that was
collectively defended. The communal defense system was a result of a long identification
of the people with a certain geographical territory which was understood to belong to
them as a group. The frequent conflicts between the Gusii and their immediate
neighbours, the Kipsigis and Maasai were classic examples that showed how the Gusii
valued land. The competition over land, which was a scarce but valuable resource among
the two communities under study led to the rise of conflicts between them. The two
communities clashed with each other over the important resource which was coupled with
political incitement and the economic and cultural importance that was attached to it.

3.4 Unemployment

Unemployment especially among the youth was also identified as another trigger of the
conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii. Besides feeding the poverty trap in terms of
high unemployment rates, low literacy rates have in turn contributed to the conflict cycle.

This draws from the fact that,

A high mass of unemployed youth are a ready force of warriors (morans) that are
deployed for cattle raids and battles. Some of the youths are ignorant due to the
increasing school drop-out rate. This has created a lot of idleness at Kamukunji
market which has forced many of them to engage in drug abuse more especially
alcohol and bhang. With no source of livelihood, these youths have been forced to engage in vices like raiding in order to meet their needs (Sang’ O.I, 2015).

Ongeto (O.I, 2015) noted that, some of the youth were learned but they lacked jobs. Owing to the small sizes of land, they could not engage in commercial farming. Some of them joined the raiding cartels so as to earn a living and during elections, the jobless youth were preyed upon through the manipulations of politicians. This more often, contributed to conflicts that turned violent where there were competing inter-community political agenda. In addition, politicians capitalized on the youth unemployment, hired the youth during campaigns to intimidate opponents.

When mobilized to engage in violence, they were sometimes promised payment for their services and activities. Some of them also benefitted from looting during the chaotic situations so as to enrich themselves. This meant that, the unemployment among the youth worked to the disadvantage of both communities. Other than engaging in raiding, the unemployed youth were a ready force that was manipulated by the politicians in the electioneering periods. They were used in campaigns and in violence against their perceived enemies at the expense of the political elites from their communities. All these were aimed at their survival in the harsh economic environments. They aimed at creating wealth in order to maintain their status in the society. As Collins states in his analytic conflict theory, the need for prestige and status is what leads to conflicts between people. This is because they will always struggle and compete to attain the desirables and in the process of doing so, they will come into conflict.
3.7 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the other factors besides the political ones that led to the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border. From the discussion, raiding was identified as a major factor which was pegged on the cultural practices of initiation and marriage. However, land too, to a larger extent, led to the animosity between the two ethnic groups due to the cultural importance attached to it in addition to its economic value.

Unemployment was also identified as a cause for the conflicts between the two ethnic groups. The chapter was guided by both the analytic conflict theory and the symbolic/emotional choice theory. The analytic conflict theory majorly explained the competition over resources/desirables as the cause of conflicts between the two communities. The emotional choice theory explained how the security dilemma and group-mythologies that justify hostility against other groups led to conflict between the two communities. This was made possible with the interaction between the masses and the elites in the two communities. This was realized in the idle generation of youths who were available for recruitment into criminal groups and for political manipulations. Having discussed the causes of the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii, the subsequent chapter will discuss the impact of the conflicts between the two communities.
CHAPTER FOUR

IMPACTS OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ABAGUSII AND THE KIPSIGIS
ALONG SOTIK/BORABU BORDER

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the consequences of the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Gusii on both the communities and the country at large. It focuses on both the negative and positive implications of the conflicts between the two communities. The chapter is guided majorly, by the symbolic/emotional choice theory, but, some aspects are based on the analytic conflict theory. The chapter is divided into two sections where the first section discusses the negative impacts while the second section discusses the positive impacts of the conflicts between the two communities.

4.2 Negative impacts of the conflicts

4.2.1 Displacement of persons

Due to battles that arose between the two communities, sometimes people were displaced from their homes. For instance, Kemunto (O.I, 2014) noted that,

In the 1992 and 1997 clashes between the Abagusii and Kipsigis, they forced us to flee our homes for safety. We stayed at Manga girls’ school and Manga police station for some time as we waited for more police to be deployed in order to escort us to our ancestral homes. This was because it was dangerous to travel on road; moreover, there were no vehicles for us to board. We had to stay in congested make-shift structures and homes far from the border and the old men, women and children got sick. Additionally, we suffered from shortage of food because many of us were caught unawares and our food stores had been torched or looted by the Kipsigis.
This assertion got the support of Cherono (O.I, 2014) who also observed that, most of the Kipsigis did not construct houses next to the border. Even though that was the case, in the 1992 and 1997 clashes between the Kipsigis and Gusii, the Abagusii warriors were able to get to their homes. They torched the Kipsigis houses which forced them to move to further places like Ndanai and Kaplomboi for safety. This was the case mainly, for children, the aged and women where they sought refuge in schools, Ndanai police station and churches. Here, they were protected by the police. However, they greatly suffered from a humanitarian crisis as they were congested which meant that, they could not get access to the basic needs. More so, as Osero (O.I, 2015) noted, due to poor sanitation and lack of adequate water, there was an outbreak of cholera and dysentery in the camps. Some of the women and girls were also impregnated whether consciously or subconsciously by the warriors and some men who decided to take advantage of the situation.

This meant that, both the Kipsigis and the Abagusii got displaced by the conflicts between them which had turned manifest in 1992 and 1997. The displacement came before the actual polling day and after, which was aimed at benefitting some individuals as another section of this chapter will discuss. However, the displacement came with a number of consequences on the affected people. In the congested areas where they assembled for safety, they were welcomed rudely with a humanitarian crisis. They were faced with hunger due to lack of enough food as many may not have carried the food while escaping from their enemies. There was shortage of clean water, better housing,
sanitation facilities, medical facilities and other social amenities. This eventually, exposed the displaced populations to some diseases that took advantage of the unhygienic conditions under which they lived. Also, as Apollos (2010) observes, the refugees as well as the internally displaced persons often tend to live with stigmatization or marginalization that tends to be associated with the status.

The displacement of persons from both communities could be explained by Kaufman’s symbolic/emotional choice theory. Kaufman (2001) observes that, conflict is a product of symbols that define a group and to which its members respond. They reflect both interest and value: a struggle for security, status and ultimately group survival is at the same time a struggle against hostile, evil or sub-human forces. Thus, in the process of struggling for security and group survival, the Kipsigis and the Gusii came into conflicts. As a result, some of them were displaced by the members of their perceived enemy group; owing to the group mythologies that justified enmity between the two communities. The idea of displacing their “enemy group” was all aimed at their survival as a community. This could be achieved by sending their opponents away from them as they considered them hostile or evil.

4.2.2 Loss of confidence in the security forces

Due to the fact that, the police were either reluctant or partial in the dispensation of their duties, people lost confidence in them. This was attributed to the fact that the police were implicated to support cattle raiding activities. They perfected it by either being involved
in the raiding cartels or did not respond in time when the raiding was reported to them or they used some delaying tactics in the tracking of livestock. As a result of the failure of the security forces to enforce law and order and the subsequent loss of public confidence in them, there was an emergence of vigilante groups that grew in their power and influence in their respective areas. Their role grew beyond local crime prevention to being utilized as militias in electoral politics like Chinkororo among the Abagusii. The most vocal ones in the area of study were small vigilante groups which were formed to prevent cattle raiding by keeping vigil over their villages. They were also involved in disciplining those involved in the raiding cartels especially among the Gusii community. Almost every village had a vigilante group which proved to be more efficient than the police in maintaining security. (Mosoti, O.I, 2014).

The situation presented in the findings could be explained better by Kaufman’s symbolic/emotional choice theory. The security dilemma among the two communities was what led to conflicts; moreover, it led to the rise of vigilante groups like Gatundu area vigilante group. Due to the failure of the police officers to implement their duties as expected by law, many people lost confidence in them. This was because they exemplified partial dispensation of their duties. As illustrated in the previous chapter, they were perceived to protect some individuals in the society instead of all members. This made the people in the area of study to view them as accomplices to the cattle raiders as they never put the much needed effort and seriousness in tracking of livestock. This subsequently made people to lose trust in them and find ways of protecting their
communities. The dilemma, therefore, gave a leeway for the formation of the vigilante groups which were most common among the Abagusii. The people therefore, trusted the vigilante groups more than the police as they became more effective in maintaining security.

4.2.3 Rise of fear and insecurity

Due to the conflicts between the two communities under study, there emerged a rise of fear and insecurity among the two communities. This was in addition to the animosity, fear and hatred that existed between them from the pre-colonial period. As Kerina (O.I, 2014) said,

The increased fear between the two communities really affected our relations from day to day. This affected our access to social amenities that were across the border more especially medical attention and schools. Previously, the Gusii used to frequent Obosi Health Centre which was specialized in dog and snake bites but with time, we preferred going to Kisii Level Five Hospital even if it was far.

Mitei (O.I, 2014) also noted that, the Kipsigis from Koiyet sub-location preferred going for medication at Eronge Dispensary or Manga which were near us than Obosi and Ndanai. With time, due to the rising fear of being attacked by the Gusii when in their land, the Kipsigis avoided going there.

The security dilemma which translated into lack of security in the area of study had far-reaching effects on the two communities. As the two communities developed more hatred and animosity, fear and insecurity was bred. This was utilized by the influential people in the two communities to incite them against each other. As Kaufman states in his symbolic
/ emotional choice theory, human motivation is based on emotion rather than rational-cost benefit calculations. As a result of the security dilemma, the two communities acted on their emotions without necessarily taking into consideration the benefits of their reactions. As Ndege et al (2009) observe, fear among ethnic communities, especially those affected by clashes is translated into bitterness and lack of mutual trust and confidence. The fear and insecurity led to more detrimental effects on both populations irrespective of age and gender.

Education of children from both communities was negatively affected. This was illustrated by Nyatogo (O.I, 2014) who argued that,

The Gusii preferred to take their children to the schools across the border as they were better equipped than those in Gusiland especially during the Moi regime. This however, drastically changed over time owing to fear and mistrust between the two communities. Some of the Gusii transferred their children to more secure places and boarding schools. Due to the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis, I was forced to close down Moonlight Academy secondary school that I had opened along the border in Rusinga village. This was due to low enrollment as parents from both communities withdrew their children due to fear and insecurity across the border. Other public schools along the border also experienced the same problem.

This view was supported by some teachers of both public and private primary schools along the border. Schools like Memisi, Kebuse, Magombo, Borderline Academy, Rotigi and Koiyet primary schools indicated that, pupils in their schools reduced in population after some parents withdrew their children. Over time, the population of pupils changed to one ethnic group-Gusii. The parents argued that, they feared for the lives and safety of their children. Some of the schools face a threat of closure due to low enrolment. The fear
and insecurity among students may have led them not to concentrate in their studies; which may have resulted into poor academic performance. On the other hand, the fear and insecurity may have impacted negatively on teacher delivery, which could have led to poor performance.

The fear and insecurity in the area under study as noted by Nyabamba (O.I, 2014), led to most of the Abagusii people spending sleepless nights keeping vigil over their livestock from raiders. Some men spent the nights in the cold for fear that their livestock could be raided when in the house where they could be tempted to sleep. As a result, many of them developed health complications arising from the cold like arthritis and pneumonia.

4.2.4 Loss of lives

Due to outbreak of occasional manifest conflicts between the two communities, loss of lives was witnessed in the area under study. For instance,

In the 1992 ethnic clashes, some of the Gusii people were killed by the Kipsigis. I can remember my neighbor who was known as Nyachieng’a who went back to his homestead to pick his ox-drawn plough so that it could not be looted. He was however, slashed to death by the Kipsigis warriors who had seen him going into the homestead. Some of the youths who had come from Kuria and interior parts of Gusiland to assist us fight against the Kipsigis were also killed and others succumbed to the injuries (Motari O.I, 2014).

The situation was not any different among the Kipsigis as Ng’eny (O.I, 2014) noted, families lost their loved ones in 1992 and in 1997 following the general elections. In 1992 more specifically, some of the Pokot who had come to assist the Kipsigis against the Abagusii were also killed.
As a result of the group-mythologies that justified hostility against each other, the two communities descended on each other with crude weapons. This was made possible with the incitement that they got more especially, from some of their political elites. In addition to the group mythologies, the two communities were guided by emotions rather than the benefits they could acquire from the violence. As a result, they killed each other which exposed them to more poverty as their labour force (the youth) was depopulated. Others especially children lost their lives as a result of contracting diarrheal diseases in the camps like cholera and dysentery, a situation that was compounded by lack of access to medical services. However, some were killed by vigilante groups for being involved in raiding activities.

The loss of lives of some people from the communities under study, led to untold suffering among some families. This led to the emergence of children who were orphaned in the society, widows and people with disabilities as a result of the injuries. It also led to poverty in some families as people of productive ages were killed; hence, the children and the aged could not engage in meaningful economic activities. It also led to bitterness and hatred among the two communities which laid a foundation for future incitement. Therefore, killing each other brought more problems among the two communities than it solved.
4.2.5 Disruption of economic activities

Due to the conflicts between the two communities, there was the disruption of the major economic activities along the border- trade and agriculture. As Nyatogo (O.I, 2014) noted,

The most affected activity during the inter-ethnic conflicts between the two communities was trade. This went to the extent of using middlemen in the trade due to the mistrust and suspicion that developed between the two communities. In the pre-colonial and colonial periods, the Kipsigis women traders used to buy cereals like maize, beans and finger millet from the Abagusii directly from their homesteads. This trend continued to the post-independence period up to the late 1990s. The trade started to deteriorate after the 1992 clashes due to fear of being attacked by the Abagusii. The Abagusii on the other hand, used to own businesses in Kipsigisland especially at Ndanai market. Due to frequent conflicts with the Kipsigis, they have since closed down the businesses. The Abagusii business people who used to frequent Ndanai market for trade, have since stopped and for the few who go there go with caution.

In the Kamukunji market where the researcher visited on a Sunday which is the market day, the businesses were not as normal as any other market. This was because, the Kipsigis sold their produce on their land and the same was done by the Abagusii. When asked why, Jelimo (O.I, 2014) said that, “anything can happen, and it is safer when one is on their land because we are always in conflict with each other”. This is attributed to the mistrust and tension that exist between the two communities.

This therefore means that, even though the two communities interacted in the trading activities, they were always suspicious of each other. This had far-reaching impacts on the two communities as many stopped the trade altogether due to constant conflicts
between the two communities. This led to poverty and suffering, among those who depended on the trade as the only source of income. It also affected the government as there was a reduction in the revenue collected from the business people. On the other hand, it may have led to food insecurity especially among the Kipsigis, as most of them bought food from the Abagusii. Thus, distribution of food and other desirables and interaction of the two communities reduced as a result of the conflicts between them.

Other than trade, agriculture was also affected as a result of the conflicts between the two communities. Apollos (2010) argues that, war is known to interfere directly with food production by preventing farmers from planting and harvesting on time. It also reduces the populations’ capacities in many ways. This assertion was supported by Rono (O.I, 2015) who noted that,

During times of manifest conflicts, farmers did not engage in cultivation of their lands, weeding or even harvesting of their produce as they are always on the run to safety. Pastoralists were also affected as they could not go out grazing their livestock due to fear of either being killed or their livestock stolen by their enemies. During such instances, the livestock were confined to areas that were considered safe and due to the overcrowding, they lacked enough pasture and water. As a result others especially the young ones die. The major effect of agriculture being affected was that, it led to an outbreak of famine. The few tea farmers, were also affected as they could not pluck their tea; hence they also incurred losses.

As a result of the disruption of agricultural activities, there was a direct negative effect on the agro-based industries. This was attributed to the fact that, there was a drop in the supply of raw materials to industries like KCC and KTDA which in turn led to hike of
prices of such commodities. This supports the views of the Kiliku Report (1992) that, as a result of the 1992 ethnic clashes, there was a drop in the supply of food and raw materials for the agro-based industries. This necessitated costly imports of such items as sugar, maize and wheat. This in turn led to the hiking and fluctuation of prices of essential commodities in the clash-prone areas. This means that, it also had an effect on the nutrition of people along the border as many lacked enough and balanced diets because of the hiked prices of food commodities like maize and milk.

The disrupted economic activities had a direct impact on the purchasing power of the two communities. As Obonyo (O.I, 2015) said, most of the people among the Kipsigis and Gusii were farmers. When agriculture was negatively affected, it also had an impact on trade because; they mainly sold what they produced in excess. This led to poverty among the locals as they could neither engage in trade nor agriculture; hence, there were no returns from the agricultural based industries. The disruption of both trade and agriculture therefore, exposed the two communities to more suffering.

Due to the ethnic mythologies that justified hostility against each other, the two communities considered each other as evil. Therefore, as the emotional choice theory states, the struggle for security, status and ultimately group survival is a struggle against hostile, evil and sub-human forces. This means that, as the two communities competed to protect themselves from their enemy group, they ended up instilling fear in them. It is the
fear that discouraged the two communities from engaging in the economic activities. They feared that, they could be killed by their enemies whom they considered to be evil and hostile. On the other hand, as they competed to prove their superiority to each other, the fear instilled on both communities made them feel that, they were superior to the other community.

4.2.6 Development of negative ethnicity

The ethnic conflicts between the two communities led to the development of negative ethnicity among the young generations. As Kombo (O.I, 2014) noted,

My children were really affected by the conflicts between the two communities as their mother is a Kipsigis. When the Kipsigis raided the Abagusii, they said that the Kipsigis were bad people but that is where their mother belongs. When they visited their maternal grandparents, they also took sides with them against the Abagusii, where their father belonged. I do not understand how it will be in the future when they grown up because they have never understood how their parents could marry one another and yet their communities were enemies.

Children were brought up knowing that the other community was an enemy. This in most cases was due to the constant raids, fights, prejudices and stereotypes the children were exposed to by their communities and parents concerning the other community (Kipyegon, O.I 2014). This as Nyukuri (1997, p 20) notes, has led to a cultural and identity crisis especially for the children of the ethnic groups. Children born of parents from the warring ethnic groups identify with either the paternal or maternal side depending on where the pressure is most. This assertion was supported by
On the other hand, children from the two communities got exposed to prejudices and stereotypes that existed between them; which they could not understand their origin. This has made them not to interact freely with one another and they considered each other as enemies (Omwansa O.I, 2015). This trend created a new dimension of societal lives where children (potential marriage partners) are discouraged from engaging in any affairs with the ‘enemy’ ethnic group (Nyukuri, 1997, p 20-21). This has affected the inter-ethnic marriages and interactions not only in the rural areas but also in urban centres.

The ethnic prejudices and stereotypes upon which the enmity between the two communities was founded could be traced to the different myths that the communities had against each other. These myths are what Kaufman describes in his symbolic/emotional choice theory. Kaufman states that, the more the group’s myth-symbol complex emphasizes hostility towards a particular (actual or potential) adversary group, portraying it and its individual as enemy and or inferior, the greater is the probability of ethnic conflict.

As discussed earlier in chapter one, the two communities had stereotypes which justified hostility against each other. Resentment developed among children who were products of intermarriages between the two communities. This was because in the traditions of the two communities, they were enemies; a fact that the children got exposed to. This could have discouraged some of them from marrying members of the ethnic group that they did not support which could be either from the side of the father or mother. The relations
between children from the two communities also became sour as they considered each other as enemies. This found its way in places like schools; which could explain why some of the schools became mono-ethnic with time. This therefore led to the development of an ethnically divided generation who could not interact freely.

4.2.7 Disenfranchisement

Since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in Kenya in 1992, political parties have been used as vehicles to ethnic political power. This was not any different among the two communities under study. Omori (O.I, 2015) noted that, as from 1992, political parties among the two ethnic groups under study were formed based on ethnicity but not ideologies. These political parties were used by politicians to air their ethnic sentiments. They lacked a national outlook and therefore, only increased ethnic animosity and prejudices instead of promoting national unity. This was because, in most instances, the two communities were in support of different political parties as most Kipsigis always supported KANU while most Gusii supported DP and other political parties.

Onchong’a (O.I, 2015) argued that, when the two communities were not in political alignment, there had to be war between them in the electioneering period as was the case in 1992 and 1997. However, when there was a political alignment between the two, there was peace like it was in 2002. The political non-alignment in some cases led to tension and threats between the two communities during political campaigns which spilled over to the polls. This made some people especially the Gusii to evacuate from the area to their
ancestral homes for fear of an outbreak of war between the two communities. This disenfranchised the electorates and therefore, it denied them their political right of voting. This was a deliberate measure taken to make the people especially the Abagusii not to vote for their favourite presidential candidate who in most cases was not the preferred candidate among the Kipsigis.

Franchise was one of the political rights enjoyed by Kenyan citizens and denying people the opportunity to exercise it could turn detrimental. During the period under study, the major political party was KANU, and until 1992, there was nothing like competitive politics in Kenya. However, with the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992, there developed patronage politics in Kenya. Political parties were formed based on ethnicity and they were utilized by some politicians to ascend to power; a position which translated into accumulation of wealth. This encouraged many to seek political offices more especially, that of presidency. As a result, ethnicity was pegged on the political parties and; hence, they became ethnic vehicles to power. People believed that, once a member of their ethnic group ascended to power, the whole community was in power; hence, the need to use every means possible to acquire the position. This is what the analytic conflict theory describes as competition for desirables between the different groups in the society.

To get a better chance, some members of the two communities resorted to intimidation of their opponent group. The two communities in most cases supported different factions of
political parties and hence, leaders. Some members of the two ethnic groups used threats of violence on those who supported the opposition. This discouraged some from registering as voters and some of those who had registered, feared voting as they could be intimidated. This even made some to migrate from the area under study before elections; thus, denying them the opportunity to exercise their democratic right. The intimidation was aimed at attaining the required percentage of votes by the opponents.

All these are explained by Collins in his analytic conflict theory. Collins argues that, individuals always strive to maximize their share of the scarce commodities and in this case, power. Those with a greater share try to consolidate their position, maximize their interests and dominate the structural arrangements by various means, especially coercion. As Chelanga et al (2009) note, even though ethnic clashes helped KANU win the general elections of 1992 and 1997, they displaced and disenfranchised thousands of potential voters. Thus, it denied them the opportunity to exercise their democratic and citizenship rights.

4.2.8 Destruction and loss of property

The two communities always witnessed the destruction and loss of their properties whenever there were violent conflicts between them. Mwembi (O.I, 2014) noted that, following the 1992 and 1997 ethnic clashes, their houses and food stores were torched. They also lost a lot of food in the fields as they were slashed down and they lost their livestock and a number of properties looted. These ranged from computers in Koiyet
Primary School, businesses, public resources like metallic water pipes and valuables from homes. The loss and destruction exposed members of the two communities to hunger as their crops were destroyed and food stores torched. It also exposed them to more poverty as most of them lost massive property and others destroyed.

The symbolic/emotional choice theory describes the destruction as a result of a struggle for security, status and group survival. This was because, the two communities viewed each other as enemies and in the process of protecting themselves from their adversaries, and they had to intimidate them. They did that by destroying their properties and even looting to make them fear and suffer. Also, the destruction could be attributed to the security dilemma where both communities feared attacks from their neighbouring community. As a result, the communities destroyed or looted their neighbours’ property as a way of protecting themselves or as a revenge for attacks. However, it could be possible for looting of property to take place among members of the same ethnic group as some took advantage of the security lapse. As a result of the destruction and loss of property, the two communities were exposed to poverty, suffering and food insecurity.

**4.3 Positive impacts**

Although in many studies conflicts are assumed to cause only the negative consequences, this study revealed some positive results which were very specific to the two communities under study. They included:
4.3.1 Development of infrastructure

As noted earlier in chapter one, the Kipsigis and Abagusii competed for the unequally distributed resources. The Kipsigis had poor roads than the Gusii and the other hand, the Kipsigis had better equipped health facilities and schools. As noted by Kipruto (O.I, 2014), those were blessings in disguise as later on, the two communities got better facilities to serve their needs. With time, the government established more dispensaries and schools in Gusiland and better roads in Kipsigisland. This left the two communities satisfied with the resources they had at their disposal. However, the two communities continued using resources of the other depending on how best they served them. The government minimized the tension by providing alternatives to choose from. The development further had a positive impact on the population as it created job opportunities for some individuals. Some were employed in the transport sector on the public service vehicles that operated on the roads and others in the dispensaries and schools. As a result of the developed infrastructure, there emerged some shopping centres along the roads and near schools and health facilities.

4.3.2 Enhanced security

As noted earlier in this chapter, the conflicts between the two communities led to a rise of fear and insecurity. However, on the other hand, it was a blessing in disguise as security was enhanced with time. As illustrated by Nyakundi (O.I, 2014), security in the area under study was enhanced towards the end of President Daniel Moi’s rule. There was the establishment of more Anti-Stock Theft Units (ASTUs) along the border and the
deployment of more police officers to the area. This development translated into increased police patrols and quick response to distress calls from the residents.

Mosoti (O.I, 2014) also argued that, the government enhanced security between the two communities through community policing. The police officers encouraged the locals to work closely with them in order to curb crime. The irony of it all lied in the use of vigilante groups by the police to gather information on planned crimes. The same vigilante groups were considered to promote crime; hence, illegal.

The security dilemma which Kaufman says is the force behind conflicts between different groups in the society could explain the above assertions. The two communities under study competed for security due to a security lapse that led to mistrust in the security forces. As a result, some people decided to take advantage of the gap to engage in criminal activities especially, raiding their neighbours. This led to conflicts between the two communities. Due to the insecurity in the area under study, the government came in handy to save the situation by deploying more police and establishing more ASTUs. The police also worked hard to restore public confidence in them through community policing. Therefore, the vigilante groups turned out to be helpful in maintaining security rather than crime. However, this did not negate the fact that, raiding as an activity and the raiding cartels between the two communities continued, even with such efforts.
4.3.3 Adoption of a mixed economy

Gusiiland served as a food basket for the Kipsigis both during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Kenya. This was illustrated earlier in chapter three, as the Kipsigis acquired food from the Gusii either through trade or by working their farms in exchange for food. Over time, as Ng’eny (O.I, 2014) argued,

The trend changed owing to the constant tension and hostility between the two communities. Most of the Kipsigis were pastoralists but they turned into mixed farming as they could not get an adequate supply of food. This was because; they depended on food from Gusiiland. The food supply reduced as many of the Kipsigis women feared going to Gusiiland to purchase the food stuffs or even working there. The Kipsigis were left without any other alternative but to cultivate their own food.

The analytic conflict theory argues that, conflicts in the society are products of competing interests between different groups of people. That the society is made up of different groups with different interests which come into conflict in the process of pursuing them. As discussed earlier, the two communities came into conflict over resources like livestock where they raided each other. The Kipsigis believed in that, culturally, it was their preserve to keep livestock and the Gusii to cultivate land. The culture became untenable over time due to forces identified by Ng’eny (O.I, 2014) above. Other than such forces, the rising population among the two communities could have forced the Kipsigis to engage in land cultivation. That was so because; the food that the Gusii produced could not sustain both communities. These factors could be the reason behind cultivation of land among the Kipsigis especially, those who lived along the border. This led to food security among the Kipsigis and by extension the Abagusii.
4.3.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the impacts of the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii of Borabu-Sotik border. The conflicts had both negative and positive impacts on the two communities even though; there were more negative effects than the positive ones. The chapter discussed the third objective of the study and it was guided by the analytic conflict theory and the symbolic/emotional choice theory. As a result of the conflicts between the two communities, negatively, there was the displacement of people from both communities which exposed them further to a humanitarian crisis. Loss of confidence in the security forces and subsequently, the rise of fear and insecurity were realized. Due to the occasional manifest conflicts between the two communities, there was the loss of lives of people from both communities and disruption of economic activities especially trade and agriculture. This exposed many people to suffering and poverty. There was also the development of negative ethnicity especially among children, disenfranchisement of voters and destruction and loss of property.

Positively, the conflicts between the two communities led to improved infrastructure and social amenities and enhanced security in the area under study. Also, there was the development of a mixed economy among the two communities. However, the positive impacts were results of necessity being a mother of invention; hence, they were not aimed at promoting conflicts between the two communities. With the idea on the causes and impacts of the conflicts between the two communities, the next chapter will give a
summary and conclusion of the study. It will also give recommendations based on what was discussed in the foregoing chapters.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

Although the Kipsigis and Abagusii interacted peacefully since the pre-colonial period in trade, agriculture, during disasters and intermarriages, occasionally, they were involved in either latent or manifest conflicts against each other. From the findings discussed in the foregoing chapters, the two communities came into conflicts due to some political, socio-cultural and economic factors. As a result, there were a number of both negative and positive consequences on both communities and the country.

Politically, the two communities were in conflicts because of a number of factors. Incitement from some political leaders which was based on the local scarce but valuable resources that the two communities were competing over like land and livestock led to the conflicts. Politics of exclusion was also identified where the Kipsigis were perceived to have received more privileges from the national government than the Abagusii. This made the Abagusii to develop bitter sentiments and hatred against the Kipsigis as they felt marginalised. The two communities were in conflicts due to the re-introduction of multiparty politics where political parties championed ethnic sentiments which in turn led to political patronage based on party affiliations. The security forces were also identified to have failed in combating the conflicts; hence, said to be either, conscious or sub-conscious actors in the conflicts between the two communities.
Other than politics, other factors were identified to be behind the conflicts between the two communities under study. Raiding of livestock was identified to be the major factor behind the conflict between the two communities as it had some cultural backing in the rites of passage of initiation and marriage among the two communities. Land was also identified to be an important resource that the two communities were in competition over. This was because of the cultural and economic value attached to land in both communities. Unemployment also contributed to the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis. The unemployed masses especially the youth provided a haven for idle minds which were misused by politicians for personal and selfish gains especially during the electioneering periods.

As a result of the conflicts between the two communities, a number of effects were identified. There was displacement of people from both communities which exposed them further to a number of dangers. There was loss of confidence in the security forces as the locals believed that, the police officers did not carry out their duties as required. The region also suffered from a rise in fear and insecurity which hampered access to social amenities and the economic activities across the border. Many people also lost their lives which increased poverty and suffering among the affected families. There was also disruption of economic activities like trade and agriculture which also increased poverty in the region. There was the development of negative ethnicity especially among the young generation which led to an identity crisis. Disenfranchisement also took place. It mostly applied in the electioneering period when fear and threats were instilled in the
communities which more often led to war. This made some of the people to move to more secure places; which denied them the opportunity to exercise their democratic right of voting for their favourite candidates. There was also the destruction and loss of property of the two communities in times of manifest conflicts between them.

On the positive side, the conflicts led to improved infrastructure and social amenities among the two communities. There was enhanced security in the area under study so as to restore the lost confidence in the police. Also, there was the adoption of a mixed economy where both communities engaged in trade, land cultivation and livestock keeping.

5.2 Conclusion:
An analysis of the history of cross-border conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii from 1963 to 2002 has been attempted in this study. In this work, a number of issues have emerged which need to be re-emphasized in this conclusion. From the pre-colonial period, the two communities under study were mostly in latent conflicts which occasionally turned into manifest conflicts when precipitated by various factors. This research therefore, found the political, social and economic factors that instigated the conflicts between the two communities and their implications.

From the research, it could be concluded that, politics played a major role in the conflicts between the two communities under study. Politically, a number of factors were identified to be behind the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii. Exclusion politics where
one community felt marginalized by the government while the other accessed many opportunities and resources led to the conflicts. The multiparty democracy also introduced patronage politics; hence, ethnicity which was further strengthened with incitement from politicians based on the scarce resources between the two communities. The security forces also played a role in the conflicts between the two communities as they exemplified laxity and biasness in the dispensation of their duties. These findings therefore, met the first objective of the study which was based on the role of politics in the conflicts between the two communities.

Other than politics, the research identified the social and economic factors behind the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Gusii; thus, addressing the second objective of the study. The research identified livestock raiding as another major cause of the conflicts between the two communities as it was pegged on some cultural practices in addition to the economic ones. Raiding each other’s livestock was promoted by the practice of initiation through the age-set system and marriage through the practice of payment of bride-price. Competition overland which also had both an economic and cultural value led to the conflicts. The unemployed youth also provided a ready force that was utilized by politicians to cause violence and to engage in some crimes like raiding across the border.

The third objective of this study was to assess the impacts of the conflicts between the two communities under study. The research identified both negative and positive impacts;
even though, the negative ones outweighed the positive ones. Negatively, there was displacement of people from their homes which could be attributed to loss of confidence in the security forces and the rise of fear and insecurity. Many people also lost their loved ones; there was disruption of the main economic activities and destruction of property, factors that subjected the two communities to suffering and poverty. Negative ethnicity also developed among people of the two communities and disenfranchisement of some voters due to their displacement. However, on the positive side, the conflicts between the two communities led to development of infrastructure especially transport and communication and some social amenities across the border. Even though there was insecurity and fear, over time, the government enhanced security across the border by deploying more security officers. Instead of depending on pastoralism alone, the Kipsigis also adopted land cultivation; which led to food security among themselves and the area under study. Some individuals also benefitted from the conflicts as they got access to government resources and opportunities; especially, those who got political offices and their allies.

This research was successfully guided by Collins’ analytic conflict theory and Kaufman’s symbolic/emotional choice theory. The analytic conflict theory explained how competition over scarce but valuable resources and desirables led to conflicts between the two communities and the subsequent effects. The symbolic/emotional choice theory also explained on how the group mythologies that justify hostility towards another group caused conflicts between the two ethnic groups. Kaufman’s theory also explained how the
emotions behind human reactions led to the conflicts and some effects on the two communities. The two theories came to an agreement that, conflicts arise when there is some form of manipulation; especially, from some chauvinist leaders as illustrated from the findings of the study.

5.3 Recommendations:

Based on the discussions in the foregoing sections of this study, the following recommendations were made:

On matters of policy, there is need for the establishment of stronger cross-border peace building committees to act as arbiters for disputes between the rival ethnic groups. They will also provide a platform for cross-border community co-ordination and co-operation on security, governance and conflict management. These should go in hand with the deployment of more police officers and ASTUs. The committees and security officers should therefore liaise with one another and the public in promoting peace between the two communities. The county governments of Bomet and Nyamira, with the support of the national government should work towards livestock branding and electrification through the Rural Electrification Authority (REA). All these will help realize security in the area under study; hence, promote peace between the two ethnic groups.

The people in the area under study should be sensitized on the importance of peace and encouraged to interact with each other. This can be done through the establishment of more cross-border markets by the county governments where the two communities will
be interacting in addition to trading activities. In the process, they can be encouraged to engage themselves in merry-go-rounds. These will help them understand each other more.

The county governments should also organize cultural and sporting activities to promote good relations, bonding, nurture talent and keep the idle youth busy. These avenues can be used to promote peace and better relations between the two communities. The schools that exist in the area under study should be encouraged to engage in the exchange programme across the border to promote interaction of students from the two ethnic groups. The county governments in the region should also come up with more village polytechnics to accommodate the school dropouts in order to alleviate idleness and train them in income-generating activities.

Further research should be carried out in the area under study as the research could not exhaust the relations between the two communities. More research should be undertaken on the rise and role of vigilante groups, the organization of raiding cartels and how the religious groups can be used as agents of peace in the region.
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List of Oral Interviews

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NOTE: C/Policing- Community policing  B/Person- Business Person  BPC- Border Peace Committee

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Appendix 1: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

QUESTIONNAIRE

The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain information that is relevant to my research title: Cross Border Conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii of Kenya, 1963-2002. The information you will help provide will be used purely for the academic research. I humbly request you to provide the information sought by this questionnaire as candidly as possible.

PART ONE: POLITICS

1. For the time you have served or stayed in this sub-county, describe the relations between the Abagusii and Kipsigis

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2. What role was played by politics in promoting conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border?

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3. (a) During the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, what privileges were given to this community by the government and denied to their neighbouring communities?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
(b) How did this lead to conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis?

4. (a) How did the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in Kenya in 1992 affect relations between the two communities?

5. What measures (if any) did the government put in place to promote peace between the two communities?

6. From your point of view, which were the other political causes of the conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusii along the Sotik- Borabu border?
PART TWO: SOCIAL-ECONOMIC FACTORS

1. How did the importance attached to livestock among the Kipsigis or Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border lead to conflicts between the two communities?

2. From your point of view, how did the initiation encourage conflicts with the neighbouring communities?

3. From your point of view, how did the payment of dowry encourage the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii of the Sotik-Borabu border?

4. How did competition over land between the two communities lead to conflicts?

5. How did colonialism affect the relations between the two communities?
6. How did the post – independence government solve the problems (if any) that were created by the colonialists?

7. In your opinion, what were the other causes of conflicts between the two communities?

PART THREE: IMPACTS.

1. What were the challenges that the displaced persons from the two communities face?

2. What were the effects of the loss of people’s lives to their families and community at large?

1. Explain how the conflicts between the two communities led to destruction of property.
2. Describe how the conflicts between the two communities disrupted economic activities and state the economic activities that were disrupted.

3. Please indicate other effects (if any) of the conflicts between the Abagusii and Kipsigis along the Sotik-Borabu border.

4. In your opinion, what measures can be put in place to build up peace between the Abagusii and Kipsigis of Borabu-Sotik border?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND ASSISTANCE.
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR THE RESIDENTS OF ESISE AND GELEGELE LOCATIONS:

1. What is your gender? (Female) (Male)

2. What is your age? (below 30) (31-40) (41-50) (above 60)

3. Which community do you come from? (Gusii) (Kipsigis) (other-specify)

4. What is your position in the community? (Administrator) (Educator) (Business person) (Religious leader) (other-specify)

5. For how many years have you been a resident along the Sotik-Borabu border?

6. What position do you hold in the society?

7. How do the Kipsigis and Abagusii communities relate with one another?

8. Are you aware of the conflicts between the two communities? (Yes) (No) If yes, did they exist in the KANU regime?

9. During the KANU regime, did the conflicts exist all the time? (Yes) (No) If yes, how were they manifested?

10. What role did politics play in the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii?

11. How did the re-introduction of multiparty democracy affect the relations between the two communities?

12. (a) What were the existing stereotypes and prejudices between the two communities?

   (b) How did these stereotypes and prejudices bring conflicts between the two communities?

13. (a) Which benefits were given to the Kipsigis or Abagusii by the KANU government that were denied to the other community?
(b) How did this inequality lead to conflicts between the two communities?

14. How did the importance attached to livestock in this community promote conflicts with the neighbouring community?

15. How did initiation of boys in this community promote conflicts with the neighbouring community?

16. How did the payment of dowry in this community promote conflicts with the neighbouring community?

17. How did the value attached to land in this community promote conflicts with the neighbouring community?

18. How did colonialism promote the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border?

19. How did the post-independence government aggravate the conflicts between the two communities?

20. What are the other causes of the conflict between the Kipsigis and the Abagusii along the Sotik-Borabu border?

21. Which effects did the conflicts between the Kipsigis and the Gusii bring to the two communities?

22. What measures do you think can be put in place in order to promote peaceful co-existence between the communities?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE.
APPENDIX 2: RESEARCH PERMIT

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:

**MS. OMWENGA MONYENCHE HELLLEN**
of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 2190-200
NAIROBI, has been permitted to conduct research in BOMET, NYAMIRA COUNTIES

on the topic: **A HISTORY OF CROSS BORDER CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE KIPSIGIS AND ABAGUSII OF KENYA, 1963-2002.**

for the period ending 28th February, 2015

**Signature**

Applicant

**Signature**

Secretary

National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/14/7738/4189
Date Of Issue : 11th December, 2014
Fee Recieved : Ksh 1,000
APPENDIX 3: AUTHORIZATION

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,
2241349, 310571, 2219420
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249
Email: secretary@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote Ref. No.

NACOSTI/P/14/7738/4189

Omwenga Monyenche Hellen
Kenyatta University
P.O. Box 43844-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on “A history of Cross Border Conflicts between the Kipsigis and Abagusit of Kenyu,” I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in Bomet and Nyamira Counties for a period ending 28th February, 2015.

You are advised to report to the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education, Bomet and Nyamira Counties before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are required to submit two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf of the research report/thesis to our office.

DR. S.K. LANGAT, OGW
FOR: SECRETARY/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Bomet County.

The County Director of Education
Bomet County.